Late last week, British Prime Minister Boris Johnson announced a massive new round of funding for the U.K.’s armed forces: a 16.5 billion British pounds boost over the previously agreed levels of funding, representing the biggest increase in defense funding in 30 years.
The funding is heavily directed at futuristic initiatives: artificial intelligence, directed-energy weapons, the Tempest sixth-generation fighter program, and the creation of a British equivalent of the United States’ new Space Force. Meanwhile, more traditional defense programs – like modernizing or replacing Britain’s fleet of increasingly outdated main battle tanks – are likely to miss out.
Of course, all of this comes at a deeply uncertain time for Britain. The pandemic has hit the British economy hard, and with just a month left before the country crashes out of the European Union unless a deal is agreed, its future has rarely been so uncertain. So, the question of whether the U.K. can follow through on this commitment is a genuine one.
Nevertheless, Britain is not alone among European nations in signaling that it intends to show the flag more in Asia. The U.K.’s new aircraft carrier, HMS Queen Elizabeth, will be making its first deployment to the region; the French and Germans have signaled that their navies will do so as well. These gestures will be welcomed by a United States that has been trying with increasing alacrity to build a grand coalition to counter growing Chinese power and influence. But does it mean that Europe will be a player in hard-edged competition in the Pacific?
It is difficult to imagine that outcome. European nations – even acting in concert – are a long way from being able to project and sustain meaningful amounts of combat power that far afield. European militaries are not configured for long-distance combat missions; even the best-equipped continental powers have limited strategic airlift and aerial refueling capacity and no strategic bombers.
At sea, there is slightly more capacity, but only when considering the continent holistically. France and Britain have all the elements of a modern navy, including aircraft carriers (nuclear-powered in France’s case), underway replenishment ships, nuclear-powered attack submarines, and capable frigates and destroyers. Other European nations have some or most of those elements – Italy and Spain operate smaller carriers and most Western European countries have at least some modern surface combatants and submarines.
The problem is numbers. For a navy with one aircraft carrier, a deployment to the Pacific means that for months at a stretch there is absolutely no reserve in case one is needed urgently at home for deterrence or humanitarian relief purposes; furthermore, sending a carrier also necessitates deploying a force of escorts and support ships.
If Europe were a single political entity with a joined-up foreign policy, it might be more straightforward to put together a carrier strike group with assets belonging to different navies in order to share the burden and maintain a continuous, or at least regular, presence. But the mechanism for coordinating such an enterprise would be NATO, which has not agreed to a consensus approach to new out of area operations – and which is a transatlantic, rather than solely European, body. And nothing about the EU’s efforts to develop a unified defense policy suggest that it will be taking on that role in the foreseeable future.
That all said, even if European military assets are a rare and transient presence in the Asia-Pacific, their presence does demonstrate that Europe has interests and aspirations in the region. But even with the advent of a more supportive transatlantic ally in President-elect Joe Biden, it will be difficult for European militaries in Asia to walk the tightrope between supporting shared strategic objectives and demonstrating meaningful strategic autonomy – especially given that, for instance, British carriers will frequently carry U.S. Marine Corps F-35s to increase their combat power.
Absent a global military conflagration, the fundamental limitations on European nations having more than a symbolic forward presence in Asia (or other regions outside Europe’s neighborhood) aren’t going to change because Britain or France has iteratively improved the quality of its multirole fighters or equipped its tanks with a laser defense system. That is not to say that European nations cannot impact the balance of military power in Asia, but rather that the most effective means for doing so will be indirect. That might entail building closer research, development, and joint procurement links with like-minded allies in the region, or by redoubling efforts to build a renewed framework of military transparency and arms control measures, and using a mixture of economic and diplomatic pressure to encourage compliance globally. Most likely, it will require both, along with patience and persistence.
Waziri Mkuu wa Uingereza Boris Johnson ametoa taarifa ya ziada ya fedha kwa ajili ya jeshi la Uingereza, na kuongeza kiasi cha pauni za Uingereza milioni 16.5 kwa kiwango cha awali cha fedha, na kuwakilisha ongezeko kubwa zaidi la fedha za ulinzi katika miaka 30 iliyopita. """Mali hizo zimekusudiwa hasa kwa ajili ya mipango ya siku zijazo: akili bandia, silaha za nishati iliyoelekezwa, mpango wa ndege za kivita za kizazi cha sita za Tempest, na kuundwa kwa jeshi la anga la Uingereza linalofanana na la Marekani." Wakati huo huo, mipango ya jadi ya ulinzi - kama vile kuboresha au kubadilisha meli ya Uingereza ya mizinga ya vita ya msingi inayozidi kuwa ya kizamani - inawezekana kukosa. Bila shaka, yote hayo yanatokea wakati ambapo Uingereza haijulikani kabisa. Janga hilo limepiga uchumi wa Uingereza kwa nguvu, na na mwezi mmoja tu umebaki kabla ya nchi hiyo kuondoka katika Umoja wa Ulaya isipokuwa makubaliano ya mkataba yatekelezwe, wakati wake ujao haujawahi kuwa na uhakika kama huu. "Kwa hivyo, swali la kama Uingereza inaweza kufuata ahadi hii ni moja ya kweli. """ Hata hivyo, Uingereza si nchi pekee kati ya mataifa ya Ulaya inayotoa ishara kwamba inakusudia kuonyesha bendera zaidi katika Asia. Meli mpya ya Uingereza ya kubeba ndege, HMS Queen Elizabeth, itafanya kazi yake ya kwanza katika eneo hilo, na Ufaransa na Ujerumani zimetoa ishara kwamba majeshi yao yatafanya hivyo pia. "Hatua hizo zitakaribishwa na Marekani ambayo imekuwa ikijaribu kwa bidii kujenga muungano mkubwa ili kukabiliana na nguvu na ushawishi wa China unaoongezeka.""" Lakini je, inamaanisha kwamba Ulaya itakuwa mchezaji katika ushindani mgumu katika Pasifiki? Ni vigumu kuwazia matokeo hayo. Mataifa ya Ulaya - hata yakitenda kwa pamoja - ni mbali sana na kuwa na uwezo wa kuonyesha na kudumisha kiasi kikubwa cha nguvu za mapigano mbali sana. Jeshi la Ulaya halijaundwa kwa ajili ya safari za vita za umbali mrefu; hata nguvu za bara zilizo na vifaa bora zina uwezo mdogo wa usafiri wa ndege wa kimkakati na uwezo wa kujaza mafuta angani na hakuna mabomu ya kimkakati. Bahari, kuna uwezo kidogo zaidi, lakini tu wakati wa kuzingatia bara kwa ujumla. Ufaransa na Uingereza zina vitu vyote vya jeshi la wanamaji la kisasa, ikiwa ni pamoja na meli za kubebea ndege (za nguvu za nyuklia katika kesi ya Ufaransa), meli za kujaza, nyambizi za shambulio za nyuklia, na meli za kivita na za kuharibu. Mataifa mengine ya Ulaya yana baadhi au zaidi ya vipengele hivyo - Italia na Hispania zinaendesha wabebaji wadogo na nchi nyingi za Ulaya Magharibi zina angalau wapiganaji wa kisasa wa uso na nyambizi. Tatizo ni idadi. Kwa meli ya wanamaji yenye meli moja ya kubebea ndege, kupelekwa kwenye Pasifiki kunamaanisha kwamba kwa miezi mingi hakuna hifadhi yoyote ikiwa inahitajika haraka nyumbani kwa madhumuni ya kuzuia au misaada ya kibinadamu; kwa kuongezea, kutuma meli ya kubebea ndege pia inahitaji kupelekwa kwa jeshi la meli za kuandamana na kusaidia. """Ikiwa Ulaya ingekuwa chombo kimoja cha kisiasa na sera ya kigeni iliyounganishwa, inaweza kuwa rahisi zaidi kuunganisha kundi la mshambuliaji wa meli za kivita na mali zinazomilikiwa na majeshi tofauti ili kushiriki mzigo na kudumisha uwepo wa kuendelea au angalau mara kwa mara." Lakini utaratibu wa kuratibu mradi kama huo ungekuwa NATO, ambayo haikukubaliana na mbinu ya makubaliano ya shughuli mpya nje ya eneo <unk> na ambayo ni transatlantic, badala ya Ulaya tu, mwili. "Hakuna kitu kuhusu juhudi za EU za kuendeleza sera ya ulinzi ya umoja unaonyesha kwamba itachukua jukumu hilo katika siku zijazo zinazotabirika. """ "Hata hivyo, hata kama vifaa vya kijeshi vya Ulaya ni nadra na vya muda mfupi katika Asia-Pacific, uwepo wao unaonyesha kwamba Ulaya ina maslahi na matarajio katika mkoa huo. """ Lakini hata na kuwasili kwa mshirika wa transatlantic mwenye kuunga mkono zaidi katika Rais-mteule Joe Biden, itakuwa vigumu kwa majeshi ya Ulaya katika Asia kutembea kwenye kamba ngumu kati ya kuunga mkono malengo ya kimkakati na kuonyesha uhuru wa kimkakati, hasa kwa kuzingatia kwamba, kwa mfano, waendeshaji wa ndege wa Uingereza mara nyingi hubeba F-35s ya Jeshi la Wanamaji la Marekani ili kuongeza nguvu zao za kupigana. """Kwa kukosekana kwa mapigano ya kijeshi ya kimataifa, mipaka ya msingi ya mataifa ya Ulaya kuwa na zaidi ya uwepo wa ishara mbele katika Asia (au mikoa mingine nje ya ujirani wa Ulaya) haitaweza kubadilika kwa sababu Uingereza au Ufaransa imeboresha ubora wa wapiganaji wake wa kazi nyingi au vifaa vya mizinga yao na mfumo wa ulinzi wa laser." Hii haimaanishi kwamba mataifa ya Ulaya hayawezi kuathiri usawa wa nguvu za kijeshi katika Asia, lakini badala yake njia bora ya kufanya hivyo itakuwa ya moja kwa moja. "Hiyo inaweza kuhusisha kujenga uhusiano wa karibu wa utafiti, maendeleo na ununuzi wa pamoja na washirika wenye mawazo sawa katika mkoa, au kwa kuongeza juhudi za kujenga mfumo mpya wa uwazi wa kijeshi na hatua za kudhibiti silaha, na kutumia mchanganyiko wa shinikizo la kiuchumi na kidiplomasia kuhamasisha kufuata kimataifa. """ Yaelekea zaidi, itahitaji yote mawili, pamoja na subira na uvumilivu.