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Iterative Signing of RDF(S) Graphs, Named Graphs, and OWL Graphs: Formalization and Application
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1 Iterative Signing of RDF(S) Graphs, Named Graphs, and OWL Graphs: Formalization and Application Andreas Kasten Ansgar Scherp Nr. 3/2013 Arbeitsberichte aus dem Fachbereich Informatik
2 Die Arbeitsberichte aus dem Fachbereich Informatik dienen der Darstellung vorläufiger Ergebnisse, die in der Regel noch für spätere Veröffentlichungen überarbeitet werden. Die Autoren sind deshalb für kritische Hinweise dankbar. Alle Rechte vorbehalten, insbesondere die der Übersetzung, des Nachdruckes, des Vortrags, der Entnahme von Abbildungen und Tabellen auch bei nur auszugsweiser Verwertung. The Arbeitsberichte aus dem Fachbereich Informatik comprise preliminary results which will usually be revised for subsequent publication. Critical comments are appreciated by the authors. All rights reserved. No part of this report may be reproduced by any means or translated. Arbeitsberichte des Fachbereichs Informatik ISSN (Print): ISSN (Online): Herausgeber / Edited by: Der Dekan: Prof. Dr. Grimm Die Professoren des Fachbereichs: Prof. Dr. Bátori, Prof. Dr. Burkhardt, Prof. Dr. Diller, Prof. Dr. Ebert, Prof. Dr. Frey, Prof. Dr. Furbach, Prof. Dr. Grimm, Prof. Dr. Hampe, Prof. Dr. Harbusch, jprof. Dr. Kilian, Prof. Dr. von Korflesch, Prof. Dr. Lämmel, Prof. Dr. Lautenbach, Prof. Dr. Müller, Prof. Dr. Oppermann, Prof. Dr. Paulus, Prof. Dr. Priese, Prof. Dr. Rosendahl, Prof. Dr. Schubert, Prof. Dr. Sofronie-Stokkermans, Prof. Dr. Staab, Prof. Dr. Steigner, Prof. Dr. Strohmaier, Prof. Dr. Sure, Prof. Dr. Troitzsch, Prof. Dr. Wimmer, Prof. Dr. Zöbel Kontaktdaten der Verfasser Andreas Kasten, Ansgar Scherp Institut für Wirtschafts- und Verwaltungsinformatik Fachbereich Informatik Universität Koblenz-Landau Universitätsstraße 1 D Koblenz
3 Iterative Signing of RDF(S) Graphs, Named Graphs, and OWL Graphs: Formalization and Application Andreas Kasten 1 and Ansgar Scherp 2 1 University of Koblenz, Koblenz, Germany, 2 University of Mannheim, Mannheim, Germany, Abstract. When publishing graph data on the web such as vocabularies using RDF(S) or OWL, one has only limited means to verify the authenticity and integrity of the graph data. Today s approaches require a high signature overhead and do not allow for an iterative signing of graph data. This paper presents a formally defined framework for signing arbitrary graph data provided in RDF(S), Named Graphs, or OWL. Our framework supports signing graph data at different levels of granularity: minimum self-contained graphs (MSG), sets of MSGs, and entire graphs. It supports for an iterative signing of graph data, e. g., when different parties provide different parts of a common graph, and allows for signing multiple graphs. Both can be done with a constant, low overhead for the signature graph, even when iteratively signing graph data. 1 Introduction Exchanging trusted graph data on the Semantic Web is only possible to a limited extend today. On the contrary, the amount of graph data published and shared has tremendously increased in the last years. Thus, it becomes inherently necessary to be able to verify the authenticity and integrity of graph data published on the web in order track its provenance and building trust networks for knowledge-based systems using that data. Authenticity and integrity are basic security requirements which ensure that graph data is really created by the party who claims to be its creator and that any modifications on the data are only carried out by authorized parties. Signing graph data allows for verifying the provenance and trustworthiness of, e. g., assertional knowledge provided as RDF graphs or terminological knowledge published in form of vocabularies defined in RDFS or OWL. To the best of our knowledge, the only solution for signing graph data so far is the work by Tummarello et al. [1]. It provides a simple graph signing function for so-called minimum self-contained graphs (MSGs). An MSG is defined over statements. It is the smallest subgraph of the complete RDF graph that contains a statement and the statements of all blank nodes associated either directly or recursively with it. Statements without blank nodes are an MSG 3
4 on their own. Tummarello et al. provide an important early step for signing graph data. However, it has significant shortcomings regarding the functionality provided and overhead required for representing the graph signature: First, the signing function can be applied on MSGs only. To this end, the signature is attached to the MSG by using the RDF Statement reification mechanism. This requires significant overhead for representing the signature statements. Second, it cannot be applied on, e. g., sets of statements like ontology design patterns or graphs as a whole. The approach does not support the signing of Named Graphs and cannot be used to sign multiple graphs at the same time. Finally, the approach by Tummarello et al. does not allow for an iterative signing of graph data. The signature statements created for each signing step become part of the same MSG. There is no explicit relationship between the signature and the signed statements. This makes it practically impossible to verify the integrity and authenticity of the graph data. In this work, we present a formal framework for signing arbitrary graph data. The framework can be configured, e. g., to optimize the signing process towards efficiency or minimizing the signature overhead. The resulting signature graph is assembled with the signed graph and can be published on the web. As input graph data, one can use RDF(S), Named Graph, or OWL. Our framework supports different levels of granularity of signing graph data. It can be used to sign a minimum self-contained graph (MSG), a set of MSGs, entire graphs, and multiple graphs at once. In addition, the graphs can be distributed over the web and can contain assertional knowledge as well as terminological knowledge. Finally, we require only a low overhead for signing graphs, which is constant even when iteratively signing graph data. The following scenario motivates the need for iteratively signing different types of graph data. The related work is presented in Section 3. In Section 4, we derive the requirements for signing graph data from the scenario and the related work. A formal definition of our graph signing framework is given in Section 5 and three different configurations are discussed in Section 6. Finally, we present an example implementation of our framework in Section 7. 2 Scenario: Trust Network for Content Regulation The ability to publish arbitrary content on the Internet also imposes the ethical and legal obligation to regulate access to content that is, e. g., inappropriate to minors or threatens public peace. In the scenario depicted in Fig. 1, we consider building a trust network for Internet regulation in Germany. The information about what kind of content is to be regulated is encoded as graph data, which is provided by different authorities. An authority receives signed graph data from another authority. It adds its own graph data to the received one, digitally signs both, and publishes it again on the web. Due to Germany s history in the second World War, until today the access to neo-nazi material on the Internet is prohibited by German law (Criminal Code, 86 [2]). The German Federal Criminal Police Office (Bundeskriminalamt, BKA) 4
5 BKA German Telecom ContentWatch XXX Primary School XXX Pupil Computers Fig. 1. Trust network for content regulation. provides a set of formally defined ontologies (ii) making use of ontology design patterns [3]. The patterns represent knowledge such as wanted persons, recent crimes, and regulation information for Internet communication like it is required by 86. In addition, the BKA provides a blacklist of web sites to be blocked according to 86. It signs both the ontologies and the blacklist (iii) and publishes the ontologies on the web. Internet service providers (ISPs) such as the German Telecom receive the regulating information from the BKA. By verifying its authenticity (a) and integrity (b), the ISPs can trust the BKA s regulation data. This data only describes what is to be regulated and not how it is regulated. Thus, ISPs like the German Telecom interpret the data received from the BKA and add concrete details such as the proxy servers and routers used for blocking the web sites. As shown in Fig. 1, the ISP compiles its technical regulation details as RDF graph which is based on the BKA s ontology pattern. It digitally signs the BKA s blacklist (iv) together with its own regulation graph (i) and sends it to its customers. The customers such as the primary school depicted in Fig. 1 are able to verify the authenticity and integrity of the regulating information. The school has to ensure that its pupils cannot access illegal neo-nazi content. The iterative signing of the regulation data allows the school to check which party is responsible for which parts of the data. Thus, it can track the provenance of the regulation s creation. In addition, the school has to ensure that adult content cannot be accessed by the pupils. To this end, it receives regulation information for adult content from private authorities such as 5
6 ContentWatch ( which offers regulation data as Named Graphs (ii) to protect children from Internet pornography and the like. Thus, different regulation information (v) from multiple sources (vi) is incorporated by the school. Finally, the primary school digitally signs the incorporated regulation information (iv) before providing it to the client computers located in the school. This ensures that the pupils using these computers access the Internet only after passing the predefined regulation mechanisms. 3 Related Work The related work is structured along the process of signing data: First, the data is normalized using a canonicalization function. This function rearranges the data s structure to a unique representation. Second, the canonicalized data is transformed into a sequential representation by applying a serialization function. If the canonicalized data is already in a sequential form, this step can be omitted. Third, a cryptographic hash value is computed on the serialized data. A hash function transforms a sequential representation of arbitrary length to one of fixed length [4]. Fourth, the actual signature value is computed using a signature function. The signature is created by combining the hash value of the serialized data with a signature key [4]. The signature key is the secret key of an asymmetric key pair such as an RSA pair [5]. The combined results of all aforementioned functions actually make up the graph signing function. Fifth, the assembly function creates a signature graph which contains all data for verifying the graph s integrity and authenticity, which is the last step. 3.1 Canonicalization Functions for Graphs A canonicalization function assures that the in principle arbitrary identifiers of a graph s blank nodes do not affect the graph s signature. Some canonicalization functions also ensure a unique ordering of the graph s statements. A formal definition of canonicalization functions is given in Section 5.2. Carroll [6] presents a canonicalization function for RDF graphs that replaces all blank node identifier with a uniform place holder, sorts all statements of the graph based on their N- Triples [7] representation, and renames the blank nodes according to the order of their statements. If this results in two blank nodes having the same identifier, additional statements are added for these blank nodes. Carroll s canonicalization function uses Unix s sort algorithm that has a runtime complexity of O(n log n) and a space complexity of O(n) with n as the number of statements in the graph [6]. Fisteus et al. [8] provide a canonicalization function for datasets serialized in N3 [9]. The function requires a hash value for each statement based on a hash function of the same authors described in Section 3.3. The hash function assures that the blank nodes do not affect the statements hash values. The canonicalization function sorts the statements according to their hash values. Due to the sorting process, the runtime complexity of the canonicalization function is O(n log n) and its space complexity is O(n). Finally, Sayers and Karp [10] 6
7 provide a canonicalization function for RDF graphs, which stores the identifier of each blank node in an additional statement. If the identifier is changed, the original one can be recreated using this statement. Since this does not require sorting the statements, the runtime complexity of the function is O(n). In order to detect already handled blank nodes, the function maintains a list of additional statements created so far. This list contains at most b entries with b as the total number of additional statements. Thus, the space complexity of the function is O(b). 3.2 Serialization Functions for Graphs A serialization function transforms an RDF graph into a sequential representation such as a bit string or a set of bit strings. This representation is encoded in a specific format such as statement-based N-Triples [7] and N3 [9] or XML-based RDF/XML [11] and OWL/XML [12]. TriG [13] is a statement-based format built upon N3, which allows for expressing Named Graphs. HDT [14] is a binary format for encoding RDF graphs in a compact form, which requires less storage space than ASCII-based formats. When signing RDF graphs, statement-based formats are often preferred to XML-based notations due to their simpler structure. Section 5.3 gives a formalization of serialization functions. If a serialization function does not utilize the full expressiveness of its serialization format like sorting the statements, it can be implemented with a runtime complexity of O(n) and a space complexity of O(1). 3.3 Hash Functions for Graphs Computing the hash value of a graph is often based on computing the hash values of its statements and combining them into a single value. Computing a statement s hash value can be done by hash functions such as MD5 [15] or SHA- 2 [16]. Section 5.4 provides both a formalization of such hash functions and a formal definition of hash functions for graphs. Melnik [17] uses a simple hash function for RDF graphs. A statement s hash value is computed by concatenating the hash value of its subject, predicate, and object and hashing the result. The hash values of all statements are sorted, concatenated, and hashed again to form the hash value of the entire RDF graph. Due to the use of a sorting algorithm, the function s runtime complexity is O(n log n) and its space complexity is O(n). Fisteus et al. [8] suggest a hash function for N3 datasets. First, all blank nodes are associated with the same identifier. Secondly, the statements hash values are computed like with Melnik s approach [17]. If two statements have the same hash value, new identifiers of the blank nodes are computed by combining the hash values of the statements in which they occur. This process is repeated until there are no collisions left. Finally, the hash value of a graph is computed by combining the hash values of its statements. Colliding hash values are detected by sorting them, which leads to a runtime complexity of O(n log n) and a space complexity of O(n). In the worst case, the runtime complexity is O(n 2 ) due to multiple re-hashing processes. Carroll [6] uses a graph-hashing function which 7
8 serializes all statements, sorts the serialized representations, concatenates the result into a bit string, and hashes this bit string using a simple hash function such as SHA-2 [16]. As the function uses Unix s sort algorithm, it has a runtime complexity of O(n log n) and a space complexity of O(n). Finally, Sayers and Karp [10] compute a hash value of an RDF graph by incrementally multiplying the hash values of the graph s statements modulo a prime number. Since this operation is commutative and associative, sorting the statements hash values is not required. Thus, the runtime complexity of the hash function is O(n). Due to the multiplication, the space complexity is O(1). 3.4 Signature Functions A signature function computes the actual signature by combining the graph s hash value with a secret key. A formalization for signature functions is given in Section 5.5. Possible signature functions are DSA [18], ElGamal [19], and RSA [5]. Since the graph s hash value is independent from the number of statements, the signature is as well. Thus, the runtime complexity and the space complexity of all signature functions are O(1). 3.5 Graph Signing Functions A graph signing function creates a signature for a graph by combining all aforementioned functions. A formal definition of graph signing functions is given in Section 5.6. Tummarello et al. [1] present a graph signing function for fragments of RDF graphs. These fragments are minimum self-contained graphs (MSGs) and are defined over statements. An MSG of a statement is the smallest subgraph of the entire RDF graph which contains this statement and the statements of all blank nodes associated with it. Statements without blank nodes are an MSG on their own. The graph signing function of Tummarello et al. is based on Carroll s canonicalization function and hash function [6]. The resulting signature is stored as a set of six statements, which are added to the signed MSG. These signature statements are linked to the MSG via RDF Statement reification of one of the MSG s statements. The approach of Tummarello et al. is based on signing one MSG at a time. Signing multiple MSGs requires multiple signatures. Individually signing MSGs with only one statement creates a high overhead of six signature statements. Furthermore, the approach by Tummarello et al. does not allow for iterative signing of graph data. The signature statements created for each signing step become part of the signed MSG. Signing this MSG again also signs the included signature statements. This makes it impossible to relate a set of signature statements to the corresponding signed graph data. Thus, verifying the signature becomes practically impossible. Signing a full graph can also be accomplished by signing a document containing a serialization of the graph [20]. For example, a graph can be serialized using an XML-based format such as RDF/XML [11] or OWL/XML [12]. This results in an XML document which can be signed using the XML signature standard [21]. 8
9 If the graph is serialized using a plain text-based format such as the statementbased serializations N-Triples [7] or N3 [9], also standard text document signing approaches may be used [22]. However, signing the graphs on the granularity levels of single MSGs or sets of MSGs is not possible by these approaches. Iterative signing of the documents is also not supported. Most significant drawback, however, is that the signature is inextricably linked with the concrete document containing the graph [20]. This means that the created signature can only be verified with the very specific serialization of the graph contained in the document. For example, if the serialized graph data is transferred from the signed document into a triple store and then retrieved back, it is not possible anymore to verify the authenticity and integrity of the graph data with the document s signature. Finally, another option for ensuring the authenticity and integrity of the graph data would be to use secure communication channels like an SSL connection [23]. Indeed, when transmitting the graph data over a secure channel like SSL the recipient of the data can verify for the graph s authenticity and integrity. However, once the communication channel is closed after all data is transmitted, there is no chance to verify the graph data again without retrieving it once more from the provider. Verifying the authenticity and integrity of the graph data again might be necessary when the data is stored on not fully-trusted services like cloud computing or when it is transmitted further to other parties (which like to check the authenticity and integrity themselves). 3.6 Assembly Function An assembly function creates a detailed description of how a graph s signature can be verified. This description may then be added to the signed graph data or be stored at a separate location. Section 5.7 provides a formal definition of assembly functions. Tummarello et al. [1] present a simple assembly function which adds additional statements to a signed MSG. These statements contain the signature value and a URL to the signature key used to compute the value. Information about the graph signing function and its subfunctions is not provided. Once the URL to the signature key is broken, i. e., the signature key is not available anymore at this URL, the signature can no longer be verified. Even if a copy of the signature key is still available at a different location, the verifier finally cannot check the true authenticity of the signature key as the issuer is only implicitly encoded in the key itself. In order to describe a signing function, the XML signature standard [21] provides an XML schema containing all details of an XML signature. These details comprise the names of the used canonicalization function, the hash function, and the signature function used for computing the signature value. Furthermore, the XML schema also allows for describing a distinguished name of the signature key issuer, the key s serial number, and further information. 9
10 4 Requirements Based on the scenario in Section 2 and the related work discussed in Section 3, we derive the following functional requirements for a generic solution for signing graph data: REQ-1: Signing at different levels of granularity: Allow a party to sign graph data at different levels of granularity starting from single statements and MSGs, respectively, sets of statements (like ontology design patterns), and entire graphs. This allows for a most flexible use of the graph signing approach. In the scenario, the BKA signs ontology patterns and the German Telecom signs its entire regulation graph (see (i)). REQ-2: Signing different kinds of graph data: Allow a party to sign graph data provided in RDF(S), OWL, and Named Graphs. This allows for the graph signing approach to be used in Linked Open Data 3 contexts as well as for signing, e. g., foundational ontologies like DOLCE+DnS Ultralite [24]. In the scenario, the BKA provides OWL ontology patterns and ContentWatch provides Named Graphs (see (ii)). REQ-3: Signing T-box and A-box knowledge: Allow a party to sign both assertional (A-box) knowledge and terminological (T-box) knowledge. This allows the graph signing approach to be used for signing vocabularies issued by, e. g., standardization bodies. In addition, parties publishing their own instance data using those vocabularies can sign their assertional knowledge as well. In the scenario, the BKA signs both its ontologies and its regulation data (see (iii)). REQ-4: Iterative signing of graph data: Allow a party to sign graph data which is already signed. This allows for provenance tracking as each party signs its own data together with the provided data and its attached signatures. In the scenario, the German Telecom signs the BKA s regulation data, which is already signed by the BKA itself (see (iv)). REQ-5: Signing multiple, distributed graphs: Allow a party to sign multiple graphs at the same time which are distributed over different locations. In the scenario, the primary school retrieves and signs two different graphs from the German Telecom and ContentWatch at once (see (v)). In addition to these functional requirements, a generic framework for signing graph data shall allow for verifying the authenticity and integrity of the provided data. This allows for establishing a trust network between the involved communication parties. Thus, the following general security requirements must be fulfilled: REQ-A: Verifying the authenticity of the graph data: Allow a party to check if a received graph was really created by the party who claims to be its creator [25]. In the scenario, the German Telecom can verify that the graph received from the BKA was really created by the BKA and not by a third party (see (a)). REQ-B: Verifying the integrity of the graph data: Allow a party to check whether or not a received graph was modified by an unauthorized 3 last accessed: 4/9/
11 party [25]. Thus, a party can identify any changes on the graph by verifying its integrity. In the scenario, the German Telecom can ensure that the graphs received from the BKA were not modified by a third party (see (b)). 5 Graph Signing Formalization This section first defines RDF graphs as they are the basic data structure to be signed. This definition is then extended to Named Graphs. Subsequently, all functions of the signing process introduced in Section 3 are formally defined. These are the canonicalization function κ N, the serialization function ν N, the hash function λ N, and the signature function ɛ. Using these functions, the graph signing function σ N for Named Graphs is defined, followed by a definition of the signature graph S and the assembly function ς N. The section is concluded with a description of the signature verification procedure. Fig. 2 depicts the process of signing graph data. The graph signing function is basically a combination of the functions used in the first four steps. Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5 Step 6 Canonicalization Serialization Hash Signature Assembly Verification Graph signing Fig. 2. The process of signing and verifying graph data. The graph signing function corresponds to the first four steps. In the fifth step, the signature graph is created. Finally, the sixth step is applied to verify the authenticity and integrity of the graph data. 5.1 Definition of Graphs An RDF graph G is a finite set of RDF triples t. The set of all RDF triples is defined as T = (R B) P (R B L) with the pairwise disjoint sets of resources R, blank nodes B, predicates P, and literals L. Thus, it is t = (s, p, o) with s R B being the subject of the triple, p P being the predicate, and o R B L being the object [26, 27]. An OWL graph can be mapped to an RDF graph [28]. Thus, in the following we will only denote RDF graphs and include OWL graphs mapped to RDF graphs. The set of all possible RDF graphs is G = 2 T. A Named Graph extends this notion of RDF graphs and associates a unique name in form of a URI to a single RDF graph [29] or set of RDF graphs. This URI can be described by further statements, which form the so-called annotation graph of the RDF graph. The RDF graph is also called the content graph. A Named Graph NG G N is defined as NG = (a, A, {C 1, C 2,..., C l }) with a 11
12 R {ε} being the name of the graph, A G being the annotation graph, and C i G N being the content graphs with i = 1... l. If a Named Graph does not explicitly specify an identifier, ε is used as its name. This corresponds to associating the graph with a blank node. In this case, the graph A is empty, i. e., A =. Any RDF graph G G can be defined as Named Graph C using the notation above as C = (ε,, G). The set of all Named Graphs G N is recursively defined as G N = (R G 2 G N ) {(ε,, G)} with G G. 5.2 Canonicalization Function The canonicalization function κ transforms a graph G G into its canonical form Ĝ Ĝ with Ĝ G being the set of all canonical graphs. Example canonicalization functions for RDF graphs are given in [6, 8, 10] and further described in Section 3.1. κ : G Ĝ, κ(g) := Ĝ (1) For Named Graphs, the canonicalization function κ N is recursively defined. It computes a canonical representation of a Named Graph NG = (a, A, {C 1,..., C l }) by computing the canonical representations  and Ĉi of its annotation graph A and its content graphs C i. The result is a canonical representation NG ˆ ĜN with ĜN G N being the set of all canonical Named Graphs. κ N (NG) := κ N : G N ĜN, κ N (NG) := ˆ NG (2) { (ε,, Ĝ) if NG = (ε,, G), G G (a, Â, {Ĉ1,..., Ĉl}) if NG = (a, A, {C 1,..., C l }) 5.3 Serialization Function The serialization function ν transforms a graph G G into a set of bit strings G 2 {0,1}. A bit string represents a statement in the graph G. The concrete characteristics of the bit strings in G as well as its length depend on the used serialization format. As outlined in Section 3.2, possible serializations for RDF graphs include Turtle [30] and RDF/XML [11]. ν : G 2 {0,1}, ν(g) := G (3) The serialization function ν can be extended to the function ν N for Named Graphs NG G N. The result of ν N is a set of o bit strings NG 2 {0,1} with NG = {b 1, b 2,..., b o }. The function is recursively defined as follows: ν N (NG) := ν N : G N 2 {0,1}, ν N (NG) := NG (4) { G if NG = (ε,, G), G G {a} A C 1... C l if NG = (a, A, {C 1,..., C l }) 12
13 5.4 Hash Function The hash function λ computes a hash value h of arbitrary bit strings b {0, 1}. The resulting hash value h has a fixed length d N, i. e., h {0, 1} d. Example hash functions are MD5 [15] and SHA-2 [16]. λ : {0, 1} {0, 1} d, λ(b) := h (5) The hash function λ N computes a hash value h N of a serialized Named Graph NG 2 {0,1} with NG = {b 1, b 2,..., b o } and is build upon the function λ. The function λ N computes a hash value of each bit string b i NG with b = 1... o and combines the results into a new bit string h N {0, 1} d using a combining function ϱ. The function ϱ is defined as follows: ϱ : 2 {0,1}d {0, 1} d, ϱ({h 1, h 2,..., h o }) := h N (6) Using the functions λ and ϱ, the hash function λ N for Named Graphs is defined as follows: λ N : 2 {0,1} {0, 1} d, λ N (NG) := h N (7) λ N (NG) := ϱ({λ(b 1 ), λ(b 2 ),..., λ(b o )}) Example hash functions λ N are presented in [17, 8, 6, 10] and further described in Section 3.3. Example combining functions ϱ are discussed in [10]. 5.5 Signature Function A signature function ɛ computes the signature value of a graph based on the graph s hash value. It requires a bit string b {0, 1} d and a cryptographic key as input. The keyspace, i. e., the set of all asymmetric, cryptographic keys is defined as K = K p K s with K p being the set of public keys and K s being the set of secret keys. For computing signatures, a secret key k s K s is used. As outlined in Section 3.4, example signature functions are DSA [18], ElGamal [19], and RSA [5]. Using b {0, 1} d as an identifier for the resulting bit string, the signature function is defined as follows: ɛ : K s {0, 1} d {0, 1} d, ɛ(k s, b) := b (8) 5.6 Graph Signing Function The graph signing function σ N for Named Graphs is defined by using the different functions introduced above. The function σ N allows for signing multiple graphs at once. It requires a secret key k s and a set of m Named Graphs NG i as input with NG i = (a i, A i, {C 1i,..., C li }) and i = 1,..., m. The resulting signature is the bit string s {0, 1} d. An example for a graph signing function is Tummarello et al. [1], which is described in Section 3.5. σ N : K s 2 G N {0, 1} d, σ N (k s, {NG 1,..., NG m }) := s (9) σ N (k s, {NG 1,..., NG m }) := ɛ(k s, λ N (ν N (κ N (NG 1 ))... ν N (κ N (NG m )))) 13
14 5.7 Assembly Function An assembly function ς N creates the signature graph S G and includes it in another Named Graph NG S. The specific contents and structure of S depend on the implementation of the function ς N. The signature graph contains information about how a graph s signature was created and how it can be verified. This includes the used canonicalization function κ N, the serialization function ν N, the hash function λ N, the signature function ɛ, the corresponding public key k p of the used secret key k s, the identifiers a i of the signed Named Graphs, and the signature value s. A possible structure of a signature graph is shown in the example in Section 7. The graph NG S contains the signature graph S as its annotation graph and the signed Named Graphs NG i as its content graphs. In order to allow for an iterative signing of Named Graphs, the result of the assembly function ς N is also a Named Graph. ς N : K s 2 G N G N (10) ς N (k s, {NG 1,..., NG m }) := (a S, S, {NG 1,..., NG m }) An example signature graph for signed RDF graphs is used in [1] and an XML fragment for signed XML documents is defined in [21]. 5.8 Verification Function The verification of a signature is similar to its creation. A verification function γ N also requires a canonicalization function κ N, a serialization function ν N, and a hash function λ N. Furthermore, it requires a signature verification function δ, which is inverse to the signature function ɛ. The signature verification function δ requires a bit string b {0, 1} d and a public key k p K p as input. δ is defined as follows with b {0, 1} d being the identifier of the resulting bit string. It holds δ(k p, ɛ(k s, b)) = b with the secret key k s. δ : K p {0, 1} d {0, 1} d, δ(k p, b) := b (11) The verification function γ N checks whether or not a given signature is a valid signature of a set of Named Graphs. The function requires a public key k p, a signature value s, and the set of signed Named Graphs {NG 1,..., NG m }. All values can be taken from the signature graph S. The key k p is the public counterpart of the secret key k s, which was used for creating the signature value s. The function γ N combines the signature value s with the public key k p and computes the hash value h of the Named Graphs NG i. The signature is valid iff both computed values are equal. It is h = λ N (ν N (κ N (NG 1 ))... ν N (κ N (NG m ))). γ N : K p 2 G N {0, 1} {T RUE, F ALSE} (12) { T RUE if δ(k p, s) = h γ N (k p, {NG 1,..., NG m }, s) := F ALSE otherwise 14
15 6 Three Graph Signing Functions The complexity of a signature solely depends on the graph signing function σ N and its subfunctions. The signature overhead depends on the additional statements created by these functions and on the size of the signature graph created by the assembly function ς N. Table 1 summarizes the complexity of different implementations of κ N, ν N, λ N, and ɛ as described in Section 3. In the table, n refers to the number of statements to be signed and b is the number of statements added by the canonicalization function. Thus, b corresponds to the number of blank nodes in the graph. Table 1. Complexity of the functions used by the graph signing function σ N. n is the number of statements and b is the number of blank nodes in the statements. Function Example Runtime Space Canonicalization κ N Fisteus et al. [8] O(n log n) O(n) Carroll [6] O(n log n) O(n) Blank Node Labeling [10] O(n) O(b) N-Triples [7] O(n) O(1) N3 [9] O(n) O(1) Serialization ν N TriG [13] O(n) O(1) RDF/XML [11] O(n) O(1) OWL/XML [12] O(n) O(1) Melnik [17] O(n log n) O(n) Hash λ N Fisteus et al. [8] O(n log n) O(n) Carroll [6] O(n log n) O(n) Incremental digest [10] O(n) O(1) DSA [18] O(1) O(1) Signature ɛ ElGamal [19] O(1) O(1) RSA [5] O(1) O(1) Table 2. Possible configurations of a signing function σ N. Configuration Canonicalization Hash A) Tummarello et al. [1] Carroll [6] Carroll [6] B) Min. Signature Overhead Fisteus et al. [8] Fisteus et al. [8] C) Min. Runtime Complexity Blank Node Labeling [10] Incremental Hash [10] 15
16 Table 3. Complexity and signature overhead of different signing functions σ N. Configuration Complexity of σ N Signature overhead runtime space of σ N and ς N A) Tummarello et al. [1] O(n log n) O(n) b h + 6r statements, b h b, r n B) Min. Signature Overhead O(n log n) O(n) statements C) Min. Runtime Complexity O(n) O(n) b + 19 statements Table 2 shows three possible configurations of the signing process applied on a single graph. Table 3 depicts their complexity and signature overhead. Following the properties of the O-notation, the complexity of a graph signing function σ N is defined by the highest complexity of all its subfunctions. To ease comparability, each configuration uses N-Triples for serialization and RSA as signature function ɛ. The configurations differ only in the canonicalization function κ N and hash function λ N. In the following, we discuss the configurations in more detail. A) Tummarello et al [1] use the canonicalization function and hash function of Carroll [6]. Due to the complexity of these functions, the runtime complexity of the graph signing function is O(n log n) and its space complexity is O(n). Carroll s canonicalization function handles blank node identifiers by sorting all of a graph s statements. If different blank nodes share the same identifier, an additional statement is created for each node. With b h b being the number of such statements, the canonicalized graph contains b h more statements than the original graph. The approach by Tummarello et al. only allows for signing a single MSG at a time. The signature is stored using six additional statements. Signing a graph with r MSGs requires r different signatures. The overhead created by the assembly functions is then 6r statements. The total overhead is thus b h + 6r statements. Since each MSG contains at least one statement, it is r n. In the worst case, each MSG contains exactly one statement and it is r = n. The signature overhead is then 6n. B) Minimum Signature Overhead Using the canonicalization function and the hash function of Fisteus et al. [8] leads to a signing process with a minimum signature overhead. Both functions have a runtime complexity of O(n log n) and a space complexity of O(n). The runtime complexity of the singing function σ N is thus O(n log n) and the space complexity is O(n). Since neither the canonicalization function nor the hash function create any additional statements, the signature overhead is solely determined by the signature graph S. The structure and size of the graph are defined by the ontology used for modeling it. Using a signature graph S as in the example depicted in Fig. 4 results in a signature overhead of 19 statements. When m graphs are signed at the same time, the m 16
17 graphs are arranged using RDF bag. This results in a signature graph of 19+2m statements. C) Minimum Runtime Complexity Using the blank node labeling approach and incremental hash function of Sayers and Karp [10] leads to a minimum runtime complexity. Since both functions have a runtime complexity of O(n), the runtime complexity of the graph signing function is also O(n). Each statement of a graph can contain no, one, or two blank nodes. A blank node is part of at least one statement. Thus, the graph can contain at most twice as many blank nodes as statements. Thus, it is b 2n. This leads to a space complexity of O(n) of the graph signing function. The total overhead of the signing process consists of b statements added by the blank node labeling algorithm and 19 statements created by the assembly function for the signature graph S. 7 Implementation and Use of the Signing Framework This section describes how the previously defined graph signing function σ N and assembly function ς N are applied. The description is structured along the scenario given in Section 2. The implementation of our signing framework is conducted in Java and uses as output format an extension of the TriG syntax for named graphs [13]. In Section 7.1, we present the application of the mathematical functions defined in Section 5. Subsequently, we present extensive examples based on TriG for signing graph data. The examples are presented along the functional requirements defined in Section 4: The signing of OWL graphs is shown in Section 7.2. The section also demonstrates signing graph data at different levels of granularity (REQ-1) and signing A-box and T-box statements (REQ-3). In Section 7.3, the signing of Named Graphs is shown (REQ-2) and Section 7.4 describes iterative signing of graph data (REQ-4). The signing of multiple and distributed graphs (REQ-5) is demonstrated in Section 7.5. Overall, the examples show that our approach fulfills all functional requirements stated in Section 4. The support for the two non-functional security requirements on the authenticity of the graph data (REQ-A) and the integrity of the graph data (REQ-B) is argued in Section Using the Signing Function σ N and Assembly Function ς N In order to sign an OWL graph such as G bka-1 G from the BKA, it has to be interpreted as a Named Graph NG bka-1 = (ε, (, ), G bka-1 ) with NG bka-1 G N. Signing the graph G bka-1 with the graph signing function σ N and the secret key k sbka is σ N (k sbka, {NG bka-1 }) = σ N (k sbka, {(ε, (, ), G bka-1 )}) = s bka-1. The signature value s bka-1 is added to a signature graph S bka-1 G by applying the assembly function ς N on the key k sbka and the graph NG bka-1. It is ς N (k sbka, {NG bka-1 }) = (sg-bka-1, S bka-1, {NG bka-1 }) = NG sg-bka-1 with S bka-1 = (V Sbka-1, E Sbka-1 ) and s bka-1 V Sbka-1. The resulting Named Graph NG sg-bka-1 17
18 ps:ps-sg-4 _:ps-data-4 gt:gt-sg-2 cw:cw-sg-3 _:gt-data-2 bka:bka-sg-1 cw:cw-rules-3 _:bka-pattern-1 _:bka-rules-1 Fig. 3. Examples of iteratively signed graphs. G N is identified by sg-bka-1. It has the signature graph S bka-1 as annotation graph and NG bka-1 = (ε, (, ), G bka-1 ) as content graph. Signing a Named Graph like NG cw-1 G N from ContentWatch with the key k scw results in the signature value s cw-1 = σ N (k scw, {NG cw-1 }). Again, s cw-1 is included in a signature graph S cw-1, which is part of a new Named Graph NG sg-cw-1. Using ς N, it is ς N (k scw, {NG cw-1 }) = (sg-cw-1, S cw-1, {NG cw-1 }) = NG sg-cw-1. Iteratively signing a Named Graph corresponds to signing the result of the assembly function ς N. Signing both the Named Graph NG sg-bka-1 from above and the RDF graph G gt-1 G from the German Telecom with the secret key k sgt results in the signature value s gt-1 = σ N (k sgt, {NG sg-bka-1, (ε, (, ), G gt-1 )}). Applying ς N leads to a new Named Graph NG sg-gt-1 = (sg-gt-1, S gt-1, {NG sg-bka-1, (ε, (, ), G gt-1 )}) with S gt-1 G being the signature graph of the signature value s gt-1. Signing multiple Named Graphs at once is done by applying the signature function on a set of Named Graphs. Signing both the Named Graphs NG sg-gt-1 and NG sg-cw-1 with the secret key k sps leads to σ N (k sps, {NG sg-gt-1, NG sg-cw-1 }) = s ps-1. Applying the assembly function leads to a new Named Graph NG sg-ps-1 which contains both the graphs NG sg-gt-1 and NG sg-cw-1 as its content graphs and a new signature graph S ps-1 G as its annotation graph. It is NG sg-ps-1 = (sg-ps-1, S ps-1, {NG sg-gt-1, NG sg-cw-1 }). The following examples are based on an extension of TriG [13] that supports nested Named Graphs. This allows for directly mapping the recursive definition of Named Graphs given in Section 5.1 to an intuitive format. An alternative for using TriG would be storing each signed graph in a separate file and referring to it by its URL. However, this would complicate the signature s verification. Fig. 3 shows the graph created in the scenario of Section 2. The graph has different parts signed by different parties. Each part is created by applying the graph signing function and the assembly function. In the following, we demonstrate the signing process for each party. Since the complete graph forms a nested structure, the examples are based on each other. The result after each signing iteration is shown using an excerpt of their representation in TriG. The complete example is available from our homepage referenced in the conclusion. The examples are based on configuration B) from Section 6, which results in a minimum signature overhead. 18
19 bka:bka-sig-1 rdf:type sig:signature sig:hassignaturevalue "TmV2ZXIgR29ubmEgR2l2ZSBZb3UgVXA=" hascertificate bka:bka-pck-1 rdf:type sig:x509certificate sig:hasserialnumber "12:E5:D0:01:D8:13:C8" sig:hassignaturemethod bka:bka-gsm-1 rdf:type sig:hasissuer sig:graphsigningmethod bka:zivit-1 rdf:type sig:hasdistinguishedname DUL:Organization "C=DE,O=Zentrum fuer Informationsverarbeitung und Informationstechnik, OU=Betrieb, CN=ZIVIT CA - G01, sig:hasgraphcanonicalizationmethod sig:gcm-fisteus-2010 rdf:type sig:graphcanonicalizationmethod sig:hasgraphdigestmethod sig:gdm-fisteus-2010 rdf:type sig:graphdigestmethod sig:hasgraphserializationmethod sig:gsm-n-triples rdf:type sig:graphserializationmethod sig:hasdigestmethod sig:dm-md5 rdf:type sig:digestmethod sig:hassignaturemethod sig:sm-rsa rdf:type sig:signaturemethod Fig. 4. Example signature graph following the XML signature standard [21]. 7.2 Example 1: Signing an OWL Graph In the first step of the scenario, the BKA creates an ontology design pattern (REQ-1) for describing web sites to be blocked according to 86 of the German Criminal Code. Using this pattern, the BKA compiles a list of particular web sites and encodes it as an OWL graph (REQ-2). It then signs the list along with the used regulation ontology design pattern. Listing 1 depicts a fragment of the resulting graph. The graph contains the regulation ontology design pattern, the list of blocked web sites, and a signature graph. The regulation ontology design pattern covers T-box knowledge of the BKA (REQ-3). It is modeled as a separate graph :bka-pattern-1 and shown in lines 27 to 49. On the other hand, the list of blocked web sites covers the A-box knowledge of the BKA. It is also modeled as a separate graph :bka-rules-1 and shown in lines 51 to 71. Signing both :bka-pattern-1 and :bka-rules-1 results in the Named Graph bka:bka-sg-1 and a signature graph. bka:bka-sg-1 contains the graphs :bka-pattern-1 and :bka-rules-1 as its content graphs and the signature graph as its annotation graph. The graph bka:bka-sg-1 is shown in lines 10 to 72 and the signature statements are shown in lines 12 to 25. bka:bka-sg-1 and its two content graphs :bka-pattern-1 and :bka-rules-1 are also shown in Fig. 3 as part of the graph ps:ps-sg-4. The complete signature graph created by the assembly function ς N is depicted in Fig. 4. The signature is defined in a vocabulary following the XML signature standard [21]. The vocabulary is available from our homepage, referenced in the conclusion. The signature graph stores the computed signature bka:bka-sig-1 and its signature value. Furthermore, the signature graph also stores all parameters of the graph signing function σ N required for verifying this value. In 19
20 the signature graph, the function σ N is identified as bka:bka-gsm-1 and linked to all its subfunctions. As explained in Section 5.8, this includes the names of the used graph canonicalization function sig:gcm-fisteus-2010, the graph serialization function sig:gsm-n-triples, the hash function (also called digest function) sig:dm-md5, the graph hashing function sig:gdm-fisteus-2010, and the signature function sig:sm-rsa. In order to be able to verify the signature, the signature graph contains a reference to the BKA s public key certificate. The certificate contains the corresponding public key of the secret key k s, which was used as the signature key. The certificate is represented as bka:bka-pck-1 and corresponds to an X.509 certificate [31]. It was issued by an organization identified as bka:zivit-1. X.509 certificates are uniquely identified by their serial number and the distinguished name [32] of their issuer. Thus, the signature graph contains these identifiers of the BKA s certificate. bka: < DUL: < flow: < owl: < proxy: < rdfs: < sig: < tec: < 10 bka:bka-sg-1 { 12 bka:bka-sig-1 13 sig:hasgraphsigningmethod bka:bka-gsm-1 ; 14 sig:hassignaturevalue "TmV2ZXIgR29ubmEgR2l2ZSBZb3UgVXA=" ; 15 sig:hasverificationcertificate bka:bka-pck-1 ; 16 a sig:signature. 18 bka:bka-gsm-1 19 sig:hasdigestmethod sig:dm-md5 ; 20 sig:hasgraphcanonicalizationmethod sig:gcm-fisteus-2010 ; 21 sig:hasgraphdigestmethod sig:gdm-fisteus-2010 ; 22 sig:hasgraphserializationmethod sig:gsm-n-triples ; 23 sig:hassignaturemethod sig:sm-rsa ; 24 a sig:graphsigningmethod _:bka-pattern-1 { 29 proxy:urlblockingrulemethod 30 a owl:class ; 31 rdfs:subclassof flow:denyingflowcontrolrulemethod, [ 32 a owl:restriction ; 33 owl:allvaluesfrom proxy:urlblockingrulesituation ; 34 owl:onproperty DUL:isSatisfiedBy 35 ], [ 36 a owl:restriction ; 37 owl:onproperty DUL:defines ; 38 owl:somevaluesfrom [ 39 a owl:class ; 40 owl:intersectionof (tec:enforcingsystem 41 [ 42 a owl:restriction ; 43 owl:onproperty DUL:classifies ; 44 owl:somevaluesfrom tec:proxyserver 45 ] 46 ) 47 ] 48 ]. 20
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text:
What's so different about a "MSP Love" Medal?
In 2012, we lost a vibrant part of our family at MSP with the passing of Josh Williams. Josh, the one who phrased "MSP LOVE," made it his mission to build relationships with everyone he met, while reminding us
of the importance of living life to the fullest each and every day. Today, MSP has one huge family that includes (but is not limited to) our staff, umpires, coaches, parents & players. As a family, we have committed ourselves to continuing Josh's mission to teach and lead others in demonstrating that same "MSP LOVE" he so effortlessly displayed every day.
In youth sports we spend so much time chasing the performance based accomplishments, often missing the impact youth sports can have on character. That's why our goal is to not award the best athlete or best player
on the team, but to award a player who demonstrates a Championship attitude in other areas of life that we feel are more important. This is what makes this award different from a game MVP award!
Attributes to look for when handing out this medal:
· Displays outstanding character on the field
· Extraordinary example of sportsmanship
· Example of respect
· Example of hustle
At the conclusion of each pool game, you will award a player from the opposing team with a "MSP LOVE" medal, and the opposing team will do the same for you.

subset: commoncrawl


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Marcelo Cervone. Actor. Musician.
Marcelo is a London based actor-musician, trained at the American Musical Theatre Academy of London (AMTA). He also has a baccalaureate in Performing Arts from Anglia Ruskin University in Cambridge. He is originally from Brazil and grew up in Portugal.
He plays the Saxophone, Guitar, Bass, Drums and sings to a professional standard, also plays the Piano intermediately and is currently learning how to play the Trumpet.
As a musician he is a performer, songwriter and composer, with experience composing for film. He also fronts his own band called The Vone. His music varies, but has a focus on Rock, Blues, Funk and Jazz. As an actor he plays both in theatre and on screen. On stage this includes plays, both classical and contemporary, as well as musicals.
He graduated in July 2015 and has been working ever since. He's worked with the award winning theatre company Action To The Word, performing in their production of Dracula at Latitude Festival 2015 and at the Arts Theatre and is currently under-studying all four Kinks in the UK tour of Sunny Afternoon, which will be on the road until May 2017.


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Jianlian Homecare Products Co.,Ltd
Address: Dali Xiebian Industrial Park, Nanhai District, Foshan, Guangdong, China (Mainland) 528231
Contact: Wendy Lin
Tel: +86-757-85563418
Fax: +86-757-8366 8083
Email: email@example.com
» Durable carbon steel frame with chromed finish
» 6" PVC solid front casters
» 22" rear wheels with solid tires
» Push to lock wheel brakes
» Detachable & padded armrests with stainless steel side guard
» Detachable & swing away footrests with aluminium flip up footplates
» Padded PVC upholstery is durable and easy to clean
#JL901-35 is model of pediatric wheelchair. It comes with durable steel frame with chromed finish. The padded upholstery is made of PVC that is durable and comfortable. Features Detachable armrests, detachable & swing away footrests with aluminium flip up footplates. 22" rear wheels and 6" front caster provide a smooth ride. It can be folded up in 9.45" for easy storage and transport.


text:
Cart is empty
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Backpack Walking Bowflag®
The Backpack Walking Bowflag® allows the popular Bowflag® flag system to be mobile. All 5 shapes from the Bowflag® can be used with the backpack and create interest with their height above a crowd. This Backpack features a lightweight pole and a flexible fiberglass pole to create the Bowflag® shape desired. The backpack itself has side pockets for storing items such as business cards, a waist strap for stability, and shoulder straps that can be adjusted. Additionally, there is padding on the shoulder straps to provide comfort for long-term use. It takes only seconds to assemble the hardware and mount the custom print. Catching attention as it moves, this display is unique and versatile.


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Located in Minnesota, one of the most vibrant labor markets in the USA, the University of St. Thomas offers high quality education and valuable connections with professionals in many fields. A Bachelor degree from University of St. Thomas will help students prepare for higher education (Master's degree or Ph.D. programs) or build a successful startup.
University of St. Thomas offers annual scholarship from $4,000 to $27,000 per year for international students, and many other scholarships for students studying business, engineering, mathematics, computer science, information science, neuroscience, and other popular majors.
The representative of University of St. Thomas will be at "Spring 2018 StudyUSA Higher Education Fairs", organized by Capstone Vietnam in March in many cities below:
HCMC: Sunday, March 11th at 1st floor, Lotus Room, Rex Hotel - 141 Nguyen Hue Street, Dist.1
Danang: Thursday, March 15th at Novotel Da Nang Premier Han River Hotel - 36 Bach Dang, Hai Chau Dist.
Hanoi: Saturday, March 17th at Pullman Hotel - 40 Cat Linh, Dong Da Dist.
✴✴✴ Time: 3 p.m - 7p.m
This is a great opportunity for Vietnamese students to have a talk with University of St. Thomas's representative, Mr. Ethan Olson, at the fair.
A prestigious degree prepares for your future career
University of St. Thomas ranks #115 among the top universities in the United States (US News and World Report - national university rankings). Graduates of the school are valued by many leading corporations in the USA. With strengths in business, engineering, biology, communications, computer science, the University of St. Thomas offers comprehensive programs with small class size, as well as personal care and attention of the professors, so students can prepare for their careers in the future.
Mr. Tom Nimmo, Finance Director of Ultimarc Group, said, "We are very pleased with young candidates graduating from University of St. Thomas. So, why should we accept other candidates from another place?"
Ultimarc Group is a reputable marine engineering corporation headquartered in Minneapolis, Minnesota. Over the past eight years, the company has been recruiting graduates from the University of St. Thomas. Most of its leaders and staff here are alumni of University of St. Thomas.
Exciting student life
In addition to its outstanding academic programs, students at the University of St. Thomas have exciting weekend activities, including outdoor recreational activities, cultural events, sports and chances to explore the city. The school has an ideal location for international students to study and experience life.
The University of St. Thomas is located in the center of Minneapolis next to the Mississippi River. River Road is always crowded with many activities such as walking, running or simply sunbathing. University of St. Thomas has a free shuttle bus for students to go from the St. Paul campus to its Minneapolis campus. Buses take 20 minutes each way, pick up students right outside the student lounge on Summit Avenue and continues to the Nicollet Mall, where there are many exciting places to eat and explore.
The Metro Green Line is easily accessible. Using trains is an inexpensive way to find all of the great attractions of the Twin Cities. The train station is just a few blocks north of the campus and the train goes both east and west to the downtown of Minneapolis and St. Paul.
Because of the convenient location and plentiful community activities, most students are very positive about their student life in St. Thomas. "The thing I like the most about St.Thomas is the opportunity to visit many coffee shops and restaurants in Minneapolis and St. Paul. You can always find something new on every street. This is a great way to relax with your friends after school", said Mark Shipman, a third-year student studying Operations and Supply Chain Management.
Sunita Dharod, a third-year student studying Justice and Peace Studies, said: "One of my favorite things about St. Thomas are the relaxing moments on school grounds. We lie on the ground and read books, do homework, or paint. I also love to bring lunch and to hang out with my friends".
For more information, please contact:
Hanoi Office
8C Hai Ba Trung Str., Trang Tien Ward, Hoan Kiem Dist.
Telephone: (84) 24.3938 8455
Hotline: (84) 936 701 696
Ho Chi Minh City Branch
22 Tran Quy Khoach Str., Tan Dinh Ward, Dist. 1
Telephone: (84) 28.3848 2628
Hotline: (84) 966 703 162


text:
Petronas, Malaysian oil company, advertisement:
"The world is changing but we should always be proud of who we are."
1. When I first landed in England in 1999, I was intrigued by how Asians there had a penchant for shortening their names to biteable English-sounding words. For example, Ashwinder Singh Gill would simply be called Ash or, similar to the case of the video above, Samyveloo Reddy would be just Sam.
2. Coming back to Asia about 5 years ago, I noticed this trend had caught on here. My Chinese peers, in particular, have adopted English names. My friend Sian Teck is now Jason or Kinn Oei is now Jervis.
3. When I asked my friends about this, they said it helped them in the course of their work. They shared it made it easier for people to remember their names.
4. Today, there are various short versions of my name circulating among my friend. To some, I am Dee. To others, I am Dom. To many, I am Dharm. To a few, I am Dharam or Endra.
5. Nevertheless, I am happy to remain Dharmendra Yadav. The world may be changing but it doesn't change who I am or where I came from.
6. Finally, I wish to thank my friend, Michael Chua, for kindly showing me how to embed a Youtube video into a blog posting.
Dharmendra Yadav
Please consider the environment - do you really need to print this?


text:
Wardrobe Styling
Using your current wardrobe, I will create and photograph personalized head-to-toe-outfits styled to your taste. Additionally, I can shop in advance for you in order to enhance our time together. After our session together, all photos will be at your finger-tips in whichever format you prefer – easily accessible on your desktop or mobile device. If you are out of state or short on time, this can also be done virtually via phone, email, and Skype consultations.
Two Hour Minimum
Find Your Type
See below for just a few of the many styles I can create to cater to your personality.
The City Slicker
Street Style is here to stay. The City Slicker look will impress anyone you bump into as you travel your city of choice.
Casual Day Wear
Just because you're going casual, doesn't mean you can't bring your A-game.
The Polished Professional
Give your wardrobe a promotion with the "Polished Professional" look, that will make you the envy of all your coworkers.
Dress To Impress
Be the talk of your next cocktail event with a sophisticated look sure to impress everyone in the room.
Not to worry, I also have plenty of experience styling a wide variety of men's clothing.


text: Posting will cease on the off topic subjects listed below unless you can convince me or Mickey Rowe (off-list) that your posting is directly related to dinosaur science. The threads have wandered afar from our list's dedicated subject matter. Tsunami food for thought What the tsunami dredged up 6th sense Urban story Bird analysis updates 3 (as related to Islam or fundamentalism) Please see our website for information on the consequences of posting after a thread has been stopped (Section 8h): http://www.psych.ucsb.edu/~rowe/dinosaur/administrivia.html#no_nos Mary Kirkaldy Dinosaur Mailing List Co-owner


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Blair Visits Putin in Moscow
Associated Press Writer
With a showdown looming over power and petroleum in postwar Iraq, British Prime Minister Tony Blair arrived in Russia on Tuesday for talks with President Vladimir Putin.
Blair flew in mid-afternoon for just a few hours of talks with Putin at his residence outside Moscow amid disagreements over the future of Iraq and its oil riches. The disputes echo the rifts that the war itself opened in the U.N. Security Council.
The two "will discuss questions of cooperation in the U.N. Security Council on the postwar restoration of Iraq, as well as the role of the U.N. itself in this process," the Interfax news agency quoted Putin deputy chief Sergei Prikhodko as saying late Monday.
The meeting comes at a sensitive time. The United States is planning U.N. resolution that would end sanctions imposed on Iraq after its 1990 invasion of Kuwait and authorize phasing out the U.N. oil-for-food humanitarian program. That would end U.N. control over Iraq's oil income.
The resolution would endorse the role of the U.S.-led military coalition now in control of Iraq and the establishment of an interim Iraqi authority, diplomats said last week. It also would ask U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan to appoint a special coordinator to work with U.S. officials in Baghdad on U.N. activities.
After firmly opposing the war, Russia has called for a central U.N. role in postwar Iraq.
It has said U.N. inspectors must verify the absence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq before sanctions can be lifted and has circulated a draft resolution calling for Annan to run the oil-for-food program, including taking charge of Iraq's petroleum sales and future oil field development until an internationally recognized Iraqi government comes to power.
Most of the tough talking has been done by Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov and others in his ministry. Last week, Ivanov suggested Russia would support a French proposal to partially suspend the sanctions and emphasized that completely lifting them would require a separate decision.
With the United States strongly urging Russia to play a constructive part in postwar Iraq and not the role of a spoiler, the meeting will be a chance for Blair to discuss the issue with Putin, who has emphasized that Russia does not want its opposition to the war to ruin relations with Washington.
Blair has cultivated a warm relationship with Putin and has been more of a champion of the United Nations in Iraq than the United States.
In addition to Iraq, Putin and Blair will discuss Russia-EU relations and Putin's planned visit to London in late June, Prikhodko said.


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I watched The Prestige last weekend. What a good movie. I was surprised by several things. The acting was topnotch. The story was interesting and fun. And it had David Bowie.
Month: March 2011
Design Update: Need End Game Conditions
I'm updating/rebuilding The Interman Game as I reported earlier. I am changing it from what was a roll and move with bells whistles to a Euro - Ameritrash hybrid. So I need end game conditions. Give me some games and their end game conditions. And I already have 'reach X # Victory Points". I have … Continue reading Design Update: Need End Game Conditions


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Sundered Realms
#Sundered_Realms is a IRC RPG on irc.darkmyst.net. Where Fantasy meets the Post Apocalyptic. Set on Earth after centuries of devastation and geopolitical upheaval.
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The Sundered World
Islamic Conference
Lith Maethor
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Thessaloniki, Macedonia, Greece
Subject: Islamic Conference
7/5/2017, 12:50
Islamic Conference
At its peak, the Islamic Conference, or Organisation of Islamic Cooperation as it was sometimes called, claimed 57 members across multiple continents. The Sundering put an end to this, with the African member countries being cut off and forced to commit fully to the AU and several member countries in Asia and Africa being conquered by the invaders.
IC is the only international body that is at war with five Mithbari regions at once. Viewing the invasions from Arcadia, Idurat, Fidessa, KwaZulu, and Sambala forces as an insult to their religion, they have declared jihad against those nations, even though governments and businesses will not allow such details to get in the way of trade and profit.
Arab League
The countries of the Arab League were already considering forming a federation before the Sundering of the planet. The sudden change in power forced the decision and by 2015 CE, Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen had joined forces politically, economically and militarily.
Their combined forces quickly devastated Israel, a country left with no overseas allies in the global turmoil. While this gained them notoriety, their great wealth and oil reserves quickly helped the Arab League to reclaim its status in the global market. Except for the elite of emirs, imams, and generals, the majority lives in pretty much the same way it did in the previous centuries.
Azer Hayk
The countries of Armenia and Azerbaijan were not members of IC initially, but the shift in global power forced them to seek allies in order to survive. Content to remain sovereign nations till then, the two countries were devastated by an earthquake in 2034 CE that destroyed them almost completely. United under a single banner, they took their place in the IC a decade later.
While the two countries united under ancient names, they are the most advanced member country of the IC in terms of culture and the people enjoy the comforts of modern life. Rich in oil and gas, the country relies on international trade for most of its wealth, serving as the trade centre for all of IC. Due to their lifestyle, they are viewed with distrust by many of their allies.
Perhaps the oldest countries in the IC, Iran was also the centre for all political power in the outfit. Armed with nuclear weapons at the time of the Sundering, it employed them in a futile attempt to attack Sambala and was devastated by the fallout. For many decades after that, the country was a wasteland, trying to rebuild itself in the new world that emerged.
In the decades that followed, Iran reinvented itself as the cultural heart of the IC, using its status among the Islamic countries to fuel their hate against all Mithbari regions and Sambala in particular. Without its nuclear arsenal or know-how, Iran has lost much of its bite but has turned to more insidious means of attacking the enemies of the Islamic Conference.
Ottoman Empire
Turkey saw a all its Aegean shores conquered by the armies of Arcadia during the Sundering. In the decades that followed, the island of Cyprus sank under the waters and half its population found shelter in mainland Turkey. With its territories greatly reduced, the country saw these disasters as divine punishment and reinvented itself as an Islamic nation.
A major player in the region, the new Ottoman Empire tests the strength of Arcadia's eastern borders almost constantly, while it serves as the IC's military arm. Ruled by a military elite in theory, the country is actually a theocracy and the priesthood dictates everyday life. Most of its citizens live in rural areas or are conscripted in the army, fuelled by religious zeal.
Turkic Council
It took the invasion of several of their neighbours before the Turkic countries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan decided to band together for mutual protection. Originally a subset of the IC, the Turkic Council turned into a federation circa 2035 CE, after the earthquakes that devastated the region and changed the land.
Each country is treated as a separate state but all answer to a single government and they pool their resources for the good of the TC. The various tribes that make up the population maintain their national identities but have come to think of the whole of TC as their country instead of the previously existed entities. They serve as the production centre of the IC.
Islamic Conference
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