From The Philosopher, vol. 110, no. 4 ("The New Basics: Philosophy").
We are unfunded and your support is greatly appreciated.
“For there are no new ideas. There are only new ways of making them felt – of examining what those ideas feel like being lived.” Audre Lorde
Academic philosophy has a novelty problem. Novelty has become a litmus test for a contribution’s value. This results in a common undertaking for academic researchers. Read a bunch. Look for holes and gaps. Figure out what hasn’t been said. Try to insert yourself in a conversation by saying something new. On first glance, this approach might appear to make sense. If it’s not new, why do we need it? Yet a fixation on novelty sculpts a landscape of philosophical inquiry that is inhospitable and self-undermining.
What does it mean to contribute something novel in philosophy? We might think of novelty as having two senses: discovery and ingenuity. In the first sense, a contribution is valued because it is (or is taken to be) the first of its kind. In the second sense, a contribution is valued because it manifests a certain quality, namely, ingenuity, innovation, originality, or inventiveness. These values come apart. An ingenious idea depreciates in value if it has already been “discovered”. The longer an idea has been in circulation, the less original it seems. Alternatively, mere discovery decreases in value if it fails to innovate; a newly discovered contribution might be poorly conceived or superfluous. While ingenuity without discovery is redundant, discovery without ingenuity is insignificant. True novelty combines both. Yet, both concepts are fraught with difficulty and the pursuit of novelty in philosophy faces myriad problems.
First, the mechanisms through which philosophers have been trained to recognize ingenuity are particularly susceptible to bias. Unlike the sciences, in which empirical tests can be deployed to assess the value of a contribution, philosophers are often left relying on their intuitions. Ingenuity in philosophy has traditionally been attributed to natural brilliance or innate talent, where such assessments tend to call up images of bearded white men. Indeed, as Kant famously derided, “a learned woman might just as well have a beard, for that expresses in a more recognizable form the profundity for which she strives”. Over two centuries later, Sally Haslanger demonstrates the continued prominence of such sentiments, recalling a colleague who tells her he had “‘never seen a first rate woman [in] philosophy and never expected to because women were incapable of having seminal ideas’”. And in 2016, Daniel Storage and colleagues found that students used the words “brilliant” and “genius” more frequently to describe professors in fields like philosophy, where comparatively fewer women and African Americans have PhDs. The ability to have one’s contributions recognized as novel in philosophy depends, in large part, on whether the contributor is seen as capable of having novel ideas. Thus, biased assessments of capability have an outsized influence on assessments of ingenuity in the field.
Second, the pursuit of ingenuity incentivizes trivial discoveries. It’s quite easy to discover something new, if the contours of inquiry are narrow enough and the threshold for novelty is fairly low. Over time, however, as Massimo Pigliucci notes, these efforts:
...yield increasingly diminishing returns, so that certain discussion threads become more and more limited in scope, ever more the result of clever logical hair splitting, and of less and less use or interest to anyone but a vanishingly small group of professionals who, for whatever reason, have become passionate about it.
But this is not the type of value that can sustainably power entire disciplines of inquiry. The quest for novelty thus risks turning philosophy into a “fast fashion” industry – cashing in on hot trends to make a quick contribution, only to end up buried in intellectual landfills at the end of the season.
Third, the pursuit of discovery can directly undermine ingenuity by hindering our ability to identify it. A rush to discover ever more new ideas generates a kind of surplus production. Yet a proliferation of contributions results in information overload. When evaluators are overloaded and overwhelmed, they rely on heuristics like familiarity to evaluate contributions. In such environments, innovative ideas are less likely to be recognized, since the value of a new contribution is heuristically assessed in virtue of its relation to old paradigms and existing frameworks. Researchers quickly learn that to garner legitimacy, they must anchor their ideas to old frameworks. Paradoxically, what already exists becomes further entrenched.
The fact that the same innovative idea occurs to many people doesn’t make that idea any less innovative.
Finally, the pursuit of discovery promotes a fiction. While a philosophical contribution might reflect original thinking and innovation, it is often the case that other thinkers at different times and places have contemplated and expressed similar ideas. The fact that the same innovative idea occurs to many people doesn’t make that idea any less innovative; still, attributions of “discovery” are usually reserved for one person (or, at most, a small cluster of people). But although ideas are ostensibly first theorized in a particular book or article in association with a particular theorist, they don’t necessarily have their origins there and are generally the product of many minds and experiences. Insights of philosophy come from our participation in dialogue, and the “aliveness” of conversations (sometimes decades and centuries long) isn’t easily captured in a single book or article, no matter how robust the bibliography. Despite this, the myth of discovery authoritatively ascribes the origin stories of ideas to fixed points in time.
In a troubled credibility economy like philosophy’s, discovery (as with ingenuity) is more likely attributed to those with greater status – owing to, e.g., their gender, race, seniority, institutional prestige, or access to platforms to disseminate work – irrespective of their actual place in an intellectual history. Even where the myth of discovery masquerades as fact, attributions of discovery don’t reliably track chronology.
Given these challenges, can novelty be reconfigured? To begin, we might reconfigure how novelty is assessed, shifting assessments away from the individual and towards the collective. I mean this in two ways. On the one hand, individuals may not be the appropriate performers of such assessments. That is, as individuals, we should be sceptical of our ability to assess and proclaim a contribution – both our own and others’ – as novel. What might appear new to us is not necessarily new to another; even amongst experts, individual perspectives remain limited. This speaks to the value of disseminating work more widely to determine its novel status, rather than having a novel status determine whether the work gets disseminated in the first place.
Assessments of novelty should be collective assessments, not just the assessments of a select few who operate as gatekeepers. So long as philosophers’ continued participation and advancement within the field is tied to the novelty of their individual contributions, assessments of novelty are likely to lack scope and be skewed by self-interest.
On the other hand, we can shift away from seeing individuals as the appropriate subjects of such assessments. How we assess and evaluate novelty is not just a practice of looking to the past, to see how an idea or concept relates to what comes before it, but also how it relates to what exists alongside it and how it shapes what comes after. Sometimes it is only possible to identify a contribution as novel far ahead into the future, when looking back and seeing a shift that was ushered in, but which couldn’t have been identified at the time of its emergence. Likewise, what may appear to be novel in the moment may turn out to have been quite common. This suggests that the appropriate subject of our analysis of novelty is the shape of inquiry as a whole, not any individual contribution by itself. This should lead us to assess novelty not as a function of individual efforts, but as a function of the relationships between those efforts.
Academic philosophers are increasingly trained to see themselves as valuable only insofar as they can produce knowledge.
Perhaps more substantially, however, we can reconfigure how novelty is valued and pursued. Increasingly, novelty is valued and pursued as an end in itself. This mode of valuation is emblematic of a product model of philosophy, where achievement is valued over effort, and products are valued over the processes through which they are produced. On a product model, philosophical inquiry is driven by a disproportionate focus on and narrow pursuit of knowledge production, an attitude Cynthia Townley refers to as “epistemophilia”. As Townley writes “knowledge acquisition has been the exclusive focus of academic inquiry and collecting knowledge is assumed to constitute the unique epistemic obligation and ideal for agents”. Within this context, academic philosophers are increasingly trained to see themselves as valuable only insofar as they can produce knowledge. As we scramble for new ideas, we objectify and instrumentalize the subjects of our study (and ourselves) along the way.
If epistemophilia is marked by the excessive valuation of knowledge production and accumulation, then philosophy in academic institutions can be said to cultivate such valuation. It is here that the pursuit of novelty as an end in itself finds its footing. Thus, resisting a product model of philosophy’s value can help provide insights into how novelty, insofar as it is valuable, is valuable in philosophy.
One alternative to the product model is a value-synthesis model. Academic institutions adopt a system that divides contributions into three arenas: research, teaching, and service. While the value of each is assessed differently by different institutions, these arenas are generally governed by divergent aims and constraints. Research contributions are designed for other scholars, with the goal of generating new discoveries and advancing knowledge. Teaching contributions are designed for (enrolled) students, with the goals of greater dissemination and understanding of existing knowledge, promoting collaborative learning, and developing skills and interests of people who will participate in the future shaping of our world. Service contributions are designed for departments, universities, and wider disciplines, with the goals of organizational and administrative functioning. Service also encompasses engagements with the broader public and aims to ensure that relationships with our communities mutually shape institutional values and practices.
It might seem as though this trichotomy effectively covers the range of values that the product model was said to exclude. Rather than engender a neutral separation, however, a tiered hierarchy emerges. With the greatest resources and investment in the most powerful institutions increasingly funnelled into research-oriented domains, a focal value on knowledge production and accumulation is steadily reinforced. Moreover, this system arbitrarily cuts off the benefits of integrating different modes of engagement, many of which can’t be sensibly separated. Indeed, many have argued that philosophy should engage more prominently with the public, not merely in terms of providing services and educational resources to broader communities, or by collaborating with communities to enable their knowledge and values to shape academic inquiry, but even more fundamentally to reshape and redistribute the resources – land, money, opportunity, and social capital – that our institutions often hoard. A tiered, split separation between research, teaching, and service – where each is responsive to different aims and audiences – does not easily foster pathways to blend these values or to reconceive their significance.
When we think about the values that guide effective teaching and service, these are often at odds with a conception of what it is to be a good researcher or what is expected when producing knowledge in a specialist niche. Research production often takes place within the context of a narrow conversation, where such a conversation appears to necessitate rigid forms of communication. These forms of communication serve as proof of a researcher’s expertise, a shorthand to facilitate faster understanding amongst a select few, and a hazing of less credentialed audiences who have not yet demonstrated themselves worthy of participation.
Inclusive pedagogy and effective service, on the other hand, embrace an expansive and empathetic conception of audience, contextualize contributions and explore them from a range of perspectives, and treat inquiry as alive and collaborative. If a contribution renders an idea more accessible, or surveys the landscape of inquiry, or organizes and compiles previously disparate efforts, or re-draws our attention to something that already exists, or explores different ways in which inquiry can be understood or usefully employed, why think that this is less novel? On a value-synthesis model, the pursuit of novelty in philosophy is recalibrated to integrate and synthesize these aims.
Knowledge is not just valuable insofar as it is produced, but also insofar as it is disseminated, understood, applied, interrogated, integrated, rejected, and practiced – in a word, lived.
Knowledge is not just valuable insofar as it is produced, but also insofar as it is disseminated, understood, applied, interrogated, integrated, rejected, and practiced – in a word, lived. As Pigliucci puts it, “Human beings need more than facts and formulas, more than experiment and observation. They need to experience it in the first person, and they need to reflect critically on all aspects of their existence. They need to understand, in the broadest possible terms, which means they need to philosophize”. Integrating and synthesizing these values goes a long way in foregrounding the goals of good stewardship for the future of philosophical inquiry – both within the academy and outside of it.
Alternatively, we might replace the product model with a game model. Philosophy is comprised of a range of activities that we might, in other contexts, readily classify as games. Philosophy involves argumentational sparring, word play, creating and escaping objections, identifying and exploiting weaknesses or gaps in an opponent’s position, and generating or solving puzzles and paradoxes. Philosophy also involves building and exploring worlds, constructing simulations and models, designing thought experiments, and speculative reasoning. While the former concerns the kind of game play that consists of challenges and obstacles, the latter involves a more imaginative type of play.
Games may seem trivial and arbitrary, however, and a game model of philosophy might appear counterintuitive. Wasn’t excess trivialization part of the problem? Challenging the view that games are trivial and arbitrary, C. Thi Nguyen writes that games offer:
…a way of specifying particular modes of agency. This is what make games a distinctive art form. Game designers designate goals and abilities for the player; they shape the agential skeleton which the player will inhabit during the game. Game designers work in the medium of agency. Game-playing, then, illuminates a distinctive human capacity.
If philosophy is aptly characterized as a game, philosophers can be said to explore novel forms of human agency deployed in the process of meaning-making and inquiry about the world. These are the kinds of agency that are needed to engage with philosophical problems of our contemporary moment and future, to understand how these problems have been tackled before and various answers resisted, to organize and interrogate our findings, and to grapple with our own positionality in the world in the context of this inquiry. For Nguyen, “Games turn out to be a technique to inscribe and transmit sculpted agencies. They let us communicate modes of agency, and store them. Games let us create an archive of agencies”.
If philosophy is a game, then who are the game designers? If the game designers are not representative of the game players, there may be a mismatch or narrowing in the types of agency that can be explored, recognized, or appreciated. For example, the content of many philosophical problems and modes of expression may presume certain forms of cultural familiarity and exclude others. Moreover, when philosophy is engaged in environments plagued with sexism and racism and other forms of exclusion, people may be forced to shift or conceal aspects of their agency to participate. Engagement as equals may be artificially diminished based on who determines the rules of play. If the “archive of agencies” we as philosophers are able to explore is limited to those agencies imagined by white men and western elites, then the rules and structures of our games demand serious revision.
On a game model, the value of novelty in philosophy lies not so much in ideas to be produced, but in the effortful striving it takes to produce them.
Still, one might worry, it may feel disrespectful to treat philosophy as a game, given the seriousness of many topics that philosophers consider, including personhood, oppression, moral responsibility, consciousness, identity, and so on. Here, however, the game model might actually help us identify those philosophical methodologies and techniques which specify the wrong modes of agency for a given context or task. Nguyen articulates two modes of play: achievement play (or playing for the “win”) and striving play (or playing for the sake of the struggle). Now there may be certain philosophical inquiries where an orientation of achievement play is simply inappropriate; if achievement becomes the ultimate or sole focus and goal, our efforts as philosophers become co-opted by these aims. Likewise, effective engagement in philosophical inquiry, like any effective game play, requires that all participants are accountable for the responsibilities they incur in the cooperative endeavour. Absent reciprocal investments of commitment and respect, our collective participation in such inquiry may indeed be waste of time (or worse!).
On a game model, the value of novelty in philosophy lies not so much in ideas to be produced, but in the effortful striving it takes to produce them. Thus, the pursuit of novelty in philosophy could inspire us to explore, uncover, and express different modes of agency – both for ourselves and for our fellow players.
Emmalon Davis is an assistant professor in the philosophy department at University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. Her work explores the social processes through which knowledge is collectively developed and disseminated within and across communities. In particular, she looks at how race and gender oppression exert a distorting influence over these processes. She is currently working on a project exploring the political philosophy of black feminist abolitionist Maria Stewart. This research is supported by fellowships from the ACLS and from the Notre Dame Institute for Advanced Study. Academic Homepage: https://lsa.umich.edu/philosophy/people/faculty/davisemm.html
From The Philosopher, vol. 110, no. 4 ("The New Basics: Philosophy").
We are unfunded and your support is greatly appreciated.
Kutoka kwa The Philosopher, vol. 110, hapana. " (The New Basics: Philosophy) 4 ("Mafundisho Mapya: Falsafa")" Hatuna fedha na msaada wako unathaminiwa sana. <unk>Kwa sababu hakuna mawazo mapya. Kuna njia mpya tu za kuwafanya wahisi <unk> ya kuchunguza nini mawazo hayo kuhisi kama kuwa aliishi. <unk> Audre Lorde falsafa ya kitaaluma ina tatizo novelty. Novelty imekuwa mtihani litmus kwa ajili ya thamani ya mchango. Hii husababisha mradi wa kawaida kwa watafiti wa kitaaluma. Soma vitabu vingi. Tafuta mashimo na mapengo. Kujua nini haijawahi kusemwa. Jaribu kujiingiza katika mazungumzo kwa kusema jambo jipya. Kwa mtazamo wa kwanza, mbinu hiyo yaweza kuonekana kuwa yenye maana. Ikiwa si mpya, kwa nini tunahitaji? Hata hivyo, kukazia fikira mambo mapya hufanyiza mandhari ya uchunguzi wa kifalsafa ambayo si yenye kukaribisha na yenye kuharibu. Inamaanisha nini kuchangia jambo jipya katika falsafa? Tunaweza kufikiria uvumbuzi kuwa na hisia mbili: ugunduzi na ubunifu. Katika maana ya kwanza, mchango unathaminiwa kwa sababu ni (au inachukuliwa kuwa) ya kwanza ya aina yake. Katika maana ya pili, mchango unathaminiwa kwa sababu unaonyesha sifa fulani, yaani, ubunifu, uvumbuzi, ubunifu, au uvumbuzi. Maadili hayo yanaharibika. Wazo la ubunifu hupungua thamani ikiwa tayari <unk>imegunduliwa<unk>. Kadiri wazo lilivyozunguka kwa muda mrefu, ndivyo lilivyoonekana kuwa lisilo la awali. Vinginevyo, ugunduzi tu hupungua kwa thamani ikiwa unashindwa kubuni; mchango uliogunduliwa hivi karibuni unaweza kuwa umefanywa vibaya au hauna maana. Ingawa ubunifu bila uvumbuzi ni wa ziada, uvumbuzi bila ubunifu ni mdogo. Uvumbuzi wa kweli huchanganya mambo hayo mawili. Hata hivyo, dhana zote mbili zina matatizo mengi na kutafuta mambo mapya katika falsafa kunakabiliwa na matatizo mengi. Kwanza, njia ambazo wanafalsafa wamefundishwa kutambua ubunifu ni rahisi sana kupingwa. Tofauti na sayansi, ambapo vipimo vya majaribio vinaweza kutumiwa kutathmini thamani ya mchango, wanafalsafa mara nyingi huachwa wakitegemea hisia zao. Uwezo wa ubunifu katika falsafa umekuwa kwa kawaida ukitokana na kipaji cha asili au kipaji cha asili, ambapo tathmini kama hizo huwa na kuita picha za wanaume weupe wenye ndevu. "Kant alisema: ""Mwanamke mwenye elimu anaweza kuwa na ndevu, kwa sababu hiyo inaonyesha kwa njia inayojulikana zaidi kina ambacho anajitahidi.""" Zaidi ya karne mbili baadaye, Sally Haslanger anaonyesha kuendelea umaarufu wa hisia kama hizo, kukumbuka mwenzake ambaye anamwambia alikuwa <unk>hajawahi kuona mwanamke wa kiwango cha kwanza [katika] falsafa na kamwe kutarajia kwa sababu wanawake walikuwa na uwezo wa kuwa na mawazo ya seminal<unk>. "Mwaka 2016, Daniel Storage na wenzake waligundua kuwa wanafunzi walitumia maneno ""mwenye kipaji"" na ""mwenye kipaji"" mara nyingi kuelezea maprofesa katika nyanja kama falsafa, ambapo wanawake na Waafrika wa Amerika ni wachache zaidi." Uwezo wa kuwa na michango ya mtu kutambuliwa kama riwaya katika falsafa inategemea, kwa sehemu kubwa, juu ya kama mchangiaji ni kuonekana kama uwezo wa kuwa na mawazo ya riwaya. Hivyo, tathmini za upendeleo za uwezo zina ushawishi mkubwa juu ya tathmini za ubunifu katika uwanja huo. Pili, kutafuta ubunifu huchochea uvumbuzi usio na maana. Ni rahisi sana kugundua kitu kipya, kama contours ya uchunguzi ni nyembamba kutosha na kizingiti kwa ajili ya novelty ni pretty chini. Hata hivyo, kwa muda, kama Massimo Pigliucci anavyosema, juhudi hizi:... zinatoa mapato yanayopungua, hivyo kwamba mada fulani za majadiliano huwa na upungufu zaidi na zaidi katika wigo, zaidi na zaidi matokeo ya kugawanya nywele za mantiki, na ya matumizi kidogo na kidogo au maslahi kwa mtu yeyote lakini kundi dogo la wataalamu ambao, kwa sababu yoyote, wamekuwa na shauku juu yake. Lakini hii si aina ya thamani ambayo inaweza kudumu nguvu taaluma nzima ya uchunguzi. Kwa hivyo utafutaji wa uvumbuzi unahatarisha kugeuza falsafa kuwa tasnia ya "mfumo wa haraka" - kupata faida ya mwenendo wa moto ili kutoa mchango wa haraka, tu kuishia kuzikwa katika matope ya akili mwishoni mwa msimu. Tatu, kutafuta uvumbuzi kwaweza kudhoofisha moja kwa moja ubunifu kwa kuzuia uwezo wetu wa kuutambua. Kushirikiana na watu wengine katika kugundua mambo mapya na ya kisasa kunatokeza aina fulani ya uzalishaji wa ziada. Hata hivyo, ongezeko kubwa la michango husababisha kuongezeka kwa habari. Wakati watathmini ni overloaded na overwhelmed, wao kutegemea heuristics kama ukoo kutathmini michango. Katika mazingira kama hayo, mawazo ya ubunifu ni uwezekano mdogo wa kutambuliwa, kwa kuwa thamani ya mchango mpya ni heuristically tathmini kwa sababu ya uhusiano wake na mifumo ya zamani na mifumo iliyopo. Watafiti hujifunza upesi kwamba ili kupata uhalali, ni lazima waunganishe mawazo yao na mifumo ya zamani. Kwa kushangaza, kile ambacho tayari kiko kinakuwa na mizizi zaidi. Ukweli kwamba wazo moja ya ubunifu hutokea kwa watu wengi haina kufanya wazo hilo yoyote chini ya ubunifu. Hatimaye, utafutaji wa uvumbuzi huendeleza hadithi bandia. Ingawa mchango wa kifalsafa unaweza kuonyesha mawazo ya awali na ubunifu, mara nyingi ni kesi kwamba wasomi wengine katika nyakati na maeneo tofauti wamefikiria na kuelezea mawazo sawa. Ukweli kwamba wazo moja ya ubunifu hutokea kwa watu wengi haina kufanya wazo hilo yoyote chini ya ubunifu; bado, sifa ya "ugunduzi" ni kawaida kuhifadhiwa kwa mtu mmoja (au, zaidi, kundi dogo la watu). Lakini ingawa mawazo ni inaonekana kwanza theorized katika kitabu fulani au makala katika ushirika na theorist fulani, wao hawana lazima kuwa na asili yao huko na kwa ujumla ni bidhaa ya akili nyingi na uzoefu. Mawazo ya falsafa yanatokana na ushiriki wetu katika mazungumzo, na "uhai" wa mazungumzo (wakati mwingine miongo na karne ndefu) haikamatwi kwa urahisi katika kitabu au makala moja, bila kujali jinsi ya nguvu ya bibliografia. Licha ya hayo, hadithi ya uvumbuzi kwa mamlaka inahusianisha hadithi za asili ya mawazo na pointi za kudumu katika wakati. Katika uchumi wenye matatizo ya uaminifu kama falsafa, uvumbuzi (kama ilivyo na ubunifu) ni uwezekano mkubwa zaidi kuhusishwa na wale wenye hadhi kubwa - kutokana na, kwa mfano, jinsia yao, jamii, uzee, umaarufu wa taasisi, au upatikanaji wa majukwaa ya kueneza kazi - bila kujali mahali pao halisi katika historia ya akili. Hata ambapo hadithi ya ugunduzi masquerades kama ukweli, sifa ya ugunduzi si kuaminika kufuatilia mfuatano wa matukio. Kwa kuzingatia changamoto hizi, je, ubunifu unaweza kubadilishwa? Kuanza, tunaweza kurekebisha jinsi novelty ni tathmini, kuhamisha tathmini mbali na mtu binafsi na kuelekea pamoja. Namaanisha hili kwa njia mbili. Kwa upande mmoja, watu binafsi wanaweza kuwa si watendaji sahihi wa tathmini hizo. Hiyo ni, kama watu binafsi, tunapaswa kuwa na shaka ya uwezo wetu wa kutathmini na kutangaza mchango - wote wetu na wengine - kama riwaya. Kile kinachoonekana kuwa kipya kwetu sio lazima kiwe kipya kwa mwingine; hata miongoni mwa wataalamu, mtazamo wa mtu binafsi unabaki mdogo. Hii inazungumza juu ya thamani ya kueneza kazi kwa wingi zaidi ili kuamua hali yake ya riwaya, badala ya kuwa na hali ya riwaya kuamua ikiwa kazi hiyo inasafirishwa kwanza. Tathmini ya novelty inapaswa kuwa tathmini ya pamoja, si tu tathmini ya wachache waliochaguliwa ambao kazi kama gatekeepers. Kwa muda mrefu kama wanafalsafa kuendelea ushiriki na maendeleo ndani ya uwanja ni amefungwa kwa novelty ya michango yao ya mtu binafsi, tathmini ya novelty ni uwezekano wa kukosa wigo na kuwa skewed na maslahi ya kibinafsi. Kwa upande mwingine, tunaweza kuachana na kuona watu binafsi kama masomo sahihi ya tathmini kama hizo. """Uchunguzi wetu wa ubunifu sio tu mazoezi ya kuangalia nyuma, kuona jinsi wazo au dhana inahusiana na kile kinachokuja kabla yake, lakini pia jinsi inahusiana na kile kinachopo kando yake na jinsi inavyounda kile kinachokuja baada yake." Wakati mwingine inawezekana tu kutambua mchango kama riwaya mbali mbele katika siku zijazo, wakati kuangalia nyuma na kuona mabadiliko ambayo ilikuwa ushered katika, lakini ambayo haiwezi kuwa kutambuliwa wakati wa kuibuka kwake. Vivyo hivyo, jambo ambalo huenda likaonekana kuwa jipya kwa wakati huo huenda likawa la kawaida sana. Hii inaonyesha kwamba mada sahihi ya uchambuzi wetu wa novelty ni fomu ya uchunguzi kwa ujumla, si mchango wowote wa mtu binafsi yenyewe. Hii inapaswa kutuongoza kutathmini novelty si kama kazi ya juhudi za mtu binafsi, lakini kama kazi ya mahusiano kati ya juhudi hizo. Wanafalsafa wa kitaaluma wanazoezwa zaidi na zaidi kujiona kuwa wenye thamani tu kadiri wanavyoweza kuzalisha maarifa. Labda zaidi ya msingi, hata hivyo, tunaweza reconfigure jinsi novelty ni thamani na kufuatiliwa. Kwa kuongezeka, mambo mapya yanathaminiwa na kufuatiliwa kama kusudi lenyewe. Njia hii ya kutathmini ni mfano wa mfano wa bidhaa ya falsafa, ambapo mafanikio ni thamani juu ya juhudi, na bidhaa ni thamani juu ya taratibu ambayo ni zinazozalishwa. Kwenye mfano wa bidhaa, uchunguzi wa kifalsafa unaendeshwa na kuzingatia isiyolingana na kufuatilia kwa ukaribu uzalishaji wa maarifa, mtazamo ambao Cynthia Townley anataja kama <unk>epistemophilia<unk>. Kama Townley anaandika <unk>upata maarifa imekuwa lengo pekee la uchunguzi wa kitaaluma na kukusanya maarifa inadhaniwa kuunda wajibu wa kipekee wa epistemic na bora kwa mawakala<unk>. Katika muktadha huu, wanafalsafa wa kitaaluma wanazoezwa zaidi na zaidi kujiona kuwa na thamani tu kwa kadiri wanavyoweza kuzalisha maarifa. Tunapojitahidi kupata mawazo mapya, tunafanya masomo yetu (na sisi wenyewe) yawe mambo halisi na ya kutumia kama chombo. Epistemophilia ni sifa ya thamani ya juu ya uzalishaji wa maarifa na mkusanyiko, na falsafa katika taasisi za kitaaluma inaweza kusemwa kukuza thamani hiyo. Ni hapa kwamba kufuatilia novelty kama mwisho katika yenyewe hupata mguu wake. Hivyo, kupinga mfano wa bidhaa ya thamani ya falsafa inaweza kusaidia kutoa ufahamu wa jinsi novelty, kwa kadiri ni thamani, ni thamani katika falsafa. Mbadala mmoja wa mtindo wa bidhaa ni mtindo wa synthesis ya thamani. Taasisi za kitaaluma hutumia mfumo ambao hugawanya michango katika nyanja tatu: utafiti, ufundishaji, na huduma. Wakati thamani ya kila moja ni tathmini tofauti na taasisi tofauti, maeneo haya ni kwa ujumla kutawaliwa na malengo tofauti na vikwazo. Michango ya utafiti ni iliyoundwa kwa ajili ya wasomi wengine, kwa lengo la kuzalisha uvumbuzi mpya na maendeleo ya maarifa. Mafundisho ni iliyoundwa kwa ajili ya wanafunzi (kujiandikisha) na malengo ya kueneza zaidi na uelewa wa maarifa ya sasa, kukuza kujifunza ushirikiano, na kuendeleza ujuzi na maslahi ya watu ambao watashiriki katika kuunda dunia yetu ya baadaye. Michango ya huduma ni iliyoundwa kwa ajili ya idara, vyuo vikuu, na taaluma pana, na malengo ya utendaji wa shirika na kiutawala. Huduma pia inajumuisha ushiriki na umma kwa ujumla na inakusudia kuhakikisha kwamba mahusiano na jamii zetu huunda maadili na mazoea ya taasisi. Inaweza kuonekana kama kama hii trichotomy ufanisi inashughulikia mbalimbali ya maadili kwamba mfano wa bidhaa ilikuwa alisema kuondoa. Hata hivyo, badala ya kutokeza mgawanyiko usio na upendeleo, kuna utaratibu wa cheo unaotokana na ngazi. Kwa sababu rasilimali na uwekezaji mkubwa katika taasisi zenye nguvu zaidi zinaelekezwa kwa maeneo ya utafiti, thamani ya msingi juu ya uzalishaji na mkusanyiko wa maarifa inaimarishwa kwa kasi. Zaidi ya hayo, mfumo huu arbitrarily kukata mbali faida ya kuunganisha njia tofauti za ushiriki, wengi ambao hawawezi sensibly kutenganishwa. "Kwa kweli, wengi wamesema kwamba falsafa inapaswa kushiriki zaidi na umma, sio tu kwa suala la kutoa huduma na rasilimali za elimu kwa jamii pana, au kwa kushirikiana na jamii ili kuwezesha maarifa na maadili yao kuunda uchunguzi wa kitaaluma, lakini hata zaidi ya msingi kuunda upya na kusambaza fursa - ardhi, fedha, rasilimali, na mtaji wa kijamii - ambayo taasisi zetu mara nyingi huhifadhi.""" Kugawanyika kwa ngazi, kugawanyika kati ya utafiti, ufundishaji, na huduma - ambapo kila moja inajibu malengo na watazamaji tofauti - haikuendeleza kwa urahisi njia za kuchanganya maadili haya au kurekebisha umuhimu wao. Tunapofikiria juu ya maadili ambayo huongoza mafundisho na huduma bora, mara nyingi haya yanapingana na dhana ya nini ni kuwa mtafiti mzuri au nini kinatarajiwa wakati wa kuzalisha maarifa katika niche maalum. Utafiti mara nyingi hufanyika katika muktadha wa mazungumzo madogo, ambapo mazungumzo kama hayo yanaonekana kuhitaji aina ngumu za mawasiliano. Aina hizi za mawasiliano hutumika kama uthibitisho wa utaalam wa mtafiti, kifupi ili kuwezesha uelewa wa haraka kati ya wachache waliochaguliwa, na udanganyifu wa watazamaji wasio na sifa ambao bado hawajaonyesha kuwa wanastahili kushiriki. Kwa upande mwingine, ufundishaji wa ujumuishaji na huduma ya ufanisi huchukua dhana ya wasikilizaji, kuunganisha michango na kuichunguza kutoka kwa safu ya mitazamo, na kutibu uchunguzi kama hai na ya ushirikiano. Ikiwa mchango hufanya wazo liwe rahisi zaidi, au kuchunguza mazingira ya uchunguzi, au kupanga na kukusanya juhudi zilizokuwa tofauti hapo awali, au kuelekeza tena umakini wetu kwa kitu ambacho tayari kiko, au kuchunguza njia tofauti ambazo uchunguzi unaweza kueleweka au kutumika kwa manufaa, kwa nini kufikiri kwamba hii ni ya kipya? Kwenye mfano wa synthesis ya thamani, utafutaji wa uvumbuzi katika falsafa unabadilishwa ili kuunganisha na kuunganisha malengo haya. Ujuzi si thamani tu kwa kadiri inavyotengenezwa, lakini pia kwa kadiri inavyosambazwa, kueleweka, kutumika, kuhojiwa, kuunganishwa, kukataliwa, na kutekelezwa - kwa neno moja, kuishi. Ujuzi si thamani tu kwa kadiri inavyotengenezwa, lakini pia kwa kadiri inavyosambazwa, kueleweka, kutumika, kuhojiwa, kuunganishwa, kukataliwa, na kutekelezwa - kwa neno moja, kuishi. Kama Pigliucci anavyosema, "Watu wanahitaji mengi zaidi ya ukweli na fomula, zaidi ya majaribio na uchunguzi. Wanahitaji kuiona kwa mtu wa kwanza, na wanahitaji kutafakari kwa ukali juu ya mambo yote ya kuwepo kwao. Wanahitaji kuelewa, kwa maneno pana zaidi iwezekanavyo, ambayo ina maana wanahitaji kutafakari. Kuunganisha na synthesizing maadili haya huenda njia ndefu katika foregrounding malengo ya usimamizi mzuri kwa ajili ya siku zijazo za utafiti wa kifalsafa - wote ndani ya chuo kikuu na nje yake. Vinginevyo, tunaweza kuchukua nafasi ya mfano wa bidhaa na mfano wa mchezo. Falsafa inajumuisha shughuli mbalimbali ambazo tunaweza, katika muktadha mwingine, kwa urahisi kuorodhesha kama michezo. Falsafa inahusisha sparring argumentational, mchezo wa maneno, kujenga na kutoroka pingamizi, kutambua na kutumia udhaifu au mapungufu katika nafasi ya mpinzani, na kuzalisha au kutatua puzzles na paradoxes. Falsafa pia inahusisha kujenga na kuchunguza ulimwengu, kujenga mifano na mifano, kubuni majaribio ya mawazo, na kufikiri kwa dhana. Wakati wa kwanza inahusu aina ya mchezo ambayo inajumuisha changamoto na vikwazo, ya mwisho inahusisha aina ya zaidi ya mawazo ya kucheza. Hata hivyo, michezo yaweza kuonekana kuwa ya kawaida na ya kimakusudi, na mfano wa mchezo wa falsafa waweza kuonekana kuwa kinyume cha akili. Je, tatizo halikuwa katika kupuuza mambo kupita kiasi? Kutilia shaka maoni kwamba michezo ni trivial na arbitrary, C. Thi Nguyen anaandika kwamba michezo kutoa:... njia ya kutaja modes maalum ya shirika. Hii ndiyo inafanya michezo iwe aina ya sanaa ya kipekee. Game wabunifu kuteua malengo na uwezo kwa mchezaji; wao kuunda agential mifupa ambayo mchezaji itakuwa kuishi wakati wa mchezo. Watengenezaji wa michezo ya kubahatisha hufanya kazi katika njia ya shirika. Hivyo, kucheza michezo ya kubahatisha huonyesha uwezo wa pekee wa kibinadamu. "Ikiwa falsafa inafafanuliwa kwa usahihi kama ""mchezo,"" wanafalsafa wanaweza kusemwa kuchunguza aina mpya za shughuli za binadamu zinazotumika katika mchakato wa kutengeneza maana na kutafiti juu ya ulimwengu." Hizi ni aina za vyombo vinavyohitajika kushiriki na matatizo ya kifalsafa ya wakati wetu wa kisasa na wakati ujao, kuelewa jinsi matatizo haya yamekabiliwa kabla na majibu mbalimbali yalivyopingwa, kuandaa na kuhoji matokeo yetu, na kukabiliana na nafasi yetu wenyewe katika ulimwengu katika muktadha wa uchunguzi huu. Kwa Nguyen, <unk>Games kugeuka kuwa mbinu ya kuandika na kupitisha mashirika sculpted. Wao basi sisi kuwasiliana njia ya shirika, na kuhifadhi yao. Michezo hebu kuunda kumbukumbu ya mashirika <unk>. Kama falsafa ni mchezo, basi ni nani wabunifu wa mchezo? Kama wabunifu wa mchezo si mwakilishi wa wachezaji wa mchezo, kunaweza kuwa na kutofautiana au kupunguzwa katika aina ya shirika ambayo inaweza kuchunguzwa, kutambuliwa, au kuthaminiwa. Kwa mfano, maudhui ya matatizo mengi ya kifalsafa na njia za kujieleza huenda yakadhani aina fulani za ukoo wa kitamaduni na kuondoa nyingine. Zaidi ya hayo, wakati falsafa inahusika katika mazingira yaliyoathiriwa na ubaguzi wa kijinsia na ubaguzi wa rangi na aina nyingine za kutengwa, watu wanaweza kulazimishwa kubadilisha au kuficha mambo ya wakala wao kushiriki. Ushirikiano kama sawa unaweza kupunguzwa kwa njia ya bandia kulingana na nani anayeamua sheria za kucheza. """Ikiwa ""archifu ya vyombo"" sisi kama wanafalsafa ni uwezo wa kuchunguza ni mdogo kwa wale vyombo mawazo na watu weupe na wasomi wa magharibi, basi sheria na miundo ya michezo yetu wanahitaji marekebisho ya dhati." Kwa mfano wa mchezo, thamani ya ubunifu katika falsafa haiko sana katika mawazo yanayopaswa kutengenezwa, lakini katika juhudi za kujitahidi zinazohitajika kuzizalisha. Hata hivyo, mtu anaweza kuwa na wasiwasi, inaweza kuhisi kutoheshimu kutibu falsafa kama mchezo, kutokana na uzito wa mada nyingi ambazo wanafalsafa hufikiria, ikiwa ni pamoja na utu, ukandamizaji, wajibu wa kimaadili, ufahamu, utambulisho, na kadhalika. Hapa, hata hivyo, mchezo mfano inaweza kweli kutusaidia kutambua wale methodologies kifalsafa na mbinu ambayo kutaja njia mbaya ya shirika kwa muktadha fulani au kazi. Nguyen anaelezea njia mbili za kucheza: kucheza mafanikio (au kucheza kwa <unk> kushinda <unk>) na kucheza kujitahidi (au kucheza kwa ajili ya mapambano). Sasa kunaweza kuwa na baadhi ya uchunguzi wa kifalsafa ambapo mwelekeo wa mchezo wa mafanikio ni tu haifai; kama mafanikio inakuwa mwisho au lengo pekee na lengo, juhudi zetu kama wanafalsafa kuwa co-opted na malengo haya. Vivyo hivyo, ushiriki wa ufanisi katika uchunguzi wa kifalsafa, kama mchezo wowote wa ufanisi, unahitaji kwamba washiriki wote wanawajibika kwa majukumu wanayofanya katika juhudi za ushirikiano. Kutokuwa na uwekezaji wa pande zote za kujitolea na kuheshimu, ushiriki wetu wa pamoja katika uchunguzi kama huo kwa kweli unaweza kuwa kupoteza wakati (au mbaya zaidi!). Kwa mfano wa mchezo, thamani ya ubunifu katika falsafa haiko sana katika mawazo yanayopaswa kutengenezwa, lakini katika juhudi za kujitahidi zinazohitajika kuzizalisha. Hivyo, kufuatilia ubunifu katika falsafa inaweza kuhamasisha sisi kuchunguza, kufunua, na kueleza njia tofauti ya shirika - wote kwa ajili yetu wenyewe na kwa wachezaji wenzetu. Emmalon Davis ni profesa msaidizi katika idara ya falsafa katika Chuo Kikuu cha Michigan, Ann Arbor. Kazi yake inachunguza michakato ya kijamii ambayo maarifa hutengenezwa kwa pamoja na kusambazwa ndani na kati ya jamii. Hasa, yeye inaangalia jinsi jamii na jinsia ukandamizaji kutumia ushawishi kupotosha juu ya michakato hii. Hivi sasa anafanya kazi kwenye mradi unaochunguza falsafa ya kisiasa ya mnyanyasaji wa wanawake weusi Maria Stewart. Utafiti huu unaungwa mkono na ushirika kutoka ACLS na kutoka Taasisi ya Notre Dame ya Mafunzo ya Juu. "Kama ilivyoelezwa katika makala ya ""Filosophy and the Future of the World"" (Kutoka kwa The Philosopher, vol. 110, hapana. " (The New Basics: Philosophy) 4 ("Mafundisho Mapya: Falsafa")" Hatuna fedha na msaada wako unathaminiwa sana.