text:
1-12 Weeks reduction in sourcing cycle time!
ARCUS e-RFx customers claim reduced sourcing cycle times of up to 12 weeks for large tenders.
"Our internal stakeholders were very happy, especially with the easy scoring. They definitely had a more positive experience, which resulted in a friendlier relationship with us and helped to change their perception of tendering"(Extract from Case Study)Matthew Fitzgerald, Category Manager, ANZ Bank.
ARCUS e-RFx is an easy-to-use online tender system for Request for Proposal (RFP), Request for Information (RFI), Request for Quotation (RFQ) or Request for Tender (RFT). Suppliers enter their responses directly into online forms which results in an instant side-by-side view of all supplier submissions. The minute the tender closes, it is available to reviewers for immediate scoring - No downloading, copying, compiling or distribution of responses required.
ARCUS e-RFX provides your organisation with an easy-to-use, fully featured cloud based e-Sourcing solution. The system is highly secure with impeccable probity characteristics and is ISO27001 certified, the global standard for digital information security.
ARCUS e-RFx comes as a complete package: The ARCUS support team will provide you with exceptional service levels, your own branded e-Rfx site and full training and support for both your internal users and all suppliers.
"Immediately, we were able to see how price compares at total cost, and quickly make some calculations without having to physically sift through papers. It was so easy, a breath of fresh air" (Extract from Case Study). Chris Kechagias, Procurement Specialist
Copyright © Rasp Pty Ltd.
Home |
Products |
About Us | Downloads |
Links | Contact Us | Privacy Policy |

subset: commoncrawl


text:
To those who spent nearly a decade resisting the liberal excesses of an out-of-control Clinton White House, the Washington scene can take on an almost lonely air. The Boogie Man is out from under our beds, at least for now. Sometimes I miss the Boogie Man.
But this week is all about networking, as more than 4,000 gather near the nation's capitol today for the American Conservative Union's annual Conservative Political Action Conference. There are 70 co-sponsors for CPAC this time, and for three solid days conservative activists will meet, talk, and plan strategies for the coming political season.
Advertisement - story continues below
A few are complaining this year about a lack of significant participation by the Bush administration. What they're really trying to say is that they're disappointed that the president or vice president will not stop by, but Bush's top-level staff can be seen everywhere.
The political landscape is different than previous years, mostly because "our guys" are in the White House now. There is a real sense of relief knowing that this president will be focused on important matters of state, and will resist the more primitive urges that always come with power. Why? Because this president has character – while the last president was a character.
TRENDING: Hunter Biden was on payroll of credit card company that benefited from 2005 bill pushed by dad
Still, there is much work to be done. The nation suffers from more than 30 years of drift toward socialism. You can't reverse that kind of damage overnight, and the administration is going to need lots of "grass-roots" support to help make the necessary changes. That's why CPAC is so important.
In previous years, Republican presidents and vice-presidents visited CPAC and made speeches, attended VIP cocktail parties, and mingled with the activists. Last year, Vice President Cheney even agreed to a "photo op" with hundreds of attendees, a chore I'm sure any sensible man dreads. Still, he came and mingled, which was a clear signal to us "true believers" that the new administration appreciated all the hard work done by passionate conservative activists. That's good, because that's who, in large part, put them in the White House.
Advertisement - story continues below
And, the activist base needs to be hugged once in a while so that they know they're appreciated. There's no better place to do that than at CPAC, where waiting C-SPAN cameras can broadcast an administration's key Cabinet member, or West Wing well-known, circulating among supporters and donors. The rest of the nation's conservative base is always tuned in, and can get that dose of enthusiasm that enables them to stay up late stuffing those envelopes and making those phone calls.
One might wrongly conclude that the absence of Bush-Cheney at CPAC means that there is an absence of leadership at the conference. One might even think that if the president and vice president had other things to do this weekend, then CPAC can't be very important this year. But, if anyone thinks that, they are so wrong about the way things really work back here in Washington, D.C.
The fact of the matter is, the conservative leadership is at the CPAC conference this year – just as they have been for so many years in the past. The conservative movement activists are not drones in some federal agency. The movers and the shakers for American traditions and values hardly ever take a post in anybody's administration.
The reason most conservative leaders are outside the White House can be explained very simply: Real leaders don't want to work for somebody else – they want to run their own shops. And in those powerful non-governmental organizations are borne the important ideas that shape a nation's future.
When the nation is threatened by the bizarre conduct of any president – say, a Clinton – these NGOs become war-rooms that mobilize the millions of "troops," the "grass roots," needed to end the insult to our body politic.
Advertisement - story continues below
And, when a friendly administration gets "off track," which sometimes happens, the NGOs give a collective "shove" to move them back to where they belong.
So, conservatives, it's OK to savor the victory of having Bush-Cheney in the White House. After all, you put them there. It's OK to enjoy the contentment that comes from knowing you have righted a wrong. It's also appropriate to believe – because it is true – that nobody from "our side" can ever win the White House without solid support from the very same people who will be attending CPAC over the next few days.
Matters discussed and decided at CPAC may not be immediately reflected in the actions of the current administration, but any Washington political pundit, any insider, any seasoned pol will tell you that the good seeds that are planted this weekend at CPAC will come to full bloom in the weeks, months and years ahead.
So, conservative activists everywhere: Don't dismay because top guys won't be pressing the flesh with their enablers at CPAC. As long as there are meetings like the one CPAC is hosting this weekend, conservative ideas will be born, shaped, supported and implemented.
Advertisement - story continues below
I also have it on good authority that President Bush appreciates what we're doing. That's good enough for me. And, this year Mrs. Cheney will be along. She's a hero to conservatives everywhere.
This year CPAC has Dr. Laura! Sixty percent of Americans polled can't name more than four Bush Cabinet members, but everybody knows who Dr. Laura is! What's going on inside the White House is important. But just as important are the thousands of political activists who have assembled today to make sure the right people are elected.
Advertisement - story continues below
Related offers:
An insider's look at Clinton's White House
Get Gary Aldrich's groundbreaking expos? autographed and personalized – now available in WorldNetDaily's online store!
Aldrich's political thriller is here!
Get 'Speak No Evil,' a novel of Washington scandal and intrigue – also available in WorldNetDaily's online store!


text:
!! History Commons Alert, Exciting News
This is a scalable context timeline. It contains events related to the event February 1999: Clinton Rewrites Memo for CIA, Removing Language Allowing Agency to Use Northern Alliance to Kill Bin Laden. You can narrow or broaden the context of this timeline by adjusting the zoom level. The lower the scale, the more relevant the items on average will be, while the higher the scale, the less relevant the items, on average, will be.
Alec Station, the CIA's bin Laden unit, discovers that al-Qaeda has established a communications hub and operations center in Sana'a, Yemen, and that there are frequent calls between it and Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan (see May 1996 and November 1996-Late August 1998). [Antiwar, 10/22/2008; PBS, 2/3/2009] According to Alec Station chief Michael Scheuer, the CIA learns of this "communications conduit" through a CIA officer detailed to the NSA and stationed overseas. According to Scheuer, the NSA "refuse[s] to exploit the conduit and threaten[s] legal action against the agency officer who advised of its existence." Despite the threat, the officer continues to supply the information. Scheuer asks senior CIA officials to intervene with the NSA, but this only leads to "a desultory interagency discussion without resolution." [Atlantic Monthly, 12/2004] Author James Bamford will say: "Scheuer knew how important the house [the operations center in Yemen] was, he knew NSA was eavesdropping on the house. He went to NSA, went to the head of operations for NSA,… Barbara McNamara, and asked for transcripts of the conversations coming into and going out of the house. And the best the NSA would do would be to give them brief summaries every… once a week or something like that, you know, just a report, not the actual transcripts or anything. And so he got very frustrated, he went back there and they still refused." [Antiwar, 10/22/2008] Because of the lack of information, the CIA will actually build its own listening post to get some of the information the NSA is concealing from it (see After December 1996).
Entity Tags: National Security Agency, Alec Station, Osama bin Laden, Central Intelligence Agency, Michael Scheuer
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline
A later review by the CIA's inspector general will find that the CIA's counterterrorism resources are not properly administered during this period. The review will comment that "during the same period [CIA counterterrorism managers] were appealing the shortage of resources, senior officials were not effectively managing the Agency's counterterrorism funds."
In particular: Although counterterrorism funding increases from 1998, funds are moved from the base budget of the Counterterrorist Center to other CIA units. Some of the funds moved are "used to cover nonspecific corporate 'taxes' and for a variety of purposes that… were unrelated to terrorism"; No funds are moved from other programs to support counterterrorism, even after CIA Director George Tenet issues a "declaration of war" against al-Qaeda in December 1998 and says he wants no resources spared in the fight against terrorism (see December 4, 1998); Little use of reserve CIA funds is made to fight terrorism; Counterterrorism managers do not spend all the money they have, even after their funding has been reduced by diversions to other programs. [Central Intelligence Agency, 6/2005, pp. x-xi ] The CIA's inspector general will recommend that accountability boards be convened to review the performance of the following officials for these failings: The executive director (David Carey from July 1997, A.B. "Buzzy" Krongard from March 2001); The deputy director for operations (Jack Downing from 1997, James Pavitt from 1999); and The chief of the Counterterrorist Center (Jeff O'Connell from 1997, Cofer Black from summer 1999). [Central Intelligence Agency, 3/16/2001; Coll, 2004, pp. xiv, 456; Central Intelligence Agency, 6/2005, pp. x-xi ]
Entity Tags: Jeff O'Connell, Office of the Inspector General (CIA), Jack Downing, James Pavitt, Counterterrorist Center, David Carey, Central Intelligence Agency, A.B. ("Buzzy") Krongard, Cofer Black
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline
After a renditions branch is established at the CIA in 1997, responsibility at the agency for dealing with Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM) is transferred there. This is because he is wanted in connection with the Bojinka plot (see January 8, 1998). The 9/11 Commission will say that this both improves the CIA's coverage of KSM—because it gives them a "man-to-man" focus—and also degrades it—as less analysis is performed related to rendition targets. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 276-7] The CIA's inspector general will say that at this time the agency's Counterterrorist Center considers KSM a "high-priority target for apprehension and rendition," but will fail to recognize the importance of reporting from "credible sources" before 9/11 that shows he is a top al-Qaeda leader and is sending other terrorists to the US to work for Osama bin Laden (see June 12, 2001 and August 28, 2001). The inspector general will recommend that an accountability board review the performance of at least four officers for these failures. [Central Intelligence Agency, 6/2005, pp. xii-xiii ]
Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed
President Clinton signs a Memorandum of Notification, which authorizes the CIA to plan the capture of bin Laden using force. The CIA draws up detailed profiles of bin Laden's daily routines, where he sleeps, and his travel arrangements. The assassination never happens, supposedly because of inadequate intelligence. However, as one officer later says, "you can keep setting the bar higher and higher, so that nothing ever gets done." An officer who helped draw up the plans says, "We were ready to move" but "we were not allowed to do it because of this stubborn policy of risk avoidance… It is a disgrace."
[Philadelphia Inquirer, 9/16/2001] Additional memoranda quickly follow that authorize the assassination of up to ten other al-Qaeda leaders, and authorize the shooting down of private aircraft containing bin Laden. [Washington Post, 12/19/2001] However, "These directives [lead] to nothing."
[New Yorker, 7/28/2003]
Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Osama bin Laden, William Jefferson ("Bill") Clinton
Following the African embassy bombings (see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998), CIA managers ask Alec Station, the CIA's bin Laden unit, what it most needs to improve the agency's capabilities against al-Qaeda. Alec Station chief Michael Scheuer will later say that he raises "our dire need for verbatim reports derived from electronic collection." This is a reference to his desire to get verbatim transcripts of calls to and from al-Qaeda's operations hub in Yemen, in particular ones between it and Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan. The NSA has the transcripts, but is refusing to provide them to the CIA, and the two agencies have been at loggerheads over the issue for nearly two years. Alec Station needs the transcripts, not the summaries the NSA provides, because the operatives talk in code on the phone and this code cannot be cracked based on the summaries, only using the transcripts (see February 1996-May 1998, December 1996, After December 1996, and After December 1996). Other senior CIA officers have similar trouble getting transcripts from the NSA. Higher officials order the NSA to comply, and they do, but only for less than 12 requests. Then the system returns to the way it was, with NSA only sharing summaries. [Atlantic Monthly, 12/2004] The reason for the change back is unclear, although bin Laden stops using his satellite phone around this time (see Late August 1998).
Entity Tags: National Security Agency, Alec Station, Central Intelligence Agency, Al-Qaeda, Michael Scheuer
Following a declaration of war on al-Qaeda issued by CIA Director George Tenet (see December 4, 1998), little happens at the CIA. The CIA's inspector general will later find that "neither [Tenet] nor [his deputy John McLaughlin] followed up these warnings and admonitions by creating a documented, comprehensive plan to guide the counterterrorism effort at the Intelligence Community level." However, McLaughlin does chair a single meeting in response to the declaration of war. Although the meetings continue, McLaughlin stops attending, leaving them to the CIA's No. 3. The meetings are attended by "few if any officers" from other agencies and soon stop discussing strategic aspects of the fight against al-Qaeda. There is no other effort, at the CIA or elsewhere in the intelligence community, to create a strategic plan to combat al-Qaeda at this time or at any other time before 9/11. [Central Intelligence Agency, 6/2005, pp. viii ]
Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, John E. McLaughlin, George J. Tenet
President Bill Clinton signs a memorandum of notification authorizing the CIA to kill Osama bin Laden. The memo is sent to Clinton by National Security Adviser Sandy Berger, apparently at the request of CIA Director George Tenet, who has discussed the memo with Berger and seems to have given it his blessing. The highly classified memo concerns operations by a group of CIA tribal assets in Afghanistan who are monitoring bin Laden. Their task had previously been to capture bin Laden and they had been banned from assassinating him, but these rules are now changed and a kill operation is authorized. The memo makes it very clear that "the president [is] telling the tribal leaders they could kill bin Laden." 9/11 Commission Executive Director Philip Zelikow will later recall the memo tells the tribal leaders: "you may conduct an operation to kill him," adding, "There were no euphemisms in the language." Although the CIA is still legally prevented from assassinating people, Clinton administration lawyers now say that bin Laden is an imminent danger to the US, so he can be killed as a part of pre-emptive self-defense. Despite his role in drafting the memo, Tenet and his deputies will later claim to the 9/11 Commission that Clinton never issued such clear authorization (see Before January 14, 2004). However, the order to assassinate bin Laden is garbled within the CIA and the CIA's bin Laden unit appears not to receive it (see December 26, 1998 and After). [Washington Post, 2/22/2004; Shenon, 2008, pp. 357-8]
Entity Tags: Philip Zelikow, Osama bin Laden, William Jefferson ("Bill") Clinton, Central Intelligence Agency
The CIA seems not to understand permission given by President Bill Clinton to assassinate Osama bin Laden (see December 24, 1998). The instruction was contained in a memorandum of notification signed by Clinton authorizing the agency to use a group of tribal fighters to kill bin Laden. Previously, the tribal leaders had only been authorized to capture bin Laden, and this new memo marks an important shift in policy. According to author Philip Shenon, the memo is "written in stark language" and it makes it very clear "that the president was telling the tribal leaders they could kill bin Laden." However, the actual memo is closely held within the CIA, and the 9/11 Commission will comment, "This intent [to have bin Laden killed] was never well communicated or understood within the agency." Apparently, it is never even communicated to Michael Scheuer, head of Alec Station, the CIA's bin Laden unit. Scheuer will later express his frustration at not being allowed to try to kill bin Laden, "We always talked about how much easier it would have been to kill him." [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 133; Shenon, 2008, pp. 358]
Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Alec Station, Michael Scheuer, 9/11 Commission
President Bill Clinton rewrites a memo authorizing the CIA to use the Northern Alliance in an operation to assassinate Osama bin Laden. This memo follows another one signed by Clinton the previous year that allowed the agency to use a group of tribal fighters to kill bin Laden (see December 24, 1998). The draft February memo contains similar language to the earlier one, but applies to the Northern Alliance, not just the tribal assets. However, Clinton himself deletes the wording authorizing an operation to simply kill bin Laden. Clinton will later tell the 9/11 Commission that he does not recall why he gives the CIA permission to kill bin Laden through the tribal assets, but not through the Northern Alliance. [Shenon, 2008, pp. 360]
Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, William Jefferson ("Bill") Clinton
The Clinton administration issues more instructions to the CIA governing operations against Osama bin Laden, but these instructions do not include wording allowing the CIA to assassinate him. Following the 1998 embassy bombings, Clinton allowed the CIA to mount an operation aimed at killing bin Laden with one group of assets (see December 24, 1998), but not another (see February 1999). These new instructions, drafted by administration lawyers, do not cover the ground of the two previous sets of instructions, but deal with "a wider set of contingencies," and they authorize the use of force only within the context of a capture operation, not an assassination attempt. The CIA is therefore allowed to try to kill bin Laden only using one specific group of assets—tribal leaders tracking bin Laden in Afghanistan, still based on the earlier instructions. But the CIA does not test "the limits of available legal authority," apparently because the CIA's bin Laden unit is not told of the kill authorization (see December 26, 1998 and After) and due to confusion (see February 1999). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 133]
Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency
The CIA sends an officer from its Counterterrorist Center (CTC) to the NSA to review raw transcripts of intercepted communications between terrorists. However, the officer is only there for a "brief period" and is subsequently withdrawn and not replaced, damaging the CIA's ability to exploit the information gleaned from the intercepts. The CIA only previously received summaries of intercepted calls, not the transcripts themselves, and had been arguing for years that it needed the actual transcripts to better understand the material (see February 1996-May 1998, December 1996, After December 1996, After December 1996, and Late August 1998). After the single officer leaves the NSA, which intercepts calls between the US-based 9/11 hijackers and an al-Qaeda communications hub in Yemen around this time (see Early 2000-Summer 2001), the reason the CIA gives for not replacing him is "resource constraints." In 2005, the CIA's Office of Inspector General will regard this failure as so serious that it will recommend an accountability board be convened to review the performance of the CTC managers responsible, and will suggest that officers should have been detailed to the NSA "on a consistent, full-time basis." [Central Intelligence Agency, 6/2005, pp. xxiii ] The CIA and NSA are obtaining information about people in the US from phone companies to support "black ops" at this time (see After July 11, 1997).
Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, Office of the Inspector General (CIA), Counterterrorist Center
Victims' family members Lorie Van Auken (right) and Kristen Breitweiser (left) are shocked to learn Tom Wilshire blocked a cable to the FBI about Khalid Almihdhar's visa. [Source: Banded Artists]Doug Miller, an FBI agent assigned to Alec Station, the CIA's bin Laden unit, reads CIA cables reporting that 9/11 hijacker Khalid Almihdhar has a US visa and drafts a cable to the FBI to inform it of this. The CIA obtained the information through a tap on Almihdhar's phone in Yemen (see December 29, 1999) and by monitoring him as he passed through Dubai (see January 2-5, 2000) on his way to an al-Qaeda summit in Malaysia (see January 5-8, 2000). Draft Cable - Miller writes that Almihdhar has a US visa (see April 3-7, 1999) and that the visa application states his destination is New York and he intends to stay for three months. The draft cable mentions the tap on Almihdhar's phone, his planned travel to Malaysia, and the links between his phone and the 1998 East African embassy bombings (see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998 and October 4, 2001). It also says that the CIA has obtained photographs of Almihdhar and these will be sent separately. Miller asks the FBI for feedback resulting from an FBI investigation. Blocked - Another CIA officer named Michael Anne Casey accesses Miller's draft about an hour after he writes it. The cable is then blocked on the orders of the station's deputy chief, Tom Wilshire, as a few hours after Miller drafts the cable Casey attaches a message to it saying, "pls hold off on [cable] for now per [Tom Wilshire]." [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 502; US Department of Justice, 11/2004, pp. 240 ] Miller is also told, "This is not a matter for the FBI." [Wright, 2006, pp. 311] 'No Reason to Kill the Message' - Author James Bamford will later comment: "A potential terrorist and member of al-Qaeda was heading for the US, the FBI's jurisdiction—its turf—and he [Miller] was putting the FBI on notice so it could take action. There was no reason to kill the message." [Bamford, 2008, pp. 19] Miller will later say he has no "rational answer" as to why the cable was blocked, but will speculate that Alec Station officers were annoyed he had encroached on their territory. [Congressional Quarterly, 10/1/2008] Casey drafts a cable falsely saying that the information about Almihdhar's visa has been shared with the FBI (see Around 7:00 p.m. January 5, 2000) and there will be a discussion the next day about whether the cable should be sent (see January 6, 2000). The Justice Department's Office of Inspector General will later call the failure to pass the information to the FBI a "significant failure" but will be unable to determine why the information was not passed on. [US Department of Justice, 11/2004, pp. 250 ] The 9/11 Commission will know of the incident, but will relegate it to an endnote in its final report, omitting Wilshire's role entirely. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 502] The CIA inspector general will falsely claim that the cable is not sent, "[a]pparently because it was in the wrong format or needed editing." [Central Intelligence Agency, 6/2005, pp. xv ]
Entity Tags: Michael Anne Casey, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Khalid Almihdhar, Doug Miller, 9/11 Commission, Alec Station, Tom Wilshire, Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Inspector General (CIA)
Although the CIA passes information to the FBI about the attendance of 9/11 hijackers Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi at al-Qaeda's Malaysia summit, it repeatedly fails to mention that Almihdhar has a US visa (see January 6, 2000, 9:30 a.m. - 4:00 p.m. January 5, 2000, January 5-6, 2000). It also fails to check that the FBI has received this information. The CIA's inspector general will say it "found no indication that anyone in [the CIA's Counterterrorist Center] checked to ensure FBI receipt of the information, which, a few [Osama bin Laden] Station officers said, should have been routine practice." [Central Intelligence Agency, 6/2005, pp. xv ]
Entity Tags: Counterterrorist Center, Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Inspector General (CIA)
The al-Qaeda summit in Malaysia (see January 5-8, 2000) ends and the participants leave. Hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar fly to Bangkok, Thailand, with al-Qaeda leader Khallad bin Attash (see January 8, 2000). Other attendees depart to other locales. There have been no media reports that any of the others were followed by intelligence agents. [Associated Press, 9/20/2002; US Congress, 7/24/2003, pp. 131 ] Before the summit started the CIA knew one attendee was named Khalid Almihdhar and that another had the first name Nawaf. At the end of the summit the CIA appears to have learned little more, and still does not know Nawaf's last name is Alhazmi. Around this time, on January 7 and 10, the CIA searches for their names in their databases but get no hits. Yet they don't ask for a search of the much larger NSA databases, which had vital information on them (see Early 1999). CIA headquarters asks the NSA to put Almihdhar on their watch list so they can pass on more information about him (see Mid-January 2000). However, neither Alhazmi nor Almihdhar are placed on the State Department's watch list, which would actually prevent them from coming to the US. [9/11 Commission, 1/26/2004] The CIA still fails to tell the FBI that Almihdhar has a valid US visa, and in fact seems to go out of their way not to tell the FBI about it (see 9:30 a.m. - 4:00 p.m. January 5, 2000, January 6, 2000, Mid-July 2004, and January 5-6, 2000). [US Congress, 7/24/2003, pp. 131 ; Stern, 8/13/2003]
Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Khalid Almihdhar, Al-Qaeda, Nawaf Alhazmi, Khallad bin Attash
Fifty to sixty CIA officers read cables reporting on travel by 9/11 hijackers Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi. The cables are generated in connection with al-Qaeda's Malaysia summit, which Almihdhar and Alhazmi attend and the CIA monitors (see January 5-8, 2000). Even though some of the cables state that Almihdhar has a US visa and Alhazmi has arrived in the US, the FBI is not informed of this (see, for example, January 6, 2000 and March 5, 2000), and the two men are not watchlisted until the summer of 2001 (see August 23, 2001). The cables are drafted at four field offices and at headquarters and are read by overseas officers, headquarters personnel, operations officers, analysts, managers, junior employees, CIA staff, and officers on attachment from the NSA and FBI. The CIA's inspector general will comment: "Over an 18-month period, some of these officers had opportunities to review the information on multiple occasions, when they might have recognized its significance and shared it appropriately with other components and agencies." [Central Intelligence Agency, 6/2005, pp. xiv ]
Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Inspector General (CIA), Khalid Almihdhar, Nawaf Alhazmi
After being prompted by CIA colleagues in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, to provide information about what happened to future 9/11 hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar and al-Qaeda leader Khallad bin Attash after they flew from Malaysia to Thailand on January 8, 2000 (see January 8, 2000 and (February 25, 2000)), the CIA station in Bangkok, Thailand, sends out a cable saying that Alhazmi arrived in the US from Thailand with an apparently unnamed companion on January 15 (see January 15, 2000). This information was received from Thai intelligence, which watchlisted Almihdhar and Alhazmi after being asked to do so by the CIA (see January 13, 2000 and January 15, 2000). [New York Times, 10/17/2002; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 181, 502] Companion - The companion to whom the cable refers is presumably Almihdhar. According to later testimony of a senior FBI official, the CIA learns the companion is Almihdhar at this time: "In March 2000, the CIA received information concerning the entry of Almihdhar and Alhazmi into the United States." [US Congress, 9/20/2002] The CIA disputes this, however. [US Congress, 7/24/2003, pp. 157 ] If the companion the cable refers to is Almihdhar, then it is unclear why he would not be named, as the NSA has been intercepting his calls for at least a year (see Early 1999), he was under CIA surveillance earlier in January (see January 5-8, 2000), he is known to have a US visa (see January 2-5, 2000), he is associated with Alhazmi (see January 8-9, 2000), and this cable is prompted by another cable specifically asking where Almihdhar is (see February 11, 2000). Missed Opportunity - Later, CIA officials, including CIA Director George Tenet and Counterterrorist Center Director Cofer Black, will admit that this was one of the missed opportunities to watchlist the hijackers. Black will say: "I think that month we watchlisted about 150 people. [The watchlisting] should have been done. It wasn't." Almihdhar and Alhazmi will not be added to the US watchlist until August 2001 (see August 23, 2001). [New York Times, 10/17/2002; US Congress, 7/24/2003, pp. 157 ] Unclear Who Reads Cable - Although Tenet will tell the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry that nobody at CIA headquarters reads this cable at this time (see October 17, 2002), the CIA's inspector general will conclude that "numerous" officers access this cable and others about Almihdhar. [US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria District, 3/28/2006 ] These officers are not named, but Tom Wilshire, the CIA's deputy unit chief in charge of monitoring the two men at this time, will access it in May 2001 at the same time as he accesses other cables about Almihdhar from early 2000 (see May 15, 2001). The 9/11 Commission will say that the cables are "reexamined" at this time, suggesting that Wilshire may have read them before. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 267, 537] Wilshire certainly did access at least two of the cables in January 2000, indicating he may read the cable about the arrival of Alhazmi and the unnamed companion in the US in March 2000. [US Department of Justice, 11/2004, pp. 240, 282 ] FBI Not Informed - The knowledge that Alhazmi has entered the US will be disseminated throughout the CIA, but not to the FBI or other US intelligence agencies (see March 6, 2000 and After). When asked about the failure by the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, Wilshire will be unable to explain it, saying: "It's very difficult to understand what happened with that cable when it came in. I do not know exactly why it was missed. It would appear that it was missed completely." [US Congress, 9/20/2002]
Entity Tags: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Central Intelligence Agency, Nawaf Alhazmi, CIA Bangkok Station, 9/11 Commission, 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, Alec Station, Tom Wilshire, Khalid Almihdhar, Malaysian Secret Service
The CIA cable watchlisting Alhazmi, Almihdhar, and two others (the sections mentioning Shakir and bin Attash are blacked out). [Source: FBI] (click image to enlarge)Thanks to the request of Margaret Gillespie, an FBI analyst assigned to the CIA's Counter Terrorism Center, the CIA sends a cable to the State Department, INS, Customs Service, and FBI requesting that "bin Laden-related individuals" Nawaf Alhazmi, Khalid Almihdhar, Ahmad Hikmat Shakir, and Salah Saeed Mohammed bin Yousaf (an alias for Khallad bin Attash) be put on the terrorism watch list. All four individuals had attended the January 2000 al-Qaeda summit in Malaysia (see January 5-8, 2000). The cable mostly focuses on Almihdhar, briefly outlining his attendance at the Malaysia summit and his subsequent travel to the US in January 2000 and July 2001. Since March 2000, if not earlier, the CIA has had good reason to believe Alhazmi and Almihdhar were al-Qaeda operatives living in the US, but apparently did nothing and told no other agency about it until now. The hijackers are not located in time, and both die in the 9/11 attacks. FBI agents later state that if they been told about Alhazmi and Almihdhar sooner, "There's no question we could have tied all 19 hijackers together" given the frequent contact between these two and the other hijackers. [Newsweek, 6/2/2002; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 538; US Department of Justice, 11/2004, pp. 32-36, 302] However, in what the Washington Post calls a "critical omission," the FAA, the Treasury Department's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, and the FBI's Financial Review Group are not notified. The two latter organizations have the power to tap into private credit card and bank data, and claim they could have readily found Alhazmi and Almihdhar, given the frequency the two used credit cards. [Washington Post, 7/25/2003] Furthermore, counterterrorism chief Richard Clarke and his Counterterrorism Security Group are not told about these two operatives before 9/11 either. [Newsweek, 3/24/2004] The CIA later claims the request was labeled "immediate," the second most urgent category (the highest is reserved for things like declarations of war). [Los Angeles Times, 10/28/2001] The FBI denies that it was marked "immediate" and other agencies treated the request as a routine matter. [Los Angeles Times, 10/18/2001; US Congress, 9/20/2002] The State Department places all four men on the watch list the next day. [US Congress, 7/24/2003 ] However, this watch list, named TIPOFF, checks their names only if they use international flights. There is another watch list barring suspected terrorists from flying domestically. On 9/11, it contains only 12 names, including Khalid Shaikh Mohammed and other al-Qaeda figures, and some names are added as late as August 28, 2001. But none of these four men are added to this domestic list before 9/11.(see April 24, 2000). [9/11 Commission, 1/26/2004]
Entity Tags: Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Margaret Gillespie, Khallad bin Attash, TIPOFF, Richard A. Clarke, Khalid Almihdhar, Nawaf Alhazmi, US Department of State, US Customs Service, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, US Immigration and Naturalization Service, Ahmad Hikmat Shakir, Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Federal Aviation Administration, Counterterrorism and Security Group
The CIA's inspector general, which is reviewing some aspects of the CIA's performance with respect to 9/11, examines the agency's analysis of Osama bin Laden-related matters before the attacks and finds it was wanting. The executive summary of the inspector general's report will state that the US intelligence community's understanding of al-Qaeda "was hampered by insufficient analytic focus, particularly regarding strategic analysis." The inspector general also asks three former senior analysts to review what was produced about bin Laden. They find that there were some shortcomings, and that some important elements, such as discussions of the implications of information, were ignored. In addition they find there was: No comprehensive strategic assessment of al-Qaeda by any unit at the CIA; No comprehensive report focused on bin Laden after 1993; No examination of the possible use of planes as weapons; Limited analytic focus on the US as a target; No comprehensive analysis putting the increased threat reporting in the summer of 2001 into context; Not much strategic analysis in the CIA's Counterterrorist Center, where the analytical unit focused on current and tactical issues. In addition, the National Intelligence Council produced its last terrorist threat assessment before 9/11 in 1995, although it was updated in 1997. Work on a new assessment began in early 2001, but was not completed by 9/11. [Central Intelligence Agency, 6/2005, pp. xvii-xviii ]
Entity Tags: Counterterrorist Center, Office of the Inspector General (CIA), Central Intelligence Agency
In interviews with the 9/11 Commission, unnamed deputies for CIA director George Tenet repeatedly claim that, before 9/11, they were never given a clear instruction to assassinate Osama bin Laden. This is false, as President Bill Clinton issued such an order following the 1998 embassy bombings (see December 24, 1998). According to author Philip Shenon, the deputies tell the commission "again and again" that they had not been given clear orders to assassinate bin Laden, but "that the CIA had instead been given a confusing set of presidential orders that allowed for bin Laden's capture, but not his death." Officers at the CIA apparently blamed this on "overly cautious" lawyers at the White House and Justice Department. The commission learns the deputies' claims are false from Clinton's former National Security Adviser Sandy Berger in January 2004 (see January 14, 2004). [Shenon, 2008, pp. 253-4]
Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, 9/11 Commission
The 9/11 Commission arranges for a final interview of CIA Director George Tenet. The Commission's staff thinks of the interview as a "final test of Tenet's credibility," because they believe that both he and other CIA managers have not been telling them the full truth (see Before January 14, 2004 and January 22, 2004). In particular they want to ask him about a memorandum of notification that enabled the CIA to kill Osama bin Laden, but was not acted on (see December 24, 1998). What Memo? - When the Commission's Executive Director Philip Zelikow says he wants to talk about the memo, Tenet, who spent a long time revising for his sessions with the Commission (see Before January 22, 2004), replies, "What are you referring to?" Zelikow explains about the memo, but Tenet says, "I'm not sure what we're talking about." He then says he remembers an early draft of the memo, which did not authorize the CIA to kill bin Laden. Zelikow explains that the draft Tenet is referring to is an early version of the memo, and that a later version, apparently requested by Tenet himself, allowed the CIA to kill bin Laden. Zelikow has not been able to bring the memo with him, because it is so highly classified, and Tenet still does not remember, saying, "Well, as I say, I don't know what you're talking about." Disbelief - Author Philip Shenon will write: "Zelikow and [Commission staffer Alexis] Albion looked at each other across the table in disbelief. It was the last straw with Tenet, the final bit of proof they needed to demonstrate that Tenet simply could not tell the truth to the Commission." Zelikow will later say that he concluded Tenet's memory lapses were not genuine, but that "George had decided not to share information on any topic unless we already had documentary proof, and then he would add as little as possible to the record." False Denial - However, Tenet will deny this was the case, and say he could not remember the authorization to kill bin Laden because he had been on holiday when it was signed and transmitted to Afghanistan. [Shenon, 2008, pp. 359-360] However, the 9/11 Commission will state that this memo was "given to Tenet." In addition, the 9/11 Commission Report calls the message in which the instructions were communicated to the assets in Afghanistan that were to kill bin Laden "CIA cable, message from the DCI." DCI stands for director of central intelligence, Tenet's official job title. Therefore, Tenet very probably did know about it. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 132, 485]
Entity Tags: 9/11 Commission, George J. Tenet, Philip Zelikow, Central Intelligence Agency, Alexis Albion
White House chief of staff Andy Card learns what the 9/11 Commission Report contains before it is published, as the various chapters are sent to the White House for classification review before the publication date. Card then hears back from the review teams. Despite fears about allegations made by former counterterrorism "tsar" Richard Clarke (see March 21, 2004) and a key Presidential Daily Brief item (see August 6, 2001), in the words of author Philip Shenon, Card can see "that the Commission's final report posed no threat to [President] Bush's re-election." This is because the report does not "single out individuals for blame. Certainly not George Bush." The allegations by Clarke, related in a "he-said, she-said" manner in the report, also do not damage National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice. [Shenon, 2008, pp. 411]
Entity Tags: 9/11 Commission, Andrew Card
Details of an internal CIA report (see June-November 2004) investigating the CIA's failure to stop the 9/11 attacks are leaked to the New York Times. The report by John Helgerson, the CIA's inspector general, was completed in June 2004 but remains classified (see June-November 2004). It sharply criticizes former CIA Director George Tenet, as well as former Deputy Director of Operations James Pavitt. It says these two and others failed to meet an acceptable standard of performance, and recommends that an internal review board review their conduct for possible disciplinary action. Cofer Black, head of the CIA's Counter Terrorism Center at the time of 9/11, is also criticized. However, the New York Times notes that, "It is not clear whether either the agency or the White House has the appetite to reprimand Mr. Tenet, Mr. Pavitt or others.… particularly since President Bush awarded a Medal of Freedom to Mr. Tenet last month." It is unclear if any reprimands will occur, or even if the final version of the report will point blame at specific individuals. [New York Times, 1/7/2005] In late October 2004, the new CIA Director, Porter Goss, had asked Helgerson to modify the report to avoid drawing conclusions about whether individual CIA officers should be held accountable. [New York Times, 11/2/2004] Helgerson "appears to have accepted [Goss's] recommendation" and will defer any final judgments to a CIA Accountability Review Board. The final version of the report is said to be completed within weeks. [New York Times, 1/7/2005] However, months pass, and in October 2005, Goss will announce that he is not going to release the report, and also will not convene an accountability board to hold anyone responsible (see October 10, 2005), although an executive summary will be released in 2007 (see August 21, 2007).
Entity Tags: John Helgerson, George W. Bush, Cofer Black, Central Intelligence Agency, George J. Tenet, James Pavitt
A revised version of the CIA inspector general's report into some of the agency's failings before 9/11 is finished and sent to CIA management. A version of the report had been completed a year earlier, but it had to be revised due to criticism (see June-November 2004). It recommends accountability boards be convened to assess the performance of several officers. Although not all the officers are named, it is sometimes possible to deduce who they are based on the circumstances. The convening of accountability boards is recommended for: CIA Director George Tenet, for failing to personally resolve differences between the CIA and NSA that impeded counterterrorism efforts; CIA Executive Director David Carey (July 1997-March 2001), CIA Executive Director A.B. "Buzzy" Krongard (March 2001-9/11), CIA Deputy Director for Operations Jack Downing (1997-1999), and CIA Deputy Director for Operations James Pavitt (1999-9/11) for failing to properly manage CIA counterterrorism funds (see 1997-2001); CIA Counterterrorist Center Chief Jeff O'Connell (1997-1999) for failing to properly manage CIA counterterrorism funds (see 1997-2001), for staffing Alec Station, the CIA's bin Laden unit, with officers lacking experience, expertise and training, for failing to ensure units under him coordinated coverage of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM), for poor leadership of the CIA's watchlisting program, for poor management of a program where officers were loaned between the CIA and other agencies, and for failing to send officers to the NSA to review its material; CIA Counterterrorist Center Chief Cofer Black (Summer 1999-9/11) for failing to properly manage CIA counterterrorism funds (see 1997-2001), for staffing Alec Station, the CIA's bin Laden unit, with officers lacking experience, expertise and training, for failing to ensure units under him coordinated coverage of KSM, for poor leadership of the CIA's watchlisting program, possibly for failing to ensure the FBI was informed one of the 9/11 hijackers had entered the US, possibly for failing to do anything about Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar in 2001, for poor management of a program where officers were loaned between the CIA and other agencies, and for failing to send officers to the NSA to review its material; Chief of Alec Station Richard Blee. Some sections of the report appear to refer to Blee, but are redacted. It seems to criticize him for failing to properly oversee operations related to KSM, failing to ensure the FBI was informed one of the 9/11 hijackers had entered the US, and failing to do anything about Alhazmi and Almihdhar in 2001; Deputy Chief of Alec Station Tom Wilshire. Some sections of the report appear to refer to Tom Wilshire, but are redacted. It seems to criticize him for failing to ensure the FBI was informed one of the 9/11 hijackers had entered the US, and for failing to do anything about Alhazmi and Almihdhar in 2001; Unnamed officer, possibly head of the CIA's renditions branch, for failing to properly oversee operations related to KSM; Unnamed officer, for failing to ensure the FBI was informed one of the 9/11 hijackers had entered the US, and for failing to do anything about Alhazmi and Almihdhar in 2001; Unnamed officer(s), for failure to produce any coverage of KSM from 1997 to 2001. The type of coverage that should have been provided is redacted in the publicly released executive summary of the report. The report may recommend accountability boards for other officers, but this is not known due to redactions and the publication of only the executive summary. CIA Director Porter Goss will decide not to convene any accountability boards (see October 10, 2005), and the report will remain secret until the executive summary is released in 2007 (see August 21, 2007). [Central Intelligence Agency, 6/2005 ]
Entity Tags: Jeff O'Connell, Office of the Inspector General (CIA), James Pavitt, Tom Wilshire, Jack Downing, David Carey, A.B. ("Buzzy") Krongard, Central Intelligence Agency, Cofer Black, George J. Tenet, Richard Blee
CIA Director Porter Goss announces that the agency will not pursue disciplinary action against any current or former CIA officials who have been severely criticized in an internal report produced by John Helgerson, the CIA's inspector general. Those who have read the classified report say that it faults about 20 intelligence officials, including former CIA Director George Tenet, his former Deputy Director of Operations James Pavitt, and the former head of the CIA's Counter Terrorism Center Cofer Black (see June 2005). Tenet in particular is faulted for focusing too little attention on combating al-Qaeda as a whole in the years prior to 9/11. However, he and others who are singled out strongly object to the report's conclusions, and have prepared lengthy rebuttals. The 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, of which Goss was ironically the co-chairman, had formally requested the report in November 2002, as it was finishing its investigation. The 400-page document was completed in June 2004, but its release was delayed (see June-November 2004). John Helgerson finally delivered it to Congress in August 2005, and had urged Goss to convene "accountability boards" to assess the performance of officers it criticized. However, Goss says he has decided not to do this. He says the report in no way suggests "that any one person or group of people could have prevented 9/11," and that "[o]f the officers named in [Helgerson's] report, about half have retired from the Agency, and those who are still with us are amongst the finest we have." Goss also claims the report "unveiled no mysteries," and states that it will remain classified. [New York Times, 10/5/2005; Los Angeles Times, 10/6/2005; Washington Post, 10/6/2005] In response to Goss's statement, Sen. John D. Rockefeller (D-WV), the senior Democrat on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, asks, "What failures in performance, if not these, warrant the convening of an accountability board at the CIA?" 9/11 victim's relative Kristen Breitweiser comments, "No one has been held accountable for the failures on 9/11." [Reuters, 10/5/2005]
Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Porter J. Goss, John D. Rockefeller, Kristen Breitweiser
Relatives of some of the victims of the 9/11 attacks call on the CIA to release a report drafted by its inspector general into some aspects of the agency's failings before 9/11. The report was completed in 2004 (see June-November 2004), and rewritten in 2005 (see January 7, 2005), but was not then released (see October 10, 2005). The call is backed by 15,000 signatures on a petition calling for the release. The victims' relatives, Patty Casazza, Monica Gabrielle, Mindy Kleinberg, and Lorie Van Auken, say the report "is the only major 9/11 government review that has still not been made publicly available," and quote Newsweek journalist Michael Isikoff saying that the main reason for the report's non-release is "a desire to protect the reputations of some of the main figures [named in the report]." [Raw Story, 6/18/2007] This coincides with efforts by lawmakers to get part of the report published (see Spring-Summer 2007) and is eventually partially successful (see August 21, 2007).
Entity Tags: Mindy Kleinberg, Lorie Van Auken, Monica Gabrielle, Office of the Inspector General (CIA), Central Intelligence Agency, Patty Casazza
Congressional legislation forces the CIA to declassify and release the executive summary of its inspector general's report into some of its pre-9/11 failings. The legislation follows a long campaign by senators (see Spring-Summer 2007) and victims' relatives (see June 18, 2007), and orders the CIA to release the summary within 30 days, together with a classified annex for Congress explaining the report's redactions. The report was completed in 2004 (see June-November 2004), and rewritten in 2005 (see January 7, 2005), but was then not released (see October 10, 2005). Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR) says, "All I can say is that it's an extraordinarily important, independent assessment, written with a specific purpose to learn how we can improve our security." Senator Kit Bond (R-MI) points out that "this should have been declassified a long time ago." [The Hill, 8/8/2007] The report is released two weeks later (see August 21, 2007).
Entity Tags: Ron Wyden, Christopher ("Kit") Bond, Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Inspector General (CIA)
A redacted summary of a report by the CIA's inspector general into some aspects of the agency's pre-9/11 performance is released. The report's main points are: No CIA employees violated the law or were guilty of misconduct in the run-up to 9/11; However, some officials did not perform their duties in a satisfactory manner. The report recommended accountability boards be convened to review their performance, but former CIA Director Porter Goss decided against this recommendation in 2005 (see October 10, 2005); There was no "silver bullet" that could have prevented 9/11, but if officers had performed satisfactorily, they would have had a better chance of stopping the attacks; The CIA had no comprehensive strategy to combat al-Qaeda before 9/11 (see After December 4, 1998 and Between Mid-December 2002 and June 2004); Management of counterterrorism funds was poor (see 1997-2001); Arguments between the CIA and NSA negatively impacted counterterrorism efforts (see December 1996, Late August 1998, and 2000); Alleged 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed was well-known to the CIA before 9/11, but his case was badly handled (see 1997 or After); There were numerous failures related to the CIA's monitoring of al-Qaeda's Malaysia summit (see Mid-January-March 2000, 9:30 a.m. - 4:00 p.m. January 5, 2000, Mid-July 2004, (After January 6, 2000), and March 5, 2000); The CIA also missed "several additional opportunities" to watchlist Pentagon hijackers Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi (see January 8, 2000 and August 23, 2001). Such watchlisting could have led to them being denied entry, or being placed under surveillance in the US; The CIA was confused about whether it was authorized to assassinate Osama bin Laden or not (see Mid-August 1998, December 24, 1998, December 26, 1998 and After, February 1999, February 1999, and December 1999); There were various problems with assets and operations linked to foreign services. [Central Intelligence Agency, 6/2005 ] The media picks various angles in commenting on the report (see August 21, 2007), which is criticized by current CIA Director Michael Hayden (see August 21, 2007) and former Director George Tenet (see August 21, 2007).
Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Inspector General (CIA)
In an interview, former counterterrorism "tsar" Richard Clarke says that the CIA purposefully withheld information from him about two future 9/11 hijackers for over a year before September 11. The interview was taped in October 2009, but is released now by documentary makers Ray Nowosielski and John Duffy ahead of a forthcoming podcast entitled "Who Is Rich Blee?" about the intelligence failures before 9/11. Clarke indicates he found out the CIA failed to pass information on to him not long after 9/11, but assumed the information had been honestly missed by a single junior officer. However, when he later learned at at least 50 officers accessed the information, he began to question this theory. (Note: the news that the information was accessed by at least 50 officers broke in August 2007—see Mid-January-March 2000 and August 21, 2007). According to Clarke, information of the sort the CIA had on two of the hijackers, Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi, was automatically forwarded to him, but he never heard their names before 9/11. Clarke, who admits he cannot prove his allegation that the information was withheld deliberately, says the best explanation he can come up with is that the CIA was attempting to turn the two hijackers into double agents, which is why nobody was told outside the agency. Clarke points out that alleged Saudi intelligence operatives working in the US (see January 15-February 2000 and Spring 2000) who knew the hijackers could have helped with this. Clarke mentions four officials who would have been involved in a decision to withhold information: CIA Director George Tenet, who followed information about al-Qaeda in "microscopic detail," Counterterrorist Center chief Cofer Black, Alec Station chief Richard Blee, and his deputy Tom Wilshire. Clarke also expresses wonder that the information was not mentioned at a key meeting with National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice in July 2001 (see July 10, 2001) when Tenet, Black, and Blee were trying to get her to take strong action against al-Qaeda, because what they had on Almihdhar and Alhazmi was the "most persuasive piece of evidence" they had. He also does not understand why the CIA told the FBI in late August 2001 that the two hijackers had entered the country (see August 21-22, 2001). Clarke adds that the CIA presumably did not mention the fact that the two men were in the US at a meeting of high-level officials on September 4, 2001 (see September 4, 2001) because it would have angered Clarke and this would have led to an investigation in CIA "malfeasance and misfeasance" in concealing the information. However, he thinks the US authorities would have caught the hijackers with a "massive sweep" even if he had been told as late as September 4. Clarke also comments that he never asked Tenet and the other CIA officials about what had happened, as the facts became known to him over time. He also says that Tenet, Black, and Blee have got away with what they did, as they were not held to account by the Joint Congressional Inquiry or the 9/11 Commission. [John Duffy and Ray Nowosielski, 8/11/2011; Truthout (.org), 8/11/2011] Tenet, Black, and Blee received an advance copy of the interview and issued a statement in response (see August 3, 2011).
Entity Tags: George J. Tenet, Cofer Black, Tom Wilshire, Richard A. Clarke, Central Intelligence Agency, Ray Nowosielski, John Duffy, Richard Blee
Receive weekly email updates summarizing what contributors have added to the History Commons database
Developing and maintaining this site is very labor intensive. If you find it useful, please give us a hand and donate what you can.Donate Now
If you would like to help us with this effort, please contact us. We need help with programming (Java, JDO, mysql, and xml), design, networking, and publicity. If you want to contribute information to this site, click the register link at the top of the page, and start contributing.Contact Us
Except where otherwise noted,
the textual content of each timeline is licensed under a
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike


text:
Music Lessons Near Monticello, WI
Music Lessons Near Monticello, WI
Music & Concert Photos
Tips & Ideas
PRACTICING General Guidelines 1. HAVE A SPECIAL TIME set aside each day for your practice session. The more consistent you are in the time of day and amount of practice, the more... Read More
Start by identifying which of these subjects interests you. Look online for software that is compatible with your computer (Mac or PC). Most software tools have a free version that you can try out... Read More
Being a Jazz improviser I use an improvised approach to warming up. Set a metronome to a moderate pace. Begin improvising quarter notes. Focus on even notes and control the volume. Stay as relaxed... Read More
To get the most out of your investment in private music lessons, it is crucial to include "musical input" in your every day life. Musical input is simply listening to music! -Listening to... Read More
I played this piece perfectly at home, really!" I believe you. There is nothing lacking in your effort, it's something else. Triumphant after many hours of practicing the student arrives at the... Read More


text:
I am very pleased to announce that we now have TWO Chinese translations of the AAVSO Manual for Visual Observing of Variable Stars available for downloading. The newest addition to our collection of Manual translations is in "Traditional Chinese" which is used in Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan and parts of southeast Asia. This beautiful translation was done by Tao Fan-Lin (陶蕃麟) who is the Director of the Taipei Association of Astronomy Now.
You can get both versions of the Chinese Manual here:
Complete Manual: Vizuális Változócsillag-észlelők Kézikönyve (7.3 MB)
This page gives background on our long-term visual data archives, with an emphasis on our data holdings for different classes of variable stars. It is meant to give an overview of the AAVSO International Database (AID) to researchers interested in studying a number of different light curves of a given class, or who are interested in a summary of what the AAVSO's visual data archives have to offer.
Published 11 January 2012.


text:
New website acts as virtual key to Milwaukee
City hopes site will lead to more jobs
A new website gives people access to all of Milwaukee.
Whether it's music, sports or simply flying a kite, there's lots to keep people busy in Milwaukee.
County Executive Chris Abele, who previously ran a foundation for the local arts, adds to the list.
"We have two opera companies, a world-class symphony, a world-class art museum. We have so much to offer here. The frustration is we don't do a great job talking about it," Abele said.
Promotion is made easy as Paul Upchurch with Visit Milwaukee unveiled Milwaukee365.com.
It's an online one-stop shop to look at events, buy tickets and basically create an itinerary.
"Giving them a great site that's a virtual key to the city that unlocks everything there is to do in Milwaukee," said Paul Upchurch of VISIT Milwaukee.
Milwaukee 365 is free to use, and there's a link to free events, but despite all this "free" talk, city leaders hope the site will generate more dollars for the local economy.
"We've got 47,000 people in Milwaukee who work in the tourism industry. Anything we can do to increase the number of people working there is a plus for the economy," Milwaukee Mayor Tom Barrett said.
Without any marketing, the website's had 50,000 visitors in two months.
With 36 other cities raving about their own online go-to guides, Visit Milwaukee is confident it will succeed with folks surfing the site.


text:
The Vello Glass LCD Screen Protector for Nikon 1 V1 is a sheet of 0.02" (0.5mm) ultra-thin optical glass used to protect your camera's LCD monitor. The glass features 6 layers of protective material that protect your display screen from dirt, scratches, sweat and oily fingerprints. The glass also blocks UV rays while allowing visible light in. The protector is easy to install and remove.
Note! Environments with excessive heat and humidity will shorten the useful life of the adhesive on the glass.


text:
Ginger and her cousin Turmeric are proud members of the zingiberaceae family and grow in sub-tropical, volcanic soils in the southern hemispheres. The plant is thought to have originated in tropical Asia and is widely cultivated in the Caribbean and Africa. many cultures report similar uses of this plant. It has been used as a favorite "diffusive" circulatory tonic and warming agent, to calm occasional nausea, and to aid in a healthy immune respiratory response. It has also been used to support a normal inflammatory response. Ginger is one of the most widely consumed aromatic spices on the planet.
The fresh rhizome in Ginger is less hot and contains more of the flavor components such as triterpenoids and volatile oils which act on the peripheries of the body. The dried rhizome is quite hot from its concentration of pungent nonvolatile compounds known as gingerols and acts centrally to dispel what are referred to in Traditional Chinese Medicine as "Cold-Wind" conditions. Ginger has shown in numerous clinical trials to support a healthy inflammatory response and as a beneficial nausea aid. It is thought that Ginger promotes normal production of inflammatory markers which would explain its action on the immune system as well as its ability to promote healthy circulation and inflammatory responses.
Uses of Ginger
This information in our Herbal Reference Guide is intended only as a general reference for further exploration, and is not a replacement for professional health advice. This content does not provide dosage information, format recommendations, toxicity levels, or possible interactions with prescription drugs. Accordingly, this information should be used only under the direct supervision of a qualified health practitioner such as a naturopathic physician.


text:
Closet Buzz!: Quiz World fans will be outing themselves all over Facebook this week, as a patch makes the PlayStation 3 trivia game the first console title with true in-game Facebook publishing.
While we've seen several console games utilizing Twitter to keep friends up-to-date with player progress, none have allowed players to publish updates directly to popular social networking website Facebook, until now.
A patch for Relentless Software's Buzz! Quiz World going live today will use the PlayStation 3's Facebook connectivity to allow players to post updates about multiplayer matches they've won and personal achievements. Players can use the functionality up to five times per day, which means that while your Buzz!-playing friends will be insufferable this week, they won't be completely insufferable.
And thus opens the flood gates. Before long we'll be able to post our entire gaming habit on Facebook, regardless of whether or not our friends care. Technology is a beautiful thing.
A Facebook First For Buzz!: Quiz World Fans [PlayStation Blog Europe]


text:
Student Self Serve Enrollment Verify
Students are encouraged to obtain enrollment verification certifications via the National Student Clearinghouse. This secure web site is available 24 hours per day and can be accessed via the Registrar's Student page in GrinnellShare (login required). The following services are free to all enrolled students, and may be used as often as necessary.
- Obtain an enrollment certificate to print and mail to a health insurer or other company that requests proof of enrollment.
- View enrollment information on file with the clearinghouse.
- View student loan deferment notifications that the clearinghouse has provided to loan holders (lenders and guarantors).
- View the proof(s) of enrollment that the clearinghouse has provided to my health insurers and other providers of student services or products.
- View specific information about my student loans. (This is a list of lenders and their contact telephone numbers only.)
The student clearinghouse provides students with instant access to their enrollment and lender information 24/7. If you have any questions concerning the service, or quality of the service, please contact the Registrar.
Enrollment and Degree Verification
Grinnell College has authorized the National Student Clearinghouse to provide enrollment and degree verifications to companies requesting such information. The certifications printed via the National Student Clearinghouse should be accepted as official certifications of any Grinnell student's attendance and/or enrollment. All such certifications received in this manner are official and need no further institutional signatures or seals. National Student Clearinghouse may be contacted at:
Website: National Student Clearinghouse
Phone: 703-742-4200
Fax: 703-742-4239
Email: Service at Student Clearinghouse
Mail: National Student Clearinghouse
13454 Sunrise Valley Drive, Suite 300
Herndon, VA 20171
Only those certification requests which require information not in the possession of the National Student Clearinghouse will be handled by the Registrar's Office.


text:
HPE SimpliVity HyperGuarantee
A performance guarantee backing up the simplicity, efficiency, and power of HPE SimpliVity hyperconverged technology.
The industry's most complete guarantee
Only HPE SimpliVity hyperconverged infrastructure delivers the enterprise-class performance, protection, and resiliency that you require, with the cloud economics your business demands. As a proof point of our platform maturity and what our capabilities can do for our customers, we offer one of the industry's most complete guarantees. See more details.
HyperEfficient—Achieve 90% capacity savings
If you use HPE SimpliVity hyperconverged infrastructure and its built-in VM-centric backup capability as outlined below, you will achieve 90% capacity savings across storage and backup combined relative to comparable traditional solutions.1,2
HyperProtected—Backups in under a minute
If you use HPE SimpliVity hyperconverged infrastructure and its built-in backup capability, it will take less than one minute, on average, to complete a local backup or local restore of a 1 TB VM.3
HyperSimple—Full VM control in a matter of clicks
Using the HPE SimpliVity user interface, which is fully integrated with VMware® vCenter™, you only need three clicks to back up, restore, move, or clone a VM, all from a single console.4
HyperManageable—Quickly manage 1000s of VMs
Using the HPE SimpliVity user interface in a central location, in less than a minute on average, you will be able to create or update backup policies for thousands of VMs across dozens of sites.
HyperAvailable—No downtime or disruptions
You will be able to add or replace HPE SimpliVity hyperconverged systems without any downtime for local or remote sites, without any disruption to local or remote HPE SimpliVity backups, without any reconfiguration of HPE SimpliVity and backup policies for local or remote sites, and without the need to reenter any IP addresses in remote sites.
No gimmicks, no separate contracts, no additional steps
These guarantees apply for 90 days to current HPE SimpliVity and HPE OmniStack products and the new HPE SimpliVity 380 product running V3.6.2 or greater. The warranty is described in the HPE SimpliVity 380 QuickSpecs.
Meet HPE SimpliVity
Learn more about the enterprise-grade hyperconverged platform that unites best-in-class data services with the world's best-selling server and offers the industry's most complete guarantee.
电子书 : Dummies guide to hyperconverged infrastructure
Learn how you can simplify IT and solve capacity, performance, data, mobility, and management challenges in this special edition of the popular For Dummies® series.
解决方案简介 : Powerful platform for virtual infrastructure: HPE SimpliVity
Powerhouse Hyperconverged Infrastructure: HPE SimpliVity 380 with OmniStack
电子书 : 超融合基础设施简介与主要用例
白皮书 : Comparing hyperconverged infrastructure options for virtualized environments
Read this TechTarget whitepaper to compare the architectural approaches and hyperconverged products from Cisco, NetApp, Nutanix and HPE.
1. The savings or efficiency are based on the assumption that you configure a backup policy to take at least one HPE SimpliVity backup per day of every virtual machine on every HPE SimpliVity system in a given VMware® Datacenter with those backups retained for 30 days. If backups are performed more frequently and/or retained for a longer period, you will enjoy even greater efficiency. The data change rate is assumed to be up to 5% per day with up to 30% growth rate of the data over a duration of 30 contiguous days.
2. Ninety percent savings is the equivalent of 10 1 efficiency in the VMware Datacenter panel in the HPE SimpliVity tab within the VMware vSphere® Client. Efficiency is calculated across all HPE SimpliVity systems in a VMware Datacenter. It's the ratio of storage capacity that would have been used on a comparable traditional storage solution to the physical storage that is actually used in the HPE SimpliVity hyperconverged infrastructure. Comparable traditional solutions are storage systems that provide VM-level synchronous replication for storage and backup and do not include any deduplication or compression capability.
3. Time taken by applications to quiesce data is not included in the one minute because it is not in HPE SimpliVity infrastructure's control.
4. Assumes that the user is starting from the view/tab in the interface that shows the VMs or backups that are being acted on. Changing default destinations are not counted in the three clicks.
The information contained herein is subject to change without notice. The only warranties for Hewlett Packard Enterprise products and services are set forth in the express warranty statements accompanying such products and services. Nothing herein should be construed as constituting an additional warranty. Hewlett Packard Enterprise shall not be liable for technical or editorial errors or omissions contained herein.


text:
Saul Bolton Moves Into the Brooklyn Museum
"We're giving the guests a chance to have a world-class culinary experience after seeing world-class art, whether it be by a cocktail or a butternut squash sorbet."
When Saul Bolton opened his namesake restaurant on Smith Street in 1999, he didn't expect to become a Brooklyn institution home to one of the borough's three Michelin stars. Yet fourteen years later he's now the head of two other spots—The Vanderbilt and Red Gravy—and he held that star seven years running until recently, when he closed his doors and moved his staff to the Brooklyn Museum, reopening Saul in a completely renovated space.
The doors officially opened October 19th, with lunch and dinner of Saul classics up and running and a counter café menu coming soon. Bolton still owns the building on Smith Street, which will eventually house a new undeveloped project, and unfortunately Michelin stars don't transfer. But for now he's got his hands full welcoming old patrons and forming new relationships—with locals, tourists, and the art itself.
Your building on Smith Street was home for 14 years. Were you planning on renovating or moving before this opportunity came up? We weren't planning to close, but the offer for the museum sort of came out of nowhere. Unbeknownst to us the Brooklyn Museum was interested in us for a long time, and then Restaurant Associates proposed Saul because we're "so Brooklyn." I've lived in Brooklyn longer than I've lived anywhere in my life, 18 years. I've raised my children here and very much feel like part of the community. Many of the members of the board of the museum were already regular Saul customers, so it was immediately thought that we'd be the perfect fit.
There's been a lot of community investment in this part of Brooklyn, and when the opportunity arose it seemed exciting. Of course there's a certain bit of risk in it, too. Across the river Danny Meyer is a whole different universe; I'm still a little guy coming into an institution like The Modern. But the possibility of it being the place where I could spend another 14 years really appeals. Logistically, the restaurant group has given us a lot of support to bring the spirit of Saul into the museum. I can't thank them enough for that.
Your space has expanded somewhat dramatically. Is there anything happening now that wasn't possible before? The kitchen is much larger so, for example, now we have an area where the pastry can be put together carefully, whereas at the old Saul pastry was very much a part of the salad station where it gets hot (and we had no air conditioning)! So it's less difficult, logistically speaking. And we have some equipment that we've always wanted like a convi oven—a convection oven that can steam—that everybody loves. And a pacojet ice cream maker, which I could never justify enough for my wife to get one.
Can we see the changes on our plates? There's nothing necessarily you couldn't eat before, but the execution of it is a little less difficult. Like before when we made ice cream we would have to have an entire batch done around noon so it could freeze for a couple of hours, whereas with the pacojet we can now make four portions at a time with the perfect consistency, ready to roll. We're splitting hairs a little bit. Maybe it's more exciting for us!
That's fair, too! But on the other hand, has the move presented any problems? We're still getting used to it. There were definitely a couple of nights recently we'd look at each other and go, "Man, at the old space we'd be able to do the same covers with two fewer people." The food is the same but it just seems more difficult at times. But I liken it to a dance partner; if you've been dancing with the same person for a long time you've got a chemistry, and a new dance partner may be technically incredible, but it's not natural yet. So I think it's just a case of getting used to it. In the long run it's going to be much better than the old Saul, but the quality of the food, for an opening, is excellent. The execution has been awesome.
How are your new surroundings taken into consideration? We haven't had the chance to go through the exhibitions as a team to be influenced by them yet, but in the future as exhibitions come and go we will do things geared specifically towards them. But the wonderful thing now from the food standpoint is that customers can see and experience fantastic art and then come and eat and have food that's executed with great love. We're giving the guests a chance to have a world-class culinary experience after seeing world-class art, whether it be a cocktail or a butternut squash sorbet.
How are guests different? All my old customers are back, driving out here, and then we're close to Prospect Heights and Park Slope, so there's the old contingent. And we've had plenty of new customers from across the street coming in. It's unique, and something that's going to take a prolonged effort to build new relationships and sustain the old ones. I'm aided greatly by my team members in the front of the house who are great with people. Customers remember them and have great relationships with them and vice versa.
It feels significant. It will be a great accomplishment if we can come into the museum, open it up to lunch and dinner, transition the café, smooth things out, and are able to come out and stick our heads up out of the water in January or February and go, "Wow, I can't believe we did this. This is crazy." It's a cool thing.
All products linked here have been independently selected by our editors. We may earn a commission on purchases, as described in our affiliate policy.


text:
We offer a range of NHS clinics and services – if you are coming to one of our clinics, you can find everything you need to know here.
We offer a range of NHS clinics and services – if you are coming to one of our clinics, you can find everything you need to know here.
We are conducting world-class research into sport, exercise and physical activity of relevance to the whole population.
We have a variety of postgraduate and continuing professional development (CPD) options available to choose from.
The NCSEM is an Olympic legacy project delivering education, research and clinical services in sport, exercise and physical activity. It aims to apply world-class expertise to policies and practice that will benefit the health and wellbeing of the nation – from everyday people at risk of ill health through to elite athletes.
NCSEM East Midlands (NCSEM-EM) is one of three regional hubs established with a £30m investment from the Department of Health, along with London and Sheffield.
NCSEM-EM has a hub and spoke structure with the hub based in a newly built, dedicated space at Loughborough University. The building has been specifically designed to bring together the capabilities of the partner universities and NHS trusts to facilitate the translation of research into education, training and clinical services.


text:
The USDA Crop Production and World Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimates (WADSE) reports released May 10 were regarded as bearish for the corn market and bullish for the soybean market in the coming months. Corn stocks are expected to double by the end of the 2012-2013 crop marketing year, while the ending soybean stocks are expected to be at the tightest level on record by the end of the 2012-2013 marketing year, which runs from Sept. 1, 2012 to Aug. 31, 2013. Following are some highlights of the latest USDA WADSE and crop reports:
According to the May 10 USDA WADSE Report, the projected corn ending stocks for 2011-2012 are now estimated at 851 million bushels, which was increased by 50 million bushels compared to the April report. This was based on an expected reduction in utilization of corn in the U.S. for feed and residual usage. The 2011-2012 ending stocks level is still below the 2010-2011 ending stocks of 1.13 billion bushels, and about half of the corn carryover level of over 1.7 billion bushels for 2009-2010. USDA is projecting that total U.S. corn use for 2011-2012 will be approximately 12.65 billion bushels of corn for livestock feed, ethanol food products, seed, exports, etc., which is down from slightly over 13 billion bushels in both 2010-2011 and 2009-2010.
Based on the most recent WADSE report, USDA is projecting the corn ending stocks to more than double by the end of the 2012-2013 marketing year, compared to 2011-2012 levels, increasing to 1.88 billion bushels. This would be the highest level of ending stocks since the 2005-2006 carryover level of 1.97 billion bushels. The important ending stocks-to-use ratio for corn is projected to increase from the current level of 6.7 % to a level of 13.7 % for 2012-2013. USDA is projecting total corn usage to increase to 13.77 billion bushels for 2012-2013; however, they are also estimating total U.S. corn production for 2012 to increase by 2.43 billion bushels compared to 2011 corn production.
According to the May 10 USDA report, the total U.S, corn production for 2012 is estimated at 14.79 billion bushels, which far surpasses the 2011 total corn production of 12.35 billion bushels and the record U.S. corn production of 13.1 billion bushels in 2009. The report indicated an estimated 95.9 million acres planted to corn in 2012, which is up 4% from the 91.9 million planted acres in 2011, and up 9% from 88.2 million acres in 2010. If achieved, the 2012 planted corn acres would be the highest since 1937, when 97.2 million acres were planted.
USDA is projecting a record national average corn yield of 166 bu./acre for 2012, surpassing the previous record corn yield of 164.7 bu. in 2009. This compares to national average corn yields of 147.2 bu./acre in 2011 and 152.8 bu. in 2010. USDA cites early corn planting in much of the U.S., along with favorable weather in the early growing season, as supporting the 2012 corn yield estimates.
USDA is estimating the average U.S on-farm corn price for the 2012-2013 marketing year in a range of $4.20-5/bu., or an average price of $4.60/bu., which is a significant decrease from the 2011-2012 average on-farm price of $6.10. This compares to an estimated average farm price of $5.18 for 2010-2011 and $3.55 for 2009-2010.
According to the May 10 USDA WADSE report, the projected soybean ending stocks for 2011-2012 will be 210 million bushels, which was reduced from the April soybean carryover estimate of 250 million bushels. The estimated reduction in ending stocks was due to a higher-than-expected domestic soybean crush level and increased soybean export demand. The 2011-2012 soybean ending stock levels compare to carryover levels of 215 million bushels in 2010-2011 and 151 million bushels for 2009-2010. The current soybean stocks-to-use ratio is now estimated at 6.8%, which is fairly tight.
Based on the recent WADSE report, soybean ending stocks for 2012-2013 are expected to shrink to 145 million bushels, which would drop the stocks-to-use ratio to the lowest level ever at 4.4%. This estimate is based on an increased soybean crush and higher soybean exports in 2012-2013, compared to a year earlier, with fairly stable levels of soybean production. Total U.S. soybean production in 2012 is expected to be just above 3.20 billion bushels, which compares to 3.06 billion bushels in 2011 and 3.33 billion bushels in 2010. Planted soybean acres for 2012 are estimated at 73.9 million acres, compared to 75.0 million acres in both 2011 and 2010. USDA is estimating a national average soybean yield of 43.9 bu./acre in 2012, which compares to 41.5 bu. in 2011, 43.5 bu. in 2010, and the U.S. record soybean yield of 44.bu./acre in 2009.
USDA is now estimating the U.S on-farm soybean price for the 2012-2013 marketing year in a range from $12-14/bu., or an average price of $13/bu., which compares to an estimated average farm price of $12.35 for 2011-2012, $11.30 for 2010-2011, and $9.59 for 2009-2010.
Marketing Strategies
The latest USDA WADSE and Crop Production reports send kind of a mixed message regarding grain marketing strategies. The relatively tight 2011-2012 corn supplies should keep the market for old-crop corn relatively strong, with fairly tight local basis levels, and some good cash marketing opportunities in the next few months. The projected large 2012 corn crop, and the associated significant increase in corn carryover levels for the 2012-2013 marketing year, is likely to put continued pressure on new-crop corn prices, This could limit substantial price increases during the coming growing season, similar to those seen in recent years when much tighter projected corn ending stocks existed. Farm operators will want to watch for some new-crop corn pricing opportunities in the coming months during short-term market rallies. Price prospects for new-crop soybeans should remain quite positive in the coming months, given the very tight projected carryover levels for the 2012-2013 marketing year, with some very strong market rallies likely, if 2012 soybean production levels are threatened.
Editor's note: Kent Thiesse is a former University of Minnesota Extension educator and now is Vice President of MinnStar Bank, Lake Crystal, MN. You can contact him at 507-726-2137 or via e-mail at firstname.lastname@example.com.