Eugene F. Kranz, author of “Failure Is Not an Option: Mission Control From Mercury to Apollo 13 and Beyond”, is a former Apollo flight director.
To read and listen to the coverage of the ongoing mission of Space Shuttle Discovery, you would think NASA’s mission team have taken careless risks with the lives of the seven astronauts who went into space last Tuesday. During the launch, foam fell off the external tank. For the risk-averse, the only acceptable thing to do now is retire the shuttle program immediately and wait for the divine arrival of the next generation of spacecraft. I am disgusted at the lack of courage and common sense this attitude shows.
All progress involves risk. Risk is essential to fuel the economic engine of our nation. And risk is essential to renew American’s fundamental spirit of discovery so we remain competitive with the rest of the world.
My take on the current mission is very straightforward. The shuttle is in orbit. To a great extent mission managers have given the spacecraft a clean bill of health. Let us remember that this is a test flight. I consider it a remarkably successful test so far.
The technical response to the Columbia accident led to a dramatic reduction in the amount of debris striking this shuttle during launch. Mission managers have said that the external tank shed 80 percent less foam this time than on previous launches. Only in the news media, apparently, is an 80 percent improvement considered a failure. Rather than quit, we must now try to reduce even more greatly the amount of foam that comes off the tank.
The instruments and video equipment developed to assess the launch performance and monitor debris falling from the tank worked superbly. For the first time, the mission team knows what is happening, when it is happening and the flight conditions under which it occurred. This was a major mission objective, and it is an impressive achievement.
Having spent more than three decades working in the space program, I know that all of the flights of the early days involved some levels of risk. Some of those risks, in hindsight, seem incomprehensible by today’s timid standards. If we had quit when we had our first difficulties in Project Mercury, we would have never launched John Glenn on the Atlas rocket Friendship 7 in 1961. Two of the previous five Atlas rockets test-fired before Friendship 7 had exploded on liftoff.
On Gemini 9, 10 and 11, all in 1966, we had complications with planned spacewalks that placed the astronauts at risk. Rather than cancel the walks, we faced the risks and solved the problems. These set the stage for Gemini 12 later that year, during which Buzz Aldrin spent more than five hours outside the capsule and confirmed to NASA that spacewalks could be considered an operational capability.
Eventually, this capability enabled astronauts to retrieve satellites and repair and maintain the Hubble space telescope; and during the current mission, spacewalks were used to repair a gyroscope on the International Space Station and will allow the crew to fix some of the damage on that occurred during the launch. These are the rewards for the risks we took on those early Gemini flights.
I understand the tragedy inherent in risk-taking; I witnessed the fire aboard Apollo that killed its three crew members. It filled us with anger at ourselves and with the resolve to make it right. After the fire we didn’t quit; we redesigned the Apollo command module. During the Apollo missions that followed, we were never perfect. But we were determined and competent and that made these missions successful.
I see the same combination of anger, resolve and determination in the Space Shuttle program today. These people are professionals who understand the business of risk, how to reduce risk and making that which remains acceptable. Most important, the current mission has demonstrated the maturity of the shuttle team that went through the tragedy of Columbia and had the guts to persevere.
This is the most important aspect of the recovery from the Columbia accident, and is a credit to the great team NASA now has in place, headed by its administrator, Michael Griffin.
There are many nations in the world that wish to surpass us in space. Does the “quit now? crowd really believe that abandoning the shuttle and International Space Station is the way to keep America the pre-eminent space-faring nation? Do they really believe that a new spacecraft will come without an engineering challenge or a human toll? The path the naysayers suggest is so out of touch with the American character of perseverance, hard work and discovery that they don’t even realize the danger in which they are putting future astronauts. Not to mention our nation.
Source: New York Times & Trek United
Written by: Eugene F. Kranz
Guest Contributor: Tim Brazeal – President, Trek United
Eugene F. Kranz, mwandishi wa Failure Is Not an Option: Mission Control From Mercury to Apollo 13 and Beyond, ni mkurugenzi wa zamani wa ndege za Apollo. "Kusoma na kusikiliza taarifa za safari ya Space Shuttle Discovery, unaweza kufikiri kwamba timu ya NASA imechukua hatari kwa maisha ya wanaanga saba waliokwenda angani Jumanne iliyopita.""" Wakati wa uzinduzi, povu lilianguka kutoka kwenye tangi la nje. Kwa wale wanaopuuza hatari, jambo pekee linaloweza kukubaliwa kufanya sasa ni kustaafu programu ya ndege za anga mara moja na kusubiri kuwasili kwa kizazi kijacho cha chombo cha angani. Ninachukizwa na ukosefu wa ujasiri na akili ya kawaida ambao mtazamo huu unaonyesha. Maendeleo yote huhusisha hatari. Hatari ni muhimu kwa mafuta injini ya kiuchumi ya taifa letu. """Uhatari ni muhimu kwa upya wa msingi wa Marekani roho ya uvumbuzi, hivyo sisi kubaki ushindani na wengine duniani." Maoni yangu juu ya utume wa sasa ni ya moja kwa moja sana. Shuttle ni katika mzunguko. Kwa kiasi kikubwa wasimamizi wa misheni wametoa cheti safi cha afya kwa chombo cha angani. Hebu tukumbuke kwamba hii ni ndege ya majaribio. Mimi huona ni mtihani wa mafanikio sana hadi sasa. Majibu ya kiufundi kwa ajali ya Columbia yalisababisha kupunguzwa kwa kiasi kikubwa kwa kiasi cha mabaki yanayogonga shuttle hii wakati wa uzinduzi. Wataalamu wa ndege hiyo wanasema kwamba tanki ya nje ya chombo hicho ilitoa povu kiasi cha asilimia 80 chini ya ile iliyotolewa na ndege nyingine. "Kwa mfano, katika vyombo vya habari, ""uboreshaji wa asilimia 80"" huonwa kuwa kushindwa." Badala ya kuacha, sasa ni lazima tujaribu kupunguza hata zaidi kiasi cha povu inayotoka kwenye tangi. Vifaa na vifaa vya video vilivyotengenezwa ili kutathmini utendaji wa uzinduzi na kufuatilia mabaki yanayoanguka kutoka kwenye tangi yalifanya kazi vizuri sana. Kwa mara ya kwanza, timu ya misheni inajua nini kinachotokea, ni lini kinachotokea na hali ya ndege ambayo ilitokea. Hii ilikuwa lengo kuu la utume, na ni mafanikio ya kuvutia. Baada ya kutumia zaidi ya miongo mitatu kufanya kazi katika programu ya anga, najua kwamba ndege zote za siku za mapema zilihusisha viwango fulani vya hatari. Baadhi ya hatari hizo, kwa kuangalia nyuma, zinaonekana kuwa zisizoeleweka kwa viwango vya leo vya hofu. "Ikiwa tungelikataa wakati tulipata matatizo ya kwanza katika mradi wa Mercury, hatungelipeleka John Glenn kwenye roketi ya Atlas ""Friendship 7"" mnamo 1961." Mlipuko wa kwanza wa roketi ya Atlas ulifanyika kabla ya Friendship 7 kuanguka. Katika Gemini 9 na 11 (mwaka wa 1966) kulikuwa na matatizo na kutembea katika nafasi iliyopangwa ambayo iliwaweka wanaanga katika hatari. Badala ya kufuta matembezi hayo, tulikabili hatari hizo na kutatua matatizo hayo. Katika kipindi cha miaka mitano, Buzz Aldrin alitumia zaidi ya saa tano nje ya chombo hicho na kuthibitisha kwa NASA kwamba kutembea angani inaweza kuchukuliwa uwezo wa uendeshaji. Uwezo huo uliruhusu wanaanga kuokoa satelaiti na kurekebisha na kudumisha darubini ya Hubble, na wakati wa safari ya sasa, kutembea angani kulitumiwa kurekebisha gyroscope kwenye Kituo cha Angani cha Kimataifa na kuruhusu wafanyakazi kurekebisha baadhi ya uharibifu uliotokea wakati wa uzinduzi. Hizi ni zawadi kwa ajili ya hatari tulichukua juu ya wale ndege mapema Gemini. """Ninaelewa msiba unaoingia katika kuchukua hatari, nilishuhudia moto uliotokea kwenye Apollo ambao uliua wafanyakazi wake watatu." Tulijaa hasira na sisi wenyewe na azimio la kufanya haki. Baada ya moto hatukuacha; tulibadilisha muundo wa moduli ya amri ya Apollo. Wakati wa misheni za Apollo zilizofuata, hatukuwahi kuwa wakamilifu. Lakini tulikuwa na azimio na uwezo na hiyo ilifanya misheni hizi zifaulu. """Ninaona mchanganyiko huo wa hasira, azimio na azimio katika mpango wa Space Shuttle leo." Watu hawa ni wataalamu ambao wanaelewa biashara ya hatari, jinsi ya kupunguza hatari na kufanya kile kinachobaki kukubalika. """Kitu muhimu zaidi, ujumbe wa sasa umeonyesha ukomavu wa timu ya shuttle ambayo ilipitia msiba wa Columbia na ilikuwa na ujasiri wa kuendelea." "Hii ni sehemu muhimu ya uokoaji kutoka ajali ya Columbia, na ni sifa kwa timu kubwa NASA sasa ina mahali, inayoongozwa na msimamizi wake, Michael Griffin.""" Kuna mataifa mengi ulimwenguni ambayo yanataka kutushinda katika anga. Je, <unk> kuacha sasa? """Je, kweli watu wanaamini kwamba kuacha Shuttle na Kituo cha Kimataifa cha Anga ni njia ya kuweka Marekani taifa la kwanza la anga?" Je, kweli wanaamini kwamba chombo kipya cha angani kitafika bila ugumu wa uhandisi au gharama ya kibinadamu? Njia ambayo wakosoaji wanapendekeza ni mbali sana na tabia ya Marekani ya uvumilivu, kazi ngumu na ugunduzi kwamba hata hawatambui hatari ambayo wanaweka wanaanga wa baadaye. Bila kutaja taifa letu. Chanzo: New York Times & Trek United Imeandikwa na: Eugene F. Kranz Mshirika mgeni: Tim Brazeal <unk> Rais, Trek United