Perhaps one of the most basic features of copyright law is the distinction between an idea and a particular expression of that idea. The concept is crucial to our understanding of copyright because ideas themselves are not protectable under copyright, while the expression or execution of a particular idea typically is. Referred to in copyright circles as the “idea-expression dichotomy” or the “idea-expression divide,” the Supreme Court has observed that the fundamental principle strikes “a definitional balance between the First Amendment and the Copyright Act by permitting the free communication of facts while still protecting an author’s expression.” Harper & Row Publishers., Inc. v. Nation Enterprises., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985) (quoting Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises., 723 F.2d 195, 203 (2d Cir. 1983)).
We can think of the idea-expression dichotomy, then, as a way of balancing the exclusive rights of authors granted by copyright law with the free speech rights of the general public protected by the First Amendment. If ideas were protectable, it would permit every author to effectively withdraw them from the pool of ideas available to other creative professionals. Taken to its logical extreme, the world would soon run out of ideas and stifle speech with it. The idea-expression dichotomy is intended to ensure that doesn’t happen while also encouraging people to develop new creative ways of expressing ideas.
Why you can’t copyright an idea: Case Law
Today the idea-expression dichotomy is described explicitly in Title 17 of the U.S. Code (where most copyright law lives), Section 120(b) of which provides that “[i]n no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.” But the doctrine originated well before Congress had even contemplated the Copyright Act of 1976.
One of the earliest idea-expression cases dates back to 1879, when the Supreme Court considered the case of Charles Selden, the author of Selden’s Condensed Ledger, a book that described and facilitated a unique way of bookkeeping. W.C.M. Baker, the auditor of Greene County, Ohio, published his own book on accounting that drew significantly on Selden’s method. Selden sued Baker for copyright infringement and initially prevailed, but the Supreme Court reversed the lower court, holding that although Selden had a copyright interest in his book, “[t]he copyright of a book on book-keeping cannot secure the exclusive right to make, sell, and use account-books prepared upon the plan set forth in such book.” Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 104 (1879). Put more succinctly, “[t]he description of the [method] in a book, though entitled to the benefit of copyright, lays no foundation for an exclusive claim to the art itself. The object of the one is the explanation; the object of the other uses.” Id. at 105.
Baker v. Selden also articulated another principle of copyright law, closely related to the idea-expression dichotomy, often referred to as the “merger doctrine.” The merger doctrine stands for the proposition that in cases where there is only one way, or a small handful of ways, to express a particular idea, not even the expression is protectable. In other words, the idea and the expression are said to “merge” such that protecting the expression would effectively be the same as protecting the idea.
The idea-expression dichotomy and the related merger doctrine are principles that are conceptually quite simple but can become difficult to apply, particularly because it is sometimes difficult to identify the line between idea and expression. That’s perhaps most true in the case of artistic works, where a concept or idea may take on dozens of different manifestations. How can we tell whether a particular work copies a specific, copyrighted expression (and is thus infringing) versus merely representing the idea represented in a particular work?
As Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart once quipped about pornography — “I know it when I see it” — sometimes the only way to get a sense of the distinction is to look at some examples.
Your Glass Jellyfish Looks Just Like My Glass Jellyfish!
Following a period of artistic exploration in the late 1980s, California-based glass artist Richard Satava began producing and selling glass-in-glass jellyfish sculptures, which Satava described as “vertically oriented, colorful, fanciful jellyfish with tendril-like tentacles and a rounded bell encased in an outer layer of rounded glass that is bulbous at the top and tapering toward the bottom to form roughly a bullet shape, with the jellyfish portion of the sculpture filling almost the entire volume of the outer, clear glass shroud.” Satava v. Lowry, 323 F3d 805, 807 (2003). Satava sold his sculptures through galleries and gift shops throughout the United States.
Richard Satava could not stop other artists from creating glass jellyfish.
Enter fellow glass artist Christopher Lowry from Hawaii. Mr. Lowry also makes glass-in-glass jellyfish sculptures that, said Satava, looked suspiciously similar to his sculptures. Like Satava, Lowry sells his works through gift shops and galleries, and Lowry “admits he examined a Satava jellyfish sculpture that a customer brought him for repair in 1997.” Id. at 809.
Typically, when a copyright plaintiff shows a defendant had previously seen the allegedly infringed work and that allegedly infringing work looks substantially similar to it, it’s a slam-dunk win for the plaintiff.
But here, the court looked at the underlying ideas embodied in each of the works at issue: glass-in-glass jellyfish sculptures. The court explained that although Satava had made a number of creative contributions to the sculptures that warranted copyright protection, he “may not prevent others from copying aspects of his sculptures resulting from either jellyfish physiology or from their depiction in the glass-in-glass medium.” Id. at 811. The court went on to explain that:
“Satava may not prevent others from depicting jellyfish with tendril-like tentacles or rounded bells because many jellyfish possess those body parts. He may not prevent others from depicting jellyfish in bright colors, because many jellyfish are brightly colored. He may not prevent others from depicting jellyfish swimming vertically because jellyfish swim vertically in nature and often are depicted swimming vertically.” Id.
The court was careful to point out that it did not mean to suggest that “realistic depictions of live animals cannot be protected by copyright.” Id. at 812. But it did note that the window of protection is narrow. “Nature gives us ideas of animals in their natural surroundings: an eagle with talons extended to snatch a mouse; a grizzly bear clutching a salmon between its teeth; a butterfly emerging from its cocoon; a wolf howling at the full moon; a jellyfish swimming through tropical waters. These ideas, first expressed by nature, are the common heritage of humankind, and no artist may use copyright law to prevent others from depicting them.” Id. at 812-13.
The court found in Lowry’s favor, and today both artists continue to sell their glass-in-glass jellyfish sculptures (see Chris Lowry’s website; Richard Satava’s website).
Your Jump Shot Logo Looks Just Like Michael Jordan!
You don’t need to be a sports fan to know that the Nike “Jumpman” logo used on its Air Jordan line of products is among the most iconic trademarks of modern times. The logo is a silhouette of Michael Jordan’s pose in a famous photo of him that was taken in 1984 by noted photographer Jacobus Rentmeester. Nike licensed the photo, ostensibly only for internal display use, around the time that it was developing plans to partner with Jordan for a line of athletic shoes. Nike subsequently hired its own photographer to create a new image of Jordan, one “obviously inspired by Rentmeester’s” photograph, but with a number of modifications, including the clearly visible Chicago skyline. Rentmeester v. Nike, 883 F.3d 1111, 1116 (9th Cir. 2018). Notwithstanding a brief legal scuffle between Rentmeester and Nike in the mid-1980s, Nike continued to use the photo, including creating the famous “Jumpman” logo that now reigns supreme in the academic apparel industry.
Rentmeester sued Nike in 2015 alleging that the Nike photo and the Jumpman logo infringe his copyright in the 1984 image.
Jacobus Rentmeester said his photo was the basis for the Nike “Jumpman” logo, but he could not stop Nike from using it because the idea of a basketball player jumping is not protectable by copyright.
Although the court acknowledged that the photographs are “undeniably similar in the subject matter they depict” — Michael Jordan in a particular ballet-inspired jumping pose — “Rentmeester’s copyright does not confer a monopoly on that general ‘idea’ or ‘concept; he cannot prohibit other photographers from taking their own photos” of Jordan in the same pose. Rentmeester, 883 F.3 at 1121. The court recognized that perhaps the outcome would be different if Nike’s photographer had copied the details of the pose as expressed in Rentmeester’s picture, but “he borrowed only the general idea or concept embodied in the photo.” Id. “In Rentmeester’s photo, Jordan’s bent limbs combine with the background and foreground elements to convey mainly a sense of horizontal (forward) propulsion, while in the Nike photo, Jordan’s completely straight limbs combine with the other elements to convey mainly a sense of vertical propulsion,” id. at 1121-22, leading the court to conclude that “[w]hile the photos embody a similar idea or concept, they express it in different ways.” Id.
The court went on to compare other aspects of the images, including the outdoor setting, the positioning of the basketball hoop, the angle of the photography, and the overall arrangement of the elements, ultimately concluding that the two photos share only “general ideas or concepts: Michael Jordan attempting to dunk inspired by [a ballet pose]; an outdoor setting stripped of most of the traditional trappings of baseball; a camera angle that captures the subject silhouetted against the sky. Rentmeester cannot claim an exclusive right to ideas or concepts at that level of generality, even in combination. Permitting him to claim such a right would withdraw those ideas or concepts from the ‘stock of materials available to other artists, thereby thwarting copyright’s ‘fundamental objective’ of ‘foster[ing]’ creativity.” Id. at 1123 (internal citations omitted) (alterations in original).
Thus, the court ultimately concluded that neither the photo nor the logo infringes because they copied only unprotectable elements — the ideas and concepts — of Rentmeester’s image.
Copyright Protection is Limited
Strictly speaking, the idea-expression dichotomy limits the scope of copyright protection afforded to authors. In the abstract, that sounds antithetical to the interests of artists, but in reality, the doctrine protects artists by ensuring there is a diverse and robust body of ideas from which to draw inspiration. Perhaps the Setava court said it best:
We do not mean to short-change the legitimate need of creative artists to protect their original works. After all, copyright law achieves its high purpose of enriching our culture by giving artists a financial incentive to create. But we must be careful in copyright cases not to cheat the public domain. Only by vigorously policing the line between idea and expression can we ensure that artists receive the due reward for their original creations and that proper latitude is granted to other artists to make use of ideas that properly belong to us all. 323 F.3d at 813.
What do you think about the idea-expression dichotomy? Let us know in the comments section below.
Labda moja ya sifa za msingi zaidi za sheria ya hakimiliki ni tofauti kati ya wazo na usemi maalum wa wazo hilo. "Hii ni muhimu kwa uelewa wetu wa haki za uchapaji kwa sababu mawazo yenyewe hayawezi kulindwa chini ya haki za uchapaji, wakati usemi au utekelezaji wa wazo fulani kwa kawaida ni "".""" "Kutokana na ""dichotomy ya wazo-maonyesho"" au ""kutofautiana kwa wazo-maonyesho,"" Mahakama Kuu imeona kwamba kanuni ya msingi inashambulia usawa wa ufafanuzi kati ya Marekebisho ya Kwanza na Sheria ya Haki za Uandishi kwa kuruhusu mawasiliano ya bure ya ukweli wakati bado inalinda usemi wa mwandishi. - Harper & Row, Inc. v. Harper & Row, Inc., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985) (kuchukua Harper & Row, Inc., 723 F.2d, 195)." 1983) na "Tunaweza kufikiria ""dichotomy ya wazo-maonyesho"" kama njia ya kusawazisha haki za kipekee za waandishi zinazotolewa na sheria ya hakimiliki na haki za uhuru wa kujieleza za umma kwa ujumla zinazolindwa na Marekebisho ya Kwanza ya Katiba." Ikiwa mawazo yangeweza kulindwa, ingeruhusu kila mwandishi kuondoa kwa ufanisi kutoka kwa dimbwi la mawazo yanayopatikana kwa wataalamu wengine wa ubunifu. Kwa sababu hiyo, kwa sababu ya hali mbaya sana, ulimwengu ungepoteza mawazo yake na kuondoa uwezo wake wa kusema. Dhana-maonyesho dichotomy ni lengo la kuhakikisha kwamba haina kutokea wakati pia kuhamasisha watu kuendeleza njia mpya ubunifu wa kuelezea mawazo. "Kwa nini haki ya uandishi wa habari haipaswi kupewa haki ya uandishi wa habari: Sheria ya kesi Leo, tofauti ya wazo na usemi imeelezwa wazi katika Kichwa cha 17 cha Kanuni ya Marekani (ambapo sheria nyingi za haki za uandishi wa habari zinaishi), Sehemu ya 120 (b) ambayo inatoa kwamba ""hakuna kesi yoyote ambayo ulinzi wa haki za uandishi wa habari kwa kazi ya awali ya uandishi wa habari unaenea kwa wazo lolote, utaratibu, mchakato, mfumo, njia ya uendeshaji, dhana, kanuni, au ugunduzi, bila kujali namna ilivyoelezwa, kuelezwa, kuonyeshwa, au kuingizwa katika kazi kama hiyo.""" "Mmoja wa kesi za kwanza za ""maonyesho ya wazo"" ni mwaka 1879 wakati Mahakama Kuu ilichunguza kesi ya Charles Selden, mwandishi wa Selden's Condensed Ledger, kitabu ambacho kilielezea na kuwezesha njia ya kipekee ya uhasibu." W.C.M. Baker, mkaguzi wa Greene County, Ohio, alichapisha kitabu chake mwenyewe juu ya uhasibu ambayo ilichora kwa kiasi kikubwa juu ya mbinu ya Selden. "Kama vile sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya sheria ya ""Baker v. Selden.""" Kwa ufupi zaidi, <unk>[t] maelezo ya [njia] katika kitabu, ingawa anastahili faida ya hakimiliki, haina msingi wa madai ya kipekee kwa sanaa yenyewe. Lengo la moja ni ufafanuzi; lengo la matumizi mengine. <unk> Id. Katika 105. "Baker v Selden pia alitoa kanuni nyingine ya sheria ya hakimiliki, inayohusiana sana na dichotomy ya wazo-maonyesho, mara nyingi inajulikana kama ""fundisho la kuunganisha"" - nadharia ya kuunganisha inasimama kwa pendekezo kwamba katika kesi ambapo kuna njia moja tu, au njia chache, kuelezea wazo fulani, hata usemi hauwezi kulindwa." Kwa maneno mengine, wazo na usemi husemwa "kuungana" kwa hivyo kulinda usemi kwa ufanisi itakuwa sawa na kulinda wazo. "Dichotomy ya ""wazo-maonyesho"" na mafundisho yanayohusiana ya ""kuunganisha"" ni kanuni ambazo ni rahisi sana, lakini zinaweza kuwa ngumu kutumia, hasa kwa sababu wakati mwingine ni vigumu kutambua mstari kati ya wazo na usemi." Hiyo labda ni kweli zaidi katika kesi ya kazi za kisanii, ambapo dhana au wazo inaweza kuchukua juu ya kadhaa ya maonyesho tofauti. Tunawezaje kujua kama kazi fulani inakili usemi maalum uliohifadhiwa na haki za uchapaji (na hivyo inakiuka) dhidi ya kuwakilisha tu wazo lililowakilishwa katika kazi fulani? "Mwanasheria wa Mahakama Kuu ya Marekani, Potter Stewart, aliwahi kusema hivi kuhusu ponografia: ""Ninajua ninapoiona"" - wakati mwingine njia pekee ya kujua tofauti ni kuangalia mifano." Samaki-mwitu wako wa kioo hufanana kabisa na samaki-mwitu wangu wa kioo! Baada ya kipindi cha uchunguzi wa kisanii mwishoni mwa miaka ya 1980, msanii wa kioo wa California Richard Satawa alianza kutengeneza na kuuza sanamu za jellyfish za kioo-katika-kioo, ambazo Satawa alielezea kama jellyfish za rangi, za kupendeza na tentacles kama tendril na kengele ya mviringo iliyofungwa katika safu ya nje ya kioo cha mviringo ambayo ni bulbous juu na tapering kuelekea chini kuunda karibu umbo la risasi, na sehemu ya jellyfish ya sanamu hiyo kujaza karibu kiasi chote cha nje, kioo wazi. Satava aliuza sanamu zake kupitia maonyesho na maduka ya zawadi kotekote Marekani. Richard Satava hangeweza kuwazuia wasanii wengine kutengeneza jellyfish za kioo. Mchoraji wa kioo Christopher Lowry kutoka Hawaii Lowry pia hufanya sanamu za jellyfish za kioo-katika-kioo ambazo, alisema Satava, zilionekana sawa na sanamu zake. Lowry pia anajitolea kwa ajili ya kazi zake za sanaa, na kwa mfano, yeye mwenyewe alitoa picha ya jellyfish ya Satawa ambayo mteja alimletea ili kurekebisha. Katika 809 Kwa kawaida, wakati mwombaji wa hakimiliki anaonyesha mshtakiwa alikuwa amewahi kuona kazi inayodaiwa kuingiliwa na kwamba kazi inayodaiwa kuingiliwa inaonekana sawa na hiyo, ni ushindi wa slam-dunk kwa mwombaji. Mahakama hiyo ilitoa uamuzi huo kwa kuzingatia mawazo yaliyo ndani ya kila moja ya kazi hizo: sanamu za jellyfish zilizotengenezwa kwa glasi. Mahakama hiyo ilieleza kwamba ingawa Satava alikuwa amefanya michango kadhaa ya ubunifu kwa sanamu ambazo zilikuwa na haki ya ulinzi wa hakimiliki, yeye "hawezi kuzuia wengine kuiga mambo ya sanamu zake yanayotokana na fiziolojia ya jellyfish au kutoka kwa picha yao katika kioo-katika-kioo". Katika kesi hii, ni lazima uende kwa 811. Mahakama iliendelea kueleza kwamba: <unk>Satava hawezi kuzuia wengine kuelezea jellyfish na tentacles kama tendril au kengele za mviringo kwa sababu jellyfish wengi wana sehemu hizo za mwili. Huenda asiwazuie wengine waonyeshe nyigu kwa rangi nyangavu, kwa sababu nyigu wengi wana rangi nyangavu. Yeye hawezi kuzuia wengine kutoka kuelezea jellyfish kuogelea wima kwa sababu jellyfish kuogelea wima katika asili na mara nyingi ni kuonyeshwa kuogelea wima. <unk> Id. Mahakama ilikuwa makini kuonyesha kwamba haikuwa na maana ya kupendekeza kwamba <unk>realistic picha ya wanyama hai haiwezi kulindwa na hakimiliki.<unk> Id. 812 katika 812 Lakini ilibainisha kwamba dirisha la ulinzi ni nyembamba. <unk>Uumbaji hutupa mawazo ya wanyama katika mazingira yao ya asili: tai mwenye makucha yaliyoinuliwa ili kumkamata panya; dubu mwenye manyoya makali akishikilia samaki wa samaki kati ya meno yake; kipepeo anayetoka kwenye kiota chake; mbwa-mwitu anayelia wakati wa mwezi mpevu; jellyfish anayeteleza katika maji ya kitropiki. Mawazo haya, yaliyoonyeshwa kwanza na asili, ni urithi wa kawaida wa wanadamu, na hakuna msanii anayeweza kutumia sheria ya hakimiliki kuzuia wengine kuwakilisha. <unk> Id. 812-113 katika Mahakama ilipata kwa niaba ya Lowry, na leo wasanii wote wawili wanaendelea kuuza sanamu zao za jellyfish za glasi-katika-glasi (tazama tovuti ya Chris Lowry; tovuti ya Richard Satava). Nembo yako ya Jump Shot Inaonekana Kama Michael Jordan! Huna haja ya kuwa shabiki wa michezo kujua kwamba Nike 'Jumpman' nembo kutumika juu ya Air Jordan yake mstari wa bidhaa ni miongoni mwa alama za biashara iconic zaidi ya nyakati za kisasa. "Logo ya ""Michael Jordan"" ni picha ya picha ya Michael Jordan iliyochorwa na mpiga picha maarufu Jacobus Rentmeister." Nike ilitoa leseni ya picha hiyo, kwa kuonekana tu kwa matumizi ya ndani ya maonyesho, karibu na wakati huo ilikuwa ikiendeleza mipango ya kushirikiana na Jordan kwa mstari wa viatu vya michezo. Nike baadaye aliajiri mpiga picha wake mwenyewe kuunda picha mpya ya Jordan, moja "kwa wazi iliyoongozwa na picha ya Rentmeester", lakini na marekebisho kadhaa, pamoja na skyline inayoonekana wazi ya Chicago. Rentmeister v. Nike, 883 F.3d 1111, 1116 (Kumi na tisa Cir. 2018) na Licha ya mapigano mafupi ya kisheria kati ya Rentmeister na Nike katikati ya miaka ya 1980, Nike iliendelea kutumia picha hiyo, ikiwa ni pamoja na kuunda nembo maarufu ya Jumpman ambayo sasa inatawala juu katika tasnia ya mavazi ya kitaaluma. Rentmeister alishtakiwa na kampuni ya Nike kwa madai ya kuharibu picha ya Jumperman na alama ya Nike kwenye picha ya mwaka 1984. "Jacob Rentmeister alisema picha yake ilikuwa msingi wa nembo ya Nike ""Jumpman,"" lakini hakuweza kuzuia Nike kuitumia kwa sababu wazo la mchezaji wa mpira wa kikapu kuruka si ulinzi na haki za wamiliki." "Japo mahakama ilikiri kuwa picha hizo ni ""haijulikani zinafanana katika mada wanayoonyesha"" - Michael Jordan katika pose maalum ya kuruka iliyoongozwa na ballet - hati miliki ya Rentmeister haitoi upendeleo kwa ""wazo"" au ""wazo"" hilo la jumla; hawezi kuwazuia wapiga picha wengine kuchukua picha zao wenyewe ""ya Jordan katika pose hiyo hiyo." Mfanyakazi wa nyumba ya nyumba, 883 F. 3 katika 1121. Mahakama ilitambua kwamba labda matokeo yangekuwa tofauti ikiwa mpiga picha wa Nike alikuwa amekopa maelezo ya pose kama ilivyoonyeshwa katika picha ya Rentmeester, lakini <unk>alikopa tu wazo la jumla au dhana iliyojumuishwa katika picha.<unk> Id. "Katika picha ya Rentmeister, viungo vilivyopindika vya Jordan vinachanganya na mambo ya nyuma na ya mbele ili kutoa hisia ya mwendo wa usawa (mbele), wakati katika picha ya Nike, viungo vilivyo sawa kabisa vya Jordan vinachanganya na vitu vingine ili kutoa hisia ya mwendo wa wima. """ "Kutokana na taarifa hiyo, mahakama imesema kuwa ""picha hizo zinaonyesha wazo au dhana sawa, lakini zinaelezea kwa njia tofauti.""" Mahakama iliendelea kulinganisha mambo mengine ya picha, ikiwa ni pamoja na mazingira ya nje, nafasi ya mpira wa kikapu, pembe ya upigaji picha, na mpangilio wa jumla wa vipengele, hatimaye ikikamilisha kwamba picha hizo mbili zinashiriki tu mawazo au dhana za jumla: Michael Jordan akijaribu kupiga dunk iliyoongozwa na [mtazamo wa ballet]; mazingira ya nje yaliyoondolewa mapambo ya jadi ya baseball; pembe ya kamera ambayo inachukua sura ya kichwa dhidi ya anga. Rentmeester hawezi kudai haki ya kipekee ya mawazo au dhana katika ngazi hiyo ya ujumla, hata katika mchanganyiko. Kumruhusu kudai haki kama hiyo kungekuja na kuondoa mawazo hayo au dhana kutoka kwa "mali ya vifaa vinavyopatikana kwa wasanii wengine, na hivyo kuzuia "lengo la msingi" la haki ya uandishi wa habari la "kuendeleza" ubunifu. <unk> Id. 1123 (maelezo ya ndani yameondolewa) (mabadiliko katika asili). Hivyo, mahakama hatimaye alikwisha hitimisha kwamba wala picha wala nembo infringes kwa sababu wao kunakiliwa tu unprotected vipengele <unk> mawazo na dhana <unk> ya Rentmeester <unk> picha. Ulinzi wa hakimiliki ni mdogo Kwa kusema kwa ukali, dichotomy ya wazo-maonyesho hupunguza wigo wa ulinzi wa hakimiliki unaotolewa kwa waandishi. Kwa ufupi, hiyo inaonekana kuwa kinyume na maslahi ya wasanii, lakini kwa kweli, mafundisho hayo yanalinda wasanii kwa kuhakikisha kuna mwili tofauti na thabiti wa mawazo ambayo huchochea. "Hata hivyo, mahakama ya Setawa ilisema: ""Hatuna nia ya kupunguza mahitaji halali ya wasanii wa ubunifu kulinda kazi zao za awali.""" Baada ya yote, sheria ya hakimiliki inafikia kusudi lake la juu la kutajirisha utamaduni wetu kwa kuwapa wasanii kichocheo cha kifedha cha kuunda. Lakini ni lazima tuwe waangalifu katika kesi za hakimiliki ili tusidanganya uwanja wa umma. Ni kwa kudhibiti kwa nguvu mpaka kati ya wazo na usemi tu tunaweza kuhakikisha kwamba wasanii wanapata thawabu inayostahili kwa uumbaji wao wa awali na kwamba uhuru sahihi unapewa wasanii wengine kutumia mawazo ambayo kwa usahihi ni mali yetu sote. 323 F3D katika 813 Una maoni gani kuhusu tofauti kati ya wazo na usemi? Tuambie katika sehemu ya maoni hapa chini.