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What is it?
Comprehensive coverage, sometimes called "Other Than Collision," helps pay to repair or replace your vehicle if it's stolen or damaged in a covered incident that's not a collision. Covered incidents include things like theft, fire, vandalism, or damage resulting from falling objects (like a tree or hail) or hitting an animal. This coverage comes with a "deductible", which is the amount you have to pay before your coverage helps pay for your claim.
Do I need it?
If you're leasing or financing your vehicle, Comprehensive coverage is typically required by the lender. If your vehicle is paid off, Comprehensive is optional but offers important protection for damage to your vehicle, particularly from events out of your control.
What is NOT covered?
Damage to your vehicle from a collision or damage to another person's vehicle from a collision
Example scenario
Tom hits a deer. Tom's vehicle has moderate damage to the front bumper. Tom's Comprehensive coverage pays for the damage to his vehicle minus his deductible.


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1661 York Ave., New York, NY 10128
Toll Free: 800-248-4692 24hr: 212-410-0303 Local: 212-410-0303Email Us
- 1661 York Ave., New York, NY 10128
Bouquet of Mixed Cut FlowersIntercat-3203
A stunning bouquet of seasonal flowers. Arrives ready for the recipient's favorite vase.
All items featured on this site represent the types of arrangements we offer and may vary depending upon availability in certain regions. Substitution Policy

subset: commoncrawl


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In the market for a new trainer, but I'm struggling with justifying the increased cost for a direct drive vs a wheel on trainer.
Looking for general thoughts on the different experience between the two and if direct drive trainers are really worth double the price.
Direct drive trainers worth it?
A virtual coach compatible with all Elite hometrainers
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Appoint Personal Injury Attorney for Recovering Loss
Accidents are nothing but distressing events which can alter a person's entire course of living. If the injuries are severe then it requires a good medical treatment. However, it requires a huge investment which every middle-class person cannot bear to invest on it. If you are working at a reputed firm and you have lost your job due an injury then you should look nowhere and hire personal injury attorney Athens GA. The personal injury lawyers are well-known for solving a vast array of personal injury cases and make your legal procedure less tedious and difficult. They provide step-by-step procedure on personal injury cases and get you the best possible outcome within shortest span of time.
The personal injury lawyers work hard in alleviating your financial burden and reach out to you to fulfill all your needs and specifications. They are warm and friendly law professionals who can discuss with you in every aspect of car accident case and provide a sharp insight on your car accident case. The personal injury lawyer Athens GA gathers bit and pieces of the case and thus, make your case strong to achieve victory on it. For instance, if you have been bitten by a dog and his owner didn't give you the compensation for curing your medical injuries then personal injury attorneys assure you to get financial settlement from the third-party through negotiation process.
Types of Personal Injury Cases
There are the following types of personal injury cases that are mentioned below:
- Bike accident
- Pedestrian accident
- Malfunctioned machines
- Dog bites
- Slip and fall
Which Legal Firm Should be Trusted for Appointing Personal Injury Lawyers?
Athens Car Accident Lawyers is a prominent law office in Athens GA which provides Athens personal injury lawyer for tackling personal injury cases.
The team of professionals of Athens Car Accident Lawyer speaks with you regarding your car accident case and gets you the compensation that you truly deserve.
About Athens Car Accident Lawyers:
Athens Car Accident Lawyers is the renowned legal firm which provides Georgia car accident lawyer for car wreck cases.
For further information, visit


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Suspect, person of interest sought in crimes against WWII veteran
90-year-old man fell victim twice, police say
A 90-year-old World War II veteran fell victim to a burglar and a robber in the past three months, police said.
On Wednesday, police named a suspect in one of the cases and released a photo of a man wanted for questioning in another.
Jeremiah Ott, 33, is suspected of breaking into the man's home in the 5000 block of Zion Road in Cleves between Sept. 20 and Sept. 24 and stealing an unknown amount of cash.
Police have described Ott as a white man with short dark hair and hazel eyes. Officers said he is around 5 feet 8 inches tall and weighs around 160 pounds.
The veteran said he fell victim again on Monday. This time, police said the man was tied up, threatened and robbed by an intruder. Officers said his car, television and wallet were stolen.
Story: 90-year-old man tied up, threatened, robbed by intruder
On Wednesday, the Hamilton County Sheriff's Office released photos of a person of interest in the aggravated robbery case. The man has been described as a 6-foot white man, with short dark hair, facial hair and a star tattoo on his left arm.
The man was last seen in the victim's vehicle, a gray 1998 Buick LeSabre.
Anyone with information about either of the cases is asked to contact the Sheriff's Office at 513-851-6000.


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Principal Investigator: Dr Peter Wurtz
Nightingale Health Ltd, FinlandTags: 30418, biomarkers, metabolomics, pathophysiology, risk scores
Biomarkers measured from blood samples are indicative of the risk for many chronic diseases, such as heart disease and diabetes. We intend to measure blood samples from the entire UK Biobank using a novel technology developed by Nightingale Health Ltd that captures >200 biomarker measures, such as lipids and amino acids, from each blood sample. Data analyses will assess how well these biomarker measures can predict future risk for disease onset. The analyses further aim to clarify the molecular roles of the biomarkers in chronic diseases and underlying risk factors, and clarify genetic and lifestyle contributions to the biomarker levels. The results may improve the ability to predict disease onset, which would allow better targeting of prevention efforts. The detailed metabolic profiling also provides an enhanced understanding of the molecular mechanisms leading to onset and progression of chronic diseases, and may hereby identify causal biomarkers and targets for drug treatment. The resource of >200 metabolic biomarker measures will also benefit numerous other research projects, such as studies of molecular intermediates of diet and other lifestyle factors as well as the examinations of the genetic basis of metabolism. We will measure the blood samples by Nightingale Health's proprietary NMR metabolomics platform in Finland. The resulting metabolic biomarker measures will subsequently be analysed statistically for association with disease events (prevalence and incidence of all ICD-10 disease categories) and health factors using so-called phenome-wide association approaches covering subclinical disease markers, other blood biomarkers, life style and dietary data, as well as complete genomic information. We will request blood samples and participant data for the full cohort (~500,000 samples; 85 ul serum needed) and, if possible, also for one follow-up time point (~20,000 blood samples). The metabolomics measurements of the entire UK Biobank are expected to be completed within 18-24 months from sample arrival to Nightingale's laboratory.


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We are looking forward to hearing from you!
For general enquiries you can reach us at +31 10 217 5555 in the Netherlands and +32 2 774 9111 in Belgium. If you specifically want to contact our recruitment department, feel free to navigate to the Careers or Apply Now sections of our website.


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Peer-Reviewed Journal Articles
10. "What is Hope?", European Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming)
Abstract According to the standard account, to hope for an outcome is to desire it and to believe that its realization is possible, though not inevitable. This account, however, faces certain difficulties: It cannot explain how people can display differing strengths in hope; it cannot distinguish hope from despair; and it cannot explain substantial hopes. This paper proposes an account of hope that can meet these deficiencies. Briefly, it argues that in addition to possessing the relevant belief-desire structure as allowed in the standard account, a hopeful person must also be able to see a way in which the desired outcome can come about, and to see such a way to the outcome as a genuine possibility.
9. "Is Open-Mindedness a Moral Virtue?" (with Anna Cremaldi), (2017) Ratio, vol. 30, no. 3, pp. 343-358.
Abstract Is open-mindedness a moral virtue? Surprisingly, this question has not received much attention from philosophers. In this paper, we fill this lacuna by arguing that there are good grounds for thinking that it is. In particular, we show that the extant account of open-mindedness as a moral virtue faces an objection that appears to show that exercising the character trait may not be virtuous. To offset this objection, we argue that a much stronger argument can be made for the case that open-mindedness is a moral virtue by appealing to the notion of moral understanding. Specifically, we provide a new rationale as to why we should exercise open-mindedness and offer several arguments to allay the concern that doing so can at times cause us to be in an epistemically and morally weaker position.
8. "Is Open-Mindedness Conducive to Truth?", (2017) Synthese, vol. 194, no. 5, pp. 1613-1626.
Abstract Open-mindedness is generally regarded as an intellectual virtue because its exercise reliably leads to truth. However, some theorists have argued that open-mindedness's truth-conduciveness is highly contingent, pointing out that it is either not truth-conducive at all under certain scenarios or no better than dogmatism or credulity in others. Given such shaky ties to truth, it would appear that the status of open-mindedness as an intellectual virtue is in jeopardy. In this paper, I propose to defend open-mindedness against these challenges. In particular, I show that the challenges are ill-founded because they misconstrue the nature of open-mindedness and fail to consider the requisite conditions of its application. With a proper understanding of open-mindedness and of its requirements, it is clear that recourse to it is indeed truth-conducive.
7. "Open-Mindedness as a Critical Virtue" (2016) Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy, vol. 35, no. 2, pp 403–411.
Abstract This paper proposes to examine Daniel Cohen's recent attempt to apply virtues to argumentation theory, with special attention given to his explication of how open-mindedness can be regarded as an argumentational or critical virtue. It is argued that his analysis involves a contentious claim about open-mindedness as an epistemic virtue, which generates a tension for agents who are simultaneously both an arguer and a knower (or who strive to be both). I contend that this tension can be eased or resolved by clarifying the nature of open-mindedness and by construing open-mindedness in terms of its function. Specifically, a willingness to take a novel viewpoint seriously is sufficient for making open-mindedness both an epistemic and a critical virtue.
6. "Open-Mindedness as Engagement" (2016) The Southern Journal of Philosophy, vol. 54, no. 1, pp. 70-86.
Abstract Open‐mindedness is an under‐explored topic in virtue epistemology, despite its assumed importance for the field. Questions about it abound and need to be answered. For example, what sort of intellectual activities are central to it? Can one be open‐minded about one's firmly held beliefs? Why should we strive to be open‐minded? This paper aims to shed light on these and other pertinent issues. In particular, it proposes a view that construes open‐mindedness as engagement, that is, a willingness to entertain novel ideas in one's cognitive space and to accord them serious consideration.
5. "Epistemic Injustice and Open-Mindedness" (2015) Hypatia, vol. 30, no. 2, pp. 337-351.
Abstract In this paper, I argue that recent discussions of culprit‐based epistemic injustices can be framed around the intellectual character virtue of open‐mindedness. In particular, these injustices occur because the people who commit them are closed‐minded in some respect; the injustices can therefore be remedied through the cultivation of the virtue of open‐mindedness. Describing epistemic injustices this way has two explanatory benefits: it yields a more parsimonious account of the phenomenon of epistemic injustice and it provides the underpinning of a virtue‐theoretical structure by which to explain what it is that perpetrators are culpable for and how virtues can have normative explanatory power.
4. "Why Concepts Should Not be Pluralized or Eliminated" (2014) Polish Journal of Philosophy, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 7-23.
Abstract Concept Pluralism and Concept Eliminativism are two positions recently proposed in the philosophy and the psychology of concepts. Both of these theories are motivated by the view that all current theories of concepts are empirically and methodologically inadequate and hold in common the assumption that for any category that can be represented in thought, a person can possess multiple, distinct concepts of it. In this paper, I will challenge these in light of a third theory, Conceptual Atomism, which addresses and dispels the contentious issues. In particular, I contend that Conceptual Atomism, when properly understood, is empirically adequate and can overcome difficulties that plague Pluralism and Eliminativism.
3. "Resisting Aliefs: Gendler on Belief-Discordant Behaviors" (2012) Philosophical Psychology, vol. 25, no. 1, pp. 77-91.
Abstract This paper challenges T. S. Gendler's notion of aliefs, a novel kind of mental state which she introduces to explain a wide variety of belief-discordant behaviors. In particular, I argue that many of the cases which she uses to motivate such a mental state can be fully explained by accounts that make use only of commonplace attitudes such as beliefs and desires.
2. "Is Conceptual Atomism a Plausible Theory of Concepts?" (2007) The Southern Journal of Philosophy, vol. xlv, pp. 413-34.
Abstract Conceptual atomism is the view according to which most lexical concepts lack 'internal' or constituent structure. To date, it has not received much attention from philosophers and psychologists. A central reason is that it is thought to be an implausible theory of concepts, resulting in untenable implications. The main objective of this paper is to present conceptual atomism as a viable alternative, with a view to achieving two aims: the first, to characterize and to elucidate conceptual atomism; and the second, to dispel some misconceptions associated with it. My aim is to show that the prospect of conceptual atomism is a promising one.
1. "Why Concepts Can't Be Theories" (2006) Philosophical Explorations, vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 309-325.
Abstract In this paper, I present an alternative argument for Jerry Fodor's recent conclusion that there are currently no tenable theories of concepts in the cognitive sciences and in the philosophy of mind. Briefly, my approach focuses on the 'theory-theory' of concepts. I argue that the two ways in which cognitive psychologists have formulated this theory lead to serious difficulties, and that there cannot be, in principle, a third way in which it can be reformulated. Insofar as the 'theory-theory' is supposed to replace, and to rectify the problems of, the earlier 'classical' and 'probabilistic' theories, its failure confirms Fodor's original observation. Since my critique does not rest on controversial philosophical assumptions and is readily available from within the cognitive sciences, it is a stronger argument than Fodor's.
Book Reviews
4. Review of New Perspectives on Concepts (2012) Philosophy in Review, vol. 32, no. 1, pp. 37-39.
3. Review of Doing Without Concepts (2010) Philosophy in Review, vol. 30, no. 2, pp. 115-17.
2. Review of The Harder Problem (2008) Philosophy in Review, vol. 28, no. 4, pp. 257-60.
1. Review of New Essays in Philosophy of Language and Mind (2007) University of Toronto Quarterly, Winter, vol. 76, no. 1, pp. 301-302.
Other Academic Writings
1. "Taking a Look at Ian Hacking" (2005) Idea&s: the arts & science review, Fall, pp. 22-23.