The right of jury nullification is considered by many to be the “last bastion” of liberty and a final check against government oppression. But does this apply to all cases? Does it allow juries to nullify constitutional law?
In “The Jury’s Constitutional Judgment,” University of Georgia School of Law assistant professor of law Nathan Champan argues there’s a case to be made, although it’s not as clear-cut as one might imagine. Although Chapman concludes that “the resulting constitutional construction is a middle ground between judicial supremacy and judicial abnegation that promises a more symbolically and substantively democratic constitutional law,” ultimately the de facto right of jury nullification remains clear due to the sheer impossibility of proving when it actually occurs, as well as the fact that the Constitution places no such limitations on a jury’s verdict.
“Despite the early American jury’s near-mythical role as a check on overreaching government agents, the contemporary jury’s role in constitutional adjudication remains opaque,” he writes. “The Constitution’s text, history, and structure strongly support the jury’s authority to apply constitutional law to the facts of a case and offer solid, though mixed, support for the longstanding doctrine against the jury’s right to nullify statutes on the basis of its own constitutional view.”
There was little room for doubt in colonial time he explains, citing Erving V. Cradock and a 1730 case involving New York publisher john Peter Zenger. Regarding the latter case, “as a matter of black-letter law, he was wrong. The jury acquitted.”
Beyond that era, Chapman looks to the Constitution itself for guidance, which he writes “says little about the allocation of authority between judge and jury, and even less about how a court should decide constitutional questions. Given the paucity of constitutional text on the issue, it is unsurprising that early American practice was diverse and contested.”
(Out of curiosity, I pursued the Virginia Ratifying Convention, considered to be one of the most important, for any discussion regarding jury nullification. Although the paramount value of a trial by jury was emphasized repeatedly, there was no explicit mention of jury nullification).
“What is equally clear from early criminal and civil cases is that virtually everyone took for granted the jury’s authority to apply constitutional law to the facts of a case,” Chapman writes further. “But just because the history supports the jury’s application of constitutional law to the facts of a case does not mean that the Constitution requires judges to defer to the jury’s constitutional judgment.” (bold emphasis added).
However, as James Madison explained in Federalist #45, the Constitution lists enumerated federal powers that are “few and defined.” If the right of a judge to overturn or reject a jury’s verdict due to nullification existed, it would have to have been explicitly state. Further, this would have no doubt been a source of controversy during constitutional conventions such as Virginia’s, when matters such as Congress’ power to levy taxes were hotly debated.
In some ways, Chapman seems to interpret it differently when it comes to the power of juries versus that of the judge (bold emphasis added):
There are important limits, however, to the jury’s role in constitutional adjudication. All of the reasons that weigh against the jury’s right to nullify apply with equal force to the jury’s right to apply constitutional law without judicial oversight. The jury is not entitled to construe the Constitution for itself. The jury must abide by the judge’s instruction on constitutional law, and courts should review the jury’s application of that law for reasonableness.
Put simply, courts should treat the jury’s constitutional judgment as they would any other jury judgment, with one caveat: when the application of a constitutional standard may be characterized as either a question of law, for the court, or a question of fact, for the jury, the court should choose the latter.”
In discussing the one exception, the Seventh Amendment’s Reexamination Clause, he writes that it “says nothing about the initial allocation of responsibility between judge and jury. Rather, it limits the authority of judges to reexamine facts a jury has already found. It does not tell a trial judge which kinds of questions to send to a jury in the first place.”
Yet, there is nothing in the Constitution that limits the power of juries or grants judges or anyone else the right overturn their verdicts.
Nevertheless, Chapman points out that at that time “there is little doubt that the criminal jury enjoyed almost universal authority to decide questions of law. But allocations of authority to the civil jury varied widely across time and jurisdiction; no matter what early Americans said about the jury’s role, judges increasingly deployed an array of procedural devices, such as directing a verdict or ordering a new trial, designed to curtail the jury’s independence.”
Citing the infamous 1895 Supreme Court decision in Sparf v. United States, Chapman argues that “there is one clear doctrine regarding the jury’s authority to construe the Constitution: the criminal jury must follow the judge’s legal instructions. The jury may not ‘nullify’ the statutory law on a case-by case basis…. the necessary implication is that the jury may not acquit because the jurors personally believe, contrary to the judge’s legal instruction, that the Constitution prohibits the law, prosecution, or conviction.”
Yet, this does not offer much proof that the Constitution itself prohibits jury nullification, as it was a Supreme Court offering an opinion on the Constitutional role of jurors over a century after the document was written.
Chapman acknowledges this, noting that “the doctrine against jury nullification is in tension with practice at the founding and well into the nineteenth century.” Further, “the Court has never clearly addressed the jury’s authority to apply constitutional law; rather, a handful of doctrines point in different directions.”
Although they may have had little opportunity to address the matter, the Court would also have zero evidence to prove any branch of the federal government, including the courts, have the right to override a jury verdict.
Chapman rightfully identifies the immense value of jury nullification in restricting an overreaching central government. “There is no question that the Framers understood that Congress could go beyond its authority; they frequently referred to such acts of a legislature as ‘usurpations.’ And there is no question that the Framers counted on ‘the People’ to correct such usurpations. Some early Americans likely would have counted the jury among the institutions with the authority to counteract legislative usurpations.”
What’s interesting is Chapman’s take on Supreme Court Justice John Jay’s instructions to the jury in the 1794 case Georgia v. Brailsford.
During the trial, Jay told the jurors the following (bold emphasis added):
It may not be amiss, here, gentlemen, to remind you of the good old rule, that on questions of fact, it is the province of the jury, on questions of law it is the province of the court to decide. But it must be observed that by the same law, which recognizes this reasonable distribution of jurisdiction, you have nevertheless a right to take upon yourselves to judge of both, and to determine the law as well as the fact controversy. On this, and on every other occasion, however, we have no doubt you will pay that respect which is due to the opinion of the court; for, as on the one hand, it is presumed that juries are the best judges of facts; it is, on the other hand, presumable that the courts are the best judges of law. But still, both objects are lawfully within your power of decision.
Referencing the case in footnotes, Chapman includes an excerpt from a book titled History of Common Law, in which the author claims that “Jay’s view was already somewhat anomalous [irregular] in 1794. The balance of power between judge and jury was undergoing a rapid shift. Within a decade or two, both state and federal courts were freely granting new trial for verdict against law.”
It’s an argument Chapman makes when discussing court trials following the Whiskey and Fries Rebellion, in which the presiding judge gave no such instruction to the jurors. With the latter, the judge likely “believed the jury had a duty to decide ‘the law and the facts, on their consideration of the whole case,’ but that the judge had a corresponding duty to steer the jury toward what he took to be the correct view of law.”
However, despite all opposition to the notion of jury nullification, Chapman observes that “its weight has been diminished by the jury’s power to nullify, and by persistent scholarly arguments for the jury’s right to do so.” (bold emphasis added).
It is worth noting that Justice Jay’s view on juries was also shared by Thomas Jefferson. In a 1789 letter to James Madison, he wrote the following (bold emphasis added):
In the form of juries therefore they determine all matters of fact, leaving to the permanent judges to decide the law resulting from those facts. But we all know, that permanent judges acquire an Esprit de corps, that being known they are liable to be tempted by bribery, that they are misled by favor, by relationship, by a spirit of party, by a devotion to the Executive or Legislative; that it is better to leave a cause to the decision of cross & pile, than to that of a judge biased to one side; and that the opinion of 12. honest jurymen gives still a better hope of right, than cross & pile does. It is left therefore to the juries, if they think the permanent judges are under any biass [sic] whatever in any cause, to take on themselves to judge the laws as well as the fact.
Though Jefferson was not at the 1787 Constitutional Convention, his opinion only provides added weight toward Jay’s regarding juries. Although there is opportunity for abuse of that right, it is also where the greatest trust could be placed within government.
Haki ya jury kufuta inachukuliwa na wengi kuwa "ngome ya mwisho" ya uhuru na ukaguzi wa mwisho dhidi ya ukandamizaji wa serikali. Lakini je, jambo hilo linatumika katika visa vyote? Je, inaruhusu baraza la mahakama kupuuza sheria ya kikatiba? Katika "Hukumu ya Katiba ya Jury", Profesa msaidizi wa sheria wa Chuo Kikuu cha Georgia cha Sheria Nathan Champan anasema kuna kesi ya kufanywa, ingawa sio wazi kama mtu anaweza kufikiria. Ingawa Chapman anafikia mkataa kwamba <unk> ujenzi wa kikatiba unaotokana na ni katikati kati ya utawala wa mahakama na kujinyima mahakama ambayo inaahidi sheria ya kikatiba ya kidemokrasia zaidi ya ishara na ya msingi, <unk> mwishowe haki ya kweli ya kufutwa kwa baraza la mahakama inabaki wazi kwa sababu ya kutowezekana kabisa kuthibitisha wakati inatokea kweli, na pia ukweli kwamba Katiba haeweki mipaka kama hiyo kwa uamuzi wa baraza la mahakama. "Licha ya jukumu la mapema la jury ya Marekani karibu na hadithi kama ukaguzi juu ya mawakala wa serikali kupita kiasi, jukumu la jury ya kisasa katika uamuzi wa kikatiba bado ni wazi", anaandika. "Nakala, historia, na muundo wa Katiba huunga mkono sana mamlaka ya baraza la mahakama ya kutumia sheria ya kikatiba kwa ukweli wa kesi na kutoa msaada thabiti, ingawa mchanganyiko, kwa mafundisho ya muda mrefu dhidi ya haki ya baraza la mahakama ya kufuta sheria kwa msingi wa maoni yake ya kikatiba. ""Kulikuwa na nafasi kidogo ya shaka katika wakati wa kikoloni, anaelezea, akitoa Erving V. Cradock na kesi ya 1730 inayohusisha mchapishaji wa New York John Peter Zenger." Kuhusu kesi ya mwisho, <unk>kama suala la sheria nyeusi-barua, alikuwa na makosa. "Kutokana na uamuzi huo, Chapman alitoa maoni yake ya kwanza kuhusu sheria ya msingi ya Marekani, ambayo alisema ""hayo yanaelezea kidogo kuhusu mgawanyo wa mamlaka kati ya hakimu na jury, na hata kidogo kuhusu jinsi mahakama inapaswa kuamua maswali ya kikatiba.""" Kwa kuzingatia upungufu wa maandishi ya kikatiba juu ya suala hilo, haishangazi kwamba mazoezi ya mapema ya Amerika yalikuwa tofauti na ya kupingwa. <unk> (Kwa udadisi, nilifuatilia Mkataba wa Kuridhia wa Virginia, unaochukuliwa kuwa moja ya muhimu zaidi, kwa majadiliano yoyote kuhusu kufuta jury. Ingawa thamani kuu ya kesi na jury ilikaziwa mara kwa mara, hakukuwa na kutajwa wazi ya jury annulment). "Kile ambacho ni wazi sawa kutoka kwa kesi za mapema za jinai na za kiraia ni kwamba karibu kila mtu alichukua mamlaka ya baraza la mahakama ya kutumia sheria ya kikatiba kwa ukweli wa kesi, "Chapman anaandika zaidi. "Lakini kwa sababu tu historia inasaidia matumizi ya baraza la mahakama ya sheria ya kikatiba kwa ukweli wa kesi haimaanishi kwamba Katiba inahitaji mahakimu kuahirisha uamuzi wa kikatiba wa baraza la mahakimu. " (mkazo wa ujasiri umeongezwa). "Hata hivyo, kama James Madison alivyoeleza katika Federalist # 45, Katiba inaorodhesha mamlaka ya shirikisho ambayo ni ""machache na iliyofafanuliwa"" - ikiwa haki ya hakimu ya kufuta au kukataa uamuzi wa baraza la mahakama kwa sababu ya kufutwa ilikuwepo, ingekuwa lazima iwe imewekwa wazi." Zaidi ya hayo, hii bila shaka ingekuwa chanzo cha utata wakati wa makusanyiko ya kikatiba kama vile Virginia, wakati masuala kama vile nguvu ya Bunge ya kulipa kodi yalipokuwa yakijadiliwa sana. Kwa njia fulani, Chapman inaonekana kuifasiri tofauti linapokuja nguvu ya jury dhidi ya ile ya hakimu (mkazo wa ujasiri umeongezwa): Hata hivyo, kuna mipaka muhimu kwa jukumu la jury katika uamuzi wa kikatiba. Sababu zote ambazo zinapingana na haki ya baraza la mahakama ya kufuta zinatumika kwa nguvu sawa kwa haki ya baraza la mahakama ya kutumia sheria ya kikatiba bila usimamizi wa mahakama. Juri haina haki ya kutafsiri Katiba kwa ajili yake mwenyewe. Mahakama lazima ifuate maagizo ya jaji kuhusu sheria ya kikatiba, na mahakama zinapaswa kukagua matumizi ya sheria hiyo na baraza la mahakama kwa sababu ya busara. "Kwa maneno mengine, mahakama zinapaswa kutibu uamuzi wa kikatiba wa baraza la mahakama kama vile wangefanya na uamuzi mwingine wowote wa baraza la mahakama, na caveat moja: wakati matumizi ya kiwango cha kikatiba inaweza kuwa sifa kama suala la sheria, kwa mahakama, au suala la ukweli, kwa baraza la mahakama, mahakama inapaswa kuchagua mwisho. ""Katika kujadili ubaguzi mmoja, kifungu cha uchunguzi wa marekebisho ya saba, anaandika kwamba ""haisemi chochote kuhusu mgawanyiko wa awali wa wajibu kati ya hakimu na baraza.""" Badala yake, inazuia mamlaka ya mahakimu ya kuchunguza tena mambo ambayo baraza la mahakimu limepata tayari. "Hakuna kitu katika Katiba kinachopunguza nguvu za baraza la mahakama au kutoa waamuzi au mtu mwingine haki ya kubadili hukumu zao. """ Hata hivyo, Chapman aonyesha kwamba wakati huo <unk>hakuna shaka kwamba baraza la mahakama ya uhalifu lilikuwa na mamlaka ya karibu ya ulimwengu wote kuamua masuala ya sheria. "Kutokana na uamuzi wa Mahakama Kuu ya Marekani mwaka 1895 katika kesi ya ""Sparrow v. Marekani,"" Chapman alisema kwamba ""kuna mafundisho moja ya wazi kuhusu mamlaka ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama.""" Jury haiwezi "kufuta" sheria ya kisheria kwa msingi wa kesi kwa kesi... "Hii inamaanisha kwamba jury inaweza kuwa na haki ya kutolewa na mahakama ya juu, kwa sababu mahakimu wanaamini, kinyume na maagizo ya kisheria ya hakimu, kwamba Katiba inakataza sheria, mashtaka, au hatia. ""Hata hivyo, hii haitoi ushahidi mwingi kwamba Katiba yenyewe inakataza kufuta mahakimu, kama ilivyokuwa Mahakama Kuu ikitoa maoni juu ya jukumu la katiba la mahakimu zaidi ya karne moja baada ya hati hiyo kuandikwa." "Chapman anasema: ""Kutokana na sheria ya jury, hakuna ushahidi wowote wa kuthibitisha kwamba tawi lolote la serikali ya shirikisho, ikiwa ni pamoja na mahakama, lina haki ya kupindua uamuzi wa jury.""" Chapman kwa haki anatambua thamani kubwa ya jury nullification katika kuzuia serikali kuu overreaching. "Hakuna shaka kwamba Framers walielewa kwamba Congress inaweza kwenda zaidi ya mamlaka yake; wao mara nyingi inajulikana kama vitendo kama vile ya bunge kama ""usurpations". "Na hakuna shaka kwamba Framers kuhesabiwa juu ya ""Watu"" kurekebisha usurpations kama hizo. "Watu wa kwanza wa Marekani waliamua kuamua kuwa mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama.""" "Wakati wa kesi hiyo, Jay aliwaambia mahakimu mambo yafuatayo: ""Hapa, Mheshimiwa, huenda ikawa haifai kukukumbusha sheria ya zamani, kwamba juu ya maswali ya ukweli, ni mamlaka ya mahakimu, juu ya maswali ya sheria ni mamlaka ya mahakama kuamua." Lakini ni lazima ieleweke kwamba kwa sheria hiyo hiyo, ambayo inatambua mgawanyiko huu wa busara wa mamlaka, bado una haki ya kuchukua juu yenu wenyewe kuamua juu ya yote mawili, na kuamua sheria na utata wa ukweli. "Hata hivyo, katika hili na katika kila tukio jingine, hatuna shaka kwamba utamuheshimu kwa heshima ambayo inapaswa kwa maoni ya mahakama, kwa sababu, kwa upande mmoja, inadhaniwa kwamba mahakama ni mahakimu bora wa ukweli, kwa upande mwingine, inadhaniwa kwamba mahakama ni mahakimu bora wa sheria. """ Lakini bado, vitu vyote viwili ni kisheria ndani ya nguvu yako ya uamuzi. "Katika maelezo ya chini, Chapman anaongeza sehemu ya kitabu kinachoitwa ""History of Common Law"" ambapo mwandishi anasema kwamba maoni ya Jay yalikuwa ya kawaida sana mwaka wa 1794." Usawaziko wa nguvu kati ya hakimu na baraza la mahakama ulikuwa ukibadilika haraka. Katika miaka kumi au miwili, mahakama za jimbo na za shirikisho zilikuwa zikitoa kwa uhuru kesi mpya kwa uamuzi dhidi ya sheria. <unk> Ni hoja Chapman hufanya wakati wa kujadili kesi za mahakama kufuatia Whiskey na Fries Rebellion, ambayo hakimu mwenyekiti hakutoa maagizo kama hayo kwa jurors. "Kwa sababu ya uamuzi wa mahakama, ""hukumu ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama ya mahakama.""" Ni muhimu kutambua kwamba maoni ya Jaji Jay juu ya majaji pia yalishirikiwa na Thomas Jefferson. "Katika barua yake kwa James Madison mwaka 1789 aliandika hivi: ""Kwa hiyo, katika namna ya baraza la mahakama, wao huamua mambo yote ya kweli, wakiacha kwa mahakimu wa kudumu kuamua sheria inayotokana na ukweli huo." Lakini sisi sote tunajua kwamba mahakimu wa kudumu wanapata roho ya mwili, kwamba wanajulikana kuwa na uwezekano wa kujaribiwa na rushwa, kwamba wao ni kupotoshwa na upendeleo, na uhusiano, na roho ya chama, na kujitolea kwa mtendaji au wa sheria, kwamba ni bora kuacha kesi kwa uamuzi wa msalaba na mti, kuliko kwa hiyo ya hakimu mwenye upendeleo kwa upande mmoja, na kwamba maoni ya 12 waaminifu jurymen bado hutoa matumaini bora ya haki kuliko msalaba na mti. Kwa hiyo, ni juu ya mahakama, ikiwa wanafikiri kwamba majaji wa kudumu wako chini ya upendeleo wowote, kwa sababu yoyote, kuchukua juu yao wenyewe kuhukumu sheria na ukweli. Ingawa Jefferson hakuwa katika Mkutano wa Katiba wa 1787, maoni yake hutoa uzito wa ziada kwa Jay kuhusu majaji. Ingawa kuna fursa ya kutumia vibaya haki hiyo, pia ni mahali ambapo imani kubwa inaweza kuwekwa ndani ya serikali.