Complex situations call for creative solutions. Nowhere is this maxim more relevant than in addressing modern environmental problems. Finding and executing solutions that properly value and protect the natural world calls on leaders across disciplines to employ their knowledge in new ways. Using contracts as a means to collaboratively solve pressing environmental problems is a tool the legal community should keep sharp in their quiver.
Most likely the first “legal” solution that comes to mind when addressing environmental issues are environmental laws that regulate the use of natural resources. For example, the United States has made vast gains in cleaning up its air and water through the provisions of the Clean Water Act and the Clean Air Act. Here, the law is employed through the use of government power exercising the traditional system of checks and balances. An elected legislature establishes the rules, the executive branch implements the rules, and when challenged, the court system determines compliance with the rules. Environmental regulations dictate the actions of numerous actors simultaneously, and are therefore very important and powerful tools for protecting the environment.
However, using this command and control technique is not without its drawbacks. For example, passing environmental regulations is a slow, expensive, and often contentious process. The parties most affected by proposed rules are typically one step removed from the process, relying on lobbyists, public interest groups, or lawyers to represent their interests. Administrative agencies are chronically underfunded, unable to fully enforce and monitor compliance with the laws. Additionally, once established, environmental regulations are rather inflexible to address changing environmental conditions.
Accordingly, to meet our environmental problems, there is a need for additional legal tools to complement our suite of environmental regulations. Recently, the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences awarded Oliver Hart of Harvard University and Bengt Holmstrom of MIT, the 2016 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences for their contributions to contract theory. Much of the new Laureates’ work focuses on contract design and how to craft contracts suitable to meeting real goals in real world settings. Paraphrasing, contracts should be more than a simple recording of an agreement, but be an instrument with stand-alone value in guiding, incentivizing, or informing the continuing interactions of the parties. For example, many contracts are “incomplete contracts” where articulating the parties’ exact actions to future eventualities is difficult. Instead of trying to design a contract to account for any number of potential outcomes, the contract should define decision-making powers in case the parties disagree. How decision-making is allocated therefore informs the relative bargaining powers and incentives for each party. Under this contract design, bestowing decision-making powers can also become an alternative to payment for performance.
The new Nobel Laureates’ collaborative and temporally flexible contract approach is well suited for parties looking to craft solutions and define rights in the face of ever-changing environmental problems. One area particularly well suited for implementing such contract tools is dictating water use between water users. Governed by the Prior Appropriation Doctrine, Utah water law contains several factors limiting flexibility: you must have a water right to use water; you must continuously use that water to maintain the validity of the right; the law only allows you to use water for very specific purposes; water rights are highly regulated and require administrative action to change any component; and water shortages are addressed by cutting off water use according to the date the water right was first put to use. While creating needed stability, the system is relatively inflexible and slow for adapting to contemporary demands.
To meet some of their water needs, water users in Utah have begun to employ many of the contract concepts discussed by Hart and Holmstrom, and are creating private water use agreements to dictate use among the parties. For example, in the 1990’s drought, combined with irrigation and power withdrawals from Bear Lake, lowered lake levels to an elevation impeding recreation. To avoid litigation, the primary Bear River irrigation companies, PacifiCorp, and recreation interests entered into a private settlement agreement. The irrigators and PacifiCorp voluntarily agreed that in times of drought they would proportionally reduce withdrawals according to decreasing lake levels instead of calling on their early priority rights and diverting large amounts of water at the expense of junior appropriators. Now invested in a more equitable apportionment of the loss, for over 20 years the stakeholders have met annually to promote water conservation among the parties and discuss issues of shared concern.
Collaborative contractual arrangements regarding water use are also becoming more prevalent to guide management of ground water resources. For example, in 2012 water users in the Beryl Enterprise area worked with the State Engineer to create a Beryl Enterprise Groundwater Management Plan. A key feature of this document, besides making an accounting of available water resources and setting safe yields for diversion, is the “Voluntary Arrangement” provision of the plan. Under these arrangements “water users may agree to participate in a voluntary arrangement to manage withdrawals based on a system other than priority.” The adopted plan establishes agreed-to amounts and timetables for reduction. If those reductions are met, the State Engineer will not order further reductions based on priority. In other words, if water users in the area band together and agree to each reduce their water usage, all users get to continue to use a substantial portion of their water instead of senior rights receiving all of their water right at the expense of junior users receiving none. While, additional agreements may be needed to implement these voluntary arrangements, the Groundwater Management Plan highlights some of the key concepts of the Nobel Laureates’ work, like defining decision-making powers at crucial junctures.
As can be seen, Utah is already starting to use and explore many of the contract theories promoted by Hart and Holmstrom to address water management. As our water demands become more complex, future forward-thinking contracts may prove to be some of our most effective tools used to complement the State’s water law and solve some of our most entrenched water problems.
Originally published for edrblog.org
Hali ngumu huhitaji suluhisho zenye ubunifu. Hakuna mahali ambapo kanuni hiyo inahusu zaidi kuliko katika kushughulikia matatizo ya kisasa ya mazingira. Kupata na kutekeleza suluhisho ambazo zinathamini na kulinda ulimwengu wa asili kwa usahihi inahitaji viongozi katika taaluma zote kutumia maarifa yao kwa njia mpya. Kutumia mikataba kama njia ya kushirikiana kutatua matatizo ya mazingira ya haraka ni chombo ambacho jamii ya kisheria inapaswa kuweka mkali katika kiota chao. Yaelekea suluhisho la kwanza la "sheria" linalokuja akilini wakati wa kushughulikia masuala ya mazingira ni sheria za mazingira ambazo zinadhibiti matumizi ya rasilimali za asili. Kwa mfano, Marekani imepata mafanikio makubwa katika kusafisha hewa na maji yake kupitia masharti ya Sheria ya Maji Safi na Sheria ya Hewa Safi. Hapa, sheria hutumiwa kupitia matumizi ya nguvu za serikali kutumia mfumo wa jadi wa kudhibiti na usawa. Bunge lililochaguliwa huanzisha sheria, tawi la utekelezaji hutekeleza sheria, na wakati wa changamoto, mfumo wa mahakama huamua kufuata sheria. Kanuni za mazingira huamuru vitendo vya watendaji wengi wakati huo huo, na kwa hivyo ni zana muhimu sana na zenye nguvu za kulinda mazingira. Hata hivyo, kutumia mbinu hiyo ya kuamuru na kudhibiti mambo kuna madhara yake. Kwa mfano, kupitisha sheria za mazingira ni mchakato wa polepole, wa gharama kubwa, na mara nyingi wenye ubishi. Vyama vinavyoguswa zaidi na sheria zilizopendekezwa kwa kawaida ni hatua moja iliyoondolewa kutoka kwa mchakato, kutegemea wanasheria, vikundi vya maslahi ya umma, au wanasheria kuwakilisha maslahi yao. Mashirika ya kiutawala yana kifedha kidogo, haiwezi kutekeleza kikamilifu na kufuatilia kufuata sheria. Kwa kuongezea, mara tu zinapowekwa, kanuni za mazingira ni ngumu sana kushughulikia hali zinazobadilika za mazingira. Kwa hiyo, ili kukabiliana na matatizo yetu ya mazingira, kuna haja ya zana za kisheria za ziada ili kukamilisha seti yetu ya kanuni za mazingira. Chuo Kikuu cha Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences kimempa Oliver Hart wa Chuo Kikuu cha Harvard na Bengt Holmstrom wa MIT tuzo ya Nobel ya Uchumi kwa mchango wao katika nadharia ya mkataba. Kazi nyingi za washindi wapya huzingatia muundo wa mkataba na jinsi ya kutengeneza mikataba inayofaa kukidhi malengo halisi katika mazingira ya ulimwengu halisi. Kwa maneno mengine, mikataba inapaswa kuwa zaidi ya rekodi rahisi ya makubaliano, lakini kuwa chombo na thamani ya kujitegemea katika kuongoza, kuhamasisha, au kuarifu mwingiliano wa kuendelea wa pande. Kwa mfano, mikataba mingi ni "mikataba isiyo kamili" ambapo kueleza hatua sahihi za pande kwa uwezekano wa baadaye ni ngumu. Badala ya kujaribu kubuni mkataba ili kuhesabu idadi yoyote ya matokeo ya uwezekano, mkataba unapaswa kufafanua mamlaka ya kufanya maamuzi katika kesi ya pande kutokubaliana. Jinsi ya maamuzi ni mgawanyiko kwa hiyo huelezea nguvu za mapatano na motisha kwa kila chama. Chini ya muundo huu wa mkataba, kutoa mamlaka ya kufanya maamuzi pia inaweza kuwa mbadala wa malipo kwa utendaji. Mkataba mpya wa ushirikiano wa Nobel na njia ya kubadilika kwa muda inafaa kwa vyama vinavyotafuta suluhisho na kufafanua haki katika uso wa matatizo ya mazingira yanayobadilika daima. Eneo moja hasa yanafaa kwa ajili ya utekelezaji wa zana hizo mkataba ni kuamuru matumizi ya maji kati ya watumiaji wa maji. Sheria ya maji ya Utah ina mambo kadhaa yanayopunguza kubadilika: lazima uwe na haki ya maji ya kutumia maji; lazima utumie maji kwa kuendelea ili kudumisha uhalali wa haki hiyo; sheria inaruhusu tu kutumia maji kwa madhumuni maalum sana; haki za maji zimepangwa sana na zinahitaji hatua za kiutawala kubadilisha sehemu yoyote; na upungufu wa maji unashughulikiwa kwa kukata matumizi ya maji kulingana na tarehe haki ya maji ilitumiwa kwanza. Wakati wa kuunda utulivu unaohitajika, mfumo ni kiasi inflexible na polepole kwa ajili ya kukabiliana na mahitaji ya kisasa. Kwa mujibu wa taarifa ya shirika la maji la Marekani, watumiaji wa maji nchini Utah wameanza kutumia baadhi ya kanuni za mkataba zilizozungumziwa na Hart na Holmstrom, na wanaanzisha mikataba ya matumizi ya maji ya kibinafsi ili kuamua matumizi kati ya pande. Kwa mfano, katika ukame wa miaka ya 1990, pamoja na umwagiliaji na uondoaji wa umeme kutoka Ziwa la Bear, ulipunguza viwango vya ziwa hadi urefu unaozuia burudani. Ili kuepuka kesi, makampuni ya msingi ya umwagiliaji wa Mto wa Bear, PacifiCorp, na maslahi ya burudani waliingia katika makubaliano ya makazi ya kibinafsi. Wanyeshaji na Pacifica walikubaliana kwa hiari kwamba wakati wa ukame watapunguza kiasi cha maji kwa kadiri ya kupungua kwa viwango vya ziwa badala ya kutumia haki zao za kipaumbele na kugeuza kiasi kikubwa cha maji kwa gharama ya wapokeaji wa chini. Kwa miaka zaidi ya 20, washirika wamekutana kila mwaka ili kukuza uhifadhi wa maji kati ya pande na kujadili masuala ya wasiwasi wa pamoja. Mipango ya mkataba wa ushirikiano kuhusu matumizi ya maji pia inakuwa ya kawaida zaidi kuongoza usimamizi wa rasilimali za maji ya chini ya ardhi. Kwa mfano, katika 2012, watumiaji wa maji katika eneo la Biashara ya Beryl walifanya kazi na Mhandisi wa Jimbo kuunda Mpango wa Usimamizi wa Maji ya Chini ya Ardhi ya Biashara ya Beryl. Kipengele muhimu cha hati hii, pamoja na kufanya uhasibu wa rasilimali za maji zinazopatikana na kuweka mavuno salama kwa ajili ya kuelekeza, ni <unk>Mapango ya hiari<unk> ya mpango. Chini ya makubaliano haya <unk>watumiaji wa maji wanaweza kukubali kushiriki katika makubaliano ya hiari ya kusimamia uondoaji kulingana na mfumo mwingine kuliko kipaumbele.<unk> Mpango uliopitishwa huanzisha kiasi kilichokubaliwa na ratiba za kupunguza. Kama kupunguzwa hizo ni kukutana, Jimbo Mhandisi si amri kupunguzwa zaidi kulingana na kipaumbele. Kwa maneno mengine, ikiwa watumiaji wa maji katika eneo hilo wanashirikiana na kukubaliana kupunguza matumizi yao ya maji, watumiaji wote wanapata kuendelea kutumia sehemu kubwa ya maji yao badala ya haki za juu kupokea haki zao zote za maji kwa gharama ya watumiaji wa chini kupokea hakuna. Ingawa makubaliano ya ziada yanaweza kuhitajika kutekeleza mipango hii ya hiari, Mpango wa Usimamizi wa Maji ya Chini ya Ardhi unaangazia baadhi ya dhana muhimu za kazi ya washindi wa Tuzo ya Nobel, kama vile kufafanua mamlaka ya kufanya maamuzi katika hatua muhimu. Utah tayari inaanza kutumia na kuchunguza nadharia nyingi za mkataba zilizotengenezwa na Hart na Holmstrom ili kushughulikia usimamizi wa maji. Kwa kuwa mahitaji yetu ya maji yanakuwa magumu zaidi, mikataba ya kufikiri ya baadaye inaweza kuthibitika kuwa baadhi ya zana zetu bora za kukamilisha sheria ya maji ya Jimbo na kutatua baadhi ya matatizo yetu ya maji ya msingi. Imechapishwa awali kwa edrblog.org