The Global Water Shortage / Dimensions of the Middle East Water Problem / Depleted Sources, Growing Conflicts / The Suggested Solutions / Desalination: The Only Realistic Hope
The Global Water Shortage
The problem of water scarcity is a growing worldwide phenomenon. Net renewable water resources per capita have declined dramatically over a single generation, and in little more than thirty years from now will reach dangerously low levels. By the year 2025 the average net water resources in the Middle East are expected to be less than 700 cubic meters per person per year, half of what they are today. The sharp growth in global population and development has badly depleted and polluted the world’s water sources. This situation is already keenly felt in India, China and Mexico, and even in the United States there is a problem of deteriorating water quality.
More and more a dilemma arises between water use for industry and agriculture, and use for domestic household purposes. Of the 5.5 billion people in the world today, 3.5 billion are forced to live with less than 50 liters per person per day, one-seventh the quantity used by the average American. Agriculture uses 73 percent of the world’s fresh water, and the world needs more agriculture because of increasing food needs. Water consumption in several countries already exceeds renewable supply; others are at or close to the limits. In many poor countries, famine is prevented only by grains and cereals taken from global grain stocks. Lately, however, these stocks have dropped sharply: in 1987 they were sufficient for 101 days, but by 1989 stocks had dropped to only 54 days.
Furthermore, experience shows that when available water resources drop to between 1,000 and 2,000 cubic meters per capita per year, large investments are generally required to meet ongoing water demand. However, when resources fall below 1,000 cubic meters per capita per year, difficult socio-economic adjustments are then required to cope with such scarcity.
Water conflicts exist in many places around the globe, such as between India and Bangladesh, Israel and its neighbors, Egypt and Ethiopia, Turkey and Syria, and Turkey and Iraq. At the same time, the distribution of water sources is highly uneven: many countries with small populations possess large amounts of water whereas many populous countries face acute shortages. Yet there is a limit to man’s ability to bring water from one place to another by building dams, tunnels, and hydroelectric projects without causing irreversible ecological damage, and in circumstances where such damage is probable, the financial assistance usually available from organizations such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund will likely be denied. Additionally, the worldwide tendency to utilize fresh river water just before it reaches the sea has proved disastrous because a river’s most biologically productive part is the brackish zone where fresh and salt water meet.
The global shift from rain-fed to irrigated agriculture has increased the salinity of the earth in many areas, and evaporation of fresh water has left chemical pesticides and fertilizers in the ground. In addition, experience has shown that attempts to dam flood waters have prevented the normal drainage of destructive salts out of the soil to the sea, thereby rendering the soil unusable. Furthermore, there is a proven link between deforestation and a reduction in the amount of rainfall. In Western Africa, deforestation has already contributed to shorter rainy seasons. In Florida, the reduction of vegetation has led to a 10 percent drop in rainfall over the past 30 years. Once exposed, land reflects more sunlight, producing atmospheric processes that reduce rainfall by drawing dryer air into a given area.
Dimensions of the Middle East Water Problem
Water supplies in the Middle East are facing enormous pressures and all are already at maximal or near-maximal use. Egypt’s population is growing by one million every nine months. Many Jordanian towns get water only once a week. Immigration into Israel is increasing the stress on that country’s already taxed water sources. In the Gaza Strip, the salination of agricultural lands and fresh-water wells has reached catastrophic levels. In Syria, the low level of the Euphrates, together with pollution from pesticides, chemicals and salt, has forced the Syrian government to cut back on the supply of drinking water and electricity in Damascus, Aleppo, and several other cities. Damascus is without water most nights, and is estimated to lose as much as 30 percent of its water from old, leaking pipes. In Jordanian cities water losses from leaking pipes may have reached 60 percent.
Over 50 percent of the population of the Middle East and North Africa (excluding the Maghreb) depend either on water from rivers that cross an international boundary before reaching them, or on desalinized water and water drawn from deep wells. Two-thirds of all Arabic-speaking people in this region depend on river water that flows to them from non-Arabic-speaking countries, and another 24 percent live in areas with no perennial surface streams whatever. The latter rely either on well water from rapidly depleting sources or seawater, which is expensive both to purify in sufficient quantities and to pump to its places of use.
The size of these water-dependent populations is rapidly increasing. In 1983, the population of this area numbered 217.4 million, while by the year 2000 an additional 119.6 million people will be added to this figure, an increase of 55 percent. Water will be needed not only for these people as individuals, but also for industry and all other urban uses. Irrigation water will also be needed to prevent, as far as possible, dependence on imported food.
Depleted Sources, Growing Conflicts
There are four sources of water in the Middle East: a) precipitation; b) exotic rivers, or those that rise in amply watered areas but eventually grow smaller as they flow through deserts to the sea or inland sinks; c) aquifers, or underground water-filled strata; and d) desalinized seawater. In areas not reached by exotic streams, particularly the Arabian Peninsula and the Libyan Sahara, millions more Arabs must rely on wells and desalinized seawater. In the Peninsula south of the Jordanian and Iraqi borders, in an area of 1,160,481 square miles, not a single permanent surface stream exists. If we add riverless Libya to the list, the Arab world includes 1,839,839 square miles without one permanent sur-face stream.
Water has long been a source of conflict in the Middle East. In the period before the June 1967 Six-Day War, armed clashes broke out between Israel and Syria over the Jordan River sources. There is also growing tension in the Nile River basin, where nine countries (Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Zaire, Uganda, Kenya, Rwanda and Burundi) plan and execute water development projects that hardly take into account each other’s needs. Any water taken by the upstream countries for their own needs means that the downstream countries get that much less. Similarly, growing immigration into Israel has caused anxiety among the Arabs that Israel will seek to exploit the two remaining rivers in the area whose waters have not yet been completely exhausted: the Litani and the Yarmuk. Indeed, the average Israeli uses five to six times more water than the average person in Arab countries, and the new immigrants to Israel come mainly from countries where water is plentiful and lavishly used. Jordan, already one of the poorest countries in terms of water, needs more water for the 350,000 Palestinian refugees who were forced to leave Kuwait following the Gulf War. Overall, population growth in the Middle East now averages a staggering 3 percent annually, which can only increase both the pressure on already exhausted water resources and the pollution of the water.
Israel, the West Bank and Gaza, and Jordan are facing a combined deficit of at least 300-400 million cubic meters per year (and some estimate the figure to be as high as 500-600 million cubic meters). Indeed, the area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea, which in a generation is expected to have a total population of 14 million people, is already currently suffering from “water stress,” which means that only 500 cubic meters per capita per year are available.
Since agriculture consumes 80 percent of Middle East water, one remedy might be to cut back on agricultural production. But it seems unlikely that countries which gained their independence from the colonial powers during the last fifty to sixty years would agree to depend on imported food. Could one expect that the Zionist dream of return to the land and to Jewish agriculture would be so easily relinquished? Would Arab farmers abandon their olive trees and grape vines? Neither droughts nor water shortages have encouraged people to switch away from agriculture. They have only led to moves from rain-fed to irrigated agriculture, thus increasing the pressure on already dwindling resources.
An added complication in regional water cooperation is the fact that countries are reluctant to make honest disclosure concerning actual water usage and available resources: information is an asset which parties to negotiations do not easily surrender. Hence there is a need to discover the real dimensions of the water problem and to refute some of the myths related to it.
Turkey’s apparent water surplus is both temporary and misleading. Turkey’s population growth is enormous (one million every nine months); furthermore, the uneven distribution of water within Turkey itself and its lack of local energy resources mean that Turkey must allocate more water to its own population and to produce more hydroelectricity. In addition, Turkey faces the need to defuse Kurdish ethnic unrest by developing eastern Turkey where most of the Kurds reside, and this will require a greater allocation of water resources.
Long-standing political disputes also complicate regional cooperation on water. A Syrian-Israeli water agreement would imply Syrian recognition of Israel. A Syrian-Turkish agreement concerning the Orontes River would imply Syrian recognition of Turkish sovereignty over the Hatay region, which the Orontes crosses on its way to the Mediterranean. Hatay, called Alexandretta by Syria, was taken in June 1939 from Syria and given to Turkey by France, then the colonial power that controlled Syria. A Turkish-Syrian-Iraqi agreement to share Euphrates water would mean, according to Ankara, the imposition of Iraqi and Syrian sovereignty on a Turkish asset. Turkey, instead, is prepared to discuss only the technical aspects of allocating water to the downstream riparians.
Intermittent civil strife in the region also frustrates the development of water sources. The civil war in the Sudan, for instance, prevents the draining of the Sudd marshes that otherwise could add 35 billion cubic meters of water annually to the Nile. A more mild clash of internal interests may be seen in Lebanon where water is used to produce electricity as well as for agriculture. There the wealthy Christian community has sought to build hydroelectric projects to supply air-conditioning to Beirut rather than irrigation projects to aid the Shiite farmers in the south.
The Suggested Solutions
Two often-discussed regional water solutions are the combining of national water systems and the diverting of seas (as a means to produce electricity for water desalination). The difficulties involved, however, are most formidable. For instance, it is absolutely clear that there could be no room for both a Jordanian Red Sea-Dead Sea Canal and an Israeli Mediterranean-Dead Sea one. Furthermore, the diversion of seas in an earthquake prone area such as this, in the vicinity of the Syrian-African Rift, could lead to the contamination of pure aquifers which lie beneath the diversion routes. Hence, the implication is that Middle East water problems can apparently be dealt with only in a regional framework. Indeed, there is a growing tendency among global financial bodies to provide monies only for regional water projects.
Yet care must be taken to avoid plans that are grandiose or impossible. The proposed Turkish “peace pipeline” would carry the water of the Ceyhan and Seyhan Rivers (now emptying into the Mediterranean) to the entire Middle East and Persian Gulf. But with the pipeline’s two arms exceeding a length of 6,500 km., its projected cost of more than $20 billion, and its building expected to last more than fifteen years, this is hardly a practical plan, not to mention the near-insurmountable psychological barriers: the Arabs having to depend on the Turks, Kuwait depending on water coming from Iraq, and the like. Likewise, Jordan’s plan to import Iraqi water from the Euphrates is highly problematic. The envisioned 650 km. pipeline would be very vulnerable and would depend on the Euphrates, which originates in Turkey. However, Turkey’s growing use of the Euphrates already leaves diminishing amounts of water to the downstream riparians. In any case, all this puts Turkey at the center of Middle East water planning.
In addition to the “peace pipeline,” another of several proposed Turkish plans would involve the shipping of water by tankers or large plastic bags from the Manavgat River (which also empties into the Mediterranean) to potential buyers in the Middle East. Israel had originally thought that the Manavgat project could provide a source of water for the country’s needs. However, current official thinking has virtually rejected this option due to apprehensions shared by other potential buyers of Turkish water of Turkey’s ability to “turn off the tap.”
At present, the building of Turkish dams on the Euphrates is causing growing conflict with Syria and Iraq. (“We give them [the Syrians and the Iraqis] the water – they can’t share it,” declared the Turkish secretary of state responsible for the southeast Anatolia water development project [GAP]). Overall, there is an internal Turkish objection to sharing and exporting a valuable national resource such as water, and the Arabs, for their part, are reluctant to depend on Turkey. Furthermore, the official Turkish stance poses almost impossible conditions, tying the import of Turkish water to support for Turkey’s position in the Cyprus conflict.
Desalination: The Only Realistic Hope
In January 1992 Israel proposed at the multilateral talks on water of the Arab-Israeli peace conference in Moscow that desalination was the only long-term remedy for water-poor areas such as the Middle East. It is cheaper to invest in desalination of brackish water, seawater, or recycled sewage water than to try to settle by force disputes over available water resources, most of them already overused. Indeed, the cost of a desalination project for 10,000 people equals the cost of one tank, and a project for 100,000 people costs about the same as a jet-fighter aircraft. Similarly, diversion of water from one place to another is much more expensive than the development of new technology for cheaper desalination.
Most of the current global desalination capacity is already installed in the Middle East: Saudi Arabia has 26.8 percent, Kuwait 10.5 percent, and the United Arab Emirates 10 percent (by comparison, the United States has 12 percent). Israel desalinates 4 million cubic meters per year in 33 desalination units at 23 sites, which supply a mere 0.2 percent of its total water consumption.
The cost of a major desalination plant with a capacity of one quarter of a billion cubic meters per year is about $1 billion ($600-700 million for basic overhead and about $250 million for required operating expenses for fifteen years). The needs of Jordan, Israel and the West Bank could be met by two plants, together producing half a billion cubic meters per year at a cost of $2 billion. The costs of desalination are thus estimated at 25 cents per cubic meter (compared with 15 cents per cubic meter that Israeli farmers currently pay for water). However, these calculations are theoretical and the real cost of desalination might actually be significantly higher. Currently, commercial companies offer desalinated seawater at 65 cents per cubic meter and brackish water at 45 cents.
At the beginning of 1990 there were 70,000 desalination plants worldwide, purifying 13 million cubic meters per day or more than 4 billion cubic meters per year. Desalination today is a viable option for regular domestic use, and not only for island-resort or oil-rich states. Advanced technologies are applied today in desalination of both brackish water and sea water, making the process more and more economical and commercially feasible. Desalination of brackish water may be accomplished through the use of relatively inexpensive solar energy ponds. Despite the potential cost reductions involved in the use of large desalination plants, however, it is not reasonable to expect that desalination can solve the problem of water supply for agriculture in the near future. For the time being, desalination will serve mainly domestic and some industrial water supply requirements.
As we have seen, the combining of national water systems in the Middle East appears virtually impossible. Likewise, the barriers to diversion of the Mediterranean or the Red Sea into the Dead Sea appear to be politically, economically, and ecologically insurmountable. Diversion of rivers, or the reduction of agriculture and the consequent dependence on foreign food sources are unfeasible as well. The recycling of water can yield only marginal quantities. Hence, in a region where nearly all available water resources are being utilized, the only remaining option is desalination. Yet even this is not commercially viable for Middle Eastern agriculture at present. Perhaps a generation from now we will possess economical technology for mass desalination of water.
In the meantime, conservation measures are necessary such as the reduction of waste in irrigation, the introduction of more economical drip-irrigation methods, the phasing-out of water- intensive crops, recycling, and price increases of formerly subsidized water toward its real value. These conservation measures will sustain the water needs of the steadily growing Middle Eastern population by better utilizing the existing resources. However, critical water shortages are still expected within ten to fifteen years. Therefore, we need to choose our options and plan now to increase the overall water supply in the region. The water needs of the Middle East are growing to such an extent that there will soon not be enough water to go around. Hence, because of the anticipated continuing lack of political cooperation in the area, each of the states in the region must not wait for better times but should act independently to develop and wisely utilize its current resources and to plan for major desalination in the future.
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Dr. Amikam Nachmani is a senior lecturer in political science at Bar-Ilan University where he specializes in countries at the border between Islam and Christendom. This Survey of Arab Affairs is based on the author’s presentation at the Jerusalem Center Fellows Forum. A more comprehensive version of this essay will appear in E. Inbar, ed., Regional Security Regimes: Israel and Its Neighbors (Albany: SUNY Press, forthcoming).
"""Kukosa maji kwa dunia"" ni tatizo la maji duniani kote, na tatizo la maji ni tatizo la maji duniani kote, na tatizo la maji ni tatizo la maji duniani kote." "Mali ya maji ya kitaifa ya kila mtu imepungua sana katika kizazi kimoja, na katika miaka 30 hivi itapungua kwa kiwango cha chini sana.""" "Kufikia mwaka 2025 wastani wa maji katika Mashariki ya Kati unatarajiwa kuwa chini ya mita 700 za kiunzi kwa mtu mmoja kwa mwaka, nusu ya kiasi cha maji ya leo.""" Ongezeko kubwa la idadi ya watu ulimwenguni na maendeleo yameharibu sana na kuchafua vyanzo vya maji vya ulimwengu. Hali hii tayari inahisiwa sana nchini India, China na Mexico, na hata nchini Marekani kuna tatizo la kuharibika kwa ubora wa maji. Zaidi na zaidi tatizo linatokea kati ya matumizi ya maji kwa ajili ya viwanda na kilimo, na matumizi kwa ajili ya matumizi ya nyumbani. Kati ya watu bilioni 5.5 duniani, bilioni 3.5 wanalazimika kuishi na chini ya lita 50 kwa mtu kwa siku, kiasi cha saba cha matumizi ya wastani wa Marekani. Kilimo hutumia asilimia 73 ya maji safi duniani, na dunia inahitaji kilimo zaidi kwa sababu ya kuongezeka kwa mahitaji ya chakula. Matumizi ya maji katika nchi kadhaa tayari inazidi usambazaji wa nishati mbadala; wengine wako au karibu na mipaka. Katika nchi nyingi maskini, njaa huepukwa tu kwa nafaka na nafaka zinazochukuliwa kutoka kwa hifadhi za nafaka za ulimwengu. Hata hivyo, kwa miaka michache iliyopita, idadi ya hifadhi hizo imepungua sana: mwaka wa 1987 zilikuwa za kutosha kwa siku 101, lakini mwaka wa 1989 zilikadiriwa kuwa za siku 54 tu. Kwa kuongezea, uzoefu unaonyesha kwamba wakati rasilimali za maji zinazopatikana zinapopungua hadi kati ya mita 1,000 na 2,000 za kiunzi kwa mtu mmoja kwa mwaka, uwekezaji mkubwa kwa ujumla unahitajika ili kukidhi mahitaji ya maji ya sasa. Hata hivyo, wakati rasilimali zinapopungua chini ya mita 1,000 za kiunzi kwa mtu mmoja kwa mwaka, marekebisho magumu ya kijamii na kiuchumi yanahitajika kukabiliana na upungufu huo. Migogoro ya maji inapatikana katika maeneo mengi duniani, kama vile kati ya India na Bangladesh, Israel na majirani zake, Misri na Ethiopia, Uturuki na Syria, na Uturuki na Iraq. Wakati huo huo, usambazaji wa vyanzo vya maji ni tofauti sana: nchi nyingi zenye idadi ndogo ya watu zina kiasi kikubwa cha maji wakati nchi nyingi zenye idadi kubwa ya watu zinakabiliwa na upungufu mkubwa. Hata hivyo, kuna kikomo cha uwezo wa mwanadamu wa kuleta maji kutoka mahali moja hadi pengine kwa kujenga mabwawa, mifereji, na miradi ya umeme wa maji bila kusababisha uharibifu wa ikolojia usioweza kurekebishwa, na katika hali ambapo uharibifu kama huo ni uwezekano, msaada wa kifedha unaopatikana kwa kawaida kutoka kwa mashirika kama vile Benki ya Dunia na Mfuko wa Fedha wa Kimataifa utapuuzwa. Kwa kuongezea, mwelekeo wa ulimwenguni pote wa kutumia maji safi ya mto kabla tu ya kufikia bahari umethibitika kuwa mbaya kwa sababu sehemu yenye uzalishaji zaidi wa kibiolojia ya mto ni eneo la maji safi na maji ya chumvi yanapokutana. Mabadiliko ya kilimo cha mvua na kilimo cha umwagiliaji maji yameongeza chumvi ya ardhi katika maeneo mengi, na mvuke wa maji safi umesababisha kemikali za kuua wadudu na mbolea katika ardhi. Kwa kuongezea, uzoefu umeonyesha kwamba majaribio ya kuimarisha maji ya mafuriko yamezuia maji ya chumvi ya uharibifu kutoka kwenye udongo hadi baharini, na hivyo kufanya udongo usiweze kutumika. Isitoshe, kuna uhusiano ulioonyeshwa kati ya ukataji-miti na kupungua kwa kiasi cha mvua. Katika Afrika Magharibi, ukataji-miti tayari umesababisha majira ya mvua yawe mafupi. Katika jimbo la Florida, idadi ya mimea imepungua kwa asilimia 10 katika miaka 30 iliyopita. Baada ya kufunuliwa, ardhi huonyesha mwangaza zaidi wa jua, na kusababisha hali ya hewa ambayo hupunguza mvua kwa kuvuta hewa kavu katika eneo fulani. """Mipango ya maji ya Mashariki ya Kati ni kubwa na inahitaji msaada wa kimataifa, na kwa sasa ni ya kiwango cha juu au karibu na kiwango cha juu." Idadi ya watu wa Misri inaongezeka kwa milioni moja kila miezi tisa. Miji mingi ya Yordani hupata maji mara moja tu kwa juma. Uhamiaji nchini Israeli unaongeza mkazo juu ya vyanzo vya maji vya nchi hiyo ambavyo tayari vimefunikwa na ushuru. Katika Eneo la Gaza, chumvi katika mashamba na visima vya maji baridi imefikia kiwango kikubwa sana. Maji ya chini ya Mto Eufrates, pamoja na uchafuzi wa kemikali na chumvi, yamelazimisha serikali ya Syria kupunguza usambazaji wa maji na umeme katika miji ya Aleppo, Damascus na miji mingine. Jiji la Damascus limekuwa bila maji usiku wa manane na inakadiriwa kuwa asilimia 30 ya maji yake yanapotea kutokana na mabomba ya zamani yanayopunguka. Katika miji ya Jordan, hasara ya maji kutokana na kuvuja kwa mabomba ya maji inaweza kuwa imefikia asilimia 60. Zaidi ya asilimia 50 ya watu wa Mashariki ya Kati na Afrika Kaskazini (bila Maghreb) hutegemea maji kutoka mito ambayo inapita mpaka wa kimataifa kabla ya kufika huko, au maji ya desalinized na maji yaliyochukuliwa kutoka visima vya kina. Thuluthi mbili ya watu wote wanaozungumza Kiarabu katika eneo hili hutegemea maji ya mito ambayo hutiririka kwao kutoka nchi zisizozungumza Kiarabu, na asilimia 24 nyingine wanaishi katika maeneo ambayo hayana mito ya uso ya kudumu. Hizi za mwisho hutegemea maji ya kisima kutoka vyanzo vinavyopungua haraka au maji ya bahari, ambayo ni ghali kusafisha kwa kiasi cha kutosha na kupomba hadi mahali pake pa matumizi. Idadi ya watu hao wanaotegemea maji inaongezeka haraka. Katika mwaka wa 1983, idadi ya watu katika eneo hilo ilikuwa milioni 217.4, na kufikia mwaka wa 2000, idadi hiyo itaongezeka kwa watu milioni 119.6, yaani, itakua asilimia 55. Maji yatahitajika si tu kwa ajili ya watu hawa kama watu binafsi, lakini pia kwa ajili ya viwanda na matumizi mengine yote ya mijini. Maji ya umwagiliaji pia yatahitajika ili kuzuia, kadiri iwezekanavyo, utegemezi wa chakula cha kuagiza. Kuna vyanzo vinne vya maji katika Mashariki ya Kati: (a) mvua; (b) mito ya kigeni, au wale ambao huinuka katika maeneo yenye maji mengi lakini hatimaye hukua ndogo wanapoingia katika jangwa hadi baharini au kwenye mabwawa ya ndani; (c) matope ya maji, au tabaka za chini ya ardhi zilizojazwa maji; na (d) maji ya bahari yaliyoondolewa chumvi. Katika maeneo ambayo hayafikikiwi na mito ya kigeni, hasa Peninsula ya Arabia na Sahara ya Libya, mamilioni zaidi ya Waarabu lazima wategemea visima na maji ya bahari yaliyoondolewa chumvi. Katika eneo la Jordan na Iraq, ambalo lina ukubwa wa kilomita 1,160,481, hakuna hata kijito kimoja cha maji. Ikiwa tutaongeza Libya isiyo na mito kwenye orodha, ulimwengu wa Kiarabu una kilomita 1,839,839 za mraba bila mto mmoja wa kudumu wa uso. Kwa muda mrefu maji yamekuwa chanzo cha migogoro katika Mashariki ya Kati. Katika kipindi cha kabla ya Vita vya Siku Sita vya Juni 1967, mapigano ya silaha yalianza kati ya Israeli na Syria juu ya vyanzo vya Mto Yordani. Mvutano unaongezeka katika bonde la Mto Nile ambapo nchi tisa (Misri, Sudan, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Zaire, Uganda, Kenya, Rwanda na Burundi) zinapanga na kutekeleza miradi ya maendeleo ya maji ambayo haizingati mahitaji ya kila mmoja. Maji yote yanayotumiwa na nchi za juu ya mto kwa mahitaji yao wenyewe yanamaanisha kwamba nchi za chini ya mto hupata maji machache. "Kama ilivyo kwa Israeli, ""kuongezeka kwa uhamiaji katika Israeli kumesababisha wasiwasi miongoni mwa Waarabu kwamba Israeli itajaribu kutumia mito miwili iliyobaki katika eneo hilo ambayo maji yake bado hayajaisha kabisa: Litani na Yarmuk.""" Kwa kweli, wastani wa Israeli hutumia maji mara tano hadi sita zaidi ya wastani wa watu katika nchi za Kiarabu, na wahamiaji wapya wa Israeli hutoka hasa katika nchi ambazo maji ni mengi na hutumiwa kwa wingi. Jordan, ambayo tayari ni moja ya nchi maskini zaidi duniani kwa suala la maji, inahitaji maji zaidi kwa ajili ya wakimbizi 350,000 wa Palestina ambao walilazimika kuondoka Kuwait baada ya vita vya Ghuba. Kwa ujumla, ongezeko la idadi ya watu katika Mashariki ya Kati sasa ni wastani wa asilimia tatu kwa mwaka, ambayo inaweza tu kuongeza shinikizo juu ya rasilimali za maji tayari zilizopungua na uchafuzi wa maji. Israel, Gaza na Jordan zinakabiliwa na upungufu wa angalau mita milioni 300 kwa mwaka, na baadhi ya takwimu zinaonyesha kuwa ni mita milioni 500 hadi 600 kwa mwaka. "Kwa kweli, eneo kati ya Mto Yordani na Bahari ya Mediterania, ambalo katika kizazi kinatarajiwa kuwa na idadi ya watu milioni 14, tayari linaugua ""dhiki ya maji,"" ambayo inamaanisha kuwa mita 500 tu za kiunzi kwa mtu kwa mwaka zinapatikana." Kwa kuwa kilimo hutumia asilimia 80 ya maji ya Mashariki ya Kati, suluhisho moja huenda likawa kupunguza uzalishaji wa kilimo. Lakini inaonekana kuwa ni vigumu kwa nchi zilizopata uhuru wao kutoka kwa mamlaka za kikoloni katika miaka ya hamsini hadi sitini iliyopita kukubali kutegemea chakula cha kuagiza. Je, mtu angeweza kutarajia kwamba ndoto ya Wasioni ya kurudi kwenye nchi na kilimo cha Kiyahudi ingeachwa kwa urahisi hivyo? Je, wakulima Waarabu wangeacha miti yao ya zeituni na mizabibu? Ukame wala upungufu wa maji haukuwatia moyo watu waache kilimo. Kwa sababu hiyo, watu wamebadilisha kilimo cha mvua na kilimo cha umwagiliaji maji, na hivyo kuongeza shinikizo juu ya rasilimali ambazo tayari zinapungua. "Ufunguo wa pili katika ushirikiano wa maji ya kikanda ni ukweli kwamba nchi ni kusita kufanya ufunuo wa uaminifu kuhusu matumizi halisi ya maji na rasilimali zilizopo: habari ni mali ambayo pande za mazungumzo hazitoi kwa urahisi. """ Kwa hiyo kuna haja ya kugundua vipimo halisi vya tatizo la maji na kupinga baadhi ya hadithi zinazohusiana na hilo. Zaidi ya maji ya Uturuki ni ya muda na ya kupotosha. Uturuki ina idadi kubwa ya watu (milioni moja kila miezi tisa); kwa kuongezea, usambazaji usio sawa wa maji ndani ya Uturuki yenyewe na ukosefu wake wa rasilimali za nishati za ndani inamaanisha kwamba Uturuki lazima itenge maji zaidi kwa idadi yake mwenyewe na kuzalisha umeme zaidi wa maji. "Uturuki pia inakabiliwa na haja ya kutuliza ghasia za kikabila za Kikurdi kwa kuendeleza mashariki mwa Uturuki ambapo Wakurdi wengi wanaishi, na hii itahitaji mgawo mkubwa wa rasilimali za maji. """ Mabishano ya kisiasa ya muda mrefu pia hufanya ushirikiano wa kikanda juu ya maji uwe mgumu. Mkataba wa maji wa Syria na Israeli ungemaanisha utambuzi wa Israeli na Syria. Mkataba wa Syria na Uturuki kuhusu Mto Orontes unamaanisha utambuzi wa Uturuki juu ya eneo la Hatay, ambalo Mto Orontes unapita kuelekea Mediterania. Hatay, jina la mji wa Aleksandretta, ulichukuliwa kutoka Syria na kupewa Uturuki na Ufaransa mnamo Juni 1939. Mkataba wa Uturuki na Syria wa kushiriki maji ya Mto Eufrates, kulingana na Ankara, unamaanisha kulazimisha uhuru wa Iraq na Syria kwenye mali ya Uturuki. Uturuki, badala yake, iko tayari kujadili tu mambo ya kiufundi ya kugawa maji kwa washirika wa chini ya mto. Mapigano ya wenyewe kwa wenyewe yanayotokea mara kwa mara katika eneo hilo pia huzuia maendeleo ya vyanzo vya maji. Vita vya wenyewe kwa wenyewe nchini Sudan vimefanya maji ya mabwawa ya Sudd yawe machafu, na hivyo kuongeza maji ya Mto Nile kwa kiasi cha mita za kipekee 35 kwa mwaka. Mgongano mdogo zaidi wa maslahi ya ndani unaweza kuonekana nchini Lebanon ambapo maji hutumiwa kutengeneza umeme na pia kwa ajili ya kilimo. Katika eneo hilo, jamii tajiri ya Wakristo imejitahidi kujenga miradi ya umeme wa maji ili kuandaa mfumo wa hewa wa Beirut badala ya miradi ya umwagiliaji maji ili kuwasaidia wakulima wa Kiislamu kusini. Suluhisho la maji la mkoa ni kuunganisha mifumo ya maji ya kitaifa na kugeuza bahari (kama njia ya kuzalisha umeme kwa ajili ya desalination ya maji). Hata hivyo, matatizo yanayohusika ni makubwa sana. Kwa mfano, ni wazi kabisa kwamba hakutakuwa na nafasi kwa ajili ya Jordan Bahari Nyekundu-Bahari Mfu Mfereji na Israeli Mediterania-Bahari Mfu moja. "Kwa kuongezea, kugeuzwa kwa bahari katika eneo lenye hatari ya matetemeko ya ardhi kama hii, karibu na Rift ya Syria na Afrika, inaweza kusababisha uchafuzi wa maji safi ambayo iko chini ya njia za kugeuza. """ Kwa hiyo, maana yake ni kwamba matatizo ya maji ya Mashariki ya Kati yaweza kushughulikiwa tu katika mfumo wa kikanda. Kwa kweli, kuna mwelekeo unaoongezeka miongoni mwa mashirika ya kifedha ya kimataifa kutoa fedha tu kwa ajili ya miradi ya maji ya kikanda. Hata hivyo, ni lazima tuwe waangalifu ili kuepuka mipango mikubwa au isiyowezekana. Mradi wa "mfereji wa amani" wa Uturuki uliopendekezwa ungechukua maji ya Mto Ceyhan na Mto Seyhan (sasa unatiririka kwenye Bahari ya Mediterania) hadi Mashariki ya Kati na Ghuba ya Uajemi. Lakini kwa kuwa sehemu mbili za bomba hilo zina urefu wa zaidi ya kilomita 6,500, gharama yake imepangwa kuwa zaidi ya dola bilioni 20, na ujenzi wake unatarajiwa kudumu zaidi ya miaka kumi na tano, mpango huo hauwezi kutekelezwa, bila kutajwa vizuizi vya kisaikolojia ambavyo vinaweza kushindwa kuvunjwa: Waarabu wanategemea Uturuki, Kuwait inategemea maji yanayotoka Iraq, na kadhalika. Vivyo hivyo, mpango wa Jordan wa kuagiza maji ya Iraq kutoka Mto Euphrates ni tatizo kubwa. Mipango ya miaka 650 Mto huo unaelekea kwenye eneo la Euphrates, ambalo linaanzia Uturuki. Hata hivyo, matumizi ya Uturuki ya Mto Eufrati yanapozidi kuongezeka, tayari kiasi cha maji kinachopungua kwa watu wanaoishi kando ya mto huo. Kwa vyovyote vile, yote haya huweka Uturuki katikati ya mipango ya maji ya Mashariki ya Kati. "Kulingana na ""mfereji wa amani,"" mpango mwingine wa Uturuki unaohusisha usafirishaji wa maji kwa mabomu au mifuko mikubwa ya plastiki kutoka Mto Manavgat (ambayo pia huingia katika Bahari ya Mediterania) kwa wanunuzi wa uwezekano katika Mashariki ya Kati." Mwanzoni Israeli ilidhani kwamba mradi wa Manavgat ungeweza kutoa chanzo cha maji kwa ajili ya mahitaji ya nchi. Hata hivyo, mawazo ya sasa ya serikali yamekataa chaguo hili kwa sababu ya wasiwasi ulioshirikiwa na wanunuzi wengine wa maji ya Uturuki juu ya uwezo wa Uturuki wa "kufunga bomba". (Tunawapa [Wasisiria na Wairaki] maji <unk> hawawezi <unk> kushiriki, <unk> alitangaza katibu wa serikali ya Uturuki anayehusika na mradi wa maendeleo ya maji ya kusini mashariki mwa Anatolia [GAP]). Kwa ujumla, kuna upinzani wa ndani wa Uturuki kwa kushiriki na kusafirisha rasilimali muhimu ya kitaifa kama vile maji, na Waarabu, kwa upande wao, wanakataa kutegemea Uturuki. Kwa kuongezea, msimamo rasmi wa Uturuki unaweka masharti yasiyowezekana, ukishikamana na uagizaji wa maji ya Uturuki kwa msaada wa msimamo wa Uturuki katika mzozo wa Cyprus. "Mwezi Januari mwaka 1992, Israel ilipendekeza katika mazungumzo ya kimataifa juu ya maji ya mkutano wa amani wa Kiarabu na Israeli huko Moscow kwamba ""kuondoa chumvi"" ilikuwa suluhisho pekee la muda mrefu kwa maeneo yenye umaskini wa maji kama vile Mashariki ya Kati." Ni nafuu zaidi kuwekeza katika desalination ya maji ya chumvi, maji ya bahari, au maji taka ya kuchakata kuliko kujaribu kutatua kwa nguvu migogoro juu ya rasilimali za maji zinazopatikana, nyingi yao tayari overused. Kwa kweli, gharama ya mradi wa kuondoa chumvi kwa watu 10,000 ni sawa na gharama ya tangi moja, na mradi wa watu 100,000 ni sawa na gharama ya ndege ya kivita. Vivyo hivyo, kugeuza maji kutoka mahali moja hadi pengine ni ghali zaidi kuliko maendeleo ya teknolojia mpya ya desalination ya bei nafuu. Kwa sasa, Saudi Arabia ina uwezo wa kuondoa chumvi katika bahari ya Bahari ya Kati, Kuwait ina asilimia 26.8 na UAE ina asilimia 10. Israel hutengeneza maji ya chumvi kwa mita milioni 4 kwa mwaka katika vituo 33 vya kutengeneza maji ya chumvi katika maeneo 23 ambayo yanatoa asilimia 0.2 tu ya jumla ya matumizi yake ya maji. Gharama ya kiwanda kikubwa cha kuondoa chumvi kwa uwezo wa mita za mraba za bilioni moja kwa mwaka ni karibu dola bilioni moja (mamilioni 600 hadi 700 kwa gharama za msingi za jumla na karibu dola milioni 250 kwa gharama za uendeshaji zinazohitajika kwa miaka kumi na tano). Mahitaji ya Jordan, Israel na Ukingo wa Magharibi yanaweza kukidhiwa na viwanda viwili, pamoja vinavyozalisha mita za mraba bilioni nusu kwa mwaka kwa gharama ya bilioni mbili. Kwa hivyo, gharama za desalination zinakadiriwa kuwa senti 25 kwa mita ya kiunzi (kilinganishwa na senti 15 kwa mita ya kiunzi ambayo wakulima wa Israeli hulipa kwa maji). Hata hivyo, mahesabu hayo ni ya nadharia na gharama halisi ya desalination inaweza kuwa kweli kwa kiasi kikubwa zaidi. Kwa sasa, kampuni za kibiashara hutoa maji ya bahari yaliyopunguzwa chumvi kwa senti 65 kwa mita moja ya kiunzi na maji ya chumvi kwa senti 45. Katika mwaka wa 1990, kulikuwa na viwanda 70,000 vya kusafisha maji ya bahari ulimwenguni pote, ambavyo vilitengeneza maji ya maji ya bahari kwa kiasi cha mita milioni 13 kwa siku, au zaidi ya mita bilioni 4 kwa mwaka. Desalination leo ni chaguo linalofaa kwa matumizi ya kawaida ya ndani, na si tu kwa ajili ya kisiwa-resort au nchi tajiri ya mafuta. Teknolojia za kisasa zinatumika leo katika desalination ya maji ya chumvi na maji ya bahari, na kufanya mchakato zaidi na zaidi ya kiuchumi na kibiashara inawezekana. Maji yenye chumvi yanaweza kutolewa kwa kutumia vidimbwi vya nishati ya jua visivyo na gharama kubwa. Hata hivyo, licha ya uwezekano wa kupunguza gharama zinazohusika katika matumizi ya mitambo mikubwa ya desalination, haifai kutarajia kwamba desalination inaweza kutatua tatizo la usambazaji wa maji kwa ajili ya kilimo katika siku zijazo. Kwa sasa, maji ya chumvi yatatumiwa hasa kwa ajili ya matumizi ya nyumbani na baadhi ya matumizi ya viwanda. Kama tulivyoona, kuunganisha mifumo ya maji ya kitaifa katika Mashariki ya Kati inaonekana kuwa haiwezekani. Vivyo hivyo, vizuizi vya kugeuza njia ya Bahari ya Mediterania au Bahari Nyekundu kuingia katika Bahari ya Chumvi vinaonekana kuwa visivyoweza kushindwa kisiasa, kiuchumi, na kiikolojia. Ugeuzi wa mito, au kupunguzwa kwa kilimo na utegemezi unaotokana na vyanzo vya chakula vya kigeni haufai pia. Kurudishwa tena kwa maji kunaweza kutoa kiasi kidogo tu. Kwa hiyo, katika eneo ambako karibu rasilimali zote za maji zinazopatikana zinatumiwa, njia pekee inayobaki ni kutengeneza maji yasiyo na chumvi. Hata hivyo hata hii si ya kibiashara kwa ajili ya kilimo Mashariki ya Kati kwa sasa. Labda kizazi kimoja kutoka sasa tutakuwa na teknolojia ya kiuchumi ya kutolea maji chumvi kwa wingi. Kwa sasa, hatua za kuhifadhi ni muhimu kama vile kupunguza taka katika umwagiliaji, kuanzisha mbinu za umwagiliaji wa matone ya kiuchumi, kuondoa hatua kwa hatua mazao ya maji, kuchakata, na kuongeza bei ya maji yaliyokuwa na ruzuku ya zamani kuelekea thamani yake halisi. Hatua hizi za uhifadhi zitadumisha mahitaji ya maji ya idadi ya watu wa Mashariki ya Kati inayoongezeka kwa kasi kwa kutumia vizuri rasilimali zilizopo. Hata hivyo, bado upungufu mkubwa wa maji unatarajiwa ndani ya miaka kumi hadi kumi na tano. Kwa hivyo, tunahitaji kuchagua chaguzi zetu na kupanga sasa kuongeza usambazaji wa maji kwa ujumla katika mkoa huo. Mahitaji ya maji ya Mashariki ya Kati yanaongezeka sana hivi kwamba hivi karibuni hakutakuwa na maji ya kutosha kwa kila mtu. Kwa hivyo, kwa sababu ya kutarajiwa kwa kuendelea kutokuwa na ushirikiano wa kisiasa katika eneo hilo, kila moja ya nchi katika mkoa huo haipaswi kusubiri nyakati bora, lakini inapaswa kutenda kwa kujitegemea ili kuendeleza na kutumia kwa busara rasilimali zake za sasa na kupanga mpango mkubwa wa desalination katika siku zijazo. Amikam Nachmani ni mhadhiri wa sayansi ya siasa katika Chuo Kikuu cha Bar-Ilan, ambapo anafanya kazi katika nchi zilizo kwenye mpaka kati ya Uislamu na Ukristo. Uchunguzi huu wa Masuala ya Kiarabu unategemea uwasilishaji wa mwandishi katika Mkutano wa Washirika wa Kituo cha Yerusalemu. "Kama ilivyoelezwa katika makala hii, ""Usalama wa Mkoa: Israeli na Majirani Yake"" (Albany: SUNY Press, 2013) ni sehemu ya kitabu cha ""Usalama wa Mkoa: Israeli na Majirani Yake."""