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Algeria's Tragic Contradictions
Democratization in the Middle East
Algeria's Tragic Contradictions
Lahouari Addi, Journal of Democracy 7.3 (1996) 94-107
Democratization is the order of the day in the Third World, but aside from certain Latin American countries where it seems to have succeeded, it is everywhere running into difficulties. These challenges need to be analyzed in relation to the history of each country, taking into account specific political, cultural, and ideological circumstances. There is assuredly no universal model of democratic transition that one can recommend to all Third World countries, which is why we must evaluate obstacles to democratization on a case-by-case basis.
Algeria is an interesting case precisely because in February 1989, just months after the October 1988 riots that cost nearly a thousand lives, the ruling National Liberation Front (FLN) embarked on a series of reforms, changing the Constitution to allow multipartism and alternation in power by means of elections. Yet the legalization of multipartism mainly benefited the Islamists organized into the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), which carried both the June 1990 local elections and the first round of the December 1991 national legislative races. The military suspended the process and nullified the first-round results in January 1992. Next, it forced President Chadli Benjedid to resign. Since then, Algeria has plunged into murderous strife that already has claimed more than 60,000 lives. 1
In January 1995, six groups (including the three major contenders–the FLN, the FIS, and the Socialist Forces Front or FFS) met in Rome to sign a pact aimed at ending the crisis. 2 The military rejected [End Page 94] this Rome Platform and ordered a presidential election for November 1995. This vote, which capped the first contested presidential election since Algeria gained its independence from France in 1962, went ahead as scheduled on November 16. Even though the principal opposition parties (most notably the FIS and the FFS) refused to participate, the balloting raised high expectations among voters, who hoped that incumbent president Liamine Zeroual (a retired general and the army's designated candidate) would emerge with strengthened legitimacy and be able to make the military accept a political solution similar to the one outlined in the Rome Platform.
On election day, three-quarters of the country's 16 million eligible voters turned out, and Zeroual won a 61 percent majority. Although widely hailed as a success, this election actually has solved nothing. Zeroual has not been able to assert control over the army, the national dialogue that he promised has broken down, and deadly violence continues to rage. In May 1996, the president promised legislative elections for early 1997, but the opposition parties dismissed his announcement as a maneuver to buy time.
In this essay, I will first explain the inner logic of Algeria's political system by examining its structure and the crisis in which it is currently embroiled, and then look at the dynamics of the various oppositions it has set in motion: 1) the internal opposition within the regime, 2) the Islamist opposition, and 3) the democratic opposition.
The Logic of the Regime
To comprehend what is happening today in Algeria, one must consider the historical and ideological foundations of the power of the state as it emerged from the war of national liberation, which made the army the country's legitimacy-granting authority. The contradiction that has led the regime toward the current violence is its inability to endow itself with legitimate leadership–an inability that has propelled the Islamists into the resulting gap, which has existed ever since the death of President Houari Boumedienne in 1978.
The legitimacy upon which any system of power rests is a principle that is forged in the history of each country. In Algeria, it is inseparable from the struggle that the national liberation movement waged against French colonial domination in the 1950s and early 1960s. The army holds the key to political legitimacy by virtue of the very fact that national sovereignty was wrested from France by the Army of National Liberation, whose heir was the National Popular Army. This situation brought about a splitting of the state's power that would have deleterious consequences for the state's provision of services and the efficiency of its decision making. From that time on, there has been, on the one hand, the power of legitimation retained by the army, and on the other, [End Page 95] the executive power that the army mandates to run the administration and handle the rents from energy exports. The government's everyday doings are hampered by the clientelistic practices of networks that enjoy the support of high-ranking army officers. A prefect, even a minister of state, has real authority in the discharge of his official responsibilities only insofar as he maintains a privileged individual relationship with a member of the military hierarchy. Relationships within the state, as well as those between state personnel and individuals in society, are particularistic rather than universalistic, whether they are based on family or tribal bonds or on common material interests. The state, then, exists in two dimensions: in one, it is visible, official, obedient to rules; in the other, it is obscure, hidden from public view, guided by a changing balance of forces that only initiates can discern.
Reinforcing this two-dimensional structure is the lack of institutionalization that characterizes the army's legitimating power. Hence the gap between the institutions that formalize the relationships of authority and subordination within the state administration and the capacity of informal networks to influence the decisions of various parts of this administration. Individual military men are among the first to deplore the inefficiency and ineptitude of state officials, but few soldiers make the connection between such incompetence and the double structure of state power. Every high-ranking officer considers it as normal as breathing that the military hierarchy should have the final say in forming the government and the right to approve all the key civilian officials who would be part of it. 3 In these officers' eyes, the army has the right and duty to act as the source of legitimacy for the governing authorities, since the state's constitution originated with the army. In view of the traditions inherited from the anticolonial struggle, the army would be loath to install an actual military regime. The Algerian system, despite the key place that the army occupies within it, is not a military regime, and still less a military dictatorship. It is an authoritarian civilian regime in which the state draws its legitimacy and strength from the army, which in turn entrusts it with the mission of preventing the emergence of a civil society independent of state power–the idea being to avoid having to institutionalize conflict in the public sphere.
The authoritarianism of the Algerian state flows not from its military origins, but from the populist ideology that the army champions. It is as if the army has been asking the administration since 1962 to create a new society whose members are socially and economically equal. This equality is to be guaranteed by the state; all will depend on the state for subsistence. This is the vantage point from which the historical legitimacy embodied by the army must be understood, for it is not an ideological justification for a military aristocracy. Rather, it is the political reserve or resource that authorizes the army to intervene, directly or indirectly, in political affairs in order to guide the government's [End Page 96] actions, in keeping with the mission that the former has entrusted to the latter. It was in the name of historical legitimacy that thenDefense Minister Houari Boumedienne in June 1965 deposed Ahmed Ben Bella, who had been elected president just a scant two years before. 4
Yet Boumedienne, fearing that he in turn would be overthrown by his successor at the Defense Ministry, resolved the contradiction of the double structure of state power by institutionalizing historical legitimacy through the fiction of the Council of the Revolution that he headed, and above all by fusing the two powers in his own person. Upon his death, however, the military men had no wish to renew this arrangement, which they thought had worked to their disadvantage. They then named to the presidency Chadli Benjedid, a military-district commander who lacked Boumedienne's forceful personality. Benjedid was not able to impose his will on his peers or to embody legitimating authority while exercising executive power; the regime entered a period of crisis that culminated in a paralysis that the Islamists would use to their advantage. In order to perpetuate itself, the regime needs the charismatic authority of a chief, a leader who can ground his legitimacy in populist discourse. The intrinsic personal qualities of such a chief are vital for the reproduction of the system: he must be a tribune and must have a passion for his job, which will involve many hours of hard work every day. When it came to such qualities, Boumedienne far outshone his successor. It is true that Benjedid had to govern during a difficult time. For one thing, the model that his predecessor had put in place had reached its limits; moreover, the bottom fell out of world oil prices in 198586. The government began reforms to make the productive apparatus profitable, but the army rejected them as too liberal, choosing to bank instead on a future upturn in the oil market.
At bottom, a political regime can rest on the charisma of a leader, on institutions that regulate the distribution of power, or on both. In the 1980s, however, the regime had neither a leader with whom the citizens could identify, nor institutions capable of truly regulating power relations. The absence of leadership, then, left a void that helped give rise to the bloody crisis that has engulfed Algeria. There were, to be sure, institutional reforms designed to cover up the contradiction between the two powers. The Council of the Revolution was suppressed and replaced by an elected assembly that was made the formal depositary of national sovereignty. In reality, legitimacy continued to be embodied by the army, acting through the expedient of the presidential office, whose holder is chosen by universal suffrage–at the end of an election [End Page 97] campaign featuring a single party running a single candidate. Constitutionally, therefore, the president derives his authority from the electorate, which allows him to form the government and put it to work on the political and social goals that he has promised to pursue. Yet this picture is false, since the president is chosen by the military hierarchy, whose candidate the voters merely ratify; hence the president's dependence on this hierarchy. He can play one faction against another and can choose his own collaborators, yet his room to maneuver remains limited, for he cannot deprive the army of its legitimating power. Hence also the peculiar relations between the presidency and the Ministry of Defense, with personnel and policy flowing from the latter to the former.
In this scheme, the choice of the president is important for the stability of the regime, for overly strong tensions must not be allowed to arise between the presidency and the military hierarchy. Moreover, stability demands not only that the president be a military man, but that he be committed to respecting the army's preeminence in making important political decisions for the regime as a whole. Hence the difficulties that surround the naming of a defense minister, who may threaten to eclipse the president. Under President Boumedienne, the post went unfilled, and it was only in 1990 that President Benjedid named Khaled Nezzar to assume the position. The latter's successor, Liamine Zeroual, became chief of state and has been very careful not to name anyone to his former position. The question now is whether the election of 16 November 1995 will mark a rupture with this arrangement or will reproduce it. Will the elections resolve the contradiction between the two powers, and give to the regime the electoral legitimacy that it has been lacking? Time will tell whether President Zeroual will act in the name of the electorate from which his formal mandate comes, and whether he, like President Boumedienne, will succeed in uniting the two powers in his own person.
The Turn Toward Competition
Democratization, begun by the Constitution ratified in February 1989, has run up against the double structure of state power that the military men have been trying to preserve. They agreed to open up the political system by introducing multipartism, electoral competition, and freedom of the press in order to limit corruption and give the regime more efficacy and credibility. Multipartism, they calculated, would be bound to reinvigorate the FLN by subjecting it to competition. Thus the goal of democratization has been a kind of institutional reorganization during which the executive power is supposed to face electoral testing, but without any question being raised about the regime's great unwritten law: The army is the source of power. The military men had no fear of [End Page 98] elections, since they expected that the FLN would end up forming an understanding with the FIS in the National Assembly, the upshot being a coalition government that would respect the legitimating power of the army. The victory of any single party aside from the FLN would raise doubts about the political preeminence of the army, since if such a party enjoyed a majority in the Assembly it could form a government without the army's go-ahead and, above all, could threaten to select a defense minister from its own ranks, which would put an end to the double structure of state power along with the army's political preeminence. It would, in short, mean the beginning of a new regime.
For unique historical reasons, the Algerian regime is built around the splitting–and the confusion–of the legitimating power and the executive power, and is organized into an administrative state in which, unlike the situation that obtains in a state under law, sovereignty is neither formally affirmed nor institutionally localized.
he legitimating power is hidden by institutions that do not correspond to political reality; it takes cover behind them in order to keep the nation from becoming aware that it possesses sovereignty. This power fears public exposure not out of cynicism or Machiavellianism, but because the political sphere, which is not independent of the religious and social spheres, is not differentiated from them. The military hierarchy, the purveyor of legitimacy, is not even aware that it is substituting itself for the electorate, retaining sovereignty in place of that electorate, which in turn does not question whether the military is making good use of that sovereignty. In its rare ideological statements, the army invokes the national sovereignty that it embodies and has the mission of defending against foreign foes. The military identifies itself with the nation and not with the electorate–which does not exist in the military's eyes because political conflicts among Algerians are presumed not to exist. Rather, there are political conflicts between Algerians and foreigners, or between Algerian patriots and Algerian traitors. But this type of conflict must not be institutionalized, for traitors are to be physically exterminated. Hence the bloody nature of the current crisis. The adversaries see each other, respectively, as traitors to the nation or traitors to Islam (which, for the Islamists, defines the nation). Neither side can acknowledge such modern categories as « the electorate » or « popular sovereignty, » because these categories presuppose the political liberty of the individual and, above all, the idea of a minority that can legally oppose a majority.
The body politic does not think of itself as sovereign and accepts, to a certain extent, that the army holds the power of legitimation; hence there can be no rule of law, for popular sovereignty is the source of modern law. This explains the willingness and indeed the zeal with which officials violate the juridical rules that they have made and that, in theory, have the force of law for everyone. Sundry contending factions and clientelistic groups flaunt their ability to violate the law [End Page 99] with impunity; it is a way of showing their strength. In sum, whether the law made by the administrative state applies or does not apply at any given moment depends on the balance of forces among various factions at that time. As for anyone among the ruled who belongs to no faction and is delivered up to the arbi-trariness of the Hobbesian state of nature, he must pay in order to benefit from laws that accord him certain rights, and must also pay to avoid laws that would impose upon him some burden or duty. This is why in Algeria officials have exorbitant power; they can make the law pay by applying it or not applying it, whichever is to their own advantage.
To defeat the factions and neutralize the pressure groups that manipulate the bureaucracy and the economy would require an independent judicial establishment that could enforce the law against people who abuse the public trust for private gain. Yet the notion of the autonomy of justice flows from the institutional distinction between the sovereign power and the executive power.
s soon as the sovereign power fails to assert itself as such, the judicial power becomes limited to carrying out the orders of the executive power, which is precisely what permits those who hold this latter type of power to abuse it. The autonomy of the judge is conceivable and feasible only if the sovereign power–and the awareness that the various actors have of it–is institutionally affirmed. If the sovereign power remains indefinitely in the hands of one group, if it is not the expression of the will of the majority of voters, justice will remain subordinated to the executive power, which will demand that it look solely to the executive's interests. And the interests of Algeria's executive power today lie in gaining loyalists and securing allegiance at any cost so as to hide its chronic deficit of legitimacy from the rising generations who are not old enough to remember the war of national liberation.
Here, precisely, resides one of the Algerian regime's major contradictions and the very source, moreover, of the dynamic that has given rise to violence. The administrative state is being ambushed by officials who abuse their power, and by the corruption to which they are drawn. This arbitrariness and corruption are not so much results of individual greed and wickedness as the unavoidable byproducts of a political regime whose functionaries wield powers that are very broad and frequently open to abuse. Corruption is the general rule, involving not just individuals but whole networks that reach up to the very highest levels of the state and are tough to dismantle. As long as an official does not [End Page 100] question the basic rule of the regime–that is, the political preeminence of the army–he will not be disturbed even if he neglects his job, misuses public funds, and lives far beyond his means. If he is relatively discreet and does nothing to arouse the enmity of competing networks that are more powerful than his own, this official will have nothing to fear from the law and may even climb up through the career ranks. Over the years, corruption became pervasive as a means of access to wealth; the struggle to acquire strategic government posts became a key part of the process of accumulating a private fortune. In the absence of the independent administration of justice, the bureaucracy has divided society up into predatory fiefdoms, with the citizenry as an inexhaustible resource. These fiefdoms form a strife-ridden system that draws its homogeneity and coherence from the regime's constitutive principle. The Algerian regime, in its operation no less than in its structure, does not have the means to protect itself against the corruption that is eating away at its administrative capacity.
The various clientelistic and kinship networks often come to an agreement over economic spoils. When they do clash, their battles can extend to the highest levels of the state. Compulsory retirement, a posting abroad, a transfer to a less important department–all these can temporarily put an end to such conflicts, with the settlement sealed by such personnel reshufflings. Officials are rarely prosecuted for incompetent management, misuse of funds, or corruption; when they are brought to book, it is invariably for political reasons. Formally, the charges are mismanagement or corruption, but the real motive is political score-settling. It may seem as though the factions and interest groups give the regime its logic and its dynamic. In truth, however, those factions are but an effect of the political regime; they appear and form thanks to the regime. Groups and factions that thwart the regime's logic are eliminated; those that enjoy the regime's favor perpetuate themselves by reinforcing its logic, accumulating riches and allies in the process. 5
The contradiction of democratization in Algeria is that the leaders have sought to introduce, alongside the historical legitimacy embodied by the army, a principle of electoral legitimacy intended to sanction the government alone. Their aim was to make the two legitimacies converge, rendering the regime more popular while decreasing corruption and increasing the efficiency of its administration of the country's affairs. The problem is that any given system can have only one principle of legitimacy, and can obey only one source of power. Seeking to solve the problem of corruption, the military exposed the regime to a contradiction that would have proved fatal. Instead of shoring up the system, the constitutional reforms of February 1989 precipitated its decay and confronted it with the violent crisis from which it is still trying to extricate itself. As currently constituted, the regime is incompatible with freedom of expression, free electoral competition, and the independence [End Page 101] of the judiciary. Meanwhile, the reforming regime has unleashed a play of opposing forces that will be difficult to stop unless radical changes are made.
Three Oppositions
Opposition to the regime appeared as a reaction to disillusionment with the postindependence state, an entity in which Algerians had placed a heavy emotional investment after many years of hardship and sacrifice under colonial rule. Corresponding less and less as the years went by to the utopian hopes that had attended its birth, this regime was rejected because a majority of Algerians found that they could no longer identify with it. Some, who belong to the regime even while calling themselves oppositionists, think that they can reform it from within by changing its leadership. There are others, the Islamists, who want to refound the regime on the basis of a religiously based ideology that they believe will keep the regime true to its mission. Finally, there are the democrats, who want the regime to obey the institutionalized rules of free government. These are Algeria's three currents of opposition: the internal opposition, led by figures who disagree with the policy that has been adopted in the face of the present crisis; the Islamists, who give voice to the aspirations of the common people and as such enjoy the largest number of supporters; and the democrats, who are vigorous enough but on the wrong side of current political circumstances.
The internal opposition. Represented by figures who have been more or less discredited by their past participation in the running of the country, the internal opposition is the least credible and the least important in terms of its impact on the people at large. It is the expression of conflicts of interest among the regime's personnel and of power struggles among various factions and clienteles. The feuds among clienteles and factions become public through the forming of parties that exist exclusively on the basis of communiqués that are obligingly published by the press. The different interest groups, even while being very critical, seek either to consolidate the regime by keeping its essence intact, to strengthen their own positions by denigrating competing groups, or to improve the efficiency of administration in order to raise the people's estimation of the regime while promising to limit corruption as much as possible and reorganize the economy. Obviously, these groups, whatever their degree of activism and their criticisms of past policies, are not really in the opposition. The true opposition is one that seeks not merely to replace one set of officials with another, but to change the institutional forms according to which the state is structured and its power is exercised. Consequently, « the opposition » can mean only those persons or groups who publicly declare that they oppose the constitutive principle of the regime–the army's exercise of sovereign [End Page 102] authority–and oppose it no matter what institutional artifices are used to conceal it. If we start with this definition, we are left with two main currents of opposition: the Islamists and the democrats.
The Islamists. As expressed by the FIS, the political ideology of the Islamists corresponds to the political culture and ideas of the average Algerian, who blames the regime for its inability to fight corruption. He perceives this inability without understanding that it inheres in and helps to constitute the regime itself. As he sees it, the government is incapable of improving the conditions of everyday life (jobs, housing, transportation, and so on) and is dominated by people who seek only to enrich themselves and their relatives. He does not understand why the army upholds the government, and concludes that some senior officers must have been bribed. Without realizing that the army retains the legitimating power, he wants to put institutions on a new footing by entrusting sovereignty to God. Without ever putting it clearly in so many words, he is questioning the institutional bases of the postindependence state. At any rate, he tells himself, sovereignty belongs to God, and to Him it must return. If those in power fear God and obey Holy Writ, they will not become corrupt. This reasoning is shared by a majority of Algerians, who wish for neither fascism nor theocracy, but appeal to God in order to limit the arrogance and arbitrariness of the current government. From this point of view, the Islamists are a populist authoritarian movement and not a totalitarian movement.
In any case, this desire for divine sovereignty, which is said to be linked inextricably to the cultural essence of Muslim peoples, would not be expressed with so much force if human sovereignty–whether popular or oligarchic–had been institutionally established from the beginning. The popular appeal of divine sovereignty, like the votes that millions of Algerians cast for the Islamists, signified a desire to name the sovereign power, to draw it out of the state of anonymity in which the army keeps it, and to abolish the « doubleness » of a power that formally resides in the institutions of the state but actually is retained by the military and exercised through hidden methods. The divine conception of sovereignty drew as many supporters as it did only because the sovereignty of the army created a zone of obscurity and the voters wanted to put a face on a method of decision making that conceals itself and those who operate through it. There is also a demand for charismatic leadership that the army has not satisfied, and which the Islamists propose to satisfy by putting forward figures like Abbassi Madani and Ali Belhadj. These citizens discern a concrete political problem and offer what they see as the best solution: entrust sovereignty to God in order to turn officials away from corrupt practices. To tell them that this is contrary to the separation of religion from politics, which is basic to democracy in the West, is to misunderstand their concerns–which are earthly–and to lead the debate up a blind alley. [End Page 103] This seems especially misguided given that, in the Algerian collective memory, secularism was a feature of a colonial system that was far from democratic for the people it referred to as natives.
It must be noted, however, that the regime and the Islamists offer not two opposing positive conceptions of sovereignty, but rather two different negations of popular sovereignty. It is true that when power is held in the name of God, its holder, since he is not anonymous, is accountable for his actions and responsible to the voters-believers; moreover, the exercise of power in God's name permits any believer whatsoever to claim it, while only the highest-ranking officers can act in the name of the army. In the one case, sovereignty belongs formally to the people but is embodied by the army; in the other, it belongs to God but is wielded by men acting in His name. In both cases, the source of power is located outside of popular sovereignty. Fundamentally, and as paradoxical as it may seem, it is likely that if the Islamist opposition takes power, it will establish a regime identical to the one that it is now fighting against, except that sovereign authority will be held by a charismatic leader who will declare that God has called him to govern the nation. As in the current regime, the judiciary will not be independent of the executive power. The Islamist opposition seeks to put in place a regime with the very same architecture as the one it is now fighting; the only change would be one of personnel. At bottom, then, the Islamists too represent a kind of internal opposition to the regime. The true opposition is the one mounted by the democrats, who are trying to further the project of removing legitimating power from the hands of the army and founding a system run according to the principle of alternation in power by means of elections.
The democrats. Although numerous enough, the democrats have been frowned upon by circumstances, in particular the unfolding of the conflict that has led to the present violent confrontation between the army and the Islamists. Recognizing themselves neither in the army, which seeks to use them in order to boost its credibility abroad, nor in the ranks of the Islamists, who suspect them of being potential allies of Islamism's foes, the democrats found their position weakening as the conflict intensified. They also split over the question of whom to regard as the main adversary. Some thought it necessary to neutralize the Islamists first; they were willing to play the regime's game for a short while, considering democracy to be a set of political and ideological values on which consensus can be built in society. For others, it was necessary above all to secure the mechanism of alternation in power through elections, even if at first it would benefit the Islamists. Thus the former defined democracy in terms of the values that were needed to ground it, while the latter saw it as a mechanism whose working would in time cause democratic values to emerge and win society's acceptance. This debate, which began in January 1992, became moot with respect [End Page 104] to influencing the actual course of events, since the military halted the election process and the Islamists turned to armed struggle.
In January 1992, the democrats were not strong enough to stop the nomenklatura's decision to repress those whom it sensed as a threat, nor could they prevent the Islamists from hurling themselves into a campaign of terrorism. Both of these groups had profound motivations, for each believed that its physical survival was at stake. The nomenklatura, hunched behind the army, refused to bear the costs of changing the regime and saw the ominous electoral victory of the Islamists as a sign that it was time to resort to repression. The democrats were not able to prevent the ratcheting up of violence because the elections had not been preceded by a pact guaranteeing individual rights to life and honor and guaranteeing the right of opposition in the event of an Islamist victory. With the dynamic of conflict having gotten the upper hand, the democrats ceased to constitute a political force, becoming instead a collection of individuals whose stands on the issues, whatever those stands might be, were bound to serve one of two armed camps. Crippled and divided, their abstract talk about respect for human rights and freedom of expression and their moral condemnation of terrorism were only so many pious utterances in the midst of murderous turmoil and gave them the air of helpless or guilty bystanders in the drift toward bloodshed.
To this one must add that a democrat, by definition, rejects violence, while the regime and the Islamists alike assert their existence through it. Democratic ideology is not a belief that demands, for its realization, the killing of one's opponents; nor does it demand that its adherents sacrifice their own lives for it. The Islamist is ready to kill in the name of a millenarian utopianism that conceives of the individual as a terrestrial means toward a heavenly end. In essence, he is ready to kill for a better world as deduced from his politico-religious convictions. The nomenklatura, meanwhile, commanding the force of the state and shielding itself behind the bulwark of legality, kills for the sake of physical survival, drawing energy from its desire to avoid having to answer to the tribunals that a new regime would almost surely set up to punish mismanagement and corruption. Yet a democrat cannot kill in the name of human rights and his democratic convictions without denying these very things. Revolutions that occur through the shedding of blood have never instituted democracy, and nowhere has democracy been erected on a foundation of murdered adversaries. This is why [End Page 105] Algeria's democratic opposition is weak in this situation of violent conflict.
Yet before they can hope to wield the power of the state, the democrats must fight to be considered a legal political opposition. The current regime is structured in such a way that it functions simultaneously as both government and opposition. In fact, it tolerates only opposition that, no matter how critical it may be, has no means to change anything. For if one looks closely at what was at stake in the 1995 presidential election, it is apparent that the opposition candidate was President Zeroual, who refused to be content with the exercise of merely potential power. Also, with the opposition embodied by figures who belong or wish to belong to the regime, the regime represses any political current that is not already recognized as legitimate opposition. In the eyes of the democratic opposition, the army's retention of legitimating power is similar to the privatization of power; in the rulers' eyes, however, it is a guarantee of national unity. That is why the question of legitimacy does not even come up for the rulers; for the democratic opposition, by contrast, it is an issue. For the regime, the army's mission of guaranteeing national unity and defending the borders gives it a legitimacy that it does not need to seek from the voters. Moreover, the opposition must attract the support of the electorate in order to exercise executive power, on the condition that it does not question the army's preeminence. Executive power is the object of negotiations and quiet bargains: hence the incessant and indefatigable attempts to co-opt opposition leaders through the offer of government posts, regardless of their past records and former political activity. The bargaining is made even easier by the « doubleness » of the power structure, which means that the proffered offices are typically positions with purely notional powers, with no consequence for the real structuring of power within the regime.
The democratic oppositionists are now at an impasse. On one side they face a regime that does not want to change and that wants to use them in order to perpetuate itself. On the other they face Islamists who want to create their own version of a one-party state. The democrats cannot join forces with the regime, and still less with the Islamists. Yet paradoxically, the victory of one or the other camp will leave the democrats even weaker. For if the regime neutralizes the Islamists militarily, it will necessarily have done so by strengthening and accentuating its own authoritarian characteristics. If the Islamists succeed in their armed struggle, however, they will have created their own legitimacy, good for at least 20 years. Thus the interest of the democrats lies in a return to the ballot box; this will strengthen electoral legitimacy, which must be accompanied by freedom of expression, independent administration of justice, and a minimal consensus negotiated among all political currents, including the Islamists. Yet for this [End Page 106] consensus to be credible, it must be guaranteed by the army, which in turn presupposes that the army will have renounced any role as the source of power and confirmed its institutional respect for the principle of alternation in government through free elections–whoever the winners may be. Through the accords signed at Rome, the FIS has shown its willingness to accept the rules of electoral competition that the democratic oppositionists have proposed. Still, these accords will mean something only if the army can be brought to see that they are not part of some antimilitary plot, and they will bring about peace only if the army offers its guarantee that they will be respected. The problem is that the army does not react as one; rather, it is itself divided by different understandings of these accords and different visions of the future.
Lahouari Addi, a native of Algeria, is visiting professor of political science at the University of Lyon II in Lyon, France, and the author of L'Algérie et la démocratie: Pouvoir et crise du politique dans l'Algérie contemporaine (1995). His essay « Religion and Modernity in Algeria » appeared in the October 1992 issue of the Journal of Democracy. Like the previous one, the present essay was translated from the French by Philip Costopoulos.
1. Robert Mortimer, « Islamists, Soldiers, and Democrats: The Second Algerian War, » Middle East Journal 50 (Winter 1996): 1839.
2. Besides the FLN, the FIS, and the FFS (a party ideologically akin to the social democratic parties of Europe that was started on the morrow of independence in 1963 by FLN cofounder Hocine Aït-Ahmed), the groups meeting at Rome included the Movement for Democracy in Algeria led by former president Ahmed Ben Bella, the Workers' Party, and the Algerian League for Human Rights. In the Rome pact, each of the signatories pledged that should it take power through the upcoming elections, it would respect the principles of universal suffrage, peaceful alternation in power, human rights, equality between men and women, and freedom of expression. The signatories also called on the other political forces in the country–especially the government–to join in these pledges.
3. It is nowhere written that the army forms the government. On the contrary, in all the various Constitutions (of 1963, 1976, and 1989) it is stipulated that the president is commander in chief of the armed forces, and that these must therefore obey the government that he directs.
4. The declaration of 19 June 1965 enumerated the criticisms addressed to Ahmed Ben Bella that were used to justify the coup d'état.
5. Prime Minister Mouloud Hamrouche, a product of the regime, was forced from office in 1991 because he contradicted the logic of the regime as a whole by seeking to undo the predatory rentier system through the introduction of market-based reforms.


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Global spending on digital video advertising is set to reach $30 billion this year, and despite concerns around brand safety and ad fraud the majority of this new spend is going on social platforms, according to WARC's latest Global Ad Trends report.
WARC reports that total global spending on online video advertising, including pre/mid/post roll, social, and broadcaster video on-demand (VOD) will reach $29.8 billion this year, representing 27.5 percent year-on-year growth.
Given linear TV's much lower predicted growth of 1.1 percent, WARC says online video advertising will continue to take a greater share of total video spend, reaching 17.5 percent this year. In some markets this share is much higher – in the UK for example, online video is predicted to account for 38.2 percent of all video ad spend this year.
While digital video ad spend continue to rise, the majority is being poured into social media platforms due to the fact that consumers are increasingly watching video content via mobile. WARC's data finds that 60 percent of daily online video viewing now occurs on mobile devices, which benefits mobile-optimised social platforms such as YouTube and Facebook.
"The vast and continuing increase in video consumption via mobile devices has directed ad dollars to social platforms, despite the well-documented and persistent risks around negative adjacency and ad fraud," said James McDonald, data editor at WARC.
This trend has been particularly prevalent in the UK, where 81.2 percent of the £1.6 billion spent on digital video ads last year was paid to social platforms, up from 55.4 percent in 2014.
The fact that spending on social video is so high is perhaps surprising given the issues that have faced social platforms over the past year. YouTube's brand safety woes continued into 2018, Facebook has been embroiled in data leaking scandals, and the practice of influencers buying fake views was raised as a key topic by Unilever's chief marketing officer Keith Weed at Cannes.
Despite all this, these social platforms continue to draw huge amounts of video ad spend, and in fact influencers specifically continue to be a big draw. WARC found that on YouTube, influencers accounted for 84 percent of all video views in Q1 this year, while on Facebook they drew 56 percent of views. Influencers' value in attracting audiences has been borne out in competing social platforms attempts to lure them away from the competition, with Twitch for example reportedly offering influencers guaranteed incomes in return for them broadcasting on the Twitch platform.
These trends look set to continue into the near future. According to Nielsen data, 79 percent of chief marketing officers view social media as either "extremely important" or "very important" to their strategies, and 63 percent see online video as either extremely or very important. However, one source of hope for traditional publishers is the fact that some governments are considering taking action to help support news media in the face of intense competition for ad spend from social media.
In the UK for example, a government review is underway assessing the sustainability of quality journalism, analysing the impacts social media and the digital advertising ecosystem have on news publishers. Calls for substantive action also received support from UK opposition leader Jeremy Corbyn today, who proposed a tech firm tax on companies like Amazon, Google and Facebook to help support the country's news media.

subset: commoncrawl


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Sharing the good news
Catholic Relief Services' new president wants to partner with more U.S. Catholics as agency works to improve the lives of people in need overseas
Carolyn Woo, the new president and CEO of Catholic Relief Services, knows something about the challenges facing refugees uprooted from their lives because of conflict, disaster or poverty.
She knows because she comes from a family of refugees herself. Her parents fled China during the communist revolution following World War II and started a new life in Hong Kong — albeit not without some challenges.
"We lived in a world in which everybody lost so much," Woo recalled in an April 18 interview with The Catholic Spirit during a visit to Minnesota. "A lot of these Chinese immigrants didn't even speak English in a colony [at the time] where English was the dominant language. So I grew up in an environment where everybody was reinventing a new life, having left a really difficult situation."
Woo was born in Hong Kong and educated by Maryknoll sisters, whose "can-do" attitude left a lasting impression on the young girl. One time, she remembers, the sisters gave up riding public transportation to raise seed money that would help them build a clinic or another school.
"The whole idea of 'can't' wasn't really part of their vocabulary," Woo said.
She brought that can-do spirit to her former position as dean of the University of Notre Dame's Mendoza College of Business and now carries it, as of Jan. 1, to her job leading Catholic Relief Services — the official international humanitarian agency of the Catholic community in the United States.
Each year CRS assists more than 130 million poor and otherwise disadvantaged people in nearly 100 countries around the world — work that ranges from helping to feed famine-stricken people in East Africa, to meeting the needs of Iraq war refugees, to aiding Haitians as they rebuild their country in the wake of a devastating earthquake that struck the island two years ago.
Woo, a married mother of two children, immigrated to the U.S. and knows from personal experience that the right kind of aid can make a difference in the day-to-day lives of people in need.
"I've seen it done for a whole population of people," Woo said, recalling her childhood days. "I remember refugees living on the hillside of Hong Kong. They constructed shanties of cardboard and whatever else they could put together. I saw within two decades or so, all those were gone — the phoenix rising from the ashes. I've actually seen it, so it's very real to me."
Sharing the story
Some Catholics know about CRS' work through Operation Rice Bowl — a popular Lenten program in which participants connect with those in need through prayer, fasting and almsgiving.
Others are familiar with CRS' work through collections taken up in parishes following some of the largest natural disasters in recent memory, including the 2004 tsunami in Southeast Asia and the 2010 earthquake in Haiti.
Still, Woo said, not enough people know about the good work the agency is doing every day around the world.
"Currently, only 8 percent of Catholics in this country know about CRS — that's what our awareness studies show us," she said. "We have to do a lot more than engaging 8 percent of our Catholics."
CRS wants to increase its visibility not only so it can garner key financial support, but also so it can engage more U.S. Catholics in advocacy on behalf of the world's poor and build support for bills in Congress that would boost crucial international aid.
"The other part of it is that we play a very important role in the 'new evangelization,'" Woo added. "We need to confront Catholics with good news — the good news that comes from the good work that's being done by the church in their name."
Woo said "friend-making and sharing the good news of CRS" was an integral part of her visit to Minnesota. She met with Archbishop John Nienstedt and spoke at St. Catherine University on the topic of global realities and the agency's work.
Seeing in a different way
Woo was tapped by the CRS board of directors last June to succeed Ken Hackett, who retired after leading the agency for 18 years. She came to the job already familiar with the organization's mission and work, having served on the CRS board of directors from 2004 to 2010 as one of its first lay members.
While on the board, Woo traveled to Indonesia not long after the tsunami, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Ethiopia and Kenya. Her board work and the trips changed her life.
One of the most difficult passages in the Bible with which to wrestle is the parable of the rich man and Lazarus (Luke 16:19-31), Woo said. The rich man wore fine linens and ate very well; Lazarus, however, was hungry and covered with sores.
When the men died, angels carried Lazarus away, but the rich man suffered torment in the netherworld.
"The rich man just never 'saw' [that he needed to help the poor man]," Woo said. "He was not mean to the poor man, he didn't kick him, he didn't harm him. He just moved around and operated in a world that was so comfortable and he never 'saw.'"
Sometimes we, too, put on blinders as a way to cope with all the suffering around us, she said. But we must expand our vision in order to act as God wants us to act.
"I think the most important thing is that CRS forced me to 'see,'" Woo said. "I saw not only suffering, but I saw solutions. And I saw the people who make the solutions possible."
Rooted in faith
Woo is grounded in her own Catholic identity and works to ensure CRS' work is likewise grounded in the faith.
The agency doesn't proselytize those it serves; rather, it witnesses to the faith through its actions, rooting its work in the church's rich body of Catholic social teaching.
"Catholic social teaching resonates across all cultures and all religions," Woo said. "We operate in a lot of countries that are not primarily Catholic. But Catholic teachings about human dignity, the preferential option for the poor, standing with people in solidarity, subsidiarity or empowering people on the ground — those are the principles that our whole organization embraces. It is really the touchstone of everything we do."
She said it's a privilege to work alongside CRS staff members who are striving to bring hope to those in need of it most. She is also motivated by the opportunity to serve the church.
"I think the church is facing a lot of challenges," she said. "I think our generation got the best of the church — the brothers, sisters and priests who gave us strong educational institutions, strong parishes, extraordinary faith examples [and] inspiration. I think it's really important for lay people to step up, to make sure the next generation can avail themselves of what we had."
Looking ahead
The nature and extent of CRS' work has changed much since its founding in 1943 to help with the resettlement of war refugees in Europe. But it has adapted along the way — serving a growing list of countries, the changing needs of the poor around the world, and dealing with shifts in technology and funding sources.
One area in which CRS has expanded its work is peace-building in areas torn by war and other conflicts.
"You can't really do development work or stabilization work if you can't put people back in neighborhoods, back into regular living situations — whether that requires sharing water systems or pulling together in other ways," Woo said.
"Communal life requires the coming together of people of many different interests, backgrounds and ethnic origins. So peace-building has become an inseparable piece of our work."
Through it all, Woo said, CRS works to maintain its commitment to excellence and good stewardship of the funds it receives from donors and other sources. About 94 percent of funds go directly to programs helping people on the ground.
One of the places benefiting right now thanks to the generosity of U.S. donors is Haiti, where CRS is working with the local church and other partners to help the 1.5 million people who were affected by the earthquake two years ago.
In the first year after the quake, CRS helped to feed over a million people and helped many with emergency health care needs, Woo said. In the second year, the agency helped to build more than 10,000 shelters — each of which could accommodate a family of five. CRS worked to get children back to school, increase access to clean water, ensure proper sanitation and help people start or restart local businesses.
In the next few years, CRS will be working to further improve the education system, build a teaching hospital, and provide more assistance to local businesses.
Woo traveled last year to Haiti to see the progress and will be traveling to other CRS overseas worksites later this year.
Karen Rauenhorst, a member of Holy Name of Jesus in Medina who served on the CRS board at the same time as Woo, said she is impressed by the new CEO's commitment.
"Carolyn has such a passion for the mission of CRS," Rauenhorst said. "She has decided to use all her skills and talents to change the lives of those who are in need."
Asked what she wanted Catholics to know about the ongoing work of the organization, Woo said this: "You have to remind U.S. Catholics that CRS is their CRS. It belongs to the U.S. Catholic Church. It does work in their name, and it is very good in doing that work. We want them to be confronted with this good news and also to help us."
Want to know more?
Visit the at the CRS website, and the Catholics Confront Global Poverty website, a joint effort of CRS and the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops.
Category: Featured, U.S. & World News


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We know that community care and support services value support, advice and mentoring especially when they are starting a new enterprise or making big changes to one that is already established. There are a number of established schemes and programmes that match start-up and small enterprises (in every business sector) with experienced business people, specialists and experts in mentoring arrangements. Most of these programmes offer this service free of charge. Small Good Stuff has researched all these different mentoring programmes and gathered information together about:
- who runs it
- how it is accessed
- what it might offer you
The table that we have compiled reflects our findings. Given that such programmes can change over time, it is suggested that this table be used as a 'starting point' rather than a definitive guide. It only profiles programmes that have a national reach and we know that there are likely to be initiatives available that are regional or local area-specific. They should be able to be identified through the schemes profiled in our table, as well as through local media and local business networks. It also presents those programmes that principally do not charge for the mentoring support available – there are numerous mentoring practices and consultants who make a direct charge for their support, and they are not profiled in our table; however, individual private mentors that are in membership of the national mentoring trade body (the Association of Business Mentors) are profiled on their website: http://www.associationofbusinessmentors.org
Please register to become a member of Small Good Stuff if you wish to use this resource – membership is free of charge.


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Event description
The Boulder Gold Rush is a two-wheeled adventure with a very rewarding twist: GOLD NUGGETS.
There will over 100 gold-painted rocks which can be exchanged for awesome prizes like Lucky's Market gift cards, a REEB bike frame, Pearl Izumi gift certificates, and many more. Nuggets will be distributed throughout the day so everybody has a chance to win!
The bike courses offer a phenomenal ride through Boulder County's most scenic and historic gold mining past. Whether you choose the short or the long course, you'll be treated to primitive roads, back county climbs, breathtaking (literally) views, and virtually every kind of trail and surface you can expect in the Rockies. You'll pass by abandoned gold and silver mines, and cruise through the quaint town of Gold Hill. There are 3 timed sections on the bike course, with the majority of the course being untimed. This allows you to ride with friends at your own pace without having to race up the big climbs. Once you've crossed the finish line, we'll be waiting with cold beers, gourmet tacos, and lots of time for you to kick back, relax, and share your good times. This is THE ride of the season for adventurous cyclists looking for an unforgettable day on their bikes.


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EZ Moves
Categories: Tools and Hardware
Trying to move heavy furniture by yourself can a difficult task and not to mention that you can end up injuring your back. That is why you should use EZ Moves.
It is the furniture lifter that helps you lift up to 10 times your natural strength and helps prevent injuries from occurring by eliminating the need to lift and carry.
With EZ Moves you just have to lift, place and slide to easily maneuver furniture around your home. It is great whether you are cleaning places blocked by furniture, rearranging a room, or adjusting appliances.
To use EZ Moves you first just have to lift a corner up with the EZ Moves Furniture Lifter and then place a EZ Slides underneath and repeat the process for all four edges.
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Get the Flash Player to see this player.
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Stuttgart, the capital of the southern German state of Baden-Wurttemberg, is a stunning city surrounded by of hills and valleys in Germany's largest wine growing region. Famous for being the home city of Porsche and Mercedes-Benz, there is no better way to discover Stuttgart than to drive one of our exotic car rentals.
Rent your exotic car at Stuttgart Airport, located in Leinfelden-Echterdingen and you will soon find yourself driving in one of Germany's greenest city's, where vineyards, parks and botanic gardens are an important part of the city landscape. Stuttgart is a stylish, modern city with a number of prestigious art collections, and the excellent Mercedez Benz Museum and the Porsch Museum that entice car enthusiasts from across the world. Stuttgart is conveniently located close to the French and the Swiss borders, and within easy driving distance of Munich, Nurmeburg and Lake Constance, so why not hire one of our exotic cars in Stuttgart today?


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15 NC-17 Movies That Defied the MPAA and Arrived in Theaters
We all know the Motion Picture Association of America really doesn't have an effective parental ratings system for the movies. The MPAA can allow all manner of violence, while usually demonizing sex. It has no transparency, and its members are shrouded in secrecy. Most significantly, it doesn't have a functional rating for movies intended exclusively for adult audiences. What it does have is the NC-17.
Unlike the R rating, doesn't allow children to accompany their parents into a theater. On the surface that seems like a great idea. Some movies Aren't intended for kids, and as such, the young ones shouldn't be allowed in the theater to see them. Unfortunately, though, movie theaters do some of their best business from films palatable to kids and teens and, better yet, films Geared toward kids and teens. Without those sweet juvenile dollars, the movie industry would be in a shambles. And that's why most theaters refuse to even screen NC-17 films. It just doesn't make sense from a business perspective.
It's no surprise, then, that movies that do get shellacked with an NC-17 rating due to depictions of sex, violence, drug use, or language that no kids should see or hear, almost always go through some kind of reedit to secure a coveted R rating. The latest example? Evil Dead, Fede Alvarez' reimagining of Sam Raimi's mayhem-and-mutilation horror franchise. It got its NC-17 from the MPAA in January, far enough in advance to cut out the most brutal bits of gore that prevented them from getting the R. Bits of gore that will undoubtedly be restored for the inevitable unrated DVD/Blu-ray release. It's far from the first movie to jump through hoops to get an R and, you know, actually be seen.
So here are 15 NC-17 moves that got around the MPAA's censorship, one way or another.
Follow Christian Blauvelt on Twitter @Ctblauvelt
'Evil Dead' Review: Better Than the Original?
Why the Bloodiest Scene in 'Evil Dead' Is Good for Women
'Evil Dead' Remake Softens the Tree Rape: Does That Make It Okay?
From Our Partners:
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Ok, we, or rather, I have decided that I am going with a high ticket business because it is easier, quicker and less expensive than trying to create my own from scratch. I won't need the membership software, the landing pages, all the rest of the bumff that goes into creating and selling a product. It's not easy and it takes a lot of time and money.
Now, as well as looking for a high ticket business to get into (and, ideally one offering 100% commission), it was also important for me to find a business that didn't have just one product. I needed multiple products along with multiple price out of every 100 people who decide to buy something I am offering, there will always be at least two who decide on the most expensive thing I can offer them.
I learned this very early in my parenting days, we call it the 20% rule. We, I, found out very soon when I put my hand up at a parents' meeting that in virtually every organisation there are 20% who actually get things done. They are the people who turn up week after week and get the grass mown or the hall painted or staffing the market stalls. Don't ask me why, it is just the way things turn out in volunteering.
When it comes to buying, I think it's closer to 10%. Ten out of every hundred customers will want, and buy, the most expensive item you can offer them. They want to buy a product (and the service that goes with it) that will give them a higher quality of assistance and experience. Just like the guys who buy the private boxes at the game, whether it be football, basketball, soccer or baseball. Sure, some of them buy so they can be seen, but most do it because they want to get the best experience out of it and they can afford it!
It's interesting, don't you think? Now if you have a product range with price points from $49 through to $2900, who do you think will be the most valuable customers, the ten who buy the $2900 item or the 90 who buy the $49 product? Well, you can work it out for yourself.
The important part of all this is that you, or in this case, I need to have multiple products set at different (and higher) price points because there will be people who want, and in fact, demand, a better service, experience, opportunity than others. And if I am not supplying it, you can bet your sweet posterior that someone else is!
Another part of the whole selling, or buying, experience is an interesting one. The stats bear out the fact that it is much easier to sell an existing customer a new product than it is to acquire a new customer. You want your customers to be repeat customers! They will only buy from you again if the first purchase was worth what they paid for it, in other words, they trust you.
Seth Goodin said that in order for any one to live well they just need 1,000 True Fans, and that's not that many when you think about it. A True Fan is described as being someone who will buy everything that you put on the market place regardless of price, availability, they even have a Google alert out with your name on it, just so that they don't miss something.
Wouldn't that be nice! And it's achievable, just by acquiring one True Fan every day it would only take three years. Think of it, One Thousand people buying everything you put out! Very nice, unlikely for me, but very nice! Let's face it, if I could find just ten good people a month, I would be made.
I have spoken with several people who, once they switched from 'old-style' marketing of $20, $30 and $50 products, struggling to make $2k a month; to the high ticket model which allows them to make commissions in the thousands of dollars per customer, their peace of mind and income went up exponentially. That sort of income can be leveraged!
If you want to scale up to a large business that will allow you to quit your job, or if you are like I was, living on a fixed income, this is the easy way to do it. If you want to struggle to make a living like 90% of the marketers out there, keep on doing what you are doing (you know what they say, " If you want things to change, you have to change some things!") no-one will stop you.
Having just one product and just one price point is not going to cut it and I know of no better business than this one. I will also be on hand to show the way, get you rolling and keep pushing you right to the top, so make the choice to change your life and get started. As before, you can contact me via Skype on christopher-hooker.


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Be safe online
In chat rooms or using instant messaging, never reveal your identity to strangers. Don't assume that someone is as he or she seems to be. Disclosing your address, telephone number, or even your name to a stranger can put you or family members in danger.
Don't open e-mail from people you don't know. Definitely don't click on any links or attachments that come with those e-mails.
Never send an email or an IM to a person you don't know. Also, don't forward e-mail to people you don't know. The person asking you to do this may be trying to involve you in a crime.
Never send a photo of yourself to someone you don't know or post it to a Web site, because your photo could be changed to show you doing embarassing things.
NEVER agree to meet, in person, someone you've "met" on the Internet without talking to your parents. Don't let people online trick you into thinking of them as real-life friends if you've never met them in person.
Here are some quick tip sheets:
For more information on internet safety, visit
Protect your privacy "Earn points toward great free stuff by taking our survey!" says a Web site. It asks for your name, age and e-mail.
After a while, you notice you're getting a lot more annoying spam! Then you start getting a lot of junk mail, too. Telemarketers have even started calling your house asking to speak with you!
Web sites use surveys and contests to get people to give them information such as their name, age and e-mail address. They want it so they can send you advertising. So think twice before you give that information.
If you do choose to give the information, first
read the Web site's "privacy policy." It should tell you how any information you give will be used. For example, it should say whether it will use it to send you information about products, and whether it shares your information with other companies. If there's no "privacy policy" posted, don't enter your information. Here's the
privacy policy of this Web site.
When you get older, you'll want to be even more protective of your private information. Adults need to protect who gets to see their credit card number, bank account number, and Social Security Number. There are criminals who find out those numbers and use them to steal money by pretending to be the person whose numbers they are using. That's called
"identity theft."
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This may sound obvious, but it's surprising just how many people don't take the time to just sit and observe their dog. You can learn an awful lot by doing so. It's interesting to see what makes them tick, and of course it's a great way to find out what actually interests them as individuals.
Fully insured professional dog walking service covering the Reading, Berkshire area. - est 2010 -
Dog vision
Colour perception
Dogs are not completely colour blind, but unlike humans who have three different colour sensitive cone cells in their retina (red, green and blue) dogs have only two (green and blue).
Kennel Cough
If your dog starts to regularly make sounds as though they are trying to clear their throat, it's quite possible that he/she may have a case of kennel cough. Although kennel cough can sound terrible, most of the time it is not a serious condition, and most dogs will recover without treatment.


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Development and application of three-dimensional optical bridge-evaluation system
Document Type
Conference Paper/Presentation
Publication Date
There has been a growing interest in developing remote sensing technologies to quickly assess the condition of bridges while minimizing traffic disruptions and limiting inspection crews' exposure to traffic. Currently, the calculation of the National Bridge Inspection (NBI) Rating for a bridge deck is done by inspectors visually inspecting the bridge deck. 3D optics is an innovative technology that can help assess bridge deck condition while at the same time enhance the ability to preserve the data for future reference and decision making. 3DOBS (the 3D Optical Bridge-evaluation System) was developed to address these issues while at the same time providing data that can be used to understand changes in condition in the future. The system is comprised of standard Digital Single Lens Reflex camera (DSLR) that is mounted to a vehicle, close-range photogrammetry software, and an automated spall detection algorithm. The camera is driven over each lane of the bridge collecting photos with a 60% overlap and then processed in the photogrammetric software. The resulting output is a Digital Elevation Model (DEM) of the bridge deck. This is then processed through the spall detection algorithm to identify spalls, calculate area and volume of individual spalls, and percent of the total bridge deck that is spalled. This information can be integrated into bridge management systems and decision making processes on bridge preservation.
Publisher's Statement
© 2013 Transportation Research Board
Publication Title
TRB 92nd Annual Meeting Compendium of Papers
Recommended Citation
Dobson, R. J.,
Brooks, C. N.,
Roussi, C.,
Shuchman, R. A.,
Ahlborn, T. M.,
Dean, D. B.
Development and application of three-dimensional optical bridge-evaluation system.
TRB 92nd Annual Meeting Compendium of Papers.
Retrieved from: https://digitalcommons.mtu.edu/mtri_p/137


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The Black Supermoon - July 31, 2019
Posted by Thyanne Garcia on
On July 31, 2019, a Black Supermoon will occur. It is said that a Black Supermoon is the second new moon in the month, and it happens only every 2.5 years as stated by the Farmer's Almanac.
According to MSN, the term Black Moon has also been used when no moon appears. This occurs only in 5 to 10 years in the month of February.
The Black Supermoon occurring in July 31st is going to be it's closest to Earth, and therefore is called a Supermoon.
Can you see a Black Supermoon? Not really. But this Black Supermoon might get you to see some shooting stars in the sky and some meteor showers.
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- Tags: black moon, black supermoon, blog, Farmer's Almanac, Galaxy, merchant of the universe, Meteor showers, MSN, news, Night, night sky, Phenomenon, phenomenons, shooting stars, Sky, space, Space Phenomenons, Stars, supermoon, universe


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Posted by CNN on
BAGHDAD, Iraq (CNN) --Ousted Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein's sons, Qusay and Uday, were killed Tuesday in a gunbattle with U.S. troops in the northern Iraqi city of Mosul, the commander of U.S. ground forces in Iraq said.
'Multiple sources' identified bodies, Army general says
BAGHDAD, Iraq (CNN) --Ousted Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein's sons, Qusay and Uday, were killed Tuesday in a gunbattle with U.S. troops in the northern Iraqi city of Mosul, the commander of U.S. ground forces in Iraq said.
Their bodies were identified from "multiple sources," Army Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez told reporters in Baghdad.
"They died in a fierce gunbattle," Sanchez said. "They resisted detention and the effort of coalition forces to apprehend them."
When asked whether the $15 million bounties on both Uday and Qusay will be paid, Sanchez said, "I would expect that it probably will happen."
Uday, 39, and Qusay, 37 -- key members of Saddam's regime -- were among four people killed during the battle.
Sanchez said U.S. forces learned about the whereabouts of the brothers from a walk-in Iraqi tipster Monday night.
Sanchez said the 101st Airborne Division, Special Forces and Air Force assets participated in the six-hour operation on a residence near the northern edge of the city. (Map)
A military task force formed to hunt for Saddam and his top supporters led the raid, supported by extensive armor and air cover, officials said.
Two-hundred members of the 101st Airborne Division also joined the assault, and no one was captured, a U.S. official told CNN Pentagon correspondent Barbara Starr.
The military went in and engaged in a "big firefight," the official said. (Gallery: The firefight scene)
A senior Pentagon official said one of the other two bodies appeared to be that of a teenage boy. U.S. officials noted that Qusay has a teenage son. The other body recovered appeared to be that of a bodyguard.
A U.S. official said Saddam was not among them.
U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld briefed President Bush about the Mosul operation after it was over, a senior defense official said.
"Part of the reason he discussed this operation in particular was because he knew it would get a lot of attention, and that first reports are often wrong," the official said.
The initial White House reaction was cautious, though one official said confirmation that the two sons were killed would "brighten" spirits after recent criticism that the Bush administration exaggerated the former Iraqi regime's threat.
Both in deck of cards
Saddam and his sons have been fugitives since their government collapsed after a U.S.-led invasion in March. (Profiles: Qusay Hussein, Uday Hussein)
Mosul is a Kurd-controlled city about 110 miles [176 kilometers] from both Syria and Iran. Intelligence officials said they are investigating whether Uday and Qusay were attempting to find a way out of Iraq.
Retired Army Brig. Gen. David Grange said the deaths of Uday and Qusay would deal a psychological blow to Saddam loyalists attacking U.S. troops.
The hunt for Saddam in Iraq is led by a U.S. Special Operations team -- code-named Task Force 20 -- with support from the CIA. The task force, which also took part in the rescue of Army Pfc. Jessica Lynch, includes covert special operations forces from the various U.S. military services. (Lynch homecoming)
Qusay and Uday are the second- and third-most-wanted Iraqi leaders, and both are in the card deck of most-wanted Iraqis issued to U.S. troops in Iraq. Uday is the ace of hearts and Qusay the ace of clubs. (Flash interactive: Iraq's most-wanted)
Qusay has been the son widely perceived as most likely to have succeeded Saddam.
With Iraq preparing its defenses in the run-up to the war, Qusay was put in charge of four key areas, including Baghdad and Tikrit -- his family's tribal home.
When the war began, he was in charge of the country's intelligence network, the 80,000-strong Republican Guard and 15,000-member Special Republican Guard, which was responsible for protecting Saddam and his family.
Uday has a reputation for violence that included torturing Iraqi athletes who did not meet expectations. He ran the dreaded Saddam Fedayeen security force.
He was also in charge of the nation's Olympic committee, edited a leading newspaper, Babel, and was head of Youth TV, the country's most popular channel.
Just before the war, Uday warned that Iraqi troops would make the mothers of U.S. soldiers "weep blood instead of tears."
Correspondents Rym Brahimi, David Ensor, Jamie McIntyre, John King, Barbara Starr and Harris Whitbeck, and producers Pam Benson and Kevin Flower, contributed to this report.


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Grey Long Vest White House Black Market/ Grey Turtleneck White House Black Market/ Flat Over the Knee Boots Forever 21/ Black Cut Out Ankle Booties Forever 21/ Tassel Necklace White House Black Market/ Faux Leather Pants H&M / Crossbody bag Forever 21
I have to make a disclaimer that while we were taking these photos in NYC it was raining! I looked like the crazy girl posing in the middle of the street while rain was coming down, but I wanted to shoot this outfit! Needless to say that's why the photos are a little dark, except for the later photos that we tried to snap when it cleared up!
NYC has been amazing, and the Simply Stylist event was so amazing as well. I wore this outfit to the event and that evening. I got so many compliments on this grey long vest and matching turtleneck... you all HAVE to get this or at least one like it; They are super hot this season and I felt super chic. I paired the vest with faux leather pants but also think this would be super cute with a dress or even jeans. I wore a great pair of ankle boots during the day and then switched to these amazing flat over the knee boots for the evening because my feet were killing me! These boots are a must buy as well... I got so many compliments on these babies shopping around in NYC. You will definitely be seeing this vest and these boots on repeat!


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For one man the demolition saw the destruction of the place that has been the home for him and generations of his family.
Jim Hodgkins and his extended family have lived in the shadow of the gas towers but have now had to make way for the new arena.
They have moved a short walk away to the back of the Rowleys Green Working Men?s Club.
Mr Hodgkins had tears in his eyes as the tower came crashing down.
He said: ?I?m full of emotions. I was only a year old when I came here. I will never forget my Grandma was 99 when she died and she always said one day I will see it come down - that was 20 years ago.
?When it came down I got very emotional but it will develop really nicely.?
A new caravan site is being built for the family as compensation for them moving from land they owned at the back of the biggest gasholder in Judd?s Lane.
It was an emotional event for everyone who lives near or was bought up by the gasworks.
Marie O?Donnell, aged 29, of Lauderdale Avenue, Holbrooks, said: ?I grew up round here and I used to play around it. There was a park next it which has also gone. It was very sad.?
Her neighbour Joan Harrison, aged 66, said: ?It is sad to see a landmark go. It was a gut-wrenching feeling when it came down.?
Reg Copson, aged 54, said: ?I live in Bedworth now but I was born in Mason Road. The Germans couldn?t bring it down so to see it happen in such a short time is strange.?


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CAIA's Career Center is an easy-to-use, comprehensive resource connecting job seekers with employers in the growing AI field. Use your knowledge and credibility to advance your career or build a talented team for your organization. Opportunities targeted to CAIA Charterholders are prioritized.
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For further information do not hesitate to contact me at or on +44 (0)20 7780 6700


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Tune in right here at 4 p.m. EST / 1 p.m. PST for live coverage as Electronic Arts takes the stage at E3 2013.
Electronic Arts is ready to show off its upcoming slate of current-gen games, as well as its line of next-gen gaming products. EA will most certainly debut new footage of EA UFC and Battlefield 4, but will the company showcase some never before seen (and heavily rumored) games? Stay with us on this page as we watch EA's E3 2013 presentation.
Check out the live stream of the event above and follow our coverage of the proceedings below. We'll be covering the event with live commentary and pics of all the announcements that go down.
Share your impressions of the event in the comment section below.
Make sure you check out everything that's happening here for E3 2013!
Live Blog:
4:57 pm: EA's E3 event is done, guys!
4:56 pm: MIRROR'S EDGE 2!
4:51 pm: Battlefield 4 multiplayer – full of mayhem and 64 players all running (and shooting) wildly.
4:33 pm: EA Sports Ignite is powering the next Madden game. Fluid and more realistic motion are coming along for the pigskin battle. For the PS4 and Xbox One.
4:27 pm: Spoken word for the return of NBA Live 14. And here's Kyrie Irving.
4:23 pm: Dragon Age: Inquisition for Fall 2014.
4:21 pm: Need for Speed: The Movie…2014? Fast and Furious has some competition, huh?
4:17 pm: Need for Speed Rivals is now being shown in an action packed trailer. Time for some live gameplay.
4:16 pm: Internet problems over here folks, sorry about that. But hey – Star Wars: Battlefront is alive!
4:04 pm: Plants vs. Zombies: Garden Warfare. IT'S CRAZY!
4 PM: And it begins… #EAE3


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Clip Job: an excerpt every day from the Voice archives.
February 15, 1973, Vol. XVIII, No. 7
Home from the war
by Joe Shea
CLARK AIR FORCE BASE, Philippines — He was a tall, blond, and heavy man who breezed into the bar around 2 a.m. in a rumpled blue polo shirt. He ordered a Coke and we talked; he said he'd just slept 14 hours after a long, hopscotch flight from Tinker to Frisco, Wake, and Guam. Now he was standing by for a flight to Bangkok, and in the manner of a man who wakes up and wants to forget what he dreamed, he talked about his war.
"I knew a half-dozen of these guys," he said, when we got to the POWs and the preparation for Operation Homecoming here, "Some of them weren't on any of the lists I saw released. Maybe I didn't see all the lists, I don't know. But this guy Schwartfinger, I didn't know him but I saw him go down, and Gaulotti, too, they weren't on the lists, in fact; he just had the names twisted a little.
"I saw them go down right under me. The Sams (surface-to-air missiles) were pretty heavy that day, and when I saw their plane explode, boy, I got scared. I got the hell out of there and I heard their mayday coming over and one of them said they were going down. Scared, boy."
That was in February, 1972; the pilot I am speaking to, in the bar of a seedy hotel on the backstreets of Angeles City, flew 194 missions over Vietnam. He flew an F-4 Phantom, a highly maneuverable aircraft that provided ground support for combat troops in the South.
"Did you ever have misgivings, morally, about what you were doing?" I asked.
"I asked myself that question, many, many times," he said slowly. "I consider myself a gentle man, I mean I don't beat my kids or my dog or anything like that. But it, the answer always came down to one thing. I never knew what I hit."
He explained that as he flew over an area he'd been directed to bomb, very little was visible beneath him. He received instructions from someone on the ground via radio. It was impossible to pick out troops, ours or theirs.
"I would see the Sams exploding, maybe two or three miles from me, and, shpfft! I just unloaded.
"There was always the question of how many people the bombs killed. Sometimes they would say, 'I think you got some of them,' and sometimes you just wouldn't know. But it was me or them.
"One time, thought, it was kind of gruesome. I flew in and unloaded and the guy on the ground says to me: 'Well, I guess I'll have to give you one kill, because I see a ribcage hanging from a tree.'"
Some came down the ramp to the red carpet and waiting admiral slowly, their hands gripping a yellow railing on each side. Some trotted down and waved, and one tall man stepped out and snapped off a salute to the flag held by an all-service color guard beside the plane. The first off was Captain Jeremiah A. Denton, United States Navy, senior officer on the first C-141 Starlifter back from Hanoi with 40 men aboard.
He shook with Admiral Gayler, Commander-in-Chief of Pacific Forces, then with Lieutenant General Moore, then with an Army NCO, and stepped to theme. The television cameraman broke ranks and swept like ungainly birds to a diagonal that followed the plane's wing to the door. Gayler said something into th mike and then Denton was there, the first of all, the first POW returned by the military after eight years in prison.
"We are proud to have had the opportunity to serve our country in difficult circumstances. We are especially grateful to our Commander-in-Chief, and to the nation, for this day." His voice broke then, a deep, thick break that was real in a way that still makes me shiver.
"God bless America!"
If everyone in this crowd of more than 300 reporters and photographers had smirked a thousand times at every statement made by Presidents and generals for the past 10 years, they did not smirk this time. There was something in his feeling, something that broke through so much and went so deep that if you had a pencil you dropped it, and if it was a camera you yelled hurrah.
The cheers of a far-off crowd, chanted like a football cheer, wafted over the engines' whistle and the applause and cheers from us rang out and reached him and carried him like the carpet to the waiting, happy nurses and the ambulance bus. But that was not the best of it, and all of it was very good.
It was the guys who came behind him. Lieutenant Commander Everett Alvarez, Jr., United States Navy, shot down in the hot bloody August of 1964 and divorced by his wife in 1970, the longest-held Navy POW. He smiled and waved as we cheered, surprising everybody who'd been led to believe by a Tass dispatch he was "despondent." The next guy was on crutches, and that did something to you.
There was the crowd from Clark with a 20-foot paper sign at their center whose legend read "We love you," with cupids between the words and "God loves you" and "Jesus loves you" on either side. There were the military men who pressed forward ahead of the always-aggressive wire and agency fotogs to yell, "Hello, Waldo!" "Welcome back, Colonel!" But mostly it was the men themselves who did it to you.
There were men on crutches, as I said, and men of dignity with limps, and men with arms bent stiff, and men bent over. And there were the things they did, the salutes, the pride and the stiffness in some of them, the waves, the Nixon-praising flags painted in prison and handkerchiefs they waved to the big satellites network cameras behind us. There were the guys that walked with them, and the way they tried to smile. There was so much, so deep, for so long. It left you with a shell for a heart, and a long time needed to look back and think it out again.
But it was a child's crooked crayon scrawl along a quiet, sunny yellow corridor in the base hospital here: Hector Cradel we love you an welcome home; Hector Cradel is a black third-grader at Wurtsmith elementary school, a child of this war. And it is funny, after the war, and these men, that a child will open you and let the horror of this long siege of conscience find rest in sighing.
[Each weekday morning, we post an excerpt from another issue of the Voice, going in order from our oldest archives. Visit our Clip Job archive page to see excerpts back to 1956.]
This article from the Village Voice Archive was posted on April 14, 2011
More:Clip Job


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Customer's path to purchase gets more complicated by the day. By providing consistent, relevant and valuable content, marketers help people make informed decisions and (hopefully) win customers and loyalty on the way. But how is this done? And how can marketers make their content stand out in a very crowded field? Tune in to our Tweet Jam to find out!
Content Marketing and the Customer Journey
The Jam will begin at 10 am PT/ 1 pm ET / 1800 DST on Thursday, September 18th. As always, the broader CMSWire community is welcome to take part. You can join in by following the #CXMChat hashtag, by logging into our chatroom or through CoverIt Live below.
The Experts
We have a great panel lined up to keep the conversation going. This time around, our experts include:
- Andy Zimmerman, CMO, Evergage -- @ahzimmerman.
- Carla Johnson, president, Type A Communications -- @CarlaJohnson
- Dan Keldsen, senior business strategist, NFP Health and president, Information Architected -- @dankeldsen
- Himanshu Sharma, marketing communications, Trigent @sharmasights
- James Goldman, senior manager of content marketing, Rauxa Agency -- @mediaingredient
- Johann Wrede, global senior director of product marketing, SAP -- @wredefine
- John Kottcamp, chief marketing technologist, Tahzoo -- @jkottcamp
- Julie Hunt, independent consultant & analyst, B2B Software Solution Strategies -- @juliebhunt
- Justin Thorp, product evangelist with a focus on the publisher experience, AddThis -- @thorpus
- Tom Petrocelli, research director, Enterprise Social, Mobile and Cloud Applications, Neuralytix, Inc -- @tompetrocelli
- Tommy Landry, president, Return On Now -- @tommy_landry
The Questions
Our experts will be weighing in on the following questions:
- Customer journeys aren't linear. Can marketers realistically guide a journey with content and if so, how?
- How do you draw a website visitor's attention to what YOU want them to read or do next?
- What's the trick for content marketers to balance oversaturation and standing out in a crowded field?
- How can marketers measure content performance?
- Joe Pulizzi brought up the need for a written content strategy at CMWorld2014. What steps are involved in creating one?
- What steps should content marketers take to continue the customer relationship after purchase?
Participation Guidelines
A few things to keep in mind:
- Introduce yourself with your first #CXMChat tweet. Include your name, job title and organization you work for.
- Subsequent tweets must start with the question number you are responding to and the #cxmchat hashtag. For example, "@bigbird Q6 The relationship between customer and company shouldn't end after the purchase is complete #CXMChat."
- Please don't pitch products or services -- stay knowledge focused.
- Keep the discussion professional, but informal.
- Remember that this is a public chat -- be thoughtful.


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