A decade ago, it would have been difficult to conceive of Donald Trump as a key figure in America’s Christian image of itself. Yet the Religious Right’s support of his candidacy, followed by continued loyalty since he took office despite numerous scandals, has shifted the nation’s traditional boundaries. Evangelical leaders like Franklin Graham and Jerry Falwell Jr. have not only defended Trump but have cast him as a godsend to the country. While this allegiance has led many critics to decry the apparent hypocrisy and opportunism among white evangelicals, it is just another example of how a certain brand of religiosity and American conservatism have become connected at the hip.
This particular connection between patriotic evangelicalism and the American Right is of recent vintage: The Moral Majority’s ascension to the national stage in the 1980s was dependent on a marriage to Ronald Reagan and the Republican Party. “This party is our home; this party is where we belong,” Pat Robertson declared at the 1992 GOP Convention. But the attachment between explicit religiosity and conservatism goes back far earlier. Though the framers of America’s federal government sought a distinction between denominational influence and state power—so much so that evangelical observers critiqued the Constitution as a “godless document”—partisans quickly capitalized on the power of religious rhetoric in political debates. Indeed, in the 1790s, when the French Revolution seemed to toss the entire world into tumult, many American ministers and politicians came to envision their nation’s future as intertwined with Christian devotion. The resulting religious nationalism has rarely been challenged since.
In the Age of Revolutions, a period that began with the American Revolution and continued for several decades as revolts rocked both the Americas and Europe, individuals on both sides of the Atlantic were forced to reconsider the relationship between religion, society, and government. And despite the secular achievements of these developments, religion continued to hold sway with many. The famed French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau, for instance, looked to Moses as the premier example for turning a “national body” into “a political Body” that lived together with stability and peace. Contemporary governments based on secular constitutions were feeble, he argued, while Moses’s was stable. Indeed, Rousseau’s primary critique of “modern nations” is that there are “many lawmakers among them but not a single lawgiver.” In his Social Contact, Rousseau insisted on the necessity of “a purely civil profession of faith” that, though steering clear of particular dogmas, helped instill “sentiments of sociability” shared by the entire nation. Similarly, in Germany, Friedrich Schlegel argued for a symbiotic relationship between religion and politics: “Politics (as the art and science of the community of all human development) is for the periphery what religion is for the centre.” If the two are incongruous, the entire system falls apart. Far from becoming inconsequential, religion only became more crucial to political discourse as nations were recognized as social constructions and expected to evolve in order to match society.
This anxiety became an even more potent during the debates surrounding the French Revolution, especially in the Anglo-American world. Though originally welcomed as a continuation of America’s cause for freedom, the revolution’s quick descent into terror and, to many observers’ eyes, anarchy, led conservative thinkers to believe it to be the example of democracy’s tragic excesses. Religion was a central part of the equation. In Britain, Edmund Burke accused the French of tossing out their federally established religion that had served as a stabilizing feature of government. “The spirit of nobility and religion” cultivated by a state-sponsored ecclesiastical structure, Burke argued, kept nations grounded in social, moral, and religious principles that were crucial for the country to survive. In response, the British radical Mary Wollstonecraft argued that a deluded devotion to state religion, rather than natural religious sentiments, was at the heart of this mistaken political theology. Religion is “the cultivation of the understanding and refinement of the affections,” she believed, and should naturally percolate from the citizen body rather than forced upon them by the state. Indeed, Wollstonecraft reasoned, Burke’s argument would “undermine” both religion and the state. These were merely two expressions, strung across a very dynamic spectrum, within a vigorous debate that had to change the course of religion’s role in society.
Despite taking place across the Atlantic Ocean, the French Revolution had a disproportionate impact on America’s political and religious culture. Its events prompted difficult questions concerning America’s own revolutionary purpose, and its timing coincided with the birth of America’s two-party political system. Previously, there was general enthusiasm for their sister nation’s cause. Now, France’s quick spiral into violence led many Americans, especially those associated with the Federalist Party, to cut cultural ties and denounce the French nation’s recent and radical developments.
This conflict proved a crucial moment in American politics, as it forced significant developments in the nation’s concept of exceptionalism, ideas of violence and revolution, and understanding of democracy. And given that religion was always at the center of their discussions concerning France, it also both shifted and validated competing theologies of national belonging. France’s descent into anarchy, many argued, was due to their lack of religious devotion. For America to succeed, then, they had to redouble their Christian alliance. America’s nationalism could only be built upon ardent Christian patriotism.
Added to this anxiety was a trenchant fear that the French Revolution was part of a global threat toward belief in general. Atheism, deism, and other ideologies that displaced orthodox faith seemed on the rise across the Atlantic. Nobody represented that threat more than Thomas Paine. Though Paine had been at the center of America’s nationalist imagination two decades earlier—his famous tract, Common Sense, paved the way for citizens to imagine a patriotic future apart from Britain—he soon left the continent, returned to Europe, and became enmeshed with France’s revolt. While imprisoned in Paris for supporting the wrong regime, Paine turned his attention once more to America. Whereas the United States had declared its independence from monarchy in 1776, it was now time for them to declare their independence from Christianity. The Age of Enlightenment, he believed, demanded nothing less.
“It is necessary to be bold,” Paine explained to fellow skeptic Elihu Palmer, because while “some people can be reasoned into sense … others must be shocked into it.” In the introduction to Age of Reason, his popular and controversial pamphlet that attacked organized religion, he admitted his excitement over “the exceeding probability that a revolution in the system of government would be followed by a revolution in the system of religion.” The “circumstance that has now taken place in France,” he believed, would finally inaugurate a global transformation that would overturn priestcraft. Joel Barlow, a diplomat, politician, and businessman from Massachusetts who helped publish Paine’s Age of Reason and penned one of the few American defenses of the controversial tract, posited that Christian belief was incompatible with America’s rational age. Progress depended on a nation’s ability to “banish [revealed religion] as much as possible from society,” he wrote in a biting treatise that was never published. The entirety of Western civilization depended on a move toward universal rationalism. America could only thrive if it embraced a transnational brotherhood with other democratic societies, especially revolutionary France, and break the shackles of organized religion.
The American reaction to Paine’s message was swift and vociferous. At least one hundred rebuttals to Age of Reason were published over the next decade, and most denounced the global skepticism that challenged religious authority. Boston minister Jeremy Belknap dismissed the work as “a species of vulgar infidelity, founded partly in pedantry, partly in debauchery and partly in ill manners, is insinuating itself into the minds of the thoughtless.” The American republic was to be built on something much more stable. As another respondent to Paine wrote, Christianity was “the most perfect standard of duty erected,” designed to “engage man to an endless progression in virtue” within the civic sphere. John Adams’s reaction to Age of Reason was both similar and succinct: “The Christian religion is, above all the religions that ever prevailed or existed in ancient or modern times, the religion of wisdom, virtue, equity and humanity, let the Blackguard Paine say what he will.” The response to Paine exhibited a matrix including Christian orthodoxy, political conservatism, and nascent exceptionalism. As Americans established new foundations for a national character, radicals like Paine and transatlantic counterpoints like France were cast aside.
More broadly, clergy defended the role of Christian belief as a crucial stabilizing force for the nation. A Christian defense transcended the mere squabbles with Paine. The stakes were much higher. Drawing from the theology of human depravity, religion was presented as necessary to control passion and curtail anarchy. “Religion is the only safeguard of a free people,” explained Boston minister Thaddeus Fiske, “and they who disregard its principles, or manifest a disposition or conduct that tends to lessen a veneration for the deity, are essentially unqualified to beat the head of government.” Religion, though technically not afforded an official place within the nation’s government, was still part of the nation’s identity, and thus needed to be taken into consideration when controlling people and policies. “That men destitute of religion, or the fear of God,” he concluded, “are unfit to lead and govern the important affairs of nations, [and] we have a recent and unhappy example in the late rulers of France, in her revolution.” America, due to its religious commitment, was a nation apart.
Likewise, in 1798, Samuel Spring warned his Newburyport, Massachusetts, congregation that America must avoid the influence of “French atheists” who were behind the chaos then spreading across the Atlantic. America’s own revolution had taken place less than two decades before, and while the quasi-war with France was still ongoing, Spring believed that the extent of the foreign nation’s nefarious plots was only now being discovered. They “have undertaken to manage our elections, and to direct our cabinet,” he proclaimed, and had attempted to “trample upon the United States.” All in all, “the French are the most deceitful, perfidious, avaricious, cruel and murderous monsters in the world.”
In response to the French Revolution, American ministers helped cultivate the framework in which their congregants could interpret their world and the events taking place within it. In an Age of Revolutions, in which everything seemed in transition, religion provided the tools through which to construct a consistent allegiance. These debates also developed one of the most dominant frameworks for American nationalism. The United States of America was to be, beyond anything else, a Christian refuge from a fallen world. Those who wished to control its power were expected to follow those guidelines.
Two centuries later, Americans, and especially American conservatives, are still devoted to proving the religious nature of their patriotic devotion. In a world of growing secularism, the United States is presented as a last refuge for explicit Christian devotion. The country’s religious nationalism has even made possible one of the unlikeliest of alliances: the loyalty between evangelical ministers and Donald Trump. On the one hand, Trump merely has to repeat the most basic language of Christian nationalism, even if it is deeply incongruent with his own history and actions, and he’s assured of the Religious Right’s support; on the other, evangelical ministers are expected to heap platitudes upon their heretical leader in exchange for ammunition in their culture wars. This quixotic marriage was only made possible due to a long tradition of patriotic piety and Christian partisanship, an uneven and dynamic trajectory that continues to produce new twists and turns.
Benjamin E. Park is an assistant professor of history at Sam Houston State University. He is the author of American Nationalisms: Imagining Union in the Age of Revolutions, 1783-1833, from which this essay was adapted. Follow him @BenjaminEPark.
"Mwaka mmoja uliopita, ingekuwa vigumu kumfikiria Donald Trump kama mtu muhimu katika picha ya Kikristo ya Amerika yenyewe. """ Hata hivyo, utegemezo wa Haki ya Kidini kwa mgombea wake, ikifuatiwa na uaminifu unaoendelea tangu alipoingia madarakani licha ya kashfa nyingi, imebadilisha mipaka ya jadi ya taifa. Viongozi wa kiinjilisti kama Franklin Graham na Jerry Falwell Jr. wamemtetea Trump na kumwona kama zawadi kutoka mbinguni. Ingawa uaminifu huu umesababisha wakosoaji wengi kukosoa unafiki na fursa ya wazi kati ya Wainjilisti weupe, ni mfano mwingine tu wa jinsi aina fulani ya dini na conservatism ya Marekani zimeunganishwa kwenye kiuno. "Uhusiano huu wa pekee kati ya uinjilisti wa kizalendo na haki ya Marekani ni wa hivi karibuni: ""Mkubwa wa Maadili"" kupanda kwa hatua ya kitaifa katika miaka ya 1980 ilitegemea ndoa ya Ronald Reagan na Chama cha Republican." "Chama hiki ni nyumba yetu; chama hiki ni mahali tunapohusika, "Pat Robertson alitangaza katika Mkutano wa GOP wa 1992. Lakini uhusiano kati ya dini ya wazi na uhifadhi unarudi nyuma sana. Ingawa watengenezaji wa serikali ya shirikisho la Marekani walitafuta tofauti kati ya ushawishi wa madhehebu na nguvu ya serikali - sana hivi kwamba waangalizi wa kiinjilisti walikosoa Katiba kama "hati isiyo na Mungu" - wapinzani walifaidika haraka na nguvu ya hotuba ya kidini katika mjadala wa kisiasa. Kwa kweli, katika miaka ya 1790, wakati Mapinduzi ya Ufaransa yalionekana kuangusha ulimwengu wote katika msukosuko, wahudumu wengi wa Marekani na wanasiasa walianza kufikiria wakati ujao wa taifa lao kama uliounganishwa na ujitoaji wa Kikristo. Tangu wakati huo, ni mara chache sana ambapo ubaguzi wa kikabila wa kidini uliotokana na hilo umepingwa. Katika enzi ya mapinduzi, kipindi kilichoanza na Mapinduzi ya Marekani na kuendelea kwa miongo kadhaa kama mapinduzi yalivyotetemeka Amerika na Ulaya, watu katika pande zote mbili za Atlantiki walilazimika kufikiria tena uhusiano kati ya dini, jamii na serikali. Na licha ya mafanikio ya kilimwengu ya maendeleo hayo, dini iliendelea kutawala kwa wengi. Kwa mfano, mwanafalsafa mashuhuri Mfaransa Jean-Jacques Rousseau alimwona Musa kuwa kielelezo bora cha kugeuza "mwili wa kitaifa" kuwa "mwili wa kisiasa" uliokaa pamoja kwa utulivu na amani. Alidai kwamba serikali za wakati huo zilizotegemea katiba za kilimwengu zilikuwa dhaifu, ilhali zile za Musa zilikuwa thabiti. Kwa kweli, upinzani wa msingi wa Rousseau wa "mataifa ya kisasa" ni kwamba kuna "watunga sheria wengi miongoni mwao lakini sio mtunga sheria mmoja". Katika Mawasiliano yake ya Jamii, Rousseau alisisitiza uhitaji wa "mafundisho ya imani ya kiraia tu" ambayo, ingawa iliondoka mbali na mafundisho fulani, ilisaidia kuingiza "hisia za ushirika" zilizoshirikiwa na taifa lote. "Kama ilivyoelezwa na Friedrich Schlegel, ""Sayansi ya siasa ni kwa ajili ya periphery kile dini ni kwa ajili ya kituo.""" Mbali na kuwa jambo lisilo na maana, dini ikawa muhimu zaidi kwa mazungumzo ya kisiasa wakati mataifa yalipatikana kuwa miundo ya kijamii na kutarajiwa kubadilika ili kufanana na jamii. Hisia hizo ziliongezeka wakati wa mapigano yaliyozunguka Mapinduzi ya Ufaransa, hasa katika ulimwengu wa Uingereza na Marekani. Ingawa awali ilikaribishwa kama mwendelezo wa sababu ya Amerika kwa uhuru, mapinduzi ya haraka ya kupungua kwa hofu na, kwa macho ya waangalizi wengi, machafuko, yaliwaongoza wasomi wa kihafidhina kuamini kuwa ni mfano wa kupita kiasi cha demokrasia. Dini ilikuwa sehemu muhimu ya usawa huo. Edmund Burke aliwashutumu Wafaransa kwa kuondoa dini yao iliyowekwa rasmi na serikali ya Uingereza, ambayo ilikuwa imeweka serikali katika hali ya utulivu. Burke alidai kwamba "roho ya watu mashuhuri na ya dini" iliyotunzwa na shirika la kanisa lililofadhiliwa na serikali, iliwafanya mataifa yaendelee kutegemea kanuni za kijamii, za kiadili, na za kidini ambazo zilikuwa muhimu kwa ajili ya kuokoka kwa nchi. Mary Wollstonecraft, mwanaharakati wa kisiasa wa Uingereza, alidai kwamba uaminifu wa kimakosa kwa dini ya serikali, badala ya hisia za kidini za asili, ulikuwa kiini cha theolojia hii ya kisiasa iliyopotoka. Dini ni "kulima ya uelewa na usafishaji wa hisia", aliamini, na inapaswa kwa kawaida kupenya kutoka kwa mwili wa raia badala ya kulazimishwa juu yao na serikali. Kwa kweli, Wollstonecraft alifikiri kwamba hoja ya Burke inge "kuharibu" dini na serikali. Hizi zilikuwa tu maneno mawili, yaliyounganishwa katika wigo wa nguvu sana, ndani ya mjadala mkali ambao ulilazimika kubadilisha mwendo wa jukumu la dini katika jamii. Licha ya kutokea ng'ambo ya Bahari ya Atlantiki, Mapinduzi ya Ufaransa yalikuwa na athari kubwa juu ya utamaduni wa kisiasa na kidini wa Marekani. Matukio yake yalileta maswali magumu kuhusu kusudi la mapinduzi ya Marekani, na wakati wake ulipatana na kuzaliwa kwa mfumo wa kisiasa wa vyama viwili wa Marekani. Hapo awali, kulikuwa na shauku ya jumla kwa sababu ya taifa lao dada. "Sasa, mzunguko wa haraka wa Ufaransa katika vurugu ulisababisha Wamarekani wengi, haswa wale wanaohusishwa na Chama cha Federalist, kukata uhusiano wa kitamaduni na kukataa maendeleo ya hivi karibuni na ya kikali ya taifa la Ufaransa. """ Mapigano hayo yalikuwa muhimu katika siasa za Marekani, kwa kuwa yalilazimisha mabadiliko makubwa katika dhana ya taifa la upendeleo, mawazo ya vurugu na mapinduzi, na uelewa wa demokrasia. Kwa kuwa dini ilikuwa daima katikati ya majadiliano yao kuhusu Ufaransa, pia ilibadilisha na kuthibitisha theolojia zinazoshindana za utajiri wa kitaifa. Wengi walisema kwamba Ufaransa ilishuka katika hali ya machafuko kwa sababu ya ukosefu wa ujitoaji wa kidini. Kwa hiyo, ili Marekani ifanikiwe, walihitaji kuimarisha ushirikiano wao na Wakristo. Utamaduni wa kitaifa wa Marekani ungeweza kujengwa tu juu ya uzalendo wenye bidii wa Kikristo. Kwa kuongezea wasiwasi huo, kulikuwa na hofu kubwa kwamba Mapinduzi ya Ufaransa yalikuwa sehemu ya tisho la ulimwenguni pote kwa imani kwa ujumla. Inaonekana kwamba imani ya kwamba hakuna Mungu, ya kwamba kuna Mungu, na itikadi nyingine zilizobadili imani ya kawaida zilikuwa zikiongezeka katika nchi nyingine za Atlantiki. Hakuna mtu aliyewakilisha tisho hilo zaidi ya Thomas Paine. Ingawa Paine alikuwa katikati ya mawazo ya kitaifa ya Marekani miongo miwili mapema, kitabu chake maarufu Common Sense kiliwafungulia wananchi njia ya kuwazia wakati ujao wa uzalendo mbali na Uingereza, aliondoka bara hilo, akarudi Ulaya, na kuingiliwa na mapinduzi ya Ufaransa. Alipokuwa gerezani huko Paris kwa kuunga mkono utawala usiofaa, Paine aligeuza fikira zake tena kuelekea Marekani. Marekani ilitangaza uhuru wake kutoka kwa utawala wa kifalme mwaka 1776, lakini sasa ilikuwa wakati wa kujitangaza huru kutoka kwa Ukristo. Aliamini kwamba Enzi ya Uelewevu haikuhitaji kitu kingine chochote. "Ni muhimu kuwa na ujasiri, ""Paine alielezea kwa mshukiwa mwenzake Elihu Palmer, kwa sababu wakati ""watu wengine wanaweza kusababu katika maana... wengine lazima washtukiwe ndani yake."" katika utangulizi wa Umri wa Sababu, kitabu chake maarufu na cha utata ambacho kilishambulia dini iliyopangwa, alikiri msisimko wake juu ya uwezekano mkubwa kwamba mapinduzi katika mfumo wa serikali yangefuatwa na mapinduzi katika mfumo wa dini." Joel Barlow, mwanadiplomasia, mwanasiasa, na mfanyabiashara kutoka Massachusetts, ambaye alisaidia kuchapisha Age of Reason ya Paine na kuandika moja ya utetezi wachache wa Marekani wa trakti hiyo yenye utata, alidai kwamba imani ya Kikristo hailingani na umri wa busara wa Amerika. Maendeleo yalitegemea uwezo wa taifa la "kuondoa [dini iliyofunuliwa] kadiri iwezekanavyo kutoka kwa jamii", aliandika katika insha yenye kuumiza ambayo haikuchapishwa kamwe. Ustaarabu wote wa Magharibi ulitegemea mwendo kuelekea busara ya ulimwengu wote mzima. Marekani ingeweza kusitawi tu ikiwa ingechukua udugu wa kimataifa na jamii nyingine za kidemokrasia, hasa Ufaransa ya mapinduzi, na kuvunja minyororo ya dini iliyopangwa. Maitikio ya Wamarekani kwa ujumbe wa Paine yalikuwa ya haraka na yenye sauti kubwa. Katika miaka kumi iliyofuata, angalau maandishi mia moja ya kupinga kitabu Age of Reason yalichapishwa, na mengi yalipinga shaka ya ulimwengu wote mzima iliyokuwa ikishindana na mamlaka ya kidini. Waziri wa Boston Jeremy Belknap alikataa kazi hiyo kama "a aina ya ukosefu wa uaminifu wa kawaida, ulioanzishwa kwa sehemu katika pedantry, kwa sehemu katika uzinzi na kwa sehemu katika tabia mbaya, ni insinuating mwenyewe katika akili ya thoughtless. <unk> Jamhuri ya Marekani ilikuwa kujengwa juu ya kitu zaidi imara. Kama mwandishi mwingine wa Paine alivyoandika, Ukristo ulikuwa "kiwango kikamilifu zaidi cha wajibu uliojengwa", kilichokusudiwa "kumhusisha mwanadamu katika maendeleo yasiyo na mwisho katika wema" ndani ya uwanja wa kiraia. "Mtu mwingine aliyemjibu Paine kwa maneno haya ya kipekee ni John Adams: ""Dini ya Kikristo ni, juu ya dini zote zilizowahi kutawala au kuwepo katika nyakati za kale au za kisasa, dini ya hekima, wema, usawa na ubinadamu, na Blackguard Paine aseme atakavyo.""" Wamarekani walipoanzisha misingi mipya ya tabia ya kitaifa, wakali kama Paine na wapinzani wa transatlantic kama Ufaransa walitupwa kando. Kwa ujumla zaidi, makasisi walitetea daraka la imani ya Kikristo kuwa nguvu muhimu ya kutuliza taifa. Ulinzi wa Kikristo ulizidi mabishano tu na Paine. Matatizo yalikuwa makubwa zaidi. Kwa kutegemea theolojia ya upotovu wa kibinadamu, dini ilionyeshwa kuwa muhimu kudhibiti shauku na kukomesha machafuko. "Dini ni ulinzi pekee wa watu huru, ""alieleza waziri wa Boston Thaddeus Fiske, ""na wale ambao hupuuza kanuni zake, au kuonyesha tabia au mwenendo ambao huelekea kupunguza heshima kwa mungu, kimsingi hawana sifa ya kumpiga mkuu wa serikali." """Watu wasio na dini au hofu ya Mungu, hawafai kuongoza na kutawala mambo muhimu ya mataifa, na tuna mfano wa hivi karibuni na usio na furaha katika watawala wa mwisho wa Ufaransa, katika mapinduzi yake." "Samuel Spring, aliyekuwa mfuasi wa Yesu, aliwaambia waumini wa Newburyport, Massachusetts, kwamba ""Wamarekani wanapaswa kuepuka uvutano wa watu wasioamini kwamba kuna Mungu wa Ufaransa, ambao walikuwa nyuma ya machafuko yaliyokuwa yakienea katika Bahari ya Atlantiki.""" Mapinduzi ya Marekani yalikuwa yametokea chini ya miongo miwili iliyopita, na wakati vita vya karibu na Ufaransa vilipokuwa bado vikiendelea, Spring aliamini kwamba kiwango cha njama mbaya za taifa la kigeni kilikuwa kinagunduliwa tu sasa. """Wamechukua jukumu la kusimamia uchaguzi wetu, na kuongoza baraza letu la mawaziri,"" alitangaza, na alijaribu ""kutikisa Marekani."" ""Kwa ujumla, Wafaransa ni waongozi zaidi, waovu, wenye pupa, waovu na wauaji wa ulimwengu.""" Katika enzi ya mapinduzi, ambapo kila kitu kilionekana kuwa katika mabadiliko, dini ilitoa zana ambazo kwa njia hiyo kuunda uaminifu thabiti. Mazungumzo hayo pia yalitokeza mojawapo ya mifumo mikubwa zaidi ya utaifa wa Marekani. Marekani ilikuwa, zaidi ya kitu kingine chochote, kimbilio la Kikristo kutoka kwa ulimwengu uliopotea. Wale waliotaka kudhibiti nguvu zake walitarajiwa kufuata miongozo hiyo. Karne mbili baadaye, Wamarekani, na hasa Wamarekani wa kihafidhina, bado wamejitolea kuthibitisha asili ya kidini ya kujitolea kwao kwa nchi. Katika ulimwengu wa kuenea kwa upendeleo wa kidini, Marekani inaonyeshwa kuwa kimbilio la mwisho kwa ajili ya ujitoaji wa wazi wa Kikristo. "Utaifa wa kidini wa nchi hiyo umefanya uwezekano wa moja ya ushirikiano usiowezekana: uaminifu kati ya wahudumu wa kiinjilisti na Donald Trump. """ Kwa upande mmoja, Trump anahitaji tu kurudia lugha ya msingi zaidi ya utaifa wa Kikristo, hata ikiwa haipatani kabisa na historia na vitendo vyake mwenyewe, na ana uhakika wa msaada wa Haki ya Kidini; kwa upande mwingine, wahudumu wa kiinjilisti wanatarajiwa kumwagilia kiongozi wao wa heretical badala ya risasi katika vita vyao vya utamaduni. Ndoa hii ya quixotic ilifanywa iwezekanavyo tu kwa sababu ya utamaduni mrefu wa uaminifu wa kizalendo na upendeleo wa Kikristo, mwendo usio sawa na wa nguvu ambao unaendelea kuzalisha mabadiliko mapya. Benjamin E. Park ni profesa msaidizi wa historia katika Chuo Kikuu cha Jimbo la Sam Houston. "Kama mwandishi wa American Nationalism: Imagining Union in the Age of Revolutions (1783-1833) na mwandishi wa ""Mashariki ya Kati"" na ""Mashariki ya Kati"" (1783-1833) na mwandishi wa ""Mashariki ya Kati"" (1783-1833) na mwandishi wa ""Mashariki ya Kati"" (1783-1833)." Mfuateni kwenye @BenjaminPark.