Symbolism and atmospherics are often just as important as literal deliverables in Korean culture. This symbolic approach is not necessarily understandable to Western minds accustomed to direct, business-like methods. The recent inter-Korean summit in Pyongyang was an example of the importance of the symbolism, atmospherics, and lavish hospitality in the Korean relationship building that often precedes tangible efforts to solve problems. It was clear the two leaders wanted to convey an overarching message of “one Korean race,” and the summit was another opportunity for North Korean leader Kim Jong-un to further build his persona as a normal leader of a normal country. The real-time visuals portrayed the natural affinity all Koreans feel for one another and focused on visions of peace between the two Koreas, while leaving the question of what unification would actually look like open ended.
Symbolism showed many different faces throughout the three days of the summit and in the September Pyongyang Joint Declaration—both of which highlighted aspirational goals, each side’s intentions and shared objectives, as well as contradictions and perhaps even hidden agendas. South Korean President Moon Jae-in and Kim indisputably advanced their April Panmunjom Declaration with more concrete pledges. The pledges were also embedded with symbols of their three main agenda items: reducing military tensions in regard to conventional weapons, improving relations, and addressing, eventually, denuclearization. The two Koreas should certainly make concerted efforts to achieve sustainable peace and deal with conventional military capabilities along the border. But the South Korean public and the international community that have seen this movie countless times before wonder when the gap will finally be closed between symbolism and reality.
The inter-Korean track. In their joint press conference, Moon opened with his version of a symbolic declaration ending the Korean War by vowing to eliminate “all threats;” Kim, meanwhile, stressed the importance for Koreans to band together as “one people” (“uri minjok ggiri”) to overcome challenges and determine their own fate. These tone-setting statements signified the priorities of the two leaders: The Moon administration is determined to declare the Korean War among Seoul, Pyongyang, and Washington over, as a first step and before a signing peace treaty formally ending the war, an idea that first surfaced in 2006. Pyongyang has regularly called on “compatriots of the same blood” to join its revolution against American influence as far back as the early 1960s during Kim Il Sung’s rule.
Moon and Kim’s action items are a reminder that history tends to repeat itself. Because of business left unfinished—including reducing military tensions across the border, improving inter-Korean relations and reuniting the peninsula, and reaching a comprehensive nuclear agreement that finally solves the North Korean nuclear problem—the Korean Peninsula is the land of political replays, despite repeated attempts for decades to finally bring peace to this last relic of the Cold War. Most of the specific actions in the Pyongyang Declaration that might reduce military tensions and improve relations between the North and South trace familiar themes that long-precede the time of Moon and Kim, dating as far back as the 1972 South-North Joint Declaration. Moon and Kim’s renewed efforts to normalize relations are commendable and needed. But those efforts face larger realities: existing sanctions against the North, Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons programs, and the complex geopolitics surrounding different priorities and interests.
In their April 2018 Panmunjom Declaration, the North and South promised to “cease all hostile acts against each other in every domain, including land, air and sea, that are the source of military tension and conflict.” At the latest Pyongyang summit, the two Koreas essentially agreed to take steps toward non-aggression and confidence-building measures for conventional arms control and established a joint military committee. The Koreas made a non-aggression pact and created a joint military commission in their 1992 Basic Agreement, but Pyongyang failed to uphold its commitments. Whether a replay of these efforts can succeed is open to question.
Still, the ability to agree on practical measures during a summit deserves recognition. Their first steps along the border and inside the Demilitarized Zone include: withdrawing some guard posts, creating no-fly zones, halting artillery and other military drills, and demilitarizing the Joint Security Area, a portion of the truce village of Panmunjom where soldiers of both countries face one another at close quarters and where tourists enjoy photo opportunities. However, the two countries’ asymmetric military might—North Korea has nuclear weapons, after all, and South Korea does not (although it does benefit from the US nuclear umbrella)—raises questions about the ultimate objective, parameters, and verification measures for inter-Korean conventional arms control.
The military agreement reached at the latest summit has sparked controversy in Seoul, with many former military generals and defense specialists warning that the proposed no-fly zone, for example, weakens the South’s intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance capabilities required to preempt or respond to surprise attacks and long-range artillery fire at Seoul. They argue that the other measures also have implications for transparency, for US forces and assets, and for US-South Korean joint military exercises. For North Korea, the source of “military tension and conflict” is the US presence on and nuclear umbrella over the peninsula. Despite their good intentions, inter-Korean conventional arms control will be difficult to achieve fully without a resolution of the nuclear issue.
The two Koreas also agreed to hold a ground-breaking ceremony that signals the linking of cross-border rails and roads—a key objective for the Moon administration for eventual regional economic integration and South Korean economic development—to resume operations at their joint Gaeseong Industrial Complex located in North Korea, and to again allow tours to Mount Geumgang, a scenic tourist destination, “when conditions are ripe.” But all of these initiatives require the lifting of sanctions on the North—sanctions that are tied to progress on denuclearization. While the two Koreas should work towards peace and reconciliation, moving too quickly on the inter-Korean track could provide disincentives for Pyongyang to seriously commit to the denuclearization process.
The denuclearization track. Symbolism is most detached from intent and scientific reality in the denuclearization components of the Pyongyang Joint Declaration issued last week. But symbolism has also put an ironic twist to Korean negotiations. Exactly 13 years ago, North Korea “committed to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs” in the September 19th Six Party Talks Joint Statement. This commitment went further than any pronouncements under a Kim Jong-un regime, and at a time when Pyongyang did not have ICBMs, mobile missile launchers, a sizable uranium enrichment program, and the ability to miniaturize a nuclear warhead. Some South Koreans find it meaningful that Kim Jong-un uttered the words “no nuclear weapons, no nuclear threat” in his own voice and agreed to it in writing. But his words actually signify the different definitions that Washington and Pyongyang have as to what “denuclearization” and a “nuclear-free Korean Peninsula” mean.
It remains to be seen how future negotiations will pan out between Washington and Pyongyang, particularly when Moon said he has details to relay to Trump in New York this week regarding Kim’s denuclearization preparedness. But based on public information in the Pyongyang agreement, the Moon-Kim press conference, and Moon’s public debrief, the North has not moved the denuclearization needle forward since the Trump-Kim Singapore summit in June.
One proposed symbolic gesture, already mentioned since the Singapore summit, would have the North abandon the Tongchangri missile engine test facility and launch pad. Last week’s Pyongyang summit added a new step—doing so in the presence of “experts from relevant countries,” apparently Pyongyang’s way of saying “verification” (although North Korea has never welcomed an International Atomic Energy Agency role in the denuclearization process). In its initial proposals related to denuclearization, Pyongyang might be trying to offer facilities that symbolize the regime’s direct threat to the United States: intercontinental ballistic missiles. However, these are not meaningful steps because the facilities in question no longer serve a purpose.
Kim Jong-un proclaimed in December 2017 that his state nuclear force is complete—this means his country no longer needs to test nuclear devices and missiles because self-proclaimed technological mastery now allows Pyongyang to simply mass produce nuclear warheads and ballistic missiles. Also, the regime can still continue to produce ICBMs at other facilities and test engines on mobile launchers, which are of more value to the North. Tongchangri, after all, is home to missiles with liquid fuel engines on static launchers. But Pyongyang has become more interested in mobile launchers and missiles with solid-fuel engines that can be stored, transported, and fired more quickly than liquid-fuel ICBMs, making them harder for the US to preempt.
Pyongyang also says it is “willing to permanently scrap” its Yongbyon nuclear complex—a symbol of its nuclear programs—and take other similar steps “depending on Washington’s corresponding measures.” This proposal suggests the regime is still waiting for Washington to make the first move and implies “corresponding measures” could be the war-ending declaration it has demanded. By mentioning Yongbyon last week, Pyongyang may be suggesting it is willing to offer it—instead of the nuclear inventory Washington wants—as a bargaining chip. Moon’s special advisor outside of government, Professor Moon Chung-in, told JTBC News that Pyongyang does not want to be blamed for cheating or untrustworthiness if it produces a nuclear inventory that differs from US intelligence estimates, so it prefers to declare an end to the Korean War, to build trust, before it hands over an inventory. Although the Trump administration should at least insist on an inventory of all fuel-cycle-related nuclear facilities anywhere in North Korea, even an incomplete list that contains discrepancies would help begin a verification process that can probe for more nuclear sites, weapons, and materials. So when the North finally produces it, the initial nuclear inventory should not be treated as a litmus test for Pyongyang’s seriousness, and if proven flawed, that inventory should not be allowed to break the diplomatic process.
Dismantling Yongbyon would be a meaningful start to a broader dismantlement process because it would constrain some fissile material production. But the value of such a move depends on how “Yongbyon” is defined (scope and specific facilities) and how American negotiators price their bargaining chips. Scrapping Yongbyon may not carry as high a value for the United States as a war-ending declaration does for North Korea. The facilities inside Yongbyon are old, and covert facilities outside the complex will still allow Pyongyang to expand its nuclear arsenal. Dismantling Yongbyon’s old reactors and a reprocessing line there would limit plutonium production, if covert facilities do not exist outside of Yongbyon. The uranium enrichment plant shown to American scientist Siegfried Hecker in 2010 is widely believed to have been built as a bargaining chip to be dealt away in eventual negotiations, while the North retained other, covert uranium-enrichment plants. Under Kim Jong-un, the North Korean regime has been shifting its fissile material production process away from reactors that produce plutonium to a program that enriches uranium via centrifuges, a process that can be hidden more easily than a nuclear reactor.
The two Koreas reached many symbolic agreements last week, but symbolism will not be enough to roll back North Korea’s expanding nuclear arsenal. Summitry with a top-down regime like North Korea can be an effective and historic opportunity, but a second Trump-Kim summit that fails to address denuclearization concretely risks repeating the mistakes of the Singapore agreement, endangering US interests in the region, and changing the future order in Northeast Asia.
Editor’s note: Duyeon Kim’s research is supported by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation.
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Mara nyingi ishara na hali ya hewa ni muhimu kama vile vifaa vya maandishi katika utamaduni wa Kikorea. Njia hii ya mfano si lazima ieleweke kwa akili za Magharibi zilizozoea mbinu za moja kwa moja, za kibiashara. Mkutano wa hivi karibuni wa kati ya Korea katika Pyongyang ulikuwa mfano wa umuhimu wa ishara, hali ya hewa, na ukarimu wa kifahari katika ujenzi wa uhusiano wa Korea ambao mara nyingi hufuata juhudi halisi za kutatua matatizo. "Ilikuwa wazi kwamba viongozi hao wawili walitaka kuwasiliana ujumbe wa ""watu wa jamii moja ya Korea,"" na mkutano huo ulikuwa fursa nyingine kwa kiongozi wa Korea Kaskazini Kim Jong-un kujenga zaidi utu wake kama kiongozi wa kawaida wa nchi ya kawaida." Picha hizo za wakati halisi zilionyesha uhusiano wa asili ambao Wakorean wote wanahisi kwa kila mmoja na zilijikita katika maono ya amani kati ya Korea mbili, wakati wakiacha swali la jinsi muungano ungeonekana wazi. "Simboli ilionyesha nyuso nyingi tofauti katika siku tatu za mkutano huo na katika Azimio la Pamoja la Pyongyang la Septemba, ambazo zote mbili zilionyesha malengo ya matarajio, nia za kila upande na malengo ya pamoja, pamoja na migogoro na labda hata ajenda zilizofichwa. """ Rais wa Korea Kusini Moon Jae-in na Kim Jong-un walitoa ahadi za dhati zaidi katika Azimio la Panmunjom la Aprili. "Makubaliano hayo pia yalikuwa na alama za vitu vitatu vikuu vya ajenda yao: kupunguza mvutano wa kijeshi kuhusiana na silaha za kawaida, kuboresha mahusiano, na kushughulikia, hatimaye, denuclearization. """ """Korean na Korea Kusini zinapaswa kufanya juhudi za pamoja ili kufikia amani ya kudumu na kushughulikia uwezo wa kijeshi wa kawaida kwenye mpaka." Lakini umma wa Korea Kusini na jamii ya kimataifa ambao wameiona filamu hii mara nyingi kabla ya kujiuliza wakati pengo hatimaye kufungwa kati ya ishara na ukweli. Njia ya kati ya Korea. Katika mkutano wao wa waandishi wa habari, Moon alifungua na toleo lake la tangazo la ishara la kumaliza Vita vya Korea kwa kuapa kuondoa "tisho lote"; Kim, wakati huo huo, alisisitiza umuhimu wa Wakorean kuungana pamoja kama "watu mmoja" (uri minjok ggiri) kushinda changamoto na kuamua hatima yao wenyewe. "Mara nyingi, viongozi hao wawili wamekuwa wakisema kuwa serikali ya Moon imedai kuwa vita vya Korea kati ya Seoul, Pyongyang na Washington vimekwisha kama hatua ya kwanza kabla ya kuidhinisha mkataba wa amani wa mwisho wa vita hivyo.""" Pyongyang imekuwa ikiwaomba wananchi wake wa damu moja kujiunga na mapinduzi dhidi ya ushawishi wa Marekani tangu mwanzoni mwa miaka ya 1960 wakati wa utawala wa Kim Il Sung. Vitu vya Moon na Kim vya vitendo ni ukumbusho kwamba historia huwa na kurudia yenyewe. Kwa sababu ya biashara iliyobaki isiyokamilika - ikiwa ni pamoja na kupunguza mvutano wa kijeshi katika mpaka, kuboresha mahusiano ya kati ya Korea na kuunganisha tena peninsula, na kufikia makubaliano ya nyuklia ya kina ambayo hatimaye hutatua tatizo la nyuklia la Korea Kaskazini - Peninsula ya Korea ni nchi ya replay za kisiasa, licha ya majaribio ya mara kwa mara kwa miongo ya hatimaye kuleta amani kwa hii ya mwisho ya Vita Baridi. """Hatua nyingi maalum katika Azimio la Pyongyang ambazo zinaweza kupunguza mvutano wa kijeshi na kuboresha mahusiano kati ya Kaskazini na Kusini zinafuatilia mandhari ya kawaida ambayo ilitangulia muda mrefu kabla ya Moon na Kim, kuanzia Azimio la Pamoja la Kusini-Kaskazini la 1972." Jitihada mpya za Moon na Kim za kurekebisha mahusiano ni zenye kusifiwa na zinahitajika. Lakini juhudi hizo zinakabiliwa na hali halisi kubwa: vikwazo vilivyopo dhidi ya Kaskazini, programu za silaha za nyuklia za Pyongyang, na geopolitics tata zinazozunguka vipaumbele na maslahi tofauti. Katika tamko la Panmunjom la Aprili 2018, Korea Kaskazini na Kusini zilitoa ahadi ya kukomesha vitendo vyote vya uhasama dhidi ya kila mmoja katika kila uwanja, ikiwa ni pamoja na ardhi, anga na bahari, ambayo ni chanzo cha mvutano wa kijeshi na mgogoro. Korea mbili zilifanya mkataba wa kutoshambulia na kuunda tume ya pamoja ya kijeshi katika Mkataba wao wa Msingi wa 1992, lakini Pyongyang ilishindwa kutimiza ahadi zake. Inaweza kuhojiwa ikiwa jitihada hizo zitafaulu. Hata hivyo, uwezo wa kukubaliana juu ya hatua za vitendo wakati wa mkutano wa kilele unastahili kutambuliwa. Hatua za kwanza za Marekani katika eneo hilo ni kuondoa vituo vya ulinzi, kuanzisha maeneo ya kutoruka ndege, kusimamisha mashambulizi ya makombora na mazoezi mengine ya kijeshi, na kuondoa silaha katika eneo la pamoja la usalama, sehemu ya kijiji cha Panmunjom ambapo wanajeshi wa nchi zote mbili wanakutana kwa ukaribu na ambapo watalii wanafurahia fursa za kupiga picha. Hata hivyo, nguvu za kijeshi za nchi hizo mbili - Korea Kaskazini ina silaha za nyuklia, baada ya yote, na Korea Kusini haina (ingawa inafaidika na mwavuli wa nyuklia wa Marekani) - huinua maswali kuhusu lengo la mwisho, vigezo, na hatua za uthibitisho wa udhibiti wa silaha za kawaida za kati ya Korea. Mkataba huo wa kijeshi uliopatikana katika mkutano wa mwisho wa kilele umesababisha utata nchini Seoul, na majenerali wengi wa zamani wa kijeshi na wataalamu wa ulinzi wakionya kwamba eneo la kutoroka ndege, kwa mfano, lina dhaifu uwezo wa upelelezi, upelelezi na ufuatiliaji wa Kusini unaohitajika kuzuia au kujibu mashambulizi ya ghafla na risasi za makombora ya mbali huko Seoul. "Wanasema hatua hizo nyingine pia zina athari kwa uwazi, kwa vikosi na mali za Marekani, na kwa mazoezi ya pamoja ya kijeshi ya Marekani na Korea Kusini.""" Kwa Korea Kaskazini, chanzo cha "mvutano wa kijeshi na mgogoro" ni uwepo wa Marekani na mwavuli wa nyuklia juu ya peninsula. "Licha ya nia zao nzuri, udhibiti wa silaha za kawaida kati ya Korea mbili utakuwa vigumu kufikia kikamilifu bila suluhisho la suala la nyuklia. """ Korea mbili pia zilikubaliana kufanya sherehe ya kuanzisha barabara za reli na barabara za mpakani - lengo kuu kwa utawala wa Moon kwa ushirikiano wa kiuchumi wa kikanda na maendeleo ya kiuchumi ya Korea Kusini - kuanza tena shughuli zao katika Jengo la Viwanda la Gaesong lililo katika Korea Kaskazini, na kuruhusu tena ziara za Mlima Geumgang, marudio ya watalii, wakati hali ni za kukomaa. """Wakati Korea mbili zinapaswa kufanya kazi kuelekea amani na upatanisho, kusonga haraka sana kwenye njia ya kati ya Korea inaweza kutoa disincentives kwa Pyongyang kujitolea kwa uzito kwa mchakato wa denuclearization." Njia ya kuondoa silaha za nyuklia. "Hii ni kwa sababu ""simboli ni zaidi detached kutoka nia na hali halisi ya kisayansi katika denuclearization vipengele vya Pyongyang Joint Declaration iliyotolewa wiki iliyopita.""" Lakini ishara pia imeweka twist ya kushangaza kwa mazungumzo ya Korea. "Kama ilivyoelezwa, Korea Kaskazini ""ilijitolea kuachana na silaha zote za nyuklia na mipango ya nyuklia iliyopo"" katika taarifa ya pamoja ya mazungumzo ya pande sita ya Septemba 19." "Hatua hiyo ilichukua hatua kubwa kuliko ilivyotangazwa wakati wa utawala wa Kim Jong-un, wakati ambapo Pyongyang haikuwa na makombora ya ICBM, vifaa vya kutupa makombora, programu kubwa ya kuimarisha uranium, na uwezo wa kutengeneza makombora madogo ya nyuklia.""" Baadhi ya Wakorea Kusini wanaona ni muhimu kwamba Kim Jong-un alitoa maneno "hakuna silaha za nyuklia, hakuna tishio la nyuklia" kwa sauti yake mwenyewe na alikubali kwa maandishi. Lakini maneno yake kwa kweli yanaonyesha ufafanuzi tofauti ambao Washington na Pyongyang wana kuhusu kile "kuondoa silaha za nyuklia" na "Kisiwa cha Korea kisicho na silaha za nyuklia" kinachomaanisha. "Imeonekana kuwa mazungumzo ya baadaye kati ya Washington na Pyongyang yatakuwaje, hasa wakati Moon alisema ana maelezo ya kumweleza Trump huko New York wiki hii kuhusu kujitayarisha kwa Kim kwa denuclearization. """ "Lakini kulingana na taarifa za umma katika makubaliano ya Pyongyang, mkutano wa waandishi wa habari wa Moon na Kim, na ripoti ya umma ya Moon, Korea Kaskazini haijaendelea na ""sugua ya kuondoa silaha za nyuklia"" tangu mkutano wa Trump na Kim Singapore mnamo Juni." Mkataba huo unaonyesha kuwa Korea Kaskazini inapaswa kuachana na kituo cha majaribio cha roketi cha Tongchangri. Mkutano wa Pyongyang wa wiki iliyopita uliongeza hatua mpya - kufanya hivyo kwa uwepo wa wataalam kutoka nchi husika, inaonekana njia ya Pyongyang ya kusema "uthibitisho" (ingawa Korea Kaskazini haijawahi kuwakaribisha jukumu la Shirika la Kimataifa la Nishati ya Atomiki katika mchakato wa kuondoa silaha za nyuklia). Katika mapendekezo yake ya awali yanayohusiana na kuondolewa kwa silaha za nyuklia, Pyongyang inaweza kuwa inajaribu kutoa vifaa ambavyo vinawakilisha tishio la moja kwa moja la utawala kwa Marekani: makombora ya balistiki ya kati ya mabara. Hata hivyo, hatua hizo hazina maana kwa sababu vifaa hivyo havitumiki tena. Kim Jong-un alitangaza Desemba 2017 kwamba nguvu za nyuklia za serikali yake zimekamilika, ikimaanisha nchi yake haihitaji tena kupima vifaa vya nyuklia na makombora kwa sababu kujitangaza kwa ustadi wa kiteknolojia sasa inaruhusu Pyongyang tu kuzalisha makombora ya nyuklia na makombora ya balistik. Pia, serikali inaweza kuendelea kutengeneza makombora ya ICBM katika vituo vingine na kujaribu injini kwenye vifaa vya kutupa vya rununu, ambavyo vina thamani zaidi kwa Kaskazini. Baada ya yote, Tongchangri ni makao ya makombora yenye injini za mafuta ya kioevu kwenye vifaa vya kutupa. Pyongyang inaendelea kuendeleza vifaa vya kutupa makombora na makombora yenye injini za mafuta, ambayo yanaweza kuhifadhiwa, kusafirishwa na kufyatua risasi kwa kasi kuliko makombora ya mafuta ya kioevu, na hivyo kufanya iwe vigumu kwa Marekani kuipiga. Pyongyang pia imesema kuwa iko tayari kuondoa kabisa jengo lake la nyuklia la Yongbyon, ishara ya programu zake za nyuklia, na kuchukua hatua nyingine kama hizo, ikitegemea hatua zinazolingana na Washington. Kwa kutaja Yongbyon wiki iliyopita, Pyongyang inaweza kuwa inaonyesha ni tayari kutoa - badala ya hesabu ya nyuklia Washington anataka - kama chip ya mazungumzo. "Mshauri wa Kimataifa wa Kimataifa Moon Jae-in, Moon Jae-in, aliwaambia waandishi wa habari wa JBC kwamba Pyongyang haipendi kupewa lawama kwa ""kudanganya au kutokuwa na uaminifu"" ikiwa itazalisha hesabu ya nyuklia ambayo inatofautiana na makadirio ya ujasusi wa Marekani, kwa hivyo inapendelea kutangaza mwisho wa Vita vya Korea, kujenga uaminifu, kabla ya kutoa hesabu." "Hata kama serikali ya Trump inapaswa angalau kusisitiza juu ya orodha ya vituo vyote vya nyuklia vinavyohusiana na mzunguko wa mafuta popote katika Korea Kaskazini, hata orodha isiyo kamili ambayo ina tofauti itasaidia kuanza mchakato wa uthibitisho ambao unaweza kuchunguza maeneo zaidi ya nyuklia, silaha na vifaa. """ "Kwa hivyo, wakati Korea Kaskazini hatimaye itazalisha, hesabu ya kwanza ya nyuklia haipaswi kuchukuliwa kama mtihani wa ""litmus"" kwa uzito wa Pyongyang, na ikiwa imethibitishwa kuwa na kasoro, hesabu hiyo haipaswi kuruhusiwa kuvunja mchakato wa kidiplomasia. """ "Kupunguza uzalishaji wa Yongbyon itakuwa mwanzo mzuri wa mchakato wa kuondoa kwa sababu itazuiwa ""kuzalisha vifaa vya kutenganisha.""" Lakini thamani ya hatua kama hiyo inategemea jinsi <unk>Yongbyon<unk> inavyofafanuliwa (kiwango na vifaa maalum) na jinsi wafanyabiashara wa Marekani wanavyopanga bei ya sarafu zao za mazungumzo. "Kupigwa marufuku kwa Yongbyon kunaweza kuwa na thamani kubwa kwa Marekani kama tangazo la kumaliza vita linavyofanya kwa Korea Kaskazini.""" Vifaa vya ndani ya Yongbyon ni vya zamani, na vifaa vya siri nje ya jengo hilo bado vitaruhusu Pyongyang kupanua silaha zake za nyuklia. Kuvunja nyuklia za zamani za Yongbyon na mstari wa usindikaji huko kungepunguza uzalishaji wa plutonium, ikiwa vifaa vya siri havipo nje ya Yongbyon. Kiwanda cha kuimarisha madini ya urani kilichowekwa mbele ya mwanasayansi wa Marekani Siegfried Hecker mwaka 2010 kinaaminika kuwa kilijengwa kama chombo cha biashara ambacho kingeweza kutumiwa katika mazungumzo ya mwisho, wakati Korea Kaskazini ilibaki na viwanda vingine vya kuimarisha madini ya urani. Kim Jong-un amekuwa akipunguza matumizi ya nyenzo za nyuklia katika uzalishaji wa nyuklia na kuifanya kuwa rahisi zaidi kuficha uranium kupitia centrifuges. Korea mbili zilifikia makubaliano mengi ya mfano wiki iliyopita, lakini ishara haitoshi kuzuia Korea Kaskazini kupanua silaha zake za nyuklia. Mkutano wa Trump na Kim unaoweza kuwa na nafasi ya kihistoria, lakini mkutano wa pili wa Kim na Kim ambao unashindwa kushughulikia denuclearization kwa uhakika unahatarisha kurudia makosa ya makubaliano ya Singapore, kuhatarisha maslahi ya Marekani katika mkoa huo, na kubadilisha utaratibu wa baadaye katika Asia ya Kaskazini Mashariki. Kumbuka: Utafiti wa Duyeon Kim unaungwa mkono na John D. na Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. Gazeti la Bulletin linainua sauti za wataalamu juu ya kelele. Kama shirika lisilo la faida, shughuli zetu zinategemea msaada wa wasomaji kama wewe. Tuendelee kutoa uandishi wa habari wa ubora ambao unawafanya viongozi kuwajibika. Msaada wako wa kazi yetu katika ngazi yoyote ni muhimu. Kwa kubadilishana, tunakuahidi chanjo yetu itakuwa inayoeleweka, yenye ushawishi, yenye tahadhari, yenye lengo la suluhisho, na yenye akili ya haki. Pamoja tunaweza kufanya tofauti.