The debate over European security turns on the different ways Russia and the West interpret NATO’s expansion. These interpretations, for their part, are rooted in the different ways the parties view the end of the Cold War.
According to Russian leaders, the Cold War ended as a result of the joint efforts of the Soviet Union and the United States in the late 1980s to move from a relationship based on confrontation to one focused on cooperation.
After the agreed-upon end to confrontation, the Russians expected the sides would jointly determine the future of the areas where their interests overlapped, primarily European security.
The main issue to be decided was the future of NATO, which had been established as a counterbalance to the Soviet Union.
In the late 1980s, during talks on the future of Germany, the subject of how German reunification would affect NATO was frequently discussed. As part of the discussions, the Soviet Union agreed not to oppose German reunification and NATO member states agreed not to deploy the alliance’s military infrastructure in East Germany – an agreement they honor still.
However, there was much debate as to whether the agreement not to expand eastward would apply only to East Germany or to Eastern Europe generally. According to the personal notes of U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, the subject was discussed in a conversation with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in Moscow in February 1990. But Baker’s notes are inconclusive as to how the parties left the issue. What can be said is that despite the fact that the Soviet Union was clear in its adamant opposition to NATO enlargement, no agreement guaranteeing that there would be no expansion was signed.
During the discussions in 1989-1990, the issue did not come up because the Warsaw Pact was still in place.
However, starting in 1991, the Soviet Union lost control over the events in Central and Eastern Europe. Communist governments fell, the Warsaw Pact dissolved, and the West had no impetus to engage in any negotiations or agreements with Moscow.
Motivation to negotiate with Moscow further decreased with the breakup of the Soviet Union. Under Boris Yeltsin, Russia not only set aside Soviet demands for guarantees that NATO would not expand, but even toyed with the idea of joining the alliance itself.
In 1990, Yeltsin, then chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet, wrote: “In what appears to be almost a mockery of our four and a bit years of perestroika, in a matter of days, the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria made such a leap from the past towards a normal, humane, civilized society that it is no longer clear if we shall ever be able to catch up with them.” These words explain why Russia was so tolerant of former Warsaw Pact members’ aspirations to join NATO.
For their part, members of the North Atlantic Alliance perceived the situation as a clear victory, and put forward a program to turn the bloc into a universal security organization. In this context, Russia lost its status as an equal partner and became, as far as NATO was concerned, just another country that the alliance would deal with on its own terms.
From these beginnings grew profound imbalances in European security, which caused ongoing disagreements between Russia and NATO starting from the mid-1990s. Over time, omissions and reticence led to a complete breakdown of understanding between the parties. In effect, the West failed to create a coherent and purposeful policy for working with Russia.
It was customary to believe that Moscow was moving toward the West, and therefore the West could not do Russia any harm by acting unilaterally. While the goal of this policy was not to ignore Moscow’s interests, in practice, that was exactly what it did.
This approach did not change, even after the first serious disagreements between Russia and NATO erupted during the conflicts in the Balkans. At that time, the West acted unilaterally on its own interpretations of how to ensure European security, which included expanding NATO and deploying U.S. missiles in eastern Europe. When Russia balked at these moves, Washington and Brussels responded that Russia could also take whatever steps it felt were necessary.
The West was not concerned with the corresponding steps Russia was taking to strengthen its own security because it believed that Moscow was not an adversary and did not represent a credible threat. The widely held belief was that while Russia wanted equal partnership, it was not an equal partner.
A divergence of interests prompted Russia to reassess its priorities in its relations with the West. Moscow’s hopes to establish a new world order on equal terms with all parties remained unfulfilled. On numerous occasions, the United States and NATO unilaterally used force in conflicts. Russia’s independent foreign policy, aimed at ensuring its own interests, met with increasing criticism in the West.
The Ukrainian crisis is just the latest example of Russia and the West’s failure create a post-Cold War world order. To prevent future conflicts in Europe, Russia and the West should agree on new rules of engagement, both in Europe and in the rest of the world.
Mjadala juu ya usalama wa Ulaya unazunguka njia tofauti za Urusi na Magharibi kutafsiri upanuzi wa NATO. Tafsiri hizi, kwa upande wao, zinategemea njia tofauti ambazo pande hizo zinaona mwisho wa Vita Baridi. "Kulingana na viongozi wa Urusi, ""Vita Baridi"" zilimalizika kama matokeo ya juhudi za pamoja za Muungano wa Sovieti na Marekani mwishoni mwa miaka ya 1980 kuhamia kutoka uhusiano wa kupingana hadi moja ya ushirikiano." Baada ya makubaliano ya mwisho wa mapigano, Warusi walitarajia pande hizo kuamua pamoja siku zijazo za maeneo ambapo maslahi yao yalipatana, hasa usalama wa Ulaya. Swali kuu lililopaswa kuamuliwa lilikuwa wakati ujao wa NATO, ambayo ilikuwa imeanzishwa kama mpinzani wa Muungano wa Sovieti. Katika miaka ya 1980, wakati wa mazungumzo juu ya mustakabali wa Ujerumani, mada ya jinsi kuunganishwa tena kwa Ujerumani kungeathiri NATO ilijadiliwa mara nyingi. Katika mazungumzo hayo, Muungano wa Sovieti ulikubali kutopinga kuunganishwa tena kwa Ujerumani na nchi wanachama wa NATO zilikubali kutotumia miundombinu ya kijeshi ya muungano huo katika Ujerumani Mashariki - makubaliano ambayo bado wanaheshimu. Hata hivyo, kulikuwa na mjadala mwingi kuhusu ikiwa makubaliano ya kutopanuka kuelekea mashariki yangetumika tu kwa Ujerumani Mashariki au kwa Ulaya Mashariki kwa ujumla. Kulingana na maelezo ya kibinafsi ya Waziri wa Mambo ya Nje wa Marekani James Baker, suala hilo lilizungumziwa katika mazungumzo na kiongozi wa Sovieti Mikhail Gorbachev huko Moscow mnamo Februari 1990. Lakini maelezo ya Baker hayana uhakika kuhusu jinsi vyama vilivyoacha suala hilo. "Kama ilivyoelezwa hapo juu, kwa sababu ya ""mtazamo wa Urusi wa kuunga mkono kwa nguvu"" kupanua NATO, hakuna mkataba wa kimataifa uliofanywa na Umoja wa Ulaya." Katika mazungumzo ya mwaka 1989-1990, suala hilo halikuja kwa sababu Mkataba wa Warsaw ulikuwa bado katika mahali pake. Hata hivyo, kuanzia mwaka wa 1991, Muungano wa Sovieti ulipoteza udhibiti juu ya matukio katika Ulaya ya Kati na Mashariki. Serikali za Kikomunisti ziliporomoka, Mkataba wa Warsaw ulivunjika, na Magharibi haikuwa na kichocheo cha kushiriki katika mazungumzo au makubaliano yoyote na Moscow. Kichocheo cha kujadili na Moscow kilipungua zaidi baada ya kuvunjika kwa Muungano wa Sovieti. Wakati wa utawala wa Boris Yeltsin, Urusi haikupuuza tu matakwa ya Sovieti ya kuhakikisha kwamba NATO haitapanuka, lakini hata ilicheza na wazo la kujiunga na muungano huo. "Yeltsin, aliyekuwa Mwenyekiti wa Baraza Kuu la Urusi mwaka 1990, aliandika: ""Katika kile kinachoonekana kuwa karibu utani wa miaka yetu minne na nusu ya perestroika, katika suala la siku, GDR, Chekoslovakia, na Bulgaria walifanya kuruka kama kutoka zamani kuelekea jamii ya kawaida, ya kibinadamu, ya ustaarabu kwamba haijulikani tena kama tutaweza kuwafikia.""" Kwa upande wao, wanachama wa Muungano wa Atlantiki Kaskazini waliona hali hiyo kama ushindi dhahiri, na wakatangaza mpango wa kugeuza muungano huo kuwa shirika la usalama wa ulimwengu. Katika hali hii, Urusi ilipoteza hadhi yake kama mshirika sawa na ikawa, kwa kadiri NATO ilivyokuwa na wasiwasi, nchi nyingine tu ambayo muungano ungeweza kushughulika nayo kwa masharti yake mwenyewe. Kuanzia mwanzo huu, kutofautiana kwa kina katika usalama wa Ulaya kulikua, na kusababisha kutoelewana kati ya Urusi na NATO kuanzia katikati ya miaka ya 1990. Baada ya muda, kukosa na kujizuia kulisababisha kuvunjika kabisa kwa uelewevu kati ya pande hizo. Kwa kweli, Magharibi ilishindwa kuunda sera thabiti na yenye kusudi la kufanya kazi na Urusi. "Ilikuwa ni kawaida kuamini kwamba Moscow ilikuwa ikisonga kuelekea Magharibi, na kwa hiyo Magharibi haingeweza kumdhuru Urusi kwa kutenda kwa upande mmoja.""" Ingawa lengo la sera hii halikuwa kupuuza maslahi ya Moscow, katika mazoezi, hiyo ndiyo iliyokuwa hasa ilifanya. Mtazamo huu haukubadilika, hata baada ya kutoelewana kwa kwanza kati ya Urusi na NATO kuzuka wakati wa migogoro katika Balkan. Wakati huo, Magharibi ilitenda kwa upande mmoja kwa tafsiri zake mwenyewe za jinsi ya kuhakikisha usalama wa Ulaya, ambayo ilijumuisha kupanua NATO na kupeleka makombora ya Marekani katika Ulaya ya Mashariki. "Wakati Urusi ilipopinga hatua hizo, Washington na Brussels zilijibu kwamba Urusi pia inaweza kuchukua hatua zozote ambazo ilihisi zinahitajika.""" "Uingereza haikujali hatua zinazochukuliwa na Urusi ili kuimarisha usalama wake, kwa sababu ilidhani kwamba Moscow haikuwa mpinzani na haikuwa tishio la kweli.""" Imani iliyoenea sana ilikuwa kwamba ingawa Urusi ilitaka ushirikiano wa usawa, haikuwa mshirika wa usawa. Tofauti ya maslahi ilisababisha Urusi kuchunguza upya vipaumbele vyake katika mahusiano yake na Magharibi. Matumaini ya Moscow ya kuanzisha utaratibu mpya wa ulimwengu kwa masharti sawa na pande zote hayakutimizwa. Katika pindi nyingi, Marekani na NATO zilitumia nguvu kwa njia moja katika migogoro. Sera ya kigeni ya Urusi ya kujitegemea, iliyoelekezwa kuhakikisha maslahi yake mwenyewe, ilikutana na ukosoaji unaoongezeka Magharibi. Mgogoro wa Ukraine ni mfano wa hivi karibuni tu wa Urusi na kushindwa kwa Magharibi kuunda utaratibu wa ulimwengu baada ya Vita Baridi. "Kupinga migogoro ya baadaye katika Ulaya, Urusi na Magharibi wanapaswa kukubaliana juu ya sheria mpya za ushirikiano, wote katika Ulaya na katika ulimwengu wote. """