By John Walker
Sent into north-central Virginia to threaten Richmond on a second front, McDowell had managed to get lost in the woods near Gainesville and lost touch with his command for 12 full hours. When he and his staff rode into Manassas Junction at dawn, he discovered that one of his three divisions—that of ailing Brig. Gen. Rufus King—had retreated during the night after a bloody two-hour clash with Confederate forces near Groveton. Another division, under Brig. Gen. James Ricketts, was four miles away at Bristoe Station, having withdrawn during the night from Gainesville.
In McDowell’s absence, Maj. Gen. John Pope, overall commander of the Army of Virginia, had issued orders to each of McDowell’s divisions for that day’s planned operations, a massive strike against the outnumbered Confederate corps of Maj. Gen. Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson, dug in north of the strategic east-west Warrenton Turnpike near Groveton. Believing that he had Jackson boxed in, Pope planned an all-out attack on the troublesome and eccentric Rebel general. “The game is now in our own hands,” Pope gleefully told his staff, “and I do not see how it is possible for Jackson to escape without very heavy loss, if at all.”
To his dismay, Pope soon discovered that several of his units were not where he expected them to be. King and Ricketts had withdrawn from the Groveton-Gainesville area during the night. Convinced that he had to hold Gainesville for the morning’s attack to succeed, Pope ordered Maj. Gen. Fitz-John Porter to march his V Corps and King’s division to Gainesville (a much-chagrined McDowell would go along as well). Pope gave Porter and McDowell vague orders concerning what they were to do when they reached their objective. Although he did not issue specific orders for them to attack Jackson’s exposed right flank, Pope fully expected them to do so once they reached the field. In a welter of confusion and misapprehension, the Union Army was about to commence the Second Battle of Manassas.
First Clash at the Second Battle of Manassas
As the sun rose, Jackson’s troops, spread out for almost two miles, could see Union infantry and artillery massed on Henry Hill and Chinn Ridge. With Maj. Gen. James Longstreet still hurrying through Thoroughfare Gap to join him, Jackson moved his three divisions a short distance northeast behind an embankment of the unfinished Manassas Gap Railroad, a ready-made system of defensive works running from Sudley Springs down to the Warrenton Pike. Maj. Gen. A.P. Hill’s 4,000 men took up positions on the critical left flank, 200 yards behind the embankment. On Hill’s far left, Brig. Gen. Maxey Gregg’s brigade of South Carolina regiments dug in on a ridge overlooking Sudley Road, 60 yards behind the unfinished railroad. Anchoring the Confederate center was the division of Brig. Gen. Alexander Lawton; two brigades were posted along the embankment and the remaining two, under Brig. Gen. Jubal Early, were held in reserve. On Jackson’s right, Brig. Gen. William Starke threw out skirmishers on the embankment; the remainder of his division waited in three lines 200 yards behind the skirmishers on a wooded ridge.
Major General Franz Sigel, the senior Union officer on the field, was unaware of Jackson’s exact location or strength, but he sent his troops forward along a two-mile front, feeling for the enemy’s line. Brig. Gen. Carl Schurz’s two brigades were on the Union right, marching north astride the Manassas-Sudley Road. Brig. Gen. Robert Milroy’s Independent Brigade was on Schurz’s left; and Brig. Gen. Robert Schenck’s two brigades advanced astride the Warrenton Pike toward the enemy’s right. The division of Brig. Gen. John Reynolds moved up on Schenck’s left, south of the pike.
One of Schurz’s brigades quickly clashed with Rebel skirmishers in the woods on the extreme Confederate left. Hearing the firing, Gregg ordered Major Edward McCrady’s 1st South Carolina forward, and it collided with the 54th and 58th New York Regiments. Despite orders to avoid a general engagement, Gregg committed more troops, sending in the 12th South Carolina under Colonel Dixon Barnes. Schurz committed another regiment as well, and the woods in front of the rocky knoll began filling with smoke from the fire of 1,500 muskets.
General Robert Milroy’s Mistake
Milroy, Schenck, and Reynolds, meanwhile, dispatched their troops against Jackson’s center and right; Milroy moved north of the pike toward the Groveton Woods, driving back Rebel skirmishers there. As Schenck’s brigades advanced along the pike with Reynolds to their left and approached Groveton, they came under intense fire from eight Rebel batteries deployed in front of Starke’s division northeast of the Brawner home. After Schenck asked that he send a battery north of the pike to outflank and drive off the Rebel guns, Reynolds sent forward a Pennsylvania battery and the infantry brigade of Brig. Gen. George Meade. Reynolds’s four cannons moved north of the pike and up the slope near the Brawner home, unlimbering several hundred yards south of Shumaker’s line, and an intense artillery duel raged for the next hour.
Milroy, an impetuous Indiana lawyer who despised West Pointers, committed a serious tactical error after hearing heavy firing coming from Schurz’s front a half mile to his right. Although he actually knew little of Schurz’s situation, he decided to send two regiments 600 yards across the enemy front in support. His troops, rather than coming up abreast of Schurz’s line, advanced 400 yards across open ground into the front of Lawton’s division along the embankment, where they were raked unmercifully by massed sheets of musket fire. Milroy committed another regiment; when it was routed he sent in his fourth and last regiment, which got to within 50 yards of the embankment before it too withered under heavy fire and fell back.
Schurz sent his entire division forward; two regiments fought their way across the unfinished railroad into a cornfield opposite Gregg’s 14th South Carolina, but Confederate cannons and reinforcements drove the attackers back to the excavation. Two more Union regiments pushed through the woods and fought their way to the embankment across from Gregg’s right where it connected with the brigade of Brig. Gen. E.L. Thomas. Hill’s defenders held, and the fighting settled into a vicious stalemate.
The Full Army of Northern Virginia
Skirmishing and artillery fire continued through the morning while the other half of General Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia edged closer to the battlefield. Brig. Gen. John Bell Hood’s Texas Brigade was in the lead. When the gray columns reached Gainesville, Lee turned the infantry units left onto the Warrenton Pike while Maj. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart’s cavalry continued ahead to reconnoiter. At 10 am, Hood arrived and moved his brigade into positions facing east, its left astride the pike. Colonel Evander Law brought up his brigade on Hood’s left and connected with Jackson’s right, after which Brig. Gens. D.R. Jones, James Kemper, and Cadmus Wilcox moved their divisions into line and sent out large numbers of skirmishers. The weight of Hood’s arrival pushed back Reynolds. Lee’s line now stretched for almost four miles and resembled a pair of huge, gaping jaws ready to snap shut.
Having reached the battlefield ahead of his foot soldiers, Longstreet deployed his artillery along a low, clear ridge 200 yards northeast of the Brawner home, from which Confederate guns could bracket the Federal positions near Groveton as well as the open field in front of Starke’s division on Jackson’s right. Soon, 19 of Longstreet’s cannons were dueling with Union batteries near Groveton, less than a mile away. Lee wanted an immediate advance, but Longstreet balked. Unsure of the ground to his front or the exact positions of the enemy forces, he asked for more time to conduct a reconnaissance.
Porter and McDowell Advance Toward Gainsville
Meanwhile, Porter and McDowell had been marching 14,000 men up the Manassas-Gainesville road, with Brig. Gen. George Morell’s division leading the column and Brig. Gen. George Sykes’s division of regulars close behind. About two miles short of Gainesville, they spotted huge dust clouds to their front indicating a large enemy presence (Stuart, immediately noticing Porter’s advance, had ordered Captain Thomas Rosser to have his 5th Virginia horse soldiers drag brush and twigs along the ground as a ruse). At 11 am, the men of Morell’s lead brigade approached a ridge over Dawkins’ Branch and spotted mounted Confederates to their front. Brig. Gen. Charles Griffin sent half of the 62nd Pennsylvania ahead as skirmishers.
When the sounds of skirmishing to his front increased, Porter halted his column and conferred with McDowell, who had received a dispatch from Brig. Gen. John Buford that a huge Rebel column, Longstreet’s corps, had passed through Gainesville that morning. Just then new orders from Pope arrived, instructing Porter and McDowell to continue their march, halt if they connected with friendly troops, and be prepared to fall back to Bull Run that evening. With a Confederate force of unknown size to his front, Porter decided to sit tight. He pulled his divisions into defensive positions astride the road and remained there for the rest of the day.
With Porter’s corps stalled, McDowell countermarched King’s division (now commanded by Brig. Gen. John Hatch, King having been incapacitated by a fit of epilepsy) back to the Manassas-Sudley road to connect with Ricketts’s division moving up from Bristoe Station. Meanwhile, Pope arrived on the field at 1 pm and was pleased with what he found—skirmishing along a two-mile front and Jackson “brought to a stand.” Pope was convinced that his decision to send Porter and McDowell up the road to Gainesville would turn out to be a stroke of genius; when they arrived they would be in perfect position to launch a devastating strike against Jackson’s exposed right flank. The problem was that none of Pope’s orders said anything about an attack upon enemy forces; Pope simply assumed Porter and McDowell would attack Jackson’s right and based his plan of attack on that bit of particularly wishful thinking
Pope ordered Maj. Gen. Samuel Heintzelman to “occupy” Jackson by testing the Rebel center; a frontal assault by Brig. Gen. Cuvier Grover’s brigade would be supported by Brig. Gen. John Robinson’s brigade. Grover’s three frontline regiments made it to within a few yards of the embankment before they were spotted by the Georgians of Thomas’s brigade, who rose and delivered a deadly massed volley. The blue line slowed only briefly before carrying the embankment in a bayonet assault.
Grover’s sudden thrust threatened to cut off Gregg’s brigade from the rest of Jackson’s line. Gregg withdrew Barnes’s 12th South Carolina from his far left and sent it to Thomas’s aid as the fighting escalated. The survivors of Grover’s first wave, trapped in a deadly pocket of fire along a 500-yard front, were suddenly overlapped on both flanks, and in minutes Grover’s attack sputtered and his survivors streamed to the rear, leaving behind 486 troops killed or wounded.
45 Minutes of Fighting
Pope was growing anxious—it was late afternoon and Porter and McDowell had not yet appeared. Another piecemeal, unsupported Union assault, this one against Jackson’s center by the 1,500-man brigade of Colonel James Nagle, met the same fate as Grover’s: very little accomplished at a cost of another 500 casualties. Pope, sending a preemptory order to Porter to attack at once, ordered another strike, this time by Maj. Gen. Philip Kearny against the Rebel left near Sudley Church. Shortly after 5 pm, Kearny sent 2,700 men forward with orders to wrap around Hill’s left and drive the defenders out of the excavation. Kearny personally led three regiments into battle over ground covered with dead and wounded. The 63rd Pennsylvania on Kearny’s left soon lost contact with its two sister regiments—the 105th Pennsylvania and 3rd Michigan—in the thick underbrush.
Meanwhile the 105th Pennsylvania and 3rd Michigan struck Gregg’s South Carolinians, who fled after suffering severe losses, exposing the flank of Gregg’s brigade, which was now under frontal assault by the 40th and 101st New York and the 4th Maine. After the exhausted 1st and 13th South Carolina also broke for the rear, the embattled Gregg appealed for help; it arrived in the shape of Brig. Gen. Lawrence Branch’s three North Carolina regiments, who crashed against Kearny’s right and slowed his advance. Gregg, brandishing his grandfather’s Revolutionary War sword, called out, “Let us die here, my men,” while groups of soldiers formed a strong line of resistance on a hill 200 yards behind the embankment.
Early hurried to the front, leading 2,500 reserve troops, and emerged from the woods to find the Confederate line barely holding along the lower slopes of Stony Ridge. Early’s nine regiments crashed into Kearny’s line and overwhelmed the exhausted attackers, who were low on ammunition and had suffered heavy losses in 45 minutes of intense fighting. Within 10 minutes of Early’s arrival, Kearny’s entire force was streaming back through the woods, pursued as far as the embankment, ending the fighting on Jackson’s front for the day.
Reconnaissance in Force
With less than two hours of daylight remaining, Lee again suggested a general advance. Longstreet demurred once more, suggesting a reconnaissance in force to prepare for an attack the following morning. Lee agreed, calling off a general advance set for the next morning and deciding instead to wait for an attack by Pope. Meanwhile, Pope sent an optimistic message to General-in-Chief Henry Halleck in Washington, estimating his losses at between 6,000 and 8,000 while grossly overestimating the Confederate casualties and claiming that the enemy was retreating toward the mountains. In fact, Lee’s two wings occupied virtually the same ground they had the previous day, and Longstreet had been bolstered by the arrival of Colonel Stephen D. Lee’s artillery battalion and the infantry division of Brig. Gen. R.H. Anderson.
Porter arrived early on August 30, adding 8,000 more troops to Pope’s force. Pope met with his commanders at his headquarters near the Warrenton Pike-Sudley Road intersection, and they convinced him to launch a renewed strike against the enemy left, where some success had been gained the previous day. Pope agreed but issued no direct orders; instead, the morning hours passed while Pope waffled, paralyzed by indecision, trying to reconcile his belief that the enemy was retreating with numerous reports to the contrary.
“Press the Enemy Vigorously”
At 11 am, McDowell and Heintzelman asked to be allowed to reconnoiter the Union right on their own. While they were gone, Pope made up his mind—the Rebels were retreating, a pursuit was in order, and Porter was to attack immediately. A bit later, when McDowell and Heintzelman returned from their half-hearted reconnaissance and reported that they had seen little evidence of a strong enemy presence, Pope was further convinced. At noon he issued revised orders for a two-pronged pursuit. Rather than attacking, Porter would instead lead the pursuit west along the Warrenton Pike, supported by Hatch and Reynolds. Ricketts’s division, backed by Heintzelman, would pursue Jackson along the road leading from Sudley west to Haymarket. The chase was to begin at once. Pope told his officers, “Press the enemy vigorously during the whole day.”
Porter prepared to launch the largest Union assault of the battle. He faced a formidable task. To Porter’s front were some of the best troops in Lee’s army—Jackson’s old division, now commanded by Starke—holding a strong position behind the unfinished railroad, arrayed in two lines of battle 200 yards apart. Porter’s men would have to cross almost 700 yards of open pastureland, the last 150 sharply uphill, to close with the enemy. At 3 pm, Porter’s 10,000 men poured out of the woods like an avalanche, the sudden appearance of the blue columns sending a shock wave through the Confederate ranks. Colonel Leroy Stafford’s Louisiana brigade, arranged in two lines, held Starke’s left; to Stafford’s right, the 42nd Virginia of Colonel Bradley Johnson’s brigade waited in the unfinished railroad at its deepest point—the “Deep Cut,” as it was known. On the right of the 42nd, where the railroad bed ran over flat ground, Johnson’s 48th Virginia waited in a grove of trees 80 yards in front of the excavation.
On the Union right, the 24th and 30th New York emerged from the timber and were immediately struck by a massed volley fired from the excavation by Stafford’s 1,000 Louisianans. The blue line recoiled but continued forward as clouds of white smoke began to obscure the field. When the New Yorkers reached Schoolhouse Branch, the Confederates rose and fired a second volley. Unbroken, the 24th and 30th closed on the excavation. Meanwhile, Brig. Gen. Daniel Butterfield’s units were pushing across the field. At Schoolhouse Branch, the men of Brig. Gen. Benjamin Roberts’s brigade felt the sting of enemy rifle fire from their front and artillery fire from their left. By now S.D. Lee had brought the full weight of his 18 guns to bear from the ridge 1,000 yards away. Roberts’s men paused for a few moments before continuing on, the din of battle rising to a deafening roar.
The smoke, dust, and noise combined to sow confusion in the Union ranks. The 1st Michigan made it to within 50 yards of the embankment before it was halted by enfilading fire and went to ground. The 13th New York and 18th Massachusetts advanced to within yards of the excavation, took cover behind bushes and rocks, and continued their fire. On Roberts’s left, the 17th New York emerged from the woods and moved forward alone. Without stopping at Schoolhouse Branch, the men of the 17th reached the base of the slope leading up to the unfinished railroad and rushed up the hill with a mad yell. When they reached the crest in front of Johnson’s brigade 50 yards from the excavation, a deadly blast of artillery and musket fire halted their line.
The exposed 48th Virginia promptly turned and headed for the rear. Along a quarter-mile front, the fighting raged unabated at extremely close ranges. Convinced that his two remaining regiments could not hold, Johnson ordered his two reserve units, the 1st Virginia Battalion and the 21st Virginia, to leave the woods and come up in support. The two fresh units moved into the open field and were promptly shredded by massed volleys of musket fire. Fewer than 300 men made it across the field, tumbling into the Deep Cut alongside the 42nd Virginia.
The retreat of the 48th Virginia opened a dangerous gap between Johnson’s right and Brig. Gen. William Taliaferro’s left. Jackson, after ordering Hill to reinforce the battered Rebel right, sent a request to Lee and Longstreet, asking for reinforcements. Longstreet concluded that sending a division of infantry would take too much time; the attack, he said, must be broken by artillery instead. Longstreet ordered Captain Will Chapman’s Dixie Battery to move to a low knoll just north of the pike. Chapman’s four guns added their fire to that of S.D. Lee. The Confederate cannons pinned the attacking Union columns against the railroad, making retreat nearly impossible.
The General Advance
Back at Groveton Woods, Porter concluded that sending additional troops across 700 yards of ground dominated by Rebel cannons would lead to disaster and decided to withhold Sykes’s entire reserve division. Porter decided against committing his reserve brigades on the right, essentially abandoning the other Union troops to their fates. Almost an hour of sustained combat had pushed the Confederate defenders to their limits; some were leaving the line to scavenge among the dead and wounded for ammunition while others had resorted to throwing rocks at their enemies. By that time, however, the Federal onslaught was almost spent. When a fresh brigade from Hill’s division came up in support, the crisis ended for the southerners. All along the line Union officers passed the order to retreat.
Moments after Porter’s attack dissolved, Longstreet and Lee simultaneously ordered a general advance of the Confederate right wing. With no more than three hours of daylight remaining, one of the largest counterattacks of the entire war got under way. Longstreet’s objective, Henry Hill, was almost a mile and a half away and shielded the Union route of retreat along the Warrenton Pike. About 500 yards west of Henry Hill lay Chinn Ridge, the only terrain feature blocking Longstreet’s legions. Another 500 yards farther west, directly in the path of the oncoming gray tide, waited Colonel Gouverneur Warren’s brigade of two Zouave regiments. Just after 4 pm, the 5th Texas moved out of the woods and started forward. On their left was Hampton’s Legion, many of its men veterans of the fighting 13 months earlier, along with the 18th Georgia and 4th Texas. Four fresh Confederate regiments entered the open fields into the path of the 10th New York’s skirmishers, who managed to get off one massed volley before they were overwhelmed and fell back in panic.
The Zouaves could not see their enemy through the clouds of smoke. By the time the fleeing skirmishers of the 10th finally cleared the 5th New York’s front, the men of Hood’s brigade were already at the edge of the woods just 40 yards away. The 5th Texas outflanked the left of the 5th New York, while Hampton’s Legion and the 18th Georgia crashed against their center and right. The colorfully dressed Zouaves made easy targets in the open field. In the first three or four minutes, the 5th suffered at least 100 casualties. Warren yelled out an order to retreat but could not be heard above the din; without orders to fall back, many Zouaves stubbornly held their ground. After another few minutes it became clear that to remain where they were was folly, and every man who could run broke to the rear, closely pursued by screaming Confederates.
As the Zouaves hurried down the slope leading to Young’s Branch, Hood’s troops moved to the crest of the ridge and slaughtered them as they attempted to follow Warren across the stream. In the first 10 minutes on the ridge, some 300 men of the 5th New York had been killed or wounded; at least 120 were killed outright—one of the heaviest regimental losses of the entire war.
After pausing at Young’s Branch, Hood’s four regiments splashed across the stream and headed up the slope. Hood’s brigade advanced almost a mile, but its rapid pace put the men far ahead of the rest of the Southern forces. Knowing that his men needed cover, Hood ordered his regiments to the right toward a patch of woods. Convinced that his tired troops were not in sufficient numbers to capture Chinn Ridge, Hood decided to wait for reinforcements.
Charge of the South Carolinians
In short order, the 18th South Carolina charged out of the woods toward the Union left, only to be hit in the flank by artillery fire and in front by the fire of the 73rd and 25th Ohio. Next came the 17th South Carolina, commanded by that state’s former governor, Colonel John Means, who soon fell mortally wounded. The Union regiments crumbled and fell back beyond the crest of the ridge. Three brigades of Kemper’s division arrived in the fields south of the Chinn house as the fighting raged on. Kemper’s front line consisted of the brigades of Brig. Gen. Micah Jenkins and Colonel Eppa Hunton, with Colonel Montgomery Corse’s brigade 250 yards behind.
Thousands of Confederates in several lines of battle advanced up the ridge and closed on the Union line from three directions. When Hunton and Jenkins advanced toward the crest of the slope against the Union center and left, the blue-clad forces unleashed a devastating volley that staggered parts of Jenkins’s line. Within minutes, however, the Confederates reorganized and came on once more, to within 40 yards of the Federals. The battle continued along a 400-yard front, the outnumbered Union brigades suffering horrendous losses.
As the Union line was pushed slowly back along the crest of the ridge, Confederate horse-drawn artillery reached Bald Hill southeast of Chinn Ridge and began firing into the Union left. This new flanking fire was more than the Federals remaining on the slope could bear; the blue line atop the ridge wavered and then broke altogether. Belated reinforcements arrived as the blue lines collapsed and watched as waves of Confederates advanced in deep, dense masses. Minutes later the remaining Union troops on Chinn Ridge, facing insurmountable odds, withdrew, leaving Chinn Ridge in Confederate hands.
The Defense of Henry Hill
Fortunately for Pope, the stubborn defense of Chinn Ridge gave him time to arrange his remaining troops into formidable defensive positions on nearby Henry Hill. At 5:30 pm, Pope ordered the right wing of his army to pull back on line with his left on Henry Hill. By 6 pm, he had four brigades on Henry Hill along a half-mile front extending from north of the Henry house ruins into and beyond the woods on the southern edge of the plateau. Three batteries on the crest of the hill would fire in support of the Union line; more troops were on the way.
Longstreet and Lee had been working to gather additional units for the drive on Henry Hill. The first to respond was Brig. Gen. R.H. Anderson, whose division left the Brawner farm at 4:50 pm, its three brigades crossing to the south of the pike for the two-mile march east. Longstreet ordered Wilcox to advance his division as well; unfortunately, Wilcox misunderstood the order and sent only one of his three brigades south of the pike and on toward Henry Hill. While these units began their march to Henry Hill, D.R. Jones renewed the Confederate advance, sending both of his brigades to capture the vital Warrenton Pike-Sudley Road intersection. His men got to within 200 yards of their objective before Union troops on Henry Hill spotted the movement.
Reynolds immediately ordered Meade’s brigade to attack the Confederate column, and with artillery firing over their heads, Meade’s men moved down the slope. The sudden appearance of Meade’s brigade on the Georgians’ right crushed Jones’s hopes of cutting off the enemy units on Dogan Ridge. Brig. Gen. Henry Benning wheeled his men to the right to face Reynolds’s line, pointed to the artillery on the hill above it, and ordered his regiment to charge. Anderson’s brigade wheeled to the right as well and moved up on Benning’s right. Minutes later nearly 3,000 Georgians were moving up the western slope of Henry Hill along a half-mile front, the largest single movement of Longstreet’s attack.
Benning’s regiments emerged from the Chinn Branch valley into the face of the combined fire of Meade, Seymour, Milroy, and the Union batteries. The gray line recoiled but recovered and continued up the slope, getting to within 80 yards of the enemy. On the Confederate right, Anderson’s troops moved through heavy timber toward the crest. As they came out of the woods, Anderson’s men recoiled from an initial volley but kept coming as well, getting to within 50 yards of Sudley Road before taking cover and continuing the fight.
The Union Line Unravels
Every frontline Union brigade was now heavily engaged. Despite the Union artillery and the formidable positions held by the defenders, the fire of the Georgians was putting tremendous pressure on the Federal line. Jones’s brigades were delivering such a fire that the Union line, and not the Confederate, was wavering; Reynolds’s two left-flank regiments gave ground, along with the bulk of Milroy’s men, who abandoned Sudley Road altogether. The 15th Georgia seized the opportunity and lunged forward into the breach, gaining a foothold on the road just yards from the Yankee batteries. The situation on the Union far left deteriorated as well when a Confederate battery arrived, its four cannons opening fire from near the Conrad home directly on the Union left, raking the thin blue line.
The entire Union defense on Henry Hill was in crisis. After Milroy and Meade appealed for help, Lt. Col. Robert Buchanan’s brigade came up at the most opportune moment. After getting his first three regiments deployed, Buchanan rode back and got his remaining two, the 3rd and 5th U.S., and placed them in the center of the Union line. The appearance of fresh troops after 45 minutes of heavy fighting was more than Benning’s four tired regiments could bear. The 17th Georgia, on Benning’s right, gave way, exposing the right of the 15th Georgia, and although they tried mightily to hold onto their salient on the road, the men of the 15th finally fell back down the hill to Chinn Branch. The situation on Benning’s left deteriorated as well; the 20th Georgia, suffering in the open under a rain of shells fired from Henry Hill 300 yards away, was ordered to pull back. At that point, although the fighting continued sporadically for another 30 minutes in the growing darkness, the Confederate attempt to overrun Henry Hill essentially came to an end.
McClellan Replaces Pope
By 7 pm, the retreat on the Union right to the heights east of Sudley Road was complete, the blue army presenting a solid front even though division and corps cohesiveness had eroded significantly. By 11 pm, most of Pope’s army had crossed Bull Run at the stone bridge or at Farm’s Ford a half mile to the north, their ebbing spirits further dampened by a driving rainstorm. More than 3,000 dead and 15,000 wounded littered the field. Jackson had suffered almost 4,000 casualties, while Longstreet had lost more than 4,700 men killed, wounded, or missing in less than four hours—some 15 percent of the Confederate forces engaged. Pope’s army, defeated but essentially intact, had suffered 13,824 casualties—1,716 killed, 8,215 wounded, and 3,893 missing.
With the Union facing its gravest threat since the commencement of hostilities, President Abraham Lincoln on September 2 reinstated Maj. Gen. George McClellan to command of all the Federal forces in and around Washington; Pope was banished to Minnesota to command Union troops fighting a Sioux uprising there, his 74 days in command of the Army of Virginia making for one of the sorriest chapters in the history of the United States Army. Conversely, the fortunes of the Confederacy had never looked brighter. Less than six months earlier, Southern armies had been on the defensive everywhere: New Orleans lost, Corinth and Richmond threatened, Missouri gone, and the entire Mississippi Valley seemingly about to follow. Now the South had regained the initiative and was on the offensive in every major theater of the war. The Confederacy had reached its true high-water mark at Manassas. Never again would it be as close to victory.
Baada ya kupelekwa kaskazini-kati mwa Virginia kutishia Richmond kwenye mstari wa pili, McDowell alikuwa amefanikiwa kupotea katika misitu karibu na Gainesville na kupoteza mawasiliano na amri yake kwa masaa 12 kamili. Wakati yeye na wafanyakazi wake walipoingia Manassas Junction asubuhi, aligundua kwamba moja ya mgawanyiko wake tatu - ile ya Brig. Jenerali Rufus King alikuwa amerejea usiku baada ya mapigano ya damu ya saa mbili na vikosi vya Confederate karibu na Groveton. Idara nyingine, chini ya Brig. Jenerali James Ricketts, alikuwa maili nne mbali katika Kituo cha Bristoe, baada ya kujiondoa wakati wa usiku kutoka Gainesville. Wakati McDowell hakuwapo, Kamanda Mkuu John Pope, kamanda mkuu wa Jeshi la Virginia, alikuwa amewapa amri kila moja ya makundi ya McDowell kwa ajili ya shughuli zilizopangwa za siku hiyo, shambulio kubwa dhidi ya jeshi la Confederate la Kamanda Mkuu Thomas Stonewall Jackson, lililochimbwa kaskazini mwa barabara ya Warrenton karibu na Groveton. Akiamini kwamba alikuwa amemkamata Jackson, Pope alipanga shambulio kubwa dhidi ya jenerali huyo wa waasi mwenye kusumbua na mwenye kushangaza. """Mchezo sasa uko mikononi mwetu,"" Pope aliiambia wafanyakazi wake kwa furaha, ""na sioni jinsi Jackson angeweza kutoroka bila hasara kubwa sana, ikiwa ni kweli kabisa.""Kwa mshangao wake, Pope aligundua kwamba vitengo vyake kadhaa havikuwa mahali alipotarajia viwe." King na Ricketts walikuwa wameondoka katika eneo la Groveton-Gainesville wakati wa usiku. Akiwa na uhakika kwamba alikuwa na kushikilia Gainesville kwa ajili ya mashambulizi ya asubuhi kufanikiwa, Papa aliamuru Meja Jenerali Fitz-John Porter kusonga V Corps yake na King's mgawanyiko kwa Gainesville (mwenye huzuni sana McDowell ingekuwa kwenda pamoja pia). Papa aliwapa Porter na McDowell maagizo yasiyo wazi kuhusu yale waliyopaswa kufanya walipofikia mradi wao. Ingawa hakuwapa amri maalum ya kushambulia upande wa kulia wa Jackson, Pope alitarajia kabisa wafanye hivyo mara tu walipofika uwanja. Katika mvurugo wa kuchanganyikiwa na kutoelewana, Jeshi la Muungano lilikuwa karibu kuanza Vita vya Pili vya Manassas. Mapigano ya Manassas ya pili: Jeshi la Jackson lilipokuwa likitembea kwa umbali wa maili mbili, liliona jeshi la jeshi la Umoja likiwa limekusanyika kwenye Henry Hill na Chinn Ridge. Wakati Maj. Gen. James Longstreet bado akimbilia kupitia Thoroughfare Gap kujiunga naye, Jackson alihamisha vikosi vyake vitatu umbali mfupi kaskazini mashariki nyuma ya mwamba wa Reli ya Manassas Gap, mfumo wa kazi za ulinzi uliokamilika kutoka Sudley Springs hadi Warrenton Pike. Meja Jenerali A.P. Wanaume 4,000 wa Hill walichukua nafasi kwenye upande wa kushoto muhimu, mita 200 nyuma ya mwamba. Kwenye kilima cha kushoto, Brig. Jeshi la jeshi la Jenerali Maxey Gregg la South Carolina lilijificha kwenye kilima kilichokuwa kimeangalia barabara ya Sudley, mita 60 nyuma ya reli iliyokuwa haijakamilika. Kuimarisha kituo cha Confederate ilikuwa mgawanyiko wa Brig. Jenerali Alexander Lawton; vikosi viwili viliwekwa kando ya mwamba na vikosi viwili vilivyobaki, chini ya Brig. Jenerali Jubal Early, walikuwa wamehifadhiwa. Kwenye haki ya Jackson, Brig. Jenerali William Starke aliwafukuza wapiganaji kwenye mwambao; mabaki ya mgawanyiko wake walisubiri katika safu tatu mita 200 nyuma ya wapiganaji kwenye mteremko wenye miti. Jenerali Franz Sigel, afisa mkuu wa Umoja katika uwanja, hakujua eneo halisi au nguvu ya Jackson, lakini alituma askari wake mbele kando ya mstari wa maili mbili, akihisi mstari wa adui. Brig. Vikosi viwili vya Jenerali Carl Schurz vilikuwa upande wa kulia wa Muungano, vikisafiri kuelekea kaskazini kwenye Barabara ya Manassas-Sudley. Brig. Jenerali Robert Milroy's Independent Brigade ilikuwa upande wa kushoto wa Schurz; na Brig. Vikosi viwili vya Jenerali Robert Schenck viliendelea kuelekea upande wa kulia wa adui. Idara ya Brig. Jenerali John Reynolds alihamia juu upande wa kushoto wa Schenck, kusini mwa pike. Moja ya vikosi vya Schurz haraka alishindana na Rebel skirmishers katika misitu juu ya kushoto ya Confederate kali. Baada ya kusikia mashambulizi hayo, Greg aliamuru Kikosi cha Kwanza cha Jeshi la Marekani la Majini la Majini la Edward McCready kiende mbele, na kikosi hicho kikapigana na Kikosi cha 54 na Kikosi cha 58 cha New York. Kwa mujibu wa amri iliyotolewa na jeshi la Marekani, Greg aliamua kuingiza askari zaidi katika jeshi la Marekani, akitumisha kikosi cha 12 cha South Carolina chini ya uongozi wa Kanali Dixon Barnes. Shurz akaweka kikosi kingine pia, na misitu iliyokuwa mbele ya kilima hicho cha miamba ikaanza kujazwa moshi uliotokana na risasi za bunduki 1,500. Wakati huohuo, Milroy, Schenck, na Reynolds walituma majeshi yao dhidi ya kituo na kulia kwa Jackson; Milroy alihamia kaskazini mwa pike kuelekea Groveton Woods, akirudisha nyuma wapiganaji wa waasi huko. Kama vikosi vya Schenck vilivyoendelea kando ya pike na Reynolds upande wao wa kushoto na kukaribia Groveton, walipata moto mkali kutoka kwa betri nane za Waasi zilizotumika mbele ya mgawanyiko wa Starke kaskazini mashariki mwa nyumba ya Brawner. Baada ya Schenck kuomba kwamba atume betri kaskazini mwa Pike ili kuondoa na kuendesha bunduki za Waasi, Reynolds alituma mbele betri ya Pennsylvania na kikosi cha wanajeshi wa Brig. Jenerali George Meade. Makombora manne ya Reynolds yalielekea kaskazini mwa Pike na juu ya mteremko karibu na nyumba ya Brawner, yakiondoa mamia kadhaa ya yadi kusini mwa mstari wa Shumaker, na mapigano makali ya makombora yaliendelea kwa saa iliyofuata. Milroy, mwanasheria wa Indiana mwenye hasira ambaye aliwachukia West Pointers, alifanya kosa kubwa la kimkakati baada ya kusikia risasi nzito zikitoka mbele ya Schurz nusu maili upande wake wa kulia. Ingawa hakujua mengi kuhusu hali ya Schurz, aliamua kutuma vikosi viwili vya jeshi la jeshi la jeshi la jeshi la jeshi la jeshi la jeshi la jeshi la jeshi la jeshi la jeshi la jeshi la jeshi la jeshi la jeshi la jeshi la jeshi la jeshi la jeshi la jeshi la jeshi la jeshi la jeshi la jeshi la jeshi. Badala ya kukutana na askari wa Schurz, wanajeshi wake waliendelea kwa urefu wa mita 400 kwenye uwanja wa wazi kuelekea mbele ya kikosi cha Lawton kwenye ukingo wa mto, ambapo walipigwa risasi bila huruma na risasi za bunduki. Milroy alituma kikosi kingine; iliposhindwa, alituma kikosi chake cha nne na cha mwisho, ambacho kilikuwa karibu na ngome hiyo kwa mita 50 kabla ya kuangamia chini ya moto mkali na kurudi nyuma. Schurz alituma kikosi chake chote mbele; vikosi viwili vilipigana njia yao kupitia reli isiyoamilishwa katika shamba la mahindi kinyume na 14th South Carolina ya Gregg, lakini bunduki za Confederate na nyongeza ziliwafukuza washambuliaji nyuma kwenye uchimbaji. Vikosi vingine viwili vya Umoja viliingia ndani ya msitu na kupigana njia yao hadi kwenye mwamba ulio kando ya Gregg's ambapo ulihusiana na kikosi cha Brig. Jenerali E. L. Thomas. Watetezi wa Hill walishikilia, na mapigano yakawa na hali mbaya sana. Mashambulizi ya jeshi la Virginia Kaskazini na risasi za makombora ziliendelea asubuhi wakati nusu nyingine ya Jeshi la Jenerali Robert E. Lee la Virginia Kaskazini lilikaribia uwanja wa vita. Brig. Kikosi cha Texas cha Jenerali John Bell Hood kilikuwa kikiongoza. Wakati makoloni ya kijivu yalipofika Gainesville, Lee aligeuza vitengo vya wapiganaji wa miguu kushoto kwenye Warrenton Pike wakati Maj. Gen. J.E.B. Jeshi la wapanda farasi la Stuart liliendelea mbele ili kukagua eneo hilo. Wakati wa saa kumi asubuhi, Hood aliwasili na kuhamisha kikosi chake katika nafasi za kuelekea mashariki, kushoto yake juu ya pike. Kanali Evander Sheria alileta brigade yake juu ya kushoto Hood ya na kushikamana na haki Jackson ya, baada ya ambayo Brig. Watu. D. R. Jones, James Kemper, na Cadmus Wilcox waliweka vikosi vyao katika mstari na kutuma idadi kubwa ya wapiganaji. Uzito wa kuwasili kwa Hood ulimzuia Reynolds. Mstari wa Lee sasa ulipanuka kwa karibu maili nne na ulifanana na taya mbili kubwa, zilizo wazi zilizo tayari kufungwa. Baada ya kufika uwanja wa vita mbele ya askari wake wa miguu, Longstreet aliweka makombora yake kando ya mteremko wa chini, wazi, mita 200 kaskazini mashariki mwa nyumba ya Brawner, ambapo bunduki za Confederate zingeweza kuunganisha nafasi za Shirikisho karibu na Groveton na uwanja wa wazi mbele ya mgawanyiko wa Starke upande wa kulia wa Jackson. Punde si punde, makombora 19 ya Longstreet yalikuwa yakipigana na makombora ya Muungano karibu na Groveton, umbali wa chini ya maili moja. Lee alitaka upanuzi wa mara moja, lakini Longstreet alikataa. Kwa kuwa hakuwa na uhakika kuhusu eneo la mbele au mahali hususa pa majeshi ya adui, aliomba muda zaidi wa kufanya uchunguzi. Wakati huo huo, Porter na McDowell walikuwa wakisafiri wanaume 14,000 kwenye barabara ya Manassas-Gainesville, pamoja na Brig. Kikosi cha Jenerali George Morell kilichoongoza safu hiyo na Brig. Kikosi cha wanajeshi wa kawaida cha Jenerali George Sykes kiko nyuma. Baada ya maili mbili hivi kutoka Gainesville, waliona mawingu makubwa ya vumbi mbele yao, ikionyesha uwepo mkubwa wa adui (Stuart, mara moja akiona maendeleo ya Porter, alikuwa ameamuru Kapteni Thomas Rosser kuwa na askari wake wa farasi wa 5 wa Virginia kuvuta brush na matawi chini kama ujanja). Wakati wa saa 11 asubuhi, wanajeshi wa kikosi cha Morell walifika kwenye kilima cha Dawkins Branch na kugundua wanajeshi wa Confederate wakiwa mbele yao. Brig. Jenerali Charles Griffin alimtuma nusu ya kikosi cha 62 cha Pennsylvania mbele kama wapiganaji. Wakati sauti za mapigano ya mbele yake zilipozidi kuongezeka, Porter alisimamisha safu yake na kushauriana na McDowell, ambaye alikuwa amepokea ujumbe kutoka kwa Brig. Jenerali John Buford kwamba safu kubwa ya Waasi, Longstreet's corps, ilikuwa imepita kupitia Gainesville asubuhi hiyo. Wakati huo huo amri mpya kutoka kwa Papa ilifika, ikiwaagiza Porter na McDowell kuendelea na maandamano yao, kusimamishwa ikiwa wangeshirikiana na majeshi ya rafiki, na kuwa tayari kurudi Bull Run jioni hiyo. Akiwa na jeshi la Muungano lenye ukubwa usiojulikana mbele yake, Porter aliamua kukaa kimya. Aliweka vikosi vyake katika nafasi za kujilinda kando ya barabara na kukaa huko siku yote iliyobaki. Kwa kuwa kikosi cha Porter kilikuwa kimesimamishwa, McDowell alishambulia kikosi cha King (sasa kilichoongozwa na Brig. Jenerali John Hatch, King baada ya kuwa haiwezi kufanya kazi kwa sababu ya kifafa) nyuma ya barabara ya Manassas-Sudley kuungana na mgawanyiko wa Ricketts wakiongozwa kutoka Kituo cha Bristoe. Wakati huo huo, Pope aliwasili uwanja saa 1 jioni na alifurahi na kile alichokipata - skirmishing kando ya mbele ya maili mbili na Jackson alileta kusimama - Papa alikuwa na hakika kwamba uamuzi wake wa kutuma Porter na McDowell juu ya barabara ya Gainesville ingekuwa kiharusi cha kipaji; walipofika wangekuwa katika nafasi kamili ya kuzindua shambulio la uharibifu dhidi ya Jackson's flank ya kulia. "Pope alidhani kwamba Porter na McDowell wangeshambulia upande wa kulia wa Jackson na kutegemea mpango wake wa shambulio kwa ""kufikiria kwa matakwa"" kwa hivyo alimwamuru Meja Jenerali Samuel Heintzelman ""kuchukua"" Jackson kwa kujaribu kituo cha waasi." Kikosi cha Jenerali Cuvier Grover kingesaidiwa na Brig. Kikosi cha Jenerali John Robinson. Vikosi vitatu vya Grover vilipiga mbio hadi mita chache kutoka kwenye ukingo wa mto kabla ya kuonekana na wanajeshi wa Georgia wa kikosi cha Thomas, ambao waliinuka na kutoa risasi kali. Mstari wa bluu ulipungua kwa muda mfupi tu kabla ya kubeba mwamba huo katika shambulio la panga. Mshtuko wa ghafula wa Grover ulitishia kukata kikosi cha Gregg kutoka kwa mstari wa Jackson. Gregg aliondoa kikosi cha 12 cha Barnes cha South Carolina kutoka upande wake wa kushoto na kukituma kusaidia Thomas wakati mapigano yalipokuwa yakiongezeka. Waokokaji wa wimbi la kwanza la Grover, waliokamatwa katika mfuko wa moto wa mauti kwenye mstari wa mbele wa mita 500, walikamatwa ghafla kwenye pande zote mbili, na kwa dakika chache shambulio la Grover lilipungua na waokokaji wake wakakimbilia nyuma, wakiacha nyuma askari 486 waliouawa au kujeruhiwa. "Katika kipindi cha ""45 Minutes of Fighting Pope"" alikuwa akizidi kuwa na wasiwasi, ilikuwa ni alasiri na Porter na McDowell hawakuwa wameonekana." Mashambulizi mengine ya Umoja, haya dhidi ya kituo cha Jackson na kikosi cha watu 1,500 cha Kanali James Nagle, yalipata hatima sawa na ya Grover: kidogo sana ilifanywa kwa gharama ya majeruhi wengine 500. Pope, akimtuma Porter amri ya kushambulia mara moja, aliamuru shambulio jingine, wakati huu na Meja Jenerali Philip Kearny dhidi ya waasi waliosalia karibu na Kanisa la Sudley. Muda mfupi baada ya saa 5 jioni, Kearny alituma watu 2,700 mbele na amri ya kuzunguka upande wa kushoto wa Hill na kuendesha watetezi nje ya uchimbaji. Kearny mwenyewe aliongoza vikosi vitatu vitatu vitani juu ya ardhi iliyofunikwa na waliokufa na waliojeruhiwa. Kikosi cha 63 cha Pennsylvania kilichokuwa upande wa kushoto wa Kearny, kilipoteza mawasiliano na vikosi vyake viwili vya dada, kikosi cha 105 cha Pennsylvania na kikosi cha 3 cha Michigan, katika misitu mikubwa. Wakati huo huo, kikosi cha 105 Pennsylvania na kikosi cha 3 Michigan kilishambulia kikosi cha Gregg cha South Carolina, ambacho kilikimbia baada ya kuathiriwa vibaya, na kufunua upande wa kikosi cha Gregg, ambacho sasa kilikuwa chini ya shambulio la mbele na kikosi cha 40th na 101st New York na kikosi cha 4th Maine. Baada ya jeshi la 1st na 13th Carolina Kusini kuanguka nyuma, Gregg aliomba msaada; ilifika kwa umbo la Brig. Jenerali Lawrence Tawi tatu North Carolina regiments, ambao crashed dhidi ya haki Kearny ya na kupunguza kasi yake ya maendeleo. "Greg, akipiga upanga wa vita vya mapinduzi ya babu yake, alitoa sauti, ""Hebu tufe hapa, wanaume wangu,"" wakati vikundi vya askari vilipofanyiza mstari mkubwa wa upinzani kwenye kilima mita 200 nyuma ya mwamba." Early alienda mbele, akiongoza vikosi 2,500 vya hifadhi, na akajitokeza kutoka msituni kupata mstari wa Confederate ukishikilia kwa shida kwenye mteremko wa chini wa Stony Ridge. Vikosi tisa vya jeshi la Early vilipiga kambi ya Kearny na kuwashinda washambuliaji waliochoka, ambao walikuwa na risasi chache na walikuwa wamepatwa na hasara kubwa katika mapigano makali ya dakika 45. Baada ya dakika kumi tu baada ya kuwasili kwa Early, jeshi lote la Kearny lilikuwa likirudi nyuma kupitia misitu, likifuatiliwa hadi kwenye ukingo wa mto, na kumaliza mapigano kwenye mstari wa mbele wa Jackson kwa siku hiyo. Kwa muda unaopungua saa mbili za mchana zilizobaki, Lee alipendekeza tena uvamizi wa jumla. Longstreet alikataa tena, akipendekeza upelelezi kwa nguvu ili kujitayarisha kwa shambulio asubuhi iliyofuata. Lee alikubali, akikataa mapigano ya kawaida yaliyopangwa kwa asubuhi iliyofuata na kuamua badala yake kusubiri shambulio la Papa. Wakati huo huo, Pope alimtumia ujumbe wa matumaini kwa Mkuu wa Jeshi Henry Halleck huko Washington, akihesabu hasara zake kati ya 6,000 na 8,000 wakati akihesabu hasara za Confederate na kudai kuwa adui alikuwa akirudi kuelekea milima. Kwa kweli, mabawa mawili ya Lee yalichukua karibu ardhi ile ile waliyokuwa nayo siku iliyotangulia, na Longstreet alikuwa ameimarishwa na kuwasili kwa kikosi cha artillery cha Kanali Stephen D. Lee na mgawanyiko wa wanajeshi wa Brig. Jenerali R. H. Anderson. Porter aliwasili mapema Agosti 30, akiongeza askari wengine 8,000 kwa jeshi la Papa. Pope alikutana na maafisa wake katika makao makuu yake karibu na makutano ya Warrenton-Pike-Sudley Road, na walimshawishi kuanza shambulio jipya dhidi ya adui kushoto, ambapo mafanikio fulani yalikuwa yamepatikana siku iliyotangulia. Papa alikubali lakini hakutoa amri ya moja kwa moja; badala yake, saa za asubuhi zilipita wakati Papa alipokuwa akizunguka, akishikwa na kutokuwa na uamuzi, akijaribu kupatanisha imani yake kwamba adui alikuwa akirudi nyuma na ripoti nyingi kinyume chake. "Kisha, saa 11 asubuhi, McDowell na Heinzman waliomba kuruhusiwa kuchunguza Umoja wa Haki kwa wenyewe.""" Walipokuwa wameondoka, Papa aliamua - Waasi walikuwa wakirudi nyuma, kufuatilia kulikuwa kwa utaratibu, na Porter alipaswa kushambulia mara moja. Baada ya muda, McDowell na Heintzelman waliporudi kutoka kwa uchunguzi wao wa nusu-moyo na kuripoti kwamba walikuwa wameona ushahidi mdogo wa uwepo mkubwa wa adui, Papa alikuwa na uhakika zaidi. Alasiri alitoa amri mpya ya kufuatilia kwa pande mbili. Badala ya kushambulia, Porter badala yake angesababisha utafutaji magharibi kando ya Warrenton Pike, ikiungwa mkono na Hatch na Reynolds. Idara ya Ricketts, ikiungwa mkono na Heintzelman, ingemfuata Jackson kando ya barabara inayoongoza kutoka Sudley magharibi hadi Haymarket. Mfuatano huo ulipaswa kuanza mara moja. Papa aliwaambia maofisa wake, "Kushinikiza adui kwa nguvu wakati wa siku nzima". Porter tayari kuzindua shambulio kubwa la Umoja wa vita. Alikabili kazi kubwa sana. Kwenye upande wa mbele wa Porter kulikuwa na baadhi ya askari bora katika kikosi cha zamani cha Lee, kikosi cha zamani cha Jackson, ambacho sasa kilikuwa kikiongozwa na Starke, na kilikuwa na nafasi ya nguvu nyuma ya reli isiyo na mwisho, iliyowekwa katika mistari miwili ya vita, mita 200 mbali. Wanaume wa Porter walipaswa kuvuka karibu mita 700 za malisho ya wazi, 150 ya mwisho kwa mwinuko mkali, ili kuungana na adui. Wakati wa saa 3 jioni, askari 10,000 wa Porter waliondoka msituni kama maporomoko ya theluji, na kuonekana ghafla kwa nguzo za bluu kulisababisha msukosuko katika safu za Confederate. Kikosi cha Leroy Stafford cha Louisiana, kilichopangwa katika safu mbili, kilimshika Starke kushoto; upande wa kulia wa Stafford, kikosi cha 42 cha Virginia cha kikosi cha Bradley Johnson kilikuwa kimesubiri kwenye reli isiyo na mwisho katika sehemu yake ya kina zaidi - Deep Cut. Upande wa kulia wa 42nd, ambapo kitanda cha reli kilikuwa juu ya ardhi tambarare, Johnson's 48th Virginia ilisubiri katika shamba la miti mita 80 mbele ya uchimbaji. Katika upande wa kulia wa Umoja, New York 24th na 30th walionekana kutoka kwa mbao na mara moja walipigwa na risasi kubwa iliyopigwa kutoka kwa uchimbaji na Wa-Louisian 1,000 wa Stafford. Mstari wa bluu ulirudi nyuma lakini ukaendelea mbele huku mawingu ya moshi mweupe yakianza kuficha uwanja huo. Wakati New Yorkers walipofika Schoolhouse Branch, Confederates waliinuka na kufyatua risasi ya pili. "Hata hivyo, ""siku ya 24 na 30 ya mwezi huu"" haijawahi kuonekana katika eneo hilo." Wakati huohuo, Brig. Vikosi vya Jenerali Daniel Butterfield vilikuwa vikivuka uwanja huo. Katika Shirika la Shule, wanaume wa Brig. Kikosi cha Jenerali Benjamin Roberts kilihisi kuumwa na risasi za adui kutoka mbele na risasi za makombora kutoka kushoto. Kwa sasa S.D. Lee alikuwa amebeba mizigo yote ya bunduki zake 18 kutoka kwenye kilima kilichokuwa umbali wa mita 1,000 kutoka hapo. Wanaume wa Roberts walisimama kwa muda mfupi kabla ya kuendelea, huku kelele za vita zikiongezeka na kuwa kelele zenye kusikika. Moshi, vumbi, na kelele zilijiunga ili kusababisha mvurugo katika safu za Muungano. Kikosi cha kwanza cha Michigan kilikuwa karibu na ngome hiyo kwa urefu wa mita 50 kabla ya kukomeshwa na risasi na kuanguka chini. Kikosi cha 13 cha New York na Kikosi cha 18 cha Massachusetts kilipanda hadi karibu na eneo la kuchimbua, kikajificha nyuma ya vichaka na miamba, na kuendelea kupigana. Kwa kushoto kwa Roberts, New York ya 17 ilitoka msituni na kusonga mbele peke yake. Bila kusimamishwa katika Schoolhouse Branch, wanaume wa 17 walifika chini ya mteremko unaoongoza kwenye reli isiyo na mwisho na kukimbilia juu ya kilima kwa kelele ya wazimu. Walipofika kwenye kilele mbele ya kikosi cha Johnson, mita 50 kutoka kwenye uchimbaji, mlipuko wa mauaji wa makombora na risasi za risasi ulisimamisha mstari wao. Kikosi cha 48 cha Virginia kilipiga marufuku na kuhamia nyuma. Kwenye eneo la kilometa moja na nusu, mapigano yaliendelea bila kukoma kwa umbali wa karibu sana. Kwa kuwa alikuwa na uhakika kwamba vikosi vyake viwili vilivyobaki havingeweza kushikilia, Johnson aliamuru vikosi vyake viwili vya hifadhi, Kikosi cha Kwanza cha Virginia na Kikosi cha 21 cha Virginia, kuondoka msituni na kuja kusaidia. Vikosi hivyo viwili vipya viliingia katika uwanja wa wazi na vikaharibiwa upesi na makombora mengi. Wanaume wachache zaidi ya 300 waliweza kuvuka uwanja huo, wakishuka kwenye Deep Cut pamoja na Virginia ya 42. Kuondoka kwa kikosi cha 48 cha Virginia kulifungua pengo hatari kati ya Johnson na Brig. Jenerali William Taliaferro ameondoka. Jackson, baada ya kuamuru Hill kuimarisha upande wa kulia wa Waasi, alituma ombi kwa Lee na Longstreet, akiomba msaada. Longstreet aliamua kwamba kutuma kikosi cha wanajeshi wa miguu kungechukua muda mwingi sana; alisema kwamba shambulio hilo linapaswa kukandamizwa na makombora. Longstreet aliamuru Kikosi cha Dixie cha Kapteni Will Chapman kihamie kwenye kilima kidogo kaskazini mwa Pike. Bunduki nne za Chapman ziliongeza moto wao kwa ule wa S.D. Lee. (Mwanamke mmoja) Makombora ya Muungano yaliweka nguzo za Muungano zilizokuwa zikishambulia reli, na hivyo kufanya iwe vigumu kurudi nyuma. Wakati wa vita vya Groveton Woods, Porter aliamua kwamba kutuma askari wa ziada katika uwanja wa 700 wa ardhi uliodhibitiwa na makombora ya waasi ingesababisha msiba na kuamua kuizuia mgawanyiko wote wa hifadhi ya Sykes. Porter aliamua dhidi ya kujitolea vikosi vyake vya hifadhi upande wa kulia, kimsingi akiacha vikosi vingine vya Muungano kwa hatima yao. Baada ya saa moja ya mapigano, majeshi ya Confederate yalifikia kikomo cha uwezo wao, baadhi yao walikuwa wakiacha mstari wa vita ili kutafuta risasi miongoni mwa waliokufa na waliojeruhiwa, wakati wengine walikuwa wametumia kutumia mawe kuwashambulia maadui wao. Hata hivyo, kufikia wakati huo, shambulio la Muungano lilikuwa karibu kumalizika. Wakati kikosi kipya kutoka mgawanyiko wa Hill kilipokuja kusaidia, mgogoro ulimalizika kwa kusini. Maofisa wote wa Muungano walipiga amri ya kurudi nyuma. Muda mfupi baada ya shambulio la Porter kufutwa, Longstreet na Lee wakati huo huo waliamuru maendeleo ya jumla ya mrengo wa kulia wa Confederate. Baada ya saa tatu tu za mchana, mojawapo ya mashambulizi makubwa zaidi ya vita vyote yalianza. Lengo la Longstreet, Henry Hill, lilikuwa karibu maili moja na nusu mbali na lilifunika njia ya kurudi nyuma ya Umoja kando ya Warrenton Pike. Karibu mita 500 magharibi mwa Henry Hill kulikuwa na Chinn Ridge, eneo pekee lililozuia majeshi ya Longstreet. Maji mengine 500 upande wa magharibi, moja kwa moja katika njia ya mawimbi ya kijivu yaliyokuwa yakija, yalingoja kikosi cha Kanali Gouverneur Warren cha vikosi viwili vya Zouave. Baada ya saa sita mchana, kikosi cha 5 cha Texas kilitoka msituni na kuanza kusonga mbele. Upande wa kushoto kulikuwa na kikosi cha Hampton, ambacho watu wengi walikuwa wamepigana vita miezi 13 mapema, pamoja na kikosi cha 18 cha Georgia na kikosi cha 4 cha Texas. Vikosi vinne vya Confederate vilivyoingia katika uwanja wa wazi, vikaingia kwenye njia ya wapiganaji wa 10th New York, ambao walifanikiwa kutupa risasi moja kabla ya kushindwa na kurudi nyuma kwa hofu. Majeshi ya Zouaves hayakuweza kumwona adui yao kupitia mawingu ya moshi. Wakati wa kukimbia kwa wapiganaji wa 10th hatimaye walipoondoa mbele ya 5th New York, wanaume wa kikosi cha Hood walikuwa tayari kwenye ukingo wa misitu ya mita 40 tu. Jeshi la 5 la Texas lilipiga upande wa kushoto wa Jeshi la 5 la New York, wakati Jeshi la Hampton na Jeshi la 18 la Georgia lilipiga katikati na kulia. Zouaves waliovalia mavazi yenye rangi nyingi walikuwa shabaha rahisi katika uwanja ulio wazi. Katika dakika tatu au nne za kwanza, Kikosi cha Tano kilipata angalau watu 100 waliokufa. Warren alipiga kelele amri ya kurudi nyuma lakini hakuweza kusikilizwa juu ya kelele; bila amri ya kurudi nyuma, Zouaves wengi walishikilia ardhi yao kwa ujasiri. Baada ya dakika chache zaidi ikawa wazi kwamba kubaki mahali walipokuwa ni upumbavu, na kila mtu ambaye angeweza kukimbia akaingia nyuma, akifuatwa kwa ukaribu na Confederates wakipiga kelele. Zouaves walipokuwa wakikimbilia chini ya mteremko unaoelekea Young's Branch, majeshi ya Hood yalihamia kwenye kilele cha mlima na kuwaua walipokuwa wakijaribu kumfuata Warren kuvuka kijito. Katika dakika kumi za kwanza kwenye mteremko, wanaume 300 wa New York ya tano walikuwa wameuawa au kujeruhiwa; angalau 120 waliuawa moja kwa moja - moja ya hasara kubwa zaidi ya kikosi katika vita vyote. Baada ya kusimamishwa katika Tawi la Young, vikosi vinne vya Hood vilivuka kijito hicho na kuelekea mteremko. Kikosi cha Hood kilipanda mbele kwa karibu maili moja, lakini mwendo wake wa haraka uliwaweka wanaume hao mbele sana ya vikosi vingine vya Kusini. Akijua kwamba watu wake walihitaji kufunikwa, Hood aliamuru vikosi vyake vigeuke upande wa kulia kuelekea eneo la misitu. Akiwa na hakika kwamba majeshi yake yaliyokuwa yamechoka hayakuwa na idadi ya kutosha ya kuteka Mlima Chinn, Hood aliamua kungojea msaada. Baada ya muda mfupi, 18th South Carolina ilishambulia nje ya misitu kuelekea kushoto kwa Umoja, tu kuanguka katika upande na risasi ya artillery na mbele na risasi ya 73rd na 25th Ohio. 17th South Carolina, iliyoongozwa na Gavana wa zamani wa jimbo hilo, Kanali John Means, ambaye alishuka mara moja akiwa amejeruhiwa vibaya. Vikosi vya Muungano vilivunjika na kurudi nyuma nyuma ya kilele cha mlima huo. Vikosi vitatu vya kikosi cha Kemper vilikuja katika mashamba kusini mwa nyumba ya Chinn wakati mapigano yalipokuwa yakiendelea. Mstari wa mbele wa Kemper ulijumuisha vikosi vya Brig. Jenerali Micah Jenkins na Kanali Eppa Hunton, na kikosi cha Kanali Montgomery Corse mita 250 nyuma. Maelfu ya Confederates katika mistari kadhaa ya vita waliendelea juu ya kilima na kufungwa kwenye mstari wa Umoja kutoka pande tatu. Wakati Hunton na Jenkins walipoendelea kuelekea kilele cha mteremko dhidi ya kituo cha Umoja na kushoto, vikosi vya mavazi ya bluu vilitoa mlipuko wa uharibifu ambao ulipindua sehemu za mstari wa Jenkins. Baada ya dakika chache, Confederates walipanga upya na kuja tena, kwa ndani ya yadi 40 ya Federals. Vita viliendelea kwenye eneo la mita 400 mbele, na vikosi vya Umoja vilivyokuwa vingi zaidi vilipata hasara kubwa. Wakati mstari wa Muungano ulipopigwa polepole nyuma kwenye kilele cha mteremko, makombora ya Confederate yalivuka Bald Hill kusini mashariki mwa Chinn Ridge na kuanza kupiga risasi upande wa kushoto wa Muungano. Moto huo mpya wa upande ulikuwa zaidi ya yale ambayo Majeshi ya Shirikisho yaliyokuwa yamebaki kwenye mteremko yangeweza kuvumilia; mstari wa bluu juu ya kilele ulitikisika na kisha kuvunjika kabisa. Nguzo za kuchelewa ziliwasili wakati mistari ya bluu ilipovunjika na kutazama wakati mawimbi ya Confederates yalipokuwa yakisonga mbele katika wingi wa kina, wenye unene. Dakika chache baadaye majeshi ya Muungano yaliyobaki kwenye Chinn Ridge, yakikabiliwa na uwezekano usioweza kushindwa, yalijiondoa, yakiacha Chinn Ridge mikononi mwa Confederate. Kwa bahati nzuri kwa Papa, ulinzi wa Chinn Ridge ulimpa wakati wa kupanga majeshi yake yaliyobaki katika nafasi za kutetea karibu na Henry Hill. Wakati wa saa 5:30 jioni, Pope aliamuru mrengo wa kulia wa jeshi lake kurudi nyuma kwenye mstari na kushoto kwake kwenye Henry Hill. Kufikia saa sita jioni alikuwa na vikosi vinne kwenye kilima cha Henry, kando ya eneo la nusu maili, kuanzia kaskazini mwa magofu ya nyumba ya Henry hadi kwenye misitu ya kusini mwa kilima hicho. Makombora matatu kwenye kilele cha kilima hicho yangepiga risasi ili kuunga mkono mstari wa Muungano; askari zaidi walikuwa njiani. Longstreet na Lee walikuwa wakifanya kazi ya kukusanya vitengo vya ziada kwa ajili ya gari kwenye Henry Hill. Mtu wa kwanza kujibu alikuwa Brig. Jenerali R.H. Anderson, ambaye mgawanyiko wake uliondoka shamba la Brawner saa 4:50 jioni, vikosi vyake vitatu vikivuka kusini mwa Pike kwa maandamano ya maili mbili mashariki. Longstreet alimwamuru Wilcox kuendeleza mgawanyiko wake pia; kwa bahati mbaya, Wilcox alielewa vibaya amri hiyo na kutuma moja tu ya vikosi vyake vitatu kusini mwa Pike na kuelekea Henry Hill. Wakati vikosi hivi vilianza maandamano yao kuelekea Henry Hill, D.R. Jones alirudisha maendeleo ya Confederate, akipeleka vikosi vyake vyote viwili kukamata makutano muhimu ya Warrenton Pike-Sudley Road. Wanaume wake walifika karibu na lengo lao kabla ya majeshi ya Muungano kwenye Henry Hill kugundua harakati. Reynolds mara moja aliamuru kikosi cha Meade kushambulia safu ya Confederate, na kwa risasi za makombora juu ya vichwa vyao, wanaume wa Meade walihama chini ya mteremko. Kuonekana ghafla kwa kikosi cha Meade upande wa kulia wa Wajorjiya kulivunja matumaini ya Jones ya kukata vitengo vya adui kwenye Dogan Ridge. Brig. Jenerali Henry Benning aliwaelekeza watu wake upande wa kulia ili kukabiliana na mstari wa Reynolds, akaelekeza silaha kwenye kilima kilicho juu yake, na kuamuru kikosi chake kushambulia. Kikosi cha Anderson kiligeuka upande wa kulia pia na kusonga juu upande wa kulia wa Benning. Dakika chache baadaye, karibu wanajeshi 3,000 wa Georgia walikuwa wakipanda mteremko wa magharibi wa Henry Hill kwenye mteremko wa nusu maili, hatua kubwa zaidi ya shambulio la Longstreet. Vikosi vya Benning vilitoka katika bonde la Chinn Branch kukabiliwa na moto wa pamoja wa Meade, Seymour, Milroy, na betri za Muungano. Mstari wa kijivu ulirudi nyuma lakini ulipata tena na kuendelea juu ya mteremko, ukifika ndani ya yadi 80 ya adui. Kwenye upande wa kulia wa Confederate, majeshi ya Anderson yalihamia kupitia mbao nzito kuelekea kilele. Wanaume wa Anderson walijiondoa kutoka kwenye msitu, lakini waliendelea kuja, wakifika karibu na mita 50 ya barabara ya Sudley kabla ya kujificha na kuendelea na mapigano. Mstari wa Muungano Unavunjika Kila kikosi cha mbele cha Muungano sasa kilikuwa kimejihusisha sana. Licha ya makombora ya Muungano na nafasi zenye kutisha zilizoshikiliwa na watetezi, moto wa Wageorgia ulikuwa ukiweka shinikizo kubwa kwenye mstari wa Shirikisho. Vikosi vya Jones vilikuwa vikitoa moto wa aina hiyo kwamba mstari wa Muungano, na sio wa Confederate, ulikuwa ukitikisika; Reynolds's mbili za mrengo wa kushoto zilitoa ardhi, pamoja na sehemu kubwa ya wanaume wa Milroy, ambao waliacha barabara ya Sudley kabisa. Kikosi cha 15 cha Georgia kilitumia fursa hiyo na kukimbilia mbele kwenye mapengo, na kupata nafasi kwenye barabara, mita chache tu kutoka kwa makombora ya Yankee. Hali ya kushoto kabisa ya Muungano ilizorota pia wakati betri ya Confederate ilipowasili, makombora yake manne yalifungua moto kutoka karibu na nyumba ya Conrad moja kwa moja kushoto kwa Muungano, ikikumba mstari mwembamba wa bluu. Ulinzi wote wa Muungano kwenye Mlima Henry ulikuwa katika mgogoro. Baada ya Milroy na Meade kuomba msaada, kikosi cha Lt. Col. Robert Buchanan kilikuja wakati unaofaa zaidi. Baada ya kuanzisha vikosi vitatu vya kwanza, Buchanan alirudi na kupata vikosi vyake viwili vilivyobaki, vikosi vya 3 na 5, na kuviweka katikati ya mstari wa Muungano. Kuonekana kwa majeshi mapya baada ya dakika 45 za mapigano makali kulikuwa zaidi ya yale ambayo vikosi vinne vya Benning vilivyochoka vingeweza kuvumilia. 17 Georgia, upande wa kulia wa Benning, ilikubali, ikionyesha upande wa kulia wa 15 Georgia, na ingawa walijaribu sana kushikilia mhimili wao barabarani, wanaume wa 15 hatimaye walirudi chini ya kilima hadi Chinn Branch. Hali ya Benning kushoto pia ilizorota; 20th Georgia, akiteseka katika wazi chini ya mvua ya makombora iliyopigwa kutoka Henry Hill 300 yadi mbali, aliamriwa kurudi nyuma. Wakati huo, ingawa mapigano yaliendelea kwa dakika 30 zaidi katika giza lililokuwa likiongezeka, jaribio la Confederate la kumkamata Henry Hill lilimalizika. Wakati wa saa 7 jioni, marudio ya Umoja kuelekea milima ya mashariki ya Barabara ya Sudley yalikuwa yamekamilika, jeshi la bluu likitoa mbele thabiti ingawa mgawanyiko na mshikamano wa jeshi ulikuwa umeharibika sana. Kufikia saa 11 jioni, jeshi la Pope lilikuwa limevuka Bull Run kwenye daraja la mawe au kwenye Farm's Ford, nusu maili kaskazini, na roho zao zilizokuwa zikizorota zilikuwa zimepunguzwa zaidi na dhoruba ya mvua. Zaidi ya watu 3,000 waliuawa na wengine 15,000 walijeruhiwa. Jackson alikuwa amepoteza karibu watu 4,000, wakati Longstreet alikuwa amepoteza zaidi ya watu 4,700 waliouawa, kujeruhiwa, au kutoweka katika muda wa chini ya saa nne - karibu asilimia 15 ya vikosi vya Confederate vilivyojihusisha. Jeshi la Papa, lililoshindwa lakini halikuharibiwa, lilikuwa limepatwa na hasara 13,824 - 1,716, 8,215 walijeruhiwa, na 3,893 waliopotea. Baada ya vita vya kwanza vya Marekani, Rais Abraham Lincoln alimwita Maj. Gen. George McClellan kuwa kamanda wa majeshi yote ya Marekani katika eneo la Washington, na baada ya siku 74 akiwa kamanda wa jeshi la Virginia, Pope alilazimika kwenda Minnesota ili kuongoza majeshi ya Marekani katika mapinduzi ya Sioux. Kinyume chake, hali ya Confederation haikuwa imewahi kuwa nzuri zaidi. Katika kipindi cha miezi sita, majeshi ya Kusini yalikuwa yamekuwa katika hali ya kujilinda kila mahali: New Orleans ilikuwa imepotea, Korintho na Richmond zilikuwa zimetishwa, Missouri ilikuwa imepotea, na Bonde lote la Mississippi lilionekana kuwa karibu kufuata. Sasa Kusini ilikuwa imepata tena mamlaka na ilikuwa ikipigana katika kila eneo kubwa la vita. Muungano ulikuwa umefikia kiwango chake cha juu kabisa huko Manassas. Haingeweza kamwe kuwa karibu sana na ushindi.