The world’s view of the state of armed conflict is severely distorted, in that it bears almost no resemblance to the actual scale or severity of conflicts in the world. This is primarily due to the highly selective and increasingly assimilated agendas of the media, policymakers, the public and academia. This situation results in ‘stealth conflicts’ – conflicts that are undetected and absent from these agendas. Using the massive conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo as the prime example of such stealth conflicts, this paper demonstrates how, for the past five years, the largest and deadliest conflict since World War II has been almost completely absent from international consciousness outside the region.
Perception defines our reality. Where access to information that may enhance our perception is limited, the reality we see becomes distorted and warped. Our view of the state of armed conflict in the world today is one of the most unfortunate victims of such distortion. In spite of supposedly unprecedented access to information, the information presented to us on conflicts occurring throughout the world is so skewed that the reality is almost unrecognisable. This is primarily due to the highly selective and increasingly assimilated agendas of the media, powerful governments, academics, NGOs and lobby groups. One or two of the 20 to 30 conflicts ongoing throughout the world are ‘chosen’ to be the subject of intense scrutiny and selective indignation – very rarely on the basis of scale or the level of humanitarian emergency. The others remain, to all intents and purposes, undetected – absent from international consciousness.
This is particularly true of the most conflict-torn region of the world – Africa, which has produced more than 90 percent of the conflict-related deaths since the end of the Cold War. Despite the scale of the human suffering, it seems that Western-centric consciousness (and outrage) ends at the Suez Canal. Nowhere is this more painfully clear than in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), which, from the perspective of media, public, policy and academic agendas outside the region, almost does not exist. In reality, it is a humanitarian catastrophe of virtually unfathomable proportions, caused by a war that has raged across more than half of a country almost the size of Western Europe, and has seen the direct military involvement of eight foreign countries. Not only is it the deadliest war in the world today, it is the deadliest since World War II, having resulted in an estimated 3.3 million conflict-related deaths since fighting broke out in August 1998.
After introducing the concept of stealth conflicts and presenting a background of the conflict in the DRC, this paper will demonstrate the dynamics behind the almost complete marginalization of the conflict through an examination of media, policy, public and academic agendas in the Western world. Based on this examination, it attempts to systematize the concept of stealth conflicts. It concludes with a somewhat pessimistic outlook as to the possibility of a change in this disturbing distortion of reality.
Recognition that certain conflicts are marginalized and excluded from the media, policy and public agendas is not new. Such conflicts are sometimes referred to as ‘forgotten conflicts’ or ‘orphan conflicts’. It can be considered, however, that these terms are misnomers. For a conflict to be ‘forgotten’, it must once have been ‘remembered’, or some significant attention given to its resolution. For a conflict to be ‘orphaned’, it must once have had ‘parents’ that were concerned with the well-being of the country in question.
The conflict in Somalia, or even that in Angola (to some extent), could be considered forgotten or orphan conflicts, for they were once remembered, and efforts (albeit unsuccessful) were made towards bringing about a conclusion to the hostilities. The lack of genuine and determined interest soon became apparent, however, and troop contributors withdrew and the ongoing conflicts were forgotten. The conflict in the DRC, however, does not fit this profile. It did not disappear from the ‘radar’ of international consciousness. The fact is, it was never really on it.
Perhaps the term ‘stealth conflict’ is more appropriate in such a case. If we consider the term in the context of the military technology that allows bombers to remain undetected on radar as they bomb their targets, certain parallels become apparent. Like the stealth bomber, the conflict in the DRC has caused a huge amount of death and destruction, while somehow remaining undetected on all of the manifestations of the international community’s radar screens. Those waging the war have not necessarily been deliberately secretive: the conflict simply hasn’t been noticed by the outside world. The term can also be considered appropriate in the sense that the majority of those who have died in the war have been killed by stealth. They were not killed by noisy gunshots or explosions, but by starvation and/or preventable and treatable diseases directly resulting from people fleeing their homes and farms, the destruction of infrastructure, and the breakdown of agriculture, public services and supply lines.
Whether or not a conflict is noticed depends on the awareness of, and interaction among, the manifestations of international consciousness (the media, policymakers, the public and academia). Attempting to systematize the concept of stealth conflicts requires a more detailed examination of international consciousness in this sense, which is provided below. Suffice it to note at this point that the DRC is by no means the only stealth conflict. The majority of conflicts in the world do not appear (or appear only fleetingly) on the radar screens of international consciousness.
The conflict in the Sudan (which has resulted in more than 2 million deaths since 1983), for example, remains a very low priority on the policy agenda, and is totally absent from the media agenda. The later stages of the conflict and historic peace in Angola went by virtually unnoticed and unsupported. Other major conflicts, such as those in Algeria and the Republic of the Congo, are also almost completely ignored. Prolonged conflict in Liberia was briefly noticed only when rebels had already entered Monrovia and the question of possible US involvement was raised. Similarly, Burundi’s conflict received fleeting attention when Nelson Mandela (with celebrity status in the West) took on the role of mediator. While the USA, UK and Australia were invading Iraq, a democracy in the Central African Republic fell unnoticed, overthrown by an armed rebellion. These are just a few examples of conflicts that are routinely marginalized and ignored.
Nor is the stealth with which the victims in these conflicts die unique to the DRC. Contrary to popular belief, bullets and bombs (‘smart’ or otherwise) are not the biggest killers in modern-day war. Starvation and disease are by far the biggest killers in almost any war. The proportion of such ‘silent’ killings, however, is particularly pronounced in stealth conflicts, largely because conflicts that are undetected do not attract the attention or indignation of aid donors or humanitarian NGOs and are therefore unchecked.
What makes the DRC unique, however, is the scale (absolutely unparalleled in recent history) of death and suffering, coupled with the fact that despite this suffering, it has somehow managed to remain undetected. Let us put aside, for a moment, the millions of those who have been injured, tortured, raped, orphaned, forced to flee their homes, starved or have otherwise suffered as a result of the conflict in the DRC, and focus only on the number of those who have actually lost their lives: 3.3 million. Three point three million is a number so high that it is extremely difficult to fathom, especially when it is used to represent the number of human lives lost as a result of a catastrophic war. It is worth noting that more than 60 of the world’s countries have populations less than 3.3 million. To further emphasise the relative scale of the conflict, the following graph compares the death toll of the conflict in the DRC to other more ‘popular’ conflicts.
With jet airplanes, television, fax machines, computers, e-mail, internet, satellite videophones and other technological innovations, our ability to gather, process and disseminate any amount of information literally from anywhere in the world is at a level unprecedented in human history. Newspapers carrying detailed information of the day’s events around the world arrive on our doorsteps the next morning. So-called ‘world’ news now spews out of television sets on multiple cable channels twenty-four hours a day. With a computer and a telephone, the internet allows us to access any amount of real-time information from anywhere in the world at any time. Considering this, and in light of the massive scale of the conflict and unparalleled level of death and suffering, it can be considered that the DRC is, without a doubt, the greatest stealth conflict in human history.
Africa’s World War in the DRC
The DRC’s current conflict is extremely complex, and describing the conflict in a singular sense may be somewhat misleading. It is in fact an intertwined convergence of several conflicts – on local, national and regional levels – which are focused primarily on the eastern half of the country. It has its origins in the legacy (in terms of citizenship rights and land ownership) of forced migrations of Rwandan-speaking people under Belgian colonialism, in internal divisions exacerbated by decades of misrule under the US-backed Mobutu, in decades of ethnic conflict and refugee flows culminating in the 1994 Rwandan genocide, and in the spillover of five foreign civil wars deep into DRC territory.
Each of the players – the DRC government, the numerous rebel groups (and their often opposing factions), the local militias, and the eight foreign countries who have intervened militarily – has or has had different objectives and agendas. Interestingly, it has been primarily the interests of the surrounding African states, rather than those of the colonial masters or Cold War patrons, that have dictated the course of the conflict. The hostile operations of rebel movements from bases in the DRC provided much of the rationale for intervention by Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi. The DRC’s relations with rebel movements from Angola and the Sudan also weighed heavily on their decision to intervene. Access to resources in the DRC has also been a key factor in foreign involvement on both sides, with deals between the DRC and Zimbabwe and Namibia in particular proving critical in securing their intervention.
The territory – which has an area roughly the size of Western Europe, covered in jungle – was cut virtually in half by the conflict. The terrain and lack of infrastructure do not generally allow long overland troop advances, and typical offensives saw troops transported by boat or plane, securing only major towns, ports, airfields and mines. Already delicate supply lines (most notably commercial traffic on the Congo River) needed to provide basic necessities to the general population have been largely cut off. Agriculture, health care and other public services have collapsed, particularly in the east.
In terms of a history of the conflict, the 1994 Rwandan genocide is perhaps an appropriate starting point. As the genocide passed its peak, Hutu perpetrators of the genocide, their families, and innocent civilians fearing reprisals, fled Rwanda as refugees into neighbouring Zaire as the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) entered Rwanda from its bases in Uganda. In the refugee camps near the Rwandan-Zaire border, the Hutu militants regrouped, recruited and trained soldiers and, using the camps as bases, began to launch attacks against Rwanda. In response, Rwanda, together with Uganda, Burundi, Angola and Eritrea, entered the DRC in 1996 in support of a loose alliance of anti-Mobutu rebels. Rwandan forces broke up the refugee camps, and the Hutu militants fled deeper into Zaire. Finding little resistance in their pursuit, the anti-Mobutu alliance headed for Kinshasa, toppling the regime in 1997. Laurent Kabila was installed as president, and Zaire was renamed the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Rifts soon developed in the friendship between the new government and the backers that had propelled it to power. Dissatisfied with Kabila’s failure to deal with the Hutu militias and other rebel groups based in the DRC, and confident that, having done it before, they could once again bring about regime change, Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi troops crossed the border into the DRC in August 1998, allying with a new set of domestic groups opposed to the Kabila regime, and advanced rapidly across the country. Part two of Africa’s World War was underway.
Kabila moved quickly to attract support for his regime. Rwanda’s bold attempt to take Kinshasa from the west using airborne troops was foiled (much to its surprise) by Angolan intervention. Zimbabwe, Namibia, Chad and Sudan also rallied to Kabila’s call, and a stalemate ensued. The Lusaka Peace Accords were signed in 1999 by the countries involved and by the main Rwandan and Ugandan proxies – the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) and the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC). The UN Security Council established an observer mission, which was later transformed into a small peacekeeping mission (known by its French acronym MONUC). The full deployment of the force was repeatedly delayed, and its role remains relatively negligible against the backdrop of the conflict.
Several other African peace initiatives have brought about numerous agreements, including a plan for an interim government pending elections, but the impact on the situation on the ground has been limited, particularly in Ituri, and the Kivus. While most of the foreign forces deployed in the DRC have now been withdrawn (Uganda began its withdrawal in April 2003), the internal conflict continues between Rwandan and Ugandan proxies (closely controlled by their backers), DRC Government forces and its allies, Mai Mai militia groups, Hutu militias and other rebel movements from neighbouring countries. Allies (most notably Rwanda and Uganda) have become enemies, and enemies, allies. Factions have split again into factions, and despite some positive developments, widespread and sustainable peace remains elusive.
Ironically, the conflict is economically self-sustaining, thanks to the DRC’s mineral wealth. The continuation of the conflict perpetuates conditions favourable to the exploitation of the resources of the DRC by parties to the conflict (as well as the individuals representing these parties) and opportunistic corporations and individuals. Many such entities have been implicated in the final report of the UN Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Apart from the parties to the conflict, those implicated include multinational corporations based in Belgium, the UK, the USA and South Africa. While resources exploited include diamonds, gold, silver, copper and timber, it is coltan – a mineral that is an essential component in mobile phones and other electronic devices – that has been the most influential resource in the conflict.
International Consciousness and the DRC
International consciousness is used in this study to refer to the collective contents of the agendas of the media, policymakers, the public and academics. The position of the conflict in the DRC in relation to each of these agendas will be dealt with individually below, but it is necessary first to examine briefly how these agendas interact – giving birth to stealth conflicts.
Agenda-setting research to date seems to support the hypothesis that the media agenda plays a key role in shaping the public agenda, and that the public agenda in turn affects the policy agenda (through public opinion and powerful lobby groups). While the full extent of the so-called CNN-factor is not completely understood, it can be considered that policymakers and the media both exert considerable influence over each other. Clever policymakers use the media to broadcast their policies and raise the position of an agenda item. Conversely, where there is indecision or indifference among policymakers, saturated media coverage can propel an item into a high position on the policy agenda. Collectively, academics are able to project some influence on the policy agenda, but are also subject to considerable influence from the policy and media agendas, as will be demonstrated below.
Whatever the dynamics of the projection of influence, it can be considered that all of these agendas have become tightly intertwined, with each feeding off and mimicking the one that takes the lead in agenda setting (usually the policymakers and sometimes the media). Ironically, this is partly a reflection of the assimilation of the flow of information in society, rather than the diversification that might have been expected with the explosion of the internet and other advances in information technology. The dissemination of information technology has led to a greatly pronounced bandwagon effect in and between all sectors of agenda setting.
In terms of conflict, the media, policymakers, the public, and even academics have shown that collectively, they are only able to consciously process one or two conflicts at a time. Thus, usually at a rate of about one a year, a conflict is ‘chosen’ to be the subject of intense scrutiny (primarily based on the interests of powerful policymakers), and it will appear as a blinding spot in the centre of policy, media, public and academic radar screens – obscuring all other points of possible interest. In 1999 it was Kosovo (and later East Timor), followed by a minor upsurge in violence in Israel-Palestine in 2000. The 9-11 attacks and war on Afghanistan covered late 2001 and early 2002, and a non-conflict (and in fact non-crisis) situation in Iraq was taken up as the chosen conflict-to-be for late 2002 to early 2003.
In the absence of such a blinding spot, other conflicts (or developments in peace processes) will sometimes make appearances on international consciousness, such as Kashmir, Chechnya, Northern Ireland, and Sierra Leone. For the past 5 years, the conflict in the DRC, however, has been notably absent, not only from the list of chosen conflicts, but even from the list of peripheral conflicts that appeared on Western radar screens.
The Media Agenda
In this era of increasingly competitive commercial mass media, simplicity and sensationalism are the keys, and news is commonly packaged as a form of infotainment. Coverage of conflict is highly oversimplified and is typically forced into the framework of a Hollywood-style morality play – complete with villain, victim and hero. As a product to be bought and sold, news must also be ‘fresh’ – live coverage is certainly preferable, and any story that takes more than a day or two to reach and report is deemed unworthy of reporting. Competition has also seen budgets for newsgathering slashed, such that rather than stationing reporters in the field, news corporations rely heavily on news gathered from government officials in the reporters’ home countries. This has considerably raised the influence of Western governments in agenda setting.
With all these factors in mind, the odds are certainly stacked against the DRC making an appearance on the media agenda. Firstly, it is far too complex to be bent to fit a simple morality play formula, or to be marketed as a product that can easily be understood in a thirty-second sound bite by the consumer. Secondly, its location does not allow its stories to reach the market as fresh news. With the terrain, lack of infrastructure and sheer distances involved, it may take days (and considerable cost, danger and/or discomfort) for a camera crew or reporter to find a story. Thirdly, the media industry is wary of perceived compassion fatigue in the West (dating back to its saturation coverage of war and famine in Ethiopia in the 1980s) with regards to the suffering of black Africans. Finally, as the DRC is not on the radars of Western governments, it does not appear on those of a media industry that has a tendency to take its cues from the government.
For all of these reasons, gatekeepers in the media industry decided (and have continued to decide over the past five years) that covering the DRC conflict is simply not worth the cost or effort that would be required. The dominance of a handful of powerful Western media corporations and the bandwagon effect ensure that this blackout is practically universal. In a study that ranked the level of coverage of conflicts in television news and newspapers in the year 2000, the lack of coverage on the DRC and the nature of the ‘other side’ of the CNN factor were made abundantly clear. The DRC was barely noticed by CNN and BBC world news, being the 14th and 15th most-covered conflict, respectively. In terms of coverage time, a viewer who watched one 30-minute program of world news every day on CNN and BBC would have seen just 16 minutes of coverage of the DRC conflict on CNN and 29 minutes on BBC over the entire year. The same viewer would have seen 8 hours and 34 minutes on CNN and 9 hours and 41 minutes on BBC of coverage of the small-scale clashes in Israel-Palestine.
Nor was the DRC on the radars of the newspapers. It was 8th and 11th most-covered conflict in the New York Times and Le Monde, respectively, and did not even register in Japan’s Yomiuri Shinbun. In all three newspapers, its coverage was but a fraction of that of other conflicts. Coverage of the DRC was one-twelfth of that of Israel-Palestine in the New York Times, and one-eighteenth in Le Monde. The sad truth is that one can be a regular viewer of cable TV news, and read newspapers from cover to cover, and still have very little idea of what is happening in the world.
Even non-governmental media watchdog organisations critical of the media fail to notice the glaring omission of the DRC (or other major African conflicts) from the media. Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting (FAIR), for example, largely concerns itself with exposing the rampant patriotism and self-censorship in the Western media. While this is a valid pursuit, in commenting primarily on the content of topics the media chooses to take up, it also ignores the topics that the media ignores. Among FAIR’s numerous articles and broadcasts since the war in the DRC broke out in 1998, only 1 article was devoted to the DRC (among a total of 11 on Africa). In contrast, more than 50 were devoted to Israel-Palestine, and more than 70 to Iraq.
The Policy Agenda
Presidents, prime ministers, politicians and their spokespersons contribute significantly to the distortion of reality regarding the state of conflict, adjusting it to suit their policy goals. Those hoping to maintain the status quo, or avoid getting involved in a conflict, ignore (or downplay) injustice and human rights abuse. Those beating war drums single out (and often exaggerate) examples of injustice and human rights abuse. It was government policy under the Clinton Administration in the USA, for example, to avoid the use of the word ‘genocide’ in reference to what was clearly an ongoing genocide in Rwanda, to avoid involvement. There were no such qualms in responding to a low-intensity conflict in Kosovo, and great liberties were taken with the use of the word in an attempt to justify NATO’s war.
The ugly reality is that injustice and human rights abuse exist in every country in the world, in varying degrees, and the level of outrage displayed by governments, to these situations, is very rarely proportionate to the degree of injustice. The deafening silence on the DRC makes it painfully obvious that the assertion that there are certain levels of killing, human rights abuse and human suffering that the West simply will not tolerate (an assertion used, for example, to justify the war on Yugoslavia), is little more than rhetoric designed to pursue narrow foreign policy objectives.
Disproportionate levels of humanitarian assistance provided by governments are one of the most telling signs of distorted Western policy radars. Lamenting “double standards” in an address to the UN Security Council, Executive Director of the World Food Programme (WPF), James Morris, commented that “commitments to humanitarian aid are political choices”, and posed the question, “How is it we routinely accept a level of suffering and hopelessness in Africa we would never accept in any part of the world?” A comparison of the total amount of humanitarian aid offered in response to (as well as outside) consolidated appeals by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian affairs (OCHA) for complex emergencies is quite revealing:
Total humanitarian assistance: Jan. 1999 – Jun. 2003 (millions of US dollars)
Four and a half years of appeals for the DRC attracted only 349 million US dollars. This pales in comparison to the more than 1 billion dollars raised in just 3 months for Iraq, or the 1.7 billion for one and a half years in Afghanistan, or the 1.5 billion for four years in South-Eastern Europe. The 180 million raised for tiny East Timor in less than one year was more than the amount raised for the DRC in any year – it was fifteen times that raised for the DRC in 2000. Even if we add the contributions for the four and a half years of appeals for the Great Lakes region and Central Africa – the most conflict-prone region in the world – the total (923 million) still does not compare with the assistance provided for much smaller and much shorter conflicts.
Likewise, in the realm of peacemaking, high-level mediation from outside the continent has been notably absent. While some low-key attempts at diplomacy with a view to achieving some limited objectives have been made, such as the UK’s mediation meetings with Rwanda and Uganda (referred to as “little more than photo opportunities over cups of tea”), and the US pressuring Rwanda to withdraw from the DRC, there remains little will in the West to become even politically involved in a solution. Furthermore, given the economic involvement of numerous Western multinationals and arms sales, rather than being pure apathy, there remains the possibility that Western inaction may be an indication that benefits from the continuation of conflict outweigh those of its conclusion – a view that is supported by allegations of covert involvement in the hostilities, and the blocking of peacekeeping reinforcements.
The DRC has not been absent from UN Security Council discussions (although it did take seven months for the Council to adopt a resolution on the issue), and the Council has continued to call for an end to the conflict through press statements, presidential statements and resolutions. With next to no political will among its members, however, little else has been done. A token peacekeeping force was authorised in 2000 but the deployment has been marked by lengthy delays, and was still not fully deployed in mid-2003. The decision to deploy peacekeepers appeared to be made largely out of a need to be seen to be ‘doing something’, after accusations of double standards following interventions in Kosovo and East Timor. In any case, deploying peacekeepers (as opposed to peace enforcers) where there was no peace to keep, and doing so in such small numbers, was clearly an inappropriate (and highly dangerous) response: a Band-Aid solution.
Sadly, the United Nations Secretariat and its affiliated agencies are not immune to the pressures of lopsided international consciousness, and are forced to adapt to the realities that surround and govern them. The UN agencies that set up the consolidated appeals for humanitarian aid cannot control the amount that is donated or pledged, but the setting of the amount requested reveals trends similar to those of the donors. OCHA’s flash appeal for Iraq, for example, was the largest ever, with a request of more than 2.2 billion dollars for just 6 months. The total amount requested from five years of appeals for the DRC and the Great Lakes region and Central Africa combined was only 1.4 billion.
Publications and websites of UN agencies also reveal tendencies to follow the popular conflicts of the times. In May 2003, for example, the UN main homepage displayed special links to Iraq, the Middle East ‘Roadmap’, and terrorism, as did the UN News Centre. Other agencies, such as UNICEF, UNDP and OCHA also displayed special links to pages on Iraq on their main homepages.
The Public Agenda
The conflict in the DRC has attracted so little attention in the media and policy agendas that, collectively, the public – completely at the mercy of media and policy agenda setting – has virtually no idea that the conflict even exists.
For example, in a simple questionnaire survey, 37 Australian university students taking a course on war and peace, were asked to name what they thought were the three deadliest conflicts in the world, and the three deadliest African conflicts since the end of the Cold War, as well as the conflict they thought, in terms of humanitarian suffering, was most in need of a solution. Of the 37, only one person could name the DRC as one of the top three deadliest conflicts in the world (and that was at third, behind Israel-Palestine and Afghanistan). The most common response was that the Israel-Palestine conflict was the deadliest (9), and an astonishing 21 (more than half) thought that, in terms of humanitarian suffering, that conflict was the most in need of a solution. Only one could name the DRC as the deadliest conflict in Africa (13 could not even name a single African conflict). While the sample size is small, it serves as an example of how distorted the public’s view on conflict is – particular as those surveyed could be expected to have an above-average interest in (and knowledge of) the subject.
Foreign policy polling services also reveal significant imbalances in awareness of conflict in the world, with a lack of mention of the DRC, and Africa in general. Gallup polls on foreign policy, for example, focus on China, Cuba, Iraq, Kosovo, the Middle East and Russia. No references to the DRC were returned in searches for references to the DRC on the Gallup website, demonstrating a total absence of the subject, whereas similar searches resulted in 75 references to Israel and 59 to Kosovo. It should also be noted that of the 26 offices Gallup has established around the world, none is based in Africa.
Powerful and well-organised lobby groups, primarily made up of diasporas and groups with ethnic and/or religious ties to countries or regions affected by conflict, are also able to influence the position of a conflict on the radar of international consciousness. Lobby groups connected to Israel and, to a lesser extent, Palestine, for example, are largely responsible for maintaining a constant and disproportionately high level of Western media, policy, public and academic interest in the relatively minor Israeli-Palestinian conflict. African diasporas (much less those of the DRC) are not sufficiently unified, organised, powerful or motivated to influence the position of African conflicts on the various manifestations of international consciousness.
Humanitarian NGOs are another manifestation of the public agenda. Such organisations are dependent on donations from the general public and government funding – making them highly susceptible to the bandwagon effect. Capitalizing on public sentiment created by the media and policymakers, many NGOs, in an effort to increase donations to their organisation and expand their sphere of influence, set up special appeals (even advertising in newspapers and on television) for donations for the victims of popular conflicts. They also take advantage of heavy government funding for NGO projects in such conflict (or post-conflict) zones. Similarly, television stations set up hotlines for donations, and rock stars (or coalitions of rock stars) hold charity concerts or produce charity albums in response to the popular conflicts of the times. The conflict in the DRC has yet to be the recipient of such attention.
The public’s lopsided view of the world shows in the comparative levels of private contributions to OCHA’s humanitarian appeals. Four and a half years of appeals for the DRC and the Great Lakes and Central Africa combined raised but one-thirty-eighth of the amount raised for South-Eastern Europe, one-thirty-second of that for one and a half years for Afghanistan, and one-fifth of that for just 3 months for Iraq.
Private contributions to OCHA appeals: Jan. 1999 – Jun. 2003 (millions of US dollars)
The internet has been hailed as a revolutionary tool in empowering the public to be in control of the information they can access. In theory, it should allow the public to circumvent the biases of the media and policymakers, and access information that better reflects reality. Unlike the newspapers, radio and television, however, the internet requires active participation in searching for specific information. Thus, without initial interest and some background knowledge, the information will not be accessed in the first place. In this sense, conventional media (based on passive audience participation) remain infinitely more powerful than the internet in agenda-setting.
The Academic Agenda
One of the most important functions of academics in the field of international politics, relations and policy, is to step back and grasp the ‘big picture’ – seeing the world in an objective light that policymakers are generally incapable of. From such a vantage point, academics are (in theory) able to educate and advise policymakers. They also bear the responsibility for the recording of human history. All too often, however, the academic community follows the cues of its governments, devoting its attention to areas in which powerful Western governments are interested or involved. Objective analysis is generally made within the boundaries of those areas.
NATO’s bombardment of Yugoslavia over Kosovo, for example, was matched with a bombardment of academic studies and analytical thinking. ‘Humanitarian intervention’ and ‘sovereignty’ were the resulting buzzwords that dominated the academic journals and books in the years that followed. The 9-11 attacks on the USA and the war on Afghanistan made ‘terrorism’ the blinding spot on the academic radar. The invasion and occupation of Iraq has since brought the issue of imposed democracy to the forefront of the academic agenda, along with the related question of the relevance of the UN Security Council. It is ironic that the illegal war on Iraq, rather than the marginalization of the DRC, has been the trigger in the academic community’s questioning of the effectiveness of the Council.
The failure of the Western academic community to adequately analyse the world’s largest conflict since World War II (or most other African conflicts, for that matter), can only be described as collective academic negligence, and brings into question the very relevance of the security studies field to the modern world. With very few exceptions, Western periodicals that deal with international affairs have failed to devote even a single article to analysis of the DRC. Such journals tend to devote more articles to the issue of Israel-Palestine than to the entire African continent. The Keesings Record of World Events is also an example of how the recording of history is being skewed. In 1999, for example, its issues contained a total of approximately 35 pages of writing on Yugoslavia (Kosovo), compared to 5 for the DRC. In 2002, 32 pages on Israel-Palestine overshadowed the 3 pages devoted to the DRC. In the four years from 1999 to 2002, it contained a total of 81 pages on Israel-Palestine, 66 on Yugoslavia, 30 on Afghanistan and only 15 on the DRC.
A similar trend can be seen in books and other academic works. A search in May 2003 of a database of books and documents available (published since 1999) on the DRC in all Japanese universities revealed a total of 11 relevant works – in English and French. An identical search for those relating to Kosovo revealed more than 120 works in over five languages. In its 1999 yearbook, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) offered individual chapters of analysis on the Middle East, Russia, the Caspian Sea and Europe in its ‘Security and Conflict’ section, but no chapters were devoted to Africa’s major security issue in the DRC (or anywhere else on the continent). In-depth analysis was also notably absent from its yearbooks of 2000, 2001 and 2002, with the focus being on Europe.
Several explanations can be suggested for this marginalization. Academics do not conduct research in a vacuum: they watch the news, read newspapers and listen to their government officials and spokespeople. Research sparked by such triggers makes academics victims of the bandwagon effect. Furthermore, analysis is often contingent on the documents, information, and prior research available, which leads to a vicious cycle. The less information there is available to begin with, the less research academics can conduct without expending considerable effort. Finally, the seduction of influence, prestige and sales can mean that the works that academic societies and book-writers produce are often focused around the ‘fashionable’ topics of the times.
A considerable amount of credit must go to organisations such as the International Crisis Group (ICG) and the International Rescue Committee (IRC), for being some of the very few organisations attempting to draw attention to the conflict, by providing analysis, a record of history, and a record of the number of deaths. In contrast, hundreds of zealous reporters and numerous other organisations provide daily updates and analysis of the conflict and the number of conflict casualties in Israel-Palestine, ensuring that casualty figures are presented down to the single digits. Despite the efforts of such organisations as the ICG and IRC in the DRC, the conflict is still in danger of being denied its place in history.
Systematizing the Concept of Stealth Conflicts
Using the above discussion, it is possible to further develop and somewhat systematize the concept of stealth conflicts, with a view to enhancing its applicability to the world at large. Stealth conflicts are those that are consistently absent from policy, media, public and academic agendas, and typically have a pronounced level of inadequately addressed human suffering. While forgotten, or orphaned, conflicts are those that have, in the past, been the recipients of sustained international consciousness and interest, stealth conflicts consistently fail to attract such attention throughout their course (although they may make occasional fleeting appearances in extreme or unique circumstances).
Examining the factors that bring conflicts onto the radar of international consciousness is useful in understanding stealth conflicts. As noted above, the agendas of the manifestations of international consciousness have become increasingly intertwined, with closely linked policy and media agendas largely dictating public and mainstream academic agendas. As such, the factors most warranting our attention are those that determine policy and media interest.
Strategic interest is the key determinant of policy interest. A conflict becomes a high priority for a government when it affects that country’s strategic interests. Such interests may be related to perceived direct military threats (including terrorism), access to (or control over) natural resources (as in the Middle East region), an influx of refugees (as in Haiti, the Balkans, East Timor), or other potentially damaging influxes, such as narcotics (as in Colombia). For these reasons, strategic interest is generally closely linked to geographical proximity. A conflict also becomes a high priority for a government when it affects the strategic interests of the government itself (in terms of re-election). In this way, powerful special-interest groups in the public domain affect the level of policy interest in a conflict (as in Israel-Palestine).
The media interest is sparked largely by government interest (or at least by the same factors that spark government interest), but there are some factors that affect media interest differently. Compared to policy interest, media interest is more influenced by ease of access to the conflict in question (in terms of obtaining visual images of the conflict or the humanitarian suffering). Hostile terrain and poor infrastructure in Colombia and the Sudan, for example, severely limit media interest, despite some policy interest by the USA. Violent targeting of journalists, such as that in Algeria, and government restriction of journalism, such as that in the Sudan, also serve as barriers. Sensationalism is also more pronounced than it is in the policy agenda. In Rwanda, sensationalism (large-scale massacres) combined with access (reporters coincidentally returning from the first post-apartheid elections in South Africa) propelled the conflict to chosen status, but sensationalism alone under similar circumstances in Burundi was an insufficient trigger. The plight of white people (farmers in Zimbabwe, Western hostages in the Philippines and Colombia) is also a key factor in prompting media interest.
Drawing a clear line marking the boundaries of stealth conflicts would be an academic (and not particularly useful) exercise. International consciousness of conflicts may range from virtually non-existent to obsessive, and also fluctuates depending on the conflict stage. Generally, however, it can be said that there is a yawning gap between chosen conflicts and stealth conflicts, and that there are few conflicts between the two extremes: as in those that attract a relatively consistent amount of low-level attention. It is perhaps the media’s commercially-driven appetite for sensationalism that has contributed the most to this yawning gap. The media’s habit of seizing upon a single conflict and providing saturation coverage of only that conflict not only makes it difficult for the policymakers, public or academia to ignore, but also makes it difficult for them to notice the existence of other conflicts.
In any case, it is, ironically, African conflicts that are the furthest from the radar screens of international consciousness, despite the fact that Africa is host to the vast majority of world conflicts. Most African conflicts are geographically and economically removed from Western strategic interests, are not easily accessible, are highly complex, do not involve white people, and are not followed by powerful diasporas in the West. These are the key factors that leave almost all African conflicts in the unfortunate status of stealth conflicts.
Recent Developments and Conclusions
In May 2003, the DRC made a brief appearance on the periphery of Western radar screens. Seven hundred Uruguayan peacekeepers that had arrived in the town of Bunia (to fill the vacuum left by the Ugandan withdrawal) found themselves severely outnumbered, under siege, and struggling to protect themselves (together with thousands of civilians), as militias battled for control of the town. The situation appeared ominously similar in nature to past tragedies in Rwanda, Bosnia and Sierra Leone. Two peacekeepers were killed and the UN Secretary-General frantically lobbied members of the international community, calling on them to intervene.
The international community responded. France agreed to lead a small Interim Emergency Multinational Force including troops from South Africa, Britain, Sweden and Pakistan, and the UN Security Council authorised the force on 30 May. It was the first time in almost 7 years that the Council had authorised a peace enforcement mission for Africa (and even that had been aborted).
Although a positive development, the appearance of the DRC on Western radar screens was prompted more by the sight of peacekeepers in danger, and by parallels drawn with the Rwandan genocide, than by the need to implement a comprehensive solution to the conflict. The reluctance of the West to rise to the pleas of the UN Secretary-General was evident, and (after some delay) France agreed to lead the mission (providing roughly half of the 1,400 troops) only with support from others, only in the small town of Bunia and its airport, and only as a temporary, three-month stopgap measure until the blue-helmet peacekeepers could be reinforced.
At worst, the French-led intervention can perhaps be described as a token force, deployed to project the appearance of ‘doing something’ – to be seen righting the wrongs of Rwanda. At best, it can be described as a good start. The Under-Secretary-General for UN Peacekeeping Operations, speaking of the UN peacekeeping force, noted that the “stand that has been taken in Bunia – a small place in a remote part of very large country – was sending a very strong signal way beyond Ituri [province]. It is of critical importance how the international community is now going to follow-up in the coming months.”
The international community’s follow-up has been mixed. The French force withdrew and was replaced by an expanded blue-helmet peacekeeping force as scheduled. Arms sanctions were also applied (for the first time) to armed groups operating in Ituri and the Kivus. At the same time, Western interest and follow-up (in terms of diplomatic, military and humanitarian involvement) proved to be fleeting. The DRC’s distance from Western interests and culture, the size of the country (together with its inhospitable terrain and lack of infrastructure), and the magnitude, complexity and depth of its conflict still present formidable obstacles to meaningful international consciousness. While local African efforts to bring about a comprehensive solution appear to be bearing some fruit, the resources that African nations can bring to bear on conflict resolution are but a fraction of those of the West, and will probably be insufficient to bring about a just and lasting peace.
In terms of the policy agenda, one proposal tabled for meaningful Western intervention, was a ‘curtain of troops’ along the DRC’s Rwandan and Ugandan borders. This could go a long way towards assuaging the security concerns of those countries and raising the overall stability of the region. The politically dangerous and expensive long-term deployment of troops, however, is not the only form of response available to the West. The careful targeting of arms (or other) sanctions and, equally importantly, the diligent enforcement of such sanctions, can also serve as a useful response. Increased and more involved diplomatic pressure – even if conducted discreetly – is also an option that should be pursued. At the very least, greater involvement in providing humanitarian assistance to the victims of the conflict, can potentially save a considerable number of lives, even though it is unlikely to contribute to conflict resolution.
How then do we go about putting the DRC on the radar of international consciousness? This is a question not easily answered, given the near-total absence of the factors shown above to draw attention to conflicts. The example of Somalia, however, does provide some room for hope. It is thought that the trigger for Somalia’s rise to prominence was the initiative of certain agencies within the US government – namely the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) – in an effort to draw the attention of other parts of the government to the conflict. This, in turn, acted as a trigger for the media and the bandwagon effect took over. The DRC is not Somalia, and Somalia certainly had the fortune of being relatively accessible, but like the DRC, it was a highly complex conflict fought between black Africans where little Western strategic interest existed, and it shows that even an internal government agency has the potential to act as a trigger for drawing attention to a stealth conflict. Perhaps academics are also in a position to act as a trigger – particularly those within advisory range of the government, or a well-planned academic movement that manages to rope in media interest.
The dynamics of international consciousness make stealth conflicts inevitable, but given its massive scale, and the considerable implications for regional security, the DRC should not be one of them. Without some bold rearranging of priorities by the media, policymakers, the public and academics to break the cycle of silence and realign themselves with reality, the conflict in the DRC will remain absent from international consciousness outside the region, and left out of the very pages of history – the greatest stealth conflict of all time.
 The International Rescue Committee (IRC) produced this estimation of the death toll, after a series of investigations to determine the number of people who had died above and beyond that which would have been expected under stable circumstances. While 3.3 million is regarded as the most accurate estimate, the IRC acknowledges that its estimate could vary between 3.0 and 4.7 million. See the International Rescue Committee, Mortality in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Results from a Nationwide Survey, Conducted September – November 2002, reported April 2003.
 See, for example, ‘Forgotten Humanitarian Crises’, Conference Paper, Conference on the Role of the Media, Decision-Makers and Humanitarian Agencies, Copenhagen, 23 October 2002.
 Although both Rwanda and Uganda denied their troops were present in the DRC for several months after the conflict began.
 For further discussion on African involvement, see John F. Clark ed., The African Stakes of the Congo War, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002.
 For more detailed background on the conflict, see Jakkie Cilliers and Mark Malan, Peacekeeping in the DRC, MONUC and the Road to Peace, ISS Monograph No. 66 October 2001; Africa’s Seven Nation War, ICG Democratic Republic of Congo Report No. 4, 21 May 1999; and Storm Clouds over Sun City: The Urgent Need to Recast the Congolese Peace Process, ICG Africa Report No.44, Brussels/Nairobi, 14 May 2002.
 UN document S/2002/1146.
 See also The Kivus: The Forgotten Crucible of the Congo Conflict, ICG Africa Report No. 56, Nairobi/Brussels, 24 January, 2003, pp. 23-26.
 Studies on agenda-setting function tend to focus on the relationship between three main components: the media agenda, the public agenda and the policy agenda. For the purposes of this study, the academic agenda is added, recognising its role in influencing the policy agenda and in the recording of history.
 Everett M. Rogers, and James W. Dearing, ‘Agenda-setting Research: Where Has It Been, Where Is It Going?’, in Media Power in Politics, Graber ed., Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc, 1994.
 See Steven Livingston and Todd Eachus, ‘Humanitarian Crisis and US Foreign Policy: Somalia and the CNN Effect Reconsidered’, Political Communication, Vol. 12, 1995, pp. 413-429.
 See Piers Robinson, ‘The Policy-Media Interaction Model: Measuring Media Power During Humanitarian Crisis’, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 37, No. 5, 2000, pp. 613-633.
 Ironically, BBC world news continued to use its slogan “Demand a broader view” in early 2003 as it broadcast week upon week of around-the-clock coverage of war in Iraq and nothing else. Apparently, the broader view we are asked to demand refers only to the view within the particular news item that is the subject of narrow focus, and even that aspect of the coverage is highly questionable.
 Largely due to constant media interest/presence interlinked with the far-reaching influence of powerful lobby groups, the Israel-Palestinian conflict and related peace process is a rare instance of a conflict that manages to maintain a relatively permanent place on international radars even when it is not a blinding spot.
 See John C. Hammock and Joel R. Charny, ‘Emergency Response as Morality Play: The Media, the Relief Agencies, and the Need for Capacity Building’, in From Massacres to Genocide: the Media, Public Policy, and Humanitarian Crisis, Rotberg and Weiss eds., Massachusetts: the World Peace Foundation, 1996, pp. 115-116.
 CNN’s slogan “Be the first to know” is quite revealing – the speed of reporting is clearly considered more valuable than accuracy, quality, breadth or depth.
 See Jonathan Mermin, Debating War and Peace: Media Coverage of U.S. Intervention in the Post-Vietnam Era, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999.
 See Susan D. Moeller, Compassion Fatigue, New York: Routledge, 1999.
 Virgil Hawkins, ‘The Other Side of the CNN Factor: Media and Conflict’, Journalism Studies, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2002, pp. 225-240.
 Measured by taking the area (in square centimetres) of newspaper articles related to each particular conflict. As an overall trend in any of the mass media, only sensational stories (like the volcanic eruption near Goma in January 2002 and passengers being sucked from a cargo plane with a faulty door in mid-flight in May 2003) are likely to be covered.
 See www.fair.org.
 See William Ferroggiaro ed., The US and the Genocide in Rwanda 1994, A National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book, August 20, 2001, www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB53.
 ‘40 million Africans on brink of starvation, Security Council told’, UN News Service, 7 April 2003.
 See the OCHA Financial Tracking System, www.reliefweb.int/fts.
 While a small portion of this appeal goes to the DRC, it is designed for the entire region, covering Burundi, DRC, Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda.
 See Francois Grignon, ‘There will be no excuses for not knowing’, Observer, 25 May 2003.
 See John Kakande, ‘US Army Operated Secretly in Congo’, New Vision, 17 June 2001. See also John Kamau, ‘Is the Congo facing a second betrayal?’, The Nation, 6 June 2003.
 See Grignon, op.cit.
 For a discussion on the marginalization of African conflicts in the Security Council, see Virgil Hawkins, ‘Measuring UN Security Council action and inaction in the 1990s: Lessons for Africa?’, African Security Review, Vol. 12, No. 2, 2003.
 See Mark Malan and Henri Boshoff, ‘A 90-day plan to bring peace to the DRC? An analysis of the Pretoria Agreement of 30 July 2002’, ISS Paper, No. 61, September 2002.
 Surveys conducted by Yasmin Hawkins, May 2003.
 For further analysis on the public’s understanding of conflict, see Greg Philo, ‘Television news and audience understanding of war, conflict and disaster’, Journalism Studies, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2002, pp. 173-186.
 Search conducted on 31 October 2003. See www.gallup.com. Searches using the keyword of Africa revealed 15 ‘hits’.
 Liberia is one notable exception, where a loose grassroots coalition known as Liberia Watch successfully lobbied the USA for a 200 million dollar aid package for Liberia. The status of Liberia as a former unofficial US ‘colony’ was undoubtedly a key factor in the decision.
 The total amount of contributions marked by OCHA as from private or NGO sources, or from the National Committees of the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). See the OCHA Financial Tracking System, www.reliefweb.int/fts.
 News sites on the internet most commonly accessed are those offered by conventional television news and newspapers, and so the resulting bias is basically the same. According to a study by the internet search engine, Google, the three most-accessed online news resources in 2001 were CNN, BBC and the New York Times. See www.google.com/press/zeitgeist2001.
 See David Shearer, ‘The Conflict in Central Africa: Africa’s Great War’, Survival, Summer 1999, Vol. 41, No. 2: pp.89-106; and Koen Vlassenroot and Hans Romkema, ‘The Emergence of a New Order? Resources and War in Eastern Congo’, Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, www.jha.ac/articles/a111, October 2002.
 Foreign Affairs, for example, devoted 6 articles to the African continent (none related to the DRC) and 14 to Israel-Palestine in the five years from mid-1998 to mid-2003.
 Figures compiled by Reiko Okumura.
 See www.webcat.nii.ac.jp
 See Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 1999: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security. London: Oxford University Press, 1999.
 The DRC did appear, however, in an appendix to the 2000 yearbook.
 UN Security Council Resolution 1484 (2003).
 According to a UN diplomat (interview with author, New York, December 2000), the USA backed out of the intervention proposed for Eastern Zaire in 1996 primarily due to a lack of media interest. See also Simon Massey, ‘Operation Assurance: The Greatest Intervention That Never Happened’, The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, http://www.jha.ac/articles/a036.htm, February 1998.
 The flashpoint in Bunia is being seen in isolation from the broader conflict across the DRC by the media (for the sake of simplicity) and the policymakers (to avoid a broader involvement).
 See Colum Lynch, ‘UN’s focus diminishes efforts on Africa’s troubles’, Washington Post, 25 May 2003.
 ‘UN official calls for international backing of political process’, United Nations News Service, 4 June 2003.
 This notion was raised by France during a Council mission to the DRC and later appeared in UN Security Council Resolution 1417 (2002).
 See Steven Livingston and Todd Eachus, ‘Humanitarian Crisis and US Foreign Policy: Somalia and the CNN Effect Reconsidered’, Political Communication, Vol. 12, 1995, pp. 413-429; and Jonathan Mermin, ‘Television News and American Intervention in Somalia: The Myth of a Media-Driven Foreign Policy’, Political Science Quarterly, Vo. 112, No. 3, 1997, pp. 385-404.
Maoni ya ulimwengu juu ya hali ya migogoro ya silaha ni mabaya sana, kwa kuwa haina karibu kufanana na kiwango halisi au ukali wa migogoro ulimwenguni. Hii ni hasa kutokana na mipango ya kuchagua sana na kuongezeka kwa assimilated ya vyombo vya habari, watunga sera, umma na chuo kikuu. Hali hii husababisha "migogoro ya siri" - migogoro ambayo haijulikani na haipo kwenye ajenda hizi. Kwa kutumia mgogoro mkubwa katika Jamhuri ya Kidemokrasia ya Kongo kama mfano bora wa migogoro kama hiyo ya siri, karatasi hii inaonyesha jinsi, kwa miaka mitano iliyopita, mgogoro mkubwa na wa mauti zaidi tangu Vita Kuu ya Pili imekuwa karibu kabisa kutokuwepo kutoka kwa ufahamu wa kimataifa nje ya mkoa. Uelewa hufafanua hali yetu halisi. Mahali ambapo upatikanaji wa habari zinazoweza kuboresha utambuzi wetu ni mdogo, hali halisi tunayoona inakuwa imepotoshwa na kupotoshwa. Maoni yetu juu ya hali ya migogoro ya silaha ulimwenguni leo ni moja ya waathirika wa bahati mbaya zaidi wa upotoshaji huo. "Licha ya uwezekano wa kupata habari, habari zinazotolewa kwetu kuhusu migogoro inayotokea duniani kote ni za kupotosha sana hivi kwamba ukweli ni karibu haujulikani. """ Hii ni kwa sababu ya mipango ya kuchagua sana na kuongezeka kwa kuingizwa kwa vyombo vya habari, serikali zenye nguvu, wasomi, mashirika yasiyo ya kiserikali na vikundi vya ushawishi. Moja au mbili ya migogoro 20 hadi 30 inayoendelea ulimwenguni kote ni "ichaguliwa" kuwa mada ya uchunguzi mkali na hasira ya kuchagua - mara chache sana kwa msingi wa kiwango au kiwango cha dharura ya kibinadamu. Wengine hubaki, kwa makusudi na madhumuni yote, bila kugunduliwa <unk> kutokuwepo kutoka kwa ufahamu wa kimataifa. Hii ni kweli hasa kwa eneo lenye migogoro zaidi duniani - Afrika, ambayo imesababisha zaidi ya asilimia 90 ya vifo vinavyohusiana na migogoro tangu mwisho wa Vita Baridi. Licha ya kiwango cha mateso ya kibinadamu, inaonekana kwamba ufahamu wa Magharibi (na hasira) huisha kwenye Mfereji wa Suez. Hakuna mahali ambapo hii ni wazi zaidi kuliko katika Jamhuri ya Kidemokrasia ya Kongo (DRC), ambayo, kutoka kwa mtazamo wa vyombo vya habari, umma, sera na ajenda za kitaaluma nje ya mkoa, karibu haipo. "Hakika, ni msiba wa kibinadamu wa ukubwa usioweza kueleweka, uliosababishwa na vita ambavyo vimeenea katika sehemu kubwa ya nchi inayofanana na Ulaya Magharibi, na ambavyo vimeona ushiriki wa moja kwa moja wa kijeshi wa nchi nane za kigeni.""" Vita hivyo ni vya kikatili zaidi duniani tangu Vita Kuu ya Pili ya Dunia, na vimeua watu milioni 3.3 tangu kuanza kwa mapigano hayo mnamo Agosti 1998. Baada ya kuanzisha dhana ya migogoro ya siri na kuwasilisha historia ya mgogoro katika DRC, karatasi hii itaonyesha nguvu nyuma ya karibu marginalization kamili ya mgogoro kupitia uchunguzi wa vyombo vya habari, sera, umma na ajenda za kitaaluma katika ulimwengu wa Magharibi. Kwa kuzingatia uchunguzi huu, inajaribu kuandaa dhana ya migogoro ya siri. Inamalizika kwa mtazamo wa kutarajia mabaya kuhusu uwezekano wa mabadiliko katika upotoshaji huu wenye kusumbua wa hali halisi. Kutambua kwamba migogoro fulani ni marginalized na kutengwa kutoka vyombo vya habari, sera na ajenda za umma si mpya. Migogoro kama hiyo wakati mwingine huitwa "migogoro iliyosahaulika" au "migogoro ya yatima". Hata hivyo, yaweza kuonwa kwamba maneno hayo ni maneno yasiyofaa. Kwa mgogoro kuwa "kusahaulika", ni lazima mara moja kuwa "kumbuka", au baadhi ya tahadhari muhimu kupewa kwa ajili ya ufumbuzi wake. Kwa mgogoro kuwa "yatima", ni lazima wakati mmoja kuwa na "wazazi" ambao walikuwa na wasiwasi na ustawi wa nchi katika suala hilo. """Mgogoro wa Somalia, au hata ule wa Angola (kwa kiasi fulani), unaweza kuonwa kuwa mgogoro uliosahaulika au yatima, kwa sababu wakati mmoja ulikumbukwa na juhudi (ingawa hazikufanikiwa) zilifanywa kuelekea kumalizika kwa uhasama." Hata hivyo, upesi ukosefu wa upendezi wa kweli na wenye kuazimia ulionekana wazi, na nchi zilizotoa majeshi zikageuka na migogoro iliyokuwa ikiendelea kusahaulika. Hata hivyo, mzozo katika Jamhuri ya Kidemokrasia ya Kongo haufanani na hali hiyo. Haikutoweka kutoka kwa "radar" ya ufahamu wa kimataifa. Ukweli ni kwamba, haikuwa kamwe kweli juu yake. Labda neno "mgogoro wa siri" ni sahihi zaidi katika kesi kama hiyo. "Ikiwa tunazingatia neno hilo katika muktadha wa teknolojia ya kijeshi ambayo inaruhusu mabomu ya kubomoa kubaki bila kugunduliwa kwenye rada wakati wanapobomoa malengo yao, kufanana fulani kunakuwa dhahiri. """ Kama mabomu ya siri, mgogoro katika DRC umesababisha idadi kubwa ya vifo na uharibifu, wakati kwa njia fulani unabaki haujulikani kwenye maonyesho yote ya skrini za rada za jamii ya kimataifa. Wale wanaopigana vita si lazima wawe wameficha kimakusudi: mgogoro huo haujagunduliwa na ulimwengu wa nje. Neno hilo linaweza pia kuonwa kuwa sahihi kwa maana kwamba wengi wa wale ambao wamefariki katika vita wameuawa kwa siri. Hawakupigwa na risasi au milipuko, bali kwa njaa na magonjwa yanayoweza kuepukwa na kutibiwa, yanayotokana na watu kukimbia nyumba zao na mashamba yao, uharibifu wa miundombinu, na kuvunjika kwa kilimo, huduma za umma na mistari ya usambazaji. Kama mgogoro ni aliona au si inategemea ufahamu wa, na mwingiliano kati ya, maonyesho ya ufahamu wa kimataifa (mitandao ya habari, watunga sera, umma na chuo kikuu). Kujaribu kuunda mfumo wa dhana ya migogoro ya siri inahitaji uchunguzi wa kina zaidi wa ufahamu wa kimataifa katika maana hii, ambayo hutolewa hapa chini. "Kuna taarifa nyingine inayoonyesha kuwa ""DRC si nchi pekee inayoendelea na vita vya siri.""" Mapigano mengi ulimwenguni hayatokei (au huonekana kwa muda mfupi tu) kwenye skrini za rada za fahamu za kimataifa. "Mgogoro wa Sudan, ambao umesababisha vifo vya watu milioni mbili tangu mwaka 1983, bado ni ""kipaumbele cha chini sana"" katika ajenda ya kisiasa na haupo kabisa katika ajenda ya vyombo vya habari." Hatua za baadaye za mgogoro na amani ya kihistoria nchini Angola zilipita bila kuonekana na bila msaada. Migogoro mingine mikubwa, kama vile ile ya Algeria na Jamhuri ya Kongo, pia hupuuzwa kabisa. Mapigano ya muda mrefu nchini Liberia yalionekana kwa muda mfupi tu wakati waasi walipoingia Monrovia na swali la uwezekano wa ushiriki wa Marekani lilizinduliwa. Vivyo hivyo, mgogoro wa Burundi ulipata umakini wa muda mfupi wakati Nelson Mandela (na hadhi ya mtu mashuhuri Magharibi) alichukua jukumu la mpatanishi. Wakati Marekani, Uingereza na Australia zilipokuwa zikivamia Iraq, demokrasia katika Jamhuri ya Afrika ya Kati ilishindwa kuonekana, ikishindwa na uasi wa silaha. Hizi ni mifano michache tu ya migogoro ambayo kwa kawaida hupuuzwa na kupuuzwa. Pia, ni kwa njia ya siri ambayo waathirika wa migogoro hiyo hufa, na si tu katika Jamhuri ya Kidemokrasia ya Kongo. Kinyume na itikadi ya kawaida, risasi na mabomu (ya "akili" au vinginevyo) si wauaji wakubwa zaidi katika vita vya kisasa. Njaa na magonjwa ndiyo mauaji makubwa zaidi katika karibu vita vyote. "Hata hivyo, idadi ya mauaji hayo ya ""kinyume cha sheria"" ni kubwa sana katika migogoro ya siri, hasa kwa sababu migogoro ambayo haijagunduliwa haivutii tahadhari au hasira ya wafadhili wa misaada au mashirika yasiyo ya kiserikali ya kibinadamu na kwa hivyo haijazingatiwa." "Kile kinachofanya DRC kuwa ya kipekee, hata hivyo, ni kiwango (kijani kabisa kisicho na kifani katika historia ya hivi karibuni) ya kifo na mateso, pamoja na ukweli kwamba licha ya mateso haya, kwa njia fulani imeweza kubaki bila kugunduliwa. """ "Tusahau kwa muda mfupi mamilioni ya watu waliojeruhiwa, kuteswa, kubakwa, kutengwa na watoto, kulazimishwa kukimbia nyumba zao, kufa njaa au kuteseka kwa sababu ya vita nchini DRC, na tuangalie idadi ya watu waliopoteza maisha yao: milioni 3.3.""" """Nambari milioni 3.3 ni kubwa sana na ni vigumu sana kuifahamu, hasa inapotumiwa kuwakilisha idadi ya watu waliopotea kutokana na vita vya kikatiba." Kwa mujibu wa takwimu za Umoja wa Mataifa, zaidi ya nchi 60 duniani zina idadi ya watu chini ya milioni 3.3. Ili kusisitiza zaidi kiwango cha jamaa cha mgogoro, grafu ifuatayo inalinganisha idadi ya vifo vya mgogoro katika DRC na migogoro mingine ya "kijani" zaidi. Kwa kuwa kuna ndege, televisheni, mashine za faksi, kompyuta, barua pepe, mtandao, simu za satellite na teknolojia nyingine, uwezo wetu wa kukusanya, kusindika na kusambaza habari kutoka mahali popote duniani umefikia kiwango kisichokumbukwa na wanadamu. Magazeti yenye habari za kina kuhusu matukio ya siku hiyo ulimwenguni pote huwasili mlangoni mwetu asubuhi inayofuata. Habari za "ulimwengu" sasa hutoka kwenye televisheni kwenye vituo vingi vya kebo saa ishirini na nne kwa siku. Kwa kutumia kompyuta na simu, tunaweza kupata habari nyingi za wakati halisi kutoka mahali popote duniani. Kwa kuzingatia hili, na kwa kuzingatia kiwango kikubwa cha mgogoro na kiwango kisicho na kifani cha kifo na mateso, inaweza kuchukuliwa kuwa DRC ni, bila shaka, mgogoro mkubwa wa siri katika historia ya binadamu. Vita vya Afrika katika Jamhuri ya Kidemokrasia ya Kongo (DRC) vita vya sasa vya DRC ni ngumu sana, na kuelezea mgogoro katika maana moja inaweza kuwa na kupotosha. Kwa kweli ni mkusanyiko wa migogoro kadhaa - katika ngazi za mitaa, kitaifa na kikanda - ambayo inazingatia hasa nusu ya mashariki ya nchi. "Uhusiano huo una asili yake katika urithi (kwa haki za uraia na umiliki wa ardhi) wa uhamiaji wa kulazimishwa wa watu wanaozungumza lugha ya Kirwanda chini ya ukoloni wa Ubelgiji, katika mgawanyiko wa ndani uliozidishwa na miongo kadhaa ya utawala mbaya chini ya Mobutu, na katika miongo kadhaa ya migogoro ya kikabila na mtiririko wa wakimbizi uliofikia kilele katika mauaji ya kimbari ya Rwanda ya 1994.""" Kila mmoja wa wachezaji - serikali ya DRC, vikundi vingi vya waasi (na vikundi vyao vinavyopingana mara nyingi), wanamgambo wa ndani, na nchi nane za kigeni ambazo zimeingilia kati kijeshi - zina au zimekuwa na malengo na ajenda tofauti. Kwa kushangaza, ni maslahi ya mataifa ya Afrika yaliyo karibu, badala ya maslahi ya mabwana wa kikoloni au wadhamini wa Vita Baridi, ambayo yameamua mwendo wa mgogoro huo. "Utaratibu wa kupigana na waasi wa DRC ulifanya Rwanda, Uganda na Burundi ""kuingilia kati.""" Uhusiano wa DRC na harakati za waasi kutoka Angola na Sudan pia ulichangia sana uamuzi wao wa kuingilia kati. Upatikanaji wa rasilimali nchini DRC pia umekuwa jambo muhimu katika ushiriki wa kigeni pande zote mbili, na mikataba kati ya DRC na Zimbabwe na Namibia hasa kuthibitika kuwa muhimu katika kupata uingiliaji wao. Eneo hilo - ambalo lina eneo lenye ukubwa wa Ulaya Magharibi, lililofunikwa na misitu - lilikatwa karibu nusu na mzozo huo. Kwa sababu ya hali ya ardhi na ukosefu wa miundombinu, kwa kawaida hawaruhusu majeshi ya nchi kavu kusonga mbele kwa muda mrefu, na mashambulizi ya kawaida yaliona majeshi yakisafirishwa kwa mashua au ndege, na kuhifadhi tu miji mikubwa, bandari, viwanja vya ndege na migodi. Vituo vya usambazaji vilivyokuwa muhimu (hususan usafiri wa kibiashara kwenye Mto Kongo) vilivyohitajika kutoa mahitaji ya msingi kwa idadi ya watu kwa ujumla vimefungwa kwa kiasi kikubwa. Kilimo, huduma za afya na huduma nyingine za umma zimeharibika, hasa mashariki. Kwa mujibu wa historia ya vita, mauaji ya kimbari ya Rwanda ya mwaka 1994 labda ni hatua sahihi ya kuanzia. Wakati mauaji hayo yalipokuwa yakifikia kilele, wahalifu wa kabila la Hutu, familia zao, na raia wasio na hatia waliogopa kulipiza kisasi, wakakimbilia Rwanda kama wakimbizi kwenda Zaire jirani wakati Kikosi cha Rwanda cha Wapenzi wa Nchi (RPF) kilipoingia Rwanda kutoka misingi yake nchini Uganda. Katika kambi za wakimbizi karibu na mpaka wa Rwanda na Zaire, wanamgambo wa kabila la Hutu walijikusanya, kuajiri na kufunza askari na, wakitumia kambi hizo kama misingi, walianza kushambulia Rwanda. Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, Angola na Eritrea ziliingia katika Jamhuri ya Kidemokrasia ya Kongo mwaka 1996 kwa kuunga mkono muungano wa waasi wa kupinga Mobutu. Majeshi ya Rwanda yalivunja kambi za wakimbizi, na wanamgambo Wahutu wakakimbilia ndani zaidi ya Zaire. Baada ya kukutana na upinzani mdogo katika kufuatilia kwao, muungano wa kupambana na Mobutu ulikwenda Kinshasa, kuangusha utawala mnamo 1997. Laurent Kabila aliwekwa kuwa rais, na Zaire ikabadilishwa jina kuwa Jamhuri ya Kidemokrasia ya Kongo. Upesi migawanyiko ilitokea katika urafiki kati ya serikali mpya na wale walioiunga mkono ambao walikuwa wameiweka madarakani. Kwa kuwa Kabila alikuwa amekosa kushughulika na wanamgambo wa kabila la Hutu na makundi mengine ya waasi katika Jamhuri ya Kidemokrasia ya Kongo (DRC), na kwa kuwa alikuwa na uhakika kwamba, baada ya kufanya hivyo hapo awali, wangeweza tena kuleta mabadiliko ya utawala, wanajeshi wa Rwanda, Uganda na Burundi walivuka mpaka wa kuingia DRC mnamo Agosti 1998, wakishirikiana na makundi mapya ya ndani yanayopinga utawala wa Kabila, na kusonga mbele haraka nchini. Sehemu ya pili ya Vita vya Ulimwengu vya Afrika ilikuwa ikiendelea. Kabila alihamia haraka ili kuvutia msaada kwa utawala wake. Jaribio la ujasiri la Rwanda la kuchukua Kinshasa kutoka magharibi kwa kutumia vikosi vya angani lilikataliwa (kwa mshangao wake) na uingiliaji wa Angola. Zimbabwe, Namibia, Chad na Sudan pia walijiunga na wito wa Kabila, na mgogoro ulikuja. Mkataba wa Lusaka ulianzishwa mwaka 1999 na makundi mawili ya Rwanda na Uganda, RCD (Rally for Congolese Democracy) na MDC (Movement for the Liberation of Congo). Baraza la Usalama la Umoja wa Mataifa lilianzisha ujumbe wa waangalizi, ambao baadaye ulibadilishwa kuwa ujumbe mdogo wa kudumisha amani (unaojulikana kwa kifupi cha Kifaransa MONUC). Utekelezaji kamili wa kikosi hicho ulicheleweshwa mara kwa mara, na jukumu lake linabaki kuwa dogo sana dhidi ya mzunguko wa mzozo. """Mipango mingine kadhaa ya amani ya Afrika imesababisha makubaliano mengi, ikiwa ni pamoja na mpango wa serikali ya mpito hadi uchaguzi, lakini athari kwa hali ya ardhi imekuwa ndogo, haswa katika Ituri na Kivu." Wakati wengi wa vikosi vya kigeni zilizowekwa katika DRC sasa zimeondolewa (Uganda ilianza kujiondoa Aprili 2003), mgogoro wa ndani unaendelea kati ya wakala wa Rwanda na Uganda (kuongozwa kwa karibu na wafadhili wao), vikosi vya serikali ya DRC na washirika wake, vikundi vya wapiganaji wa Mai Mai, wapiganaji wa Hutu na harakati nyingine za waasi kutoka nchi jirani. Washirika (hasa Rwanda na Uganda) wamekuwa maadui, na maadui, washirika. Vikundi vimegawanyika tena katika vikundi, na licha ya maendeleo fulani mazuri, amani ya kuenea na endelevu bado haijapatikana. Kwa kushangaza, mgogoro huo unajitegemeza kiuchumi, kwa sababu ya utajiri wa madini wa DRC. "Uendelevu wa mgogoro huo unaendeleza hali zinazofaa kwa unyonyaji wa rasilimali za DRC na pande za mgogoro (na watu wanaowakilisha pande hizo) na mashirika na watu binafsi wa fursa.""" Miongoni mwao ni waandishi wa habari wa Umoja wa Mataifa, pamoja na waandishi wa habari wa Umoja wa Mataifa, na waandishi wa habari wa Umoja wa Mataifa, pamoja na waandishi wa habari wa Umoja wa Mataifa, pamoja na waandishi wa habari wa Umoja wa Mataifa, pamoja na waandishi wa habari wa Umoja wa Mataifa. Mbali na pande za mgogoro, wale waliohusika ni pamoja na mashirika ya kimataifa yenye makao yake makuu nchini Ubelgiji, Uingereza, Marekani na Afrika Kusini. Wakati rasilimali zinazotumiwa ni pamoja na almasi, dhahabu, fedha, shaba na mbao, ni coltan - madini ambayo ni sehemu muhimu katika simu za mkononi na vifaa vingine vya elektroniki - ambayo imekuwa rasilimali yenye ushawishi mkubwa katika mgogoro huo. "Kujulikana kwa jina la ""DRC,"" DRC ni jina la kimataifa la habari, ambalo linahusu vyombo vya habari, watunga sera, umma na wasomi." Msimamo wa mgogoro katika DRC kuhusiana na kila moja ya ajenda hizi itakuwa kushughulikiwa moja kwa moja chini, lakini ni muhimu kwanza kuchunguza kwa ufupi jinsi ajenda hizi kuingiliana - kuzaa migogoro stealth. Utafiti wa kuweka ajenda hadi sasa unaonekana kuunga mkono nadharia kwamba ajenda ya vyombo vya habari ina jukumu muhimu katika kuunda ajenda ya umma, na kwamba ajenda ya umma kwa upande huathiri ajenda ya sera (kupitia maoni ya umma na vikundi vya nguvu vya lobby). Ingawa kiwango kamili cha kinachoitwa CNN-sababishi haijaeleweka kabisa, inaweza kuchukuliwa kuwa watunga sera na vyombo vya habari wote wawili wana ushawishi mkubwa juu ya kila mmoja. Watengenezaji wa sera wenye busara hutumia vyombo vya habari kutangaza sera zao na kuongeza nafasi ya kipengele cha ajenda. Kwa upande mwingine, ambapo kuna kutokuwa na uamuzi au kutokuwa na hisia kati ya watunga sera, chanjo ya vyombo vya habari yenye ujazo inaweza kusukuma kipengele kwenye nafasi ya juu kwenye ajenda ya sera. Kwa pamoja, wasomi wanaweza kuathiri baadhi ya ajenda za sera, lakini pia wanakabiliwa na ushawishi mkubwa kutoka kwa ajenda za sera na vyombo vya habari, kama itakavyoonyeshwa hapa chini. "Lakini, kwa vyovyote vile, inaweza kuonekana kwamba ajenda hizi zote zimeunganishwa kwa ukaribu, na kila moja inatoa na kuiga ile inayoongoza katika kuweka ajenda (kwa kawaida watunga sera na wakati mwingine vyombo vya habari).""" Kwa kushangaza, hii ni sehemu ya kutafakari ya assimilation ya mtiririko wa habari katika jamii, badala ya utofauti ambao unaweza kuwa inatarajiwa na mlipuko wa mtandao na maendeleo mengine katika teknolojia ya habari. Kuenea kwa teknolojia ya habari kumesababisha athari ya bandwagon iliyoelezwa sana ndani na kati ya sekta zote za kuweka ajenda. Kwa upande wa migogoro, vyombo vya habari, watunga sera, umma, na hata wasomi wameonyesha kwamba kwa pamoja, wana uwezo wa kuchanganua mgogoro mmoja au mbili tu kwa wakati mmoja. Kwa hivyo, kwa kiwango cha karibu moja kwa mwaka, mgogoro "umechaguliwa" kuwa mada ya uchunguzi mkali (kwa msingi wa maslahi ya watunga sera wenye nguvu), na itaonekana kama sehemu ya upofu katikati ya sera, vyombo vya habari, umma na skrini za rada za kitaaluma - kufunika pointi zingine zote za maslahi. Mwaka 1999 ilikuwa Kosovo (na baadaye Timor Mashariki), ikifuatiwa na kuongezeka kidogo kwa vurugu katika Israeli-Palestina mwaka 2000. Mashambulizi ya Septemba 11 na vita vya Afghanistan vilijumuisha mwishoni mwa 2001 na mwanzo wa 2002, na hali isiyo ya mgogoro (na kwa kweli sio mgogoro) nchini Iraq ilichukuliwa kama mgogoro uliochaguliwa wa mwishoni mwa 2002 hadi mwanzo wa 2003. """Kwa kukosekana kwa sehemu kama hiyo ya upofu, migogoro mingine (au maendeleo katika michakato ya amani) wakati mwingine itaonekana kwenye fahamu ya kimataifa, kama vile Kashmir, Chechnya, Ireland ya Kaskazini na Sierra Leone." "Kwa miaka mitano iliyopita, vita vya DRC vimekuwa havipo, sio tu kwenye orodha ya vita vilivyochaguliwa, lakini hata kwenye orodha ya vita vya pande zote vilivyoonekana kwenye skrini za rada za Magharibi. """ Katika enzi hii ya vyombo vya habari vya kibiashara vinavyozidi kushindana, unyenyekevu na sensationalism ni funguo, na habari kwa kawaida hupakiwa kama aina ya infotainment. Ufikiaji wa mgogoro ni sana oversimplified na ni kawaida kulazimishwa katika mfumo wa Hollywood-style maadili kucheza <unk> kamili na villain, mhasiriwa na shujaa. Kama bidhaa inayonunuliwa na kuuzwa, habari lazima pia iwe ya'mchanga' - chanjo ya moja kwa moja ni bora, na hadithi yoyote ambayo inachukua zaidi ya siku moja au mbili kufikia na kuripoti inahesabiwa kuwa haistahili kuripoti. Ushindani pia umeona bajeti za kukusanya habari zikipunguzwa, kwa hivyo badala ya kuweka waandishi wa habari katika uwanja, mashirika ya habari hutegemea sana habari zilizokusanywa kutoka kwa maafisa wa serikali katika nchi za nyumbani za waandishi wa habari. Hii imeongeza sana ushawishi wa serikali za Magharibi katika kuweka ajenda. Kwa kuzingatia mambo haya yote, uwezekano ni dhahiri dhidi ya DRC kufanya kuonekana kwenye ajenda ya vyombo vya habari. Kwanza, ni ngumu sana kugeuzwa ili kufanana na kanuni rahisi ya mchezo wa maadili, au kuuzwa kama bidhaa ambayo inaweza kueleweka kwa urahisi katika mdomo wa sekunde thelathini na watumiaji. Pili, eneo lake haliruhusu hadithi zake kufikia soko kama habari mpya. Kwa sababu ya eneo, ukosefu wa miundombinu na umbali mkubwa unaohusika, inaweza kuchukua siku (na gharama kubwa, hatari na au usumbufu) kwa wafanyakazi wa kamera au mwandishi wa habari kupata hadithi. "Tatu, sekta ya vyombo vya habari ni mwangalifu wa hisia za uchovu wa huruma katika Magharibi (kuanzia chanjo yake ya ""kujaa"" ya vita na njaa nchini Ethiopia katika miaka ya 1980) kuhusiana na mateso ya Waafrika weusi." "Mwishowe, kwa kuwa DRC haipo kwenye rada za serikali za Magharibi, haionekani kwenye zile za tasnia ya vyombo vya habari ambayo ina mwelekeo wa kuchukua ishara zake kutoka kwa serikali. """ Kwa sababu hizi zote, walinzi wa milango katika sekta ya vyombo vya habari waliamua (na wameendelea kuamua katika miaka mitano iliyopita) kwamba kufunika mgogoro wa DRC kwa urahisi haifai gharama au juhudi ambazo zingehitajika. Utawala wa makampuni machache yenye nguvu ya vyombo vya habari vya Magharibi na athari ya bandwagon kuhakikisha kwamba kuzima hii ni karibu ulimwenguni. Katika utafiti ulioorodhesha kiwango cha chanjo ya migogoro katika habari za televisheni na magazeti katika mwaka 2000, ukosefu wa chanjo ya DRC na asili ya "upande mwingine" wa sababu ya CNN ulionekana wazi kabisa. Mkutano wa DRC haukuonekana sana na CNN na BBC, ikiwa ni mgogoro wa 14 na 15 uliofunikwa zaidi. Kwa mujibu wa ripoti hiyo, mtazamaji ambaye angetazama kipindi kimoja cha dakika 30 cha habari za dunia kila siku kwenye CNN na BBC angekuwa ameona dakika 16 tu za ripoti za vita vya DRC kwenye CNN na dakika 29 kwenye BBC kwa mwaka mzima. "Mtazamaji huyo huyo angekuwa ameona saa nane na dakika 34 kwenye CNN na saa tisa na dakika 41 kwenye BBC ya chanjo ya mapigano madogo ya Israeli na Palestina.""" DRC pia haikuwa kwenye rada za magazeti. "Hiyo ilikuwa ni mara ya nane na ya kumi na moja kwa ""mashindano yaliyofunikwa zaidi"" katika New York Times na Le Monde, na hata haikuorodheshwa katika Yomiuri Shinbun ya Japani." Katika magazeti yote matatu, habari zake zilikuwa sehemu ndogo tu ya habari za migogoro mingine. Ufikiaji wa DRC ulikuwa wa kumi na mbili ya ule wa Israeli-Palestina katika New York Times, na wa kumi na nane katika Le Monde. Ukweli ni kwamba mtu anaweza kuwa mtazamaji wa kawaida wa habari za televisheni ya kebo, na kusoma magazeti kutoka juu hadi chini, na bado kuwa na wazo kidogo sana la kile kinachotokea ulimwenguni. Hata mashirika yasiyo ya kiserikali ya ufuatiliaji wa vyombo vya habari yanayokosoa vyombo vya habari hayakugundua kutokuwepo kwa wazi kwa DRC (au migogoro mingine mikubwa ya Kiafrika) kutoka kwa vyombo vya habari. Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting (FAIR) ni shirika la habari la Marekani ambalo linashughulikia masuala ya ujasusi na ujasusi katika vyombo vya habari vya nchi za Magharibi. Ingawa hii ni utafutaji halali, katika kutoa maoni hasa juu ya maudhui ya mada vyombo vya habari huchagua kuchukua juu, pia hupuuza mada ambazo vyombo vya habari hupuuza. Katika makala nyingi za FAIR tangu vita vya DRC vilipoanza mwaka 1998, makala moja tu ilihusu DRC (katika jumla ya makala 11 kuhusu Afrika). Kwa upande mwingine, zaidi ya 50 zilikuwa zimewekwa wakfu kwa Israeli-Palestina, na zaidi ya 70 kwa Iraq. "Marais, waziri mkuu, wanasiasa na wasemaji wao wanachangia sana kupotosha ukweli kuhusu hali ya mgogoro, kuirekebisha ili ifanane na malengo yao ya sera. """ Wale wanaotumaini kudumisha hali ilivyo, au kuepuka kujihusisha na mgogoro, hupuuza (au kupuuza) ukosefu wa haki na ukiukaji wa haki za binadamu. Wale wanaopiga ngoma za vita huonyesha (na mara nyingi huongeza) mifano ya ukosefu wa haki na ukiukaji wa haki za kibinadamu. "Kwa mfano, katika utawala wa Clinton, Marekani, ilikuwa ni sera ya serikali kuepuka kutumia neno ""mauaji ya kimbari"" kwa kurejelea kile ambacho ni wazi kuwa ni mauaji ya kimbari yanayoendelea nchini Rwanda, ili kuepuka kuhusika." "Hakuna wasiwasi kama huo katika kujibu mgogoro wa kiwango cha chini huko Kosovo, na uhuru mkubwa ulichukuliwa na matumizi ya neno hilo katika jaribio la kuhalalisha vita vya NATO. """ """Ukweli mbaya ni kwamba ukosefu wa haki na ukiukaji wa haki za binadamu upo katika kila nchi duniani, kwa viwango tofauti, na kiwango cha hasira kilichoonyeshwa na serikali kwa hali hizi ni nadra sana kulinganishwa na kiwango cha ukosefu wa haki." """Ubishi wa kusikitisha kuhusu DRC unaonyesha wazi kuwa madai ya kuwa kuna viwango fulani vya mauaji, ukiukaji wa haki za binadamu na mateso ya binadamu ambayo Magharibi haitathubutu (madai yanayotumiwa, kwa mfano, kuhalalisha vita dhidi ya Yugoslavia) ni maneno tu yaliyokusudiwa kufuatia malengo madogo ya sera za kigeni." """Kiwango kisicho na usawa cha misaada ya kibinadamu inayotolewa na serikali ni moja ya ishara za kueleza zaidi za radars za sera za Magharibi zilizopotoka." "Mkurugenzi Mtendaji wa Programu ya Chakula ya Dunia (WFP) James Morris alisema: ""Msaada wa kibinadamu ni chaguo la kisiasa, na tunaendelea kukubali kiwango cha mateso na kukosa matumaini katika Afrika ambayo hatukukubali kamwe katika sehemu yoyote ya ulimwengu." Mwaka 2003 na mwaka wa 2013 walipata dola milioni 349 tu kwa ajili ya DRC. "Hiyo ni kidogo ikilinganishwa na dola zaidi ya bilioni moja zilizokusanywa katika miezi mitatu tu kwa ajili ya Iraq, au bilioni 1.7 kwa mwaka mmoja na nusu nchini Afghanistan, au bilioni 1.5 kwa miaka minne katika Kusini-Mashariki mwa Ulaya.""" "Mamilioni 180 yaliyokusanywa kwa ajili ya Timor Mashariki katika muda wa chini ya mwaka mmoja ni zaidi ya kiasi kilichokusanywa kwa ajili ya DRC katika mwaka wowote - ilikuwa mara kumi na tano ya kiasi kilichokusanywa kwa ajili ya DRC katika mwaka wa 2000.""" Hata ikiwa tutaongeza michango kwa miaka minne na nusu ya wito kwa eneo la Maziwa Makuu na Afrika ya Kati - eneo lenye msukosuko zaidi ulimwenguni - jumla ya milioni 923 bado hailinganishi na msaada uliotolewa kwa migogoro ndogo na fupi zaidi. Vivyo hivyo, katika uwanja wa utengenezaji wa amani, upatanishi wa ngazi ya juu kutoka nje ya bara umekuwa haupo. "Wakati baadhi ya majaribio ya chini ya ufunguo katika diplomasia kwa lengo la kufikia baadhi ya malengo mdogo yamefanywa, kama vile Uingereza ""mikutano ya upatanishi na Rwanda na Uganda"" (inajulikana kama ""wachache zaidi ya fursa za picha juu ya vikombe vya chai""), na Marekani kushinikiza Rwanda kujiondoa kutoka DRC, bado kuna mapenzi kidogo katika Magharibi ya kuwa hata kisiasa kushiriki katika ufumbuzi." "Kwa kuongezea, kutokana na ushiriki wa kiuchumi wa makampuni mengi ya Magharibi na mauzo ya silaha, badala ya kuwa na wasiwasi, kuna uwezekano kwamba kutofanya kazi kwa Magharibi kunaweza kuwa dalili kwamba faida kutoka kwa kuendelea kwa mgogoro hupita zile za kumalizika kwake - mtazamo ambao unategemezwa na madai ya ushiriki wa siri katika vita, na kuzuia misaada ya utunzaji wa amani. """ DRC haijawahi kutoweka katika majadiliano ya Baraza la Usalama la Umoja wa Mataifa (ingawa ilichukua miezi saba kwa Baraza kupitisha azimio juu ya suala hilo), na Baraza limeendelea kutaka kumaliza mgogoro kupitia taarifa za vyombo vya habari, taarifa za rais na maazimio. Hata hivyo, kwa kuwa washiriki wake hawana nia ya kisiasa, mambo mengine machache yamefanywa. Kikosi cha kudumisha amani cha kimapenzi kilitolewa mwaka 2000, lakini kupelekwa kwake kumekuwa na kucheleweshwa kwa muda mrefu, na bado hakikuwa kimechapishwa kabisa katikati ya 2003. Uamuzi wa kupeleka wanajeshi wa kulinda amani ulionekana kufanywa kwa kiasi kikubwa kutokana na haja ya kuonekana kuwa "anafanya kitu", baada ya mashtaka ya viwango viwili kufuatia uingiliaji katika Kosovo na Timor Mashariki. Kwa vyovyote vile, kupeleka wanajeshi wa kulinda amani (kinyume na watekelezaji wa amani) mahali ambapo hakukuwa na amani ya kudumisha, na kufanya hivyo kwa idadi ndogo kama hiyo, ilikuwa wazi majibu yasiyofaa (na hatari sana): suluhisho la Band-Aid. Kwa kusikitisha, Katibu Mkuu wa Umoja wa Mataifa na mashirika yake ya ushirika si salama kwa shinikizo la ufahamu wa kimataifa usio na usawa, na wanalazimika kukabiliana na hali halisi inayowazunguka na kuwatawala. Mashirika ya Umoja wa Mataifa ambayo huanzisha wito wa pamoja wa misaada ya kibinadamu hayawezi kudhibiti kiasi kinachotolewa au kuahidiwa, lakini kuweka kiasi kinachohitajika hufunua mwenendo sawa na ule wa wafadhili. Kwa mfano, wito wa haraka wa OCHA kwa Iraq ulikuwa mkubwa zaidi, na ombi la zaidi ya dola bilioni 2.2 kwa miezi sita tu. Kwa mujibu wa ripoti hiyo, jumla ya fedha zilizopendekezwa kwa ajili ya nchi za DRC, Great Lakes na Afrika ya Kati ni bilioni 1.4 tu. Machapisho na tovuti za mashirika ya Umoja wa Mataifa pia hufunua mwelekeo wa kufuata migogoro ya watu wa nyakati hizo. Kwa mfano, katika Mei 2003, ukurasa mkuu wa UN ulionyesha viungo maalum kwa Iraq, "Roadmap" ya Mashariki ya Kati, na ugaidi, kama vile Kituo cha Habari cha UN. Mashirika mengine kama vile UNICEF, UNDP na OCHA pia yalionyesha viungo maalum kwa kurasa juu ya Iraq kwenye kurasa zao kuu za nyumbani. "Mgogoro katika DRC umevutia umakini mdogo sana katika vyombo vya habari na ajenda za sera kwamba, kwa pamoja, umma - kabisa kwa rehema ya vyombo vya habari na ajenda za sera - hauna wazo kwamba mgogoro hata upo. """ Katika utafiti wa utafiti wa utafiti wa utafiti wa utafiti wa utafiti wa utafiti wa utafiti wa utafiti wa utafiti wa utafiti wa utafiti wa utafiti wa utafiti wa utafiti wa utafiti wa utafiti wa utafiti wa utafiti wa utafiti wa utafiti wa utafiti wa utafiti wa utafiti wa utafiti wa utafiti wa utafiti wa utafiti wa utafiti wa utafiti wa utafiti wa utafiti wa utafiti wa utafiti wa utafiti wa utafiti wa utafiti wa utafiti wa utafiti wa utafiti wa utafiti wa utafiti wa utafiti. "Kutokana na idadi hiyo, ni mtu mmoja tu aliyeweza kumtaja DRC kama mojawapo ya migogoro mitatu ya hatari zaidi duniani, ""aliandika katika ukurasa wake wa tatu, baada ya Israeli-Palestina na Afghanistan." "Jibu la kawaida lilikuwa kwamba mgogoro wa Israeli na Palestina ulikuwa mbaya zaidi, na asilimia 21 (zaidi ya nusu) walidhani kwamba, kwa suala la mateso ya kibinadamu, mgogoro huo ulikuwa na haja zaidi ya suluhisho. """ "Watu 13 tu ndio waliosema DRC ndiyo ""mgogoro wenye vifo vingi zaidi"" na wengine 13 hawakusema kuna mgogoro wowote wa Afrika." Wakati ukubwa wa sampuli ni ndogo, ni hutumika kama mfano wa jinsi kupotoshwa maoni ya umma juu ya migogoro ni - hasa kama wale waliohojiwa inaweza kutarajiwa kuwa na juu ya wastani maslahi katika (na maarifa ya) somo. Huduma za uchaguzi wa sera za kigeni pia zinafunua ukosefu mkubwa wa usawa katika ufahamu wa migogoro ulimwenguni, na ukosefu wa kutaja DRC, na Afrika kwa ujumla. Uchunguzi wa Gallup kuhusu sera za kigeni, kwa mfano, unazingatia China, Cuba, Iraq, Kosovo, Mashariki ya Kati na Urusi. "Hakuna kumbukumbu za DRC zilizorudishwa katika utafutaji wa kumbukumbu za DRC kwenye wavuti ya Gallup, ikionyesha kutokuwepo kabisa kwa mada hiyo, wakati utafutaji kama huo ulisababisha kumbukumbu 75 za Israeli na 59 za Kosovo. """ Kwa mujibu wa ripoti hiyo, Gallup ina ofisi 26 duniani kote, lakini hakuna moja iliyoko Afrika. Vikundi vyenye nguvu na vilivyoandaliwa vizuri, hasa vilivyoundwa na diasporas na vikundi vyenye uhusiano wa kikabila na au kidini na nchi au mikoa inayohusika na mgogoro, pia vina uwezo wa kuathiri nafasi ya mgogoro kwenye rada ya ufahamu wa kimataifa. "Kundi za ""lobby"" zinazohusiana na Israeli na, kwa kiwango kidogo, Palestina, kwa mfano, zina jukumu kubwa la kudumisha kiwango cha juu cha vyombo vya habari vya Magharibi, sera, umma na maslahi ya kitaaluma katika mgogoro mdogo wa Israeli na Palestina." "Wafilipi wa Afrika (na hata wale wa DRC) hawajaunganishwa vya kutosha, wameandaliwa, wenye nguvu au waliohamasishwa kuathiri msimamo wa migogoro ya Afrika juu ya maonyesho mbalimbali ya ufahamu wa kimataifa.""" Mashirika yasiyo ya kiserikali ya kibinadamu ni wonyesho mwingine wa ajenda ya umma. Mashirika kama hayo yanategemea michango kutoka kwa umma kwa ujumla na ufadhili wa serikali <unk> ikiwafanya wawe na uwezekano mkubwa wa athari ya bandwagon. Kwa kutumia hisia za umma zilizotengenezwa na vyombo vya habari na watunga sera, mashirika mengi yasiyo ya kiserikali, katika juhudi za kuongeza michango kwa shirika lao na kupanua eneo lao la ushawishi, walianzisha wito maalum (hata matangazo katika magazeti na televisheni) kwa michango kwa ajili ya waathirika wa migogoro ya watu. Pia hutumia faida ya ufadhili mkubwa wa serikali kwa miradi ya mashirika yasiyo ya kiserikali katika maeneo kama hayo ya mgogoro (au baada ya mgogoro). Vivyo hivyo, vituo vya televisheni vilianzisha njia za simu za kutoa michango, na nyota za roki (au muungano wa nyota za roki) zilifanya maonyesho ya kutoa misaada au kutengeneza albamu za kutoa misaada ili kukabiliana na migogoro ya watu wa wakati huo. Mgogoro katika Jamhuri ya Kidemokrasia ya Kongo bado haujapata uangalifu kama huo. Maoni ya umma ya ulimwengu yanaonekana katika viwango vya kulinganisha vya michango ya kibinafsi kwa wito wa kibinadamu wa OCHA. Katika miaka minne na nusu ya maombi kwa DRC na Maziwa Makuu na Afrika ya Kati pamoja, walipata thelathini na nane ya kiasi kilichokusanywa kwa Ulaya ya Kusini Mashariki, thelathini na mbili ya hiyo kwa mwaka mmoja na nusu kwa Afghanistan, na tano ya hiyo kwa miezi mitatu tu kwa Iraq. Msaada wa kibinafsi kwa maombi ya OCHA: Januari 1999 <unk> Juni "Mfano: ""Intaneti imekuwa ikisifiwa kama chombo cha mapinduzi katika kuwezesha umma kuwa na udhibiti wa habari wanayoweza kupata.""" Kwa nadharia, inapaswa kuruhusu umma kuepuka upendeleo wa vyombo vya habari na watunga sera, na kupata habari ambayo inaonyesha vizuri hali halisi. Tofauti na magazeti, redio na televisheni, hata hivyo, mtandao inahitaji ushiriki wa kazi katika kutafuta habari maalum. Hivyo, bila maslahi ya awali na baadhi ya maarifa ya msingi, habari haitapatikana katika nafasi ya kwanza. Kwa maana hii, vyombo vya habari vya kawaida (kwa msingi wa ushiriki wa watazamaji wa passive) hubaki na nguvu zaidi kuliko mtandao katika kuweka ajenda. "Mmoja wa kazi muhimu zaidi za wasomi katika uwanja wa siasa za kimataifa, mahusiano na sera ni kuchukua hatua nyuma na kuelewa ""picha kubwa"" - kuona ulimwengu katika mwangaza wa lengo kwamba watunga sera kwa ujumla ni uwezo wa." Kutoka kwa mtazamo kama huo, wasomi (katika nadharia) wanaweza kuelimisha na kushauri watunga sera. Pia wana daraka la kurekodi historia ya wanadamu. Hata hivyo, mara nyingi sana, jamii ya wasomi hufuata ishara za serikali zao, wakikazia fikira maeneo ambayo serikali zenye nguvu za Magharibi zinavutiwa au zinahusika. Uchambuzi wa kimakusudi kwa ujumla hufanywa ndani ya mipaka ya maeneo hayo. Kwa mfano, shambulio la NATO dhidi ya Yugoslavia juu ya Kosovo, lilipatana na shambulio la masomo ya kitaaluma na kufikiri kwa uchambuzi. "Uingiliaji wa kibinadamu" na "utawala" zilikuwa maneno ya kawaida yaliyotokana na hayo ambayo yalitawala majarida na vitabu vya kitaaluma katika miaka iliyofuata. Mashambulizi ya Septemba 11 dhidi ya Marekani na vita dhidi ya Afghanistan vilifanya "ughaibuni" kuwa sehemu ya upofu kwenye rada ya kitaaluma. Kuingilia na kuishika Iraq tangu wakati huo kulileta suala la demokrasia iliyowekwa mbele ya ajenda ya kitaaluma, pamoja na swali linalohusiana na umuhimu wa Baraza la Usalama la Umoja wa Mataifa. "Ni jambo la kushangaza kwamba vita haramu dhidi ya Iraq, badala ya kutengwa kwa DRC, imekuwa kichocheo katika jamii ya kitaaluma ya kuhoji ufanisi wa Baraza la Umoja wa Mataifa. """ Kushindwa kwa jamii ya wasomi wa Magharibi kuchambua kikamilifu mgogoro mkubwa zaidi ulimwenguni tangu Vita Kuu ya Pili (au migogoro mingine mingi ya Kiafrika, kwa suala hilo), inaweza tu kuelezwa kama uzembe wa kitaaluma wa pamoja, na inaleta swali la umuhimu wa uwanja wa masomo ya usalama kwa ulimwengu wa kisasa. Kwa sababu ya hali hiyo, gazeti la habari la Magharibi, ambalo lina habari za kimataifa, halijawahi kutoa makala yoyote kuhusu DRC. Majarida kama hayo huelekea kujitolea makala zaidi kwa suala la Israeli-Palestina kuliko kwa bara lote la Afrika. Rekodi ya Keesings ya Matukio ya Ulimwengu pia ni kielelezo cha jinsi rekodi ya historia inavyochanganyikiwa. Kwa mfano, katika 1999, matoleo yake yalikuwa na jumla ya kurasa 35 za maandishi kuhusu Yugoslavia (Kosovo), ikilinganishwa na kurasa tano za Jamhuri ya Kidemokrasia ya Kongo. Katika 2002, kurasa 32 juu ya Israeli-Palestina shadowed kurasa 3 wakfu kwa DRC. Katika kipindi cha miaka minne kuanzia mwaka 1999 hadi 2002, ilijumuisha jumla ya kurasa 81 kuhusu Israel na Palestina, 66 kuhusu Yugoslavia, 30 kuhusu Afghanistan na 15 tu kuhusu Jamhuri ya Kidemokrasia ya Kongo. Mwelekeo kama huo waweza kuonekana katika vitabu na kazi nyingine za kitaaluma. Uchunguzi uliofanywa mnamo Mei 2003 katika hifadhidata ya vitabu na nyaraka zilizopatikana (zilichapishwa tangu 1999) juu ya DRC katika vyuo vikuu vyote vya Japani ulifunua jumla ya kazi 11 zinazohusiana na DRC - kwa Kiingereza na Kifaransa. Utafiti huo ulifunua zaidi ya kazi 120 katika lugha zaidi ya tano. "Kama ilivyoelezwa katika kitabu cha mwaka wa 1999, Taasisi ya Kimataifa ya Utafiti wa Amani ya Stockholm (SIPRI) ilitoa sura za uchambuzi wa Mashariki ya Kati, Urusi, Bahari ya Caspian na Ulaya katika sehemu yake ya ""Usalama na Mgogoro,"" lakini hakuna sura zilizowekwa kwa suala kuu la usalama wa Afrika katika DRC (au mahali pengine popote barani)." Utafiti wa kina pia haukuonekana katika vitabu vyake vya mwaka wa 2000, 2001 na 2002, na umakini ulikuwa juu ya Ulaya. Maelezo kadhaa yanaweza kupendekezwa kwa ajili ya marginalization hii. Wanafunzi wa chuo kikuu hawafanyi utafiti katika utupu: wao huangalia habari, kusoma magazeti na kusikiliza maafisa wao wa serikali na wasemaji. Utafiti unaosababishwa na visababishi hivyo huwafanya wasomi wawe waathirika wa athari ya msafara. Isitoshe, mara nyingi uchambuzi hutegemea hati, habari, na utafiti wa awali unaopatikana, jambo linalotokeza mzunguko mbaya. Kadiri habari inavyokuwa ndogo, ndivyo wasomi wanavyoweza kufanya utafiti mdogo bila kufanya jitihada nyingi. Mwishowe, ushawishi wa ushawishi, umaarufu na mauzo unaweza kumaanisha kwamba kazi ambazo vyama vya kitaaluma na waandishi wa vitabu hutengeneza mara nyingi huzunguka mada za "mfumo" wa nyakati. "Mashirika kama International Crisis Group (ICG) na International Rescue Committee (IRC) yamekuwa yakijaribu kuvutia watu kwa kutoa taarifa kuhusu vita hivyo na kutoa taarifa kuhusu idadi ya watu waliokufa.""" Kwa kulinganisha, mamia ya waandishi wa habari wenye bidii na mashirika mengine mengi hutoa taarifa za kila siku na uchambuzi wa mgogoro na idadi ya majeruhi wa mgogoro katika Israeli-Palestina, kuhakikisha kwamba takwimu za majeruhi zinawasilishwa hadi tarakimu moja. Licha ya juhudi za mashirika kama vile ICG na IRC nchini DRC, mgogoro huo bado uko katika hatari ya kukataliwa nafasi yake katika historia. Kutumia mjadala wa juu, inawezekana kuendeleza zaidi na kwa kiasi fulani kuandaa dhana ya migogoro ya siri, kwa lengo la kuongeza matumizi yake kwa ulimwengu kwa ujumla. Migogoro ya siri ni ile ambayo ni daima kutokuwepo kutoka sera, vyombo vya habari, umma na ajenda ya kitaaluma, na kwa kawaida kuwa na kiwango cha wazi cha kuteseka binadamu inadequately kushughulikiwa. Ingawa mapigano yaliyopuuzwa au yatima ni yale ambayo, katika siku za nyuma, yamekuwa wakipokea ufahamu na maslahi ya kimataifa, mapigano ya siri mara kwa mara hayakuvutia umakini kama huo katika mwendo wao wote (ingawa yanaweza kuonekana mara kwa mara katika hali kali au ya kipekee). Kuchunguza mambo yanayofanya migogoro iangaliwe na jamii ya kimataifa ni muhimu katika kuelewa migogoro ya siri. Kama ilivyoelezwa hapo juu, ajenda za maonyesho ya ufahamu wa kimataifa zimekuwa zinaingiliana zaidi, na ajenda za sera na vyombo vya habari vinavyounganishwa kwa karibu zinaamuru ajenda za umma na za kawaida za kitaaluma. Kama vile, mambo zaidi ya kudai tahadhari yetu ni wale ambao kuamua sera na maslahi ya vyombo vya habari. Maslahi ya kimkakati ni msingi wa kuamua maslahi ya sera. Mzozo huwa kipaumbele cha juu kwa serikali wakati unaathiri maslahi ya kimkakati ya nchi hiyo. Maslahi kama hayo yanaweza kuhusiana na vitisho vya moja kwa moja vya kijeshi (ikiwa ni pamoja na ugaidi), upatikanaji wa (au udhibiti juu ya) rasilimali za asili (kama katika mkoa wa Mashariki ya Kati), mtiririko wa wakimbizi (kama katika Haiti, Balkan, Timor Mashariki), au mtiririko mwingine wa uwezekano wa uharibifu, kama vile dawa za kulevya (kama katika Colombia). Kwa sababu hizi, maslahi ya kimkakati kwa ujumla yanahusiana sana na ukaribu wa kijiografia. Mgogoro pia unakuwa kipaumbele cha juu kwa serikali wakati unaathiri maslahi ya kimkakati ya serikali yenyewe (kwa suala la uchaguzi upya). Kwa njia hii, vikundi vyenye nguvu vya maslahi maalum katika uwanja wa umma huathiri kiwango cha maslahi ya sera katika mgogoro (kama katika Israeli-Palestina). Maslahi ya vyombo vya habari huchochewa kwa kiasi kikubwa na maslahi ya serikali (au angalau na sababu sawa ambazo huchochea maslahi ya serikali), lakini kuna baadhi ya mambo ambayo huathiri maslahi ya vyombo vya habari tofauti. "Kulinganisha na maslahi ya sera, maslahi ya vyombo vya habari yanaathiriwa zaidi na urahisi wa kupata mgogoro husika (kwa suala la kupata picha za kuona za mgogoro au mateso ya kibinadamu).""" Kwa mfano, maeneo yenye uhasama na miundombinu duni nchini Colombia na Sudan, hupunguza sana maslahi ya vyombo vya habari, licha ya maslahi ya sera fulani ya Marekani. "Ushambuliaji wa waandishi wa habari, kama vile ule wa Algeria, na vikwazo vya serikali kwa uandishi wa habari, kama vile ule wa Sudan, pia hutumika kama vizuizi. """ Sensationalism pia ni zaidi ya wazi kuliko ni katika ajenda ya sera. Katika Rwanda, sensationalism (mauaji makubwa) pamoja na upatikanaji (waandishi wa habari kwa bahati mbaya kurudi kutoka uchaguzi wa kwanza baada ya ubaguzi wa rangi katika Afrika Kusini) propelled mgogoro kwa hali ya kuchaguliwa, lakini sensationalism peke yake chini ya hali sawa katika Burundi ilikuwa trigger kutosha. Hali mbaya ya wazungu (wakulima nchini Zimbabwe, mateka wa Magharibi nchini Ufilipino na Colombia) pia ni sababu kuu ya kuamsha maslahi ya vyombo vya habari. Kuchora mstari wazi unaoweka mipaka ya migogoro ya siri ingekuwa mazoezi ya kitaaluma (na sio muhimu sana). Ujuzi wa kimataifa wa migogoro unaweza kuanzia kutokuwepo kabisa hadi kuwa na wasiwasi, na pia hubadilika kulingana na hatua ya mgogoro. Kwa ujumla, hata hivyo, inaweza kusemwa kwamba kuna pengo kubwa kati ya migogoro iliyochaguliwa na migogoro ya siri, na kwamba kuna migogoro michache kati ya pande mbili za mwisho: kama katika wale ambao huvutia kiasi cha mfululizo wa umakini wa kiwango cha chini. Labda ni upendezi wa vyombo vya habari unaoendeshwa na biashara kwa sensationalism ambao umechangia zaidi pengo hili kubwa. Uzoefu wa vyombo vya habari wa kukamata mgogoro mmoja na kutoa chanjo ya saturation ya mgogoro huo tu sio tu inafanya kuwa vigumu kwa watunga sera, umma au wasomi kupuuza, lakini pia inafanya kuwa vigumu kwao kugundua kuwepo kwa migogoro mingine. Kwa bahati mbaya, ni migogoro ya Afrika ambayo iko mbali zaidi na skrini za rada za ufahamu wa kimataifa, licha ya ukweli kwamba Afrika ni mwenyeji wa idadi kubwa ya migogoro ya ulimwengu. Mapigano mengi ya Afrika ni ya kijiografia na kiuchumi mbali na maslahi ya kimkakati ya Magharibi, hayafikiki kwa urahisi, ni magumu sana, hayahusishi watu weupe, na hayafuatiwi na diaspora zenye nguvu Magharibi. Hizi ndizo sababu kuu ambazo zinafanya karibu migogoro yote ya Afrika iwe na hali mbaya ya migogoro ya siri. Katika May 2003, DRC ilionekana kwa muda mfupi kwenye pembe ya skrini za rada za Magharibi. Wanajeshi 700 wa Umoja wa Mataifa waliowasili mjini Bunia (kujaza nafasi iliyobaki baada ya Uganda kuondoka) walijikuta wakiwa wengi zaidi, wakiwa wamezingirwa, na wakijitahidi kujilinda (pamoja na maelfu ya raia) wakati wanamgambo wakipigana ili kudhibiti mji huo. Hali hiyo ilionekana kuwa sawa na msiba wa zamani katika Rwanda, Bosnia na Sierra Leone. Wanajeshi wawili wa kulinda amani waliuawa na Katibu Mkuu wa Umoja wa Mataifa aliwaomba wanachama wa jumuiya ya kimataifa kuingilia kati. Jumuiya ya kimataifa ilijibu. Ufaransa ilikubali kuongoza kikosi kidogo cha muda cha dharura cha kimataifa, ikiwa ni pamoja na vikosi kutoka Afrika Kusini, Uingereza, Sweden na Pakistan, na Baraza la Usalama la Umoja wa Mataifa liliruhusu kikosi hicho Mei 30. "Hiyo ilikuwa mara ya kwanza katika miaka saba hivi kwamba Baraza lilitoa idhini ya ""kupeleka amani Afrika"" na hata hiyo ilifutwa." Ingawa ni maendeleo mazuri, kuonekana kwa DRC kwenye skrini za rada za Magharibi kulisababishwa zaidi na kuona walinzi wa amani katika hatari, na kwa kufanana na mauaji ya kimbari ya Rwanda, kuliko kwa haja ya kutekeleza suluhisho la kina la mgogoro. "Uhitaji wa nchi za Magharibi kukabiliana na maombi ya Katibu Mkuu wa Umoja wa Mataifa ulionekana wazi, na (baada ya kucheleweshwa kidogo) Ufaransa ilikubali kuongoza ujumbe huo (kuandaa karibu nusu ya wanajeshi 1,400) tu kwa msaada wa wengine, tu katika mji mdogo wa Bunia na uwanja wake wa ndege, na tu kama hatua ya muda wa miezi mitatu hadi walinzi wa amani wa kofia ya bluu waweze kuimarishwa.""" Katika hali mbaya zaidi, uingiliaji ulioongozwa na Ufaransa labda unaweza kuelezwa kama nguvu ya ishara, iliyotumika kuonyesha kuonekana kwa "kufanya kitu" - kuonekana kurekebisha makosa ya Rwanda. Kwa vyovyote vile, inaweza kuelezwa kuwa mwanzo mzuri. Naibu Katibu Mkuu wa Umoja wa Mataifa wa Uhifadhi wa Amani, akizungumzia kuhusu vikosi vya ulinzi wa amani vya Umoja wa Mataifa, alisema kuwa msimamo uliochukuliwa katika mji mdogo wa Bunia, sehemu ya mbali ya nchi kubwa, ni ishara ya nguvu zaidi ya Ituri. Ni muhimu sana jinsi jamii ya kimataifa itakavyofuata katika miezi ijayo. <unk> Ufuatiliaji wa jamii ya kimataifa umechanganywa. Kikosi cha Ufaransa kilijiondoa na kubadilishwa na kikosi kikubwa cha kulinda amani cha kofia za bluu kama ilivyopangwa. Vizuizi vya silaha pia vilitumiwa (kwa mara ya kwanza) kwa vikundi vya silaha vinavyofanya kazi katika Ituri na Kivus. Wakati huo huo, maslahi ya Magharibi na ufuatiliaji (kwa suala la ushiriki wa kidiplomasia, kijeshi na kibinadamu) ilithibitika kuwa ya muda mfupi. """Ukaribu wa DRC kutoka kwa maslahi na utamaduni wa Magharibi, ukubwa wa nchi (pamoja na eneo lake lisilo na mazingira na ukosefu wa miundombinu), na ukubwa, utata na kina cha mgogoro wake bado ni vizuizi vikubwa kwa ufahamu wa kimataifa wenye maana." Ingawa juhudi za Afrika za kuleta suluhisho la jumla zinaonekana kuwa na matunda, rasilimali ambazo mataifa ya Afrika yanaweza kuleta kwa utatuzi wa migogoro ni sehemu ndogo tu ya zile za Magharibi, na labda hazitoshi kuleta amani ya haki na ya kudumu. Kwa suala la ajenda ya sera, pendekezo moja lililowekwa kwa uingiliaji wa maana wa Magharibi, lilikuwa "kumbukumbu ya askari" kando ya mipaka ya DRC ya Rwanda na Uganda. Hii inaweza kwenda mbali kuelekea kutuliza wasiwasi wa usalama wa nchi hizo na kuongeza utulivu wa jumla wa mkoa. Hata hivyo, kuhamishwa kwa vikosi kwa muda mrefu, kwa hatari ya kisiasa na kwa gharama kubwa, si njia pekee ya majibu ambayo Magharibi inapatikana. Uelekezaji wa tahadhari wa silaha (au nyingine) vikwazo na, sawa muhimu, utekelezaji bidii wa vikwazo hivyo, pia inaweza kutumika kama majibu muhimu. Ongezeko na zaidi kushiriki shinikizo la kidiplomasia <unk> hata kama uliofanywa discreetly <unk> pia ni chaguo kwamba inapaswa kufuatiliwa. """Kupunguza ushiriki katika kutoa msaada wa kibinadamu kwa waathirika wa mgogoro kunaweza kuokoa idadi kubwa ya maisha, hata kama haiwezekani kuchangia utatuzi wa mgogoro." Kwa hiyo, ni kwa nini DRC inapaswa kuwa kwenye radari ya kimataifa? Hii ni swali si rahisi kujibu, kutokana na karibu kukosekana kwa jumla ya sababu zilizoonyeshwa hapo juu ili kuvutia tahadhari ya migogoro. Hata hivyo, mfano wa Somalia unatoa tumaini fulani. Inadhaniwa kuwa kichocheo cha Somalia kuibuka kwa umaarufu kilikuwa mpango wa mashirika fulani ndani ya serikali ya Marekani - yaani Ofisi ya Msaada wa Msiba wa Nje (OFAD) - katika juhudi za kuvutia tahadhari ya sehemu nyingine za serikali kwa mgogoro huo. Hii, kwa upande wake, ilifanya kazi kama kichocheo kwa vyombo vya habari na athari ya bandwagon ilichukua. "Kama ilivyo kwa DRC, ni vita vya ""mzito"" kati ya Waafrika weusi, ambapo maslahi machache ya kimkakati ya Magharibi yalitokea, na inaonyesha kwamba hata shirika la ndani la serikali lina uwezo wa kutenda kama kichocheo cha kuvutia umakini kwa mgogoro wa siri." Labda wasomi pia wako katika nafasi ya kutenda kama kichocheo - haswa wale walio ndani ya safu ya ushauri wa serikali, au harakati ya kitaaluma iliyopangwa vizuri ambayo inafanikiwa kuvutia maslahi ya vyombo vya habari. "Mtazamo wa kimataifa unafanya mapigano ya siri kuwa ya lazima, lakini kwa kuzingatia kiwango chake kikubwa na athari kubwa kwa usalama wa kikanda, DRC haipaswi kuwa moja yao. """ """Bila marekebisho ya ujasiri ya vipaumbele na vyombo vya habari, watunga sera, umma na wasomi kuvunja mzunguko wa ukimya na kujipatanisha na hali halisi, mgogoro wa DRC utabaki nje ya ufahamu wa kimataifa nje ya mkoa na kutolewa nje ya kurasa za historia - mgogoro mkubwa wa siri wa wakati wote." Kamati ya Kimataifa ya Uokoaji (IRC) ilitoa takwimu hii ya idadi ya watu waliokufa baada ya uchunguzi wa kuamua idadi ya watu waliokufa zaidi ya ile ambayo ingekuwa inatarajiwa chini ya hali ya kudumu. Ingawa takwimu za IRC zinaonyesha kuwa idadi ya watu walioathirika ni milioni 3.3 lakini inakadiriwa kuwa ni milioni 3.7 hadi milioni 4. "Kama ilivyoelezwa katika ripoti ya Kamati ya Kimataifa ya Uokoaji, ""Kifo katika Jamhuri ya Kidemokrasia ya Kongo: Matokeo kutoka kwa Uchunguzi wa Kitaifa, uliofanywa Septemba - Novemba 2002,"" ripoti ya Aprili 2003." "Kama ilivyoelezwa katika ""Makosa ya Kibinadamu yaliyosahaulika"" na ""Mkutano wa Majukumu juu ya Jukumu la Vyombo vya Habari, Watendaji wa Uamuzi na Mashirika ya Kibinadamu"" Copenhagen, Oktoba 23, 2002." Rwanda na Uganda zimekanusha kuwa wanajeshi wao walikuwa nchini DRC kwa miezi kadhaa baada ya mapigano kuanza. "Kwa maelezo zaidi kuhusu vita vya Congo, tazama ""The African Stakes of the Congo War"" (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002)." "Kwa maelezo zaidi juu ya vita, angalia Jakkie Cilliers na Mark Malan, ""Uhifadhi wa Amani katika DRC, MONUC na Njia ya Amani,"" ISS Monograph No. 1." "Mwezi Oktoba, 2001: ""Vita vya Mataifa Saba Afrika"" (ICG, Jamhuri ya Kidemokrasia ya Kongo, ripoti ya No. "Mwaka wa 1999: ""Storm Clouds Over Sun City: The Urgent Need to Remake the Congolese Peace Process"" (Mwaka wa 1999: ""Storm Clouds Over Sun City: The Urgent Need to Remake the Congolese Peace Process"") ni ripoti ya ICG Afrika, nambari 44, Brussels, Nairobi, 14 Mei 2002." UNITED NATIONS (UN) S.1146. "Kivus: ""The Forgotten Crucible of the Congo Conflict"" (Kivus: ""Mchanganyiko uliosahaulika wa mgogoro wa Kongo"") ni ripoti ya ICG Afrika." Nairobi, 24 Januari 2003 23-26 ya mwaka huu. Utafiti wa kazi ya kuweka ajenda huelekea kuzingatia uhusiano kati ya vipengele vitatu kuu: ajenda ya vyombo vya habari, ajenda ya umma na ajenda ya sera. Kwa madhumuni ya utafiti huu, ajenda ya kitaaluma imeongezwa, ikitambua jukumu lake katika kuathiri ajenda ya sera na katika kurekodi historia. "Everett M. Rogers na James W. Deering, ""Utafiti wa kuweka ajenda: Imekuwa wapi, Inaenda wapi?"" katika Media Power in Politics, Graber ed., Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1994."" Steven Livingston na Todd Eachus, "Mgogoro wa Kibinadamu na Sera ya Nje ya Marekani: Somalia na Athari ya CNN Ilikaguliwa upya", Mawasiliano ya Kisiasa, Vol. 12 na 15, ukurasa wa 15. 413-429 - Mfano wa Usalama Piers Robinson, <unk>The Policy-Media Interaction Model: Measuring Media Power During Humanitarian Crisis<unk>, Jarida la Utafiti wa Amani, Vol. Hapana, 37, 5, 2000, ukurasa wa 5. 613-63 ya "Hata hivyo, BBC World News iliendelea kutumia kauli mbiu yake ""Demand a broader view"" mapema mwaka 2003 wakati ilitangaza habari za vita vya Iraq na hakuna kitu kingine." "Kwa hivyo, ""maoni ya kina zaidi"" ambayo tunaulizwa kudai inahusu tu maoni ndani ya kipengele maalum cha habari ambacho ni mada ya ""mtazamo mdogo"" na hata kipengele hicho cha chanjo ni cha kushangaza sana." Kwa sababu ya maslahi ya daima ya vyombo vya habari na ushawishi wa mbali wa makundi yenye nguvu ya lobby, mgogoro wa Israeli na Palestina na mchakato wa amani unaohusiana ni mfano wa nadra wa mgogoro ambao unafanikiwa kudumisha nafasi ya kudumu kwenye rada za kimataifa hata wakati sio doa la upofu. "John C. Hammock na Joel R. Charney, ""Usaidizi wa dharura kama mchezo wa maadili: vyombo vya habari, mashirika ya misaada, na uhitaji wa kujenga uwezo,"" katika ""Kutoka kwa mauaji ya kimbari hadi Uuaji wa Kimbari: vyombo vya habari, sera za umma, na mgogoro wa kibinadamu,"" Rotberg na Weiss eds., Massachusetts: World Peace Foundation, 1996, pp." 115-116 - Mfano wa Usalama "Slogan ya CNN ""Be the first to know"" inaonyesha kuwa ""haraka ya ripoti ni muhimu kuliko usahihi, ubora, upana au kina.""" Angalia Jonathan Mermin, Debating War and Peace: Media Coverage of U.S. "Kutoka kwa ""Mashambulizi ya Vietnam"" na ""Mashambulizi ya Vietnam"" na ""Mashambulizi ya Vietnam"" na ""Mashambulizi ya Vietnam"" na ""Mashambulizi ya Vietnam"" na ""Mashambulizi ya Vietnam"" na ""Mashambulizi ya Vietnam"" na ""Mashambulizi ya Vietnam"" na ""Mashambulizi ya Vietnam.""" Susan D. Mueller, Mfumo wa Uvumilivu, New York: Routledge, 1999. Virgil Hawkins, <unk>The Other Side of the CNN Factor: Media and Conflict<unk>, Journalism Studies, Vol. Nambari ya tatu. 2, 2002, ukurasa wa Uwezo wa kuendesha gari 225-240 Imepimwa kwa kuchukua eneo (katika sentimeta za mraba) ya makala za gazeti zinazohusiana na kila mgogoro maalum. "Kama mwelekeo wa jumla katika vyombo vya habari vya umma, tu hadithi sensationalist (kama volkano mlipuko karibu Goma Januari 2002 na abiria kuwa sucked kutoka ndege ya mizigo na mlango defective katikati ya ndege Mei 2003) ni uwezekano wa kuwa kufunikwa.""" Angalia www.fair.org. William Ferroghiaro, Mhariri wa Rwanda, 1994: The US and the Genocide in Rwanda, A National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book, August 20, 2001 (www.gwu.edu.nl) "Mashirika ya usalama ya Umoja wa Mataifa yamesema ""Wafirika milioni 40 wako karibu kufa njaa,"" shirika la habari la Umoja wa Mataifa liliripoti." "Kama ilivyoelezwa katika mfumo wa kufuatilia fedha wa OCHA, ""Mfumo wa kufuatilia fedha wa OCHA"" ni mfumo wa kufuatilia fedha wa OCHA unaoendeshwa na OCHA." Ingawa sehemu ndogo ya wito huu huenda kwa DRC, ni iliyoundwa kwa ajili ya mkoa mzima, kufunika Burundi, DRC, Jamhuri ya Kongo, Rwanda, Tanzania, na Uganda. "Francois Grignon, ""Hakuna udhuru wa kutokujua,"" Observer, 25 Mei 2003" "John Kakande, ""Ushindi wa Marekani katika Kongo,"" New Vision, Juni 17, 2001" "John Kamou, ""Je, Kongo inakabiliwa na usaliti wa pili?"" - The Nation, Juni 6, 2003" Angalia Grignon, op.cit. "Kwa majadiliano juu ya kutengwa kwa migogoro ya Afrika katika Baraza la Usalama, angalia Virgil Hawkins, ""Kupima hatua za Baraza la Usalama la Umoja wa Mataifa na kutofanya kazi katika miaka ya 1990: Masomo kwa Afrika,"" African Security Review, Vol." Nambari ya 12. 2 ya mwaka 2003. "Mark Malan na Henri Boshoff, ""Mpango wa siku 90 wa kuleta amani kwa DRC.""" Mkataba wa Pretoria wa Julai 30, 2002 (ISS Paper, No. Septemba 16, 2002 Uchunguzi uliofanywa na Yasmin Hawkins, Mei 2003. Kwa uchambuzi zaidi juu ya uelewa wa umma wa mgogoro, angalia Greg Philo, <unk> Habari za Televisheni na uelewa wa watazamaji wa vita, mgogoro na msiba <unk>, Mafunzo ya Uandishi wa Habari, Vol. Nambari ya tatu. 2, 2002, ukurasa wa 173 na 186 Uchunguzi huo ulifanyika tarehe 31 Oktoba 2003. Angalia www.gallup.com. Utafutaji kwa kutumia neno muhimu la Afrika ulifunua 15 <unk>hits<unk>. Liberia ni mojawapo ya nchi ambazo hazina serikali, lakini shirika la Liberia Watch limeshawishi Marekani kutoa misaada ya dola milioni 200 kwa ajili ya Liberia. Hali ya Liberia kama zamani yasiyo rasmi ya Marekani <unk> koloni<unk> bila shaka ilikuwa sababu muhimu katika uamuzi. Kiasi cha jumla cha michango iliyoorodheshwa na OCHA kama kutoka vyanzo vya kibinafsi au NGOs, au kutoka kwa Kamati za Kitaifa za Shirika la Umoja wa Mataifa la Watoto (UNICEF). "Kama ilivyoelezwa katika mfumo wa kufuatilia fedha wa OCHA, ""Mfumo wa kufuatilia fedha wa OCHA"" ni mfumo wa kufuatilia fedha wa OCHA unaoendeshwa na OCHA." Tovuti za habari kwenye mtandao zinazopatikana kwa kawaida ni zile zinazotolewa na habari za kawaida za televisheni na magazeti, na hivyo upendeleo unaotokana ni sawa. Kulingana na utafiti uliofanywa na injini ya utafutaji ya Google, vyombo vitatu vya habari vilivyopatikana zaidi kwenye mtandao mwaka 2001 vilikuwa CNN, BBC na New York Times. "Kama ilivyoelezwa katika ukurasa wa ""Google"" na ""Google"" na ""Google"" na ""Google"" na ""Google"" na ""Google"" na ""Google"" na ""Google"" na ""Google"" na ""Google"" na ""Google"" na ""Google"" na ""Google"" na ""Google"" na ""Google"" na ""Google"" na ""Google"" na ""Google"" na ""Google"" na ""Google"" na ""Google"" na ""Google"" na ""Google"" na ""Google"" na ""Google"" na ""Google"" na ""Google"" na ""Google"" na ""Google"" na ""Google"" na ""Google"" na ""Google"" na ""Google"" na ""Google."""" Angalia David Shearer, <unk>The Conflict in Central Africa: Africa<unk>s Great War<unk>, Survival, Summer 1999, Vol. Nambari ya 41, 2:89-106; na Koen Vlassenroot na Hans Romkema, ‘The Emergence of a New Order? "Mashirika ya misaada ya kibinadamu ya Congo ya Mashariki, ""Jurnal of Humanitarian Assistance,"" JHA, Oktoba 2002" Kwa mfano, gazeti la Foreign Affairs lilitoa makala sita kuhusu bara la Afrika (hakuna moja iliyohusiana na DRC) na 14 kuhusu Israeli na Palestina katika kipindi cha miaka mitano kuanzia katikati ya mwaka 1998 hadi katikati ya mwaka 2003. Takwimu zilizokusanywa na Reiko Okumura. "Kama ilivyoelezwa katika makala ya ""Stockholm International Peace Research Institute: SIPRI Yearbook 1999: Arms, Disarmament and International Security""" London, Oxford University Press, 1999) na kitabu chake cha Hata hivyo, DRC ilionekana katika nyongeza ya kitabu cha mwaka wa 2000. Azimio la Baraza la Usalama la Umoja wa Mataifa 1484 (2003) Kulingana na mwanadiplomasia wa Umoja wa Mataifa (interview na mwandishi, New York, Desemba 2000), Marekani ilijiondoa katika mpango wa kuingilia mashariki mwa Zaire mnamo 1996 hasa kwa sababu ya ukosefu wa maslahi ya vyombo vya habari. "Simon Massey, ""Operation Assurance: The Greatest Intervention That Never Happened,"" The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, http: www.jha.ac.gov.au, Februari 1998" "Mashambulizi ya Bunia yanaonekana kuwa ""ya kutenganisha"" na mapigano makubwa ya DRC na vyombo vya habari (kwa ajili ya unyenyekevu) na watunga sera (ili kuepuka ushiriki mkubwa zaidi)." "Kama ilivyoelezwa na Colum Lynch, ""Utangazaji wa Umoja wa Mataifa hupunguza juhudi za matatizo ya Afrika,"" Washington Post, Mei 25, 2003." "Maafisa wa Umoja wa Mataifa wanatoa wito wa kimataifa kuunga mkono mchakato wa kisiasa,"" United Nations News Service, Juni 4, 2003."" Mtazamo huu ulizinduliwa na Ufaransa wakati wa ujumbe wa Baraza la Umoja wa Mataifa nchini DRC na baadaye ulionekana katika Azimio la Baraza la Usalama la Umoja wa Mataifa 1417 (2002). Steven Livingston na Todd Eachus, "Mgogoro wa Kibinadamu na Sera ya Nje ya Marekani: Somalia na Athari ya CNN Ilikaguliwa upya", Mawasiliano ya Kisiasa, Vol. 12 na 15, ukurasa wa 15. 413-429; na Jonathan Mermin, <unk>Television News and American Intervention in Somalia: The Myth of a Media-Driven Foreign Policy<unk>, Sayansi ya Siasa Quarterly, Vol. 112, Hapana 3, 1997, ukurasa wa 5. 385404 - Mfano wa Utafiti