This is “Administrative Agencies: Their Structure and Powers”, section 5.1 from the book The Legal Environment and Foundations of Business Law (v. 1.0). For details on it (including licensing), click here.
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The US Constitution mentions only three branches of government: legislative, executive, and judicial (Articles I, II, and III). There is no mention of agencies in the Constitution, even though federal agencies are sometimes referred to as “the fourth branch of government.” The Supreme Court has recognized the legitimacy of federal administrative agenciesGovernmental units, either state or federal, that have specialized expertise and authority over some area of the economy. to make rules that have the same binding effect as statutes by Congress.
Most commentators note that having agencies with rule-making power is a practical necessity: (1) Congress does not have the expertise or continuity to develop specialized knowledge in various areas (e.g., communications, the environment, aviation). (2) Because of this, it makes sense for Congress to set forth broad statutory guidance to an agency and delegate authority to the agency to propose rules that further the statutory purposes. (3) As long as Congress makes this delegating guidance sufficiently clear, it is not delegating improperly. If Congress’s guidelines are too vague or undefined, it is (in essence) giving away its constitutional power to some other group, and this it cannot do.
The market often does not work properly, as economists often note. Monopolies, for example, happen in the natural course of human events but are not always desirable. To fix this, well-conceived and objectively enforced competition law (what is called antitrust law in the United States) is needed.
Negative externalities must be “fixed,” as well. For example, as we see in tort law (Chapter 7 "Introduction to Tort Law"), people and business organizations often do things that impose costs (damages) on others, and the legal system will try—through the award of compensatory damages—to make fair adjustments. In terms of the ideal conditions for a free market, think of tort law as the legal system’s attempt to compensate for negative externalities: those costs imposed on people who have not voluntarily consented to bear those costs.
In terms of freedoms to enter or leave the market, the US constitutional guarantees of equal protection can prevent local, state, and federal governments from imposing discriminatory rules for commerce that would keep minorities, women, and gay people from full participation in business. For example, if the small town of Xenophobia, Colorado, passed a law that required all business owners and their employees to be Christian, heterosexual, and married, the equal protection clause (as well as numerous state and federal equal opportunity employment laws) would empower plaintiffs to go to court and have the law struck down as unconstitutional.
Knowing that information is power, we will see many laws administered by regulatory agencies that seek to level the playing field of economic competition by requiring disclosure of the most pertinent information for consumers (consumer protection laws), investors (securities laws), and citizens (e.g., the toxics release inventory laws in environmental law).
In short, some forms of legislation and regulation are needed to counter a tendency toward consolidation of economic power (Chapter 28 "Antitrust Law") and discriminatory attitudes toward certain individuals and groups (Chapter 30 "Employment Law") and to insist that people and companies clean up their own messes and not hide information that would empower voluntary choices in the free market.
But there are additional reasons to regulate. For example, in economic systems, it is likely for natural monopolies to occur. These are where one firm can most efficiently supply all of the good or service. Having duplicate (or triplicate) systems for supplying electricity, for example, would be inefficient, so most states have a public utilities commission to determine both price and quality of service. This is direct regulation.
Sometimes destructive competition can result if there is no regulation. Banking and insurance are good examples of this. Without government regulation of banks (setting standards and methods), open and fierce competition would result in widespread bank failures. That would erode public confidence in banks and business generally. The current situation (circa 2011) of six major banks that are “too big to fail” is, however, an example of destructive noncompetition.
Other market imperfections can yield a demand for regulation. For example, there is a need to regulate frequencies for public broadcast on radio, television, and other wireless transmissions (for police, fire, national defense, etc.). Many economists would also list an adequate supply of public goods as something that must be created by government. On its own, for example, the market would not provide public goods such as education, a highway system, lighthouses, a military for defense.
True laissez-faire capitalism—a market free from any regulation—would not try to deal with market imperfections and would also allow people to freely choose products, services, and other arrangements that historically have been deemed socially unacceptable. These would include making enforceable contracts for the sale and purchase of persons (slavery), sexual services, “street drugs” such as heroin or crack cocaine, votes for public office, grades for this course in business law, and even marriage partnership.
Thus the free market in actual terms—and not in theory—consists of commerce legally constrained by what is economically desirable and by what is socially desirable as well. Public policy objectives in the social arena include ensuring equal opportunity in employment, protecting employees from unhealthy or unsafe work environments, preserving environmental quality and resources, and protecting consumers from unsafe products. Sometimes these objectives are met by giving individuals statutory rights that can be used in bringing a complaint (e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, for employment discrimination), and sometimes they are met by creating agencies with the right to investigate and monitor and enforce statutory law and regulations created to enforce such law (e.g., the Environmental Protection Agency, for bringing a lawsuit against a polluting company).
Through the commerce clause in the US Constitution, Congress has the power to regulate trade between the states and with foreign nations. The earliest federal agency therefore dealt with trucking and railroads, to literally set the rules of the road for interstate commerce. The first federal agency, the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), was created in 1887. Congress delegated to the ICC the power to enforce federal laws against railroad rate discrimination and other unfair pricing practices. By the early part of this century, the ICC gained the power to fix rates. From the 1970s through 1995, however, Congress passed deregulatory measures, and the ICC was formally abolished in 1995, with its powers transferred to the Surface Transportation Board.
Beginning with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in 1914, Congress has created numerous other agencies, many of them familiar actors in American government. Today more than eighty-five federal agencies have jurisdiction to regulate some form of private activity. Most were created since 1930, and more than a third since 1960. A similar growth has occurred at the state level. Most states now have dozens of regulatory agencies, many of them overlapping in function with the federal bodies.
Independent agencies are different from federal executive departments and other executive agencies by their structural and functional characteristics. Most executive departments have a single director, administrator, or secretary appointed by the president of the United States. Independent agencies almost always have a commission or board consisting of five to seven members who share power over the agency. The president appoints the commissioners or board subject to Senate confirmation, but they often serve with staggered terms and often for longer terms than a usual four-year presidential term. They cannot be removed except for “good cause.” This means that most presidents will not get to appoint all the commissioners of a given independent agency. Most independent agencies have a statutory requirement of bipartisan membership on the commission, so the president cannot simply fill vacancies with members of his own political party.
In addition to the ICC and the FTC, the major independent agencies are the Federal Communications Commission (1934), Securities and Exchange Commission (1934), National Labor Relations Board (1935), and Environmental Protection Agency (1970). See Note 5.4 "Ideal Conditions for a Free Market" in the sidebar.
By contrast, members of executive branch agencies serve at the pleasure of the president and are therefore far more amenable to political control. One consequence of this distinction is that the rules that independent agencies promulgate may not be reviewed by the president or his staff—only Congress may directly overrule them—whereas the White House or officials in the various cabinet departments may oversee the work of the agencies contained within them (unless specifically denied the power by Congress).
Agencies have a variety of powers. Many of the original statutes that created them, like the Federal Communications Act, gave them licensing power. No party can enter into the productive activity covered by the act without prior license from the agency—for example, no utility can start up a nuclear power plant unless first approved by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. In recent years, the move toward deregulation of the economy has led to diminution of some licensing power. Many agencies also have the authority to set the rates charged by companies subject to the agency’s jurisdiction. Finally, the agencies can regulate business practices. The FTC has general jurisdiction over all business in interstate commerce to monitor and root out “unfair acts” and “deceptive practices.” The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) oversees the issuance of corporate securities and other investments and monitors the practices of the stock exchanges.
Unlike courts, administrative agencies are charged with the responsibility of carrying out a specific assignment or reaching a goal or set of goals. They are not to remain neutral on the various issues of the day; they must act. They have been given legislative powers because in a society growing ever more complex, Congress does not know how to legislate with the kind of detail that is necessary, nor would it have the time to approach all the sectors of society even if it tried. Precisely because they are to do what general legislative bodies cannot do, agencies are specialized bodies. Through years of experience in dealing with similar problems they accumulate a body of knowledge that they can apply to accomplish their statutory duties.
All administrative agencies have two different sorts of personnel. The heads, whether a single administrator or a collegial body of commissioners, are political appointees and serve for relatively limited terms. Below them is a more or less permanent staff—the bureaucracy. Much policy making occurs at the staff level, because these employees are in essential control of gathering facts and presenting data and argument to the commissioners, who wield the ultimate power of the agencies.
Congress can establish an agency through legislation. When Congress gives powers to an agency, the legislation is known as an enabling actThe legislative act that establishes an agency’s authority in a particular area of the economy.. The concept that Congress can delegate power to an agency is known as the delegation doctrineAs a matter of constitutional law, the delegation doctrine declares that an agency can only exercise that power delegated to it by a constitutional authority.. Usually, the agency will have all three kinds of power: executive, legislative, and judicial. (That is, the agency can set the rules that business must comply with, can investigate and prosecute those businesses, and can hold administrative hearings for violations of those rules. They are, in effect, rule maker, prosecutor, and judge.) Because agencies have all three types of governmental powers, important constitutional questions were asked when Congress first created them. The most important question was whether Congress was giving away its legislative power. Was the separation of powers violated if agencies had power to make rules that were equivalent to legislative statutes?
In 1935, in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, the Supreme Court overturned the National Industrial Recovery Act on the ground that the congressional delegation of power was too broad.Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 US 495 (1935). Under the law, industry trade groups were granted the authority to devise a code of fair competition for the entire industry, and these codes became law if approved by the president. No administrative body was created to scrutinize the arguments for a particular code, to develop evidence, or to test one version of a code against another. Thus it was unconstitutional for the Congress to transfer all of its legislative powers to an agency. In later decisions, it was made clear that Congress could delegate some of its legislative powers, but only if the delegation of authority was not overly broad.
Still, some congressional enabling acts are very broad, such as the enabling legislation for the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), which is given the authority to make rules to provide for safe and healthful working conditions in US workplaces. Such a broad initiative power gives OSHA considerable discretion. But, as noted in Section 5.2 "Controlling Administrative Agencies", there are both executive and judicial controls over administrative agency activities, as well as ongoing control by Congress through funding and the continuing oversight of agencies, both in hearings and through subsequent statutory amendments.
Congress creates administrative agencies through enabling acts. In these acts, Congress must delegate authority by giving the agency some direction as to what it wants the agency to do. Agencies are usually given broad powers to investigate, set standards (promulgating regulations), and enforce those standards. Most agencies are executive branch agencies, but some are independent.
"Hii ni ""Administrative Agencies: Structure and Powers"" (Mashirika ya Utawala: Muundo na Mamlaka Zake), sehemu ya 5.1 kutoka kitabu ""The Legal Environment and Foundations of Business Law"" (v. 1.0)." Kwa maelezo juu yake (ikiwa ni pamoja na leseni), bonyeza hapa. Kwa habari zaidi juu ya chanzo cha kitabu hiki, au kwa nini inapatikana kwa bure, tafadhali angalia ukurasa wa nyumbani wa mradi. Unaweza kutazama au kupakua vitabu vingine huko. Ili kupakua faili ya.zip yenye kitabu hiki kwa ajili ya matumizi ya nje ya mtandao, bonyeza hapa. Katiba ya Marekani inataja matawi matatu tu ya serikali: ya kisheria, ya utekelezaji, na ya mahakama (Mstari wa I, II, na III). "Hakuna kumbukumbu ya mashirika katika Katiba, ingawa mashirika ya shirikisho wakati mwingine huitwa ""tawi la nne la serikali."" Mahakama Kuu imetambua uhalali wa mashirika ya utawala wa shirikisho, vitengo vya serikali, ama jimbo au shirikisho, ambavyo vina utaalam maalum na mamlaka juu ya eneo fulani la uchumi." Sheria hizo zina nguvu sawa na sheria zilizopitishwa na Bunge. "Wahusika wengi wanasema kuwa kuwa na mashirika yenye nguvu ya kutunga sheria ni ""uhitaji wa vitendo"" - ""Congress haina utaalam au kuendelea kuendeleza maarifa maalum katika maeneo mbalimbali (kwa mfano, mawasiliano, mazingira, anga)." Kwa sababu hii, ni busara kwa Bunge kuweka mwongozo wa kisheria kwa shirika na kuwakabidhi mamlaka kwa shirika kupendekeza sheria zinazoendeleza madhumuni ya kisheria. """Kama Bunge linafanya mwongozo huu wa kugawa wazi vya kutosha, halitumiwi vibaya." Kama miongozo ya Bunge ni vague sana au undefined, ni (katika kiini) kutoa mbali nguvu yake ya kikatiba kwa kundi fulani, na hii haiwezi kufanya. Mara nyingi soko halifanyi kazi ifaavyo, kama vile wataalamu wa uchumi wanavyosema mara nyingi. Kwa mfano, udhibiti wa biashara hutokea katika mwendo wa asili wa matukio ya kibinadamu lakini si jambo linalotamaniwa sikuzote. Ili kurekebisha jambo hilo, sheria ya ushindani iliyofanyiwa kazi vizuri na kutekelezwa kwa njia ya usawaziko (ambayo huitwa sheria ya kupambana na ushindani nchini Marekani) inahitajika. Negative externalities lazima <unk>fixed,<unk> pia. Kwa mfano, kama tunavyoona katika sheria ya dhima (Sura ya 7 "Utangulizi wa Sheria ya Dhima"), watu na mashirika ya biashara mara nyingi hufanya mambo ambayo huweka gharama (uharibifu) kwa wengine, na mfumo wa kisheria utajaribu - kupitia tuzo ya uharibifu wa fidia - kufanya marekebisho ya haki. Kwa suala la hali bora kwa soko la bure, fikiria sheria ya dhima kama jaribio la mfumo wa kisheria kulipia athari za nje hasi: gharama hizo zilizowekwa kwa watu ambao hawajakubaliana kujitolea kubeba gharama hizo. Kwa mujibu wa sheria za Marekani, sheria za kisheria za Marekani zinahakikisha kwamba serikali za mitaa, serikali za majimbo na serikali za shirikisho hazitaweza kuweka sheria za ubaguzi kwa biashara ambazo zingezuia watu wachache, wanawake na mashoga kushiriki kikamilifu katika biashara. Kwa mfano, ikiwa mji mdogo wa Xenophobia, Colorado, ulipitisha sheria ambayo ilihitaji wamiliki wote wa biashara na wafanyikazi wao kuwa Wakristo, wapenzi wa jinsia tofauti, na kuolewa, kifungu cha ulinzi sawa (kama vile sheria nyingi za fursa sawa za ajira za serikali na shirikisho) ingewapa walalamikaji nguvu kwenda mahakamani na kupata sheria hiyo kuondolewa kama kinyume cha katiba. "Kwa kuwa habari ni nguvu, tutaona sheria nyingi zinazodhibitiwa na mashirika ya udhibiti ambayo yanatafuta kulinganisha uwanja wa ushindani wa kiuchumi kwa kuhitaji kufichuliwa kwa habari muhimu zaidi kwa watumiaji (sheria za ulinzi wa watumiaji), wawekezaji (sheria za dhamana), na raia (kwa mfano, sheria za uhifadhi wa kutolewa kwa sumu katika sheria ya mazingira).""" "Kwa kifupi, aina fulani za sheria na kanuni zinahitajika kukabiliana na mwelekeo wa kuunganisha nguvu za kiuchumi (Sura ya 28: ""Sheria ya Kupinga Usalama wa Biashara"") na mitazamo ya ubaguzi dhidi ya watu fulani na vikundi (Sura ya 30: ""Sheria ya Ajira") na kusisitiza kwamba watu na makampuni kusafisha fujo yao wenyewe na si kuficha habari ambayo itawezesha uchaguzi wa hiari katika soko huru." Lakini kuna sababu za ziada za kudhibiti. Kwa mfano, katika mifumo ya kiuchumi, ni uwezekano wa monopolies asili kutokea. Hizi ni ambapo kampuni moja inaweza ufanisi zaidi kutoa wote wa bidhaa au huduma. Kwa mfano, kuwa na mifumo ya kurudia (au kurudia mara tatu) ya usambazaji wa umeme, haingekuwa na ufanisi, kwa hivyo majimbo mengi yana tume ya huduma za umma kuamua bei na ubora wa huduma. Hii ni kanuni ya moja kwa moja. Nyakati nyingine ushindani wenye kuharibu waweza kutokea ikiwa hakuna udhibiti. Benki na bima ni mifano mizuri ya hili. Bila udhibiti wa serikali wa benki (kuweka viwango na mbinu), ushindani wazi na mkali ungesababisha kufilisika kwa benki kwa wingi. Hiyo ingeharibu imani ya umma katika benki na biashara kwa ujumla. Hali ya sasa (karibu 2011) ya benki kuu sita ambazo ni "kubwa sana kushindwa" ni, hata hivyo, mfano wa usio ushindani wenye uharibifu. Kasoro nyingine za soko zaweza kusababisha uhitaji wa udhibiti. Kwa mfano, kuna haja ya kudhibiti masafa kwa ajili ya matangazo ya umma kwenye redio, televisheni, na maambukizi mengine ya wireless (kwa polisi, moto, ulinzi wa kitaifa, nk). Wataalamu wengi wa uchumi pia wangetaja ugavi wa kutosha wa bidhaa za umma kama kitu ambacho lazima kiwe kimeundwa na serikali. Kwa mfano, soko peke yake halingeweza kutoa bidhaa za umma kama vile elimu, mfumo wa barabara kuu, minara ya taa, jeshi kwa ajili ya ulinzi. Ubepari wa kweli wa laissez-faire - soko lisilo na udhibiti wowote - halingejaribu kushughulikia kasoro za soko na pia lingeruhusu watu kuchagua kwa uhuru bidhaa, huduma, na mipango mingine ambayo kihistoria imeonwa kuwa haikubaliki kijamii. Hizi zingejumuisha kufanya mikataba inayoweza kutekelezwa kwa ajili ya kuuza na kununua watu (utumwa), huduma za kingono, "dawa za kulevya za mitaani" kama vile heroini au crack cocaine, kura kwa ofisi ya umma, alama kwa ajili ya kozi hii katika sheria ya biashara, na hata ushirikiano wa ndoa. Hivyo soko huru katika maneno halisi <unk>na si katika nadharia<unk>ni biashara kisheria vikwazo na nini ni kiuchumi ya kutamaniwa na nini ni kijamii ya kutamaniwa pia. Lengo la sera za umma katika uwanja wa kijamii ni pamoja na kuhakikisha fursa sawa katika ajira, kulinda wafanyakazi kutoka mazingira ya kazi yasiyo ya afya au salama, kuhifadhi ubora wa mazingira na rasilimali, na kulinda watumiaji kutoka bidhaa zisizo salama. Wakati mwingine malengo haya yanatimizwa kwa kuwapa watu haki za kisheria ambazo zinaweza kutumiwa katika kuleta malalamiko (kwa mfano, Kichwa cha 7 cha Sheria ya Haki za Kiraia ya 1964 kwa ubaguzi wa ajira), na wakati mwingine zinatimizwa kwa kuunda mashirika yenye haki ya kuchunguza na kufuatilia na kutekeleza sheria za kisheria na kanuni zilizoundwa kutekeleza sheria kama hizo (kwa mfano, Shirika la Ulinzi wa Mazingira, kwa kuleta kesi dhidi ya kampuni ya uchafuzi). Kwa mujibu wa katiba ya Marekani, Bunge lina mamlaka ya kudhibiti biashara kati ya nchi na mataifa ya kigeni. Kwa hiyo, shirika la kwanza la shirikisho lilishughulika na usafiri wa malori na reli, ili kuweka sheria za biashara kati ya majimbo. Shirika la kwanza la serikali, Tume ya Biashara ya Kati (ICC), ilianzishwa mwaka 1887. Congress ilipewa mamlaka ya kutekeleza sheria za shirikisho dhidi ya ubaguzi wa kiwango cha reli na mazoea mengine ya bei isiyo ya haki. Katika karne ya 20, ICC ilipata mamlaka ya kuamua viwango vya ushuru. Tangu miaka ya 1970 hadi 1995, Congress ilipitisha hatua za deregulatory, na ICC ilifutwa rasmi mnamo 1995, na mamlaka yake ilihamishwa kwa Bodi ya Usafiri wa uso. Kuanzia na Tume ya Biashara ya Shirikisho (FTC) mnamo 1914, Bunge limeunda mashirika mengine mengi, mengi yao ni watendaji wa kawaida katika serikali ya Amerika. Leo zaidi ya mashirika 85 ya shirikisho yana mamlaka ya kudhibiti aina fulani ya utendaji wa kibinafsi. Wengi wao walianzishwa tangu 1930, na zaidi ya thuluthi tangu 1960. Ongezeko kama hilo limetokea katika ngazi ya serikali. Majimbo mengi sasa yana mamia ya mashirika ya udhibiti, mengi yao yanafanya kazi sawa na mashirika ya shirikisho. Mashirika huru ni tofauti na idara za mtendaji wa shirikisho na mashirika mengine ya mtendaji kwa sifa zao za muundo na kazi. Idara nyingi za mtendaji zina mkurugenzi mmoja, msimamizi, au katibu aliyechaguliwa na rais wa Marekani. Mashirika huru karibu daima kuwa na tume au bodi inayojumuisha wanachama watano hadi saba ambao kushiriki nguvu juu ya shirika. Rais huteua kamishna au bodi chini ya uthibitisho wa Seneti, lakini mara nyingi hutumikia kwa mihula ya mfululizo na mara nyingi kwa mihula ndefu kuliko muhula wa kawaida wa urais wa miaka minne. Hawezi kuondolewa isipokuwa kwa sababu nzuri, hii inamaanisha kuwa marais wengi hawatapata kuteua kamishna wote wa shirika fulani huru. "Kama ilivyo kwa mashirika mengi ya kujitegemea, sheria inahitaji kuwa na wanachama wa vyama viwili katika tume hiyo, kwa hivyo rais hawezi kujaza nafasi zilizopo wazi na wanachama wa chama chake cha kisiasa.""" Pamoja na ICC na FTC, mashirika makubwa ya kujitegemea ni Tume ya Mawasiliano ya Shirikisho (FCC), Tume ya Usalama na Soko (SEC), Bodi ya Taifa ya Mahusiano ya Kazi (NLRB) na Shirika la Ulinzi wa Mazingira (EPA). "Kumbuka: ""Masharti ya Bora kwa Soko Huru"" ni sehemu ya 5 ya Sura ya 5." Kwa kulinganisha, wanachama wa mashirika ya tawi la utekelezaji hutumikia kwa furaha ya rais na kwa hiyo ni rahisi zaidi kwa udhibiti wa kisiasa. Matokeo ya tofauti hii ni kwamba sheria ambazo mashirika huru yanatangaza hayawezi kuchunguzwa na rais au wafanyakazi wake - tu Bunge linaweza kuzipinga moja kwa moja - wakati Ikulu ya White House au maafisa katika idara mbalimbali za baraza la mawaziri wanaweza kusimamia kazi ya mashirika yaliyo ndani yao (isipokuwa hasa kukataliwa nguvu na Bunge). Mashirika yana mamlaka mbalimbali. Sheria nyingi za awali zilizozalishwa, kama vile Sheria ya Mawasiliano ya Shirikisho, ziliwapa nguvu ya leseni. Hakuna chama kinachoweza kuingia katika shughuli za uzalishaji zinazofunikwa na sheria bila leseni ya awali kutoka kwa shirika - kwa mfano, hakuna huduma inayoweza kuanza kituo cha umeme wa nyuklia isipokuwa kwanza imepitishwa na Tume ya Udhibiti wa Nyuklia. Katika miaka ya hivi karibuni, hatua kuelekea deregulation ya uchumi imesababisha kupungua kwa baadhi ya mamlaka ya leseni. Mashirika mengi pia yana mamlaka ya kuweka viwango vilivyotozwa na makampuni yaliyo chini ya mamlaka ya shirika. Hatimaye, mashirika yanaweza kudhibiti mazoea ya biashara. FTC ina mamlaka ya jumla juu ya biashara zote katika biashara ya kati ya majimbo ili kufuatilia na kuondoa "matendo yasiyo ya haki" na "matendo ya udanganyifu" Tume ya Uhifadhi na Soko (SEC) inasimamia utoaji wa dhamana za ushirika na uwekezaji mwingine na inasimamia mazoea ya masoko ya hisa. Tofauti na mahakama, mashirika ya kiutawala yanawajibika kwa jukumu la kutekeleza mgawo maalum au kufikia lengo au seti ya malengo. Hawatakuwa na msimamo wa kutokuwamo katika masuala mbalimbali ya wakati huo; ni lazima watende. """Wamepewa mamlaka ya kutunga sheria kwa sababu katika jamii inayokua ngumu zaidi, Bunge halijui jinsi ya kutunga sheria kwa aina ya maelezo ambayo ni muhimu, wala halitakuwa na wakati wa kukaribia sekta zote za jamii hata ikiwa ingejaribu." Ni kwa sababu tu wao ni kufanya nini vyombo vya sheria ya jumla hawawezi kufanya, mashirika ni mashirika maalumu. Kwa miaka mingi ya uzoefu katika kushughulika na matatizo kama hayo, wao hukusanya maarifa ambayo wanaweza kutumia kutimiza wajibu wao wa kisheria. Mashirika yote ya kiutawala yana aina mbili tofauti za wafanyakazi. Viongozi, iwe ni msimamizi mmoja au mwili wa kamati ya kamishna, ni wateule wa kisiasa na hutumikia kwa mihula ndogo. Chini yao ni wafanyakazi zaidi au chini ya kudumu <unk> uburuki. Msimamo mkubwa wa sera hutokea katika ngazi ya wafanyakazi, kwa sababu wafanyakazi hawa wana udhibiti muhimu wa kukusanya ukweli na kuwasilisha data na hoja kwa kamishna, ambao wana nguvu ya mwisho ya mashirika. Bunge linaweza kuanzisha shirika kupitia sheria. Wakati Congress inatoa mamlaka kwa shirika, sheria inajulikana kama sheria ya kuwezesha Sheria ya kisheria ambayo huanzisha mamlaka ya shirika katika eneo fulani la uchumi. "Kama sheria ya kikatiba, ""Doktrina ya Ujumbe"" inatangaza kwamba shirika linaweza tu kutumia nguvu iliyopewa na mamlaka ya kikatiba, kwa kawaida, shirika litakuwa na aina zote tatu za nguvu: mtendaji, sheria, na mahakama." Kwa mfano, shirika la sheria la Marekani linaweza kuweka sheria ambazo biashara lazima ifuate, inaweza kuchunguza na kushtaki biashara hizo, na inaweza kufanya usikilizaji wa kiutawala kwa ukiukaji wa sheria hizo. Kwa kweli, wao ni watunga-sheria, washtakiwa, na mahakimu.) Kwa sababu mashirika yana aina zote tatu za mamlaka ya serikali, maswali muhimu ya kikatiba yaliulizwa wakati Bunge lilipowaumba kwa mara ya kwanza. Swali muhimu zaidi lilikuwa kama Bunge lilikuwa likitoa mamlaka yake ya kisheria. Je, mgawanyiko wa mamlaka ulivunjwa ikiwa mashirika yalikuwa na mamlaka ya kutunga sheria ambazo zilikuwa sawa na sheria za kisheria? Katika kesi ya Schechter Poultry Corp v. Marekani, Mahakama Kuu ya Marekani ilikataza sheria ya National Industrial Recovery Act kwa sababu ya mamlaka ya Congress ya kuwakabidhi kwa kiasi kikubwa. Chini ya sheria hiyo, makundi ya biashara ya viwanda yalipewa mamlaka ya kutunga kanuni za ushindani wa haki kwa sekta nzima, na kanuni hizi zikawa sheria ikiwa zitathibitishwa na rais. Hakuna mamlaka ya kiutawala iliyoundwa kuchunguza hoja kwa ajili ya kanuni fulani, kuendeleza ushahidi, au kupima toleo moja la kanuni dhidi ya nyingine. Hivyo ilikuwa kinyume cha katiba kwa Bunge kuhamisha mamlaka yake yote ya kisheria kwa shirika. Katika maamuzi ya baadaye, ilibainishwa wazi kwamba Bunge linaweza kugawa baadhi ya mamlaka yake ya kisheria, lakini tu ikiwa uhamisho wa mamlaka haukuwa pana sana. Sheria za Congress za kuwezesha ni kama sheria za kuwezesha kwa ajili ya Usalama wa Kazi na Afya ya Usimamizi (OSHA), ambayo ni mamlaka ya kufanya sheria ili kutoa hali salama na afya ya kazi katika maeneo ya kazi ya Marekani. Nguvu kama hiyo pana ya mpango inatoa OSHA uhuru mkubwa wa kuamua. "Lakini, kama ilivyoelezwa katika Sehemu ya 5.2 ""Kudhibiti Mashirika ya Utawala,"" kuna udhibiti wa utekelezaji na mahakama juu ya shughuli za mashirika ya utawala, pamoja na udhibiti wa kuendelea na Bunge kupitia fedha na usimamizi wa kuendelea wa mashirika, katika mikutano na kupitia marekebisho ya baadaye ya kisheria." Bunge huunda mashirika ya kiutawala kupitia sheria za kuwezesha. Katika sheria hizi, Bunge lazima kuwakabidhi mamlaka kwa kutoa shirika baadhi ya mwelekeo kama nini anataka shirika kufanya. Kwa kawaida mashirika hupewa mamlaka kubwa ya kuchunguza, kuweka viwango (kuchapisha kanuni), na kutekeleza viwango hivyo. Mashirika mengi ni mashirika ya tawi la utekelezaji, lakini baadhi ni huru.