The British Royal Navy’s HMS Albion, a 22,000-ton amphibious transport dock, conducted a freedom of navigation patrol (FON) in waters near the Paracel islands (Xisha Qundao in Chinese) in the South China Sea in late August. The HMS Albion’s patrol was a traditional assertion of freedom of navigation on the high seas unlike the freedom of navigation operations (FONOPS) of the U.S. Navy that are designed to challenge what the United States views as excessive maritime claims. This difference illustrates variations in approach by allies to join FON in the South China Sea.
China, Vietnam, and Taiwan all claim the Paracel islands. In January 1974, China resorted to force to seize South Vietnamese occupied features in the Paracel islands. Beijing angrily denounced that the HMS Albion sailed within its territorial waters around the Paracels without seeking prior approval. An anonymous British source nonetheless notes that the royal warship did not enter the 12 nautical mile limit of any feature in the Paracels, but its operation was conducted in a way invalidating China’s excessive maritime claim in the area. After the operation, the HMS Albion sailed to Ho Chi Minh City for a four-day visit to Vietnam from September 3.
The patrol by the British warship demonstrated the U.K.’s serious intention to engage in Southeast Asian region. It signaled that the Royal Navy is likely to be a regular party patrolling the South China Sea. As Ian Storey and Euan Graham assert, the patrol would make U.S. happy as it resonated with Washington’s call for upholding freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. Recently, the UK and Australia made public their agreement to strengthen military cooperation. The British aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth is to be deployed to the Pacific as early as 2020 and will sail side by side with Australian navy ships.
The Royal Navy has not elucidated the objective of the operation. Its spokesperson only informed in brief that “HMS Albion exercised her rights for freedom of navigation in full compliance with international law and norms.” However, regional observers widely interpreted it and previous patrols as a challenge to China’s excessive claims in the Paracels in particular and the South China Sea in general.
Regarding the Paracel islands, China unilaterally declared the composition of all straight lines connecting the 28 adjacent base points in 1996. The straight baselines encircling the Paracels form internal waters area within the base points. At the same time, China claims a territorial sea of 12 nautical miles around the Paracel islands. As Carl Thayer has asserted, China’s declaration of straight baselines with the Paracel islands is not compatible with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 (UNCLOS). According to the convention, drawing straight baselines is only applicable to archipelagic states. Noticeably, the Arbitration Court in Hague, in its ruling on 12 July 2016, invalidated China’s claimed historic rights to the sea areas within the notorious “nine-dash line” that also embraces the Paracel islands.
Beijing only made official comments after Western media outlets cited anonymous British defence sources about the HMS Albion naval patrol. Similar to the U.S. FONOPs, China sent vocal warnings, its warship and fighter jets to shadow the HMS Albion operation. In almost a week later, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs charged that the operational assertion was a provocation, violation of its domestic law, relevant international law and a breach of its sovereignty. China warned that additional operations would be detrimental to bilateral relations, regional peace and stability. Noticeably, China reactions were restrained both verbally and its actions at sea avoided any direct confrontation with the British warship thus preventing any escalation. However, China demonstrated its resolve by cancelling the important post-Brexit trade deal that London has been pursuing with Beijing because of the HMS Albion challenge.
The HMS Albion indeed added up to the external powers’ endeavor to uphold the right of free access to the waterways [and airway] in the South China Sea. In a relevant move, France and the U.K. conducted a joint freedom of navigation patrol through Mischief, Subi and Fiery Cross Reefs in the Spratly islands last June as announced at the 17th Asia Security Summit, or Shangri-La Dialogue 2018. Both London and Paris considered themselves Indo-Pacific powers and committed to protecting the free passage through the strategic sea line of communications in Southeast Asia pursuant to international maritime law. Beside the two publicized patrols, both [and together with Australia] have maintained their naval operations in the area. France, for instance, sailed at least five ships in the South China Sea in 2017.
The U.S. has conducted eleven publicized FONOPs to challenge China’s excessive maritime claims in the South China Sea since October 2015. Five FONOPs in the Paracels were carried out by the USS Curtis Wilbur (January 2016), the USS Decatur (October 2016), the USS Stethem (July 2017), the USS Chafee (October 2017) and the first-ever joint operation by the USS Higgins and USS Antietam (May 2018). The USS Lassen (October 2015), the USS William P. Lawrence (May 2016), the USS Dewey (May 2017), the USS John S. McCain (August 2017), and the USS Mustin (March 2018) conducted the five FONOPs in the Spratlys. The FONOP by the USS Hopper in January 2018 was undertaken at Scarborough Shoal. Despite this, South China Sea expert Gregory Poling assessed that the U.S. current strategy had failed and FONOPs were ineffective.
Unfortunately, the U.S. military dynamics in the region, during and after President Barack Obama’s pivot and rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific, have not restrained China from constructing artificial islands and military bases in the South China Sea. China has finished the constructions of seven artificial islands and equipped them with modern offensive and defensive military capabilities. China has militarized the South China Sea with the installation of jamming communications and radar systems in Fiery Cross Reef and Mischief Reef, anti-ship cruise missiles YJ-12B and surface-to-air missile systems HQ-9B on Fiery Cross Reef, Subi Reef and Mischief Reef. In addition, China temporarily deployed H-6K nuclear capable bombers in Woody Island. The question from now on is to what extent China will militarize the artificial islands.
States with vested interests in the South China Sea are more concerned with China’s increasing militarization of artificial islands in the region. Their concern has heightened due to the increased ambiguity of the U.S. policy in Asia. U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s elucidation of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific is not sufficient to shore up the international rules-based order. The new Trump Administration policy is mainly economic-centric and interestingly falls short in security substance. Regional states can hardly find reassurance in the Trump Administration’s plan to deal with China’s fait accompli in the South China Sea. In addition, U.S. financial commitments under the new Indo-Pacific vision is too meagre compared to China’s expansive and ambitious Belt and Road Initiative. It would be naïve to think that Secretary Pompeo’s commitment to ASEAN’s centrality in the Indo-Pacific Region will convince skeptics of U.S. resolve to push back against China.
The Franco-English joint patrol and the HMS Albion operation exemplified the increased engagement of other external powers in the South China Sea dispute. Southeast Asian states are likely to respond with caution to recent developments. The engagement of additional external powers goes in tandem with the new outward looking regionalism promoted by inclusive ASEAN over the last few decades. Nonetheless, ASEAN states should be concerned about their region once again becoming an arena for rivalry among the major powers. This is not the outcome that regional states expected after more than five decades of regional building.
Tuan Anh Luc is a PhD Candidate in the School of Humanities and Social Sciences at the University of New South Wales, Canberra.
HMS Albion, meli ya meli ya Uingereza yenye uzito wa tani 22,000 ilifanya kazi ya ulinzi wa uhuru wa usafiri katika maji ya visiwa vya Paracel (Xisha Qundao) katika Bahari ya China Kusini. "Hifadhi ya HMS Albion ilikuwa uthibitisho wa jadi wa uhuru wa usafiri baharini, tofauti na shughuli za uhuru wa usafiri (FONOP) za Jeshi la Wanamaji la Marekani ambazo zimekusudiwa kupinga kile Marekani inaona kama madai ya bahari ya kupita kiasi.""" Tofauti hii inaonyesha tofauti katika mbinu ya washirika kujiunga na FON katika Bahari ya Kusini mwa China. China, Vietnam, na Taiwan wote wanadai Visiwa vya Paracel. Mwaka 1974 China ilitumia nguvu ili kuvamia maeneo ya Vietnam Kusini katika Visiwa vya Paracel. China imesema meli ya HMS Albion ilisafiri katika maji yake ya eneo la Visiwa vya Paracel bila kupata idhini ya awali. "Mtaalamu mmoja wa Uingereza amesema meli hiyo haikuingia katika ""kiwango cha maili 12 za baharini"" katika eneo la Visiwa vya Paracel lakini ilifanya kazi kwa njia inayopinga madai ya China ya kuwa na mamlaka ya baharini katika eneo hilo." Baada ya operesheni hiyo, HMS Albion ilisafiri hadi Ho Chi Minh City kwa ziara ya siku nne nchini Vietnam kuanzia Septemba 3. Meli hiyo ya kivita ya Uingereza ilionyesha nia ya Uingereza ya kushiriki kikamilifu katika eneo la Asia ya Kusini Mashariki. "Hii ni ishara kwamba Royal Navy ina uwezekano wa kuwa ""kikundi cha kawaida"" patrolling Bahari ya Kusini ya China." "Ian Storey na Ewan Graham wanasema kuwa ""hatua hii itawafurahisha Marekani kwa sababu inalingana na wito wa Washington wa kudumisha uhuru wa usafiri baharini katika Bahari ya China Kusini.""" Hivi karibuni, Uingereza na Australia zilitangaza makubaliano yao ya kuimarisha ushirikiano wa kijeshi. Meli ya ndege ya Uingereza HMS Queen Elizabeth itasafirishwa hadi Bahari ya Pasifiki mnamo 2020 na kusafiri kando ya meli za jeshi la wanamaji la Australia. Jeshi la Wanamaji la Uingereza halijafafanua lengo la operesheni hiyo. "HMS Albion ilitumia haki zake za uhuru wa kusafiri kwa kufuata sheria na kanuni za kimataifa, ""lakini waangalizi wa kikanda walifafanua kwa ujumla kuwa ni changamoto kwa madai ya China ya kupita kiasi katika Paracel na Bahari ya Kusini ya China kwa ujumla." Kwa upande wa Visiwa vya Paracel, China ilitangaza kwa upande mmoja muundo wa mistari yote ya moja kwa moja inayounganisha pointi za msingi 28 zilizo karibu mnamo 1996. Mstari wa msingi wa moja kwa moja unaozunguka Paracels huunda eneo la maji ya ndani ndani ya pointi za msingi. China inadai kuwa na bahari ya bahari ya maili 12 karibu na visiwa vya Paracel. "Kama Carl Thayer alivyosema, ""matangazo ya China ya mistari ya msingi ya moja kwa moja na Visiwa vya Paracel hayapatani na Mkataba wa Umoja wa Mataifa juu ya Sheria ya Bahari ya 1982.""" Kulingana na mkataba huo, kuchora mistari ya msingi ya moja kwa moja inatumika tu kwa mataifa ya visiwa. Mahakama ya Arbitration ya Hague ilitangaza tarehe 12 Julai 2016 kwamba China haikuhusika katika suala la haki za kihistoria za maeneo ya baharini ndani ya mstari wa 9 ambao pia unajumuisha visiwa vya Paracel. Beijing ilitoa maoni rasmi baada ya vyombo vya habari vya Magharibi kunukuu vyanzo vya ulinzi vya Uingereza kuhusu doria ya majini ya HMS Albion. "Kama ilivyo kwa ""FONOPs"" za Marekani, China ilituma maonyo ya sauti, meli zake za vita na ndege za kivita kufuatilia operesheni ya HMS Albion." "Katika taarifa iliyotolewa na Wizara ya Mambo ya Nje ya China, China ilisema kuwa ""mashambulizi hayo ni ya kikatili, ni ukiukaji wa sheria za ndani na sheria za kimataifa zinazohusiana na suala hili na ni uvunjaji wa uhuru wake.""" China ilionya kuwa shughuli za ziada zingeharibu mahusiano ya nchi mbili, amani na utulivu wa kikanda. "Kwa kushangaza, China ilijizuia katika majibu yake ya maneno na vitendo vyake baharini, na hivyo kuepuka mapigano yoyote ya moja kwa moja na meli ya vita ya Uingereza, na hivyo kuzuia kuongezeka kwa ghasia.""" Hata hivyo, China ilionyesha azimio lake kwa kufuta makubaliano muhimu ya biashara ya baada ya Brexit ambayo London imekuwa ikifuatilia na Beijing kwa sababu ya changamoto ya HMS Albion. HMS Albion kwa kweli iliongeza juhudi za nguvu za nje za kutetea haki ya upatikanaji wa bure wa njia za maji [na njia ya hewa] katika Bahari ya Kusini mwa China. Ufaransa na Uingereza zimefanya kazi ya pamoja ya kulinda uhuru wa usafiri wa baharini katika visiwa vya Mischief, Subi na Fiery Cross katika kisiwa cha Spratly mwezi Juni mwaka jana, kama ilivyotangazwa katika mkutano wa usalama wa Asia wa 17 au Shangri-La Dialogue. London na Paris zilijiona kuwa nguvu za Indo-Pacific na zimejitolea kulinda njia huru kupitia mstari wa mawasiliano ya baharini ya kimkakati katika Asia ya Kusini-Mashariki kulingana na sheria ya kimataifa ya baharini. Mbali na doria hizo mbili zilizotangazwa, zote mbili [na pamoja na Australia] zimeendelea na shughuli zao za majini katika eneo hilo. Ufaransa ilisafiri kwa meli tano katika Bahari ya China Kusini mwaka 2017. Marekani imefanya uchunguzi wa mara ya kwanza dhidi ya madai ya China ya kuwa na mamlaka ya bahari katika Bahari ya China Kusini tangu Oktoba 2015. Majaribio hayo yalifanywa na USS Curtis Wilbur (January 2016), USS Decatur (October 2016), USS Stethem (July 2017), USS Chafee (October 2017) na USS Higgins (May 2018). USS Lassen (Oktoba 2015) USS William P. Lawrence (Mei 2016) USS Dewey (Mei 2017) USS John S. McCain (Agosti 2017) na USS Mustin (Machi 2018) walifanya FONOP tano katika Spratly. Utafiti wa FONOP uliofanywa na USS Hopper mnamo Januari 2018 ulifanywa huko Scarborough Shoal. Mtaalamu wa bahari ya China Kusini Gregory Poling amesema kuwa Marekani imeshindwa kutekeleza mpango huo. "Kwa bahati mbaya, mwelekeo wa kijeshi wa Marekani katika eneo hilo, wakati na baada ya Rais Barack Obama ""kugeuka na kusawazisha"" kuelekea Asia-Pacific, haijazuia China kujenga visiwa vya bandia na misingi ya kijeshi katika Bahari ya Kusini ya China." China imemaliza ujenzi wa visiwa saba vya bandia na kuviandaa na uwezo wa kisasa wa kijeshi wa kushambulia na kujilinda. China imepiga silaha katika Bahari ya China Kusini kwa kuweka vifaa vya kuzuia mawasiliano na radar katika Fiery Cross Reef na Mischief Reef, makombora ya kupambana na meli YJ-12B na mifumo ya makombora ya ardhi-hewa HQ-9B kwenye Fiery Cross Reef, Subi Reef na Mischief Reef. China pia imeweka ndege za kivita za nyuklia aina ya H-6K katika kisiwa cha Woody. Swali kuanzia sasa ni kwa kiwango gani China itafanya kijeshi visiwa vya bandia. Nchi zilizo na maslahi katika Bahari ya China Kusini zina wasiwasi zaidi na kuongezeka kwa kijeshi cha China cha visiwa vya bandia katika mkoa huo. Wasiwasi wao umeongezeka kutokana na kuongezeka kwa utata wa sera ya Marekani katika Asia. "Katika taarifa yake, Waziri wa Mambo ya Nje wa Marekani Mike Pompeo alisema ""Free and Open Indo-Pacific"" ni ""mtazamo wa kimataifa wa sheria.""" Sera mpya ya utawala wa Trump ni hasa ya kiuchumi na kwa kushangaza haifai katika usalama. "Mataifa ya mkoa wa Asia ya Kusini yana wasiwasi kuhusu mpango wa utawala wa Trump wa ""fact accompli"" ya China katika Bahari ya China Kusini." "Kwa kuongezea, ahadi za kifedha za Marekani chini ya maono mapya ya Indo-Pacific ni duni sana ikilinganishwa na mpango mkubwa wa China wa ""Belt and Road.""" """Ni jambo la ubinafsi kufikiri kwamba ahadi ya Waziri Pompeo kwa ASEAN katika eneo la Indo-Pacific itawasadikisha wale wanaotilia shaka azimio la Marekani la kukabiliana na China." Msafara wa pamoja wa Ufaransa na Uingereza na operesheni ya HMS Albion zilionyesha kuongezeka kwa ushiriki wa nguvu zingine za nje katika mzozo wa Bahari ya Kusini ya China. Nchi za Kusini Mashariki mwa Asia zina uwezekano wa kujibu kwa tahadhari kwa maendeleo ya hivi karibuni. Ushirikiano wa nguvu za nje za ziada unaenda sambamba na mkoa mpya wa kuangalia nje uliotangazwa na ASEAN ya ujumuishaji katika miongo michache iliyopita. Hata hivyo, nchi za ASEAN zinapaswa kuwa na wasiwasi kuhusu eneo lao kuwa uwanja wa ushindani kati ya mataifa makubwa. Hii si matokeo ambayo mataifa ya kikanda yalitarajia baada ya zaidi ya miongo mitano ya ujenzi wa kikanda. Tuan Anh Luc ni PhD Candidate katika Shule ya Sayansi ya Binadamu na Jamii katika Chuo Kikuu cha New South Wales, Canberra.