text:
Click here to go to the next issue
Highlights Home Page | Receive the Nonduality Highlights each day
How to submit material to the Highlights
#3140 - Friday, April 18,
2008 - Editor: Jerry Katz
Nonduality Highlights - http://groups.yahoo.com/group/NDhighlights
Eight more responses to the following question:
QUESTION (sender is anonymous): I am having difficulty with something that Nisargadatta Maharaj is quoted as saying:
"Once you know that the body alone
dies and not the continuity of memory and the sense of I am
reflected in it, you are afraid no longer."
Surely when the body dies there can be no
memory as there is no instrument to cognize with. The
brain holds the memory which is made up of mindstuff, and when that dies surely there can be no
persistence of memory?
Maybe the quote is a translation mistake?
I know that we are the one beingness and
always will be that, but in my experience it is a state of
no thing,and no knowing.
Are you able to enlighten me on this point?
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
The question was originally posted in issue 3130: http://nonduality.com/hl3130.htm, with my response. The initial batch of reader responses was featured in issue 3132: http://nonduality.com/hl3132.htm
What follows is the second collection of responses.
Peter Dziuban
Hi Jerry,
Just saw the posting about memory and dying...here's a response which
some may find interesting. In this case, the example refers to being
"knocked unconscious" instead of dying... This is an excerpt from
Consciousness Is All, chap 5, "Consciousness is not the human mind."
Best regards, Peter
he following is from Consciousness
Is All: Now Life Is Completely New
by Peter Francis Dziuban: http://www.amazon.com/Consciousness-All-Now-Life-Completely/dp/1577332024/ref=pd_bbs_sr_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1202427984&sr=1-1
"If Consciousness is conscious, is present, even when the body is
`knocked out,' then why isn't there any memory of the experience?" the
thought may insist.
Well, exactly what is memory anyway? Memory is entirely a function
of thought or a sensing mentalityit has nothing to do with Infinite
Consciousness, pure Being. They're not the same at all. Memory is
merely the projected thought of people, objects, places, feelings;
myriad imagesall of which are mental forms.
The capacity to project these finite mental images is what has
stopped, not Infinite Consciousness, undimensional I-Presence. Don't
confuse projected thought forms with formless Consciousnessjust as
you never confuse the moving images on a movie screen with the screen
itself. Consciousness as It is being doesn't involve thinking; so It
doesn't involve memory or project thoughts of past or future. It is a
state of pure Is. Consciousness simply never leaves being presentand
one cannot have a memory of the present.
As It is present only, Consciousness Itself never jumps back or ahead
in time, past or future. Thinking seems to project thoughts of past or
future, but that's thinking doing that, not Awareness being.
Awareness cannot have a memory of having been. Why? Its only
state is that of being present. Because Awareness changelessly is, It
can't become something that was. It can't look back upon Itself
because It's not backIt's present!
This Present-ness that Awareness is, is exactly the same as not being
able to have a memory of now. It simply is not possible to say you
have a memory of the now that is now, because it's not pastit's now!
As further proof that pure Awareness is not in the realm of memory,
notice that It can't be memorized.
The would-be finite "thinking mind" based on the senses and time is
incapable of coming up with any thought, any finite mental form to
express this undeniable Truth. You "glimpse" or be your own
Infinityand the constantly running finite mind stops dead in its tracks.
Yet You don't stop. You still are very real and present as the
permanent Now that pure Consciousness is. Life, Being, is present. You
simply have nothing objective to You. You don't identify with any
form, but only as the formless Infinity of Your Selfpure unthinkable
This completely un-finite, unlimited "vastness" that pure
Consciousness is, is why It is in some traditions called "emptiness"
or "no-mind." It sometimes is called nothingness. That really means
no-thing-ness, because that's exactly what It ispure Consciousness
alone, apart from finite things. Rather than being a nothing,
Consciousness is specific vital Presencejust without a form.
Only a state of limited thinking based on the finite senses would
insist on experiencing some observable form or phenomenon, would
want to be able to point to it and say, "I had that experience."
As Pure Consciousness, You never are the same as any experience
you appear to have. All experience would be what one appears to be
conscious of on a finite basis. The Infinite Consciousness You are is
not an experience that is objective to You.
You've just shown yourself the difference between Consciousness
Itself, and what appears. You are out of the realm of limited form. In
Truth, Your Consciousness never was in it. So never look for, or wait
to have the "big spiritual experience," whatever that might be. Never
wait for any type of time-event or finite phenomenon, to verify that
you finally have "arrived." You never will arrive at Infinite
Consciousness because You never left.
Consciousness Is All: Now Life Is
Completely New
by Peter Francis Dziuban: http://www.amazon.com/Consciousness-All-Now-Life-Completely/dp/1577332024/ref=pd_bbs_sr_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1202427984&sr=1-1
In some versions of the ND story M's view
on memeory continuation would simply be another dream. However on
the face of it, it looks like he is stating it as not dream.
In M's teachings it is not clear whether he regards his own statements as part of the dream. However there are some references which indicate that. The following is from memeory and not a direct quote.
"Realization can be fast or slow but really there is no such thing............."
From Love to Love
Yes, you are caught in a quicksand of
words, and the only way out
is to abandon them altogether.
I think that you have the right take on
Maharaj was addressing the personal situation
of a particular seeker. To more advanced seekers
he'd say, " Consciousness is just the food essence."
He said a few days before his death, "All my
knowledge has gone into liquidation, but I
remain unconcerned." He wouldn't have said
that if he thought his knowledge would survive
in a subtle body. If such thing as a subtle body
existed and it were able to store memories,
aging would not affect memories the way it does.
To place too much importance in the future of
our memories only shows our attachment to our
identity, and our story line. No explanation,
theory, knowledge or belief can lead us back to
our true nature: The bare sensing of existing
apart from the flux of perceptions. This bare
sensing is a hairbreadth apart from unconsciousness
itself. In this bareness life and death also merge
into one.
The quote appears to suggest that the
"continuity of
memory and the sense of "I am" reflected on it" does
not die, which is at variance with the non-dual
...it appears that Maharaj has bent over backwards in this instance.
Jenny Munday
And then Jenny was told, regarding
3130, that
"Consciousness is Life in its many manifestations--
subtle, physical, causal and is constant movement or
flow as an electrical wave. The higher the voltage
the greater the understanding..... and
The subtle, the Akashic, the spiritual are permanent
and are actually The Plane of Mass Information. It
is a plane above the physical where-in is contained
all imprints left by all souls throughout all
Eternity. Each soul's essence in each lifetime leaves
a deposit of so-called good & evil, but is actually
just Knowledge. How individual change and move in
their path changes as they develop but it is
Information Mass which controls destiny in a
non-personal - wisdom-way."
And in another "hearing" she heard this:
"The individual entity is an overlay of actions
repeated over eons - and the reality of the human
entity is holigraphic; that appearing as actions/and
human entities are collective thought-pictures only"
David Bohme came to this conclusion during his
studies. When one finds he/she is in the nature of
a constant repeated thought pattern, it's a great
relief - for this one anyway.
"There is no death - life and death are both
illusions - simply manifestation appearing real"
It stops appearing so real when the emotions (or
subtle body swings) are seen through.
Eve, here:
Hello! Thanks for the posts. I'm new here, but have been dropping by
periodically. Interesting 'stuff'! :) I do have a few comments to add
to this topic. I will appreciate your responses.
So, timelessness is only experienced 'now'. When we are with the
immediacy of now...no 'pasting' and 'futuring' we are existing in the
eternity of (no duration) now-ness.
The mind and linear time are synonymous. To step 'out' of time is to
realize that all that is, is 'this', here, now...as it is.
The embracing of all that arises, as it arises, is being with 'what
is'. If one 'loses it', doesn't 'get' it, doesn't care, cares too
much, feels stupid, feels smart, has a fit, saves a nation...It is
all relative. It is life unfolding, as it will...like thoughts...life
will come and then go.
A great quote I would like to share:
"Knowing I'm the fiction I'm no longer subjected to the fictitious
continuity between consecutive pages of the book. There is no
continuity, only discontinuity. Continuity doesn't appear unless I
consent to it."
Stephen Jourdain
One thing I know for sure, is that the questioner has the common misunderstanding concerning 'mind - stuff' which most uneducated listeners presume is the 'grey-matter of the brain'.
I don't have my texts with me, but if my 'memory' (note: who is this I that has a body, mind & memory?) serves me correctly, mind stuff generally refers to the 'internal instrument' or antahkarana - described in Cologne Digital Sanskrit Lexicon as "the internal organ , the seat of thought and feeling , the mind , the thinking faculty , the heart , the conscience , the soul."
Rajarshi Muni and Guruji's Textbook of Yoga Psychology have a more precise definition which I won't elaborate, but it is composed of chitti (consciousness reflected in the jiva), buddhi, anhankara, and manas. As you know, buddhi among many of its functions is the repository of 'memory', anhankara is the 'I-maker' from whence we have our notion of ego, and manas is the 'logical' processing mind similar to the left hemisphere of the bifurcated mind.
So, the listener is caught up in the Western notion of mind equals brain, and mind stuff equals grey matter, whereas the translation refers to the kernel of individual consciousness.
Furthermore, around p 221 and ff. [in I Am That], Nisargadatta refers to the precise distinctions between 'Consciousness, Mind, and Awareness"
The correct understanding of these 2 notions -- Mind & Consciousness -- will go a long way in understanding one's ultimate state beyond states which is given the word: Awareness.
top of page


text:
King places, coach looks to future
The bus left Wednesday for Casper and the good weather had the wrestling coach wondering why they had left early. By Wednesday night Saratoga head wrestling coach Zach Schmidt had his answer. Schmidt said, "By about nine o'clock that night you could not see out the front door of the hotel."
To relieve the extra time, Schmidt took the team to the mall to play laser tag only to find the business had closed its doors days earlier. The coach then kept his team loose by getting in some time at the hotel pool and getting in some workouts at the Casper Event Center.
While at the event center, the coach took the opportunity to dissolve any team jitters by saying "Take it in. When you get here on Friday the stands will be packed. It will be loud and these lights will be bright. But it's the same mat we wrestle on at home, those are the same bulbs they put in the gym lights. It's just a bigger arena now."
Friday exits & optimism
Of Friday's wrestling, Schmidt said, "Thomas (Ingraham) and Jaxon (King) ... Friday was pretty flawless for them," but went on to add, "(for the rest of the team) the ball just didn't bounce our way" to indicate some tough matchups his younger wrestlers faced with wrestlers they had not seen before.
Though much of the younger Panther wrestlers were out of the tournament by Friday evening, coach Schmidt showed obvious pride in his team.
The coach said he was excited to see Torrin Hedley and C.J. Boswell wrestle on Friday because they are both first year grapplers getting their first taste of the big stage.
"To go from wrestling in small gyms to that big arena and see the look on their face," Schmidt said, "It's not something that every kid in high school gets to do, compete at the state level in the event center. We told them just to take it in."
While Schmidt indicated that he wanted to make sure the Panthers were always competitive, he stressed that improvements could be made.
"I thought Andrew (Everett) and Trez (Trezdon Martinez) wrestled really hard. Trez probably had the most unlucky draw-in in the tournament of any weight class." Schmidt said, "He was a 20-win kid this year—which is not an easy feat—so when you look at his bracket and he is matched up against a 30-win kid and whether he wins or loses is matched up against another 30-win kid, that's a tough drawing."
Schmidt added that, "I think we peaked Tristan (Gray) a week too soon and that combined with nerves of state and the nerves of 'I've never seen these guys wrestle' kind of led to an early exit from him."
Of Everett, Martinez and Gray, coach Schmidt said, "We are looking for big things from these three next year."
Schmidt looked to encourage his younger players who had lost their Friday matches saying "this can make or break you now, you can go to camps with us over the summer and we can get you on a weight lifting program. Go compete in track, go compete in football or cross country, but you have to compete. You have to constantly be working towards these (championship) goals."
King rebounds to place
"For Jaxon to place fifth, and I know it was kind of an expectation of his to place at tournament, there wasn't going to be anything guaranteed at 120 pounds," Schmidt said, "He spent the summer doing a lot of work to get ready to … do the student exchange thing—which meant he didn't have a whole lot of time for camp and lifting. Then to come back prior to the wrestling season starting and trying to get out on the mat—not to mention we lost him for like a three-week span because of illness and injury … Trying to come back from that is hard."
Schmidt was visibly impressed with the Jaxon's rebound though. "For him to show up like he did on Friday … first round he did well on getting himself loose and working on some things." Schmidt continued, "But the emotional win he had in the second round against a kid who had beat him three times this year, it was impressive."
He ran into a kid in the semifinals which the ball could have fallen either way. It has with those two before.
Same way Saturday morning that kid from Kemmerer that he wrestled. It's gone both ways all year. We had a couple of errors in that match that led a couple of points for that kid. Ultimately when you lose by one, you sit back and reflect and go hmm. we probably should have changed that."
He bounced back for the fifth/sixth place match pinning the kid from Glenrock he had beaten the day before.
"That's a good way to end the season," Schmidt said.
A whole different level
Speaking on Thomas Ingraham, Schmidt glowed saying, "Thomas was on a whole different level this weekend."
That was evident by the unbeaten weekend. Ingraham wrestled four times over the weekend beating his first challenger in a 0:44 second fall, his second opponent from Hulett in a 10-4 decision, his third wrestler from Glenrock by a 11-4 decision and taking Moorcroft's Rowdy Pfeil in a7-4 decision for the 152 pound division championship.
Looking forward
While sad to see senior Ingraham leave, coach Schmidt seemed excited at the prospect of having his newly-experienced wrestlers returning next year along with a crop of USA wrestlers who he says have been really well trained. He also looks forward to getting in some summer training in preparation for the grappling to come.

subset: commoncrawl


text:
AB Variation:
Back To Previous
Charlie "T" Jones Conference Center
The Charlie "T" Jones Conference Center is conveniently located in the heart of downtown Mechanicsburg and is an ideal setting for your event or meeting. Amenities include seating for up to 70; a projector with blu-ray/DVD/CD player and project screen; a podium with microphones, two lavaliere mics, ceiling speakers, and integrated control panel; wireless internet access; kitchenette with refrigerator, coffee maker and microwave; and a large off-street parking lot providing free parking. Visit the website for rental rates. All profits from conference center rentals benefit the not-for-profit Books for Tremendous Living Foundation which supports a variety of local needs.


text:
General Off-Topic Board / Re: Why Obama will lose in the fall« on: October 31, 2008, 11:28:50 AM »
John Mccain has more experience blowing up planes than any terrorist I've heard of. They've all blown up one. He's destroyed three. That's impressive.
John McCain was a bomber pilot, which may explain why he didn't blow up very many planes numbnuts.
Bomber pilots rarely, if ever, shoot down planes. The drop bombs on target.
Stop being an idiot. Thank you.


text:
And so David Cameron becomes the first PM in over two centuries to fail to carry the House with him on war action. He gets little sympathy from Max Hastings, who is still seething over being prevented from having an interview with a British general on the ground that "there has been far too much military leaking to the media".
But it's not just Cameron who is displaying premature signs of the autocrat. Michael Gove appears to think that bovine party loyalty trumps the will and interest of the country he has a temporary part in governing: it is reported that he "had to be restrained by colleagues" as he repeatedly yelled "disgrace" at Conservative and LibDem MPs who voted against bombing Syria.
The UN inspectors' report on the alleged use of chemical weapons is not yet due and it is far from certain that the Syrian government is responsible for the attack that is supposed to form the pretext for another terrible Western military adventure. The allegation is hardly credible: how, knowing that it would trigger direct intervention by the USA, is Assad supposed to have believed launching a gas attack would serve his best interest, and even if he had thought that, why on earth bomb a school?
In the midst of this information fog, we're told Gove "did not join colleagues in calling for MPs to vote on military action, saying he believed the appropriate response should be decided by the Prime Minister." Soldiers, who have to kill and die, are not so gung-ho. Hastings quotes a letter in yesterday's Times newspaper from General Sir Michael Rose:
"... the invasion of Iraq, initiated by Bush and supported so zealously by Blair, triggered the unravelling of the status quo in the Middle East, resulting in so much misery and death."
This is the same Michael Gove who is charged with directing the education of the young and during the brief reign of this minority government is nevertheless hurrying through radical change, and (I suspect) using Ofsted as his battering-ram to denigrate schools in areas of social deprivation and force their conversion into "academies". He and his colleagues remind me of the episode of "Bottom" in which Adrian Edmondson proposes to break into the off-licence and drink as much as they can before the police arrive.
This is a controlling government that is out of control, and the sooner it goes, the better.
All original material is copyright of its author. Fair use permitted. Contact via comment. Nothing here should be taken as personal advice, financial or otherwise. No liability is accepted for third-party content, whether incorporated in or linked to this blog; or for unintentional error and inaccuracy


text:
Cristóbal Balenciaga spent most of his career where he belonged, as an acknowledged master in the haute couture world capital of Paris. But his Spanish homeland was the ever-present lifeblood of his work, nourishing every phase and aspect of his art.
"The impact of Spain remained extraordinarily potent in his work," says Hamish Bowles, the curator of the de Young Museum's Balenciaga and Spain exhibition. In his sustained and richly varied acts of transformation, the Basque-born couturier turned what Bowles calls an "aching nostalgia" for his native turf and culture into an act of perpetual refraction and reinvention.
Click on the photo to the right to see a photo slideshow.
"Balenciaga's inspirations came from the bullrings, the flamenco dancers, the loose blouses the fishermen wear, the cool of the cloisters," wrote the fashion writer and editor Diana Vreeland, who mounted the first major Balenciaga show, at the Metropolitan Museum of Art in 1973.
The current exhibition, which features 120 pieces from both museum and private collections, sets out to document the impact of the Spanish culture and aesthetic on the designer's work. As such, it is full of echoes, harmonies and layered chords. Here are some of the major notes in this richly chromatic composition.
Among the abundant riches of Madrid's Prado Museum are several galleries of Velázquez paintings. A number of them, including the enthralling "Las Meninas" (detail, right), depict the royal infantas, or crown princesses, in their exquisite dresses with tight bodices of jewel-like embroidery and trimmings. Not only did Balenciaga fashion his own infanta dresses, but he also appropriated the lacework from one Velázquez portrait for a 1938 day suit in this show.
"Goya, whether Balenciaga is aware of it or not, is always looking over his shoulder," Vogue editor Bettina Ballard said. Black lace, mantillas, silk tassels and other details evoke works such as "The Duchess of Alba" by that Spanish master. In the transfixing treatment of drapery by the 17th-century painter Zurbarán, Balenciaga found a touchstone for the luscious gathers, bunching and folds in some of his more opulent dresses.
If Balenciaga and Spain visitors can't hear the infectious pounding rhythms and seductive songs of flamenco, they're just not listening closely enough with their eyes. It's all there in the notelike flurries of lunares (polka dots), the melodic sweep of a curved and ruffled hemline and the fluttering grace notes of flounced skirts.
Characteristically, Balenciaga found his own tunes to play from the traditional ruffled-train bata de cola dress — using a single flounce here, a wild explosion of lunares there, a voluptuous long train somewhere else. No detail escaped him. He borrowed from the male flamenco dancer's garb in wittily reworked hats and torso-hugging forms. Balenciaga utilized the foliate embroidery pattern from a flamenco dancer's shawl in one dress and a red-carnation print in another.
Balenciaga himself detested bullfighting and rarely visited the bullrings. But the glamour and sleek lines of the costumes were irresistible. As early as 1939, his collections featured overt reworkings of the matadors' traje de luces (suit of lights), that glittering focal point of confrontation between man and bull. The taut bolero jacket, with its braid trimming and borlones (pom-pom tassels), turned up again and again in his work.
In later years, Balenciaga scattered bullfighting allusions widely, using a row of pom-poms on an evening gown, adding a dramatic cape or playfully expanding and contracting the dimension of the matadors' headwear — the black montera or knotted silk headwrap.
Bullfighting remained an integral force in Balenciaga's thinking. When Adolf Hitler considered moving the couture houses to Germany during the occupation of Paris, the designer remarked that he "might just as well take all the bulls to Berlin and try to train bullfighters there."
To an outsider, the sober, cloaklike drama of some Balenciaga designs conveys a sculptural purity. "Ecclesiastical and clerical clothing based on simple shapes and austere styles lent itself to modernist interpretation outside Spain," Lesley Ellis Miller writes in Balenciaga (2005). But for the designer himself, religious belief and inspiration were powerfully internalized.
He once thought he would become a priest, he attended Mass faithfully and he displayed crucifixes and religious
statuary at home.
For Bowles, "the dress of the clergy and of devotional Madonna figures has extraordinary resonance" in Balenciaga's work. The use of rich capes, simple cassocks, nuns' sculpted wimples, monastic hoods and embroidered chasubles captures what Bowles calls "the dual nature of Spanish Catholicism, characterized by the extreme contrasts of severe austerity and extravagant luxury."
Tn lavish wedding dresses, ornate theatrical costumes, evening dresses and infanta gowns, Balenciaga drew on five centuries of Spanish royalty to fuel his imagination. For a 1960 wedding dress, the designer worked in bands of white mink to invoke the 15th-century Queen Isabella's love of ermine. The deep, pure blacks in some of Balenciaga's work summon the 16th-century piety of King Philip II.
And then there were his costumes for a 1942 production of a Don Juan drama. Called on by the lead actress to create an "orgy of colors" in a "riot of fabrics," Balenciaga turned to 16th- and 17th-century court portraits for a visual vocabulary of velvets, satins, silk failles and ermine tails. Plumed hats, blooming hooped petticoats (known as farthingales), armorlike embroidery and ruff collars all found a place in Balenciaga's royally inflected artistry.
From his extensive travels in Spain, Balenciaga had direct and intimate knowledge of his homeland's regional dress. He never forgot it, working native forms, materials and embellishments into his own designs throughout his career.
Fashion historian Colin McDowell described Balenciaga as "a man homesick for his own land to whom visual memories keep returning." From his own seaside town of Guetaria, he could summon up the loose-fitting blouses worn by fishermen. In Navarra, he found the shepherds' garb he would later rework into expansive mohair pelt coats. The velvet bands he recalled from Santander nursemaids turned up in a 1949 strapless evening gown.
Bonnets, fringed shawls and other accessories all had their origins in some Spanish province. Balenciaga always kept his distance from the press, but he might well have relished Le Figaro's account of the "bunched-up effect, washerwoman style" of his 1941 summer skirts.
Click here to read more.
Click here to read more.


text:
Public versus Private Health Care in a National Health Service
- Miles Maxwell
- 3 years ago
- Views:
1 Public versus Private Health Care in a National Health Service Kurt R. Brekke Lars Sørgard Approx words. Abstract This paper study the interplay between private and public health care in a National Health Service. We consider a two-stage game, where at stage one a Health Authority sets the public sector wage and a subsidy to (or tax on) private provision. At stage two physicians decide how much to work in the public and the private sector. We characterise different equilibria depending on the Health Authority s objectives, the physicians job preferences, and the cost efficiency of private relative to public provision of health care. We find that the scope for a mixed health care system is limited when physicians are indifferent between working in the public and private sector. Competition between physicians triggers a shift from public provision towards private provision, and an increase in the total amount of health care provided. The endogenous nature of labour supply may have counter-intuitive effects. For example, a cost reduction in the private sector is followed by a higher wage in the public sector. JEL Classification: I11, I18, J42, L33 Keywords: Health care; Mixed oligopoly; Physicians HEB and Department of Economics, University of Bergen. Fosswinckelsgate 6, N-5007 Bergen, Norway. Department of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, Helleveien 39, N-5045 Bergen, Norway. 1
2 1 Introduction Most health care systems involve a mixture of public and private provision. In a National Health Service (NHS), though, the role for private health care is quite different than in private (or mixed) health care systems along several dimensions (Besley and Gouveia, 1994). In particular, health care is mainly provided publicly and financed by general taxation rather than private insurance payments. Still there exists a private sector alongside the public one in most countries with a NHS. An important difference, though, is that patients receive public health care for free, while seeking private health care they often have to cover the costs of the medical treatment by themselves. Another interesting feature of NHS systems is that a substantial share of the physicians tends to work in both sectors. For example, in the UK most private medical services are provided by physicians whose main commitment is to the NHS. The UK Monopolies and Merger Commission (1994) estimated that about 61% of the NHS consultants had significant private work. Similar observations can be made in Norway, Sweden, France, etc. In other words, there seems to be close links between the public and the private sector not only on the demand side but also on the supply side. The purpose of this paper is to analyse the complex relationship between the public and the private sector in a National Health Service, emphasising the direct links between the two sectors. The analysis will focus on the following questions: How does the option for NHS physicians to provide private health care affect the public provision? In what way may physicians job preferences matter? Could it be that such a system is potentially unstable because the private sector tends to drive out the public sector? How should the Health Authority set wages in the public sector, and should it tax or subsidise the private sector? To analyse these questions, we consider a situation where there is a Health Authority (e.g. the Ministry of Health) that sets a public sector wage and a subsidy to (or tax on) private provision of health care. Based on the payments in the public and the private sector, and on their job preferences, physicians decide how much to work in either sector. 2
3 In the public sector physicians are on salary, while in the private sector they are selfemployedandearnprofits from their private practice. Irrespective of the payments, physicians may have some intrinsic preferences for working in a public hospital or at a private clinic, which may be related to non-pecuniary job characteristics in the two sectors (see e.g. Scott, 2001). The physicians labour supply is decisive of the amount of public versus private health care that will be provided. Patients perceive public and private health care as, but prefers to taken care of by the public sector since this is free at the point of consumption. Patients not served by the public health care sector may instead demand private health care. The Health Authority may influence the physicians labour supply via the public sector wage offered and possible support on the private sector. While a higher wage will encourage physicians to spend more time in a public hospital, a subsidy on the private health care provision will have the opposite effect. However, it also has the opportunity to tax the private sector to induce more public provision. We investigate in detail how the Health Authority s wage setting and support (or taxation) of private sector is influenced by physicians endogenous supply of labour, the costs of providing private health care as well as the costs associated with distortionary taxation. There are some obvious informational asymmetries in the health care market. A large part of the literature is therefore concerned with the implications of such informational asymmetries for the amount of health care and the quality of it. 1 For example, several studies raise the issue of how the reimbursement scheme affects the total supply of health care as well as the quality. 2 In this paper, though, we sidestep from some of the issues that have been investigated in detail in the literature. We apply a model that does not encompass private information, and we do not raise the issue how quality of care 1 See Frech (1996) for a discussion of issues in the health market in general, and Frech (1991) for a discussion of compensation schemes for physicians. 2 Ellis and McGuire (1986, 1990) have considered how the reimbursement scheme affects the supply of health services, while Ma (1994) and Sharma (1998) have investigated how it affects quality as well as the incentives for reducing costs. For a survey of the literature, see Newhouse (1996) or Ennis (1998). 3
4 is affected by the structure of the health sector. This allows us to concentrate on the complex relationship between a public and a private health care market, where there are direct links between those two sectors on both the supply and the demand side. In the literature there are few studies that examine the mix of private and public health care. One study that does, and is closely related to ours, is Rickman and McGuire (1999). 3 Their modelling approach is distinctly different from ours in many respects, though. First, we let a physician s utility be determined by his/her total wage income in the public sector as well as his/her income from the private sector. In contrast, in Rickman and McGuire (1999) a physician s utility from public sector work is determined by the performance of his/her public hospital as well as from his patients satisfaction. Second, we assume an increasing marginal disutility of work. The reason for this is that each physician may face a soft time constraint, finding it more and more costly to supply an extra hour of labour. In contrast, Rickman and McGuire (1999) assume a constant marginal disutility. In their setting, therefore, there are no direct links on the cost side between the two sectors. Third, we let the government act as a monopsonist in the labour market in the public health sector and the hospital then receives full-cost reimbursement. Although Rickman and McGuire (1999) have full-cost reimbursement in the public sector, they have no direct link between the costs associated with public health care and the physicians revenue from such an activity. Finally, we assume strategic interaction between physicians, while Rickman and McGuire (1999), building on the model of Ellis and McGuire (1986), ignores the role of competition. The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we discuss various modelling issues, 3 There are other studies of the interplay between public and private health care. Barros and Martinez- Giralt (2000) analyse the rivalry between preferred providers and out-of-plan providers under different reimbursement rules. Jofre-Bonet (2000) deals with the interaction between public and private providers when consumers differ in their income levels. Marchand and Schroyen (2000) consider how different physician contracts affect the mixture of public and private health care. They use a setting with monopolistic competition between physicians and where the government takes distributional aspects into account. 4
5 such as the formulation of demand and supply and the nature of the rivalry between the physicians. In Section 3 we derive the physicians labour supply for given payments. In Section 4, we report results concerning the equilibrium outcomes in two separate cases. In the first one, the role of physicians job preferences is analysed, while in the second case, we consider asymmetric (cost) efficiencies in providing care. Finally, in Section 5, we summarise our findings. 2 The model Consider a health care system characterised by a National Health Service (NHS). In this system there is three types of agents; The Health Authority (e.g. Ministry of Health), the hospital-based physicians, and individuals in need for medical treatment (i.e. patients). The health authority is responsible for providing public health care, assumed to be free of charge for the patients at the point of consumption. Physicians decide to work in a public hospital and/or establish their own private practise. Since private health care is not included in the NHS, patients are charged a (full-cost) price if they decide to visit a private practice. The demand for private health care is represented by the following inverse demand function: p =1 Q O Q P, (1) where p is the marginal willingness to pay, Q o is the quantity of health care provided by the public sector (o) and Q p is the quantity of health care provided by the private sector (p). First, note from (1) that public and private health care are assumed to be perfect substitutes from the patients perspective. 4 Second, note that we assume efficient rationing. As the public sector provision of health care increases, the marginal willingness 4 McAvinchey and Yannopoulos (1994) find in an empirical study that private and public health care are substitutes. In some cases one could argue that private health care is of higher quality than public health care, and in other cases vice versa. Since we consider a situation where physicians operate in both the private and the public sector, we find it reasonable to assume public and private health care as perfect substitutes. 5
6 to pay for private health care drops. Hence, the public sector has by assumption served those consumers with the highest willingness to pay for health care. 5 6 On the supply side, the important input to production is health personnel. Let us call them physicians. For ease of exposition, let us normalise input and output so that one unit of labour equals one unit of health care. Then Q i denotes the units of labour used in sector i, wherei = o, p. Since we focus on a specific health care product, it is plausible to assume that there is only a limited number of physicians qualified to supply thehealthcareproductinquestioninaspecific area. In line with this, we simplify by assuming that there are only two physicians in the market, which may work in both the public and the private sector. Let qi k denote the labour supplied by physician k in sector i, wherek =1, 2. Total provision of health care in sector i is then given by Q i = P k qk i. In the public sector, the physicians are on salary, earning the wage, w per unit of labour. In the private sector physicians are self-employed and earns the profit fromtheir private practice. Private sector revenues are equal to the price p, and possibly a transfer r from the health authority, per unit of health care (and thereby per unit of labour) provided. Spending time providing health care generates disutility for the physicians. We find it plausible to assume a convex disutility function: the longer a physician initially works, 5 Although we have not explicitly modeled waiting cost, one may argue that it is included in an implicit manner. If there is excess demand at a price for public health care equal to zero, the waiting line consists of those neither served by public nor private health care providers. However, the deadweight loss we derive from the demand function would capture the loss associated with not being served. See Iversen (1997) for an explicit modeling of waiting costs. 6 This formulation is chosen since it is consistent with a system where public health sector s priority depends on the seriousness of the disease. However, high willingness to pay may not only depend on the serverity of the disease, but may also depend on the wealth at an individual s disposal. It is difficult to disentangle these two effects, so distributional concerns may point in another direction. This might be of large importance if the income distribution is very skewed. Since we are focusing only on efficiency, we should be cautious with the interpretation of our model in a situation where the income distribution is very skewed. 6
7 the greater disutility from a marginal labour increase. 7 In line with this, we let the marginal disutility be influenced by a physician s total amount of labour in public and private sector. However, it seems plausible as well to assume that a decision to work more in one of the sectors is influenced not only by total labour input, but also by how much she works in that particular sector initially. The more a person has worked in one sector, the higher marginal disutility in this particular sector. This reflects that physicians are not indifferent about where to work. In particular, they may have an intrinsic preference for working in both the public and the private sector. 8 A disutility function that encompasses both elements in the marginal utility is the following: G k = ³ qo k 2 ³ + qp 2 k + δq k o qp, k (2) where 0 < δ < 2. The parameter δ measures the degree of substitutability between working in the public and the private sector for each physician. 9 If δ 2, themarginal disutility is determined by only the total amount of labour supplied. This corresponds to the case where physician k perceives working in a public hospital or at a private clinic as perfect substitutes. Contrary, if δ 0, the marginal disutility is determined by only how much the physician works in either private or public sector initially, implying that the allocation of labour supply between the two sectors matters. This refers to the 7 In our setting we consider physicians that work in both the public and private sector. The total amount of work can then be quite high, and each physician may face some restrictions on their labour supply: There are obviously physical limitations to how much each of them can work each day. Then it is natural to assume that each physician s total supply is approaching some kind of capacity constraint, and a convex disutility function captures such a case. 8 This may be due to non-pecuniary factors like job characteristics. For instance, physicians may prefer to work in the public sector because of opportunities for research and specialising, meeting colleagues, access to medical facilities, etc. On the other hand, the private health care sector may be attractive because of, for instance, more autonomy due to being self-employed. See e.g. Scott (2001) for the relevance of this. 9 Alternatively, we can think of δ as the fraction of physicians that are indifferent between working in the public and the private sector. 7
8 case where physicians perceives public and private provision as imperfect substitutes, for instance, due to some intrinsic preferences related to certain job characteristics, as mentioned above. We now have the following utility function for physician k: 10 π k = wqo k +(p + r c) qp k G k, (3) where c denotes the marginal cost of providing health care in the private sector. The total marginal cost in private health care is the sum of c and the marginal disutility. With a slight abuse of terminology, in the following we refer to c as the marginal cost of private health care. A Health Authority (HA) is responsible for providing public health care. In line with this, we find it reasonable to assume that the HA has a monopsony role in the labour market for health care workers. In particular, we assume that the HA sets the wage in the public sector. In our model, we take this into account by allowing the health authority to set w, the wage in the public sector. In addition, it can choose either to pay a per unit subsidy (r >0) or impose a per unit tax (r <0) on private health care. The health authority is in principle concerned about consumer surplus, physician utility as well as any possible distortion in the economy generated by taxes. From (1) we can derive the following utility function for persons demanding this particular health care product: U = Q o + Q p (Q o + Q p ) 2. (4) 2 Public health care is by assumption provided at a price equal to zero for the patients. Then the cost of public health care, as well as any possible payments to the private 10 Note that we assume that physicians are not taking into account any patient benefit fromhealth care when they maximize their utility. This non-altruistic approach is in contrast to some of the received literature, for example Rickman and McGuire (1999), where the patient s benefit enters the physician s utility function in a direct way. In principle, though, it should be simple to encompass altruism in our model. For example, it could be added as a downward shift in the disutility function. 8
9 sector, is financed by distortionary taxes. The social welfare function is the following: 2X W = U pq p + β π k (1 + λ)(wq o + rq p ), (5) k=1 where β =0, 1 and λ (0, 1). The parameter λ represents the marginal cost of public funds and captures the tax distortion. The other parameter β reflects the view that a health authority may put a different, and often lower, weight on provider surplus relative to the patients benefit of receiving health care. Each physician determines her own labour supply in each sector. It is an open question whether the physicians coordinate their decisions or not. For example, could it be that the physicians coordinate their decisions in the private sector by establishing a joint private health care firm where both works? In theory, there are four possible situations. These are shown in Table 1 below. In the situation called competition in Table 1, both physicians set their labour supply non-cooperatively. That would be the case where physician k maximises the utility function specified in (3), π k, with respect to qo k and qp. k However, we know from theory that the players can jointly be better off in a collusive outcome. In such a case, the physicians would maximise joint utility, π 1 + π 2, with respect to the physicians labour supply in both sectors: qo,q 1 o,q 2 p 1 and qp. 2 In this situation, denoted perfect coordination in Table 1, both physicians are expected to restrict their total supply of labour, thereby increasing the equilibrium price in the private sector. If each physician s discount factor is sufficiently high, we know that perfect coordination can be the equilibrium outcome in a repeated game. 9
10 Table 1: Coordination of labour supply? Private sector Yes No Yes Perfect Public Public coordination coordination Sector No Private Competition coordination In the two remaining situations, public coordination and private coordination, the physicians coordinate their labour supply in only one sector. However, we find neither of those two situations plausible. If the physicians have coordinated their labour supply in one sector, why should they not extend the cooperation to also include the other sector and thereby be better off? Therefore, wefind it reasonable to contrast competition with perfect coordination. From now on we denote the latter simply coordination. We let superscript S and F denote coordination and competition, respectively. Whether coordination would be the equilibrium outcome is determined by exogenous factors such as period length and time preference rate. In addition, we may expect the structure of the private sector to be of importance. In particular, whether antitrust enforcement allows physicians to establish joint facilities can be decisive for whether a competitive outcome is attained or not in the labour market. Therulesofthegamearethefollowing: Stage 1: The government sets w and r. Stage 2: The physicians set qi k,wherei = o, p and k =1, 2. The model is solved by backward induction. 10
11 3 Physicians labour supply Let us start the analysis by solving the game at stage two. In the competition game, physician k sets qo k and qp k to maximise (3), yielding the following first order conditions: 11 π k q k o =0 w q k p =2q k o + δq k p (6) π k q k p ³ =0 1+r qo k + qo l 2qp k qp l = c +2qp k + δqo k, (7) where k, l =1, 2 and k 6= l. The left-hand side of (6) and (7) represent the marginal revenues of providing public and private health care, respectively, while the right-hand sides are the corresponding marginal costs. Notice the crowding-out effect the physician is facing when deciding her labour supply in the public and the private sector. When increasing the time spent at a public hospital, more patients are taken care of in the public sector, and this will, in turn, lower the demand for private health care. Thus, by restricting the labour supply in the public sector, the physician increases the profitability of working in the private sector. Solving stage 2 of the game, yields the following equilibrium outcomes: q F o (w, r) = 5w (1 + r c)(1+δ) 8 3δ δ 2 (8) qp F 2(1+r c) w (2 + δ) (w, r) = 8 3δ δ 2, (9) where the superscript F denotes that we consider the competition game. In the coordination game, the physicians set qo,q 1 o,q 2 p 1 and qp 2 to maximise joint profit, π 1 + π 2, yielding the following first order conditions: 12 π 1 + π 2 q k o ³ =0 w qp k + qp l =2qo k + δqp k (10) π 1 + π 2 q k p ³ ³ =0 1+r c qo k + qo l 2 qp k + qp l =2qp k + δqo k. (11) 11 Second order conditions require that δ < ' Second order conditions require δ < '
12 Again the left-hand side of (10) and (11) are the marginal revenues of providing public and private health care, respectively, and the right-hand sides are the corresponding marginal costs. While coordination eliminates the negative externality between physicians due to non-cooperatively labour supply present in the competition game, we see from the conditions that the crowding-out effect between public and private labour supply is also present in this case. Solving the first order conditions, yield the following outcomes at stage 2 of the game: qo S 6w (1 + r c)(2+δ) (w, r) = 8 4δ δ 2 (12) qp S 2(1+r c) w (2 + δ) (w, r) = 8 4δ δ 2, (13) where the superscript S denotes that we consider the coordination game. As expected, physicians will work more in the public sector and less in the private sector when the wage (w) becomes higher, all else equal. The opposite is true when the Health Authority subsidise private health care provision (r >0). We also see that the marginal cost of private provision (c) affects the physicians allocation of working time. This is not true for any production costs in the public sector since these are covered by the Health Authority and do not enter the physicians utility functions. Obviously, these effects are present irrespective of whether physicians compete or coordinate their labour supply. The effect of physician preferences, measured by δ, on private versus public labour supply (for given w and r) is, however, more complicated. Examination of the equilibrium outcomes enables the following statement. Proposition 1 Let j = F, S. (i) qo j =0and qp j > 0 if w w j (ii) qo j > 0 and qp j =0if w w j (iii) w j w j > 0 and δ w j w j < 0. Proof. Consider the competition game (j = F ). Setting (8) and (9) equal to zero and solving for w, yield the following critical values for public and private provision, 12
13 respectively, where w F = 1+δ (1 + r c), 5 w F = 2 (1 + r c), 2+δ 8 3δ δ w F w F 2 = (1 + r c) > 0, 5(2+δ) and w F w F δ + δ2 = δ 5(2+δ) 2 (1 + r c) < 0 In a similar way the results for the coordination game (j = S) can be proved. When physicians have the ability to decide their labour supply in the public and the private sector, and this affects the number of patients treated in either sector, the amount of public and private health care provided depends crucially on the public sector wage relative to potential profits in the private sector. From the Lemma its clear that there is an upper and a lower bound on the wage that induce the physicians to work in both sectors. If the wage becomes sufficiently low, physicians decide to spend time only in the private sector, while if the wage becomes sufficiently high they decide to only work in the public sector. Less evident, though, is the effect of physicians job preferences (measured by δ) on private versus public provision of health care. From the Lemma we see that as physicians become more indifferent about where to work, the scope for a mixed health care system is reduced. The reason for this is two-fold: First, δ affects the total amount of labour physicians are willing to supply. When δ becomes higher, the cost of working an extra hour in either sector is increasing, and this tends to lower physicians total labour supply for a given payment. Second, δ also affects the physicians division of labour between the two sectors. When physicians have an intrinsic motivation for working in a public hospital or at a private clinic (δ 0), this provides an incentive for the physicians to split their working time, irrespective of relative payments in the two sectors. On the 13
14 other hand, when physicians are indifferent between where to work (δ 2), they tend to spend all their working hours in the sector which yields the higher payment. 4 The Health Authority Having described the physicians incentives to work in the public and the private sector for given payments (w and r), we now turn to the HA s decision about the public sector wage and support to (or taxation of) private health care provision. We assume that the HA is either concerned about patients welfare only, or both patients and physicians welfare. Two separate cases are analysed. In the first one, attention is restricted to physicians job preferences and how this may influence the HA s wage setting and support to the private sector, and, in turn, the scope for public and private health care. In the second one, we will focus on asymmetric (cost) efficiency of providing health care, and examine how this may affect the desirability of public versus private health care. In either case, we also analyse how the nature of competition between physicians may alter HA s decisions. 4.1 Physicians job preferences Let us start by examining the role of physicians job preferences. For simplicity, we assume that public and private provision are equally efficient, i.e. c =0. ConsideraHA that only cares about patients welfare (β =0). From (5), the HA solves the following problem max U pq p (1 + λ)(wq o + rq p ), w,r anticipating the physicians labour supply responses, which in the competition case is given by (8) and (9), and in the coordination case is given by (12) and (13). Note that when the HA does not care about providers surplus, physicians job preferences do not directly affect the HA s decisions, but only indirectly via the physicians labour supply responses to different wages and subsidies. The equilibrium outcomes in both the competition and coordination game are presented in Table A in the Appendix. 14
15 Let us start by investigating how physicians job preferences affects the scope for public and private provision of health care. From the equilibrium outcomes, we can establish the following result. Proposition 2 Assume that c =0and β =0,andletj = S, F. (i) qo j > 0 if δ < δo j (λ). (ii) qp j > 0 if δ < δp j (λ). n o (iii) qo j > 0 and qp j > 0 if δ < min δo j (λ), δp j (λ) Proof. The results are found by setting the equilibrium values of qo j and qp, j reported in Table A in the Appendix, equal to zero and solve the expressions for δ, wherej = F, S. We then get the following critical values for public provision and for private provision δo F (λ) = 3λ2 +4λ +5 2(λ 2 +2λ +1) and δs o (λ) 2λ2 +2λ +3 2λ + λ 2 +1 δ F p (λ) 2λ and δs p (λ) 2λ +1, in the competition case (F ) and the coordination case (S), respectively. Thus, the scope for public and private provision of health care depends crucially on physicians job preferences (δ). Both public and private provision of health care requires that physicians perceive working in the public and private sector as sufficiently imperfect substitutes (i.e. δ is sufficiently low). However, the relation to the marginal cost of public funds are different. While a high λ tends to reduce the scope for public provision of health care, the opposite is true for a low λ. The reason is, of course, that public provision is purely based on costly transfers from the Health Authority, while private provision is only partially so, given that (r >0). In Figure 1, we have characterised the different regimes that may emerge depending on physicians job preferences (δ) and the marginal cost of public funds (λ) for the competition game. A similar picture is present for the coordination game. In this figure, 15
16 Figure 1: The scope for a mixed health care system when j = F, c =0. Regime A refers to a mixed health care system including both public and private health care provision, while Regime B refers to a purely private regime without any public provision, and Regime C refers to a purely public regime. To fully understand the mechanisms at work let us consider how the public sector wage and the subsidy to the private sector are influenced by the physicians job preferences. From the equilibrium outcomes in Table A in the Appendix, the following result can be established. Proposition 3 Assume that c =0and β =0. (i) r j < 0, where j = F, S. (ii) w S >w F if δ < δ w (λ), andr S <r F if δ < δ r (λ) Proof. (i) By setting r F then solve for δ we get: and r S (in Table A in the Appendix) equal to zero and δr F = 3 8λ 4λ2 + p ( λ +304λ λ 3 +48λ 4 ) 2(λ 2, +2λ +1) δr S = 3 10λ 5λ2 + p ( λ + 874λ λ λ 4 ) 2(2λ 2. +4λ +2) 16
17 Thenitcanbeprovedthatδr F / 0, (see footnote 12) and δr S / 0, (see footnote 13), which are the relevant values of δ in the competition game and the coordination game, respectively. (ii) By setting w S = w F and r S = r F, respectively, and solving for δ, wegetthe critical values δ w (λ) and δ r (λ), where both can be within the allowed set 0, for given values of λ. Thus, irrespective of whether physicians compete or coordinate their labour supply, the HA imposes a tax on their provision of private health care. To understand this result, remember the HA s objectives, which is to maximise patients utility while take into account distortions due to costly public transfers. Although patients consider public and private health care as perfect subsitutes, the fact that they have to pay the full bill in the private sector implies that they prefer to be taken care of by a public hospital, which tends to limit the scope for a private sector. On the other hand, free public health care means that public provision relies fully on costly transfers from the HA, which tends to limit the scope for the public sector. In addition, the HA must take into account the physicians labour market responses. This is especially the case when physicians are rather indifferent about where to work (a high δ). In this situation, they tend to spend all their time in the sector which yields the higher revenue, and this, together with the fiscal argument above, explains why the HA chooses to impose a tax on private health care provision. The comparison of the coordination and the competition case (part (ii) of the Proposition) is illustrated in Figure 2. We see that as long as physicians are sufficiently interested in working in both sectors (δ is sufficiently low), they will face a higher wage in the public sector, but also a higher tax in the private sector, when they coordinate their labour supply rather than compete. This refers to regime A in the figure. The reason is intuitive. Coordination of labour supply has two effects. First, it tends to restrict the total amount of time spent in providing care. Second, it tends to increase the profit potential in the private sector. To secure an optimal level of public health care the HA, 17
18 Figure 2: Comparison of wages and subsidies in the competition and coordination game for c =0, β =0. therefore, must set a higher wage and a higher tax on private provision to induce the physicians to reallocate their labour supply. On the other hand, if physicians become sufficiently indifferent between where to work two things may happen. First, if the marginal cost of public funds (λ) is high, this limits the HA s ability to set high wages to attract physicians to the public sector. However, this makes it more tractable for the HA to tax physicians in order to reduce the profitability of working in the private sector, which explains why w S <w F (and r S <r F ) is true in this situation. In regime C, where the marginal cost of public funds is low, the opposite is true, implying that r S >r F (and w S >w F ). This demonstrates that taxation may work as a regulatory substitute for public sector wage in provision of health care. 4.2 Asymmetric cost efficiency The results above where derived under the assumption that the public and the private sector were equally (cost) efficient in producing health care. In practice, this may not always be the case. In health care systems characterised as NHS, public hospitals may 18
19 have access to inputs, like medical equipment, pharmaceuticals, etc., at lower prices than private clinics, for instance, because they are larger buyers. In this section we will therefore assume a positive marginal cost in the private sector (c >0), while the marginal cost in the public sector is normalised to zero. 13 To focus on the effect of asymmetric cost, we will abstract from the issue of physicians job preferences. For simplicity, we assume that δ =1, which means that the public and private sector is considered as imperfect substitutes by the physicians. Moreover, we restrict attention to a HA that is concerned about both patients and physicians welfare (β =1). Thisisnotcrucialfor the analysis as the results are not qualitatively altered for the other case. From (5), the HA solves the following problem: max W = U pq p + X w,r k πk (1 + λ)(wq o + rq p ), anticipating the physicians labour supply responses, which are given by (8) and (9) for the competition game and (12) and (13) for the coordination game. The equilibrium outcomes in are shown in Table C in the Appendix. Proposition 4 Assume that δ =1. Then (i) qo j > 0 and qp j > 0 if c c j, c j,wherej = F, S. (ii) c F > c S,andc F >c S. (iii) cj λ > 0, and cj λ > 0, wherej = F, S. Proof. c S (or c S ) is found by setting the equilibrium value of qp S (or qo S )inthe coordination regime (see Table C) equal to zero and solve with respect to c, yielding the following critical values c S In a similar way, we find c F 1+2λ +4λ2 4(1+2λ + λ 2 ) and cs 1+3λ +4λ2 4(1+2λ + λ 2 ) and cf 1 3λ +6λ2 3(1+3λ +2λ 2 ) 1 3λ +6λ2 3(1+3λ +2λ 2 ), 13 One can interprete a negative c as the private sector being more efficient than the public sector in providing health care. However, this must be considered as an approximation. 19
20 in the competition game. It is easy to check that c j >c j,wherej = F, S. From these expressions, we have that c F c S = λ 4(1+λ) 2 > 0 and cf c S = 2λ 9+42λ +63λ 2 +30λ 3 > 0 A marginal change in λ has the following effect on the critical values: c S λ = c S λ = 3λ 2(1+λ) 3 > 0, c F λ = 1+5λ 4(1+λ) 3 > 0, (2 + 3λ)8λ cf 3(1+λ) 2 2 > 0, (1 + 2λ) λ = λ +25λ 2 (1 + λ) 2 (3 + 5λ) 2 > 0. The proposition shows that there is no interior solution if marginal costs in the private sector are either too high or too low. When c is sufficiently low only private provision of health care is an equilibrium, while the opposite is true when c is sufficiently high. The reason is intuitive. Consider the case of a low c. On one hand, a low c makes private provision less undesirable since it is both more efficient and yields lower prices, which both tend to increase the scope for private provision. On the other hand, a low c induces the physicians to work more in the private sector because they earn higher profits relative to the case of a high c. Thus, when c is low the HA must offer a high wage (or impose a substantial tax) to mitigate physicians incentives to reallocate their labour supply towards the private sector. Moreover, we see from (iv) that an increase in the marginal cost of public funds (λ) will reduce the scope for the public sector. The reason is obvious. By allowing the private sector to provide relatively more health care, and not subsidising private health care (see below), the HA can avoid serious distortions caused by taxation. 20
Public versus Private Health Care in a National Health Service
Public versus Private Health Care in a National Health Service Kurt R. Brekke y, Lars Sørgard z August 22, 2003 Abstract This paper studies the interplay between public and private health care in a NationalMore information
PUBLIC VERSUS PRIVATE HEALTH CARE IN A NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE KURT R. BREKKE LARS SØRGARD CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 1679 CATEGORY 9: INDUSTRIAL ORGANISATION MARCH 2006 An electronic version of the paperMore information
Hospital Reimbursement in an Oligopolistic Industry
Hospital Reimbursement in an Oligopolistic Industry Kurt R. Brekke Program for Health Economics in Bergen University of Bergen May 8, 2000 Abstract This paper analyses the design of hospital reimbursementMore information
. In this case the leakage effect of tax increases is mitigated because some of the reduction in disposable income would have otherwise been saved.
Chapter 4 Review Questions. Explain how an increase in government spending and an equal increase in lump sum taxes can generate an increase in equilibrium output. Under what conditions will a balancedMore information
Prices versus Exams as Strategic Instruments for Competing Universities
Prices versus Exams as Strategic Instruments for Competing Universities Elena Del Rey and Laura Romero October 004 Abstract In this paper we investigate the optimal choice of prices and/or exams by universitiesMore information
Oligopoly: How do firms behave when there are only a few competitors? These firms produce all or most of their industry s output.
Topic 8 Chapter 13 Oligopoly and Monopolistic Competition Econ 203 Topic 8 page 1 Oligopoly: How do firms behave when there are only a few competitors? These firms produce all or most of their industryMore information
Work incentives and household insurance: Sequential contracting with altruistic individuals and moral hazard
Work incentives and household insurance: Sequential contracting with altruistic individuals and moral hazard Cécile Aubert Abstract Two agents sequentially contracts with different principals under moralMore information
Market Power and Efficiency in Card Payment Systems: A Comment on Rochet and Tirole
Market Power and Efficiency in Card Payment Systems: A Comment on Rochet and Tirole Luís M. B. Cabral New York University and CEPR November 2005 1 Introduction Beginning with their seminal 2002 paper,More information
Intellectual Property Right Protection in the Software Market
Intellectual Property Right Protection in the Software Market Yasuhiro Arai Aomori Public College 153-4, Yamazaki, Goushizawa, Aomori-city, Aomori 030-0196, Japan March 01 Abstract We discuss the softwareMore information
Chapter 21: The Discounted Utility Model
Chapter 21: The Discounted Utility Model 21.1: Introduction This is an important chapter in that it introduces, and explores the implications of, an empirically relevant utility function representing intertemporalMore information
ECON 312: Oligopolisitic Competition 1. Industrial Organization Oligopolistic Competition
ECON 312: Oligopolisitic Competition 1 Industrial Organization Oligopolistic Competition Both the monopoly and the perfectly competitive market structure has in common is that neither has to concern itselfMore information
Subsidies in oligopoly markets: a welfare comparison between symmetric and asymmetric costs
Subsidies in oligopoly markets: a welfare comparison between symmetric and asymmetric costs Stephen F. Hamilton and Rickard Sandin Oligopolistic industries generally produce less than is socially desirable.More information
Online Supplementary Material
Online Supplementary Material The Supplementary Material includes 1. An alternative investment goal for fiscal capacity. 2. The relaxation of the monopoly assumption in favor of an oligopoly market. 3.More information
Oligopoly and Strategic Pricing
R.E.Marks 1998 Oligopoly 1 R.E.Marks 1998 Oligopoly Oligopoly and Strategic Pricing In this section we consider how firms compete when there are few sellers an oligopolistic market (from the Greek). SmallMore information
tariff versus quota Equivalence and its breakdown
Q000013 Bhagwati (1965) first demonstrated that if perfect competition prevails in all markets, a tariff and import quota are equivalent in the sense that an explicit tariff reproduces an import levelMore information
Week 7 - Game Theory and Industrial Organisation
Week 7 - Game Theory and Industrial Organisation The Cournot and Bertrand models are the two basic templates for models of oligopoly; industry structures with a small number of firms. There are a numberMore information
CostandQualityIncentivesinHealthCare: Altruistic Providers
CostandQualityIncentivesinHealthCare: Altruistic Providers Ching-to Albert Ma Department of Economics Boston University 27 Bay State Road Boston Massachusetts 2215 firstname.lastname@example.com December, 1997 JEL ClassificationMore information
Credit card interchange fees
Credit card interchange fees Jean-Charles Rochet Julian Wright January 23, 2009 Abstract We build a model of credit card pricing that explicitly takes into account credit functionality. We show that aMore information
Knowledge Transfer and Partial Equity Ownership
Knowledge Transfer and Partial Equity Ownership Arghya Ghosh and Hodaka Morita School of Economics, UNSW Business School University of New South Wales 2nd ATE Symposium, UNSW, December 2014 IntroductionMore information
A theory of yardstick competition Andrei Shleifer Rand Journal of Economics, Vol 16, No. 3 (1985)
A theory of yardstick competition Andrei Shleifer Rand Journal of Economics, Vol 16, No. 3 (1985) Owain Evans Saki Georgiadis Introduction Why Regulate? Regulation of an industry is required when it isMore information
Working Paper No 27/07. Pricing of on-line advertising: Pay-per-view or pay-per-click? by Kenneth Fjell. SNF project no 1303
Working Paper No 7/07 Pricing of on-line advertising: Pay-per-view or pay-per-click? by Kenneth Fjell SNF project no 303 Konvergens mellom IT, medier og telekommunikasjon: Konkurranse- og mediepolitiskeMore information
Two Papers on Internet Connectivity and Quality. Abstract
Two Papers on Internet Connectivity and Quality ROBERTO ROSON Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Università Ca Foscari di Venezia, Venice, Italy. Abstract I review two papers, addressing the issue ofMore information
Information Exchanges Among Firms and their Impact on Competition*
Information Exchanges Among Firms and their Impact on Competition* Kai-Uwe Kühn Xavier Vives Institut d'anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) Barcelona June 1994 Revised December 1994 *We are grateful to Paco Caballero,More information
Advertising. Sotiris Georganas. February 2013. Sotiris Georganas () Advertising February 2013 1 / 32
Advertising Sotiris Georganas February 2013 Sotiris Georganas () Advertising February 2013 1 / 32 Outline 1 Introduction 2 Main questions about advertising 3 How does advertising work? 4 Persuasive advertisingMore information
Economic analysis of the market - 1
Economic analysis of the market - 1 Paolo Buccirossi Rome, April 28 2014 Questions 1. What are the desirable properties (the goals ) of a system to trade (buy and sell) goods or services? 2. Is competitionMore information
Richard Schmidtke: Private Provision of a Complementary Public Good
Richard Schmidtke: Private Provision of a Complementary Public Good Munich Discussion Paper No. 2006-20 Department of Economics University of Munich Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät Ludwig-Maximilians-UniversitätMore information
Week 3: Monopoly and Duopoly
EC202, University of Warwick, Term 2 1 of 34 Week 3: Monopoly and Duopoly Dr Daniel Sgroi Reading: 1. Osborne Sections 3.1 and 3.2; 2. Snyder & Nicholson, chapters 14 and 15; 3. Sydsæter & Hammond, EssentialMore information
Price Discrimination: Part 2. Sotiris Georganas
Price Discrimination: Part 2 Sotiris Georganas 1 More pricing techniques We will look at some further pricing techniques... 1. Non-linear pricing (2nd degree price discrimination) 2. Bundling 2 Non-linearMore information
Moral Hazard. Itay Goldstein. Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania
Moral Hazard Itay Goldstein Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania 1 Principal-Agent Problem Basic problem in corporate finance: separation of ownership and control: o The owners of the firm are typicallyMore information
Thus MR(Q) = P (Q) Q P (Q 1) (Q 1) < P (Q) Q P (Q) (Q 1) = P (Q), since P (Q 1) > P (Q).
A monopolist s marginal revenue is always less than or equal to the price of the good. Marginal revenue is the amount of revenue the firm receives for each additional unit of output. It is the differenceMore information
The Elasticity of Taxable Income: A Non-Technical Summary
The Elasticity of Taxable Income: A Non-Technical Summary John Creedy The University of Melbourne Abstract This paper provides a non-technical summary of the concept of the elasticity of taxable income,More information
- SaBHBBI ^ m v > x S EMPIRICAL MACRO PRODUC TION FUNCTIONS SOME METHODOLOGICAL COMMENTS by Sören Wibe Umeå Economic Studies No. 153 UNIVERSITY OF UMEÅ 1985 ISSN 0348-1018 - 1 - EMPIRICAL MACRO PR ODUCTIONMore information
Unraveling versus Unraveling: A Memo on Competitive Equilibriums and Trade in Insurance Markets
Unraveling versus Unraveling: A Memo on Competitive Equilibriums and Trade in Insurance Markets Nathaniel Hendren January, 2014 Abstract Both Akerlof (1970) and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) show thatMore information
Credible Discovery, Settlement, and Negative Expected Value Suits
Credible iscovery, Settlement, and Negative Expected Value Suits Warren F. Schwartz Abraham L. Wickelgren Abstract: This paper introduces the option to conduct discovery into a model of settlement bargainingMore information
A Simple Model of Price Dispersion *
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Globalization and Monetary Policy Institute Working Paper No. 112 http://www.dallasfed.org/assets/documents/institute/wpapers/2012/0112.pdf A Simple Model of Price DispersionMore information
AS Economics Unit 1: Markets and Market Failure Syllabus, Key Terms & Charts
AS Economics Unit 1: Markets and Market Failure Syllabus, Key Terms & Charts 10.1 The Economic Problem The Nature and Purpose of Economic Activity The central purpose of economic activity is the productionMore information
Economic background of the Microsoft/Yahoo! case
Economic background of the Microsoft/Yahoo! case Andrea Amelio and Dimitrios Magos ( 1 ) Introduction ( 1 ) This paper offers an economic background for the analysis conducted by the Commission duringMore information
0 100 200 300 Real income (Y)
Lecture 11-1 6.1 The open economy, the multiplier, and the IS curve Assume that the economy is either closed (no foreign trade) or open. Assume that the exchange rates are either fixed or flexible. AssumeMore information
Documents de Travail du Centre d Economie de la Sorbonne
Documents de Travail du Centre d Economie de la Sorbonne Trade Liberalization and Optimal R&D Policies with Process Innovation Thanh LE, Cuong LE VAN 014.79 Maison des Sciences Économiques, 106-11 boulevardMore information
Industry profit in an oligopoly (sum of all firms profits) < monopoly profit.
Collusion. Industry profit in an oligopoly (sum of all firms profits) < monopoly profit. Price lower and industry output higher than in a monopoly. Firms lose because of non-cooperative behavior : EachMore information
Optimal Age Specific Income Taxation
Optimal Age Specific Income Taxation Jean-Marie Lozachmeur 1 October, 2005 1 GREMAQ, University of Toulouse. Mailing: Gremaq, 21 Allée de Brienne F- 31000 Toulouse. E-mail: email@example.com information
Why do merchants accept payment cards?
Why do merchants accept payment cards? Julian Wright National University of Singapore Abstract This note explains why merchants accept expensive payment cards when merchants are Cournot competitors. TheMore information
CHAPTER 18 MARKETS WITH MARKET POWER Principles of Economics in Context (Goodwin et al.)
CHAPTER 18 MARKETS WITH MARKET POWER Principles of Economics in Context (Goodwin et al.) Chapter Summary Now that you understand the model of a perfectly competitive market, this chapter complicates theMore information
ECONOMIC RESEARCH CENTER DISCUSSION PAPER. Partial Privatization and Market-Opening Policies: A Mixed Oligopoly Approach. Lihua Han Hikaru Ogawa
ECONOMIC RESEARCH CENTER DISCUSSION PAPER E-Series No.E07-3 Partial Privatization and Market-Opening Policies: A Mixed Oligopoly Approach by Lihua Han Hikaru Ogawa June 2007 ECONOMIC RESEARCH CENTER GRADUATEMore information
Competition and Regulation. Lecture 2: Background on imperfect competition
Competition and Regulation Lecture 2: Background on imperfect competition Monopoly A monopolist maximizes its profits, choosing simultaneously quantity and prices, taking the Demand as a contraint; TheMore information
Physician dual practice and the public health care provision
Physician dual practice and the public health care provision Review of literature Karolina Socha The Research Unit of Health Economics University of Southern Denmark www.healtheconomics.dk Health EconomicsMore information
Negotiation advantages of professional associations in health care
Negotiation advantages of professional associations in health care Pedro Pita Barros Universidade Nova de Lisboa CEPR (London) Xavier Martinez-Giralt Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona November 2000 AbstractMore information
Optimal Paternalism: Sin Taxes and Health Subsidies
Optimal Paternalism: Sin Taxes and Health Subsidies Thomas Aronsson and Linda Thunström Department of Economics, Umeå University SE - 901 87 Umeå, Sweden April 2005 Abstract The starting point for thisMore information
Health and Healthcare Systems
Health and Healthcare Systems Lectures 9 and 10 Le Grand, Propper and Smith (2008): Chp 2 Bochel, Bochel, Page and Sykes (2009): Chp 15 Stiglitz (2000): Chp 12 Outline Healthcare, efficiency and equityMore information
Price competition with homogenous products: The Bertrand duopoly model [Simultaneous move price setting duopoly]
ECON9 (Spring 0) & 350 (Tutorial ) Chapter Monopolistic Competition and Oligopoly (Part ) Price competition with homogenous products: The Bertrand duopoly model [Simultaneous move price setting duopoly]More information
Notes on indifference curve analysis of the choice between leisure and labor, and the deadweight loss of taxation. Jon Bakija
Notes on indifference curve analysis of the choice between leisure and labor, and the deadweight loss of taxation Jon Bakija This example shows how to use a budget constraint and indifference curve diagramMore information
1.4 Hidden Information and Price Discrimination 1
1.4 Hidden Information and Price Discrimination 1 To be included in: Elmar Wolfstetter. Topics in Microeconomics: Industrial Organization, Auctions, and Incentives. Cambridge University Press, new edition,More information
Credit card interchange fees
Credit card interchange fees Jean-Charles Rochet Julian Wright October 2009 Abstract We build a model of credit card pricing that explicitly takes into account credit functionality. In the model a monopolyMore information
MARKET STRUCTURE AND INSIDER TRADING. Keywords: Insider Trading, Stock prices, Correlated signals, Kyle model
MARKET STRUCTURE AND INSIDER TRADING WASSIM DAHER AND LEONARD J. MIRMAN Abstract. In this paper we examine the real and financial effects of two insiders trading in a static Jain Mirman model (HenceforthMore information
Lobbying on Entry Regulations under Imperfect. Competition
Lobbying on Entry Regulations under Imperfect Competition Dapeng CAI a and Shinji KOBAYASHI b a Corresponding Author. Institute for Advanced Research, Nagoya University, Furo-cho, Chikusa-ku, Nagoya, 464-86,More information
Inflation. Chapter 8. 8.1 Money Supply and Demand
Chapter 8 Inflation This chapter examines the causes and consequences of inflation. Sections 8.1 and 8.2 relate inflation to money supply and demand. Although the presentation differs somewhat from thatMore information
Entry Barriers and Antitrust Objectives
Entry Barriers and Antitrust Objectives Oz Shy WZB, and University of Haifa Rune Stenbacka Swedish School of Economics, and RUESG, University of Helsinki, and HECER December 8, 2005 Abstract We show thatMore information
Chapter 11 Perfect Competition
These notes provided by Laura Lamb are intended to complement class lectures. The notes are based on chapter 11 of Microeconomics and Behaviour 2 nd Canadian Edition by Frank and Parker (2004). ChapterMore information
Lecture 6: Price discrimination II (Nonlinear Pricing)
Lecture 6: Price discrimination II (Nonlinear Pricing) EC 105. Industrial Organization. Fall 2011 Matt Shum HSS, California Institute of Technology November 14, 2012 EC 105. Industrial Organization. FallMore information
Hyun-soo JI and Ichiroh DAITOH Tohoku University. May 25, 2003. Abstract
Interconnection Agreement between Internet Service Providers and the Optimal Policy Intervention: The Case of Cournot-type Competition under Network Externalities Hyun-soo JI and Ichiroh DAITOH TohokuMore information
MICROECONOMICS II PROBLEM SET III: MONOPOLY EXERCISE 1 Firstly, we analyze the equilibrium under the monopoly. The monopolist chooses the quantity that maximizes its profits; in particular, chooses theMore information
INTRODUCTORY MICROECONOMICS UNIT-I PRODUCTION POSSIBILITIES CURVE The production possibilities (PP) curve is a graphical medium of highlighting the central problem of 'what to produce'. To decide whatMore information
UNIT 6 cont PRICING UNDER DIFFERENT MARKET STRUCTURES. Monopolistic Competition
UNIT 6 cont PRICING UNDER DIFFERENT MARKET STRUCTURES Monopolistic Competition Market Structure Perfect Competition Pure Monopoly Monopolistic Competition Oligopoly Duopoly Monopoly The further right onMore information
Competition between Apple and Samsung in the smartphone market introduction into some key concepts in managerial economics
Competition between Apple and Samsung in the smartphone market introduction into some key concepts in managerial economics Dr. Markus Thomas Münter Collège des Ingénieurs Stuttgart, June, 03 SNORKELINGMore information
ECON4620 Public Economics I Second lecture by DL
ECON4620 Public Economics I Second lecture by DL Diderik Lund Department of Economics University of Oslo 9 April 2015 Diderik Lund, Dept. of Econ., UiO ECON4620 Lecture DL2 9 April 2015 1 / 13 OutlineMore information
Sustainable Energy Systems
Theory of Regulation PhD, DFA M. Victor M. Martins Semester 2 2008/2009 Theories of regulation : normative and positive analysis, interest group theory 1.2 Theories of regulation normative and positiveMore information
Bundling in Cable Television: A Pedagogical Note With a Policy Option. Keith Brown and Peter J. Alexander Federal Communications Commission, USA
K. Bundling Brown and in Cable P. J. Alexander Television Bundling in Cable Television: A Pedagogical Note With a Policy Option Keith Brown and Peter J. Alexander Federal Communications Commission, USAMore information
Platform Competition under Asymmetric Information
Platform Competition under Asymmetric Information Hanna Hałaburda Yaron Yehezkel Working Paper 11-080 Copyright 2011 by Hanna Hałaburda and Yaron Yehezkel Working papers are in draft form. This workingMore information
Implications of Intellectual Property Rights for Dynamic Gains from Trade
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO WORKING PAPER SERIES Implications of Intellectual Property Rights for Dynamic Gains from Trade Michele Connolly Duke University and Diego Valderrama Federal ReserveMore information
A2 Micro Business Economics Diagrams
A2 Micro Business Economics Diagrams Advice on drawing diagrams in the exam The right size for a diagram is ½ of a side of A4 don t make them too small if needed, move onto a new side of paper rather thanMore information
Pricing and Persuasive Advertising in a Differentiated Market
Pricing and Persuasive Advertising in a Differentiated Market Baojun Jiang Olin Business School, Washington University in St. Louis, St. Louis, MO 63130, email@example.com Kannan Srinivasan TepperMore information
Buyer Search Costs and Endogenous Product Design
Buyer Search Costs and Endogenous Product Design Dmitri Kuksov firstname.lastname@example.com University of California, Berkeley August, 2002 Abstract In many cases, buyers must incur search costs to find theMore information
Second degree price discrimination
Bergals School of Economics Fall 1997/8 Tel Aviv University Second degree price discrimination Yossi Spiegel 1. Introduction Second degree price discrimination refers to cases where a firm does not haveMore information
1 Monopoly Why Monopolies Arise? Monopoly is a rm that is the sole seller of a product without close substitutes. The fundamental cause of monopoly is barriers to entry: A monopoly remains the only sellerMore information
Endogenous Growth Theory
Chapter 3 Endogenous Growth Theory 3.1 One-Sector Endogenous Growth Models 3.2 Two-sector Endogenous Growth Model 3.3 Technological Change: Horizontal Innovations References: Aghion, P./ Howitt, P. (1992),More information
Perfect Competition. We will use the second concept in here and your text, chapter 11.
Perfect Competition There are two concepts of competition normally used in Economics: 1. The manner or process in which firms compete with one another for market share. 2. A description of a particularMore information
Regret and Rejoicing Effects on Mixed Insurance *
Regret and Rejoicing Effects on Mixed Insurance * Yoichiro Fujii, Osaka Sangyo University Mahito Okura, Doshisha Women s College of Liberal Arts Yusuke Osaki, Osaka Sangyo University + Abstract This papersMore information
Intermediate Microeconomics Video Handbook, IM6 Faculty, 2014
A. MATH TOPICS 1. Calculus Review Machina 2. Elasticity Machina 3. Level Curves Machina a. Level Curves of a Function Machina b. Slopes of Level Curves Machina 4. Scale Properties of Functions a. ScaleMore information
Saving the public from the private? Incentives and outcomes in dual practice
RESEARCH GROUP ECONOMICS Institute of Mathematical Methods in Economics Saving the public from the private? Incentives and outcomes in dual practice September 013 by Michael Kuhn Robert Nuscheler WorkingMore information
Labor Economics, 14.661. Lecture 3: Education, Selection, and Signaling
Labor Economics, 14.661. Lecture 3: Education, Selection, and Signaling Daron Acemoglu MIT November 3, 2011. Daron Acemoglu (MIT) Education, Selection, and Signaling November 3, 2011. 1 / 31 IntroductionMore information
Chapter 15: Monopoly WHY MONOPOLIES ARISE HOW MONOPOLIES MAKE PRODUCTION AND PRICING DECISIONS
Chapter 15: While a competitive firm is a taker, a monopoly firm is a maker. A firm is considered a monopoly if... it is the sole seller of its product. its product does not have close substitutes. TheMore information
Marginal cost. Average cost. Marginal revenue 10 20 40
Economics 101 Fall 2011 Homework #6 Due: 12/13/2010 in lecture Directions: The homework will be collected in a box before the lecture. Please place your name, TA name and section number on top of the homeworkMore information
Foreclosure, Entry, and Competition in Platform Markets with Cloud
Foreclosure, Entry, and Competition in Platform Markets with Cloud Mark J. Tremblay Department of Economics Michigan State University E-mail: email@example.com August 27, 2015 Abstract Platforms in two-sidedMore information
Partial Equilibrium: Positive Analysis
Partial Equilibrium: Positive Analysis This Version: November 28, 2009 First Version: December 1, 2008. In this Chapter we consider consider the interaction between different agents and firms, and solveMore information
All these models were characterized by constant returns to scale technologies and perfectly competitive markets.
Economies of scale and international trade In the models discussed so far, differences in prices across countries (the source of gains from trade) were attributed to differences in resources/technology.More information
Chapter 29: Natural Monopoly and Discrimination
Chapter 29: Natural Monopoly and Discrimination 29.1: Introduction This chapter discusses two things, both related to the fact that, in the presence of a monopoly, there is less surplus generated in theMore information
Gains from trade in a Hotelling model of differentiated duopoly
Gains from trade in a Hotelling model of differentiated duopoly Kenji Fujiwara School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University and Department of Economics, McGill University August 8, 009 Abstract ConstructingMore information
Common in European countries government runs telephone, water, electric companies.
Public ownership Common in European countries government runs telephone, water, electric companies. US: Postal service. Because delivery of mail seems to be natural monopoly. Private ownership incentiveMore information
Chapter 5. Market Equilibrium 5.1 EQUILIBRIUM, EXCESS DEMAND, EXCESS SUPPLY
Chapter 5 Price SS p f This chapter will be built on the foundation laid down in Chapters 2 and 4 where we studied the consumer and firm behaviour when they are price takers. In Chapter 2, we have seenMore information
Conditions for Efficiency in Package Pricing
Conditions for Efficiency in Package Pricing Babu Nahata Department of Economics University of Louisville Louisville, Kentucky 40292, USA. e-mail: email@example.com and Serguei Kokovin and Evgeny ZhelobodkoMore information
Uncertain altruism and the provision of long term care
Uncertain altruism and the provision of long term care Helmuth Cremer Toulouse School of Economics (University of Toulouse and Institut universitaire de France) 31015 Toulouse, France Firouz Gahvari DepartmentMore information
ECON20310 LECTURE SYNOPSIS REAL BUSINESS CYCLE YUAN TIAN This synopsis is designed merely for keep a record of the materials covered in lectures. Please refer to your own lecture notes for all proofs.More information
A Dynamic Analysis of Price Determination Under Joint Profit Maximization in Bilateral Monopoly
A Dynamic Analysis of Price Determination Under Joint Profit Maximization in Bilateral Monopoly by Stephen Devadoss Department of Agricultural Economics University of Idaho Moscow, Idaho 83844-2334 Phone:More information
Solution to Selected Questions: CHAPTER 12 MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION AND OLIGOPOLY
Chulalongkorn University: BBA International Program, Faculty of Commerce and Accountancy 900 (Section ) Chairat Aemkulwat Economics I: Microeconomics Spring 05 Solution to Selected Questions: CHAPTER MONOPOLISTICMore information
Week 1 Efficiency in Production and in Consumption and the Fundamental Theorems of Welfare Economics
1. Introduction Week 1 Efficiency in Production and in Consumption and the Fundamental Theorems of Welfare Economics Much of economic theory of the textbook variety is a celebration of the free marketMore information
Labor Demand The Labor Market
Labor Demand The Labor Market 1. Labor demand 2. Labor supply Assumptions Hold capital stock fixed (for now) Workers are all alike. We are going to ignore differences in worker s aptitudes, skills, ambitionMore information
Technology platforms, such as Microsoft Windows, are the hubs of technology industries. We develop a
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE Vol. 52, No. 7, July 2006, pp. 1057 1071 issn 0025-1909 eissn 1526-5501 06 5207 1057 informs doi 10.1287/mnsc.1060.0549 2006 INFORMS Two-Sided Competition of Proprietary vs. Open SourceMore information
1. Suppose demand for a monopolist s product is given by P = 300 6Q
Solution for June, Micro Part A Each of the following questions is worth 5 marks. 1. Suppose demand for a monopolist s product is given by P = 300 6Q while the monopolist s marginal cost is given by MCMore information
Economics 165 Winter 2002 Problem Set #2
Economics 165 Winter 2002 Problem Set #2 Problem 1: Consider the monopolistic competition model. Say we are looking at sailboat producers. Each producer has fixed costs of 10 million and marginal costsMore information
Final Exam (Version 1) Answers
Final Exam Economics 101 Fall 2003 Wallace Final Exam (Version 1) Answers 1. The marginal revenue product equals A) total revenue divided by total product (output). B) marginal revenue divided by marginalMore information


text:
This work in progress seminar is an opportunity for graduate students from all departments whose work has an applied ethics dimension to present draft papers or thesis chapters for constructive comments and discussion with other graduate students, led by Dr Rebecca Brown.
Each week two students will have the opportunity to present a paper, and two students will respond to the papers presented. Papers are circulated a week in advance via email. Students will be given 10-15 minutes for their presentations, respondents will have 5-10 minutes to discuss the paper, followed by an open group discussion for the remainder of the hour.
The presenting and respondent spaces are issued on a first come first served basis so please email ASAP to ensure you get a space. Responding to papers is as important an aspect of the seminar as presenting.
Please contact firstname.lastname@example.com to reserve your space.


text:
PixAlert's Image Auditor is an advanced image discovery software solution which helps organisations quickly discover and eliminate the level of risk caused from illicit and inappropriate image content stored on corporate networks. Image Auditor combines the latest image scanning technologies and best practice case management tools, to deliver the ultimate in enterprise illicit image and explicit content detection and monitoring solutions.
The distribution and storage of illicit and inappropriate images on corporate networks is a significant and growing issue for all types of organisations. Of the thousands of networks scanned by PixAlert, stored inappropriate content has been detected on 99% of them. This presents a serious risk to organisations in terms of vicarious liabilities, loss of productivity and reputational damage.
PixAlert's automated image auditing solutions help to protect corporate reputation through monitoring and eliminating risk caused by inappropriate image and offensive content residing across all parts of the corporate networks.
PixAlert Image Audior can be run remotely or on a local machine. All files on the selected target media are examined for image content and ranked on the basis of being inappropriate (i.e. pornographic). Audited images are presented to the operator in a ranked manner. The operator can then manage the inappropriate images through the case management interface for reporting and removal.
PixAlert Image Auditor has been designed for the corporate environment to:
Rapidly identify risks and incidents
- Run locally or on remote PC
- Display images in a gallery format in order of most offensive material
- Fully report and document on its findings
- Maintain a full Audit-Trail
- Certified on all Microsoft desktop and server systems
Recommended Hardware Requirement
- Desktop, PC, Server (recommended for enterprise version)
- 8 GB Ram
- 4 Core
- 100 GB free disk space
Operating System Requirements
- Windows 7 Professional with the latest service pack
- MS Windows Server 2012 R2
Image Auditor Scans
- Desktops, Windows Shares and Virtual Environments: Microsoft Windows, Linux (UNIX) through SMB, Citrix
- Email Servers: Microsoft Exchange, IBM Notes and IBM Domino, Novell GroupWise
- Live Databases: SQL Server, Oracle, DB2
- Documents Store: Microsoft Sharepoint
- Cloud: Microsoft 365
- Also Includes Offline Files: Microsoft Office (Word, Excel, Outlook, Access), Archives, Images and Videos
Customer Approval
- Rapid scanning speeds
- Low deployment cost
- Ease of Use
- Lack of visibility by end user
- Ongoing network security safeguard