By Bill Hayton
The search for the missing Malaysian airliner has demonstrated the capabilities gap between China, on one side, and the United States and its allies in the Asia Pacific, on the other, but also China’s increasingly sophisticated public diplomacy.
For the past several weeks, an unprecedented military coalition has been operating off the coast of western Australia, including Chinese, Japanese, South Korean, and U.S. crews. In the global battle for hearts and minds, every country wants to look like it is doing its best for grief-stricken neighbors.
But in a region as contested as the Asia Pacific, bigger messages must be communicated too: ones that signal the power of militaries to allies and rivals. For the casual consumer of television or online news, however, the relative contributions to the search for MH370 by different navies and air forces – and hence the messages about those forces’ relative strengths – are being obscured by the differing emphases that countries place on security and public diplomacy.
Media coverage of the operation has been constrained by geography. Journalists have to be content with press handouts from public affairs officers or repetitive shots of planes taking off and landing, while the desire for fresh pictures to maintain public interest is immense. Chinese participation in such a high-profile mission is certainly new and appears for many to symbolize its growing role on the international stage. But by equating Chinese and U.S. efforts, media coverage has acted as a “force multiplier” for Beijing’s public diplomacy, indirectly making Washington’s job in the region more difficult.
There is a vast gap in capabilities between the United States and its allies on the one hand and China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) on the other. In the air, the United States has deployed the world’s most advanced maritime surveillance aircraft, the P-8 Poseidon, and the Australians, New Zealanders, Japanese, and South Koreans have sent out their P-3 Orions loaded with radars and other sensors. By contrast, the Chinese have sent a pair of transport planes and several pairs of binoculars.
When the P-3s spotted objects they thought might belong to the missing plane, they dropped GPS buoys to transmit the location to surface ships. Pictures from March 29showed Chinese planes also dropping buoys, but theirs contained nothing more sophisticated than brightly-colored dye. When crew members aboard the Jinggangshan amphibious warfare vessel – one of the largest ships in the Chinese Navy – discovered one of the GPS buoys, they were unable to work out whose it was or where it came from.
While hand-out images showed the P-8 technicians hunched over data screens, video of the search operation distributed by Chinese Central Television showed crew members taking pictures out of a plane’s windows with smart phones and then enlarging the images on a laptop. Their inexperience in maritime operations was revealed by frequent announcements early in the operation that Chinese crews had spotted debris floating in the ocean, which turned out to be false leads.
The search for MH370 shows there is a considerable difference between ambition and competence of the Chinese Navy. As Gary Li, Senior Analyst of IHS Maritime in Beijing told me when I was researching my book on the South China Sea, “Every single new bit of kit that the Navy adds makes it look a little closer to a modern Navy. But that doesn’t mean it is a modern Navy.”
If China’s deployment has been less than effective in a practical sense, it has been much more successful as a public relations exercise. Audiences back home vociferously demanding government action were treated to regular reports about the deployment of seven Chinese naval and coast guard vessels. Chinese reporters sent back breathless accounts of intrepid action.
On March 23 and 24, they transmitted a video and stills of the crew of the Xue Long icebreaker scanning the horizon with binoculars. Similar pictures from other ships were broadcast on March 25. But at the time they were filmed, none of these ships were in the search area. The Xue Long only reached the suspected crash zone on March 26.
What is more surprising than the Chinese government’s exaggerating its own achievements, however, is the way the Chinese news agenda has been incorporated into western media outlets. Pictures of the Xue Long’s pointless horizon-gazing or of divers getting into wetsuits while actually being a long way from the crash site were distributed by the main international news agencies and incorporated in reports by broadcasters around the world.
This happens because of agreements struck in 2010 between China Central Television (CCTV) and the two main video agencies: Associated Press Television News (APTN) and Reuters Television. Since January 2011, CCTV has paid the two agencies to transmit its pictures around the world. Almost every broadcaster has an agreement with APTN and/or RTV and receives the CCTV pictures along with the agency’s own. The CCTV pictures are clearly identified as such and the agencies make clear they are not responsible for the content. Nonetheless, as in the case for MH370, they allow Beijing’s version of events to filter into the mainstream.
As the search continues, international media interest will wane. As news reports become briefer, the insight will become shallower and the more the inputs of different militaries will be equated. The relative contributions of the U.S. P-8 Poseidon and Chinese Ilyushin 76 to the search for MH370 are vastly different, but in the eyes of viewers they may appear equivalent. China’s growing abilities in public diplomacy are beginning to compensate for its deficiencies in military capability. While the image of China’s strategic reach is growing stronger, that of America’s real capabilities is being obscured.
Utafiti wa ndege ya Malaysia iliyopotea umeonyesha pengo la uwezo kati ya China upande mmoja na Marekani na washirika wake katika eneo la Asia-Pacific upande mwingine, lakini pia utetezi wa umma wa China unaozidi kuwa wa hali ya juu. Kwa wiki kadhaa zilizopita, muungano wa kijeshi usio na kifani umekuwa ukifanya kazi kwenye pwani ya magharibi mwa Australia, ikiwa ni pamoja na wafanyakazi wa China, Japani, Korea Kusini na Marekani. Katika vita vya kimataifa vya kupigania mioyo na akili, kila nchi inataka kuonekana kama inafanya kila kitu kinachowezekana kwa majirani wake wanaoshuka moyo. Lakini katika eneo lenye utata kama Asia-Pacific, ujumbe mkubwa zaidi lazima uelekezwe pia: ule ambao unaonyesha nguvu za kijeshi kwa washirika na wapinzani. Kwa watumiaji wa kawaida wa habari za televisheni au mtandaoni, hata hivyo, mchango wa jamaa kwa utafutaji wa MH370 na majeshi tofauti ya majini na majeshi ya hewa - na kwa hivyo ujumbe kuhusu nguvu za jamaa za majeshi hayo - unazuiwa na msisitizo tofauti ambao nchi zinaweka kwenye usalama na diplomasia ya umma. Utangazaji wa vyombo vya habari wa operesheni hiyo umepunguzwa na kijiografia. Waandishi wa habari wanalazimika kuridhika na vipeperushi vya vyombo vya habari kutoka kwa maafisa wa masuala ya umma au picha za mara kwa mara za ndege zinazoondoka na kutua, wakati hamu ya picha mpya ili kudumisha maslahi ya umma ni kubwa. Ushiriki wa China katika ujumbe wa hali ya juu kama huo ni mpya na inaonekana kwa wengi kuashiria jukumu lake linaloongezeka katika jukwaa la kimataifa. Lakini kwa kulinganisha juhudi za China na Marekani, chanjo ya vyombo vya habari imefanya kazi kama "mzidishaji wa nguvu" kwa diplomasia ya umma ya Beijing, kwa njia isiyo ya moja kwa moja kufanya kazi ya Washington katika mkoa huo kuwa ngumu zaidi. Kuna pengo kubwa katika uwezo kati ya Marekani na washirika wake kwa upande mmoja na Jeshi la Ukombozi la Watu wa China (PLA) kwa upande mwingine. Marekani imepeleka ndege ya P-8 Poseidon, ndege ya ulinzi wa baharini ya hali ya juu zaidi duniani, na Australia, New Zealand, Japan na Korea Kusini zimepeleka ndege za P-3 Orion zenye vifaa vya radari na sensorer. Kwa kulinganisha, Wachina wametuma ndege mbili za usafirishaji na vioo kadhaa. P-3s walipoona vitu ambavyo walidhani vinaweza kuwa vya ndege iliyopotea, waliangusha boi za GPS ili kuwasilisha eneo hilo kwa meli za juu. Picha zilizochapishwa tarehe 29 Machi zilionyesha ndege za China zikitupa makombora, lakini ndege zao hazikuwa na vifaa vya hali ya juu zaidi kuliko rangi nyangavu. Wakati wafanyakazi wa meli ya Jinggang Shan, mojawapo ya meli kubwa zaidi za jeshi la wanamaji la China, walipogundua mojawapo ya vifaa hivyo, hawakuweza kujua ni ya nani au ilitoka wapi. Picha za ndege hiyo zilionyesha wafanyakazi wa P-8 wakiwa wamepiga makofi kwenye skrini za data, lakini video ya operesheni ya utafutaji iliyotolewa na kituo cha televisheni cha China ilionyesha wafanyakazi wa ndege wakipiga picha kutoka kwenye madirisha ya ndege kwa kutumia simu zao za mkononi na kisha kupanua picha kwenye kompyuta zao. Uzoefu wao katika shughuli za baharini ulifunuliwa na matangazo ya mara kwa mara mapema katika operesheni hiyo kwamba wafanyakazi wa China walikuwa wameona mabaki ya meli yakielea baharini, ambayo yaligunduliwa kuwa ni uongo. """Utafiti wa MH370 unaonyesha kuna tofauti kubwa kati ya tamaa na uwezo wa jeshi la wanamaji la China." "Gary Li, Mtafiti Mkuu wa IHS Maritime huko Beijing, aliniambia wakati nilikuwa nikifanya utafiti wa kitabu changu juu ya Bahari ya Kusini mwa China, ""Kila kipande kipya cha kit ambacho Navy inaongeza hufanya ionekane karibu kidogo na Navy ya kisasa.""" Lakini hiyo haimaanishi ni Navy ya kisasa. Kama China's kupelekwa imekuwa chini ya ufanisi katika maana ya vitendo, imekuwa na mafanikio zaidi kama mazoezi ya mahusiano ya umma. Waandishi wa habari nchini China wamekuwa wakitoa taarifa za mara kwa mara kuhusu kupelekwa kwa meli saba za jeshi la wanamaji na ulinzi wa pwani. Waandishi wa habari wa China walirudisha ripoti zenye kusisimua za vitendo vya ujasiri. Mnamo Machi 23, picha za msafara wa Xue Long zilipigwa na meli ya Xue Long, na kuonekana kwenye mawimbi ya bahari. Picha za aina hiyo zilitolewa na meli nyingine mnamo Machi 25. Lakini wakati walipokuwa wakipigwa filamu, hakuna mojawapo ya meli hizo iliyokuwa katika eneo la utafutaji. Xue Long ilifika eneo la ajali hiyo tarehe 26 Machi. Hata hivyo, jambo la kushangaza zaidi kuliko serikali ya China kuizidisha mafanikio yake mwenyewe, ni jinsi ajenda ya habari ya China imeingizwa katika vyombo vya habari vya magharibi. Picha za Xue Long's horizon-gazing isiyo na maana au ya wapiga mbizi kupata katika suti za maji wakati kwa kweli kuwa mbali sana kutoka eneo la ajali ziligawanywa na mashirika makuu ya habari ya kimataifa na kuingizwa katika ripoti na watangazaji duniani kote. Mkataba huo ulifungwa mwaka 2010 kati ya kituo cha televisheni cha China Central Television (CCTV) na mashirika mawili makuu ya habari ya televisheni ya China, Associated Press Television News (APTN) na Reuters Television. Tangu Januari 2011, CCTV imelipa mashirika hayo mawili kusambaza picha zake ulimwenguni kote. Karibu kila mtangazaji ana makubaliano na APTN na RTV na hupokea picha za CCTV pamoja na picha za shirika hilo. Picha za CCTV zimetambuliwa wazi kama hizo na mashirika yanaeleza wazi kuwa hayana jukumu la yaliyomo. Hata hivyo, kama ilivyo katika kesi ya MH370, wanaruhusu toleo la Beijing la matukio kufyonzwa katika mainstream. Wakati utafutaji unaendelea, maslahi ya vyombo vya habari vya kimataifa yatapungua. Kadiri ripoti za habari zinavyokuwa fupi, ufahamu utakuwa mdogo na zaidi ya pembejeo za majeshi tofauti zitakuwa sawa. P-8 Poseidon na Ilyushin 76 za China zilikuwa na jukumu tofauti katika kutafuta ndege ya MH370, lakini kwa macho ya watazamaji, zinaweza kuonekana sawa. Uwezo wa China unaoongezeka katika diplomasia ya umma unaanza kulipia upungufu wake katika uwezo wa kijeshi. Wakati picha ya ufikiaji wa kimkakati wa China inazidi kuwa na nguvu, ile ya uwezo halisi wa Amerika inazuiwa.