text:
Voluntary private health insurance and health care utilization of people aged 50+ PRELIMINARY VERSION
- Merryl Hill
- 3 years ago
- Views:
1 Voluntary private health insurance and health care utilization of people aged 50+ PRELIMINARY VERSION Anikó Bíró Central European University March 30, 2011 Abstract Does voluntary private health insurance coverage in uence health care utilization in countries where the coverage ratio with public health insurance is high? I estimate this e ect using the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe. Handling the potential endogeneity of voluntary insurance coverage and the large fraction of zero observations in the utilization models in uences the empirical results. I show that the e ect of private health insurance coverage on inpatient and outpatient care utilization is not trivial even in countries with generous public health funding. The main nding is that voluntary private health insurance coverage increases dental care utilization, but decreases the visits to general practitioners. Private insurance is estimated to have little and insigni cant in uence on the utilization of inpatient care and outpatient specialist care. The magnitude of the e ect of voluntary private health insurance on health care utilization varies with the characteristics of the health care systems. JEL codes: C25, C35, G22, I11, 1 Introduction In most of the European countries there is almost universal coverage with public health insurance, and more than 50% of health expenditures are nanced by the general government. Given this institutional background does voluntary private health insurance (PHI) in uence health care utilization? I focus on the utilization of hospital, general practitioner (GP), specialist and dental care among people aged 50 and over. Due to the age restriction the sample used is not representative for the whole population of the analyzed countries. However, health care utilization increases on average with age, therefore the results can be indicative for the overall health care systems. The utilization of the four types of health services is analyzed separately, since insurance coverage and other individual characteristics have di erent in uencing e ects on those. For instance, utilization of hospital care is rather determined by the health condition of the patient than by the individual utility maximizing behavior. Despite the broad coverage with public insurance, the coverage rate with voluntary private health insurance is still not negligible in the countries analyzed. Whether such private insurance increases health care utilization or private care utilization, or decreases out-of-pocket expenditures is of interest for the insurance 1
2 companies and for the public policy, as well. In this paper I estimate the e ects of PHI on health care utilization, and also analyze how these e ects vary with some institutional characteristics of the countries. A seminal empirical paper analyzing the e ect of health insurance on the demand for medical care is of Manning et al. (1987). Based on the RAND health insurance experiment conducted in the U.S., they show that more generous health insurance plans increase the demand for outpatient services. Due to the experimental design, the authors do not have to worry about the endogeneity of health insurance coverage. Gibbons and Wilcox-Gok (1998) also nd positive e ect of health insurance coverage on health care utilization probability, using the National Medical Expenditure Survey from the United States. In Europe mandatory health insurance is more widespread, therefore private health insurance might have smaller role in in uencing health care utilization. Two closely related papers which use European data are of Jones et al. (2006) and Paccagnella et al. (2008). Jones et al. (2006) nd a positive e ect of supplementary health insurance coverage on the probability of visiting a specialist. Their results are based on samples of four countries from the European Community Household Panel User Database (EHCP-UDB). My research di ers from theirs not only in the wider country coverage of the sample used, but also in the di erent methodology and extended research question - I analyze the e ect of PHI on hospital, GP and dental care utilization, as well. Paccagnella et al. (2008) give a detailed analysis of the determinants of voluntary PHI coverage in Europe, based on the rst wave of the SHARE database. 1 They also analyze the e ect of voluntary PHI on out-of-pocket expenditures, and nd that this e ect varies across countries. The demand for voluntary private health insurance, and its e ect on medical expenditures based on the SHARE data are analyzed to some extent by Holly et al. (2005). They nd some evidence that voluntary PHI coverage may have a positive e ect on out-of-pocket medical expenditures. My paper contributes to the literature in providing an international comparison about the utilization enhancing e ect of voluntary private health insurance coverage. An additional novelty is to analyze the e ect of voluntary private health insurance coverage on the utilization of medical services if health care utilization is modelled as two-stage decision, and the endogeneity of PHI is taken into account. I identify the e ect of PHI on health care utilization by using the assumption that only current employment characteristics in uence the utilization, whereas past employment characteristics in uence PHI coverage. Section 2 provides an overview of the health care institutions and the role of private health insurance in the analyzed countries. The economic considerations underlying the empirical analysis are discussed in Section 3. Section 4 presents the empirical models, and the data used is described in Section 5. Section 6 discusses the empirical results, and Section 7 concludes. 2 Institutional background In the empirical analysis I investigate the e ect of voluntary PHI on health care utilization in eleven European countries. Although all of these are developed countries and except for Switzerland these are EU member states, there are still considerable di erences in the health care institutions. Some of these di erences are related to health care nancing and health care resources. The institutional background in uences the role PHI has. The demand for PHI, and its e ect on health care utilization depend among others on the out-of-pocket cost of medical services. If the services are covered by the mandatory public insurance then the out-of-pocket costs cannot be further reduced by the voluntary PHI. I return to further economic considerations in Section 3. 1 Details about the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) database are provided in Section 5. 2
3 In this section I summarize some basic features of the health care systems in the analyzed countries. I focus on those characteristics which might indicate the role PHI has in nancing health care. In Table 1 I present a selection of indicators related to the insurance markets and to the health care institutions. Except for the data presented in the rst column, all indicators are based on aggregate statistics provided by the WHO. 2 I give a detailed explanation in Section 5 how the PHI indicator was generated. According to the calculated correlation coe cients, PHI coverage is more prevalent among people aged 50 or over in those countries where the public health expenditure per inhabitant or relative to GDP is higher. On the other hand, the correlation coe cient with the ratio of health expenditures covered by public sources is close to zero. Thus the demand for PHI seems to be uncorrelated with the generosity of the public health care measured by the ratio of funding coming from the government. The positive correlation of coverage rate with the last two public health expenditure indicators can be the result of the following in uencing e ect: more developed and widespread health care resources can increase not only the public health expenditures, but also the demand for PHI coverage. In Section 6.1 I present that even if a rich set of individual characteristics are controlled for, the country dummies remain signi cantly di erent from zero in the model of PHI coverage. Analyzing the in uencing mechanisms of private health insurance coverage in further details is out of the scope of this paper. PHI coverage Public per Public health Public health ratio (%) total health expenditures per expenditures in the sample expenditures (%) inhabitant ($ ppp) per GDP (%) AT , BE , DK , FR , DE , GR , IT , NL , ES , SE , CH , Source SHARE WHO WHO WHO Table 1: Heath insurance and health expenditure (HE) indicators, 2004 In the following I summarize some further health care system characteristics of the countries included. These characteristics refer to year 2004, when the survey data I use was collected, and are based on OECD (2004), Paccagnella et al. (2008), and Thomson et al. (2009). Except for Switzerland, all analyzed countries have mandatory public health insurance. In Switzerland there is mandatory insurance, but that is provided by private insurance companies. The coverage with the mandatory insurance is almost universal in all countries except for Germany and Netherlands. In Germany the civil servants, high earners, and self employed are exempt, whereas in the Netherlands the high earners are exempt (prior to 2006). Although there is almost universal coverage with the mandatory (public) health insurance, some cost sharing arrangements still apply in all countries. These arrangements vary across the countries. It varies to which services and to whom does the cost sharing apply, and also its magnitude di ers across the countries. 2 The WHO data are based on the WHO European health for all (HFA) database. In the WHO statistics the public health expenditure measure for Switzerland includes the expenditures covered by mandatory private health insurance. 3
4 For example, in Austria and Sweden it applies to most services, whereas in Spain there is no cost sharing for GP or specialist care. In some countries, as in Austria, Belgium, and Italy, those with low income or with chronic health problems are exempt from the cost sharing. Private health insurance can be the primary (principal or substitutive) health insurance for those not covered by public insurance. Otherwise, PHI can have supplementary or complementary role. Supplementary PHI covers services not insured by the public insurance. This is the most prevalent role of PHI in Europe. Complementary PHI can be contracted to cover cost sharing for services not fully nanced by the public insurance. This is widespread in France, where the complementary PHI is even provided free of charge for those with low income. In the following I call "voluntary private health insurance" all those private health insurance contracts which do not have primary function. I give some additional statistics about voluntary private health insurance coverage in Section 5. 3 Economic considerations In this section I outline the economic considerations on how voluntary private health insurance coverage can a ect health care utilization. My aim here is to provide some theoretical motivation to the empirical analysis. The key point is that health insurance coverage can decrease the observed costs of health services or can make higher quality of services available, both of which increase the demand for medical care. An important assumption throughout this paper is that PHI coverage is predetermined. The main reason for this assumption is that individuals above a given age are generally excluded from contracting PHI (details can be found in Mossialos and Thomson (2004)). The decision about buying private health insurance is likely to be made before age 50, during the earlier working life. 3 This decision can be in uenced by the insurance costs and availability, and by the potential bene ts of such a contract, which depends on risk-aversion, risk of future health problems and potential health care expenditures (in uenced also by the health care system). In some countries the majority of health insurance policies are purchased by groups, rather than by individuals. These groups are typically employment-based groups, which have a predominant role e.g. in the Netherlands and in Sweden (according to Mossialos and Thomson (2004), Table 10). Although PHI is predetermined in this model, some of the in uencing factors of coverage are timeinvariant, like gender, education, cohort-e ects, or also the main features of the health care system, at least in the short to middle run. Thus, it is possible to estimate the e ect of such time-invariant factors on the likelihood of PHI coverage. I assume that individuals maximize a deterministic utility function, which depends on consumption and health. Future health is in uenced by the utilization of health care. Decision about making an initial contact with a physician or going to hospital is made by the individual. It is a subject of modelling assumption whether the frequency of doctoral visits afterwards, and the length of hospital stay are basically determined by the suppliers of health care or these are also decided by the patients. Expenditure on consumption goods and on medical services are limited by income and wealth. The cost of medical services depends on several factors: on the type or quality of the service, whether the individual has private health insurance, and on the country-speci c features of health care. In the empirical analysis I control for the country-speci c e ects by including country dummies in the utilization models, and allowing country-speci c e ect of some observables. 3 The question about PHI coverage is not included in the second wave of the SHARE, but there is a question about change in health insurance coverage since the last interview. Although this question is not restricted to private insurance, 89% of the respondents report no change in coverage for health problems, which indicates little time variation in insurance coverage. 4
5 Assuming positive but diminishing marginal utility of consumption and health, and positive but diminishing marginal product of medical care on health, it can be derived that the demand for health care services decreases with realized price and increases with service quality. Thus, according to a simple health care demand model, private health insurance coverage is expected to increase the demand for health services. This e ect can be due to moral hazard or to the access to services unavailable without PHI coverage. 4 On the other hand, if health care prices are generally low, and utilization is determined by health problems then insurance coverage might have moderate e ect on utilization. As discussed in Section 6, the empirical results a rm the positive e ect of voluntary PHI on health care utilization only partially. 4 Empirical models I estimate the insurance coverage and utilization models on a pooled sample of the analyzed countries. A key modelling question is whether the partial e ects of exogenous variables are the same across countries. Bago d Uva and Jones (2009) reject the equality of income and education e ects on health care utilization across European countries. However, some assumption of equality is needed in order to avoid the problem of small country-speci c samples. Apart from including country dummies in the empirical models, I allow the e ect of income and wealth on utilization to be country-speci c. The out-of-pocket costs of health care services vary across countries, these di erences imply varying e ect of income and wealth on utilization. The liquidity of certain wealth components, thus their e ect on health care utilization might also vary across countries. The e ect of voluntary PHI on health care utilization is also allowed to be country speci c. I consider two categories of health demand models: those where the utilization is a result of a single decision, and those where the decision is made in two stages. The reason behind the second type of models is that many people do not utilize health care at all, and the e ect of observables on the probability of utilization can be di erent from their e ect on the positive amount of utilization. Following the model of Grossman (1972), most empirical health care models include a rich set of regressors to capture health, and health production characteristics. This latter can include the price of health care, and standard socioeconomic variables that a ect the availability of services, and capture tastes, preferences. Such empirical models of health care demand are applied among others by Hunt-McCool et al. (1994) and Gibbons and Wilcox-Gok (1998). This strand of the literature follows the consumer theory approach. The other approach is based on the principal-agent set-up, where the initial contact is decided by the patient, but afterwards the utilization is determined by the physician. A detailed discussion about econometric issues in estimating medical care usage models is given by Jones (2000). Basic issues are that the dependent variable is not continuous, there is a large number of zero observations, which can be modelled with one-step or two-step models, and there are usually measurement problems as well. In my empirical analysis I account for the potential endogeneity of voluntary PHI, and also for the large number of zero observations. The preferred speci cation is a two-part model, which takes into account both of the empirical di culties: it models the endogenous PHI coverage and also the zero utilization decisions. As a benchmark model, I assume that health care utilization is the result of a single decision, and treat voluntary PHI as exogenous. The preferred speci cation is a two-part model. In this approach I model nonzero utilization and the amount of utilization separately, and consider the voluntary PHI indicator as 4 Jones et al. (2006) di erentiate four in uencing mechanisims of health insurance on utilization: 1. moral hazard e ect due to reduced prices, 2. risk reduction e ect due to reduced nancial uncertainty, 3. income transfer e ect (ex post transfer from the healthy to the ill), and 4. access e ect due to access to high quality services. 5
6 endogenous in both parts of the model. In this version of the model the e ects of the individual characteristics are allowed to be di erent in the two parts of the utilization decision. For handling the endogeneity of PHI I apply bivariate probit estimation, and the method of two-stage residual inclusion (2SRI) suggested by Terza et al. (2008). 4.1 Benchmark model As the benchmark case, I assume that health care utilization is a one-stage decision, and voluntary PHI coverage is exogenous in this decision. This simple model will be compared to the preferred two-part speci cation. Since there is a large ratio of zero observations among the reported numbers of hospital nights and of doctoral visits, assuming Poisson distribution would be unrealistic. I assume negative binomial distribution, which ts the data indeed relatively well. 5 The benchmark utilization model is the following: E [Y ji jx i ; P HI i ; " 1ji ] = exp(x i 1jk + 1jk P HI i + " 1ji ); (1) where index i refers to individual i, j = 1; 2; 3 di erentiate the parameters and variables according to the dependent variable, and k is the country index: The dependent variable Y is either the number of doctoral visits (GP and specialist visits) or hospital nights, P HI indicates the coverage with voluntary private health insurance, and X is a vector of variables including a rich set of socioeconomic indicators that might in uence health care utilization through costs, potential bene ts, and preferences. In particular, X includes age, gender, marital status, dummy variable for having children, logarithmic income, logarithmic value of the main residence (replaced with zero if the reported value of the main residence is zero), education (four categories: ISCED codes 0-1, 2, 3-4 and 5-6), employment status, indicators of the current employment as civil servant, public sector employee or self employed, rm size at current employment, living area and smoking dummies (as proxies for health behavior), country dummies, and three health measures. In the outpatient care utilization models the education level and the number of health problems of the partner are also included as regressors. These can serve as proxies for the partner s health care utilization, which might induce utilization by the respondent. The e ects of income, wealth, and voluntary PHI coverage are allowed to be country-speci c. Further details about the data are given in Section 5. I assume that there is no reverse causality from health care utilization to the reported health problems within one year. This assumption is more reasonable for chronic conditions and limitations in activities of daily living than for reported symptoms, in which case it is a data limitation that health symptoms of the previous year cannot be observed. " 1 is a latent heterogeneity term, it is assumed that exp(" 1 ) has a gamma distribution. " 1 includes unobservables which in uence health care demand, but are independent from the regressors. These can be such speci c health characteristics which are not captured by the included health measures, but can also be other factors like being acquainted with a physician. Since spouses might make joint decisions on health care utilization (and on PHI coverage), I allow the error terms to be correlated across the household members, and the standard errors are clustered by household. 5 A simple way to check the distributional assumption is using the nbvargr command in Stata, written by Philip B. Ender. Nevertheless, based on Gourieroux et al. (1984), if the mean is correctly speci ed, the maximum likelihood estimation gives consistent results even if the negative binomial distribution assumption does not hold. 6
7 4.2 Two-part model The assumption that PHI coverage is exogenous in the health care demand model might be unrealistic, even if it is predetermined. Time-invariant but unobserved taste shifters might be correlated both with voluntary PHI coverage and health care utilization. It can be due to adverse selection and to positive selection, as well. First, the problem of adverse selection arises if those people are more likely to be covered with PHI who are more likely to utilize health care due to unobserved health problems or due to less subjective disutility attached to medical care. Second, there is positive selection if PHI is more likely to be purchased by wealthier individuals who are at the same time in better health condition, thus less likely to utilize health care. Although I control for income and wealth in the empirical models, these controls cannot capture perfectly the economic situation of the respondents. If PHI is endogenous in equation (1) then the consistency of the benchmark estimation is violated. In the preferred two-part speci cation I relax the assumption that health care utilization is a one-stage decision, and also assume that PHI is endogenous both in the rst and second stage. The underlying assumption is that separate processes drive the probability of making any doctoral visits, and the exact number of visits (similarly for hospital stays). The statistical reason for applying two-stage modelling is the relatively large number of observed zero outcomes. 6 Following the argument of Dow and Norton (2003), if zero values are "true zeros", i.e. the results of corner solution and not of sample selection then applying sample selection estimation methods can be misleading, whereas two-part models can be appropriate. In addition, Norton et al. (2008) analyze the properties of sample selection and two-part models if there is a large fraction of zero observations and there are no exclusion restrictions. They show that two-part models can be superior even if the errors in the two parts of the models are correlated. In the health care utilization models of this paper there are no clear exclusion restrictions: the same observed characteristics drive the probability of health care utilization and the amount of utilization. This modelling feature calls for the application of two-part models, instead of selection models. The two-part model is based on the assumption that the second stage error term has zero expected value, conditional on positive outcome and on the exogenous regressors. Based on this assumption the two parts of the model can be estimated separately. The overall marginal e ect of PHI can be calculated as a combination of the two sets of estimation results. The basic two-part model has to be modi ed due to the potential endogeneity of PHI in the utilization models. The rst stage equations model the voluntary PHI coverage together with the probability of having any GP visits, specialist visits or hospital stays (P os_y j ). This rst stage model can also be estimated for dental care, for which only a binary indicator of utilization is available. P HI i = Z i k + i P HI i = 1(P HI i > 0) (2) P os_y ji = X i 2jk + 2jk P HI i + " 2ji P os_y ji = 1(P os_y ji > 0): (3) 6 Two-stage modelling is a standard approach in modelling health care demand, see e.g. Zimmerman Murphy (1987), Pohlmeier and Ulrich (1995), and Werblow et al. (2007). An alternative modelling strategy could be the application of nite mixture (latent class) models, as e.g. Deb and Trivedi (1997). Such models allow for heterogeneity in the population, but do not apply strict separation between those who utilize and do not utilize health care services. Then the marginal e ects are allowed to vary among "latent classes" of the population. I apply the simpler two-part modelling approach, but extend that with handling the endogeneity of PHI coverage. 7
8 The variables in vector Z which can also in uence health care utilization are the following: age, gender, marital status, having children, wealth and income measures, education level, living area, and country dummies. Again, the income and wealth variables are allowed to have country-speci c e ect (k is the country index). The reason for excluding smoking indicators and health measures from the regressors is that PHI is treated as predetermined, therefore I exclude those indicators that are likely to have changed since contracting the insurance. 7 The instruments for PHI coverage included in vector Z are the rm size and the last employment status indicators of the individual. Equation (2) is a reduced form model of insurance coverage where potential interactions between health and PHI coverage are not modelled. The aim of this speci cation is to include such control variables that can capture the socioeconomic circumstances when the decision on PHI coverage was made, keeping in mind that this decision was made earlier. The identifying instruments of voluntary PHI are indicators of the last employment: the number of people employed at the last job (" rm size" categories), and whether the respondent was public employee, civil servant or self-employed in the last job. The rm size indicator is based on the number of employees at the current or last job. I di erentiate six categories from 1 to 500 plus employees, and an additional category holds if the respondent is self-employed or the question is not applicable (25% of the respondent). Occupational status can in uence PHI coverage, as it is possible that the insurance is contracted through or supported by the employer, and in some countries di erent insurance regulations hold for the self-employed or civil servants. Paccagnella et al. (2008) document that in most countries covered by SHARE, voluntary PHI coverage is predominant among employees of rms with more than 24 employees. Mossialos and Thomson (2004) also report that group policies, i.e. voluntary PHI purchased by groups (typically by employers) have a major role in many European countries. Group policies generally o er lower prices and more favorable conditions, and are often provided as an employee bene t. The availability of group policies varies with rm size. The identi cation is based on the assumption that only the current characteristics of the employment in uence health care utilization decisions, whereas the rm size at the last employment and the type of the last job in uence insurance coverage. Current job characteristics might in uence health care utilization e.g. through the availability of health services at the workplace or through required regular health checks. I assume that after retirement the characteristics of the last job do not have direct e ect on health care utilization. Similar identi cation strategy is applied by Jones et al. (2006) and Paccagnella et al. (2008). The regressors included in X are the same as in equation (1). Since some unobservables might a ect both the voluntary PHI coverage and the decision on health care utilization, PHI can be endogenous in equation (3), and the error terms and " 2 can be correlated. Assuming that and " 2 have bivariate normal distribution with zero means and unit variances, these two binary models form a bivariate probit model. This model handles the likely endogeneity of private health insurance in equation (3). The method of multivariate probit estimation in similar medical care demand framework is also applied by Gibbons and Wilcox-Gok (1998). If the exogeneity assumptions hold (Z and X are exogenous in equations (2) and (3)), the maximum likelihood estimation of the bivariate probit models gives consistent estimates. The nonzero numbers of doctoral visits and hospital nights are estimated by zero-truncated negative binomial regression. This regression model takes into account that the outcome values are positive counts. Again, PHI coverage can be endogenous in the utilization models, therefore I apply the method of twostage residual inclusion: rst I estimate a probit model for the probability of PHI coverage (equation (2)), 7 Pre-existing conditions can in uence coverage since those are generally excluded from voluntary PHI cover (see Mossialos and Thomson (2004)), or due to adverse selection. Analyzing the e ects of long-term illness measures on PHI coverage is out of the scope of this paper, and would also require additional data. 8
9 then include the estimated residual as regressor in the zero-truncated negative binomial regression. 8 2SRI method is an implementation of the method of instrumental variables in nonlinear models. applicable when there are such regressors in a nonlinear model that are correlated with unobserved (latent) variables, and these unobservables also in uence the outcome variable. This approach is widely applied in empirical models in health economics, for a list of citations see Terza et al. (2008). Provided that there are appropriate instruments for the endogenous regressor, the 2SRI method is consistent. 9 This It is I apply maximum likelihood estimation in both stages. According to Cameron and Trivedi (2005), the consistency of two-step m-estimation requires that the parameters in the rst stage are estimated consistently, and the second stage parameter estimates with rst stage parameters known would be consistent. Without conditioning on positive utilization, the expected value of the outcome is: E[Y ji jx i ; P HI i ; ^u i ; " 3ji ] = exp(x i 3jk + 3jk P HI i + j ^u i + " 3ji ); (4) where exp(" 3 ) has gamma distribution. ^u is the rst stage residual: ^u i = P HI i (Z i^ k ), where (:) is the cumulative standard normal distribution function, and ^ indicates the estimated value of the parameter vector from the probit model. 10 If P HI is exogenous in the jth health care utilization model then j should equal zero. " 3 includes unobservables (heterogeneity components) which are independent from the included regressors. It is assumed in this model that the coe cient of the rst stage residual is not country speci c. This follows from the implicit assumption that the correlation between the unobservables in the utilization and PHI coverage models is the same across the countries. Without this assumption this simple 2SRI method could not be applied for the pooled sample, and separate rst stage models would be needed for all the analyzed countries. The expression under equation (4) can be used in the likelihood function for positive outcomes. The outcome of nal interest is E(Y ji jx i ; P HI i ) = Pr(Y ji > 0jX i ; P HI i ) E(Y ji jy ji > 0; X i ; P HI i ); and the marginal e ect of PHI coverage on utilization ji jx i ; P HI i HI i = Pr(Y ji > 0jX i ; P HI i jijy ji > 0; X i ; P HI i HI i + Pr(Y ji > 0jX i ; P HI i HI i E(Y ji jy ji > 0; X i ; P HI i ): (5) This marginal e ect can be calculated using the estimation results of the two parts of the model. 5 Data The empirical analysis is based on the rst wave of the Survey of Health, Ageing, and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), release The SHARE data covers individuals aged 50+, and their spouses. The sample is 8 The zero-truncated negative binomial models are estimated with the ztnb Stata command. 9 Alternative consistent estimation methods could be to use the full-information maximum likelihood and two-stage method of moments estimation suggested by Terza (1998). 10 Based on Terza et al. (2008), three conditions have to be satis ed for the consistency of the 2SRI method: 1. The identifying instruments cannot be correlated with the unobservable determinants of health care utilization. 2. The identifying instruments must be correlated with the PHI variable. 3. The identifying instruments might not have direct in uence on the utilization measure, and might not be correlated with the random error term in the utilization model. These conditions are satis ed based on the assumptions that the characteristics of the last job have no direct e ect on current helath care utilization, and these characteristics are independent of the unobservable determinants of utilization. 11 This paper uses data from SHARE release 2.3.1, as of July 29th SHARE data collection in was primarily funded by the European Commission through its 5th and 6th framework programmes (project numbers QLK6-CT ; 9
10 based on probability samples in the participating countries. Since only the rst wave questionnaire of SHARE contains a question about private health insurance coverage, I use the rst wave data, which corresponds to year I use samples on 11 European countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. In order to avoid the problem of small samples, I use pooled data for these countries, the size of the estimating sample is 23:5 thousand. I weight the observations so as each country has the same share in the pooled sample. Each weight is country speci c, and equals the number of all observations divided by the number of observations in the particular country. Due to the relatively high rate of nonresponse, for income, wealth, and health insurance premia I use the imputed values provided in the dataset. The SHARE dataset contains multiple imputations, I use the average of these. This approach is a simpli cation, since it neglects the uncertainty of the imputations, therefore can cause downward bias in the estimated standard errors. However, this simpli cation does not a ect the main results of the paper. The household-level income and wealth measures are divided by the household size so as to get individual-level measures. I generate the income measure used in this analysis as the gross income minus the health insurance payments, based on the imputed values. 12 The key interest lies in the e ect of voluntary PHI coverage on health care utilization in Europe. Coverage with voluntary PHI refers by de nition only to those individuals who do not have private insurance as primary health insurance. Having primary private health insurance is relevant only in Germany and the Netherlands (the mandatory private insurance in Switzerland is de ned here as public insurance). In the Netherlands the high-earners were excluded from the public insurance in In the SHARE sample 36% of the individuals living in the Netherlands report not having basic public health insurance coverage. These people have private primary coverage. In case of Germany, high-earners, self-employed people and civil servants might not be covered with the basic public insurance (9% of the sample). I exclude those individuals from the estimation sample who are covered with primary private health insurance. The reason for this exclusion is that my aim in this paper is to analyze the di erence in utilization between those who are covered with only the mandatory health insurance, and those who have voluntary PHI coverage as well. Some descriptive statistics of the variables are reported in Table A.1 in Appendix A. The nancial values are purchasing power parity adjusted. The adjusted values are included in the SHARE dataset, the adjustment was based on OECD purchasing power parity data. As health indicators I use the number of chronic diseases the respondents ever had, ADL limitations, and reported symptoms. 13 I de ne voluntary private health insurance coverage as having any type of private health insurance which supplements or complements the basic health insurance. Although there are questions in the SHARE about the services the private health insurance provides, I do not use this information because of the following reasons. First, the de nitions of these insurance categories vary across the country-speci c questionnaires. RII-CT ; CIT5-CT ). Additional funding by the US National Institute on Aging (grant numbers U01 AG S2; P01 AG005842; P01 AG08291; P30 AG12815; Y1-AG ; OGHA ; R21 AG025169) as well as by various national sources is gratefully acknowledged (see for a full list of funding institutions). 12 Since PHI is predetermined in this model, it is reasonable to subtract its costs from the disposable income measure. I replace the net income to one for whom its calculated value is zero or negative (there are 63 such observations in the sample used). The median value of annual payments for private health insurance contracts is 356 EUR, the mean is 596 EUR among those in the sample who report supplementary or complementary PHI coverage. 13 The chronic conditions are: heart attack, high blood pressure, high blood cholesterol, stroke, diabetes, chronic lung disease, asthma, arthritis, osteoporosis, cancer, stomach ulcer, Parkinson disease, cataracts, hip or fremoral fracture. The ADL limitations include di culties with dressing, walking across a room, eating, bathing, getting in or out of bed, and using the toilet. The speci ed symptoms are: pain in a joint, heart trouble, breathlessness, persistent cough, swollen legs, sleeping problems, falling down, fear of falling down, dizziness, stomach problems, and incontinence. 10
11 Second, it would be di cult to separate the partial e ects of the certain insurance types, since in some insurance categories there are very few observations. The coverage ratios with the basic ten insurance categories are reported in Table 2. The prevalence of the di erent categories varies across the countries. Insurance for long term and home care are generally the least widespread. The predominant type of PHI also varies across countries, for example in Austria it is the insurance for hospital care, in the Netherlands the dental care insurance, whereas in Spain the insurance that provides direct access to specialists. AU BE DK FR DE GR IT NL ES SE CH Medical care with direct access to specialists Medical care with an extended choice of doctors Dental care Larger choice of drugs and/or full drugs expenses Extended choice of hospitals Long term care Nursing care at home Home help for ADL Full coverage of costs for doctor visits Full coverage of costs for hospital care Table 2: Percentage of individuals covered by speci c types of voluntary PHI (SHARE data) Estimating country speci c probit models for insurance coverage shows that higher education and income generally increase the likelihood of insurance coverage, whereas age decreases that. The type of last employment and workplace, and the insurance status of the spouse also a ect the PHI coverage. Firm size also seems to have an in uencing factor, although not in all countries. Paccagnella et al. (2008) analyze in details the determinants of voluntary PHI coverage of people aged 50 and over using the SHARE data. They also point out the e ect of employment status. The dependent variables I analyze in this paper refer to the last 12 months before the interview. These are the number of times seeing or talking to general practitioners (GP), and to specialists, the number of nights spent in hospital, and reporting visits to dentists. 14 I analyze the demand for the GP and outpatient specialist care separately, so as to check if the in uencing mechanisms are di erent for these two types of outpatient care. The number of dental visits cannot be modelled, since there is no information in the SHARE data about the number of such visits. However, I can use the information if the respondent had any dental visits or not. When estimating the number of hospital nights or doctoral visits, I exclude those observations where it is larger than 50. The rst reason for this exclusion is theoretical: the underlying utility maximization model might not be valid for those in the worst health condition. Reporting high utilization can indicate critical health condition. The second reason is related to the data. In some countries the SHARE data excludes individuals living in institutions for elderly. If these people are generally in worse health condition than the ones not living in such institutions, then the data is not representative for those with severe health problems. Cutting the sample at 50 reported hospital nights, GP or specialist visits implies the exclusion of less than 1% of the observations. In Table A.2 in Appendix A I present a table of country-level averages of PHI coverage and health care 14 When asking about specialist visits, a showcard is shown to the respondents indicating 13 types of specialist care. 11
12 utilization. There are large di erences in voluntary PHI coverage rates (ranging from 5 6% in Greece and Italy to 84% in France). The cross-country variation in the ratio of people reporting specialist visits, dental visits, or hospital stays is not negligible, but that is relatively small for GP visits. The majority (85%) of the respondents report some visits to general practitioners. The average number of nonzero GP visits, specialist visits, and the average length of hospital stays also show cross-country variation, here it is the number of GP visits for which the standard deviation relative to the mean is the highest. The average length of reported hospital stays is the largest in Germany (12:4), the average number of nonzero GP visits is the highest in Italy and Spain (7:7), whereas the highest average number of specialist visits can be observed in Greece (4:6). On the other hand, all these three utilization statistics are the lowest in Sweden. The SHARE data also provides some information on the out-of-pocket expenditures on health care. The weighted average of annual out-of-pocket expenditure on inpatient services is 280 EUR for those who report nonzero hospital nights. The average annual outpatient expenditure is 130 EUR among those who report outpatient visits to general practitioners, specialists or dentist. The survey also asks if the respondent had to forego health care due to high costs: only 4% of the respondents report such di culty, about half of them indicate that the costs of dental care were not a ordable. These statistics indicate that the out-of-pocket inpatient and outpatient health expenditures are moderate in the analyzed European countries. Moral hazard due to PHI coverage is most likely to play a role in case of dental care. For the other types of health care the role of PHI is more likely to make higher quality of services available. 6 Estimation results 6.1 Voluntary private health insurance coverage Although the focus of the paper is on the e ect of voluntary PHI on health care utilization, estimating the in uencing factors of PHI coverage is needed as the rst stage equation in the structural estimation. PHI is considered as predetermined in the health care equations, but it is still likely to be endogenous. It is assumed that the observed individual characteristics included in equation (2) reveal permanent di erences among the individuals, thus these can be used to estimate individual speci c likelihoods of being covered with PHI. The estimated coe cients of the probit model are reported in Table B.1 in Appendix B. Income is estimated to have generally signi cantly positive e ect on insurance coverage (the reference country is Austria). The Netherlands is an exception in this respect because there the richest individuals are typically covered with primary private health insurance, which is not included in the voluntary PHI category. Higher education is also associated with higher probability of coverage. Most of the country dummy coe cients are signi cantly di erent from zero, due to the di erences in the health care and insurance institutions across the countries. Working for a big rm can indicate the availability of group policies, and accordingly its e ect is signi - cantly positive. Although the estimated likelihood of PHI does not increase monotonically with rm size at last employment, the highest rm size (with above 500 employees) implies the highest probability of coverage, ceteris paribus. As for the type of the last job, self-employment signi cantly increases the probability of being covered with PHI, ceteris paribus Based on the estimated marginal e ects at the average, the probability of having PHI is 5 percentage points higher if the rm size is above 500 employees than if the rm size is between The increasing e ect of self-employment at the average is 7 percentage points. 12
13 The indicators of the rm size and employment status signi cantly in uence the probability of coverage with PHI. This suggests that these indicators might indeed be used for identifying the e ect of PHI coverage on health care utilization. When testing the joint signi cance of these indicators, the p-value of the Wald-test is approximately zero. 6.2 Benchmark estimation results In the benchmark model I assume that health care utilization is a one stage decision, and PHI coverage is exogenous. The estimated coe cients of the benchmark model are reported in Table B.2 in Appendix B, the estimated country-speci c coe cients of the PHI indicator are repeated in Table Number of Number of Number of hosp. nights GP visits spec. visits AT BE DK FR DE GR IT NL ES SE CH ,, signi cant at the 10, 5, 1% level, respectively Table 3: PHI coe cients: benchmark model Based on the benchmark negative binomial estimation results there is no clear evidence for a positive e ect of voluntary PHI coverage on health care utilization. The sign of the e ect on inpatient and outpatient services varies across the countries. Using 10% signi cance level, the results indicate signi cant positive e ect on inpatient care utilization in Austria, and Italy. The estimated e ect on the number of visits to general practitioners is signi cantly positive in France, but signi cantly negative in Belgium, Germany, and Greece. The negative e ect can be the result of direct access to specialist. The estimated e ect on specialist care utilization is positive in most of the countries, but it is signi cantly di erent from zero only in the Netherlands, and Spain. As expected, the indicators of health problems have positive coe cients in the health care utilization models. Some of the country dummies are also signi cantly di erent from zero, indicating the di erences of health care systems and health behaviors in the countries analyzed. 6.3 Two-part model estimation results The preferred speci cation follows the model described in Section 4.2: the utilization is modelled as two-stage decision, and voluntary PHI is considered to be endogenous in both stages. The rst stage model is about the probability of utilization. This model can be estimated for dental care utilization, as well. In Table 4 I present the estimated coe cients of interest based on the bivariate probit models, but I report also the estimated e ect of PHI if insurance coverage is assumed to be exogenous. 16 The reported signi cance levels are always based on clustered standard errors (with clustering on the household level). 13
14 Nonzero hosp. nights Nonzero GP visits Nonzero spec. visits Nonzero dent. visits Probit Bivar. probit Probit Bivar. probit Probit Bivar. probit Probit Bivar. probit AT BE DK FR DE GR IT NL ES SE CH corr ,, signi cant at the 10, 5, 1% level, respectively Table 4: PHI coe cients: probit models of nonzero utilization If the endogeneity of PHI is neglected then its e ect is underestimated in absolute value for hospital, GP and dental care utilization. For specialist care utilization the estimated e ects under the simple and bivariate probit models are close to each other. Despite the di erences in the point estimates of the PHI coe cients under the probit and bivariate probit speci cations, the estimated correlation coe cients between the error terms of the PHI and nonzero utilization models are insigni cant. Thus there is no clear evidence for the endogeneity of PHI in the rst stage of utilization. 17 The results also indicate that coverage with voluntary PHI increases the probability of utilizing hospital care, visiting specialists and dentists. On the other hand, PHI coverage decreases the probability of visiting a general practitioner. However, most of the estimated coe cients are not signi cantly di erent from zero. The second stage estimated coe cients of PHI are presented in Table 5. In this speci cation voluntary PHI is allowed to be endogenous also in the second stage of utilization decision, where the amount of utilization is analyzed for those respondents who report nonzero hospital nights or doctoral visits. standard errors have to be adjusted for two-stage estimation. The results presented in Table 5 are based on bootstrapped standard errors (with 1000 replications). The adjustment of standard errors has only small e ects. There is some evidence that PHI is endogenous in the second stage decision on GP care utilization. The estimated coe cient of the residual from the probit model of PHI coverage is signi cantly positive in the second part model of GP care. The positive coe cient indicates that the unobservables increasing the probability of PHI coverage also increase the demand for GP care. On the other hand, the residual is insigni cant in the hospital and specialist care models, thus PHI coverage might be exogenous in those models. 18 One of the advantages of the here applied two-part modelling method is that it can provide information on the di erent e ects of PHI on the probability of utilization and on the amount of utilization. However, the size of the coe cients cannot be interpreted on themselves, therefore I analyze the estimated marginal 17 I also test the di erence between the probit and bivariate probit PHI coe cients using the bootstrap Hausman test, following Cameron and Trivedi (2009), p The test indicates for all four types of health care that the estimated PHI coe cients under the two speci cations do not di er signi cantly. This implies that the exogeneity of PHI in the rst stage of utilization cannot be rejected. 18 The second stage estimation results are consistent if the regressors other than PHI, and the characteristics of the previous job are exogenous. In order to test the validity of the exogeneity assumptions, it is possible to calculate the nonlinear version of the Sargan test, suggested by Cameron and Trivedi (2005), p The test con rms the exogeneity assumptions. The 14
15 Number of Number of Number of hosp. nights GP visits spec. visits AT BE DK FR DE GR IT NL ES SE CH First stage residual ,, signi cant at the 10, 5, 1% level, respectively, based on bootstrapped standard errors Table 5: PHI coe cients: zero-truncated negative binomial models of nonzero utilization e ects in Section 6.4. In addition, in Section 6.5 I analyze the sensitivity of the estimation results with respect to the modelling (distributional and exogeneity) assumptions. The presented results suggest that PHI coverage might increase the probability of hospital care utilization, but decrease the length of the stay. On the other hand, being covered with PHI implies lower probability and fewer number of visits to general practitioners. There is some evidence for increased probability of specialist care utilization due to voluntary PHI coverage, but its e ect on the frequency of visits is small. I return to the analysis of these results in Section Analysis of the results Due to the nonlinear nature of the empirical models, the partial e ect of PHI varies among the individuals. In Table 6 I present the estimated marginal e ect of voluntary PHI on the number of hospital nights and doctoral visits for a representative individual. Using the estimating sample the mode of the discrete regressors are determined. For the rest of the regressors the mean values are used, and the marginal e ect of the insurance indicator is calculated for this individual. The marginal e ects presented in Tables 6 and 7 are based on the estimation results as discussed in Sections The results of Table 6 refer to overall utilization, not only to nonzero utilization. 19 two-part model (2PM) estimates are based on the combination of the rst and second part of the model, as described under equation (5) in Section 4.2. Except for Denmark and Sweden, PHI coverage has positive marginal e ect on the expected number of hospital nights, based on the two-part model estimates. The positive overall e ects are due to the positive e ect of PHI in the rst stage of utilization. However, the positive marginal e ect on the probability of inpatient care utilization is insigni cant for all countries. The estimated increase in the overall number of hospital nights due to PHI coverage varies between 0:1 (Spain) and 0:9 (Greece), according to the two-part model results. Thus, these e ects are relatively small. The benchmark model underestimates the e ect of PHI on hospital care utilization: this model neglects that PHI coverage is endogenously determined, and 19 The mfx command of Stata 10 is used when calculating the marginal e ects. The signi cance levels of the marginal e ects in the two-part models are based on bootstrapped standard errors. The Stata codes of Deb et al. (2010) are used as basis for the bootstrapping procedures replications are used. The 15
16 Number of hosp. nights Number of GP visits Number of spec. visits Benchm. 2PM Benchm. 2PM Benchm. 2PM AT BE DK FR DE GR IT NL ES SE CH ,, signi cant at the 10, 5, 1% level, respectively (2PM: based on bootstrapped standard errors) Table 6: Marginal e ect of voluntary PHI cannot wholly capture the positive e ect of PHI coverage on the likelihood of hospital stays. The estimated marginal e ect of voluntary PHI on the expected number of GP visits is negative for most of the countries based on both speci cations. Neglecting the endogeneity of PHI coverage in the utilization model (benchmark model) causes upward bias in the estimated e ect, which becomes positive for some of the countries. The di erent results of the benchmark and two-part model estimations can be explained by the self-selection into PHI coverage. Due to the in uencing e ect of unobserved preferences, those who are covered with PHI are also more likely to visit general practitioners. Therefore the benchmark speci cation underestimates the negative e ect of PHI coverage on the number of GP visits. According to the estimates of the two-part models the marginal e ect of PHI coverage on the number of GP visits for the representative individual lies between 3:9 (Greece) and 2:8 (France). For specialist care utilization the estimated marginal e ect of PHI coverage is less than one, insigni cant, but positive under the two-part speci cation for all countries. The two-part estimates predict the largest positive e ect for Spain (0:6). Based on the results of the two-part models it is possible to separately analyze the e ect of PHI coverage on the probability of utilization, and on the amount of nonzero care utilized. These estimated e ects are presented in Table 7. For hospital care the overall estimated e ect is generally positive (as shown in Table 6), which comes from the increasing e ect of PHI coverage on the probability of utilization. On the other hand, being covered with PHI implies shorter stays in hospitals, and this estimated e ect is not negligible in magnitude, although signi cantly di erent from zero only for Spain. Two explanations are possible for these ndings. First, PHI coverage might make more e cient or alternative (home care) services available. Second, it is also likely that individuals with PHI coverage utilize di erent kinds of inpatient services than the uncovered ones. For example, general health checks induced by PHI coverage might necessitate short stays in hospitals. Contrary to the hospital care, PHI has negative e ect both on the probability and number of visits to general practitioners, and the second-stage e ects are signi cantly di erent from zero for all of the countries. The marginal e ect on the probability of visiting a GP is of considerable magnitude in some of the countries. For instance, PHI coverage is estimated to decrease the estimated probability for the representative individual by around 30 percentage points in Greece and Italy. The negative e ect can be the result of direct access to specialists. An alternative explanation can be that those covered with PHI have access to more e cient treatments and preventive care, which necessitates fewer visits to general practitioners, ceteris paribus. 16
17 Hosp. nights GP visits Spec. visits Dent. visits Prob. Nr. Prob. Nr. Prob. Nr. Prob. AT BE DK FR DE GR IT NL ES SE CH ,, signi cant at the 10, 5, 1% level, respectively (amount of utilization: based on bootstrapped standard errors) Table 7: Marginal e ect of voluntary PHI based on the two-part model The estimated marginal e ect on the probability of visiting a specialist is generally positive, but the maximum is 11 percentage points and insigni cant for all countries. The number of nonzero specialist visits are estimated to increase due to PHI coverage in all of the countries, but these results are also insigni cant. This nding is di erent from the results of Jones et al. (2006), who estimate positive e ect of PHI on specialist visits. Although they apply di erent methodology to a set of European countries (Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and the U.K.) than I do in this paper, the most likely explanation for the di erent ndings lies in the age structure of the estimating sample. The ndings of Jones et al. (2006) are based on a sample of individuals aged 16 and above, which suggests that specialist care utilization can be more responsive to PHI coverage among the younger generations than among the older ones. Finally, the marginal e ect of PHI coverage on the probability of dental care utilization is also analyzed. This e ect is positive for all countries, and varies between 7 (Germany) and 22 (Denmark and the Netherlands) percentage points. The substantial positive e ects for Denmark and the Netherlands are reasonable, since there the main role of voluntary PHI is nancing dental care (see Table 2). The estimated marginal e ects can be compared to the ndings of other authors. The rst stage utilization results are directly comparable to the results reported by Gibbons and Wilcox-Gok (1998), due to the similar methodology. Based on a U.S. sample they estimate that supplementary PHI coverage in the U.S. increases the probability of outpatient care utilization by about 2 7 percentage points for a representative individual, depending on the type of the insurance. Based on my estimation results the marginal e ect of voluntary PHI coverage on doctoral care utilization varies across the countries and across the service types. Unanimously positive e ect among the outpatient services is found only for dental care. Although my results are based on a sample of elderly individuals, these estimates still indicate that PHI has smaller e ect on outpatient specialist care utilization than in the U.S., but the marginal e ect on the probability of visits to dentists is relatively large. The negative partial e ect of voluntary PHI coverage on GP care utilization is most likely a consequence of the European health care institutions: PHI coverage often can ensure direct access to specialists. Similarly to these results, negative e ect of PHI coverage on visits to general practitioners is found by Rodríguez and Stoyanova (2004) based on Spanish data, which they also explain by direct access to specialists due to private insurance. Hullegie and Klein (2010) also estimate negative e ect of private insurance on doctoral visits in Germany, which they explain by receiving better medical treatment. How do the estimated e ects relate to the country-speci c characteristics of the public health care system? 17
18 Table 8 shows the correlation coe cients between the estimated marginal e ects of PHI on the amount and probability of health care utilization, and the indicators of public health care. The analyzed aggregate statistics are the ones presented in Table 1. The marginal e ects on the amount of utilization are based on the two-part model estimates as presented in Table 6, and the marginal e ects on the probability of utilization are the ones presented in Table 7. I consider the probability of utilization since that is available also for dental care. Aggregate indicators (source: WHO) Public/total Public health Public health health expend. expend./inhabitant expend./gdp 2PM Hospital marginal GP e ects Specialist Marginal Hospital e ects GP on Specialist prob. Dentist Table 8: Estimated marginal e ect of PHI on nonzero utilization under various speci cations The marginal e ect of PHI on the probability of hospital stays and dental visits, and on the overall number of hospital nights are positive for most of the countries. Based on the calculated correlations, these positive e ects are larger in countries where the relative measures of public health expenditure are smaller. Thus these ndings indicate that the role of PHI coverage in making inpatient and dental care available is more important in countries where general government spends relatively less on health care. The estimated e ect of voluntary PHI is also generally positive on the probability and amount of specialist care utilization. There is some evidence for positive correlation with the indicators of public health expenditures, but these relationships are weak. Nevertheless, since the marginal e ects on specialist care utilization are small and insigni cant, these correlations are less conclusive. Contrary to the e ects on hospital and dental care, the estimated e ect of voluntary PHI is negative on the probability and amount of GP care utilization for all countries. These negative e ects are smaller in absolute value if the public health care is more generous. This result suggests that the role of PHI coverage in ensuring direct access to specialists or higher quality services is less important in countries with relatively larger public health care systems. In countries where public health expenditures are lower there might be greater need for avoiding the gatekeeper function of general practitioners or accessing private specialist 6.5 Speci cation checks In the following, I modify the preferred two-part models, and check how sensitive are the results to changes in the distributional and exogeneity assumptions. In column (1) under each service type in Table 9 I present the estimated marginal e ect of the PHI indicator based on the second part of the two-part estimation, as discussed in Section 4.2. The marginal e ect is calculated at the mode of the discrete, and mean of the continuous regressors. The results in the second, third, and fourth columns of each block also correspond to 18
19 the estimated e ects on nonzero utilization. 20 The estimates under column (2) for all three service types correspond to the case when voluntary PHI is still assumed to be endogenous in the rst and second part of the utilization model, but standard negative binomial model is used in the second part, instead of zero-truncated negative binomial distribution. Due to the exclusion of zero observations this model is clearly misspeci ed. However, in case of GP care the estimated coe cients are close to the zero-truncated negative binomial (ZTNB) estimates. For all three types of utilization, neglecting the lack of zero observations shifts the estimated coe cients towards zero. The signi cance of the estimates is not a ected by this modi cation. These results provide some evidence for the robustness of the preferred two-part model estimates in the sense that modifying the distributional speci cation in the second part of the model does not a ect qualitatively the estimation results. The third speci cation is a selection model with endogenous PHI. It is analogous to the presented twopart model, but this speci cation also models the potential correlation between the error terms of the probit model of utilization and count data model of nonzero utilization. The problem with this speci cation is that there is no sample selection inherent in the health care utilization model: there are observed zero and nonzero utilizations. The rst part of the model is the same as in the two-part model (equations (2) and (3)). However, equation (4) is modi ed the following way: E[Y ji j X ~ i ; P HI i ; ~" 3ji ] = exp( X ~ i 3jk ~ + ~ 3jk P HI i + ~" 3ji ) := ji (~" 3ji ) if P os_y ji = 1: (6) I assume that ; " 2 and ~" 3 have multivariate normal distribution with mean zero and variance 1; 1; 2, respectively. Under this assumption it is not true any more that Y has negative binomial distribution, but the normality assumption simpli es the manipulation of the likelihood function with endogenous bivariate regressor and selectivity. I also assume that the correlation coe cients between these error terms are the same across the countries. The ~ X vector of regressors is the same as X, except for the exclusion restrictions which can strengthen the identi cation. For inpatient care utilization the living area is considered as such variable which in uences the probability of hospital stay, but not the length of the stay. Living area can indicate the availability of hospitals, and the inclination of going to hospital, but it is not likely to in uence the length of the treatment. For outpatient care utilization the indicators of the spouse s visit to GP or specialist are excluded from the second stage model. These indicators are assumed to in uence the propensity to visit a physician, but not the frequency of visits afterwards. Based on the distributional assumptions this model can be estimated with maximum simulated likelihood (MSL). 21 Simulation is needed since there is no closed form of the likelihood 20 The reported signi cance levels under the rst three speci cations take into account the two-stage estimation procedure: those are based on bootstrapped ((1) and (2)) or adjusted (3) standard errors. The adjustment procedure is based on Greene (2003). 21 The contribution of the ith observation with nonzero utilization to the likelihood is Pr(Y ji ; P os_y ji = 1; P HI i = ljx i ; Z i ) = Z = Pr(Y ji ; P os_y ji = 1; P HI i = ljx i ; Z i ; ~" 3ji )f(~" 3ji )d~" 3ji = Z exp( ji (~" 3ji )) ji (~" 3ji ) Y ji = Pr(P os_y ji = 1; P HI i = ljx i ; Z i ; ~" 3ji )f(~" 3ji )d~" 3ji : Y ji! f(:) is the normal probability density function with mean zero and variance 2, and l equals 0 or 1. The second term in the integral can be expressed as a function of ~" 3ji, using the rst stage bivariate probit estimation results, and the assumption of multivariate normality. In order to simplify the estimation procedure I apply two-stage maximum likelihood estimation - I estimate the bivariate probit model of equations (2) and (3) in the rst stage, and use these estimation results as known in the second stage. 19
20 Number of hospital nights Number of GP visits Number of specialist visits (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) Selection ZTNB, Selection ZTNB, Selection ZTNB, Neg. model, exog. Neg. model, exog. Neg. model, exog. ZTNB binom. MSL PHI ZTNB binom. MSL PHI ZTNB binom. MSL PHI AT BE DK FR DE GR IT NL ES SE CH ,, signi cant at the 10, 5, 1% level, respectively, based on bootstrapped (speci cations (1) and (2)) and adjusted (speci cation (3)) standard errors Table 9: Estimated marginal e ect of PHI on nonzero utilization under various speci cations 20
Health care nancing and its e ect on outpatient public and private care utilization above age 50 PRELIMINARY VERSION
Health care nancing and its e ect on outpatient public and private care utilization above age 50 PRELIMINARY VERSION Anikó Bíró Central European University March 30, 2011 Abstract I analyze the e ectsMore information
Voluntary Private Health Care Insurance Among the Over Fifties: A Comparative Analysis of SHARE Data
1 st SHARE ELSA HRS User Conference 26 28 September 2005, Lund, Sweden Voluntary Private Health Care Insurance Among the Over Fifties: A Comparative Analysis of SHARE Data Omar Paccagnella, Vincenzo Rebba,More information
HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE AND ADVERSE SELECTION Philippe Lambert, Sergio Perelman, Pierre Pestieau, Jérôme Schoenmaeckers 229-2010 20 Health Insurance Coverage and Adverse Selection Philippe Lambert, SergioMore information
Voluntary Private Health Care Insurance Among the Over Fifties in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of SHARE Data *
Voluntary Private Health Care Insurance Among the Over Fifties in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of SHARE Data * Omar Paccagnella, Vincenzo Rebba, Guglielmo Weber Department of Economics, University ofMore information
Asymmetric Information in the Portuguese Health Insurance Market
Asymmetric Information in the Portuguese Health Insurance Market Teresa Bago d Uva Instituto Nacional de Estatística J.M.C. Santos Silva ISEG/Universidade Técnica de Lisboa 1 1 Introduction ² The negativeMore information
THE IMPACT OF CHILDHOOD HEALTH AND COGNITION ON PORTFOLIO CHOICE Dimitris Christelis, Loretti Dobrescu, Alberto Motta 214-2010 5 The Impact of Childhood Health and Cognition on Portfolio Choice DimitrisMore information
The frequency of visiting a doctor: is the decision to go independent of the frequency?
Discussion Paper: 2009/04 The frequency of visiting a doctor: is the decision to go independent of the frequency? Hans van Ophem www.feb.uva.nl/ke/uva-econometrics Amsterdam School of Economics DepartmentMore information
Identifying Moral Hazard in Car Insurance Contracts 1
Identifying Moral Hazard in Car Insurance Contracts 1 Sarit Weisburd The Hebrew University May 26, 2013 1 I would like to thank Yehuda Shavit for his thoughtful advice on the nature of insurance data andMore information
Identifying Moral Hazard in Car Insurance Contracts 1
Identifying Moral Hazard in Car Insurance Contracts 1 Sarit Weisburd The Hebrew University September 28, 2014 1 I would like to thank Yehuda Shavit for his thoughtful advice on the nature of insuranceMore information
Identifying Moral Hazard in Car Insurance Contracts 1
Identifying Moral Hazard in Car Insurance Contracts 1 Sarit Weisburd The Hebrew University April 6, 2010 1 I would like to thank Yehuda Shavit for his thoughtful advice on the nature of insurance dataMore information
Working Paper no. 37: An Empirical Analysis of Subprime Consumer Credit Demand
Centre for Financial Analysis & Policy Working Paper no. 37: An Empirical Analysis of Subprime Consumer Credit Demand Sule ALAN & Gyongyi LORANTH December 2010 The Working Paper is intended as a mean wherebyMore information
1. The Classical Linear Regression Model: The Bivariate Case
Business School, Brunel University MSc. EC5501/5509 Modelling Financial Decisions and Markets/Introduction to Quantitative Methods Prof. Menelaos Karanasos (Room SS69, Tel. 018956584) Lecture Notes 3 1.More information
The Health Insurance Puzzle in Europe: The Role of Information
WORKING PAPER NO. 221 The Health Insurance Puzzle in Europe: The Role of Information Ciro Avitabile April 2009 University of Naples Federico II University of Salerno Bocconi University, Milan CSEF - CentreMore information
E ect of Interest Rate on Consumption
E ect of Interest Rate on Consumption Mudit Kapoor and Shamika Ravi y Indian School of Business Hyderabad, India Abstract This paper estimates the response of consumption to higher real interest rate.More information
Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data Second Edition. Jeffrey M. Wooldridge. The MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts London, England
Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data Second Edition Jeffrey M. Wooldridge The MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts London, England Preface Acknowledgments xxi xxix I INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUNDMore information
Retirement routes and economic incentives to retire: a cross-country estimation approach Martin Rasmussen
Retirement routes and economic incentives to retire: a cross-country estimation approach Martin Rasmussen Welfare systems and policies Working Paper 1:2005 Working Paper Socialforskningsinstituttet TheMore information
Identifying Moral Hazard in Car Insurance Contracts 1
Identifying Moral Hazard in Car Insurance Contracts 1 Sarit Weisburd The Hebrew University September 12, 2010 1 I would like to thank Yehuda Shavit for his thoughtful advice on the nature of insuranceMore information
Disparities in Regular Health Care Utilisation in Europe
Séminaire «Santé et Travail dans les Enquêtes Européennes» Lille, (FR) 13 décembre 2010 Disparities in Regular Health Care Utilisation in Europe A Life-time Analysis Nicolas Sirven *, Zeynep Or InstituteMore information
IDENTIFICATION IN A CLASS OF NONPARAMETRIC SIMULTANEOUS EQUATIONS MODELS. Steven T. Berry and Philip A. Haile. March 2011 Revised April 2011
IDENTIFICATION IN A CLASS OF NONPARAMETRIC SIMULTANEOUS EQUATIONS MODELS By Steven T. Berry and Philip A. Haile March 2011 Revised April 2011 COWLES FOUNDATION DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 1787R COWLES FOUNDATIONMore information
Private health insurance: second-best or second-worst solution? Sarah Thomson EHMA VHI MASTERCLASS Milan, 27 June 2013
Private health insurance: second-best or second-worst solution? Sarah Thomson EHMA VHI MASTERCLASS Milan, 27 June 2013 VHI as a policy tool Policy goals Research findings Policy design Regulation OverMore information
Identifying Moral Hazard in Car Insurance Contracts 1
Identifying Moral Hazard in Car Insurance Contracts 1 Sarit Weisburd The Hebrew University August 28, 2012 1 I would like to thank Yehuda Shavit for his thoughtful advice on the nature of insurance dataMore information
Public / private mix in health care financing
Public / private mix in health care financing Dominique Polton Director of strategy, research and statistics National Health Insurance, France Couverture Public / private mix in health care financing 1.More information
Changing income shocks or changed insurance - what determines consumption inequality?
Changing income shocks or changed insurance - what determines consumption inequality? Johannes Ludwig Ruhr Graduate School in Economics & Ruhr-Universität Bochum Abstract Contrary to the implications ofMore information
Tap Water Consumption
Tap Water Consumption Assessing the Role of Attitudes towards Environment using Non-Parametric Mokken Scale Analysis Olivier Beaumais* and Mouez Fodha** *CARE EA-2260, GRE, University of Rouen, FranceMore information
The deductible in health insurance: do the insured make a choice based on the arguments as intended by the policy makers?
Discussion Paper: 2009/03 The deductible in health insurance: do the insured make a choice based on the arguments as intended by the policy makers? Hans van Ophem and Peter Berkhout www.feb.uva.nl/ke/uva-econometricsMore information
Health Insurance and the Demand for Medical Care: Instrumental Variable Estimates Using Health Insurer Claims Data
Health Insurance and the Demand for Medical Care: Instrumental Variable Estimates Using Health Insurer Claims Data Abe Dunn y January 28, 2015 Abstract This paper takes a di erent approach to estimatingMore information
Conditional Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivities and Financing Constraints
WORING PAPERS IN ECONOMICS No 448 Conditional Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivities and Financing Constraints Stephen R. Bond and Måns Söderbom May 2010 ISSN 1403-2473 (print) ISSN 1403-2465 (online) DepartmentMore information
Health at a Glance: Europe 2014
Health at a Glance: Europe 2014 (joint publication of the OECD and the European Commission) Released on December 3, 2014 http://www.oecd.org/health/health-at-a-glance-europe-23056088.htm Table of ContentsMore information
The Household Level Impact of Public Health Insurance. Evidence from the Urban Resident Basic Medical Insurance in China. University of Michigan
The Household Level Impact of Public Health Insurance Evidence from the Urban Resident Basic Medical Insurance in China University of Michigan Jianlin Wang April, 2014 This research uses data from ChinaMore information
Portfolio Choice in Retirement: Health Risk and the Demand for Annuities, Housing, and Risky Assets
Portfolio Choice in Retirement: Health Risk and the Demand for Annuities, Housing, and Risky Assets Motohiro Yogo University of Pennsylvania and NBER 1 Public policy : Potential reform of health care andMore information
EAT INSURANCE AS A PRODUCTIVE FACTOR AAN DIZIOI and ROBERTO PINEIRO y March 2012 Abstract In this paper, we present a less explored channel through which health insurance impacts productivity: by o eringMore information
Age and Choice in Health Insurance: Evidence from Switzerland
Age and Choice in Health Insurance: Evidence from Switzerland Karolin Becker and Peter Zweifel* November 5, 2004 Abstract: Elements of regulation inherent in most social health insurance systems are aMore information
Advanced Health Economics Econ555/HPA543. Week 4: Health Insurance
Advanced Health Economics Econ555/HPA543 Week 4: Health Insurance Types of Insurance Coverage Fee-for-Service: Coinsurance Deductibles Catastrophic Maximum Indemnity Capitation Mixed Coinsurance - PatientMore information
Decline in Federal Disability Insurance Screening Stringency and Health Insurance Demand
Decline in Federal Disability Insurance Screening Stringency and Health Insurance Demand Yue Li Siying Liu December 12, 2014 Abstract This paper proposes that the decline in federal disability insuranceMore information
Finance and Economics Discussion Series Divisions of Research & Statistics and Monetary Affairs Federal Reserve Board, Washington, D.C.
Finance and Economics Discussion Series Divisions of Research & Statistics and Monetary Affairs Federal Reserve Board, Washington, D.C. Do Self-Insurance and Disability Insurance Prevent Consumption LossMore information
Normalization and Mixed Degrees of Integration in Cointegrated Time Series Systems
Normalization and Mixed Degrees of Integration in Cointegrated Time Series Systems Robert J. Rossana Department of Economics, 04 F/AB, Wayne State University, Detroit MI 480 E-Mail: firstname.lastname@example.com information
Incorporation for Investment
Incorporation for Investment Michael P. Devereux and Li Liu y Preliminary draft 26th June 2014 Abstract We estimate the causal e ect of corporation tax on small business incorporation and investment byMore information
From Pawn Shops to Banks: The Impact of Banco Azteca on Households Credit and Saving Decisions
From Pawn Shops to Banks: The Impact of Banco Azteca on Households Credit and Saving Decisions Claudia Ruiz UCLA January 2010 Abstract This research examines the e ects of relaxing credit constraints onMore information
WORKING P A P E R. Unequal Giving. Monetary Gifts to Children Across Countries and Over Time JULIE ZISSIMOPOULOS JAMES P. SMITH WR-723.
WORKING P A P E R Unequal Giving Monetary Gifts to Children Across Countries and Over Time JULIE ZISSIMOPOULOS JAMES P. SMITH WR-723 December 2009 This paper series made possible by the NIA funded RANDMore information
Chapter 3: The Multiple Linear Regression Model
Chapter 3: The Multiple Linear Regression Model Advanced Econometrics - HEC Lausanne Christophe Hurlin University of Orléans November 23, 2013 Christophe Hurlin (University of Orléans) Advanced EconometricsMore information
Chapter 2. Dynamic panel data models
Chapter 2. Dynamic panel data models Master of Science in Economics - University of Geneva Christophe Hurlin, Université d Orléans Université d Orléans April 2010 Introduction De nition We now considerMore information
The demand for private medical insurance
Economic Trends 66 May 24 The demand for private medical insurance Gavin Wallis This article provides an overview of private medical insurance (PMI) coverage in Great Britain and presents results fromMore information
Critical Illness Insurance to Alleviate Catastrophic Health Expenditures: New Evidence from China
Critical Illness Insurance to Alleviate Catastrophic Health Expenditures: New Evidence from China February 16, 2015 Abstract Currently, a high percentage of China s households face nancial catastropheMore information
CEE DP 86. Studying Mobility:
ISSN 2045-6557 CEE DP 86 Studying abroad and the Effect on International Labour Market Mobility: Evidence from the Introduction of Erasmus Matthias Parey Fabian Waldinger August 2007 Published by CentreMore information
College degree supply, productivity spillovers and occupational allocation of graduates in Central European countries
College degree supply, productivity spillovers and occupational allocation of graduates in Central European countries Barbara Gebicka CERGE-EI Anna Lovasz IE HAS June 2010 Abstract Public funding drivesMore information
Work Absence in Europe: An Update
Work Absence in Europe: An Update Lusine Lusinyan Leo Bonato International Monetary Fund Rome, June, Disclaimer: The views expressed herein are those of the authors and should not be attributed to theMore information
APPENDIX C HONG KONG S CURRENT HEALTHCARE FINANCING ARRANGEMENTS. Public and Private Healthcare Expenditures
APPENDIX C HONG KONG S CURRENT HEALTHCARE FINANCING ARRANGEMENTS and Healthcare Expenditures C.1 Apart from the dedication of our healthcare professionals, the current healthcare system is also the cumulativeMore information
Pariahs or Pals: Understanding peer in uences on the bankruptcy decision
Pariahs or Pals: Understanding peer in uences on the bankruptcy decision Ethan Cohen-Cole and Burcu Duygan-Bump Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Presentation at the Chicago Bank Structure Conference 8 MayMore information
Corporate Income Taxation
Corporate Income Taxation We have stressed that tax incidence must be traced to people, since corporations cannot bear the burden of a tax. Why then tax corporations at all? There are several possibleMore information
A Comparison of Option Pricing Models
A Comparison of Option Pricing Models Ekrem Kilic 11.01.2005 Abstract Modeling a nonlinear pay o generating instrument is a challenging work. The models that are commonly used for pricing derivative mightMore information
The Real Business Cycle Model
The Real Business Cycle Model Ester Faia Goethe University Frankfurt Nov 2015 Ester Faia (Goethe University Frankfurt) RBC Nov 2015 1 / 27 Introduction The RBC model explains the co-movements in the uctuationsMore information
A note on the impact of options on stock return volatility 1
Journal of Banking & Finance 22 (1998) 1181±1191 A note on the impact of options on stock return volatility 1 Nicolas P.B. Bollen 2 University of Utah, David Eccles School of Business, Salt Lake City,More information
WORK DISABILITY AND HEALTH OVER THE LIFE COURSE Axel Börsch-Supan, Henning Roth 228-2010 19 Work Disability and Health over the Life Course Axel Börsch-Supan and Henning Roth 19.1 Work disability acrossMore information
Terence Cheng 1 Farshid Vahid 2. IRDES, 25 June 2010
Demand for hospital care and private health insurance in a mixed public-private system: empirical evidence using a simultaneous equation modeling approach. Terence Cheng 1 Farshid Vahid 2 IRDES, 25 JuneMore information
Growth in the Nonpro t Sector and Competition for Funding
Growth in the Nonpro t Sector and Competition for Funding Debra Yurenka November 2007 Abstract: I use September 11, 2001 as an example of an unanticipated event that increased fundraising productivityMore information
Swe den Structure, delive ry, administration He althcare Financing Me chanisms and Health Expenditures Quality of Bene fits, C hoice, Access
Sweden Single payer, universal healthcare system, with 21 county councils as the primary payer (reimburser) Administration of healthcare plan is decentralized in the hands of the county councils CentralMore information
Private Provision of Environmental Public Goods:
Private Provision of Environmental Public Goods: Household Participation in Green-Electricity Programs * By Matthew J. Kotchen y Department of Economics Williams College and Michael R. Moore School ofMore information
Credit Lines: The Other Side of Corporate Liquidity Filippo Ippolito Ander Perez March 2012
Credit Lines: The Other Side of Corporate Liquidity Filippo Ippolito Ander Perez March 2012 Barcelona GSE Working Paper Series Working Paper nº 618 Credit Lines: The Other Side of Corporate Liquidity FilippoMore information
Health insurance as a productive factor
MPRA Munich Personal RePEc Archive ealth insurance as a productive factor Allan Dizioli and Roberto B. Pinheiro University of Pennsylvania, University of Colorado 29. June 2012 Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/39743/More information
Documento de Trabajo. ISSN (edición impresa) 0716-7334 ISSN (edición electrónica) 0717-7593
Nº 195 Agosto 2001 Documento de Trabajo ISSN (edición impresa) 0716-7334 ISSN (edición electrónica) 0717-7593 Self Selection and Moral Hazard in Chilean Health Insurance. Claudio Sapelli Bernardita VialMore information
Optimal insurance contracts with adverse selection and comonotonic background risk
Optimal insurance contracts with adverse selection and comonotonic background risk Alary D. Bien F. TSE (LERNA) University Paris Dauphine Abstract In this note, we consider an adverse selection problemMore information
Econometrics II. Lecture 9: Sample Selection Bias
Econometrics II Lecture 9: Sample Selection Bias Måns Söderbom 5 May 2011 Department of Economics, University of Gothenburg. Email: email@example.com. Web: www.economics.gu.se/soderbom, www.soderbom.net.More information
Does Experience Rating Matter in Reducing Accident Probabilities? A Test for Moral Hazard
Does Experience Rating Matter in Reducing Accident Probabilities? A Test for Moral Hazard Olivia Ceccarini University of Pennsylvania November, 2007 Abstract I examine the empirical importance of moralMore information
Preference Heterogeneity and Selection in Private Health Insurance: The Case of Australia
Preference Heterogeneity and Selection in Private Health Insurance: The Case of Australia Thomas Buchmueller a Denzil Fiebig b, Glenn Jones c and Elizabeth Savage d 2nd IRDES WORKSHOP on Applied HealthMore information
Medicaid Crowd-Out of Long-Term Care Insurance With Endogenous Medicaid Enrollment
Medicaid Crowd-Out of Long-Term Care Insurance With Endogenous Medicaid Enrollment Geena Kim University of Pennsylvania 12th Annual Joint Conference of the Retirement Research Consortium August 5-6, 2010More information
Expenditure on Health Care in the UK: A Review of the Issues
Expenditure on Health Care in the UK: A Review of the Issues Carol Propper Department of Economics and CMPO, University of Bristol NIERC 25 April 2001 1 Expenditure on health care in the UK: The factsMore information
Wealth and health in Europe and the United States
Wealth and health in Europe and the United States Mauricio Avendano, Erasmus Medical Center Maria Glymour, Harvard School of Public Health Johan Mackenbach, Erasmus Medical Center RAND Corporation SantaMore information
INEQUALITIES IN HEALTH CARE SERVICES UTILISATION IN OECD COUNTRIES Marion Devaux, OECD Health Division 2014 QICSS International Conference on Social Policy and Health Inequalities, Montreal, 9-May-2014More information
A survey conducted by: The Swedish Drug Development Pipeline May 2011
A survey conducted by: The Swedish Drug Development Pipeline May 2011 The survey In February March 2011 a survey of the Swedish Drug Development Pipeline was conducted by SwedenBIO in cooperation withMore information
Impact of Private Health Insurance on the Choice of Public versus Private Hospital Services
Impact of Private Health Insurance on the Choice of Public versus Private Hospital Services Preety Srivastava & Xueyan Zhao Centre for Health Economics Monash University 3 June 2008 Background AustralianMore information
The Value of Coverage in the Medicare Advantage Insurance Market
The Value of Coverage in the Medicare Advantage Insurance Market Abe Dunn y September 2, 2010 Abstract This paper examines the impact of coverage on demand for health insurance in the Medicare AdvantageMore information
THE ANALYSIS OF PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE PENETRATION DEGREE AND DENSITY IN EUROPE Gheorghe Matei, Professor Ph.D University of Craiova Faculty of Economics and Business Administration Craiova, RomaniaMore information
Chapter 1. Vector autoregressions. 1.1 VARs and the identi cation problem
Chapter Vector autoregressions We begin by taking a look at the data of macroeconomics. A way to summarize the dynamics of macroeconomic data is to make use of vector autoregressions. VAR models have becomeMore information
Cross-country comparison of health care system efficiency
Cross-country comparison of health care system efficiency Isabelle Joumard, OECD, Economics Department IMF conference, June 21, 2011 Public Health Care Reforms: Challenges and Lessons for Advanced andMore information
Voluntary health insurance and health care reforms
Voluntary health insurance and health care reforms Sarah Thomson Senior Research Fellow, European Observatory Deputy Director, LSE Health IMF conference, Paris, 21 st June 2011 Health financing policyMore information
GENERAL MULTILELEVEL MODELING WITH SAMPLING WEIGHTS. Tihomir Asparouhov Muthen & Muthen Los Angeles, California, USA
GENERAL MULTILELEVEL MODELING WITH SAMPLING WEIGHTS Tihomir Asparouhov Muthen & Muthen Los Angeles, California, USA email@example.com Key Words: multilevel pseudo maximum likelihood; sampling weights;More information
INEQUALITIES IN HEALTH CARE UTILISATION IN OECD COUNTRIES Marion Devaux, OECD Health Division EU Expert Group Meeting on Social Determinants and Health Inequalities, 21-Jan-2013 1 Equity OECD frameworkMore information
The Cyclical Behavior of Debt and Equity Finance Web Appendix
The Cyclical Behavior of Debt and Equity Finance Web ppendix Francisco B. Covas and Wouter J. Den Haan December 15, 2009 bstract This appendix gives details regarding the construction of the data set andMore information
This PDF is a selection from a published volume from the National Bureau of Economic Research
This PDF is a selection from a published volume from the National Bureau of Economic Research Volume Title: Labor Markets and Firm Benefit Policies in Japan and the United States Volume Author/Editor:More information
The impact of tobacco advertising bans on consumption in developing countries
The impact of tobacco advertising bans on consumption in developing countries Evan Blecher 1 Policy Paper Number 13 1 Health Economics Unit, University of Cape Town The impact of tobacco advertising bansMore information
Policy Forum. Understanding the Effects of Medicare Prescription Drug Insurance. About the Authors. By Robert Kaestner and Kelsey McCoy
Policy Forum Volume 23, Issue 1 October 2010 Understanding the Effects of Medicare Prescription Drug Insurance By Robert Kaestner and Kelsey McCoy The Medicare Modernization The size and potential significanceMore information
Managing the financial consequences of LTC risks Christophe Courbage
Managing the financial consequences of LTC risks Christophe Courbage The Geneva Association What is LTC risk? Risk of becoming dependent (functional limitation) and of needing LTC in the future LTC isMore information
Quantifying the Gains from Trade Across Countries with Consumer Heterogeneity
Quantifying the Gains from Trade Across Countries with Consumer Heterogeneity Ying (Sunny) Sun y December, 2011 Abstract The workhorse consumer utility model in international trade literature assumes constantMore information
Breast and cervical cancer screening in Great Britain: Dynamic interrelated processes
Labeit and Peinemann Health Economics Review (2015) 5:32 DOI 10.1186/s13561-015-0065-3 RESEARCH Open Access Breast and cervical cancer screening in Great Britain: Dynamic interrelated processes AlexanderMore information
An Analysis of the Effect of Income on Life Insurance. Justin Bryan Austin Proctor Kathryn Stoklosa
An Analysis of the Effect of Income on Life Insurance Justin Bryan Austin Proctor Kathryn Stoklosa 1 Abstract This paper aims to analyze the relationship between the gross national income per capita andMore information
Introduction. Agents have preferences over the two goods which are determined by a utility function. Speci cally, type 1 agents utility is given by
Introduction General equilibrium analysis looks at how multiple markets come into equilibrium simultaneously. With many markets, equilibrium analysis must take explicit account of the fact that changesMore information
Copayments for Ambulatory Care in Germany: A Natural Experiment Using a Difference-in-Difference Approach
Copayments for Ambulatory Care in Germany: A Natural Experiment Using a Difference-in-Difference Approach SOEP User Conference 2008, Berlin Jonas Schreyögg 1 and Markus Grabka 2 1) Dept. Health Care Management,More information
The recent turmoil in nancial markets has highlighted the need
Economic Quarterly Volume 100, Number 1 First Quarter 2014 Pages 51 85 A Business Cycle Analysis of Debt and Equity Financing Marios Karabarbounis, Patrick Macnamara, and Roisin McCord The recent turmoilMore information
The Dynamics of Marriage and Divorce
D I S C U S S I O N P A P E R S E R I E S IZA DP No. 6379 The Dynamics of Marriage and Divorce Gustaf Bruze Michael Svarer Yoram Weiss February 2012 Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit InstituteMore information
DOCTORAL (Ph.D) THESIS
DOCTORAL (Ph.D) THESIS UNIVERSITY OF KAPOSVÁR FACULTY OF ECONOMIC SCIENCE Department of Finance and Economics Head of Doctors School: DR. GÁBOR UDOVECZ Doctor of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences Supervisor:More information
THE ORGANISATION AND FINANCING OF HEALTH CARE SYSTEM IN LATVIA Eriks Mikitis Ministry of Health of the Republic of Latvia Department of Health Care Director General facts, financial resources MinistryMore information
Trade Liberalization and the Economy:
Trade Liberalization and the Economy: Stock Market Evidence from Singapore Rasyad A. Parinduri Shandre M. Thangavelu January 11, 2009 Abstract We examine the e ect of the United States Singapore Free TradeMore information
Risk adjustment as a tool to improve solidarity and incentives for cost containment under consumer cost sharing
Risk adjustment as a tool to improve solidarity and incentives for cost containment under consumer cost sharing Richard van Kleef Second Health Policy Workshop November 9, 2011 Outline Background: costMore information
An Analysis of the Health Insurance Coverage of Young Adults
Gius, International Journal of Applied Economics, 7(1), March 2010, 1-17 1 An Analysis of the Health Insurance Coverage of Young Adults Mark P. Gius Quinnipiac University Abstract The purpose of the presentMore information
The Wage E ects of Not-for-Pro t and For-Pro t. Certi cations: Better Data, Somewhat Di erent Results
The Wage E ects of Not-for-Pro t and For-Pro t Certi cations: Better Data, Somewhat Di erent Results Kevin Lang and Russell Weinstein y 7th June 2013 Abstract Using the Beginning Postsecondary StudentMore information
The S-Curve Relation Between Per-Capita Income and Insurance Penetration
The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Vol. 25 No. 3 (July 2000) 396±406 The S-Curve Relation Between Per-Capita Income and Insurance Penetration by Rudolf Enz Models that assume a constant income elasticityMore information
Selection on moral hazard in health insurance
Selection on moral hazard in health insurance Liran Einav, Amy Finkelstein, Stephen Ryan, Paul Schrimpf, and Mark Cullen y April 2011 Abstract. In this paper we explore the possibility that individualsMore information
Family Structure Changes and Children s Health, Behavior, and Educational Outcomes
WORKING PAPER 09-15 Astrid Würtz Rasmussen Family Structure Changes and Children s Health, Behavior, and Educational Outcomes Department of Economics ISBN 9788778824059 (print) ISBN 9788778824066 (online)More information
The Impact of Health Insurance Mandates on Drug Innovation: Evidence from the United States
The Impact of Health Insurance Mandates on Drug Innovation: Evidence from the United States Natalie Chun Asian Development Bank 6 ADB Avenue Mandaluyong City 1550 Philippines Minjung Park Haas School ofMore information
Premium Copayments and the Trade-off between Wages and Employer-Provided Health Insurance. February 2011
PRELIMINARY DRAFT DO NOT CITE OR CIRCULATE COMMENTS WELCOMED Premium Copayments and the Trade-off between Wages and Employer-Provided Health Insurance February 2011 By Darren Lubotsky School of Labor &More information


text:
I wanted to share an AMAZING opportunity with you that is in honor of Disney's Cinderella movie. Do you and/or your daughter(s) DREAM of staying in the Cinderella Castle Suite at Walt Disney World Resort? Well, I know I have been to Disney World many, many times and have always wondered what it'd be like to sleep in her castle for a night!
In honor of Disney's CINDERELLA, opening in theatres everywhere on March 13th, enter today for your chance to win a 5-day, 4-night enchanting vacation for four to the Walt Disney World® Resort including one special night in the Cinderella Castle Suite!!!
The sweepstakes ends 3/27/15 and to enter you must be 13+ and a resident of US or CA (excluding Quebec). Limit one (1) Entry per day, per person. There is only one (1) prize available to be won. Entry/Full Official Rules: http://di.sn/6009IaAB. Void where prohibited.

subset: commoncrawl