The Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe was one of the few western railroads with transcontinental ambitions that did not have the word Pacific in its name. That certainly did not mean, however, that the railroad’s transcontinental plans were any less determined or that they stopped in the middle of New Mexico. By 1881, the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe was advancing on the Pacific Ocean by three different fronts.
Admittedly, William Barstow Strong and the Santa Fe received little more than a handshake from Collis P. Huntington and the Southern Pacific at Deming, but Strong and his board of directors seem to have sensed well in advance that might be the case. They undertook the construction south from Albuquerque in part to protect the Santa Fe’s southern flanks and to keep Jay Gould and/or Huntington from building north from El Paso.
The Santa Fe’s second Pacific front was via the Sonora Railway to Guaymas, Mexico. But even though the Santa Fe built its own New Mexico and Arizona Railroad from Benson, Arizona, south to join the Sonora Railway at the Mexican border at Nogales, this route, too, was dependent on the dictates of the Southern Pacific because of the 174-mile joint trackage agreement between Deming and Benson.
What the Santa Fe needed—and what Strong had been patiently acquiring by bits and pieces—was a transcontinental route between the Mississippi and the Pacific completely under its own control. A key component was to come from assorted railroad ventures that traced their roots back to the fervent expansionism of Thomas Hart Benton.
Even before the Pacific Railroad surveys of 1853, Senator Benton had long championed a railway between St. Louis and San Francisco. What might lie in between was, Benton once told Congress, “a matter of detail.” The most important thing to him was to set the termini of the route irrevocably in the two cities that hugged the 38th parallel. To that end, the Pacific Railroad Company of Missouri was incorporated in 1849, to build west from St. Louis.
It didn’t get very far, and the trials and tragedies of John C. Frémont and John Gunnison while filling in the “detail” along the 38th parallel soon had Missourians pondering the more southerly 35th parallel route instead. St. Louis would still be the eastern terminal, but a south-west branch of the Pacific Railroad Company was projected to cut diagonally across the state to Springfield, which had long touted itself the logical railroad gateway to the 35th parallel route.
Amidst the land grant giveaway in the aftermath of the Civil War, Springfield got its opportunity. Benton was dead by then, but Frémont acquired control of the south-west branch—renamed the Southwest Pacific Railroad—and used the line’s goal of Springfield to promote the new Atlantic and Pacific Railroad as the logical extension westward from there.1
With a lengthy list of incorporators that included J. Edgar Thomson and Thomas A. Scott, the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company was formed by an act of Congress on July 27, 1866. It was to run generally west from Springfield to a point on the Canadian River, then to Albuquerque, the headwaters of the Little Colorado River, and on to the Colorado River, “at such point as may be selected by said company for crossing; thence by the most practicable and eligible route to the Pacific.”
There was no promise of the lucrative bond subsidies that had benefited the Union Pacific, but the Atlantic and Pacific land grant was generous—every alternate section to the extent of twenty alternate sections per mile on each side of the railroad line through the territories and ten alternate sections per mile on each side through any state. The Atlantic and Pacific was required to begin construction within two years, complete at least fifty miles per year, and finish its main line by July 4, 1878.
But there was one section in the enabling legislation that bespoke the hand of Collis P. Huntington. Despite authorizing the Atlantic and Pacific to proceed “by the most practicable and eligible route to the Pacific,” section 18 provided that Huntington’s Southern Pacific Railroad was “authorized to connect with the said Atlantic and Pacific Railroad … at such point, near the boundary line of the State of California, as they shall deem most suitable for a railroad line to San Francisco.”2
Whether this provision merely afforded the Southern Pacific the opportunity to connect with the Atlantic and Pacific at the Colorado River or prohibited the Atlantic and Pacific from building beyond it into California would soon be a matter of heated debate.
The mercurial Frémont was soon off to other ventures, but by June 1871, the Atlantic and Pacific had consolidated with the Southwest Pacific as planned. It completed its line across Missouri through Springfield to the state line and continued into Indian Territory and a junction with the Missouri, Kansas and Texas Railroad (the Katy) at Vinita, Indian Territory.
Much as Tom Scott did to court San Diegans on behalf of the Texas and Pacific, a Missouri delegation traveled to San Francisco in 1872 to win friends and connections at the contemplated western end of the line. But Californians were of divided loyalties. Some favored Scott’s Texas and Pacific enterprise; others wanted a line totally under Californian control; and, of course, the Big Four muddied the waters by opposing any railroad that might someday compete with the recently finished Central Pacific or the expanding Southern Pacific.
Meanwhile, the Atlantic and Pacific leased the original Pacific Railroad of Missouri that had finally made it from St. Louis to Kansas City, albeit by floating a staggering debt. This orphan of Benton’s Pacific dreams would someday emerge as Jay Gould’s vaunted Missouri Pacific, but in the mid-1870s, it floundered, and it took the Atlantic and Pacific down with it.
The Atlantic and Pacific went into receivership on November 3, 1875, but its directors and major shareholders quickly devised what became the ultimate coup. They formed a new corporation that would bid at foreclosure for the Atlantic and Pacific’s franchise and land grant, while being free from the Atlantic and Pacific’s debts.
On September 8, 1876, the Atlantic and Pacific went on the auction block on the east steps of the courthouse in St. Louis. Two days earlier, the soon-to-be Missouri Pacific had sold for $3 million. But this time the insiders were in control. When the auctioneer dropped his gavel, the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad—with its land grants potentially worth millions and millions of dollars—was sold for the paltry sum of $450,000 to the new corporation. “The new company is to be called the St. Louis & San Francisco Railway Company,” the Railroad Gazette reported wryly, “because, perhaps, it has no terminus in either city.”3
But the reality was that the St. Louis and San Francisco Railway now owned the Atlantic and Pacific franchise outright, and the parent company made plans to strike westward from its railhead at Vinita. When continuing uncertainty over its right-of-way and land grants across Indian reservations delayed that construction, the St. Louis and San Francisco bypassed Indian Territory and built westward into Kansas instead. Given its ultimate goal, the railroad replaced the old Atlantic and Pacific trademark of “the Vinita Route” with a new moniker. Henceforth, the St. Louis and San Francisco Railway would be known as “the Frisco Line.”
The Frisco’s immediate destination was Wichita, Kansas. While bypassed by the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe main line, Wichita had taken upon itself to build a 20-mile spur and ensure its future as a cattle town and commercial hub. Looking to become a rail center as well, Wichita encouraged the Frisco’s advance by floating a county bond issue. But by the time the Frisco laid tracks into town, the Santa Fe main line stretched westward to Albuquerque. One look at the map told the story.
If the Frisco continued westward and paralleled the Santa Fe across southern Kansas, there would be fierce competition between the two roads. Regardless of how the Frisco’s claims in Indian Territory were resolved, they were likely to be of dubious value. (Oil discoveries would change that, but not until much later.)
For its part, the Santa Fe was concerned about another competitor shadowing it across Kansas. It had long contended with just such competition from the Kansas Pacific north of its line. Rather than competing with each other across the plains, perhaps there was a way that the Frisco and the Santa Fe might work together and put their resources into finishing the 35th parallel route west from Albuquerque instead of knocking heads in Kansas.
It helped matters that the leaders of both railroads moved in the same circles of Boston capitalists. Thomas Nickerson and his protégé William Barstow Strong were already showing themselves to be patient plodders focused on long-term results. The reborn Atlantic and Pacific land grant was certainly of interest, but so too was another route by which to challenge Collis P. Huntington’s stranglehold on California.
Finally, both the Frisco and the Santa Fe were watching the increasingly large shadow that Jay Gould cast over all railroad ventures. Concerned about their own independence or Gould’s role in a competitor, the Frisco and the Santa Fe had additional reasons to be allies rather than foes.
The 1879 annual report of the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe told the results: “Another negotiation which required nearly six months to complete, secures your Company an interest in the valuable franchise of the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad which gives your road right of way across Arizona and California to the Pacific Coast. Your Company, jointly with the St. Louis and San Francisco Railway Company, will build a new road from Albuquerque along the thirty-fifth parallel, which in due time will form part of a transcontinental line.”4
Formally ratified on January 31, 1880, this Tripartite Agreement was in some respects more sweeping than the Treaty of Boston or even the agreements between Huntington and Gould in Texas. Its triple nature came from the fact that the Santa Fe and the Frisco formed a jointly owned subsidiary further preserving the fiction of the old Atlantic and Pacific. Its stock, directors, costs of construction, and profits were to be equally divided between the Santa Fe and the Frisco. This reborn Atlantic and Pacific Western Division was to build west from the Santa Fe line at Albuquerque, claiming as it went the original Atlantic and Pacific land grant.
To fund this 600-mile expansion between Albuquerque and the Colorado River, the Santa Fe and the Frisco each agreed to raise $5 million secured by a first mortgage of 6 percent thirty-year bonds to be guaranteed by both companies. All business to and from the Western Division was to pass over the Santa Fe from Albuquerque to Wichita—later changed to Halstead, Kansas, on the Santa Fe’s main line. From that point east, all St. Louis business went via the Frisco and all Chicago-bound business continued over the Santa Fe to Kansas City.
The two roads further agreed that the Frisco or its St. Louis, Wichita and Western subsidiary would not build west from Wichita and that neither party would build new competing lines except by mutual consent and with joint ownership and cost.
Thomas Nickerson became president of the Atlantic and Pacific Western Division, while former Union general Edward F. Winslow became vice president to look after the Frisco’s interests. It seemed a neat solution to everyone, although Wichita and surrounding Sedgwick County, having enticed the Frisco with a bond issue, now complained, “As a county we agreed to pay our money for the benefits to be derived from a direct competition and not for an extra track of a monopoly.” Out of the ashes of previous 35th parallel failures, that is exactly what the Santa Fe was suddenly in the position to achieve.5
Not everyone, however, was keen on the idea of the Santa Fe building along the 35th parallel. Shortly after the initial battles at Raton Pass and the Royal Gorge, William Barstow Strong dispatched the steady A. A. Robinson west from Albuquerque to take a look. Robinson was not walking into the unknown but rather following the footsteps of Lieutenant Amiel Whipple’s 1853 efforts and William Jackson Palmer’s 1867 survey on behalf of the Kansas Pacific. But he wasn’t impressed.
Robinson argued against the 35th parallel route west from Albuquerque because he believed that the depths of the Grand Canyon to the north precluded any trade or connecting lines in that direction. (Clearly, Robinson was not thinking about the tourist trade.) He urged instead that all efforts be directed to driving south down the Rio Grande to the 32nd parallel. But by the time the Santa Fe reached Deming, Huntington and the Southern Pacific had preempted that route.
Meanwhile, the Santa Fe surveyors who were momentarily cheered in Tucson in the summer of 1879 reported back that the territory between Albuquerque and Tucson was “hopeless” both for a suitable direct line and local traffic. That left Nickerson and Strong with Lieutenant Whipple’s preferred route along the 35th parallel. The fact that they seized on that route early in the game—regardless of Robinson’s negative report—and made the deal with the Frisco is evidence that they were looking at the big picture of railroading in the American Southwest. Rather than taking the 35th parallel as a last resort, securing it early left Nickerson and Strong looking like rather shrewd railroaders after Huntington and Gould combined against them in the south.6
On paper, the railroad to be built west from Albuquerque would be known as the Atlantic and Pacific Western Division, but the men involved with its construction and later operation were definitely part of the greater Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe organization. Barely was the ink dry on the Tripartite Agreement than A. A. Robinson—his doubts about the route put aside but not dismissed—sent survey crews west from Albuquerque in the summer of 1880 to pound stakes along a final alignment between there and the Colorado River.
George S. Van Law, a veteran of the Santa Fe’s Raton and Royal Gorge battles, was in the lead party. It quickly became clear to him these preparations were “for the construction of a first class transcontinental railroad to do big business.” Robinson’s work specifications were very strict and called for light gradients and easy curves that in many cases “eased off at both ends.”
But as Van Law and his party progressed west across northern Arizona, it also became clear that there was not much local business. Supposedly, they were following a semblance of an old trail, but Van Law found it a road “in name only.” He never saw a man or wagon on it in an entire summer of work that at times was quite demanding. When the supply wagons were close, life was good, but when they failed to keep up with the advance or arrive at an agreed-upon rendezvous, hunger became a familiar companion. Breakfast one morning for Van Law’s crew of nine consisted of two cans of tomatoes and one can of peaches. It was, he acknowledged, “a lot better than starving.”
A few days later, after walking miles to start their work and running line for a half day, their lunch was only sugar and some bacon almost green with age and heat. But typical of the men who pushed these lines west, Van Law confessed, “we were a tough lot and nobody got sick.”7
The Santa Fe was in a hurry, and construction crews quickly followed Van Law’s markers west from near Albuquerque. The chosen junction point was Isleta, some 12 miles south of town, where the Santa Fe line down the Rio Grande crossed the river from east to west. The dust from the construction of that bridge and the Santa Fe’s march toward Deming had settled only a few weeks. One would have been hard pressed to say which route was the main line. At the very least, the Santa Fe’s frenzied construction on two fronts at once bespoke Nickerson’s and Strong’s transcontinental plans.
Certainly Robinson understood what was at stake. Not wanting a repeat of the conflict at Raton Pass, he sent a work crew 180 miles west of Albuquerque to seize and hold the staked right-of-way through Querino Canyon. Just west of the Arizona–New Mexico border, this 2-mile-long sandstone gap was wide enough for only a single set of tracks.
Robinson’s caution was well founded, particularly after Charley Crocker himself showed up on Santa Fe turf in Albuquerque “on railroad business.” Figuring that Crocker and Huntington were quite capable of being even more aggressive than General Palmer had been at Raton and the Royal Gorge, Robinson next directed that ties and rails be hauled by wagon to Querino Canyon well in advance of the railhead. Two and one-half miles of track were laid in the canyon during the summer of 1880 to hold the right-of-way. This section stood as a rather forlorn outpost while the end of track advanced toward it over the next year. 8
When the first 50 miles of track were completed west of Isleta, the Santa Fe–Frisco–owned Atlantic and Pacific Western Division applied for the land grants due under the original 1866 Atlantic and Pacific charter. The legislation had mandated that the line be completed within ten years. Now, two years past that deadline, there was growing sentiment in Congress against land grants from the public domain.
But U.S. Attorney General Charles Devens, an appointee of President Hayes, ruled that the original act, while requiring completion in ten years, did not specifically provide for a forfeiture of the railroad’s rights to such lands. They could be earned, Devens decided, by construction any time unless Congress wanted to intervene, take possession of the road, and complete it as a federal project, which clearly it did not. So the Western Division received its first patents for land along the route.
By February 1881, 100 miles of track had been laid west from Isleta, and 80 were in operation. Crews kept on through the cold of the high-desert winter and reached Fort Wingate, now Gallup, New Mexico. Lewis Kingman, who located the line, was in charge of construction.
Most of Kingman’s crews were Irish. Tracklayers and graders were paid $2.25 per day, and spikers and iron layers earned $2.50 per day—the latter equivalent to about $54 in 2008 dollars. Kingman also hired local Apaches and Navajos and later Mojaves from California as shovelers and day laborers.
Many of the Irish workers had built the Santa Fe or other roads across the plains, just as many of the Chinese working for Huntington in southern Arizona had labored through the Sierras. The simple economics of reaching the respective railheads dictated the labor pool—the Irish from the East and the Chinese from the West. Ethnic background meant little when it came to hoisting a fifty-two-pound rail, but that did not mean that there was no racism. “The directors of the 35th Parallel R.R.,” a local Arizona newspaper declared, “certainly deserve much credit for employing none but white labor in building their great transcontinental railway from the Atlantic to the Pacific.”
By April, the orphan track in Querino Canyon had been joined to the main line, and crews were building west across northern Arizona at the rate of a mile a day. “The whole country north of Prescott along the 35th parallel road,” the Weekly Arizona Minerreported, “is alive with advance workmen, who are preparing the road bed of the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad, which is coming along from the East at break-neck rate.…”9
But up ahead, the flat tablelands of the Colorado Plateau held one of its many surprises. Twenty-six miles west of Winslow, the serpentine meanders of Cañon Diablo cut deep into the landscape. Its white and yellow limestone walls dropped 250 feet in blocky terraces to the intermittent stream coursing along its bottom. It was more than 500 feet across the chasm.
Stumbling upon the canyon in 1853, Lieutenant Whipple confessed his surprise and termed a descent to the “thread-like rill of water” far below to be “impossible.” But he did conclude that “for a railroad it could be bridged and the banks would furnish plenty of stone for the purpose.” Whipple and many other Arizona travelers bypassed the canyon by circling to the north, but the Atlantic and Pacific would take Whipple’s advice and bridge it directly.
The rails of the Atlantic and Pacific reached the rim at Cañon Diablo on December 19, 1881. Having long anticipated this obstacle, the railroad had a rough and rowdy construction camp named Cañon Diablo going full blast near the east rim. Variously described as meaner than Tombstone and deadlier than Dodge City, the motley collection of windswept tents and rough buildings was home to 240 men working the bridge site and a bevy of prostitutes, gamblers, and barkeeps working the men.
John M. Price and Co. had the primary construction contract for the bridge crossing, and its first task was to blast and excavate platforms in the canyon walls and along the streambed to hold masonry pedestals for the support towers. In addition, one large stone abutment was constructed on each rim.
The Central Bridge Works of Buffalo, New York, prefabricated the bridge itself at a reported cost of $250,000. It was shipped to the site in pieces in some twenty railcars. Eleven separate spans—two of 100 feet in length, two of 30 feet, and seven of 40 feet—were fastened together and supported by ten sets of tower legs and the abutments on the rims. When completed, the narrow, spindly structure was 222 feet above the canyon floor and 560 feet long.
But as the final sections were put into place, they proved to be several feet short. Somehow, someone had measured incorrectly, or the excavation for the abutments on the rims had inadvertently widened the distance. Modifications were hurriedly made.
Meanwhile, grading crews leapfrogged ahead to work on the roadbed to the west. Finally, on July 1, 1882, the first train inched across the narrow structure under operating rules that required a maximum speed of four miles an hour, and the Cañon Diablo bridge was officially certified. At the time, it was easily the most impressive bridge structure on the combined Santa Fe–Atlantic and Pacific line between Kansas City and the Colorado River.10
During the construction pause at Cañon Diablo, the railhead halted at Winslow. A January 1882 visitor remarked, “the town at present consists of a row of tents about one-fourth of a mile in extent.” But that was to change quickly because Winslow was slated to become a division point on the line. Service buildings, yards, and a roundhouse were built in short order.
Of the major towns along the Atlantic and Pacific route through Arizona, all except Flagstaff and Williams were named for men somehow associated with the railroad. Edward Winslow was president of the Frisco and vice president of the Atlantic and Pacific; Lewis Kingman and H. R. Holbrook were surveyors and construction engineers (the town of Holbrook was originally called Horsehead Crossing); and Joseph Seligman was a prominent Frisco stockholder and financier.
The construction snafu at Cañon Diablo had also given Price and Co. time to complete a second major bridge just 5 miles to the west at Cañon Padre. Not quite as spectacular as the structure at Cañon Diablo, the bridge at Cañon Padre was only 230 feet long. Its measurements had been precise, and once track was laid across Cañon Diablo, tracklayers spiked their way across without a pause.
Up ahead at the base of the San Francisco Peaks was the booming lumber town of Flagstaff, already boasting one hundred houses. Across the dry mesas of northern Arizona, the San Francisco Peaks were a welcome oasis of green and a ready source of ponderosa pine for ties and lumber. The first train steamed into Flagstaff on August 1, 1882.11
All this construction was satisfying to the directors of the Atlantic and Pacific’s parent organizations. As expected, local traffic along the expanding 35th parallel route was still weak, but westward lay the gateway to California. Expansion westward had become the mantra of William Barstow Strong, who became president of the Santa Fe in 1881, just as assuredly as it had been J. Edgar Thomson’s charge on the Pennsylvania three decades earlier.
Strong recognized that “in the United States … the power of a Railroad to protect and increase its business depends upon its length, and the extent of the territory it can touch.” Pausing at the Colorado River while westbound was really no more of an option for the Atlantic and Pacific than halting at the Colorado while eastbound had been for Huntington and the Southern Pacific several years earlier.
So, quite logically, Strong championed continued expansion westward into California. At their December 1881 Atlantic and Pacific board of directors meeting, the representatives of the Santa Fe and the Frisco jointly agreed to raise an additional $16.5 million. A small portion was to be used to extend the Vinita branch through Indian Territory, but the lion’s share was to finance construction from the Colorado River crossing at Needles all the way to San Francisco.
A solicitation circular was distributed to this effect and met with initial success. Then, in February 1882, Strong and the Santa Fe were unexpectedly notified by their equal partner in the venture that the Frisco was not going to raise its one-half share. “Owing to changes going on in the ownership of the stock of the St. Louis and San Francisco Railroad Company,” it was suspending all sales of the new issue of securities. It didn’t take long to smell a rat. In fact, this time, from the Santa Fe’s perspective, there were two rats, and they were acting in concert.12
Fresh from their agreement in West Texas, Collis P. Huntington and Jay Gould had decided that being allies wasn’t so bad. The two titans momentarily found great commonality of purpose in joining forces to oppose the extension of the Santa Fe via the Atlantic and Pacific. Not only would the Santa Fe’s 35th parallel line strike directly to Huntington’s California border but also its eastern transcontinental traffic and the proposed Vinita expansion were threats to Gould’s Texas and Pacific and his budding Missouri Pacific system.
From the New York banking firm of J. and W. Seligman and Company, of which Gould had been a client since the late 1860s, Huntington and Gould jointly bought a controlling interest in the stock of the Frisco. Apparently Huntington had taken to heart the advice his father is supposed to have given him: “Do not be afraid to do business with a rascal, only watch him; but avoid a fool …”
Controlling the Frisco, Huntington and Gould now owned half interest in the Atlantic and Pacific as well. The irony was that Joseph Seligman of Seligman and Company had championed the Santa Fe–Frisco alliance and expansion, but his recent death had given his brothers the opportunity to dispose of what they felt was an overly large investment in the 35th parallel route. Frisco president Edward Winslow balked at the sale, but the surviving Seligmans made it, at least in part because of past loyalties “to Gould as a client.”13
This deft maneuver left Strong and his Santa Fe directors decidedly embarrassed. They had gone to great pains to promote the Atlantic and Pacific’s construction and tout their strategic alliance with the Frisco. Suddenly, Santa Fe shareholders found themselves equal partners with Huntington and Gould in the Atlantic and Pacific, but partners with very different agendas.
When the Atlantic and Pacific’s board of directors next convened, the newcomers—Collis Huntington, Leland Stanford, Jay Gould, and Gould’s close associate, Russell Sage—sat down across the table from William Barstow Strong and the Santa Fe directors. The former group wanted to halt the Atlantic and Pacific at the Colorado River; the latter, to continue on to San Francisco as planned.
In public, Strong tried to put the best possible face on the new relationship. The Santa Fe president was quoted in the New York Times as saying that relations with Gould would be harmonious and that the new blood at the Frisco might even prove a positive advantage to his road. Offhandedly, Strong professed it “a matter of indifference to the Atchison who controls the San Francisco Road.”
A week later, Strong received a letter written personally by Jay Gould that left no doubt about who controlled the Frisco, as well as the immediate fate of the Atlantic and Pacific. “Mr. Huntington today informs me that he has decided to extend the Southern Pacific from Mohave to the Colorado River to connect with the Atlantic and Pacific,” Gould wrote.
Gould claimed that “under other circumstances, I might think it desirable to extend the A & P to Mohave or even to San Francisco,” but he saw no reason to “antagonize” the Southern Pacific when it was in “our interest to tie them up to our new line in the way suggested.”
“My interests lie in working in harmony with both the Southern and the Atchison Companies,” Gould told Strong, “and I think before any further steps are taken in issuing securities we should have a meeting and come to an equitable harmonious adjustment.…” Then Gould penned a much shorter note to Huntington: “Enclosed I hand you copy of letter written to Wm. Strong as per our conversation today.” The rats were indeed working together.14
Strong’s written response was equally cordial and, perhaps, equally disingenuous. “Your desire to secure harmony is appreciated,” Strong replied to Gould, adding “that from the day you took charge of the Union Pacific Railroad to the present, whenever and wherever your interests and the interests of this Company have come in conflict, all differences have been arranged with a spirit of fairness.”
Strong went on to delay the Huntington-Gould victory by pleading that he was “without official notice from the St. L. & S.F. that any change in the original plan is desired” and that he would refer Gould’s letter to his board. But the outcome was as certain as the bold scrawl of Gould’s handwriting.15
One New York financial paper—quite possibly encouraged in its perspective by the Santa Fe’s investors—later went so far as to praise the Boston crowd’s “sagacity and good sense” in not pursuing its own purchase of the Frisco before Gould and Huntington had done so.
While an independent line to the Pacific was “a pleasing idea,” the Commercial and Financial Chronicle mused, it was far better “to discriminate and draw the line between ventures of a dubious or not very promising character and those offering a fair measure of success, that, is the true test …”16
But the ultimate test, as Strong well knew, was in reaching the Pacific. Strong and his Santa Fe directors, however, were quite willing to be patient in achieving that goal. They might have gotten into a cutthroat battle with Huntington and Gould that likely would have left the Santa Fe exhausted and still without a Pacific outlet. Instead Strong took a chapter from the Huntington-Gould agreement at Sierra Blanca. Why fight one’s competitors if you could work with them to your own advantage?
When at the first opportunity Huntington formally proposed to the newly comprised Atlantic and Pacific board of directors that the Southern Pacific would meet the Atlantic and Pacific at Needles, Strong accepted the proposition without argument.
He concluded an agreement with Huntington and Gould that earmarked 25 percent of the Southern Pacific’s gross revenues on through business over the Atlantic and Pacific to the payment of the interest on the latter’s bonds, effectively helping to pay for the construction of the line. The two roads further agreed to expedite their construction and meet at Needles as soon as possible—the Southern Pacific extending a line eastward from Mojave and the Atlantic and Pacific completing its 35th parallel route west of Albuquerque.
In addition, the Atlantic and Pacific retained whatever rights it might have to build through California. But when Strong looked at the numbers, what was the rush? It had been projected to cost the Atlantic and Pacific at least $10 million to build from Needles to San Francisco. If, through its interest in the railroad, the Santa Fe could gain access to the entire Southern Pacific system without additional capital expense, the Atlantic and Pacific and the Santa Fe could save millions of dollars to use in improving their existing lines.
That is exactly what Strong set about doing throughout the remainder of 1882 and into 1883 as the two roads converged on Needles. Even Huntington had become envious of the financial condition of the Santa Fe. The railroad had “strong backers in Boston,” Charley Crocker acknowledged to Huntington, “[who] do not seem to want for money.” Part of the reason, of course, was that unlike many railroads, the Santa Fe was making money for its investors by means of steady but conservative expansion.
At the close of 1878—the year of the fight for Raton Pass and the opening blows in the Royal Gorge—the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe owned, leased, and operated 868 miles of track. It had net earnings of $2 million on gross earnings of $4 million. That left $2 million to service debt and reward shareholders with dividends. But just four years later, at the close of 1882—before completing the line to Needles—those numbers had more than tripled to 2,620 miles of track and net earnings of $6.5 million on gross earnings of $14.8 million.17
If nothing else, these numbers evidence the conservative financial leadership under Thomas Nickerson and William Barstow Strong that was to become a hallmark of the Santa Fe. Strong had big plans to increase those numbers much more, but for the moment in 1882, it served his long-term purposes to agree to meet Huntington at the Colorado River at Needles. After all, why do battle when one could achieve half the plum peacefully and ponder acquiring the other half at a later date?
So, the corporate shell of the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad, with the solid financial backing of both the Santa Fe and the Frisco, continued to build westward from Flagstaff in the summer of 1882. By September 1, the railhead had reached Williams—a bustling settlement named for mountain man and trapper “Old Bill” Williams. Land speculators anticipated the railroad’s advance, and their optimism was rewarded when Williams was initially made a division point.
West of Williams, the terrain got tougher again. The line dropped 2, 000 feet in elevation along a 3 percent grade to reach Ash Fork. The chief difficulty was in Johnson Canyon. Here workers were forced to blast two 150-foot cuts and a 328-foot tunnel through hardened lava flows.
It was dangerous work. On one hot summer day, two and one-half tons of powder were tamped into drill holes in preparation for the usual blast. Tamping with a copper or bronze rod was the correct procedure, but someone picked up an iron bar by mistake. It struck the hard rock with a spark that ignited the powder and caused a premature explosion. Six workers were killed and another three seriously injured. A young boy riding nearby in a mule cart became a seventh victim. The cart was totally demolished, but somehow the mule escaped unharmed.
J. T. Simms was the tunnel contractor, and he worked crews from both ends. Once completed in the spring of 1882, the Johnson Canyon Tunnel was a work of art. Because of loose rock, the tunnel was lined with stonework retaining walls topped with sections of boilerplate that arched across the roof.
The Santa Fe continued to use this tunnel until 1959. The fact that it was the only tunnel on the Santa Fe line between Cajon Pass and Raton Pass is a testament to the less mountainous terrain of the 35th parallel route when compared to lines in the Rockies or Sierras. (The Crookton Cutoff on the main line now bypasses this entire section of Johnson Canyon and has reduced grades to about 1 percent.)
Once the Johnson Canyon Tunnel and two nearby viaducts across arroyos were ready for rails, the tracklayers quickly pushed westward to Seligman, which eventually replaced Williams as the division point. Beyond Seligman lay Chino Wash, a normally dry expanse of arroyos that had the tendency to fill with raging flash floods when the rains of July and August dumped moisture from the south onto the rocky terrain.
Construction crews had already learned the lesson of the infamous summer monsoons of the Arizona desert the hard way. Flash floods and high water destroyed portions of the Southern Pacific’s new line across Cienega Wash, east of Tucson, in the summer of 1880. The Atlantic and Pacific experienced similar problems and was forced to rebuild sections of roadbed around Holbrook the following year. Finally getting wise to nature’s vagaries, the Atlantic and Pacific opted to construct a 600-foot iron viaduct across the usually dry flats of Chino Wash.
From there the line headed northwest to a more reliable and less tumultuous source of water. Near orchards that the Hualapai Indians cultivated, Peach Springs gushed out a reliable supply. Crews constructed a 50,000-gallon water tank there, and because of the reliability of water, the little oasis became a place of importance to the railroad. Major sidetracks and a six-bay roundhouse were also installed. Later, a generation of Route 66 travelers found similar respite at Peach Springs.
By now it was March 1883, and Strong and his Santa Fe associates were anxious to beat the Southern Pacific to Needles. Yes, they had Huntington’s word that he would meet them there and not build into Arizona, but the Boston crowd well remembered the Southern Pacific’s charge into Yuma six years earlier. They urged their contractors onward, and crews put down from 2 to 2.5 miles of track per day. The line advanced so quickly that carpenters working on bridges were almost bowled out of the way as temporary shoo-fly tracks were thrown down on hastily piled debris around the permanent sites.
By the time the first train steamed into Kingman on March 27, 1883, the railhead had finally run itself out of rail. Tracklaying came to a halt for several weeks while more iron was rushed to the front. During the lull, all available carpenters were sent ahead to work on the Needles bridge. With them went 60-foot-long piles of fresh-cut pine from the San Francisco Peaks that were brought to Kingman by rail and then hauled by mule teams to the crossing site.18
Today the railroad and Interstate 40 cross the Colorado River within yards of each other about a dozen miles south of Needles at Topock, Arizona, where the river channel narrows. But in 1883, the surveyed line stayed on the east side of the river and ran north before crossing the river directly into what became the town of Needles.
Here the riverbed was very wide, with many braided channels. Long before the Colorado was harnessed by a succession of dams, spring floods—these caused by annual snowmelt high in the Rockies and not the summer monsoons—swept a muddy, brown torrent down the river. That’s exactly what happened at the bridge site in June 1883 as workers attempted to erect a 1,700-foot trestle.
Meanwhile, Southern Pacific crews were pushing eastward across California’s Mojave Desert. Truth be told, Huntington was in just as much of a hurry to reach the Colorado River at Needles as Strong was. The question of the Santa Fe extending into California appeared to be momentarily resolved, but Huntington was taking no chances. Huntington didn’t intend to force his way across this bridge, but he certainly wasn’t going to permit the Santa Fe much of a toehold on the western bank.
So, east from Mojave, the Southern Pacific crews raced at breakneck speed. Technically, it was Huntington and Stanford’s Pacific Improvement Company doing the work, and its ranks were again filled with veteran Chinese laborers. The site of Barstow, California, was only an empty valley—a town would not be founded there until some years later. From there east to the Colorado River, the line snaked through 150 miles of desert mountain ranges, crested 2,770-foot Mountain Springs Summit, and descended to the Colorado at Needles.
The flurry of construction was at times as haphazard as that on the Atlantic and Pacific, but when the Southern Pacific laid rails into Needles, the Atlantic and Pacific crews were still struggling to complete the bridge. This time the agreed-upon boundary at the river would stand.
Finally, on August 3, 1883, Atlantic and Pacific tracklayers spiked rails across the long trestle and five days later joined those of the Southern Pacific. The 35th parallel route west from Albuquerque was complete, but more important, the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe had become a critical link in a transcontinental at last.
The line wasn’t under one management, let alone one ownership, but it was now possible to travel by rail from St. Louis to San Francisco along a route generally free from the blizzards that routinely plagued the Union Pacific’s route. By the fall of 1883, one could board a Pullman sleeper in St. Louis and travel west to Halstead on the Frisco, then continue to Albuquerque on the Santa Fe, to Needles on the Atlantic and Pacific, and finally arrive in San Francisco on the Southern Pacific.
The 574 miles between Albuquerque and Needles alone required twenty-four hours via what was unabashedly billed as “express service,” but in time, the gentle grades, moderate climate, and beeline path of this southern route would make it the crux of America’s greatest transcontinental line.19
At the time, William Barstow Strong and his backers did not pause to celebrate. No matter which way they looked—from Deming or from Needles—they were still hostage to the whims of Collis P. Huntington and the Southern Pacific. The Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe had become a transcontinental link, but the battle for California remained to be fought.
Atchison, Topeka na Santa Fe ilikuwa moja ya reli chache za magharibi na matarajio ya kuvuka bara ambayo haikuwa na neno Pasifiki katika jina lake. Hata hivyo, hilo halikumaanisha kwamba mipango ya reli hiyo ya kuvuka mabara ilikuwa imepunguzwa au kwamba ilisimama katikati ya New Mexico. Mwaka 1881 meli za Atchison, Topeka na Santa Fe zilikuwa zikisafiri kwenye Bahari ya Pasifiki kupitia pande tatu tofauti. "Hata hivyo, William Barstow Strong na Santa Fe walipokea kidogo zaidi ya ""kushikana mkono"" kutoka kwa Collis P. Huntington na Southern Pacific huko Deming, lakini Strong na bodi yake ya wakurugenzi walionekana kuwa na hisia mapema kwamba inaweza kuwa hivyo." Walijitolea ujenzi kusini kutoka Albuquerque kwa sehemu ili kulinda Santa Fe's pande za kusini na kuweka Jay Gould na au Huntington kutoka kujenga kaskazini kutoka El Paso. Mstari wa pili wa Pasifiki wa Santa Fe ulikuwa kupitia Reli ya Sonora hadi Guaymas, Mexico. Hata hivyo, Santa Fe ilijenga reli yake ya New Mexico na Arizona kutoka Benson, Arizona, kusini ili kuungana na Reli ya Sonora kwenye mpaka wa Mexico huko Nogales, lakini njia hii pia ilitegemea amri ya Pasifiki ya Kusini kwa sababu ya makubaliano ya pamoja ya reli ya kilomita 174 kati ya Deming na Benson. Kile ambacho Santa Fe alihitaji - na kile ambacho Strong alikuwa akipata kwa subira kwa vipande na vipande - kilikuwa njia ya kuvuka mabara kati ya Mississippi na Pasifiki chini ya udhibiti wake mwenyewe kabisa. Sehemu muhimu ilikuwa kutoka kwa biashara mbalimbali za reli ambazo zilitokana na upanuzi mkali wa Thomas Hart Benton. Hata kabla ya uchunguzi wa Reli ya Pasifiki ya 1853, Seneta Benton alikuwa amepigania reli kati ya St. Louis na San Francisco. "Benton aliwahi kusema katika mkutano wa Congress kwamba ""kitu muhimu zaidi kwake ilikuwa kuweka mwisho wa njia hiyo katika miji miwili ambayo ilikumbatia mstari wa 38.""" Kampuni ya Reli ya Pasifiki ya Missouri ilianzishwa mnamo 1849 na kuanzisha reli ya reli ya St. Louis. "Hata hivyo, ""majaribu na msiba wa John C. Frumont na John Gunnison wakati wa kujaza ""maelezo"" kando ya mstari wa 38 hivi karibuni ulifanya Missourians kufikiria njia ya kusini zaidi ya mstari wa 35 badala yake." St. Louis bado itakuwa terminal ya mashariki, lakini tawi la kusini magharibi la Kampuni ya Reli ya Pasifiki ilitazamiwa kukata kwa mstatili katika jimbo hadi Springfield, ambayo kwa muda mrefu ilijitangaza kuwa lango la reli ya mantiki kwa njia ya 35th. Katikati ya utoaji wa ardhi baada ya Vita vya wenyewe kwa wenyewe, Springfield ilipata fursa yake. Wakati huo, Benton alikuwa amekufa, lakini Frémont alipata udhibiti wa tawi la kusini magharibi - jina lake lilibadilishwa kuwa Southwest Pacific Railroad - na kutumia lengo la Springfield kukuza Reli mpya ya Atlantiki na Pasifiki kama upanuzi wa mantiki kuelekea magharibi kutoka hapo. "Ilikuwa ni kwa ujumla kwenda magharibi kutoka Springfield kwa uhakika juu ya Mto Canada, kisha Albuquerque, kichwa cha Little Colorado, na juu ya Mto Colorado, katika hatua kama inaweza kuchaguliwa na alisema kampuni kwa kuvuka, na kutoka hapo kwa njia ya uwezekano mkubwa na haki kwa Pasifiki. ""Hakuna ahadi ya faida ya dhamana ya ruzuku ambayo alikuwa na faida ya Union Pacific, lakini Atlantic na Pasifiki ardhi ruzuku ilikuwa ukarimu ""kila sehemu mbadala kwa kiasi cha ishirini sehemu mbadala kwa kila maili ya reli kupitia maeneo na kumi sehemu mbadala kwa kila upande." Atlantic na Pacific ilihitaji kuanza ujenzi ndani ya miaka miwili, kukamilisha angalau maili hamsini kwa mwaka, na kumaliza mstari wake kuu ifikapo Julai 4, 1878. Lakini kulikuwa na sehemu moja katika sheria ya kuwezesha ambayo ilionyesha mkono wa Collis P. Huntington. "Hata hivyo, kwa mujibu wa kifungu cha 18, ""Huntington's Southern Pacific Railroad ilikuwa na mamlaka ya kuunganisha na Atlantic na Pacific Railroad katika hatua kama hiyo, karibu na mpaka wa jimbo la California, kama watakavyoona inafaa zaidi kwa mstari wa reli kwenda San Francisco.""" "Meli ya ""Fremont"" ilitoka katika safari zake za baharini, lakini kufikia Juni 1871 meli ya ""Atlantic and Pacific"" ilikuwa imeshirikiana na meli ya ""Southwest Pacific"" kama ilivyopangwa." Reli hiyo ilifunga njia ya Missouri kupitia Springfield hadi mpaka wa jimbo na kuendelea katika eneo la India na makutano na Missouri, Kansas na Texas Railroad (Katy) huko Vinita, eneo la India. Kama vile Tom Scott alivyofanya kwa San Diego kwa niaba ya Texas na Pasifiki, ujumbe wa Missouri ulisafiri kwenda San Francisco mnamo 1872 kupata marafiki na uhusiano katika mwisho wa magharibi wa mstari huo. Lakini Wakalifornia walikuwa na uaminifu-mshikamanifu uliogawanyika. Baadhi ya watu walipendelea mradi wa Scott wa Texas na Pasifiki; wengine walitaka mstari huo uwe chini ya udhibiti wa California; na, bila shaka, Big Four walifanya mambo kuwa magumu kwa kupinga reli yoyote ambayo siku moja ingeweza kushindana na Reli ya Pasifiki ya Kati iliyokuwa imekamilika hivi karibuni au Reli ya Pasifiki ya Kusini iliyokuwa ikipanuka. Wakati huohuo, Atlantic na Pacific ilikodi Reli ya Asili ya Pasifiki ya Missouri ambayo hatimaye ilikuwa imefanya kutoka St. Louis hadi Kansas City, ingawa kwa kuelea deni kubwa. "Mwanzoni mwa miaka ya 1870, Bennington alitafuta ""Mji wa Pasifiki"" na Jay Gould alitafuta ""Mji wa Pasifiki wa Missouri"" lakini akashindwa na kufanikiwa na kuharibu bahari ya Pasifiki." Atlantic & Pacific ilifungwa mnamo Novemba 3, 1875, lakini wakurugenzi wake na wanahisa wakuu waliunda haraka kile kilichokuwa mapinduzi ya mwisho. Waliunda shirika jipya ambalo lingetoa zabuni kwa ajili ya franchise ya Atlantic na Pacific na ruzuku ya ardhi, wakati wa kuwa huru kutoka kwa madeni ya Atlantic na Pacific. Mnamo Septemba 8, 1876, meli ya Atlantic na Pacific iliuzwa kwa bei ya juu kwenye ngazi ya mashariki ya mahakama ya St. Louis. Siku mbili kabla ya hapo, meli ya Missouri Pacific ilikuwa imeuzwa kwa dola milioni tatu. Lakini wakati huu watu wa ndani walikuwa wakidhibiti. Wakati mnada alishuka nyundo yake, Atlantic na Pacific Reli - na ardhi yake grants uwezekano wa thamani ya mamilioni na mamilioni ya dola - ilikuwa kuuzwa kwa kiasi kidogo cha $ 450,000 kwa shirika jipya. "Kampuni hiyo mpya itaitwa ""St. Louis & San Francisco Railway Company"" - kwa sababu, labda, haina kituo katika miji yote miwili.""3 Lakini ukweli ni kwamba sasa St. Louis & San Francisco Railway ilikuwa inamiliki franchise ya Atlantic & Pacific kabisa, na kampuni ya mzazi ilifanya mipango ya kushambulia magharibi kutoka kwa kichwa chake cha reli huko Vinita." Wakati kutokuwa na uhakika juu ya haki yake ya njia na ruzuku ya ardhi katika hifadhi za Wahindi ilichelewesha ujenzi huo, St. Louis na San Francisco walipiga kando ya Eneo la Wahindi na kujenga magharibi hadi Kansas badala yake. Kwa kuzingatia lengo lake la mwisho, reli ilibadilisha alama ya zamani ya Atlantiki na Pasifiki ya "Njia ya Vinita" na jina jipya. Kuanzia wakati huo na kuendelea, Reli ya St. Louis na San Francisco ingejulikana kama "Mstari wa Frisco". Mahali pa moja kwa moja pa Frisco kilikuwa Wichita, Kansas. Wakati wa kuingiliwa na Atchison, Topeka na Santa Fe Main Line, Wichita alikuwa amechukua juu yake mwenyewe kujenga 20 maili spur na kuhakikisha siku zake za baadaye kama mji wa ng'ombe na kituo cha kibiashara. Kuangalia kuwa kituo cha reli pia, Wichita alitia moyo maendeleo ya Frisco kwa kuelea suala la dhamana ya kaunti. Lakini wakati Frisco ilipoweka reli mjini, reli kuu ya Santa Fe ilielekea magharibi hadi Albuquerque. Tazama tu ramani hiyo na utaona mambo yote. Mto Frisco ulipokuwa ukiendelea kuelekea magharibi na kufanana na Mto Santa Fe katika kusini mwa Kansas, kulikuwa na ushindani mkali kati ya barabara hizo mbili. Bila kujali jinsi madai ya Frisco katika Eneo la Wahindi yalivyotatuliwa, yaelekea yalikuwa na thamani yenye kutiliwa shaka. (Ugunduzi wa mafuta ungebadilisha hilo, lakini si hadi baadaye sana.) Kwa upande wake, Santa Fe alikuwa na wasiwasi juu ya mshindani mwingine shadowing ni katika Kansas. Kwa muda mrefu ilikuwa imepambana na ushindani kama huo kutoka Kansas Pacific kaskazini mwa mstari wake. Badala ya kushindana katika mapambano ya kuendesha meli hizo, huenda meli za Frisco na Santa Fe zingeweza kufanya kazi pamoja na kutumia rasilimali zao kumaliza njia ya 35th Parallel kuelekea magharibi kutoka Albuquerque badala ya kukabiliana na Kansas. Ilisaidia mambo kwamba viongozi wa reli zote mbili walihamia katika duru zilezile za wakuu wa Boston. Thomas Nickerson na msaidizi wake William Barstow Strong tayari walikuwa wakijionyesha kuwa wavumilivu waliozingatia matokeo ya muda mrefu. Kwa hakika, mpango wa kupewa ardhi katika eneo la Atlantiki na Pasifiki ulikuwa na manufaa, lakini pia kulikuwa na njia nyingine ya kupinga utawala wa Collis P. Huntington huko California. Mwishowe, Frisco na Santa Fe walikuwa wakitazama kivuli kikubwa zaidi na zaidi ambacho Jay Gould alikuwa akitoa juu ya miradi yote ya reli. Wakiwa na wasiwasi kuhusu uhuru wao wenyewe au jukumu la Gould katika mshindani, Frisco na Santa Fe walikuwa na sababu za ziada za kuwa washirika badala ya maadui. "Mwaka 1879 ripoti ya kila mwaka ya Atchison, Topeka na Santa Fe aliiambia matokeo: ""Mjadala mwingine ambayo ilihitaji karibu miezi sita kukamilika, inahakikisha Kampuni yako maslahi katika franchise ya thamani ya Atlantic na Pacific Reli ambayo inatoa barabara yako haki ya njia kupitia Arizona na California kwa Pwani ya Pasifiki." Kampuni yako, pamoja na Kampuni ya Reli ya St. Louis na San Francisco, itajenga barabara mpya kutoka Albuquerque kando ya mstari wa thelathini na tano, ambayo wakati unaofaa itakuwa sehemu ya mstari wa kuvuka bara. <unk>4 Mkataba huu wa tatu, uliothibitishwa rasmi Januari 31, 1880, ulikuwa katika mambo fulani zaidi ya Mkataba wa Boston au hata makubaliano kati ya Huntington na Gould huko Texas. "Utu wake wa tatu ulitokana na ukweli kwamba Santa Fe na Frisco ziliunda kampuni ndogo inayomilikiwa kwa pamoja, ikidumisha zaidi hadithi ya zamani ya Atlantiki na Pasifiki. """ Hisa zake, wakurugenzi, gharama za ujenzi, na faida zilipaswa kugawanywa kwa usawa kati ya Santa Fe na Frisco. Idara hii ya Magharibi ya Atlantiki na Pasifiki ilizaliwa upya ili kujenga magharibi kutoka mstari wa Santa Fe huko Albuquerque, ikidai kama ilikwenda ruzuku ya ardhi ya awali ya Atlantiki na Pasifiki. Ili kufadhili upanuzi huu wa maili 600 kati ya Albuquerque na Mto Colorado, Santa Fe na Frisco kila mmoja alikubali kukusanya dola milioni 5 zilizohakikishwa na mkopo wa kwanza wa asilimia 6 wa dhamana za miaka thelathini zinazohakikishwa na kampuni zote mbili. Biashara yote ya kwenda na kutoka Idara ya Magharibi ilikuwa kupita juu ya Santa Fe kutoka Albuquerque hadi Wichita - baadaye ilibadilishwa kuwa Halstead, Kansas, kwenye mstari kuu wa Santa Fe. Kutoka mahali hapo mashariki, biashara yote ya St. Louis ilienda kupitia Frisco na biashara yote ya Chicago iliendelea juu ya Santa Fe hadi Kansas City. Barabara hizo mbili pia zilikubaliana kwamba Frisco au St. Louis, Wichita na kampuni yake ndogo ya Magharibi haitajenga magharibi kutoka Wichita na kwamba hakuna upande wowote utajenga mistari mpya ya ushindani isipokuwa kwa makubaliano ya pande zote na kwa umiliki wa pamoja na gharama. Thomas Nickerson akawa rais wa Atlantic na Pasifiki Magharibi Idara, wakati zamani Union mkuu Edward F. Winslow akawa makamu wa rais kuangalia baada ya maslahi ya Frisco. "Wichita na Sedgwick County, baada ya kuvutia Frisco na suala la dhamana, sasa walilalamika, ""Kama kaunti tulikubali kulipa pesa zetu kwa faida za mashindano ya moja kwa moja na sio kwa njia ya ziada ya upendeleo."" - kutoka kwa majivu ya kushindwa kwa 35th Parallel, hiyo ndiyo Santa Fe ilikuwa na nafasi ya kufikia." Baada ya mapigano ya kwanza ya Raton Pass na Royal Gorge, William Barstow Strong alituma A. A. Robinson magharibi kutoka Albuquerque kuangalia. Robinson hakuingia katika eneo lisilojulikana, bali alifuata hatua za Luteni Amiel Whipple katika juhudi zake za 1853 na William Jackson Palmer katika uchunguzi wake wa 1867 kwa niaba ya Kansas Pacific. Lakini hakupendezwa. Robinson alishindana na njia ya 35th parallel magharibi kutoka Albuquerque kwa sababu aliamini kwamba kina cha Grand Canyon kaskazini kilizuia biashara yoyote au kuunganisha mistari katika mwelekeo huo. (Ni wazi kwamba Robinson hakuwa akifikiria biashara ya watalii.) "Alichagiza badala yake kwamba jitihada zote zielekezwe kuelekea kusini chini ya Mto Rio Grande hadi sambamba ya 32.""" Lakini wakati Santa Fe ilipofika Deming, Huntington na Pasifiki ya Kusini walikuwa wamechukua njia hiyo. Wakati huo huo, wapimaji wa Santa Fe, ambao walifurahi kwa muda huko Tucson katika majira ya joto ya 1879, waliripoti kwamba eneo kati ya Albuquerque na Tucson lilikuwa "lisilo na matumaini" kwa mstari sahihi wa moja kwa moja na trafiki ya ndani. Nickerson na Strong walianza safari ya kusafiri kwa njia ya Lieutenant Whipple kwenye mstari wa 35. Ukweli kwamba wao kukamatwa juu ya njia hiyo mapema katika mchezo - bila kujali ripoti hasi Robinson 'na alifanya mpango na Frisco ni ushahidi kwamba walikuwa kuangalia picha kubwa ya reli katika American Southwest. "Kama vile ilivyoelezwa hapo juu, ""Nickerson na Strong walionekana kama wafanyabiashara wa reli wenye busara baada ya Huntington na Gould kuungana dhidi yao kusini.""6 Kwa karatasi, reli iliyopangwa kujengwa magharibi kutoka Albuquerque ingejulikana kama Idara ya Magharibi ya Atlantiki na Pasifiki, lakini wanaume waliohusika na ujenzi wake na baadaye kazi walikuwa sehemu ya shirika kubwa la Atchison, Topeka na Santa Fe." Ni mara tu wakati wino ulipokuwa umekauka kwenye Mkataba wa Vyama Vitatu kuliko A. Robinson, ambaye alikuwa na shaka juu ya njia hiyo, alituma vikosi vya uchunguzi magharibi kutoka Albuquerque katika majira ya joto ya 1880 ili kupiga nguzo kando ya mpangilio wa mwisho kati ya hapo na Mto Colorado. George S. Van Law, mkongwe wa vita vya Santa Fe's Raton na Royal Gorge, alikuwa katika kikundi cha kuongoza. "Kwa hivyo, kwa sababu ya kuwa na ""mtazamo wa juu"" wa ujenzi wa reli ya kwanza ya kimataifa, Robinson alitoa mwongozo wa ""mwisho wa mwisho"" wa barabara ya reli ya kwanza ya Ulaya, ambayo ilifanya iwe rahisi kwa watu wengi kuhamia Arizona." Walikuwa wakifuatilia njia ya zamani, lakini Van Law aliona ni barabara ya jina tu, na hakuona mtu au gari kwenye barabara hiyo wakati wote wa majira ya joto ya kazi ambayo wakati mwingine ilikuwa ngumu sana. Wakati magari ya vifaa yalipokuwa karibu, maisha yalikuwa mazuri, lakini walipokosa kuendelea na maendeleo au kufika mahali walipokuwa wamekubaliana, njaa ikawa rafiki wa kawaida. Kiamsha-kinywa cha asubuhi moja kwa wafanyakazi tisa wa Van Law kilikuwa na makopo mawili ya nyanya na makopo moja ya peach. "Ilikuwa, alikiri, ""bora zaidi kuliko kufa njaa.""Siku chache baadaye, baada ya kutembea maili kuanza kazi yao na kukimbia mstari kwa nusu siku, chakula chao cha mchana kilikuwa sukari tu na baadhi ya nyama ya ng'ombe karibu kijani na umri na joto." "Lakini kama ilivyo kwa watu waliosukuma mistari hii kuelekea magharibi, Van Law alikiri, ""Tulikuwa watu wazima na hakuna aliyejeruhiwa.""7 Santa Fe ilikuwa na haraka, na wafanyakazi wa ujenzi walifuata haraka alama za Van Law kuelekea magharibi kutoka karibu na Albuquerque." Mji wa Islet, karibu kilomita 12 kusini mwa mji, ulikuwa mahali ambapo reli ya Santa Fe iliyokuwa ikisafiri kwenye Mto Rio Grande ilivuka mto huo kutoka mashariki hadi magharibi. Vumbi kutoka kwa ujenzi wa daraja hilo na maandamano ya Santa Fe kuelekea Deming yalikuwa yametulia kwa majuma machache tu. Ingekuwa vigumu kusema ni njia gani iliyokuwa njia kuu. Angalau, ujenzi wa Santa Fe uliofanywa kwa ghafula katika pande mbili za meli hiyo ulifaa kwa mipango ya Nickerson na Strong ya kuvuka mabara. Bila shaka Robinson alielewa kilichokuwa hatarini. Kwa kuwa hakutaka vita vya Raton Pass kurudia tena, alituma kikosi cha wafanyakazi umbali wa maili 180 magharibi mwa Albuquerque ili kukamata na kushikilia haki ya njia kupitia Bonde la Querino. Magharibi tu ya mpaka wa Arizona na New Mexico, pengo hili la mawe ya mchanga lenye urefu wa maili mbili lilikuwa pana vya kutosha kwa seti moja tu ya nyimbo. "Kwa sababu ya kuonekana kwa ""mwenyeji"" wa Santa Fe huko Albuquerque, Crocker na Huntington walikuwa na uwezo wa kuwa wakali zaidi kuliko Jenerali Palmer alikuwa katika Raton na Royal Gorge, Robinson alitoa maagizo kwamba vifungo na reli zipelekwe kwa gari hadi Querino Canyon kabla ya reli." Barabara ya reli ya kilomita mbili na nusu iliwekwa katika bonde hilo wakati wa kiangazi cha 1880 ili kudumisha haki ya njia. Sehemu hii ilisimama kama kituo cha mbele kilichokuwa kimepunguzwa wakati mwisho wa reli ulipokuwa ukielekea mwaka uliofuata. Wakati maili 50 ya kwanza ya reli zilipokamilika magharibi mwa Isleta, Idara ya Magharibi ya Atlantiki na Pasifiki iliyomilikiwa na Santa Fe-Frisco ilitoa ombi kwa ajili ya ruzuku ya ardhi inayostahili chini ya mkataba wa awali wa Atlantiki na Pasifiki wa 1866. Sheria hiyo ilitoa amri kwamba mstari huo ukamalizike ndani ya miaka kumi. Sasa, miaka miwili baada ya tarehe hiyo ya mwisho, kulikuwa na hisia zinazozidi kuongezeka katika Bunge dhidi ya ruzuku ya ardhi kutoka kwa uwanja wa umma. Hata hivyo, mwanasheria mkuu wa Marekani Charles Devens, aliyechaguliwa na Rais Hayes, aliamua kwamba sheria ya awali, ingawa ilihitaji kukamilika katika miaka kumi, haikutoa kwa usahihi kwa ajili ya kutekwa kwa haki za reli kwa ardhi kama hiyo. "Kama Devens alivyosema, ""Waliweza kupata fedha kwa ujenzi wakati wowote isipokuwa Bunge likiamua kuingilia kati, kuchukua barabara na kuikamilisha kama mradi wa shirikisho, ambayo ni wazi haikufanya hivyo.""" Hivyo Idara ya Magharibi ilipokea hati miliki zake za kwanza za ardhi kando ya njia hiyo. Kufikia Februari 1881, kilomita 100 za reli zilikuwa zimewekwa magharibi mwa Isleta, na 80 zilikuwa zikitumiwa. Wafanyakazi wa meli hiyo waliendelea na safari yao kupitia baridi kali ya majira ya baridi kali ya jangwa na kufika Fort Wingate, ambayo sasa inaitwa Gallup, New Mexico. Lewis Kingman, ambaye alipata eneo la reli hiyo, ndiye aliyekuwa na daraka la kujenga reli hiyo. Wafanyakazi wengi wa Kingman walikuwa Wairelandi. Wakala wa chuma na wachimbaji walipata $ 2.25 kwa siku, na wachimbaji na wachimbaji wa chuma walipata $ 2.50 kwa siku - ya mwisho inalingana na karibu $ 54 kwa dola za 2008. Kingman pia aliajiri Wapachesi na Wanahajo wa eneo hilo na baadaye Wamohaves kutoka California kuwa wachimbaji wa makombora na wafanyakazi wa siku. Waingereza wengi walianza kujenga barabara za Santa Fe na nyingine katika nyanda, kama vile Wachina wengi waliofanya kazi kwa ajili ya Huntington kusini mwa Arizona walifanya kazi katika milima ya Sierra. Uchumi rahisi wa kufikia reli husika aliamuru hifadhi ya kazi - Ireland kutoka Mashariki na Kichina kutoka Magharibi. Utamaduni wa watu wa kabila fulani haukujulikana sana wakati wa kuunganisha reli yenye uzito wa pauni 52, lakini hilo halikumaanisha kwamba hakukuwa na ubaguzi wa rangi. "Mkurugenzi wa 35th Parallel R.R. alisema, ""Hakika wanastahili sifa kubwa kwa kuajiri watu wazungu tu katika ujenzi wa reli yao kubwa ya kuvuka bara kutoka Atlantiki hadi Pasifiki."" Kufikia Aprili, reli ya yatima katika Querino Canyon ilikuwa imeunganishwa na mstari mkuu, na wafanyakazi walikuwa wakijenga magharibi kaskazini mwa Arizona kwa kiwango cha maili moja kwa siku." "Nchi nzima kaskazini mwa Prescott kando ya barabara ya 35th sambamba, ""Weekly Arizona Miner iliripoti, ""ni hai na wafanyakazi wa mbele, ambao ni kuandaa barabara ya reli ya Atlantic na Pasifiki, ambayo inakuja pamoja kutoka Mashariki kwa kasi ya shingo....""" Kilomita 26 magharibi mwa Winslow, miamba ya mto Cañon Diablo ilichonga ndani sana ya eneo hilo. Kuta zake za mawe ya chokaa nyeupe na manjano zilishuka kwa urefu wa futi 250 kwenye mitaro ya mawe ya chokaa hadi kwenye kijito cha maji kilichokuwa kikitiririka chini yake. Ilikuwa zaidi ya mita 150 kutoka kwenye bonde hilo. "Wipple alishangaa na kusema kwamba ""kuanguka kwa mto kama thread"" chini ya mto ni ""hawezekani,"" lakini alimaliza kwamba ""kwa reli inaweza kuwa daraja na benki itatoa mawe mengi kwa kusudi hilo.""" Meli ya Atlantic na Pacific ilifika kwenye ukingo wa Cañon Diablo Desemba 19, 1881. Baada ya kutabiri kwa muda mrefu kizuizi hiki, reli ilikuwa na kambi ya ujenzi mbaya na yenye kelele inayoitwa Cañon Diablo ikienda kwa mlipuko kamili karibu na ukingo wa mashariki. "Kama ilivyoelezwa kwa njia mbalimbali, ""Mkubwa kuliko Tombstone na hatari kuliko Dodge City,"" mkusanyiko huo wa hema zilizopigwa na upepo na majengo magumu ulikuwa makao ya wanaume 240 waliofanya kazi kwenye eneo la daraja na kundi la makahaba, wachezaji wa kamari, na wafanyakazi wa bar." John M. Price & Co. ilikuwa na mkataba wa ujenzi wa msingi wa kuvuka daraja, na kazi yake ya kwanza ilikuwa kulipua na kuchimba majukwaa katika kuta za bonde na kando ya mto ili kushikilia pedestals za mawe kwa minara ya msaada. Kwa kuongezea, nguzo moja kubwa ya mawe ilijengwa kwenye kila ukingo. Kampuni ya Central Bridge Works ya Buffalo, New York, ilijenga daraja hilo kwa gharama ya dola 250,000 (zaidi ya dola milioni mbili). Ilisafirishwa hadi mahali hapo kwa vipande-vipande katika magari-moshi ishirini hivi. Vipande 11 tofauti - viwili vilivyo na urefu wa futi 100, viwili vilivyo na urefu wa futi 30, na saba vilivyo na urefu wa futi 40 - vilitengenezwa pamoja na kuungwa mkono na viunzi kumi vya miguu ya mnara na viunzi vilivyo kwenye pembe. Jengo hilo lenye urefu wa mita 22 lilikuwa juu ya sakafu ya bonde hilo na lilikuwa na urefu wa mita 560. Lakini sehemu za mwisho zilipowekwa mahali pake, zilithibitika kuwa fupi kwa meta kadhaa. Kwa njia fulani, mtu fulani alikuwa amepima vibaya, au kuchimbua kwa ajili ya nguzo za juu ya mviringo kulikuwa kumepanua umbali huo bila kukusudia. Marekebisho yalifanywa haraka. Wakati huohuo, wafanyakazi wa kurekebisha barabara waliendelea na kazi ya kurekebisha barabara iliyo upande wa magharibi. Hatimaye, Julai 1, 1882, gari-moshi la kwanza lilivuka daraja hilo lenye urefu wa kilometa sita kwa saa, na daraja la Cañon Diablo likaidhinishwa rasmi. Wakati huo, ilikuwa ni rahisi zaidi kuvutia daraja muundo juu ya pamoja Santa Fe Atlantic na Pasifiki mstari kati ya Kansas City na Colorado River.10 Wakati wa ujenzi pause katika Cañon Diablo, reli head kusimamishwa katika Winslow. "Mwezi Januari 1882 mgeni alisema, ""Mji sasa inajumuisha safu ya mahema kuhusu robo ya maili katika kiasi. ""Lakini kwamba ilikuwa kubadilisha haraka kwa sababu Winslow ilikuwa slated kuwa sehemu ya mgawanyiko juu ya mstari." Majengo ya utumishi, viwanja, na jengo la kuzunguka-zunguka lilijengwa upesi. Miji mikubwa iliyokuwa kwenye njia ya Bahari ya Atlantiki na Pasifiki kupitia Arizona, isipokuwa Flagstaff na Williams, ilipewa majina ya watu waliohusishwa kwa njia fulani na reli hiyo. Edward Winslow alikuwa rais wa Frisco na makamu wa rais wa Atlantic na Pacific; Lewis Kingman na H. R. Holbrook walikuwa wapimaji na wahandisi wa ujenzi (jiji la Holbrook awali liliitwa Horsehead Crossing); na Joseph Seligman alikuwa mmiliki mashuhuri wa hisa na mfadhili wa Frisco. Mvutano wa ujenzi wa Cañon Diablo pia ulimpa Price na Co wakati wa kukamilisha daraja la pili kuu maili 5 tu magharibi huko Cañon Padre. Kwa mfano, daraja la Cañon Padre lilikuwa na urefu wa mita 70 tu. Utaratibu wa kupima ulikuwa sahihi, na mara tu reli ilipowekwa kwenye Mto Diablo, wapiga-njia waliendelea kuvuka bila kusubiri. Upande wa juu chini ya Milima ya San Francisco kulikuwa na mji wa Flagstaff uliokuwa ukisitawi wa kutengeneza mbao, ambao tayari ulikuwa na nyumba mia moja. Kando ya milima ya kaskazini mwa Arizona, Milima ya San Francisco ilikuwa oasis ya kijani kibichi na chanzo cha msonobari wa ponderosa kwa ajili ya vifungo na mbao. Treni ya kwanza iliwasili Flagstaff Agosti 1, 1882.11 Ujenzi huu wote ulikuwa wa kuridhisha kwa wakurugenzi wa mashirika ya wazazi wa Atlantic na Pacific. Kama ilivyotarajiwa, trafiki ya ndani kwenye njia ya 35th parallel ilikuwa bado dhaifu, lakini upande wa magharibi ulikuwa mlango wa kuingia California. "Mfano wa ""mwisho wa mwisho"" wa William Barstow Strong, rais wa Santa Fe, ulifanyika mnamo 1881 na ilichukuliwa na J. Edgar Thomson, mwandishi wa Pennsylvania." Strong alitambua kwamba katika Marekani, nguvu ya reli ya kulinda na kuongeza biashara yake inategemea urefu wake, na kiasi cha eneo ambalo linaweza kugusa. kusimamishwa kwa Mto Colorado wakati wa magharibi kwa kweli haikuwa chaguo zaidi kwa Atlantiki na Pasifiki kuliko kusimamishwa kwa Colorado wakati wa mashariki ilikuwa kwa Huntington na Pasifiki ya Kusini miaka kadhaa mapema. Kwa hiyo, kwa sababu ya akili, Strong aliunga mkono kupanuka kwa nchi hiyo kuelekea magharibi hadi California. Katika mkutano wa bodi ya wakurugenzi wa Atlantic na Pacific mnamo Desemba 1881, wawakilishi wa Santa Fe na Frisco walikubaliana pamoja kukusanya dola milioni 16.5 za ziada. Sehemu ndogo ilitumiwa kupanua tawi la Vinita kupitia Eneo la Wahindi, lakini sehemu kubwa ilikuwa kufadhili ujenzi kutoka kuvuka Mto Colorado huko Needles hadi San Francisco. Mzunguko wa kuomba uligawanywa kwa kusudi hilo na ulipata mafanikio ya awali. "Kisha, Februari 1882, Strong na Santa Fe waliarifiwa bila kutarajia na mshirika wao sawa katika mradi huo kwamba ""Frisco"" haikuwa na kwenda kuongeza sehemu yake ya nusu." "Kwa sababu ya mabadiliko yanayotokea katika umiliki wa hisa za Kampuni ya Reli ya St. Louis na San Francisco", ilikuwa ikisimamisha mauzo yote ya toleo jipya la dhamana. Haikuchukua muda mrefu kunusa panya. Kwa kweli, wakati huu, kutoka kwa mtazamo wa Santa Fe, kulikuwa na panya wawili, na walikuwa wakifanya kazi kwa pamoja.12 Mara tu baada ya makubaliano yao huko Magharibi mwa Texas, Collis P. Huntington na Jay Gould walikuwa wameamua kuwa kuwa washirika haikuwa mbaya sana. Kwa muda mfupi, majeshi hayo mawili yalipata makusudi ya pamoja katika kuungana ili kupinga upanuzi wa Santa Fe kupitia Bahari ya Atlantiki na Pasifiki. Mstari wa 35 wa mstari wa Santa Fe haungeshambulia moja kwa moja mpaka wa Huntington wa California, lakini pia trafiki yake ya mashariki ya transcontinental na upanuzi uliopendekezwa wa Vinita ulikuwa tishio kwa Texas na Pasifiki ya Gould na mfumo wake wa Missouri Pacific. Kutoka kwa kampuni ya benki ya New York ya J. na W. Seligman na Kampuni, ambayo Gould alikuwa mteja tangu mwishoni mwa miaka ya 1860, Huntington na Gould walinunua pamoja hisa za kudhibiti katika hisa za Frisco. "Huntingdon alitoa shauri la kipekee kwa baba yake: ""Usiogope kufanya biashara na mchafu, lakini uepuke mpumbavu"" na ""Ukidhibiti Frisco, Huntington na Gould sasa walikuwa na nusu ya hisa katika Atlantiki na Pasifiki pia.""" Joseph Seligman, mwandishi wa vitabu vya San Francisco, aliamua kuanzisha kampuni ya San Francisco, lakini kifo chake kilimfanya afanye kazi ya ujenzi wa barabara hiyo. Rais wa Frisco Edward Winslow alikataa kuuza, lakini Seligmans waliookoka walifanikiwa, angalau kwa sehemu kwa sababu ya uaminifu wa zamani kwa Gould kama mteja. Walikuwa wamefanya bidii sana kukuza ujenzi wa Bahari ya Atlantiki na Pasifiki na kutangaza muungano wao wa kimkakati na Frisco. Kwa ghafla, wanahisa wa Santa Fe walijikuta wanashiriki sawa na Huntington na Gould katika Atlantiki na Pasifiki, lakini washirika na ajenda tofauti sana. Wakati bodi ya wakurugenzi wa Atlantic na Pasifiki ilipokutana tena, wageni - Collis Huntington, Leland Stanford, Jay Gould, na mshirika wa karibu wa Gould, Russell Sage - waliketi kwenye meza kutoka kwa William Barstow Strong na wakurugenzi wa Santa Fe. Kikundi cha kwanza kilitaka kusimamisha Bahari ya Atlantiki na Pasifiki kwenye Mto Colorado; cha pili, ili kuendelea hadi San Francisco kama ilivyopangwa. Huko hadharani, Strong alijaribu kuonyesha uhusiano huo mpya kwa njia bora zaidi. "Mkuu wa Santa Fe alitoa taarifa katika gazeti la New York Times kwamba uhusiano na Gould ungekuwa mzuri na kwamba ""damu mpya"" katika Frisco inaweza hata kuthibitisha faida nzuri kwa barabara yake." Strong alidai kuwa jambo la kutojali kwa Atchison ambaye anadhibiti San Francisco Road. wiki moja baadaye, Strong alipokea barua iliyoandikwa kibinafsi na Jay Gould ambayo haikuacha shaka juu ya nani alidhibiti Frisco, na vile vile hatima ya haraka ya Atlantiki na Pasifiki. <unk>Bwana Huntington leo ananiarifu kwamba ameamua kupanua Pasifiki ya Kusini kutoka Mohave hadi Mto Colorado kuunganisha na Atlantiki na Pasifiki, Gould aliandika. "Wakati mwingine, huenda ikawa afadhali kupanua A&P hadi Mohave au hata San Francisco, lakini hakuona sababu ya ""kupinga"" Pasifiki Kusini wakati ilikuwa katika ""upendezi wetu kuifunga kwenye mstari wetu mpya kwa njia iliyopendekezwa."" ""Mapendezi yangu ni kufanya kazi kwa upatano na Kampuni za Kusini na Atchison,"" alisema Gould, ""na nadhani kabla ya hatua nyingine yoyote kuchukuliwa katika kutoa dhamana tunapaswa kuwa na mkutano na kuja kwa marekebisho ya usawa.""" Strong kama kwa mazungumzo yetu leo. <unk> Panya walikuwa kweli kufanya kazi pamoja. <unk> 14 Strong <unk> jibu lililoandikwa ilikuwa sawa cordial na, labda, sawa disingenuous. "Nafsi yako ya kuhakikisha usawa inathaminiwa, ""Strong alimwambia Gould, akiongeza kwamba kutoka siku uliyochukua jukumu la Union Pacific Railroad hadi sasa, wakati wowote na mahali popote maslahi yako na maslahi ya Kampuni hii yamepingana, tofauti zote zimepangwa kwa roho ya haki. ""Strong aliendelea kuchelewesha ushindi wa Huntington-Gould kwa kuomba kwamba alikuwa ""bila taarifa rasmi kutoka kwa St. Louis na SF.""" kwamba mabadiliko yoyote katika mpango wa awali ni taka <unk> na kwamba yeye kutaja barua Gould ya bodi yake. Lakini matokeo yalikuwa ya hakika kama maandishi ya Gould. Gazeti moja la kifedha la New York - labda lilihimiza mtazamo wake na wawekezaji wa Santa Fe - baadaye lilienda mbali sana kama kupongeza "uhamasishaji na akili njema" ya umati wa Boston katika kutofanya ununuzi wake wa Frisco kabla ya Gould na Huntington kufanya hivyo. "Wakati mstari wa kujitegemea kwa Pasifiki ulikuwa ""wa wazo la kupendeza,"" Commercial and Financial Chronicle ilizungumzia, ilikuwa bora zaidi ""kutofautisha na kuchora mstari kati ya biashara za tabia ya kutiliwa shaka au isiyo ya kuahidi sana na zile zinazotoa kipimo cha haki cha mafanikio, ambayo ni mtihani wa kweli... lakini mtihani wa mwisho, kama Strong alijua vizuri, ulikuwa katika kufikia Pasifiki.""" Strong na wakurugenzi wake wa Santa Fe, hata hivyo, walikuwa tayari kuwa na subira katika kufikia lengo hilo. "Waliweza kupata katika vita cutthroat na Huntington na Gould kwamba pengine ingekuwa kushoto Santa Fe uchovu na bado bila Pasifiki outlet. """ Badala yake Strong alichukua sura kutoka kwa makubaliano ya Huntington-Gould huko Sierra Blanca. Kwa nini kupigana na washindani wa mtu kama unaweza kufanya kazi nao kwa faida yako mwenyewe? Wakati Huntington alipopendekeza rasmi kwa bodi ya wakurugenzi ya Atlantic na Pacific kwamba Pasifiki Kusini itakutana na Atlantiki na Pasifiki huko Needles, Strong alikubali pendekezo hilo bila hoja. Mkataba uliokubaliwa na Huntington na Gould uliweka asilimia 25 ya mapato ya jumla ya Southern Pacific kupitia biashara ya Atlantic na Pacific kwa malipo ya riba ya dhamana ya mwisho, kwa ufanisi kusaidia kulipia ujenzi wa mstari. Barabara hizo mbili zilikubaliana kuharakisha ujenzi wao na kukutana huko Needles haraka iwezekanavyo - Pasifiki Kusini ikipanua mstari kuelekea mashariki kutoka Mojave na Atlantiki na Pasifiki kukamilisha njia yake ya 35 ya sambamba magharibi mwa Albuquerque. Kwa kuongezea, Atlantic na Pacific zilihifadhi haki zozote ambazo zingeweza kuwa nazo za kujenga kupitia California. Lakini Strong alipotazama namba hizo, kwa nini akafanya haraka? Meli hiyo ilikadiriwa kuwa itachukua kampuni ya Atlantic na Pacific angalau dola milioni 10 kujenga kutoka Needles hadi San Francisco. Ikiwa, kupitia maslahi yake katika reli, Santa Fe ingeweza kupata upatikanaji wa mfumo mzima wa Pasifiki Kusini bila gharama ya ziada ya mtaji, Atlantic na Pasifiki na Santa Fe wangeweza kuokoa mamilioni ya dola kutumia katika kuboresha mistari yao ya sasa. Hiyo ndiyo iliyokuwa njia ya Strong ya kuendesha barabara hiyo hadi mwaka wa 1882, wakati barabara hizo mbili zilipokuwa zikielekea Needles. Hata Huntington alikuwa amekuwa na wivu kwa hali ya kifedha ya Santa Fe. Reli hiyo ilikuwa na "wafadhili wenye nguvu huko Boston", Charley Crocker alikiri kwa Huntington, "ambao hawaonekani wanataka pesa". Sehemu ya sababu, bila shaka, ilikuwa kwamba tofauti na reli nyingi, Santa Fe ilikuwa ikipata pesa kwa wawekezaji wake kwa njia ya upanuzi thabiti lakini wa kihafidhina. Katika mwaka wa 1878, wakati wa vita vya Raton Pass na Royal Gorge, Atchison, Topeka na Santa Fe walikuwa na milia 868 ya reli. Ilikuwa na mapato ya $ 2 milioni kwenye mapato ya jumla ya $ 4 milioni. Inabaki dola milioni mbili kwa ajili ya huduma ya madeni na kuwaheshimu wanahisa kwa mgawanyo. Lakini miaka minne tu baadaye, mwishoni mwa mwaka wa 1882 - kabla ya kukamilisha mstari wa Needles - idadi hiyo ilikuwa zaidi ya mara tatu hadi maili 2,620 za reli na mapato ya $ 6.5 milioni kwenye mapato ya jumla ya $ 14.8 milioni, na idadi hiyo ilionyesha uongozi wa kifedha wa kihafidhina chini ya Thomas Nickerson na William Barstow Strong. Strong alikuwa na mipango mikubwa ya kuongeza idadi hiyo zaidi, lakini kwa sasa katika 1882, ilitumika kwa makusudi yake ya muda mrefu kukubali kukutana na Huntington kwenye Mto Colorado huko Needles. Baada ya yote, kwa nini kupigana wakati mtu anaweza kupata nusu ya plum kwa amani na kufikiria kupata nusu nyingine katika tarehe ya baadaye? Kampuni ya reli ya Atlantic na Pacific, iliyoanzishwa na Santa Fe na Frisco, iliendelea kujenga kutoka Flagstaff hadi West. Kufikia Septemba 1, reli hiyo ilikuwa imefika Williams - makazi yenye shughuli nyingi yaliyoitwa kwa jina la mtu wa milimani na mnyang'anyi "Old Bill" Williams. Wawekezaji wa ardhi walitarajia maendeleo ya reli, na matumaini yao yalithawabishwa wakati Williams awali ilifanywa kuwa hatua ya mgawanyiko. Magharibi mwa Williams, eneo hilo likawa gumu tena. Mstari huo ulishuka kwa futi 2,000 juu ya ardhi kwenye mwinuko wa asilimia 3 ili kufikia Ash Fork. Ugumu mkubwa ulikuwa katika Bonde la Johnson. Kazi hiyo ilifanya wafanyakazi waanguke kwa urefu wa mita 150 na kufungua handaki lenye urefu wa mita 328 kupitia mito ya lava. Ilikuwa kazi hatari. Siku moja ya kiangazi yenye joto, tani mbili na nusu za poda zilipigwa ndani ya mashimo ya kuchimba ili kujitayarisha kwa mlipuko wa kawaida. Kuigonga kwa fimbo ya shaba au shaba ilikuwa utaratibu sahihi, lakini mtu fulani alichukua fimbo ya chuma kwa kosa. Iligonga mwamba mgumu kwa cheche ambayo iliwasha risasi na kusababisha mlipuko wa mapema. Wafanyakazi sita waliuawa na wengine watatu kujeruhiwa vibaya. Mvulana mdogo aliyekuwa akiendesha gari la punda karibu akawa mhasiriwa wa saba. Gari hilo lilibomolewa kabisa, lakini kwa njia fulani punda huyo aliokoka bila kujeruhiwa. J. T. Simms alikuwa mjenzi wa handaki hilo, naye alifanya kazi na wafanyakazi kutoka pande zote mbili. Baada ya kukamilika mwaka wa 1882, Johnson Canyon Tunnel ilikuwa kazi ya sanaa. Kwa sababu ya miamba iliyokuwa imefunguka, handaki hilo lilikuwa na kuta za mawe zilizotengenezwa kwa mawe na zilizokuwa na sehemu za mbao zilizopindika juu ya paa. Meli ya Santa Fe iliendelea kutumia handaki hilo hadi mwaka wa 1959. Kwa kuwa ilikuwa ni handaki pekee kwenye mstari wa Santa Fe kati ya Cajon Pass na Raton Pass, ni ushahidi wa eneo la chini la mlima wa njia ya 35th sambamba ikilinganishwa na mistari katika Rocky Mountains au Sierras. Mstari wa Crookton kwenye mstari mkuu sasa unapita sehemu hii nzima ya Johnson Canyon na umepunguza viwango hadi asilimia 1 hivi. Baada ya Johnson Canyon Tunnel na viaducts mbili karibu katika Arroyo walikuwa tayari kwa reli, tracklayers haraka kusukuma magharibi kwa Seligman, ambayo hatimaye kubadilishwa Williams kama sehemu ya mgawanyiko. Zaidi ya Seligman kulikuwa na Chino Wash, eneo la kawaida lenye maji mengi ambalo lilikuwa na mwelekeo wa kujazwa na mafuriko ya ghafula wakati mvua za Julai na Agosti zilipopeleka unyevu kutoka kusini kwenye eneo lenye miamba. Wafanyakazi wa ujenzi walikuwa tayari wamejifunza somo kutokana na mvua zenye kuogopesha za kiangazi za jangwani la Arizona kwa njia ngumu. Mafuriko ya maji ya baharini yaliharibu sehemu ya mstari mpya wa Bahari ya Pasifiki Kusini kupitia Cienega Wash, mashariki mwa Tucson, katika majira ya joto ya 1880. Atlantic na Pacific zilipata matatizo kama hayo na zikalazimika kujenga upya sehemu za barabara karibu na Holbrook mwaka uliofuata. Baada ya kuamua kuanzisha mstari wa chuma wa mita 600, Atlantic na Pacific waliamua kujenga viaduct ya chuma katika maeneo ya kawaida kavu ya Chino Wash, na kutoka hapo mstari huo ulielekea kaskazini magharibi kwa chanzo cha maji cha kuaminika zaidi na kisicho na msukosuko. Karibu na mashamba ya matunda ambayo Wahindi wa Hualapai walilima, Peach Springs ilitoa maji kwa uaminifu. Wakala wa maji walijenga tangi la maji lenye lita 50,000 huko, na kwa sababu ya kuegemea maji, oasi hiyo ndogo ikawa mahali muhimu kwa reli. Barabara kuu za kando na nyumba ya mviringo yenye viwanja sita pia ziliwekwa. Baadaye, kizazi kingine cha wasafiri wa Barabara ya 66 kilipata kitulizo kama hicho huko Peach Springs. Mwaka 1883 Strong na wenzake wa Santa Fe walikuwa na hamu ya kuishinda meli ya Southern Pacific. "Hata hivyo, Huntington alitoa neno kwamba atawakutana huko na si kujenga katika Arizona, lakini umati wa Boston walikumbuka vizuri ""mshtuko wa Pasifiki ya Kusini"" katika Yuma miaka sita mapema." Walipiga mbizi kwa makampuni ya ujenzi na wafanyakazi walianza kujenga barabara ya kilomita mbili hadi mbili na nusu kwa siku. Mstari huo ulisonga mbele haraka sana hivi kwamba mafundi waliokuwa wakifanya kazi kwenye madaraja karibu wakaangushwa nje ya njia wakati njia za muda za kusafirisha ndege zilipopigwa chini juu ya mabaki yaliyokusanywa haraka kuzunguka maeneo ya kudumu. Wakati gari-moshi la kwanza lilipofika Kingman, tarehe 27 Machi 1883, hatimaye reli hiyo ilikuwa imeishiwa na reli. Ujenzi wa reli ulisimamishwa kwa majuma kadhaa huku chuma kingine kikipelekwa haraka mbele. Wakati wa utulivu huo, mafundi wote waliopatikana walitumwa mbele kufanya kazi kwenye daraja la Needles. "Kama vile vile, ""miti ya misonobari iliyokatwa hivi karibuni kutoka San Francisco Peaks ilifika Kingman kwa reli na kisha ikabebwa na timu za punda hadi mahali pa kuvuka"" (Mstari wa 40 wa Interstate 40 unavuka Mto Colorado kwa mita chache, karibu maili kumi na mbili kusini mwa Needles, Topeka, Arizona)." Lakini mwaka 1883 mstari huo uliokaguliwa ulibaki upande wa mashariki wa mto na ukaelekea kaskazini kabla ya kuvuka mto moja kwa moja hadi mahali ambapo mji wa Needles ulikuja. Hapa kitanda cha mto kilikuwa pana sana, kikiwa na mifereji mingi iliyofunikwa. Muda mrefu kabla ya Colorado kutumiwa na mfululizo wa mabwawa, mafuriko ya masika - haya yaliyosababishwa na kuyeyuka kwa theluji ya kila mwaka juu katika Milima ya Rocky na si mvua za majira ya joto - yalipiga mkondo wa matope, wa kahawia chini ya mto. Hii ni kwa sababu ya tukio la mlipuko wa daraja la mto wa Mto wa Mto wa Mto wa Mto wa Mto wa Mto wa Mto wa Mto wa Mto wa Mto wa Mto wa Mto wa Mto wa Mto wa Mto wa Mto wa Mto wa Mto wa Mto wa Mto wa Mto wa Mto wa Mto wa Mto wa Mto wa Mto wa Mto wa Mto wa Mto wa Mto wa Mto wa Mto wa Mto wa Mto. Wakati huohuo, vikosi vya Bahari ya Pasifiki ya Kusini vilikuwa vikisonga kuelekea mashariki kupitia Jangwa la Mojave la California. Kwa kweli, Huntington alikuwa na haraka sana kufikia Mto Colorado huko Needles kama vile Strong. Suala la Santa Fe kupanuka katika California ilionekana kuwa kutatuliwa kwa muda, lakini Huntington alikuwa kuchukua hakuna nafasi. Huntington hakuwa na nia ya kulazimisha njia yake juu ya daraja hili, lakini yeye hakika hakuwa na kwenda kuruhusu Santa Fe mengi ya toothhold juu ya benki ya magharibi. Kwa hiyo, mashariki ya Mojave, wafanyakazi wa Bahari ya Pasifiki Kusini walishindana kwa mwendo wa kasi sana. Kimsingi, ilikuwa Kampuni ya Kuboresha Bahari ya Pasifiki ya Huntington na Stanford iliyofanya kazi hiyo, na vikosi vyake vilijaa tena wafanyakazi wa zamani wa Kichina. Eneo la Barstow, California, lilikuwa tu bonde tupu - mji haungeanzishwa huko hadi miaka kadhaa baadaye. Kutoka hapo kuelekea mashariki hadi Mto Colorado, mstari huo ulipita kwa maili 150 za safu za milima ya jangwa, ulipanda Mlima Springs wa futi 2,770 na kushuka hadi Colorado huko Needles. Wakati mwingine ujenzi huo ulikuwa wa ghafula kama ule wa daraja la Atlantic na Pacific, lakini wakati kampuni ya Southern Pacific ilipoweka reli kwenye daraja la Needles, wafanyakazi wa kampuni ya Atlantic na Pacific walikuwa bado wakijitahidi kukamilisha ujenzi. Wakati huu mpaka uliokubaliwa kwenye mto ungedumu. Mwishowe, Agosti 3, 1883, meli za Atlantic na Pacific zilipiga reli kwenye mstari huo mrefu, na siku tano baadaye zilijiunga na meli za Pacific Kusini. Njia ya 35 ya mstari wa magharibi kutoka Albuquerque ilikuwa imekamilika, lakini muhimu zaidi, Atchison, Topeka na Santa Fe walikuwa wamewa kiungo muhimu katika njia ya kuvuka bara. Mstari huo haukuwa chini ya usimamizi mmoja, acheni tu umiliki mmoja, lakini sasa ilikuwa inawezekana kusafiri kwa reli kutoka St. Louis hadi San Francisco kwenye njia ambayo kwa ujumla haikuwa na dhoruba za theluji ambazo mara kwa mara zilitesa njia ya Union Pacific. Kufikia mwaka wa 1883, mtu angeweza kupanda ndege ya Pullman huko St. Louis na kusafiri kuelekea magharibi hadi Halstead kwenye Frisco, kisha kuendelea hadi Albuquerque kwenye Santa Fe, hadi Needles kwenye Atlantic na Pacific, na hatimaye kufika San Francisco kwenye Pasifiki ya Kusini. "Kutembea kwa maili 574 kati ya Albuquerque na Needles pekee ilihitaji masaa ishirini na nne kupitia kile kilichoitwa ""huduma ya haraka,"" lakini kwa wakati, viwango vya upole, hali ya hewa ya wastani, na njia ya njia ya kusini ya njia hii itaifanya kuwa muhimu zaidi ya ""mstari mkubwa wa Amerika.""" Haijalishi ni kwa njia gani walionekana - kutoka Deming au kutoka Needles - bado walikuwa mateka kwa whims ya Collis P. Huntington na Pasifiki ya Kusini. Mto Atchison, Topeka na Santa Fe ulikuwa umekuwa kiungo cha kuvuka mabara, lakini vita vya California vilibaki kupiganwa.