Jacques Derrida (1930—2004)
Jacques Derrida was one of the most well known twentieth century philosophers. He was also one of the most prolific. Distancing himself from the various philosophical movements and traditions that preceded him on the French intellectual scene (phenomenology, existentialism, and structuralism), he developed a strategy called “deconstruction” in the mid 1960s. Although not purely negative, deconstruction is primarily concerned with something tantamount to a critique of the Western philosophical tradition. Deconstruction is generally presented via an analysis of specific texts. It seeks to expose, and then to subvert, the various binary oppositions that undergird our dominant ways of thinking—presence/absence, speech/writing, and so forth.
Deconstruction has at least two aspects: literary and philosophical. The literary aspect concerns the textual interpretation, where invention is essential to finding hidden alternative meanings in the text. The philosophical aspect concerns the main target of deconstruction: the “metaphysics of presence,” or simply metaphysics. Starting from an Heideggerian point of view, Derrida argues that metaphysics affects the whole of philosophy from Plato onwards. Metaphysics creates dualistic oppositions and installs a hierarchy that unfortunately privileges one term of each dichotomy (presence before absence, speech before writing, and so on).
The deconstructive strategy is to unmask these too-sedimented ways of thinking, and it operates on them especially through two steps—reversing dichotomies and attempting to corrupt the dichotomies themselves. The strategy also aims to show that there are undecidables, that is, something that cannot conform to either side of a dichotomy or opposition. Undecidability returns in later period of Derrida’s reflection, when it is applied to reveal paradoxes involved in notions such as gift giving or hospitality, whose conditions of possibility are at the same time their conditions of impossibility. Because of this, it is undecidable whether authentic giving or hospitality are either possible or impossible.
In this period, the founder of deconstruction turns his attention to ethical themes. In particular, the theme of responsibility to the other (for example, God or a beloved person) leads Derrida to leave the idea that responsibility is associated with a behavior publicly and rationally justifiable by general principles. Reflecting upon tales of Jewish tradition, he highlights the absolute singularity of responsibility to the other.
Deconstruction has had an enormous influence in psychology, literary theory, cultural studies, linguistics, feminism, sociology and anthropology. Poised in the interstices between philosophy and non-philosophy (or philosophy and literature), it is not difficult to see why this is the case. What follows in this article, however, is an attempt to bring out the philosophical significance of Derrida’s thought.
Table of Contents
- Life and Works
- Deconstructive Strategy
- Key terms from the early work
- Time and Phenomenology
- The Other
- Possible and Impossible Aporias
- References and Further Reading
In 1930, Derrida was born into a Jewish family in Algiers. He was also born into an environment of some discrimination. In fact, he either withdrew from, or was forced out of at least two schools during his childhood simply on account of being Jewish. He was expelled from one school because there was a 7% limit on the Jewish population, and he later withdrew from another school on account of the anti-semitism. While Derrida would resist any reductive understanding of his work based upon his biographical life, it could be argued that these kind of experiences played a large role in his insistence upon the importance of the marginal, and the other, in his later thought.
Derrida was twice refused a position in the prestigious Ecole Normale Superieure (where Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir and the majority of French intellectuals and academics began their careers), but he was eventually accepted to the institution at the age of 19. He hence moved from Algiers to France, and soon after he also began to play a major role in the leftist journal Tel Quel. Derrida’s initial work in philosophy was largely phenomenological, and his early training as a philosopher was done largely through the lens of Husserl. Other important inspirations on his early thought include Nietzsche, Heidegger, Saussure, Levinas and Freud. Derrida acknowledges his indebtedness to all of these thinkers in the development of his approach to texts, which has come to be known as ‘deconstruction’.
It was in 1967 that Derrida really arrived as a philosopher of world importance. He published three momentous texts (Of Grammatology, Writing and Difference, and Speech and Phenomena). All of these works have been influential for different reasons, but it is Of Grammatology that remains his most famous work (it is analysed in some detail in this article). In Of Grammatology, Derrida reveals and then undermines the speech-writing opposition that he argues has been such an influential factor in Western thought. His preoccupation with language in this text is typical of much of his early work, and since the publication of these and other major texts (including Dissemination, Glas, The Postcard, Spectres of Marx, The Gift of Death, and Politics of Friendship), deconstruction has gradually moved from occupying a major role in continental Europe, to also becoming a significant player in the Anglo-American philosophical context. This is particularly so in the areas of literary criticism, and cultural studies, where deconstruction’s method of textual analysis has inspired theorists like Paul de Man. He has also had lecturing positions at various universities, the world over. Derrida died in 2004.
Deconstruction has frequently been the subject of some controversy. When Derrida was awarded an honorary doctorate at Cambridge in 1992, there were howls of protest from many ‘analytic’ philosophers. Since then, Derrida has also had many dialogues with philosophers like John Searle (see Limited Inc.), in which deconstruction has been roundly criticised, although perhaps unfairly at times. However, what is clear from the antipathy of such thinkers is that deconstruction challenges traditional philosophy in several important ways, and the remainder of this article will highlight why this is so.
Derrida, like many other contemporary European theorists, is preoccupied with undermining the oppositional tendencies that have befallen much of the Western philosophical tradition. In fact, dualisms are the staple diet of deconstruction, for without these hierarchies and orders of subordination it would be left with nowhere to intervene. Deconstruction is parasitic in that rather than espousing yet another grand narrative, or theory about the nature of the world in which we partake, it restricts itself to distorting already existing narratives, and to revealing the dualistic hierarchies they conceal. While Derrida’s claims to being someone who speaks solely in the margins of philosophy can be contested, it is important to take these claims into account. Deconstruction is, somewhat infamously, the philosophy that says nothing. To the extent that it can be suggested that Derrida’s concerns are often philosophical, they are clearly not phenomenological (he assures us that his work is to be read specifically against Husserl, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty) and nor are they ontological.
Deconstruction, and particularly early deconstruction, functions by engaging in sustained analyses of particular texts. It is committed to the rigorous analysis of the literal meaning of a text, and yet also to finding within that meaning, perhaps in the neglected corners of the text (including the footnotes), internal problems that actually point towards alternative meanings. Deconstruction must hence establish a methodology that pays close attention to these apparently contradictory imperatives (sameness and difference) and a reading of any Derridean text can only reaffirm this dual aspect. Derrida speaks of the first aspect of this deconstructive strategy as being akin to a fidelity and a “desire to be faithful to the themes and audacities of a thinking” (WD 84). At the same time, however, deconstruction also famously borrows from Martin Heidegger’s conception of a ‘destructive retrieve’ and seeks to open texts up to alternative and usually repressed meanings that reside at least partly outside of the metaphysical tradition (although always also partly betrothed to it). This more violent and transgressive aspect of deconstruction is illustrated by Derrida’s consistent exhortation to “invent in your own language if you can or want to hear mine; invent if you can or want to give my language to be understood” (MO 57). In suggesting that a faithful interpretation of him is one that goes beyond him, Derrida installs invention as a vitally important aspect of any deconstructive reading. He is prone to making enigmatic suggestions like “go there where you cannot go, to the impossible, it is indeed the only way of coming or going” (ON 75), and ultimately, the merit of a deconstructive reading consists in this creative contact with another text that cannot be characterised as either mere fidelity or as an absolute transgression, but rather which oscillates between these dual demands. The intriguing thing about deconstruction, however, is that despite the fact that Derrida’s own interpretations of specific texts are quite radical, it is often difficult to pinpoint where the explanatory exegesis of a text ends and where the more violent aspect of deconstruction begins. Derrida is always reluctant to impose ‘my text’, ‘your text’ designations too conspicuously in his texts. This is partly because it is even problematic to speak of a ‘work’ of deconstruction, since deconstruction only highlights what was already revealed in the text itself. All of the elements of a deconstructive intervention reside in the “neglected cornerstones” of an already existing system (MDM 72), and this equation is not altered in any significant way whether that ‘system’ be conceived of as metaphysics generally, which must contain its non-metaphysical track, or the writings of a specific thinker, which must also always testify to that which they are attempting to exclude (MDM 73).
These are, of course, themes reflected upon at length by Derrida, and they have an immediate consequence on the meta-theoretical level. To the minimal extent that we can refer to Derrida’s own arguments, it must be recognised that they are always intertwined with the arguments of whomever, or whatever, he seeks to deconstruct. For example, Derrida argues that his critique of the Husserlian ‘now’ moment is actually based upon resources within Husserl’s own text which elide the self-presence that he was attempting to secure (SP 64-66). If Derrida’s point is simply that Husserl’s phenomenology holds within itself conclusions that Husserl failed to recognise, Derrida seems to be able to disavow any transcendental or ontological position. This is why he argues that his work occupies a place in the margins of philosophy, rather than simply being philosophy per se.
Deconstruction contends that in any text, there are inevitably points of equivocation and ‘undecidability’ that betray any stable meaning that an author might seek to impose upon his or her text. The process of writing always reveals that which has been suppressed, covers over that which has been disclosed, and more generally breaches the very oppositions that are thought to sustain it. This is why Derrida’s ‘philosophy’ is so textually based and it is also why his key terms are always changing, because depending upon who or what he is seeking to deconstruct, that point of equivocation will always be located in a different place.
This also ensures that any attempt to describe what deconstruction is, must be careful. Nothing would be more antithetical to deconstruction’s stated intent than this attempt at defining it through the decidedly metaphysical question “what is deconstruction?” There is a paradoxicality involved in trying to restrict deconstruction to one particular and overarching purpose (OG 19) when it is predicated upon the desire to expose us to that which is wholly other (tout autre) and to open us up to alternative possibilities. At times, this exegesis will run the risk of ignoring the many meanings of Derridean deconstruction, and the widely acknowledged difference between Derrida’s early and late work is merely the most obvious example of the difficulties involved in suggesting “deconstruction says this”, or “deconstruction prohibits that”.
That said, certain defining features of deconstruction can be noticed. For example, Derrida’s entire enterprise is predicated upon the conviction that dualisms are irrevocably present in the various philosophers and artisans that he considers. While some philosophers argue that he is a little reductive when he talks about the Western philosophical tradition, it is his understanding of this tradition that informs and provides the tools for a deconstructive response. Because of this, it is worth briefly considering the target of Derridean deconstruction – the metaphysics of presence, or somewhat synonymously, logocentrism.
There are many different terms that Derrida employs to describe what he considers to be the fundamental way(s) of thinking of the Western philosophical tradition. These include: logocentrism, phallogocentrism, and perhaps most famously, the metaphysics of presence, but also often simply ‘metaphysics’. These terms all have slightly different meanings. Logocentrism emphasises the privileged role that logos, or speech, has been accorded in the Western tradition (see Section 3). Phallogocentrism points towards the patriarchal significance of this privileging. Derrida’s enduring references to the metaphysics of presence borrows heavily from the work of Heidegger. Heidegger insists that Western philosophy has consistently privileged that which is, or that which appears, and has forgotten to pay any attention to the condition for that appearance. In other words, presence itself is privileged, rather than that which allows presence to be possible at all – and also impossible, for Derrida (see Section 4, for more on the metaphysics of presence). All of these terms of denigration, however, are united under the broad rubric of the term ‘metaphysics’. What, then, does Derrida mean by metaphysics?
In the ‘Afterword’ to Limited Inc., Derrida suggests that metaphysics can be defined as:
“The enterprise of returning ‘strategically’, ‘ideally’, to an origin or to a priority thought to be simple, intact, normal, pure, standard, self-identical, in order then to think in terms of derivation, complication, deterioration, accident, etc. All metaphysicians, from Plato to Rousseau, Descartes to Husserl, have proceeded in this way, conceiving good to be before evil, the positive before the negative, the pure before the impure, the simple before the complex, the essential before the accidental, the imitated before the imitation, etc. And this is not just one metaphysical gesture among others, it is the metaphysical exigency, that which has been the most constant, most profound and most potent” (LI 236).
According to Derrida then, metaphysics involves installing hierarchies and orders of subordination in the various dualisms that it encounters (M 195). Moreover, metaphysical thought prioritises presence and purity at the expense of the contingent and the complicated, which are considered to be merely aberrations that are not important for philosophical analysis. Basically then, metaphysical thought always privileges one side of an opposition, and ignores or marginalises the alternative term of that opposition.
In another attempt to explain deconstruction’s treatment of, and interest in oppositions, Derrida has suggested that: “An opposition of metaphysical concepts (speech/writing, presence/absence, etc.) is never the face-to-face of two terms, but a hierarchy and an order of subordination. Deconstruction cannot limit itself or proceed immediately to neutralisation: it must, by means of a double gesture, a double science, a double writing, practise an overturning of the classical opposition, and a general displacement of the system. It is on that condition alone that deconstruction will provide the means of intervening in the field of oppositions it criticises” (M 195). In order to better understand this dual ‘methodology’ – that is also the deconstruction of the notion of a methodology because it no longer believes in the possibility of an observer being absolutely exterior to the object/text being examined – it is helpful to consider an example of this deconstruction at work (See Speech/Writing below).
Derrida’s terms change in every text that he writes. This is part of his deconstructive strategy. He focuses on particular themes or words in a text, which on account of their ambiguity undermine the more explicit intention of that text. It is not possible for all of these to be addressed (Derrida has published in the vicinity of 60 texts in English), so this article focused on some of the most pivotal terms and neologisms from his early thought. It addresses aspects of his later, more theme-based thought, in Sections 6 & 7.
The most prominent opposition with which Derrida’s earlier work is concerned is that between speech and writing. According to Derrida, thinkers as different as Plato, Rousseau, Saussure, and Levi-Strauss, have all denigrated the written word and valorised speech, by contrast, as some type of pure conduit of meaning. Their argument is that while spoken words are the symbols of mental experience, written words are the symbols of that already existing symbol. As representations of speech, they are doubly derivative and doubly far from a unity with one’s own thought. Without going into detail regarding the ways in which these thinkers have set about justifying this type of hierarchical opposition, it is important to remember that the first strategy of deconstruction is to reverse existing oppositions. In Of Grammatology (perhaps his most famous work), Derrida hence attempts to illustrate that the structure of writing and grammatology are more important and even ‘older’ than the supposedly pure structure of presence-to-self that is characterised as typical of speech.
For example, in an entire chapter of his Course in General Linguistics, Ferdinand de Saussure tries to restrict the science of linguistics to the phonetic and audible word only (24). In the course of his inquiry, Saussure goes as far as to argue that “language and writing are two distinct systems of signs: the second exists for the sole purpose of representing the first”. Language, Saussure insists, has an oral tradition that is independent of writing, and it is this independence that makes a pure science of speech possible. Derrida vehemently disagrees with this hierarchy and instead argues that all that can be claimed of writing – eg. that it is derivative and merely refers to other signs – is equally true of speech. But as well as criticising such a position for certain unjustifiable presuppositions, including the idea that we are self-identical with ourselves in ‘hearing’ ourselves think, Derrida also makes explicit the manner in which such a hierarchy is rendered untenable from within Saussure’s own text. Most famously, Saussure is the proponent of the thesis that is commonly referred to as “the arbitrariness of the sign”, and this asserts, to simplify matters considerably, that the signifier bears no necessary relationship to that which is signified. Saussure derives numerous consequences from this position, but as Derrida points out, this notion of arbitrariness and of “unmotivated institutions” of signs, would seem to deny the possibility of any natural attachment (OG 44). After all, if the sign is arbitrary and eschews any foundational reference to reality, it would seem that a certain type of sign (ie. the spoken) could not be more natural than another (ie. the written). However, it is precisely this idea of a natural attachment that Saussure relies upon to argue for our “natural bond” with sound (25), and his suggestion that sounds are more intimately related to our thoughts than the written word hence runs counter to his fundamental principle regarding the arbitrariness of the sign.
In Of Grammatology and elsewhere, Derrida argues that signification, broadly conceived, always refers to other signs, and that one can never reach a sign that refers only to itself. He suggests that “writing is not a sign of a sign, except if one says it of all signs, which would be more profoundly true” (OG 43), and this process of infinite referral, of never arriving at meaning itself, is the notion of ‘writing’ that he wants to emphasise. This is not writing narrowly conceived, as in a literal inscription upon a page, but what he terms ‘arche-writing’. Arche-writing refers to a more generalised notion of writing that insists that the breach that the written introduces between what is intended to be conveyed and what is actually conveyed, is typical of an originary breach that afflicts everything one might wish to keep sacrosanct, including the notion of self-presence.
This originary breach that arche-writing refers to can be separated out to reveal two claims regarding spatial differing and temporal deferring. To explicate the first of these claims, Derrida’s emphasis upon how writing differs from itself is simply to suggest that writing, and by extension all repetition, is split (differed) by the absence that makes it necessary. One example of this might be that we write something down because we may soon forget it, or to communicate something to someone who is not with us. According to Derrida, all writing, in order to be what it is, must be able to function in the absence of every empirically determined addressee (M 375). Derrida also considers deferral to be typical of the written and this is to reinforce that the meaning of a certain text is never present, never entirely captured by a critic’s attempt to pin it down. The meaning of a text is constantly subject to the whims of the future, but when that so-called future is itself ‘present’ (if we try and circumscribe the future by reference to a specific date or event) its meaning is equally not realised, but subject to yet another future that can also never be present. The key to a text is never even present to the author themselves, for the written always defers its meaning. As a consequence we cannot simply ask Derrida to explain exactly what he meant by propounding that enigmatic sentiment that has been translated as “there is nothing outside of the text” (OG 158). Any explanatory words that Derrida may offer would themselves require further explanation. [That said, it needs to be emphasised that Derrida’s point is not so much that everything is simply semiotic or linguistic – as this is something that he explicitly denies – but that the processes of differing and deferring found within linguistic representation are symptomatic of a more general situation that afflicts everything, including the body and the perceptual]. So, Derrida’s more generalised notion of writing, arche-writing, refers to the way in which the written is possible only on account of this ‘originary’ deferral of meaning that ensures that meaning can never be definitively present. In conjunction with the differing aspect that we have already seen him associate with, and then extend beyond the traditional confines of writing, he will come to describe these two overlapping processes via that most famous of neologisms: différance.
Différance is an attempt to conjoin the differing and deferring aspects involved in arche-writing in a term that itself plays upon the distinction between the audible and the written. After all, what differentiates différance and différence is inaudible, and this means that distinguishing between them actually requires the written. This problematises efforts like Saussure’s, which as well as attempting to keep speech and writing apart, also suggest that writing is an almost unnecessary addition to speech. In response to such a claim, Derrida can simply point out that there is often, and perhaps even always, this type of ambiguity in the spoken word – différence as compared to différance – that demands reference to the written. If the spoken word requires the written to function properly, then the spoken is itself always at a distance from any supposed clarity of consciousness. It is this originary breach that Derrida associates with the terms arche-writing and différance.
Of course, différance cannot be exhaustively defined, and this is largely because of Derrida’s insistence that it is “neither a word, nor a concept”, as well as the fact that the meaning of the term changes depending upon the particular context in which it is being employed. For the moment, however, it suffices to suggest that according to Derrida, différance is typical of what is involved in arche-writing and this generalised notion of writing that breaks down the entire logic of the sign (OG 7). The widespread conviction that the sign literally represents something, which even if not actually present, could be potentially present, is rendered impossible by arche-writing, which insists that signs always refer to yet more signs ad infinitum, and that there is no ultimate referent or foundation. This reversal of the subordinated term of an opposition accomplishes the first of deconstruction’s dual strategic intents. Rather than being criticised for being derivative or secondary, for Derrida, writing, or at least the processes that characterise writing (ie. différance and arche-writing), are ubiquitous. Just as a piece of writing has no self-present subject to explain what every particular word means (and this ensures that what is written must partly elude any individual’s attempt to control it), this is equally typical of the spoken. Utilising the same structure of repetition, nothing guarantees that another person will endow the words I use with the particular meaning that I attribute to them. Even the conception of an internal monologue and the idea that we can intimately ‘hear’ our own thoughts in a non-contingent way is misguided, as it ignores the way that arche-writing privileges difference and a non-coincidence with oneself (SP 60-70).
In this respect, it needs to be pointed out that all of deconstruction’s reversals (arche-writing included) are partly captured by the edifice that they seek to overthrow. For Derrida, “one always inhabits, and all the more when one does not suspect it” (OG 24), and it is important to recognise that the mere reversal of an existing metaphysical opposition might not also challenge the governing framework and presuppositions that are attempting to be reversed (WD 280). Deconstruction hence cannot rest content with merely prioritising writing over speech, but must also accomplish the second major aspect of deconstruction’s dual strategies, that being to corrupt and contaminate the opposition itself.
Derrida must highlight that the categories that sustain and safeguard any dualism are always already disrupted and displaced. To effect this second aspect of deconstruction’s strategic intents, Derrida usually coins a new term, or reworks an old one, to permanently disrupt the structure into which he has intervened – examples of this include his discussion of the pharmakon in Plato (drug or tincture, salutary or maleficent), and the supplement in Rousseau, which will be considered towards the end of this section. To phrase the problem in slightly different terms, Derrida’s argument is that in examining a binary opposition, deconstruction manages to expose a trace. This is not a trace of the oppositions that have since been deconstructed – on the contrary, the trace is a rupture within metaphysics, a pattern of incongruities where the metaphysical rubs up against the non-metaphysical, that it is deconstruction’s job to juxtapose as best as it can. The trace does not appear as such (OG 65), but the logic of its path in a text can be mimed by a deconstructive intervention and hence brought to the fore.
The logic of the supplement is also an important aspect of Of Grammatology. A supplement is something that, allegedly secondarily, comes to serve as an aid to something ‘original’ or ‘natural’. Writing is itself an example of this structure, for as Derrida points out, “if supplementarity is a necessarily indefinite process, writing is the supplement par excellence since it proposes itself as the supplement of the supplement, sign of a sign, taking the place of a speech already significant” (OG 281). Another example of the supplement might be masturbation, as Derrida suggests (OG 153), or even the use of birth control precautions. What is notable about both of these examples is an ambiguity that ensures that what is supplementary can always be interpreted in two ways. For example, our society’s use of birth control precautions might be interpreted as suggesting that our natural way is lacking and that the contraceptive pill, or condom, etc., hence replaces a fault in nature. On the other hand, it might also be argued that such precautions merely add on to, and enrich our natural way. It is always ambiguous, or more accurately ‘undecidable’, whether the supplement adds itself and “is a plenitude enriching another plenitude, the fullest measure of presence”, or whether “the supplement supplements… adds only to replace… represents and makes an image… its place is assigned in the structure by the mark of an emptiness” (OG 144). Ultimately, Derrida suggests that the supplement is both of these things, accretion and substitution (OG 200), which means that the supplement is “not a signified more than a signifier, a representer than a presence, a writing than a speech” (OG 315). It comes before all such modalities.
This is not just some rhetorical suggestion that has no concrete significance in deconstruction. Indeed, while Rousseau consistently laments the frequency of his masturbation in his book, The Confessions, Derrida argues that “it has never been possible to desire the presence ‘in person’, before this play of substitution and the symbolic experience of auto-affection” (OG 154). By this, Derrida means that this supplementary masturbation that ‘plays’ between presence and absence (eg. the image of the absent Therese that is evoked by Rousseau) is that which allows us to conceive of being present and fulfilled in sexual relations with another at all. In a sense, masturbation is ‘originary’, and according to Derrida, this situation applies to all sexual relations. All erotic relations have their own supplementary aspect in which we are never present to some ephemeral ‘meaning’ of sexual relations, but always involved in some form of representation. Even if this does not literally take the form of imagining another in the place of, or supplementing the ‘presence’ that is currently with us, and even if we are not always acting out a certain role, or faking certain pleasures, for Derrida, such representations and images are the very conditions of desire and of enjoyment (OG 156).
Derrida has had a long and complicated association with phenomenology for his entire career, including ambiguous relationships with Husserl and Heidegger, and something closer to a sustained allegiance with Lévinas. Despite this complexity, two main aspects of Derrida’s thinking regarding phenomenology remain clear. Firstly, he thinks that the phenomenological emphasis upon the immediacy of experience is the new transcendental illusion, and secondly, he argues that despite its best intents, phenomenology cannot be anything other than a metaphysics (SP 75, 104). In this context, Derrida defines metaphysics as the science of presence, as for him (as for Heidegger), all metaphysics privileges presence, or that which is. While they are presented schematically here, these inter-related claims constitute Derrida’s major arguments against phenomenology.
According to Derrida, phenomenology is a metaphysics of presence because it unwittingly relies upon the notion of an indivisible self-presence, or in the case of Husserl, the possibility of an exact internal adequation with oneself (SP 66-8). In various texts, Derrida contests this valorisation of an undivided subjectivity, as well as the primacy that such a position accords to the ‘now’, or to some other kind of temporal immediacy. For instance, in Speech and Phenomena, Derrida argues that if a ‘now’ moment is conceived of as exhausting itself in that experience, it could not actually be experienced, for there would be nothing to juxtapose itself against in order to illuminate that very ‘now’. Instead, Derrida wants to reveal that every so-called ‘present’, or ‘now’ point, is always already compromised by a trace, or a residue of a previous experience, that precludes us ever being in a self-contained ‘now’ moment (SP 68). Phenomenology is hence envisaged as nostalgically seeking the impossible: that is, coinciding with oneself in an immediate and pre-reflective spontaneity. Following this refutation of Husserlian temporality, Derrida remarks that “in the last analysis, what is at stake is… the privilege of the actual present, the now” (SP 62-3). Instead of emphasising the presence of a subject to themselves (ie. the so-called living-present), Derrida strategically utilises a conception of time that emphasises deferral. John Caputo expresses Derrida’s point succinctly when he claims that Derrida’s criticisms of Husserlian temporality in Speech and Phenomena involve an attempt to convey that: “What is really going on in things, what is really happening, is always “to come”. Every time you try to stabilise the meaning of a thing, try to fix it in its missionary position, the thing itself, if there is anything at all to it, slips away” (cf. SP 104, Caputo DN 31). To put Derrida’s point simplistically, it might be suggested that the meaning of a particular object, or a particular word, is never stable, but always in the process of change (eg. the dissemination of meaning for which deconstruction has become notorious). Moreover, the significance of that past change can only be appreciated from the future and, of course, that ‘future’ is itself implicated in a similar process of transformation were it ever to be capable of becoming ‘present’. The future that Derrida is referring to is hence not just a future that will become present, but the future that makes all ‘presence’ possible and also impossible. For Derrida, there can be no presence-to-self, or self-contained identity, because the ‘nature’ of our temporal existence is for this type of experience to elude us. Our predominant mode of being is what he will eventually term the messianic (see Section 6), in that experience is about the wait, or more aptly, experience is only when it is deferred. Derrida’s work offers many important temporal contributions of this quasi-transcendental variety.
In its first and most famous instantiation, undecidability is one of Derrida’s most important attempts to trouble dualisms, or more accurately, to reveal how they are always already troubled. An undecidable, and there are many of them in deconstruction (eg. ghost, pharmakon, hymen, etc.), is something that cannot conform to either polarity of a dichotomy (eg. present/absent, cure/poison, and inside/outside in the above examples). For example, the figure of a ghost seems to neither present or absent, or alternatively it is both present and absent at the same time (SM).
However, Derrida has a recurring tendency to resuscitate terms in different contexts, and the term undecidability also returns in later deconstruction. Indeed, to complicate matters, undecidability returns in two discernible forms. In his recent work, Derrida often insists that the condition of the possibility of mourning, giving, forgiving, and hospitality, to cite some of his most famous examples, is at once also the condition of their impossibility (see section 7). In his explorations of these “possible-impossible” aporias, it becomes undecidable whether genuine giving, for example, is either a possible or an impossible ideal.
Derrida’s later philosophy is also united by his analysis of a similar type of undecidability that is involved in the concept of the decision itself. In this respect, Derrida regularly suggests that a decision cannot be wise, or posed even more provocatively, that the instant of the decision must actually be mad (DPJ 26, GD 65). Drawing on Kierkegaard, Derrida tells us that a decision requires an undecidable leap beyond all prior preparations for that decision (GD 77), and according to him, this applies to all decisions and not just those regarding the conversion to religious faith that preoccupies Kierkegaard. To pose the problem in inverse fashion, it might be suggested that for Derrida, all decisions are a faith and a tenuous faith at that, since were faith and the decision not tenuous, they would cease to be a faith or a decision at all (cf. GD 80). This description of the decision as a moment of madness that must move beyond rationality and calculative reasoning may seem paradoxical, but it might nevertheless be agreed that a decision requires a ‘leap of faith’ beyond the sum total of the facts. Many of us are undoubtedly stifled by the difficulty of decision-making, and this psychological fact aids and, for his detractors, also abets Derrida’s discussion of the decision as it appears in texts like The Gift of Death, Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice, Adieu to Emmanuel Lévinas, and Politics of Friendship.
In Adieu to Emmanuel Lévinas, Derrida argues that a decision must always come back to the other, even if it is the other ‘inside’ the subject, and he disputes that an initiative which remained purely and simply “mine” would still be a decision (AEL 23-4). A theory of the subject is incapable of accounting for the slightest decision (PF 68-9), because, as he rhetorically asks, “would we not be justified in seeing here the unfolding of an egological immanence, the autonomic and automatic deployment of predicates or possibilities proper to a subject, without the tearing rupture that should occur in every decision we call free?” (AEL 24). In other words, if a decision is envisaged as simply following from certain character attributes, then it would not genuinely be a decision. Derrida is hence once more insisting upon the necessity of a leap beyond calculative reasoning, and beyond the resources of some self-contained subject reflecting upon the matter at hand. A decision must invoke that which is outside of the subject’s control. If a decision is an example of a concept that is simultaneously impossible within its own internal logic and yet nevertheless necessary, then not only is our reticence to decide rendered philosophically cogent, but it is perhaps even privileged. Indeed, Derrida’s work has been described as a “philosophy of hesitation”, and his most famous neologism, différance, explicitly emphasises deferring, with all of the procrastination that this term implies. Moreover, in his early essay “Violence and Metaphysics”, Derrida also suggests that a successful deconstructive reading is conditional upon the suspension of choice: on hesitating between the ethical opening and the logocentric totality (WD 84). Even though Derrida has suggested that he is reluctant to use the term ‘ethics’ because of logocentric associations, one is led to conclude that ‘ethical’ behaviour (for want of a better word) is a product of deferring, and of being forever open to possibilities rather than taking a definitive position. The problem of undecidability is also evident in more recent texts including The Gift of Death. In this text, Derrida seems to support the sacrificing of a certain notion of ethics and universality for a conception of radical singularity not unlike that evinced by the “hyper-ethical” sacrifice that Abraham makes of his son upon Mt Moriah, according to both the Judaic and Christian religions alike (GD 71). To represent Derrida’s position more precisely, true responsibility consists in oscillating between the demands of that which is wholly other (in Abraham’s case, God, but also any particular other) and the more general demands of a community (see Section 6). Responsibility is enduring this trial of the undecidable decision, where attending to the call of a particular other will inevitably demand an estrangement from the “other others” and their communal needs. Whatever decision one may take, according to Derrida, it can never be wholly justified (GD 70). Of course, Derrida’s emphasis upon the undecidability inherent in all decision-making does not want to convey inactivity or a quietism of despair, and he has insisted that the madness of the decision also demands urgency and precipitation (DPJ 25-8). Nevertheless, what is undergone is described as the “trial of undecidability” (LI 210) and what is involved in enduring this trial would seem to be a relatively anguished being. In an interview with Richard Beardsworth, Derrida characterises the problem of undecidability as follows: “However careful one is in the theoretical preparation of a decision, the instant of the decision, if there is to be a decision, must be heterogeneous to the accumulation of knowledge. Otherwise, there is no responsibility. In this sense not only must the person taking the decision not know everything… the decision, if there is to be one, must advance towards a future which is not known, which cannot be anticipated” (NM 37). This suggestion that the decision cannot anticipate the future is undoubtedly somewhat counter-intuitive, but Derrida’s rejection of anticipation is not only a rejection of the traditional idea of deciding on the basis of weighing-up and internally representing certain options. By suggesting that anticipation is not possible, he means to make the more general point that no matter how we may anticipate any decision must always rupture those anticipatory frameworks. A decision must be fundamentally different from any prior preparations for it. As Derrida suggests in Politics of Friendship, the decision must “surprise the very subjectivity of the subject” (PF 68), and it is in making this leap away from calculative reasoning that Derrida argues that responsibility consists (PF 69).
Perhaps the most obvious aspect of Derrida’s later philosophy is his advocation of the tout autre, the wholly other, and The Gift of Death will be our main focus in explaining what this exaltation of the wholly other might mean. Any attempt to sum up this short but difficult text would have to involve the recognition of a certain incommensurability between the particular and the universal, and the dual demands placed upon anybody intending to behave responsibly. For Derrida, the paradox of responsible behaviour means that there is always a question of being responsible before a singular other (eg. a loved one, God, etc.), and yet we are also always referred to our responsibility towards others generally and to what we share with them. Derrida insists that this type of aporia, or problem, is too often ignored by the “knights of responsibility” who presume that accountability and responsibility in all aspects of life – whether that be guilt before the human law, or even before the divine will of God – is quite easily established (GD 85). These are the same people who insist that concrete ethical guidelines should be provided by any philosopher worth his or her ‘salt’ (GD 67) and who ignore the difficulties involved in a notion like responsibility, which demands something importantly different from merely behaving dutifully (GD 63).
Derrida’s exploration of Abraham’s strange and paradoxical responsibility before the demands of God, which consists in sacrificing his only son Isaac, but also in betraying the ethical order through his silence about this act (GD 57-60), is designed to problematise this type of ethical concern that exclusively locates responsibility in the realm of generality. In places, Derrida even verges on suggesting that this more common notion of responsibility, which insists that one should behave according to a general principle that is capable of being rationally validated and justified in the public realm (GD 60), should be replaced with something closer to an Abrahamian individuality where the demands of a singular other (eg. God) are importantly distinct from the ethical demands of our society (GD 61, 66). Derrida equivocates regarding just how far he wants to endorse such a conception of responsibility, and also on the entire issue of whether Abraham’s willingness to murder is an act of faith, or simply an unforgivable transgression. As he says, “Abraham is at the same time, the most moral and the most immoral, the most responsible and the most irresponsible” (GD 72). This equivocation is, of course, a defining trait of deconstruction, which has been variously pilloried and praised for this refusal to propound anything that the tradition could deem to be a thesis. Nevertheless, it is relatively clear that in The Gift of Death, Derrida intends to free us from the common assumption that responsibility is to be associated with behaviour that accords with general principles capable of justification in the public realm (ie. liberalism). In opposition to such an account, he emphasises the “radical singularity” of the demands placed upon Abraham by God (GD 60, 68, 79) and those that might be placed on us by our own loved ones. Ethics, with its dependence upon generality, must be continually sacrificed as an inevitable aspect of the human condition and its aporetic demand to decide (GD 70). As Derrida points out, in writing about one particular cause rather than another, in pursuing one profession over another, in spending time with one’s family rather than at work, one inevitably ignores the “other others” (GD 69), and this is a condition of any and every existence. He argues that: “I cannot respond to the call, the request, the obligation, or even the love of another, without sacrificing the other other, the other others” (GD 68). For Derrida, it seems that the Buddhist desire to have attachment to nobody and equal compassion for everybody is an unattainable ideal. He does, in fact, suggest that a universal community that excludes no one is a contradiction in terms. According to him, this is because: “I am responsible to anyone (that is to say, to any other) only by failing in my responsibility to all the others, to the ethical or political generality. And I can never justify this sacrifice; I must always hold my peace about it… What binds me to this one or that one, remains finally unjustifiable” (GD 70). Derrida hence implies that responsibility to any particular individual is only possible by being irresponsible to the “other others”, that is, to the other people and possibilities that haunt any and every existence.
This brings us to a term that Derrida has resuscitated from its association with Walter Benjamin and the Judaic tradition more generally. That term is the messianic and it relies upon a distinction with messianism.
According to Derrida, the term messianism refers predominantly to the religions of the Messiahs – ie. the Muslim, Judaic and Christian religions. These religions proffer a Messiah of known characteristics, and often one who is expected to arrive at a particular time or place. The Messiah is inscribed in their respective religious texts and in an oral tradition that dictates that only if the other conforms to such and such a description is that person actually the Messiah. The most obvious of numerous necessary characteristics for the Messiah, it seems, is that they must invariably be male. Sexuality might seem to be a strange prerequisite to tether to that which is beyond this world, wholly other, but it is only one of many. Now, Derrida is not simplistically disparaging religion and the messianisms they propound. In an important respect, the messianic depends upon the various messianisms and Derrida admits that he cannot say which is the more originary. The messianism of Abraham in his singular responsibility before God, for Derrida, reveals the messianic structure of existence more generally, in that we all share a similar relationship to alterity even if we have not named and circumscribed that experience according to the template provided by a particular religion. However, Derrida’s call to the wholly other, his invocation for the wholly other “to come”, is not a call for a fixed or identifiable other of known characteristics, as is arguably the case in the average religious experience. His wholly other is indeterminable and can never actually arrive. Derrida more than once recounts a story of Maurice Blanchot’s where the Messiah was actually at the gates to a city, disguised in rags. After some time, the Messiah was finally recognised by a beggar, but the beggar could think of nothing more relevant to ask than: “when will you come?”(DN 24). Even when the Messiah is ‘there’, he or she must still be yet to come, and this brings us back to the distinction between the messianic and the various historical messianisms. The messianic structure of existence is open to the coming of an entirely ungraspable and unknown other, but the concrete, historical messianisms are open to the coming of a specific other of known characteristics. The messianic refers predominantly to a structure of our existence that involves waiting – waiting even in activity – and a ceaseless openness towards a future that can never be circumscribed by the horizons of significance that we inevitably bring to bear upon that possible future. In other words, Derrida is not referring to a future that will one day become present (or a particular conception of the saviour who will arrive), but to an openness towards an unknown futurity that is necessarily involved in what we take to be ‘presence’ and hence also renders it ‘impossible’. A deconstruction that entertained any type of grand prophetic narrative, like a Marxist story about the movement of history toward a pre-determined future which, once attained, would make notions like history and progress obsolete, would be yet another vestige of logocentrism and susceptible to deconstruction (SM). Precisely in order to avoid the problems that such messianisms engender – eg. killing in the name of progress, mutilating on account of knowing the will of God better than others, etc. – Derrida suggests that: “I am careful to say ‘let it come’ because if the other is precisely what is not invented, the initiative or deconstructive inventiveness can consist only in opening, in uncloseting, in destabilising foreclusionary structures, so as to allow for the passage toward the other” (RDR 60).
Derrida has recently become more and more preoccupied with what has come to be termed “possible-impossible aporias” – aporia was originally a Greek term meaning puzzle, but it has come to mean something more like an impasse or paradox. In particular, Derrida has described the paradoxes that afflict notions like giving, hospitality, forgiving and mourning. He argues that the condition of their possibility is also, and at once, the condition of their impossibility. In this section, I will attempt to reveal the shared logic upon which these aporias rely.
The aporia that surrounds the gift revolves around the paradoxical thought that a genuine gift cannot actually be understood to be a gift. In his text, Given Time, Derrida suggests that the notion of the gift contains an implicit demand that the genuine gift must reside outside of the oppositional demands of giving and taking, and beyond any mere self-interest or calculative reasoning (GT 30). According to him, however, a gift is also something that cannot appear as such (GD 29), as it is destroyed by anything that proposes equivalence or recompense, as well as by anything that even proposes to know of, or acknowledge it. This may sound counter-intuitive, but even a simple ‘thank-you’ for instance, which both acknowledges the presence of a gift and also proposes some form of equivalence with that gift, can be seen to annul the gift (cf. MDM 149). By politely responding with a ‘thank-you’, there is often, and perhaps even always, a presumption that because of this acknowledgement one is no longer indebted to the other who has given, and that nothing more can be expected of an individual who has so responded. Significantly, the gift is hence drawn into the cycle of giving and taking, where a good deed must be accompanied by a suitably just response. As the gift is associated with a command to respond, it becomes an imposition for the receiver, and it even becomes an opportunity to take for the ‘giver’, who might give just to receive the acknowledgement from the other that they have in fact given. There are undoubtedly many other examples of how the ‘gift’ can be deployed, and not necessarily deliberately, to gain advantage. Of course, it might be objected that even if it is psychologically difficult to give without also receiving (and in a manner that is tantamount to taking) this does not in-itself constitute a refutation of the logic of genuine giving. According to Derrida, however, his discussion does not amount merely to an empirical or psychological claim about the difficulty of transcending an immature and egocentric conception of giving. On the contrary, he wants to problematise the very possibility of a giving that can be unequivocally disassociated from receiving and taking.
The important point is that, for Derrida, a genuine gift requires an anonymity of the giver, such that there is no accrued benefit in giving. The giver cannot even recognise that they are giving, for that would be to reabsorb their gift to the other person as some kind of testimony to the worth of the self – ie. the kind of self-congratulatory logic that rhetorically poses the question “how wonderful I am to give this person that which they have always desired, and without even letting them know that I am responsible?”. This is an extreme example, but Derrida claims that such a predicament afflicts all giving in more or less obvious ways. For him, the logic of a genuine gift actually requires that self and other be radically disparate, and have no obligations or claims upon each other of any kind. He argues that a genuine gift must involve neither an apprehension of a good deed done, nor the recognition by the other party that they have received, and this seems to render the actuality of any gift an impossibility. Significantly, however, according to Derrida, the existential force of this demand for an absolute altruism can never be assuaged, and yet equally clearly it can also never be fulfilled, and this ensures that the condition of the possibility of the gift is inextricably associated with its impossibility. For Derrida, there is no solution to this type of problem, and no hint of a dialectic that might unify the apparent incommensurability in which possibility implies impossibility and vice versa. At the same time, however, he does not intend simply to vacillate in hyperbolic and self-referential paradoxes. There is a sense in which deconstruction actually seeks genuine giving, hospitality, forgiving and mourning, even where it acknowledges that these concepts are forever elusive and can never actually be fulfilled.
It is also worth considering the aporia that Derrida associates with hospitality. According to Derrida, genuine hospitality before any number of unknown others is not, strictly speaking, a possible scenario (OH 135, GD 70, AEL 50, OCF 16). If we contemplate giving up everything that we seek to possess and call our own, then most of us can empathise with just how difficult enacting any absolute hospitality would be. Despite this, however, Derrida insists that the whole idea of hospitality depends upon such an altruistic concept and is inconceivable without it (OCF 22). In fact, he argues that it is this internal tension that keeps the concept alive.
As Derrida makes explicit, there is a more existential example of this tension, in that the notion of hospitality requires one to be the ‘master’ of the house, country or nation (and hence controlling). His point is relatively simple here; to be hospitable, it is first necessary that one must have the power to host. Hospitality hence makes claims to property ownership and it also partakes in the desire to establish a form of self-identity. Secondly, there is the further point that in order to be hospitable, the host must also have some kind of control over the people who are being hosted. This is because if the guests take over a house through force, then the host is no longer being hospitable towards them precisely because they are no longer in control of the situation. This means, for Derrida, that any attempt to behave hospitably is also always partly betrothed to the keeping of guests under control, to the closing of boundaries, to nationalism, and even to the exclusion of particular groups or ethnicities (OH 151-5). This is Derrida’s ‘possible’ conception of hospitality, in which our most well-intentioned conceptions of hospitality render the “other others” as strangers and refugees (cf. OH 135, GD 68). Whether one invokes the current international preoccupation with border control, or simply the ubiquitous suburban fence and alarm system, it seems that hospitality always posits some kind of limit upon where the other can trespass, and hence has a tendency to be rather inhospitable. On the other hand, as well as demanding some kind of mastery of house, country or nation, there is a sense in which the notion of hospitality demands a welcoming of whomever, or whatever, may be in need of that hospitality. It follows from this that unconditional hospitality, or we might say ‘impossible’ hospitality, hence involves a relinquishing of judgement and control in regard to who will receive that hospitality. In other words, hospitality also requires non-mastery, and the abandoning of all claims to property, or ownership. If that is the case, however, the ongoing possibility of hospitality thereby becomes circumvented, as there is no longer the possibility of hosting anyone, as again, there is no ownership or control.
Derrida discerns another aporia in regard to whether or not to forgive somebody who has caused us significant suffering or pain. This particular paradox revolves around the premise that if one forgives something that is actually forgivable, then one simply engages in calculative reasoning and hence does not really forgive. Most commonly in interviews, but also in his recent text On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness, Derrida argues that according to its own internal logic, genuine forgiving must involve the impossible: that is, the forgiving of an ‘unforgivable’ transgression – eg. a ‘mortal sin’ (OCF 32, cf. OH 39). There is hence a sense in which forgiving must be ‘mad’ and ‘unconscious’ (OCF 39, 49), and it must also remain outside of, or heterogenous to, political and juridical rationality. This unconditional ‘forgiveness’ explicitly precludes the necessity of an apology or repentance by the guilty party, although Derrida acknowledges that this pure notion of forgiveness must always exist in tension with a more conditional forgiveness where apologies are actually demanded. However, he argues that this conditional forgiveness amounts more to amnesty and reconciliation than to genuine forgiveness (OCF 51). The pattern of this discussion is undoubtedly beginning to become familiar. Derrida’s discussions of forgiving are orientated around revealing a fundamental paradox that ensures that forgiving can never be finished or concluded – it must always be open, like a permanent rupture, or a wound that refuses to heal.
This forgiveness paradox depends, in one of its dual aspects, upon a radical disjunction between self and other. Derrida explicitly states that “genuine forgiveness must engage two singularities: the guilty and the victim. As soon as a third party intervenes, one can again speak of amnesty, reconciliation, reparation, etc., but certainly not of forgiveness in the strict sense” (OCF 42). Given that he also acknowledges that it is difficult to conceive of any such face-to-face encounter without a third party – as language itself must serve such a mediating function (OCF 48) – forgiveness is caught in an aporia that ensures that its empirical actuality looks to be decidedly unlikely. To recapitulate, the reason that Derrida’s notion of forgiveness is caught in such an inextricable paradox is because absolute forgiveness requires a radically singular confrontation between self and other, while conditional forgiveness requires the breaching of categories such as self and other, either by a mediating party, or simply by the recognition of the ways in which we are always already intertwined with the other. Indeed, Derrida explicitly argues that when we know anything of the other, or even understand their motivation in however minimal a way, this absolute forgiveness can no longer take place (OCF 49). Derrida can offer no resolution in regard to the impasse that obtains between these two notions (between possible and impossible forgiving, between an amnesty where apologies are asked for and a more absolute forgiveness). He will only insist that an oscillation between both sides of the aporia is necessary for responsibility (OCF 51).
In Memoires: for Paul de Man, which was written almost immediately following de Man’s death in 1983, Derrida reflects upon the political significance of his colleague’s apparent Nazi affiliation in his youth, and he also discusses the pain of losing his friend. Derrida’s argument about mourning adheres to a similarly paradoxical logic to that which has been associated with him throughout this article. He suggests that the so-called ‘successful’ mourning of the deceased other actually fails – or at least is an unfaithful fidelity – because the other person becomes a part of us, and in this interiorisation their genuine alterity is no longer respected. On the other hand, failure to mourn the other’s death paradoxically appears to succeed, because the presence of the other person in their exteriority is prolonged (MDM 6). As Derrida suggests, there is a sense in which “an aborted interiorisation is at the same time a respect for the other as other” (MDM 35). Hence the possibility of an impossible bereavement, where the only possible way to mourn, is to be unable to do so. However, even though this is how he initially presents the problem, Derrida also problematises this “success fails, failure succeeds” formulation (MDM 35).
In his essay “Fors: The Anglish Words of Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok”, Derrida again considers two models of the type of encroachment between self and other that is regularly associated with mourning. Borrowing from post-Freudian theories of mourning, he posits (although later undermines) a difference between introjection, which is love for the other in me, and incorporation, which involves retaining the other as a pocket, or a foreign body within one’s own body. For Freud, as well as for the psychologists Abraham and Torok whose work Derrida considers, successful mourning is primarily about the introjection of the other. The preservation of a discrete and separate other person inside the self (psychologically speaking), as is the case in incorporation, is considered to be where mourning ceases to be a ‘normal’ response and instead becomes pathological. Typically, Derrida reverses this hierarchy by highlighting that there is a sense in which the supposedly pathological condition of incorporation is actually more respectful of the other person’s alterity. After all, incorporation means that one has not totally assimilated the other, as there is still a difference and a heterogeneity (EO 57). On the other hand, Abraham and Torok’s so-called ‘normal’ mourning can be accused of interiorising the other person to such a degree that they have become assimilated and even metaphorically cannibalised. Derrida considers this introjection to be an infidelity to the other. However, Derrida’s account is not so simple as to unreservedly valorise the incorporation of the other person, even if he emphasises this paradigm in an effort to refute the canonical interpretation of successful mourning. He also acknowledges that the more the self “keeps the foreign element inside itself, the more it excludes it” (Fors xvii). If we refuse to engage with the dead other, we also exclude their foreignness from ourselves and hence prevent any transformative interaction with them. When fetishised in their externality in such a manner, the dead other really is lifeless and it is significant that Derrida describes the death of de Man in terms of the loss of exchange and of the transformational opportunities that he presented (MDM xvi, cf WM). Derrida’s point hence seems to be that in mourning, the ‘otherness of the other’ person resists both the process of incorporation as well as the process of introjection. The other can neither be preserved as a foreign entity, nor introjected fully within. Towards the end of Memoires: for Paul de Man, Derrida suggests that responsibility towards the other is about respecting and even emphasising this resistance (MDM 160, 238).
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- Wood, D., & Bernasconi, R., eds. Derrida and Différance, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1988.
La Trobe University
Jacques Derrida (1930-2004) alikuwa mwanafalsafa maarufu wa karne ya 20. Pia alikuwa mmoja wa watu wenye uzazi mwingi zaidi. "Akiwa amejitenga na harakati mbalimbali za kifalsafa na mila zilizomtangulia katika mazingira ya kiakili ya Ufaransa (phenomenology, existentialism, na structuralism), aliendeleza mkakati ulioitwa ""deconstruction"" katikati ya miaka ya 1960." Ingawa si hasi kabisa, deconstruction ni hasa wasiwasi na kitu sawa na ukosoaji wa utamaduni wa falsafa ya Magharibi. Ujenzi kwa ujumla ni iliyotolewa kupitia uchambuzi wa maandishi maalum. Inatafuta kufunua, na kisha kuharibu, upinzani mbalimbali wa binary ambao unategemea njia zetu za kuongoza za kufikiri - uwepo-kutokuwepo, hotuba-kuandika, na kadhalika. Uharibifu una angalau pande mbili: fasihi na kifalsafa. Sehemu ya fasihi inahusu tafsiri ya maandishi, ambapo uvumbuzi ni muhimu kupata maana mbadala zilizofichwa katika maandishi. Kipengele cha kifalsafa inahusu lengo kuu la deconstruction: <unk>metaphysics ya uwepo,<unk> au tu metaphysics. Kuanzia mtazamo wa Heideggerian, Derrida anadai kwamba metafizikia huathiri falsafa nzima kutoka kwa Plato na kuendelea. Metafizikia huunda upinzani wa dualistic na huanzisha utaratibu ambao kwa bahati mbaya unatoa upendeleo kwa neno moja la kila dichotomy (kuwepo kabla ya kutokuwepo, hotuba kabla ya kuandika, na kadhalika). Mkakati wa deconstructive ni kufichua njia hizi too-sedimented ya kufikiri, na inafanya kazi juu yao hasa kupitia hatua mbili - reversing dichotomies na kujaribu kuharibu dichotomies wenyewe. Mkakati huo pia unakusudia kuonyesha kwamba kuna undecidables, ambayo ni, kitu ambacho hakiwezi kufuata upande wowote wa dichotomy au upinzani. Undecidability inarudi katika kipindi cha baadaye cha tafakari ya Derrida, wakati inatumika kufunua paradoxes zinazohusika katika dhana kama vile kutoa zawadi au ukaribishaji, ambao hali ya uwezekano ni wakati huo huo hali yao ya kutowezekana. Kwa sababu hiyo, haiwezekani kuamua ikiwa kutoa kwa njia ya kweli au ukaribishaji-wageni inawezekana au haiwezekani. Katika kipindi hiki, mwanzilishi wa deconstruction anageuza umakini wake kwa mandhari za maadili. "Hasa, mandhari ya wajibu kwa mwingine (kwa mfano, Mungu au mtu mpendwa) husababisha Derrida kuondoka wazo kwamba wajibu ni kuhusishwa na tabia ya umma na mantiki haki na kanuni za jumla. """ Akitafakari hadithi za mapokeo ya Kiyahudi, yeye hukazia upekee kabisa wa daraka kwa mwingine. Uharibifu umekuwa na ushawishi mkubwa katika saikolojia, nadharia ya fasihi, masomo ya kitamaduni, lugha, feminism, sosholojia na anthropolojia. Kwa kuwa tunaishi katika mipaka kati ya falsafa na yasiyo falsafa (au falsafa na fasihi), si vigumu kuona ni kwa nini hali iko hivyo. Hata hivyo, kile kinachofuata katika makala hii ni jaribio la kuonyesha umuhimu wa kifalsafa wa mawazo ya Derrida. "Mfano: ""Mtazamo wa kuunda"" (Derrida, 1930), ""Mtazamo wa kuunda"" (Derrida, 1930), ""Mtazamo wa kuunda"" (Derrida, 1930), ""Mtazamo wa kuunda"" (Derrida, 1930), ""Mtazamo wa kuunda"" (Derrida, 1930), na ""Mtazamo wa kuunda"" (Derrida, 1930)." Pia alizaliwa katika mazingira yenye ubaguzi fulani. Kwa kweli, alijiuzulu au alilazimishwa kutoka angalau shule mbili wakati wa utoto wake kwa sababu tu ya kuwa Myahudi. Alifukuzwa shule moja kwa sababu kulikuwa na kikomo cha asilimia saba ya idadi ya Wayahudi, na baadaye akaondoka shule nyingine kwa sababu ya upinzani wa Wayahudi. Ingawa Derrida angepinga uelewa wowote wa kupunguzwa wa kazi yake kulingana na maisha yake ya wasifu, inaweza kusemwa kwamba aina hii ya uzoefu ilicheza jukumu kubwa katika kusisitiza kwake juu ya umuhimu wa marginal na wengine katika mawazo yake ya baadaye. Derrida alikataliwa mara mbili nafasi katika Ecole Normale Supérieure (ambapo Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir na wengi wa wasomi wa Kifaransa na wasomi walianza kazi zao), lakini hatimaye alikubaliwa katika taasisi hiyo akiwa na umri wa miaka 19. Alihamia Ufaransa kutoka Algiers na baadaye akaanza kushiriki katika jarida la Tel Quel. Kazi ya awali ya Derrida katika falsafa ilikuwa kwa kiasi kikubwa ya kipekee, na mafunzo yake ya mapema kama mwanafalsafa yalifanywa kwa kiasi kikubwa kupitia lensi ya Husserl. Msukumo mwingine muhimu juu ya mawazo yake ya mapema ni pamoja na Nietzsche, Heidegger, Saussure, Levinas na Freud. Derrida anatambua deni lake kwa wanasaikolojia hawa wote katika maendeleo ya mbinu yake ya maandishi, ambayo imekuwa inajulikana kama <unk>deconstruction<unk>. Mwaka 1967 Derrida alishinda kwa ushindi mkubwa katika siasa za nchi hiyo. Alichapisha maandishi matatu muhimu (Of Grammatology, Writing and Difference, na Speech and Phenomena). Kazi zote hizi zimekuwa na ushawishi kwa sababu tofauti, lakini ni Of Grammatology ambayo inabaki kuwa kazi yake maarufu zaidi (inachambuliwa kwa undani katika makala hii). Katika Of Grammatology, Derrida anafunua na kisha kudhoofisha upinzani wa kuandika hotuba ambayo anasema imekuwa sababu yenye ushawishi mkubwa katika mawazo ya Magharibi. Kujiingiza kwake katika lugha katika maandishi haya ni kawaida kwa kazi yake nyingi za mapema, na tangu kuchapishwa kwa maandishi haya na mengine makubwa (ikiwa ni pamoja na Uenezaji, Glas, The Postcard, Spectres of Marx, The Gift of Death, na Politics of Friendship), deconstruction imehamia hatua kwa hatua kutoka kuchukua jukumu kubwa katika bara la Ulaya, na pia kuwa mchezaji muhimu katika muktadha wa falsafa ya Anglo-American. Hii ni hivyo hasa katika maeneo ya ukosoaji wa fasihi, na masomo ya kitamaduni, ambapo mbinu ya deconstruction ya uchambuzi wa maandishi imewavutia wanatheoria kama Paul de Man. Pia amekuwa na nafasi za kufundisha katika vyuo vikuu mbalimbali, ulimwenguni kote. Derrida alikufa mwaka 2004. Mara nyingi ubuni-mwisho umekuwa jambo linalobishaniwa. Wakati Derrida alipopata shahada ya heshima ya udaktari katika Chuo Kikuu cha Cambridge mwaka 1992, kulikuwa na kelele za upinzani kutoka kwa wanafalsafa wengi wa "uchambuzi". Tangu wakati huo, Derrida pia amekuwa na mazungumzo mengi na wanafalsafa kama vile John Searle (tazama Limited Inc.), ambayo deconstruction imekosolewa kabisa, ingawa labda bila haki wakati mwingine. Hata hivyo, kile kilicho wazi kutokana na chuki ya wasomi kama hao ni kwamba deconstruction inashinda falsafa ya jadi kwa njia kadhaa muhimu, na sehemu iliyobaki ya makala hii itaangazia kwa nini hii ni hivyo. Derrida, kama wanatheolojia wengine wengi wa kisasa wa Ulaya, amejishughulisha na kudhoofisha mwelekeo wa upinzani ambao umepata sehemu kubwa ya utamaduni wa falsafa ya Magharibi. Kwa kweli, dualisms ni chakula cha msingi cha deconstruction, kwa sababu bila hizi hierarchies na amri za subordination ingekuwa kushoto na mahali popote kuingilia. "Kupunguza ni parasitic katika kwamba badala ya kuunga mkono hadithi nyingine kubwa, au nadharia kuhusu asili ya ulimwengu ambao sisi kushiriki, ni mdogo yenyewe kwa kupotosha hadithi zilizopo tayari, na kufunua hierarchies dualistic wao kuficha. """ Wakati madai ya Derrida ya kuwa mtu ambaye anazungumza tu katika pembe za falsafa yanaweza kupingwa, ni muhimu kuzingatia madai haya. Uharibifu ni, kwa njia mbaya, falsafa ambayo haisemi chochote. Kwa kiasi ambacho inaweza kupendekezwa kwamba wasiwasi wa Derrida mara nyingi ni wa kifalsafa, ni wazi sio phenomenological (anatuhakikishia kwamba kazi yake ni kusoma hasa dhidi ya Husserl, Sartre na Merleau-Ponty) na wala si ontological. Uharibifu, na hasa uharibifu wa mapema, hufanya kazi kwa kushiriki katika uchambuzi wa kudumu wa maandishi fulani. "Kama ilivyoelezwa hapo juu, ""Mtazamo wa akili unajitolea kuchanganua kwa ukali maana halisi ya maandishi, na hata hivyo pia kupata ndani ya maana hiyo, labda katika pembe zilizopuuzwa za maandishi (ikiwa ni pamoja na maelezo ya chini), matatizo ya ndani ambayo kwa kweli yanaelekeza kwa maana mbadala.""" Kwa hiyo, deconstruction lazima kuanzisha mbinu ambayo inatoa makini sana kwa hizi imperatives inaonekana kinyume (kufanana na tofauti) na kusoma yoyote Derridean maandishi inaweza tu kuthibitisha kipengele hiki mbili. Derrida anataja kipengele cha kwanza cha mkakati huu wa deconstructive kama kuwa sawa na uaminifu na "tamani ya kuwa mwaminifu kwa mandhari na ujasiri wa kufikiri" (WD 84). Wakati huo huo, hata hivyo, deconstruction pia maarufu mikopo kutoka Martin Heidegger ya dhana ya 'kuharibu retrieve' na inatafuta kufungua maandishi hadi maana mbadala na kawaida repressed kwamba kuishi angalau sehemu nje ya utamaduni metaphysical (ingawa daima pia sehemu betrothed kwa hilo). "Kama vile Derrida alivyosema, ""Bila shaka, kuna njia ya kuunda lugha yako mwenyewe ikiwa unaweza au unataka kusikia lugha yangu; kuunda ikiwa unaweza au unataka kutoa lugha yangu ili ieleweke.""" Katika kupendekeza kwamba tafsiri ya uaminifu ya yeye ni moja ambayo huenda zaidi yake, Derrida anaweka uvumbuzi kama kipengele muhimu sana cha usomaji wowote wa deconstructive. "Amesema: ""Nenda mahali ambapo huwezi kwenda, kwa kitu kisichowezekana, kwa kweli ni njia pekee ya kuja au kwenda"" (ON 75), na hatimaye, sifa ya usomaji wa deconstructive ni katika mawasiliano haya ya ubunifu na maandishi mengine ambayo hayawezi kuwa na sifa ya uaminifu tu au kama ukiukaji kamili, lakini ambayo inazunguka kati ya madai haya mawili." Jambo la kuvutia kuhusu deconstruction, hata hivyo, ni kwamba licha ya ukweli kwamba tafsiri Derrida mwenyewe ya maandishi maalum ni kabisa mkali, ni mara nyingi ni vigumu kutambua ambapo tafsiri ya ufafanuzi wa maandishi mwisho na ambapo upande zaidi ya vurugu ya deconstruction huanza. Derrida daima ni kusita kulazimisha <unk> maandishi yangu <unk>, <unk> maandishi yako <unk> majina kwa uwazi sana katika maandishi yake. Hii ni kwa sehemu kwa sababu ni hata tatizo kuzungumza ya "kazi" ya deconstruction, tangu deconstruction tu highlights nini tayari ilifunuliwa katika maandishi yenyewe. "Vitu vyote vya uingiliaji wa deconstructive viko katika ""mawe ya msingi yaliyopuuzwa"" ya mfumo uliopo tayari (MDM 72), na usawa huu haubadiliki kwa njia yoyote muhimu ikiwa mfumo huo unafikiriwa kama ""metaphysics kwa ujumla, ambayo lazima iwe na njia yake isiyo ya metafizikia, au maandishi ya mwandishi maalum, ambayo lazima pia daima ashuhudie kile wanachojaribu kuondoa." Hizi ni, bila shaka, mandhari kutafakari juu ya kwa urefu na Derrida, na wana matokeo ya mara moja juu ya ngazi meta-theoretical. Kwa kiwango kidogo ambacho tunaweza kurejelea hoja za Derrida mwenyewe, ni lazima itambuliwe kwamba wao daima ni intertwined na hoja za mtu yeyote, au chochote, yeye anatafuta deconstruct. Kwa mfano, Derrida anadai kwamba ukosoaji wake wa Husserlian'sasa' wakati ni kweli msingi juu ya rasilimali ndani ya Husserl mwenyewe maandishi ambayo elide binafsi-kuwepo kwamba alikuwa kujaribu kupata (SP 64-66). Ikiwa uhakika wa Derrida ni tu kwamba phenomenology ya Husserl inashikilia ndani yake hitimisho ambalo Husserl alishindwa kutambua, Derrida inaonekana kuwa na uwezo wa kukataa msimamo wowote wa transcendental au ontological. Hii ndiyo sababu yeye anadai kwamba kazi yake inachukua nafasi katika pembe ya falsafa, badala ya kuwa tu falsafa yenyewe. Deconstruction anadai kwamba katika maandishi yoyote, kuna bila shaka pointi ya equivocation na <unk> undecidability <unk> kwamba kuachana maana yoyote imara kwamba mwandishi inaweza kutafuta kulazimisha juu ya maandishi yake. Utaratibu wa kuandika daima hufunua kile ambacho kimesimamishwa, hufunika kile ambacho kimefunuliwa, na kwa ujumla zaidi huvunja upinzani ambao unafikiriwa kuendeleza. Hii ndiyo sababu ya Derrida 'falsafa' ni hivyo textually msingi na pia ni kwa nini maneno yake muhimu ni daima kubadilika, kwa sababu kulingana na nani au nini yeye ni kutafuta deconstruct, kwamba uhakika wa equivocation daima itakuwa iko katika mahali tofauti. Hii pia inahakikisha kwamba jaribio lolote la kuelezea nini deconstruction ni, lazima kuwa makini. Hakuna kitu ambacho kingeweza kuwa kinyume zaidi na nia ya kuunda zaidi kuliko jaribio hili la kuifahamu kupitia swali la kimetaphysical - ni nini kuunda? - Kuna paradoxicality inayohusika katika kujaribu kuzuia kuunda kwa kusudi moja maalum na kuu (OG 19) wakati inategemea tamaa ya kutufunua kwa kile ambacho ni tofauti kabisa (tout autre) na kutufungua kwa uwezekano mbadala. Wakati mwingine, tafsiri hii itaendesha hatari ya kupuuza maana nyingi za uharibifu wa Derridean, na tofauti inayokubaliwa sana kati ya kazi ya mapema na ya marehemu ya Derrida ni mfano wazi zaidi wa ugumu unaohusika katika kupendekeza <unk> uharibifu unasema hii <unk>, au <unk> uharibifu unakataza hiyo <unk>. Hiyo ilisema, baadhi ya sifa za kufafanua ya deconstruction inaweza kuonekana. Kwa mfano, biashara nzima ya Derrida inategemea imani kwamba dualisms ni irrevocably sasa katika wanafalsafa mbalimbali na mafundi kwamba anafikiria. Ingawa baadhi ya wanafalsafa wanasema kwamba yeye ni kidogo reductive wakati yeye anaongea juu ya mapokeo ya falsafa ya Magharibi, ni uelewa wake wa utamaduni huu kwamba inatoa taarifa na hutoa zana kwa ajili ya majibu deconstructive. Kwa sababu hii, ni thamani ya kuzingatia kwa ufupi lengo la Derridean deconstruction <unk> metaphysics ya uwepo, au kwa kiasi fulani sawa, logocentrism. Derrida alitumia maneno mengi tofauti kuelezea kile alichokiona kuwa njia ya msingi ya kufikiri ya utamaduni wa falsafa ya Magharibi. Hizi ni pamoja na: logocentrism, phallogocentrism, na labda maarufu zaidi, metaphysics ya uwepo, lakini pia mara nyingi tu <unk> metaphysics <unk>. Maneno hayo yote yana maana tofauti kidogo. Logocentrism inasisitiza jukumu la upendeleo ambalo logos, au hotuba, imepatiwa katika utamaduni wa Magharibi (tazama Sehemu ya 3). Phallogocentrism inaonyesha umuhimu wa kiukoo wa upendeleo huu. Marejeo ya kudumu ya Derrida kwa metaphysics ya uwepo hukopa sana kutoka kwa kazi ya Heidegger. Heidegger alisisitiza kwamba falsafa ya Magharibi daima imependelea kile kilicho, au kile kinachoonekana, na imesahau kuzingatia hali ya kuonekana. Kwa maneno mengine, uwepo wenyewe ni upendeleo, badala ya kile ambacho inaruhusu uwepo kuwa inawezekana wakati wote <unk> na pia haiwezekani, kwa Derrida (tazama Sehemu ya 4, kwa zaidi juu ya metaphysics ya uwepo). Hata hivyo, maneno yote haya ya kudharau yanaunganishwa chini ya kichwa kikubwa cha neno <unk>metaphysics<unk>. Basi, Derrida anamaanisha nini kwa kusema kwamba kuna mambo yasiyo ya kweli? "Kama ilivyoelezwa katika kitabu chake cha ""Afterword"" cha Limited Inc., Derrida alitoa maoni kwamba metafizikia inaweza kufafanuliwa kama ""kujiingiza katika kurudi kwa njia ya kimkakati, kwa njia ya kipekee, kwa asili au kwa kipaumbele ambacho kinafikiriwa kuwa rahisi, kisicho na kasoro, cha kawaida, safi, cha kawaida, na sawa na nafsi, ili kisha kufikiri kwa njia ya utamaduni, matatizo, uharibifu, ajali, na kadhalika.""" "Wanamuziki wote wa kimetaphysics, kuanzia Plato hadi Rousseau, Descartes hadi Husserl, wameendelea kwa njia hii, wakiona mema kabla ya mabaya, chanya kabla ya hasi, safi kabla ya uchafu, rahisi kabla ya ngumu, muhimu kabla ya bahati mbaya, iliyoiga kabla ya kuiga, na kadhalika.""" Na hii si tu ishara moja ya metaphysical miongoni mwa wengine, ni mahitaji ya metaphysical, kwamba ambayo imekuwa mara kwa mara zaidi, zaidi ya kina na nguvu zaidi <unk> (LI 236). Kwa Derrida, metafizikia inahusisha kuanzisha hierarchies na amri za chini katika dualisms mbalimbali ambazo zinakutana (M 195). Zaidi ya hayo, mawazo ya kimetaphysical yanatoa kipaumbele kwa uwepo na usafi kwa gharama ya contingent na ngumu, ambayo ni kuchukuliwa kuwa tu aberrations kwamba si muhimu kwa uchambuzi wa kifalsafa. Kwa hiyo, kwa msingi, mawazo ya kimetaphysical daima hutoa upendeleo kwa upande mmoja wa upinzani, na kupuuza au marginalizes neno mbadala wa upinzani huo. Katika jaribio jingine la kueleza matibabu ya deconstruction ya, na maslahi katika upinzani, Derrida imependekeza kwamba: <unk> Upinzani wa dhana za metaphysical (matamshi / uandishi, uwepo / kutokuwepo, nk.) "Hakuna wakati ambapo maneno mawili yanakutana uso kwa uso, lakini kuna utaratibu wa ""hierarchy"" na ""subordination.""" Uharibifu hauwezi kujizuia au kuendelea mara moja kwa neutralization: lazima, kwa njia ya ishara mbili, sayansi mbili, kuandika mbili, kufanya mazoezi ya kupindua upinzani wa kawaida na kuhamisha kwa ujumla mfumo. Ni kwa hali hiyo tu kwamba deconstruction itatoa njia ya kuingilia katika uwanja wa upinzani inashutumu <unk> (M 195). Ili kuelewa vizuri hii mbili "mbinu" <unk> kwamba pia ni deconstruction ya dhana ya mbinu kwa sababu si tena anaamini katika uwezekano wa mtazamaji kuwa kabisa nje ya kitu / maandishi kuwa kuchunguzwa <unk> ni muhimu kuzingatia mfano wa deconstruction hii katika kazi (Tazama Hotuba / Kuandika chini). Maneno ya Derrida hubadilika katika kila maandishi anayoandika. Hii ni sehemu ya mkakati wake wa kuharibu. Yeye hukazia fikira mandhari au maneno fulani katika maandishi, ambayo kwa sababu ya kutofautisha kwao huthubutu kusudi la wazi zaidi la maandishi hayo. Kwa kuwa haikuwezekana kuelezea haya yote (Derrida amechapisha karibu maandishi 60 kwa Kiingereza), makala hii ililenga baadhi ya maneno muhimu zaidi na neologisms kutoka kwa mawazo yake ya mapema. Katika sehemu ya 6 na 7 ya kitabu hicho, yeye anataja mambo fulani ya baadaye ya mawazo yake, ambayo yanategemea mambo mengi. Upinzani maarufu zaidi ambao kazi ya mapema ya Derrida inahusika ni ile kati ya hotuba na uandishi. Kulingana na Derrida, wasomi tofauti kama Plato, Rousseau, Saussure, na Levi-Strauss, wote wamedharau neno lililoandikwa na kusema kwa thamani, kwa kulinganisha, kama aina fulani ya njia safi ya maana. "Wanasema kwamba maneno yaliyosemwa ni alama za uzoefu wa kiakili, lakini maneno yaliyoandikwa ni alama za ishara hiyo iliyopo tayari.""" Kama uwakilishi wa hotuba, wao ni mara mbili derivative na mara mbili mbali na umoja na mawazo ya mtu mwenyewe. Bila kuingia katika maelezo kuhusu njia ambazo wasomi hawa wameanza kuhalalisha aina hii ya upinzani wa hierarchical, ni muhimu kukumbuka kwamba mkakati wa kwanza wa deconstruction ni kugeuza upinzani uliopo. Katika Of Grammatology (labda kazi yake maarufu zaidi), Derrida kwa hivyo anajaribu kuonyesha kwamba muundo wa uandishi na sarufi ni muhimu zaidi na hata "mzee" kuliko muundo wa asili wa uwepo-kwa-wenyewe ambao unajulikana kama kawaida ya usemi. "Kwa mfano, katika sura moja nzima ya kitabu chake ""Mtaala wa Lugha ya Jumla,"" Ferdinand de Saussure anajaribu kuunganisha sayansi ya lugha na neno la sauti na la kusikika tu." Katika uchunguzi wake, Saussure anaendelea kusema kwamba "lugha na uandishi ni mifumo miwili tofauti ya ishara: ya pili ipo kwa kusudi pekee la kuwakilisha ya kwanza". Saussure alisisitiza kwamba lugha ina mapokeo ya mdomo ambayo hayategemei maandishi, na ni uhuru huu ambao hufanya sayansi safi ya usemi iwezekane. Derrida anakataa kabisa utaratibu huu wa cheo na badala yake anasema kwamba yote ambayo yanaweza kudaiwa ya kuandika <unk> kwa mfano. kwamba ni derivative na tu inahusu ishara nyingine <unk> ni sawa kweli ya hotuba. Lakini pamoja na kukosoa msimamo kama huo kwa baadhi ya dhana zisizo na haki, ikiwa ni pamoja na wazo kwamba sisi ni self-identical na sisi wenyewe katika 'kusikia' sisi wenyewe kufikiri, Derrida pia hufanya wazi njia ambayo hierarchy kama hiyo ni rendered untenable kutoka ndani ya maandishi Saussure mwenyewe. Saussure alikuwa mtetezi wa nadharia inayojulikana kama arbitraryness of the sign, ambayo inadai kwamba signifier haina uhusiano wowote na kile kinachohitajika. Saussure anatokana na matokeo mengi kutoka kwa msimamo huu, lakini kama Derrida anavyoonyesha, dhana hii ya hiari na ya "mashirika yasiyo na nia" ya ishara, inaonekana kukataa uwezekano wa kiungo chochote cha asili (OG 44). Baada ya yote, kama ishara ni arbitrary na evades yoyote msingi rejea ya ukweli, ingekuwa inaonekana kwamba aina fulani ya ishara (yaani. kuongea) haiwezi kuwa ya asili zaidi kuliko nyingine (yaani. maandishi). Hata hivyo, ni hasa wazo hili la kiungo cha asili kwamba Saussure hutegemea kujadili kwa ajili ya "kiungo cha asili" yetu na sauti (25), na pendekezo lake kwamba sauti ni zaidi ya karibu kuhusiana na mawazo yetu kuliko neno lililoandikwa kwa hiyo anaendesha kinyume na kanuni yake ya msingi kuhusu arbitrary ya ishara. Katika Of Grammatology na kwingineko, Derrida anadai kwamba maana, kwa ujumla, daima inahusu ishara nyingine, na kwamba mtu hawezi kamwe kufikia ishara ambayo inahusu tu yenyewe. "Anasema ""kuandika si ishara ya ishara, isipokuwa mtu akisema ni ishara ya ishara zote, ambayo ingekuwa kweli zaidi"" (O.G. 43), na mchakato huu wa marejeo ya kutokuwa na mwisho, ya kamwe kufika kwa maana yenyewe, ni wazo la ""kuandika"" kwamba anataka kusisitiza." Hii si kuandika narrowly kufikiriwa, kama katika maandishi ya neno kwa neno juu ya ukurasa, lakini kile yeye majina <unk>arche-kuandika<unk>. "Archaeography inahusu dhana ya jumla ya kuandika ambayo inasisitiza kwamba ""kivunja ambacho maandishi huanzisha kati ya kile kinachokusudiwa kuwasiliana na kile kinachohusiana na kile kinachohusiana na kile kinachohusiana na kile kinachohusiana na kile ambacho mtu anaweza kutaka kuweka takatifu, ikiwa ni pamoja na dhana ya ""kuwepo kwa nafsi.""" Uvunjaji huu wa asili ambao arche-kuandika inahusu inaweza kutenganishwa ili kufunua madai mawili kuhusu tofauti ya nafasi na kuahirisha muda. Ili kuelezea madai haya ya kwanza, msisitizo wa Derrida juu ya jinsi uandishi unavyo tofauti na yenyewe ni kupendekeza tu kwamba uandishi, na kwa upanuzi wote, umegawanywa (tofauti) na kutokuwepo ambayo inafanya iwe muhimu. Mfano mmoja wa hili unaweza kuwa kwamba tunaandika kitu kwa sababu tunaweza kusahau hivi karibuni, au kuwasiliana kitu kwa mtu ambaye si pamoja nasi. Kwa mujibu wa Derrida, kila maandishi, ili kuwa nini ni, lazima kuwa na uwezo wa kazi katika kukosekana kwa kila empirically kuamua mpokeaji (M 375). Derrida pia anaona kuahirisha kuwa kawaida ya maandishi na hii ni kuimarisha kwamba maana ya maandishi fulani ni kamwe sasa, kamwe kabisa kukamatwa na jaribio la mkosoaji wa pin chini. Maana ya maandishi daima ni chini ya whims ya siku zijazo, lakini wakati kwamba inaitwa siku zijazo ni yenyewe'sasa' (kama sisi kujaribu na circumscribe siku zijazo kwa rejea ya tarehe maalum au tukio) maana yake ni sawa si alitambua, lakini chini ya bado baadaye nyingine ambayo pia haiwezi kuwa sasa. Ufunguo wa maandishi hauwezi kamwe kuwapo kwa mwandishi mwenyewe, kwa sababu yaliyoandikwa daima huondoa maana yake. "Kwa sababu hiyo, hatuwezi kumwuliza Derrida aeleze hasa alichomaanisha kwa kueleza hisia hiyo ya ajabu ambayo imetafsiriwa kama ""hakuna kitu nje ya maandishi"" (OG 158)."" Maneno yoyote ya ufafanuzi ambayo Derrida aweza kutoa yangehitaji ufafanuzi zaidi. [Hiyo alisema, ni muhimu kusisitiza kwamba uhakika Derrida si sana kwamba kila kitu ni tu semiotic au lugha <unk> kama hii ni kitu kwamba yeye wazi anakataa <unk> lakini kwamba michakato ya kutofautiana na kuahirisha kupatikana ndani ya uwakilishi lugha ni dalili ya hali ya jumla zaidi ambayo afflicts kila kitu, ikiwa ni pamoja na mwili na perceptual]. Kwa hiyo, dhana ya Derrida ya kuandika, arche-kuandika, inahusu njia ambayo imeandikwa inawezekana tu kwa sababu ya hii 'ya awali' kuahirishwa kwa maana ambayo inahakikisha kwamba maana haiwezi kamwe kuwa sasa kabisa. "Kwenye kuunganisha na kipengele tofauti ambacho tumemwona tayari kuhusishwa na, na kisha kupanua zaidi ya mipaka ya jadi ya uandishi, atakuja kuelezea michakato hii miwili ya kuingiliana kupitia neologism maarufu zaidi: ""different.""" Difference ni jaribio la kuunganisha mambo tofauti na ya kuahirisha yanayohusika katika arche-kuandika katika neno ambalo lenyewe hucheza juu ya tofauti kati ya sauti na iliyoandikwa. Baada ya yote, kile kinachotofautisha différance na différence ni kisichosikika, na hii inamaanisha kwamba kutofautisha kati yao kwa kweli inahitaji maandishi. Hii problematizes juhudi kama Saussure ya, ambayo pamoja na kujaribu kuweka hotuba na kuandika mbali, pia kupendekeza kwamba kuandika ni karibu ziada ya ziada kwa hotuba. "Kulingana na madai hayo, Derrida anaweza tu kuonyesha kwamba kuna mara nyingi, na labda hata daima, aina hii ya utata katika neno la kuongea ""different"" ikilinganishwa na ""difference"" ambayo inahitaji kumbukumbu ya maandishi." Kama neno la kusema linahitaji lililoandikwa ili lifanye kazi vizuri, basi neno la kusema lenyewe huwa daima mbali na uwazi wowote unaodhaniwa wa ufahamu. Ni uvunjaji huu wa awali ambao Derrida huhusisha na maneno arche-kuandika na différance. "Hata hivyo, neno ""difference"" halina maana ya kipekee, na hii ni kwa sababu ya msisitizo wa Derrida kwamba si neno wala dhana, na pia kwa sababu maana ya neno hilo hubadilika kulingana na muktadha husika ambao linatumiwa." Kwa sasa, hata hivyo, inatosha kupendekeza kwamba kulingana na Derrida, difference ni ya kawaida ya kile kinachohusika katika arche-kuandika na wazo hili la jumla la kuandika ambalo linabomoa mantiki nzima ya ishara. Imani ya kawaida kwamba ishara inawakilisha kitu ambacho, hata ikiwa haipo, inaweza kuwapo, haikuwezekana kwa sababu ya archeography, ambayo inasisitiza kwamba ishara daima inahusu ishara zaidi ad infinitum, na kwamba hakuna kumbukumbu ya mwisho au msingi. Hii reversal ya muhula subordinate ya upinzani kutimiza kwanza ya deconstruction ya nia mbili za kimkakati. Badala ya kukosolewa kwa kuwa derivative au sekondari, kwa Derrida, kuandika, au angalau michakato ambayo sifa kuandika (yaani. Difference na arche-kuandika), ni kila mahali. Kama vile kipande cha maandishi hakina kichwa cha kujitegemea kuelezea maana ya kila neno maalum (na hii inahakikisha kwamba kile kilichoandikwa lazima kwa sehemu kuepuka jaribio lolote la mtu binafsi kuidhibiti), hii ni sawa na ya kuongea. Kwa kutumia muundo huo wa kurudia, hakuna kitu kinachohakikisha kwamba mtu mwingine atawapa maneno ninayotumia maana maalum ninayowapa. Hata dhana ya monologue ya ndani na wazo kwamba tunaweza intimately 'kusikia' mawazo yetu wenyewe katika njia isiyo ya makusudi ni makosa, kama ni kupuuza njia ambayo archeography mapendeleo tofauti na si-kufanana na mtu mwenyewe (SP 60-70). Katika suala hili, ni muhimu kuelezea kwamba wote wa deconstruction reversals (arche-kuandika ni pamoja na) ni sehemu kukamatwa na jengo kwamba wao kutafuta kuangusha. "Kwa Derrida, ""mtu daima anaishi, na zaidi wakati mtu hajui"" (OG 24), na ni muhimu kutambua kwamba kugeuka tu kwa upinzani wa kimetaphysical uliopo inaweza pia kutaka changamoto ya mfumo wa utawala na dhana ambazo zinajaribu kugeuka (WD 280)." Kwa hiyo, deconstruction haiwezi kuridhika na kuipa kipaumbele kuandika juu ya kusema, lakini lazima pia itimize kipengele cha pili cha msingi cha mikakati miwili ya deconstruction, ambayo ni kuharibu na kuchafua upinzani wenyewe. Derrida lazima akumbuke kwamba makundi ambayo hutegemeza na kulinda dualism yoyote daima tayari yamevurugwa na kuhamishwa. "Kwa maana hii, Derrida kwa kawaida hutengeneza neno jipya, au hufanya kazi tena neno la zamani, ili kuvuruga kabisa muundo ambao amehusika - mifano ya hii ni pamoja na majadiliano yake ya pharmakon katika Plato (dawa au tincture, salary au maleficent), na nyongeza katika Rousseau, ambayo itachukuliwa kuelekea mwisho wa sehemu hii.""" Kuelezea tatizo katika maneno tofauti kidogo, hoja ya Derrida ni kwamba katika kuchunguza upinzani wa binary, deconstruction inaweza kufunua alama. Hii si alama ya upinzani ambao tangu wakati huo umebomolewa - kinyume chake, alama ni kuvunjika ndani ya metaphysics, muundo wa incongruities ambapo metaphysical rubs juu ya yasiyo ya metaphysical, kwamba ni kazi ya deconstruction juxtapose bora kama inaweza. "Kama vile alama haionekani kama hivyo, lakini mantiki ya njia yake katika maandishi inaweza kuigwa na uingiliaji wa deconstructive na hivyo kuletwa mbele. """ Mantiki ya nyongeza pia ni kipengele muhimu cha Of Grammatology. Dawa ya kuongeza ni kitu ambacho, inadaiwa kwa njia ya pili, hutumiwa kama msaada kwa kitu "kiyapokuwa" au "asili". "Kutumia maandishi ni mfano wa muundo huu, kwa sababu kama Derrida anavyosema, ""Ikiwa nyongeza ni mchakato usio na uhakika, kuandika ni nyongeza kwa ubora kwani inajitolea kama nyongeza ya nyongeza, ishara ya ishara, kuchukua nafasi ya hotuba tayari muhimu.""" Mfano mwingine wa kuongeza inaweza kuwa masturbation, kama Derrida anapendekeza (OG 153), au hata matumizi ya tahadhari ya kuzuia kuzaliwa. Jambo la kushangaza kuhusu mifano hii ni kwamba kuna utata ambao unahakikisha kwamba kile kinachotumika kama nyongeza kinaweza kutafsiriwa kwa njia mbili. Kwa mfano, matumizi ya jamii yetu ya tahadhari za kuzuia uzazi yanaweza kuelezwa kama kupendekeza kwamba njia yetu ya asili inashindwa na kwamba dawa ya kuzuia mimba, au kondomu, nk, kwa hivyo inachukua nafasi ya kosa katika asili. Kwa upande mwingine, huenda pia ikawa na hoja kwamba tahadhari kama hizo huongeza tu, na kutajirisha njia yetu ya asili. Ni daima ambiguous, au kwa usahihi zaidi 'undecidable', kama nyongeza huongeza yenyewe na 'ni fullness kutajirisha fullness nyingine, kipimo kamili ya uwepo' au kama 'kutoa nyongeza... anaongeza tu kuchukua nafasi... inawakilisha na hufanya picha... nafasi yake ni kupewa katika muundo na alama ya utupu' (OG 144). "Mwanzoni Derrida alitoa maoni kwamba ""kijumuisho ni vitu vyote viwili, kuongeza na kubadilisha"" (OG 200), ambayo inamaanisha kwamba ""kijumuisho si maana zaidi ya maana, mwakilishi kuliko uwepo, maandishi kuliko hotuba.""" Inakuja kabla ya njia hizo zote. Hii si tu baadhi ya pendekezo rhetorical kwamba haina umuhimu halisi katika deconstruction. Kwa kweli, wakati Rousseau daima anaomboleza mzunguko wa masturbation yake katika kitabu chake, The Confessions, Derrida anadai kwamba <unk>haijawahi kuwa inawezekana kutamani uwepo <unk> katika mtu<unk>, kabla ya mchezo huu wa uingizwaji na uzoefu wa mfano wa auto-upendo <unk> (OG 154). Kwa hili, Derrida inamaanisha kwamba hii masturbation ziada kwamba "hucheza" kati ya uwepo na kutokuwepo (kwa mfano. "Kama vile picha ya Therese asiyepo ambayo Rousseau anajitokeza, ni kile kinachotuwezesha kufikiria kuwapo na kutimizwa katika mahusiano ya kingono na mwingine.""" Kwa njia fulani, kujigamba ni "ya awali", na kulingana na Derrida, hali hii inatumika kwa mahusiano yote ya kingono. Mahusiano yote ya kimapenzi yana kipengele chao cha ziada, ambapo hatupo kamwe katika maana fulani ya muda mfupi ya mahusiano ya kingono, lakini daima tunahusika katika aina fulani ya uwakilishi. "Hata kama hii haichukui fomu ya kufikiria mwingine mahali pa, au kuongeza ""ujumbe"" ambao sasa uko nasi, na hata kama hatufanyi kazi ya jukumu fulani, au kuigiza raha fulani, kwa Derrida, uwakilishi na picha kama hizo ni hali halisi za tamaa na kufurahia. """ Derrida amekuwa na uhusiano mrefu na mgumu na phenomenology kwa kazi yake yote, ikiwa ni pamoja na mahusiano ya kutofautisha na Husserl na Heidegger, na kitu karibu na uaminifu endelevu na Levinas. Licha ya utata huu, mambo mawili makuu ya mawazo ya Derrida kuhusu phenomenology kubaki wazi. Kwanza, yeye anafikiri kwamba phenomenological msisitizo juu ya upesi wa uzoefu ni mpya transcendental udanganyifu, na pili, yeye anadai kwamba licha ya nia yake bora, phenomenology haiwezi kuwa kitu kingine chochote isipokuwa metaphysics. Katika muktadha huu, Derrida anafafanua metafizikia kama sayansi ya uwepo, kama kwa yeye (kama kwa Heidegger), metafizikia zote zina haki ya uwepo, au kile ambacho ni. Wakati wao ni iliyotolewa schematically hapa, madai haya interrelated kuunda Derrida ya hoja kuu dhidi ya phenomenology. Kulingana na Derrida, phenomenology ni metaphysics ya uwepo kwa sababu ni unwittingly hutegemea dhana ya indivisible binafsi-kuwapo, au katika kesi ya Husserl, uwezekano wa sahihi ndani ya kutosha na mwenyewe. Katika maandishi mbalimbali, Derrida anapinga thamani hii ya subjectivity undivided, kama vile kipaumbele kwamba nafasi kama hiyo inatoa kwa <unk>now<unk>, au kwa aina nyingine ya muda wa haraka. Kwa mfano, katika Hotuba na Phenomena, Derrida anadai kwamba kama wakati wa'sasa' unafikiriwa kama unaojikosa katika uzoefu huo, hauwezi kuwa na uzoefu, kwa sababu hakutakuwa na kitu cha kujilinganisha na ili kuangaza'sasa' hiyo. "Kama vile Derrida alivyosema, ""kila kitu kinachoitwa ""sasa"" au ""sasa"" wakati mwingine huathiriwa na alama au mabaki ya uzoefu wa zamani ambao hutuzuia kuwa katika wakati wa ""sasa"" uliojificha." Phenomenology ni kwa hiyo walidhani kama nostalgically kutafuta haiwezekani: kwamba ni, coinciding na mwenyewe katika moja kwa moja na kabla ya kutafakari spontaneity. Kufuatia upinzani huu wa muda wa Husserlian, Derrida anasema kwamba <unk> katika uchambuzi wa mwisho, kile kilicho hatarini ni... upendeleo wa sasa halisi, sasa <unk> (SP 62-3). Badala ya kusisitiza uwepo wa somo kwa wenyewe (yaani. inayoitwa kuishi-sasa), Derrida kimkakati hutumia dhana ya muda ambayo inasisitiza kuahirisha. John Caputo anaelezea uhakika wa Derrida kwa ufupi wakati anadai kwamba ukosoaji wa Derrida wa muda wa Husserlian katika Hotuba na Phenomena unahusisha jaribio la kuwasiliana kwamba: <unk>Kuna nini kweli kinaendelea katika mambo, nini kweli kinachotokea, daima <unk> kuja<unk>. Kila mara unapojaribu kuimarisha maana ya kitu, kujaribu kuifunga katika nafasi yake ya mishonari, kitu yenyewe, ikiwa kuna chochote kabisa, huondoka. (Soma pia: SP 104, Caputo DN 31) Kwa kusema kwa njia rahisi, Derrida anasema kwamba maana ya kitu fulani au neno fulani haibadiliki kamwe, bali daima hubadilika. kuenea kwa maana ambayo deconstruction imekuwa notorious). Zaidi ya hayo, umuhimu wa mabadiliko hayo ya zamani inaweza tu kufahamu kutoka wakati ujao na, bila shaka, kwamba "maendeleo" yenyewe ni kuhusishwa katika mchakato sawa wa mabadiliko kama ni milele kuwa na uwezo wa kuwa "sasa". Wakati ujao ambao Derrida anataja sio tu wakati ujao ambao utakuwa sasa, lakini wakati ujao ambao hufanya "ujumbe" wote uwezekane na pia usiwezekane. Kwa Derrida, haiwezi kuwa na uwepo-kwa-wenyewe, au utambulisho wa kujitegemea, kwa sababu "asili" ya uwepo wetu wa muda ni kwa aina hii ya uzoefu kutukimbia. "Mtazamo wetu wa kuwa ni kile ambacho hatimaye ataita ""Messianic"" (tazama sehemu ya 6) katika kwamba uzoefu ni kuhusu kusubiri, au kwa usahihi zaidi, uzoefu ni tu wakati ni kucheleweshwa." Kazi ya Derrida inatoa michango mingi muhimu ya muda ya aina hii ya karibu-transcendental. Katika mfano wake wa kwanza na maarufu zaidi, undecidability ni moja ya majaribio muhimu zaidi ya Derrida ya shida dualisms, au kwa usahihi zaidi, kufunua jinsi wao ni daima tayari matatizo. undecidable, na kuna wengi wao katika deconstruction (kwa mfano. Mfano: Pharmakon, Hymen, na mengineyo. ), ni kitu ambacho hakiwezi kufuata polarity yoyote ya dichotomy (kwa mfano. sasa au kutokuwepo, tiba au sumu, na ndani au nje katika mifano ya juu. Kwa mfano, mfano wa roho huonekana kuwa haupo au haupo, au kwa njia mbadala ni wote sasa na haupo wakati huo huo (SM). Hata hivyo, Derrida ana mwelekeo wa mara kwa mara wa kufufua maneno katika muktadha tofauti, na neno undecidability pia inarudi katika deconstruction baadaye. Kwa kweli, ili kufanya mambo yawe magumu zaidi, kutokuwa na uwezo wa kuamua kunarudi katika namna mbili zinazoonekana. Katika kazi yake ya hivi karibuni, Derrida mara nyingi anasisitiza kwamba hali ya uwezekano wa kuomboleza, kutoa, kusamehe, na ukaribishaji, kutaja baadhi ya mifano yake maarufu, ni mara moja pia hali ya kutowezekana kwao. Katika uchunguzi wake wa hizi "inawezekana-inawezekana" aporias, inakuwa undecidable kama kutoa halisi, kwa mfano, ni ama inawezekana au haiwezekani bora. Falsafa ya baadaye ya Derrida pia imeunganishwa na uchambuzi wake wa aina sawa ya undecidability ambayo inahusika katika dhana ya uamuzi yenyewe. "Derrida anasema kwamba ""hawezi kuwa uamuzi wa busara, au hata zaidi ya kusababisha, kwamba wakati wa uamuzi lazima kweli kuwa wazimu"" (DPJ 26: 65)." "Kierkegaard alitoa maoni kwamba ""kuamua kunahitaji kuruka bila kuamua zaidi ya maandalizi yote ya awali kwa uamuzi huo"" (GD 77), na kulingana na yeye, hii inatumika kwa maamuzi yote na sio tu yale yanayohusu kugeuka kwa imani ya kidini ambayo inahusika na Kierkegaard." "Kwa mfano, Derrida alidai kwamba ""maamuzi yote ni imani na imani dhaifu, kwa kuwa ikiwa imani na uamuzi haukuwa dhaifu, haungekuwa imani au uamuzi kabisa.""" GD 80) Ufafanuzi huu wa uamuzi kama wakati wa wazimu ambao lazima uondoke kwa busara na sababu za hesabu inaweza kuonekana kuwa ya kutatanisha, lakini bado inaweza kukubaliwa kwamba uamuzi unahitaji 'kuruka kwa imani' zaidi ya jumla ya ukweli. "Mambo mengi ya kukosa ujasiri katika kufanya maamuzi, na ukweli huu wa kisaikolojia husaidia na, kwa wapinzani wake, pia huchochea majadiliano ya Derrida ya uamuzi kama inavyoonekana katika maandishi kama ""The Gift of Death,"" ""Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice,"" ""Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas,"" na ""Politics of Friendship.""" Katika Adieu kwa Emmanuel Levinas, Derrida anadai kwamba uamuzi lazima daima kurudi kwa mwingine, hata kama ni mwingine 'ndani' ya somo, na yeye anashutumu kwamba mpango ambao alibaki kabisa na tu 'wangu' bado itakuwa uamuzi (AEL 23-4). "Samuuli ya ""somo la mtu"" haijui ni nini kinachotokea katika uamuzi mdogo (PF 68:9) kwa sababu, kama anavyouliza, ""Je, hatungekuwa na haki kuona hapa kufunuliwa kwa immanence ya ego, uendelezaji wa kiotomatiki na wa moja kwa moja wa predicates au uwezekano wa mtu, bila kuvunjika kwa kupasuka ambayo inapaswa kutokea katika kila uamuzi tunaoita huru?""" Kwa maneno mengine, ikiwa uamuzi unafikiriwa kama unafuata tu kutoka kwa sifa fulani za tabia, basi haungekuwa uamuzi halisi. Kwa hiyo, Derrida anasisitiza tena umuhimu wa kuruka zaidi ya sababu za hesabu, na zaidi ya rasilimali za somo fulani la kujitegemea linalofikiria jambo linalozungumziwa. Uamuzi lazima ueleze kile kilicho nje ya udhibiti wa somo. Ikiwa uamuzi ni mfano wa dhana ambayo ni mara moja haiwezekani ndani ya mantiki yake mwenyewe na bado ni muhimu, basi si tu ni kutokuwamo kwetu kuamua kutolewa kifalsafa, lakini labda ni upendeleo. Kwa kweli, kazi ya Derrida imeelezwa kama "falsafa ya kusita", na neologism yake maarufu zaidi, différance, inasisitiza wazi kuahirisha, na ucheleweshaji wote ambao neno hili linamaanisha. "Kwa kuongezea, katika insha yake ya mapema ""Ukatili na Metaphysics,"" Derrida pia anadokeza kwamba usomaji wa mafanikio wa deconstructive unategemea kusimamishwa kwa chaguo: juu ya kusita kati ya ufunguzi wa maadili na jumla ya logocentric. """ "Hata ingawa Derrida amedokeza kwamba yeye ni kusita kutumia neno ""maadili"" kwa sababu ya ushirika logocentric, mtu ni kuongozwa na kuhitimisha kwamba ""maadili"" tabia (kwa ukosefu wa neno bora) ni bidhaa ya kuahirisha, na kuwa milele wazi kwa uwezekano badala ya kuchukua msimamo wa mwisho." Tatizo la kutokuwa na uamuzi pia linaonekana katika maandishi ya hivi karibuni ikiwa ni pamoja na Zawadi ya Kifo. Katika maandishi haya, Derrida inaonekana kuunga mkono sadaka ya dhana fulani ya maadili na universality kwa dhana ya singularity radical si tofauti na kwamba evinced na <unk>hyper-ethical<unk> sadaka kwamba Ibrahimu hufanya wa mwanawe juu ya Mlima Moriah, kulingana na dini ya Kiyahudi na Kikristo sawa (GD 71). "Kulingana na Derrida, ""wajibu wa kweli ni kuteleza kati ya mahitaji ya kile ambacho ni mwingine kabisa (katika kesi ya Abraham, Mungu, lakini pia mwingine yeyote maalum) na mahitaji ya jumla ya jamii.""" Wajibu ni kuvumilia jaribio hili la uamuzi usioweza kuamuliwa, ambapo kuhudhuria wito wa mwingine maalum bila shaka itahitaji kujitenga na "wengine wengine" na mahitaji yao ya kijamii. "Kama Derrida alivyosema, ""Hakuna uamuzi wowote ambao unaweza kuhalalishwa kabisa.""" "Derrida, kwa kuzingatia ""ukosefu wa uamuzi"" katika maamuzi yote, hakutaka kuelezea kutofanya kazi au utulivu wa kukata tamaa, na alisisitiza kwamba wazimu wa uamuzi pia unahitaji haraka na haraka." Hata hivyo, kile kinachopitia hufafanuliwa kama "jaribio la kutokuwa na uamuzi" (Lk 210) na kile kinachohusika katika kuvumilia jaribio hili kinaonekana kuwa kiumbe mwenye uchungu wa kiasi. Katika mahojiano na Richard Beardsworth, Derrida anaelezea tatizo la undecidability kama ifuatavyo: Hata hivyo makini moja ni katika maandalizi ya nadharia ya uamuzi, wakati wa uamuzi, kama kuna kuwa na uamuzi, lazima kuwa heterogeneous kwa mkusanyiko wa maarifa. Vinginevyo, hakuna daraka. Katika maana hii, mtu anayepiga uamuzi lazima tu asijue kila kitu... uamuzi, ikiwa kuna moja, lazima uendelee kuelekea siku zijazo ambazo hazijulikani, ambazo haziwezi kutarajiwa. "Kusema kwamba uamuzi hauwezi kutabiri wakati ujao ni bila shaka kiasi fulani kinyume na intuitive, lakini Derrida ""kukataa ya utabiri si tu kukataa wazo la jadi la kuamua juu ya msingi wa kupima na ndani ya kuwakilisha chaguzi fulani." Kwa kusema kwamba utabiri hauwezekani, yeye anamaanisha kufanya uhakika wa jumla kwamba haijalishi jinsi tunaweza kutarajia uamuzi wowote lazima daima kuvunja mifumo hiyo ya utabiri. Uamuzi lazima uwe tofauti kabisa na maandalizi yoyote ya awali kwa ajili yake. "Derrida anasema katika ""Sera ya Urafiki,"" uamuzi lazima ""ushangae ubinafsi wa somo"" (PF 68), na ni katika kufanya hii kuruka mbali na hoja ya hesabu kwamba Derrida anadai kwamba wajibu unajumuisha (PF 69)." "Huenda sehemu ya wazi zaidi ya falsafa ya baadaye ya Derrida ni utetezi wake wa tout autre, ""mwingine kabisa,"" na ""zawadi ya kifo"" itakuwa lengo letu kuu katika kuelezea nini hii exaltation ya mwingine kabisa inaweza kumaanisha." Jaribio lolote la kuelezea maandishi haya mafupi lakini magumu linapaswa kuhusisha kutambua kutoweza kulinganishwa kwa kitu fulani kati ya kipekee na cha ulimwengu, na mahitaji mawili yaliyowekwa kwa mtu yeyote anayekusudia kutenda kwa uwajibikaji. Kwa Derrida, paradoksi ya tabia ya kuwajibika inamaanisha kwamba daima kuna swali la kuwajibika mbele ya mwingine wa pekee (kwa mfano. Mtu mpendwa, Mungu, na kadhalika. Lakini pia, sisi ni daima kuelekezwa kwa wajibu wetu kwa wengine kwa ujumla na kwa kile sisi kushiriki nao. "Derrida anasema kwamba aina hii ya aporia, au tatizo, ni mara nyingi kupuuzwa na ""kiongozi wa wajibu"" ambao kudhani kwamba uwajibikaji na wajibu katika nyanja zote za maisha, kama kwamba kuwa na hatia mbele ya sheria ya binadamu, au hata mbele ya mapenzi ya Mungu, ni rahisi kabisa kuanzishwa. """ "Hawa ndio watu ambao wanasisitiza kwamba miongozo halisi ya maadili inapaswa kutolewa na mwanafalsafa yeyote anayestahili ""chumvi yake"" (GD 67) na ambao hupuuza ugumu unaohusishwa na dhana kama vile wajibu, ambayo inahitaji kitu muhimu tofauti na tu kutenda kwa uaminifu (GD 63)." Uchunguzi wa Derrida wa jukumu la ajabu na la kushangaza la Ibrahimu mbele ya matakwa ya Mungu, ambalo ni kutoa dhabihu ya mwanawe wa pekee Isaka, lakini pia katika kuachana na utaratibu wa maadili kupitia ukimya wake juu ya kitendo hiki (GD 60: 57), imekusudiwa kutatanisha aina hii ya wasiwasi wa maadili ambayo huweka jukumu katika ulimwengu wa jumla. "Derrida hata anatoa maoni kwamba ""dhana hii ya kawaida ya wajibu, ambayo inasisitiza kwamba mtu anapaswa kutenda kulingana na kanuni ya jumla ambayo ina uwezo wa kuthibitishwa na kuhalalishwa katika uwanja wa umma, inapaswa kubadilishwa na kitu karibu na ubinafsi wa Abrahamian ambapo mahitaji ya mwingine wa pekee (kwa mfano, ""mtu mwingine"" au ""mtu mwingine") yanapaswa kuendelezwa.""" Mungu) ni muhimu tofauti na mahitaji ya maadili ya jamii yetu (GD 61, 66). Derrida anaeleza kwa ufupi ni kwa kadiri gani anataka kuunga mkono dhana kama hiyo ya wajibu, na pia juu ya suala lote la kama nia ya Abrahamu ya kuua ni kitendo cha imani, au ni kosa lisiloweza kusamehewa. "Kama alivyoandika, ""Abrahamu ni wakati huo huo, wa maadili zaidi na wa maadili mabaya zaidi, mwenye wajibu zaidi na asiye na wajibu zaidi"" (Genesis 72:3)." Uwezo huu wa kutofautisha ni, bila shaka, sifa ya kuamua ya deconstruction, ambayo imekuwa kwa njia mbalimbali pilloried na kusifiwa kwa kukataa hii ya kupendekeza chochote ambacho utamaduni inaweza kuhesabiwa kuwa thesis. "Hata hivyo, ni wazi kwamba katika ""The Gift of Death,"" Derrida anakusudia kutuweka huru kutoka kwa dhana ya kawaida kwamba wajibu unahusishwa na tabia inayokubaliana na kanuni za jumla zinazoweza kustahili haki katika uwanja wa umma." liberalism). Kwa kupinga maelezo kama hayo, yeye anasisitiza "upendeleo mkubwa" wa matakwa yaliyowekwa juu ya Abrahamu na Mungu (Genesis 60: 68-79) na yale ambayo yanaweza kuwekwa juu yetu na wapendwa wetu wenyewe. Maadili, kwa kutegemea kwake kwa ujumla, lazima daima kuachwa kama kipengele cha kutoweza kuepukika cha hali ya binadamu na mahitaji yake ya aphoretic ya kuamua. "Asrida anasema, ""kuandika juu ya sababu moja badala ya nyingine, katika kufuatilia kazi moja badala ya nyingine, katika kutumia wakati na familia ya mtu badala ya kazi, mtu bila shaka hupuuza wengine wengine, na hii ni hali ya kila maisha.""" "Hakuna mtu anayeweza kujibu wito, ombi, wajibu, au hata upendo wa mwingine bila kumdhabihu mwingine, wengine wengine. """ "Kwa mfano, kama ilivyoelezwa katika kitabu cha Derrida, ""tamaa ya Kibuddha ya kuwa na uhusiano wa kipekee na mtu yeyote na huruma sawa kwa kila mtu ni ndoto isiyoweza kupatikana.""" Kwa kweli, yeye hudokeza kwamba jumuiya ya ulimwengu wote mzima ambayo haimwondoi mtu yeyote ni kinyume cha maoni. Kulingana naye, hii ni kwa sababu: <unk>Mimi ni wajibu kwa mtu yeyote (yaani, kwa mwingine yeyote) tu kwa kushindwa katika wajibu wangu kwa wengine wote, kwa ujumla wa maadili au kisiasa. Na siwezi kamwe kuhalalisha dhabihu hii; lazima daima kukaa kimya juu yake... Nini binds mimi kwa hii au kwamba moja, bado hatimaye unjustifiable <unk> (GD 70). "Derrida anasema kwamba ""wajibu kwa mtu yeyote ni uwezekano tu kwa kuwa wajibu kwa wengine wengine, yaani, kwa watu wengine na uwezekano kwamba haunt yoyote na kila kuwepo.""" Hii inatuleta kwa neno ambalo Derrida amefufua kutoka kwa ushirika wake na Walter Benjamin na utamaduni wa Kiyahudi kwa ujumla. "Jina la ""Messianic"" linatokana na neno la ""Messianism.""" Kulingana na Derrida, neno messianism linarejelea hasa dini za Masiya <unk> yaani. dini za Kiislamu, Kiyahudi na Kikristo. Dini hizo hutoa Masihi wa sifa zinazojulikana, na mara nyingi mmoja anayetarajiwa kufika wakati au mahali fulani hususa. "Masihi ni ""mwenyeji"" wa dini ya Kikristo, na ni ""mwenyeji"" wa dini ya Kikristo, ambao ni ""mwenyeji"" wa dini ya Kikristo, ambao ni ""mwenyeji"" wa dini ya Kikristo." "Kama ilivyoelezwa hapo juu, mojawapo ya sifa muhimu za Masihi ni kwamba ""hakuna mtu yeyote ambaye hawezi kuonekana kuwa na uwezo wa kufanya hivyo.""" """Jinsia inaweza kuonekana kuwa hali ya ajabu ya kuunganisha na kile kilicho nje ya ulimwengu huu, kitu kingine kabisa, lakini ni moja tu ya mengi." Sasa, Derrida si mtu anayechambua dini na imani ya kwamba ni Masihi. Katika suala muhimu, messianic inategemea messianisms mbalimbali na Derrida anakiri kwamba hawezi kusema ambayo ni zaidi ya awali. "Messianism ya Abrahamu katika jukumu lake la pekee mbele ya Mungu, kwa Derrida, inafunua muundo wa kimesiya wa kuwepo kwa ujumla, kwa kuwa sisi sote tunashiriki uhusiano sawa na tofauti, hata ikiwa hatujaita na kuelezea uzoefu huo kulingana na template iliyotolewa na dini fulani. """ Hata hivyo, wito wa Derrida kwa mwingine kabisa, wito wake kwa mwingine kabisa 'kuja', si wito kwa mwingine wa kudumu au anayetambuliwa wa sifa zinazojulikana, kama inavyoweza kusemwa katika uzoefu wa kawaida wa kidini. Mwingine wake kabisa hawezi kuamuliwa na hawezi kamwe kufika kwa kweli. Derrida mara nyingi anasimulia hadithi ya Maurice Blanchot ambapo Masihi alikuwa kweli katika malango ya mji, disguised katika nguo. Baada ya muda, mwishowe Mtakatifu alitambuliwa na mtu mmoja, lakini yule mtu huyo hakuweza kufikiria swali lingine muhimu zaidi kuliko hili: 'Utakutana lini?' Hata wakati Masihi ni <unk>there<unk>, yeye lazima bado kuwa bado kuja, na hii inatuleta nyuma ya tofauti kati ya messianic na messianisms mbalimbali ya kihistoria. """Mashine ya umilele wa kimesiya ni wazi kwa kuja kwa mwingine asiyejulikana kabisa, lakini messianisms halisi ya kihistoria ni wazi kwa kuja kwa mwingine maalum wa sifa zinazojulikana.""" "Messianic inahusu hasa muundo wa maisha yetu ambayo inahusisha kusubiri, kusubiri hata katika shughuli, na uwazi usio na mwisho kuelekea siku zijazo ambazo haziwezi kamwe kuamuliwa na upeo wa umuhimu ambao sisi bila shaka huleta juu ya siku zijazo zinazowezekana. """ Kwa maneno mengine, Derrida haarejelei siku zijazo ambazo siku moja zitakuwa sasa (au dhana maalum ya mwokozi ambaye atafika), lakini kwa ufunguzi kuelekea siku zijazo zisizojulikana ambazo lazima ziwe na kile tunachokichukulia kuwa "kuwepo" na kwa hivyo pia hufanya iwe "hawezekani". "Kutenganisha ambayo ilifurahisha aina yoyote ya hadithi kubwa ya unabii, kama hadithi ya Marxist kuhusu harakati ya historia kuelekea siku zijazo zilizowekwa mapema, ambazo, mara moja zinapofikiwa, zitafanya dhana kama historia na maendeleo kuwa ya kizamani, itakuwa ni alama nyingine ya ""logocentrism"" na uwezekano wa kutenganisha." Hasa ili kuepuka matatizo ambayo messianisms kama hizo kuzalisha <unk> eg. Kuua kwa jina la maendeleo, kuharibu kwa sababu ya kujua mapenzi ya Mungu bora kuliko wengine, nk. "Derrida anasema: ""Ninajihadhari kusema ""Let it come"" kwa sababu kama mwingine ni hasa kile ambacho haikubuniwa, mpango au inventiveness deconstructive inaweza tu kujumuisha katika kufungua, katika unclosing, katika destabilizing foreclosure miundo, hivyo kuruhusu kwa njia ya mwingine.""" "Derrida amekuwa akijishughulisha sana na kile kinachoitwa ""aporia ya uwezekano-usiowezekana"" (aporia awali ilikuwa neno la Kigiriki linalomaanisha ""puzzle,"" lakini sasa linamaanisha kitu kama mgogoro au utata)." Hasa, Derrida ameelezea utata ambao unakumba dhana kama vile kutoa, ukaribishaji-wageni, kusamehe na kuomboleza. Yeye anadai kwamba hali ya uwezekano wao pia, na mara moja, hali ya kutowezekana kwao. Katika sehemu hii, nitajaribu kufunua mantiki ya pamoja ambayo aporias hizi hutegemea. "Aporia inayozunguka zawadi inazunguka wazo la ""paradoxical"" kwamba zawadi halisi haiwezi kueleweka kama zawadi." "Derrida anasema katika kitabu chake ""Given Time"" kwamba ""kipaji cha kweli lazima kiwe nje ya mahitaji ya kupinga ya kutoa na kuchukua, na zaidi ya nia ya kibinafsi au sababu ya hesabu.""" "Kwa mujibu wake, zawadi pia ni kitu ambacho hakiwezi kuonekana kama hivyo, kwani ni kuharibiwa na kitu chochote kinachoonyesha usawa au malipo, na pia na kitu chochote kinachoonyesha kujua au kutambua.""" Hii inaweza kuonekana kinyume na intuitive, lakini hata rahisi'shukrani' kwa mfano, ambayo wote wawili anatambua uwepo wa zawadi na pia inapendekeza aina fulani ya usawa na zawadi hiyo, inaweza kuonekana kufuta zawadi (cf. MDM 149). Kwa kujibu kwa heshima kwa 'asante', mara nyingi kuna, na labda hata daima, dhana kwamba kwa sababu ya utambuzi huu mtu haashikili tena kwa yule mwingine ambaye ametoa, na kwamba hakuna zaidi inayoweza kutarajiwa kutoka kwa mtu ambaye amejibu hivyo. Kwa maana hiyo, zawadi huingizwa katika mzunguko wa kutoa na kupokea, ambapo tendo zuri lazima lifuatewe na jibu linalofaa na lenye haki. Kama zawadi ni kuhusishwa na amri ya kujibu, inakuwa kulazimisha kwa mpokeaji, na hata inakuwa fursa ya kuchukua kwa <unk>mtoaji<unk>, ambaye anaweza kutoa tu kupokea uthibitisho kutoka kwa mwingine kwamba wao kwa kweli wamewapa. Bila shaka kuna mifano mingine mingi ya jinsi "zawadi" inaweza kutumika, na si lazima makusudi, kupata faida. Bila shaka, huenda ikawa vigumu kupinga kwamba hata kama ni vigumu kiakili kutoa bila pia kupokea (na kwa njia ambayo ni sawa na kuchukua) hii si yenyewe ni kupinga mantiki ya kutoa halisi. Hata hivyo, kulingana na Derrida, mazungumzo yake hayana maana ya kudai tu ya kihistoria au ya kisaikolojia juu ya ugumu wa kupita dhana isiyo na ukomavu na ya ubinafsi ya kutoa. Kinyume chake, anataka kutatanisha uwezekano tu wa kutoa ambayo inaweza kutenganishwa kwa wazi na kupokea na kuchukua. Kwa Derrida, zawadi ya kweli inahitaji kutokujulikana kwa mtoaji, kwa hivyo hakuna faida inayopatikana katika kutoa. Mtoaji hawezi hata kutambua kwamba wao ni kutoa, kwa hiyo itakuwa reabsorb zawadi yao kwa mtu mwingine kama aina fulani ya ushuhuda kwa thamani ya binafsi. "Hiyo ni aina ya mantiki ya kujipongeza ambayo kwa usemi huuliza swali: ""Ni ajabu gani mimi kumpa mtu huyu kile ambacho amekuwa akitaka daima, na bila hata kumruhusu ajue kwamba mimi ni wajibu?""" Hii ni mfano wa kupita kiasi, lakini Derrida anadai kwamba hali kama hiyo huathiri kutoa yote kwa njia za wazi zaidi au chini. Kwa ajili yake, mantiki ya zawadi halisi inahitaji kwamba nafsi na wengine kuwa radically tofauti, na hawana wajibu au madai juu ya kila mmoja wa aina yoyote. "Yeye anasema kwamba ""zawadi ya kweli haipaswi kuhusisha hofu ya tendo zuri lililofanywa, wala utambuzi wa upande mwingine kwamba wamepokea, na hii inaonekana kufanya ukweli wa zawadi yoyote kuwa haiwezekani.""" "Kwa mujibu wa Derrida, ""nguvu ya kuwepo kwa mahitaji haya ya altruism kamili haiwezi kamwe kutosheleza, na bado ni wazi kwamba haiwezi kamwe kutimizwa, na hii inahakikisha kwamba hali ya uwezekano wa zawadi ni inextricably kuhusishwa na kutowezekana kwake.""" Kwa Derrida, hakuna suluhisho kwa aina hii ya tatizo, na hakuna dalili ya dialectic ambayo inaweza kuunganisha inaonekana incommensurability katika ambayo uwezekano ina maana ya kutowezekana na kinyume chake. Wakati huo huo, hata hivyo, yeye hana nia tu ya kutetemeka katika hyperbolic na kujitegemea-referential paradoxes. Kuna maana ambayo deconstruction kweli inatafuta kutoa halisi, ukaribishaji, msamaha na maombolezo, hata ambapo inathibitisha kuwa dhana hizi ni milele elusive na kamwe inaweza kweli kutimizwa. Pia ni jambo la maana kufikiria aporia ambayo Derrida huhusianisha na ukaribishaji-wageni. Kwa mujibu wa Derrida, ukaribishaji wa kweli mbele ya idadi yoyote ya wengine wasiojulikana sio, kwa kweli, hali inayowezekana (OH 135, GD 70, AEL 50, OCF 16). Kama tunazingatia kuacha kila kitu tunachojaribu kumiliki na kukiita chetu, basi wengi wetu tunaweza kuelewana na jinsi ngumu kuanzisha ukaribishaji wowote kamili ungekuwa. Hata hivyo, Derrida anasisitiza kwamba wazo lote la ukaribishaji-wageni hutegemea dhana kama hiyo ya kujitolea na haiwezekani bila hiyo (OCF 22). Kwa kweli, yeye husema kwamba ni mvutano huo wa ndani unaoendeleza wazo hilo. Asrida anaeleza wazi, kuna mfano zaidi wa kuwepo kwa mvutano huu, kwa kuwa dhana ya ukaribishaji inahitaji mtu kuwa 'bwana' wa nyumba, nchi au taifa (na kwa hivyo kudhibiti). Jambo la msingi ni rahisi: ili kuwa mwenye ukaribishaji-wageni, ni lazima mtu awe na uwezo wa kukaribisha. Kwa hiyo ukaribishaji-wageni unadai umiliki wa mali na pia unashiriki katika tamaa ya kuanzisha aina fulani ya utambulisho wa kibinafsi. "Kwenye suala la ukaribishaji-wageni, ""mkaribishaji"" lazima awe na uwezo wa kuwaongoza wageni." Hii ni kwa sababu kama wageni kuchukua juu ya nyumba kwa nguvu, basi mwenyeji ni tena kuwa ukaribishaji-wageni kuelekea yao hasa kwa sababu wao si tena katika udhibiti wa hali. "Kwa Derrida, hii inamaanisha kwamba jaribio lolote la kuwa mwenyeji daima ni sehemu ya ""kuweka wageni chini ya udhibiti, kufunga mipaka, utaifa, na hata kutengwa kwa makundi au makabila fulani.""" Hii ni Derrida ya "inawezekana" dhana ya ukaribishaji, ambayo dhana zetu zaidi ya nia nzuri ya ukaribishaji kufanya "wengine wengine" kama wageni na wakimbizi (tazama. (H.H. 135, G.D. 68; kwa Kiingereza) Iwe mtu anataja wasiwasi wa kimataifa wa sasa na udhibiti wa mpaka, au tu uzio wa vitongoji na mfumo wa kengele, inaonekana kwamba ukaribishaji-wageni daima huweka aina fulani ya kikomo juu ya mahali ambapo mwingine anaweza kuvunja, na kwa hivyo ina mwelekeo wa kuwa badala ya kukaribisha. Kwa upande mwingine, pamoja na kudai aina fulani ya udhibiti wa nyumba, nchi au taifa, kuna maana ambayo dhana ya ukaribishaji inahitaji kukaribisha yeyote, au chochote, ambacho kinaweza kuwa na haja ya ukaribishaji huo. "Kutokana na hili, ukaribishaji-wageni usio na masharti, au tunaweza kusema ukaribishaji-wageni ""usiowezekana,"" kwa hivyo unahusisha kuachana na uamuzi na udhibiti kuhusu ni nani atakayepokea ukaribishaji-wageni huo." Kwa maneno mengine, ukaribishaji-wageni pia huhitaji kutokuwa na ustadi, na kuachana na madai yote ya mali, au umiliki. Hata hivyo, ikiwa ndivyo ilivyo, uwezekano wa kuendelea wa ukaribishaji-wageni kwa hivyo unazungukwa, kwa kuwa hakuna tena uwezekano wa kumkaribisha mtu yeyote, kama tena, hakuna umiliki au udhibiti. Derrida anatambua aporia nyingine kuhusiana na kama au si kusamehe mtu ambaye ametusababisha mateso au maumivu makubwa. "Kama ilivyoelezwa hapo juu, ""paradox hii inazunguka nadharia kwamba ikiwa mtu anasamehe kitu ambacho kwa kweli kinaweza kusamehewa, basi mtu hujiingiza tu katika hoja ya hesabu na kwa hivyo hasamehe kweli.""" Kwa kawaida katika mahojiano, lakini pia katika maandishi yake ya hivi karibuni On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness, Derrida anadai kwamba kulingana na mantiki yake mwenyewe ya ndani, msamaha wa kweli lazima ujumuishe haiwezekani: ambayo ni, msamaha wa kosa la "kusamehewa" - kwa mfano. "Dhambi ya kifo" (OCF 32, cf. OH 39). Kwa hiyo kuna maana ambayo msamaha lazima uwe "mjinga" na "usio na fahamu" (OCF 39, 49), na lazima pia ubaki nje ya, au tofauti na, busara ya kisiasa na kisheria. "Hii ""kusamehe"" bila masharti waziwazi inazuia uhitaji wa kuomba msamaha au toba na chama cha hatia, ingawa Derrida anatambua kwamba dhana hii safi ya msamaha lazima daima kuwepo katika mvutano na msamaha zaidi masharti ambapo msamaha ni kweli wanadai. """ Hata hivyo, yeye anadai kwamba msamaha huu wa masharti ni kiasi zaidi cha msamaha na upatanisho kuliko msamaha wa kweli (OCF 51). Bila shaka, mazungumzo hayo yanaanza kuonekana kuwa ya kawaida. "Mtazamo wa Derrida wa msamaha unazunguka kufunua ""paradox ya msingi ambayo inahakikisha kwamba msamaha hauwezi kumaliza au kumaliza, lazima daima uwe wazi, kama kuvunjika kwa kudumu, au jeraha ambalo linakataa kupona.""" Mshuko huu wa msamaha unategemea, katika moja ya pande zake mbili, juu ya kutoelewana kabisa kati ya nafsi na mwingine. Derrida anasema waziwazi kwamba <unk>msamaha wa kweli lazima ujumuishe singularities mbili: mwenye hatia na mhasiriwa. Mara tu mtu wa tatu anapingilia kati, mtu anaweza tena kuzungumza juu ya msamaha, upatanisho, fidia, nk, lakini hakika si juu ya msamaha kwa maana ya karibu <unk> (OCF 42). Kwa kuwa yeye pia anakiri kuwa ni vigumu kufikiria kukutana uso kwa uso bila mtu wa tatu - kama lugha yenyewe lazima itumie kazi kama hiyo ya upatanishi (OCF 48) - msamaha umekamatwa katika aporia ambayo inahakikisha kuwa ukweli wake wa empirical unaonekana kuwa hauwezekani kabisa. Kwa muhtasari, sababu ya dhana ya Derrida ya msamaha imekamatwa katika paradoksi isiyoweza kutenganishwa ni kwa sababu msamaha kamili unahitaji mapambano ya moja kwa moja kati ya nafsi na mwingine, wakati msamaha wa masharti unahitaji kuvunja makundi kama vile nafsi na mwingine, ama kwa upande wa upatanishi, au kwa kutambua njia ambazo tayari tumevunjika na mwingine. "Derrida anasema: ""Kama tunajua kitu chochote kuhusu mwingine, au hata kuelewa nia yao kwa njia ndogo, msamaha huu kamili hauwezi tena kutokea.""" Derrida hawezi kutoa suluhisho kuhusu mgogoro unaoendelea kati ya dhana hizi mbili (kati ya msamaha unaowezekana na usiowezekana, kati ya msamaha ambapo ombi la msamaha linaombwa na msamaha kamili zaidi). "Hata hivyo, kuna uwezekano wa kuwa na ""mzunguko wa aporia"" katika sehemu zote mbili za aporia, na kwa hivyo inaweza kuathiri athari za aporia." Katika kitabu chake cha Memoirs for Paul de Man, ambacho kiliandikwa karibu mara tu baada ya kifo cha de Man mwaka 1983, Derrida anaelezea umuhimu wa kisiasa wa ushirika wa Nazi wa mwenzake katika ujana wake, na pia anazungumzia uchungu wa kupoteza rafiki yake. Hoja ya Derrida kuhusu maombolezo inashikamana na mantiki sawa na ile ambayo imehusishwa naye katika makala hii yote. Yeye anaonyesha kwamba kinachoitwa "mafanikio" maombolezo ya marehemu mwingine kweli kushindwa <unk> au angalau ni uaminifu unfaithful <unk> kwa sababu mtu mwingine inakuwa sehemu ya sisi, na katika hii interiorization alterity yao halisi ni tena kuheshimiwa. Kwa upande mwingine, kushindwa kuomboleza kifo cha mwingine kwa kushangaza inaonekana kufanikiwa, kwa sababu uwepo wa mtu mwingine katika nje yao ni mrefu (MDM 6). "Derrida anasema, ""Kuna maana ambayo interiorization aborted ni wakati huo huo heshima kwa mwingine kama mwingine.""" Kwa hiyo kuna uwezekano wa kufiwa kwa mtu asiyewezekana, ambapo njia pekee ya kuomboleza ni kutoweza kufanya hivyo. "Kwa hivyo, hata kama hii ni jinsi anavyowasilisha tatizo hilo mwanzoni, Derrida pia anashughulikia formula hii ya ""mafanikio hayana mafanikio, kushindwa hufanikiwa"" (MDM 35)." Katika insha yake 'Fors: The English Words of Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok', Derrida anataja tena mifano miwili ya aina ya uvamizi kati ya nafsi na wengine ambao mara kwa mara huhusishwa na maombolezo. Kwa kukopa kutoka kwa nadharia za baada ya Freudian za maombolezo, yeye anaweka (ingawa baadaye huchafua) tofauti kati ya introjection, ambayo ni upendo kwa mwingine ndani yangu, na kuingizwa, ambayo inahusisha kuhifadhi mwingine kama mfuko, au mwili wa kigeni ndani ya mwili wako mwenyewe. Kwa Freud, na pia kwa wanasaikolojia Abraham na Torek ambao kazi Derrida inachukulia, huzuni ya mafanikio ni hasa kuhusu introjection ya mwingine. Kuhifadhiwa kwa mtu mwingine tofauti na tofauti ndani ya nafsi (kifikra ya kisaikolojia), kama ilivyo katika kuingizwa, inachukuliwa kuwa ambapo maombolezo huacha kuwa majibu ya kawaida na badala yake inakuwa ya ugonjwa. Kwa kawaida, Derrida anageuza utaratibu huu kwa kusisitiza kwamba kuna maana ambayo hali ya kuingizwa inayoonekana kuwa ya ugonjwa kwa kweli inaheshimu zaidi tofauti ya mtu mwingine. Baada ya yote, kuingizwa inamaanisha kwamba moja haijaingizwa kabisa kwa mwingine, kwani bado kuna tofauti na kutofautiana (EO 57). Kwa upande mwingine, Ibrahimu na Torok's kinachoitwa 'kawaida' maombolezo inaweza kushtakiwa ya interiorising mtu mwingine kwa kiwango kwamba wamekuwa assimilated na hata metaphorically cannibalized. Derrida anaona introjection hii kuwa ukosefu wa uaminifu kwa mwingine. Hata hivyo, akaunti ya Derrida si rahisi sana kama kwa unreservedly valorize kuingizwa kwa mtu mwingine, hata kama yeye anasisitiza mfano huu katika juhudi ya kupinga tafsiri canonical ya huzuni mafanikio. Yeye pia anatambua kwamba zaidi ya binafsi <unk>huhifadhi kipengele kigeni ndani yake, zaidi ni kutengwa <unk> (Fors xvii). Kama tunakataa kushirikiana na wafu wengine, sisi pia kutengwa yao ugeni kutoka kwetu wenyewe na hivyo kuzuia mwingiliano wowote mabadiliko na wao. "Kama fetishized katika externality yao kwa njia hiyo, wafu wengine ni kweli lifeless na ni muhimu kwamba Derrida anaelezea kifo cha ""Mtu"" katika suala la hasara ya kubadilishana na fursa za mabadiliko kwamba yeye iliyotolewa. """ Kwa hiyo, maoni ya Derrida yanaonekana kuwa katika maombolezo, "tofauti ya mwingine" mtu hupinga mchakato wa kuingizwa pamoja na mchakato wa introjection. Mwingine hawezi kuhifadhiwa kama chombo cha kigeni, wala kuingizwa ndani kabisa. "Mwanzoni mwa kitabu chake cha Memoirs, Derrida alitoa maoni kwamba ""wajibikaji kwa mwingine ni kuheshimu na hata kusisitiza upinzani huu"" (M.D.M. 160, 238)." - Matendo ya Fasihi, ed. Attridge, New York: Routledge, 1992 (AL). - Adieu kwa Emmanuel Lévinas, trans. Brault & Naas, Stanford, California: Chuo Kikuu cha Stanford Press, 1999 (AEL). "Mchoro wa ""Mapokeo ya Usalama"" wa Bennington, G. Jacques Derrida, Chuo Kikuu cha Chicago Press, 1993" "Kutokana na ""Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness"" (London, 2001) na ""The New World Order"" (London, 2001) ni moja ya vitabu vya kihistoria zaidi." - Deconstruction na Uwezekano wa Haki, (inc. <unk>Force of the Law<unk>), eds. Cornell, Carlson, & Benjamin, New York: Routledge, 1992 (DPJ). - Uenezaji, trans. Johnson, Chicago: Chuo Kikuu cha Chicago Press, 1981 (D). - <unk><unk>Kula vizuri<unk> au hesabu ya somo: Mahojiano na Jacques Derrida<unk> katika Nani Anakuja Baada ya Somo? eds. "Cadava, Connor, & Nancy, New York: ""Routledge, 1991, p. 96-119." - The Ear of the Other: Otobiography, Transference, Tafsiri, tafsiri. Kamuf, ed. McDonald, New York: Vitabu vya Schocken, 1985 (EO). - Edmund Husserl's ‘Origin of Geometry: An Introduction, trans. "Kama ilivyoelezwa katika kitabu cha ""Ducks University Press"" cha mwaka wa 1972: ""Kuna uwezekano mkubwa kwamba""" - <unk>Fors: Maneno ya Kiingereza ya Nicolas Abraham na Maria Torok<unk>, tafsiri. Johnson, katika The Wolfman's Magic Word: A Cryptonomy, Abraham, N., & Torok, M., trans. "Miniapolis, Minnesota: Chuo Kikuu cha Minnesota Press, 1986 (Fors).""" - Zawadi ya Kifo, trans. Wills, Chicago: Chuo Kikuu cha Chicago Press, 1995 (1991) (GD). - Given Time: i. Fedha bandia, trans. Kamouf, Chicago: Chuo Kikuu cha Chicago Press, 1992 (GT). - <unk>Hostipitality<unk> katika Angelaki: Jarida la Theoretical Humanities, Vol. 5 (Soma pia: Nambari ya 3 ya Desemba 2000) - Le Toucher: Jean-Luc Nancy, Paris: Galilée, 2000 (T). - <unk>Le Toucher: Touch <unk> kumgusa<unk>, katika Paragraph, trans. Kamau, 16:2, 1993, p. 122-57. - Limited Inc. (inc. <unk>Afterword<unk>), ed. Graff, trans. "Weber, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, toleo la 1998 (LI).""" - Margins of Philosophy, trans. "Mwaka wa 1982: ""Ushindi wa Chuo Kikuu cha Chicago Press""" - Memoirs: kwa Paul de Man, tafsiri. "Lindsay, Culler, Cadavra, & Kamuff, New York: Chuo Kikuu cha Columbia Press, 1989 (MDM).""" - Memoirs of the Blind: The Self-Portrait and Other Ruins, trans. Brault & Naas, Chicago: Chuo Kikuu cha Chicago Press, 1993 (1991) (MB). - Monolingualism ya Nyingine au Protesi ya Asili, trans. "Mensh, Stanford: Chuo Kikuu cha Stanford Press, 1996 (MO).""" "Nietzsche na Mashine: Mahojiano na Jacques Derrida, katika ""Jarida la Mafunzo ya Nietzsche,"" toleo la saba, Spring 1994." Ya Grammatolojia, tafsiri. Spivak, Baltimore: John Hopkins Chuo Kikuu Press, 1976 (OG). - Derrida, J., & Dufourmantelle, A., Of Hospitality, tafsiri. "Bolby, Stanford: ""Mafunzo ya Chuo Kikuu cha Stanford, 2000 (OH)." - On the Name (inc. <unk>Passions<unk>), ed. D. D. Dutoit, Stanford, 1995 (Utaalamu wa Utafiti wa Chuo Kikuu cha Stanford) - <unk>Ousia na Gramme: A Note to a Footnote in Being and Time<unk> trans. Casey katika Phenomenology katika Perspective, ed. "Hatimaye, katika kitabu chake cha The Hague, ""Nijhof"" (1970) anasema hivi:" - Parages, Paris: Galilée, 1986. Points... Interviews, 1974-1995, ed. Weber, tafsiri. Kamau et al, Stanford: Chuo Kikuu cha Stanford Press, 1995 (P). - Siasa ya Urafiki, trans. Collins, New York: Verso, 1997 (PF). - Msimamo, trans. "Bass, London: Athlone Press, 1981 (1972) (PO) ""; na ""Mungu"" (PO) " - <unk>Psyche: Inventions of the Other<unk> katika Reading De Man Reading, eds. Waters & Godzich, Minneapolis: Chuo Kikuu cha Minnesota Press, 1989 (RDR). - Spectres ya Marx: Hali ya deni, kazi ya maombolezo na International Mpya, tafsiri. "Kamuf, New York: Routledge, 1994 (SM).""" - <unk>Speech and Phenomena<unk> na Other Essays on Husserl's Theory of Signs, trans. "Alison, Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1973 (S.P.): ""Kutoka kwa Mfano wa Yesu""" - Kazi ya Maombolezo, eds. Brault & Naas, Chicago: Chuo Kikuu cha Chicago Press, 2001 (WM). - Kuandika na Tofauti, trans. "Mwaka wa 1978: ""Ushindi wa Chuo Kikuu cha Chicago"" (Ushindi wa Chuo Kikuu cha Chicago Press, 1978), ""Ushindi wa Chuo Kikuu cha Chicago"" (Ushindi wa Chuo Kikuu cha Chicago Press, 1978), ""Ushindi wa Chuo Kikuu cha Chicago Press, 1978,"" ""Ushindi wa Chuo Kikuu cha Chicago Press, 1967.""" Bennington, G., Interrupting Derrida, Warwick Studies in European Philosophy, London: Routledge, 2000. Bennington, G., Jacques Derrida, Chicago: Chuo Kikuu cha Chicago Press, 1993. "Kama ilivyoelezwa katika kitabu chake ""Deconstruction in a Nutshell"" cha mwaka 1997 cha Fordham University Press." "Kama ilivyoandikwa katika kitabu cha ""The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida"" cha Bloomington, Indiana University Press, mwaka 1997." "Critchley, S. The Ethics of Deconstruction: Derrida na Levinas, Oxford, Uingereza: Blackwell, 1992.""" "Kuller, J. ""On Deconstruction: Theory and Criticism after Structuralism"" (Kuller, J., On Deconstruction: Theory and Criticism after Structuralism), London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983) ni kitabu cha kwanza cha kitabu cha kwanza cha Kiingereza kilichochapishwa mwaka wa 1983." "Gasquet, R., ""Uvumbuzi wa Tofauti: juu ya Jacques Derrida,"" Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1994." "Gasquet, R. The Mirror: Derrida na Falsafa ya Reflection, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1986.""" "Hart, K., The Trespass of the Sign: Deconstruction, Theology and Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. ""Hart, K., The Trespass of the Sign: Deconstruction, Theology and Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989" "Harvey, I. Derrida na Uchumi wa Tofauti: Mafunzo katika Phenomenology na Existential Falsafa, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986.""" "Hawl, C. Derrida, ""Dekonstruksioni kutoka Phenomenology kwa Ethics,"" Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999." "Krehl, D., ""The Purest of Bastards: Works of Art, Affirmation and Mourning in the Thought of Jacques Derrida,"" Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania University Press, 2000, ilitumwa zaidi ya mwaka mmoja uliopita" "Kama ilivyoelezwa katika kitabu cha ""Derrida, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press,"" ilitumwa mwaka wa 1987." "Patrick M. Derrida, ""Uwajibu na Siasa,"" Avebury Series in Philosophy, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 1997" - Silverman, H., ed. "Derrida na Deconstruction, New York: Routledge, 1989.""" "Wood, D., ""The Deconstruction of Time: Contemporary Studies in Philosophy and the Human Sciences,"" Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1989" - Wood, D., mkurugenzi. Derrida: Msomaji Mshindani, Oxford: Blackwell, 1992. - Wood, D., & Bernasconi, R., eds. "Derrida na Difference, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1988" Chuo Kikuu cha La Trobe