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The German people also have experienced a variety of political institutions—rule by emperors, kings, and princes, representative institutions and republics. In studying German history one can benefit from understanding the relationship between geography and the growth of military institutions. Germany has often been contrasted to Britain, which has been protected by the water, while Germany has lacked frontiers and required a strong military to defend it from potential enemies on all sides. Germany also was internally weak, even though it encompassed the Holy Roman Empire, which began with the Saxon, Otto I, who was crowned king in 962. By the end of the Middle Ages there were, however, some 300 states—duchies, counties, ecclesiastical territories, free cities, and other territories. There was no clear boundary to the west, where the German states were threatened by the French king, or to the east, where Slavic tribes predominated. During this period the Germans themselves colonized the east in one of the greatest movements of peoples before the American West was settled. Here the Germans settled in areas associated with the names of Mecklenburg, Pomerania, and Brandenburg, and they pushed into Silesia. This eastward expansion indicated a new direction of German influence, with which the Hohenzollern family, which created Prussia, was associated.
Many cleavages have divided German society throughout history. Ethnically, the Germans were not homogeneous. The religious conflicts between Protestants and Catholics during the Reformation created other serious divisions. Some historians even claim that Germany was never thoroughly Christianized, and its pagan tradition erupted again during the Nazi regime. Other divisions existed in the political and cultural realm and among the social classes. Political disunity, however, was the most obvious division.
The Germans oscillated between universal empire and localism. When nationalism belatedly developed, attempting to bridge these differences, it ended up becoming a most violent kind. The 18th century saw the rise of the state of Prussia and the violent threat of the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars, which revealed the weaknesses of Germany but led to a widespread growth of national feeling. Unfortunately, the Congress of Vienna militated against the growth of unity. The rivalry between Prussia and Austria prevented the growth of a true federation that might have led to a unified state. The revolutions of 1848 were a turning point for Germany, during which the Germans failed to turn toward democratic government and create a successful unified state based on a liberal constitution. In the end it was the authoritarian Prussian Junker, Otto von Bismarck, who set himself the task of destroying liberalism in order to strengthen conservative Prussia and maintain its position as a great power. Prussia and Prussianism eventually triumphed over the rest of Germany, which was more passive, liberal, and good-natured. Bismarck and Prussia impressed on the Germans a spirit of militarism and the Machiavellian doctrine of the reason of state, which justified every infringement of written and unwritten law. These were qualities that found even greater expression in the leadership of Adolf Hitler. The cleavages continued after World War II, as West and East Germany were divided between a democratic Federal Republic and a communist German Democratic Republic. Today the Germans are still trying to bridge those differences since they were reunified in 1990.


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How Do Large Banking Organizations Manage Their Capital Ratios?
- Harvey O'Neal'
- 3 years ago
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1 issn
2 How Do Large Banking Organizations Manage Their Capital Ratios? Allen N. Berger * Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Washington, DC U.S.A. Wharton Financial Institutions Center, Philadelphia, PA U.S.A. Robert DeYoung ** University of Kansas, Lawrence, KS U.S.A. Visiting Scholar, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Mark J. Flannery University of Florida, Gainesville, FL U.S.A. David Lee * Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Washington, DC U.S.A. Ozde Oztekin University of Florida, Gainesville, FL U.S.A. Abstract: Large banking organizations in the U.S. hold significantly more equity capital than the minimum required by bank regulators. This capital cushion has built up during a period of unusual profitability for the banking system, leading some observers to argue that the capital merely reflects recent profits. Others contend that the banks deliberately choose target capital levels based on their risk exposures and their counterparties sensitivities to default risk. In either case, the existence of excess capital makes it difficult to observe how banks manage their capital levels, particularly in response to regulatory changes (such as Basel II). We propose several hypotheses to explain this excess capital, and test these hypotheses using annual panel data for large, publicly traded U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs) from 1992 through 2006, and an innovative partial adjustment approach that allows both the target capital ratios and the speed of adjustment toward those targets to vary with firm-specific characteristics. We find evidence to suggest that large BHCs actively managed their capital ratios during our sample period. Our tests suggest that large BHCs choose target capital levels substantially above well-capitalized regulatory minima; that these targets increase with BHC risk but decrease with BHC size; that BHCs adjust toward these targets relatively quickly; and that adjustment speeds are faster for poorly capitalized BHCs, but slower (ceteris paribus) for BHCs under severe regulatory pressure. JEL Classification Numbers: G21, G28, G32 Key words: Banks, Capital management, Capital regulation, Partial adjustment models. The authors thank Doug Evanoff and the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago for inviting the presentation, Phil Strahan, and an anonymous referee for insightful comments on an earlier draft, seminar participants at the University of Kansas and Renssalaer Polytechnic Institute for helpful comments, and Norah Barger, John Connolly, Beth Klee, and Kevin Wilson for very helpful background material. * The opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, or their staffs. ** Corresponding author: Robert DeYoung, 1300 Sunnyside Avenue, Lawrence, KS, 66045, phone: ,
3 Introduction Banking firms have long been subject to explicit or implicit limits on their permissible leverage. Bankers frequently argue that an excessively high equity capital ratio reduces their ability to compete because equity is more expensive than debt finance. Many researchers therefore expect that banks will operate close to their required minimum capital ratios. Since the early 1990s, however, the largest U.S. banking organizations have maintained ratios well in excess of regulatory minimums. Large U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs) are subject to similar capital standards as individual banks. 1 To meet the Basel I capital guidelines, U.S. BHCs must have Tier 1 capital of 4% of riskweighted assets (RWA) and total regulatory capital (Tier 1 plus Tier 2) exceeding 8% of RWA. 2 U.S. BHCs are also subject to a leverage requirement most large BHCs must operate with Tier 1 capital equal to at least 3% or 4% of unweighted total assets (the leverage ratio ), depending on the condition of the institution. It is widely believed that current supervisory procedures afford some discretionary benefits to institutions classified as well capitalized those holding Tier 1 capital of at least 6% of RWA and total regulatory capital above 10% of RWA. Since the mid-1990s, the typical large U.S. banking organization has substantially exceeded even these highest supervisory standards. For example, in late 2007 and early 2008, Citigroup raised about $20 billion of new capital and cut its dividend by 30% to offset losses from mortgages and other investments. Their goal was to help restore Citigroup s Tier 1 capital ratio to its desired 7.5% level, substantially above the well capitalized level of 6%. More generally, as of June 2007, the 67 BHCs with assets exceeding $10 billion had a mean Tier 1 leverage ratio of 7.63%, a Tier 1 risk-based ratio of 9.38%, and a total riskbased capital ratio of 11.97%. By all three measures, large U.S. BHCs hold substantially more capital 1 Our data are for U.S. bank holding companies with total assets exceeding $150 million, and are obtained from the year-end FR-Y9C reports. Unless otherwise indicated, all capital data referred to in the text comes from these reports. For convenience, we refer to these companies alternatively as banks, firms, or institutions. 2 Definitions for Tier 1 capital, Tier 2 capital, and other risk-based capital terms are provided in the following section. 1
4 than required by the most restrictive supervisory standard. 3 Why? A bank or, indeed, any sort of firm might stockpile more capital than it currently needs if it may confront costs or uncertainties of raising new equity on short notice. If capital becomes low, a bank can only raise capital quickly by selling new shares, which may entail significant transaction costs or share price reductions. In addition, the owners of a highly-levered firm transfer value to fixed income claimants (including the government safety net) when they raise new equity, as in the classic debt overhang situation (Myers 1977). Just as banks may wish to maintain high capital ratios to avoid such problem situations, it is also relatively easy to maintain or increase equity when earnings are high. Since dividend payments tend to be sticky, capital ratios may rise almost automatically with high earnings. Given the historically high profitability of U.S. banking since the early 1990s, some observers contend that banks increased their capital ratios simply because earnings were easily retained. According to this view, today s high bank capital ratios were not explicitly targeted, but simply reflect a long run of high profits. These so-called capital cushions at large banking organizations capital ratios that exceed the regulatory minima have important implications for policy. Regulators are concerned that banks capital cushions may move pro-cyclically. That is, banks might target higher capital ratios during recessions to mitigate insolvency risk, which would restrict the extension of credit and potentially exacerbate the recession. It is alternatively possible that banks target lower capital ratios during recessions in order to maintain lending relationships, raising bank default probabilities in the process. The existence of voluntary capital cushions also has implications for the efficacy of bank capital regulation. Are capital standards effective even if they do not always bind? If capital requirements were to rise, would banks raise their capital targets by a like amount? Or would they simply reduce their capital cushions and leave their capital targets unchanged? What are the implications of these behaviors on banks default risk 3 Many of the BHC-year observations in our sample showed risk-weighted capital ratios more than 600 basis points above the well capitalized standard. This proportion is 44.1% for the Tier 1 capital ratio and 19.2% for total regulatory capital ratio. 2
5 and/or on the influence of supervisors on banks default risk? Without understanding banks observed capital levels and capital cushions, it is hard to predict how they will respond to economic or supervisory changes. The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we describe current U.S. capital regulations and show that the vast majority of large BHCs in the U.S. substantially exceed the minimum capital requirements. In Section III, we offer some testable hypotheses to help explain these facts. Section IV decomposes the capital changes at large BHCs between 1992 and 2006 into three parts: retained earnings, shares issued to acquire other institutions, and shares issued for non-merger-related purposes. Banking companies earned high profits during the 1990s and early 2000s, and retained large portions of those earnings. However, our sample of large BHCs also retired equity shares in 12 of our 15 sample years, suggesting that banks actively managed their capital ratios. In Section V we present a partial adjustment regression model with firm-specific speeds of adjustment. The model allows us to separate active capital management from passive capital build-ups. We hypothesize that a BHC s desired or target capital level depends on its riskiness, market value, growth strategy, size, and product mix, while the speed at which a BHC adjusts toward that target depends on its initial capital adequacy and any extraordinary supervisory or market pressures it may be under. Section VI describes our data set, which includes 4,563 bank-year observations on 666 publicly traded BHCs between 1992 and Section VII presents and interprets our empirical results. We find strong evidence that large BHC capital targets were higher than their actual capital ratios during our sample period; that these targets increase with BHC risk but decrease with BHC size; and that BHCs adjust toward their targets quite rapidly. Poorly capitalized BHCs adjust toward their targets more quickly than already well capitalized BHCs, and BHCs under the most severe regulatory pressure adjust toward their targets more slowly. Importantly, our results suggest that incorporating firm-specific adjustment speeds into a partial adjustment model has non-trivial effects on the estimated model coefficients. Section VIII concludes. 3
6 II. BHC Capital Requirements and Aggregate Capital Ratios Supervisors require that banks and bank holding companies maintain minimal equity capital ratios as protection for depositors, other stakeholders, and the government safety net. 4 During our sample period, these minimum ratios were specified by the U.S. implementation of the 1988 Basel Accord, an international agreement commonly referred to as Basel I. 5 Basel I specifies which outstanding securities count as regulatory capital. In the main, Tier 1 regulatory capital includes common and preferred equity shares. Tier 2 capital includes subordinated debentures and a variety of limited-life (hybrid) securities. The allowance for loan and lease losses also counts as Tier 2 capital, up to 1.25% of the bank s risk-weighted assets. 6 Basel I also specifies a set of risk weights applicable to bank assets, including contingent and off-balance sheet obligations. The international Basel Accord specifies two minimally acceptable capital ratios: Tier 1 capital must be at least 4% of risk-weighted assets, while total capital (Tier 1 plus Tier 2) must be at least 8% of risk-weighted assets. Basel I capital standards consider only credit risk and distinguish only coarsely among different types of bank assets. In recognition of difficult-to-measure interest rate, operational, and market risk exposures, U.S. supervisors placed a floor under bank capital by imposing a third minimum equity ratio known as the leverage requirement, which requires banks to maintain a minimum ratio of Tier 1 capital to unweighted assets. BHCs with the highest supervisory rating (i.e., a BOPEC rating of 1, discussed below), as well as those that have implemented the Federal Reserve Board s risk-based capital measure for market risk, may hold a leverage ratio of 3%. All other BHCs are expected to maintain a minimum leverage ratio of at least 4%. 4 At a multibank holding company these supervisory capital standards are applied at two organizational levels: individually at each of the affiliate banks by applying risk weights to their assets and activities, and collectively at the bank holding company by applying risk weights to the combined or consolidated assets and activities of the organization, including the assets and activities of its affiliates. 5 Basel II was finalized and published by the Basel Committee in European and Japanese banks began transitioning to Basel II rules in January 2007, while U.S. banks have not yet begun their transition. Recent rules announced by the U.S. regulatory agencies set 2008 as the earliest year for a large U.S. banking organization to begin its transition to Basel II s advanced internal ratings-based (AIRB) method for computing adequate capital. 6 The complete rules for determining a BHC s capital adequacy are provided in Appendix A to CFR Part 225 (Regulation Y). 4
7 While these formal capital regulations specify minimums for all institutions, supervisors may require some additional capital for individual institutions that are perceived to pose significant risks. The largest institutions and those with special roles in the payments system may also be required to hold additional capital as protection against systemic defaults. Strictly speaking, therefore, an outside observer cannot determine whether an individual large BHC s capital exceeds regulatory and supervisory requirements. However, U.S. bank holding companies as a whole do hold capital in amounts that substantially exceed the Basel I minimums. Figures 1a and 1b plot, respectively, the annual time-series of (equally-weighted) mean capital ratios for all of the large BHCs in our sample period, and for the largest 25 BHCs in our sample during that time period. 7 While the figures display some systematic ups and downs over time, the annual averages exceed minimum capital standards by material amounts in every year of the data. For example, Figure 1a shows that in 2006 the average Tier 1 riskbased capital ratio exceeded the well-capitalized standard by 5.27% ( = 11.27% - 6%), while the Total risk-based capital ratio exceeded the well-capitalized standard by 2.83% ( = 12.83% - 10%). Calculated relative to the adequately capitalized standards, these capital cushions would be 200 basis points larger. Similar conclusions follow for the very largest BHCs, as shown in Figure 1b. The time trends in Figures 1a and 1b reflect two separate phenomena: recovery from a weak banking environment and risk-shifting behavior by banks. The banking system re-capitalized itself in the early 1990s, following the effects of the recession and the so-called credit-crunch. Basel I, the leverage requirement, and renewed regulatory vigilance about capital ratios are often credited with these increases in bank capital. Note that the leverage ratio is more than 100 basis points higher in 2006 than it was at year-end 1992, continuing a trend that goes back at least to 1986 (not shown in the figures). The two risk-based measures, however, peaked in the mid-90s and then declined. The broader impact of these time trends are reflected in Figures 2, 3, and 4, which show how the distribution of the leverage, Tier 1, and total capital ratios shifted between 1992 and 2006 for the individual bank holding companies in our 7 We evaluate book-valued capital ratios because supervisory minima apply to book values. It remains an open question whether a firm, left to its own devices, would evaluate its leverage in terms of book or market values. 5
8 sample. 8 The rightward shift in Figure 2 s distribution of leverage capital ratios reflects the general increase in industry-wide capital during our sample period. Over the same interval, the cross-sectional standard deviation of leverage ratios fell slightly, from 1.8% to 1.6%. Figure 3 indicates a relatively stable distribution of Tier 1 risk-weighted capital ratios which became more tightly distributed over time around a center of 11% to 12% well above regulatory minimums. The reduced dispersion occurs on both sides of the mean: poorly capitalized banks increased their capital ratios, while the most heavily capitalized banks reduced their capital ratios. Similarly, the total risk-based capital ratio shown in Figure 4 also became more tightly distributed over time, around a center of about 13% again, well above regulatory minimums. The increasing leverage ratio together with the flat (or declining) risk-weighted capital ratios suggest that banks have substituted into assets with higher risk weights over time. III. Hypotheses: Why do Banks Hold Excess Capital? Some authors have asserted that explicit and implicit government guarantees lead banking institutions to operate with as little capital as the supervisor will permit. Clearly, though, the evidence displayed above shows that this assertion is not always true. We investigate three alternative hypotheses, some or all of which may help explain the high observed capital ratios: 1. Earnings Retention. High capital may simply reflect BHCs retention of historically high earnings during the period following Myers (1984) suggests that firms may face difficulties raising equity capital on short notice, and hence prefer to retain earnings as a precaution against unknown future needs (see also Myers and Majluf 1984). This pecking order theory of capital structure implies that leverage at any point in time primarily reflects the history of retained earnings, not a forward-looking leverage goal. Capital payouts may also send unfavorable signals to the market about the bank s ability to invest the funds profitably (i.e., its growth opportunities). Supervisory pressure to maintain high capital may further reinforce the pecking order considerations. 8 The figures exclude BHCs with high outlying capital ratios in the top 1% of the distributions. 6
9 2. Economic Capital. Banking organizations may match their capital ratios to perceived risk exposures and to the benefits of maintaining a specific standing in credit markets. Under this view, minimum supervisory standards are largely irrelevant, at least under normal industry conditions. 9 Instead, a BHC s optimal capital ratio responds to (at least) four forces. First, banks with more volatile earnings should choose higher equity capital ratios. 10 Second, banks whose customers are more sensitive to default risks should hold added capital, reflecting pressure from uninsured market counterparties such as large liability-holders, customers with lines of credit, and OTC trading partners. Third, firms with more valuable charters may tend to hold more equity to protect their future profit streams (e.g., Marcus 1984, Keeley 1990, Demsetz, Saidenberg, and Strahan 1996, Hellmann, Murdock, and Stiglitz 2000). A valuable charter may be reflected in a higher market-to-book ratio (MB), so a high MB would be associated with a higher capital ratio. (Alternatively, a high MB may indicate that it would be easier to raise new equity in the future, which reduces the demand for precautionary capital today. The sign of the market-to-book ratio should reflect the net effect of these opposing hypotheses. Peura and Keppo (2006) model the bank capital decision as a dynamic tradeoff between the opportunity cost of equity and the loss of franchise value.) Finally, bank capital ratios tend to be inversely related to asset size. This might reflect greater diversification, scale economies in risk management, and/or lower expected cost of raising new equity on short notice. For the very largest banks, another contributor to low capital may be the presence of conjectural government guarantees ( too big to fail ). 3. Acquisition Plans. Acquisition-minded banking organizations may maintain additional capital in order have some dry powder available should attractive investment opportunities arise. Since the 9 Gropp and Heider (2007) find no evidence of a strong supervisory influence on capital ratios at large U.S. and European banking firms. Rather, they conclude that their sample banks select leverage in much the same way that nonfinancial firms do. Although we evaluate a very similar question, our analysis differs in several important regards. First, Gropp and Heider investigate the determinants of book-valued and market-valued equity ratios, while we explicitly study the regulatory capital ratios. Second, their static regression imposes the assumption that capital is chosen each period without regard to the prior year s capital. This assumption is not consistent with significant leverage adjustment costs. Finally, our explanatory variables reflect banking institutional arrangements more closely than Gropp and Heider s, which include the same balance ratios typically related to nonfinancial firms leverage ratios. 10 Related to this motive for holding capital is the risk aversion of bank decision makers. See, for example, Gale and Ozgur (2005). 7
10 Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) eliminated pooling-of-assets accounting treatment for mergers in mid-2001, acquiring a firm at above its book value requires more capital than the target and the acquirer had previously been holding. 11 Even without this accounting reform, supervisors may be reluctant to permit large acquisitions on safety and soundness grounds unless the resulting pro forma firm would be sufficiently capitalized. We therefore expect that banks planning more mergers and acquisitions would maintain higher capital ratios. Clearly, these three hypotheses are not mutually exclusive and we include variables related to all three in our regressions. Still, it may be difficult to disentangle their independent effects, for two reasons. First, the observed capital ratios may not be equilibria. Actual bank capital can differ from desired or target bank capital, and these hypotheses concern desired capital. Second, during our sample period relatively few banks were undercapitalized and bank earnings often reached historic highs. It may be more difficult to reject some of the null hypotheses during our sample period than it would be in a period in which banks experienced more variation in capital and earnings. 12 IV. Sources of Capital Growth at Large BHCs Here, we trace the growth of equity capital (relative to total assets) from 1992 through 2006 for the BHCs in our sample with publicly traded shares. In particular, we concentrate on the contribution of retained earnings to the aggregate growth in capital ratios. The 1990s provided U.S. banks with an extended period of historically high earnings, as shown in Figure 5. Since 1992, aggregate return-onassets (ROA) at U.S. commercial bank holding companies has averaged 1.05% per year, substantially higher than the 0.63% annual average between 1976 and It seems possible that the recent high 11 Before June 2001, most bank mergers were treated as a pooling of interests, in which the acquired firm s assets remained valued at their book values. The combined (post-merger) entity therefore had no increase in the value of its unweighted assets, and hence required no more capital on account of the merger. We estimated several versions of our empirical analysis below that included an interaction term between our merger strategy variable and a post- June 2001 dummy; the coefficient on this interaction variable was never statistically significant and hence we dropped the variable from the specifications shown here. 12 We do not extend our analysis back before 1992 because the detailed financial data needed to test our hypotheses were not all available in earlier years, and because the Basel I international capital regime was not fully implemented in the U.S. until
11 levels of earnings permitted the banks to build their capital ratios through simple inertia keeping dividends constant and retaining the high earnings as a defense against unspecified risks or eventualities. How does this pecking order explanation accord with the movements in capital ratios observed in Figures 1 through 4? If BHCs were simply retaining earnings as they occurred, there should be no correlation between earnings and new shares. According to the pecking order theory, we might even expect a negative correlation: BHCs sell new shares only when their earnings are insufficient to cover available investment opportunities. However, based on aggregate annual data for our full sample of BHCs between 1992 and 2006, we find a correlation between retained earnings and (total) new equity issued each year. 13 This correlation increases to for the set of 136 Surviving Banks as well as for the 25 largest Surviving Banks, which might be expected to manage their equity capital more carefully. Such positive correlations strongly suggest that banks were actively seeking higher capital ratios, even beyond their unusually high levels of retained earnings. This impression becomes even stronger after we net out the impact of acquisitions on the banks capital ratios. Our sample period coincides with the consolidation of the U.S. banking industry, predominantly via mergers, following the deregulation of geographic banking markets. Virtually all of the larger transactions were financed with stock. 14 Hence, the shifts in book capital at large surviving BHCs illustrated in Figures 1-4 includes (a) the book equity capital of the acquired banks plus (b) any acquisition premium paid in excess of the target banks book equity capital. Because acquisitions are likely driven by considerations other than capital ratios, we separate the impact of acquisitions from the impact of retained earnings on capital. Each bank s year-over-year change in equity capital can be decomposed (approximately) into two parts: retained earnings (net income less dividends) and the net issuance of new common shares. We 13 The annual dollar figures we used in these correlations correspond with the percentages in Table 1 below. 14 Until the middle of 2001, bank acquisitions were generally accounted for as a pooling of interests, which required payment in shares. The FASB eliminated the pooling treatment on June 30, 2001, but large transactions continued to be financed with shares. Because the post-2001 purchase method of accounting recognizes capital gains in the target s assets, this accounting change tends to raise the amount of equity required for the post-transaction entity. 9
12 estimate how much new equity a bank issued each year in the following way: 1) Calculate the change in the bank s capital value between adjacent year-ends (ΔCAP). 2) Calculate the bank s retained earnings as net income less dividends paid (RE). 3) Identify any BHCs in our sample that were acquired by the bank. 15. Assume that the acquirer issued new shares to the target s shareholders. This acquisition cost (AC) should equal the market value of the target s equity on its last trading day. 4) A BHC can adjust its capital independent of its acquisitions by issuing or redeeming additional shares beyond those involved in the merger. We can compute the value of these other new shares issued by the BHC as: value of other shares issued = ΔCAP RE AC. The darker bars in Figures 6a and 6b indicate shares issued to acquire other BHCs (AC), while the lightercolored bars illustrate the value of other shares issued in the same year. In the aggregate, BHCs were redeeming substantial amounts of existing shares at the same time they were issuing new shares to finance their acquisitions. This is equally true of the entire sample (Figure 6a) and of the 25 largest surviving BHCs (Figure 6b), and strongly suggests active capital management. Table 1 decomposes each year s aggregate change in equity capital for the firms in our sample into retained earnings (RE), shares issued in connection with mergers (AC), and other shares issued (OTHER). We generate these numbers separately for three groups of BHCs: all 666 sample banks (4,563 bank-year observations), the 136 banks that survived our entire sample period (1,598 bank-year observations), and the 25 largest surviving banks based on their year-end 2006 book assets (348 bankyear observations). 16 Because one year s results (1999) distort the sample means, we focus primarily on the medians reported in the bottom row of Table Retained earnings accounted for roughly two-thirds 15 This procedure ignores any acquisitions that were not previously included in our dataset of exchange-traded BHC. Such omissions are likely to be relatively small. 16 Note that even BHC that survived in the sense of reporting data in the first and last sample years -- have some missing values in the intervening years. As we discuss in Section VI, some of these missing values reflect extremely high capital ratios, which we omitted in order to avoid distorting our results by idiosyncratic factors outsdie of our model. 17 This 1999 distortion may be related to the unusual amount of bank acquisition activity in Approximately $200 billion (market value of equity) worth of banks were acquired in the U.S. during 1998, including the NationsBank-Bank of America, Wells Fargo-Norwest, and Bank One-First Chicago NBD deals. Absorbing these 10
13 of new equity capital for all three groups, although the variation across time is large. New shares to finance acquisitions account for more than half of new equity capital in the entire sample, but more than 85% of new equity for the surviving banks, which are presumably more acquisitive than average. Perhaps the most surprising feature of Table 1 is that the other issuance of shares is negative on average for all three groups. For all three sub-samples, BHCs retired shares on net as part of their non-acquisitionrelated activities in twelve of the fifteen sample years. The median amount retired was about 51% of the change in equity capital for the entire sample, and 55% (65%) for the Surviving (Largest 25 Surviving) sub-samples. These share retirements are strongly related to merger-related share issuance: the simple linear correlations between the AC/ΔCAP and Other/ΔCAP columns are -0.77, -0.73, and (left-toright) for these three groups of BHCs. The results in Table 1 strongly suggest that U.S. BHC actively manage their capital positions to compensate for the effect of acquisitions. Thus, the industry s high capital ratios reflect more than a simple accumulation of historically high retained earnings. We now proceed to model more completely how and why BHCs regulatory capital ratios change over time. V. Model Specification We apply a variable speed of partial-adjustment model to the data underlying Figures 1 through 4. This model allows us to estimate whether banks operating features determine specific target capital ratios. We model the target capital ratio k i,t * as a function of the firm s characteristics: 18 k i,t * = K A * i, t i, t = βx i,t-1 (1) where: large acquisitions apparently sidelined large acquisitive banks for a year, resulting in only about $60 billion worth of bank merger deals in (Data from Thomson Financial.) 18 In terms of this model, a supervisory capital standard is binding when it equals or exceeds the firm s preferred capital ratio (βx i,t-1 ). Note that if BHCs operate without capital targets, or if we have not included relevant firm characteristics in X, we will find βˆ = 0. 11
14 * K i,t is the target (desired) book value of either Tier 1 capital or Total capital, A i,t is the book value of either simple assets or risk-weighted assets, β is a vector of coefficients, and X i,t-1 is the set of firm characteristics that affect target financial leverage, including firm risk, firm size, business strategy, and market-to-book ratio. The determinants of target financial leverage also include a set of fixed firm effects, which have been shown to be important in previous research (Flannery and Rangan (2006), Lemmon, Roberts and Zender forthcoming). Finding β coefficients that differ significantly from zero would be consistent with the relevance of a target capital ratio to BHC. However, it seems unreasonable to impose the assumption that BHCs always remain at their target capital ratios. If banks choose to hold capital cushions, they likely do so because they feel that rapidly adjusting their capital ratios upwards entails substantial adjustment costs. We can thus combine (1) with a partial adjustment model specifying that the firm closes a constant proportion of the gap between its current capital ratio and its target capital ratio (k i,t *) each period. We write this as: where: ~ k i,t DNK i, t = λ ( k i,t * - DNK i,t ) + δ (2) k i,t = book value of BHC equity capital K i,t (measured alternatively as Tier 1 or the sum of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital, depending on the capital ratio we are considering) divided by BHC assets A i,t (measured alternatively unweighted assets or risk-weighted assets), K i, t 1 + NI i, t DIVi, t 1 DNK i, t = do-nothing capital ratio. This is BHC i s pro forma Ai, t capital ratio at time t if it maintains the prior year s dividend payments and maintains outstanding a constant number of shares. NI i,t = net income of the i th BHC in the current period, DIV i,t-1 = dollar dividend payments by the i th BHC in period t-1, λ is a scalar adjustment speed, and i, t 12
15 ~ δ i,t is a random error. The dependent variable in (2) can be viewed as the bank s voluntary, or actively managed, capital ratio change, undertaken through a combination of equity issues/repurchases, changes in dividend payments, or adjustments to asset size or risk-weighted assets. We specify the partial-adjustment process in terms of (k i,t DNK i,t ) rather than simply k i,t in order to separate a BHC s capital ratio into an active component and a passive component. Low estimated values for λ will indicate that BHCs are passive managers of their capital ratios, doing little to actively manage their capital ratios away from the do-nothing capital ratio DNK i,t and toward the desired capital ratio k i,t *. In contrast, a high estimated λ will indicate that BHCs actively manage their capital ratios away from DNK i,t and toward k i,t *. Hence, we can interpret λ as the speed of capital adjustment and its complement 1-λ as the portion of capital that is inertial. Substitute (1) into (2) to get an estimable regression model: ~ k i,t DNK i, t = λ (βx i,t-1 - DNK i,t ) + γd_year t.+ δ (3) According to (3), each firm has its own capital target and its own starting place (DNK), but all firms adjust at the same rate (λ). We include a vector of year dummies D_YEAR t to absorb the effects of unspecified macroeconomic and financial market conditions on observed capital. Equation (3) constitutes a standard partial adjustment model for capital structure. We conjecture, however, that the speed with which a large BHC adjusts its capital ratio depends on its specific situation. A BHC that finds itself far away from its desired capital ratio (due to exogenous events) may feel the need to adjust quickly at first, but then slow its adjustment speed once it is closer to its target. The speed of capital adjustment may be slower for banks that find themselves above their target capital ratios, but faster for banks that find themselves below their targets. This may be especially true for capital-deficient banks if they are subject to extra pressure from bank supervisors or investors to increase capital. We therefore specify a firm-specific adjustment speed that varies with time and bank characteristics: i, t 13
16 λ i,t = ΛZ i,t-1 (4) and investigate a nonlinear model in which bank characteristics affect both the target capital ratio and the speed of adjustment: ~ ( )( ) _ δ (5) k i, t DNKi, t = ΛZi, t 1 β X i, t 1 DNKi, t + γd YEARt + i, t where: Λ is a vector of coefficients for the adjustment speed function, and Z i,t-1 is the set of bank characteristics that affect adjustment speed, including the lagged capital ratio (expressed relative to static regulatory capital standards), the supervisory assessment (BOPEC), and the bond rating. Econometric tests of our hypotheses about capital targets and adjustment speeds are complicated by several potential endogeneities. First, profits may vary with the firm s capital structure, and with relatively constant dividends increasing capital will also increase retained earnings, further adding to the capital cushion (Berger 1995). Second, asset risk and capital may be co-determined, as banks with more capital may choose to take on more portfolio risk and their supervisors may allow this behavior (Flannery and Rangan 2008). Finally, supervisory opinions and bond ratings may entail some endogeneity. If the BOPEC or bond rating is kept low until the BHC has raised its capital ratio, we might find a negative coefficient on low ratings as a result of the rating process itself. 19 VI. Data and Variables We estimate our models using annual data for all publicly traded U.S. bank holding companies 19 On January 1, 2005, the U.S. supervisory rating system for bank holding companies changed from a BOPEC system to an RFI(C) system. The new rating system emphasizes risk management (R), financial condition including capital adequacy, asset quality, earnings, and liquidity (F), impact of the parent company and nondepository entities on the subsidiary depository institutions (I), and a composite rating (C). R is rated on a threepoint scale of Strong, Adequate, or Weak, while F, I, and C are rated on a 1 to 5 numeric scale as in the past, with a 1 indicating the highest rating." For the final two years of our sample, the composite C rating from RFI(C) is used in place of the composite BOPEC rating to form the variable BADBOPEC (described below). 14
17 (BHCs) between 1992 and 2006 for which we could compile complete information. 20 Most of our information comes from the Federal Reserve s Y-9C Consolidated Financial Statements for Bank Holding Companies. Before 2006, all BHCs with at least $150 million in total assets filed these quarterly reports. Beginning with the March 2006 reports, the cutoff for mandatory filing was raised to $500 million. In addition, we collect information on stock prices from the Center for Research on Stock Prices (CRSP) database, information on bond ratings from Standard and Poor s Compustat, and information on BHC examination ratings from the Federal Reserve. Table 2 defines the variables and provides summary statistics. Capital measures. We construct three capital ratio variables k i,t, corresponding to the three measures of regulatory capital. CAPLEV is the Tier 1 leverage ratio and is equal to Tier 1 capital divided by total unweighted, on-book assets. CAPTIER1 is the Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio and is equal to Tier 1 capital divided by risk-weighted assets. CAPTOTAL is the total risked-based capital ratio and is equal to Tier 1 plus Tier 2 capital divided by risk-weighted assets. We delete observations for which one or more of these three regulatory capital ratios are in the top one percent of their sample distributions respectively, above 17.7%, 30.5%, and 34.4%. Such high capital ratios might otherwise distort our findings because they are likely determined by idiosyncratic factors outside of our models. The resulting data set is an unbalanced panel containing 4,563 annual observations over 15 years, or about 304 BHCs per year on average. 21 Because the largest BHCs control the vast majority of banking assets, we also present estimates for a subset of such firms. We also construct a pre-determined measure of do-nothing capital for each of the three regulatory capital ratios. DNK equals capital lagged one year plus current-year net income minus lagged dividends, all divided by current assets, where assets is either total unweighted assets (DNK_LEV) or 20 We focus on top-tier companies that are not owned by other BHCs. Lower-tier companies are owned by highertier BHCs are included as part of the larger entities. 21 During the sample period, BHCs entered our data set when they converted from privately held to publicly traded, and exited our data set because they either failed or (much more likely) were acquired by another BHC. 15
18 risk-weighted assets (DNK_TIER1 and DNK_TOTAL). 22 Thus, DNK corresponds to what the capital ratio would be if the bank did nothing : kept dividend payments constant and let the remaining cash flow accrue to capital. In all three cases, the mean values of DNK are marginally below their corresponding do something capital ratios on average 46 basis points below CAPLEV, 35 basis points below CAPTIER1, and 53 basis points below CAPTOTAL. This is our first indication that sample BHCs have actively sought to raise their capital ratios beyond the ratios implied by passive retention of earned income. Determinants of capital targets. We include a number of exogenous variables to test for the determinants of target capital ratios (i.e., the elements of vector X), consistent with the hypotheses described above. First, we compute a risk variable (STDROA) measured as the standard deviation of accounting return on assets over the preceding twelve quarters. We hypothesize that riskier BHCs will hold larger stocks of buffer capital and/or have higher target capital ratios. We include the lagged marketto-book ratio MKTBOOK to measure two potentially offsetting BHC behaviors. A high MKTBOOK value might mean that the bank can raise capital more easily or cheaply in the future, implying less need for a protective capital cushion. Alternatively, a high MKTBOOK might reflect a valuable charter, which should be protected with a large capital ratio. The regression coefficients on this variable will reflect the net effect of these competing hypotheses. Companies with external growth strategies may need to hold extra capital for unpredictable acquisition opportunities. We infer BHCs acquisition strategies based on their actual pattern of acquisitions in the near future, and measure this by the number of acquisitions actually undertaken in the following calendar year, NMERGER. Larger banking organizations are likely to hold relatively less capital due to greater diversification, scale economies in risk management, greater ability to raise equity on short notice, and/or a too-big-to-fail expectation for the largest institutions. We attempt to capture this complex set of relationships with a two-part size measure: the continuous natural log of assets 22 We make small adjustments to DNK for various accounting corrections recorded in the Y-9C reports. 16
19 lnassets and a dummy variable for firms with more than $50 billion in assets (2001 dollars), which we also interact with each other. Only 5.4% of our observations had assets of more than $50 billion. Organizations with more uninsured counterparties should choose higher capital ratios, all else equal. Although it is difficult to capture differences in counterparty risk concerns using financial statement data, we hope to capture several dimensions of this issue with the following proxy variables: RETAILDEP: A one-year lag of retail deposits (non-demand transactions accounts plus small denomination, non-brokered certificates of deposit) divided by total liabilities. A greater reliance on insured retail deposits should reduce pressure from counterparties to hold capital. At the same time, a greater endowment of (core) retail depositors may increase the BHC s charter value and induce it to hold more equity as protection. BUSINESSLOAN: A one-year lag of the ratio of commercial and industrial loans plus nonresidential real estate loans to total assets. Allen, Carletti, and Marquez (2006) argue that corporate borrowers may prefer to deal with banks that put more capital at risk, which increases banks incentives to monitor. We argue additionally that business borrowers prefer well-capitalized lenders because borrower-lender relationships are costly to replace in the event that the lender fails. OFFBSHEET: A dummy equal to one for BHCs that hold (one-year lagged) derivatives with notional amounts that exceed ten times the value of BHC assets. Only 0.9 percent of the observations in our data have such large derivative concentrations. BHCs may desire to hold more capital against these exposures to counterparty risk. However, if BHCs are using these positions to hedge the risk of their other operations, then they may desire less capital. Importantly, we exclude BUSINESSLOAN and OFFBSHEET from the CAPTIER1 and CAPTOTAL regressions because of endogeneity concerns, as the values of these business strategy variables partly determine these capital ratios denominators. Finally, we include firm fixed effects among the determinants of a BHC s target capital ratio. We also include year dummy variables in the regressions, but we do not specify these as determinants of the target capital ratios. Determinants of adjustment speed. Troubled BHCs may raise capital more rapidly in response to extraordinary external pressures from bank supervisors and the bond markets. We measure supervisory pressure with the dummy variable BADBOPEC, equal to one if the BHC s BOPEC rating was a 3, 4, or 5. Only 7.8 percent of our observations had bad BOPEC ratings by this measure. We measure bond market pressure using Standard and Poor s bond ratings. The variables BBB and JUNK are dummy 17
20 variables equal to one for BHCs with bond ratings of BBB (6.2 percent of our observations) or worse than BBB (Junk = 1 for 0.1 percent of our observations), respectively. We lack bond ratings for 83.3 percent of our observations and include the dummy variable MISSING to capture these firms. 23 If regulatory capital standards influence where BHCs set their capital targets, then BHCs with especially high or low capital relative to those regulatory standards may adjust more quickly. We include a set of dummy variables indicating the BHC s beginning-of-period capital position relative to regulatory thresholds, specified as follows: Wellcap_over800 = 1 if the BHC s capital ratio exceeds the regulatory standard for well capitalized by more than 800 bp, 0 otherwise; Wellcap_600to800 = 1 if the BHC s capital ratio is bps above the well capitalized threshold, 0 otherwise. Wellcap_400to600 = 1 if the BHC s capital ratio is bps above the well capitalized threshold, 0 otherwise. Wellcap_200to400 = 1 if the BHC s capital ratio is bps above the well capitalized threshold, 0 otherwise. Wellcap_0to200 = 1 if the BHC s capital ratio is up to 200 bps above the well capitalized threshold, 0 otherwise; Adeqcap = 1 if the BHC s capital ratio lies between the adequate and well-capitalized thresholds, = 0 otherwise; Undercap = 1 if Adeqcap = 0 and the BHC s capital ratio lies less than 100 bps below the adequately capitalized level, = 0 otherwise. Sig-Undercap = 1 if the BHC s capital ratio lies more than 100 bps below the adequately capitalized level, = 0 otherwise. We construct separate versions of these dummy variables for each of the three capital measures. The adequate capital thresholds for Tier 1 and Total capital are 4% and 8% respectively. The well capitalized thresholds are 6% and 10%. There is no definition of well capitalized for the leverage 23 Supervisory opinions and bond ratings may entail some endogeneity. If the BOPEC or bond rating is kept low until the BHC has raised its capital ratio, we might find a negative coefficient on low ratings as a result of the rating process itself. We return to this issue below. 18
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subset: commoncrawl


text:
FREE COUPON Workshop in Evansville, IN! Wednesday, February 7, 2018! Learn how to SAVE your HARD EARNED Money in just minutes a week!
Event Details
Grocery Match-Ups Click Here
Free COUPONING Workshop
Learn how to SAVE your HARD EARNED Money $
in just minutes a week!
at the Fairfield Inn Evansville West
Wednesday, Febuary 7, 2018
Pick either 3:30pm OR 7:00pm
Learn Extreme Savings, Without Extreme Effort!
Slash your grocery bill by $100's each month!
Meet Veronica Hall, MASTER COUPONER! Veronica has taught thousands of moms nation wide the REAL secrets of saving BIG at the cash register! She will teach you all the couponing secrets, tips & tricks the PROS use to slash your grocery bill by hundreds of dollars a month. All you'll need when you leave this workshop is the Sunday newspaper coupons and internet accesss. Don't miss this Free event! it will change your world!
Veronica uses a simple method to organize her newspaper coupons in just a few minutes a week!! Paired with just a few principles, she is able to purchase her favorite name brand groceries & household items... including healthy, fresh food!! By following these easy steps she spends LESS than $250 a month for her family of 4!!
DON'T miss this Class!! Change your Family's Budget FOREVER!!
Fairfield Inn Evansville West
5400 Weston Road
Wednesday, Febuary 7, 2018
Space is limited! You MUST register to attend this FREE event. Tell your friends so they can attend with you!
Please re-post a link to this event on Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram. See you there!
DOOR PRIZES and GIVEAWAYS: Win raffled Grocery Gift cards and other prizes!
SAVINGS ARE MEANT TO BE SHARED: Make sure your friends attend with you. Who do you know looking for a major budget windfall? They will need to register, too.
Post a link to this registration page on your Facebook!
HURRY, LIMITED SEATING: Don't miss out. FREE EVENT seating will run out, so print your ticket today while it is still available!


text:
Brand Label: Bernardaud
ITEM MOVED TO ARCHIVE: On January 30, 2018 12:51 pm, Fashion Stylist Online noted this item may be out of stock at Neiman Marcus because it was not referenced in their latest online catalog. If this item is out of stock at Neiman Marcus, you may be able to find similar fashions sold there or elsewhere on our Bernardaud Designer Brand Directory.
Available for Purchase Online at Neiman Marcus for $101.00Pin It
Bernardaud Athena Accent Salad Plate Designer About Bernardaud: An icon of the grand tradition of excellence based in Limoges, France, Bernardaud embodies one of the most innovative spirits among French luxury houses today. A trendsetter in design, its porcelain collections are characterized by delicate colors and original forms, capturing the essence of their time. Traditional or contemporary, the Bernardaud collections elegantly modernize the art of entertaining. "The art of fire is subtle.
Shop other brand label items from Bernardaud on FashionStylist.com.
This item was published for sale online by Neiman Marcus on January 30, 2018 9:23 am and last updated by us January 30, 2018 12:51 pm.
Editor Picks: 'The Homebody' Effortless Cool Stay at Home Syle
Sixth June Bomber Jacket
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Band Of Outsiders Varsity Sweater Wool Pullover
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Bernardaud Naxos Porcelain Mug White Tableware
New promo codes and links offering limited time promotions, sales coupons, and special offers on Bernardaud designer fashions and accessories will be posted on each designer label apparel page. For the latest up to date information on this Bernardaud Athena Accent Salad Plate | Home fashion item, including product specifications, ordering options, pricing, shipping details, high resolution pictures, shopper comments, and other sales media, visit the Neiman Marcus Online Store.


text:
I had a very tiring week, but it was a good week. My week ended with me having a headache, a throbbing one, and tired body.
We always hang out till we fall asleep, and I was surprised that you purposely ended the call. When I checked if you're still online, you were (and even now while I'm typing this), so it is by choice.
I have gone a long way to be at this point where I have accepted you for who you are. I thought I have processed everything and can love you for every life choices you make, but it turned out today that I'm not yet there… the question is more like, "Will I ever get there?"
Anyway, my head is still throbbing and I need to sleep again. I just need to write this down and let some frustrations out. It's so frustrating how you have so much time for things you count as "nothing" and so limited time for things you count as, at the very least, "something". I do not know any more what the word "important" means to you, and I'm not sure how to deal with it right now, so I'm writing it here.
It's just a sad reality, reminding me that people, like myself, is imperfect. We will, and will, always disappoint that one person in our life.
As much as I don't want this to happen, I know it can't be avoided, we're not perfect after all.
Ugh, my head really hurts, I'll sleep now. Goodbye for now, world.


text:
2 thoughts on "The Monopoly Board Game!"
G'day William,
I love how you put a google slide in your blog this week, that is a great addition. Monopoly is a favourite for a lot of people when it comes to board games it seems, what is it that you enjoy the most about playing Monopoly?
Best of luck with your next student blogging challenge, make sure you check back in regularly!
– Rian
You can view my blogs here:


text:
Cruise Planners/American Express, the nation's largest home-based travel agent franchise network in the cruise industry, was recognized by three top travel companies with awards reflecting dedicated corporate partnerships and support to the cruise travel industry. The awards include the "Globe Award" from American Express Vacations; the Globus "Top Producing Premier Partner" award and recognition in Oceana Cruises' Cruise Connoisseur Club.
Recognized for delivering outstanding customer service and booking unforgettable travel experiences for clients, Cruise Planners was one of 47 travel agencies that received the coveted "Globe Award" from American Express Vacations, one of the country's premier, private-label tour operators selling destinations worldwide. Recipients were chosen based on their business growth, innovation and partnership with the tour operator.
For the fifth year in a row, Cruise Planners was once again acknowledged with the Globus "Top Producing Premier Partner" award for 2009. Cruise Planners earned this award for their annual sales and support of the Globus family of brands, which includes Globus, Cosmos, Monograms and Avalon Waterways.
"We awarded Cruise Planners with this recognition because we believe they represent the best in the travel industry," said Paula Hayes, vice president of sales for the Globus family of brands. "Over the years, Cruise Planners has demonstrated how committed they are to booking their clients with us because they understand how their clients would appreciate our award-winning, escorted travel packages."
In addition, Oceania Cruises, the world's largest upscale cruise line featuring a fleet of intimate and luxurious mid-sized ships, announced Cruise Planners is once again a member of its exclusive Cruise Connoisseur Club through 2010. The Cruise Connoisseur Club is the line's recognition and rewards program for its top producing travel agency partners who have demonstrated their support to the company.
"These three award recognitions are a testament to how much we value our partners in the travel industry," said Michelle Fee, CEO and cofounder of Cruise Planners. "We are dedicated to providing our clients with memorable travel experiences, and by working with and nurturing our partnerships with these top travel companies, there is only movement toward success and continued support on both ends."
About Cruise Planners/American Express
Cruise Planners, an American Express Travel Services Representative, is the largest home-based travel agent network in the cruise industry with more than 700 franchise owners across the country that independently book cruises and associated travel. Named No.1 Cruise Tour / Travel Agency by Entrepreneur magazine for the past seven years, Cruise Planners positions franchise owners for success by providing them with innovating marketing, booking and lead-generating tools as well as professional development and hands-on training with the industry's top executives. Headquartered in Coral Springs, Fla., Cruise Planners has achieved top producer status with every major cruise line. Accolades include Royal Caribbean International Home-based Partner of the Year (2007 – 2009); Regent Seven Seas Top Producer (2009); and American Express Travel Representative Excellence Awards (2004 – 2009). For more general information, please visit www.cruiseplannersfranchise.com.
Media Contact:
Holly Zawyer / Deseraé del Campo
Cheryl Andrews Marketing
firstname.lastname@example.com / email@example.com


text:
Tuesday, March 26, 2013
Dear Anonymous...
Please STOP commenting on my posts.
I do not need to know that you really like the content on my blog.
I do not need you to leave an obscure comment about fake Gucci, Versace bags and clothes.
I do not want to buy anything you are selling.
I do not need you to leave some bizarre string of letters that do not make any sense.
If I didn't find word verification codes annoying...I would have shut you out a long time ago.
I enjoy getting comments BUT NOT FROM YOU!
You've left like a million comments on one of my posts and I've gone in and deleted every single one of your comments and turned off the comment button...that gets annoying!!
The crazy thing is I don't even know if you are an actual person or a computer generated thing
but whatever you are....you are JUST. PLAIN. ANNOYING!!!!
You will probably comment on this post too...
but at least leave a comment that you will never ever comment on any of my posts again.
Thank you! And do not come back!
Ever so annoyed,
Mrs. Pancakes
14 comments:
- Cece said...
I have the same problem!! so annoying. I finally switched my setting so that I have to approve every comment because blogger was catching them for a while but recently a bunch started making it on the blog. It was either that or captcha and I don't want readers to have to do that.
- March 26, 2013 at 11:24 AM
- Babydreams2011 said...
That's the reason I added the captcha thing girl, smh.. freakin spammers!
- March 26, 2013 at 11:27 AM
- Katie said...
So annoying!! I finally switched my settings to not allow anonymous comments.
- March 26, 2013 at 1:18 PM
- Nicole said...
I make it so anonymous comments aren't allowed, and I approve all comments before they're published...that takes care of them!
- March 26, 2013 at 1:55 PM
- kita said...
That can be annoying normally the plugin I have that catches spam and I just click all of them and delete I scan through them because sometimes a real comment may end up in spam.
- March 26, 2013 at 3:59 PM
- Aleta said...
Yep I get those annoying pesky comments too and that's one reason why I have comment must be approved before posting.
- March 26, 2013 at 4:16 PM
- Teems said...
That is one of the reasons I switch to approval. I got tired of it. But I would never use verification because I dont like it either. Sorry about your little pest!
- March 26, 2013 at 7:05 PM
- Cam | Bibs and Baubles said...
Spam SUCKS! :(
- March 26, 2013 at 7:05 PM
- Sara Marie said...
I never used to get spam comments until just a few months ago. Now i get multiple per day, on the same friggin post! It is so annoying!
- March 26, 2013 at 7:54 PM
- Nellie @ Brooklyn Active Mama said...
These spammers are getting more and more clever, just the annoying side of blogging :/
- March 26, 2013 at 8:13 PM
- Nylse said...
Initially I felt flattered that others were reading my blog since I only have 35 followers, but one day he went on overload...I marked his comments as spam and have not had that problem since.
Now if I could just get more real readers and real comments...sigh.
- March 26, 2013 at 9:24 PM
- Mrs JK said...
You can change your settings to not allow anonymous comments. I did the same after 2days of allowing anyone to comment...very annoying indeed!
- March 27, 2013 at 3:14 AM
- Tia said...
It has been so bad lately. Blogger was really good about catching it but it's finding its way to my comments more now.
- March 27, 2013 at 1:05 PM
- toi said...
this is one of the reasons I simply add the verification option, i know it's annoying but I prefer to keep my blog comments safe from strange commentators
- March 27, 2013 at 10:55 PM


text:
So sorry for the lack of post guys, i've been so busy lately dealing with academic thingies (finals are just around the corner, in fact i've just finished my first exam today), some student body activities, and some works relating on the environmental foundation i'm in, while on the other hand, i actually have a lot to share, from some events i attended weeks earlier and from my BIRTHDAY!! -mine was on May 8 :)
Neways, here are some things i (badly) want for my house, or even better, my 'future' house ;)
1. a stylish huge bookshelf,
i badly need this one, my books are scattered all round
two words, uber.cool.
i must admit, i can't sew, but a sewing corner with a cute sewing machine is a must for a vintage inspired home. and frankly, i believe it can also motivate me into learning how to sew *LOL*
it's a must ;)
images from desire to inspire
another posts, including outfit posts will be up soon after finals.
in the mean time, take care! :)


text:
So you remember this thrift haul, right?
Well, that sweater was purchased for a very specific project. I have been looking for a big red cabled sweater to make into a pillow for quite a while. And my patience was rewarded, for I finally found one.
We had some older couch pillows that were horrible, so I washed them and set to work making them better.
First the stuffing and "measuring" and then cutting.
I ran over the top edges of the cuts with the serger just so they wouldn't unravel. then the top seam got sewed together. Then the pillows went in and I crocheted the ribbed part together in a matching yarn.
And of course, it's already been adopted. They don't use the bed I made for them, but they'll use this.


text:
London, May 23: Pop star Jennifer Lopez will reportedly perform on the semi-final episode of music reality show "Britain's Got Talent", and sing her latest track "Live it up".
Pop star Demi Lovato might also sing her new single "Heart attack", reports thesun.co.uk.
Other performers include singer-songwriter Ellie Goulding, who will sing her recent releases "Explosions" and "Anything can happen".
Olly Murs will sing track "Right Here Right Now", while last year's show winners Ashleigh and Pudsey will also make a special appearance.
The live semi-finals will kick-off May 27, whereas the final will be aired June 8.


text:
|Homer Simpson Drinking Quotes
In a previous post I talked about making better moonshine by testing the level of methanol. Many months before I also I commented on the surface properties of bile which are increased after drinking alcohol. If you drink alcohol many different effects occur in your body as a result. One of the ways our body detoxifies alcohol and other toxins is with the liver. Drinking excessively causes massive trauma to the liver causing it to not function properly. Increased bilirubin (1.5 mg/dL ) in the blood makes the condition hyperbilirubinemia. The bilirubin is a yellow breakdown product of normal heme catabolism. This catabolism of the heme in redblood cells is done in the liver. Also you can see the yellow bilirubin after you get a bruise. However, with the liver damaged this product goes to the blood then to extracellular fluids like conjuntival membranes over the sclerae (whites of the eyes) and mucous membranes which causes the yellowish pigmentation of the skin.
Jaundice comes from the French word jaune, meaning yellow. Homer Simpson is yellow. He drinks excessively which may cause liver failure leading to jaundice. How could Homer tell if he had jaundice? If his eyes were yellow this might possibly tell that he has jaundice. A more diagnostic test would be to use a tensiometer. If Homer goes to Dr. Heibert and takes a urine test Dr. Heibert could do a simple diagnostic test with a tensiometer to test the surface tension of the urine. Normal urine has a surface tension of about 66 dynes/cm but if bile is present (a test for jaundice), it drops to about 55 dynes/cm. This is a simple diagnostic test that does not require expensive lab equipment and can be done in the field for example at small clinics. Doh!


text:
Increase operational longevity with the VR-10/4 mechanical computer. Features pricing up to $3.99 per gallon and contains four transfer money wheels, operating at one-fourth normal speed while doing the same job. This means significantly longer life – particularly at higher price-per-gallon values and higher flow rates.
Key features:
- Can be equipped with various options such as pulse generators and electric reset for self-serve operations
- Factory installed "Quick Change" gearbox can be ordered for fast conversion to the metric system
Key benefits:
- Four transfer money wheels offer greater operational efficiency, reliability
- Unique worm gear drive prevents wheel overthrow
- Exclusive high-resolution clutch to improve accuracy and readability
- Precise and repeatable positioning of the wheels at the zero point during reset
- Sales rates up to $60 per minute
Speed: 150 rpm maximum of right-hand money wheel (20 gallons/minute at $2.999/gallon or 15 gallons/minute at $3.999/gallon). $60/minute maximum at any price/gallon.
Number of Computer Wheels: Two banks of 4 wheels each for money and gallons, front and back.
Size of Figures: First and second money wheels: 10.2 mm high, 6.4 mm wide (0.400", 0.251"). All other 20.6 mm high, 12.7 mm wide (0.812", 0.500").
Price Setting Figures: 0.000 to 3.999 dollars per gallon. (Optional to $9.99).
Character Configuration: 0, 2, 4, 6, 8 with graduation every penny, four times on right-hand money wheel. 0, 0, 1, 1 etc. to 9, 9 on second money wheel.
Totalizers: Gallons: 7 digits. Money: 7 digits. Right-hand wheel of the money totalizer also has the four transfer design with 5-cent increments.
Dial Face Masks: No change is required when replacing a VR-2002 or VR-2002E with a VR-10/4.
Reset: Double handle or rotary reset mechanism. Readily accepts V-R electric resets.
Operating Temperature Range: -40 degrees to +71 degrees C (-40 degrees to +160 degrees F).