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Oligopoly. Chapter Overview
- Brent Cannon
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1 Chapter 10 Oligopoly 10.1 Overview Oligopoly is the study of interactions between multiple rms. Because the actions of any one rm may depend on the actions of others, oligopoly is the rst topic which requires us to consider interactive decision making. In our study of supply and demand, we assumed that rms and consumers took market conditions to be given and did not realize their decisions a ected the other side of the market. In our study of monopoly pricing, we allowed the monopolist to account for the interdependence of quantity and price, but still assumed that consumers took market prices as given. That is, monopoly amounted to a single person strategic decision problem where the rm had complete control of the market outcome. But oligopoly requires a serious assumption of some sort about the interactions between the decisions of the rms because each rm has partial e ect on the market price. The standard models of oligopoly fall partway between the models of monopoly and perfect competition. Each rm accounts for its own e ect on prices, and maximizes pro ts, while taking the actions of other rms to be xed according to some prevailing conjecture about what those rms will do. An equilibrium requires that the prevailing conjectures about the actions of all rms actually correspond to their pro t-maximizing decisions given these conjectures. This de nition of equilibrium matches the de nition of Nash equilibrium in game theory. 261
2 10.2 Classical Cournot Outcomes The most prominent model of competition among a small number of rms is Cournot competition, as studied originally by Auguste Cournot in Each rm decides on a quantity to produce and the total quantity of production sets the market price. The formal model of Cournot competition is based on rms 1; :::; m. Each rm is de ned by a cost function c j (q j ) which gives its cost for production a give quantity of goods. The market demand function p(q) gives the market-clearing price as a function of total quantity, Q. assume that production costs are strictly increasing and convex (c 0 j > 0,. c00 j We 0) and that the market price is decreasing in quantity sold (p 0 (Q) 0). Each rm faces the same type of problem: (F P j ) max q j q j p(q 1 ; q 2 ; :::; q m ) c j (q j ): De nition 1 A Cournot equilibrium consists of quantities (q 1 ; q 2 ; :::; q m ) such that each rm maximizes pro ts given the production of other rms. The assumption that each rm takes the quantities of the others as given may seem unrealistic, for a rm may have many competitors and is unlikely to know about the speci c production plans of each and every one of them. In fact, since we assume that the market price depends only on the total quantity Q and not on the quantities chosen by individual rms, the informational requirements for a Cournot equilibrium can be somewhat relaxed any rm needs only to know the aggregate production of others to determine its pro t-maximizing quantity in equilibrium. One way to proceed with equilibrium analysis is very mechanical. Crank out the rst order conditions for each rm, check that the combination of cost function c j (q j ) and price function p(q) satisfy the second-order conditions so that the FOC s for each rm. Assuming that all second-order conditions are satis ed, then the combination of rst-order conditions for all the rms produce a system of m equations with m unknowns (the quantities of the rms) and should generally produce an interior solution which is a Cournot equilibrium. 1 But a more 1 It is also possible that there could be a boundary solution. For example, if one or more rms had very 262
3 intuitive approach is to analyze the reaction curves of each rm, which describe each rm s optimal quantity as a function of the total quantity produced by others. We begin by studying reaction curves in the case of duopoly (two rms) and then extend our analysis to the case of many rms. Reaction Curves De ne q1 (q 2) as the optimal production for rm 1 as a function of rms 2 s production, q 2. De ne q2 (q 1) similarly. An equilibrium consists of quantities ^q 1 ; ^q 2 such that q1 (q 2) = ^q 1 ; q2 (q 1) = ^q 2. For xed and known q 2, the rst-order conditions for rm 1 s maximization problem are p(q 1 + q 2 ) + q 1 p 0 (q 1 + q 2 ) c 0 1(q 1 ) = 0: The second-order conditions for a maximum are given by 2p 0 (q 1 + q 2 ) + q 1 p 00 (q 1 + q 2 ) c 00 1(q 1 ) 0: The rst and second-order conditions for rm 2 are exactly parallel to the conditions identi ed above for rm 1. We have assumed that p 0 0, c 00 0, so the second-order conditions always hold if p 00 is non-positive, and will also hold in some cases where p 00 > 0, but is not su ciently positive to o set the two other negative terms in the sum. In the simplest example, which we discuss at length below, both p and c are linear functions, so that p 00 = c 00 j = 0 and the second-order conditions are guaranteed to hold. Proposition 2 Suppose that the rst-order conditions characterize the reaction functions for each rm 2 and that p 00 (q) 0. Then q 1 (q 2) is decreasing in q 2 and q 2 (q 1) is decreasing in q 1. We illustrate this result by totally di erentiating the rst-order conditions for q 1. analysis for q 2 is similar.) (The high costs of production that they would only lose money by setting q j > 0, then these rms should not produce anything in equilibrium. 2 This is equivalent to assuming that there is a unique solution to (FOC) and that the second-order conditions hold as well. 263
4 p 00 (q 1 +q 2 )dq 1 +p 00 (q 1 +q 2 )dq 2 +p 0 (q 1 +q 2 )dq 1 +q 1 p 00 (q 1 +q 2 )dq 1 +q 1 p 00 (q 1 +q 2 )dq 2 c 00 1(q 1 )dq 1 = 0: Rearranging terms to isolate the ratio dq 1 dq 2 ; dq 1 dq 2 = q 1 p 00 (q 1 + q 2 ) + p 0 (q 1 + q 2 ) q 1 p 00 (q 1 + q 2 ) + p 00 (q 1 + q 2 ) + p 0 (q 1 + q 2 ) c 00 (q 1 ) : By assumption, each term in the numerator is (weakly) negative and each term in the denominator is (weakly) negative, implying dq 1 dq 2 0. Example 3 Consider a simple linear example with linear demand and constant marginal cost for the rms: p(q) = A Q = A q 1 q 2, MC 1 = c 1, MC 2 = c 2 :Then the rms are distinguished only by their marginal costs, with 1 (q 1 ; q 2 ) = q 1 (A q 1 q 2 ) c 1 q 1 ; 2 (q 1 ; q 2 ) = q 1 (A q 1 q 2 ) c 2 q 2 The derivative of rm 1 s pro t with respect to its quantity is 1 1 = A c 1 q 2 2q 1. Given the parameters A, Q, and a conjectured value q 2, rm 1 s marginal pro ts are decreasing in its quantity q 1, and thus its second-order conditions for a maximum are satis ed. This is analogous to a monopoly problem with rm 1 as monopolist facing demand function D 1 (q 1 ) = A 0 q 1, where A 0 = A q2 0 and q0 2 represents the conjectured value of rm 2 s production, which rm 1 takes as given. In this respect, we can view each rm in a Cournot duopoly as a residual monopolist for customers who are not served by the other rm. As in the monopoly case, each rm recognizes that as it increases its quantity, it cuts the price to its existing customers, thereby producing decreasing marginal pro ts and a unique solution to its maximization problem for a given quantity produced by the other rm. Thus, rm 1 s rst-order conditions are su cient to identify its optimal quantity (assuming that they identify a positive value for q 1 ), yielding the solution q 1(q 2 ) = (A q 2 c 1 )=2: 264
5 This equation identi es rm 1 s reaction function to rm 2 s production since it identi es an optimal quantity as a function of rm 2 s production. rm 1 s reaction function is given by the equation Similarly, rm 2 s reaction function to q 2(q 1 ) = (A q 1 c 2 )=2: Given the assumption of linear costs and prices, these reaction functions are linear as well. Figure 1 graphs both reaction functions simultaneously; note that rm 1 s production is represented as a function from the vertical axis ( rm 2 s quantity) to the horizontal axis ( rm 1 s quantity).for the speci c parameter values A = 10, c 1 = 3; c 2 = 2. A Cournot equilibrium is an intersection of the two reaction functions, for this is the only way that the conjectured quantities for the rms could match the solutions to their maximization problems. As seen in Figure 1, there is a unique intersection of the reaction curves in the linear example and thus a unique Cournot equilibrium with q 1 = A 2c 1 + c 2 3 ; q2 = A 2c 2 + c 1 : 3 In Figure 1, rm 2 has lower marginal costs of production than does rm 1, so naturally rm 2 produces a greater quantity in the resulting equilibrium at (2, 3). Note in addition that if the two reaction curves are linear, they can intersect at most once, so there is a unique Cournot equilibrium. As depicted in the gure below, Firm 1 s reaction curve q1 (q 2) is more steeply sloping than rm 2 s reaction curve q2 (q 1). This is a general property of a linear duopoly model 3 that guarantees a unique equilibrium, either at an intersection of the reaction curves or (if there is no intersection of the reaction curves) at a boundary with only one rm producing a positive quantity. 4 3 In a linear duopoly model, rm 1 s reaction function is given by q1(q 2) = A c 1 q 2, which can be represented 2 as the inverse function q 1 2 (q 1) = A c 1 2q1, which has a slope of -2. By comparison, rm 2 s reaction function has a slope of -1/2 (q2(q 1) = A c 2 q 1 ), so in graphical representation, rm 2 s reaction function is always atter 2 than rm 1 s reaction function. 4 A boundary equilibrium occurs, if for example q2(0) = q 2m is on rm 2 s reaction curve, but q1(q 2m) < 0. In this case, rm 2 simply produces its monopoly quantity and rm 1 produces nothing in equilibrium. The negative value for rm 1 s reaction function indicates that rm 1 s production costs are so high that it cannot compete pro tably with rm 2 in equilibrium. 265
6 Duopoly Reaction Curves Firm 2 quantity q1(q2) q2(q1) Firm 1 quantity 266
7 In a symmetric case with c 1 = c 2 = k, the equilibrium values for the two rms converge to the same value (A k)=3. Tatonnement One challenge is that the equilibrium analysis above does not provide a description of why rms would produce the equilibrium quantities in a Cournot duopoly. If each rm makes the right conjecture about what the other will produce, then they would certainly produce their equilibrium quantities, but this leaves the question of how they might come to these conjectures. One extreme answer, suggested by Cournot, is that sophisticated rms should come to expect equilibrium actions from each other. The basis for this answer in Cournot competition is based on what is known as a tatonnement (slight adjustment) process. Suppose that the rms compete over time in many consecutive periods, where rm i produces q i;t in period t. Further, the rms use last period s output as the best prediction of this period s output for its rival. That gives a dynamic process for the outputs over time based on the equations q 1;t+1 = q 1(q 2;t ); q 2;t+1 = q 2(q 1;t ): As shown in Figure 2 for a linear duopoly example, the tatonnement process leads to "cobweb" dynamics that converge towards the equilibrium point. For example, if we start at an arbitrary point B, where both rms are producing more than their equilibrium quanities, then they will move to point C in the second period, where both rms are producing less than their equilibrium quantities, to point D in the third period, and so on. Each period, the rms switch their production from one side of the equilibrium point to the other (alternating between producing relatively more and relatively less than the equilibrium quantities), while moving ever closer to equilibrium. If we allow this dynamic process to continue for many periods, the rms will move asymptotically closer and closer to the Cournot equilibrium over time for any nite number of periods t, they will not actually reach equilibrium, but for any distance from the equilibrium point, there is some t () so that after t or more periods, the rms are always within of their equilibrium quantities. 267
8 . The Cournot equilibrium is nice because it has this interpretation as the long-run dynamic outcome of some version of strategic interactions. At the same time, though, the tatonnement description is dubious. First, it only applies in repeated competition. But more worrying is the fact that the assumption of each rm that their competitor is acting as in the previous period is clearly false, yet they cling to that assumption over many periods of play. Furthermore, rms may wish to try to develop a reputation over time in order to in uence their rivals. Thus, we cannot really rely on the tatonnement story provided by Cournot and are left without a justi cation of the Cournot equilibrium as the result of a dynamic convergence process Comparison of Cournot and Monopoly Outcomes A monopolist in a simple linear demand economy p(q) = A Q would set p = Q = (A k)=2, where k is the constant marginal cost of production. By contrast, two Cournot competitors would each produce (A k)=3 for total production of 2(A k)=3 and price of (A k)=3. Since the monopoly output maximizes total pro ts for the industry, the Cournot rms would do better to reduce their production. They do not do so because their relationship to the product market mixes competition and monopoly. Taking the production of the other competitor as xed (competition), each acts as a monopolist in what it perceives as the residual market, where 2(A k)=3 consumers remain and the demand curve appears to be p(q i ) = 2A=3 k=3 q i : 268
9 As a result, each rm incorporates the e ect of its production on the prices of its own goods, but it ignores the e ect on the sales of the other rm. With more rms, the pattern continues as each has less and less of a residual market to monopolize. Then, q i = (A k)=(n 1); Q = (A k) n=(n + 1); p = A=(n + 1) + nk=(n + 1): As n increases, total quantity Q increases and p decreases. Ultimately, as n! 1, p! k and we reach the state of perfect competition. This example demonstrates the earlier statement that as the number of rms increases (from 1), the behavior of the rms moves further away from monopoly and towards perfect competition Incentives and the Market The reaction curves illustrate a simple point. As rm 1 produces more, rm 2 s optimal reaction is to produce less. If the rms recognize that point (and they will), they may try to in uence their rival s action. Note that the strategic interaction between the actions of the rms is dismissed in the de nition of Cournot equilibrium. If rm 1 can somehow commit to a more aggressive production policy, it could improve its lot from the original equilibrium because rm 2 would produce correspondingly less than before. Firm 1 can attempt to commit to more production in several ways Stackleberg Competition In the Stackelberg version of competition, one rm moves rst. This rm must be at least as well o as its rival because it can always choose the earlier level of production (e.g. (A k)=3 with two rms). Instead, it will produce more, based on the logic above, giving it a rstmover advantage. Formally, rm 1 can anticipate rm 2 s production as a function of its own decision. 5 q2(q 1 ) = A q 1 k : 2 5 Note that rm 1 s decision precedes rm 2 s decision in time, so only rm 1 can view the problem in this manner. 269
10 (F P 1 ) max q 1 q 1 p(q) = q 1 (A q 1 q 2(q 1 )): Substituting and taking the derivative gives q 1 = (A k)=2; q 2 = (A k)=4: Total output has increased from the Cournot equilibrium, but rm 1 is better o. Although we have only solved for a special case here, it is easy to demonstrate that both of these properties carry over when the demand function is more general (not necessarily so simple and linear) and marginal costs are increasing rather than constant: rm 1 increases output if it can move rst, increases pro ts from the symmetric equilibrium because rm 2 reduces its output in response. The Stackelberg equilibrium is not an equilibrium of the original Cournot simultaneousmoves game. Firm 2 is responding optimally to rm 1, but rm 1 s is producing too much to be optimal. Firm 1 increased its production to constrain rm 2, but it cannot do that and choose the best response to rm 2 simultaneously. What rm 1 would really like to do is 1) pretend to commit to (A k)=2, 2) induce rm 2 to produce (A k)=4, 3) actually respond optimally to q 2 = (A k)=4 by producing 3(A k)=8. Of course, then rm 2 would wish to increase its production a bit from (A k)=4 and so on. What happens if we allow this process to of thought to continue? We will inevitably end up back at the symmetric Cournot equilibrium because this is exactly the tatonnement process Fixed and Marginal Costs: Another way to become more aggressive is to shift costs from marginal costs to xed costs. With lower marginal costs of production, a rm hits the point MC = MR at higher production level than before (in its monopoly calculations for its residual market). Again, because of production in uence on rivals, it is possible to improve pro ts by shifting towards a xed cost production technology, e.g. building new, faster (but expensive) machinery. The natural extension of this result is that it might be desirable to choose a more costly technology which is weighted towards xed costs over a cheaper one weighted towards marginal costs. Example: Suppose that p(q) = 9 Q; k 1 = k 2 = 3: The rms are identical, each with marginal costs of 3 and no xed costs. The Cournot equilibrium is for each to produce (A k)=3 or 2 each, with a market price of 5. Each rm produces 3 units of the good at a total cost of 6, while incurring a cost of 3*2 =
11 How much would rm 1 pay to reduce its marginal cost to 0? You would not think that it would ever pay more than its current production costs of 6. But let s see what happens. With c 1 = 0, rm 1 s optimal reaction to rm 2 is to produce (9 9q 2 )=2, which is an increase from the earlier value of 3 (q 2 =2). Note that xed costs play no role in the market competition because they are taken to be sunk costs at that point. Then the Cournot equilibrium is q 1 = 4; q 2 = 1; p = 4. By shifting to a lower marginal cost technology, rm 1 in uences rm 2 to cut production by 50%! Now rm 1 s production costs are given by the xed cost, F C and its pro t is 16 F C. It is pro table to spend up to 12 to change technologies, even though that shift could increase the production costs in the relevant range of possibilities Managerial Contracts A nal method to become more aggressive is to pay your managers a bonus based on marketshare rather than total pro ts. That is quite unusual because most contracting issues involve attempts to align the incentives of employees with those of the rm. Paradoxically, oligopoly competition is one instance where it can improve pro ts of the rm to have its managers value something else. If the managers value market share, then they will always choose to produce more output than suggested by the reaction curve. That in turn causes other rms to be more conservative. It is the e ect on other rms that is paramount here. Once again, the commitment to aggressiveness can increase pro ts. Kreps problem 16.2 develops this idea further Price Competition It may seem that price rather than quantity competition is a more natural model. After all, rms cannot choose their market shares, which is at the core of Cournot competition. In fact, it is said that Cournot wished to study a situation in which the strategic choice of rms was the price rather than the quantities, but that he felt that it was too di cult that way. Price competition is known as Bertrand competition. In its extreme form, the rms have unlimited capacity of production, constant and identical marginal costs k, and undi erentiated goods. The rms choose prices simultaneously and the rm which charges a lower price will 271
12 capture the whole market. They split the market at equal prices. Unfortunately, this model produces an astonishing and somewhat unbelievable result: the only equilibrium is for both rms to choose a price equal to their marginal cost, yielding no pro ts whatsoever. The proof of this result is really quite simple: the best response for rm 1 to any price p 2 > MC = k is a price just less than p 2. Similarly, the best response for rm 2 to any price p 1 > k is a price just less than p 1. Price equals marginal cost equals k is the only way both can be simultaneously playing best responses to the other s action. In this case, tatonnement takes the form of continual undercutting of prices. If the initial price is above marginal cost, the rms will reduce those prices ruthlessly to attempt to take the whole market, and they will continue cutting prices until price reaches marginal cost. Comment: This actual story of price competition is an explanation of why it might be that rms o er minimum price guarantees. If you have to o er rebates to previous customers whenever you cut the price, then this reduces your incentives to cut the price, even if it allows you to capture the whole market. If all the rms o er minimum price guarantees, then they may be able to maintain a pro table price and escape from the cutthroat competition that drove the price down to marginal cost Linking Bertrand and Cournot Results Since Bertrand and Cournot each o er such di erent conclusions about the results of market pricing, we would like to resolve their seeming clash. With slightly more realistic assumptions, the Bertrand model adjusts to produce results close to Cournot outcomes. 1. Let the rms choose capacities in period 1 (building expenses are increasing in capacity) and then choose prices in period 2. If the capacity of the rms are not large enough to meet the full market demand individually, then they could charge di erent prices and yet each still have some market share. 2. Allow for a cost of congestion. As one rm gains more customers, it cannot o er such good service to them, either because of long lines or because it is straining its production limits. 3. The rms o er slightly di erentiated products. Even if Coke is considerably cheaper than Pepsi, some customers will still buy Pepsi. Any of these adjustments produces an equilibrium which resembles pure Cournot competi- 272
13 tion more than it resembles pure Bertrand outcomes. 273
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Presiding over a meeting of High Economic Council on Sunday, President Ashraf Ghani assigned a team to work on ways that could help to enhance the exports of Afghan pine nuts abroad, a move which will have significant impacts on boosting local economies particularly in Afghanistan's urban areas.
Ghani thanked the Khost governor, Hukum Habibi, for his efforts to increase the trade of pine nuts in the province, saying government will provide equal opportunities to all provincial governors to boost the sector.
In turn, the Khost governor said his province is unique in terms of having fertile land for agriculture and that it has the right climate for pine nuts.
He also said thousands of tons of dry fruit from Khost is exported to various countries every year.
Khost is known for its moderate climate, forests, pine nuts and walnuts.
According to Habibi, Afghanistan exports 30,000 to 33,000 tons of pine nuts annually – a sector that also creates jobs for local people.
The meeting was also attended by high level government officials including Naseer Ahmad Durani, acting minister of agriculture, and irrigation; Humayoun Rasa, minister of commerce; Mustafa Mastoor, acting minister of economy and MP Obaidullah Ramin.
The officials said government must ensure that the exports of Afghanistan's pine nuts are carried out in a professional manner and under the name of Afghanistan. They also said revenue generated from the export of pine nuts must be tackled transparently and distributed fairly.
Ghani said a joint team of officials from the ministries of agriculture, economy, finance, commerce and the office of the presidential advisory on banking affairs must work together to find ways to help boost the sector.
Pine nut trees are mostly found in Afghanistan's eastern provinces of Nangarhar, Laghman, Nuristan, Kunar, Paktia, Khost and Paktika provinces.
Pine nuts also constitutes one of the major income sources for local people. A recent report Pine Nuts Global Report one of the major drivers for this market is the multiple health benefits associated with pine nuts.
The report found that as consumers around the world become more health conscious, there has been an exponential increase in the consumption of natural food products.
"Consumers are becoming more conscious about their health and fitness and paying more attention to the nutritional content of the food that they consume. The health-conscious population demands foods that have lower calorie content but have the right combination of essential nutrients.
Hence, healthy eating has increased the demand for pine nuts as they are unprocessed and contain vitamins, fibres, and naturally occurring minerals," read the report.
Afghanistan is known throughout the world for its fresh and dry fruits. But years of war and violence have hindered the country for taking full advantage of what its land and natural resources offer.
Source: tolonews.com

subset: commoncrawl


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Eight guys from a crime organization in London are sent to guard a coffin.
Instant DeathSD
A vicious gang war for drug dominance draws in a disturbed Special Forces veteran John Bradley. Trying to adjust to normal life and haunted by ...
Blood FeudSD
Two reformed thugs embark on one last JOB - to seek FORGIVENESS. Not easy, as their violent pasts CREEP back to haunt them in the ...
Bonded by Blood 2SD
In the aftermath of the infamous 'Essex Boys' Range Rover killings, a group of younger, flashier criminals emerge to fill the power vacuum.
Full English BreakfastHD
Through flashbacks, Full English Breakfast follows the violent career of Dave Bishop (Dave Courtney) a small-time London villain who kills his way to the top ...


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Banks welcome UK Brexit plan but eye relocating from London anyway
Related topics
Finance firms welcomed Prime Minister Theresa May's pledge to deliver a "phased approach" to the UK's withdrawal from the European Union's single market even as they said they were preparing for the worst.
"We do not seek membership of the single market," May said in a speech in London on Tuesday. "Instead we seek the greatest possible access to it through a new, comprehensive, bold and ambitious free trade agreement."
While May promised to fight for a transitional period that would allow financial-services firms time to adjust to whatever new trade deal is agreed with the EU -- a key industry demand -- there are no guarantees she will be successful.
Absent of firm assurances that their rights to sell services freely around the EU from London will be protected, banks have said they will start the process of moving operations into Europe within weeks of the government triggering Brexit talks.
"If you don't know where you are going, you have to plan for the worst and execute faster," HSBC Holdings Plc Chairman Douglas Flint said earlier Tuesday. "This isn't rocket science."
Laying out the government's Brexit plans with 12 core objectives, May said that she was confident a deal could be reached with the EU once the trigger to leave is pulled by the end of March. She called for "a smooth and orderly Brexit."
"We support the phased approach outlined today that would allow businesses time to adjust to a new deal at the end of the Article 50 period," TheCityUK Chief Executive Officer Miles Celic said in a statement. "Ensuring sufficient time for highly regulated industries such as UK-based financial and related professional services to do this will be key."
Financial services firms may derive some comfort from May's assurances around transitional arrangements and selective access to the single market for certain industries, according to Caroline Meinertz, regulatory partner at Clifford Chance. "The real question now is whether firms will match the prime minister's optimism that such goals are achievable, and how long they can risk waiting for more concrete assurances."
Much will "remain uncertain for some time despite the 12 point plan," said Mark Peters, a managing director at London-based consulting firm Protiviti. "There remains significant unknown risks and threats to an organisation's business objectives, financial management and its business operating model."
Reacting to May's comments, Morgan Stanley executives said on a call with analysts they will likely have to set up a new headquarters somewhere in continental Europe to comply with the new rules. In June, Morgan Stanley President Colm Kelleher said that would most likely be Dublin or Frankfurt.
Speaking earlier on Tuesday, Aberdeen Asset Management CEO Martin Gilbert said it was time for banks to decide whether they were going to move to Dublin, Paris or Frankfurt.
"You have to work out where you are going and you have to plan for the worst and hope for the best," Gilbert said.
There's little doubt the decision to break from the single market is bad news for the City, and for the U.K., said Blair Adams, a partner with DMH Stallard, a London-based law firm that represents hedge funds and other investment companies.
"The harder the Brexit, the faster and stronger the erosion of London's position as a financial services centre," Adams said.
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"Sometimes I do smart things. Sometimes I do dumb things. Most of the time I don't do anything."
Does it happened that you have a group project in class and you are assigned to lead the group? It is a notable position but stressful. Being a leader is considering even the most little factor that could affect your group and your project. It can be tiresome, but when you're done with a positive result, then achievement can be seen on your accomplishments.
There are challenges in leading a group, the obstacle you'll face will not be easy. This can be tiresome, to hold the duty of pushing your group mates to become responsible and productive members will not be easy especially on lazy group members.
If you are dealing with lazy group members in your dissertation writing services project, you'll find this post a helpful reference. This will help you guide those lazy groupmates of yours to become a productive one.
Evaluate your group mates. In the process of evaluation make sure that you'll not judge them base on the first glance, remember the quote "don't judge a book by its cover". Sometimes, they can be capable of doing you least expect them to do.
Assign individual task for everybody. Explain carefully the task you'll give in easch member. Tell them that you trust each of them, boost their morale by saying that they are all responsible.
Set Objectives. Every successful project starts with good planning. Make a smart plan that will be understand by every member, create objectives that will have an terrific result.
Reward. Prize, is a good form of motivation. A person can be pushed by an extra points after completing their task. Rewards will surely ignite the productive side of the lazy member.


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- BAUTISTA SANTOS ANGELAsked on December 10, 2016 at 12:29 AM
- JotForm SupportBJoannaAnswered on December 10, 2016 at 12:40 AM
I saw that my colleague Aury replied to you via email.
Your account is suspended because there is a dispute placed on the credit card used to pay for the subscription. Until this issue is resolved your account will remain suspended.
If you have any followup question, I would suggest you to reply to email that Aury sent you, because she will have more info regarding this issue.
- BAUTISTA SANTOS ANGELAnswered on January 11, 2017 at 06:10 PM
My user name is angelbauts
I try to sign up but this error appears.
Account Suspended
Due to terms of use violation, your account has been suspended. If you think this is a mistake please contact us to resolve this issue.
I had problems with my bank, and they did not cancel my internet payments by mistake. I need to retrieve my account, they sent me this email to reactivate it, but send me the error "Unable Switch subscription. Please try again by clicking the button below." If the problem .... Sorry for the inconvenience. I need to reactivate my account. I will pay whatever you need to pay.
- JotForm SupportEltonCrisAnswered on January 12, 2017 at 12:32 AM
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AIME was founded by the American composer and pianist, Paul Leavitt. We have always taken great pleasure in meeting people from all over the world, including (but not limited to) New Zealand, Iceland, Canada, Japan, Rwanda.... Only a basic understanding of French will be needed to understand the conductor's instructions, so you will be very welcome, wherever you come from.
We don't ask for any previous experience - though that is always helpful - so come and try a couple of rehearsals with us and see how you get on. You can email us in English or leave a message on our phone and we'll get back to you - or just turn up at a rehearsal. You will find details on the Contact page of this website. We look forward to meeting you!


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For many Americans making just enough to get by and with minimal balances in their bank accounts, the idea of getting into investing probably sounds laughable. Even for those that might be able to set aside a small amount each month to put into the stock market, commissions and fees can quickly eat up any chance at a positive return.
Let's take the hypothetical scenario of a 20-something waiting tables. Maybe she has $100/month that she would like to put into the market. Since that budget already puts shares of Google (GOOG), Apple (AAPL), and Amazon (AMZN) out of reach, she might aim for some affordable blue-chip stocks, like Coca-Cola (KO), Microsoft (MSFT), or General Electric (GE). The problem is that brokers charge commission fees to process a transaction. For many online brokerages, those fees amount to $7.95 to $10 per trade. So even if our waitress wants to buy only a couple shares, she still has to pay as much as $10 in fees. On a $100 investment, she's already starting with a 10% loss.
Zero-Fee Trading
Enter Robinhood, an app developed by Vladimir Tenev and Baiju Bhatt, Stanford grads with years of experience in finance. Backed by investments from Google Ventures, Andressen Horowitz, Index Ventures, and Ribbit Capital and protected by the SIPC—the same corporation that insures investors' money with E*Trade, Fidelity, and others—Robinhood aims to make investing a feasible option for people who can only afford to dabble in the market.
By eliminating commissions altogether, our waitress can put the entirety of her $100 budget into the market without starting out behind the 8-ball.
The App
Robinhood boasts a slick, minimalist interface, with easy visual cues such as a light background when the market is open and a dark background when it's closed. With real-time data, you can view a stock's trends back as far as one year, and basic analytics such as 52-week high/low, P/E ratio, and dividend yield are also available.
Buying shares is as simple as pressing the "Buy" button on a given stock, choosing the number of shares, rewviewing the estimated cost of your order, and swiping up to confirm.
Since other brokerages make money from commissions and fees, it might be concerning that Robinhood doesn't have an apparent revenue stream. Fortunately, the creators of Robinhood have simply found other ways of monetizing their service. They plan on accruing interest from cash in users' accounts, in much the same way as one might earn interest from cash in a bank. Additionally, as the user base expands, they hope to sell their trading volume to stock exchanges, who will pay for the additional liquidity that offers.
For Now
For now, the primary goal is to get users off of the waitlist and into the market. Even with the best laid plans and a strong infrastructure, it's hard to know for certain whether the idea will work in practice. Still, as someone who is interested in investing but doesn't have a lot of cash to put in, Robinhood has my full attention as a way for me to get started right now.
Update (12/17): I've just been accepted off the waitlist and have submitted my account for approval. Once it's approved I can fund it and start investing real money through Robinhood. I plan on doing a follow-up post down the line with my thoughts on the experience.
Update 2 (12/26): My application remains pending. I've emailed support and they stressed patience as they try to onboard more users. It's hard to see how "onboarding" them helps if these people can't get through the application process. These are the growing pains of a new startup, but it is frustrating nonetheless.


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SOUTH BEND — St. Joseph County Assessor David Wesolowski says he is ready for whatever might happen with the two remaining township assessors who face a referendum in the Nov. 4 election.
Voters will decide if Rosemary Mandrici will keep her job in Portage Township, and Greg Bock will keep his in Penn. The countyÂ?s other 11 townships lost their assessors on July 1 as part of House Enrolled Act 1001, which is changing the way some things are done in state and local governments.
Wesolowski met Wednesday night with the county commissioners and council to talk about his 2009 budget.
Commissioner Steve Ross said the state has created a lot of problems for counties under the new law, and he wanted to know how Wesolowski is dealing with them.
The county assessor said his office remains behind on taxes for 2007, payable this year, but he hopes to catch up for this yearÂ?s assessments, with bills due in 2009.
He hired several employees from the townships that lost their assessors, but said some of them have quit.
Ross questioned why Wesolowski did not hire the displaced township assessors, since they have the skills, training and certifications to do the job.
Wesolowski said HEA 1001 provided for them to stay on the payroll through the end of this year, even though they have had no responsibility since July 1. He said he has been using the assessors from Harris and Centre townships to help him catch up with some of the backlogged work.
Ross tried to pin him down on whether he will retain the Portage and Penn assessors if they are voted out of office. They already have their Level II licenses, he said, and have the necessary skills to move seamlessly onto the county staff.
Pay might be a problem, Wesolowski said. Mandrici receives $47,700 as the Portage Township assessor, while Bock is paid $45,700.
Wesolowski said he has been paying $12 an hour for his office staff, which equates to about $25,000 a year. He doesnÂ?t think Mandrici and Bock will be willing to take that much of a pay cut, and it wouldnÂ?t be fair to the other workers if he paid them more.
Commissioner Mark Dobson suggested that their knowledge and skill levels might justify a higher rate.
Ross also wondered what will happen if the added workload of Portage and Penn, which comprise 60 percent of the properties in the county, might cause WesolowskiÂ?s staff to implode.
"I donÂ?t want to think about the worst-case scenario," Wesolowski said. He insisted heÂ?ll be ready to take on the extra workload.
Staff writer Nancy J. Sulok:
(574) 235-6234


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If you're reading this it's too late - you're thinking about becoming a runner. Luckily, you've come to the right place because our website is full of running tips and resources to help you navigate your running journey. Below you'll find links to some of our most helpful blog posts to get you off of your couch.
Before you start reading, let's get one thing clear - City Fit Girls is a community for women of all fitness levels and abilities. That means that you don't have to be the "best", the "fastest", or the most experienced runner to use any of the info provided on this website. We believe that running is a great form of exercise that can lead to plenty of mental and physical benefits.
P.S. If you're brand new to running and fitness, we recommend visiting your primary care physician before starting any new physical fitness program.
How to start running
- City Fit Girls Running 101
- City Fit Girls Guide To Run 1-Mile
- How Do I Know My Running Pace?
- How To Sign Up for Your First Race
What Should You Wear To Run
- How To Pick The Best Running Shoes For YOU
- Should You Wear Underwear On Your Runs?
- How To Pick The Best Running & Fitness Sports Bras
How to Recover after a run
- How To Recover After A Workout or Run
- How To Foam Roll Like A Pro
- How To Rock Your Rest Day
- What the Heck is Plantar Fasciitis?
Cross-Training & Building Strength for Running
Finding Inspiration & Motivation To Run
What Should I Eat During/After My Run?


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Ghost stories, urban legends, historical serial killers and 'Pompey noir' are just a few of the subjects set to be explored in a month-long festival celebrating the darker side of art and culture.
Portsmouth DarkFest – a spin-off from the University of Portsmouth-led Supernatural Cities project – will bring together creative talent from the city and beyond for a packed programme of storytelling, live music, poetry performances, talks, plays, film screenings and art exhibitions at venues across Portsmouth from October 27 to November 30.
Highlights of the event – a collaboration between the University, Portsmouth Writers' Hub and local arts collective 1000 Plateaus – include an evening with thriller writer Andy McNab (October 27), screenings of film classics including Sleepy Hollow (October 29) and The Shining (November 30), a 'dark songs' evening at The Square Tower (November 6), a ghost walk around Old Portsmouth (November 14), a lecture on urban monsters Spring-Heeled Jack and Jack the Ripper (November 16) and a 'femmes fatales' writers' workshop (November 24).
There will also be a short story competition for teenagers at local schools.
Organiser Dr Karl Bell, senior history lecturer and director of the Supernatural Cities project, said: "The festival will celebrate all things dark and sinister, bringing together Portsmouth's diverse but often disconnected creative communities around a common theme for one month.
"This promises to be a public engagement extravaganza, tapping into a popular interest in the supernatural, the macabre, crime and urban noir in the wake of Halloween."
Supernatural Cities is an interdisciplinary network of humanities and social science scholars of urban environments and the supernatural.
For more information about the festival go to www.lifeisamazing.co.uk/darkfest. Anyone with questions about the festival can contact Dr Bell through firstname.lastname@example.com.


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Ieva Ozolina with docomentary "Solving My Mother" won de IDFA Special Jury Award for First Appearance in memory of Peter Wintonick.
The camera, recording as an omnipresent, invisible presence, exposes these crippled relations in long drawnout scenes. We witness Raitis's painful attempts to get closer to women and an awkward direct confrontation with his father, as well as a tragic attempt at celebrating Easter with his mother, brother and grandfather. The ease with which he can do complex sums in his head contrasts starkly with the difficulties Raitis experiences in his relationships. The extremely intimate footage becomes ever more excruciating, as it almost heartlessly exposes how a motherson relationship that was destructive to start with deteriorates even further.
FA Filma is a Latvian film production company, producing feature films and documentaries with artistic merit, lately focusing on co-productions. Our films have won numerous festival awards and were distributed internationally.
We also provide full spectrum of production service for films, commercials and music videos in Latvia and the neighboring countries. During your production in Latvia FA Filma will secure you effective solutions and internationally experienced English-speaking crews, professional camera, light and grip equipment and sound stages. Creatively we can offer script consulting and editing.
Madara Melberga – producer
Laura Olina - production manager/ office manager
Juris Poškus –director


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Eastern Beacon Industries offers a wide range of quality training. We can provide individual, company, or agency training. Our training staff are all law enforcement and military officers.
You can call us toll free (855-883-0097) or complete a contact form and specify the training.
- DOJ Handgun Safety Class
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Manipur face Tamil Nadu in Senior Women's National Football Championship final
Manipur defeated Railways 2-1, while Tamil Nadu thrashed West Bengal 4-1 in the semi-finals of the Senior Women's National Football Championship on Mondayfootball Updated: Feb 12, 2018 22:07 IST
Manipur beat a spirited Railways 2-1 today to book a summit clash showdown against Tamil Nadu in the 23rd Senior Women's National Football Championship in Cuttack on Monday.
Star striker Bala Devi struck twice (13th and 85th minutes) for Manipur while Kamala Devi (14th) scored the lone goal for Railways in the second semifinal match at the Barabati Stadium.
Earlier in the first semifinals, Tamil Nadu outplayed West Bengal 4-1. The final match will be played on Wednesday.
Both the teams played an open game from the beginning, exchanging quick passes and timely interceptions in an exciting display of football.
Manipur struck first blood when Railways keeper Samal failed to latch onto Bala's powerful shot in the 13th minute.
But even before the celebrations could die down on the Manipur bench, Railways struck back with Kamala Devi making an exceptional run into the box to score the equaliser in the 14th minute.
The second half saw both teams looking for the match-winner but a disciplined display at the back blunted out each other's attacking intentions.
Prameshwori came close but her shot went over the bar while Kamala's shot was well judged by Panthoi at the other end as both teams matched each other at every turn.
Just as it seemed that the game was headed towards extra-time, Railways resistance was broken when Bala Devi poked it in from a goal mouth melee in the 85th minute, her goal turning out to be the winner and eventual difference between the two sides.
First Published: Feb 12, 2018 22:07 IST


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Anyone who's spent some time on Vimeo in the last few years should be familiar with a certain surge in fawning Icelandic tourism videography, the tropes of which are immediately recognizable, from time-lapse footage of waterfalls to leisurely pans of glaciers, all accompanied by sub-Sigur Rós post-rock. If a mark of distinction can be conferred upon the Icelandic-American production Autumn Lights, it's that writer-director Angad Aulakh more or less skirts these conventions. Save for the occasional pillow shot of a distantly viewed snowcapped mountain or a glassy lake surface, the filmmaker keeps most of his story's action confined to interiors, and when his characters do venture into the great outdoors, they spend most of their time in dense pine groves that effectively block off Iceland's picturesque vistas.
The choice of Iceland as a story setting isn't arbitrary, however, as the round-the-clock soft gray daylight of the country's summer months provides a visual corollary to the screenplay's emphasis on the failed suppression of secrets. While strolling a foggy shoreline one afternoon, a vacationing American photographer, David (Guy Kent), stumbles upon one such truth hidden in plain sight: a female corpse. But while this discovery involves him in an investigation that mandates a longer stay at his secluded cabin, the casualty is little more than a red herring, an initial glaze of intrigue that frees up time for David to become enmeshed in a comparatively mundane love triangle with a flighty but seductive Italian woman, Marie (Marta Gastini), and her severe Nordic husband, Jóhann (Sveinn Ólafur Gunnarsson).
Jóhann and Marie are the social butterflies of the local community, and the film's narrative is ushered along by a pair of soirées held at their posh modern property, where David's attraction to the waiflike Marie, as well as his jealousy in the midst of her flirtatiousness, become apparent. These party scenes feel palpably inauthentic, as everyone's overdressed, classical music is dialed down to the point of being swallowed by the unnerving dead air, and rote small talk is repeatedly employed as a carrier of functional backstory, but it's the private one-on-ones that branch off from these ensemble scenes that really expose Aulakh's clumsy approximation of naturalism.
Throughout the film, recurring discussions about the differences between urban and rural living and the riddle of female desire make all too evident Aulakh's thematic concerns, and the script's blunt edges aren't exactly smoothed by the performers: Kent displays little charisma as the ostensibly desirable leading man, while Gastini's hesitant monotone delivery only seems to rationalize her character's sporadic tendency to dip into Italian.
With its faux-realist handheld camera and moody soundtrack of sustained glockenspiel and cello dolloped generously onto David's gloomy wanderings, Autumn Lights has the forced gravity of a routine network mystery series, except there's no real mystery to be solved here. Like a landlocked Bergman chamber drama divested of any ambivalence regarding human relationships, the film methodically works toward its moralistic thesis, fleshing out its disapproval of Marie's sexual promiscuity with each aborted romantic tryst and subsequent spell of emotional frustration. That it gradually devolves into a succession of monologues whereby David mansplains the importance of emotional commitment feels like a natural endpoint. It's a trajectory so dull, leaden, and unambiguously misogynist that by the end it's easy to find oneself longing for some spectacular nature photography as distraction.


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epidermolysis bullosa lethalis
Definition: a form of epidermolysis bullosa characterized by persistent and nonhealing perioral and perinasal crusted lesions with bullae often present in the oral mucosa and trachea, but not on the palms and soles, complicated by dermal sepsis and serum protein and electrolyte loss leading to death; autosomal recessive inheritance, caused by mutation in any one of the three distinct polypeptides of laminin-5; alpha-3 (LAMA3) on chromosome 18q, beta-3 (LAMB3) and gamma-2 (LAMC2) on 1q or the gene encoding integrin, beta-4 (ITGB4) on 17q.
Synonym(s): epidermolysis bullosa, junctional type, Herlitz syndrome
Further information
Always consult your healthcare provider to ensure the information displayed on this page applies to your personal circumstances.
© Copyright 2018 Wolters Kluwer. All Rights Reserved. Review date: Sep 19, 2016.


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People Magazine has named the Sexiest Man Alive for 2017.The issue will hit stands Wednesday.
Earlier Tuesday, People revealed other men on the list, including Zac Efron, Kumail Nanjiani, 50 Cent and Armie Hammer.
The editors also ranked what features qualify the stars for making the sexy list.
Looking Back at Dwayne 'The Rock' Johnson's Very Sexy Year https://t.co/z7svWqNKNh— People (@people) November 14, 2017
On Tuesday evening, Blake Shelton was announced as this year's Sexiest Man Alive. Not one to be modest, the country singer and "The Voice" coach jokingly said he was excited to rub the honor in Adam Levine's face.
👀🔥😍 @BlakeShelton is this year's #SexiestManAlive! And most importantly, he 'can't wait' to stick it to his fellow #TheVoice judge (and former SMA) @AdamLevine. 😂 https://t.co/LtQ2q8QSkU pic.twitter.com/g7IilIXzxA— People (@people) November 15, 2017
In truth, Shelton needed some convincing once he heard the news. His girlfriend of two years, singer and "The Voice" coach Gwen Stefani, told him to embrace it.
"She goes, 'Listen to me, you're going to regret this for the rest of your life if you don't take this gift and just live in the moment," Shelton said.
Thank you @people!!!! Don't hate me because I'm beautiful... https://t.co/rX6GCGTO3U pic.twitter.com/uWwV0KxjVV— Blake Shelton (@blakeshelton) November 15, 2017
The 6'5" 41-year-old plans on using his new title as often as he can.
"I've been ugly my whole life," he said. "If I can be sexy for a year, I'm taking it. I'm taking it."


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Traditionally, Joomla extensions stored all their assets (images, javascript, css, flash files…) inside the extension's folder. However, because these files are supposed to be publicly accessible, and all other files should stay hidden, that doesn't really make sense. Fortunately, this was fixed in Joomla 1.5.4. Extensions can now use the /media folder.
How does it work?
Very easy: simply add a media tag in your extension's manifest file.
Inside your installable package, you should now have the folders /site and /media. During the extension's installation, the files from /media will be copied to /media/com_mycomp (or plg_myplugin or mod_mymodule).
Separating publicly accessible assets from the rest of the system like this has some security advantages. Ideally, you'd move all other files below the document root, increasing security. Joomla doesn't support this yet. What you can do however, is add a htaccess file in /com_mycomp with 'deny from all'. This way you don't need to litter your component with index.html files and defined('_JEXEC') or die(); statements. Of course, this assumes that the end user's host has AllowOverride turned on.


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Fourth District Justice of the Peace Mandy Alford has announced she will be a candidate for re-election in the May 22 Democratic primary.
Fourth District Justice of the Peace Mandy Alford has announced she will be a candidate for re-election in the May 22 Democratic primary.
Alford has held the position on the Jefferson County Quorum Court for six years.
She is currently chairman of the community development/grants committee and serves on the health and welfare and solid waste/recycling committees.
In a news release, Alford said she worked hard for the passage of the Jefferson County Economic Development Tax and �as a current member of the Pine Bluff Regional Chamber of Commerce, she is looking forward to ever-increasing economic growth and benefits for Southeast Arkansas.�
Then-Gov. Dale Bumpers appointed Alford to the Arkansas State Alcohol and Drug Abuse Coordination Council where she served as a member of the grants committee, appropriating millions of dollars to substance abuse programs from 1997 to 2001.
She has also held leadership positions in the Episcopal Diocese of Arkansas.
�Ensuring that area agencies have the resources they need to operate is one of the most important aspects of serving on the quorum court,� Alford said, �as well as making sure agency employees are paid a fair wage.�
As a registered nurse, Alford has worked for the Jefferson County Health Department as well as volunteering for the Red Cross Bloodmobile and as a Contact Telephone volunteer. She was also appointed to the Jefferson County Emergency Ambulance Committee, a position she still holds.
�After much prayer and discussion, I determined that serving as justice of the peace is a way for me to put my leadership skills to work for a positive impact on the community,� she said.
Alford is a member of Grace Episcopal Church where she serves on the church Board and as a lay minister. She is also a member of the Jefferson County Democratic Women�s Club and the University of Arkansas Cooperative Extension Service Planning Committee, �Dedicated to Turning the Tide on Poverty.�


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How does one paint fur? In this lesson we experimented with different ways of dragging and stamping to create fur texture, working wet in wet to make a blurry, fuzzy edge and creating a jagged edge to a shape to read as fur. Next we worked on a portrait of a furry animal using these various approaches.
Barbara used dry brush stokes to create a fur texture and negative painted an irregular edge on the right, sunlit side of the dog to say 'fur'.
Dan began working very wet letting the paint form blurry edges. Later he sharpened up the left edge and added line work on the right in the tail.
Nancy worked with flat patches of color letting the jagged edges say 'fur'.
Rochelle used the red to paint a sharp furry edge around her cat and used gray to create some jagged edges in the neck fur.
Saturday, October 31, 2009
Lesson 55 Furry Animals
Posted by Viewpoints Gallery at 11:49 AM
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text: Our visit to Toronto last summer was sponsored in part by Toronto Tourism #SeeTorontoNow. Opinions expressed are those of Canadian Blog House. If I asked you what the number one Toronto tourist attraction is, what would you say? The CN Tower? I would. I don't have any hard facts or figures but, if I had to take a guess, that would be it. What I do know … [Read more...] about 10 Things To Do Once You've Been Up The CN Tower


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Today I cut out the whisperweft, ironed the glue side on to the facing, stitched the darts, gathering and bodice shoulders. I was confident because we had already gone through this when making the toile.
I spoke to my tutor about my next dresses that I want to make: M6201 and M5850.
I spoke to my tutor about my next dresses that I want to make: M6201 and M5850.
Was abit ambitious thinking I could get a dress together for the January engagement, but I don't think that will happen. Tutor says I can make the 6201 with satin back crepe because it is easy for beginners, but still has the look of satin which is what I am after.
I'll buy the 5850 pattern anyway since it's a 2-4-1 sale.
See below for the photo from Pattern Review for 6201, its a beautiful dress!!!! Then tonight I saw a Forever New dress that looks easy to make!
Can't wait!
|Forever New ad in Vogue magazine.
|McCall's 6201 - Photo courtesy of Pattern Review member : review.


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Sep.21 2010
posted in holy trinity catholic church
1 comment
Date: July 24, 2010
Ceremony and Reception: Holy Trinity Catholic Church, San Antonio, Texas
One of the most emotional weddings that I have ever witnessed.
I covered Amanda's getting ready at a local salon and then at her parents house in San Antonio. I was really impressed by how close her family was, with her parents and her 4 siblings.
Frank works at a well known political think tank in Washington DC, and Amanda is also moving to the area right after the wedding. We can feel during the day that this was going to be a really emotional day for them, since she's getting married and moving on the same day.
The wedding took place at the Holy Trinity Catholic church – originally Hazel and I didn't think we photograph there before but as soon as I saw those awesome red rows of chairs, I knew I have been there, about four years and over hundred weddings ago (and yes, I remember the red chairs!) One of the best thing about the Holy Trinity is the unobscured views from literally all angles. We discovered that it has some seriously nice light during day time – four years ago the wedding was at night, so there weren't any available day light through.
Dad gets emotional when we head over to the church….
We love how playful Amanda and her bridesmaids/sisters were and knew it would be a really fun reception to follow.
Frank singing to Lady Gaga…
Love the little kid here – he has a small Canon G10 I think and was shooting up close, like what I do 🙂
Amanda's sister serenades to her:
One of the most emotional ending to a wedding….
What an incredible, emotional, and fun wedding! Congratulations Amanda and Frank!
San Antonio Wedding Photography by Tony Ku, Ku Photography LLC


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May 3, 1863 (Sunday)
All through the long night into the dawn, General Joe Hooker completely reorganized his defenses at Chancellorsville. Stonewall Jackson's flank attack had smashed his right flank and compressed his lines to a piece of high ground called Hazel Grove. John Reynold's newly-arrived I Corps now held his fully refused right, while O.O. Howard's routed XI Corps held the left. In the center was a hodge podge of four different corps, with General Dan Sickle's III Corps holding Hazel Grove.
The Rebel Army was fully divided with two divisions personally commanded by Robert E. Lee on the right and Stonewall Jackson's entire corps, now under Jeb Stuart on the left. Stuart had been selected to take over by Jackson at the field hospital where his arm had been amputated. Jackson would soon be taken to his old headquarters at Guinea Station, south of Fredericksburg.
General Lee, knowing that his divided army was extremely vulnerable, wanted more than anything to combine the two wings. In the early morning, he called upon Jackson's topographer, Jedediah Hotchkiss, to tell Stuart to "press the enemy vigorously."
Meanwhile, Union Generals Hooker and Sickles were examining Hazel Grove. The problem with this bit of high ground was that it was a salient. It could be attacked from three sides and, Hooker believed, would fall – so why defend it? Sickles, on the other hand, wanted very much to defend it, suggesting Hooker move forward his lines so that it wouldn't be the salient that it was. Hooker wouldn't budge and ordered Sickles to fall back.
As they fell back, the Rebels under Stuart attacked. They had targeted Hazel Grove and were willing to pay a bloody price for it, but thanks to Joe Hooker, all they met was Sickles' small rear guard. As soon as the hill was in Rebel hands, Stuart called for the artillery, which placed fifty guns atop the bluff. And now Stuart could the assault in earnest.
Back at Fredericksburg, General Lee had left William Barksdale's Brigade atop Marye's Heights, above the town, with Jubal Early's spread out division to the south. Joe Hooker had called upon John Sedgwick's VI Corps to take the town, carry the heights and attack up the Plank Road towards Chancellorsville. This would bring him in behind Lee's army.
Somehow or another, Barksdale's men held as Sedgwick made first one assault, and then another. Seeing that the Rebel flank was dangling in the open, a Federal commander called for a flag of truce under the pretense of collecting the wounded. However, the true reason was to see exactly what they were up against. With the information of just how few Rebels remained, the Yankees renewed the attack, sweeping the Southerners out of their entrenchments by assaulting the flank and the front.
With the fall of Marye's Heights, Jubal Early's entire line was in peril. But General Sedgwick wasn't interested in fighting Early's entire division. He had orders to make a run for Chancellorsville and the rear of Lee's Confederate Army.
While Sedgwick was overrunning Barksdale, around Chancellorsville, things were getting hot for Joe Hooker. Now, with the two divisions under Lee's command joining in with Jeb Stuart's assault, he was penned in. Hooker wanted to counterattack, but he had left himself no such room. The ground of his choosing was only good for defense.
Stuart seemed to be everywhere at once. He was bold and maintained not a doubt in his ability to lead an entire corps of infantry. As he rode the lines, his men could hear him singing, "Old Joe Hooker, won't you come on out the wilderness" to the tune of "The Old Gray Mare." His dashing and bravery emboldened the men. With the artillery in Hazel Grove pounding away at the Union lines, he sent forward everything he had, and the Southerners screamed ferociously into the Union lines.
General Hooker, commanding his army from the Chancellor House, was standing on the pillared porch, about to receive a call for reinforcements from Sickles, when a Rebel artillery shell struck the pillar next to where he was standing. It split down the center, throwing one half into Hooker's head and side, knocking him to the ground.
Almost immediately, the rumor spread that Hooker had been killed. But he was not dead, only dazed. He insisted upon being lifted onto a horse and began to ride. Soon, the pain became so intense that he nearly fell off his mount. Helped to the ground, he was given brandy, which seemed to do the trick, and before long was back in command. But the shock had taken something out of him.
In trying to find a way to stem Stuart's Confederate attack, George Meade, commanding the V Corps, saw that his corps and John Reynolds' I Corps were positioned on Stuart's left flank. He found Hooker and asked for permission to launch an attack that would derail the Rebel assault. Hooker denied it. Reynolds saw the same thing, but was also denied.
Hooker, suffering from the wound, retired to his tent and called together Generals Couch, Meade, and others. To Couch, his second in command, he said, "I turn the command of the army over to you. You will withdraw it and place it in the position designated on this map."
Had Hooker simply placed Couch in charge, giving him full discretion to do as he saw fit, Meade and Reynolds would probably have been able to attack. But Couch followed Hooker's orders, and called for Sickle's III Corps to fall back, contracting the Union center.
At Chancellorsville, the victory for General Lee was complete. But, through messengers, he learned that Jubal Early's lines had been broken at Fredericksburg. Sedgwick's Federal VI Corps was streaming towards him, threatening to ruin it all.
Quickly, Lee dispatched McLaw's Division, sending them east towards Fredericksburg and Sedgwick's coming troops. Meanwhile, Early had put up a successful delaying action, while the brigade of Cadmus Wilcox, which had been severed from Early's line when the Federals attacked, played upon Sedgwick's marching column, slowing it up even more.
Wilcox was able to get in front of Sedgwick's Corps at Salem Church, halfway between Chancellorsville and Fredericksburg. There, they were joined by McLaws' Division. Both sides unlimbered artillery and pounded each other until the Federals attacked in the late afternoon.
The assault pushed the Rebels back, some regiments wavered, and others began to retreat, until a counter charge was ordered for a single Alabama regiment. Seeing their comrades surging forward, soon, the bulk of McLaws' Division joined in. The Yankees reeled back and finally gave. There was no general route for John Sedgwick, but there didn't need to be. All McLaws and Wilcox had to do was stop him. And with dusk and darkness swiftly approaching, Sedgwick's Yankees weren't going any place anytime soon.
As evening crawled across the ground, writhing thick with the wounded and dead, General Lee and Jeb Stuart rode down Orange Plank Road towards the Chancellor House – Hooker's former headquarters. They were greeted with cheers and salutes along the way.
But the battle was not yet won. The Union army greatly outnumbered them, and there was nothing stopping the foe from making an all out assault upon Lee's Army come morning. Nothing aside from General Hooker, of course.1
- Sources: Chancellorsville by Stephen W. Sears; Stonewall Jackson by James I. Robertson; Make Me a Map of the Valley by Jedediah Hotchkiss; A Glorious Army by Jeffry Wert; Chancellorsville by John Bigelow, Jr.; Chancellorsville 1863 by Ernest Furguson; Fighting Joe Hooker by Walter H. Hebert. [↩]