The weaponizing of smartphone location data on the battlefield
For soldiers on the battlefield, the act of turning on one’s smartphone has been described as the digital equivalent of lighting a cigarette, as doing so creates a signal about one’s location that can be picked up by the enemy. Despite this, smartphones have played a meaningful role in recent conflicts, including Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, where the devices have been used for communicating in the event of radio failure, disseminating on-the-ground footage to counter propaganda and maintaining morale by staying in touch with family and friends. How each side collects the adversary’s smartphone location data and shields their own can mean the difference between victory and defeat.
How smartphone location data is obtained
For a country at war, monitoring the cellular networks in the conflict zone provides the most comprehensive view of mobile device activity. But before the conflict even begins, the nation can identify phones of interest, including the devices belonging to soldiers.
Because mobile app location data is often sold to commercial data brokers and then repackaged and sold to individual customers, a country can access such a database and then pick out the phones likely belonging to soldiers. Such devices will ping regularly in the locations of known bases or other military facilities. It’s even possible to identify the owner of a device by tracking the phone to its home address and then referencing publicly available information.
A country can also use information obtained from one or more data breaches to inform their devices of interest. The T-Mobile breach in 2021 demonstrated how much customer data is in the hands of a mobile operator, including a phone’s unique identifier (IMEI) and its SIM card’s identifier (IMSI).
Spies can also physically monitor known military sites and use devices known as IMSI catchers – essentially fake cell towers – to collect phone data from the phones in the vicinity. The Kremlin reportedly did this in the UK, with GRU officers gathering near some of the UK’s most sensitive military sites.
When a phone of interest appears on the monitored mobile network, the country can keep a close eye on the device’s location and other cellular data. The presence of two or more such devices in close proximity indicates that a mission may be taking place.
In addition to monitoring cell networks, a nation at war can utilize IMSI catchers on the battlefield to gather phone data for the purposes of locating and identifying devices. Location can be determined by triangulating signal strengths from nearby cell towers or by pinging a targeted device’s GPS system. Russia’s Leer-3 electronic warfare system, which consists of two drones containing IMSI catchers along with a command truck, can locate up to 2,000 phones within a 3.7-mile range.
To counter these location-finding drones, an opposing nation may jam a drone’s GPS signal, using a radio emitter to block the drone from receiving GPS signals. The country can also try GPS spoofing, employing a radio transmitter to corrupt the accuracy of the drone’s reported location. To counter such spoofing, systems for validating GPS signals have been deployed on the battlefield. In the larger picture, the corruptibility of GPS data has forced some nations to build their own geopositioning systems. For the US, M-Code serves as a military-only GPS signal that is both more accurate and provides anti-jamming and anti-spoofing capabilities.
Spyware is a more targeted approach to obtaining location data. It can be delivered over the cell network (via a malicious carrier update) or through an IMSI catcher. It’s also not uncommon for operators to pose as single women on social media sites to lure soldiers into downloading a malicious app. Hamas has reportedly used this tactic many times against Israeli soldiers. Such spyware can capture a device’s real-time location, among other capabilities.
The risks of captured smartphone location data
Of all the signals given off by smartphones in the normal course of operation, location data is perhaps the most valuable during battle. Unlike captured conversations or call metadata, location data is actionable immediately. Location data can reveal troop movements, supply routes and even daily routines. A cluster of troops in a given location may signal an important location. Aggregated location data can also reveal associations between different groups.
The obvious risk to soldiers is that their location data can be used by the enemy to direct targeted attacks against them. Notably, it has been reported that a Russian general and his staff were killed in an airstrike in the early weeks of the invasion after his phone call was intercepted and geolocated by the Ukrainians.
Short of lethal strikes, location data can be used to inform a country’s strategy. For example, Russia’s phone data-collecting drone flights over Poland and the Baltic states in 2017 suggested to military experts that the country was trying to monitor troop levels at NATO’s new bases to see if there were more forces present there than the alliance had disclosed publicly.
Smartphone location data countermeasures
To counter the capture of location data from soldiers’ smartphones, many countries have understandably banned the presence of these devices on the battlefield. In 2019, for instance, Russia’s parliament unanimously voted to ban smartphones and tablets from being used by on-duty armed forces.
However, banning mobile device usage by soldiers who have never known a world without smartphones has its limitations. Since the invasion began, there have been multiple instances of Russian commanders confiscating their subordinates’ personal phones for fear that they would unwittingly give away the locations of their units.
Short of an outright ban, soldiers may be encouraged to mind their SIM cards. Ukrainian soldiers have been advised to obtain a SIM card in the conflict zone, which helps shield a device’s identity. During the war in Afghanistan, some top Taliban leaders played SIM card roulette, randomly distributing SIM cards at frequent intervals to elude American trackers.
Soldiers are also advised to shield their true locations when smartphones are used. Ukrainian soldiers, for example, are instructed to walk at least 1,600 feet away from their squad position in order to make a phone call, ideally to an area with many civilians. Soldiers can also use a Faraday case to cloak their direction of travel, first heading in the wrong direction before placing their phone in the case. Using a Faraday case is a safer option than turning off the phone, as powering off is a signal in its own right that can invite additional scrutiny, and as the phone may have been hacked to appear to be off when it’s in fact still on and transmitting signals to the enemy.
What’s at stake
Smartphones are so ubiquitous that their presence on the battlefield is inevitable, even when they’ve been prohibited or otherwise discouraged from use due to lethal consequences. But each location ping gives the enemy another signal that may ultimately culminate in a targeted missile strike or an improved defensive posture. The side that can best fight this information battle very likely has the upper hand in winning the war.
"Kutumia simu za mkononi kama silaha katika mapigano: ""Kufanya kazi ya simu ya mkononi kama silaha ni sawa na kuwasha sigara, kwani kufanya hivyo huunda ishara kuhusu eneo la mtu ambayo inaweza kukamatwa na adui.""" "Hata hivyo, simu za mkononi zimekuwa na jukumu muhimu katika migogoro ya hivi karibuni, ikiwa ni pamoja na uvamizi wa Urusi wa Ukraine, ambapo vifaa hivyo vimetumika kwa mawasiliano katika tukio la kushindwa kwa redio, kusambaza picha za ""juu ya ardhi"" ili kukabiliana na propaganda na kudumisha maadili kwa kukaa katika mawasiliano na familia na marafiki." Jinsi kila upande unavyokusanya data ya eneo la simu ya mkononi ya mpinzani na kulinda yao wenyewe inaweza kumaanisha tofauti kati ya ushindi na kushindwa. Kwa nchi iliyo katika vita, ufuatiliaji wa mitandao ya simu za mkononi katika eneo la mgogoro hutoa mtazamo kamili zaidi wa shughuli za kifaa cha rununu. Lakini kabla ya vita kuanza, taifa linaweza kutambua simu zinazohusika, ikiwa ni pamoja na vifaa vya askari. Kwa sababu data ya eneo la programu ya rununu mara nyingi huuzwa kwa wafanyabiashara wa data na kisha hupakuliwa na kuuzwa kwa wateja wa kibinafsi, nchi inaweza kupata hifadhidata kama hiyo na kisha kuchagua simu ambazo zinaweza kuwa za askari. Vifaa hivyo vitapiga pingi kwa ukawaida katika maeneo ya misingi inayojulikana au vituo vingine vya kijeshi. Ni hata inawezekana kutambua mmiliki wa kifaa kwa kufuatilia simu kwa anwani yake ya nyumbani na kisha rejea habari inapatikana kwa umma. Nchi inaweza pia kutumia habari iliyopatikana kutoka kwa ukiukaji mmoja au zaidi wa data ili kuarifu vifaa vyao vya maslahi. Uvunjaji wa simu za T-Mobile ulionyesha jinsi data nyingi za wateja zilivyo mikononi mwa waendeshaji wa simu, pamoja na kitambulisho cha kipekee cha simu (IMEI) na kitambulisho cha kadi yake ya SIM (IMSI). Pia, wapelelezi wanaweza kufuatilia maeneo ya kijeshi na kutumia vifaa vinavyoitwa IMSI catchers, yaani, minara bandia ya simu, ili kukusanya data za simu kutoka kwa simu zilizo karibu. Kremlin imesema kuwa maafisa wa GRU wamekusanyika karibu na maeneo ya kijeshi ya Uingereza. Wakati simu ya maslahi inaonekana kwenye mtandao wa simu za mkononi uliodhibitiwa, nchi inaweza kuweka jicho karibu kwenye eneo la kifaa na data nyingine za simu za mkononi. Uwepo wa vifaa viwili au zaidi vya aina hiyo karibu sana huonyesha kwamba huenda kazi fulani ikafanywa. Kwa kuongezea, kwa mfano, nchi inayopigana inaweza kutumia IMSI catcher kwenye uwanja wa vita kukusanya data ya simu kwa madhumuni ya kupata na kutambua vifaa. Eneo linaweza kuamuliwa kwa triangulating nguvu ishara kutoka minara ya karibu ya simu au kwa pinging mfumo wa GPS ya kifaa lengo. Mfumo wa kijeshi wa Urusi unaoitwa Leer-3 unaojumuisha ndege mbili zenye vifaa vya IMSI na gari la kuongoza, unaweza kugundua simu 2,000 ndani ya umbali wa maili 3.7. Ili kukabiliana na drones hizi za kutafuta eneo, taifa linalopinga linaweza kuzuia ishara ya GPS ya drones, kwa kutumia emitter ya redio kuzuia drones kupokea ishara za GPS. Nchi hiyo pia inaweza kujaribu GPS spoofing, kutumia transmitter ya redio kuharibu usahihi wa eneo la drone liliyoripotiwa. Ili kukabiliana na udanganyifu huo, mifumo ya kuthibitisha ishara za GPS imewekwa kwenye uwanja wa vita. Katika picha kubwa, uharibifu wa data ya GPS umesababisha baadhi ya mataifa kujenga mifumo yao wenyewe ya geopositioning. M-Code ni ishara ya GPS ya kijeshi tu ambayo ni sahihi zaidi na hutoa uwezo wa kupambana na jamming na anti-spoofing. Programu za ujasusi ni mbinu iliyoelekezwa zaidi ya kupata data ya eneo. Inaweza kutolewa juu ya mtandao wa seli (kupitia update ya mtoa huduma mbaya) au kupitia IMSI catcher. Pia si jambo la kawaida kwa waendeshaji kujifanya kuwa wanawake wasio na wenzi kwenye tovuti za mitandao ya kijamii ili kuvutia askari kupakua programu mbaya. Inaripotiwa kwamba Hamas imetumia mbinu hii mara nyingi dhidi ya askari wa Israeli. Spyware kama hiyo inaweza kukamata eneo la kifaa kwa wakati halisi, kati ya uwezo mwingine. "Kutokana na hatari ya data ya eneo la simu ya mkononi, ""kwa ishara zote zinazotolewa na simu za mkononi katika mchakato wa kawaida wa operesheni, data ya eneo labda ni muhimu zaidi wakati wa vita.""" Tofauti na mazungumzo yaliyokamatwa au metadata ya wito, data ya eneo inaweza kutumiwa mara moja. Takwimu za eneo zinaweza kufunua harakati za majeshi, njia za ugavi na hata utaratibu wa kila siku. Kikundi cha askari katika eneo fulani chaweza kuonyesha mahali muhimu. Takwimu za mahali zilizokusanywa pia zaweza kufunua uhusiano kati ya vikundi tofauti. Hatari ya wazi kwa askari ni kwamba data yao ya eneo inaweza kutumika na adui kuelekeza mashambulizi ya lengo dhidi yao. "Kulingana na ripoti za vyombo vya habari, jenerali wa Urusi na wafanyakazi wake waliuawa katika shambulio la angani katika wiki za kwanza za uvamizi baada ya simu yake kukamatwa na ""geolocated"" na Ukrainians." Mbali na mashambulizi ya kuua, data ya eneo inaweza kutumika kueleza mkakati wa nchi. Kwa mfano, ndege za Urusi zilizokusanya data za simu za mkononi juu ya Poland na nchi za Baltic mnamo 2017 zilionyesha wataalamu wa kijeshi kwamba nchi hiyo ilikuwa ikijaribu kufuatilia viwango vya askari katika vituo vipya vya NATO ili kuona ikiwa kulikuwa na vikosi zaidi huko kuliko muungano huo ulivyofunua hadharani. "Kupinga kukamatwa kwa data za eneo kutoka kwa simu mahiri za askari, nchi nyingi zimepiga marufuku uwepo wa vifaa hivi kwenye uwanja wa vita. """ Mwaka 2019, Bunge la Urusi lilipiga kura kwa umoja kupiga marufuku matumizi ya simu za mkononi na kompyuta kibao katika vikosi vya jeshi. Hata hivyo, kupiga marufuku matumizi ya vifaa vya rununu na askari ambao hawajawahi kujua ulimwengu bila simu mahiri ina mipaka yake. Tangu uvamizi huo kuanza, kumekuwa na visa vingi vya maafisa wa Urusi kuwakamata watu waliowatawala kwa hofu kwamba bila kujua watatoa taarifa za maeneo ya vikosi vyao. Mbali na marufuku ya moja kwa moja, askari-jeshi wanaweza kuhimizwa wajihadhari na kadi zao za SIM. Askari wa Ukraine wamependekezwa kupata kadi ya SIM katika eneo la mgogoro, ambayo husaidia kulinda utambulisho wa kifaa. Wakati wa vita vya Afghanistan, viongozi wa Taliban walicheza mchezo wa roulette kwa kutumia kadi za SIM, wakitoa kadi za SIM kwa mara kwa mara ili kuepuka kufuatilia kwa Marekani. Askari pia wanashauriwa kulinda maeneo yao halisi wakati wa kutumia simu mahiri. Askari wa Ukraine wanaamriwa kutembea umbali wa mita 1,600 kutoka kwa kikosi chao ili kupiga simu, ikiwezekana kwenye eneo lenye raia wengi. Askari wanaweza pia kutumia kesi ya Faraday kuficha mwelekeo wao wa kusafiri, kwanza kuelekea upande usiofaa kabla ya kuweka simu yao katika kesi. Kutumia kesi ya Faraday ni chaguo salama kuliko kuzima simu, kwani kuzima ni ishara yenyewe ambayo inaweza kualika uchunguzi wa ziada, na kwa kuwa simu inaweza kuwa imeharibiwa kuonekana kuwa imezimwa wakati kwa kweli bado inaendelea na kupitisha ishara kwa adui. Simu mahiri ni kila mahali kwamba uwepo wao kwenye uwanja wa vita ni wa kuepukika, hata wakati wamepigwa marufuku au vinginevyo kukatishwa moyo kutoka kwa matumizi kwa sababu ya matokeo ya mauti. Lakini kila ping ya eneo hutoa ishara nyingine kwa adui ambayo inaweza hatimaye kuishia katika shambulio la makombora au msimamo bora wa ulinzi. Upande ambao unaweza kupambana vizuri zaidi katika vita hivi vya habari uwezekano mkubwa una mkono wa juu katika kushinda vita.