By Lieutenant Gordon C. Bennett
Quartermaster Review January-February 1953
“When there is no book, write the book!” Members of the 8081st Army Unit (full designation: Quartermaster Airborne Air Supply & Packaging Company) were faced with this alternative a few weeks after their arrival in Japan in September 1950. Before them lay the Korean airlift and the prospect of supporting the Eighth Army in Korea through sustained airdrop operations. Behind them lay school, theory, and knowledge of how to do it-without anyone shooting at you.
The first problem was airdrop equipment. A quick inventory revealed that aerial delivery containers were in very short supply. These containers come in various shapes and sizes-A-4 and A-6 containers are rectangular shaped bags open at one end and used to deliver 200 to 300 pounds of such miscellaneous items as rations, clothing, medical supplies and radio and signal equipment; an A-7A sling is designed for ammunition airdrop; an A-5 container, a canvas duck roll with end caps made of the same material, may be used to deliver weapons, mortar rounds machine gun barrels, and a number of other items.
Confronted with a shortage of these essential containers the 808lsters came up with a simple and obvious solution-rope. Rope could be used to improvise slings for any shape of bundle, thus taking the pressure off the container supply, which could be conserved for specific items requiring delivery in a container.
In order to facilitate operations and rope-rig the resupply bundles as fast as possible an assembly line system was initiated. As the rope came from the piles it was cut into lengths (predetermined by the type of bundle being rigged) by a team of Japanese boysans armed with an assortment of axes, hatchets, and knives. On the rigging line more Japanese rigged the resupply bundles.
On October 20, 1950, the 8081st directly supported the 187th Regimental Combat Team in its airborne assault on Sukchon, North Korea, and rope carried down the bulk of the resupply bundles of ammunition, rations, and fuel.
After the Sukchon operation rope was utilized for delivery of the majority of parachuted supplies to the UN forces in Korea. On November 29, 1950, elements of the 1st Marine and 7th Infantry Divisions became encircled by Communist troops at Chosin Reservoir in North Korea. Rope had proven itself in the Sukchon operation, and in the eleven-day period between November 30 and December 10 over a million feet were used in “getting the goods” to the beleaguered soldiers and Marines at Chosin.
Clearly rope was a good substitute for airdrop containers and as time went on two facts became evident. First, by using rope a considerable materials saving was realized. Many of the 8081st drops were to units cut off by enemy action and the parachutes and aerial delivery equipment used were seldom recovered. If aerial delivery containers, many times more expensive than rope, had been used, most of them could never have been reused.
Second, identification of resupply bundles was made easier for the receiving troops inasmuch as they did not have to undo containers to discover their contents. A parachute color code, whereby different types of supplies are carried to earth by distinctively colored parachutes, was not feasible as the 8081st did not always have on hand a wide enough variety of colored parachutes.
Another use for rope, though not the final answer in overcoming a major problem, served the purpose pending the development of a more satisfactory procedure. When the 8081st began its airdrop operations in Korea it utilized a method for the ejection of the supplies from the plane known as the ”floor level roller conveyor system.” This system consisted of 10-foot lengths of roller conveyors attached to the floor of the cargo compartment of the C-119 type aircraft (“Flying Boxcar”) after the rear “clamshell” doors had been removed. Supply bundles were loaded onto these roller conveyors and secured by means of high tensile strength cotton webbing wound around the entire load. At a designated time the aerial delivery technicians would manually cut the webbing with jackknives and the bundles would move along the roller conveyors and exit from the rear of the aircraft by means of gravity.
Unfortunately, the release method of this system (i.e. the use of knives to cut the bundles loose) was not only unsatisfactory but contributed to materials and time losses as the cut webbing utilized to hold the bundles in the aircraft had to be repaired before re-use in another mission. Inevitably, with the stepping-up of airdrop operations the 8081st maintenance section, which was responsible for the repair of the webbing, could not keep the webbing supply consistent with the demand. The situation was aggravated by the fact that fresh stocks of webbing were not being received to replace the webbing worn out and lost on airdrops.
Once again rope was recruited, this time to substitute for webbing. and the steady flow of airdrop operations was maintained without interruption. Rope, however, was not as satisfactory as webbing because it was harder to cut and in the air a delay of two or three seconds in cutting the restraining rope could mean that the entire load might miss the drop zone and, if in an area surrounded by the enemy, might conceivably fall into the hands of Communist troops. To make matters worse, a shortage of knives used in the cutting operation was developing.
A new release system was sorely needed-one that would not require cutting any material, could be reused immediately, and would release the airdrop load instantaneously upon signal.
M/Sgt. Michael J. Gordon, maintenance chief of the 8081st, had designed ”on paper” such a device, to be made from several lengths of webbing and a portable bomb shackle. The actuation of the device was to be accomplished by pulling a lever on the bomb shackle which would release two ”D” rings attached to the lengths of webbing. The webbing would whip around the load and the bundles exit, as usual by gravity after the pilot had altered the ship’s attitude.
Sergeant Gordon sought and received authorization from 1st Lt. Claude A. Jones (now Captain), 8081st commanding officer, to manufacture and test his device, and on January 11, 1951, over Chongju, Korea, it was used to drop a load of small arms ammunition to UN combat troops.
As a result of this initial test Sergeant Gordon determined that certain improvements were needed. The lengths of webbing stretched from the rear of the ship to the forward area. They wound around the resupply load from either side of the ship and snaked up a center aisle between two rows of bundles to the forward part of the ship where the bomb shackle was located. This arrangement presented the maximum opportunity for the webbing to tangle with the existing load, causing a dangerous malfunction within the ship.
Sergeant Gordon solved the problem by moving the bomb shackle to the rear of the ship, shortening and modifying the webbing lengths to stretch around the rear of the load, and utilizing a lanyard of parachute suspension line to actuate the entire device. This lanyard stretched from the bomb shackle to the forward area of the ship, where an aerial delivery technician could pull it without going to the rear of the ship.
The immediate effect of the modified device was to cut down the amount of webbing necessary, thus minimizing the chance of malfunction. In addition, less time was required to tie down a load in the aircraft.
On January 25, 1951, and on a series of test flights made afterwards (all under combat conditions) the device was found to be eminently satisfactory and it was decided to manufacture enough of them for universal use on all 8081st airdrop operations.
(It is interesting to note that the time and material to conduct a controlled project on the device were not available. Ordinarily, in implementing a new development, it is customary to set men, time, and equipment aside in order to arrive at a conclusion concerning the item being developed. At the time of Sergeant Gordon’s experiments, however, every 8081st man was being utilized to either rig, load, or deliver supplies, every C-119 aircraft was involved in aerial delivery, and there was no time to conduct a controlled project. It was necessary to test the device under actual combat conditions. Sergeant Gordon and the other aerial delivery technicians present on these flights were ready at all times to cut the load loose should the new device “hang up.”)
For his meritorious service in designing and developing this ejection device (which in time came to be known as the “Gordon Quick-Release”) Sergeant Gordon was awarded the Bronze Star Medal.
The Gordon Quick-Release had another effect on 8081st operations-it lent impetus to the latent creative potential of the 8081st Para-Quartermasters and was the first in a long series of ideas and innovations put forward by 8081st individuals and groups of individuals.
Noteworthy among these was the system introduced by Corporal Linwood E. Pate for airdropping 55-gallon drums of gasoline. Previous systems, while not unsuccessful, involved a high degree of breakage, sometimes as high as 25 per cent on normal terrain and 75 per cent on hard winter terrain.
Most of this breakage was due to the drums hitting the hard, uneven Korean ground flush on the thin metal bottoms. It was desirable to attach the parachute or parachutes to the drum in such a manner that it would land on the reinforced bottom rim. Attaching two 24-foot parachutes slowed the descent of the drum but it was difficult, due to the structure of this particular parachute when packed, to place two of them on the bundle in such a manner as to insure that the reinforced bottom rim of the drum would contact the ground first. Added to this was a shortage of 24-foot parachutes that would be aggravated by ”doubling up” on each drum of airdropped gasoline.
A system had to be devised which would (1) set the 55-gallon drum down easily on the reinforced bottom rim so that the drum would not split a seam or otherwise break, and (2) if more parachutes were to be utilized, they should be arranged so that too many would not open outside the aircraft at the same time. thereby increasing the danger of entanglement and malfunction.
Corporal Pate recommended a system involving the use of one 24-foot and one 18-foot parachute, the former to be affixed to the top of the rigged drum and the latter to be secured in the general area of the top reinforced rim so that the attitude of the drum during descent would insure its landing on the bottom reinforced rim. The structure of the 18-foot parachute, which was packed in a small, loose bag, permitted its easy placement anywhere on the rigged drum of gasoline.
To make certain that both parachutes would not open simultaneously Corporal Pate cut the static line of the 18-foot parachute, used to pull the parachute from its pack, and attached it to the static line of the larger parachute so that it opened approximately a second after the larger one had completely opened. One second was enough delay to prevent simultaneous opening and, at the same time, allow both parachutes to support the load during the greater part of the descent.
This system came at a time when the 8081st was resupplying tremendous amounts of 80-octane gasoline to the troops in Korea. C-119 Flying Boxcars, taking off at five and ten minute intervals, shuttled into the drop zone at Wonju and maintained an unceasing flow of airborne gasoline to the troops on the ground.
In order to view the effectiveness of his system, Corporal Pate went into the drop zone and reported a recovery figure of 95 per cent. Later reports from Korea substantiated his findings.
For his contribution to the maintenance and success of the Korean airlift Corporal Pate received the Commendation Ribbon with Medal Pendant (Army Commendation Medal).
The foregoing gives a small idea of the scope and the magnitude of the 8081st’s airdrop operations. The 8081st, at its Airlift Base headquarters, had to literally maintain a “rolling stock” rigged and ready on skate-wheel conveyors for anticipated commitments. Stock levels on common airdrop items such as fuel, rations, and ammunition were kept on a ready line which sometimes extended over an area upwards of 30,000 square feet.
Couple this with the fact that most of the 8081st’s commitments were received at night, requiring the Para-Quartermasters to work during the hours of darkness in order to package the requested supplies. and you begin to see a problem in communications and coordination developing.
This was overcome when Sfc. James E. Ruble. NCO in charge of aircraft loading, visited the company supply room and emerged with an armful of “SRC536″ Handy Talkie” radios. Putting one in the loading office, two at strategic points in the pre-rigged supplies area, and two with the loading crews on the aircraft parking strip, he and 1st Lt. Paul E. Smith, officer in charge of the loading operation, situated themselves in a central position and issued orders and instructions, having, at all times, a complete picture of the over-all situation.
It can readily be seen that in aerial delivery operations one of the primary considerations is the economical use of materials-small as well as large and expensive items. No matter how inexpensive, an item assumes a value out of proportion to its actual cost when it is needed and not available.
A certain cord used by the 8081st riggers in packing parachutes was in short supply because it would knot on the spool, causing considerable waste when the tangled parts were cut away. No conventional cord dispensers were available through normal supply channels.
Economy-conscious Corporal William H. Peele devised a simple gadget. with a pressure regulator of webbed elastic attached, that uniformly doled out the cord without knotting.
Many of the innovations put forward by 8081st individuals were concerned with the heavy drop of such items as trucks, trailers, and artillery pieces.
Heavy equipment is normally carried to earth by up to four 100-foot parachutes supporting a platform up-on which the drop item is mounted and rigged.
At the beginning of the 8081st’s activities it was realized that while the supply of these parachutes and platforms was adequate to meet the requirements of a limited number of heavy drop operations it might be wise to develop alternate methods in the event that field expedients had to be introduced into the aerial delivery of heavy items.
The quarter-ton jeep trailer lent itself to being airdropped by an alternate method due to the fact that it was light (550-600 pounds) and had no moving parts that would break on ground contact.
In line with the encouragement lent new ideas from men in the company, Sergeant Thomas J. Boylan developed a reinforced sling capable of carrying the trailer to earth. The complete assembly, besides the sling, consisted of a rectangular piece of plywood cut to conform to the shape of the trailer, a 48-foot parachute, and various shock absorbing materials such as felt cushions and padding.
In rigging the trailer the plywood was centered on the sling; padding and cushions were applied at points on the plywood where the trailer would rest; the trailer was placed. upside-down, flush on the plywood; more padding was applied; the sling was adjusted over the trailer; and, finally. the parachute was secured to the load.
In experimental trials the sling proved successful and a pattern was cut from the original and filed against the time when its use would be required.
In addition to making available an alternate method of airdropping the jeep trailer Sergeant Boylan’s development provided an easing on the supply of 100-foot parachutes and heavy drop platforms.
Maintaining airdrop equipment is a constant responsibility of the 8081st Para-Quartermasters. Regular inspections make certain that the containers, platforms, parachutes, and other items are maintained in top condition. Besides careful inspection, parachutes require careful packing in order to insure maximum operating efficiency.
Generally, no difficulties were encountered in packing the different types of parachutes. The 100-foot cargo parachute. however, presented a problem-in order to stow its canopy in the pack two riggers were required to sit on each side of the pack and push the canopy into it with their feet. Understandably, this method oftentimes precluded neat and uniform stowage of the canopy with the result that maximum operating efficiency could not be realized.
In order to guarantee correct canopy stowage Sergeant Hannibal Lopez, an 8081st heavy drop supervisor, designed a shallow, three-sided rectangular box cut to the dimensions of the 100-foot canopy when folded for stowing. The parachute riggers (1) folded the canopy into the box; (2) slipped the box, open end first, into the pack; and (3) then withdrew the box, leaving the canopy neatly folded within the pack. Besides eliminating stowage error Sergeant Lopez’s box enabled the canopy to be stowed faster and with less effort than under the old method.
Most of the field expedients mentioned thus far have been the creations of individuals. Despite the excellence and far-reaching effects of these innovations, however, the 8081st will be remembered more for its coordinated group endeavors, achieved through the utilization of the experiences and know-how of the majority of its members working as a team.
An example of one of these “group endeavors” was mentioned at the beginning of this article. Where the idea or suggestion came from to use rope as a substitute for airdrop containers is not known, although a large part of the credit for its procurement and implementation is due to Captain Cecil W. Hospelhorn and CWO Byron J. Kirkman, respectively commanding officer and supply officer of the 8081st at the time. Another example, and probably the one that attracted the most attention, was the first airdrop of a bridge to troops engaged in combat.
On the morning of December 7, 1950, a rush call was received. An unusual item was to be airdropped to the beleaguered troops at Chosin Reservoir. Aerial delivery technicians were required at a forward airbase to prepare and help deliver the item. Immediately, a detachment from the 8081st, led by Captain Hospelhorn, was dispatched to the airbase. Once there the Para-Quartermasters were shown an eight-section treadway bridge and told to figure out a way to drop it.
It was decided that each section of the bridge should be delivered in a C-119 aircraft and carried to earth by two 48-foot parachutes.
The men worked through the night rigging the bridge sections. In the morning the sections were loaded aboard eight Flying Boxcars. Once in the air, the sections had to be moved again. It had been decided at an Army-Air Force briefing that at 1,000 feet the sections would be moved so that seven feet of the 16-foot length of each section would extend past the rear opening of the plane. This was necessary to facilitate a fast drop because the drop zone was only 300 yards long. However, with careful planning each section hit well within the limits of the prescribed area.
Captain Hospeihorn, for distinguishing himself in this action, received the Legion of Merit. Thus, the story of the 8081st is written; a story of the individual and combined efforts of all members of the unit.
Today, as in the past, the 8081st Army Unit is “delivering the goods” to the people who need them. If in their future assignments a situation arises which is not covered in “the book” the Para-Quartermasters will write their own chapter-and complete the mission!
"Leo, Luteni Gordon C. Bennett, Mkurugenzi wa Jeshi la Marekani, aliandika katika jarida la Quartermaster Review, ""Wakati hakuna kitabu, andika kitabu!"" na kuelezea jinsi wanajeshi wa Marekani wanavyoweza kufanikiwa katika kazi zao za kuhamisha silaha kutoka kwa jeshi la Marekani hadi Japan." Kabla yao kulikuwa na usafirishaji wa ndege wa Korea na matarajio ya kuunga mkono Jeshi la Nane huko Korea kupitia shughuli za kudumu za kutupa hewa. Nyuma yao kulikuwa na shule, nadharia, na ujuzi wa jinsi ya kufanya hivyo - bila mtu yeyote kukupiga risasi. Tatizo la kwanza lilikuwa vifaa vya kutupa kutoka angani. Uchunguzi wa haraka ulifunua kwamba kontena za usafirishaji wa angani zilikuwa chache sana. Vifaa vya A4 na A6 ni mifuko ya umbo la mstatili iliyofunguliwa kwenye mwisho mmoja na hutumiwa kutoa pauni 200 hadi 300 za vitu mbalimbali kama vile chakula, nguo, vifaa vya matibabu na vifaa vya redio na ishara; A7A sling imeundwa kwa ajili ya kutupa risasi; A5 - roll ya bata ya canvas na vifuniko vya mwisho vilivyotengenezwa kwa vifaa sawa, inaweza kutumika kutoa silaha, risasi za makombora, mabomu ya bunduki, na vitu vingine. Kwa sababu ya upungufu wa vifaa vya msingi, 808Lsters ilikuja na suluhisho rahisi na dhahiri. Kamba inaweza kutumika kwa improvise slings kwa ajili ya umbo lolote la bundle, hivyo kuchukua shinikizo mbali container ugavi, ambayo inaweza kuhifadhiwa kwa ajili ya vitu maalum zinazohitaji utoaji katika container. Ili kuwezesha shughuli na kamba-rig bundles resupply haraka iwezekanavyo mfumo wa mstari wa mkutano ilianzishwa. Mnyororo ulipokuwa ukitoka kwenye rundo, ulikatwa vipande-vipande (iliyoamuliwa mapema na aina ya mfuko uliokuwa ukitengenezwa) na kikundi cha wavulana Wajapani waliokuwa na makombora, shoka, na visu. Kwenye mstari wa kuunganisha, Wajapani wengine waliunganisha vifungo vya kuunganisha. Oktoba 20, 1950, 808th moja kwa moja kusaidia 187th Regimental Combat Team katika mashambulizi yake ya hewa juu ya Sukwon, Korea Kaskazini, na kamba kubeba chini ya sehemu kubwa ya vifaa vya vifaa vya risasi, rasilimali, na mafuta. Baada ya operesheni ya Sukchon, kamba ilitumiwa kwa utoaji wa vifaa vingi vya parachute kwa vikosi vya Umoja wa Mataifa nchini Korea. Mnamo Novemba 29, 1950, vikosi vya 1st Marine na 7th Infantry Divisions vilizungukwa na vikosi vya Kikomunisti katika Hifadhi ya Chosin huko Korea Kaskazini. Katika kipindi cha siku kumi na moja kati ya Novemba 30 na Desemba 10, zaidi ya miguu milioni moja ilitumika katika "kupata bidhaa" kwa askari na wanamaji walioathiriwa huko Chosin. Ni wazi kwamba kamba ilikuwa mbadala mzuri wa vyombo vya kurushwa angani na kadiri wakati ulivyopita mambo mawili yakawa dhahiri. Kwanza, kwa kutumia kamba, vifaa vingi viliokolewa. Wengi wa 808th imeshuka kwa vitengo kukatwa na hatua ya adui na parachutes na vifaa vya utoaji wa hewa kutumika walikuwa mara chache alipata. Ikiwa vyombo vya kupeleka vitu hewani, ambavyo ni ghali mara nyingi kuliko kamba, vingeendelezwa, vingi vyavyo havingeweza kutumiwa tena. Pili, kugundua vifurushi vya vifaa vilivyohifadhiwa kulifanya iwe rahisi kwa majeshi yaliyokuwa yakipokea kwa kuwa hawakuwa na haja ya kufungua vifurushi ili kugundua yaliyomo. Kwa hiyo, chombo cha rangi ya parachute, ambacho kinaweza kutumiwa na aina tofauti za vifaa, hakikuweza kutekelezwa kwa sababu 8081 haikuwa na aina ya kutosha ya parachutes ya rangi. Matumizi mengine ya kamba, ingawa si suluhisho la mwisho la kushinda tatizo kubwa, yalitumika hadi utaratibu wenye kuridhisha zaidi ulipofanywa. "Mfano wa ""Flying Boxcar"" ni mfumo wa kutupa vifaa kutoka kwa ndege inayojulikana kama ""floor level roller conveyor system"" ambayo ina sehemu ya chini ya mita 10 ya roller conveyor iliyounganishwa na sakafu ya chumba cha mizigo ya ndege ya aina ya C-119 baada ya milango ya nyuma ya clamshell kuondolewa." Vipande vya vifaa vilipakiwa kwenye mashine hizo za kusafirisha mizigo na kufungwa kwa kutumia kamba za pamba zenye nguvu nyingi zilizozungukwa mzigo wote. Wakati maalum, mafundi wa usafirishaji wa angani walipaswa kukata kamba kwa mkono na jackknifes na vifungo vingeweza kusonga kando ya rollers na kuondoka nyuma ya ndege kwa njia ya mvuto. Kwa bahati mbaya, njia ya kutolewa kwa mfumo huu (yaani "Kutumia kisu kukata vifungo vya ndege haikuwa ya kuridhisha tu, lakini pia ilichangia hasara ya vifaa na wakati, kwani ""kuchonga"" kwa kutumia kushikilia vifungo vya ndege kulilazimika kurekebishwa kabla ya kutumiwa tena katika utume mwingine." Kwa sababu ya kuongezeka kwa shughuli za kutupa hewa, idara ya matengenezo ya 8088, ambayo ilikuwa na jukumu la kurekebisha kamba, haikuweza kuweka usambazaji wa kamba kulingana na mahitaji. Hali ilizidi kuwa mbaya kwa sababu hazikuwa zikipokelewa hifadhi mpya za kamba za kuondoa kamba zilizoharibika na kupotea kwenye kurushwa kutoka angani. Kwa mara nyingine tena kamba ilitumiwa, wakati huu ili kuchukua mahali pa kamba. na mtiririko thabiti wa shughuli za kutupa hewa ulihifadhiwa bila kukatika. Hata hivyo, kamba haikuwa nzuri kama kamba kwa sababu ilikuwa ngumu kukata, na angani kuchelewa kwa sekunde mbili au tatu kukata kamba ya kuzuia inaweza kumaanisha kwamba mzigo wote unaweza kukosa eneo la kushuka na, ikiwa katika eneo lililozungukwa na adui, inaweza kuanguka mikononi mwa vikosi vya Kikomunisti. Jambo lililofanya mambo yawe mabaya zaidi ni kwamba kulikuwa na upungufu wa visu vilivyotumiwa katika kazi ya kukata. Mfumo mpya wa kutolewa ulihitajiwa sana - mmoja ambao haungehitaji kukata nyenzo yoyote, ungeweza kutumiwa tena mara moja, na ungeachilia mzigo wa kutolewa angani mara moja baada ya ishara. M.S. Michael J. Gordon, mkuu wa matengenezo wa 8081, alikuwa amebuni "katika karatasi" kifaa kama hicho, kutengenezwa kutoka kwa urefu kadhaa wa utando na kifungo cha bomu cha kubeba. Uendeshaji wa kifaa hicho ulipaswa kufanywa kwa kuvuta lever kwenye kamba ya bomu ambayo ingeachilia pete mbili za <unk>D<unk> zilizounganishwa na urefu wa kamba. Uvuvi huo ungezunguka mzigo na vifungo hivyo vingeondoka, kama kawaida kwa nguvu za uvutano baada ya rubani kubadilisha mwelekeo wa meli. "Gordon alitafuta na kupokea idhini kutoka kwa Luteni Claude A. Jones (sasa Kapteni), Mkurugenzi wa 808th, kutengeneza na kupima kifaa chake, na mnamo Januari 11, 1951 juu ya Chongju, Korea, ilitumiwa kutupa mzigo wa risasi za silaha ndogo kwa vikosi vya vita vya Umoja wa Mataifa. """ Kama matokeo ya mtihani huu wa kwanza, Kamanda Gordon aliamua kwamba marekebisho fulani yalihitajiwa. Vipande vya kamba vilivyoenea kutoka nyuma ya meli hadi mbele. Walipiga mzunguko mzunguko wa mzigo wa vifaa kutoka pande zote mbili za meli na kuunganisha njia ya katikati kati ya safu mbili za vifungo hadi sehemu ya mbele ya meli ambapo kifungo cha bomu kilikuwa. Mpangilio huo ulitoa nafasi kubwa zaidi kwa kamba hiyo kuingiliana na mzigo uliokuwapo, na kusababisha kasoro hatari ndani ya meli. Gordon aliweza kutatua tatizo hilo kwa kuhamisha kifungo cha mabomu nyuma ya meli, kukata na kurekebisha urefu wa kamba ili kupanua nyuma ya mzigo, na kutumia kamba ya mstari wa kusimamisha parachute kuendesha kifaa chote. Lanyard hii ilichukua kutoka kwa kifungo cha bomu hadi sehemu ya mbele ya meli, ambapo fundi wa utoaji wa angani angeweza kuivuta bila kwenda nyuma ya meli. Matokeo ya papo hapo ya kifaa hicho kilichobadilishwa yalikuwa kupunguza kiasi cha kamba zinazohitajika, hivyo kupunguza uwezekano wa kutofanya kazi vizuri. Kwa kuongezea, muda mdogo zaidi ulihitajiwa kuunganisha mzigo ndani ya ndege. "Kwa hiyo, katika jaribio la ndege ya 25 Januari 1951 na katika mfululizo wa majaribio ya ndege ya baadaye (wote chini ya hali ya mapigano), kifaa hicho kiligunduliwa kuwa cha kuridhisha sana na iliamuliwa kutengeneza vifaa vya kutosha kwa matumizi ya ulimwengu wote katika shughuli zote za 808th Airdrop.""" (Ni ya kuvutia kutambua kwamba muda na nyenzo ya kufanya mradi kudhibitiwa juu ya kifaa haikuwa inapatikana. Kwa kawaida, katika kutekeleza maendeleo mapya, ni desturi kuweka watu, wakati, na vifaa kando ili kufika kwenye hitimisho kuhusu kitu kinachoendelezwa. Wakati wa majaribio ya Sergeant Gordon, hata hivyo, kila mtu wa 808 alikuwa akitumiwa kuandaa, kubeba, au kutoa vifaa, kila ndege ya C-119 ilihusika katika utoaji wa hewa, na hakukuwa na wakati wa kufanya mradi uliodhibitiwa. Ilikuwa muhimu kujaribu kifaa hicho chini ya hali halisi ya mapigano. Gordon na mafundi wengine wa utoaji wa angani waliopo kwenye ndege hizi walikuwa tayari wakati wote kukata mzigo huru inapaswa kifaa kipya <unk> hang up<unk> Kwa huduma yake ya sifa katika kubuni na kuendeleza kifaa hiki cha kutupa (ambayo kwa wakati ilikuja kujulikana kama <unk> Gordon Quick-Release<unk>) Sergeant Gordon alipewa medali ya Bronze Star. Gordon Quick-Release ilikuwa na athari nyingine juu ya shughuli za 8081, ilitoa msukumo kwa uwezo wa ubunifu wa 8081, na ilikuwa ya kwanza katika mfululizo mrefu wa mawazo na ubunifu uliotolewa na watu binafsi na vikundi vya watu. Mfano wa kwanza ni ule wa Kaporali Linwood E. Pate, ambaye alitumia mashine ya kutupa mafuta kutoka angani. Mifumo ya zamani, ingawa haikuwa na mafanikio, ilihusisha kiwango cha juu cha kuvunjika, wakati mwingine hadi asilimia 25 kwenye eneo la kawaida na asilimia 75 kwenye eneo gumu la majira ya baridi kali. Sehemu kubwa ya kuvunjika huko kulisababishwa na ngoma kugonga ardhi ngumu, isiyo sawa ya Kikorea kwenye sakafu nyembamba ya chuma. Ilikuwa ni ya kupendeza kuunganisha parachute au parachutes kwa ngoma kwa njia ambayo ingekuwa ardhi juu ya reinforced chini rim. Kuunganisha parachutes mbili za miguu 24 kulifanya kushuka kwa ngoma kupungua, lakini ilikuwa vigumu, kwa sababu ya muundo wa parachute hii maalum wakati wa kufunga, kuweka mbili kati yao kwenye mfuko kwa njia ambayo inahakikisha kwamba ukingo wa chini wa ngoma utawasiliana na ardhi kwanza. Kuongezwa kwa hili kulikuwa na upungufu wa parachutes ya miguu 24 ambayo ingeongezeka kwa <unk>doubling up<unk> kwenye kila ngoma ya petroli iliyopigwa kutoka angani. Ili kuweza kufanikiwa, ilibidi kutengeneza mfumo ambao ungeweza (1) kuweka ngoma ya galoni 55 chini kwa urahisi kwenye ukingo wa chini ulioimarishwa ili ngoma isivunjike au kuvunjika kwa njia nyingine, na (2) ikiwa parachuti zaidi zilitumiwa, zilipaswa kupangwa ili kwamba nyingi sana hazingefunguliwa nje ya ndege wakati huo huo. hivyo kuongeza hatari ya entanglement na kasoro. "Kaburi Pate alipendekeza mfumo unaohusisha matumizi ya parachuti moja ya miguu 24 na moja ya miguu 18, ya kwanza iliwekwa juu ya ngoma iliyounganishwa na ya mwisho ili kuhifadhiwa katika eneo la jumla la rim ya juu iliyoimarishwa ili msimamo wa drum wakati wa kushuka uweze kuhakikisha kutua kwake kwenye rim ya chini iliyoimarishwa. """ Parachuti hiyo ilikuwa na urefu wa futi 18 na ilikuwa imefungwa ndani ya mfuko mdogo, na iliweza kuwekwa mahali popote kwenye pipa la petroli. Ili kuhakikisha kwamba parachuti zote mbili hazingefunguliwa kwa wakati mmoja, Kaporali Pate alikata mstari wa static wa parachuti ya miguu sita na sita, na kuunganisha kwa mstari wa static wa parachuti kubwa ili kufunguliwa karibu sekunde moja baada ya moja kubwa kufunguliwa kabisa. Sekunde moja ilikuwa kuchelewesha kutosha kuzuia ufunguzi wakati huo huo na, wakati huo huo, kuruhusu parachutes wote kuunga mkono mzigo wakati wa sehemu kubwa ya kushuka. Wakati huo, jeshi la Korea la 808 lilikuwa likitoa mafuta ya kiwango cha 80 kwa majeshi ya Korea. Ndege za C-119 Flying Boxcar ziliondoka kwa muda wa dakika tano na kumi, na kuingia katika eneo la kutua huko Wonju na kudumisha mtiririko usio na kikomo wa mafuta ya hewa kwa askari walio ardhini. Ili kuona ufanisi wa mfumo wake, Kaporali Pate alienda katika eneo la kushuka na kuripoti takwimu ya kupona ya 95%. Ripoti za baadaye kutoka Korea zilithibitisha matokeo yake. Kwa mchango wake katika matengenezo na mafanikio ya Korea airlift Corporal Pate alipokea Commendation Ribbon na Medal Pendant (Army Commendation Medal). Hii ni moja ya sababu za msingi za kuonekana kwa kiwango cha juu cha 808 na kiwango cha juu cha 808 cha Airdrop. "Mashirika ya 808th, katika makao makuu ya Airlift Base, ilikuwa na ""rolling stock"" rigged na tayari juu ya conveyors skate-wheel kwa ahadi ya kutarajia." Vifaa vya kawaida kama vile mafuta, chakula na risasi vilitolewa kutoka angani kwa kiwango cha juu, wakati mwingine kilikuwa juu ya eneo la zaidi ya futi za mraba 30,000. Kwa sababu ya hali hiyo, kwa kuwa sehemu kubwa ya vifaa vya 808 vilitolewa usiku, ilibidi wafanyakazi wa jeshi la wanamgambo wa majeshi ya kivita wafanye kazi wakati wa giza ili kuandaa vifaa vilivyotakiwa. Na kwa hivyo, unaweza kuona tatizo katika mawasiliano na ushirikiano. Hii ilishindwa wakati Sfc. James E. Ruble. "Mkuu wa jeshi, aliyekuwa na jukumu la kubeba ndege, alitembelea chumba cha vifaa cha kampuni na akajitokeza na mkono kamili wa ""SRC536"" Handy Talkie"" redio." "Wakiwa na mmoja katika ofisi ya kupakia, wawili katika maeneo ya kiufundi katika eneo la vifaa vya kabla ya kuunganishwa, na wawili na wafanyakazi wa kupakia kwenye uwanja wa ndege, yeye na Lt. Paul E. Smith, afisa anayesimamia operesheni ya kupakia, walijishughulisha na nafasi ya kati na kutoa amri na maagizo, wakiwa na picha kamili ya hali ya jumla wakati wote. """ Ni rahisi kuona kwamba katika shughuli za utoaji wa hewa moja ya kuzingatia ya msingi ni matumizi ya kiuchumi ya vifaa-vidogo kama vile vitu kubwa na ghali. Haijalishi ni nafuu kadiri gani, bidhaa huchukua thamani isiyo na uwiano na gharama yake halisi inapohitajika na haipatikani. Kamba fulani iliyotumiwa na wapangaji wa 808 katika kufunga parachutes ilikuwa katika ugavi mdogo kwa sababu ingekuwa knot juu ya spool, kusababisha taka kubwa wakati sehemu tangled walikuwa kukatwa mbali. Hakuna dispensers cord kawaida walikuwa inapatikana kupitia njia ya kawaida ya usambazaji. Kaporali William H. Peele, ambaye alipenda kutumia pesa kwa kiasi kikubwa, alibuni kifaa rahisi. Mfumo wa kudhibiti shinikizo wa elastic ya webbed uliongezwa, na kuunganisha kamba hiyo kwa njia ya usawa bila kufunga kamba. Mengi ya ubunifu uliotolewa na watu wa 8081st ulihusu kushuka kwa vitu kama vile malori, trela, na vipande vya makombora. Vifaa vya mizigo kwa kawaida hubebwa duniani na parachuti nne za futi 100 zinazounga mkono jukwaa ambalo kipengele cha kushuka kimewekwa na kushikiliwa. Katika mwanzo wa miaka ya 1980, iligunduliwa kwamba wakati usambazaji wa parachutes na majukwaa haya ulikuwa wa kutosha kukidhi mahitaji ya idadi ndogo ya shughuli za kushuka nzito, inaweza kuwa busara kuendeleza mbinu mbadala katika tukio ambalo vifaa vya uwanja vinapaswa kuanzishwa katika utoaji wa hewa wa vitu vizito. Jeep hiyo yenye uzito wa tani moja na nusu ilitumiwa kwa njia nyingine kwa sababu ilikuwa nyepesi na haikuwa na sehemu zozote zilizokuwa zikiweza kuvunjika. Kwa kutegemea mawazo mapya kutoka kwa wanaume wa kampuni hiyo, Kamanda Thomas J. Boylan alibuni kamba iliyoimarishwa ambayo ingeweza kubeba trela hadi ardhini. Sehemu ya kwanza ya gari ilikuwa na sehemu ya mstatili ya mbao zilizochongwa kwa umbo la gari, parachuti ya miguu 48 na vifaa mbalimbali vya kuondoa mshtuko kama vile vifuniko vya felt. Wakati wa kuunganisha trailer, plywood ilikuwa katikati ya sling; padding na viti vilitumiwa katika pointi kwenye plywood ambapo trailer ingekuwa kupumzika; trailer ilikuwa imewekwa. Pini ya juu, juu ya plywood, juu ya plywood, juu ya plywood, juu ya plywood, juu ya plywood, juu ya plywood, juu ya plywood. Parachute ilikuwa imefungwa kwa mzigo. Katika majaribio, shoka hilo lilithibitika kuwa lenye mafanikio na mfano ulikatwa kutoka kwa ile ya awali na kuandikwa kwa wakati ambapo utumizi wake ungehitajika. Pamoja na kuwezesha njia mbadala ya airdropping, maendeleo ya Sergeant Boylan yalitoa upungufu katika usambazaji wa parachutes za miguu 100 na majukwaa mazito ya kutupa. Usimamizi wa vifaa vya kurusha hewa ni jukumu la mara kwa mara la Para-Quartermasters 8081. Uchunguzi wa kawaida huhakikisha kwamba vyombo, majukwaa, parachuti, na vitu vingine vimehifadhiwa vikiwa katika hali nzuri. Mbali na ukaguzi wa uangalifu, parachuti huhitaji kufungwa kwa uangalifu ili kuhakikisha ufanisi mkubwa wa uendeshaji. Kwa ujumla, hakukuwa na ugumu wowote wa kufunga aina mbalimbali za parachuti. Parachute ya mizigo ya mita 30 Hata hivyo, ilitoa tatizo - ili kuweka canopy yake katika pakiti mbili riggers walikuwa zinahitajika kukaa kila upande wa pakiti na kushinikiza canopy ndani yake na miguu yao. Kwa kueleweka, mara nyingi njia hiyo ilizuia kuhifadhiwa kwa utaratibu na kwa usawa kwa paa hilo, na matokeo yakawa kwamba ufanisi mkubwa wa uendeshaji haukuweza kupatikana. Ili kuhakikisha usimamizi sahihi wa canopy, Kanali Hannibal Lopez, msimamizi wa 808th Heavy Drop, alibuni sanduku la mstatili la pande tatu lililokatwa kwa vipimo vya canopy ya futi 100 wakati wa kukunjwa kwa ajili ya kuhifadhi. "Wafanyabiashara wa parachuti walipiga ""kifuniko"" ndani ya sanduku, kisha wakaweka sehemu ya mwisho ya sanduku ndani ya sanduku, na kisha wakaivuta sanduku, na kuacha kifuniko ndani ya sanduku." Mbali na kuondoa makosa ya kuhifadhi sanduku la Sergeant Lopez liliwezesha canopy kuhifadhiwa haraka na kwa juhudi kidogo kuliko chini ya njia ya zamani. Vifaa vingi vya shambani vilivyotajwa hadi sasa vimetengenezwa na watu mmoja-mmoja. Hata hivyo, licha ya ubora na athari za mbali za ubunifu huu, 808 itakuwa ikikumbukwa zaidi kwa juhudi zake za kikundi zilizopangwa, zilizopatikana kwa kutumia uzoefu na ujuzi wa wengi wa wanachama wake wanaofanya kazi kama timu. Mfano wa mojawapo ya "jitihada za kikundi" hizo ulitajwa mwanzoni mwa makala hii. """Hakuna mtu anayejua ni wapi wazo au pendekezo la kutumia kamba kama mbadala wa vyombo vya kutupwa angani lilitoka, ingawa sehemu kubwa ya sifa kwa ununuzi na utekelezaji wake ni kwa sababu ya Kapteni Cecil W. Hospelhorn na C.O. Byron J. Kirkman, wakuu wa jeshi na afisa wa usambazaji wa 808th wakati huo." Mfano mwingine, na labda ule uliovutia zaidi, ulikuwa kutupwa kwa daraja kwa mara ya kwanza kutoka angani kwa majeshi yaliyokuwa yakipigana. Asubuhi ya Desemba 7, 1950, simu ya dharura ilipokelewa. Kitu kisicho cha kawaida kilipaswa kutupwa kutoka angani kwa majeshi yaliyokuwa yamezingirwa kwenye Hifadhi ya Maji ya Chosin. Wataalamu wa utoaji wa angani walihitajiwa katika kituo cha angani cha mbele ili kutayarisha na kusaidia kupeleka bidhaa hiyo. Mara moja, kikosi cha 808 cha jeshi la Marekani, kilichoongozwa na Kapteni Hospelhorn, kilipelekwa kwenye kituo hicho cha ndege. Mara walipofika huko, Maofisa wa Jeshi la Jeshi la Jeshi la Jeshi la Jeshi la Jeshi la Jeshi la Jeshi la Jeshi la Jeshi la Jeshi la Jeshi la Jeshi la Jeshi la Jeshi la Jeshi la Jeshi la Jeshi la Jeshi la Jeshi la Jeshi la Jeshi la Jeshi la Jeshi la Jeshi la Jeshi la Jeshi la Jeshi. Kila sehemu ya daraja hilo ilipaswa kupelekwa kwa ndege ya C-119 na kupelekwa duniani kwa parachuti mbili zenye urefu wa futi 48. Wanaume hao walifanya kazi usiku kucha ili kurekebisha sehemu za daraja hilo. Asubuhi sehemu hizo zilipakiwa kwenye magari manane ya kubebea mizigo. Mara tu zilipopaa angani, sehemu hizo zililazimika kuhamishwa tena. """Ilikuwa imeamuliwa katika mkutano wa jeshi na jeshi la anga kwamba katika urefu wa futi 1,000 sehemu hizo zingehamishwa ili kwamba futi saba za urefu wa kila sehemu ya futi 16 zingepanuka zaidi ya ufunguzi wa nyuma wa ndege." Hii ilikuwa muhimu ili kuwezesha kushuka kwa haraka kwa sababu eneo la kushuka lilikuwa na urefu wa yadi 300 tu. Hata hivyo, kwa kupanga kwa uangalifu kila sehemu iligonga vizuri ndani ya mipaka ya eneo lililopendekezwa. Kapteni Hospeihorn, kwa kujitokeza katika hatua hii, alipokea Legion of Merit. Kwa hivyo, hadithi ya 8081 imeandikwa; hadithi ya juhudi za mtu binafsi na pamoja za wanachama wote wa kitengo. "Kama ilivyo wakati uliopita, leo, Kikosi cha Jeshi cha 8081 ""kutoa bidhaa"" kwa watu wanaohitaji." Kama katika mgawo wao wa baadaye hali hutokea ambayo si kufunikwa katika <unk> kitabu <unk> Para-Quartermasters kuandika sura yao wenyewe-na kukamilisha utume!