Deception has been and remains a decisive and powerful instrument to the outcome of maneuverable operations. The case studies which I have chose to research and analyse to support this view are focused on the Arab-Israeli conflicts between 1956 and 1973. Principally the 1956 Suez Crisis and 1973 Yom Kippur War. As I will show how deception was successful utilized by each side. The first such instance of successful use of deception and strategic counter intelligence was during the 1956 Suez crisis. It is vital to give context to the events leading up to crisis and the complexity of international relations that required deception, deceit and cunningness to enable the operation to go ahead. The Suez Canal was once described as the ‘jugular vein of the British Empire’. The canals one-hundred-and-twenty-mile length enabled the distance vessels would have to navigate to be reduced by many thousands of miles. As it enabled vessels to navigate between Europe and Asia without circumnavigating the horn of Africa. It was operated and owned by the Suez Canal company which was formed by predominantly European shareholders and at the time 44 percent owned by the British government. The Suez Canal was a pivital link to its Empire, with 80% of all ships using the canal being British. Therefore, control of the canal was a major strategic concern and later proved as a factor resulting Suez crisis 1956.
The British remained in Egypt as a de facto protectorate long after the 1922 Egyptian indepenance. Though, by 1947 the British withdrew to canal zone, with the intention to remain there under the authority of the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian treaty which would allow British troops stationed there in defence if the Suez Canal. The Free Officers Movement, blamed the King Farouk of Egypt for agreeing to this treaty. They were further angered for his failure to prevent the creation of the Zionist state of Israel. Placing muc of the blame for embarrassing defeat of Egyptian armed forces thoughout the Arab-Israeli war during 1948 until 1949. This movement was lead by Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser, who successfully deposed king Farouk in 1952. The newly imposed President detailed that he formed the notion of the revolution while he served as a Major in the 6th Infantry Battalion. During the Arab-Israeli War in 1949. He was present during the several unsuccessfully attacks on Israeli positions in the area of Khirbet Mahaz in the Negev region. (refence page book)
The United States of America would later refuse to further arm President Nasser due to fears that they would be used against the newly formed state of Israel, which many in America had close affiliation. However, unbeknown to the US Government the Israeli Defence Force would carry out a raid on Egyptian controlled Gaza in February of 1955. This resulted in the killing of 38 Egyptian soldiers, which led to President Nasser to turn eastwards to strengthen his Armed Forces, by signing a significant arm deal with communist Czechoslovakia. The US government on 19th of July 1956 reacted to this agreement by withdrawing financial aid for the Aswan Dam project on the Nile River. President Nasser as a consequence took the divisive decision to nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company on the 26 July 1956. Stating that ‘Tonight, our Egyptian canal will be run by Egyptians’ - Gamal Abdel Nasser.
This would result in one greatest successful use of deception in international history. The Protocol of Sèvres was a secret agreement reached between the governments of the United Kingdom, France and Israel held secretly at Sèvres, France between 22nd and 24th of October 1956. Its primary purpose was to depose President Nasser and regain control of the Suez Canal.
The plan was known as Operation Musketeer, it was entirely dependent on use of strategic counter intelligence and deception. The first step of the approach would see Israel strike the Egyptian Sinai on 29th October with their paratroopers jumping into the region. This strike seized the eastern entrance of the Mitla Pass, this was strategically important as it would allow the ensuing ground invasion by the IDF. Israeli forces would then advance along three routes; along the Mediterranean coast, The Bir Gafgafa Mitla pass itself and towards the southernmost end of the Suez Canal. This would essentially enable Israel to gain controlled of the area surrounding west Suez Canal.
The Prime minister of Israel, David Ben-Gurion was concerned that they would appear to the international community as an antagonist. However, prior publicity given to attacks carried out by Palestinian militants and the ongoing Egyptian blockade of Israeli shipping aided in the plausibility of the attacks and assisted the overall deception. Israel successfully convinced the United Nations that they were acting in self defence. Stating that raids were being carried out by Palestinian Fedayeen on Israel launched from Egyptian controlled Sinai and Gaza. However, this was later found to be disingenuous as there were no known bases in the Egyptian Sinai. This would then serve the next step in Protocol of Sèvres, which was to provided justification and foundations for the diplomatic intervention by Britain and France, under the guise of the 1888 convention and 1954 withdrawal agreement. These agreements enabled the defence Suez Canal if any threat posed to its operation, even by the fabricated threat posed by the Israeli forces to the Suez.
The British and French delivered an ultimatum to both parties involved Egypt and Israel. Demanding the immediate withdrawal of their forces from the ten-mile Suez zone which encompassed both sides of the canal. With the Israel, Britain and France complicit in the deception. Israel as planned in the cunning deception agreed to the demands as planned. As anticipated Egypt refused to do so which lead to the third step Protocol of Sèvres, military intervention by Anglo-French forces. On 31st of October their aircraft began to carry out airstrikes upon Egyptian airfields, anti-aircraft positions and other military infrastructure. This was swiftly followed by British Paratrooper’s landing on the airfields of El Gamil and decisive strike on Er Wasra on the 5th of November. Haste proved vital in order to maintain the element of surprise of subsequent naval advance towards Port Said and the imminent beach landings carried out by the Commando brigade on the 6th of November. Although many in the international community would later suspect collaboration between Israel, Britain and France. They were unable to categorically verify it. It was not until details were published.
The use deception proved pivotal to Operation Musketeers success. It enabled all parties that were in complicit to achieve their individual goals. The second case study which I believe demonstrates the successful use of deception to the outcome maneuver operations was in the weeks leading to the 6th of October 1973. This would date would symbolize the start of the Yom Kippur War to Israeli’s or the Ramadan war to the Arabs. 174The origins of which trace directly back to the Six-day war in June 1967, which resulted in a resounding defeat of Arab forces. Many in the international community question whether this was a successful use of a deception or merely grand failure of the Israeli intelligence services.
The Egyptians used misinformation, denial and deception to ensure a high level of certainty to the initial outcome in the conflict. However, this would be further enhanced by Israeli Intelligence services whose inflexibility to differing views, coupled with bureaucratic antagonism would lend itself effortlessly to the Egyptians plan. Mossad, Modin, Shabak and Shin Bet the Israeli intelligence services, would all exhibit resistance to change primarily in doctrine. In addition, stagnation of personnel in key positions would further diminish their effectiveness. This was particularly evident when evaluating the threat posed by their surrounding hostile Arab neighbours. Israel’s hierarchy were of consensus that an Arab attack was not likely. This assumption was based on the relatively quick defeat of Arab forces in the Six-day war in 1967. Major General Eli Zeira the Chief of Military Intelligence in an interview prior to the conflict stated - ‘I discount the likelihood of a conventional Arab attack. The biggest problem Israeli intelligence faces is to underestimate what we're up against, but an equally big risk is that we would overestimate (and thus over-react). They (Arab leadership) have their own logic. Thus, we have to look hard for evidence of their real intentions in the field. Otherwise, with the Arabs, all you have is rhetoric. Too many Arab leaders have intentions which far exceed their capabilities.’
This was further supported by the view point that as Egypt was unlikely to carry out such an attack until 1975 as they did not possess adequate numbers of bomber squadrons and medium fighter bombers. Aircraft such as the Jaguar, Phantom and MiG-23; which were capable of striking Israeli airfields. However, President Sadat of Egypt realised that this would be a deciding factor if this operation was to be a success. Therefore, he would request an alternative to neutralise the Israeli air superiority. This was provided by the Soviets in the form of a missile umbrella of various types of SAM ground-to-air-missile systems. This would be additionally be supported by Soviet SCUD surface-to-surface missiles capable of threatening populated area in Israel itself. (page 227 – The arab Isreali wars) The Egyptians would also bring the Syrians into the deception plan, convincing President Assad to join in the simultaneous attack on Israel. Creating a two front offensive code named Operation Bad.
The Egyptian masterful deception plan was conceived to encourage Israeli misconceptions. The misinformation campaign would utilise foreign journalists to publish articles indicating that their equipment was poorly maintained and that they were simply not ready for a conflict. They would successful convince many governments in the West of this also. The Egyptians government attempted to plan for every eventuality, including from a political stand point. They requested the Soviet Union to bring about a ceasefire through the UN if the war going badly. Likewise prevent any interference if the opposite was true. The deception would go further as the date the war would be initiated was chosen due to two main factors. Firstly, it coincided with Yom Kippur Day which is the Jewish day of atonement. Additionally, it would provide the necessary tides to cross the Suez Canal.
The next stage to the deception and misinformation campaign was the high frequency of military posturing an escalation of political rhetoric in by the Egyptians along the border and followed shortly by de-escalation. This was occurred routinely particularly in the years prior to the 6th of October 1973 attack. This again would feed the Israeli misconceptions that an attack was unlikely. However, It important to acknowledge that Israel was aware of the increased troop movements near their border. However, military intelligence agencies both Israeli and international refused to recognise that these were more than mere military exercises. Many believed that forces on Syrian border in the Golan Heights were to be expected. As recent conflict with Syria had resulted in thirteen aircraft being shot down over the Mediterranean in mid-September. Fortunately, there were those in Israeli hierarchy such General Elazar the Chief of Staff, who obtained permission to increase the alert status and readiness of the IDF, on the 5th of October, hours before the strike was to take place. Although Israel were initially, caught by surprise, the IDF through sheer fortitude and with the real threat to their existence, were able to regain the upper hand. By the 25th of October 1973 Israel decisively defeated both Arab forces.
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Udanganyifu umekuwa na unabaki kuwa chombo muhimu na chenye nguvu kwa matokeo ya shughuli za kuendesha. Katika utafiti wangu wa kesi, nimechagua kuchunguza na kuchambua mapigano ya Kiarabu na Israeli kati ya 1956 na 1973. Vita vya Suez vya 1956 na Vita vya Yom Kippur vya 1973 Kama nitakavyoonyesha jinsi udanganyifu ulivyotumiwa kwa mafanikio na kila upande. Mfano wa kwanza wa mafanikio ya kutumia udanganyifu na ujasusi wa kimkakati ulikuwa wakati wa mgogoro wa Suez wa 1956. """Ni muhimu kutoa muktadha kwa matukio yaliyoongoza kwenye mgogoro na utata wa mahusiano ya kimataifa ambayo yalihitaji udanganyifu, udanganyifu na ujanja ili kuwezesha operesheni hiyo kuendelea." Mfereji wa Suez wakati mmoja ulifafanuliwa kuwa "mfereji wa utawala wa Milki ya Uingereza". Mfereji huo ulikuwa na urefu wa kilometa 120 na ulifanya iwezekane kupunguza umbali ambao meli zilipaswa kusafiri kwa maelfu mengi ya kilometa. Meli hizo zilikuwa na uwezo wa kusafiri kati ya Ulaya na Asia bila kuzunguka pembe ya Afrika. Kampuni hiyo ilijulikana kama Suez Canal Company, na ilikuwa na hisa za Ulaya na wakati huo asilimia 44 ilikuwa inayomilikiwa na serikali ya Uingereza. Mfereji wa Suez ulikuwa muhimu sana kwa Uingereza, na meli 80% za Uingereza zilitumia mfereji huo. Kwa hiyo, udhibiti wa mfereji huo ulikuwa wasiwasi mkubwa wa kimkakati na baadaye ulithibitika kuwa sababu ya kusababisha mgogoro wa Suez wa 1956. Uingereza iliendelea kuwa na mamlaka juu ya Misri kwa muda mrefu baada ya uhuru wa Misri mwaka 1922. Mwaka wa 1947 Uingereza iliondoka katika eneo la mfereji wa Suez, na kwa hivyo ikawa na uwezo wa kuhifadhi eneo hilo chini ya Mkataba wa 1936 wa Uingereza na Misri, ambao uliruhusu vikosi vya Uingereza kuhifadhi eneo hilo. Harakati ya Maofisa Huru, ilimlaumu Mfalme Farouk wa Misri kwa kukubali mkataba huu. Walikuwa na hasira zaidi kwa sababu ya kushindwa kwake kuzuia kuanzishwa kwa serikali ya Kiyahudi ya Israeli. Mshindi wa vita vya Kiarabu na Israeli katika mwaka wa 1948 na 1949 Harakati hiyo iliongozwa na Kanali Gamal Abdel Nasser, ambaye alifanikiwa kumshinda Mfalme Farouk mnamo 1952. Rais huyo wa hivi karibuni alieleza kuwa aliunda wazo la mapinduzi wakati alipokuwa akitumikia kama Meja katika Kikosi cha 6 cha Wanajeshi. Vita vya Kiarabu na Israeli mwaka 1949. Alishiriki katika mashambulizi kadhaa ya kushambulia maeneo ya Israeli katika eneo la Khirbet Mahaz katika eneo la Negev. Marekani baadaye ilikataa kumpa silaha Rais Nasser kwa sababu ya hofu kwamba silaha hizo zitatumika dhidi ya taifa jipya la Israeli, ambalo wengi nchini Marekani walikuwa na uhusiano wa karibu nalo. Hata hivyo, bila serikali ya Marekani kujua, Jeshi la Ulinzi la Israeli lilifanya shambulio dhidi ya Gaza iliyodhibitiwa na Misri mnamo Februari 1955. Mauaji hayo yaliwaua askari 38 wa Misri, na Rais Nasser akaanza kuimarisha vikosi vyake vya kijeshi na kuanzisha mpango wa silaha na Chekoslovakia. Serikali ya Marekani ilikataza mradi wa kuimarisha bwawa la Aswan kwenye Mto Nile mnamo Julai 19, 1956. Rais Nasser alitoa uamuzi wa kuifanya kampuni ya Suez Canal kuwa ya kitaifa mnamo Julai 26, 1956. Akisema kwamba 'Usiku wa leo, mfereji wetu wa Misri utaendeshwa na Wamisri' - Gamal Abdel Nasser. Hilo lingetokeza mojawapo ya matumizi yenye mafanikio zaidi ya udanganyifu katika historia ya kimataifa. Mkataba wa Sèvres (au Mkataba wa Sèvres) ni mkataba wa kipekee kati ya Uingereza, Ufaransa na Israel uliofanyika katika mji wa Sèvres, Ufaransa, kati ya Oktoba 22 na 24. Kusudi lake kuu lilikuwa kumfukuza Rais Nasser na kurudisha udhibiti wa Mfereji wa Suez. Mpango huo uliitwa Operesheni ya Musketeer, na ulitegemea kabisa matumizi ya ujasusi wa kimkakati na udanganyifu. Hatua ya kwanza ya mpango huo ni kuishambulia Sinai ya Misri tarehe 29 Oktoba na wanajeshi wa jeshi la Israel. Shambulio hilo liliteka mlango wa mashariki wa Mlango wa Mitla, jambo ambalo lilikuwa muhimu sana kwa sababu lingeruhusu uvamizi wa ardhi wa IDF. Jeshi la Israel lilitembea kwa njia tatu: kando ya pwani ya Mediterania, kupitia Mto Bir Gafga Mitla na kuelekea mwisho wa kusini wa Mfereji wa Suez. Hii kimsingi ingewezesha Israeli kupata udhibiti wa eneo linalozunguka magharibi mwa Mfereji wa Suez. Waziri Mkuu wa Israel, David Ben-Gurion alikuwa na wasiwasi kwamba wangeonekana kwa jamii ya kimataifa kama mpinzani. Hata hivyo, matangazo ya awali yaliyotolewa kwa mashambulizi yaliyofanywa na wapiganaji wa Palestina na kizuizi cha Misri cha usafirishaji wa Israeli kilisaidia katika uaminifu wa mashambulizi na kusaidia udanganyifu wa jumla. Israel ilifaulu kuwasadikisha Umoja wa Mataifa kwamba walikuwa wakitenda kwa kujitetea. Mashambulizi hayo yalifanywa na jeshi la Israel lililokuwa likiongozwa na jeshi la Palestina la Fedayeen, ambalo lilikuwa likishambulia eneo la Sinai na Gaza. Hata hivyo, baadaye iligunduliwa kwamba hilo halikuwa kweli kwa kuwa hakukuwa na vituo vya kijeshi vilivyojulikana katika Sinai ya Misri. Mkataba wa Sèvres ulifanyika mwaka 1888 na ulifanyika mwaka 1954 na ulifanyiza msingi wa kuingilia kati kwa Uingereza na Ufaransa katika masuala ya kidiplomasia. Mkataba huo uliruhusu ulinzi wa Mfereji wa Suez iwapo kutakuwa na tishio lolote kwa uendeshaji wake, hata kama ni tishio la uwongo lililotengenezwa na jeshi la Israeli kwa Suez. Waingereza na Wafaransa waliwapa vikosi vyote viwili vilivyohusika Misri na Israeli ultimatum. "Mashirika hayo yalidai kuondolewa kwa mara moja kwa vikosi vyao katika eneo la ""Suech"" lenye urefu wa maili kumi, ambalo lilikuwa pande zote mbili za mfereji wa Suez." Israel, Uingereza na Ufaransa ni washirika katika udanganyifu huo. Israel, kama ilivyopangwa, kwa udanganyifu wa hila, ilikubali madai kama ilivyopangwa. Hata hivyo, Misri ilikataa kufanya hivyo na hatua ya tatu ikawa Mkataba wa Sèvres, uingiliaji wa kijeshi wa majeshi ya Uingereza na Ufaransa. Mnamo Oktoba 31, ndege zao zilianza kushambulia uwanja wa ndege wa Misri, nafasi za kupambana na ndege na miundombinu mingine ya kijeshi. Majeshi ya Uingereza yalianza kushuka kwenye uwanja wa ndege wa El Gamil na kushambulia Er-Wassir mnamo Novemba 5. "Hatua hiyo ya haraka ilithibitika kuwa muhimu ili kudumisha ""kiwango cha kushangaza"" cha maendeleo ya baadaye ya majini kuelekea Port Said na kutua kwa pwani iliyokuwa karibu kufanywa na kikosi cha Comando mnamo Novemba 6." Ingawa wengi katika jamii ya kimataifa baadaye wangedhani ushirikiano kati ya Israeli, Uingereza na Ufaransa. Hawakuweza kuthibitisha jambo hilo kwa usahihi. Haikuwa hivyo mpaka maelezo yalipochapishwa. Matumizi ya udanganyifu yalithibitika kuwa muhimu kwa mafanikio ya Operesheni ya Musketeers. Iliwawezesha pande zote zilizokuwa katika ushirikiano kufikia malengo yao ya kibinafsi. "Utafiti wa kesi ya pili, ambayo naamini inaonyesha mafanikio ya matumizi ya udanganyifu katika shughuli za ""kufanya kazi"" za matokeo, ilikuwa katika wiki zilizotangulia Oktoba 6, 1973. """ Tarehe hii ingekuwa ishara ya mwanzo wa Vita vya Yom Kippur kwa Waisraeli au vita vya Ramadan kwa Waarabu. "Mashambulizi hayo yalianza katika vita vya siku sita vya mwaka 1967 na kusababisha ""kushindwa kwa nguvu za Kiarabu.""" Wengi katika jumuiya ya kimataifa wanajiuliza kama hii ilikuwa ni matumizi ya mafanikio ya udanganyifu au tu kushindwa kubwa ya huduma za ujasusi za Israeli. Wamisri walitumia habari zisizo sahihi, kukataa na udanganyifu ili kuhakikisha kiwango cha juu cha uhakika kwa matokeo ya awali katika mgogoro. Hata hivyo, hii ingeimarishwa zaidi na huduma za ujasusi za Israeli ambazo ukosefu wa kubadilika kwa maoni tofauti, pamoja na upinzani wa kiutawala, ungejitolea bila shida kwa mpango wa Wamisri. Mossad, Shabab, Shin Bet na Idara ya Usalama ya Israel, pia walijaribu kuanzisha mashambulizi dhidi ya Israel. Kwa kuongezea, kukosa kazi kwa wafanyakazi katika nafasi muhimu kungepunguza zaidi ufanisi wao. Hilo lilionekana wazi hasa wakati wa kutathmini tisho lililotokezwa na majirani wao Waarabu wenye uhasama. Viongozi wa Israeli walikubaliana kwamba mashambulizi ya Waarabu hayangewezekana. "Hiyo ni kwa sababu ya ""shindano la haraka"" la jeshi la Kiarabu katika vita vya siku sita mwaka 1967." Meja Jenerali Eli Zeira Mkuu wa Ujasusi wa Kijeshi katika mahojiano kabla ya mgogoro alisema - 'Mimi discount uwezekano wa mashambulizi ya kawaida ya Kiarabu. """Tatizo kubwa la ujasusi wa Israeli ni kupuuza kile tunachokipambana nacho, lakini hatari kubwa ni kwamba tutaweza kukadiria (na hivyo kujibu kupita kiasi)." Wao (usimamizi wa Kiarabu) wana mantiki yao wenyewe. Kwa hiyo, ni lazima tuchunguze kwa bidii uthibitisho wa makusudi yao halisi katika uwanja huo. Vinginevyo, na Waarabu, wote una ni hotuba. "Wanajeshi wa Kiarabu wengi wana nia ambayo inazidi uwezo wao, ""aliongeza, akisema, ""Kwa kuwa Misri haikuwa na uwezekano wa kufanya shambulio kama hilo hadi 1975 kwa sababu hawakuwa na idadi ya kutosha ya vikosi vya mabomu na mabomu ya kupigana ya kati.""" Ndege kama vile Jaguar, Phantom na MiG-23; ambazo zilikuwa na uwezo wa kushambulia viwanja vya ndege vya Israeli. Hata hivyo, Rais Sadat wa Misri alitambua kwamba hii ingekuwa sababu ya kuamua kama operesheni hii ilikuwa na mafanikio. Kwa hiyo, angeomba mbadala wa kuondoa ubora wa angani wa Israeli. Mfumo huo ulijengwa na Urusi na kuunganishwa na makombora ya aina mbalimbali ya SAM (Sea-to-Air Missile System). "Hii inapaswa pia kuungwa mkono na Soviet SCUD ardhi-kwa- ardhi makombora uwezo wa kutisha eneo lenye watu katika Israeli yenyewe. """ "Mashambulizi ya Misri dhidi ya Israeli ""yalitokea wakati wa vita vya Kiarabu,"" ambapo Misri ililazimika kuingiza Syria katika mpango wa udanganyifu na kumshawishi Assad kushiriki katika shambulio la wakati mmoja dhidi ya Israeli." Kuunda code ya mashambulizi ya pande mbili inayoitwa Operesheni Mbaya. Mpango wa Misri wa kudanganya wenye ustadi ulibuniwa ili kutia moyo maoni yasiyofaa ya Waisraeli. Kampeni hiyo ya habari zisizo za kweli ilitumia waandishi wa habari wa kigeni kuchapisha makala zinazoonyesha kwamba vifaa vyao havikuwa vimehifadhiwa vizuri na kwamba hawakuwa tayari kwa mgogoro. Wangekuwa na mafanikio ya kusadikisha serikali nyingi katika Magharibi ya hii pia. Serikali ya Misri ilijaribu kupanga kila uwezekano, kutia ndani kutoka kwa mtazamo wa kisiasa. Umoja wa Mataifa ulitoa wito kwa Urusi kuanzisha makubaliano ya kusitisha mapigano katika eneo hilo, ikiwa vita hivyo vitatokea. Vivyo hivyo kuzuia kuingiliwa yoyote kama kinyume ilikuwa kweli. Uongo huo ungeendelea zaidi kwa kuwa tarehe ambayo vita vingeanza ilichaguliwa kwa sababu mbili kuu. Siku hiyo pia inaitwa Yom Kippur, yaani, siku ya Wayahudi ya kutengana na dhambi. Kwa kuongezea, ingeandaa mawimbi yanayohitajiwa kuvuka Mfereji wa Suez. Hatua ya pili ya kampeni ya udanganyifu na habari bandia ilikuwa mara nyingi ya jeshi kuimarisha hotuba za kisiasa na Wamisri kando ya mpaka na kufuatiwa kwa muda mfupi na kupunguza. Hii ilitokea mara kwa mara hasa katika miaka iliyotangulia shambulio la Oktoba 6, 1973. Hii tena ingeongeza dhana zisizo za kweli za Israeli kwamba shambulio halingewezekana. Hata hivyo, ni muhimu kutambua kwamba Israeli ilikuwa na ufahamu wa kuongezeka kwa harakati za askari karibu na mpaka wao. Hata hivyo, mashirika ya ujasusi ya kijeshi ya Israeli na ya kimataifa yalikataa kutambua kwamba haya yalikuwa zaidi ya mazoezi ya kijeshi tu. Wengi waliamini kwamba vikosi vilivyokuwa kwenye mpaka wa Syria katika Milima ya Golan vilipaswa kutarajiwa. Mapigano ya hivi karibuni na Syria yalisababisha ndege 13 kupigwa chini juu ya Bahari ya Mediterania katikati ya Septemba. "Kwa bahati nzuri, kulikuwa na wale katika uongozi wa Israeli kama vile Jenerali Elazar, Mkuu wa Jeshi, ambaye alipata ruhusa ya kuongeza hali ya tahadhari na utayari wa IDF, Oktoba 5, saa chache kabla ya shambulio hilo kufanyika. """ Ingawa Israel ilishangazwa mwanzoni, IDF kupitia ujasiri na kwa tishio halisi la kuwepo kwao, waliweza kupata tena mkono wa juu. Kufikia Oktoba 25, 1973, Israeli ilishinda vikosi vyote viwili vya Kiarabu. 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