Davina Cooper’s “Everyday Utopias: The Conceptual Life of Promising Spaces” considers the contribution that “everyday utopias” – networks and spaces that perform regular daily life in a radically different fashion – make to transformative politics. They do this by demonstrating the viability of alternatives to dominant social structures: there is no clearer way to challenge basic presumptions of how things should work than by successfully showcasing alternatives.
In a previous post, Dr. Cooper has discussed the advantages of such an approach through the sphere of equality rights for nudists. In particular, it forces us to consider the practical implications of provision for equality. She cites the example of urban spaces, designed for clothed individuals – dirty benches, tarmac roads and narrow pavements implicitly accommodate clothed, rather than naked, activity. Thus, thinking about equality in this more practical way allows us to abandon our attachment to the dominant social norm.
That this approach to considering equality is beneficial can be seen in the sphere of disability discrimination. An example is the conceptual shift in thinking about the causes of such discrimination. Certain statutory material adopts the “medical” definition of disability, which attributes the difficulty which a disabled individual may have in everyday life to that disability. For instance, Section 6 of the UK Equality Act 2010 states that a person is defined as having a disability if he or she has a physical or mental impairment, and that impairment has an adverse effect on day-to-day activities. Contrast this with the “social” definition of disability, which holds that an individual’s everyday difficulties stem not from the impairment itself, but from the fact that the world around them has been constructed for the able-bodied majority. Article 1 of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities adopts this definition. It states that people with disabilities include those whose impairments, “in interaction with various barriers,” may hinder their effective participation in society. An individual in a wheelchair isn’t disadvantaged because of her wheelchair. She’s disadvantaged because, catering for the non-wheelchair-bound majority, steps rather than ramps are the preferred method of accessing buildings.
Another point made by Dr. Cooper in “Everyday Utopias” is that equality as a normative principle does not exist in a vacuum, but is instead inextricably linked with other norms. Her example of nudism is again illustrative. She notes that, even where it is permitted, it still operates within the confines of other norms: “organized associational nudism is replete with rules, conventions and etiquette…how to cook, deal with menstrual blood, manage sweat and other personal secretions…” The norm of equality in this example has to compete with other norms of acceptable standards of hygiene, amongst others.
Once this complexity of normative interaction is revealed, we can look at attempts to counter discrimination with a fresh perspective. Consider equal pay for men and women. One argument used to resist equal pay measures is that women will inevitably contribute less to the workforce. For instance, Posner’s argument from 1989 was that “the average woman expects to take more time out of the work force to raise children,” meaning that she will invest less in human capital than her male counterpart. However, employing the broader view advocated above, we see that the hindrance to women’s effective participation in the workforce stems not from them being child-bearers, but from the fact that the norm is for women to take on the role of childcare. The case law in this area is promising in its willingness to look at the influence of such entrenched norms when considering equality provisions. In the case of Markin v Russia, the European Court of Human Rights held that providing maternity leave to servicewomen but not servicemen “ha[d] the effect of perpetuating gender stereotypes and is disadvantageous both to women’s careers and to men’s family life.”
Dr. Cooper’s approach to considering equality law is therefore progressive, and appears to be part of a welcome trend of looking beyond the individual victim of discrimination and to society and its norms. In doing so, we are able to reconsider what, not long ago, were non-negotiables (that women would stay at home and care for children, for instance). It allows us to redefine the limits of equality law, by forcing us to reconsider what truly drives differences in treatment.
Davina Cooper's <unk>Everyday Utopias: The Conceptual Life of Promising Spaces<unk> inachukua jukumu ambalo <unk>utopia za kila siku<unk> <unk> mitandao na nafasi ambazo hufanya maisha ya kila siku ya kawaida kwa njia tofauti kabisa <unk> hufanya kwa siasa za mabadiliko. Wanafanya hivyo kwa kuonyesha uwezekano wa mbadala wa muundo wa kijamii unaotawala: hakuna njia ya wazi ya kupinga dhana za msingi za jinsi mambo yanapaswa kufanya kazi kuliko kwa kuonyesha mbadala kwa mafanikio. Katika chapisho la awali, Dk Cooper amezungumzia faida za mbinu kama hiyo kupitia uwanja wa haki za usawa kwa nudists. Hasa, inatufanya tufikirie matokeo ya vitendo ya utoaji wa usawa. Yeye anataja mfano wa nafasi za mijini, iliyoundwa kwa watu waliovalia - benchi chafu, barabara za lami na vijia nyembamba kwa njia ya wazi huandaa shughuli za kuvaa, badala ya uchi. Hivyo, kufikiri juu ya usawa katika njia hii ya vitendo zaidi inaruhusu sisi kuacha kiungo chetu kwa kanuni kuu ya kijamii. Kwamba mbinu hii ya kuzingatia usawa ni ya manufaa inaweza kuonekana katika uwanja wa ubaguzi wa ulemavu. Mfano ni mabadiliko ya dhana katika kufikiri juu ya sababu za ubaguzi kama huo. Baadhi ya vifaa vya kisheria huchukua ufafanuzi wa "matibabu" wa ulemavu, ambao unahusisha ugumu ambao mtu mlemavu anaweza kuwa nao katika maisha ya kila siku kwa ulemavu huo. "Kwa mfano, kifungu cha 6 cha Sheria ya Usawa ya Uingereza ya 2010 inasema kwamba mtu ""anafafanuliwa kuwa na ulemavu"" ikiwa ana ulemavu wa kimwili au kiakili, na ulemavu huo una athari mbaya kwa shughuli za kila siku." Tofauti hii na ufafanuzi wa "jamii" wa ulemavu, ambayo inadai kwamba matatizo ya kila siku ya mtu binafsi hayatokani na ulemavu yenyewe, lakini kutoka kwa ukweli kwamba ulimwengu karibu nao umejengwa kwa wengi wenye uwezo wa mwili. Makala ya kwanza ya Mkataba wa Umoja wa Mataifa kuhusu Haki za Watu Wenye Ulemavu inatoa ufafanuzi huu. Inasema kwamba watu wenye ulemavu ni pamoja na wale ambao ulemavu wao, "katika mwingiliano na vizuizi mbalimbali", unaweza kuzuia ushiriki wao wa ufanisi katika jamii. Mtu aliye kwenye kiti cha magurudumu hana hasara kwa sababu ya kiti chake cha magurudumu. Yeye ni hasara kwa sababu, catering kwa wengi zisizo wheelchair-bound, hatua badala ya ramps ni njia preferred ya kupata majengo. "Kama ilivyoelezwa katika kitabu chake cha ""Everyday Utopia,"" Cooper alisema kwamba usawa kama kanuni ya kanuni haipo katika utupu, lakini ni ""kuunganishwa kwa njia isiyoweza kutenganishwa na kanuni nyingine.""" Mfano wake wa uchi ni kielelezo kingine. "Hata pale ambapo inaruhusiwa, bado inafanya kazi ndani ya mipaka ya kanuni nyingine: ""Umoja wa nudism umepangwa ni kamili na sheria, mikataba na adabu... jinsi ya kupika, kushughulika na damu ya hedhi, kusimamia jasho na tofauti nyingine za kibinafsi..."" Mfano huu wa usawa lazima ushindane na kanuni nyingine za viwango vya usafi vinavyokubalika, miongoni mwa wengine." Mara tu utata huu wa mwingiliano wa kanuni unapofunuliwa, tunaweza kuangalia majaribio ya kukabiliana na ubaguzi kwa mtazamo mpya. Fikiria mshahara sawa kwa wanaume na wanawake. Hoja moja inayotumiwa kupinga hatua za usawa wa mshahara ni kwamba wanawake bila shaka watachangia kidogo kwa nguvu za kazi. Kwa mfano, hoja ya Posner kutoka 1989 ilikuwa kwamba mwanamke wa wastani anatarajia kuchukua muda zaidi kutoka kwa nguvu za kazi ili kulea watoto, ikimaanisha kwamba atawekeza kidogo katika mtaji wa binadamu kuliko mwenzake wa kiume. Hata hivyo, kwa kutumia mtazamo wa jumla uliotetezwa hapo juu, tunaona kwamba kizuizi cha ushiriki wa wanawake katika kazi haitokani na kuwa wao ni wajawazito, lakini kutokana na ukweli kwamba kawaida ni kwa wanawake kuchukua jukumu la utunzaji wa watoto. Sheria ya kesi katika eneo hili ni kuahidi katika utayari wake wa kuangalia ushawishi wa kanuni kama hizo imara wakati wa kuzingatia masharti ya usawa. Katika kesi ya Markin v. Urusi, Mahakama ya Ulaya ya Haki za Binadamu ilisema kwamba kutoa likizo ya uzazi kwa wanajeshi wa kijinsia lakini sio wanajeshi ina athari ya kudumisha mitazamo ya kijinsia na ni mbaya kwa kazi za wanawake na maisha ya familia ya wanaume. Kwa kufanya hivyo, tunaweza kufikiria tena kile ambacho, sio muda mrefu uliopita, kilikuwa kisichoweza kujadiliwa (kwa mfano, kwamba wanawake wangebaki nyumbani na kutunza watoto). "Hii inatuwezesha kufafanua mipaka ya sheria ya usawa, kwa kutulazimisha kufikiria tena kile kinachosababisha tofauti za matibabu. """