William Hasker is a philosopher trained in theology and interested in problems of philosophy of mind. His theory of "Emergent Dualism" argues that the emergence of the mind from the brain provides a solution to the mind-body problem. He says:
While emergent dualism shares with (nonreductive) materialism the claim that ordinary matter contains within itself the potentiality for consciousness, it actually goes some way beyond materialism in the powers it attributes to matter. For standard materialism, the closure of the physical guarantees that consciousness does not "make a difference" to the way matter itself operates; all of the brain-processes are given a mechanistic explanation which would be just the same whether or not the processes were accompanied by conscious experience. Emergent dualism, on the other hand recognizes that a great many mental processes are irreducibly teleological, and cannot be explained by or supervenient upon brain processes that have a complete mechanistic explanation. So the power attributed to matter by emergent dualism amounts to this: when suitably configured, it generates a field of consciousness that is able to function teleologicaliy and to exercise libertarian free will, and the field of consciousness in turn modifies and directs the functioning of the physical brain. At this point, it must be admitted, the tension between the apparently mechanistic character of the physical basis of mind and the irreducibly teleological nature of the mind itself becomes pretty severe, and the siren song of Cartesian dualism once again echoes in our ears.
Free Will and AgencyHasker analyzes the problem of free will and concludes that determinism is very likely not the case. Indeed, determinism is an emergent property of large numbers of particles treated statistically.
Empirically speaking, there is not much of a case for determinism. The only direct empirical evidence for determinism is the existence of consistent, reliable, and accurate predictions of individual events.1 In some fields of science we do have such predictions to a remarkable degree, but in others they are conspicuously absent. To be sure, the failure of prediction in many areas of science can be explained in ways that are consistent with an underlying determinism. Perhaps the causal factors involved are simply too complex for our analysis - or (as chaos theory has shown) long-range outcomes may depend with incredible sensitivity on minute (and undetectable) differences in initial conditions. And the indeterminism of quantum mechanics, even if it is ultimate and not merely apparent, can in many contexts be ignored as making no difference to the behavior of macroscopic objects. So deterministic theories can be maintained in the absence of reliable, accurate, predictions — but why should they be maintained? Why not admit that determinism just does not apply to certain aspects of the world.Hasker criticizes Harry Frankfurt's attempt to deny the existence of alternative possibilities for action.
I will proceed, then, on the assumption that we do have free will in the libertarian sense, and that the principle of alternative possibilities is intact. Our concern in this section and the next will be with the other, perhaps even more difficult, part of the free will problem: the task of giving an illuminating positive characterization of the nature of the act of free choice. compatibilist's contention that chance and randomness are even more inimical to freedom and responsibility than is causal determination. As Hume explained (and his argument has been echoed ever since): "Actions are, by their very nature, temporary and perishing; and where they proceed not from some cause in the character and disposition of the person who performed them, they can neither redound to his honour, if good; nor infamy, if evil." The challenge for the libertarian is to explain how free actions are praiseworthy or blameworthy even though they lack a sufficient cause, whether in the agent's character or elsewhere.Hasker then discusses the For the libertarian will always have to confront the two-stage models of free will developed in the 1970's by Daniel Dennett and Robert Kane. He begins with Dennett:
In approaching this problem, we shall look for help to an unexpected source, namely Daniel Dennett's essay "On Giving Libertarians What They Say They Want." In this essay Dennett sketches out, though he does not fully endorse, a strategy for explaining libertarian free will. Following a suggestion from David Wiggins, he undertakes to show that an action might be "random" in the sense of causally undetermined, without being random in the sense of pointless or arbitrary.Note that this argument had been made by Karl Popper in 1977, who said "A choice process may be a selection process, and the selection may be from some repertoire of random events, without being random in its turn. This seems to me to offer a promising solution to one of our most vexing problems, and one by downward causation." The reason Dennett is an "unexpected source" is that Dennett is the very model of a compatibilist and determinist (with the exception that he does not deny moral responsibility, as do most determinists). Hasker is concerned that Dennett as a source of a libertarian free will model might motivate questions about its adequacy. He says:
Hasker then turns to Kane's 1984 work. Kane says he developed his two-stage model earlier than Dennett, but actually this is because both Dennett and Kane knew of some earlier models (besides Wiggins' suggestion, they include I am suggesting that libertarians should ask themselves, "With Dennett for our friend, why do we need enemies?" Dennett's contributions to the philosophy of mind are numerous and impressive, but few of his doctrines are such as to be welcomed enthusiastically by libertarians — indeed, he has become known as an outstanding contemporary advocate of compatibilism. Surely a proposal for understanding libertarianism which is acceptable (or nearly acceptable) to Dennett requires the most careful scrutiny? Henri Poincaré, Jacques Hadamard, Arthur Holly Compton, and Popper).
As we've noted, Dennett does not fully endorse this model, but he does feel it has impressive merits. Rather than linger over these, however, I wish to call attention to a striking fact: Dennett's model for free will coincides, in its most important features, with that proposed in one of the best and most insightful books of recent years advocating libertarian free will. I am referring to Robert Kane's Free Will and Values. In virtue of this similarity, I shall refer to their common doctrine as DK-libertarianism. One nontrivial difficulty for DK-libertarianism is that it requires one to postulate within the brain a process by which quantum-level indeterminacy is amplified to produce macroscopic effects. While this notion has seemed attractive to many, the general trend of brain science seems to be unfavorable to it, though the issue is not yet closed. So this assumption clearly represents a significant empirical burden for DK-libertarianism to carry. Quite apart from this, the theory is hardly without difficulties. Kane observes that some libertarians will find his theory inadequate because it does not permit "total rational control" for the free agent. It is clear enough what he has in mind. Consider a situation in which one comes to make a decision in which the reasons on both sides are about equally balanced, so that neither set of reasons necessitates a particular outcome. The decision actually made, in this case, is the product of chance — of the internal "randomizing device" about which we learned from Dennett. Is the outcome then merely the result of chance?Hasker is right that a subtle combination of causality and chance is what is needed in a plausible two-stage model of libertarian free will. The model depends on where indeterminism fits. Most No, because the range of possibilities available to one — the fact that these choices, and no others, are the "live options" in the situation — is itself a consequence of the reasons one has, and thus of the underlying values which are a stable part of one's personality. But why are these particular reasons, and values, part of the choice situation? One could, given sufficient knowledge, trace the causal history of those values and reasons in one's brain and nervous system. But somewhere back along the line, one comes upon another chance event — either the chance involved in the fact that these reasons, and not others, occurred to one, or the chance determination of some previous actions which led to those particular values becoming reinforced as a part of one's personality. And so on. When we complain about randomness, we are given (partial) causal determination by reasons. When we ask about the origin of the reasons, we are referred back to prior chance events, occurring of course within the context of reasons which were efficacious at that previous time. What we have, then, is an alternation of causal necessitation and chance; what we never get, is a person making a decision in what a libertarian will take to be the ordinary sense of those terms. I believe, in fact, that the strategy of DK-libertarianism at this point is basically a compatibilist strategy. The compatibilist recognizes that straightforward determination of actions by external causes negates freedom and responsibility. His answer to this is to display the causal chains as interwoven, in subtle and complex ways, with the inner life of the agent. Similarly, the DK-libertarian recognizes that straightforward determination either by sufficient causation or by chance is inimical to freedom and responsibility. And the response is similar: the causation and the randomness are shown as being interwoven in complex ways with the agent's inner life, with the chance events actually occurring within the agent's nervous system. I shall not debate at length the merits of these strategies. Rather, I shall content myself with pointing out that libertarians consistently reject such a strategy as followed by compatibilists, and if so they should reject it also when put forward by DK-libertarians. But what then? If free will can be explicated neither by causal necessitation, nor by chance, nor by any combination of the two however subtle, then how are we to explicate this crucial notion? two-stage_models of free will locate indeterminism in the early deliberative stage, in order to generate alternative possibilities that are not pre-determined. The reason that Dennett did not endorse his model is because he is a determinist. The other place that indeterminism might be involved is in the decision itself. This would make the decision random, except for Kane's defense of his "torn decisions." Kane's "torn decisions" are often between a moral choice and an expedient choice. These are the kinds of decisions that Aristotle thought of as character building and Kane calls "Self-Forming Actions" or SFAs. When this is a moral decision, Kane makes it the basis for his SFAs that provide "ultimate responsibility" (UR).
While Hasker regards the soul as an "emergent" substance, he says that it is dependent upon the body from which it emerges for its existence. And he is an advocate for "Open Theism." The omniscience of God does not extend to things in the future that have not yet happened.
William Hasker ni mwanafalsafa aliyezoezwa katika theolojia na anapendezwa na matatizo ya falsafa ya akili. Nadharia yake ya "Emergent Dualism" inadai kwamba kuibuka kwa akili kutoka ubongo hutoa suluhisho la tatizo la akili-mwili. "Kama dualism ya kuibuka inashirikiana na (non-reductive) materialism madai kwamba ""mambo ya kawaida ina ndani yake uwezo wa ufahamu,"" ni kweli huenda njia fulani zaidi ya materialism katika nguvu inatoa kwa mambo." Kwa materialism ya kawaida, kufungwa kwa dhamana za kimwili kwamba fahamu haifanyi tofauti kwa njia ambayo jambo lenyewe linafanya kazi; michakato yote ya ubongo hutolewa ufafanuzi wa mitambo ambayo itakuwa sawa tu ikiwa michakato hiyo ilifuatana na uzoefu wa ufahamu au la. Kwa upande mwingine, dualism ya kuibuka inatambua kwamba michakato mingi ya akili ni teleological irreducibly, na haiwezi kuelezwa na au supervenient juu ya michakato ya ubongo ambayo kuwa na maelezo kamili mechanistic. Kwa hiyo nguvu inayohusishwa na nyenzo na dualism inayoibuka ni hii: inapowekwa kwa usahihi, inazalisha uwanja wa ufahamu ambao una uwezo wa kufanya kazi teleologically na kutekeleza uhuru wa uhuru, na uwanja wa ufahamu kwa upande unabadilisha na kuelekeza utendaji wa ubongo wa kimwili. Katika hatua hii, ni lazima ikubaliwe, mvutano kati ya tabia ya mechanistic ya msingi wa kimwili wa akili na asili ya teleological ya akili yenyewe inakuwa kali sana, na wimbo wa siren wa Cartesian dualism mara nyingine tena echoes katika masikio yetu. Free Will and AgencyHasker inachambua tatizo la uhuru wa kuchagua na kuhitimisha kwamba determinism ni uwezekano mkubwa si kesi. Kwa kweli, determinism ni mali ya kuibuka ya idadi kubwa ya chembe kuchukuliwa takwimu. Kwa kusema kwa njia ya majaribio, hakuna sababu kubwa ya kuwa na itikadi. """Ushahidi wa moja kwa moja wa empirical kwa determinism ni kuwepo kwa uthabiti, kuaminika, na sahihi utabiri wa matukio ya mtu binafsi."" (13) Katika baadhi ya nyanja za sayansi tuna utabiri kama huo kwa kiwango cha ajabu, lakini katika nyingine wao ni wazi kutokuwepo." Kwa hakika, kushindwa kwa utabiri katika maeneo mengi ya sayansi kunaweza kuelezwa kwa njia zinazopatana na dhana ya msingi ya kuamua. Labda sababu zinazohusika ni ngumu sana kwa uchambuzi wetu - au (kama nadharia ya machafuko imeonyesha) matokeo ya muda mrefu yanaweza kutegemea kwa unyeti wa ajabu juu ya tofauti ndogo (na zisizoweza kugunduliwa) katika hali za awali. Na indeterminism ya quantum mechanics, hata kama ni mwisho na si tu dhahiri, inaweza katika muktadha wengi kupuuzwa kama kufanya hakuna tofauti kwa tabia ya vitu macroscopic. Hivyo nadharia deterministic inaweza kudumishwa katika kukosekana kwa kuaminika, sahihi, utabiri <unk> lakini kwa nini wanapaswa kudumishwa? "Hasker alishutumu jaribio la Frankfurter la kukataa kuwepo kwa uwezekano wa mbadala wa vitendo.""" "Nitaendelea, basi, kwa dhana kwamba tuna hiari katika maana ya uhuru, na kwamba kanuni ya uwezekano mbadala ni intact. """ Hatua hii na ile inayofuata itahusu sehemu nyingine, labda ngumu zaidi, ya tatizo la hiari: kazi ya kutoa sifa nzuri ya asili ya tendo la hiari. Kwa mujibu wa Compatibilists, uwezekano na randomness ni hata zaidi ya uadui kwa uhuru na wajibu kuliko ni sababu ya kuamua. "Hume alieleza kwamba, ""Hatua ni za muda tu na za kupotea, na zinapotokana na tabia na tabia ya mtu aliyezitenda, haziwezi kumletea heshima, ikiwa ni nzuri, wala aibu, ikiwa ni mbaya.""" "Hasker anaeleza kuwa ""mtu wa uhuru daima atahitaji kukabiliana na mifano ya hatua mbili ya uhuru wa kuchagua iliyoundwa na Daniel Dennett na Robert Kane katika miaka ya 1970.""" "Kama ilivyoelezwa hapo juu, ""Kwa kukabiliana na tatizo hili, tutaangalia msaada kutoka kwa chanzo kisichotarajiwa, yaani insha ya Daniel Dennett ""Kutoa Libertarians kile wanachosema wanataka.""" Katika insha hii Dennett anaelezea, ingawa haikubali kikamilifu, mkakati wa kuelezea hiari ya uhuru. "Kulingana na maoni ya David Wiggins, ""Hatua inaweza kuwa ya bahati mbaya katika maana ya sababu isiyo na uhakika, bila kuwa ya bahati mbaya katika maana ya kutokuwa na maana au arbitrary."" - Karl Popper, Mtaalamu wa Utafiti wa Utafiti wa Utafiti wa Utafiti wa Utafiti wa Utafiti wa Utafiti wa Utafiti wa Utafiti wa Utafiti wa Utafiti wa Utafiti wa Utafiti wa Utafiti wa Utafiti wa Utafiti wa Utafiti wa Utafiti." Hii inaonekana kwangu kutoa suluhisho la kuahidi kwa moja ya matatizo yetu ya kusumbua zaidi, na moja kwa sababu ya chini. " "Kama vile Dennett alivyosema, ""Mwanadamu ni mfano wa mtu anayeamini katika muundo wa mambo na ambaye anaamini katika muundo wa mambo, lakini yeye hakukataa kuwa na wajibu wa kiadili kama wanavyofanya watu wengi.""" Hasker ana wasiwasi kwamba Dennett kama chanzo cha mtindo wa uhuru wa uhuru wa uhuru wa uhuru wa uhuru wa uhuru wa uhuru wa uhuru wa uhuru wa uhuru wa uhuru wa uhuru wa uhuru wa uhuru wa uhuru wa uhuru wa uhuru wa uhuru wa uhuru wa uhuru wa uhuru wa uhuru wa uhuru wa uhuru wa uhuru wa uhuru wa uhuru wa uhuru wa uhuru wa uhuru wa uhuru wa uhuru wa uhuru wa uhuru wa uhuru wa uhuru wa uhuru. "Hasker alitoa taarifa hiyo baada ya kuwasiliana na Kane, ambaye aliandika kitabu chake cha ""1984.""" "Kane anasema kwamba yeye aliendeleza mfano wake wa hatua mbili kabla ya Dennett, lakini kwa kweli hii ni kwa sababu wote Dennett na Kane walijua baadhi ya mifano ya awali (zaidi ya Wiggins 'pendekezo, wao ni pamoja na mimi kupendekeza kwamba libertarians wanapaswa kuuliza wenyewe, ""Na Dennett kwa rafiki yetu, kwa nini tunahitaji maadui?""" Mchango wa Dennett katika falsafa ya akili ni mwingi na wa kuvutia, lakini ni wachache wa mafundisho yake ambayo yanakaribishwa kwa shauku na libertarians - kwa kweli, amejulikana kama mtetezi bora wa kisasa wa compatibilism. Bila shaka pendekezo la kuelewa libertarianism ambayo ni kukubalika (au karibu kukubalika) kwa Dennett inahitaji uchunguzi wa uangalifu zaidi? Henri Poincaré, Jacques Hadamard, Arthur Holly Compton, na Popper). Kama tulivyoona, Dennett haipendezi kabisa na mtindo huu, lakini anahisi una sifa nzuri. Badala ya kukaa juu ya haya, hata hivyo, ningependa kuelekeza uangalifu kwenye ukweli wa kushangaza: mfano wa Dennett wa hiari ya hiari unalingana, katika sifa zake muhimu zaidi, na ile iliyopendekezwa katika moja ya vitabu bora na vya ufahamu zaidi vya miaka ya hivi karibuni, ikiunga mkono hiari ya uhuru. "Kama ilivyoelezwa katika kitabu cha Robert Kane ""Free Will and Values.""" Kwa sababu ya kufanana hii, nitarejelea fundisho lao la kawaida kama DK-libertarianism. Tatizo moja la msingi kwa DK-libertarianism ni kwamba inahitaji mtu kuhitimisha ndani ya ubongo mchakato ambao kiwango cha quantum indeterminacy ni amplified kuzalisha athari macroscopic. Ingawa wazo hili linaonekana kuwa lenye kuvutia kwa wengi, mwelekeo wa jumla wa sayansi ya ubongo unaonekana kuwa usiofaa kwa hilo, ingawa suala hilo bado halijafungwa. Kwa hiyo dhana hii ni wazi inawakilisha mzigo mkubwa wa kihistoria kwa DK-libertarianism kubeba. Mbali na hayo, nadharia hiyo haina matatizo yoyote. Kane anaona kwamba baadhi ya wanaharakati wa uhuru watapata nadharia yake kuwa haitoshi kwa sababu hairuhusu "udhibiti kamili wa busara" kwa wakala huru. Ni wazi kabisa kile anachokifikiria. Fikiria hali ambapo mtu anakuja kufanya uamuzi ambapo sababu za pande zote mbili ni kuhusu sawa usawa, hivyo kwamba hakuna seti ya sababu inahitaji matokeo maalum. Uamuzi kweli kufanywa, katika kesi hii, ni bidhaa ya bahati <unk> ya ndani "randomizing kifaa" kuhusu ambayo tulijifunza kutoka Dennett. "Hasker ana haki kwamba mchanganyiko wa subtle wa causality na bahati ni nini inahitajika katika mfano wa hatua mbili ya ""haki ya uhuru.""" Mfano inategemea ambapo indeterminism inafaa. "Hapana, kwa sababu mbalimbali ya uwezekano inapatikana kwa mtu - ukweli kwamba uchaguzi huu, na hakuna wengine, ni ""chaguzi kuishi"" katika hali - ni yenyewe matokeo ya sababu mtu ana, na hivyo ya maadili ya msingi ambayo ni sehemu thabiti ya utu wake. """ Lakini kwa nini sababu hizi maalum, na maadili, ni sehemu ya hali ya uchaguzi? Mtu angeweza, akipewa maarifa ya kutosha, kufuatilia historia ya kisababishi cha maadili na sababu hizo katika ubongo na mfumo wa neva wa mtu. Lakini mahali fulani nyuma kwenye mstari, mtu huja juu ya tukio jingine la bahati - ama bahati inayohusika katika ukweli kwamba sababu hizi, na sio nyingine, zilitokea kwa mtu, au uamuzi wa bahati ya baadhi ya vitendo vya awali ambavyo viliongoza kwa maadili hayo maalum kuwa imara kama sehemu ya utu wa mtu. Na kadhalika. Tunapolalamika juu ya nasibu, tunapewa (sehemu) sababu ya kuamua kwa sababu. Tunapouliza juu ya asili ya sababu, tunarejelea matukio ya bahati ya awali, ambayo hutokea, bila shaka, ndani ya muktadha wa sababu ambazo zilikuwa na ufanisi wakati huo wa awali. Kile tunacho, basi, ni kubadilishana kwa uhitaji wa kisababishi na bahati; kile ambacho hatuwezi kupata, ni mtu anayefanya uamuzi katika kile libertarian atachukua kuwa maana ya kawaida ya maneno hayo. Kwa kweli, ninaamini kuwa mkakati wa DK-libertarianism katika hatua hii ni kimsingi mkakati wa kuendana. Compatibilist anatambua kwamba kuamua moja kwa moja ya vitendo na sababu za nje negates uhuru na wajibu. Jibu lake kwa hili ni kuonyesha minyororo ya sababu kama interwoven, katika njia subtle na tata, na maisha ya ndani ya wakala. Vivyo hivyo, DK-libertarian anatambua kwamba uamuzi wa moja kwa moja ama kwa sababu ya kutosha au kwa bahati ni kinyume na uhuru na wajibu. "Kama matokeo, ""usababishi na bahati mbaya"" huonyeshwa kuwa zimeunganishwa kwa njia ngumu na maisha ya ndani ya wakala, na matukio ya bahati ambayo hutokea ndani ya mfumo wa neva wa wakala." Mimi si kujadili kwa muda mrefu sifa ya mikakati hii. Badala yake, nitakubali kuwa na uhakika kwamba libertarians daima kukataa mkakati kama huo kama ikifuatiwa na compatibilists, na kama hivyo wanapaswa kukataa pia wakati iliyotolewa na DK-libertarians. Lakini baadaye ingeendeleaje? Ikiwa uhuru wa kuchagua hauwezi kuelezwa kwa sababu ya uhitaji, wala kwa bahati, wala kwa mchanganyiko wowote wa hizo mbili, hata kama ni ndogo, basi tunawezaje kuelezwa kwa wazo hili muhimu? mbili-hatua_mifano ya hiari kupata indeterminism katika hatua ya mapema ya kujadili, ili kuzalisha uwezekano mbadala kwamba si kabla ya kuamua. Sababu kwamba Dennett hakukubali mfano wake ni kwa sababu yeye ni determinist. Mahali pengine ambapo indeterminism inaweza kuhusika ni katika uamuzi yenyewe. Hii ingefanya uamuzi huo uwe wa nasibu, isipokuwa kwa utetezi wa Kane wa "maamuzi yake yaliyovunjika". Mara nyingi "maamuzi ya Kane yenye kuvunjika" ni kati ya uchaguzi wa kiadili na uchaguzi unaofaa. "Kama vile Aristotle alivyosema, ""kujenga tabia"" ni ""kujijenga mwenyewe"" au ""kujijenga mwenyewe.""" "Kama ni suala la maadili, Kane hufanya msingi wa SFA yake ambayo hutoa ""wajibikaji wa mwisho.""" Ingawa Hasker huona nafsi kuwa kitu "kilichotokea", yeye husema kwamba inategemea mwili ambao hutoka kwa ajili ya kuwepo kwake. Na yeye ni mtetezi wa "Open Theism". Ujuzi wa Mungu haujumuishi mambo ya wakati ujao ambayo bado hayajatokea.