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Illicit International Transactions
Linked with Bradford Dillman – USA, with undergraduate study of International Political Economy, and with Lessons for US Policy in the Arab World.
Implications for Reconstruction in Iraq, Palestine, and Algeria – DRAFT, NOT FOR CITATION, by Bradford Dillman, Assistant Professor of International Political Economy, The University of Puget Sound, 1500 N. Warner St., #1057, Tacoma, WA 98416, Mail, 253-879-3594.
This text is from a workshop on �Rebuilding Devastated Economies in the Middle East�, G.E. von Grunebaum Center for Near Eastern Studies, UCLA, Session II, February 3-5, 2005.
For more than a decade, violence has devastated the economies of Iraq, the Palestinian Territories, and Algeria. All three nations are beset with high unemployment, degraded infrastructure, and low or negative per capita economic growth.
Reconstruction is hampered by continuing civil conflict, although Algeria�s Islamist insurgency has tapered off in recent years. National elites face the daunting challenge of re-establishing security, strengthening state institutions, enforcing a rule of law, expanding social services, and providing productive employment for large numbers of youth entering the workforce. At the same time, leaders face mounting internal and external pressure for political liberalization.
It is easy enough to catalogue a panoply of actions that domestic and international actors should undertake to rebuild these economies, but it is much more difficult to assess whether the policies will be politically viable or effective if implemented. This paper examines the impact that illicit international transactions have on economic recovery efforts. It places shadow actors and illicit transactions front-and-center in a political economy analysis of Iraq, the Palestinian Territories, and Algeria. Its central thesis is that cross-border �shadow� networks imperil reconstruction in conflict-ridden countries. Understanding the importance of actors in illicit transnational networks allows us to better assess policy options and anticipate the roadblocks those options may encounter. Illicit international transactions are defined as activities that result in a transfer of goods, services, and money across borders by actors that contravene domestic laws or violate international norms of good governance. These transactions typically involve the misuse of public resources, evasion of economic regulations, and undermining of competition. Some of the most important examples of transnational shadow activities are: smuggling; money laundering; illegal capital flight; commission-taking on international contracts; monopolization of importing through coercion; sanctions-busting; and misappropriation of external rents such as aid and oil revenues.
Scholarship on the Middle East has for years underestimated the centrality of illicit transactions in structuring political systems and channeling resource distribution. This is not to say that analysts of the Middle East have ignored illicit activities such as corruption, criminality, and trading in the informal economy, but that they tend to portray them as domestic, episodic, and secondary phenomena. The rentier state literature is a partial exception. Comparative and statistical analysis of rentier states suggests, among other things, that rents tend to facilitate corruption, impede economic reform, and limit democratization (see Karl 1997; Vandewalle 1998; and Ross 2001). Iraq, the Palestinian Territories, and Algeria – all rentier states – show evidence of these effects. If reconstruction efforts center on expansion of the oil sector and increases in international aid, they may actually reinforce some of these negative structural characteristics.
There are two other bodies of literature that prominently factor illicit transactions into development processes, but neither has been systematically applied to a wide range of Middle East cases. Literature on the politics of economic reform – much of it drawing on post-communist cases – has traced a number of unintended illicit effects of market-oriented transitions: personalization of public property; privatization scams; stripping of industrial assets; capital flight; and money laundering; and the rise of a mafia-oligarch-state nexus. Joel Hellman (1998), for example, argues that economic liberalization in former command economies creates a set of early �winners� who seek to monopolize ill-gotten gains by preventing complete liberalization from occurring. B�atrice Hibou (2004), looking at sub-Saharan Africa, contends that adoption of Washington-Consensus policies has led to a thoroughly corrupt �privatization� of the state. My own analyses suggests that North African elites tap international resource inflows during partial economic reform to bolster extra-budgetary funds, consolidate patronage, and re-regulate the economy (see Dillman 2002; 2001; and 2000). This body of literature – which also includes �infitah� studies – cautions that economic reform is not a panacea; it often creates shadow networks with damaging consequences.
The third body of literature of relevance to the Arab cases looks at economies of violence. The International Peace Academy�s Economic Agendas in Civil Wars (EACW) program has published a number of cases studies of societies engulfed in war or extreme violence (unfortunately there are no Arab cases). The studies suggest that illicit trade in commodities like blood diamonds, small arms, and timber lengthens the duration of conflict and creates potential �peace spoilers� (see Ballantine 2004). Rebel financing tends to come from external third parties, while government elites in times of war often loot private and public assets. A separate ethnography by Carolyn Nordstrom (2004) uncovers entrenched illicit networks in African conflict zones where foreign military actors, foreign donors, and foreign commercial actors join in the profiteering. Iraq, the Palestinian Territories, and Algeria have suffered prolonged violence (short of civil war) with similar processes of smuggling, profiteering, conflict financing, and (shadowy) �differential accumulation.�
A brief look at several recent �funny money� activities in the three Arab cases illustrates some of their broad implications for rebuilding. In the case of Iraq, newspapers reported on a shadowy arms deal carried out by the interim government. Four Iraqi cabinet members – including Defense Minister Hazim al-Shalaan – apparently approved the physical transfer of $300 million from the Iraqi Central Bank to Lebanon for the purchase of weapons from international arms dealers (Filkins 2005). The actors who either participated in or �green-lighted� the unorthodox transaction allegedly included Iraqi cabinet officials, American financial overseers, a private Iraqi bank, intermediaries in Lebanon, and manufacturers of weapons in Poland, the Czech Republic, Turkey, the Ukraine, and the United States. In the case of Palestine, there was much ballyhoo at the time of Yasser Arafat�s death about the fate of billions of dollars of �hidden cash� he had allegedly skimmed from public coffers and stashed in international assets. An International Monetary Fund audit of Palestinian Authority finances in 2003 estimated that since 1995 Arafat had diverted $900 million to a variety of commercial investments outside the West Bank and Gaza (Erlanger 2004). In Algeria, the country�s largest private bank – Khalifa Bank – collapsed in 2003 and entered into government receivership following a financial scandal. It has been alleged that the managers of the bank duped depositors – many of whom were state entities – and embezzled funds estimated at some $1.5 billion that were transferred out of the country (see Crumley 2003).
These cases are emblematic of a wider set of illicit transactions about which several observations can be made. First, grand corruption is rarely confined to the domestic sphere; proceeds from �swindling� are often parked outside the territorial unit from which they were derived. Second, carrying out shadow activities typically requires a network of domestic and international actors. Economists often portray the key actors as �private rent-seekers� who illegally extract gains from public officials. Policy makers in the post-9/11 world tend to identify key culprits as organized criminal mafias and terrorists. Yet public officials are often key actors, which is one of the reasons for the widely-held public perception in the MENA that governments are like kleptocracies. Third, analysts often assume that economic and political elites want more transparency and rule of law to dampen opportunities for transnational corruption. However, the record in Iraq, the Palestinian Territories, and Algeria suggests that powerholders rarely police themselves or their private allies, especially during periods of civil violence. Fourth, reconstruction policies sometimes make the illicit problem worse, and illicit actors often hamper policy reform. Policy prescriptions focused on economic liberalization, international aid inflows, foreign investment enhancement, state-institution strengthening, and democratization may unintentionally complicate matters. Finally, illicit transactions affect development prospects and governance, but it is often difficult to know precisely how. Tracking clandestine networks and large transfers of resources is an inherently imprecise, but necessary, daunting task.
Placing Illicit Transactions in an International Context:
Many studies suggest that illicit activities tend to lower growth, reduce social trust, and discourage foreign investment. Petty illicit activities in some instances can be a survival mechanism for the poor and can grease the wheels of government with positive macro-economic effects. Shadow economies grow substantially in societies beset by civil conflict. The breakdown in government institutions encourages both political elites and rival non-state actors to pursue ill-gotten gains. The risk of punishment in conflict societies like Iraq, Palestine, and Algeria tends to decrease at the same time that scarcity of good and services creates windfall profits for those willing to deal in the shadows.
There are two proxy indicators of the scale of transnational illicit activities in the Middle East: capital flight and contract-intensive money. It seems reasonable to assume that actors in devastated economies or countries with civil conflict want to hold a significant proportion of their money (legal or ill-gotten gains) outside the country. Capital flight is a means of transferring or laundering illicit proceeds to banks and other depositories outside one�s borders. By many estimates, wealth flight as a percentage of Middle East GDP is higher than for almost any other region in the world. In the 1990s, a commonly accepted figure for the amount of Arab capital invested abroad was $500 billion (Henry and Springborg 2001: 97). A proportion of this flight capital was generated through shadow activities. Volatile exchange rates and significant variations between official and black market foreign currency rates could also reflect capital flight. Similarly, Henry and Springborg (2001) assess levels of institutional credibility and accountability in the Middle East by measuring the ratio of contract-intensive money (CIM) in banks to the total money supply. The ratio is lowest in �bunker� regimes like Iraq and Algeria – where weak property rights, corruption, and violence dissuade people from parking funds in domestic commercial banks. This proxy indicator also seems to correlate with corruption perception surveys and other measures of rule of law. If illicit accumulators of funds are not parking assets in banks, under their beds, or in local real estate, we would expect a significant proportion will be parked outside the country.
In recognition of the development implications of illegality, international institutions have ratcheted up funding for programs to combat corruption and to create transparency in state finances. The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank have many good-governance and anti-corruption programs. The World Bank now compiles Investment Climate Surveys and a �Doing Business� database to measure perceptions of corruption, lack of contract enforcement, and regulatory unpredictability. The United States and the European Union have also joined in anti-corruption funding through USAID and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership�s MEDA program. These actors, joined by international NGOs like Transparency International, tend to focus on reforming Middle East administrative apparatuses, legal systems, and law enforcement capacities. Their policy targets are domestic Middle East actors and institutions. The problem, however, is that policy prescriptions that focus solely on the domestic level are unlikely to have a significant dampening effect on shadow economies. Grand corruption that impacts the prospects for reconstruction usually has an important transnational dimension. International organizations increasingly advocate policy interventions that can be targeted at different points in the illegal transnational chain.
The security policies of the occupying powers in the Palestinian Territories and Iraq indicate that Israel and the United States are increasingly cognizant of the regional and international dimensions of illicit transactions. Israel�s separation wall may, among other things, prevent arms smuggling into the West Bank and constrict the points through which Palestinians can access Israeli goods that end up in the hands of Palestinian Authority monopolies and illicit trade networks. And the Israeli government�s secret decision in July 2004 to authorize seizure without compensation of Palestinian-owned property inside the security wall (Myre 2005) is the extension of a decades-long practice of illegal expropriation [aka primitive accumulation] hampering Palestinian state-building.
US pressure on Syria and Iran to prevent smuggling of weapons to Iraqi insurgents is part of a more general effort to police importing into Iraq. Policing of illicit exports, however, seems to have met with mixed success, even though these exports are a direct drain on public resources. A number of newspaper reports in 2004 indicated that since the US invasion criminal networks have been dismantling Iraqi infrastructure and factories, smuggling the stripped machinery, parts, and scrap metal into Jordan and other neighboring countries. Similarly, criminal rackets apparently continue to illegally tap crude oil pipelines and ship the diverted oil out of the country. A 2004 audit of the Coalition Provisional Authority by the International Advisory and Monitoring Board concluded that the CPA could not estimate the amount of illegal oil smuggling when sovereignty was handed over to the Iraqi interim government, partly because the there was a lack of metering equipment in the oil industry (Revenue Watch 2004).
US efforts to secure the return of Saddam-era funds deposited in foreign banks has apparently had a modicum of success, but Syria and other Arab states have dragged their heels. Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and the Gulf countries remain banking havens for criminal elites throughout the region. These countries remain largely resistant to international banking standards, although the Gulf states appear to be increasing banking oversight and regulation of money transfer agents. As long as these banking and trade entrepots remain accessible, regional actors will use them for money laundering and financing of a wide range of illicit current transactions. Moreover, as James Henry (2003) argues, there are plenty of Northern �blood bankers� who accommodate kleptocrats and criminals seeking to launder absconded public funds.
The Centrality of State Actors in Shadow Economies:
Who are the primary illicit transactors, facilitators, and beneficiaries in the Middle East? �Rent-seeking� theorists tend to define the main instigators of informal transactions as private actors who offer public officials bribes to gain government-granted privileges. Since the start of the second intifada and the 9/11 attacks, security-oriented policymakers have focused on insurgents and terrorists who engage in money laundering and arms trafficking. But terrorists, criminals, and businesspeople are only a subset of the actors involved in Middle East shadow economies, and not necessarily the most important ones. Participants often hold formal positions in the government or the state apparatus. Paul Salem (2003) argues that in state-socialist holdovers such as Iraq and Algeria, massive corruption and profiteering reached into the highest levels of government, security, military, and party elites, turning the regimes into what the public regarded (or regards) as kleptocracies. Transnational illicit activities blur the distinction between public/private and state/business. Actors frequently �straddle� formal juridical categories and associate through some degree of separation with actors in various juridical and institutional categories.
Steven Heydemann (2004) and Reinoud Leenders and John Sfakianakis (2003) argue that we should focus on cross-juridical and cross-institutional domestic networks. A network or transactional approach concentrates on chains of connection between a range of individuals and entities who structure the interests of political and coercive institutions. Within these networks, there are varying degrees of separation between actors who cooperate for mutual gain. The networks are not simply government patronage systems in which the �state� is the distributor and �social actors� are the recipients, nor are they simply bribery rackets in which businesspeople �pay� for officials� favoritism. Political elites may be part of the networks but exercise little control over them. In a similar fashion, Ballantine (2004) advocates a focus on �stakeholders� in conflict economies. The aim is not to distinguish between actors merely on the basis of where they �sit,� but rather to distinguish between actors in terms of their motivation: whether they enter illicit economies for survival, exploit war to amass resources, or steal resources in order to conduct war. From this perspective, the relevant network actors include military elites, bureaucrats, private businessmen, smugglers, transporters, criminals, foreign contractors, foreign suppliers, foreign investors, and foreign bankers.
When looking at cross-border networks, distinguishing between the motives of actors becomes an important issue with ramifications for reconstruction. Non-national actors and institutions are not necessarily willing accomplices; their presence in illicit networks may simply be functional to the achievement of the ends of some of the network�s members. In other words, the �complicity� of international actors is not necessarily one of intent; it may occur by default. International financial institutions and aid donors who facilitate financial flows to Iraq, Algeria, and the Palestinian Authority create opportunities for funds-diversion, but they can be unwilling or unwitting participants. Even if they know that funds are misused and placed in secret accounts, the alternative of cutting off flows may be worse (politically). Whether out of strategic self-interest or some notion of respect for the principle of sovereignty, the United States, the European Union, and international organizations generally do not �take to task� friendly kleptocrats�they tend to target pariahs and rogue states. When domestic actors know this – or when they know that foreign actors are not willing to unseat them or push the reform agenda too far – they are in a better position to instrumentalize foreign actors to support their extra-legal activities.
In the cases under consideration in this paper, I argue that, on balance, the key shadow actors are public officials, military and security elites, and their allies in the private sector. This is not to deny the significance of insurgent/ terrorist/ rebel actors and networks. Hamas, Ansar al-Islam, Saddam loyalists, al-Qa�ida, the GSPC, and the GIA also operate in the shadow economy and affect prospects for reconstruction. Yet the state-military-business troika – what Algerians often refer to as the �politico-administrative mafia� – has its hands in the public coffers and probably has a much more significant impact on resource redistribution. This troika often has privileged access to international rents and controls large interstate trade. In conflict zones, it is often the predominant holder of the means of coercion, and it can put those means of coercion to use for extortion and racketeering as well as security operations. Military, security, and intelligence services are particularly important members of this troika. Ironically, security policies in Iraq, Palestine, and Algeria designed to bolster the size and scope of military forces may in the very process expand the size and scope of these same forces� extralegal �moonlighting.� If rebuilding a devastated economy means reestablishing the government�s monopoly on the legitimate use of force, and assuming that the use or threat of force is an important tool in many illicit activities, the rebuilt state apparatus – especially if unaccountable to the electorat – may increase corruption.
The centrality of state officials in illicit transactions can be seen in the Palestinian Territories, Algeria, and Iraq. After the Oslo Accords, Arafat constructed a neo-patrimonial regime, much of whose revenue ultimately came from outside the territories. According to Hans-Joachim Rabe (2004), a core economic elite emerged involving Arafat loyalists, security officials, Palestinian Authority professionals, and private businessmen. Similarly, Markus Bouillon (2004) argues that the political economy of peace initially rewarded the �Tunisians� and diaspora entrepreneurs who wove a fabric of corruption based on indirect collaboration with Israelis and foreign aid providers. PA authorities and security services became the key intermediaries between foreign actors and local actors. PA officials established their own private businesses and channeled government purchasing to foreign firms in which they had financial interests. Importing, public procurement, and taxation became important mechanisms to accumulate private capital. The dividing line between legitimate government extraction and illegal personal rent-taking was blurred, just as it has been blurred in Iraq and Algeria.
PA authorities in collusion with security services and diaspora conglomerates established import monopolies over cement, gasoline, cigarettes, flour, and just about everything else (Bouillon 2004). Importing became a �zero-sum� game, where one actor�s ability to get trucks through the border with Israel denied another actor the opportunity to import (Rabe 2004). Post-Oslo conditions of �privileged movement� helped determine the set of actors who could consistently make connections to the main territorial supplier, Israel. The monopolization of importing damaged Palestinian businesses while providing extra-budgetary resources for powerholders. On the export side, the IMF (2003) notes that despite post-2000 closures, large West Bank and Gazan companies with �good connections (especially with the Israelis)� had little trouble getting their goods through checkpoints and into Israeli and foreign markets. Palestinian security services also diverted money from the Customs Office that was supposed to go to the Treasury. The IMF (2003) describes the process as �diversion of excise revenue�to off-budget activities outside the control of the Ministry of Finance, which contributed to liquidity problems and a buildup of expenditure arrears.�
Sara Roy (2002) and Bouillon (2004) argue that the devastation of the Palestinian economy can be traced to the onset of Oslo, and the second intifada accelerated negative trends. Roy attributes most of the decline to Israeli closure policies, territorial fragmentation, and destruction of infrastructure, but she also cites PA mismanagement and corruption. Beginning in 2000, Israel�s refusal to transfer VAT and customs duties to the PA threatened privileged networks. EU donors and the Arab League ratcheted up funds and diverted project-oriented aid to emergency budgetary support. Corruption has a large part to play in explaining why a �peace process� does not necessarily rebuild a devastated economy. At the same time, closures and curfews since 2000 have undermined some illicit transactions. A revealing example is motor vehicle theft. In the 1990s, auto theft in Israel was estimated to amount to $1 billion.
According to Sergio Herzog (2002), the Oslo process helped spur a thriving, professionalized trade in stolen Israeli vehicles into PA-controlled regions. Palestinian �chop shops� dismantled the vehicles and re-exported car parts to Israel. In this case, peace was good for cross-border criminals and their protectors. Auto theft and smuggling has decreased in the face of Israeli border closures and a 1999 Israeli administrative decision to ban the purchase of used car parts from the Palestinian territories (Herzog 2002).
In Algeria, public officials and military elites have also been implicated in a series of scandals and shadow activities. In 1989, former prime minister Abdelhamid Brahimi accused officials of having appropriated $26 billion in bribes and commissions from foreign companies with contracts in Algeria in the 1980s. [Brahimi later became an Islamist oppositionist in exile. Several dozen members of his extended family were reported to have been killed during one of Algeria�s �mysterious� massacres in the 1990s.] In another scandal in 1990, the National Chamber of Commerce – a public institution – was accused of illegally granting scarce foreign exchange to private sector �insiders.� The outbreak of civil violence following the 1992 coup created an environment in which clandestine transactions flourished. Luis Martinez (2000) traces the creation of new fortunes by both military elites and Islamist networks. Isabelle Werenfels (2004: 178) observes, �The involvement of current and retired military officials in the private and the informal sectors of the economy had been increasing since the 1980s and was indirectly encouraged by an early retirement regulation for civil servants. Not surprisingly, many members of the core elite, for example Belkeir and Mohammed Lamari, placed family members in privileged positions in the private sector and were reputed to have made fortunes.�
Algeria�s military elites and private allies took advantage of trade �liberalization� to stake a claim to the lucrative import trade (Dillman 2000). Djillali Hadjadj (1999) describes a set of state officials, security officers, and private mafias who monopolized importing of foodstuffs and pharmaceuticals. Generals and security officers set up a host of lucrative private security firms offering protective services to public and private enterprises. He also notes that the army, gendarmerie, and military police oversaw imports of arms and security equipment estimated to cost about $3 billion per year during the height of the violence. The amount of this public procurement – much of it conducted without solicitation of competitive bids – is still unknown, and Hadjadj guesses that this type of procurement gave rise to all sorts of misappropriation of public funds. Similarly, opaque public contracts with international firms for the supply of airplanes and engineering services presumably involved a lot of under-the-table money.
It is probably too early to know whether Iraq will witness the emergence of a state/security/private troika under its newly-elected government. The legacy of illicit Baathist networks may influence the behavior of Shia and Kurdish elites.
The insurgency will likely shape new illicit international networks. In conflict zones where military budgets are non-transparent and military actors procure supplies from abroad, opportunities for illicit activities flourish. Security forces and their allies often try to �expropriate� monopolies over cross-border exchange, or at least get into the �game.� During the first year of Iraqi occupation, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) managed the Iraqi budget by drawing on oil revenues and repatriated assets in the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI). The CPA transferred control of this fund in June 2004 to the Iraqi interim government, but the assets are subject to oversight by the International Advisory and Monitoring Board (IAMB). The newly-constituted government in 2005 will have full control over the fund, which is replenished with revenues from oil exports. The IAMB�s most recent audit of the DFI in the first half of 2004 found serious deficiencies in the management of more than $4 billion of Iraqi finances (see Revenue Watch 2004). The CPA usually disbursed funds without seeking competitive bids from contractors. In many cases, the CPA did not monitor the use of funds by Iraqi ministries. The Kurdish Regional Government denied the IAMB access to all of its accounting records.
Similarly, in its October 2004 report to Congress, the Coalition Provisional Authority Inspector General found many irregularities in use of DFI funds by the CPA and Iraqi ministries (see Revenue Watch 2004). Among other things, the CPA-IG could find no data on how the Ministry of Finance utilized a $1.4 billion disbursement from the fund just days before the transfer of sovereignty. It noted the lack of transparency in the interim government�s use of Iraqi finances.
In its January 2005 report, the Inspector General found that before the turnover of sovereignty, the CPA gave hundreds of millions of dollars to Iraqi ministries that had not presented plans for how the money would be used, opening the door to corruption and fraud (Eckholm 2005). Iraqi ministries� lack of skilled workers, equipment, and accounting oversight may open the door for personalization of public resources in the coming years.
Oil Rents and Corruption:
Iraq and Algeria are rentier states that derive a majority of government revenues from oil and gas sales. They will remain rentier states for a long time. In fact, reconstruction will necessarily require investment and expansion in the hydrocarbons sector, making both countries even more dependent on international rents. Efforts to establish financial transparency and reduce corruption will have difficulty counteracting the structural effects of natural resource dependency. The line between use of these hydrocarbons resources for �legal� patronage and misuse for personal accumulation is often blurry. Moreover, according to Karl and Gary (2004), �IFI�s and private commercial banks support lending to deeply indebted oil-exporters, even when it is clear that debt only supports unproductive activities or papers over rent-seeking behaviors.�
A wide body of literature contends that access to natural resource rents and strategic rents tends to make public expenditures non-transparent. Moore (2004: 309) notes that �external banking sanctuary� facilitates nontransparency in natural resource-based regimes that have the �capacity to stash illicit capital in developed countries and enjoy it later.� Transparency International�s 2004 Corruption Perceptions Index ranks Algeria, the Palestinian Territories, and Iraq as having rampant corruption. According to TI chairman Peter Eigen, many of the worst scorers are oil-rich countries where �public contracting in the oil sector is plagued by revenues disappearing into the pockets of western oil executives, middlemen and local officials.� He argues that �without strict anti-bribery measures, the reconstruction of Iraq will be wrecked by a wasteful diversion of resources to corrupt elites� (Transparency International 2004). Saddam Hussein�s end run around the UN Oil-for-Food program is one of the most extraordinary examples of the difficulty of accounting for oil revenue use. Surcharges, kickbacks, and oil-smuggling involving a host of countries, oil companies, and purchasers allowed Saddam to garner $8-$20 billion despite one of the most elaborate sanctions regim
Karl and Gary (2004) argue that �only those who control political power can grant the opportunity to make money from oil, and only those who receive this opportunity can provide the revenues to keep regimes in power.� Control over hydrocarbons generally means control over the budget, foreign exchange, and the ability to import. Prolonged conflict in Algeria and Iraq has decreased industrial production in the public sector and increased already-high reliance on imports of foodstuffs, machinery, and industrial inputs. It is state officials that usually control the terms of access to foreign exchange for the public sector and for many private businesses, and therefore the state often determines who can profit from importing. Dutch disease tends to raise the real exchange rate of the country�s currency. Insiders who get rationed foreign exchange at official exchange rates get a subsidy�low cost credit. The Algerian government also has a history of rationing licenses for trade franchises and importers.
Oil booms fuel public spending, which enhances prospects for economic recovery. The Iraqi government will benefit from recovery of oil export potential. Sustained high oil prices in the last two years have boosted growth of Algerian GDP and left Algeria with $37 billion in foreign exchange reserves by September 2004. President Abdelaziz Bouteflika has launched a massive state spending program. �Black gold,� however, makes possible huge kickbacks and commissions when states issue international contracts for supply of military equipment, turnkey projects, and engineering services. A frenzy of international oil companies seeking oil drilling concessions, joint ventures, and oil services contracts in Algeria (and probably soon in Iraq) has opened the door to extraordinary graft. Leenders and Sfakianakis (2003) provide indirect evidence of the oil-creates-graft thesis by pointing out that corruption in the Middle East and North Africa actually declined in 2001-2002 because an oil-price slump and global recession – which reduced investment in the emerging markets – curtailed opportunities for �commission-taking� by state elites. Paul Stevens (2004) contends that the recent rises in oil and gas prices are dampening the momentum for economic reform. Absent profound political change and legislative oversight of the executive branch, ruling elites will continue to line their own pockets with oil windfalls, reinforcing public perceptions that they are kleptocrats.
Will Elites Promote Transparency and Good Governance?:
Reducing transnational criminality in countries seeking to recover from civil conflict depends on the extent to which political elites are willing to confront the shadows. Extra-legal actors seek to avoid the public spotlight, and states run by �information-shy� elites seek to cover their tracks. There are any number of actors who �talk the good governance talk� in consultation with international institutions and foreign governments. Many may do so based on a conviction that corruption devastates the economy or based on a cost-benefit analysis that better governance will enhance state capacity. The easiest policy in many countries is to create �pockets of efficiency� in the administration, which amounts to targeting particular officials or bodies for cleanup. Targeted campaigns against weak links in the shadows can be successful and not too costly politically. The hope is often that a demonstration effect will occur, persuading illicit actors to be more circumspect, legalize their activities, or withdraw completely from the shadows. In this regard, public scandals can have a catalytic effect, drawing civic groups, legislatures, and authorities into a temporary alliance to root out particular networks. For example, the public outrage over Algeria�s Khalifa Bank scandal has pushed the government to question hundreds of current and former government officials, charge a former governor of the Central Bank, and issue an international arrest warrant for the president of Khalifa Group.
However, Leenders and Sfakianakis (2003) argue that most anti-corruption discourse is rarely translated into sincere policies, and public corruption cases frequently are an effort by governments to �settle political scores.� In countries with pervasive violence or threats to security, taking on powerful networks is politically and personally risky. Those who would enforce transparency may themselves engage in shady transactions or be part of a network that is involved in domestic or cross-border corruption. Werenfels (2004) recounts an interview with an Algerian private sector consultant who is conversant in World Bank-anti corruption lingo and is a participant in fora publicizing governance problems. The same person also has close ties with d�cideurs and uses those connections to �mediate� between Algerian elites and international organizations. In this case, the actor apparently perceives no contradiction between his public persona and his private economic activities. It should not be surprising that public officials who straddle the public and private realms will not make the fight against illicit activities a crusade but will choose their targets selectively.
Whether authorities decide to earnestly promote transparency depends on calculations of political and economic rationality. In some cases attacking political competitors in illicit networks may enhance one�s political power and also benefit the economy as a whole. Alternatively, it may be politically rational to attack illicit networks in order to �appropriate� their activities, but society will reap no gains. In many cases it is politically suicidal to pressure shadow actors who control government resources or means of coercion. Of course, political and economic self interest may compel some elites to participate fully in shadow economies. In studies of sub-Saharan African cases, William Reno, B�atrice Hibou, and Carolyn Nordstrom argue that leaders who deliberately undermine their national economy and state institutions in pursuit of personal enrichment are often still able to sustain a system of governance.
Establishing budgetary transparency is a necessary but insufficient means to attack public corruption. Extra-budgetary funds are a key source of personal gain and patronage. Military and security actors, for example, often morph into entrepreneurs or godfathers for importers, security services contractors, and factory owners. Their activities – which are often technically illegal and have an international dimension – may depend only tangentially on the state budget. Actors are loathe to give up these activities when violence subsides. Legalization of these activities during reconstruction is one means to create a more vibrant private sector.
Public pressure, legislative activism, and international assistance have helped promote some progress on the transparency issue in the Palestinian Authority, but Iraq and Algeria still appear to be foot-draggers. A Palestinian ministerial reform committee initiated legal changes in 2003 to create a quasi-autonomous financial monitoring office and to require officials to submit financial disclosure statements. A Palestinian Investment Fund is supposed to manage the PA�s commercial assets, many of which are invested in other countries. The Finance Ministry is consolidating budget accounting and expenditures. However, the IMF (2004: 10) is a bit too congratulatory in its claim that �reforms have placed the Palestinian Authority to a level of fiscal responsibility, control, and transparency which rivals the most fiscally advanced countries in the region.� El-Aryan (2004) notes that pensions and insurance funds have not been included in the Palestinian budget, and security agencies have resisted distributing payrolls through the banking system. One is hard-pressed to identify any senior PA official who has been convicted for corruption.
Algeria�s Bouteflika has repeatedly emphasized the importance of establishing a rule of law and rooting out corruption. In 2002 he issued a decree requiring the government to publish provisional awards of contracts so that unsuccessful bidders could appeal the government�s decisions. Parliament is poised to ratify an international money-laundering and anti-terrorist financing treaty. His government is rigorously investigating the Khalifa bank scandal. However, since early 2003 Bouteflika has conducted a campaign of intimidation and imprisonment against journalists and publishers, particularly those who have reported on corruption, embezzlement, and mismanagement by public officials.
Unintended Consequences of Well-Intentioned Reconstruction Policies:
Many of the policy proposals to help devastated economies are based on a neo-liberal worldview. These solutions stress the virtuous, mutually-reinforcing effects of democratization, institution-building, economic liberalization, and North-to-South financial transfers. In a recent article in Foreign Affairs, Stuart Eizenstat, John Porter, and Jeremy Weinstein (2005) argue that the United States should aid, develop, and stabilize weak or failed states. This is to be accomplished in weak states by enhancing their capacity to protect borders, strengthening their security forces, strengthening good governance, and promoting an expansion of world trade. Similarly, the European Union since 1995 has touted a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in the southern Mediterranean designed to bolster development through free trade and generous aid for structural adjustment and administrative reform. Illicit political economies, however, can weaken or undermine these reconstruction polices. Conversely, we should recognize that these same policies may in some cases unintentionally expand opportunities for illicit transactions.
Market-oriented reforms are commonly proposed for countries seeking to enhance efficiency and transparency. But economic liberalization – absent the establishment of powerful legislative and regulatory institutions – can easily facilitate large-scale personalization of public property. Heydemann (2004: 6) observes that economic reform in the Middle East �reorganizes opportunities for rent-seeking� but does not necessarily eliminate rent-seeking and disproportionate gains by members of pre-existing �networks of privilege.� Economic transition that expands the realm of economic activities to a wider range of actors requires both weakening some regulations and re-regulating some economic activities. Ballantine (2004) finds that donors who promote rapid economic liberalization in post-conflict societies can produce perverse effects that encourage criminality. To the extent that liberalization expands access to international actors – multinational corporations, foreign contractors, international banks, aid agencies, and Northern donors – it also expands opportunities for illicit exchange of resources. In addition, privatization often degenerates into personalization of public property. Hibou (2004) notes that in Sub-Saharan and Northern Africa privatization still allows public officials to indirectly govern through the use of private intermediaries. It allows for new negotiations among public and private actors, blurring public/private and licit/illicit distinctions.
In post-invasion Iraq there is a new constellation of foreign contractors, foreign buyers of oil, foreign trading partners, and Iraqi �intermediaries.� Paul Bremmer�s precipitous attempt to liberalize the economy may have caused more harm than good. Expansion of the legal market has been concomitant with expansion of the gray market. In post-Oslo Palestine there is a new constellation of Palestinian, Israeli and Jordanian trade partners, foreign contractors, and aid agencies. Public official routinely �moonlight� in private business. Some private investors such as the head of the Palestine International Bank found their businesses targets of public shakedowns, unfair judicial proceedings, and outright seizure (Abu Issa 2004). Post-coup structural adjustment in Algeria has encouraged new oil investments, joint ventures, and import privatization. Under the guise of �financial restructuring,� the government in the 1990s spent billions of dollars to recapitalize state banks and �clean up� ailing state enterprises in preparation for their privatization. Most of the money was misappropriated or wasted. Only a small portion of the largest public enterprises have been privatized in the last decade. Full or partial sales of state-owned enterprises ground to a halt in 2003.
Poorly-managed public banks – whose only purpose seems to be to fund current operations of devastated public enterprises – continue to dominate the financial system, holding 90% of long-term loans and more than 80 percent of banking deposits. Public banks are not audited by reputable foreign companies. In a recent report, the IMF assessed that within Algerian state banks �observance of existing standards is not effectively enforced and a framework of sanctions and penalties is missing� (�Algeria� 2004: 17). The two largest private banks in the country went bankrupt in 2003 following financial scandals, and their remaining assets are under government control. Prime Minister Ahmed Ouyahia�s decision in August 2004 to require all public funds to be held in public banks probably spells the end of Algeria�s experiment with private banking. The experiences of all three economies with civil conflict or on the cusp of recovery suggest that conventional economic reform may not be a viable solution.
Is international aid a panacea, capable of jump-starting economic recovery and decreasing the need for shadow economies? Ballantine (2004) observes that donor countries and international financial institutions that provide �state-focused� development aid during conflict may actually increase opportunities for illicit activities. Similarly, Leenders and Sfakianakis (2003) contend that donor conditionality has had very little effect on corruption in the MENA. World Bank programs to clean up privatization and USAID judiciary-strengthening programs have had limited success. The EU�s MEDA funds are mostly funneled through the hands of authorities who determine which groups in society can join the gravy train. The EU itself recognizes that auditing of funds is inadequate. Part of the problem is that aid money is fungible. It indirectly allows governments to personalize other state resources.
In Palestine it seems clear that massive foreign aid has helped institutionalize a rentier system and provides greater opportunities for top-down patronage. Donors seem to believe that their rigorous monitoring has prevented misuse of funds. In his assessment of aid effectiveness during the Oslo Process, Lasensky (2004: 231) finds, �Donor insistence on transparency and accountability had a positive, but extremely limited effect on PA administrative practices and good governance.� Like the Palestinian Authority, Iraq has become an international mendicant. An International Reconstruction Fund facility run by the World Bank and the United Nations distributes some international assistance. The United States, however, is the primary international donor. Congress has appropriated more than $24 billion to the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund. The CSIS (2004) estimates that some 15% of US funds spent in Iraq thus far have been lost to corruption, fraud, and mismanagement.
Increased foreign investment may not be a savior either. A significant proportion of MENA FDI in non-oil sectors is thought to come from nationals reinvesting in the countries in which they made their fortunes. This recycling will not necessarily enhance transparency or the rule of law. In Iraq and Algeria, the hydrocarbons sector will remain the only big attractor of FDI. We should not expect existing rentier states to become more transparent when investments enhance their source of rent. Foreign investors may be just as likely to pay bribes and commissions to state officials. International NGOs suggest that one way to increase transparency is for international oil companies to adopt the practice of �Publish What You Pay.�
This paper has argued that cross-border illicit activities and the interests of those who operate in the shadows will hinder reconstruction. Corruption is both a cause and consequence of economic devastation. If illicit state-private networks are one of the biggest problems, it is questionable whether international reconstruction policies predicated on cooperation with and strengthening of public officials who are already complicit in national predation will quickly transform economies.
Profound political liberalization – rather than counterinsurgency – may be one of the most important preconditions for national reconstruction. Leenders and Sfakianakis (2003) contend that real structural change to address grand corruption will not occur with dramatic political reform. Salem (2003) states, �Until democratization has reached the highest level of state rule, large-scale corruption will remain a structural fact of public life in the Arab world.� Similarly, Hellman (1998), Ballantine (2004), Dillman (2002), and Heydemann (2004) emphasize that allowing a strong role for the previously disenfranchised can temper �unfair winners� during transition. Successful rebuilding may in some instances require that the state �legalize� past illicit gains of ruling elites and former combatants. Inclusionary politics requires free and fair elections and powerful legislatures. It probably requires a guaranteed political role for large, opposition groups like Sunni Baathists, and for Hamas and the FIS, both of whose notion of the �rule of law� includes implementation of some Sharia law. Iraqi Shia overtures to Sunnis, Abbas� overtures to Hamas, and Bouteflika�s proposal for a general amnesty may be small steps towards political pluralism. Creating that pluralism could mean, regrettably, that many criminals and illicit predators will never face justice.
Works Cited
- Abu Issa, Issam. 2004. �Arafat�s Swiss Bank Account.� Middle East Quarterly (Fall).
- �Algeria: Financial System Stability Assessment, Including Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes on the Following Topics: Monetary and Financial Policy, Transparency and Banking Supervision.� 2004. Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund (May).
- Ballantine, Karen. 2004. �Program on Economic Agendas in Civil Wars: Principal Research Findings and Policy Recommendations.� New York: International Peace Academy (April).
- Bouillon, Markus. 2004. �The Failure of Big Business: On the Socio-Economic Reality of the Middle East Peace Process.� Mediterranean Politics 9:1 (Spring): 1-28.
- Crumley, Bruce. 2003. �Crash and Burn.� Time Europe (22 September).
- Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). 2004. �Estimated Breakdown of Funding Flows for Iraq�s Reconstruction: How Are the Funds Being Spent?� (December)
- Dillman, Bradford. 2002. �International Markets and Partial Economic Reforms in North Africa: What Impact on Democratization?� Democratization 9:1 (Spring): 63-86.
- ———-. 2001. �Facing the Market in North Africa.� The Middle East Journal 55:2 (Spring): 198-215.
- ———-. 2000. State and Private Sector in Algeria: The Politics of Rent-Seeking and Failed Development. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Eckholm, Eric. 2005. �Occupation Authority Did Not Properly Monitor Spending of Iraqi Money, U.S. Audit Says.� New York Times (31 January).
- Eizenstat, Stuart, John Porter, and Jeremy Weinstein. 2005. �Rebuilding Weak States.� Foreign Affairs 84:1 (January-February): 134-136.
- El-Aryan, Hada. 2004. �Palestinian Authority.� In Global Corruption Report 2004. Transparency International.
- Erlanger, Steven. 2004. �Arafat Mystery: The Hidden Cash.� New York Times (11 November).
- Filkins, Dexter. 2004. �Mystery in Iraq as $300 Million is Taken Abroad.� New York Times (22 January).
- Hadjadj, Djillali. 1999. Corruption et d�mocratie en Alg�rie. Paris: La Dispute.
- Hellman, Joel. 1998. �Winners Take All: The Politics of Partial Reform in Postcommunist Transitions.� World Politics 50:2 (January): 203-234.
- Henry, Clement and Robert Springborg. 2001. Globalization and the Politics of Development in the Middle East. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Henry, James. 2003. Blood Bankers: Tales from the Global Underground Economy. New York: Four Walls Eight Windows.
- Herzog, Sergio. 2002. �Empirical Analysis of Motor Vehicle Theft in Israel, 1990-97.� The British Journal of Criminology 42:4 (Autumn): 709-728.
- Heydemann, Steven. 2004. �Networks of Privilege: Rethinking the Politics of Economic Reform in the Middle East.� In Networks of Privilege in the Middle East: The Politics of Economic Reform Revisited, ed. Steven Heydemann. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Hibou, B�atrice. 2004. �From Privatising the Economy to Privatising the State: An Analysis of the Continual Formation of the State.� In Privatizing the State, ed. B�atrice Hibou. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Heydemann, Steven, ed. 2004. Networks of Privilege in the Middle East: The Politics of Economic Reform Revisited. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2003. �West Bank and Gaza: Economic Performance and Reform under Conflict Conditions.� Washington, DC (15 September).
- �Iraq in Transition: Post-Conflict Challenges and Opportunities.� 2004. Open Society Institute and the United Nations Foundation.
- Karl, Terry Lynn. 1997. The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Lasensky, Scott. 2004. �Paying for Peace: The Oslo Process and the Limits of American Foreign Aid.� The Middle East Journal 58:2 (Spring): 210-234.
- Leenders, Reinoud and John Sfakianakis. 2003. �The Middle East and North Africa.� In Global Corruption Report 2003. Transparency International.
- Martinez, Luis. 2000. The Algerian Civil War, 1990-1998. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Moore, Mike. 2004. �Revenues, State Formation, and the Quality of Governance in Developing Countries.� International Political Science Review 25:3, 297-319.
- Myre, Greg. 2005. �Palestinians Fear East Jerusalem Land Grab.� New York Times (25 January).
- Nordstrom, Carolyn. 2004. Shadows of War: Violence, Power, and Profiteering in the Twenty-First Century. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Rabe, Hans-Joachim. 2004. �Palestinian Territories: From State Building to Crisis Management.� In Arab Elites: Negotiating the Politics of Change, ed. Volker Perthes. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. 267-297.
- Revenue Watch. 2004. �Audit Finds More Irregularities and Mismanagement of Iraq�s Revenues.� Briefing no. 9 (December).
- Ross, Michael. 2002. �Does Oil Hinder Democracy?� World Politics 53 (April): 325-361.
- Roy, Sara. 2002. �Ending the Palestinian Economy.� Middle East Policy 9:4 (2002): 122-165.
- Salem, Paul. 2003. �The Impact of Corruption on Human Development in the Arab World: A Concept Paper.� The Lebanese Transparency Association (April).
- Stevens, Paul. 2004. �Reform Buried under Oil Cash.� The World Today (November): 7-8.
- Transparency International. 2004. �Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2004.�
- Vandewalle, Dirk. 1998. Libya since Independence: Oil and State-Building. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Werenfels, Isabelle. 2004. �Algeria: System Continuity Through Elite Change.� In Arab Elites: Negotiating the Politics of Change, ed. Volker Perthes. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. 173-205.


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American Standard Country Kitchen Sink
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As adjective
of or relating to the United States of America or its inhabitants:an American citizen
of or relating to North or South America; of the Western Hemisphere:the American continents
of or relating to the aboriginal Indians of North and South America, usually excluding the Eskimos, regarded as being of Asian ancestry and marked generally by reddish to brownish skin, black hair, dark eyes, and prominent cheekbones
As noun
a citizen of the United States of America
a native or inhabitant of the Western Hemisphere
an Indian of North or South America
American English
a steam locomotive having a four-wheeled front truck, four driving wheels, and no rear truck
As noun
something considered by an authority or by general consent as a basis of comparison; an approved model
an object that is regarded as the usual or most common size or form of its kind:We stock the deluxe models as well as the standards
a rule or principle that is used as a basis for judgment:They tried to establish standards for a new philosophical approach
an average or normal requirement, quality, quantity, level, grade, etc
:His work this week hasn't been up to his usual standard
standards, those morals, ethics, habits, etc
, established by authority, custom, or an individual as acceptable:He tried to live up to his father's standards
a grade of beef immediately below good
the authorized exemplar of a unit of weight or measure
a certain commodity in or by which a basic monetary unit is stated
Compare gold standard, silver standard, bimetallism, monometallism
the legally established content of full-weight coins
the prescribed degree of fineness for gold or silver
a class or grade in elementary schools
a musical piece of sufficiently enduring popularity to be made part of a permanent repertoire, especially a popular song
a flag indicating the presence of a sovereign or public official
a flag, emblematic figure, or other object raised on a pole to indicate the rallying point of an army, fleet, etc
any of various military or naval flags
the colors of a mounted unit
(initial capital letter) a U
Navy radar-guided surface-to-air missile with a range of – miles (– km)
a long, tapering flag or ensign, as of a monarch or a nation
something that stands or is placed upright
a long candlestick or candelabrum used in a church
an upright support or supporting part
a standing collar of mail
a plant trained or grafted to have a single, erect, treelike stem
a distinct petal, larger than the rest, of certain flowers; a vexillum
As adjective
serving as a basis of weight, measure, value, comparison, or judgment
of recognized excellence or established authority:a standard reference on medieval history
usual, common, or customary:Chairs are standard furniture in American households
manual; not electric or automatic:standard transmission
conforming in pronunciation, grammar, vocabulary, etc
, to the usage of most educated native speakers, especially those having prestige, and widely considered acceptable or correct:Standard American English; standard pronunciation
Compare nonstandard (def )
authorized or approved:The program was broadcast on the standard broadcast band
As noun, plural countries
a state or nation:What European countries have you visited?
the territory of a nation
the people of a district, state, or nation:The whole country backed the president in his decision
the land of one's birth or citizenship
rural districts, including farmland, parkland, and other sparsely populated areas, as opposed to cities or towns:Many city dwellers like to spend their vacations in the country
any considerable territory demarcated by topographical conditions, by a distinctive population, etc
:mountainous country; the Amish country of Pennsylvania
a tract of land considered apart from any geographical or political limits; region; district
the public
the public at large, as represented by a jury
country music
As adjective
of, from, or characteristic of the country; rural:a winding country road
of, relating to, or associated with country music:That Nashville station plays country records all day long
rude; unpolished; rustic:country manners
of, from, or pertaining to a particular country
of one's own country
As Idioms
go to the country, British
to dissolve a Parliament that has cast a majority vote disagreeing with the prime minister and cabinet and to call for the election of a new House of Commons
Also, appeal to the country
put oneself upon the / one's country, Law
to present one's cause formally before a jury
As noun
a room or place equipped for cooking
culinary department; cuisine:This restaurant has a fine Italian kitchen
the staff or equipment of a kitchen
As adjective
of, relating to, or designed for use in a kitchen:kitchen window; kitchen curtains
employed in or assigned to a kitchen:kitchen help
of or resembling a pidginized language, especially one used for communication between employers and servants or other employees who do not speak the same language
As verb (used without object), sank or, often sunk; sunk or sunken; sinking
to displace part of the volume of a supporting substance or object and become totally or partially submerged or enveloped; fall or descend into or below the surface or to the bottom (often followed by in or into):The battleship sank within two hours
His foot sank in the mud
Her head sinks into the pillows
to fall, drop, or descend gradually to a lower level:The river sank two feet during the dry spell
to settle or fall gradually, as a heavy structure:The tower is slowly sinking
to fall or collapse slowly from weakness, fatigue, distress, etc
:He gasped and sank to his knees
to slope downward; dip:The field sinks toward the highway
to go down toward or below the horizon:the sun sinks in the west
to penetrate, permeate, or seep (usually followed by in or into):Wipe the oil off before it sinks into the wood
to become engulfed or absorbed in or gradually to enter a state (usually followed by in or into):to sink into slumber
to be or become deeply absorbed or involved in a mood or mental state (usually followed by in or into):sunk in thought
She sank into despair
to pass or fall into some lower state, as of fortune, estimation, etc
; degenerate:to sink into poverty
to decline or deteriorate in quality or worth
to fail in physical strength or health
to decrease in amount, extent, intensity, etc
:The temperature sank to ° at noon
to become lower in volume, tone, or pitch:Her voice sank to a whisper
to enter or permeate the mind; become known or understood (usually followed by in or into):He said it four times before the words really sank in
to become concave; become hollow, as the cheeks
to drop or fall gradually into a lower position:He sank down on the bench
As verb (used with object), sank or, often sunk; sunk or sunken; sinking
to cause to become submerged or enveloped; force into or below the surface; cause to plunge in or down:The submarine sank the battleship
He sank his fist into the pillow
to cause to fall, drop, or descend gradually
to cause to penetrate:to sink an ax into a tree trunk
to lower or depress the level of:They sank the roadway by five feet
to bury, plant, or lay (a pipe, conduit, etc
) into or as if into the ground
to dig, bore, or excavate (a hole, shaft, well, etc
to bring to a worse or lower state or status
to bring to utter ruin or collapse:Drinking and gambling sank him completely
to reduce in amount, extent, intensity, etc
to lower in volume, tone, or pitch
to suppress; ignore; omit
to invest in the hope of making a profit or gaining some other return:He sank all his efforts into the business
to lose (money) in an unfortunate investment, enterprise, etc
to throw, shoot, hit, or propel (a ball) so that it goes through or into the basket, hole, pocket, etc
: She sank the ball into the side pocket
to execute (a stroke or throw) so that the ball goes through or into the basket, hole, pocket, etc
: to sink a putt; to sink a free throw
As noun
a basin or receptacle, as in a kitchen or laundry, usually connected with a water supply and drainage system, for washing dishes, clothing, etc
a low-lying, poorly drained area where waters collect and sink into the ground or evaporate
sinkhole (def )
a place of vice or corruption
a drain or sewer
a device or place for disposing of energy within a system, as a power-consuming device in an electrical circuit or a condenser in a steam engine
any pond or pit for sewage or waste, as a cesspool or a pool for industrial wastes
any natural process by which contaminants are removed from the atmosphere
As Idioms
sink one's teeth into, to bite deeply or vigorously
to do or enter into with great enthusiasm, concentration, conviction, etc
: to sink my teeth into solving the problem
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Bake Those Apples [Fierce Foodie]
I think one of the main struggles of being human is self-acceptance. For a long time I wanted to believe that I am not a naturally lazy person who, like a cat, would prefer in general to spend eighteen straight hours in bed or staring out a window. I wanted to believe that I might learn to make a gorgeous fruit and crème tart, knit a scarf or change the oil in my car. Heck, I thought I might even bake bread some day. But as it turns out, I am not that person. I think that the only activity in which I can accept tedious practice and prolonged delayed gratification may be writing.
So instead of a carefully detailed recipe for apple pie, I give you baked apples. And baked in the microwave, no less! With only three other ingredients! Can it get any easier? The bonus is that this recipe is also far healthier than your typical butter and sugar filled pie. And you may even be saving energy by not using the oven. I'm not really sure because that sort of information falls into the realm of things I am too lazy to research…is that my bed calling?
Raisin-Filled Baked Apple
Courtesy of Fat Free Vegan
1 medium apple
1 Tbsp raisins
2 tsp maple syrup (or other sweetener)
Place raisins in a heat-proof bowl and pour boiling water over them. Allow them to soak until plump and remain in soaking liquid until ready to use.
Wash an apple and remove most of the core, leaving about 1/4-inch of core at the bottom of the apple. Remove a thin strip of peel from around the top of the cavity. Place the apple into a deep microwave-safe baking dish or bowl. Sprinkle the inside with a little cinnamon and fill with drained raisins. Pour a teaspoon of the soaking water over the raisins and drizzle the syrup over the raisins and top of the apple.
Microwave, uncovered, on high power until apple is tender, 3-5 minutes, testing with a fork after 3 minutes. Allow apple to cool for 5 minutes before serving, as the inside will be very hot. (To cook more than one apple at a time, increase the cooking time by about 1 minute per extra apple.)
featured image credit: lar-f
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Gunplay's Previous Mixtapes
MixxMobb.com Featured Artist: Gunplay
Platinum-selling artist Rick Ross introduced the rap game to Gunplay with the debut of 'Rollin' the addictive anthem to 'living the good life;' featuring the high-octane rapper Waka Flocka Flame from the Inglorious Bastard mixtape hosted by DJ Fletch & Off Safety Mixtape Hosted by DJ P-Cutta which featured the Remix to "Rollin" which featured Rick Ross & Waka Flocka.
Gunplay has been rooted in the rap game dating back to when the Carol City natives Ross and Gunplay met in 1997 their passion for music lead to the formation of Carol City Cartel better known as Triple C's;. The trio worked hard to build a buzz, later releasing their debut album Custom Cars & Cyles in 2009; after being featured on Rick Ross' first two platinum albums Port of Miami, and Trilla. Gunplay, Torch, & Young Breed have showed their prowess as a group and individually as solo emcees. Gunplay made his solo debut on Rick Ross' third number one album Deeper Than Rap featured on the track Gunplay.
Now, with the success of the hit single 'Rollin', expect Gunplay's new mixtape "Bogota" Hosted By Atlanta's Own DJ Holiday to be as big!!!


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Ashampoo 3D CAD Architecture 5 5.0.0
Ashampoo 3D CAD Architecture brings computer-aided planning and design of indoor and outdoor projects to your PC. The built-in project assistant guides your through the basic setup process and even inexperienced users will feel right at home with the thematically-structured user interface.
The program offers all common tools for blueprint creation with extensive 2D and 3D views. Rooms can be individually furnished using the integrated object catalogue. It offers a myriad of objects from doors, windows, balconies and car ports to sanitary and electrical appliances.
Finished buildings are instantly explorable through virtual tours. The integrated light and shadow simulation gives an even more realistic picture and also takes modern photovoltaic elements into account.
If you're planning on building your own house or redecorating your garden, Ashampoo 3D CAD Architecture 5 is the ideal tool for you.
Highlights:- Step-by-step project assistant
- 2D, 3D and cross-section views
- Smart input and construction aids
- Integrated roof, staircase and environment builders
- Realistic light and shadow simulation
- Extensive object catalogue
New In Ashampoo Cad Architecture 5:- Easier and more intuitive with ribbons
- Faster and future-proof with native 64-bit support
- More beautiful and expressive with custom fill patterns and 3D texture displays in 2D
ashampoo_3d_cad_architecture_3_3.0.2_sm.exe file was thoroughly tested by our system on Sep 3, 2012 by the three antivirus programs and passed. Is absolutely clean, enjoy!
This archive is 100% safe to download and install.
Have a look at the full Ashampoo 3D CAD Architecture 5 5.0.0 antivirus scan reports.
Online shop for buying.
(1942MB, Extension: EXE)
Download alternate to Ashampoo 3D CAD Architecture 5 solution
Look at the free or trial alternatives and similar apps to Ashampoo 3D CAD Architecture 5 software by the tags. It's possible also to find substitutes for the most popular titles in the Graphics & Design category.
| Virual | Planning | Graphic | Design | Construction | Cad Software | Ashampoo |
History updates (Complete changelogs since the listing on this site)
5.0.0 [03-11-15]
- Faster and future-proof with native 64-bit support
- More beautiful and expressive with custom fill patterns and 3D texture displays in 2D
Other versions : 4.0.1 4.0.0 3.0.2 3.0.1 184.108.40.206 1.09
v4.0.1 [09-14-13]
-New translations: Spanish, French, Hungarian, Dutch, Polish, Russian, Slovak, Italian
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|2011-01-22, 05:52
|Link #23
Stupidity is Bliss.
Join Date: Oct 2010
Location: In Hancock's Heart
wow,i didn't know this thread exists. LOL.
oh, btw, I WANT TO READ CHAP 37 TRANSLATED ALREADY!! what's taking the translators so long? L0L. i guess it's school. XD
mah,in the end, it's patience-is-a-virtue still..XD
|2011-04-10, 11:23
|Link #24
Senior Member
Join Date: Oct 2008
Location: cloud cuckoo land
Does anyone have an explanation what Akira's dream in ch37 meant? And what it had to do with ch36's
I was shocked when I read ch38, though :P I was like: WHUT is this Aoi Hana I am reading? I do worry about the two of them, though...I don't think it will work out between them at least not how things are right now...
|2011-05-16, 04:49
|Link #26
Senior Member
Join Date: Oct 2008
Location: cloud cuckoo land
No Fumi and Ah-chan goodness, but:
Spoiler for chapter 39:
Chapter 42 is quite interesting and indicates that perhaps Ah-chan's perception of her relationship with Fumi is slowly changing. Though to what conclusion will she cone?
Is her relationship with Fumi just a passing fad?
Or is she starting to understand what love really means?
And while Ah-chan's still in the process of finding herself, Fumi falls in love with her even deeper.
You gotta love Shimura's storytelling. So calm and simple, but every line bears powerful emotions.
Last edited by tezu; 2011-11-24 at 17:35.
|2012-03-29, 16:20
|Link #28
Join Date: Dec 2005
Location: middle of nowhere, Virginia
Age: 32
Oh, so we do have an Aoi Hana manga thread. Kinda wondered. Either way, I guess I'll have to settle with /u/ for much activity.
Akira's really trying so hard. She shouldn't push/rush herself. Even if she isn't sexually attracted to Fumi*, that she's willing to go this far with Fumi (and I don't mean just chapter 44) makes a compromise relationship reasonable, right? Still a couple. She shouldn't put so much pressure on herself to match what she thinks a girlfriend should be like and just enjoy being with Fumi.
*And that's an "if"--I'm not ruling that out as a present or future possibility, certainly not in a yuri manga; it's just that things are still really awkward in that category, and there's her reflection in this chapter, too...
I had been hoping they'd talk this out at some point, at least a little bit more, but not this chapter, and it looks like Akira will be asking that teacher for advice before anything else. That ought to put more light on how Akira feels.
Still a nice chapter.
Last edited by KaneDragon; 2012-03-29 at 16:31.
|2012-06-06, 18:25
|Link #29
Senior Member
Got a Facebook account? Then vote for Aoi Hana so it'll have a better chance of getting licensed by Vertical!
|2012-07-26, 05:05
|Link #30
Senior Member
Join Date: Oct 2008
Location: cloud cuckoo land
I have trouble understanding the purpose behind Yassan's backstory. She was obviously never meant to be a fleshed out character (her backstory in ch 46 didn't change much for me) so why waste so many pages on her? (these pages could've shown Ah-chan asking Hinako-sensei for advice instead, for instance)
Nevertheless, I'm kind of glad Pon-chan's play is going to be incorporated into the plot. It's such a nice parallel to Fumi's and Akira's story.
|2013-05-08, 07:48
|Link #32
Anime addict
Join Date: Nov 2007
Location: São Paulo/Brazil
Age: 41
Aoi Hana/Sweet Blue Flowers Yuri Manga to End in July
|2017-09-11, 08:43
|Link #33
Join Date: Nov 2015
It has been mentioned in a few places recently, including on ANN, but Viz Media have a re-release scheduled for this manga, translated as "Sweet Blue Flowers" in English. In about a week they'll publish a first volume of a print edition, as their debut, to be followed by a second volume in December. (400 pages each book)
Also taking the opportunity to post a quick note, in this re-opened manga thread, about Ohta Books, the Publishing company's site, giving access to chapters from 青い花 (Aoi Hana) in Japanese as a web comic.
A digital edition in English is reportedly offered by Digital Manga but I have no experience with them and although the search results show the first volume in a April 2014 blog entry on their site, the link in that entry doesn't currently take me to the actual first volume. Archive link from April 2016.
I may be overlooking something or it may be regional issues because the "Wayback Machine" informs that the linked Free Preview on the saved page is available on the web. The "Online Viewer" is there and all the online reader's buttons can be pushed to function, but no pages, no images from this particular manga are displayed when doing so.
Last edited by Verso Sciolto; 2017-10-08 at 22:10.
|2017-10-08, 00:21
|Link #34
Join Date: Nov 2015
... the first of the four omnibus volumes in English translation has since been published by Viz.
Edit Oct. 10. 2017: Based on this:
Relaying a request posted by Rachel Matt Thorn - "Associate Prof. in Faculty of Manga, Kyoto Seika University. Translator, shōjo manga scholar, feminist"- on Twitter:
[Side note: Thorn didn't translate "Sweet Blue Flowers" but her credits do include translating Shimura's "Hourou Musoko" manga into English. Published as "Wandering Son" by Fantagraphics.]
Last edited by Verso Sciolto; 2017-10-10 at 05:53.
|2018-01-27, 11:40
|Link #36
Join Date: Nov 2015
Last edited by Verso Sciolto; 2018-04-26 at 22:32.
|Thread Tools


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(Excerpt from an article I wrote for The Doable City Reader)
In 1940, the small farming community of San Jose, California, sat nestled between sloping hillsides and the rugged Pacific Ocean. Back then, its humble downtown core was surrounded by walkable neighbourhoods. But when the post-war boom came in the 1960s and 70s, San Jose was one of the fastest growing cities in America. This rapid expansion coupled with the mid-century demand for a suburban lifestyle resulted in San Jose, like so many other cities, developing around the needs of cars, not people.
The city became a network of ribbons of asphalt linking low-density suburban areas as it swelled from a quaint town of 70,000 to one million. By the 1970s the suburban exodus had taken its toll on the city's once vibrant downtown. Businesses closed or moved to malls in the suburbs, buildings were demolished and the core became littered with vacant lots.
That meant that when 2008 rolled around and San Jose city planners were pigeon-toeing their way into a new age of urbanism—one less beholden to the rollercoaster of international oil prices, and focused instead around people and vibrant places—they were grappling with the same question that dozens of other cities across the country were grappling with as well. San Jose is projected to grow by nearly half a million people by 2035. How on earth would they accommodate that level of growth while starting to shrink a giant, sprawling auto-centric city to a walkable, human scale?
Their first step? Urban villages.
Urban villages are walkable, mixed-use neighbourhoods close to transit amenities. In San Jose's urban plan, most housing and job growth is slated to take place in urban villages. The idea is to put these villages throughout the city to concentrate growth in strategic locations and enable both newcomers living in the villages as well as those in more traditional nearby neighbourhoods to be closer to day-to-day amenities. The goal is to create pockets of vibrant spaces where people can live, work, eat, drink, shop and be entertained all throughout the city, reducing the need for cars and making the city more livable as it grows.
Currently San Jose has approved one urban village, a few miles east of the downtown core in the neighbourhood of Alum Rock and has eight more in the works.
Learn more about San Jose's urban village concept in the video above and below.


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Sandy's daughter Georgia Lucas at the Folk Awards
Sandy's daughter Georgia Lucas flew over from her native Australia to witness her mother be inducted into the Folk Awards Hall of Fame at the Royal Albert Hall in London on 27th April 2016.
Sandy acoustic CD heading for the top 10!
Help get Sandy Into The Top 10! Amazingly, Sandy is on course for her highest ever chart position! I've Always Kept a Unicorn debuted at #8 on the midweek sales figures, which means by the end of this week, there's a real chance Sandy could have her first ever top 10 album. You can purchase the cd at Amazon or on i-Tunes
New pictures of Sandy in our gallery
We've uploaded some wonderful new pictures of Sandy into our gallery. Including this wonderful never seen before colour portrait by Joe Stevens which features in the booklet to I've always Kept A Unicorn: The Acoustic Sandy Denny. Click on the links below.
Joe Stevens 1973, Steve Wood 1971, Melody Maker Awards 1970, Richard Bennet-Zeff 1968, Jon Lyons 1972, and some great live images: Charles Strijid 1972, Unknown 1974.


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The moment you walk into CoMotion On King you feel it. The place has atmosphere. There's a vibe, an energy, that every member talks about – and it's an enormous part of the coworking appeal. In the summer months, that atmosphere extends to the...Read more
Our Response to the Recent Vandalism at CoMotion 302
It's been a bit of a rough spring for the CoMotion Group. By and large not bad and nothing that can't be handled, but we have certainly faced a couple unexpected challenges. In April, Hamilton had a day that experienced more rain in a 24-hour...Read more
The Heart and Hub of the Hammer
The passion people have for Hamilton here at CoMotion is evident just about every day. It would be no exaggeration to say my own fondness for our Ambitious City is one reason why I enjoy coworking here so much. I've found I'm definitely not...Read more


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From the flexibility they get being able to access data from anywhere there is an Internet connection to the cost-savings they realize, there are number of benefits small businesses experience from storing their data in the cloud. Editor's Note: Use the questionnaire below to have our sister site, BuyerZone, provide you with information from a variety of vendors for free: buyerzone widget Here are eight of the biggest benefits small businesses say they get from using online data storage. Employees can work from anywhere Online storage data allows employees to work from anywhere there is an Internet connection, which is a huge benefit to Matthew Vollmar, CEO of managed IT services provider Newmind Group. He said his staff is no longer limited by location. "It provides our 19 team members the freedom to work from anywhere (home, coffee shops, client facilities) and still have access to any needed documents or information," Vollmar told Business News Daily. No server maintenance Jeff Kear, owner and founder of online event management software provider Planning Pod, said one of the greatest benefits he gets from using online storage services is that he doesn't need to hire IT staff or retain consultants to maintain a server for all of his digital data. "Servers are expensive to run and often more expensive to maintain, and by using a service like Dropbox, I don't need to spend additional money on server support personnel," Kear said. "This probably saves my business $5,000 to $10,000 every year." [For a side-by-side comparison of the best online data storage services visit our sister site Top Ten Reviews.] Data is easily moved As a business that has moved offices five times in the last seven years, Tao Wong, CEO of eCommerce consultant PDB Sales Inc., said using online storage makes the process go much smoother. "Concerns about data loss is minimized," Wong said. "With the online data storage solutions, setup for the [new] offices has been a matter of plug-and-play." Remote workers Robyn Tippins, co-founder of the marketing agency Mariposa, said with offices in three states and consultants across the globe, online data storage allows them to share files efficiently. She said they previously used email files, but that didn't work as well as new staff members were added. "We use an inexpensive cloud storage provider to ensure everyone has the most up-to-date version of working docs, like client proposals, training documents, SOWs and contracts," Tippins said. "It helps us manage our workflow, onboard new consultants and new clients, and makes it possible to be a small team, despite the large geographic area we span." Saves money Cost is a big reason why Mickey Luongo, vice president of heating and air conditioning products provider Total Home Supply, uses online data storage services over in-house options. "Managing servers in-house is expensive," Luongo said. "By outsourcing our data storage, we saved on a lot of hardware and maintenance costs." No data loss Jacob Lang, business development coordinator of Back Bay Networks, said one major benefit of using online storage services is that his company doesn't have to worry about losing any data should a natural disaster hit their offices. "Living in New England, we're prone to heavy snow storms and weird weather patterns that may knock out our server," Lang said. "With online storage we never have to worry about losing our important documents." Security While cybercriminals are a threat to everyone, Tripp Wiggins, co-founder of Cooking Planit, said he feels more confident in the protection online storage services can provide, than what he is capable on his own. "Though everyone is vulnerable, online storage companies like Dropbox have teams of people that are solely focused on data security," Wiggins said. Client feedback X. Kevin Liao, founder of design firm Illustria Designs, said he prefers using online data storage services because it gives him the ability to easily share his design files with clients who are eager to see his work. "We are able to share project drafts in real time and get instant feedback from clients," Liao said. "It makes [clients] feel that they are involved in the process and gives them that in-house experience." Culled from businessnewsdaily.com
8 Benefits of Online Data Storage
March 30, 2016 Written by Super User
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by Chad Brooks
For small businesses, cloud services are quickly becoming the preferred method of storing digital data.While they used to rely on in-house servers to store their growing amounts of online files, many small businesses are now transferring those services to online data storage services, such as JustCloud or DropBox.
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This trip was put together quickly. I had a whole bunch of VCR tapes that Jim Nowell had donated to the Silver Rails Library to take back to La Plata. Once the Texas Eagle Detour was announced, there was only sleeping car space left so I bought on. I was booked on the Southwest Chief to Kansas City, a Missouri River Runner train to St Louis where I got a night at the Drury Inn. The next day the Texas Eagle and if all works out right the Southwest Chief to La Plata. The Depot Inn & Suites was sold out for Friday and Saturday nights so I decided to sleep out in the Chris Guenzler Million Mile Lookout Point. Sunday night I would move into the Inn and on Monday I would borrow the van to chase the Union Pacific Challenger 3985. Tuesday night I would head home.
9/28/2010 After a Tuesday morning Solana Beach turn, I came home finished packing and just relaxed. After a 111 degree Monday it cooled off nicely by the time my mother drove me down to the Santa Ana Train Station where I saw Marty and did a Business Class upgrade since Guest Reward didn't give it to me. I used the elevators to get to Track 1 and watched trains come and go.
The old Metrolink emblem is being removed from their cars.
Being replaced by nothing.Surfliner 583 9/28/2010
The train came into Santa Ana and I boarded Pacific Business Class for the trip to LAUPT. I worked on this story until Fullerton then relaxed the rest of the way to Los Angeles as I enjoyed the working Internet aboard. Santa Fe 3751 was seen at Redondo Jct minus its tender. The train arrived and a Red Cap gave me a ride over to Track 12 via Passenger Services where she dropped off a child.Southwest Chief 4 9/28/2010
The train backed in with Engines 153 and 165, Baggage 1225, Sleepers 32081, 32103 Ohio and 32086 Kansas, Diner 38044, Lounge 33025 with Coaches 34102, 34109 and 31029. No Transition Car so no Room 17. After I stood outside for over 25 minutes my Car Attendant Jose, who had to work two cars, finally put me in Deluxe Room D in the 32081 Car and I was very happy with that decision. I got a 7:00 PM Dinner Reservation and just relaxed until I was called into the Dining Car after the train left LAUPT on time. I was seated with two ladies going to Framingham, MA and a gentleman going to Albuquerque. I was enjoying my steak as we stopped at Fullerton and had ice cream for dessert as we left. I went back to my Room D and put on my new CD of Selena Gomez and the Scene "A year without rain". The train stopped at Riverside and then San Bernardino where a tired Chris made up his room for the night.
9/29/2010 I woke up refreshed at Winslow and went to the Dining Car
for a breakfast of French Toast and bacon. I was seated with two ladies, one
going to Albuquerque and the other going to Lamy. After breakfast I went back
to Room D where I shaved and showered.
The train was sprinted across the rest of Arizona and into New Mexico with me reading two days of USA Today. The train stopped at Gallup and I put on my David Bowie Live DVD and enjoyed the view out of both sides of the train as we sped east.
I love the open beauty of New Mexico. The Bowie DVD took me way past Dalies across the river into Albuquerque which we arrived into early at 11:25 AM. I found Randy Jackson who was going to Raton and then the bus to pick up his car from the APPRCO Trip last week. We went to my room and visited before he walked outside the train to the coach section to officially board. I put on my DVD of the Ramones Live and while that was playing the train left Albuquerque for Lamy. After Apache Canyon, Jose gave me a 5:00 PM Dinner Reservation. At Canyoncito we held the mainline for a few minutes late westbound Southwest Chief. We climbed up and over Glorieta Pass then down to the Pecos River. The Ramones finished before Glorieta so I then put on my Alice Cooper DVD "Live in Montreux 2005". By the way Alice Cooper is finally going into the Rock n' Roll Hall of Fame. It's been a long wait for him.
The train ran by Starvation Peak.
This was an interesting scene this clear afternoon on the way to Las Vegas. The train ran onto Wagon Mound then made its sprint to Raton, our next station stop. At just before 5:00 PM I was called into the Dining Car and was seated with a couple from Arlington, Texas and a woman from Manhattan in New York City. I had the New York Steak and vanilla ice cream as the train climbed Raton Pass. The train dropped to Trinidad before we did the high speed run to La Junta which we arrived into early tonight at 7:00 PM. The train left La Junta, I made up my room and called it a night.
9/30/2010 My morning started getting up before Holiday, looking at my watch and realizing we wouldn't make the morning train to St Louis. I checked with the conductor who confirmed that fact. I put my luggage downstairs and enjoyed the last few minutes in Deluxe Room D. The train arrived into Kansas City just after the time it was supposed to leave. I talked with the new conductor who agreed to take the bags with the tapes to La Plata and would deliver them to Bob Cox. Bob called later to tell me he got them.Kansas City 9/30/2010
I paid $2.20 to take the later train and then $3.00 to check my bag in during my stay in Kansas City. From there I walked out onto the Freight House Bridge where I would be spending plenty of my time today in KC.
The first train was the BNSF 7273 West with DPU's on the rear end.
Next came the BNSF 4141 East.
The 5453 West came through town next.
The Kansas City Terminal Railroad came by my location next.
BNSF 7549 East came through on a baretable train.
BNSF 7573 East followed along. From here I went back into the station.The Kansas City Rail Experience 9/30/2010
Two views inside Kansas City Union Station. I bought my ticket for the 9:30 AM tour of the Kansas City Rail Experience.
I went back outside for a picture of the KCS 34. I went back in and waited until it was my time.
The first thing you see is this counter scene.
The lite up Union Pacific Emblem leads you to the stairs which you take down to get to the main exhibits.
Different railroad symbols are on the east wall as you head down the stairs.
Looking down the stairs.
Various train times from the stations former trains that served this station.
CTC Board and a modern operator.
The BNSF 8109 is a walk through exhibit and gives you the feel of a moving freight engine.
They have all sort of displays in this room.
A handcar on tracks you do not have to worry about tripping on.
A model of a UP Steam Engine.
Two famous trains that once served Kansas City Union Station.
Railroads and their merger partners.
Mock up of a MKT Passenger Car.
Railroad China and baskets.
More displays in this part of the exhibit.
Mock up of a MKT Passenger Car.
Another view of the BNSF 8109.
Two more display cases.
Mock up of a caboose coming out of a tunnel.
Three more display cases.
Mock up of a cattle car.
Inside the wooden caboose mock up.
Inside the mock up tunnel.
Baggage Cart with a man helping the woman. Next we walked through the door to the real trains.
The Texas Southern & Eastern platform observation car 100.
The Great Northern Empire Builder Going to the Sun Mountain Rounded End Observation Car 1292.
Milwaukee Road Pullman 24 Jefferson River.
Outside on the mainline a loaded UP coal train heads eastbound.
One more view of the BNSF 8109.
Looking back down from where we had come from.
The KCS Sign as I headed to the model train display room.