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The Evolution of Bank Supervision: Evidence from U.S. States
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1 The Evolution of Bank Supervision: Evidence from U.S. States Kris James Mitchener University of Warwick, CAGE & NBER Matthew Jaremski Colgate University & NBER * July 2013 JEL codes: G28, E44, N11 We use a novel data set spanning to examine the origins of bank supervision and assess factors leading to the creation of formal bank supervisory institutions across U.S. states. We show that it took more than a century for the widespread adoption of independent supervisory institutions tasked with maintaining the safety and soundness of banks. State legislatures initially pursued cheaper regulatory alternatives, such as double liability laws; however, banking distress at the state level as well as the structural shift from note-issuing to deposit-taking commercial banks propelled policymakers to adopt costly and permanent supervisory institutions. * Mitchener: Department of Economics, University of Warwick and NBER; Jaremski: Department of Economics, Colgate University & NBER; 13 Oak Dr., Hamilton, NY 13346; We thank Jessica Hardwick, Lea Halloway, and Amanda Razon for invaluable research assistance and Mark Carlson and David Wheelock for comments and suggestions.
2 The Evolution of Bank Supervision: Evidence from U.S. States Given the potential damage that widespread bank failures can have on macroeconomic stability, the large impact of government-funded bailouts of failed banks on public sector accounts, and the considerable governmental and industry resources directed toward influencing banking market structure, it is surprising how little is actually known about when and why formal bank supervisory institutions came into existence. For example, existing research on their early evolution in the United States simply summarizes the environment for particular years (e.g., Weldon 1910) or presents a limited number of case studies (e.g., Gruchy 1937). More recent studies have examined supervision in later periods (Agarwal et al. 2011; Mitchener 2005, 2007; White 2011), but they have not attempted to provide a long-term quantitative assessment of the evolution of bank supervisory institutions. We aim to fill this lacuna by analyzing the factors that led to the creation of formal bank supervisory institutions in the United States at the state level, where such institutions are defined as government agencies established specifically for the purpose of supervising banks. We examine their evolution in light of theory as well as modern policy objectives, such as the reduction of systemic risk and the monitoring of individual bank s balance sheets and management behavior. The federalist structure of the United States implies that powers, such as the chartering of commercial banks, reside with individual states. Supervision of banks chartered by states naturally followed from this delegation of powers, and meant that bank supervision initially developed at this jurisdictional level. We thus focus on when and why states established banking departments designed to both charter state financial institutions and supervise them. We trace their evolution from the early years of the republic through the beginning of the twentieth century a critical period that laid down the foundations of the bank 2
3 supervisory system observed today. To do so, we assemble a unique data set spanning from archival and census records that provides information on the date of adoption of formal institutions as well as on state-specific factors influencing that decision. Using these data and additional information on supervisory characteristics, we also examine whether states made progressive improvements to the quality of their supervisory institutions. Since implementation dates and supervisory characteristics varied considerably across states, we are able to exploit both the cross-state and time differences to identify factors that drove the adoption of state bank supervision. Results from duration models indicate that it took more than 100 years to adopt formal supervisory institutions as well as what policymakers today would consider as modern supervisory priorities. Consistent with Rajan s (2009) view that financial regulation has been procyclical, we find that formal supervisory institutions (i.e., state banking departments) rose from the ashes of banking crises. Six states created government banking agencies immediately after the Panic of 1837, six states put them in place after the Baring Crisis of 1890 and Banking Panic of 1893, and 17 made changes after the Panic of No other interval had as many new departments established. The pattern indicates that bank supervision was likely a response to bank failures: the high sunk costs of establishing formal bank supervisory institutions likely delayed states from preemptively installing them. On the other hand, prudential regulations, such as double liability requirements for stockholders and reserve requirements on deposits, were installed during relatively stable times. The timing of the implementation of regulation in comparison to supervision suggests that they preferred using less costly regulation. Legislatures only moved begrudgingly to create formal and more expensive supervisory institutions once banking crises hit their states. 3
4 The introduction of a national currency in the 1860s also appears to have shaped the development of modern supervisory institutions and priorities. Commercial banks shifted the composition of their liabilities from notes to deposits, simultaneously drawing more individuals (and potential voters) into the banking sector and increasing the potential for systemic bank runs. Our econometric results suggest that state legislatures refocused their attention on the safety of depositors and installed relatively more costly state banking departments. As deposit taking grew in importance relative to note issuance, supervision shifted more purposefully toward maintaining the safety and soundness of banking systems. By the beginning of the nineteenth century and prior to the founding of the Federal Reserve System, most states had established separate regulatory agencies charged with bank supervision and were requiring banks to submit balance sheet information with regularity. Our empirical evidence further indicates that states that moved earlier to create an independent banking authority devoted more resources toward supervision. Early adopters were more likely to publish highly detailed and periodic bank reports, spend more on supervision expenses, and carry out more examinations per bank. Some of these states had also given their examiners the power to shut down banks that were deemed unsafe. Because enforcement problems, compliance, and competition with federal regulatory agencies persisted long after the founding of the Federal Reserve System, these quality differentials may have had lasting implications for systemic stability. II. Theoretical Arguments for Supervision Why are commercial banks supervised? Public interest theories of regulation suggest at least two explanations for the special treatment of banks: externalities and efficiency. When large numbers of banks fail they often impose 4
5 external costs on the economy, reducing lending and aggregate investment. Moreover, as banks fail and disintermediation occurs, the costs of credit can rise for firms due to the loss in information about the quality of investment projects (Bernanke 1983). Since commercial banks are conduits through which the money supply changes, a large number of failures can also impact the macroeconomy by altering the money supply (Friedman and Schwartz 1963). Prudential regulation and supervision could therefore potentially reduce the incidence of failures and contagious runs, and limit macroeconomic externalities. A second public-interest argument for regulating and supervising banks has to do with the efficient transfer of savings from lenders to borrowers. As in other industries, market structure can affect the price and provision of services. In banking, this translates to lending rates that are influenced by the competitive structure of the industry. While government policies often limit entry and increase the monopoly power of existing banks by making chartering costly (imposing requirements on paid-in capital or controlling who can receive licenses to operate), formal supervision could arise to ensure product and price competition and to enforce legal restrictions on bank activity. Absent intervention, market structure in banking could evolve in a way that leads to an inefficient or suboptimal allocation of capital, either geographically or in terms of sectoral allocation, resulting in slower economic growth. 1 Private-interest theories of regulation provide an alternative explanation, suggesting that supervision might evolve in response to the needs of the banks they oversee. Stigler (1971) theorized that regulation principally serves to redistribute economic resources from those with less political power to those with 1 The special status often conferred to banks is sometimes confounded with a government s desire to extract seigniorage through monopoly note issuance. While governments may desire to have control over note issuance to derive rents, it is not clear that supervision of banks is necessary to achieve this objective. 5
6 more. 2 For example, banks may lobby for restrictions on branching or chartering and then use government agencies, such as bank supervisory departments, to limit entry. Public interest objectives thus can be compromised by the private agendas of well-organized bankers, customers, or political constituencies. Consequently, even without spillovers or efficiency considerations, regulation may still be compatible with the self-interest and profit maximizing motives of banks. 3 Theory further suggests that bank supervision may enhance welfare given costly state verification (Townsend 1979), monitoring costs, the opacity of bank decisionmaking (Chen 2001, Meh and Moran 2010), and incentive problems. When present and without monitoring, managers may take on more risk than what is optimal from a depositors perspective (i.e., moral hazard). Asymmetric information may be lessened through government activities aimed at transparency or through supervision. It is certainly possible that banks could monitor their own risk. For example, managers (directors) could also be owners, aligning incentives and limiting risk taking. Alternatively, managers contracts could be structured such that they are incentive compatible, in turn limiting risk taking and rendering government policies aimed at reducing risk potentially redundant. 4 Demandable deposits could also potentially operate like incentive compatible contracts. A bank offers to pay a fixed return on deposits, which can be withdrawn at any time, in exchange for use of deposits. If depositors doubt the safety of their bank, they have the ability to run the bank. 5 The possibility of bank runs may act to discipline bank managers such that they hold less risky portfolios (Calomiris and Kahn 1991). 2 See also (Posner 1971, 1974) and Peltzman (1976). 3 Both of these approaches ignore the possibility of self-regulation, a point we also discuss. 4 If such contracts can be created, then regulation of risk taking may be unnecessary since losses would accrue to equity and debtholders just like for firms in other sectors. 5 Theorists have shown that it is rational for depositors to run on fractional reserve banks (Diamond and Dybvig 1983). 6
7 taking. 6 Formal rules or regulations on bank behavior are another mechanism that In practice, it may be difficult to rein in managerial risk taking simply through the use of demand deposits. For example, Dewatripont and Tirole (1993) argue that private monitoring is costly because bank customers are small and dispersed. Before the twentieth century, few households had large bank accounts, and the release of bank information was spotty and periodic at best. Therefore, only if a handful of very large depositors exist would the costs of monitoring be outweighed by the benefits. When monitoring is imperfect, managers may still invest in risky assets and depositors may still rationally start bank runs. If runs become contagious, they can potentially result in costly spillovers to the real economy. The possibility of contagious and costly bank runs, however, provides a theoretical justification for supervision and/or regulation of banks: governments can commit resources to develop technologies that monitor risk can be used to make managers operate in ways that are incentive compatible with depositors. For example, governments can impose double liability such that bank stockholders are additionally liable for losses up to the amount of their stock. Grossman (2001) shows that double liability pushed banks to reduce their risk, but that it did not guarantee systemic stability. Reserve requirements on deposits and minimum capital requirements have also been enacted to rein in bank risk taking. 6 It is possible that banks could act jointly and come up with collective mechanisms that would prevent spillovers to each other or to the economy, but in practice such practices have been few and far between as a result of coordination problems. 7
8 III. Institutional Development of Bank Supervision in the U.S. Guided by our discussion of theory, we now provide some further structure to the econometric model we test in Section IV by providing a roadmap to the key institutional changes that also may have influenced the path of bank supervision. We describe three eras. The first covers the nation s early history, , when state banks received special charters from state legislatures to operate. The second period corresponds to the free banking era a period beginning around 1837 when special chartering fell by the wayside and state bank supervision evolved in response to the growth in commercial banking. The last period covers the National Banking Era, , including the rise of dual banking and the shift to deposit-taking commercial banks, both of which further transformed state bank supervision. A. Special Bank Charters and the Young Republic Commercial banking emerged slowly during the first decades of the 19th century, a period when private banks and moneylenders featured prominently. In part, the growth in banking was hindered by the chartering process. Individuals wanting to create a bank had to seek legislative approval at the state level. The use of special acts of incorporation to charter banks was a practice inherited from Europe. American legislators, however, viewed their authority to bring banks into existence with some trepidation, fearing that charters effectively granted monopolies that were concentrated in a moneyed elite. Because states were banned from issuing their own currency, some politicians also worried about concentrating banks' unique power to create money through note issuance in the 8
9 hands of a few. 7 Special charters balanced two objectives: permitting banks to exist but providing more control over banking than a fixed set of standards. The chartering process was tedious and requests were often denied by state legislatures. Often in order to obtain a charter, banks had to agree to purchase government debt or make loans to the state (Bodenhorn 2003). 8 Special bank charters were also susceptible to influence peddling, and many histories of this period describe a process whereby charters were handed out only to those that were politically connected. For example, as one banking historian describes, It had long been difficult to get new bank charters in New York And whenever a new one was decided on...opportunities were afforded the public to purchase stock provided of course that most of the stock went into the possession of Democrats (Hammond 1957, 574). Fears of centralized bank power were ironically enhanced by the special chartering process. Since banks needed special government privilege to operate, banking during this period grew slowly, mostly in urban areas, and banks had considerable monopoly power. Bank supervision sprouted its first roots in response to these special charters, and with the general concern of giving banks the right to exist and issue notes. 9 In addition to rules such as reserve requirements and double liability of stockholders, legislators sometimes required simple reports of condition and reserved the right to inspect banks by special committee. However, these requirements had little bite and were often avoided. When reports were requested, it was easy to hide the true state of a bank s condition. Virginia problems are indicative of this early ear of bank supervision. In 1817, residents of Lynchburg accused Farmers Bank of Virginia of discriminating in its lending practices, 7 Although they feature less prominently in the early discussions of bank chartering, some legislatures also expressed concern that the issuance of bad notes would lead to a faulty money supply or that excessive note issuance could lead to inflation. 8 This was also a quite common practice in Europe during the period. 9 Some states placed limitations on note issuance or prohibited dealings in certain types of securities. These types of provisions were often vague and enforcement was virtually non-existent. 9
10 including lending excessively to insiders (directors) and real estate agents. In response, the Virginia legislature appointed a committee to examine the bank's practices, but the bank's directors had no incentive to cooperate with the committee: there was no legal means to enforce it to comply with requests for information or changes in conduct (Gruchy 1937). In spite of these shortcomings, incremental improvements took place in the first three decades of the 19 th century. For example, Massachusetts passed a law in 1803 requiring periodic statements by banks; the law specified which items were to be included and authorized the assessment of fines when reports were not submitted. In 1813, the governor of the state set up a system of three bank commissioners to enforce charter regulations, including minimum paid-in capital, but their examinations could not be described as comprehensive by any means (Gruchy 1937). New York also moved relatively early to improve bank supervision. The New York Safety Fund, set up in 1829, established a mutual insurance system that guaranteed the liabilities of failed banks. 10 The fund authorized three bank commissioners to examine member banks on a quarterly basis and determine if they were solvent. This public-private partnership also authorized any three banks to call for the examination of any other bank within the system. 11 Despite giving them the power to supervise member banks, the commissioners had no legal basis to shut down banks unless they were in violation of a particular section of state banking law. The fund eventually had to be bailed out through state borrowing 10 It is helpful to note that the insurance was only intended to cover bank notes, and it was only through loose wording that some depositors were paid out. During the collapse of the system, New York properly defined the language to make sure that no additional depositors were repaid. 11 The fund, however, did not properly incentivize its member to monitor each other as failures were borne by the fund and not individual banks (Weber 2011). 10
11 after the Panic of 1839, making it any early example of socialized risk in the American banking system. 12 A group of banks in Indiana also set up a self-insurance system to limit risk taking in Under this system, state banks in Indiana were independent but were mutually responsible for each other s liabilities. A board of directors, composed primarily of the individual bank presidents, was created to oversee the integrity of all the banks in the system. This structure encouraged banks to monitor each other s portfolios in order to prevent default while allowing each bank a large degree of autonomy (Weber 2011). As a result, no member bank in Indiana failed during the Panics of 1837 and Eventually groups of banks in Ohio (1845) and Iowa (1858) set up similar mutual guarantee systems. Archival evidence from the era of the early republic shows that formal bank supervisory institutions were only present in Massachusetts and New York before 1830, despite nearly 420 banks operating across 24 states. Legislative records at both the state and national level also suggest little impetus for more formalized bank supervision. If anything, the 1830s ushered in the Jacksonian era of Free Banking and a move toward less government involvement in banking at both the national and state level. B. The Free Banking Era: Unleashing the Genie from the Bottle Bank creation through special legislative chartering does not appear to have quenched the nation s thirst for capital. Beginning in the 1830s, 18 states passed general bank incorporation acts permitting groups of individuals to form 12 A similar insurance scheme was started in Vermont in 1831, but suffered from similar problems as well. 11
12 banks without legislative approval. 13 Free banking laws were particularly prevalent in the Midwest, but many states in the Northeast also passed versions. These laws specified a well-defined set of capital, reserve, and note issue requirements. While these particular requirements differed by jurisdiction, all free banks, regardless of the state in which they were chartered, were required to fully back their note issues with government bonds or other specified assets. 14 Free banking reduced entry costs and hence led to a tremendous growth in the number of state commercial banks. 15 Despite the financial panics of 1837, 1839, and 1857, the commercial banks in the U.S. increased from just over 765 banks in 1836 to more than 1,600 in Consistent with the laissez faire nature of the laws, free banking states generally did not create agencies to monitor bank behavior. Instead, states chose the cheaper regulatory option of requiring notes to be fully backed with collateral that was held by a state official in the hope that it would prevent losses. While they still had the ability to run on a bank, noteholders only truly needed to worry about repayment in the case of dramatic bond market or economic fluctuations that would have affected all banks in a given state. During the discussion of free banking in Indiana s Constitutional Convention of 1850, it was argued that the state should have no more interest in banks than to protect the billholder. All else must be left to the exigencies of commerce (Esarey, 1912, pp ). In this way, legislatures were more likely to increase backing requirements than watch over bank activities, and at most, free banks 13 Rolnick and Weber (1983, p.1082) dates the passage of free banking laws as follows: Michigan 1837 (repealed 1839) and 1857; Georgia 1838; New York 1838; Alabama 1849; New Jersey 1850; Illinois 1851; Massachusetts 1851; Ohio 1851; Vermont 1851; Connecticut 1852; Indiana 1852; Tennessee 1852; Wisconsin 1852; Florida 1853; Louisiana 1853; Iowa 1858; Minnesota 1858; Pennsylvania Kentucky, Missouri, and Virginia are generally not considered free banking states as their general incorporation law differed from the rest. 14 The intent was that notes should be riskless since the state could redeem the notes of a defaulted bank out of the collateral bonds. 15 For instance, 46 free banks were chartered in four years after free banking was established in Wisconsin. 12
13 were required to publish unaudited balance sheets a few times a year. Hence with little government attention directed toward supervision, depositors, noteholders, and creditors had to rely on private monitoring and the limited information published by banks to monitor bank behavior. Free banking nevertheless raised two concerns for state policymakers, bank note issuance and bank capital, both of which could have potentially been addressed with improved state bank supervisory institutions. With banks sprouting up like wildcats, no institutional framework existed to verify that capital was paid-in prior to the start of business. In addition, the free banking legislation placed few, if any, restrictions on the size of note issuance, continuing a trend that had been started in the era of special charters. 16 Bank notes were consequently profligate circulating widely throughout the U.S. states and territories (often far outside their city of issuance), and eventually constituting two-thirds of the money supply (Temin 1969, Table 5.2). Varying in quality and quantity, many thousand types of bank notes circulated by The vast array of notes represented a potential risk to state banking systems since note issuance was not fundamentally limited and since mechanisms to induce banks to issue them prudently were largely lacking in state laws. State banking during the Free Banking era proved to be unstable. 17 By 1863, nearly a third of free banks and a fifth of all legislatively-chartered banks had defaulted on their notes. Scholars point to insufficient portfolio diversity and lack of supervision as reasons for these failures (Rolnick and Weber 1984, and 16 Banks received interest on their bond collateral and thus had little incentive to rein in their issuance. 17 While there were many bank closures and failures over the period, losses to depositors and noteholders were minor outside of panics (Rockoff 1974, King 1983). On the liability side, this was likely due to the requirement of collateral bonds. They issued more short-term debt and made far fewer long-term commercial loans and investments than today s banks; hence liquidity mismatch was less of a problem. They also tended to make many loans to insiders and members of the board of directors (at least in the Northeast), thus lessening the information asymmetry problem and reducing losses (Lamoreaux 1986, 1994). 13
14 Jaremski 2010). In response, 15 states established separate banking authorities (generally called state bank commissioners) between 1830 and Similar to the New York Safety Fund, however, most commissioners had little power to take action against banks that were in danger of becoming insolvent, and primarily focused on determining if de novo banks were in compliance with capital and note requirements. Lacking permanent banking departments, very few states devoted resources to regular and periodic examinations of balance sheets and the monitoring of risk taking Banking panics, in particular, seem to have played a central role in the creation of these banking departments. Of the 15 states that installed supervision between 1830 and 1863, six states created formal supervisory institutions in the three years following the Banking Panic of 1837, and two of the hardest hit states of the Panic of 1857, Iowa and Missouri, set them up within two years of experiencing bank failures. The number of large and publicized bank closures stirred up fears of instability. As a likely response to both a demand for reform from the public as well self interest, politicians seized upon these failures and used banking reform as a platform for gaining electoral support. 18 Even New York and Massachusetts upgraded their supervisory institutions in response to the instability of the era. After the suspension or failure of 32 banks, Massachusetts strengthened its board of bank commissioners in 1838, requiring it to conduct annual examinations of all banks in addition to any special examinations requested by the legislature. The state supreme court also empowered the commissioners to force any bank to cease unsound businesses practices. This enabling provision provided the first basis for a state s supervisory authority to take action before a bank became insolvent, and eventually became a universal feature of state bank regulation. In 1851, the state passed a free banking 18 For instance, the architect of the National Banking Act, Salmon Chase, railed against the improper behavior of state banks while he was governor of Ohio (Davis, 1910). 14
15 law and, in contrast to some other states, simultaneously enabled stockholders or creditors to request an examination of any bank in the state. The Panics of 1837 and 1839 also led New York to require all bank notes to be backed by only New York or Federal bonds in 1841, and abolish its banking commissioners in response to corruption and the failure of the Safety Fund in The state then took a new approach in 1851 when it transferred authority from the State Comptroller to a newly, independent banking department. The superintendent of this department was authorized to hire as many examiners as necessary, had the authority to require quarterly reporting of balance sheets from all banks, and (in 1853) gained the power to solicit weekly statements of condition for all banks. 19 The structure of each state s banking system may also explain the timing of changes in supervisory practices. For instance, the general lack of state supervision in the South was likely a result of their state-sponsored banks. The banks had large capital stocks, were filled by state funds, and were allowed to branch throughout a state. The resulting small number of banks may thus have limited the incentives for legislatures to develop costly supervision. Louisiana stands out as the exception to this statement. It established a board of commissioners in 1842, and improved the quality of supervision with its free banking law in 1853 by requiring weekly statements of condition, uniform quarterly reporting (including details on loans by maturity), and annual bank examinations. In this way, the state far surpassed the basic supervision installed in Florida and Georgia (i.e. the only other southern states with bank supervision). 19 These features were later embraced by the Comptroller of Currency s office, the regulatory agency authorized to oversee national banks beginning in the 1860s (Gruchy, 1937). 15
16 C. The Era of the Dual Banking: Bottling the Genie The 1860s ushered in dramatic changes to the American banking system. The National Banking Acts of 1863 and 1864 established national banks a new type of commercial bank that was federally chartered by the Office Comptroller of the Currency and competed with state chartered banks. The Act adopted free banking s process of incorporation, but made that conditional on higher capital, note, and reserve requirements than many state laws. 20 Borrowing extensively from the supervisory systems of New York, Massachusetts, and Louisiana, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) also extended government s role in supervising banks. It required commercial banks it chartered (national banks) to file reports of condition five times a year, and implemented a system of regular bank examinations. OCC examiners were charged with looking at the balance sheets as well as the quality of management and loans of national banks. While they had the ability to prohibit payments of dividends and compel writedowns of capital, the OCC did not have the authority to force banks that were nearing insolvency to alter their behavior (Bolles 1888; Robertson 1968). It only had the authority to force a suspension if the bank had defaulted and failed to redeem its bank notes. 21 Competition from national banks as well as a tax placed on state bank notes fundamentally altered the balance sheets of state banks. Liabilities shifted from notes to deposits. Figure 1 shows that deposits in the antebellum period were a smaller and relatively constant portion of liabilities than bank notes, but deposits quickly surpassed them after the Civil War. The rise in deposits is often attributed to state banks gradually introducing demand deposits and checking accounts as a 20 First, the Acts avoided the attachment of note issuance to risky state debt by requiring the use of U.S. Treasury bonds to back 90% of their value. Second, they prevented the creation of rural banks by increasing minimum capital requirements. Third, they avoided land speculation by prohibiting loans secured by real estate. Finally, they increased reserves on notes and required them on deposits as well. 21 White (2009) provides much more detail on supervision under the OCC. 16
17 way of competing with national banks, but national banks also seized upon the benefits of deposits. By the end of 1900, bank notes made up less than 10% of all liabilities. The shift in the U.S. banking system to the widespread use of demand deposits exposed banks to greater liquidity risk and depositor runs, as witnessed by the banking Panics of 1873, 1893, and 1907, where liquidity seems to have played a role (Sprague 1910). In response to the rise of demandable deposits, state policymakers seem to have begun to shift their focus toward ensuring bank safety and making improvements in supervisory standards in order to protect depositors and improve solvency. However, this shift began slowly, with significantly cheaper alternatives like double liability laws being installed first. Double liability maintained that directors, chief executive officers, chief financial officers, and stockholders of banks would have to pay up to twice the par value of their shares in the event of bank failure. With more at stake, bank owner-managers may have taken less risk. States appear to have adopted this earlier than formal supervision (with 32 states installing double liability prior to creating a separate banking department) as an early attempt to mitigate bank risk taking. 22 Figure 2 shows that most states in the Midwest and Northeast had passed a double liability law before 1870, and potentially in response to the National Banking Acts requirements, many more passed one during the 1870s and 1880s. By 1890, 27 states had enacted double liability. Similar to modern regulations, reserve requirements during the period stipulated that banks had to keep a certain proportion of their liabilities in legal tender. While reserve requirements were legislated in a few states before 1863, only two states extended it to deposits. As shown in Figure 2, reserve 22 Only 7 states installed double liability after a separate banking authority was created (GA, MI, MS, NH, NV, NY, OR). The average state installed double liability almost 15 years before the authority. 17
18 requirements did not gain traction until after the Civil War. Like double liability, many of the requirements were legislated in periods of relative calm. Ten states enacted reserve requirements between 1863 and 1890, 12 between 1897 and 1905, and five more after Unlike double liability, however, many of these requirements came after supervision, with only 10 states installed them before supervision. In contrast to these regulatory changes, the creation of independent state banking departments saw little development between 1863 and Only California installed bank commissioners during this 27-year period, bringing the number of states that had a separate department to 18 in 1890 (Figure 3). The next two decades, however, saw a flurry of activity, such that by 1914, only Arizona, Delaware, and Indiana were without an independent banking authority. Once again, banking crises seem to have been an agent for change, bringing the shortcomings of the states supervisory systems to the forefront. Six states installed formal supervisory institutions within four years of the Baring Crisis of 1890 and the (banking) Panic of 1893; 17 more states established formal supervisory institutions between 1907 and Existing state banking departments also responded to the Panic of For instance, New York reformed its laws in 1908, giving the state banking department the power to restrict chartering by requiring that banks receive charters only if public convenience and advantage required a new financial institution. Several other states passed legislation or began to more strongly enforce restrictions on the chartering of new banks. By the beginning of the twentieth century, the actions of state banking authorities had been affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States. In a 1911 decision, the Supreme Court ruled: It has been held, we do not doubt rightly, that inspections may be required and the cost thrown on the bank. (Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S January 3, 1911). Therefore, groundwork 18
19 had been laid for supervision in the public interest prior to the creation of the Federal Reserve System. IV. Explaining the Development of State Bank Supervision A. Predicting When States Adopted Formal Supervisory Institutions We now turn to assessing the adoption of formal supervisory institutions. Using a wide variety of archival records including state constitutions, state banking reports, and survey data based on responses from state banking departments, we obtained the year in which each state first established an independent banking authority (e.g. Office of the Bank Examiner, Bank Commissioner, or state banking department), our measure the adoption of formal supervisory institutions. (See the data appendix for further details and for sources on all variables included in our empirical analysis.) To explain the timing of adoption, we estimate Cox proportional hazard models where observations are by state and by decade. 23 The dependent variable is coded as either a zero in a decade where the state had not established an independent banking department for any of the years of that decade or a one if the formal institution came into existence during the decade. 24 The panel is updated each decade, such that states without banks or areas that were still territories are excluded from the sample until those conditions are met. Based on the theory and historical evidence presented in Sections II and III, we include a set of conditioning variables influencing the legislative decision on when to create formal state bank supervisory institutions. Since commercial banking grew at different rates across states and over different eras (free banking 23 We have chosen the decade-level in order to match with the U.S. Census. Other hazard model specifications yield similar results. 24 In order to form a complete panel of states, we disaggregate states such as West Virginia and Virginia and South and North Dakota for the whole period. 19
20 versus the national banking era), we include the number of new banks created in a given decade in the regressions. States also experienced differing degrees of banking distress, so we account for this by including closures (either voluntary liquidations or failures) across the previous decade as an additional factor. 25 We normalize closures by state population to measure the relative impact of bank losses. It should be noted that using decennial data might create a timing mismatch with the bank data. For instance, supervision could have been installed early in a decade, resulting in the closure of insolvent banks. To the extent that this within-decade phenomenon occurred, the coefficient on bank closures would be biased upward. However, despite the possibility of reverse causality, Figure 4 illustrates that independent bank authorities were installed after financial panics and bank closures rather than before them. As a robustness check, we find similar results when we use higher frequency data or when we only include closures and entries prior to supervision being installed. 26 Because the structure of U.S. banking changes significantly with the introduction of national banks in the 1860s, we disaggregate the bank entry and closure data into separate variables for state and national banks. In considering the creation of state banking departments, legislators may have viewed the growth or failures of national banks differently from those state-chartered institutions that were directly under their purview. The inclusion of national banking data at the state level also allows us to test whether there were any potential positive or negative externalities associated with national banks. For instance, even though 25 Alternatively, we could have used the rate of closures to measure distress; however, calculating the rate requires that the denominator is nonzero. Since some new states had no banks at the beginning of a decade yet still had entry and closure during the 10-year period, we would be required to drop these observations from the analysis. Regardless when we include the rate of bank closure and entry, the coefficient on state banks closures generally remains economically important. 26 Results are available upon request. 20
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text:
Your Online Source for Swarovski Crystal, Japanese Seed Beads, Findings, Tools and So Much More
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Our journals are gorgeous in and of themselves, but by embellishing them with some of the funky new Vintaj Natural Brass™ pieces, you can create a stunning one of a kind personal journal to express your own style or give as a gift to a special friend or loved one.
We have chosen the 'Glowing Flower' Journal, but any of them would make good subjects to embellish, and the new Vintaj Embellishment pieces make it so easy.
Parts List
Two part epoxy is the perfect glue for this project.1- Large Journal (Glowing Flower)2- Floral Corners1- Ornate Scrolled Corner2- Diving Sparrows1- Art Deco Dragonfly1- Full Openwork Flower Filigree1- Skeleton Key1- Rustic Rectangle Create1- Embossed Keyhole1- Swarovski Filigree Bead

subset: commoncrawl


text:
Why hello there, my name is Remington (Remi for short)! I am Shady's partner in crime, right-hand man, peanut butter to her jelly, a listener (although I tend to fall asleep :/), and emotional support through college! I am almost 1.8 months in this picture and I have been with my mom since 5 weeks old! After being abandoned and thrown out of a moving vehicle, I was rescued and nursed back to health. I am a lab beagle mix… so I am scared of water and howl at everything… makes sense right?! But thats not important! What IS important is that I am cool enough to have my own section on Mom's blog! So here's to the first of many posts about my adventures…
We have recently started going on hikes several days a week. Today we went to Keowee-Toxaway State park and hiked the Raven Rock loop, a 4.4 mile hike. It whooped both of our butts but definitely worth the views! Our goal is to eventually do long distance hikes… mom keeps talking about getting me my own pack and equipment and everything; I don't know how I feel about carrying all that… For now though we will keep with short hikes close to home, after all there are so many trails to explore, leaves to eat, water to splash (once I'm convinced it won't hurt me), and and smells to smell!
So keep checking back to my page for more stories, tips, and pictures!
Don't forget to lick your owner… they love to know how much you appreciate them!!


text:
Mahar madness...
I...oops, I mean EZ E...must have this Lilly Bean Play Food Bento Box from Mahar Dry Goods. It's going to be my job as a responsible parent to instill a love for sushi early on...and what better way to do that?! Perhaps I could save the cash and just try to make my own version of the fabulus Lilly Bean Play Food Bento Box. We'll see.
Posted by Aesthetic Outburst... at 11:17 PM
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text:
I have 2 storage hdd encrypted w/ bitlocker, in addition to the encrypted OS volume C:.
I activated auto unlock expecting the storage volumes to automatically unlock with the unlocking of C: (I enter the psw during boot since I don't have TPM). However they stay locked until I open them and manually enter their psw.
Looked everywhere on the internet for solutions but the problem is still here, so I'm posting asking for help.
Things to know:
- storage volumes are seen as removable, instead of fixed (I guess because ahci is set, so should be normal)
- the two storage volumes have been encrypted before encrypting C:, and have different psw from C: (shouldn't matter either, but you never know)


text:
Love Town
She ran in.
Wet corn.
Yellow braid.
Down her back.
Wolf Town
Let tigers.
Kill them let bears.
Kill them let tapeworms and roundworms and heartworms.
Kill them let them.
Kill each other let porcupine quills.
Kill them let salmon poisoning.
Kill them let them cut their tongues on a bone and bleed.
To death let them.
Freeze let eagles.
Snatch them when young let a windblown seed.
Bury itself in their inner ear destroying equilibrium let them have.
Very good ears let them yes.
Hear a cloud pass.


text:
Camilla Ch. 101byMawrGorshin©
Almost two weeks had gone by, and 37-year-old Camilla's naked body was still hovering over the fouled water of a large water tank in the public aquarium in Montreal. Her captive audience of lecherous voyeurs was still getting video of her gaping mouth, pussy, and asshole as they were being stuffed with the invisible cocks of incubi.
She was still gushing out come and piss into the water, and occasionally shitting into it; sometimes an especially large and aggressively thrusting ghost cock would puncture her anal or vaginal walls, and blood would drip into the water, as would saliva from her sucking mouth.
News reporters from around the world tirelessly continued their coverage of the bizarre story, and the crowd of people in the observation area never turned their dazed, upward gaze from the sight of Camilla through the giant, TV-screen-like glass that separated the fouled water from them. No one came to stop what was happening, nor could anyone: for the masked men were always in total psychic control of the situation.
Dr. Singh and the spirits of Camilla's loved ones continued doing all they psychically could to keep the glass from breaking and drenching all her watchers in her bodily fluids, all saturated with her Nigrovum, which in turn was saturated with the energy of her desire and fear, useful energy for enslaving the masses. Her friends also helplessly waited for her to wake up from her current memory vision, so they could communicate with her again; but she still wouldn't wake up.
Instead, she was in the middle of reliving a memory seven years before the Montreal aquarium incident, when she was thirty. She, Cameron, and eleven-year-old Eros were watching Hitchcock's Psycho on TV one night in late July.
For no apparent reason, she was heavily made up and dressed like a schoolgirl, in a white blouse, a dark plaid dress, black socks going up almost to her knees, and black dress shoes. She had the black-eyed, black-haired, pale 'Goth' look that Nigrovum had replaced her original blonde hair, blue eyes, and peach skin with.
After a while of listening to Norman Bates and Marion Crane talking about his mother, Eros, sitting with Camilla on the couch, looked back at her and asked, "Is a boy's best friend his mother?"
"Yes, of course," she answered with a grin, hugging him tight.
Then why is Cameron in bed with you every night? the unusually big boy wondered. I'm as big as he is now; I could replace him. Camilla and Cameron exchanged pained glances, since they'd psychically felt what Eros was thinking.
Suddenly, Camilla felt a heat covering her whole body. She began to sweat.
"Uh oh," she said, with her hand on her forehead.
"Are you OK?" Cameron asked.
"I will be," she said. "I just need to go out for a while. I need some air." She got up and went to the front door.
"OK," Cameron said, looking at her with worry in his eyes.
"Don't go, Mom," Eros said, looking up at her anxiously.
"Don't worry, baby," she said to him as she turned the doorknob. "I'll be back soon. Enjoy the movie with your daddy." She went outside with her purse.
He isn't my dad, Eros thought, and I won't enjoy the movie with him. Only with you, Mom. Cameron felt that thought also, and pouted.
Camilla felt a psychic tug pulling her towards her car. She got in, left the window open for a breeze to cool herself, and drove away.
She didn't know where she was going, but her psychic tug was making her drive to a very specific place. As she got closer to that place, a mental haze made her less and less aware of where she was or what she was doing, though she drove there in perfect safety.
After about a half hour of driving, she parked in front of a tall apartment building, in an area of Montreal she'd never been to before. Leaving her purse in the car, she got out with absolutely none of her own volition or conscious awareness of what she was doing; like an automaton, she walked over to the front doors of the apartment building, completely forgetting about her car. She got into an elevator and pressed the button for the eleventh floor, looking at the button as if she didn't even know what 'eleven' meant, but compelled to choose it anyway.
Reaching the eleventh floor, she walked out of the elevator with dazed, agape eyes, and went to Room 1111. She knocked on the door.
"Come on in, Camilla," a man's voice called from inside the room. Her hair, eyes, and skin all changed back to their original blonde, blue-eyed, and peach-skinned colours. A man watching her from down the hall just looked in astonishment at the change, but went into his room and thought no more about it.
Camilla went into Room 1111, closed the door, and walked over to the living room, where a dozen men in black suits were sitting on chairs and on the couch. She saw the faces of some of her elementary and high school teachers.
"I thought you were all dead," the girl said, as if high on drugs.
"We were," 'Mr. Patterson' lied. "But with Nigrovum, we can reanimate our bodies."
"You know that," 'Mr. Langella' said. "You reanimated your dead father once, remember?"
"Yeah," she said, giggling in embarrassment, and too dazed to wonder how he could have known about her having committed incest with Agape.
"Do you know why we all called you here?" 'Mr. Gray' asked.
"You all wanna have sex with me, right, sir?" she asked.
"Yes, of course," 'Mr. Fulson' said. "Now, be a good girl and take all your clothes off for us, sweetie. We're dying to see that beautiful body of yours again."
"Yes, sir," she said, shyly unbuttoning her blouse. She'd been psychically made completely oblivious to the very existence of her husband and son, and therefore totally forgot that they were still waiting for her to return home from her 'walk'. "I'm older now," she said to the men, "so maybe my body doesn't look as good as it used to." She took off the blouse, revealing her pink lace bra.
"Nonsense," said 'Mr. Leroy'. "You look about 22, maybe 23."
Remembering how Nigrovum was slowing down her ageing process, she said, "Oh, yeah." She undid her skirt and dropped it to the floor, showing off her pink panties.
"Nice undies," 'Mr. Grisham' said, licking his lips.
"Thank you, sir," she said, then began taking off her shoes and socks. "Are you guys still mad at me, I mean, for killing you with Nigrovum?"
"No, not anymore," 'Mr. Hanson' said. "We forgive you now."
"Now that we can reanimate ourselves, and can come back into this world to be with you and have a fuck or two occasionally, we can handle the afterlife," 'Mr. Baker' said.
"OK," she said, taking off her bra.
"Oh, look at those beautiful titties," said 'Mr. Burgess'.
"Thank you, sir," she said. The trance she'd been put in made her too dazed to contemplate how 'Mr. Baker' could ever want to fuck Camilla occasionally, and with a group of other men; this of course was totally unlike him in nature, since when he was alive, he'd hoped she'd be his one true love, and had died of a broken heart when he learned she was a slut.
She pulled down her panties, revealing her pubic hair, in its original brown colour. She stood naked in the middle of the twelve men, who were standing around her in a circle.
"What a beautiful body," 'Mr. Finch' said.
"OK, sweetie," 'Mr. Fulson' said. "Could you please get down on all fours and spread your legs out so we can see your asshole and pussy?"
"Yes, Mr. Fulson," she said, getting on the floor as asked, with her ass pointing at 'Fulson'.
"Thank you, baby," he said. "You're such a good girl."
"So, how do you all want to enjoy me?" she asked, looking up at the men timidly.
"Well, I'd like to put my cock in your pretty mouth, OK?" said 'Mr. Williams', unzipping his fly.
"Yes, sir," she said, salivating as his cock came out of his pants.
"And I want your pussy," said 'Langella', pulling down his pants and getting under her.
"OK," she said, bringing her ass down a bit so his cock could reach up to her cunt.
"And I'll have your pretty little beige asshole," said 'Fulson', getting behind her and pulling out his hard cock. He used his psychic powers to lubricate her anus and rectum, then pushed the tip of his cock against her anal orifice.
"But, what about Mr. Finch, Mr. Burgess, Mr. Phillips, and...?" she began to ask, but was interrupted by 'Williams'' bit cock shoving its way in her mouth.
"Don't worry," said 'Gray'. "We'll all have our turn soon enough."
As 'Fulson', 'Williams', and 'Langella' were sliding their cocks in and out of her asshole, mouth, and pussy, the other 'teachers' all put masks on; one of them, 'Mr. Finch', said, "You know, Camilla, how you imagine that you used Nigrovum to seduce us, however unconsciously? Well, actually, we were the ones who used it on you...and most consciously."
"Huh?" she moaned in confusion, then looked to her left and saw the man who'd just spoken--not Finch, but a masked man. Then she looked up at the man she was blowing, and instead of seeing Williams, she saw another man who'd just finished covering his face with a grotesque mask. Getting increasingly scared, but too dazed to do anything about it, she looked at the man under her, and saw a third masked man; taking the cock out of her mouth for a moment, she looked behind her, and saw another masked man fucking her ass. She looked around the room, and saw a dozen masked men...no teachers. They had all used Nigrovum to make themselves look like her old lovers, but had now changed back to their original appearances.
Impatient to have his cock sucked, the man in front of her used his psychic power to make her head turn back to him, and to receive his cock in her mouth again. Looking up at him timidly, she kissed the tip of his cock and licked the underside before deep-throating it.
"We believe an associate of ours already briefly told you about what happened, about us psychically engineering all of your sexual encounters with your elementary and high school teachers, though you'd been made to forget what he said," said another masked man, the one who'd looked like Grisham. "When we're finished with you tonight, you'll be made to forget again, of course, as all our pawns are made to forget our schemes. Indeed, that's how all those in power keep their power: by making the masses forget the past sins of their leaders, by making the masses unaware of what's really going on in the world, even after the truth has been shown."
The cock in her ass enjoyed the feeling of her anal lips expanding and contracting as it pushed all the way in and pulled two-thirds of the way out. The cock in her pussy was filling her up so fully that her every wet vaginal wall was tingling with pleasure, all while she listened in fear to what the men were saying.
"It may seem pointless to tell you everything we plan to do, since we'll psychically erase the memory of our words from your mind," said a masked man standing by the one she was blowing. "But it amuses us to tell you everything, since you won't be able to do a thing about it, anyway."
Indeed, Camilla was powerless to do anything at that moment except receive cock up her ass, and in her pussy and mouth; for the masked men had psychically put her in a state of total passivity. In fact, she screamed just then, not in terror, but from having just orgasmed. Her come splashed all over the thighs of the man who before had looked like Langella.
"When you, then a 17-year-old girl, saw Mr. Grisham walk into your English classroom for the first time, you were much too shy to tell him you had a crush on him, let alone try to seduce him," said the masked man who'd looked like Burgess. "With a little Nigrovum in your blood, with a power you didn't even know you had, or knew how to use in any significant capacity, did you actually think you could seduce your teachers all by yourself? For about three years, our men in Vancouver had been collecting the come you'd sprayed on the grass of parks after masturbating there; and later, when they learned you'd gotten a job as a stripper and fucked your boss and a customer, Wayne, they had an idea for how they could use your budding nymphomania to their advantage."
"They sensed your own unconscious use of Nigrovum to send a signal--a slight one--to Grisham that you wanted him," said a masked man standing by her ass-fucker. "They also sensed his then-mild sexual interest in you. They decided to heat up both your passions and his, to a point where you were both actually willing to risk getting in trouble, all for a mere lay."
The man underneath her was thrusting away quickly and forcefully now, as was the man fucking her ass. The man she was blowing held her head tightly in his hands, guiding it back and forth as her slippery lips tightly embraced his rock-hard shaft. Her lower lip was hugging his protruding corpus spongiosum, her tongue flickered against his knob, and her hand held his balls, gently shaking them. She came again, soaking her pussy-fucker's lap.
"Our Vancouver men were the ones to put the urge in Grisham's mind to touch your thighs one day; he didn't think of that himself, however much it may have seemed that way," said another masked man. "Then, on that fateful day when you were crying after your fight with your mother over becoming a stripper, our men psychically made you bold enough--and horny enough--to sit and grind on your teacher's lap. They also made him enjoy your grinding so much that he wouldn't think about getting in trouble."
"It was the same with Mr. Hanson," said a masked man who was squatting beside Camilla and fondling her tits. "Our men intensified the temptation in his mind to go to the massage parlour you were working at; they, much more than you, made it impossible for him to resist you. It was the same with all your other teachers, especially the gang-bang you had in the abandoned building with Williams, Burgess, Johnson, Langella, and Knowles. To be sure, you unconsciously put the psychic fire in their hearts to gang-bang you, but our Vancouver men fanned that flame strongly enough to make your teachers willing enough to risk their careers, and risk being accused of gang-rape." He squeezed her tits harder and pinched the nipples. "Our men, much more than you, made all that sex happen--even with your elementary school teachers."
"Now our Vancouver associates' plan was to cause all your deaths, either through psychically-induced despair and madness, or in Satanic rites of human sacrifice," said another masked man, who was enjoying watching the double penetration from up close. "When you'd died, your souls--filled with the energy of lust and fear in your Nigrovum--would psychically influence the living, making them do whatever we wanted them to do. We'd make them become more lustful, materialistic, and gluttonous, buying all the things our corporations produce and making us rich. Also, we'd make them more fearful, so as to support the policies of the politicians we put in office, keeping our men in power."
"The plan wasn't very good," said the masked man standing by the one she was blowing. "The influence of ghosts on the living is nowhere near as strong as that of the living on the living, so after you burned the Grouse Mountain mansion to the ground, we regrouped and made a better plan." He smiled as he saw the cock come out of her mouth and spray its jizz all over her eyes, her nose, her lips, and her right cheek.
Her ass-fucker and pussy-fucker also pulled their cocks out: the first man blew his load first on her right buttock, then on her anal cleft, dripping some come around her gaping anal orifice, then on her left buttock; the second man moved up so his cock would be right under her breasts, then he aimed up and shot his come first on her left breast, then on her right nipple, then in the middle, and finally on her left breast again, just right of the nipple.
Camilla got off the second man so he could get up, then he and her ass-fucker got some handkerchiefs and jars. They wiped her come off the second man's crotch, making it fall into the jars. When his crotch was all clean, he pulled up his pants. He and her ass-fucker zipped up their pants and sat on the couch, ready to watch another three men have a go at her.
Those next three men had been watching her up close during the first gang-bang. They turned her over and lay her on her back. One knelt over her head--upside-down to him--then unzipped his pants, pulled out his hard-on, and put it in her mouth. The second man put his cock between her tits and wrapped them tightly around it. The third man slid his cock inside her soaking wet pussy.
"As another of our associates had told you before," her former ass-fucker said, "it took us a while to find you when you'd moved to Toronto with Candice; but as soon as we found you, we got to work planning. Our man who found you when you were fucking Alex McVie in Queen's Park? He sensed your growing desire for your father."
"What at first had been a subconscious but intense Electra Complex, Nigrovum then expanded into something much stronger," said the man who'd come on her face. "Still, you were resisting your desires. We decided to have some fun with your forbidden urges."
"We were the ones who turned up the heat, making you want to fuck and suck your dad," said her former pussy-fucker. "Seeing you joyfully plunge into incest was so much fun, it makes a gang-bang like this seem like Sunday school in comparison. Then watching you plan to murder Carrie, and how you fucked that up--wow!"
She came all over her current pussy-fucker's cock and balls. The man fucking her tits was squeezing them the way Mr. Finch used to when he fucked her in her old elementary school in Vancouver; soon, he blew his load all over her tits and upper chest, near her neck. Her pussy-fucker pulled his cock out, jerked off briefly, and came all over her belly, leaving a small pool in her navel. These two men got up, got handkerchiefs and a jar, then wiped her come off her pussy-fucker's cock and balls and put the come in the jar. Then they pulled up their pants and sat on chairs by the couch.
Another two masked men pulled down their pants and got on top of her. They pushed her legs up so they'd be on either side of the man she was still blowing; then the two new men slid their hard cocks in her pussy and asshole.
"Though in Vancouver, relatively little of the psychic manipulation was from you, much more of what you were doing back in Toronto really was your own growing mental powers," her former tit-fucker said. "Sometimes we intensified things a bit, like our augmenting the terror of your later incubus dreams; but more often we just psychically monitored you, sat back, and laughed."
"It was only when Garth Van Duyne had sex with you that we really began to dominate your life, and not just your sex life," said her former ass-fucker. "For that's when we began to implement our plan to use Nigrovum to control the entire Earth, ironically, by pretending to want to save it!" All the masked men laughed.


text:
Pop-up shops will be rolled out across tube stations as Transport for London uses its vacant retail space for new purposes.
Old Street, Piccadilly Circus, Baker Street, St James' Park will feature pop-ups for millions of people who use the tube every day.
The short-term letting deal, struck up with online property agency Appear Here, will begin with 15 spaces at pop-up capital Old Street and launches at the end of April.
"Pop-up shops have proved extremely popular for us," explained Graeme Craig, Director of Commercial Development for TfL. "The partnership will enable us to make the most of our retail assets whilst generating revenue we can reinvest into improving the transport network."
Appear Here says annual footfall at Old Street is 23m a year, while Piccadilly station is an impressive 43m.
TFL previously used a vacant unit to sell Nike special edition trainers at pop-up store inside Piccadilly station in December last year. It introduced its first pop-up shop in November 2013 with PAPER London, a fashion retailer, taking over TfL's retail space on South Molton Street.


text:
A little while back, KLiC posted in a Facebook writing group I belong to, calling for submissions for an inaugural short story collection called KLiCbait Volume 1. The theme was interesting - the story had to be set in a pub somewhere in Leicestershire on the day of the first commercial space flight to the moon.
Now, I like themes and even more, I like challenges. I submitted my idea and a sample of writing (taken from You Should Have Let Me Sleep, which will be published this summer by the RASSSA) and didn't think any more of it.
'Cos, y'know, I've done competitions and the like, and my stuff just doesn't seem to get anywhere.
Well, I'm delighted to say that there must've been something good in the sample - because I'm one of ten authors who've been selected to write their stories for KLiCbait volume 1! And as it's been officially announced on their website, I reckon I can share the news now...
I can't tell you how exciting this is for me. Everything I've written so far that's been published (apart from Granny Rainbow) has gone into an anthology with people I know putting them together. Now, I'm not for one minute suggesting that being selected is a matter of who you know, rather than what you write. I was well aware, for example, that I wouldn't have made it into Stories for Homes if the writing had been under par. And I've also had the pleasure of being judged a runner-up in a competition which entitled me to publication...
But this is the first time that someone who doesn't know me - who has never seen my writing before - has taken a decision base on the strength of what they've read. It's an incredibly affirming thing to have happened.
It's also bloomin' scary. I have to write to a deadline, make sure this new story lives up to KLiC's expectations, get the facts I'm intending to use right...*bites nails to the quick*
So...I'm now busy plotting out a story set in The Organ Grinder, a Blue Monkey Brewery pub, which will feature moon rocks and space monkeys...and has to be finished by the 31st July, ready for online publication at the end of August.
I think a trip to the pub might be justified...all in the name of research, of course!


text:
GERMANY'S parliament has overwhelmingly approved a four-month extension of Greece's financial bailout – despite unease over the new government in Athens.
Politicians voted 542-32 to back the bailout extension, with 13 abstentions.
Greece was granted the extension by its European creditors in exchange for a commitment to budget reforms.
Germany is among the countries that needed to approve the deal in its national parliament.
"This is not about new billions for Greece, not about changing this programme," finance minister Wolfgang Schaeuble assured parliament ahead of the vote. "It's about providing additional time to complete this programme successfully."
Comments by Greek officials casting doubt on their promise on privatisation deals and raising the possibility of further debt relief had irked some in Germany in the run-up to the vote.
Mr Schaeuble said: "We Germans should do everything to keep Europe together and bring it together, as far as we can."
Germany, a key creditor nation, has nevertheless been among the strongest advocates of unpopular spending cuts and insists aid must come with strings attached.
Mr Schaeuble told parliament the eurozone is on the right track. "We must stick to this course and we must say to our colleagues in Greece that, with all respect for voters' decisions in Greece, Greece alone cannot decide in Europe what the right path is," he said.
Left-wing Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras ousted traditionally dominant political parties in 25 January elections, promising to scrap bailout agreements and supervision, and demand a massive write-down of Greece's 240 billion Euro bailout debt.
However, his government has backed off key demands and secured a bailout extension by pledging a series of policy measures including adherence to certain reforms.
A minority of politicians in Chancellor Angela Merkel's conservative bloc has consistently voted against bailouts for European strugglers.
Still, with Ms Merkel's current coalition with the centre-left Social Democrats having four-fifths of the parliamentary seats and, with opposition support as well, approval for the bailout extension had always looked assured.
"[But] if you're not travelling in the right direction, there's no point in always speeding up – you just get further from your destination," said Klaus-Peter Willsch, a member of Ms Merkel's Christian Democrats.
He pointed to the possibility of a further bailout package for Greece this summer, which Mr Schaeuble didn't mention, and said that "it will never end."
Andreas Scheuer, a senior conservative who backed extending the bailout, said: "Everyone has a feeling that isn't just positive." He added: "We will have to rely on the Greek government delivering now. This is one of the last chances we are giving Greece."


text:
Plan B, the controversial "morning after pill," was approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for over the counter sale on August 24, 2006. Plan B is a market name for an emergency contraception. It is to be used within 72 hours after unprotected sex or when contraception is compromised, such as a broken condom. The passed law allowed anyone over the age of 18 to obtain emergency contraceptives from a pharmacy without a prescription of a doctor. This mean over the counter availability will help any woman over the age of 18 who needs to use an emergency contraceptive, but cannot find a doctor to write a prescription. However, this approval by the FDA may cause problems for teenage girls, those who are 18 year of age and younger.
The abortion debate has been going on around in United States for several years between the federal and states.
During this year, the Supreme Court lost two advocates, the death of Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and the retirement of Sandra Day O'Connor. This gave Bush administration the advantages to change the balance on the court to favor against abortion. Due to this, there was a delay in the decision for the FDA to allow the emergency contraceptive, "morning after pill," to be over the counter sale.