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An All Cynthia Wright
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Return of the Lost Bride
Return of the Lost Bride
Release Date: 7/19/19
Author: Cynthia Wright
Series: Brides of Skye, book 2
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Author Bio:
Cynthia Wright is the New York Times and USA Today bestselling author of the two Rakes & Rebels series, 12 intertwining historical romances starring the irresistible Raveneau & Beauvisage families. She has also written beloved series set during the Renaissance and in the American West. Romantic Times Magazine hails Cynthia's novels as "Romance the way it was meant to be."
Cynthia has just released RETURN OF THE LOST BRIDE, the second in her Brides of Skye series, set in 16th century Scotland. Proud Highlander Ciaran MacLeod is falling in love…with Violette, the plain lass he wed for convenience. But when the honor of his clan is at stake, will he put her aside for another? And, coming in the spring of 2020: Lennox's romance (as yet untitled).
Cynthia lives in northern California. She enjoys riding a tandem bike and taking road trips in an airstream trailer with her Colombian-born husband, Alvaro & their corgi, Watson. She is also devoted to her two adorable grandsons who live nearby.
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Proud Highlander Ciaran MacLeod is falling in love…with the plain lass he wed for convenience. But when the honor of his clan is at stake, will he put her aside for another?
Book Summary:
From New York Times Bestselling author Cynthia Wright comes a thrilling new romance of 16th century Scotland!
Darkly handsome Ciaran MacLeod revels in his life as a Highland warrior. He spends his days training with his comrades at Duntulm Castle on the far cliffs of the Isle of Skye, and by night he takes his pick of smitten lasses.
However, Ciaran harbors a family secret that makes him deeply suspicious of love. He's grateful he doesn't have to worry about taking a wife, for the castle is efficiently run by Violette, a plain young Frenchwoman who hides under a dowdy gable hood and reveals nothing of her own past.
Violette Pasquiére fled to Scotland to escape a vengeful stepfather. On the remote Isle of Skye, she feels safe, tending to the strong Clan MacLeod men who would be lost without her care. The potent attraction Violette feels for Ciaran MacLeod is just one more secret she keeps.
But a threat to Duntulm Castle changes everything, and Ciaran's elders pressure him to make a marriage alliance that will benefit the clan. Rebelling against their efforts to control him, Ciaran impulsively proposes to Violette instead, setting in motion a passionate series of events that shake not only their future, but challenge their carefully guarded hearts…
A preview of chapter 1 is available at:
My Review of this book will be posted in my July 24th Blog Tour post!
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Also by Cynthia Wright & Currently FREE!
In a Renegade's Embrace
Rogues Go West Book 2
File Size: 3607 KB
Print Length: 347 pages
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Publisher: Boxwood Manor Books
Publication Date: November 8, 2013
Sold by: Amazon Digital Services LLC
Language: English
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"Cynthia Wright magically intertwines passion and history!" ~ RT Book Reviews
Sent to Little Bighorn by President Grant to keep an eye on hot-headed General Custer, Fox Matthews will have to live with a decision that left him alive after the rest of Custer's men were killed by Sioux warriors. Struggling with survivor's guilt, Fox takes refuge in a place where he's a stranger – the raucous gold town of Deadwood, located deep in the Black Hills, sacred land to the same Sioux Indians who decimated Custer's troops.
Madeleine Avery, raised to be a lady in Philadelphia, is appalled when she arrives in unrefined Deadwood with her family. Slowly she learns to bend, coaxed out of her shell by a powerful attraction to Fox and a journey into the world of the Sioux Indians.
IN A RENEGADE'S EMBRACE is an unforgettable tale of cultures colliding and the passionate, tender journey of Fox and Maddie as they discover the secrets of their own hearts.
The ROGUES GO WEST Series:
1. BRIGHTER THAN GOLD (Jack & Katie)
2. IN A RENEGADE'S EMBRACE (Fox & Maddie)
3. THE DUKE & THE COWGIRL (Geoff & Shelby)
Author's Note:
Maddie's grandmother, Susan Hampshire O'Hara, is the daughter of Lion & Meagan from TOUCH THE SUN. She also appears in HER DANGEROUS VISCOUNT as a young woman.
IN A RENEGADE'S EMBRACE was originally published by Ballantine Books as FIREBLOSSOM.
You are invited to learn more about Cynthia Wright's "addictive" novels at cynthiawrightauthor.com
"Looking for a hero to sweep you off your feet? Look no further…" ~ Kathe Robin, ROMANTIC TIMES MAGAZINE
Fox Matthews is a ROMANTIC TIMES WINNER for K.I.S.S. HERO OF THE YEAR!
"Wright weaves history and fiction together skillfully. Maddie is a proper lady who must learn to unbend. Fox is the presidential adviser who's undercover and left with survivor's guilt after he survives the Battle of Little Bighorn. Like 'Dances With Wolves,' IN A RENEGADE'S EMBRACE paints the Sioux as an idyllic people faced with the end of life as they know it. Wright creates sympathetic Indian characters and populates Deadwood with an array of real-life eccentrics. IN A RENEGADE'S EMBRACE again shows why Wright is one of the country's most popular romance novelists." ~ THE SIOUX FALLS ARGUS LEADER
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NATHANIEL GOLDBERG | Kantian Conceptual Geography | Oxford University Press 2015
By Nathaniel Goldberg
I am grateful to Paul Franco for his penetrating critique. As Franco knows, Kantian Conceptual Geography (hereafter 'KCG'), though not quite a work in the history of philosophy, nevertheless takes that history seriously. Whether or not I hit the right mix in writing, this kind of work is probably not the easiest for reviewing. And yet Franco was able to offer thought-provoking comments. Hopefully my reply does them justice.
KCG explores issues in analytic epistemology, philosophy of language, and metaphysics by appealing to theses drawn from Kant's Critique of Pure Reason:
Dualism: All empirical concepts, terms, or properties are linked essentially to subjective and objective sources.
Principlism: The subjective source of all empirical concepts, terms or properties takes the form of subjective principles.
Kantianism combines these:
Kantianism: All empirical concepts, terms or properties are linked essentially to subjective and objective sources. The subjective source may take the form of subjective principles.
Though all three theses have ontological and epistemological variants, each 'subjective source' means the specific conceptual, linguistic or perceptual capacities in an individual subject's mind, shared across a group of subjects' minds, or encoded in a subject's or subjects' language or (other) conventions. 'Objective' means not subjective.
My focus in KCG was on exploring those epistemological, semantic and metaphysical issues—including analyticity, apriority, empirical properties, incommensurability, meaning, possible worlds, response-dependence and truth. Nevertheless I also wanted to present defensible readings of Kant to do so. Understandably Franco brackets my discussions of many of the issues just mentioned as well as philosophers articulating them. Instead Franco has questions about three areas central my project:
I'd like to hear more about the senses of "conceptual, linguistic, or perceptual capacities" that render, say, the following all subjective in relevantly similar senses: a transcendental mind, genetic mechanisms shaped by (objective?) processes of evolution, linguistic conventions, and agreement/consensus among a scientific community.
I would like to hear more from Goldberg about the ways in which he thinks Principlism optional to Kantianism.
I'd be interested, then, in hearing from Goldberg about the ways in which he thinks his form of conceptual geography is similar to and different from the very brief and rough characterisation of historical epistemology that I have given here.
Franco is being unnecessarily kind. He would like to hear more from me because, whether he explicitly intends to do so or not, I read him as expressing three worries associated with the first two areas, and I see three responses to his final area. I address each area—and ensuing threesome—in turn.
1. Subjective Sources
I read Franco as expressing three worries about my use of 'subjective' in particular.
First, some constitutive principles (those are his examples; as Franco explains, on my view constitutive principles are the ontological version of subjective principles) that I claim are subjective are not. Franco appeals to work of Hans Reichenbach and Michael Friedman, two philosophers whom I classify as Kantian. (Reichenbach likely would and Friedman definitely does classify himself as such also.) Nonetheless, according to Franco, Reichenbach and Friedman do not understand constitutive principles as subjective in my sense. "For both Reichenbach and Friedman", Franco writes,
Kant's brand of transcendental inquiry is better framed as aimed at uncovering the conditions of certain secure and dependable bodies of knowledge in a way that avoids references to a transcendental mind; as such, I take Reichenbach and Friedman as reluctant to appeal to things like conceptual, linguistic or perceptual capacities.
Franco knows Reichenbach's view better than I do. Regardless, as Franco and I agree, Reichenbach wanted to retain much of the structure that Kant thought knowledge had, distinguishing a priori from a posteriori or empirical elements. But how could Reichenbach do so without appealing to transcendental idealism? I argued that Moritz Schlick persuaded Reichenbach that he "should designate [his] a priori principles as conventions" (Schlick 1979:324) in Henri Poincaré's fashion (KCG, p. 148). Although I am unsure whether Reichenbach explored the nature of these conventions, I am sure that his (and Poincaré's own) conventionalism inspired Rudolf Carnap to take conventions to be linguistic. And linguistic conventions establish which linguistic capacities are appropriate for users to have insofar as they are users of that language and so members of that linguistic community. This does not mean that Reichenbach would endorse my notion of subjectivity as concerning linguistic capacities, but it does mean that Reichenbach should be less reluctant to appeal to such capacities than Franco thinks.
Franco next observes that Friedman elaborates on Reichenbach's analysis by describing discrete elements of physical theories: (a) "completely abstract mathematical equations" (Franco) and (b) "a special class of non-empirical physical principles […] whose function is precisely to establish and secure the required connection between abstract mathematical structures and concrete sensory experience" (Friedman 2001:78). Though Franco does not mention this, Friedman also describes a final element: (c) properly empirical laws directly tested against experience (2001:35, 38, 45, 74, 78, 79–80, 83) (KCG, Chap. 6, §5). Friedman in particular thinks that, while (a) and (b) are a priori and non-empirical, (c) is empirical. Franco worries specifically about how (b) can count as subjective in my sense. Though non-empirical, it is nevertheless physical. In Reichenbach's and Friedman's shared term, it "coordinates" between purely abstract mathematics and sensory experience in a way that allows properly empirical laws to be formulated and tested against experience.
Franco illustrates his worry with what Friedman (and, on both their readings, Reichenbach) takes to be an example of (b), the light principle of special relativity, according to which the speed of light in a vacuum is constant for all observers. Franco claims that on my view the source of the light principle seems objective since it is derived from the nature of light itself. Though Franco does not put it thus, because by my definition of 'objective' it is not subjective, I am caught in a contradiction.
Yet, according to Friedman, the light principle does not function in special relativity as an empirical claim. As Franco himself observes, according to Friedman, "Einstein has 'elevated' an empirical law to the status of a convention" (2001:88). Perhaps I am weighting this move more than Franco is. But that is because Friedman weights it more too. According to Friedman, for Einstein, the light principle becomes a relativised a priori constitutive principle in the sense of involving "an essentially non-empirical element of 'decision'" (2001:88) in its use. And that decision is based on the capacities of subjects—including linguistic, conceptual and perceptional—to formulate and use it to coordinate between abstract mathematics and sensory experience.
Friedman also says that "Einstein uses his light principle empirically to define a fundamentally new notion of simultaneity and, as a consequence, fundamentally new metrical structures for both space and time" (2001:88; emphasis his). Friedman's italics are telling. The light principle defines, and so stipulates—or establishes by convention—a new notion and new structures. Because definitions are linguistic, their resulting convention would be linguistic too. The light principle does this empirically because this linguistic convention is meant to apply to experience. The light principle is subjective yet establishes the legitimate terms with which empirical laws can be formulated and tested against experience. While Franco "find[s] it odd to call Friedman's physical, but non-empirical coordinative principles subjective in the sense of being traceable back to our specific conceptual, perceptual or linguistic capacities", on Friedman's own view they seem to be just that. While Franco does grant that conventions "are non-empirical in the sense of not being fully determined by experience" he nevertheless continues,
it does not seem to me to be the case that 'non-empirical' (or 'not determined by experience') and 'subjective' (in Goldberg's sense of being traceable back to specific linguistic or conceptual capacities) are co-extensive, especially in the case of the principles Friedman calls mathematical-physical presuppositions of our empirical knowledge.
Perhaps they are not co-intensive.[1] But I do think that they are co-extensive.
There is more evidence for my reading of Friedman. Besides championing Reichenbach, in characterising his a priori constitutive principles Friedman (2001) is also inspired by Carnap and Thomas Kuhn. As I quote in KCG, Friedman urges that "one could attempt to combine basic aspects of Carnap's philosophy of formal languages or frameworks with fundamental features of Thomas Kuhn's much less formal theory of scientific revolutions" (2001:xii). Doing so, Friedman continues, allows one to avoid "the drawbacks of Carnapian formal Wissenschaftslogik. In particular, W.V.O Quine's well-known and widely accepted attack on the Carnapian conception of analytic truth need no longer compel us to adopt a thoroughgoing epistemological holism according to which there is nothing left of the a priori at all".[2]
There are two ways to read what Friedman thinks Kuhn brings to his arranged marriage with Carnap. Kuhn brings a way in which Carnap's conception of analytic truth can be made either (a) informally linguistic or (b) non-linguistic. Since Friedman claims that Carnap's reliance on "formal languages" and "Wissenschaftslogik" (or logic of science) makes his conception of analytic truth vulnerable to Quine's attack, either seems on Friedman's view to save Carnap's conception. Now, if Friedman tries to save Carnap's conception by reformulating it as informal linguistic, then he is appealing to informal linguistic conventions. And linguistic conventions still establish linguistic capacities. Conversely, if Friedman tries to save Carnap's conception by reformulating it as non-linguistic—if what he himself calls "relativized a priori constitutive principles" are themselves non-linguistic—then two things follow. First, Friedman owes us an explanation of what they are. For it is unclear what a non-linguistic principle that nevertheless is used in generating empirical claims (which are linguistic if anything is) could be. Since Friedman gives no explanation, we should presume that he retains a role for language. Hence he retains a role for linguistic capacities. Second, were his constitutive principles somehow non-linguistic, then they would still be conceptual. Rather than being empirical, they would establish the legitimate concepts with which a properly empirical law could be formulated and tested against experience. But then they would establish conceptual capacities for such formulating and testing. Either way, Friedman's constitutive principles are traceable back to specific linguistic or conceptual capacities.
Moreover, as I argue in KCG (Chap. 5, §6), Friedman has no reason not to regard his relativised a priori constitutive principles as linguistic. There, I identify six arguments that Quine makes against Carnap's conception of analytic truth[3] and show that none impugns Friedman's relativised a priori constitutive principles. Rather, in each case, their historical rather than any informal linguistic or non-linguistic nature saves them. So nothing is preventing Friedman from treating his principles as linguistic, informal or otherwise. Since, I have argued, Friedman should treat them as linguistic or conceptual, he should treat them as traceable to linguistic or conceptual capacities. That makes them subjective in my sense.
The second worry that I read Franco as expressing about my use of 'subjective' is that its referents are a gerrymandered set. Franco asks:
What unifies [1] non-empirical and non-physical principles (like geometrical conventions), [2] physical principles that function non-empirically within empirical theories (like Einstein's light principle), [3] methodological principles (like Davidson's principle of charity), and [4] principles like Kant's cause and effect that are explicitly traced back to a transcendental mind? (bracketed numbers mine)
To these let me add those that at the outset I quoted Franco as listing:
[5] a transcendental mind, [6] genetic mechanisms shaped by (objective?) processes of evolution, [7] linguistic conventions, and [8] agreement/consensus among a scientific community. (bracketed numbers mine)
Franco is right that I call [1]–[8] 'subjective'. Is anything non-arbitrary holding the set together? Though the list is long, it is worth considering in toto:
[1] seems least objectionably subjective. Geometric conventions, Franco's example, have since Poincaré been seen as stipulations or—and I think these are co-extensive—elements of a formal language. And stipulation and formal-linguistic elements establish the legitimate terms with which empirical laws can be formulated and tested against experience. They therefore establish linguistic capacities for those who accept and use them. Moreover above I explained that this is the sense in which [2] is subjective. For Friedman, Franco's own example should rely on linguistic or conceptual capacities.
[3] requires more discussion. While Franco has my analysis of Davidson in mind, and while Davidson maintains that the principle of charity derives from the subject's "underlying methodology of interpretation" (2001b:197), that principle is not merely methodological. It is instead, as Davidson (2001a:220–1) himself maintains, constitutive. Davidson even calls the principle "synthetic a priori" (2001a:221). Moreover, as Kant himself holds that "[w]e cannot think any object except through categories" (B165), embedded in his synthetic a priori judgements (or principles), so Davidson holds that we cannot interpret any utterances except through the principle of charity. Perhaps I should have quoted Davidson here: "[C]harity is not an option, but a condition of having a workable theory [of interpretation] […]. Charity is forced on us; whether we like it or not, if we want to understand others, we must count them right in most matters" (2001b:197). The connection between Davidson and Kant is closer than even Davidson realises. One conclusion of KCG is that, while Davidson famously attacks Dualism, he is instead committed to it (Chapter 5). Likewise, in the form of the principle of charity, he is committed to Principlism too (Chapter 4). Because Franco does otherwise bracket Davidson, I do not mean any of this as a criticism of Franco's view but instead as an elaboration of Davidson's and by extension mine. Regardless, in KCG I do not consider any methodological principles. So I need not explain the sense in which [3] is subjective.
In fact Davidson's principle of charity has much in common with [4], which traces to [5], and Franco himself seems not to question the subjectivity of either. His example of [4] is Kant's Second Analogy, which presupposes the category of causality. Of the Transcendental Deduction of the categories Kant himself observes: "Thus a difficulty is revealed here that we did not encounter in the field of sensibility, namely how subjective conditions of thinking should have objective validity" (A89–90/B122). The categories, and the Analogies and other principles that presuppose them, are subjective in Kant's own sense, which is subsumed by mine. The categories are conceptual capacities if anything is, and they are encoded in a subject's mind. I return to this below.
[6] requires more discussion too, since I answer Franco's parenthetical question affirmatively. Genetic mechanisms are shaped by processes of evolution—even though those mechanisms are subjective, while those processes are objective, in my sense. Here my explanation concerning [2] applies. Just as Einstein consciously elevated an empirical law to the status of a convention, subjects subconsciously elevate the empirical result of evolution—their genetic mechanisms—to the status of innate dispositions and therefore broadly conceptual, linguistic, and perceptual capacities. While the light principle understood before Einstein might have been formulated and tested against experience, Einstein stipulated its truth to formulate and test his own properly empirical laws as such. While genetic mechanisms are shaped by objective processes of evolution, subjects use those mechanisms in the form of broadly conceptual, linguistic, and perceptual capacities when they formulate and test their own hypotheses against experience. I return to this below too.
As for [7] and [8], a community's linguistic conventions codify its agreement/consensus. And those conventions are subjective in the sense in which [1] and [2], and broadly [6], are. Non-empirical and non-physical principles, like geometrical conventions, are linguistic conventions, which are agreements/consensuses among the scientific community. Physical principles that function non-empirically, like Einstein's light principle, are, for reasons already discussed, linguistic conventions that are agreements/consensuses among the scientific community also.
Is the set gerrymandered? [1], [2], [6], [7], and [8] all concern linguistic capacities. While the linguistic capacities involved in [6] are broader than those involved in the others, that is the point of my distinguishing subjective scopes. [6] might ground anthropocentric linguistic capacities, while [1], [2], [7], and [8] might ground ethnocentric ones. As Franco observes, I identify these and other subjective scopes too. What should we make of the remaining elements? [3] may be either set aside or, if understood as transcendental, elided with [4] and [5]. Now, as I observed above, Franco himself writes: "For both Reichenbach and Friedman, Kant's brand of transcendental inquiry is better framed as aimed at uncovering the conditions of certain secure and dependable bodies of knowledge in a way that avoids references to a transcendental mind", and, as I showed, both Reichenbach and Friedman can understand those conditions as concerning linguistic capacities. More generally, as Alberto Coffa (2008) argues, the "semantic tradition from Kant to Carnap", in which Reichenbach himself was central, was concerned with understanding Kant's claims about intuition and other transcendental faculties in terms of semantic, and so linguistic, convention (KCG, pp. 4n.1, 69n.15, 144n.12, 145n.14, 148n.17). Insofar as [4] and [5] seem dissimilar from [1], [2], [6], [7] and [8], that is because the latter are a semantic version of the former. But that is to say that linguistic capacities are a semantic version of conceptual capacities, which is my point. Hence, even given the variety of its elements, [1]–[8] is not a gerrymandered set.
Admittedly that does not mean the subjective/objective distinction is the most perspicuous way to characterise Kantianism or Dualism specifically. That is the third worry that I read Franco as expressing about my use of 'subjective'. He asks:
Why think the subjective/objective distinction is the relevant one for charting Kantian territory and uniting the disparate positions Goldberg canvasses, instead of, say, other Kantian distinctions that may (or may not) map directly onto the subjective/objective distinction like the [a] constitutive/empirical distinction, the [b] form/content distinction, or the [c] passivity (sensation)/spontaneity (convention) distinction? (bracketed lettering mine)
In KCG (Chap. 5) I explain that the subjective/objective distinction just is Davidson's scheme/content distinction, which is a form of [b], and that Davidson's dualism is my Dualism of subjective and objective sources. So Franco's [b] is my distinction. Though [c] may be vaguer than the subjective/objective distinction, these may amount to the same also.
There are two reasons, however, that the subjective/objective distinction differs from [a] and so that I cannot accept it. On the one hand, as Franco observes, I regard Philip Pettit as concerned not with constitution but with acquisition. For him, all empirical concepts, terms or properties are acquired by a subject's appealing essentially to subjective and objective sources. Moreover, as he also observes, I read Henry Allison (2004) as construing Kant's own transcendental idealism similarly. The subjective/objective distinction has to do with more than merely constitution. [a] falls shorts.
On the other hand, for all Kantians, the empirical derives from the interanimation of the subjective and the objective. For Kant, empirical judgements, and experience itself (B147), result from sensibility's intuiting sensation in space and time, whose resulting empirical intuitions the understanding conceptualises with the categories. For Carnap, synthetic statements, which are empirical and so describe experience, result from analytic statements being used to formulate them given sense data (2003) or sensation (1988). For Kuhn, empirical claims result from the application of paradigms (2012) or lexica (2002) to sensation. For Reichenbach as Friedman (2001) reads him, and Friedman himself, properly empirical laws are formulated by using physical non-empirical principles to coordinate purely abstract mathematics and sensory experience—which in this sense just means sensation. [a] therefore presupposes the subjective/objective distinction.
Hence my distinction just is [b], may amount to [c], and is superior to [a].[4]
2. Requiring Principlism
Franco's concern with what I mean by 'subjective' targets the required Dualism component of Kantianism. Franco would also like to hear more about why I think that the Principlism component is itself merely optional. I read him as offering three worries that it should be required too.
First, making Principlism required solves what Franco takes to be my dubious uses of 'subjective'. His point seems to be that since we better understand when a principle is, rather than what makes it, subjective, I might make the existence of subjective principles necessary for any view to be Kantian. Insofar as I have shown that my uses of 'subjective' are not dubious, however, this first worry is avoidable.
Second, Principlism is essential to various Kantian positions. Indeed, as I observe, Kant's principles, his synthetic a priori judgements, are "indispensable" (KCG, p. 7) to his view. So are Kuhn's principles implicit in his paradigms, disciplinary matrices and lexica. So is Davidson's principle of charity. And so are Carnap's analytic truths, and Reichenbach's and Friedman's relativised a priori constitutive principles. Nevertheless, just because Principlism is essential or indispensable to various Kantian positions does not mean that Principlism is or should be essential or indispensable to Kantianism. Nor, independent of other reasons to do so, need it encourage me to make it as such. One independent reason that Franco offers was the one just considered, that making Principlism required would help with my uses of 'subjective', though these turn out not to be dubious. Another is that leaving Principlism optional makes other views that we have reasons not to consider Kantian, like Quine's holism and Pettit's global response-dependence, Kantian.
This is the third worry that I read Franco as offering for making Principlism required. Franco questions Quine's Kantian credentials in particular. Friedman is right that I make much of Quine's claim that "[t]aken collectively, science has its double dependence upon language and experience; but this duality is not significantly traceable into the statements of science taken one by one" (2006:42)—and that I understand language, as depending on linguistic capacities, as subjective, while experience here is objective. Franco (note 8) is also right to question whether Quine's use of 'experience' does not succumb to my own point about the empirical, viz., that it is hybrid. Anticipating that worry I mentioned (KCG, p. 113n.4) that Quine also describes subjective and objective sources in terms of "language" and "extra-linguistic fact" (2006:34). Nevertheless, Franco is concerned that, when Quine goes on to claim that he "espouse[s] a more thoroughgoing pragmatism" than Carnap and C.I. Lewis (Quine 2006:46), he might be denying the usefulness of Dualism altogether. Because Quine rejects Principlism—that is how I read his rejecting analyticity (KCG, Chap. 6, §3)—leaving Principlism optional apparently dilutes Quine's commitment to Dualism so much that he turns out not to be a Kantian in any useful sense.
Quine's commitment to Dualism is nevertheless not diluted. Though I do not quote this in KCG, Quine does write:
We cannot strip away the conceptual trappings sentence by sentence and leave a description of the objective world; but we can investigate the world, and man as a part of it, and thus find out what cues he could have of what goes on around him. Subtracting his cues from his world view, we get man's net contribution as the difference. This difference marks the extent of man's conceptual sovereignty—the domain within which he can revise theory while saving the data. (1964:5)
Man's (and woman's) net contribution, our "conceptual trappings" (traceable to conceptual capacities), is the subjective source of sentences and therefore terms. The "data", which just are of the "objective world", are the objective source. Even the title of Quine's final book, From Stimulus to Science (1995), names the objective source of empirical concepts and terms and then their systematisation into science, which, like the empirical concepts and terms themselves, are hybrid.
There is another reason to count Quine a Kantian. Quine maintains:
The lore of our fathers is a fabric of sentences […]. It is a pale gray lore, black with fact and white with convention. But I have found no substantial reason for concluding that there are any quite black threads in it, or any white ones. (2004:87)
The lore of our fathers (and mothers) has conventional and factual sources. The conventional source is subjective; the factual, objective. Dualism is true. Nevertheless, there are no quite white threads. No knowledge claims are purely subjective. There are no subjective principles. Principlism is false. Yet neither are there any quite black threads. No knowledge claims are purely objective. The world's intrinsic nature or aspect, independent of our subjective responses to it, is unknowable.
In KCG I follow Pettit (2002, overview to part I, essay 3) in calling this latter view 'noumenalism' and show that all Kantians endorse it. Quine endorses it here, as he does above when he admits that "[w]e cannot strip away the conceptual trappings sentence by sentence and leave a description of the objective world"—a world objective in my sense. Kant (in)famously endorses it, and I discuss (KCG, Chap. 2, §3) different construals of his particular variety. I also discuss (KCG, Chap. 2, §§3–5) how Pettit endorses noumenalism and engages in a debate with Michael Smith and Daniel Stoljar over how to construe it. As I explain (KCG, pp. 74, 204), Kuhn endorses it too: "Underlying all these processes of differentiation and change, there must, of course, be something permanent, fixed, and stable. But, like Kant's Ding an sich, it is ineffable, undescribable, undiscussable" (2002:104). As I argue (KCG, p. 134), Davidson endorses it as well. And I argue as well (KCG, p. 149n.20) that Carnap in the form of non-conceptual sense data (2003) and non-conceptual sensation (1988) endorses a version of noumenalism too—with similar reasoning applying to Reichenbach and Friedman.
In fact, as I show, noumenalism follows directly from Dualism (KCG, p. 56). By requiring that there be subjective and objective sources, Dualism requires that there be an objective one—a source independent of the subject. That source might be the world in itself, if noumenalism is construed ontologically, or the world considered in itself, if noumenalism is construed epistemologically. Regardless of how noumenalism is construed, however, all empirical concepts, terms or properties would have subjective and objective sources mixed. But then possessing such concepts or terms, or perceiving such properties, would not allow us to know any objective source in itself or considered in itself. Conversely, any non-empirical concepts, terms or properties (were there any) would be purely subjective. So possessing such concepts or terms, or perceiving (if this is even the right word) such properties, would not allow us to know any objective source in itself or considered in itself either. And those are the only options for the Kantian. We can then never know any objective source in itself or considered in itself.
No matter how we understand noumenalism, every kind of Kantianism entails it in virtue of its Dualism component. Because noumenalism has historically and contemporarily been associated with Kantianism, we therefore have reason to count anyone committed to Dualism—even if, like Quine and Pettit, one is not also committed to Principlism—as a Kantian.[5]
3. Conceptual Geography vs. Historical Epistemology
Finally Franco would like to hear about "the ways in which [Goldberg] thinks his form of conceptual geography is similar to and different from […] historical epistemology."
As I understand it, historical epistemology is related to Michel Foucault's (2007) method of genealogy. Historical epistemology aims to understand the historical (or 'genetic') origin of our concepts, thereby illuminating their contemporary content as well as that content's historical contingency.[6] This suggests three differences from conceptual geography.
First, while historical epistemology may be concerned with conceptual geography,[7] it must be concerned with conceptual genealogy. A historical epistemologist's investigating the (average? dominant?) contemporary concept of substance would recognise that we inherited it from various concepts employed by the Early Moderns, who inherited theirs from various concepts employed by the Scholastics, who inherited theirs from Aristotle (who inherited his from Plato, tracing earlier still, much earlier being historically inaccessible). Though the concept of substance has changed—conceptual inheritances, like monetary ones, can be depleted, replenished, and diversified—we nevertheless inherited some of its virtues and vices. And understanding all that helps us understand what our concept is and that it need not have been as such. Though both are worthwhile, conceptual geography and conceptual genealogy are nevertheless distinct, and historical epistemology might forgo the former.
Second, conversely, while conceptual geography may be concerned with conceptual genealogy, it must (obviously) be concerned with conceptual geography. By 'engaging in conceptual geography' I mean exploring, surveying, and mapping how concepts relate to one another and the broader conceptual world (KCG, p. 4). As Franco observes, I get my notion of conceptual geography from Gilbert Ryle's (2000:7) notion of logical geography. Ryle does not engage in genealogy, nor need he. Nor need any conceptual geographer. While it is possible to combine them, conceptual geographers can accept their concepts at face value without researching their inheritance.
And third, because only historical epistemology must be concerned with genealogy, only it must be concerned with history. That concern must also be deep. To understand our concept of substance, a historical epistemologist should consider not just major but also minor Early Modern works, including those lost to most contemporary readers. She should also consider religious, scientific, and other texts from the era. She should dig into historical ground, not for history's own sake, but for the sake of the present.
Now, though conceptual geography need not be concerned with conceptual genealogy or history (deep or otherwise), it can be. Indeed my own brand of conceptual geography is concerned with both. Although I do not provide a genealogy of most of my concepts, I do provide something of one concerning the definition of 'Principlism' and 'analyticity', since I defend Principlism partly by "consider[ing] the historical progression of versions of Principlism" (p. 137) and arguments against it, which involves considering the historical evolution of analyticity (KCG, Chap. 6). Moreover, though I do not engage with history deeply, I do appeal to historical views from major historical works. But should I do more?
As with all conceptual geographers, the answer is that I could but need not. There is however an overall historicist lesson that I should make clear. No philosophical method is ahistorical. Conceptual geography, no matter what brand, is necessarily situated in the historical period in which it is conducted. My own conceptual geography, which appeals to historical authors to make a present point, does so in a present moment in history that is itself influenced by past moments. Even my idea of engaging in conceptual geography occurs in such a moment. Not enough appreciate William Faulkner's insight that "[t]he past is never dead. It's not even past" (1994, I.iii), to which I should add that the present and the past are both historical. Implicitly holding to Faulkner's insight, I made sure never to claim that my definitions of 'subjective' and 'objective', or 'Principlism and Kantianism', or my engaging in Kantian conceptual geography generally, are given or performed sub specie aeternatis. But that is distinct from explicitly declaring that they are not. I might have even observed that a different Kantian conceptual geography could be performed in every generation.
To be sure, Franco does not take historical epistemology to be superior to conceptual geography, my brand or generally. Instead he explains:
Just like Goldberg's conceptual geography does, historical epistemology might yield somewhat surprising results and help us understand the conceptual space current philosophers operate in. For example, Scott Edgar argues in his examination of neo-Kantian conceptions of objectivity in the 1850s to the 1870s that "neo-Kantians [e.g., Hermann von Helmholtz, F.A. Lange, and Otto Liebmann] […] reject the view that our knowledge's objectivity consists in resembling or being determined by mind-independent objects." (2015:103; Franco's ellipsis)
Although I do not know Edgar's work, and though I quote Liebmann, I am no expert on these early neo-Kantians, I do discuss the two dominant neo-Kantian schools, the Marburg (including Hermann Cohen, Paul Natorp, and Ernst Cassirer) and the Baden or Southwest (Wilhelm Windelband, Heinrich Rickert, Jonas Cohn, Emil Lask, and Bruno Bauch) on a related topic (p. 22n.28). Nevertheless, I accept Franco's general point that historical epistemology might itself yield surprising results concerning the conceptual space in which current philosophers operate.
For that reason, I am, like Franco, a methodological pluralist. On my view, historical epistemology has its place, as does my brand of conceptual geography, as do other brands and other methodologies altogether. Toward the beginning of KCG (p. 4) I quote Wilfrid Sellars, who himself appeals to the history of philosophy, and especially Kant, to make progress on "the current [philosophical] situation and its demands" (1968:1). At the end of my response to Franco's stimulating critique of KCG let me quote Sellars again: "The aim of philosophy, abstractly formulated, is to understand how things in the broadest possible sense of the term hang together in the broadest possible sense of the term" (1991:1). One way to assist in achieving this aim is for philosophers to embrace the broadest possible philosophical tools—historical epistemology and conceptual geography among them.
Acknowledgements: Thanks go to Chris Gavaler for helpful comments.
Received: 22 August 2016.
1. Franco (note 12) explains that the same point apparently holds for Kuhn's paradigms and Carnap's linguistic frameworks. But, even if it does hold for Kuhn's paradigms—and below I offer reasons to think that it does not—Kuhn's replaces his paradigms with lexica, which are linguistic, and Carnap's frameworks already are. And linguistic objects establish linguistic capacities. Moreover Franco seems to elide two separate points. It is one thing to say, as I am saying, that coordinating principles, linguistic frameworks, and lexica are subjective. It is another to say, as I am not saying, that decisions to change those principles, frameworks, and lexica must be subjective.↩
2. Friedman (2001:40) elaborates.↩
3. These occur variously in Quine (1964, Chap. 2; 2006; 2008a and b).↩
4. Franco (note 16) adds a "related worry" that he shares with Colin Marshall, who in a review of KCG writes: "Given these definitions [of 'subjective' and 'objective'], one might think that it is trivially true that, setting aside properties, empirical terms and concepts have subjective and objective sources in Goldberg's sense. On any familiar sense of 'empirical,' empirical terms and concepts depend essentially on subjects' linguistic and conceptual capacities (subjective sources) and on objects or sensations deriving from objects (objective sources)" (Marshall 2015). And yet I address this point directly (KCG, pp. 18–20) by explicating the role that "essentially" plays in my definitions. Marshall also worries that my definitions are disjunctive. This is curious. Besides explaining why the—inclusive—disjunction is needed, I also show that, as Franco observes (note 4), in many cases the inclusive disjunction becomes a conjunction.↩
5. Davidson himself (2001b, essay 13), otherwise "Quine's faithful student" (2001b:29), thinks that Quine eliminates two dogmas of empiricism—the analytic/synthetic distinction and radical reductionism—only to leave the third dogma, scheme/content dualism. Quine (1981) agrees. As I explained above, scheme/content dualism is one formulation of Dualism. Davidson groups Kant, Kuhn, Carnap, and Quine together as his dualists just as I group them together as my Dualists. Franco (note 15) himself notes the historical connection between Quine and Kant via C.I. Lewis, whom Davidson (2004:237) also groups with them. So for this reason too Quine should be understood as a Kantian.↩
6. See Feest and Sturm (2011b and especially 2011a) for an overview.↩
7. Nevertheless, see Franco's fascinating suggestion from Ian Hacking (2015:25) on how genealogy and geography relate.↩
Allison, H. (2004), Kant's Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense, revised and enlarged (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press).
Carnap, R. (1988), 'Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology', in Meaning and Necessity: A Study in Semantics and Modal Logic, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), suppl. A (pp. 205–29).
——— (2003), 'The Logical Structure of the World', in The Logical Structure of the World and Pseudoproblems in Philosophy, trans. R. George (Chicago: Open Court), pp. 3–303.
Coffa, A. (2008), The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap: to the Vienna Station (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Davidson, D. (2001a), Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
——— (2001b), Inquiries Into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
——— (2004), Problems of rationality (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Edgar, S. (2015), 'Intersubjectivity and Physical Laws in Post-Kantian Theory of Knowledge Natorp and Cassirer', in M. Friedman et al. (eds), The Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer: A Novel Assessment (Berlin and New York: de Gruyter), pp. 141–62.
Feest, U. and T. Sturm (2011a), 'What (Good) is Historical Epistemology? Editors' introduction'. Erkenntnis 75: 285–302.
———, (eds) (2011b), 'What (Good) is Historical Epistemology?', special issue, Erkenntnis 75(3).
Faulkner, W. (1994) Requiem for a Nun. William Faulkner: Novels 1942–1954, ed. J. Blotner and N. Polk (New York: Library of America).
Foucault, M. (2007), Discipline and punish (New York: Vintage Books).
Friedman, M. (2001), Dynamics of Reason (Stanford: CSLI).
Gibson, R. (ed.) (2008), Quintessence: Basic Readings From the Philosophy of W.V. Quine (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).
Hacking, I. (2015), 'Let's not Talk About Objectivity', in F. Padovani et al. (eds), Objectivity in Science: New Perspectives From Science and Technology Studies (New York: Springer), pp. 19–34.
Kuhn, T. (2012), The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).
——— (2002), The Road Since Structure, ed. J. Conant and J. Haugeland (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).
Marshall, C. (2015), Review of Kantian Conceptual Geography, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews: http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/60060-kantian-conceptual-geography/.
Quine, W.V.O. (1964), Word and Object (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).
——— (1981), 'On the Very Idea of a Third Dogma', in Theories and things (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), pp. 38–42.
——— (1995), From stimulus to Science (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).
——— (2004), Pursuit of Truth, revised ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).
——— (2006), 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', in From a Logical Point of View: Nine Logico-Philosophical Essays, 2nd rev. edition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), pp. 20–46.
——— (2008a), 'Truth by Convention, in Gibson (2008), pp. 3–30.
——— (2008b), 'Carnap and Logical Truth', in Gibson (2008), pp. 64–90.
Pettit, P. (2002) Rules, Reasons, and Norms: Selected Essays (New York: Oxford University Press).
Ryle, G. (2000), The Concept of Mind (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).
Sellars, W. (1968), Science and Metaphysics: Variations on Kantian Themes (New York: The Humanities Press).
——— (1991) Science, Perception and Reality (Atascadero: Ridgeview).
Schlick, M. (1979), Critical or Empiricist Interpretation of Modern Physics?', in Philosophical Papers, vol. 1, 1909–1922, ed. H. Mulder and B. Van DeVelde-Schlick, trans. P. Heath (Dordrecht and Boston: D. Reidel), pp. 322–34.
© Nathaniel Goldberg, 2016.
Nathaniel Goldberg is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Washington and Lee University, Lexington, Virginia. He researches at the intersection of epistemology, metaphysics and philosophy of language, and has an abiding interest in Kant.

subset: commoncrawl


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Environmental non-profit CDP recently announced a 24% jump in the number of companies asking their suppliers to report environmental data this year.
According to CDP, corporations such as Nike, Airbus, Sainsbury's and Ørsted, as well as public sector organizations including the New York Metropolitan Transport Authority are among the 30 large purchasing organizations from around the world that have started working with CDP for the first time this year to help manage their supply chains more sustainably.
These corporations and organizations are asking their key suppliers to report data through CDP's environmental disclosure platform on their impacts, risks, opportunities, and strategies related to climate change, deforestation and/or water security issues. This data will then be used to inform procurement decisions and supplier engagement strategies.
These companies are joining the likes of Walmart, Microsoft, Stanley Black & Decker and Japan's Environment Ministry, bringing the total number of CDP supply chain members to over 150 organizations, all calling for transparency on environmental issues from their suppliers. In total the request has gone out to over 15,000 suppliers this year.
The organizations joining CDP for 2020 hail from around the world, with a surge of 34% growth in North America. Specific statistics include:
- North America: 17 new joiners including Nike, One Jeanswear Group, Prudential, The Clorox Company, Nordstrom, and the New York MTA
- EU: 10 new joiners including Airbus, Ørsted, and Bayer
- UK: Six new joiners including Sainsbury's, HSBC, CBRE, and GSMA (the international mobile networks trade association)
- Latin America: Three new joiners including Vale and Empresas CMPC
- Australia: Telstra Corporation
- China: Fujian Sunner Group
- Japan: Yokohama Rubber Company
CDP has increased its transparency initiatives as of late. In June 2019, the organization published a report that says 70% of 1,500 companies are failing to provide forest data. Called "The Money Trees," the report says that brands including Dominos, Mondelez, Next, and Sports Direct are among those that didn't disclose effects on forests worldwide in 2018.
Companies reporting to the international nonprofit are asked to disclose on four commodities linked to deforestation: timber, palm oil, cattle, and soy. More than 350 companies declined to respond over the last three years. CDP says in its new report that major consumer-facing brands like Dominos, Next, and Sports Direct as well as the global food corporation Mondelez and its palm oil supplier Rimbunan Hijau Group are among them.
Emily Holbrook
Source: https://www.environmentalleader.com/2020/05/cdp-reports-a-24-jump-in-companies-asking-their-suppliers-for-environmental-transparency/


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Portable Industrial Ventilator Axial Blower Workshop Extractor Fan 16 400mm. Top quality Electrical Portable Industrial Ventilator/Extractor strong carry handle and rubber feet Comes with 2m power cable and UK plug.
Power Supply: AC: 220 - 240V / 50-60Hz S. The item "Portable Industrial Ventilator Axial Blower Workshop Extractor Fan 16 400mm" is in sale since Tuesday, January 14, 2020. This item is in the category "Business, Office & Industrial\HVAC & Refrigeration\HVAC & Refrigeration Components\Air Handlers". The seller is "100bluebells" and is located in Harrow. This item can be shipped to United Kingdom.


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French farce
Jean-Claude Trichet faces new obstacles in his quest to head the ECB
Where am I going next year?
WHOEVER said central banking was dull? It seems that a trial may now be on pitting Jean-Claude Trichet, governor of France's central bank, against Philippe Courroye, France's top magistrate. Off, as a result, is Mr Trichet's once-sure appointment to the presidency of the European Central Bank (ECB) next summer. On July 15th Mr Courroye ruled that Mr Trichet and eight others must answer for their roles in the filing in 1991 and 1992 of misleading accounts by Crédit Lyonnais, a then state-controlled and fraud-ridden bank.
If found guilty, Mr Trichet would face a two-year prison sentence and a fine. But even if not guilty, the slow timetable for justice in France makes it hard to maintain his lock on the ECB. A trial cannot start before next March, and it is unlikely to be a short affair. Yet Wim Duisenberg, the ECB's current head, has announced that he will step down in July 2003. Twitchy European governments are likely to insist on a firm successor before Mr Trichet can clear his name.
Mr Trichet's problem triggered much conjecture. Was it bad news for the euro, even though it simultaneously breached parity with the dollar? Might Mr Duisenberg be asked to stay on longer? Would another French candidate be acceptable—for instance Christian Noyer, until recently an ECB vice-president, if he is eligible (which some EU lawyers say he may not be), Jean Lemierre, head of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, or Laurent Fabius, a former finance minister?
Such questions raise two more. One is whether it matters who heads the ECB. The bank has done a competent economic job despite the euro's weakness and a series of gaffes that has taught Mr Duisenberg that the best policy is silence or deliberate obscurity. Mr Trichet has great media savvy, but the lack of his presence will scarcely reduce the bank to impotence, let alone incompetence.
But the biggest question is why the next ECB president has to be French. President Jacques Chirac bullied his fellow Europeans in 1998 into agreeing that Mr Duisenberg would step down before his eight-year term was up in favour of a Frenchman. Yet this agreement could surely be reopened in the interests of finding the best candidate.
There is another element of farce. The reason why Mr Trichet is judicially compromised is that Mr Chirac ordered an investigation into Crédit Lyonnais's accounts in 1996; the president was peeved by Mr Trichet's tight monetary policy, and wanted to embarrass him. Only a last-minute stage-effect might now give Mr Chirac a happy French finale. An amnesty, perhaps? Don't rule it out.
This article appeared in the Finance & economics section of the print edition under the headline "French farce"
From the July 20th 2002 edition
Discover stories from this section and more in the list of contentsExplore the edition
More from Finance & economics
Tackling sexual harassment could bring sizeable economic dividends
New research puts a price tag on unpunished predation—and offers clues on how to deter abuse
Europe and America put a brave face on a growing economic rift
The transatlantic tandem is drifting towards a full-fledged subsidy race
For bond investors, every country is an emerging market now
It could take years for rich-world government bonds to become boring again


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Swede claims 'Wazza' would not be able to score goals like he can though.
Check in to Sunderland vs Manchester United
Paris Saint-Germain front man Zlatan Ibrahimovic has urged unsettled Manchester United striker Wayne Rooney to quit the Premier League champions and join him in the French capital, according to reports in the Daily Mail.
The skilful England international's future at Old Trafford has been put in grave doubt of late after previous Red Devils head coach Sir Alex Ferguson claimed that Rooney had asked to leave the club towards the backend of last season.
And, despite the fact that Rooney and his advisers have subsequently denied that the striker ever handed in a transfer request, for long periods during the summer window it had appeared likely that the 27-year-old had played his last game for the Premier League giants.
However, with Ferguson having since been replaced at the 'Theatre of Dreams' by former Everton boss David Moyes, the man who handed Rooney his Premier League debut with the Toffees, the Englishman has decided to remain in the north west, for now at least.
But Swedish forward Ibra has told his fellow attacker to try out a new challenge in his already glittering and trophy-laden career by swapping the Premier League champions for the Ligue 1 title holders.
"When there was talk of Wayne Rooney joining us in Paris it was a prospect that excited me," said Ibrahimovic.
"I don't just want to play with just great players I want to play with technically great players – and that is what he is.
"You can work on the technical side of your game – but it is not something you can be taught.
"You either have it or you don't – and Rooney does.
"I think he made it clear in the summer that he wanted a fresh challenge – and things have not been going so well for Manchester United this season.
"If he still wants to move next summer or even in January I would urge him to come and play with me in Paris.
"The only direction this club is going is up, but if he did join he would have to get used to the fact that Zlatan scores even better goals than he does."


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fitFLEX Articles - Learn, Share and Discover
Some scientists believe that while amino acids ore involved in muscle-protein synthesis, certain anabolic hormones must be present at the same time for the synthesis to work efficiently. However, a new study, reported in the American Journal of Physiology (34:E718-E724, 1996), found
that amino acids don't need the hormonal partnership of insulin and insulin like growth factor-I (IGF-l) to do the job. The study, which used normal human subjects, found that amino-acid infusions increased protein synthesis and prevented protein breakdown in arm and leg muscles.
There were some interesting aspects of this study: 1. No changes occurred in levels of either IGF-l or insulin during the infusions, and 2. the amino-acid mixture used was balanced in essential amino acids, which suggests that the body can supply recirculated amino acids (aminos already present) to make up for amino-acid deficiencies. The latter effect is similar to what occurs in vegetarian diets. Past advice concerning such diets suggested using "complementary" proteins; that is, combining foods lacking in different essential amino acids, so that one protein food could make up far the deficiencies of another consumed during the same meal.
At the time this concept was developed, it was believed that all essential amino acids had to be present simultaneously for optimal protein absorption. later studies using sophisticated isotope-labeled amino acids found that consuming all of the essential amino acids at the same time wasn't necessary due to the existence of an amino-acid pool in the body that could supply missing aminos according to need. The advice given to vegetarians was subsequently changed: They were advised to eat a variety of foods over the course of a day in order to eventually supply oil required amino acids, some of which were added to the amino-acid pool.
The message of the new study reported here is that amino acids themselves promote increased muscle protein synthesis while simultaneously retarding muscle-protein breakdown. Producing an optimal anabolic effect requires eating frequent protein meals throughout the day, spaced no more than three hours apart.


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I pray that you all have been keeping safe and well. The world is upside down at the moment.
An impromptu trip to Hospital reminded me of just how fleeting life can be. What could have been Covid was something else. Fever and two weeks in bed I am still recovering. Either the tests are flawed, or the staff are students, and unsure of which end of the stethoscope goes where.
From the looks of my body, after they finished attempting their ritual bloodletting, I am thinking someone relaxed the rules on what it takes to be a medical professional. Sorry if that offends, had you been me, you would understand.
I spent a large part of April with a fever and medicated. Medical facilities were such that I was not in dire enough straights to garner a room, so I suffered at home.
Fever can be an interesting trigger for horrible nightmares, visions, and close personal chats with those that have passed years, if not decades prior. Yes, I am talking about spooky stuff.
There is a paradigm shift in the world. The pandemic might be the cause, or the tool. I suspect the latter. I don't think we have seen the other shoe drop where this pandemic is concerned. My research into vaccines and what they are doing with them vary. Either it takes me to sites that tell you everything else is fake news, take the shot, yada yada or, you read on genomics, happen to have more than a passing understanding of the subject and realize that there is a real danger in messing with RNA. That is how we got here in the first place.
Who, what sane person takes a virus that in and of itself is dangerous and thinks, 'now, how could I make this more transmissible and increase the damage that it does to the host?'
If we knew the truth, we would probably convene trials reminiscent of Nurnberg.
Reported on several sites, the lab in Wuhan had sloppy controls, funding from other countries, and supposedly, Fauci was involved. Let that one sink in. If true, anything he said would be very suspect.
Just because you can, does not mean that you should.
We have enough nukes pointed at each other around the world to turn the planet into dust. Why? Are we that insecure as a race?
Over three and a half million have fallen to this virus. Is the plan to weed out the old, sickly and so on much like in the wilds of the animal Kingdome? Is this tied to Climate Change and some magic number of humans to resources? Are we revisiting Hitler's Eugenics on Steroids?
As for Climate Change, It is bullshit. Here is why.
When a 12-year-old girl becomes the lightning rod for a cause championed by non-other than a privileged girl, ex bartender who couldn't spell Celestial Mechanics, you know there is an issue.
There is power and big money in cow farts and controlling your lives.
This winter was unseasonably colder for us in the south. This July, August it will be warmer than last year, and it is predictable.
Celestial mechanics, the movement of the heavenly bodies, plays a part in the majestic dance we are in with the other planets, moons, etc.
Gravity is the key driving force that regulates this dance.
Our sun goes through a cycle much like everything else in nature, including us humans. Where the sun is concerned every 11.5 or so years, it has a period. Crude, but to the point. The sun's face gets some acne, a zit or two appear, and at times those pimples erupt. We call them solar storms. Sluffing off large amounts of solar stuff into the cosmos, if you are in the direction of the flair, much like your mirror if you squeeze your zits, there are now spots to contend with.
We get pretty dancing lights in the different extreme north or south hemispheres, and we are also at heightened risk of skin cancer from cosmic radiation.
The Thunberg's and the AOC's of the world will find some cause to rally around calling it exhaust from your immaculate burning car, but that is what stupid people do; they become shepherds, leading the sheep, even more foolish people, off cliffs.
In reality, the menstrual cycle of the sun is regulated by our protector and wandering star, Jupiter.
Much like the three wise men followed the Eastern star to find Jesus, we should be thankful it is there. Its gravity is so dense that it plays minesweeper, capturing many wayward fast-moving rocks that might end our puny lives in a heartbeat, much like the dinosaurs before us.
Jupiter has such an immense gravitational field that it drags the sun's core over a half-million miles closer to it, as it traverses its orbit ever oh say, 11.5 years.
Wait, doesn't the sun have its menses every 11.5 years? Could it be that there is no internal mystery of the cyclical nature of the sunspot cycle?
As it happens, this winter, not only was Jupiter tugging on the sun dragging it a half-million miles further away from our lovely little planet but, Saturn is also in conjunction with Jupiter.
Saturn is also a gas giant. I would surmise it does a fair amount of changing the core dimensions of the sun, shifting its center of gravity, and so on all on its own. With both gas giants dragging on the sun in one direction, how much further will the core be nudged?
Well, kids, this July August guess where the earth will be positioned?
Yep, between the sun and those two gas giants. If you could stand on the sun and look into the 'night sky, you would see the earth, Jupiter, and Saturn all lined up within a few arcseconds of each other. With each body exacting some attraction on the sun, this summer will be warmer than others.
The climate change people will beat their chest and demand more money from you to use less efficient forms of energy to save the planet. Now you have fodder to push back. Knowledge is power. Critical thinking is part of the process. Greta and her ilk are used as pawns by the rich and the powerful to control the masses. Her Glower and adulation by Time Magazine, who also praised the likes of Hitler and Stalin, should be your first clue that you are reading the wrong rags. We are controlled and manipulated by multimedia conglomerates who own the politicians.
I am all about a clean environment. I also know there are no free lunches and no perpetual motion machines.
Visionaries like Musk are who we should be looking for.
As for the virus, the more I learn, the more upset I am that this might not be the first such contagion released on the world.
Back in our history, Smallpox was released on the indigenous population. If ever we needed that Thunberg scowl, that would be such a place
Here is some more glower material for those of you who study such things.
Radioactive dust in the form of Zinc Cadmium Sulfide was dropped on cities coast to coast by your very own military, exposing millions to toxic radioactive substances. They did this as part of cold war feasibility studies on attacking cities or countries with airborne agents. Little did they know, years later we would have a virus that was .001 nm in size, more virulent and deadly than Hitler's mustard gas, and would be transported by people.
While I admire the tenacity of the Hog's, Thunberg's, and even the AOC's of the world, I wish to god you would educate yourselves.
You three and your ilk are like No Toes McGrew… Ready Fire Aim. You want the facts; follow the damned money.
Guns are not the issue; sick people with severe mental anomalies are the problem. With the pandemic, it is worse, not better.
Climate change is all about greed. Yes, this inexpensive way of doing things works, but how can we nudge you into paying much more for less?
Freon is the perfect example of how chemical companies lobbied the US to outlaw a perfectly efficient gas for air conditioners for a less efficient form that wears out equipment four times as fast and is much more expensive. This cheap gas is still used in other countries, not in the US, because our lawmakers sold out to the chemical giants.
These last few months have been tough.
If you know someone who, or perhaps you suffered a personal loss, you have my heartfelt sympathies.
As you might suspect, I know many people from what I do. I would need both hands and feet to tally the close personal acquaintances that have passed in these last few months. I am waiting for Zoom to capitalize on Virtual funerals.
Mental illness is by far one of the most significant issues we face as a race. Violence around the globe is on the uptick. Domestic disturbances are off the charts, and personal attacks on people they didn't even know are reported more often.
Here in the states, shootings are frequent with the spark, often as simple as cutting someone off on the motorway, even by accident.
Young girls, teenagers murder a peer for reasons as of yet unknown. Part of me thinks it was to video it and get her five minutes of fame. Plunging a knife into the chest of a classmate and former friend over an argument, video it, and brag about it. On her own phone video, she tells her friends 'I stabbed the bitch in the heart.' Sure, Guns are the problem. NOT.
If your emotions are triggered, you're being manipulated. Preachers have been using this method for years, holding out your eternal salvation as a way to get part of your wealth, and worse, your time. Business execs are more upfront, dollars for hours worked. Yes, we are all whores.
Then there is the lowest of the low, politicians who enslave vast populations by paying them not to work. Idle hands are the devil's workshop. If you are paid not to work, how likely are you to get into trouble with all that spare time?
They know this, and they don't care. Vote the right way, and what happens to you, your family, and so on is none of their concern.
Live on the streets in run-down, crime-ridden cities and vote when it is time. Pitiful.
If you stomach the news, you might be tempted to believe it is a race thing. That is what the talking heads all say, it must be true. That would be a lie.
Melanin has nothing to do with what kind of life you have. If the desire to learn new skills and develop talents has been removed, our natural tendency is to take the path of least resistance. Those of us who have had to scratch at the dirt, claw our way up from the ground to eat, appreciate opportunities. That my friends is the real difference between privilege, and non. Flipping burgers as a child while going to school was a privilege. That entry level job taught me the value of work. The friends I grew up with, who were handed everything in life did not do so well.
What am I doing?
I am working on a thriller that is modeled after my Kelly McGuire novel. This Story has a paranormal feel to it and is written from the 1rst POV. This is an unusual style for me so stay tuned when it will be ready for pre-release.
Yes, all of the ideas and opinions in this blog are mine. No, I have not borrowed anything from anyone in scientific circles. Much like my argument that meteors can have their own mini moons orbiting them, the concept of the sun's cycles are mine.
Every so often I get an e-mail about the variety of stuff that I write. People are rather bemused by the fact that I have written books on how to be successful in the adult entertainment industry.
When E.L. James wrote 50 shades, she did not want people to know who she was until she became rich.
I am not ashamed of trying to assist those that are attempting to make a go of it, modeling on web cam. I am not ashamed of any of my over 25 million published words. I am still scratching at the dirt, the walls and yes, the glass ceiling, because that is who I am.
As my craft continues to improve, I might go back and 'fix' some of my earlier works. I try to look forward, and not backward. Those two how to manuals took me less than a day to write each and they have assisted many. If that is your version of scratching, God Speed.
If you are a regular to my blog, thanks so much. It has been a while since I had anything of value to contribute.
Much Love -TW


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FIRPTA, or the Foreign Investment in Real Property Tax Act, is part of the United States continued efforts to tax all income/gain connected to the United States. Real estate agents, escrow agents, and buyers should be aware of FIRPTA because it mandates income tax withholding and paying over to the IRS 15% of the sales price on the purchase of a U.S. real property interest from a foreign person under certain circumstances. 26 U.S.C. § 1445. In other words, buyers may not be able to pay all of the purchase price to the seller—some may have to be paid to the IRS. This can include situations where a foreign person (or entity) sells, exchanges, liquidates, redeems, gifts, or transfers in any other way a real property interest. The obligation is imposed on a buyer as well as a buyer's agent and/or settlement/escrow officer.
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Day 2 Breisach: Choice of Black Forest Excursion or visit to a local winery in Breisach
Day 3 Strasbourg: Guided sightseeing, visit the La Petite France district and the gothic cathedral; Christmas market
Day 4 Mainz. Excursion to Heidelberg: Choice of guided tour of Heidelberg Castle, see the Great Vat, or guided walk in Mainz with visit of the Gutenberg Museum; Christmas market
Day 5 Rüdesheim–Rhine Gorge-Koblenz: Visit Siegfried's Mechanical Musical Instrument Museum in Rüdesheim; Christmas market; scenic sailing through the Rhine Gorge; Christmas market
Day 6 Cologne: Guided walk; Christmas market
Day 7 Amsterdam: Canal cruise
Day 8 Amsterdam (Disembarkation): Your cruise ends this morning
Avalon has designed included activities with a choice of experiences. We invite you to select the tours, activities, and events that interest you most, so you can experience your cruise your way. Plus, we offer independent exploration options and the use of our exclusive AvalonGO APP on most of our cruises.
Below are 3 types of included shore excursions for you to experience.


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Making Cash Loans Work For You
For the most part everyone in life at one time or another goes through a rough stretch financially. Some people turn to loved ones when they need money. Others don't have that option so they seek alternative sources. You can get a cash loan to help you out. Use the information in this article to learn what Freedom Cash Lenders Bbb are all about.
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Make sure that you understand exactly what a cash loan is before taking one out. These loans are normally granted by companies that are not banks; they lend small sums of money and require very little paperwork. The loans are accessible to most people, although they typically need to be repaid within two weeks.
Before applying for a cash loan have your paperwork in order this will help the loan company, they will need proof of your income, so they can judge your ability to pay the loan back. Take things like your W-2 form from work, alimony payments or proof you are receiving Social Security. Make the case possible for yourself with proper documentation.
Ask about any hidden fees. You won't know if you don't ask. It is common for individuals to end up with a much higher bill than they anticipated after they sign on the dotted line. Make certain to ask plenty of questions, and understand every detail, before you commit yourself.
A lot of companies that offer cash loans make sure their agreements protect them, the lender, in case of a dispute. If the person taking out the loan declares bankruptcy, the cash loan debt won't be discharged. You might have to still pay no matter what.
Only apply for a loan directly from a lender. There are a lot of companies that will match you up with someone; do not use them.
More and more companies are popping up and offering cash loans. Cash loans are small loans based on your receipt of direct deposit of a regular paycheck. Because of the shorter loan amount and repayment schedule, these loans are a lot different than traditional loans. Interest rates are outrageous on these short term loans, but they are a good tool for people in need when used wisely.
Cash loan companies do belong to the BBB and have good ratings. Prior to signing loan documents, try contacting BBB to find out about filed complaints against the company. If you find complaints, you may want to take your business somewhere else.
Keep in mind that you have certain rights when you use a cash loan service. If you feel that you have been treated unfairly by the loan company in any way, you can file a complaint with your state agency. This is in order to force them to abide by any rules, or conditions they fail to live up to. Always read your contract carefully. So that you know what their responsibilities are, as well as your own.
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WGA Consensus Series 1
Glaucoma Diagnosis
Structure and Function
edited by: R.N. Weinreb & E.L. Greve
Price: € 40.00 / US $ 50.00
|Add to cart
This book contains the updated papers of the 1st Global AIGS Consensus Meeting on "Structure and Function in the Management of Glaucoma"
Publication details: Book. 2004. xiv and 162 pages. Publication date: 2004-04-16. 17 figures, of which 12 in full color and one table. Hardbound. 16x24 cm (6.3x9.4 in).
This publication is part of the WGA Consensus series
Also available as ebook
To the best of our knowledge, the 1st Global AIGS Consensus Meeting on "Structure and Function in the Management of Glaucoma" was also the first global consensus meeting in ophthalmology. The goal was to reach an evidence-based consensus for both clinical practice and research through the use of information obtained from peer-reviewed literature describing functional and structural diagnostic testing in glaucoma.
The faculty and review group consisted of leading global authorities on glaucoma diagnostic testing. The preparation for the Consensus was unique in its format (see page xii). Reports on the individual methods of Structure and Function were prepared by an expert group. This was followed by intra-function and intra-structure comparisons and, finally, by a comparison of structure versus function. All the reports were placed in the Consensus e-Room, where they could be commented on by all participants. In addition, basic aspects of this Consensus were considered, as well as the important issue of Evidence-Based Diagnosis. This intense preparation was needed in order to obtain a preliminary Consensus before the meeting. The final Consensus was formulated, based on the preliminary report and adapted following comments from the discussions. It is recognized by all who participated that this is a fluid topic, which will change considerably as further research is conducted and new knowledge is gained.
Robert N. Weinreb
Erik L. Greve
See also:
Table of Contents
Robert N. Weinreb and Erik L. Greve
The Value of Guidelines and Consensus and the Reality of Clinical
Paul Lee
Levels of Evidence of Diagnostic Studies
Anne Coleman, David Friedman, Stefano Gandolfi, Kuldev Singh and Anja Tuulonen
Histopathology Underlying Glaucomatous Damage - I
Ronald S. Harwerth
Histopathology Underlying Glaucomatous Damage - II
Harry Quigley
Comment on the Histopathology of Glaucoma
James E. Morgan
Histopathology Underlying Glaucomatous Damage - III
Yeni Yücel
Optic Disc Photographs
Joseph Caprioli, Jost Jonas and Christiana Vasile
Retinal Nerve Fiber Layer (RNFL) Photography
Harry Quigley, Antoinette Niessen, Anja Tuulonen and Juhani Airaksinen
Scanning Laser Tomography (HRT)
Marcelo Nicolela, Alfonso Anton, Somkiat Asawaphureekorn, Claude Burgoyne and Goji Tomita
Scanning Laser Polarimetry (SLP)
Hans G. Lemij, Eytan Blumenthal, Robert Fechtner, David Greenfield and Michael Kook
Optical Cohererence Tomography (OCT)
Jeffrey Liebmann, Christopher Bowd, Felipe A. Medeiros and Joel Schuman
Standard Automated Perimetry (SAP)
Anders Heijl, Boel Bengtsson, Mike Patella and John Wild
Comment on Standard Automated Perimetry - I
Douglas R. Anderson
Comment on Standard Automated Perimetry - II
Balwantray C. Chauhan
Comment on Standard Automated Perimetry - III
Stefano Miglior
Short Wavelength Automated Perimetry (SWAP)
Shaban Demirel, John Flanagan and Pamela Sample
Frequency Doubling Technology Perimetry (FDT), Chris A. Johnson,
Murray Fingeret and Aiko Iwase
Comparison of Functional Methods
Pamela Sample, Balwantray C. Chauhan, Makato Araie and Chris A. Johnson
Comparison of Structural Methods
Linda M. Zangwill, Christopher Girkin, Stefano Miglior, Remo Susanna and Ravi Thomas
Comparison of Structural and Functional Methods - I
David F. Garway-Heath
Comparison of Structural and Functional Methods - II
Balwantray C. Chauhan
Comparison of Structural and Functional Methods - III
Linda M. Zangwill
Concluding Remarks
Financial Disclosure
Index of Authors


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Dear SM (Straight Mom) - She hears you sighing when you attempt to brush her curls. She hears your comments about her "rats' nest". She's listening. She hears you. She gets the message. So let's change it. First, since you don't have curls, there will be a bit of a learning curve. Please check out… Continue reading Dear Straight Mom of a Curly Kid…
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Dear Curly Girl
Dear Curly Girl, Where do I even start? I, too, was made fun of because of my hair. I was called all the not-so-nice nicknames, and know that it sucks being ridiculed about something over which you have no control. It stinks and it's frustrating because no matter how you try - they are what… Continue reading Dear Curly Girl


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Google has its Project Loon balloons for beaming Internet to Earthlings and now Facebook is planning to test drones which will be able to do the same. The company will carry out tests to check the feasibility of hosting Wi-Fi hotspots in the sky in 2015. The social network's Mark Zuckerberg has announced it to be part of the efforts of Internet.org to connect the entire population across the world to the web.
Apart from the flying Wi-Fi drones, there will be satellites and infrared lasers too which will be built to provide Internet to all. Yes, ladies and gentlemen, the future is going to be very exciting indeed. It's a noble effort to try and get everyone online so they have access to the vast amount of information the infinite virtual spaces hold, and also to Facebook.
Of course, issues such as the prices, benefits and capabilities of dishing out Wi-Fi from high up in the air come into consideration here. This is why the Facebook-backed organization has chosen not to stick with a single solution, unlike Google and its balloons. So going with invisible laser beams using light to transmit data through space is another option.
While talking about the reasoning behind using drones, Zuckerberg makes it a point to note that precise control over the location of these aircraft, unlike balloons, will be possible. The guys behind the world's longest flying solar-powered unmanned craft called Zephyr, will be joining the Facebook Connectivity Lab to work on the upcoming project.
Also see: Facebook Internet.org shows Google how it's done
With regards to Google's lofty ambitions, it's busy planning a ring of balloons to fly 20km above the Earth's surface and provide Internet access to everyone on the ground. Maybe we're being too skeptical about the search giant's concept, but Facebook's Internet beaming drones sound more achievable.