A decade has passed since negotiations first began on the “US-India Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Agreement,” an accord that, when it was finally signed, gave India a waiver from the rules of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. In a nutshell, the act ended a 34-year ban on nuclear trade with India. Popularly known as the “US-India Nuclear Deal,” it was a watershed moment in the history of US-India relations, marking a transition from a lukewarm and sometimes downright adversarial engagement during the Cold War to the warm glow of, if not quite a strategic partnership, then more of a joint venture.
It meant that India—a state known to possess nuclear weapons—was allowed to buy and sell nuclear fuel and technology with the rest of the world for civilian purposes, without having to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or dismantle any of its existing nuclear weapons or its nuclear weapons-making program. In other words, India got all the benefits of being an NPT member without any of the drawbacks.
US diplomats agreed to this because there was the presumption that the act would be a way to nudge India towards putting its civilian nuclear facilities—and hopefully, eventually, its military ones—under permanent International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and inspections agreements, bringing it closer to the NPT regime. But there were many other reasons for the signing of the deal, which had nothing to do with containing the spread of nuclear weapons.
Has anything changed? Who benefited from the deal, and who lost? And what are the prospects for the future?
In my opinion, the deal has mostly achieved its real, yet unstated, goals: vastly improving US-India trade and defense cooperation, gradually opening up the Indian economy, and nudging Indian foreign policy to a closer alignment with the United States. It gave India open access to nuclear trade with the United States and other nations, and de facto recognition as a state with nuclear weapons. Yet while improved US-India relations are good for the two nations involved and for global peace and stability, the accord has contributed to aggravated tensions between India and Pakistan and a nuclear arms race between the two neighbors. By perpetuating the practice of nuclear double-standards, the agreement did long-lasting damage toward both the global non-proliferation norms and the efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons.
So, was the agreement a success? It depends. In a sense, the deal was not completely unsuccessful, as often thought. The nuclear trade with India has not grown, as was feared. But the unspoken goals regarding the direction of India’s economy and its being a team player were largely achieved. Consequently, what we have is more of a mixed bag.
A little background. “At one time, US policy toward India focused nearly entirely on nuclear weapons concerns, with Washington and New Delhi on opposite sides of the issue. The civil nuclear agreement changed that…” a recent report of the Council of Foreign Relations concludes. The report goes on to say: “India is now an active strategic partner for the United States in global nonproliferation, and India is now ‘inside’ the global nonproliferation tent.” These were precisely the goals articulated by the Bush administration and adopted later whole-heartedly by the Obama administration.
But the report neglects another interpretation: The US-India deal actually undermined the global non-proliferation regime and hurt progress toward the total elimination of nuclear weapons, so eloquently articulated by President Obama on a beautiful morning in Prague.
The fact that this viewpoint was ignored is not a surprise. Contrary to the rationale that was put forward for selling the deal—that it was urgently needed to satisfy India’s growing demand for electricity—I would argue that the accord was principally about two things: first, capturing the potentially huge Indian market, and second, making India a strategic partner in US efforts to counter a rising China.
The business interests came first. It was largely the business lobby that helped clinch the deal, as I argued in a 2006 article. Another author argued similarly in a 2009 Bulletin article, a year after the US Congress ratified it. A small coalition of arms control and disarmament activists led by the Council for a Livable World and the Arms Control Association made a valiant effort to stop the deal or, failing that, include tougher conditions on India. They were no match for the business lobbies. (Full disclosure: I acted as an advisor to the coalition.)
The deal sailed through Congress, and the IAEA) and the Nuclear Suppliers Group also acquiesced, after much arm-twisting by the United States.
From nuclear pariah to strategic partner. India conducted a so-called peaceful nuclear explosion in 1974, following which the United States grew concerned about India’s not-so-secret nuclear weapons program. Sanctions were imposed on India under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978. India was further isolated after the Nuclear Suppliers Group prohibited nuclear trade with India by other nations. It served US foreign policy interests during the Cold War to isolate India because it often sided with the Soviet Union in global affairs, despite India’s leading role in the Non-Aligned Movement.
More importantly, India had a tightly controlled economy, which did not allow large-scale penetration of the Indian market by foreign capital. This changed dramatically after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Almost immediately afterward, India suffered a huge crisis with its foreign currency reserves. To stave off financial disaster, India had to ship its gold reserves to the Bank of England as collateral, so that it could continue to receive funds from international lending institutions.
Under pressure from the United States and other Western powers, India started liberalizing its economy almost immediately, a process that picked up steam with successive business-friendly governments led by the Congress Party and its rival, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which is in power now. The nuclear-related sanctions stood in the way of free trade and better relations. Efforts to remedy the situation went into a high gear during the Clinton years. However, they hit two major roadblocks, first in 1996, when India refused to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and second, in 1998 after India tested its nuclear weapons (quickly followed by Pakistan’s own tests).
As new sanctions were imposed on both countries, the relationship with India chilled for a bit, but this situation did not last. On-going shuttle diplomacy between Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and India’s then-Foreign Minister, Jaswant Singh from the BJP, continued despite the brouhaha. The new sanctions were lifted and we were off to the races. The Bush administration picked up the mantle after taking office in 2001, by which time the government in India had also changed, from the one headed by the BJP to the Congress Party led by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. Negotiations conducted in total secrecy led to the signing of the agreement on July 18, 2005 by President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Singh during the latter’s visit to Washington. It caught nearly everyone by surprise, including members of Congress. Only a handful of officials in both governments were in the know.
Officially called the US-India Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, it quickly shed its formal title, which was a mouthful, and came to be known simply as the “nuclear deal.” And it was sometimes put humorously as “126 for 123,” a phrase which captured the essence of what was indeed a deal, in which one gives something to get something else in return. 126 is the number of fighter aircraft India planned to purchase and 123 referred to the section in the US Atomic Energy Act that needed to be revised by Congress to permit nuclear trade with India. So, in essence, the deal was “You buy 126 of our expensive jet fighters, and we eliminate that troublesome section 123 that prevents trade with India.”
The deal was a de facto admission of India into the “nuclear club” without signing the NPT. Although its status as a country having nuclear weapons remained unclear, India would soon be accorded most, if not all, of the privileges enjoyed by the five countries crowned by the treaty as “nuclear weapon states.”
Under the deal, India could keep its weapons program under wraps and expand it as it wished. All sanctions on India would be lifted. India could now import nuclear reactors and related technology, and material including fissile material like uranium from international suppliers. In return, India would separate its civilian nuclear facilities from those it considered to be a part of its strategic program, and open up the civilian facilities to inspections by the IAEA. Most important, while unstated, was the understanding that India would continue to open up its economy and be helpful to US foreign policy interests.
A milestone is a good time to take stock. The 10th anniversary of the signing of the US-India deal seems an appropriate moment to take stock. In contrast to the newspaper headlines the deal generated at the time, there was nary a whimper this time around. The nuclear part of the nuclear deal had fallen so far out of the limelight that the high-level US-India Energy Dialog held on September 22, 2015 in Washington, D.C.—between the US energy secretary Ernest Moniz and his Indian counterpart, Piyush Goyal—was not even included on the official agenda. Yet, the real goals of the deal have largely been met from both US and Indian perspectives.
From the US point of view, US-India trade has flourished, and defense cooperation between the countries has improved dramatically. According to the US Census Bureau, trade in goods between the United States and India grew from $32 billion in 2006 to about $67 billion in 2014—a growth of more than 100 percent since the deal was signed. In addition, India had taken steps to open its economy to allow foreign investment and privatize previously state-owned enterprises; US exports to India grew by a whopping 339 percent between 2003 and 2012, according to the Office of the US Trade Representative. India had also reduced government red tape in an attempt to make it easier for foreign corporations to do business in India; foreign direct investment in India by US firms stood at $28.4 billion in 2012, an increase of greater than 15 percent in just one year.
While India has not supported US foreign policy 100 percent, it has largely cooperated in isolating Iran and improving its relationship with Israel, two high-priority items for the United States. India is also giving tacit support to the United State’s pivot toward Asia. Although India did join the newly established China-sponsored Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, which is perceived as a rival of the Washington-led World Bank, there is talk of India being made a part of the US-led Trans Pacific Partnership, which conspicuously excludes China. Under US tutelage, India recently signed a strategic partnership with Japan, thereby bolstering Japan’s aggressive stand in regard to China. India has also entered into a nuclear cooperation agreement with that country.
So, from the point of view of the two sub rosa parts of the agreement, the deal has been a success: Indian markets opened up to US firms, and India (largely) became a willing partner in US efforts to counter a rising China.
But there continued to be pesky questions related to India’s nuclear program. Chief among them is accountability.
The law that stalled the “nuclear” in the nuclear deal. The question is simple, but profoundly important: Who will pay if there is a nuclear accident?
It stalled the implementation of the deal because the United States was not comfortable with India’s 2010 liability law, known as the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act (CLNDA). The Parliament had passed it hurriedly because one of the conditions of the nuclear deal was that India needed to pass legislation that would spell out who would shoulder the liability in the event of an accident.
The origins of this law can be traced back to the legacy of the 1984 chemical plant accident in Bhopal, which killed hundreds of people and affected thousands more who never received adequate compensation from Union Carbide, the large US corporation that owned the plant. The incident remains fresh in the psyche of both countries, which have different perspectives.
Consequently, nuclear suppliers wanted any liability to be ultimately borne by the plant’s Indian operator, not its future US suppliers. The CLNDA did lessen their exposure; however, it did not completely leave the suppliers off the hook in the event of an accident. US suppliers were not comfortable with it because of their own memories of the Bhopal tragedy, which resulted in criminal charges in the Indian courts and an arrest warrant brought against Warren Anderson, then-chairman of Union Carbide and an American.
Prime Minister Singh’s government depended for its political survival on a coalition called the United Progressive Alliance (UPA), which consisted of small center-left parties, including Communists. The coalition became very shaky after the Communists withdrew their support because of disagreements over the deal’s terms. The government by then had become too weak to push through revisions to the CLAND, even if it wanted. Consequently, the implementation of the deal stalled for a number of years.
In the general election held in May 2014, the Hindu Nationalist BJP swept into power in a landslide victory. Its controversial leader, Narendra Modi, became the new prime minister, and he put improving relations with the United States at the top of his agenda. He also had a personal agenda to rehabilitate himself in US eyes. Once a pariah, he was denied for a number of years an entry visa to the United States because of his party’s role in the massacre of Muslim civilians in 2002 in in India’s Gujarat state, where Modi was then chief minister.
But as the saying goes, in diplomacy, there are no permanent friends or enemies, only permanent interests. So, all was forgotten quickly. Within a few months, President Obama and Prime Minister Modi held their first summit in Washington in September 2014. The two reportedly became close personal “friends.”
Addressing the issue of the stalled deal as a high priority, the two leaders announced the formation of a “contact group” to tackle, among other things, the nuclear liability issue. In their second summit a year later, they declared that a solution had been found through the creation of a state-backed insurance pool to cover supplier liability of up to $244 million. According to media reports, the Indian government would cover additional costs of up to $300 million through a special drawing rights account from the International Monetary Fund.
India also agreed to join the UN Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, which will soon enter into force. It had been a longstanding US demand. On the other hand, the United States gave up its demand that India allow US agencies to track all the fissile material supplied by the United States. The breaking of the liability impasse was announced during President Obama’s landmark three-day visit to India in January of 2015.
The 2009 nuclear deal had not produced a single new reactor sale to India by US companies. From the US point of view, this was a definite setback; France’s Areva and the Russian reactor supplier had signed contracts to build nuclear power plants in India. But now both sides are optimistic that American firms will be able to compete to build new Indian reactors.
The deal has done precious little to light India’s homes. According to its Department of Atomic Energy, India has a signed a preliminary contract with the Westinghouse Electric Company for a technical feasibility study for AP-1000 reactors for the proposed Mithivirdi Site in Bhavnagar, Gujarat—which, while promising, is a long way from building a power plant. Yet, even after resolution of the liability question, it won’t be easy for US suppliers to gain contracts in India, because of stiff price competition, especially from Russia, but also from India’s indigenous suppliers.
Russia has a leg up because it has already built the Kudankulam plant in Tamil Nadu in southern India. Of the two 1,000 megawatt reactors in the plant, Unit 1 is currently operational and Unit 2 is described as “under commissioning,” which means it is undergoing power tests before going online. Russia is under contract to install two more units there, which will bring up the total to 4,000 megawatts.
The bottom line, however, is that the growth in nuclear power has so far failed to match the projections that India set at the outset: 20 gigawatts by 2020. In the last 10 years, it has barely grown, from 3.3 gigawatts to the present 4.8, doing little to solve India’s growing demand for electricity.
Yet from the Indian point of view, India has benefited significantly from the US-India nuclear deal in the time since the deal was signed. India has come out of nuclear pariah status, US sanctions have been lifted, and India obtained an exemption from the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Since then, India has signed nuclear cooperation agreements with Canada, France, the UK, South Korea, and Japan, and secured uranium supplies from Canada and Australia. And with the removal of the nuclear-related sanctions, India was no longer prohibited from importing many dual-use high-technology components and systems—a prohibition that had previously constrained its space and defense programs, as well as its ability to manufacture electronic components and systems.
But what about the US perspective?
A bigger non-proliferation tent, but a smaller disarmament camp. The United States faced a conundrum a decade ago. Which was more important to the US national security interest: non-proliferation, or a strategic partnership with India? It seems that the answer was the latter. Yes, there was some congressional opposition, but it vanished quickly. And who can really argue against it, with all the benefits that accrue from a partnership between the two countries? One is the only true superpower in the world, and the other is an emerging tiger with a population that will surpass China’s in the next two decades.
But what was the price paid for the partnership?
First, the US-India partnership has done serious damage to the NPT, perpetuating double standards in regard to nuclear power and further weakening the possibility of universalizing the treaty. With India now an accepted member of the nuclear club, there is no chance of India giving up its weapons—and so it will not be able to join the NPT with its existing formulation.
The same goes for Pakistan. It has indeed lobbied for a similar deal and recent press reports indicated that the United States offered perhaps a lighter version of the India deal to Pakistan.
Israel has also indirectly hinted at dropping its so-called “nuclear ambiguity” and entering into a similar arrangement. There is little or no chance for a favorable response from the United States on this issue, given that the NPT member countries have demanded that the United States not block a serious discussion on a Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone in the Middle East that would include Israel and Iran.
But the Pakistan nuclear situation remains unsettled, and a challenge to the nonproliferation regime.
During a White House meeting with Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in the fall of 2015, President Obama reportedly turned down Sharif’s request for the same deal as India. Instead, the United States apparently offered to ease the Nuclear Suppliers Group restrictions on Pakistan by giving it a waiver, so that Pakistan could import nuclear technology and perhaps reactors for its desperate power sector. In the meantime, Pakistan is reportedly building up its nuclear arsenal, including smaller tactical weapons that can be used in the battlefield. Yet, just focusing on Pakistan’s non-proliferation past is short-sighted for US-Pakistan relations and also for peace in South Asia.
To make matters worse, as a part of the recent “breakthrough” regarding the nuclear liability issue discussed earlier, the United States has promised to make India a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which would surely irritate Pakistan. China will likely ask that in exchange for India’s membership, Pakistan be admitted, too. Because the Nuclear Suppliers Group works by consensus, China has leverage because it can withhold its consent for admitting India. Media reports indicate that the United States will also facilitate India’s membership into other non-proliferation regimes as well, such as the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Wassenaar Arrangement—a regime for regulating conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies. Because they allow India to obtain benefits previously withheld from nuclear weapons states that are not NPT members, such actions create bad precedents and a slippery slope that could lead other countries to develop nuclear weapons.
Clearly, the US-India nuclear partnership has complicated the nuclear standoff in South Asia.
Although the uranium India secures from the world market is under IAEA monitoring, India’s smaller reserve of its own uranium is not, and therefore is available to be used for its weapons program. Various estimates by mostly US-based analysts put India’s nuclear arsenal at between 110 and 120 bombs. And in competition with India, Pakistan continues to expand a nuclear weapons stockpile of an estimated 110 to 130 warheads. (One must, however, take these numbers with a grain of salt; no independent verification is possible.)
One may argue that there has been a positive nonproliferation development since the US-India agreement was signed; India has signed an additional protocol to the India-specific agreement with the IAEA for the application of safeguards to Indian civilian nuclear facilities. It entered into force on July 25, 2014.
An additional protocol for India’s civilian nuclear program is indeed a good thing, but India’s military nuclear effort is not subject to it. And leaving Pakistan entirely outside the nonproliferation tent is not a good thing, at all. As the US-India partnership deepens, is Pakistan now further outside that tent? If so, do the benefits of the deal for India justify the world continuing to consider Pakistan a nuclear pariah, compared to a “responsible” India?
While one more country has been brought at least partly under the non-proliferation tent, the tent itself is fraying. The grand bargain contained in the NPT—nuclear weapons countries would disarm, in exchange for other countries agreeing not to acquire nuclear weapons—has been treated as an afterthought. Even President Obama’s inspiring Prague speech contained such gems as “not in my lifetime.” In fact, India’s admission to the non-proliferation tent has effectively removed one of the historically powerful advocates for disarmament from the disarmament camp. Having complained against “nuclear apartheid” and double-standards of the nuclear powers for decades, India is now happy being a beneficiary of the mother of all double standards.
That any discussion of nuclear disarmament has been completely absent in the discourse associated with the US-India deal is indicative of a larger problem. The situation in South Asia—and around the globe as evidenced by the recent events in the Korean peninsula—is not sustainable. The deal has clearly aggravated nuclear tensions between India and Pakistan. While India has boasted of its cruise missile capability and nuclear triad, Pakistan has reportedly developed battlefield nuclear weapons. The proliferation of nuclear weapons will be a constant threat, if disarmament continues to be put off indefinitely.
As a final comment, it is worth noting that most analysts avoid the central point of the India-Pakistan dispute. It is not about nuclear weapons, but about the region known as Kashmir. India does not want any outside mediation to end the conflict, but bilateral talks between the two countries have sputtered for six decades. An arms race in South Asia, both conventional and nuclear, is fueled partially by this long-lasting conflict, nuclear deal or not. But the US-India nuclear partnership has made the conflict harder to resolve, and even more dangerous.
The author would like to thank his colleague Marvin Miller at MIT, who read the first draft and made very helpful suggestions and additions.
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Mkataba wa ushirikiano wa nyuklia ya kiraia kati ya Marekani na India, ambao ulisainiwa mwaka jana, ulitoa India msamaha kutoka kwa sheria za kundi la wauzaji wa nyuklia. Sheria hiyo ilimaliza miaka 34 ya marufuku ya biashara ya nyuklia na India. Mkataba wa nyuklia wa Marekani na India (US-India Nuclear Deal) ni mkataba wa kihistoria wa Marekani na India, ambao ulifanyika wakati wa Vita Baridi na kuashiria mabadiliko ya uhusiano wa kati kati ya nchi hizo, na kugeuka kuwa ushirikiano wa kimkakati. India, ambayo ni nchi inayomiliki silaha za nyuklia, iliruhusiwa kununua na kuuza mafuta ya nyuklia na teknolojia na nchi nyingine za dunia kwa madhumuni ya kiraia bila ya kujiunga na Mkataba wa Kuzuia Kuenea kwa Silaha za Nyuklia au kuondoa silaha zake za nyuklia. Kwa maneno mengine, India ilipata faida zote za kuwa mwanachama wa NPT bila kasoro yoyote. """Wadiplomasia wa Marekani walikubaliana na hili kwa sababu kulikuwa na dhana kwamba kitendo hicho kitakuwa njia ya kuhimiza India kuelekea kuweka vifaa vyake vya nyuklia vya kiraia - na hatimaye, matumaini, vya kijeshi - chini ya makubaliano ya kudumu ya usalama na ukaguzi wa Shirika la Kimataifa la Nishati ya Atomiki (IAEA) - na kuileta karibu na mfumo wa NPT." Lakini kulikuwa na sababu nyingine nyingi za kusaini mkataba huo, ambazo hazikuwa na uhusiano wowote na kuzuia kuenea kwa silaha za nyuklia. Je, kuna badiliko lolote? Ni nani aliyefaidika na mapatano hayo, na ni nani aliyeharibika? Na kuna matarajio gani ya wakati ujao? "Kwa maoni yangu, mpango huo umefikia malengo yake halisi, lakini yasiyoelezwa: kuboresha sana biashara ya Marekani na India na ushirikiano wa ulinzi, hatua kwa hatua kufungua uchumi wa India, na kusukuma sera ya kigeni ya India kwa usawa wa karibu na Marekani. """ Mkataba huo ulitoa fursa kwa India ya kufanya biashara ya nyuklia na Marekani na mataifa mengine, na kuitambua kuwa nchi yenye silaha za nyuklia. Hata hivyo, wakati mahusiano bora ya Marekani na India ni mazuri kwa mataifa mawili yanayohusika na kwa amani na utulivu wa kimataifa, makubaliano hayo yamechangia kuongezeka kwa mvutano kati ya India na Pakistan na mbio za silaha za nyuklia kati ya majirani hao wawili. Kwa kuendeleza zoea la viwango viwili vya nyuklia, makubaliano hayo yalileta uharibifu wa muda mrefu kwa kanuni za kimataifa za kutoenea kwa silaha za nyuklia na juhudi za kuondoa silaha za nyuklia. Kwa hiyo, je, makubaliano hayo yalifanikiwa? Inategemea. Kwa njia fulani, mpango huo haukufaulu kabisa, kama vile ilivyodhaniwa mara nyingi. Biashara ya nyuklia na India haijakua, kama ilivyotarajiwa. Lakini malengo yasiyoelezwa kuhusu mwelekeo wa uchumi wa India na kuwa mchezaji wa timu kwa kiasi kikubwa yalipatikana. Kwa hiyo, tunachofanya ni mchanganyiko wa mambo. Historia fupi ya mambo. Wakati mmoja, sera ya Marekani kuelekea India ililenga karibu kabisa wasiwasi wa silaha za nyuklia, na Washington na New Delhi katika pande tofauti za suala hilo. Mkataba wa nyuklia wa kiraia ulibadilisha hilo... ripoti ya hivi karibuni ya Baraza la Mahusiano ya Nje inahitimisha. "Hii ndiyo lengo la utawala wa Bush na baadaye lilitambuliwa na utawala wa Obama.""" "Lakini ripoti hiyo inapuuza tafsiri nyingine: ""Mkataba wa Marekani na India kwa kweli ulidhoofisha mfumo wa kimataifa wa kutoenea kwa silaha za nyuklia na kuharibu maendeleo kuelekea kuondolewa kabisa kwa silaha za nyuklia, kama ilivyoelezwa na Rais Obama asubuhi moja nzuri huko Prague.""" Jambo la kushangaza si kwamba maoni hayo yalipuuzwa. "Kinyume na hoja iliyotolewa kwa ajili ya kuuza mpango huo - kwamba ulihitajiwa haraka ili kukidhi mahitaji ya India ya umeme - ningesema kwamba makubaliano hayo yalikuwa hasa juu ya mambo mawili: kwanza, kukamata soko kubwa la India, na pili, kufanya India kuwa mshirika wa kimkakati katika juhudi za Marekani za kukabiliana na China inayoongezeka. """ Maslahi ya kibiashara yalikuwa ya kwanza. "Hiyo ilikuwa ni ""mfano wa biashara"" ambao ulisaidia kuimarisha biashara hiyo, kama nilivyosema katika makala yangu ya 2006." "Mwandishi mwingine aliandika katika makala ya ""Bulletin"" ya mwaka 2009 kwamba ""mwisho wa mwaka huu, Marekani imepiga kura kwa kura ya maoni.""" Muungano mdogo wa wanaharakati wa kudhibiti silaha na kuondoa silaha unaoongozwa na Baraza la Ulimwengu wa Kuishi na Chama cha Kudhibiti Silaha ulifanya juhudi za ujasiri kuzuia mpango huo au, ukishindwa, kujumuisha masharti magumu zaidi kwa India. Hawakupingana na vikundi vya wafanyabiashara. (Ufunuo kamili: Nilifanya kazi kama mshauri wa muungano.) Mkataba huo ulipitishwa na Bunge, na IAEA na Kikundi cha Wauzaji wa Nyuklia pia walikubali, baada ya Marekani kugeuza mkono wake. Kutoka kwa pariah ya nyuklia hadi mshirika wa kimkakati. India ilifanya jaribio la nyuklia la amani mwaka 1974 na Marekani ilizidi kuwa na wasiwasi kuhusu mpango wa silaha za nyuklia wa India. India ilifungwa marufuku ya silaha za nyuklia mwaka 1978 kwa mujibu wa sheria ya kutokuenea kwa silaha za nyuklia. India ilijitenga zaidi baada ya Kikundi cha Wauzaji wa Nyuklia kupiga marufuku biashara ya nyuklia na India na mataifa mengine. Wakati wa Vita Baridi, Marekani ilitumikia maslahi ya sera ya kigeni ya kutenganisha India kwa sababu mara nyingi ilishirikiana na Muungano wa Sovieti katika masuala ya kimataifa, licha ya jukumu la India katika harakati za kutokuungana. Zaidi ya hayo, India ilikuwa na uchumi ulioongozwa kwa ukali, ambao haukuruhusu kupenya kwa kiwango kikubwa cha soko la India na mtaji wa kigeni. Hali hiyo ilibadilika sana baada ya kuanguka kwa Muungano wa Sovieti mwaka 1991. Karibu mara moja baada ya hapo, India ilipatwa na mgogoro mkubwa wa akiba yake ya fedha za kigeni. Ili kuepuka msiba wa kifedha, India ililazimika kupeleka akiba yake ya dhahabu kwa Benki ya Uingereza kama dhamana, ili iweze kuendelea kupokea fedha kutoka kwa taasisi za kimataifa za kukopesha. India ilianza kuunda mfumo wa kiuchumi wa uhuru mara moja baada ya kushinikizwa na Marekani na mataifa mengine ya Magharibi, mchakato ambao uliongezeka baada ya serikali za biashara zilizoongozwa na chama cha Congress na chama chake cha upinzani cha Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) kuwa madarakani. Vizuizi vilivyohusiana na nyuklia vilizuia biashara huru na mahusiano bora. Jitihada za kurekebisha hali hiyo ziliendelea sana wakati wa utawala wa Clinton. India ilishindwa kuidhinisha mkataba wa kuzuia majaribio ya nyuklia mwaka 1996 na mwaka 1998 baada ya Pakistan kufanya majaribio ya nyuklia. Kwa kuwa vikwazo vipya viliwekwa juu ya nchi zote mbili, uhusiano na India ulipungua kwa muda, lakini hali hii haikuendelea. Mkutano huo uliendelea kati ya Naibu Katibu wa Jimbo la India Strobe Talbot na waziri wa mambo ya nje wa India wakati huo Jaswant Singh kutoka chama cha BJP, licha ya ghasia hizo. Vizuizi vipya viliondolewa na tukaanza mashindano ya mbio. Serikali ya Bush ilichukua madaraka baada ya kuchukua madaraka mwaka 2001, wakati ambapo serikali ya India ilikuwa imebadilika pia, kutoka kwa ile iliyoongozwa na BJP hadi Chama cha Congress kilichoongozwa na Waziri Mkuu Manmohan Singh. Mazungumzo yaliyofanywa kwa siri kabisa yalisababisha saini ya makubaliano hayo Julai 18, 2005 na Rais George W. Bush na Waziri Mkuu Singh wakati wa ziara ya mwisho ya Rais George W. Bush huko Washington. Ilichukua karibu kila mtu kwa mshangao, kutia ndani washiriki wa Bunge. Ni maafisa wachache tu katika serikali zote mbili waliokuwa na habari. "Mkataba wa ushirikiano wa nyuklia wa raia wa Marekani na India (US-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement) ulibadilishwa jina na kuwa ""mkataba wa nyuklia"" na wakati mwingine ulibadilishwa kuwa ""mkataba wa 126, kwa 123"" na ""mkataba wa nyuklia"" na ""mkataba wa nyuklia.""" "126 ni idadi ya ndege za kivita India iliyopanga kununua na 123 ilirejelea sehemu katika Sheria ya Nishati ya Atomiki ya Marekani ambayo ilihitaji kurekebishwa na Bunge ili kuruhusu biashara ya nyuklia na India. """ "Mkataba huo ulisema: ""Unanunua ndege 126 za kivita za bei ghali na sisi tunatoa kifungu cha 123 ambacho kinazuia biashara na India,"" na kwa hivyo India inakuwa katika ""klabu ya nyuklia"" bila kusaini NPT." Ingawa hadhi yake kama nchi yenye silaha za nyuklia haikuwa wazi, India hivi karibuni ingepewa zaidi, ikiwa sio yote, ya mapendeleo yaliyopatikana na nchi tano zilizotawazwa na mkataba kama "nchi zenye silaha za nyuklia". Vizuizi vyote dhidi ya India vingeondolewa. India sasa inaweza kuagiza mitambo ya nyuklia na teknolojia inayohusiana, na vifaa ikiwa ni pamoja na vifaa vya fission kama uranium kutoka kwa wauzaji wa kimataifa. India pia ilitangaza kuwa itaondoa vituo vyake vya nyuklia vya kiraia kutoka kwa vituo ambavyo inaziona kuwa sehemu ya mpango wake wa kimkakati na kuifungua kwa ukaguzi wa IAEA. "Hata hivyo, ""kitu muhimu zaidi, ingawa hakikuelezwa, kilikuwa uelewa kwamba India itaendelea kufungua uchumi wake na kuwa na manufaa kwa maslahi ya sera za kigeni za Marekani.""" Kipindi muhimu ni wakati mzuri wa kukagua mambo. Maadhimisho ya miaka kumi ya mkataba wa kibiashara kati ya Marekani na India ni wakati mzuri wa kutafakari kuhusu suala hilo. Kinyume na vichwa vya habari vya magazeti makubaliano yaliyotokezwa wakati huo, hakukuwa na kilio wakati huu. Mkataba huo wa nyuklia ulionekana kuwa umepuuzwa sana na kwamba mazungumzo ya ngazi ya juu ya nishati ya Marekani na India yaliyofanyika Septemba 22, 2015 huko Washington, D.C. kati ya waziri wa nishati wa Marekani Ernest Moniz na mwenzake wa India Piyush Goyal, hayakuingizwa hata kwenye ajenda rasmi. Hata hivyo, malengo halisi ya mpango huo yametimizwa kwa kiasi kikubwa kutoka kwa mtazamo wa Marekani na India. Kwa upande wa Marekani, biashara kati ya Marekani na India imeongezeka na ushirikiano wa ulinzi kati ya nchi hizo umeimarika sana. Kulingana na Idara ya sensa ya Marekani, biashara ya bidhaa kati ya Marekani na India ilikua kutoka dola bilioni 32 mwaka 2006 hadi karibu dola bilioni 67 mwaka 2014, ukuaji wa zaidi ya asilimia 100 tangu mkataba huo ulipo sainiwa. India pia imefanya hatua za kufungua uchumi wake ili kuruhusu uwekezaji wa kigeni na kuanzisha biashara za kibinafsi ambazo hapo awali zilikuwa za serikali; mauzo ya nje ya Marekani kwa India yaliongezeka kwa asilimia 339 kati ya 2003 na 2012, kulingana na Ofisi ya Mwakilishi wa Biashara wa Marekani. India pia imepunguza udhibiti wa serikali katika jaribio la kuifanya iwe rahisi kwa mashirika ya kigeni kufanya biashara nchini India; uwekezaji wa moja kwa moja wa kigeni nchini India na makampuni ya Marekani ulifikia $ 28.4 bilioni mnamo 2012, ongezeko la zaidi ya asilimia 15 katika mwaka mmoja tu. India haikuunga mkono sera ya kigeni ya Marekani kwa asilimia 100, lakini imeshirikiana sana katika kutenganisha Iran na kuboresha uhusiano wake na Israel, mambo mawili ya kipaumbele cha juu kwa Marekani. India pia inatoa msaada wa kimya kwa pivot ya Marekani kuelekea Asia. India imejiunga na Benki ya Uwekezaji ya Miundombinu ya Asia iliyoanzishwa na China, ambayo inaonekana kuwa mshindani wa Benki ya Dunia inayoongozwa na Washington, lakini kuna mazungumzo ya India kuwa sehemu ya ushirikiano wa Trans-Pacific unaoongozwa na Marekani, ambao unaondoa China. India imesajili ushirikiano wa kimkakati na Japan, na hivyo kuimarisha msimamo wa Japan dhidi ya China. India pia imefanya makubaliano ya ushirikiano wa nyuklia na nchi hiyo. Kwa hivyo, kwa mtazamo wa sehemu mbili za mkataba huo, mpango huo umekuwa na mafanikio: masoko ya India yamefunguliwa kwa makampuni ya Marekani, na India (kwa kiasi kikubwa) ikawa mshirika mwenye nia katika juhudi za Marekani za kukabiliana na China inayoongezeka. Lakini kulikuwa na maswali yenye kusumbua yanayohusiana na programu ya nyuklia ya India. Jambo kuu kati ya hayo ni kuwajibika. Sheria ambayo ilizuia "nyuklia" katika makubaliano ya nyuklia. Swali ni rahisi, lakini muhimu sana: Ni nani atakayelipa ikiwa kutakuwa na ajali ya nyuklia? India imepinga hatua hiyo kwa sababu ya kutokubaliana na sheria ya India ya mwaka 2010 inayoitwa Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act (CLDA). Bunge lilipitisha sheria hiyo kwa haraka kwa sababu moja ya masharti ya makubaliano ya nyuklia ni kwamba India inahitaji kupitisha sheria ambayo itaeleza ni nani atakayechukua jukumu katika tukio la ajali. Sheria hiyo ilitokana na ajali ya kiwanda cha kemikali cha Bhopal mwaka 1984 ambapo watu mia moja waliuawa na maelfu zaidi waliathiriwa na ajali hiyo na kampuni ya Union Carbide ambayo ilikuwa na kiwanda hicho. Tukio hilo bado liko safi katika akili za nchi zote mbili, ambazo zina mtazamo tofauti. Kwa hivyo, wauzaji wa nyuklia walitaka dhima yoyote kubeba mwishowe na mwendeshaji wa kiwanda cha India, sio wauzaji wake wa baadaye wa Amerika. Licha ya kuwa na uwezo wa kupunguza gharama za usafirishaji, kampuni hiyo haikujaribu kabisa kuondoa gharama za usafirishaji wakati wa ajali. "Wauzaji wa India walipinga mpango huo kwa sababu ya kumbukumbu zao za msiba wa Bhopal, ambao ulisababisha mashtaka ya jinai katika mahakama za India na amri ya kukamatwa iliyoletwa dhidi ya Warren Anderson, mwenyekiti wa wakati huo wa Union Carbide na Mmarekani. """ Serikali ya Waziri Mkuu Singh ilitegemea kwa ajili ya kuishi kwake kisiasa kwa muungano ulioitwa United Progressive Alliance (UPA), ambao ulijumuisha vyama vidogo vya kati-kushoto, ikiwa ni pamoja na Wakomunisti. Muungano huo ulizorota sana baada ya Wakomunisti kuondoa msaada wao kwa sababu ya kutokubaliana juu ya masharti ya mpango huo. Serikali ilikuwa imedhoofika sana kufikia wakati huo ili kuweza kushinikiza marekebisho ya CLAND, hata ikiwa ilitaka. Kwa hiyo, utekelezaji wa mpango huo ulisimama kwa miaka kadhaa. Katika uchaguzi mkuu uliofanyika Mei 2014, chama cha Hindu cha BJP kilishinda kwa ushindi mkubwa. Kiongozi wake mwenye utata, Narendra Modi, akawa waziri mkuu mpya, na akaweka kuboresha mahusiano na Marekani juu ya ajenda yake. Pia alikuwa na ajenda ya kibinafsi ya kujirekebisha mwenyewe machoni pa Marekani. Alipokuwa akipigwa marufuku, alikataliwa kwa miaka kadhaa visa vya kuingia Marekani kwa sababu ya jukumu la chama chake katika mauaji ya raia wa Kiislamu mwaka 2002 katika jimbo la Gujarat, India, ambapo Modi alikuwa waziri mkuu. "Kama ilivyoelezwa katika kauli mbiu ya zamani, ""katika diplomasia hakuna marafiki wa kudumu au maadui, tu maslahi ya kudumu.""" Kwa hiyo, mambo yote yalisahauliwa upesi. Baada ya miezi michache, Rais Obama na Waziri Mkuu Modi walifanya mkutano wao wa kwanza wa kilele huko Washington mnamo Septemba 2014. "Wanafunzi hao wawili wamekuwa marafiki wa karibu, na wakizungumzia suala la mkataba huo wa nyuklia, viongozi hao wawili wametangaza kuunda ""kikundi cha mawasiliano"" cha kushughulikia suala la dhima ya nyuklia." Katika mkutano wao wa pili wa kilele mwaka mmoja baadaye, walitangaza kuwa suluhisho limepatikana kupitia uundaji wa kundi la bima linaloungwa mkono na serikali ili kufunika dhima ya wauzaji hadi $ 244 milioni. Serikali ya India imesema itashughulikia gharama za ziada za hadi dola milioni 300 kupitia akaunti maalum ya haki za kuchora kutoka kwa Mfuko wa Fedha wa Kimataifa. India pia imekubali kujiunga na Mkataba wa Umoja wa Mataifa juu ya fidia ya ziada kwa uharibifu wa nyuklia, ambao utaingia katika nguvu hivi karibuni. Ilikuwa ni madai ya muda mrefu ya Marekani. India imetoa uamuzi wa kuachilia mbali madai ya Marekani ya kuwa India inapaswa kuruhusu mashirika ya Marekani kufuatilia vifaa vyote vya kutenganisha vilivyotolewa na Marekani. Mkataba huo ulitangazwa wakati wa ziara ya siku tatu ya Rais Obama nchini India mnamo Januari 2015. Mkataba wa nyuklia wa 2009 haukufanya makampuni ya Marekani kuuza nyuklia mpya India. Kwa upande wa Marekani, hatua hiyo ilikuwa ni kushindwa kwa kampuni ya Areva ya Ufaransa na kampuni ya Urusi ya kutengeneza mitambo ya nyuklia nchini India. Lakini sasa pande zote mbili zina matumaini kwamba makampuni ya Marekani yataweza kushindana kujenga mitambo mipya ya India. Mkataba huo umefanya kidogo sana kuangaza nyumba za India. India imesaini mkataba wa awali na kampuni ya umeme ya Westinghouse kwa ajili ya utafiti wa kiufundi wa uwezekano wa vifaa vya AP-1000 kwa ajili ya eneo la Mithivardi lililopendekezwa katika Bhavnagar, Gujarat, ambalo, wakati wa kuahidi, ni njia ndefu kutoka kwa ujenzi wa kituo cha umeme. Hata hivyo, hata baada ya kutatua suala la dhima, itakuwa si rahisi kwa wauzaji wa Marekani kupata mikataba nchini India, kwa sababu ya ushindani mkali wa bei, hasa kutoka Urusi, lakini pia kutoka kwa wauzaji wa India. Urusi imeweka mstari wa mbele kwa sababu tayari imejenga kiwanda cha Kudankulam huko Tamil Nadu kusini mwa India. Kati ya mitambo miwili ya megawatt 1,000 katika kiwanda hicho, kitengo cha kwanza kinafanya kazi kwa sasa na kitengo cha pili kinafafanuliwa kuwa "chini ya kuanzishwa", ambayo inamaanisha inapitia vipimo vya nguvu kabla ya kuanza. Urusi imeweka mkataba wa kuanzisha vitengo vingine viwili huko, ambavyo vitaleta jumla ya megawati 4,000. Hata hivyo, kwa sasa, India haijafikia kiwango cha kuimarisha nishati ya nyuklia ambacho kilikuwa kilitazamiwa kufikia gigawatt 20 kufikia mwaka 2020. Katika miaka ya hivi karibuni, India imepata nguvu ya juu ya gigawati 3.3 na ina uwezo wa kuendesha umeme wa gigawati 4.8. Hata hivyo, India imefaidika sana kutokana na makubaliano ya nyuklia kati ya Marekani na India tangu makubaliano hayo yalipotiwa saini. India imeondolewa katika hali ya kutokuwa na silaha za nyuklia, vikwazo vya Marekani vimeondolewa na India imepata msamaha kutoka kwa kundi la wauzaji wa nyuklia. Tangu wakati huo, India imesaini mikataba ya ushirikiano wa nyuklia na Canada, Ufaransa, Uingereza, Korea Kusini na Japan, na imehakikisha usambazaji wa urani kutoka Canada na Australia. Baada ya kuondolewa kwa vikwazo vya nyuklia, India haikuruhusiwa tena kuagiza vifaa na mifumo ya teknolojia ya hali ya juu ya matumizi mawili, ambayo hapo awali ilikuwa imezuia programu zake za anga na ulinzi, na uwezo wake wa kutengeneza vifaa na mifumo ya elektroniki. Lakini vipi kuhusu mtazamo wa Marekani? Hema kubwa la kuzuia kuenea kwa silaha za nyuklia, lakini kambi ndogo ya kuondoa silaha. Marekani ilikabili tatizo hilo miaka kumi iliyopita. Ni nini kilichokuwa muhimu zaidi kwa maslahi ya usalama wa kitaifa wa Marekani: kutokuwa na silaha za nyuklia, au ushirikiano wa kimkakati na India? Yaonekana jibu lilikuwa la pili. Ndiyo, kulikuwa na upinzani fulani katika bunge, lakini ulipungua upesi. Na ni nani anayeweza kupinga, kwa faida zote zinazotokana na ushirikiano kati ya nchi hizo mbili? Moja ni nguvu kubwa pekee ya kweli duniani, na nyingine ni tiger inayoibuka na idadi ya watu ambayo itapita China katika miongo miwili ijayo. Lakini mshahara uliolipwa kwa ajili ya ushirikiano huo ulikuwa nini? "Mashirika ya Marekani na India yameharibu sana Mkataba wa kuepuka silaha za nyuklia, na kuimarisha viwango viwili kuhusu nyuklia na kuharibu uwezekano wa kuunganisha mataifa yote katika mkataba huo.""" India sasa ikiwa ni mwanachama aliyekubaliwa wa klabu ya nyuklia, hakuna nafasi ya India kuacha silaha zake <unk> na kwa hivyo haiwezi kujiunga na NPT na muundo wake wa sasa. Ndivyo ilivyo na Pakistan. "Hata hivyo, Marekani imesisitiza kwamba Pakistan inapaswa kufanya ""mkataba wa India"" na ripoti za hivi karibuni za vyombo vya habari zinaonyesha kwamba Marekani inatoa toleo la ""mkataba wa India"" kwa Pakistan." Israel pia imeonyesha kwa njia isiyo ya moja kwa moja kuondoa kile kinachoitwa "kutokuwa na uhakika wa nyuklia" na kuingia katika mpangilio kama huo. "Hakuna uwezekano mkubwa wa Marekani kutoa jibu la kuunga mkono suala hili, kwa kuwa nchi wanachama wa NPT zimedai Marekani isiweke kizuizi kwenye mazungumzo ya dhati kuhusu eneo lisilo na silaha za nyuklia katika Mashariki ya Kati ambalo lingehusisha Israel na Iran.""" Lakini hali ya nyuklia ya Pakistan bado haijatengenezwa, na ni changamoto kwa mfumo wa kutoenea kwa silaha za nyuklia. Wakati wa mkutano wa White House na Waziri Mkuu wa Pakistan Nawaz Sharif katika majira ya kupukutika kwa majani ya 2015, Rais Obama alidai kuwa alikataa ombi la Sharif kwa mpango sawa na India. "Badala ya hayo, Marekani inaonekana imetoa fursa ya kupunguza vikwazo vya kundi la wauzaji wa nyuklia kwa Pakistan kwa kutoa msamaha, ili Pakistan iweze kuagiza teknolojia ya nyuklia na labda mitambo kwa sekta yake ya umeme iliyokuwa ikikosa matumaini. """ Pakistan inaendelea kuimarisha silaha zake za nyuklia, ikiwa ni pamoja na silaha ndogo za kijeshi ambazo zinaweza kutumiwa vitani. Hata hivyo, kuzingatia tu historia ya Pakistan ya kutosambaza silaha za nyuklia ni upungufu wa macho kwa mahusiano ya Marekani na Pakistan na pia kwa amani katika Asia Kusini. "Kuna taarifa kwamba Marekani imeahidi kuwafanya India kuwa mwanachama wa ""Nuclear Suppliers Group"" (NGS) na hilo litakuwa ni jambo la kushangaza kwa Pakistan." China yaelekea itaomba kwamba kwa kubadilishana na uanachama wa India, Pakistan ikubaliwe pia. Kwa kuwa kundi la wauzaji wa nyuklia linafanya kazi kwa makubaliano, China ina nguvu kwa sababu inaweza kuzuia idhini yake ya kuikubali India. "Makubaliano hayo yanaonyesha kuwa Marekani pia itawezesha India kujiunga na ""mfumo mwingine wa kuzuia kuenea kwa silaha za nyuklia"" kama vile ""Mfumo wa Udhibiti wa Teknolojia ya Makombora"" na ""Mfumo wa Wassenaar"" ambao unasimamia silaha za kawaida na bidhaa na teknolojia za matumizi mawili." "Kwa sababu zinawawezesha India kupata faida ambazo hapo awali zilikuwa zimekataliwa na mataifa yenye silaha za nyuklia ambayo si wanachama wa NPT, vitendo kama hivyo huunda mfano mbaya na mwinuko wa kuteleza ambao unaweza kuongoza nchi nyingine kuendeleza silaha za nyuklia. """ Kwa kweli, ushirikiano wa nyuklia wa Marekani na India umezidisha mgogoro wa nyuklia katika Asia Kusini. Ingawa urani India inasafiri kutoka soko la dunia ni chini ya IAEA ufuatiliaji, India ndogo akiba ya urani yake mwenyewe si, na kwa hiyo inapatikana kwa kutumika kwa ajili ya programu yake ya silaha. Kwa mujibu wa takwimu za wataalamu wa masuala ya nyuklia nchini India, India ina silaha za nyuklia kati ya 110 na 120. Pakistan inaendelea kupanua silaha zake za nyuklia, ambazo zinakadiriwa kuwa na makombora 110 hadi 130. (Hata hivyo, ni lazima mtu achukue idadi hizi kwa chembe ya chumvi; hakuna uthibitisho wa kujitegemea unaowezekana.) "Mtu anaweza kusema kwamba kumekuwa na maendeleo mazuri ya kutokuwa na silaha za nyuklia tangu makubaliano ya Marekani na India yalipotiwa saini; India imesaini itifaki ya ziada kwa makubaliano ya India na IAEA kwa matumizi ya ulinzi kwa vifaa vya nyuklia vya raia vya India. """ Sheria hiyo ilianza kutumika Julai 25, 2014. """Mkataba wa ziada kwa ajili ya programu ya nyuklia ya kiraia ya India ni jambo zuri, lakini juhudi za kijeshi za nyuklia za India hazina sheria hiyo." """Kuacha Pakistan nje ya hema la kutokuwa na silaha za nyuklia si jambo zuri." Pamoja na kuimarika kwa uhusiano kati ya India na Marekani, Pakistan inaendelea kuwa na uhusiano mzuri na India. Ikiwa ndivyo, je, faida za mpango huo kwa India zinahakikishia ulimwengu kuendelea kuiona Pakistan kama mchawi wa nyuklia, ikilinganishwa na India "yenye jukumu"? Wakati nchi moja zaidi imeleta angalau sehemu chini ya hema la kutoenea kwa silaha za nyuklia, hema lenyewe linaharibika. Mkataba mkubwa ulio katika Mkataba wa Utoaji wa Silaha za Nyuklia - nchi zenye silaha za nyuklia zingevunja silaha, kwa kubadilishana na nchi nyingine zinazokubali kutopata silaha za nyuklia - umechukuliwa kama wazo la baadaye. "Hata hotuba ya Rais Obama ya Prague ilionyesha ""si katika maisha yangu"" na ""kuingizwa kwa India katika hema la kutokuwa na silaha za nyuklia kwa ufanisi kumeondoa mmoja wa watetezi wenye nguvu wa kihistoria wa silaha kutoka kwenye kambi ya silaha.""" Baada ya kulalamika dhidi ya "ubaguzi wa rangi ya nyuklia" na viwango viwili vya nguvu za nyuklia kwa miongo mingi, India sasa inafurahi kuwa mfaidikaji wa mama wa viwango vyote viwili. """Kutokuwepo kabisa kwa majadiliano yoyote ya kuondoa silaha za nyuklia katika mazungumzo yanayohusiana na makubaliano ya Marekani na India ni dalili ya tatizo kubwa zaidi." Hali katika Asia Kusini - na duniani kote kama inavyoonyeshwa na matukio ya hivi karibuni katika peninsula ya Korea - si endelevu. Mkataba huo umezidisha mvutano wa nyuklia kati ya India na Pakistan. India ilijigamba kuwa na uwezo wa kutengeneza makombora ya cruise na makombora ya nyuklia, Pakistan iliripotiwa kuwa na silaha za nyuklia za vita. Kuenea kwa silaha za nyuklia kutakuwa tishio la daima, ikiwa uondoaji wa silaha utaendelea kuahirishwa kwa muda usiojulikana. Kama maoni ya mwisho, ni muhimu kutambua kwamba wachambuzi wengi kuepuka uhakika wa kati ya India na Pakistan mgogoro. Si kuhusu silaha za nyuklia, bali kuhusu eneo linalojulikana kama Kashmir. India haitaki upatanishi wa nje kumaliza mgogoro huo, lakini mazungumzo ya nchi mbili yamekuwa yakizuiwa kwa miongo sita. Mashindano ya silaha katika Asia Kusini, ya kawaida na ya nyuklia, yanachochewa kwa sehemu na mgogoro huu wa muda mrefu, mkataba wa nyuklia au la. Lakini ushirikiano wa nyuklia wa Marekani na India umefanya mgogoro huo uwe mgumu zaidi kutatua, na hata hatari zaidi. Mwandishi anataka kumshukuru mwenzake Marvin Miller wa MIT, ambaye alisoma rasimu ya kwanza na kutoa mapendekezo na nyongeza muhimu sana. Gazeti la Bulletin linainua sauti za wataalamu juu ya kelele. Kama shirika lisilo la faida, shughuli zetu zinategemea msaada wa wasomaji kama wewe. Tuendelee kutoa uandishi wa habari wa ubora ambao unawafanya viongozi kuwajibika. Msaada wako wa kazi yetu katika ngazi yoyote ni muhimu. Kwa kubadilishana, tunakuahidi chanjo yetu itakuwa inayoeleweka, yenye ushawishi, yenye tahadhari, yenye lengo la suluhisho, na yenye akili ya haki. Pamoja tunaweza kufanya tofauti.