A Theory Derived from the Practice of Command and Control
The qualities of commanders and their ideas are more important to a general theory of command and control than are the technical and architectural qualities of their computers and communications systems. This theory separates the art of command and control (C2) from the hardware and software systems that support C2. It centers on the idea of a command concept, a commander's vision of a military operation that informs the making of command decisions during that operation. The theory suggests that the essential communications up and down the chain of command can (and should) be limited to disseminating, verifying, or modifying command concepts. The theory also suggests, as an extreme case, that an ideal command concept is one that is so prescient, sound, and fully conveyed to subordinates that it would allow the commander to leave the battlefield before the battle commences, with no adverse effect upon the out-come. This report advances a theory about military command and control. Then, through six historical case studies of modern battles, it explores the implications of the theory both for the professional development of commanders and for the design and evaluation of command and control architectures. The report should be of interest to members of the Joint Staff and the services involved in developing command and control doctrine for the U.S. military, and to all of those interested in the military art and science of command and control.
"Kama ilivyoelezwa katika kitabu cha ""The Theory Derived from the Practice of Command and Control,"" sifa za maofisa na mawazo yao ni muhimu zaidi kwa nadharia ya jumla ya amri na udhibiti kuliko sifa za kiufundi na usanifu wa kompyuta zao na mifumo ya mawasiliano." Utafiti huu unafafanua jinsi ya kuendesha na kudhibiti (C2) kutoka kwa vifaa na mifumo ya programu inayounga mkono C2. "Kama ilivyoelezwa hapo juu, ""mtazamo wa kamanda wa operesheni ya kijeshi ambayo inatoa habari ya kufanya maamuzi ya amri wakati wa operesheni hiyo.""" Nadharia hiyo inadokeza kwamba mawasiliano muhimu juu na chini ya mlolongo wa amri yanaweza (na inapaswa) kuwa mdogo kwa kueneza, kuthibitisha, au kurekebisha dhana za amri. Nadharia hiyo pia inadokeza, kama kesi ya kupita kiasi, kwamba dhana ya amri bora ni moja ambayo ni ya kipekee sana, ya sauti, na ya kuwasiliana kikamilifu kwa chini yake ambayo ingewawezesha kamanda kuondoka uwanja wa vita kabla ya vita kuanza, bila athari mbaya juu ya matokeo. Ripoti hii inaendeleza nadharia kuhusu amri na udhibiti wa kijeshi. Kisha, kupitia masomo sita ya kesi ya kihistoria ya vita vya kisasa, inachunguza athari za nadharia kwa maendeleo ya kitaaluma ya makamanda na kwa kubuni na tathmini ya usanifu wa amri na udhibiti. "Hati hiyo inapaswa kuwa ya kuvutia kwa wanachama wa Jopo la Wafanyakazi na huduma zinazohusika katika kuendeleza mafundisho ya amri na udhibiti kwa jeshi la Marekani, na kwa wote wanaopendezwa na sanaa ya kijeshi na sayansi ya amri na udhibiti. """