text:
!! History Commons Alert, Exciting News
We are planning some big changes! Please follow us to stay updated and be part of our community.
Project: 9/11 TimelineOpen-Content project managed by matt, Paul, KJF
add event | references
Near the end of his visit to Spain in July 2001 (see July 8-19, 2001), future 9/11 hijacker Mohamed Atta sends a cell phone text message to three friends in Hamburg, Germany. The message reads: "Salam (greetings). This is for you, Abbas, and Mounir. Hasn't the time come to fear God's word. Allah. I love you all. Amir." The message is sent to Said Bahaji, so he is the "you." "Mounir" is Mounir El Motassadeq. "Abbas" is Abbas Tahir, a Sudanese friend of Ziad Jarrah's who author Terry McDermott says is one of the Hamburg group. Atta signs the message "Amir" because he is generally known as Mohamed el-Amir in Germany. The information about this message will come from the BKA (German intelligence). It will be unknown if the BKA finds the message before or after 9/11. [McDermott, 2005, pp. xi, 225, 303, 328]
Entity Tags: Mohamed Atta, Bundeskriminalamt Germany, Said Bahaji, Abbas Tahir, Mounir El Motassadeq
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline
Category Tags: Mohamed Atta, Al-Qaeda's Hamburg Cell
9/11 hijacker Hani Hanjour rents an aircraft from Caldwell Flight Academy in New Jersey and flies to Montgomery Airpark in Maryland. The route he takes means that he flies near to Washington. He is accompanied by another man the 9/11 Commission will suggest is hijacker Nawaf Alhazmi, whose credit card is used to pay for the aircraft rental, as well as fuel in Maryland. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 242; US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, 7/31/2006, pp. 67 ]
Entity Tags: Hani Hanjour, Nawaf Alhazmi
Category Tags: Hani Hanjour, Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Alleged Hijackers' Flight Training
An unknown intelligence agency intercepts a telephone call between alleged 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM) and his associate Ramzi bin al-Shibh. [9/11 Commission, 2004; 9/11 Commission, 3/18/2004] In the call, KSM and bin al-Shibh discuss the state of the 9/11 plot, in particular the fact that Ziad Jarrah, one of the proposed pilots, may drop out. They speak in a code, substituting unexceptional words for what they really mean. [9/11 Commission, 3/18/2004] KSM instructs bin al-Shibh to send the "skirts," meaning money forwarded to bin al-Shibh by an associate of KSM, to "Sally," meaning Moussaoui. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 246] The reason for this is that "Teresa," meaning Jarrah, is "late," i.e. he is wavering and may drop out of the plot, due to possible conflicts with lead hijacker Mohamed Atta about Jarrah's isolation from the conspiracy. It therefore appears that KSM is thinking of Moussaoui as a replacement for Jarrah. According to a 9/11 Commission memo, KSM says something like, "if there is a divorce, it will cost a lot of money." Bin al-Shibh then tries to reassure him, saying it will be okay. The conversation also mentions "Danish leather," an apparent reference to failed "20th hijacker" Mohamed al-Khatani (see August 4, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 3/18/2004] The agency which intercepts this call is never identified to the public, although the NSA is reportedly intercepting such calls to and from KSM at this time (see Summer 2001). The 9/11 Commission will mention the call in a staff statement and its final report, but will not mention that it was intercepted, merely citing detainee interrogations as the source of information about it. [9/11 Commission, 6/16/2004, pp. 16-17; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 246, 530]
Entity Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Ziad Jarrah, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Al-Qaeda, Mohamed al-Khatani
Category Tags: Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Zacarias Moussaoui, Ziad Jarrah, Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh
Anti-aircraft stationed around the G8 Summit in Genoa, Italy. [Source: BBC]The G8 summit is held in Genoa, Italy. Acting on previous warnings that al-Qaeda would attempt to kill President Bush and other leaders, Italian authorities surround the summit with anti-aircraft guns. They keep fighter jets in the air and close off local airspace to all planes. [Los Angeles Times, 9/27/2001] The warnings are taken so seriously that Bush stays overnight on an aircraft carrier offshore, and other world leaders stay on a luxury ship. [CNN, 7/18/2001] No attack occurs. US officials state that the warnings were "unsubstantiated," but after 9/11, they will claim success in preventing an attack. [Los Angeles Times, 9/27/2001] According to author Philip Shenon, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice is involved in discussions about the precautions, and this is the only time she focuses on al-Qaeda threats in the summer of 2001. Shenon will add: "There is no record to show that Rice made any special effort to discuss terrorist threats with Bush. The record suggested, instead, that it was not a matter of special interest to either of them that summer." [Shenon, 2008, pp. 154]
Entity Tags: Condoleezza Rice, Philip Shenon, George W. Bush
Category Tags: Warning Signs
Niaz Naik. [Source: Calcutta Telegraph (left)]Three former American officials, Tom Simons (former US Ambassador to Pakistan), Karl Inderfurth (former Deputy Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs), and Lee Coldren (former State Department expert on South Asia) meet with Pakistani and Russian intelligence officers in a Berlin hotel. [Salon, 8/16/2002] This is the third of a series of back-channel conferences called "brainstorming on Afghanistan." Taliban representatives sat in on previous meetings, but boycotted this one due to worsening tensions. However, the Pakistani ISI relays information from the meeting to the Taliban. [Guardian, 9/22/2001] At the meeting, Coldren passes on a message from Bush officials. He later says, "I think there was some discussion of the fact that the United States was so disgusted with the Taliban that they might be considering some military action." [Guardian, 9/26/2001] Accounts vary, but former Pakistani Foreign Secretary Niaz Naik later says he is told by senior American officials at the meeting that military action to overthrow the Taliban in Afghanistan is planned to "take place before the snows started falling in Afghanistan, by the middle of October at the latest." The goal is to kill or capture both bin Laden and Taliban leader Mullah Omar, topple the Taliban regime, and install a transitional government of moderate Afghans in its place. Uzbekistan and Russia would also participate. Naik also says, "It was doubtful that Washington would drop its plan even if bin Laden were to be surrendered immediately by the Taliban." [BBC, 9/18/2001] One specific threat made at this meeting is that the Taliban can choose between "carpets of bombs"
—an invasion—or "carpets of gold"
—the pipeline. [Brisard and Dasquie, 2002, pp. 43] Naik contends that Tom Simons made the "carpets" statement. Simons claims, "It's possible that a mischievous American participant, after several drinks, may have thought it smart to evoke gold carpets and carpet bombs. Even Americans can't resist the temptation to be mischievous." Naik and the other American participants deny that the pipeline was an issue at the meeting. [Salon, 8/16/2002]
Entity Tags: Uzbekistan, Tom Simons, Russia, Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, Mullah Omar, Lee Coldren, Niaz Naik, Osama bin Laden, Karl Inderfurth, Taliban, Bush administration (43)
Category Tags: Counterterrorism Policy/Politics
A property risk assessment report is prepared for Silverstein Properties before it acquires the lease for the World Trade Center (see July 24, 2001). It identifies the scenario of an aircraft hitting one of the WTC towers as one of the "maximum foreseeable losses." The report says, "This scenario is within the realm of the possible, but highly unlikely." Further details of the assessment, such as who prepared it, are unreported. [National Institute of Standards and Technology, 5/2003, pp. 16; Barrett and Collins, 2006, pp. 189; American Prospect, 9/1/2006]
Entity Tags: Silverstein Properties, World Trade Center
Category Tags: 9/11 Related Lawsuits, WTC Investigation, 9/11 Investigations
The photograph of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed on his 2001 US visa application. [Source: 9/11 Commission]Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM) is granted a visa to enter the US, despite being under a federal terrorism indictment, having a $2 million reward on his head, and being one of only a dozen people in the world on a US domestic no-fly list (see April 24, 2000). There is no evidence that he actually uses his visa to travel to the US. Investigators speculate that he may have considered a trip to shepherd some aspect of the 9/11 plot. He applied for the visa using a Saudi passport and an alias (Abdulrahman al Ghamdi), but the photo he submitted is really of him. He uses the new, controversial Visa Express program that allows Saudis to apply for US visas without having to appear in person at any point during the application process (see May 2001). [Los Angeles Times, 1/27/2004] Just a month earlier, the CIA passed a warning to all US intelligence agencies, certain military commanders, and parts of the Justice and Treasury Departments saying that Mohammed may be attempting to enter the US (see June 12, 2001). However, either this warning isn't given to immigration officials or else they fail to notice his application. [Los Angeles Times, 1/27/2004]
Entity Tags: US Department of Justice, US Department of the Treasury, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed
Category Tags: Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit
Due to a lack of response to a previous request that information about the Cole bombing and al-Qaeda's Malaysia summit be passed to the FBI (see July 13, 2001), CIA officer Tom Wilshire e-mails another CIA manager asking about the request's status. The manager's identity is unknown, but the previous request was received by Richard Blee, a close associate of Wilshire's who is responsible for the CIA's bin Laden unit (see June 1999 and Between Mid-January and July 2000), so presumably he receives this request as well. Wilshire writes: "When the next big op is carried out by [Osama bin Laden's] hardcore cadre, [Khallad bin Attash] will be at or near the top of the command food chain—and probably nowhere near either the attack site or Afghanistan. That makes people who are available and who have direct access to him of very high interest. Khalid [Almihdhar] should be very high interest anyway, given his connection to the [redacted]." The name of the redacted event or entity is unclear. [US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, 7/31/2006 ] However, it could be a mention of Almihdhar's role in the 1998 US embassy bombings in East Africa, since the CIA was aware of that from at least January 2000 (see 9:30 a.m. - 4:00 p.m. January 5, 2000). Or, more likely, it could be a mention of Almihdhar's role in the 2000 USS Cole bombing (see October 12, 2000), since Wilshire mentioned earlier in the month that Almihdhar could be linked to the Cole bombers (see July 5, 2001).
Entity Tags: Khalid Almihdhar, Khallad bin Attash, Central Intelligence Agency, Tom Wilshire, Richard Blee
Category Tags: Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit, Alhazmi and Almihdhar, CIA Hiding Alhazmi & Almihdhar, Key Hijacker Events
The attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. [Source: US Navy]Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld writes a note, in which he expresses his fear of the US experiencing a "modern-day version" of Japan's surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, in 1941. Rumsfeld dictates the note to himself, which he intends to offer when he is next testifying before Congress. In the note, he states: "In some future hearing, I am going to say that I do not want to be sitting before this panel in a modern-day version of a Pearl Harbor post-mortem as to who didn't do what, when, where, and why. None of us would want to have to be back here going through that agony." [Donald Rumsfeld, 7/23/2001 ; Rumsfeld, 2011, pp. 334] The 9/11 attacks, which take place less than two months after Rumsfeld writes this note, will be frequently compared to the attack on Pearl Harbor. [New York Times, 9/12/2001; San Francisco Chronicle, 9/14/2001] Rumsfeld warned of the danger of a surprise attack like the one at Pearl Harbor happening again during his confirmation hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee in January this year (see January 11, 2001). [US Congress. Senate, 1/11/2001]
Entity Tags: Donald Rumsfeld
Djamel Beghal.
[Source: Public domain]High-level al-Qaeda operative Djamel Beghal is arrested in Dubai on his way back from Afghanistan. Earlier in the month the CIA sent friendly intelligence agencies a list of al-Qaeda agents they wanted to be immediately apprehended, and Beghal was on the list (see July 3, 2001). Information Obtained - Beghal quickly starts to talk, and tells French investigators about a plot to attack the American embassy in Paris. Crucially, he provides new details about the international-operations role of top al-Qaeda deputy Abu Zubaida, whom he had been with a short time before. [New York Times, 12/28/2001; Time, 8/12/2002] One European official says Beghal talks about "very important figures in the al-Qaeda structure, right up to bin Laden's inner circle. [He] mention[s] names, responsibilities and functions—people we weren't even aware of before. This is important stuff." [Time, 11/12/2001] One French official says of Beghal's interrogations, "We shared everything we knew with the Americans." [Time, 5/19/2002] Link to 9/11 - The New York Times later will report, "Enough time and work could have led investigators from Mr. Beghal to an address in Hamburg where Mohamed Atta and his cohorts had developed and planned the Sept. 11 attacks." Beghal had frequently associated with Zacarias Moussaoui. However, although Moussaoui is arrested (see August 16, 2001) around the same time that Beghal is revealing the names and details of all his fellow operatives, Beghal is apparently not asked about Moussaoui. [New York Times, 12/28/2001; Time, 8/12/2002] Timing of Arrest - Most media accounts place the arrest on July 28. However, in a 2007 book CIA Director George Tenet will say he received a briefing about the arrest on July 24. [Tenet, 2007, pp. 156-157]
Entity Tags: Djamel Beghal, Al-Qaeda, Mohamed Atta, George J. Tenet, Zacarias Moussaoui
Category Tags: Warning Signs, Zacarias Moussaoui, Al-Qaeda's Hamburg Cell
Larry Silverstein.
[Source: Silverstein Properties publicity photo]Real estate development and investment firm Silverstein Properties and real estate investment trust Westfield America Inc. finalize a deal worth $3.2 billion to purchase a 99-year lease on the World Trade Center. The agreement covers the Twin Towers, World Trade Center Buildings 4 and 5 (two nine-story office buildings), and about 425,000 square feet of retail space. [New York Times, 4/27/2001; Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, 7/24/2001; IREIzine, 7/26/2001] Westfield America Inc. will be responsible for the retail space, known as the Mall. Silverstein Properties' lease will cover the roughly 10 million square feet of office space of the Twin Towers and Buildings 4 and 5. Silverstein Properties already owns Building 7 of the WTC, which it built in 1987. This is the only time the WTC has ever changed hands since it was opened in 1973. [International Council of Shopping Centers, 4/27/2001; Westfield Group, 7/24/2001; Daily Telegraph, 9/11/2001; New York Times, 11/29/2001; CNN, 8/31/2002] It was previously controlled by the New York Port Authority, a bi-state government agency. [Wall Street Journal, 5/12/2007] Silverstein and Westfield are given the right to rebuild the structures if they are destroyed. [New Yorker, 5/20/2002] Silverstein Properties Not the Highest Bidder - Silverstein Properties' bid for the WTC, at $3.22 billion, was the second highest after Vornado Realty Trust's, at $3.25 billion. Silverstein Properties won the contract only after protracted negotiations between the Port Authority and Vornado Realty Trust failed. The privatization of the WTC has been overseen by Lewis M. Eisenberg, the chairman of the Port Authority. Eisenberg, a financier, is involved in Republican politics. [New York Times, 3/17/2001; Forward, 8/20/2004] Banks Provide Most Money for Deal - Larry Silverstein, the president of Silverstein Properties, only uses $14 million of his own money for the deal. His partners, who include real estate investors Lloyd Goldman and Joseph Cayre, put up a further $111 million, and banks provide $563 million in loans. [Brill, 2003, pp. 156; New York Times, 11/22/2003; South Florida CEO, 2/2005; Wall Street Journal, 9/11/2008] Silverstein's Lenders Want More Insurance - The Port Authority had carried only $1.5 billion in insurance coverage on all its buildings, including the WTC, but Silverstein's lenders insist on more, eventually demanding $3.55 billion in cover. [American Lawyer, 9/3/2002] After 9/11, Larry Silverstein will claim the attacks on the World Trade Center constituted two separate events, thereby entitling him to a double payout totaling over $7 billion. [Daily Telegraph, 10/9/2001; Guardian, 8/18/2002] Eventually, after several years of legal wrangling, a total of $4.55 billion of insurance money will be paid out for the destruction of the WTC (see May 23, 2007). Most of this appears to go to Silverstein Properties. How much goes to Westfield America Inc. is unclear. [New York Post, 5/24/2007]
Entity Tags: Vornado Realty Trust, Larry Silverstein, Joseph P. Cayre, Lewis M. Eisenberg, Lloyd Goldman, Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, Westfield America, World Trade Center, Silverstein Properties
Category Tags: 9/11 Investigations, WTC Investigation, 9/11 Related Lawsuits, 9/11 Investigations, WTC Investigation, 9/11 Related Lawsuits, 9/11 Investigations, WTC Investigation, 9/11 Related Lawsuits, 9/11 Investigations, WTC Investigation, 9/11 Related Lawsuits, 9/11 Investigations, WTC Investigation, 9/11 Related Lawsuits, 9/11 Investigations, WTC Investigation, 9/11 Related Lawsuits, 9/11 Investigations, WTC Investigation, 9/11 Related Lawsuits, 9/11 Investigations, WTC Investigation, 9/11 Related Lawsuits, 9/11 Investigations, WTC Investigation, 9/11 Related Lawsuits, 9/11 Investigations, WTC Investigation, 9/11 Related Lawsuits, 9/11 Investigations, WTC Investigation, 9/11 Related Lawsuits, 9/11 Investigations, WTC Investigation, 9/11 Related Lawsuits, 9/11 Investigations, WTC Investigation, 9/11 Related Lawsuits, 9/11 Investigations, WTC Investigation, 9/11 Related Lawsuits, 9/11 Investigations, WTC Investigation, 9/11 Related Lawsuits, 9/11 Investigations, WTC Investigation, 9/11 Related Lawsuits
Future 9/11 hijacker Ziad Jarrah seems to leave the US twice on the same day. According to a 2002 FBI document about the 9/11 attacks, Jarrah takes a KLM flight from Atlanta, Georgia, to Amsterdam, Netherlands. But the same document says he also takes a Continental flight from Newark, New Jersey, to Dusseldorf, Germany. The FBI document contains a note from an analyst that merely comments this is "conflicting information." [Federal Bureau of Investigation, 4/19/2002] Jarrah seems to leave the US twice in a short time period on one other occasion (see December 26-28, 2000).
Entity Tags: Ziad Jarrah, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Category Tags: Ziad Jarrah, HIjacker Visas and Immigration
Dan Rather in July 2001 presenting the story about John Ashcroft. [Source: CBS via Banded Artists Productions]CBS News reports that Attorney General Ashcroft has stopped flying commercial airlines due to a threat assessment, but "neither the FBI nor the Justice Department… would identify [to CBS] what the threat was, when it was detected or who made it." [CBS News, 7/26/2001] One newspaper reports, "Ashcroft demonstrated an amazing lack of curiosity when asked if he knew anything about the threat. 'Frankly, I don't,' he told reporters." [San Francisco Chronicle, 6/3/2002] It is later reported that he stopped flying in July based on threat assessments made on May 8 and June 19. In May 2002, it is claimed the threat assessment had nothing to do with al-Qaeda, but Ashcroft walked out of his office rather than answer questions about it. [Associated Press, 5/16/2002] The San Francisco Chronicle will later conclude, "The FBI obviously knew something was in the wind.… The FBI did advise Ashcroft to stay off commercial aircraft. The rest of us just had to take our chances." [San Francisco Chronicle, 6/3/2002] CBS's Dan Rather will later ask of this warning: "Why wasn't it shared with the public at large?" [Washington Post, 5/27/2002] On July 5, the CIA had warned Ashcroft to expect multiple, imminent al-Qaeda attacks overseas (see July 5, 2001) and on July 12 the FBI warned him about the al-Qaeda threat within the US (see July 12, 2001).
Entity Tags: John Ashcroft, Dan Rather, Al-Qaeda, US Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Future 9/11 hijacker Waleed Alshehri books a one-way airplane ticket from San Francisco to Miami, via Las Vegas, at a Florida travel agent office. According to an FBI report about the 9/11 attacks, he is accompanied by an older man in his mid-40s. Days after 9/11, the travel agent who books the flight will be shown photographs of the other hijackers in an attempt to determine who this other man is, but the agent will not recognize any of the hijackers as that man. Apparently, Alshehri does not use the flight, although he does fly from Miami to San Francisco and back a few days later. [Federal Bureau of Investigation, 4/19/2002] Mohamed Atta is believed to be the oldest of the 9/11 hijackers, and is 33 years old by the time of 9/11.
Entity Tags: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Waleed Alshehri
Category Tags: Other 9/11 Hijackers, Possible Hijacker Associates in US
Counterterrorism "tsar" Richard Clarke informs National Security Adviser Rice and her deputy Stephen Hadley that the spike in intelligence about a near-term al-Qaeda attack has stopped. However, he urges keeping readiness at a high level during August, when President Bush and many other top US leaders go on vacation. He warns that another recent report suggests that an attack has just been postponed for a few months "but will still happen." Similarly, on August 3, the CIA sends a cable to the US intelligence community warning that the threat of impending al-Qaeda attacks is likely to continue indefinitely. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 260, 534]
Entity Tags: Richard A. Clarke, Condoleezza Rice, Central Intelligence Agency, Stephen J. Hadley
The FBI sends a request to the CIA, asking the agency to check for information on eight Islamist radicals mentioned in the Phoenix memo (see July 10, 2001). However, the CIA apparently does not find any additional information about them. [USA Today, 5/20/2002; Washington Times, 5/23/2002; Wright, 2006, pp. 350-1] Had the CIA investigated these men closely they might have turned up ties connecting them to al-Qaeda. For instance, in 2000, two friends of the main target of the Phoenix memo were detained and deported after twice attempting to enter a US airplane cockpit in what may have been practice for the 9/11 attacks. That same year it was learned by US intelligence that one of these men had received explosives and car bombing training in Afghanistan (see November 1999-August 2001). Other ties between the men in the memo go undiscovered; for instance, another person targeted in the memo had trained in al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan and will later be arrested with a top al-Qaeda leader (see July 10, 2001). Around this time, the Phoenix memo is sent to FBI headquarters and its I-49 squad in New York (see July 27, 2001 and after and July 27, 2001 or Shortly After). After 9/11, the CIA will say it did not receive the memo and its Office of Inspector General will agree with this. [US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, 3/28/2005 ] However, in a 2006 book journalist Lawrence Wright will report that the memo was also sent to the CIA's bin Laden unit. One of the sources Wright cites for this passage is Mark Rossini. Rossini is an FBI agent who at one time worked in the unit's I-49 squad in New York, but was detailed to the bin Laden station in the summer of 2001. [Wright, 2006, pp. 316, 350, 381, 426 Sources: Mark Rossini]
Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Ken Williams, Alec Station, Mark Rossini, I-49
Category Tags: Counterterrorism Policy/Politics, Phoenix Memo
FBI headquarters. [Source: GlobeXplorer]FBI headquarters receives the Phoenix Memo, but does not act on it. The memo was drafted by Arizona FBI agent Ken Williams and warns that a large number of Islamic extremists are learning to fly in the US. It is dated 17 days earlier, but is not uploaded until this date (see July 10, 2001). Although the memo is addressed to eight specific agents, it is apparently not received by all of them. The Justice Department's Office of Inspector General will later say that the memo was not delivered directly to the addressees, but uploaded to a central dispatching point, from where it was assigned to Radical Fundamentalist Unit agent Elizabeth Matson on July 30. Before sending the memo, Williams called both Matson and her colleague Fred Stremmel to talk to them about it. Matson pulls up the memo, which has "routine" precedence, and prints and reads it. However, she thinks it should go to the bin Laden unit. A week later she discusses the matter with bin Laden unit agent Jennifer Maitner and they agree that Maitner will do some research and then they will talk again. Matson will later tell the Office of Inspector General she may have mentioned the memo to her superior, but is not sure. Her superior will say he was not consulted. Maitner discusses the memo with bin Laden unit chief Rod Middleton and also sends it to the FBI's Portland, Oregon, field office, which was previously interested in one of the men named in the memo. However, she does not do anything else with it before 9/11, apparently due to her high workload. The FBI will later acknowledge the memo did not receive the sufficient or timely analysis that it deserved. [US Department of Justice, 11/2004, pp. 65-77, 80 ] The memo is also seen by the FBI's New York field office (see July 27, 2001 or Shortly After), another RFU agent researching the Moussaoui case (see August 22, 2001) and possibly the CIA's bin Laden unit (see (July 27, 2001)).
Entity Tags: Rod Middleton, Ken Williams, Radical Fundamentalist Unit, Fred Stremmel, FBI Headquarters, Elizabeth Matson, FBI Portland field office, Jennifer Maitner
An FBI agent assigned to the CIA's bin Laden unit locates a CIA cable that says 9/11 hijacker Khalid Almihdhar has a US visa, but fails to disseminate the information to the FBI. It is not clear why the agent, Margaret Gillespie, fails to do this. However, at the same time she locates another CIA cable which mistakenly states that the information about the visa has already been passed to the FBI (see 9:30 a.m. - 4:00 p.m. January 5, 2000). [US Department of Justice, 11/2004, pp. 299 ]
Entity Tags: Margaret Gillespie, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Alec Station, Khalid Almihdhar, Central Intelligence Agency
Category Tags: Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit, Alhazmi and Almihdhar, CIA Hiding Alhazmi & Almihdhar
9/11 hijacker Marwan Alshehhi pays for a few hours of ground and flying time at Kemper Aviation in Lantana, Florida. According to a document used as evidence at the Zacarias Moussaoui trial, on the first day, "Alshehhi could not answer basic questions on the written aviation test, which he needed an instructor's assistance to complete." Alshehhi returns on July 30 and August 8, when he rents a plane for approximately one hour. [US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, 7/31/2006, pp. 66 ] Alshehhi is accompanied by an unknown man on August 8. [Federal Bureau of Investigation, 10/2001 ] The FBI will visit the school on September 12, seizing all records of pilots from Saudi Arabia. Over a year later, the FBI will renew its interest in a Saudi, Turki al-Masri, who attended the school around the same time as Alshehhi, but the reason for the renewed interest is not known. [ABC News, 1/23/2003]
Entity Tags: Marwan Alshehhi, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Turki al-Masri, Kemper Aviation
Category Tags: Alleged Hijackers' Flight Training, Marwan Alshehhi
The FBI's New York field office, which specializes in international terrorism, receives Ken Williams' Phoenix Memo, but only briefly checks the named radicals and does not respond to Williams. In the memo, Williams noted that there is a suspiciously large number of Islamic extremists learning to fly in Arizona. Some of them will turn out to be connected to 9/11 hijacker Hani Hanjour (see July 10, 2001). Williams sent the memo to FBI headquarters (see July 27, 2001 and after) and the I-49 squad in the New York FBI field office. In New York, the memo is read by FBI agent Jack Cloonan, a member of the I-49 squad. Cloonan believes that the memo has a "glaring deficiency," as he thinks bin Laden does not have a support operation in Arizona any more. He forms the opinion that William's theory and conclusions are "faulty." However, two of the hijackers were in Arizona in early 2001 (see December 12, 2000-March 2001) and some of the people named in the memo will later be linked to bin Laden (see October 1996-Late April 1999). In August 2001, Cloonan will ask, "Who's going to conduct the thirty thousand interviews? When the f_ck do we have time for this?" Nonetheless, he checks out the eight names mentioned in the memo. He will apparently find nothing, although several individuals associated with the Phoenix cell are Sunni extremists (see November 1999-August 2001). The memo is also read by an analyst and an auditor in New York while they are researching other matters, and Cloonan will tell the Justice Department's Office of Inspector General (OIG) he may have discussed the memo with some of his colleagues. The OIG's report will say Cloonan told investigators that "he did not contact Williams or anyone else in Phoenix to discuss the [memo]." However, in a 2006 book author Lawrence Wright, citing an interview with Cloonan, will say that Cloonan spoke to Williams' supervisor in Phoenix about it. [US Department of Justice, 11/2004, pp. 77-9 ; Wright, 2006, pp. 350, 426] The I-49 squad possibly forwards the memo to the Alec Station bin Laden unit at the CIA's Counterterrorist Center (see (July 27, 2001)).
Entity Tags: I-49, Office of the Inspector General (DOJ), Jack Cloonan, Ken Williams
A Western Union money transfer between Ahad Sabet (Ramzi bin al-Shibh's alias) and Moussaoui in Norman, Oklahoma. [Source: FBI]According to the Justice Department indictment against Zacarias Moussaoui, Moussaoui and 9/11 hijacker associate Ramzi bin al-Shibh are in communication for several days. Moussaoui makes several calls from Norman, Oklahoma, to Dusseldorf, Germany. Then, around July 31 someone using the name "Hashim Abdulrahman" in the United Arab Emirates sends two wire transfers totaling about $15,000 to an "Ahad Sabet" in Hamburg, Germany. Sabet is claimed to be an alias for bin al-Shibh. Then bin al-Shibh, again using the Sabet name, wires about $14,000 to Moussaoui in Oklahoma. [MSNBC, 12/11/2001] Moussaoui immediately moves to Minnesota and begins studying at a flight school there (see August 10-11, 2001). The passport with the name Ahad Sabet that bin al-Shibh used appears to belong to an innocent US doctor who had his passport stolen in Spain several years earlier (see July 7, 1998). [CNN, 8/7/2002]
Entity Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui, Ramzi bin al-Shibh
Category Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui, Al-Qaeda's Hamburg Cell, Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh
The Hyatt Regency hotel in San Francisco. [Source: Hyatt Hotels Corporation]A conference is held in San Francisco, California, to examine airport security, during which terrorism and hijackings are two of the main topics of discussion. The Airport Security Summit is held at the Hyatt Regency hotel, near San Francisco International Airport. [Security, 6/2001; Security Technology and Design, 10/2001] It is produced by World Research Group, a New York-based conference and training development company. [Security Technology and Design, 10/2001; World Research Group, 2011] Numerous top aviation and airport executives attend the three-day event, at which they discuss their security problems and successes. Participants include representatives from San Francisco International Airport, JFK International Airport in New York, Logan International Airport in Boston, United Airlines, the Federal Aviation Administration, and the US Department of Transportation, among others. [World Research Group, 6/19/2001; World Research Group, 6/19/2001; Airport Business, 9/2001] Aircraft hijackings and terrorism are two of the key agenda topics. [Security Technology and Design, 10/2001] The conference includes presentations with titles such as "It Can't Happen Here: Anatomy of an Attempted Hijacking," "Airport Safety and Security: Logan International Airport's Approach," and "Working Towards Better Partnerships to Combat Security Threats." [World Research Group, 6/19/2001] The event is held "[i]n response to growing awareness that aviation security needed strengthening," according to Security Technology and Design magazine. [Security Technology and Design, 10/2001]
Entity Tags: John F. Kennedy International Airport, Logan International Airport, World Research Group, Federal Aviation Administration, US Department of Transportation, United Airlines, San Francisco International Airport
Category Tags: Other Pre-9/11 Events
Argentina's Jewish community receives warnings of a major attack against the United States, Argentina, or France from "a foreign intelligence source." The warning is then relayed to the Argentine security authorities. It is agreed to keep the warning secret in order to avoid panic while reinforcing security at Jewish sites in the country. Says a Jewish leader, "It was a concrete warning that an attack of major proportion would take place, and it came from a reliable intelligence source. And I understand the Americans were told about it." Argentina has a large Jewish community that has been bombed in the past, and has been an area of al-Qaeda activity. [Forward, 5/31/2002]
Entity Tags: Al-Qaeda
Category Tags: Warning Signs, Foreign Intelligence Warnings
Taliban Foreign Minister Wakil Muttawakil. [Source: Reuters]Taliban Foreign Minister Wakil Ahmed Muttawakil learns that bin Laden is planning a "huge attack" on targets inside America. The attack is imminent, and will kill thousands. He learns this from Tahir Yuldashev, top leader of the rebel Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), which is allied with al-Qaeda at the time. Yuldashev apparently is worried that a large al-Qaeda attack will lead to a US attack on Afghanistan, which would threaten the IMU's safe haven there. Muttawakil sends an emissary to pass this information on to the US consul general, and another US official, "possibly from the intelligence services," also attends the meeting. The message is not taken very seriously; one source blames this on "warning fatigue" from too many warnings. In addition, the emissary supposedly is from the Foreign Ministry, but did not say the message came from Muttawakil himself. The emissary then takes the message to the Kabul offices of UNSMA, the political wing of the UN. They also fail to take the warning seriously. [Independent, 9/7/2002; Reuters, 9/7/2002]
Entity Tags: Tahir Yuldashev, Al-Qaeda, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Mullah Wakil Ahmed Muttawakil
CBS later reports, in a long story on another topic: "Just days after [Mohamed] Atta return[s] to the US from Spain, Egyptian intelligence in Cairo says it received a report from one of its operatives in Afghanistan that 20 al-Qaeda members had slipped into the US and four of them had received flight training on Cessnas. To the Egyptians, pilots of small planes didn't sound terribly alarming, but they [pass] on the message to the CIA anyway, fully expecting Washington to request information. The request never [comes]." [CBS News, 10/9/2002] This appears to be just one of several accurate Egyptian warnings from their informants inside al-Qaeda. Around this time, word of the upcoming 9/11 attacks is spreading widely in the training camps in Afghanistan. For instance, in a recorded speech played at one of the camps, Osama bin Laden specifically urges trainees to pray for the success of an upcoming attack involving 20 martyrs (see Summer 2001).
Entity Tags: Al-Qaeda, Central Intelligence Agency
Category Tags: Foreign Intelligence Warnings
CIA Director George Tenet will recall in his 2007 book that "during one of my updates in late July when, as we speculated about the kind of [al-Qaeda] attacks we could face, Rich B. suddenly said, with complete conviction, 'They're coming here.' I'll never forget the silence that followed." Rich B. is the alias Tenet uses for Richard Blee, the official who oversees Alec Station, the CIA's bin Laden unit, at this time (see June 1999 and Between Mid-January and July 2000). It is not known who else is at the meeting. [Tenet, 2007, pp. 158]
Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Richard Blee, George J. Tenet
CIA Director George Tenet has been alarmed all summer about the rise in attack warnings (see Summer 2001). As Tenet later tells the 9/11 Commission, in his world "the system was blinking red." By late July,
Tenet believes that the level of alarm could not "get any worse." [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 259]
Entity Tags: George J. Tenet
David Schippers.
[Source: Publicity photo]David Schippers, the House Judiciary Committee's chief investigator in the Clinton impeachment trial and the lawyer for FBI agent Robert Wright since September 1999, will later claim that he was warned about an upcoming al-Qaeda attack on lower Manhattan in May 2001 (see May 2001). After May, Schippers continues to get increasingly precise information about this attack from FBI agents in Chicago and Minnesota, and around July he renews efforts to pass the warning to politicians. He will claim, "I tried to see if I could get a Congressman to go to bat for me and at least bring these people [to Washington] and listen to them. I sent them information and nobody cared. It was always, 'We'll get back to you,' 'We'll get back to you,' 'We'll get back to you.'" At the same time he is attempting to pass on this warning, he will claim he is also attempting to pass on the work of reporter Jayna Davis and her theory that Middle Easterners were involved in the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing (see 8:35 a.m. - 9:02 a.m. April 19, 1995), and also Wright's claim that Hamas operatives were operating freely inside the US (see February-March 2001). The three claims put together seem to lead to a bad response; Schippers later comments, "People thought I was crazy." Around July 15, he attempts to contact Attorney General John Ashcroft. Conservative activist "Phyllis Schlafly finally apparently made some calls. She called me one day and said, 'I've talked to John Ashcroft, and he'll call you tomorrow.'" The next day, one of Ashcroft's underlings in the Justice Department calls him back and says, "We don't start our investigations with the Attorney General. Let me look into this, and I'll have somebody get back to you right away." Schippers will say he never did hear back from anyone in the Justice Department. Perhaps coincidentally, on July 26 it will be reported that Ashcroft has stopped flying commercial aircraft due to an unnamed threat (see July 26, 2001). In late August, his FBI agent sources again confirm that an al-Qaeda attack on lower Manhattan is imminent. [WorldNetDaily, 10/21/2001; Indianapolis Star, 5/18/2002; Ahmed, 2004, pp. 258-260] In 2003, Wright will say, "In 2000 and in 2001, [Schippers] contacted several US congressmen well before the September 11th attacks. Unfortunately, these congressmen failed to follow through with Mr. Schippers' request that they investigate my concerns." It is not clear if Wright was one of the Chicago FBI agents that Schippers claims gave warnings about a Manhattan attack, or if Wright is only referring to Wright's investigation into funding for Hamas and other groups that Schippers was also warning politicians about (see February-March 2001). [Federal News Service, 6/2/2003]
Entity Tags: William Jefferson ("Bill") Clinton, US Department of Justice, Al-Qaeda, Robert G. Wright, Jr., Phyllis Schlafly, John Ashcroft, Hamas, Federal Bureau of Investigation, David Schippers, Jayna Davis
Jordanian intelligence (the GID) makes a communications intercept deemed so important that King Abdullah's men relay it to Washington, probably through the CIA station in Amman. To make doubly sure the message gets through it is passed through an Arab intermediary to a German intelligence agent. The message states that a major attack, code named "The Big Wedding," is planned inside the US and that aircraft will be used. "When it became clear that the information was embarrassing to Bush administration officials and congressmen who at first denied that there had been any such warnings before September 11, senior Jordanian officials backed away from their earlier confirmations." The Christian Science Monitor will call the story "confidently authenticated" even though Jordan has backed away from it. [International Herald Tribune, 5/21/2002; Christian Science Monitor, 5/23/2002] It has been reported elsewhere that in July 2001, Jordan warns the US that al-Qaeda is planning an attack inside the US, but it is unknown if this is referring to the same warning or a separate one (see July 2001).
In late July 2001, the king of Jordan will offer the US to send two battalions of Jordanian special forces to Afghanistan to eliminate al-Qaeda havens there (see July 24, 2001). Also in July 2001, Jordan briefly detains and interrogates Mohammed Haydar Zammar, who is a member of the Hamburg cell with three of the 9/11 hijackers (see July 2001). Zammar appears to have foreknowledge of the 9/11 plot around this time (see August 2001).
Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Bush administration (43), Mohammed Haydar Zammar, Jordan General Intelligence Department, Abdullah II ibn al-Hussein
Category Tags: Warning Signs, Foreign Intelligence Warnings, Mohammed Haydar Zammar
Al-Qaeda Hamburg cell member Mohammed Haydar Zammar appears to have foreknowledge of the 9/11 attacks. Ibrahim Diab, a Lebanese national, has recently been recruited into the cell. Diab makes plans to attend an al-Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan, and Zammar pays for his travel expenses to the camp. Zammar is generally considered to be the main recruiter for the cell. Diab will later claim that Zammar warns him in August 2001 to leave for the camps as soon as possible because something big is about to happen. [Los Angeles Times, 1/30/2003] In 2002, the Los Angeles Times will report: "Zammar's bluster matched his size. In almost any discussion, his was the loudest voice and most radical view.… In part because of Zammar's outspokenness, authorities tend to discount his role in the Sept. 11 plot. They concluded no one would entrust information to a braggart like him." [Los Angeles Times, 9/1/2002] Diab's confession, made public in 2003, would seem to discredit the idea that Zammar was not trusted with knowledge of the 9/11 plot. And since Zammar is monitored for years before 9/11 (see March 1997-Early 2000), it also raises questions about what German intelligence might have learned from monitoring him. Diab will fly out of Germany on September 10, 2001, just one day before the 9/11 attacks (see September 10, 2001). He will attend an al-Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan, but be arrested in Pakistan in late October and quickly deported back to Germany. He will confess his activities to German intelligence shortly thereafter, and then be released without charge (see October 29, 2001). [Chicago Tribune, 2/23/2003]
Entity Tags: German intelligence community, Ibrahim Diab, Al-Qaeda, Mohammed Haydar Zammar
Category Tags: Al-Qaeda's Hamburg Cell, Mohammed Haydar Zammar
Kathryn LaBorie. [Source: Family photo]A flight attendant who will be on board one of the hijacked planes on 9/11 reveals that she is undertaking training to deal with terrorists, but will not give any details. [Rocky Mountain News, 9/6/2006] Kathryn LaBorie has been working for United Airlines for nearly seven years. [Rocky Mountain News, 9/18/2001] While visiting her parents in Colorado Springs, Colorado in the weeks before 9/11, she mentions terrorists and the training she is undergoing at United Airlines to deal with them. Her father, Gene Yancey, later recalls: "She started to say something to me about terrorists, and the fear of, and then she wouldn't talk to me anymore about it." He will add, "I don't know why to this day, but she wouldn't talk about it any more than that introduction." [Rocky Mountain News, 9/6/2006] LaBorie will be on Flight 175, the second plane to hit the World Trade Center, on 9/11. [Rocky Mountain News, 9/18/2001]
Entity Tags: United Airlines, Kathryn LaBorie
A Federal Express 727 lands in New Mexico in August 2001. [Source: Associated Press]US company Raytheon flies and lands a Federal Express 727 passenger jet six times on a military base in New Mexico, entirely by remote control and without a pilot on board. This is done to test equipment intended to make hijackings difficult, by allowing ground controllers to take over the flying of a hijacked plane. The Associated Press will later report, "[T]he Raytheon test used technology that provides the extremely precise navigational instructions that would be required for remote control from a secure location." The Associated Press will observe, "Unmanned, ground controlled reconnaissance aircraft have been used by the military for missions over Iraq and Kosovo," and will quote Thomas Cassidy, president of the California-based General Atomics Aeronautical Systems and manufacturer of the military aircraft, as saying, "It's a reliable system." [Associated Press, 10/2/2001; Der Spiegel (Hamburg), 10/28/2001] Raytheon Employees on 9/11 Planes - Several Raytheon employees with possible ties to this remote control technology and/or Raytheon's Global Hawk program will be reported to have been on the hijacked 9/11 flights (see September 25, 2001). Earlier in the year, a specially designed Global Hawk plane flew from the US to Australia without pilots or passengers. [ITN, 4/24/2001] Others Say Remote Control Is Impossible - Contradicting the Associated Press report, a number of media reports after 9/11 will suggest such technology is impossible, or flatly deny its existence. For instance, The Observer will quote an expert as saying, "the technology is pretty much there," but is still untried. [Observer, 9/16/2001] An aviation-security expert at Jane's Defence Weekly will say this type of technology belongs "in the realms of science fiction." [Financial Times, 9/18/2001; Economist, 9/20/2001] And in late September 2001, President Bush will give a speech in which he mentions that the government would give grants to research "new technology, probably far in the future, allowing air traffic controllers to land distressed planes by remote control." [New York Times, 9/28/2001]
Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Raytheon
Category Tags: 9/11 Investigations
Gregg Chatterton. [Source: Bill Ingram / Palm Beach Post]Pharmacist Gregg Chatterton approaches two men—later identified as 9/11 hijackers Mohamed Atta and Marwan Alshehhi—after observing them spending a suspiciously long time in the skin care aisle of his drugstore, Huber Healthmart Drugs in Delray Beach, Florida. "My hands. They're itching and they're burning," says Atta. Chatterton will later recall: "Both [of Atta's] hands were red from the wrist down. If you filled your sink with bleach and stuck your hands in there for six hours, they would come out red, and that is what they looked like." Asked the cause of his skin irritation, Atta replies evasively. After recommending a particular lotion, Chatterton is about to turn away when Atta forcefully slaps his hand against the druggist's chest and says, "My friend, he's got a cough." Chatterton gives Alshehhi a bottle of Robitussin. Chatterton will remember the pair when the FBI comes calling a few weeks later. He will say, "When somebody touches you like that, you remember that customer." According to the St. Petersburg Times, the incident will give rise "to the theory that Atta irritated his hands while handling anthrax" (See also October 14, 2001 and March-April 2002). [Los Angeles Times, 10/13/2001; US News and World Report, 10/28/2001; St. Petersburg Times, 9/1/2002]
Entity Tags: Marwan Alshehhi, Mohamed Atta, Gregg Chatterton
Category Tags: Marwan Alshehhi, Mohamed Atta
In 1999, a Moroccan named Hassan Dabou infiltrated al-Qaeda for the Moroccan intelligence agency. He was sent to Afghanistan, posing as an Islamic radical on the run from the Moroccan government. While there, he was able to grow close to bin Laden. He heard bin Laden repeatedly vent his anger at the failure of the World Trade Center bombing in 1993 (see February 26, 1993). Bin Laden was "very disappointed" that the towers did not fall. Dabou heard that bin Laden had planned "something spectacular" involving "large scale operations in New York in the summer or fall of 2001." Moroccan intelligence passed this information to US. Around this time, US intelligence is so interested that they call Dabou to Washington to report on this information in person. Dabout makes the trip in secret, but apparently his cover is blown and he is unable to go back and gather more intelligence. Dabou is still in Washington cooperating with US intelligence agents when 9/11 occurs. After 9/11 he will remain in Washington, get a new identity, and continue to work with US intelligence. [Agence France-Presse, 11/22/2001; International Herald Tribune, 5/21/2002; London Times, 6/12/2002]
Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Al-Qaeda, Hassan Dabou, World Trade Center, Osama bin Laden
Mohand Alshehri. [Source: FBI]Hijacker Mohand Alshehri is apparently seen in a bar in Rochester, Minnesota, and is engaged in conversation with a woman there. Rochester is home to the Federal Medical Center prison, where the "Blind Sheikh," Sheikh Omar Abdul-Rahman, is held from 1998 to 2002. The hijackers have a number of tangential links to him (see Early 2000-September 10, 2001). The woman, Nancy Hanlon, often runs into Arabs at the bar, which is popular with Saudis receiving medical treatment nearby. Hanlon will later describe Alshehri as "young, dishevelled—and utterly despondent. He was slumped over a glass of beer… It was overwhelming—the despair that a person can give out! Out of every part of him. His face." During their three-hour conversation Alshehri, who claims to be a pilot and produces a pilot's ID, insists, "You are talking to a dead man. I don't exist. I'm a ghost. I'm not even here, I'm dead… I've got myself into something there is no way out. There is no way out… It has been decided. He has decided it. It is done. It is finished." However, he does brighten up a few times and says, "We are really going to show your country something. Something big. It's going to be really big." After 9/11, Hanlon apparently remains unaware of pictures showing Alshehri as one of the 9/11 hijackers. She goes to the FBI in 2002 and identifies Alshehri from a series of photographs. However, the FBI will say there is no reason to believe Alshehri ever visited Rochester. [Minneapolis St. Paul City Pages, 6/30/2004]
Entity Tags: Nancy Hanlon, Mohand Alshehri, Omar Abdul-Rahman
Category Tags: Other 9/11 Hijackers
Russian President Vladimir Putin warns the US that suicide pilots are training for attacks on US targets. [Fox News, 5/17/2002] The head of Russian intelligence Nikolai Patrushev also later states, "We had clearly warned them" on several occasions, but they "did not pay the necessary attention." [Agence France-Presse, 9/16/2001] A Russian newspaper on September 12, 2001, will claim, "Russian Intelligence agents know the organizers and executors of these terrorist attacks. More than that, Moscow warned Washington about preparation to these actions a couple of weeks before they happened." Interestingly, the article will claim that at least two of the militants were Muslim radicals from Uzbekistan. [Izvestia, 9/12/2001]
Entity Tags: Vladimir Putin, Nikolai Patrushev
Former CIA agent Robert Baer is advising a prince in a Persian Gulf royal family, when a military associate of this prince passes information to him about a "spectacular terrorist operation" that will take place shortly. He is given a computer record of around 600 secret al-Qaeda operatives in Saudi Arabia and Yemen. The list includes ten names that will be placed on the FBI's most wanted terrorists list after 9/11. He is also given evidence that a Saudi merchant family had funded the USS Cole bombing on October 12, 2000, and that the Yemeni government is covering up information related to that bombing. At the military officer's request, he offers all this information to the Saudi Arabian government. However, an aide to the Saudi defense minister, Prince Sultan, refuses to look at the list or to pass the names on (Sultan is later sued for his complicity in the 9/11 plot in August 2002). Baer also passes the information on to a senior CIA official and the CIA's Counter Terrorism Center, but there is no response or action. Portions of Baer's book describing his experience wil be blacked out, having been censored by the CIA. [Baer, 2002, pp. 55-58; Financial Times, 1/12/2002]
Entity Tags: USS Cole, Sultan bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud, Central Intelligence Agency, Robert Baer, Saudi Arabia, Al-Qaeda, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Counterterrorist Center
New York City's Office of Emergency Management (OEM) purchases crisis management computer software that it plans to launch for use on September 17, and that will significantly help the city's response to the 9/11 attacks. [Wall Street Journal, 10/23/2001; Wired News, 11/2/2001] The OEM is intended to improve New York's response to major incidents, including terrorist attacks, and play a key role in managing the city's overall response to an incident. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 283-284] The software it buys, called E Team, is an emergency and event management product created by E Team Inc., a small company based in Canoga Park, California. [Wall Street Journal, 10/23/2001; e-ProWire, 5/22/2002] John Hughes, a vice president of E Team Inc., in fact used to be the deputy director of the New York City OEM. E Team was originally created for use by the military in battlefield coordination, but the software can now be used by public agencies and private companies, to "prepare for, respond to, and recover from disasters and emergencies of all types." [Los Angeles Times, 12/11/2000; California Technology Ventures, 10/16/2001; Wired News, 11/2/2001] It enables officials to coordinate thousands of workers and hundreds of agencies. [Wall Street Journal, 10/23/2001] The OEM plans to install the software on special server computers in its Emergency Operations Center on the 23rd floor of World Trade Center Building 7, and to launch the E Team system on September 17. [Wired News, 11/2/2001; Council of the City of New York, 8/2002, pp. 22 ] But as a result of the terrorist attacks on September 11, the system will instead go into use on September 14, at OEM's temporary command center at Pier 92 on the Hudson River (see September 14, 2001). [Wall Street Journal, 10/23/2001; e-ProWire, 5/22/2002] Every government organization supporting the OEM command center after 9/11 will use E Team to coordinate its rescue and recovery efforts with the OEM. [California Technology Ventures, 10/16/2001] A report later published by New York City Council's Select Committee on Technology in Government will say it is ironic that the OEM decides to buy the E Team software in the month before the terrorist attacks in New York take place. The report will comment that the OEM buys the software "in order to better manage precisely the emergency situations that the city faced after 9/11." [Council of the City of New York, 8/2002, pp. 22 ]
Entity Tags: Office of Emergency Management
US intelligence learns of a plot to either bomb the US embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, from an airplane or crash an airplane into it. Two people who were reportedly acting on instructions from bin Laden met in October 2000 to discuss this plot. [US Congress, 9/18/2002]
Entity Tags: Osama bin Laden
At least six 9/11 hijackers, including all of those who boarded Flight 77, live in Laurel, Maryland, from about this time. They reportedly include Hani Hanjour, Majed Moqed, Khalid Almihdhar, Nawaf Alhazmi, and Salem Alhazmi. Laurel, Maryland, is home to a Muslim imam named Moataz Al-Hallak who teaches at a local Islamic school and has been linked to bin Laden. He has testified three times before a grand jury investigating bin Laden. NSA expert James Bamford later states, "The terrorist cell that eventually took over the airliner that crashed into the Pentagon ended up living, working, planning and developing all their activities in Laurel, Maryland, which happens to be the home of the NSA. So they were actually living alongside NSA employees as they were plotting all these things." [Washington Post, 9/19/2001; Radio 4 'Today', 6/21/2002]
Entity Tags: Pentagon, Salem Alhazmi, Nawaf Alhazmi, Osama bin Laden, Moataz Al-Hallak, Hani Hanjour, National Security Agency, Majed Moqed, James Bamford, Khalid Almihdhar
Category Tags: Hani Hanjour, Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Other 9/11 Hijackers
The CIA sends a message to the FAA asking the FAA to advise corporate security directors of US airlines, "A group of six Pakistanis currently based in La Paz, Bolivia may be planning to conduct a hijacking, or possibly a bombing or an act of sabotage against a commercial airliner. While we have no details of the carrier, the date, or the location of this or these possibly planned action(s), we have learned the group has had discussions in which Canada, England, Malaysia, Cuba, South Africa, Mexico, Atlanta, New York, Madrid, Moscow, and Dubai have come up, and India and Islamabad have been described as possible travel destinations." [US Congress, 9/18/2002] In late July, the government of Bolivia arrested six Pakistanis, though it is not clear if they are the same six or an additional six. One of them appeared to be related to Mir Aimal Kasi, a militant who killed two CIA employees in front of CIA headquarters in 1993 (see January 25, 1993). [Tenet, 2007, pp. 156] The 9/11 Congressional Inquiry will later note, "While this information was not related to an attack planned by al-Qaeda, it did alert the aviation community to the possibility that a hijacking plot might occur in the US shortly before the September 11 attacks occurred." [US Congress, 9/18/2002] It has not been reported if the FAA actually passed this message on to the US airlines or not. There have been no reports of any extra security measures taken by the airlines, airports, or the FAA in the month before 9/11 in places such as New York City and Atlanta.
Entity Tags: Mir Aimal Kasi, 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Aviation Administration
The NSA has been intercepting calls between at least two 9/11 hijackers, Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar, in the US and an al-Qaeda communications hub in Sana'a, Yemen, run by al-Qaeda operative Ahmed al-Hada over an approximately 18-month period before 9/11 (see Early 2000-Summer 2001). According to MSNBC, the final intercepted call comes "only weeks" before 9/11. [MSNBC, 7/21/2004] Around the same time there is great alarm in the US intelligence community over a communications intercept in Yemen indicating there was going to be a major al-Qaeda attack against US interests (see June 30-July 1, 2001). Further, the investigation of the USS Cole bombing has reignited interest in Almihdhar and Alhazmi on the part of the US intelligence community since at least June 2001 (see June 11, 2001 and July 13, 2001). The two of them are placed on an international no-fly list in late August (see August 23, 2001).
Entity Tags: National Security Agency, Khalid Almihdhar, Ahmed al-Hada, Nawaf Alhazmi
Category Tags: Counterterrorism Policy/Politics, Yemen Hub, Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit, Hijacker Contact w Government in US
British intelligence asks India for legal assistance in catching Saeed Sheikh sometime during August 2001. Saeed has been openly living in Pakistan since 1999 and has even traveled to Britain at least twice during that time, despite having kidnapped Britons and Americans in 1993 and 1994. [London Times, 4/21/2002; Vanity Fair, 8/2002] According to the Indian media, informants in Germany tell the internal security service there that Saeed helped fund hijacker Mohamed Atta. [Frontline, 10/13/2001] On September 23, it is revealed, without explanation, that the British have asked India for help in finding Saeed. [London Times, 9/23/2001] Saeed Sheikh's role in training the hijackers and financing the 9/11 attacks soon becomes public knowledge, though some elements are disputed. [Daily Telegraph, 9/30/2001; CNN, 10/6/2001; CNN, 10/8/2001] The Gulf News claims that the US freezes the assets of Pakistani militant group Jaish-e-Mohammed on October 12, 2001, because it has established links between Saeed Sheikh and 9/11. [Gulf News, 10/11/2001] However, in October, an Indian magazine notes, "Curiously, there seems to have been little international pressure on Pakistan to hand [Saeed] over"
[Frontline, 10/13/2001] , and the US does not formally ask Pakistan for help to find Saeed until January 2002.
Entity Tags: Jaish-e-Mohammed, United States, India, Pakistan, Mohamed Atta, Saeed Sheikh, United Kingdom
Category Tags: Pakistani ISI Links to 9/11
Al-Qaeda operative Luai Sakra is reportedly arrested by Turkish intelligence in Turkey and then let go. It will later appear that Sakra was an informant for the CIA, Turkish intelligence, and Syrian intelligence before 9/11. He appears to have begun working for the CIA and Turkish intelligence in 2000 (see 2000). Sakra will later claim to have been arrested and quickly released twice by Turkish intelligence. It seems the first time was in 2000 and this was the second time. [Der Spiegel (Hamburg), 8/24/2005] It would make sense that he was released at this time if he was a secret informant for Turkey. It will later come to light that Sakra had some foreknowledge of the 9/11 attacks and warned Syrian intelligence about them one day before the attacks (see September 10, 2001). But it is not known if he used this arrest to warn Turkish intelligence and/or the CIA as well.
Entity Tags: Luai Sakra, Central Intelligence Agency
Category Tags: Counterterrorism Action Before 9/11
Randy Glass. [Source: Banded Artists Productions]Randy Glass, a former con artist turned government informant, will later claim that he contacts the staff of Senator Bob Graham (D-NY) and Representative Robert Wexler (D-FL) at this time, and warns them of a plan to attack the World Trade Center, but his warnings are ignored. [Palm Beach Post, 10/17/2002] Glass also tells the media at the present time that his recently concluded informant work has "far greater ramifications than have so far been revealed," and, "potentially, thousands of lives [are] at risk." [South Florida Sun-Sentinel, 8/7/2001] Glass was a key informant in a sting operation involving Pakistani ISI agents who were illegally trying to purchase sophisticated US military weaponry in return for cash and heroin. He will claim that in July 1999, one ISI agent named Rajaa Gulum Abbas pointed to the WTC and said, "Those towers are coming down." [Palm Beach Post, 10/17/2002] Most details will apparently remain sealed. For instance Glass will claim that his sealed sentencing document dated June 15, 2001, lists threats against the WTC and Americans but, according to Glass, "[t]he complaints were ordered sanitized by the highest levels of government." [WPBF 25 (West Palm Beach), 8/5/2002] Florida State Senator Ron Klein, who has dealings with Glass before 9/11, will say he is surprised it took so many months for the US to listen to Glass. "Shame on us," he will say. [Palm Beach Post, 10/17/2002] Klein will recall getting a warning from Glass, though he cannot recall if it mentions the WTC specifically. He will say he was told US intelligence agencies would look into it. [WPTV 5 (West Palm Beach), 10/7/2002] Graham will later acknowledge that his office has contact with Glass before 9/11, and is told about a WTC attack, saying, "I was concerned about that and a dozen other pieces of information which emanated from the summer of 2001." However, Graham will say that he personally is unaware of Glass's information until after 9/11. [Palm Beach Post, 10/17/2002] In October 2002, Glass will testify under oath before a private session of the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, and tell it that he has "specific evidence, and I can document it." [Palm Beach Post, 10/17/2002]
Entity Tags: Robert Wexler, Randy Glass, Daniel Robert ("Bob") Graham, Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, Ron Klein, Rajaa Gulum Abbas, World Trade Center
Category Tags: Warning Signs, Pakistani ISI Links to 9/11, Warning Signs, Pakistani ISI Links to 9/11
A neighbor of Anwar al-Awlaki, an imam who had frequent contact with future 9/11 hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi, Khalid Almihdhar, and Hani Hanjour in San Diego and/or Virginia (see March 2001 and After), will later claim that, in the first week of August 2001, al-Awlaki knocks on his door and tells him he is leaving for Kuwait. "He came over before he left and told me that something very big was going to happen, and that he had to be out of the country when it happened," the neighbor says. [Newsweek, 7/28/2003] The neighbor, Lincoln W. Higgie, lives in San Diego, California, and has long been friendly with al-Awlaki. Al-Awlaki had already moved to Virginia earlier in the year (see March 2001 and After), but apparently he is briefly stopping by San Diego. Higgie will later recall that he tells al-Awlaki to visit if he is ever in the area. Al-Awlaki replies: "I don't think you'll be seeing me. I won't be coming back to San Diego again. Later on you'll find out why." [New York Times, 5/8/2010]
Entity Tags: Anwar al-Awlaki, Lincoln W. Higgie
Category Tags: Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Possible Hijacker Associates in US, Anwar Al-Awlaki
The ransom for a wealthy Indian shoe manufacturer kidnapped in Calcutta, India, two weeks earlier is paid to an Indian gangster named Aftab Ansari. Ansari is based in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, and has ties to the Pakistani ISI and Saeed Sheikh. Ansari gives some of the about $830,000 in ransom money to Saeed, who sends about $100,000 of it to future 9/11 hijacker Mohamed Atta. [Los Angeles Times, 1/23/2002; Independent, 1/24/2002] The Times of India will later report that Lieutenant General Mahmood Ahmed, the director of the ISI, instructed Saeed to transfer the $100,000 into Atta's bank account. This is according to "senior government sources," who will claim that the FBI has privately confirmed the story. [Times of India, 10/9/2001] According to some accounts, the money is moved through a charity, the Al Rashid Trust. Some of the money is also channelled to the Taliban, as well as Pakistani and Kashmiri militant groups. [NewsInsight, 1/4/2002; Press Trust of India, 4/3/2002] The money is apparently paid into two of Atta's accounts in Florida (see Summer 2001 and before). The Al Rashid Trust will be one of the first al-Qaeda funding vehicles to have its assets frozen after 9/11 (see September 24, 2001). A series of recovered e-mails will show the money is sent just after August 11. This appears to be one of a series of Indian kidnappings this gang carries out in 2001. [India Today, 2/14/2002; Times of India, 2/14/2002] Saeed provides training and weapons to the kidnappers in return for a percentage of the profits. [Frontline (Chennai), 2/2/2002; India Today, 2/25/2002] This account will frequently be mentioned in the Indian press, but will appear in the US media as well. For instance, veteran Associated Press reporter Kathy Gannon will write, "Western intelligence sources believe Saeed sent $100,000 to Mohamed Atta, the suspected ringleader of the Sept. 11 terrorist hijackings," although they apparently think the hawala system was used for this. [Associated Press, 2/9/2002] Some evidence suggests Saeed may also have sent Atta a similar amount in 2000 (see (July-August 2000) and Summer 2000).
Entity Tags: Al Rashid Trust, Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, Aftab Ansari, Saeed Sheikh, Mohamed Atta
Category Tags: Pakistani ISI Links to 9/11, Possible 9/11 Hijacker Funding, Pakistani ISI Links to 9/11, Possible 9/11 Hijacker Funding
The CIA has "developed general information a month before the [9/11] attacks that heightened concerns that Osama bin Laden and his followers were increasingly determined to strike on US soil," the Associated Press will later report. A CIA official will affirm, "There was something specific in early August that said to us that [bin Laden] was determined in striking on US soil." [Associated Press, 10/3/2001] Further details about this information will remain unknown. However, the October 2001 article mentioning it could be describing an early, incomplete account of the CIA-produced Presidential Daily Briefing (PDB) entitled "Bin Laden Determined to Strike in US" from August 6, 2001 (see August 6, 2001). The full title of that PDB will be made public in May 2002 (see May 15, 2002), and the full text of it will be made public in April 2004 (see April 11, 2004).
Entity Tags: Osama bin Laden, Central Intelligence Agency
Category Tags: Warning Signs, Bush's Aug. 6, 2001 PDB
At some time in August 2001, Zacarias Moussaoui calls Naamen Meziche, who is an apparent member of the al-Qaeda cell in Hamburg, Germany, with a few of the future 9/11 hijackers. Moussaoui is in the US and will be arrested and imprisoned on August 16 (see August 16, 2001). Although it is not specified in news reports, presumably Moussaoui makes the call before his arrest, while he still is able to make calls. Meziche's phone number is written on a piece of paper among Moussaoui's belongings. FBI officials will not be allowed to search Moussaoui's possessions until after 9/11. Presumably, if they had been able to, the call and phone number could have helped point investigators to the Hamburg cell and hijackers. Meziche is the son-in-law of Mohammed Fazazi, the radical imam of the Al-Quds mosque in Hamburg, Germany, regularly attended by three of the 9/11 hijackers (see 1993-Late 2001). He is also said to be a friend of hijacker Mohamed Atta. Meziche's role in the Hamburg cell will only emerge after he is killed in a US drone strike in Pakistan in 2010 (see October 5, 2010). [Wall Street Journal, 10/16/2010] Before 9/11, German investigators are monitoring some members of the Hamburg cell (see for instance November 1, 1998-February 2001). Had that investigation widened to include Meziche, the call from Moussaoui could have been detected and changed the investigation of Moussaoui in the US.
Entity Tags: Mohamed Atta, Zacarias Moussaoui, Mohammed Fazazi, Naamen Meziche
Category Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui, Al-Qaeda's Hamburg Cell
Britain gives the US another warning about an al-Qaeda attack. The previous British warning on July 16, 2001 (see July 16, 2001), was vague as to method, but this warning specifies multiple airplane hijackings. This warning is said to reach President Bush. [Sunday Herald (Glasgow), 5/19/2002]
Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Al-Qaeda
An unnamed Sudanese national living in Saudi Arabia makes two wire transfers totaling about $6,500 from the National Commercial Bank in Saudi Arabia to 9/11 plot facilitator Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi's Standard Chartered Bank account in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The 9/11 Commission will later report that a "foreign security agency" learned from the sender that he had been asked to wire the funds by Uthman Alshehri, a brother of hijackers Waleed and Wail Alshehri. According to the commission, $4,900 of this is deposited in a UAE account of hijacker Fayez Ahmed Banihammad. What happens to the other $1,600 is unclear. [9/11 Commission, 8/21/2004, pp. 138, 143 ] After the money is deposited in his UAE account, Banihammad receives a call from an associate in Germany on August 18 and withdraws $3,000 on August 20 and $4,800 on August 22 from the account. [US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, 6/2002 ; US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, 7/31/2006 ] Court documents suggest that more money was sent to the hijackers by al-Hawsawi. "[Khalid] Shaikh Mohammed (KSM) explained that Alshehhi was sent $81,000 (US) via al-Baluchi for Alshehhi's, Atta's, and Jarrah's flight training… Most of these types of transfers were made by al-Hawsawi who was located in the UAE." However, doubts have been expressed about the reliability of this document, which was based on KSM's testimony, obtained through the use of torture (see June 16, 2004). [US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, 7/31/2006 ] For some time after 9/11, Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi is described in the media as the hijackers' paymaster, even though this is the only confirmed transfer associated with him. Moreover, there are questions about his identity and whether or not "Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi" is his real name. [CNN, 3/4/2003]
Entity Tags: 9/11 Commission, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Fayez Ahmed Banihammad, Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi, Uthman Alshehri
James Woods.
[Source: Disney Enterprises/ Publicity photo]Actor James Woods, flying first class on an airplane, notices four Arabic-looking men, the only other people in the first class section. He concludes they are Islamic militants intent on hijacking the plane, acting very strangely (for instance, only talking in whispers). [Boston Globe, 11/23/2001] He tells a flight attendant, "I think this plane is going to be hijacked," adding, "I know how serious it is to say this." He conveys his worries to the pilots, and they assure him that the cockpit would be locked. [New Yorker, 5/27/2002] The flight staff later notifies the FAA about these suspicious individuals. Though the government will not discuss this event, it is highly unlikely that any action is taken regarding the flight staff's worries [New Yorker, 5/27/2002] Woods will not be interviewed by the FBI until after 9/11. Woods will say the FBI believes that all four men took part in the 9/11 attacks, and the flight he was on was a practice flight for them. [O'Reilly Factor, 2/14/2002] Woods believes one was Khalid Almihdhar and another was Hamza Alghamdi. [New Yorker, 5/27/2002] The FBI later will report that this may have been one of a dozen test run flights starting as early as January (see May 24-August 14, 2001). Flight attendants and passengers on other flights later recall men looking like the hijackers who took pictures of the cockpit aboard flights and/or took notes. [Associated Press, 5/28/2002] The FBI has not been able to find any evidence of hijackers on the flight manifest for Woods' flight. [New Yorker, 5/27/2002]
Entity Tags: James Woods, Federal Aviation Administration, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Hamza Alghamdi, Khalid Almihdhar
Category Tags: Warning Signs, Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Other 9/11 Hijackers
A mass casualty exercise, involving a practice evacuation, is held at the Pentagon. General Lance Lord, the assistant vice chief of staff of the Air Force who is one of the participants in the exercise, will later recall, "[It was] purely a coincidence, the scenario for that exercise included a plane hitting the building." Lord will also say that on 9/11, "our assembly points were fresh in our minds" thanks to this practice. [Air Force Space Command News Service, 9/5/2002]
Entity Tags: Pentagon, Lance Lord
Category Tags: Military Exercises
Abdulaziz Alomari. [Source: FBI]9/11 hijacker Abdulaziz Alomari tests airline security while flying across the US. He boards USAir flight 608 from Las Vegas to New York City. Before the flight takes off, he tells a flight attendant that he is a pilot and wants to sit in the jumpseat (a spare seat in the cockpit) to observe the pilots for the whole flight. When asked for his pilot credentials, he says he is just a student pilot. Alomari is allowed in the cockpit, but only for a short while before take-off. The pilots get the impression he doesn't know much about flying. Half way through the flight, he tries to get back into the cockpit by claiming that he'd lost a valuable pen while in there earlier, but he is not allowed back in. [Miller, Stone, and Mitchell, 2002, pp. 296-297] Although this story is not confirmed by other sources, several of the hijackers do fly to and from Las Vegas at this time (see May 24-August 14, 2001 and August 1, 2001). Apparently the hijackers repeatedly attempt to ride on jumpseats in the summer of 2001 and are sometimes successful, sometimes not (see Summer 2001). Some news stories after 9/11 will allege that the hijackers did use jumpseats on 9/11 (see November 23, 2001).
Entity Tags: Abdulaziz Alomari
Category Tags: Other 9/11 Hijackers, Alleged Hijackers' Flight Training
Paul Kurtz. [Source: Publicity photo]Counterterrorism "tsar" Richard Clarke and Paul Kurtz, a member of the White House counterterrorism team, visit New York, where they tour the facilities of the stock exchange and telecommunications company Verizon, and inquire about security precautions there. Clarke will later describe that, about a month before 9/11, he and Kurtz spend "two days literally crawling around Wall Street." They visit the floor of the New York Stock Exchange and also go through the tunnels that carry the fiber optic cable to the Verizon and AT&T switches. (Verizon has a switching center for Wall Street located next to the World Trade Center.) Clarke and Kurtz ask about the security precautions that are in place to protect such a large concentration of critical communications equipment. According to Clarke, "What they told us was that after the 1993 attack against the World Trade Center they had diversified some of their routing capability." Clarke will recall that he and Kurtz identify "several buildings that, were they taken out, would disconnect Wall Street from the world." The two men also talk to stock market officials about the need for alternative sites and backup facilities. [Verton, 2003, pp. 157; Clarke, 2004, pp. 19-20] Infrastructure Examined by Clarke Damaged on 9/11 - On September 11, damage to some of the telecommunications infrastructure Clarke and Kurtz inspect will severely hamper communications in the area surrounding the WTC, including the financial district (see (After 10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). The New York Times will describe: "The collapse of the World Trade Center crippled many of the connections that downtown Manhattan depended on, threatening crucial links for the police and emergency crews. Cellular sites were knocked out.… Fiber-optic transport equipment was crushed. Power failures cut off high-speed Internet service for many companies across the city." Verizon's switching center at 140 West Street will be badly damaged by falling debris and burst water pipes. AT&T officials will say "they are certain that they lost several pieces of sophisticated equipment in the basement of the World Trade Center that were used to transport data over fiber-optic cables." [New York Times, 9/20/2001; General Accounting Office, 2/2003, pp. 91-92 ; Jenkins and Edwards-Winslow, 9/2003, pp. 33 ; 9/11 Commission, 2/25/2004 ] As journalist and author Dan Verton will note, "For Richard Clarke, the digital destruction that severed Wall Street from the world [on September 11] was a nightmare come true." [Verton, 2003, pp. 157]
Entity Tags: Paul Kurtz, Richard A. Clarke
A hotel owner in Oklahoma City will later say that he sees Zacarias Moussaoui, Mohamed Atta, and Marwan Alshehhi together on or around this day. He will claim they come to his hotel late at night and ask for a room, but end up staying elsewhere. At the time, Moussaoui is living 28 miles away in Norman, Oklahoma (see February 23-June 2001). However, even though the US government will later struggle to find evidence directly connecting Moussaoui to any of the 9/11 hijackers, this account will not be cited by any US government officials or prosecutors. An article will later suggest this may be because of numerous reports and eyewitnesses claiming Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols stayed at the same hotel with a group of Middle Easterners in the weeks before the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing (see 8:35 a.m. - 9:02 a.m. April 19, 1995). By highlighting this encounter, it might draw renewed attention to controversial Oklahoma City bombing theories. Atta and Alshehhi briefly visited an Oklahoma flight school in July 2000 (see July 2-3, 2000), before Moussaoui arrived in the US. On April 1, 2001, 9/11 hijacker Nawaf Alhazmi received a speeding ticket in Oklahoma (see April 1, 2001), but there have been no sightings of him with Moussaoui. [LA Weekly, 8/2/2002] Link to Oklahoma City Bombing? - Former CIA analyst Larry Johnson will say of this meeting: "One of the things that's evident right now in connection with this investigation, the motel in Oklahoma City where the April bombing against the Murrah building was planned and executed from, that same hotel figures in two of the 9/11 hijackers and Zacarias Moussaoui, who's currently in jail. Those three guys tried to check into that motel. And there is another fellow in Oklahoma City that links them to the April bombing against the Murrah building.… I have spoken to the owner of the motel. After the 9/11 attack, he called the FBI. The FBI came out and interviewed him, as he identified Mohamed Atta, Marwan Alshehhi, and Zacarias Moussaoui. They came in. They said, 'We're looking for a room.' He said: 'I don't have any room. What do you need it for?' They said, 'We're going for flight training.'" [O'Reilly Factor, 5/7/2002] Intriguingly Similar Sightings Nearby - Years later, a 2002 FBI document will be made public that reveals several employees at a flight school in Bethany, Oklahoma, saw Atta, Alshehhi, and hijacker Waleed Alshehri flying small aircraft several times from early 2001 until August 2001. Additionally, Moussaoui was said to use the same airport, although there will be no mentioned sightings of him with the others. Bethany is about five miles from Highway 40, which is where the hotel mentioned above is near. Additionally, the hotel is about 28 miles from Norman, Oklahoma (where Moussaoui is living) and Bethany is about 33 miles from Norman (see Early 2001-August 2001). [Federal Bureau of Investigation, 4/19/2002]
Entity Tags: Marwan Alshehhi, Larry C. Johnson, Mohamed Atta, Zacarias Moussaoui
Category Tags: Marwan Alshehhi, Mohamed Atta, Zacarias Moussaoui, Marwan Alshehhi, Mohamed Atta, Zacarias Moussaoui
Members of the Chemical Biological Incident Response Force. [Source: Daniel Wetzel / US Marine Corps]Members of the US Marine Corps' Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF) participate in a major training exercise with the New York Fire Department (FDNY) sometime this month. During the exercise, the FDNY's response to the 1993 World Trade Center bombing (see February 26, 1993) is discussed, according to Colonel Thomas Hammes, commanding officer of the CBIRF. Further details of the exercise are unstated. The CBIRF was established by the Marine Corps in 1996 in order to support first responders during attacks involving chemical or biological weapons. [Lerner and Lerner, 2003, pp. 176; Hammes, 2004, pp. xii] It has around 370 members and is capable of deploying rapidly to anywhere in the world if there is an attack involving weapons of mass destruction or if a chemical, biological, or nuclear agent is released. [Washington Post, 1/8/2000; US Marine Corps, 7/21/2000] The unit has a history with the FDNY going back to when it was founded in 1996. FDNY Deputy Chief Ray Downey in fact helped develop its original training. [US Marine Corps, 4/23/2010] It moved from Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, to the Naval Surface Warfare Center in Indian Head, Maryland, in the summer of 2000. [US Department of Defense, 7/2001, pp. 125 ] The move, it was reported at the time, would "place CBIRF closer to Washington, DC, and New York City," thereby "reducing response time to crucial national locations." [US Marine Corps, 7/21/2000] On September 11, the CBIRF's immediate response force will prepare to respond to the attacks in New York and at the Pentagon, if needed. The unit will not be deployed, though, and will instead be held in reserve in case there is a weapons of mass destruction attack in the Washington area. [Hammes, 2004, pp. xii-xiii]
Entity Tags: US Marine Corps, New York City Fire Department, Thomas X. Hammes, Chemical Biological Incident Response Force
9/11 hijacker pilot Hani Hanjour is pulled over for speeding on South George Mason Drive in Arlington, Virginia, for going 50-55 miles per hour in a 30 mph zone. He is driving a Chevrolet van rented two days before from Borough Jeep Chrysler in Wayne, New Jersey. He has a Florida driver's license that gives his address as Miramar, Florida, where he lived in the mid-1990s (see Spring 1996). [CNN, 9/26/2001; CNN, 1/9/2002; Washington Post, 1/9/2002; US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, 7/31/2006 ] However, according to the 9/11 Commission, he did not have a Florida driver's license, although he did have a Florida ID card. [9/11 Commission, 8/21/2004, pp. 32 ] Three weeks after the stop, Hanjour sends Arlington General District Court a money order for the $70 and $30 court costs. [Washington Post, 1/9/2002] Three other plot leaders are also stopped for speeding in the US (see April 1, 2001).
Entity Tags: Hani Hanjour, 9/11 Commission
Category Tags: Hani Hanjour, Hijacker Contact w Government in US
This Amhed Al-Ghamdi photo comes from his Virginia ID card, the only one publicly released by the 9/11 Commission.
[Source: 9/11 Commission]Hijackers Hani Hanjour and Khalid Almihdhar meet Luis Martinez-Flores, an illegal immigrant from El Salvador, in a 7-Eleven parking lot in Falls Church, Virginia. Martinez-Flores is paid $100 cash to accompany the two to a local Department of Motor Vehicles office and sign forms attesting to their permanent residence in Virginia. Given new state identity cards, the cards are used the next day to get Virginia identity cards for several (five to seven) additional hijackers, including Abdulaziz Alomari, Ahmed Alghamdi, Majed Moqed, and Salem Alhazmi. [Arizona Daily Star, 9/28/2001; Washington Post, 9/30/2001; Wall Street Journal, 10/16/2001]
Entity Tags: Ahmed Alghamdi, Khalid Almihdhar, Abdulaziz Alomari, Luis Martinez-Flores, Majed Moqed, Salem Alhazmi, Hani Hanjour
Category Tags: Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Other 9/11 Hijackers, Hani Hanjour
After being fined for speeding the day before (see August 1, 2001), 9/11 hijacker Hani Hanjour fails a test to obtain a Virginia driver's license. Hanjour already has an Arizona driving license and an international driving license. [9/11 Commission, 8/21/2004, pp. 32, 44 ] According to the Virginia police, Hanjour also has a Florida driver's license, although the 9/11 Commission will dispute this (see August 1, 2001).
Entity Tags: Hani Hanjour
Category Tags: Hani Hanjour
The Federal Reserve Board of Governors issues a non-routine supervisory letter to Federal Reserve banks, emphasizing the need to continue monitoring suspicious activity reports (SARs). The letter gives no explanation why it has been sent out at this particular time, but states, "Reserve banks must continue to conduct a thorough and timely review of all material SARs filed by supervised financial institutions in their districts." It adds, "A periodic, comprehensive review of SARs will assist Reserve banks in identifying suspicious or suspected criminal activity occurring at or through supervised financial institutions; provide the information necessary to assess the procedures and controls used by the reporting institutions to identify, monitor, and report violations and suspicious illicit activities; and assist in the assessment of the adequacy of anti-money laundering programs." [Spillenkothen, 8/2/2001] While the letter does not say if there are specific reasons why the banks should currently be watching for suspicious activities, William Bergman, an economist who works at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago from 1990 to 2004, will later point out, "Intelligence warnings on terrorism were rising significantly in mid-2001." He will therefore question whether, "with terrorism and its financing already recognized as an important element of the national money laundering strategy," this letter is "related to these warnings." He will also point out, "negotiations between the Taliban and representatives of the United States over energy production issues in Afghanistan ended on August 2, 2001" (see August 2, 2001), and that, "Four days later, President Bush received a 'PDB'—a presidential daily brief—with a headline warning that bin Laden was 'determined to strike in US,' and the body text of the PDB referred to 'patterns of suspicious activity'" (see August 6, 2001). [Sanders Research Associates, 1/4/2006] When, in December 2003, Bergman asks the Board of Governors staff why it issued the August 2 letter, and if the letter was related to intelligence about heightened terrorist threats, he will receive no reply and subsequently be told he has "committed an egregious breach of protocol in calling the Board staff and asking the question." [Veteran Affairs Whistleblowers Coalition, 5/14/2006] Also around this time, between June and August 2001, there is an unexplained surge in the amount of US currency in circulation (see June-August 2001). [Sanders Research Associates, 9/16/2005]
Entity Tags: William Bergman, Federal Reserve Board of Governors
Category Tags: Insider Trading/ Foreknowledge
Almost half of the Pentagon has to be evacuated because of a small but smoky fire there. [CNN, 8/2/2001] The three-alarm fire apparently starts early in the afternoon, in electrical wires near the loading dock behind a food service area, between two main corridors. [United Press International, 8/2/2001] It starts on the building's first floor but extends up to the second floor. [CNN, 8/2/2001] It spreads into the return air duct system, causing smoke to disperse through a fifth of the building. Seventeen vehicles respond to it, and it is put out with extinguishers and a minimal amount of water. About 8,000 Pentagon workers are forced to evacuate from the building, but no one suffers any injury. [United Press International, 8/2/2001] Reportedly, the fire provides "the Pentagon's most relevant experience in dealing with the Flight 77 attack" on 9/11. It is one of the first real tests for the Pentagon's new Building Operations Command Center (BOCC), which opened two months earlier, on June 4. [Microsoft Executive Circle, 2006] Steve Carter, the assistant building manager, will later recall that due to this fire, when the Pentagon is hit on 9/11 the emergency drill is "fresh in everybody's mind." Consequently his building maintenance and operations workers are able to "immediately [start] those same steps again." [Washington Post, 9/11/2006] And in response to this fire, Paul Haselbush, the director of real estate and facilities at the Pentagon, will direct his staff to update their emergency plans. As a result, his continuity of operations plan will be fresh in his mind when the attack occurs on 9/11. [Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 143]
Entity Tags: Steve Carter, Pentagon, Building Operations Command Center
Category Tags: Other Events
Mehmet Eymur. [Source: Mehmet Eymur]Mehmet Eymur, a retired Turkish intelligence official, allegedly alerts the CIA to the imminent 9/11 attacks, but his warning is ignored. Eymur, the former head of the counterterrorism department of the Turkish National Intelligence Organization, will claim this in a book released in 2019. Eymur, who now lives in the US, has learned of the planned terrorist attacks from a Turkish drug dealer called Mustafa. He contacted the CIA yesterday and said he needed to have a meeting regarding an important issue, and the CIA agreed to see him at his home. Today, therefore, he is visited by two CIA officials. One of them is a woman he already knows; the other is a man he has never met before. Mustafa is waiting at a nearby hotel, at Eymur's request, in case the CIA officials want to interview him. During his meeting with the CIA officials, Eymur passes on the information Mustafa has given to him. However, according to Eymur, they are uninterested in it. He will suggest in 2019 that the information might have prevented the 9/11 attacks, stating: "Forty days after the meeting, one of the deadliest terror attacks in the history of the United States occurred.… If Mustafa was taken seriously, maybe this incident would have been prevented." American intelligence agencies contact Eymur after 9/11, the retired spy will write in his 2019 book, and he consequently puts the CIA and the FBI in touch with Mustafa. However, Mustafa will subsequently tell him that his meetings with the two agencies were unproductive due to language issues. [Demiroren News Agency, 6/14/2019]
Entity Tags: Mehmet Eymur, Central Intelligence Agency
A senior official in the Taliban's defense ministry tells journalist Hamid Mir that the US will soon invade Afghanistan. Mir will later recall that he is told, "[W]e believe Americans are going to invade Afghanistan and they will do this before October 15, 2001, and justification for this would be either one of two options: Taliban got control of Afghanistan or a big major attack against American interests either inside America or elsewhere in the world." Mir reports this information before 9/11, presumably in the newspaper in Pakistan that he works for. [Bergen, 2006, pp. 287] Interestingly, Afghan warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar made a similar prediction to Mir several months before (see April 2001). Also, several weeks earlier, US officials reportedly passed word to Taliban officials in a back channel meeting that the US may soon attack Afghanistan if the Taliban do not cooperate on building an oil and gas pipeline running through the country. According to one participant in the meeting, the US attack would take place "by the middle of October at the latest" (see July 21, 2001).
Entity Tags: Taliban, Hamid Mir
9/11 hijacker Mohamed Atta's rental car is queried by police in Broward County, Florida. This incident is added to the NCIC, a widely used nationwide police database. [Federal Bureau of Investigation, 10/2001, pp. 204 ] On June 4, a Florida warrant was issued for Atta's arrest, as he skipped court following a previous traffic offense (see June 4, 2001). It is not clear why the existing arrest warrant does not raise a red flag, since he rented the car in his own name.
Entity Tags: Mohamed Atta, National Crime Information Center
Category Tags: Mohamed Atta, Hijacker Contact w Government in US
Ayub Usama Saddiq Ali. [Source: Marco Stepniak / Bild]Future 9/11 hijacker Ziad Jarrah telephones Ayub Usama Saddiq Ali, an imam and an Islamic Jihad leader wanted for murder in Egypt. No details about the call are known except that it lasts 13 minutes. Jarrah also called Ali in November 1999 (see November 7, 1999). Ali was convicted of murder in Egypt in 1996, but he fled to Muenster, Germany, and received political asylum there in October 1999. Also in October 1999, Ali was on a published list of the Egyptian government's most wanted terrorists (see October 2, 1999), and he is said to be a close associate of al-Qaeda second in command Ayman al-Zawahiri. Jarrah's two phone calls to Ali will be mentioned in a classified 2002 FBI report about the 9/11 hijackers, but it is unclear how or when the FBI learns about the calls. [Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1/11/2002; Vidino, 2006, pp. 230; Bild, 3/10/2011] Ali Attended a Monitored Terror Summit in Italy - On August 12, 2000, Ali attended a terrorist summit in Bologna, Italy, that lasted for several days and was monitored by the Italian government (see August 12, 2000 and Shortly After). Also attending the summit were Mahmoud Es Sayed, another close associate of al-Zawahiri (see Before Spring 2000) and Yemeni government official Abdulsalam Ali Abdulrahman. On their way to the summit, Es Sayed and Abdulrahman were overheard discussing an attack using aircraft, indicating they have some level of foreknowledge of the 9/11 attacks (see August 12, 2000). Also attending the summit was Mohammed Fazazi, the imam of the Al-Quds mosque in Hamburg, Germany, that Jarrah and other members of the al-Qaeda Hamburg cell regularly attend (see Early 1996 and (April 1, 1999)). Fazazi will be convicted of a role in a bombing in Casablanca, Morocco, in 2003 (see May 16, 2003). The summit was organized by the Islamic Cultural Institute, which is the epicenter of an al-Qaeda cell in Milan, Italy, that was heavily monitored by the Italian government at the time (see 2000). [Vidino, 2006, pp. 230] It is not known if the Italian government warned the German government of Ali's presence at this summit, or if Ali was monitored by anyone in Germany after it. Asylum Status Later Stripped - Beginning in 2007, the German government will attempt to strip Ali of his asylum status because of his link to Islamic Jihad. He will lose that status in 2011, but is not subsequently deported from Germany. [Deutsche Presse-Agentur (Hamburg), 3/9/2011; Bild, 3/10/2011]
Entity Tags: Ayub Usama Saddiq Ali, Islamic Jihad, Ziad Jarrah
Category Tags: Ziad Jarrah, Al-Qaeda's Hamburg Cell, Ziad Jarrah, Al-Qaeda's Hamburg Cell
Customs agent Jose Melendez-Perez.
[Source: US Senate]A Saudi named Mohamed al-Khatani is stopped at the Orlando, Florida, airport and denied entry to the US. Jose Melendez-Perez, the customs official who stops him, later says he was suspicious of al-Khatani because he had arrived with no return ticket, no hotel reservations, spoke little English, behaved menacingly, and offered conflicting information on the purpose of his travel. At one point, al-Khatani said that someone was waiting for him elsewhere at the airport. After 9/11, surveillance cameras show that Mohamed Atta was at the Orlando airport that day. 9/11 Commissioner Richard Ben-Veniste says: "It is extremely possible and perhaps probable that [al-Khatani] was to be the 20th hijacker." Al-Khatani boards a return flight to Saudi Arabia. He is later captured in Afghanistan and sent to a US military prison at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (see December 2001). Melendez-Perez says that before 9/11, customs officials were discouraged by their superiors from hassling Saudi travelers, who were seen as big spenders. [Los Angeles Times, 1/27/2004; Time, 6/12/2005] Al-Khatani will later confess to being sent to the US by 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM) (see July 2002), and in June 2001 US intelligence was warned that KSM was sending operatives to the US to meet up with those already there (see June 12, 2001).
Entity Tags: Richard Ben-Veniste, Mohamed Atta, Jose Melendez-Perez, Mohamed al-Khatani, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed
Category Tags: Mohamed Atta, Mohamed Atta
NORAD's Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) runs a training exercise called Fertile Rice, based on the scenario of Osama bin Laden attacking a prominent target in the Washington, DC, area, using an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) armed with a fuel-air explosive. An information sheet for the exercise will describe the scenario. "According to reliable sources," it will state, "operatives of Osama bin Laden will attack a highly visible US government target within the next 24-36 hours. Specifically, the terrorist will utilize an unmanned aerial vehicle, believed to be the Russian-developed Colibri, modified to be launched off a ship." Bin Laden has acquired at least one, and perhaps two, Colibri UAVs. The plans for the Colibri may have been illegally purchased by his agents posing as Iranian Air Force representatives. The terrorists' exact target is unknown, but "unconfirmed reports" suggest it is in the Washington area. Drone Has Electronic Jamming Equipment - The Colibri is a propeller-driven remotely piloted vehicle that is designed to perform a wide variety of military and civilian missions. It is 4.25 meters long, has a wingspan of 5.9 meters, and its maximum speed is 155 miles per hour. The aircraft bin Laden has obtained in the scenario is reportedly fitted with sophisticated electronic jamming equipment, as well as equipment for monitoring electronic communications and radar. Ship Carrying the Drone Left from a Port in the Middle East - The ship carrying the Colibri left a port in the Middle East about two weeks ago in the scenario and is set to rendezvous with an unspecified person off the coast of Norfolk, Virginia, on August 4. This person will provide the final targeting information that will be programmed into the Colibri. The ship is reportedly also carrying a dozen shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles, rocket-propelled grenades, automatic weapons, and unspecified types of plastic explosives. Drone Is Carrying a Highly Destructive Explosive - The Colibri's "weapon payload" in the scenario is reportedly a type of fuel-air explosive. [Northeast Air Defense Sector, 8/4/2001; Northeast Air Defense Sector, 8/5/2001] Fuel-air explosives are highly destructive. They "disperse an aerosol cloud of fuel, which is ignited by an embedded detonator to produce an explosion," according to the Federation of American Scientists. The "rapidly expanding wavefront" that results from the explosion "flattens all objects within close proximity of the epicenter of the aerosol fuel cloud and produces debilitating damage well beyond the flattened area." [Federation of American Scientists, 2/5/1998] Weekly Exercise Includes Simulated Hijackings - Fertile Rice is a NEADS command post exercise (CPX). [North American Aerospace Defense Command, 8/25/1989] (A CPX is defined by the Department of Defense as a type of exercise "in which the forces are simulated, involving the commander, the staff, and communications within and between headquarters." [US Department of Defense, 11/8/2011 ] ) Fertile Rice exercises are held weekly at NEADS prior to 9/11, according to Master Sergeant Joe McCain, the NEADS mission crew commander technician. They routinely involve simulated aircraft hijackings, although multiple hijack scenarios are never included. Occasionally the aircraft that is hijacked has taken off from within the United States. Sometimes the scenario takes place over land and at other times it takes place over water. These large-scale exercises include at least seven "targets," according to McCain, although what the targets might be is unstated. [9/11 Commission, 10/28/2003; 9/11 Commission, 10/28/2003 ] NEADS, based in Rome, New York, is responsible for protecting the airspace in which the hijackings take place on September 11 and will therefore be responsible for coordinating the US military's response to the hijackings. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 17; Vanity Fair, 8/1/2006; Shenon, 2008, pp. 203]
Entity Tags: Osama bin Laden, Northeast Air Defense Sector, Joe McCain, Fertile Rice
President Bush spends most of August 2001 at his Crawford, Texas, ranch, nearly setting a record for the longest presidential vacation. While it is billed a "working vacation," news organizations report that Bush is doing "nothing much" aside from his regular daily intelligence briefings. [ABC News, 8/3/2001; Washington Post, 8/7/2001; Salon, 8/29/2001] One such unusually long briefing at the start of his trip is a warning that bin Laden is planning to attack in the US (see August 6, 2001), but Bush spends the rest of that day fishing. By the end of his trip, Bush has spent 42 percent of his presidency at vacation spots or en route. [Washington Post, 8/7/2001] At the time, a poll shows that 55 percent of Americans say Bush is taking too much time off. [USA Today, 8/7/2001] Vice President Cheney also spends the entire month in a remote location in Wyoming. [Jackson Hole News and Guide, 8/15/2001]
Entity Tags: Osama bin Laden, George W. Bush, Richard ("Dick") Cheney
Category Tags: Counterterrorism Policy/Politics, Bush's Aug. 6, 2001 PDB
The CIA officers who draft a presidential daily briefing (PDB) item given to George Bush on August 6 (see August 6, 2001) ask an FBI agent for additional information and also to review a draft of the memo, but she does not provide all the additional information she could. The 9/11 Commission will refer to the FBI agent as "Jen M," so she is presumably Jennifer Maitner, an agent with the Osama bin Laden unit at FBI headquarters. The purpose of the memo is to communicate to the president the intelligence community's view that the threat of attacks by bin Laden is both current and serious. But Maitner fails to add some important information that she has: around the end of July, she was informed of the Phoenix memo, which suggests that an inordinate number of bin Laden-related Arabs are taking flying lessons in the US (see July 10, 2001). She does not link this to the portion of the memo discussing aircraft hijackings. Responsibility for dealing with the Phoenix memo is formally transferred to her on August 7, when she reads the full text. The finished PDB item discusses the possibility bin Laden operatives may hijack an airliner and says that there are "patterns of suspicious activity in this country consistent with preparations for hijackings." It is unclear whether the draft PDB item Maitner reviews contains this information. However, if it does, it apparently does not inspire her to take any significant action on the memo before 9/11, such as contacting the agents in Phoenix to notify them of the preparations for hijackings (see July 27, 2001 and after). The PDB will contain an error, saying that the FBI was conducting 70 full field investigations of bin Laden-related individuals (see August 6, 2001), but this error is added after Maitner reviews the draft, so she does not have the opportunity to remove it. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 260-2, 535; US Department of Justice, 11/2004, pp. 69-77 ]
Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, FBI Headquarters, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Usama bin Laden Unit (FBI), Jennifer Maitner
Category Tags: Phoenix Memo, Bush's Aug. 6, 2001 PDB
Insider trading based on advanced knowledge of the 9/11 attacks may have begun on this date, if not earlier. Investigators later discover a large number of put option purchases (a speculation that the stock will go down) that expire on September 30 at the Chicago Board Options Exchange are bought on this date. If exercised, these options would have led to large profits. One analyst later says, "From what I'm hearing, it's more than coincidence."
[Reuters, 9/20/2001]
Entity Tags: Chicago Board Options Exchange
Warrick's Rent-a-Car. [Source: Corbis]On three occasions Mohamed Atta rents cars from Warrick's Rent-a-Car in Pompano Beach, Florida. [Los Angeles Times, 9/15/2001] According to the company's owner Brad Warrick, "a lot of criminals come here because we're a little guy, out of the way… We don't have software in our computer system that checks the background of drivers like the major companies do." Atta, always accompanied by Marwan Alshehhi, appears like a businessman, yet doesn't "rent the best car we had, he rented the cheapest, a white Escort, then a blue Chevy Corsair, then back to the Escort." From August 15-29, he travels 1,915 miles in the Corsair. Another time, he tells Warrick he is going up to New York State. He always leaves the cars scrupulously clean after using them. [Observer, 9/16/2001; Corbin, 2003, pp. 212-213] However, Warrick later discovers a small amount of an unidentified white powder in the trunk of the Escort rented by Atta (see October 29, 2001). When, two days before 9/11, Alshehhi returns the car rented by Atta the final time, he asks that the charge be removed from Atta's credit card and placed on his. Says Warrick, "If you're going on a suicide mission, who cares who pays for what?" [St. Petersburg Times, 9/1/2002] Warrick comments, "I mean, if you're going on a suicide mission, why not leave the car at the airport?" [Kansas City Star, 9/18/2001] Atta has his own car, a red Pontiac, but sells this about a week before 9/11. [CNN, 10/26/2001]
Entity Tags: Marwan Alshehhi, Warrick's Rent-a-Car, Mohamed Atta, Brad Warrick
President Bush at his Crawford, Texas, ranch on August 6, 2001. Advisors wait with classified briefings. [Source: White House]President Bush receives a classified presidential daily briefing (PDB) at his Crawford, Texas ranch indicating that Osama bin Laden might be planning to hijack commercial airliners. The PDB provided to him is entitled, "Bin Laden Determined to Strike in US." The entire briefing focuses on the possibility of terrorist attacks inside the US. [New York Times, 5/15/2002; Newsweek, 5/27/2002] The analysts who drafted the briefing will say that they drafted it on the CIA's initiative (see July 13, 2004), whereas in 2004 Bush will state that he requested a briefing on the topic due to threats relating to a conference in Genoa, Italy, in July 2001, where Western intelligence agencies believed Osama bin Laden was involved in a plot to crash an airplane into a building to kill Bush and other leaders (see April 13, 2004). The analysts will later explain that they saw it as an opportunity to convey that the threat of an al-Qaeda attack in the US was both current and serious. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 260] The existence of this briefing is kept secret, until it is leaked in May 2002, causing a storm of controversy (see May 15, 2002). While National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice will claim the memo is only one and a half pages long, other accounts state it is 11 1/2 pages instead of the usual two or three. [New York Times, 5/15/2002; Newsweek, 5/27/2002; Die Zeit (Hamburg), 10/1/2002] A page and a half of the contents will be released on April 10, 2004; this reportedly is the full content of the briefing. [Washington Post, 4/10/2004] The briefing, as released, states as follows (note that the spelling of certain words are corrected and links have been added): Clandestine, foreign government, and media reports indicate bin Laden since 1997 has wanted to conduct terrorist attacks in the US (see December 1, 1998). Bin Laden implied in US television interviews in 1997 and 1998 that his followers would follow the example of World Trade Center bomber Ramzi Yousef and "bring the fighting to America" (see May 26, 1998). After US missile strikes on his base in Afghanistan in 1998, bin Laden told followers he wanted to retaliate in Washington, according to a -REDACTED-service (see December 21, 1998). An Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) operative told -REDACTED- service at the same time that bin Laden was planning to exploit the operative's access to the US to mount a terrorist strike. The millennium plotting in Canada in 1999 may have been part of bin Laden's first serious attempt to implement a terrorist strike in the US. Convicted plotter Ahmed Ressam has told the FBI that he conceived the idea to attack Los Angeles International Airport himself (see December 14, 1999), but that bin Laden lieutenant Abu Zubaida encouraged him and helped facilitate the operation. Ressam also said that in 1998 Abu Zubaida was planning his own US attack (see Late March-Early April 2001 and May 30, 2001). Ressam says bin Laden was aware of the Los Angeles operation. Although bin Laden has not succeeded, his attacks against the US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 (see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998) demonstrate that he prepares operations years in advance and is not deterred by setbacks. Bin Laden associates surveyed our embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam as early as 1993 (see Late 1993-Late 1994), and some members of the Nairobi cell planning the bombings were arrested and deported in 1997. Al-Qaeda members—including some who are US citizens—have resided in or traveled to the US for years, and the group apparently maintains a support structure that could aid attacks (see January 25, 2001). Two al-Qaeda members found guilty in the conspiracy to bomb our embassies in East Africa were US citizens (see September 15, 1998), and a senior EIJ member lived in California in the mid-1990s (see November 1989 and September 10, 1998). A clandestine source said in 1998 that a bin Laden cell in New York was recruiting Muslim-American youth for attacks (see October-November 1998). "We have not been able to corroborate some of the more sensational threat reporting, such as that from a [REDACTED] service in 1998 saying that bin Laden wanted to hijack a US aircraft to gain the release of 'Blind Sheikh' Omar Abdul-Rahman and other US-held extremists" (see 1998, December 4, 1998, and May 23, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 223] According to the Washington Post, this information came from a British service. [Washington Post, 5/18/2002] Nevertheless, FBI information since that time indicates patterns of suspicious activity in this country consistent with preparations for hijackings or other types of attacks, including recent surveillance of federal buildings in New York (see May 30, 2001). The FBI is conducting approximately 70 full-field investigations throughout the US that it considers bin Laden-related (see August 6, 2001). CIA and the FBI are investigating a call to our embassy in the UAE in May saying that a group or bin Laden supporters was in the US planning attacks with explosives (see May 16-17, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 223] In retrospect, the briefing is remarkable for the many warnings that apparently are not included (see for instance, from the summer of 2001 prior to August alone: May 2001, June 2001, June 12, 2001, June 19, 2001, Late Summer 2001, July 2001, July 16, 2001, Late July 2001, Late July 2001, Summer 2001, June 30-July 1, 2001, July 10, 2001, and Early August 2001). According to one account, after the PDB has been given to him, Bush tells the CIA briefer, "You've covered your ass now" (see August 6, 2001).
Incredibly, the New York Times later reports that after being given the briefing, Bush "[breaks] off from work early and [spends] most of the day fishing." [New York Times, 5/25/2002] In 2002 and again in 2004, National Security Adviser Rice will incorrectly claim under oath that the briefing only contained historical information from 1998 and before (see May 16, 2002 and April 8, 2004).
Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Islamic Jihad, Omar Abdul-Rahman, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Los Angeles International Airport, Condoleezza Rice, Abu Zubaida, Al-Qaeda, World Trade Center, Central Intelligence Agency, 9/11 Commission, Ahmed Ressam, Ramzi Yousef, Osama bin Laden
Category Tags: Warning Signs, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics, Bush's Aug. 6, 2001 PDB, Key Hijacker Events, Presidential Level Warnings
According to journalist and author Ron Suskind, just after a CIA briefer presents President Bush with the later infamous PDB (Presidential Daily Briefing) item entitled "Bin Laden Determined to Strike in US" (see August 6, 2001), Bush tells the briefer, "You've covered your ass, now." This account is from Suskind's 2006 book The One Percent Doctrine, which is based largely on anonymous accounts from political insiders. In the book, after describing the presentation of the PDB, Suskind will write: "And, at an eyeball-to-eyeball intelligence briefing during this urgent summer, George W. Bush seems to have made the wrong choice. He looked hard at the panicked CIA briefer. 'All right,' he said. 'You've covered your ass, now.'" [Suskind, 2006, pp. 2; Washington Post, 6/20/2006]
Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, George W. Bush
Category Tags: Bush's Aug. 6, 2001 PDB, Warning Signs, Presidential Level Warnings
The CIA's Presidential Daily Briefing (PDB) given to President Bush on this day (see August 6, 2001) contains the important line, "The FBI is conducting approximately 70 full field investigations throughout the US that it considers bin Laden-related." Bush will state in 2004 that, based on this, "I was satisfied that some of the matters were being looked into." National Security Adviser Rice will explain that since the FBI had 70 "full-field investigations under way of cells" in the US, "there was no recommendation [coming from the White House] that we do something about" the large number of warnings coming in. However, the number and content of the FBI investigations appears grossly exaggerated. The FBI later will reveal that the investigations are not limited to al-Qaeda and do not focus on al-Qaeda cells. Many were criminal investigations, which typically are not likely to help prevent future terrorist acts. An FBI spokesman will say the FBI does not know how that number got into Bush's PDB. The 9/11 Commission will later conclude, "The 70 full-field investigations number was a generous calculation that included fund-raising investigations. It also counted each individual connected to an investigation as a separate full-field investigation. Many of these investigations should not have been included, such as the one that related to a dead person, four that concerned people who had been in long-term custody, and eight that had been closed well before August 6, 2001." [Newsday, 4/10/2004; Associated Press, 4/11/2004; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 262, 535]
Entity Tags: Al-Qaeda, Condoleezza Rice, Osama bin Laden
Category Tags: Counterterrorism Policy/Politics, Bush's Aug. 6, 2001 PDB, Warning Signs, Presidential Level Warnings
Bush being briefed at his ranch on August 6, 2001. [Source: Associated Press]On April 29, 2004, President Bush will testify before the 9/11 Commission, but almost no details of what he said will be publicly released. He testifies with Vice President Cheney, in private, not under oath, is not recorded, and the notes that the commissioners take are censored by the White House (see April 29, 2004). However, the 9/11 Commission will release a one paragraph summary of how Bush claims he responded to the Presidential Daily Briefing of August 6, 2001, entitled, "Bin Laden Determined to Strike in US" (see August 6, 2001). The Commission recalls, "The President told us the August 6 report was historical in nature. President Bush said the article told him that al-Qaeda was dangerous, which he said he had known since he had become President. The President said bin Laden had long been talking about his desire to attack America. He recalled some operational data on the FBI, and remembered thinking it was heartening that 70 investigations were under way (see August 6, 2001). As best he could recollect, [National Security Adviser] Rice had mentioned that the Yemenis' surveillance of a federal building in New York had been looked into in May and June, but there was no actionable intelligence (see May 30, 2001). He did not recall discussing the August 6 report with the Attorney General or whether Rice had done so. He said that if his advisers had told him there was a cell in the United States, they would have moved to take care of it. That never happened." The 9/11 Commission will conclude that they could find no evidence of any further discussions or actions taken by Bush and his top advisers in response to the briefing (see Between August 6 and September 10, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 260]
Entity Tags: Condoleezza Rice, George W. Bush, 9/11 Commission
CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia. [Source: GlobeXplorer]A fire lasting several hours leads to the forced evacuation of the CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia. [Reuters, 8/8/2001] The fire is discovered on August 7 at around 5:45 p.m., in the northeast section of the agency's older headquarters building, and more than 60 firefighters are involved in putting it out. It was reportedly caused by a workman at the top of an elevator shaft dropping a welder, which ignited wood at the bottom of the shaft. Both the older headquarters building and the agency's new headquarters building nearby are evacuated. Following this fire, A. B. "Buzzy" Krongard—the executive director of the CIA since March this year—is dismayed to find that plans for an evacuation of the headquarters are patchy, and that some of the fire alarms do not work. In the ensuing month he therefore initiates regular fire drills and equips key agency officials with tiny walkie-talkies, meaning communication will still be possible should cell phones ever go out. Krongard declares that evacuating safely is to be more important than storing classified material, and has the agency's computer network reprogrammed so an evacuation warning could be flashed on all computer screens. Journalist and author Ronald Kessler will describe the August 7 fire as being "fortuitous," as little over a month later, on the morning of September 11, CIA Director George Tenet will order the evacuation of the headquarters building due to fears that it might be targeted (see (9:50 a.m.-10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). On that day, Tenet and other top officials will reconvene at an alternate location on the CIA campus, "[f]ollowing procedures laid out by Krongard after the fire." [Central Intelligence Agency, 3/16/2001; Associated Press, 8/7/2001; Washington Post, 8/8/2001; Kessler, 2003, pp. 222-223]
Entity Tags: A.B. ("Buzzy") Krongard, Central Intelligence Agency
One day after President Bush receives a Presidential Daily Briefing entitled, "Bin Laden Determined to Strike in US," a version of the same material is given to other top government officials. However, this Senior Executive Intelligence Brief (SEIB) does not contain the most important information from Bush's briefing. It does not mention that there are 70 FBI investigations into possible al-Qaeda activity, does not mention a May 2001 threat of US-based explosives attacks, and does not mention FBI concerns about recent surveillance of buildings in New York City. The Associated Press will report that this type of memo "goes to scores of Cabinet-agency officials from the assistant secretary level up and does not include raw intelligence or sensitive information about ongoing law enforcement matters" due to fear of media leaks. SEIBs were sent to many more officials during the Clinton administration. The Associated Press will also state that "some who saw the memo said they feared it gave policy-makers and members of the congressional intelligence committees a picture of the domestic threat so stale and incomplete that it didn't provide the necessary sense of urgency one month before the Sept. 11 attacks." [Associated Press, 4/13/2004] Attorney General John Ashcroft will later say he does not recall seeing the SEIB before 9/11 (see Between August 7 and September 10, 2001).
Entity Tags: Al-Qaeda, George W. Bush, Bush administration (43), Osama bin Laden, Federal Bureau of Investigation
The 9/11 Commission will later state that after the now famous "bin Laden Determined to Strike in US" memo is given to President Bush on August 6, 2001 (see August 6, 2001), "We have found no indication of any further discussion before September 11 among the president and his top advisers of the possibility of a threat of an al-Qaeda attack in the United States." [Newsweek, 4/28/2005] 9/11 Commissioner Bob Kerrey will later state to CNN,"[B]y the way, there's a credible case that the president's own negligence prior to 9/11 at least in part contributed to the disaster in the first place.… [I]n the summer of 2001, the government ignored repeated warnings by the CIA, ignored, and didn't do anything to harden our border security, didn't do anything to harden airport country, didn't do anything to engage local law enforcement, didn't do anything to round up INS and consular offices and say we have to shut this down, and didn't warn the American people. The famous presidential daily briefing on August 6, we say in the report that the briefing officers believed that there was a considerable sense of urgency and it was current. So there was a case to be made that wasn't made.… The president says, if I had only known that 19 Islamic men would come into the United States of America and on the morning of 11 September hijack four American aircraft, fly two into the World Trade Center, one into the Pentagon, and one into an unknown Pennsylvania that crashed in Shanksville, I would have moved heaven and earth. That's what he said. Mr. President, you don't need to know that. This is an Islamic Jihadist movement that has been organized since the early 1990s, declared war on the United States twice, in '96 and '98. You knew they were in the United States. You were warned by the CIA. You knew in July they were inside the United States. You were told again by briefing officers in August that it was a dire threat. And what did you do? Nothing, so far as we could see on the 9/11 Commission." [CNN, 11/8/2004]
Entity Tags: World Trade Center, Pentagon, Central Intelligence Agency, George W. Bush, Bob Kerrey, Al-Qaeda, 9/11 Commission, Bush administration (43), Osama bin Laden
On August 7, 2001, a version of the Presidential Daily Briefing (PDB) entitled "Bin Laden Determined to Strike in US" given to President Bush the day before is sent to other top US officials (see August 7, 2001). This version, called an SEIB, has the same title as the PDB but contains less classified information. Attorney General John Ashcroft - the head of law enforcement in the US - will later claim that he does not remember seeing this SEIB before 9/11. He will say he was at a conference in Chicago at the time and he does not remember his staff briefing him about it later. In the Clinton administration, the attorney general was a regular recipient of the same PDB given to the president. [9/11 Commission, 4/13/2004]
Entity Tags: John Ashcroft
The Bush administration holds no high-level meetings prior to 9/11 to discuss the 'Bin Laden Determined to Strike in US' Presidential Daily Briefing (PDB) given to President Bush on August 6, 2001 (see August 6, 2001). Counterterrorism "tsar" Richard Clarke will later suggest that 9/11 might have been stopped "if [National Security Adviser] Rice and the president had acted personally, gotten involved, shaken the trees, gotten the Cabinet members involved when they had ample warning in June and July and August that something was about to happen.… [Rice] said that the president received 40 warnings face to face from the director of central intelligence that a major al-Qaeda attack was going to take place and she admitted that the president did not have a meeting on the subject, did not convene the Cabinet. She admitted that she didn't convene the Cabinet. And as some of the [9/11 Commissioners] pointed out, this was in marked contrast to the way the government operated in December of 1999, when it had similar information and it successfully thwarted attacks." [ABC News, 4/8/2004] Former CIA official Larry Johnson will similarly comment, "At a minimum, the details in the 6 August PDB should have motivated Rice to convene a principals' meeting. Such a meeting would have ensured that all members of the president's national security team were aware of the information that had been shared with the president. George Bush should have directed the different department heads to report back within one week on any information relevant to the al-Qaeda threat. Had he done this there is a high probability that the FBI field agents concerns about Arabs taking flight training would have rung some bells. There is also a high probability that the operations folks at CIA would have shared the information they had in hand about the presence of al-Qaeda operators in the United States." [Tom Paine (.com), 4/12/2004] There will be one cabinet-level principals meeting to discuss terrorism on September 4, 2001, but no evidence has been released suggesting the PDB or the possibility of al-Qaeda attacking the US was discussed (see September 4, 2001).
Entity Tags: Condoleezza Rice, Richard A. Clarke, George W. Bush, Larry C. Johnson
Ephraim Halevy was head of the Israeli Mossad from 1998 to 2002. [Source: Associated Press]At some point between these dates, Israel warns the US that an al-Qaeda attack is imminent. [Fox News, 5/17/2002] Reportedly, two high-ranking agents from the Mossad come to Washington and warn the FBI and CIA that from 50 to 200 terrorists have slipped into the US and are planning "a major assault on the United States." They say indications point to a "large scale target," and that Americans would be "very vulnerable." They add there could be Iraqi connections to the al-Qaeda attack. [Daily Telegraph, 9/16/2001; Ottawa Citizen, 9/17/2001; Los Angeles Times, 9/20/2001] The Los Angeles Times later retracts its story after a CIA spokesperson says, "There was no such warning. Allegations that there was are complete and utter nonsense." [Los Angeles Times, 9/21/2001] Other newspapers do not retract it.
Entity Tags: Israel Institute for Intelligence and Special Tasks (Mossad), Central Intelligence Agency, Al-Qaeda, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Category Tags: Warning Signs, Foreign Intelligence Warnings, Alleged Israeli Spy Ring
Zacarias Moussaoui. [Source: US Justice Department]Zacarias Moussaoui moves from Oklahoma to Minnesota, in order to attend flight school training there. Moussaoui drives there with Hussein al-Attas, a friend who will stay with him in Minnesota. Curiously, on August 11, someone breaks into the Norman, Oklahoma, apartment that remained unoccupied since Moussaoui moved out of it at the end of May 2001. A neighbor's bicycle is used to break through the door of the vacant apartment and a bloodstain is left on the wall. A neighbor "[tells] reporters that furniture was overturned as if someone was looking for something." [MSNBC, 12/11/2001; St. Paul Pioneer Press, 9/10/2002; US Congress, 10/17/2002]
Entity Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui, Hussein al-Attas
Category Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui
Hugh Sims (left) and Tim Nelson (right). [Source: Flysouth and Andy King / Associated Press]Flight engineer Tim Nelson and pilot Hugh Sims, who work at the Pan Am International Flight School where Zacarias Moussaoui trains to fly a Boeing 747-400, are immediately suspicious of Moussaoui, and their suspicions continue to grow after his arrival because: He sends unusual emails that are signed "zuluman tangotango" and laced with grammatical errors, even though he says he is a British businessman; [CNN, 3/2/2006] His e-mails also include abnormal comments such as, "E[mail] is not secure;" [Newsweek, 10/1/2001] He pays most of his $8,300 fee in hundred dollar bills. This makes Nelson suspicious, because he thinks cash is hard to track; [New York Times, 2/8/2002; Star-Tribune (Minneapolis), 4/24/2005; CNN, 3/2/2006] He is alone, whereas most trainees arrive in groups; [Star-Tribune (Minneapolis), 4/24/2005] He says he wants to fly a 747 not because he plans to be a pilot, but as an "ego boosting thing." However, within hours of his arrival, it is clear he is "not some affluent joyrider," as he is shabbily dressed; [New York Times, 2/8/2002; New York Times, 10/18/2002; Star-Tribune (Minneapolis), 4/24/2005] In addition, it is unusual that he has no aviation background, very little experience, and no pilot's license. All other pilots at the center, even "vanity pilots"—wealthy individuals who just want the thrill of flying a large jet—have many times more flying hours than Moussaoui and are all licensed; [US Congress, 10/17/2002; Star-Tribune (Minneapolis), 4/24/2005; Rake, 5/2005] He has flown for 57 hours at flight school in Oklahoma, but not yet flown solo, which is unusual. The school's manager of pilot training, Alan McHale, will later comment, "My worst student was a grandma, and I got her to solo after 21 hours;" [Star-Tribune (Minneapolis), 4/24/2005] He is not just buying a one-period joyride, but a whole course; [Star-Tribune (Minneapolis), 4/24/2005] He seems determined to pack a large amount of training in a short period for no apparent reason; [New York Times, 2/8/2002] He is "extremely" interested in the operation of the plane's doors and control panel. [US Congress, 10/17/2002] He also is very keen to learn the protocol for communicating with the flight tower, despite claiming to have no plans to become an actual pilot; [New York Times, 2/8/2002] He talks to some Syrian airline pilots training at the facility, and the pilots tell Nelson that Moussaoui is fluent in Arabic. Nelson, who is already worried Moussaoui might be up to no good, thinks, "One more red flag;" [Star-Tribune (Minneapolis), 4/24/2005; CNN, 3/2/2006] The school's accountant complains that Moussaoui's payment is a couple of hundred dollars short, but that he does not have a credit card with him, even though he says he is an international businessman; [Star-Tribune (Minneapolis), 4/24/2005] and Nelson thinks back to an incident in Japan when the captain was stabbed to death and the killer then flew the plane for 45 minutes before the co-captain regained control. He is concerned Moussaoui might perform a suicide hijacking, "Here's the problem: You've got an aircraft that weighs upwards of 900,000 pounds fully loaded and carries between 50,000 and 57,000 gallons of jet fuel. If you fly it at 350 knots [about 400 miles per hour] into a heavily populated area, you're going to kill a boatload of people." After talking to instructor Clancy Prevost, who is also suspicious of Moussaoui (see August 13-15, 2001), both Sims and Nelson independently decide to call the FBI and Moussaoui is arrested soon after the calls are made (see August 16, 2001). [Star-Tribune (Minneapolis), 4/24/2005]
Entity Tags: Tim Nelson, Zacarias Moussaoui, Alan McHale, Hugh Sims
Mohamed Atta stayed at the Las Vegas Econolodge. [Source: Chris Farina/Corbis]The lead hijackers meet in Las Vegas for a summit a few weeks before 9/11. Investigators will believe that this is the "most crucial planning in the United States," but will not understand why the hijackers choose Vegas, since they are all living on the East Coast at this time (see March 2001-September 1, 2001 and August 6-September 9, 2001). One senior official will speculate, "Perhaps they figured it would be easy to blend in." [New York Times, 11/4/2001] At least three of the plot leaders are in Las Vegas at this time. Hani Hanjour and Nawaf Alhazmi fly from Dulles Airport to Los Angeles on an American Airlines Boeing 757, the same sort of plane they hijack on 9/11, and then continue to Las Vegas. Mohamed Atta also flies to Las Vegas from Washington National Airport. This is his second trip to Vegas, which was also previously visited by some of the other hijackers (see May 24-August 14, 2001). A few weeks earlier, Atta had traveled to Spain, possibly with some of the other hijackers, to finalize the plans for the attack with their associate Ramzi bin al-Shibh (see July 8-19, 2001). [US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, 7/31/2006, pp. 1, 17, 21 ; US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, 7/31/2006, pp. 57-8 ] Alhazmi will later be recalled by a hotel employee, who will say she ran into him at the Days Inn. According to her later account, he is "cold and abrupt," in Vegas on "important business," and will soon be traveling to Los Angeles. He asks for a list of Days Inns in Los Angeles, but does not want a reservation to be made. He also claims to be from Florida, although he is only thought to have spent a week there (see June 19-25, 2001). [Las Vegas Review-Journal, 10/26/2001] A close associate of the hijackers, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, will later say in a 2002 interview that Ziad Jarrah, Marwan Alshehhi, and Khalid Almihdhar are also present in Vegas at this time. [Fouda and Fielding, 2003, pp. 137] Newsweek calls Vegas an "odd location" and comments: "They stayed in cheap hotels on a dreary stretch of the Strip frequented by dope dealers and $10 street hookers. Perhaps they wished to be fortified for their mission by visiting a shrine to American decadence. Or maybe they just wanted a city that was easy to reach by air from their various cells in Florida, New Jersey and San Diego." [Newsweek, 10/15/2001]
Entity Tags: Marwan Alshehhi, Khalid Almihdhar, Hani Hanjour, Ziad Jarrah, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Mohamed Atta, Nawaf Alhazmi
Category Tags: Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Marwan Alshehhi, Mohamed Atta, Hani Hanjour, Ziad Jarrah, Other 9/11 Hijackers
Pan Am International Flight School. [Source: FBI] (click image to enlarge)Although some staff at the Pan Am International Flight School became a little suspicious of Zacarias Moussaoui before he arrived (see August 11-15, 2001), within two days of his arrival at the school, Moussaoui's behaviour makes his assigned instructor Clancy Prevost highly suspicious. This is because: Moussaoui has only flown for under 60 hours, whereas the second least experienced student Prevost ever had had 10 times as many hours. This lack of experience means Moussaoui does not really understand the instruction; [US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, 3/9/2006] When Moussaoui is asked what his goal is, he tells Prevost he wants to fly a 747 from London to New York, the same goal he gave in his original e-mail to the flight school. [Rake, 5/2005] This raises fears he has plans to hijack such a flight; [US Congress, 10/17/2002] When Prevost relates a story about a charter flight in the Middle East where getting the doors open was a problem, the story causes Prevost to ask Moussaoui whether he is a Muslim and Moussaoui replies in a strange tone, "I am nothing." This makes Prevost worry so much that he ends the session, goes back to his motel, and calls the flight school to express his reservations about Moussaoui. He talks to his manager in the morning and says, "We'll care [about having trained Moussaoui] when there's a hijacking and he knows how to throw the switches and put them in the right position and all the lawsuits start coming in when they figure out we taught him how to do this"; Prevost then goes into a supervisors' meeting and recommends calling the FBI, but becomes even more upset when he is told Moussaoui paid for his training in $100 bills. As Moussaoui does not learn much during the day, Prevost invites him to observe a simulator session that evening, which Moussaoui does with interest. The following day Prevost meets the FBI, which has now been alerted by the school, and shares his feeling it would be a good idea to do a background check on Moussaoui. The FBI subsequently arrests Moussaoui (see August 16, 2001). [US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, 3/9/2006] Some claims later made about Moussaoui in the media may be inaccurate: He is said to mostly practice flying in the air, not taking off or landing. [Star-Tribune (Minneapolis), 12/21/2001; New York Times, 2/8/2002; Slate, 5/21/2002; New York Times, 5/22/2002] However, he is arrested after ground instruction and never flies the simulator, so it is unclear how this could happen. [US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, 3/9/2006] 9/11 Congressional Inquiry staff director Eleanor Hill will also later say that the reports saying he only wanted to pilot a plane in the air are untrue. [US Congress, 9/24/2002] In addition, the 9/11 Commission will comment, "Contrary to popular belief, Moussaoui did not say he was not interested in learning how to take off or land"; [9/11 Commission, 4/13/2004] It will be reported that he appears not to understand French, despite being from France, and does not specify the Middle Eastern country he says he comes from. [Star-Tribune (Minneapolis), 12/21/2001; Washington Post, 1/2/2002] However, at the trial Prevost will recall that Moussaoui spoke good French and that Moussaoui told him he had both French and Moroccan passports. [US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, 3/9/2006] Prevost will later receive a controversial $5 million reward from the US Department of State's Reward for Justice program. [Newsweek, 1/30/2008]
Entity Tags: Clancy Prevost, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Zacarias Moussaoui, Pan Am International Flight School
Category Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui, Zacarias Moussaoui
Zacarias Moussaoui writes the phone number of Amer el-Azizi in his notebook. El-Azizi is a Spain-based militant who is linked to 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (see (November 2001)) and is thought to have helped set up a meeting between Mohamed Atta and Ramzi bin al-Shibh in Spain in July 2001 (see Before July 8, 2001
and July 8-19, 2001). It is unclear when the number is written in Moussaoui's notebook or what type of contact there is between Moussaoui and el-Azizi, if any. [Wall Street Journal, 4/7/2004] However, the connection to el-Azizi does not appear to be mentioned at Moussaoui's trial (see March 6-May 4, 2006), even though it would be one of very few pieces of evidence potentially tying Moussaoui to the 9/11 plot. The reason for this is unclear. El-Azizi's arrest shortly after 9/11 will be frustrated by Spanish intelligence (see October 2001 and Shortly After November 21, 2001) and he will go on to be involved in the 2004 Madrid bombings (see Before March 11, 2004 and 7:37-7:42 a.m., March 11, 2004).
Entity Tags: Amer el-Azizi, Zacarias Moussaoui
The FBI's Minneapolis field office tells the CIA that Zacarias Moussaoui will be arrested the next day (see August 16, 2001). The information is communicated to a CIA field office, which then informs the Counterterrorist Center (CTC) at CIA headquarters. The CTC searches for information on Moussaoui, but does not find anything. The CIA has information on Moussaoui at this point, but the information is related to one of Moussaoui's aliases and the CIA apparently does not understand that the alias is used by Moussaoui (see April 2001). [Tenet, 2007, pp. 200-201]
Entity Tags: FBI Minnesota field office, Charles Frahm, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Harry Samit, Zacarias Moussaoui, Central Intelligence Agency
Cofer Black.
[Source: US State Department]Cofer Black, head of the CIA's Counter Terrorism Center, says in a speech to the Department of Defense's annual Convention of Counterterrorism, "We are going to be struck soon, many Americans are going to die, and it could be in the US." Black later complains that top leaders are unwilling to act at this time unless they are given "such things as the attack is coming within the next few days and here is what they are going to hit." [US Congress, 9/26/2002]
Entity Tags: Cofer Black
Category Tags: Warning Signs, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics
The US Army is preparing to severely restrict public access to its posts in the Washington, DC area. For decades, visitors have been able to enter these bases freely. But now, as a probably permanent change, barriers will be erected across many roads leading into them, funneling traffic to a few roads staffed by guards. Drivers entering without proper registration will be sent to a visitor's center to obtain a guest pass. [Washington Post, 8/15/2001] The new measures will mean commanders know who is entering their installations 24 hours a day, and give them the capability to adjust security measures immediately if required. [MDW News Service, 8/3/2001] The changes will occur at all installations belonging to the Military District of Washington (MDW). [MDW News Service, 7/2001] These include forts Hamilton, Meade, Belvoir, Ritchie, Myer, and McNair. Several of these bases will be reported as having implemented the changes in the following weeks, prior to September 11 (see August 20, 2001)(see September 4, 2001)(see September 5, 2001). Whether the changes take place at the other MDW installations prior to 9/11 is unknown. Part of MDW's stated mission is to "respond to crisis, disaster or security requirements in the National Capital Region through implementation of various contingency plans." [Military District of Washington, 8/2000; GlobalSecurity (.org), 11/28/2001] It will therefore be much involved with the rescue and recovery efforts following the 9/11 Pentagon attack. [Army, 10/2004] The restriction of access to MDW posts stems from guidance from Army leadership and specifically from MDW Commander Maj. Gen. James Jackson. [MDW News Service, 7/2001] It is reportedly part of a nationwide security clampdown due to concerns about terrorism, following such attacks as the Oklahoma City bombing and the attack on the USS Cole. [Washington Post, 8/15/2001]
Entity Tags: Military District of Washington, US Department of the Army
After Zacarias Moussaoui is arrested (see August 16, 2001), the FBI's Minneapolis field office becomes very concerned that he may be part of a larger operation involving hijacked aircraft and that he represents a real threat to US national security. One of the agents, Harry Samit, will later say that he and his colleagues are "obsessed" with Moussaoui. Samit sends over 70 communications warning about Moussaoui to the following: The Hezbollah, bin Laden, and Radical Fundamentalist Units at FBI headquarters (see August 20-September 11, 2001); Another FBI field office (see August 23, 2001); The CIA (see August 24, 2001); The FBI's offices in Paris and London; The FAA; The Secret Service; The Immigration and Naturalization Service; and Another intelligence agency (possibly the National Security Agency). While some of these bodies are responsive (see August 22, 2001 and August 24, 2001), Samit and his colleagues in Minnesota are forced to engage in a running battle with the Radical Fundamentalist Unit (RFU) at FBI headquarters, which obstructs their attempts to obtain a warrant to search Moussaoui's belongings. Samit will later accuse the RFU of "criminal negligence" because they were trying to "run out the clock" to deport Moussaoui, instead of prosecuting him. [US Department of Justice, 11/2004, pp. 101-221 ; USA Today, 3/9/2006; Washington Post, 3/21/2006]
Entity Tags: FBI Minnesota field office, Radical Fundamentalist Unit, FBI Headquarters, Harry Samit, Zacarias Moussaoui
Immediately after learning of Zacarias Moussaoui's suspicious behavior, Minneapolis FBI agent Harry Samit, one of the agents who arrests Moussaoui (see August 16, 2001), suspects he is preparing to hijack an airliner. He writes to a colleague, "That's pretty ominous and obviously suggests some sort of hijacking plan." [St. Paul Pioneer Press, 4/4/2006] Interviews with Moussaoui after his arrest will reinforce the Minneapolis FBI's suspicions that he is involved in a wider terrorist plot against airliners (see August 16-17, 2001). And after interviewing Moussaoui's associate Hussein al-Attas as well (see August 16, 2001), Samit is unequivocally "convinced… a hundred percent that Moussaoui [is] a bad actor, [is] probably a professional mujaheddin and this [is] not a joyride, that he [is] completely bent on the use of this aircraft for destructive purposes." [US Department of Justice, 11/2004, pp. 114-5, 120-2 ] In the main initial memo from Samit to other FBI units, Samit describes Moussaoui as "extremely evasive" and "extremely agitated." Samit also writes that Moussaoui appeared to by lying when he denied he had weapons training. Samit says, "Minneapolis believes that Moussaoui is an Islamic extremist preparing for some future act in furtherance of radical fundamentalist goals." Samit expresses his belief Moussaoui is planning something with a 747-400. He is aware Moussaoui's plan probably involves co-conspirators and writes "Moussaoui, al-Attas, and others yet unknown are conspiring to commit violations of [Federal anti-terrorism statutes]," and "there is reason to believe that Moussaoui and al-Attas are part of a larger international radical fundamentalist group." Samit even suspects Moussaoui of two of the offenses he will eventually be charged with and plead guilty to (see April 22, 2005). The e-mail accompanying the main memo concludes, "[p]lease let me know a soon as [the Department] gives the go-ahead. We're all counting on you!" [US Department of Justice, 11/2004, pp. 120-2 ; Minneapolis Star Tribune, 6/4/2006]
Entity Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui, FBI Headquarters, Harry Samit, Hussein al-Attas
Three Qatari men—Meshal Al Hajri, Fhad Abdulla, and Ali Al Fehaid—behave curiously in the weeks before 9/11, leading to later suspicions that they could have had some link to the 9/11 attacks. Suspicious Behavior - The men fly from London to New York on August 15, 2001, and travel around the East Coast together. They visit the World Trade Center, the Statue of Liberty, the White House, and various parts of Virginia, but it is unclear if they are simply tourists or are conducting surveillance on potential targets. On August 24, they fly from Washington to Los Angeles and check into a single room at a hotel near the airport. They pay with cash and are booked to leave on September 10, which they do. They spend about a week traveling within California with a United Arab Emirates man named Mohamed Al Mansoori. The hotel staff grow suspicious of the men because they notice pilot uniforms, laptops, and cardboard boxes addressed to Syria, Afghanistan, and Jordan in their room. This may not be that unusual, since pilots frequently stay at the hotel due to its proximity to the airport. But, according to a later US government document, the men also "had a smashed cellular phone in the room and a cellular phone attached by wire to a computer. The room also contained pin feed computer paper print outs with headers listing pilot names, airlines, flight numbers, and flight times." Suspicions are further aroused because on the last few days of their stay, the men request that their room should not be cleaned. The staff are not alarmed enough to alert police, however. The men are scheduled to board American Airlines Flight 144 on September 10, from Los Angeles to Washington. This flight will be reassigned Flight 77 the next day and will crash into the Pentagon in the 9/11 attacks. However, the men do not take the flight, but instead fly directly from Los Angeles to London on a British Airways flight the same day, and then back to Doha, Qatar. [Daily Telegraph, 2/1/2011] Link to 'Convicted Terrorist'? - In 2010, the names of the three men and Mansoori will appear in a State Department cable suggesting that they are still being investigated for a possible role in the 9/11 attacks (see February 11, 2010). The cable will state, "A subsequent FBI investigation revealed that the men's plane tickets were paid for and their hotel reservations in Los Angeles, CA, were made by a convicted terrorist." This is likely a reference to Fahed Alhajri, a Qatari who lived in Chesapeake, Virginia. News reports in 2002 will call Alhajri a suspected terrorist because of some items found in his possession when he is arrested as part of a visa fraud scheme that same year. For instance, he has photos of Osama bin Laden and the World Trade Center in his apartment, as well as a datebook with only one entry, written on 9/11 with the cryptic words, "Trackd the World Trade Center or the Pentagon Trackd for the Plane." According to these news reports, he paid for the Los Angeles hotel room and plane fare of his brother Meshal Alhajri and two friends. Alhajri is one of the three Qatari men, and the friends presumably are the other two. But Fahed Alhajri cannot be called a "convicted terrorist," because in 2003 he is convicted of visa fraud, not terrorism, and then he is deported. [New York Times, 5/10/2002; MSNBC, 2/2/2011] Terrorists or Tourists? - The names of the three men will be included on an FBI list of over 300 people wanted for questioning in connection with the 9/11 attacks that is accidentally made public in late 2001 (see October 3, 2001). However, they never are questioned by the FBI, apparently because they left the US the day before 9/11 and never came back. Mansoori's name is not on that list, but he will remain in the US, and he will be questioned by the FBI as part of a years-long investigation into his activities. The FBI will never come up with enough evidence to charge him, but he will be deported several years after 9/11. One US official will say, "I don't think people were in love with him," implying the FBI continued to have suspicions about him. In 2011, the 2010 cable mentioning the men will be made public, and The Telegraph will write: "It is not known whether the FBI believe that the men were simply assisting the hijackers or were a fifth cell who pulled out at the final moment. Alternatively, they may have been planning an attack on the West Coast of America or even London which was abandoned or went wrong." But there is also the possibility they may simply have been tourists. [Daily Telegraph, 2/1/2011; MSNBC, 2/2/2011]
Entity Tags: Fhad Abdulla, Ali Al Fehaid, Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Fahed Alhajri, US Department of Homeland Security, US Department of State, Meshal Al Hajri, Mohamed al Mansoori
Category Tags: Possible Hijacker Associates in US
In a 2007 book about the "Lackawanna Six" entitled The Jihad Next Door, author Dina Temple-Raston will write that al-Qaeda "shuttered the training camps in August 2001, leaving little sign of the encampments that once dotted the Pakistan-Afghan border." After 9/11, the camps are not reopened. [Temple-Raston, 2007, pp. 130] One article shortly after 9/11 suggests that bin Laden moves his training camps in Afghanistan "in the days before the attacks." [Philadelphia Inquirer, 9/16/2001] Presumably the CIA notices. CIA Director George Tenet will later claim a group of men from an allied intelligence agency penetrated the camps not long before 9/11 (see Early September 2001), satellites are monitoring Afghanistan from the sky, and the CIA had over 100 assets in Afghanistan before 9/11 (see Before September 11, 2001). FBI agent Jack Cloonan will also later say, "There were agents run into the camps" (see Before September 11, 2001).
Some time before 9/11, ISI Director Lt. Gen. Mahmood Ahmed learns that two prominent Pakistani nuclear scientists met with Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri in Afghanistan in mid-August 2001. Bin Laden revealed to the two scientists, Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood and Chaudiri Abdul Majeed, that he had acquired nuclear material and wanted their help to turn it into a weapon (see Mid-August 2001). ISI Director Mahmood is said to have learned about this through military contacts, as several Pakistani generals sit on the board of directors of a charity run by the two scientists that assists the Taliban. For instance, Hamid Gul, a former director of the ISI, is the charity's honorary patron and was in Afghanistan at the time of the meeting. However, the ISI does not warn the US or take any action against the scientists or their charity. [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 310-311]
Entity Tags: Mahmood Ahmed, Al-Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Chaudiri Abdul Majeed, Hamid Gul, Ummah Tameer-e-Nau, Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood, Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, Osama bin Laden
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, A. Q. Khan's Nuclear Network
Hani Hanjour. [Source: FBI]9/11 hijacker Hani Hanjour goes to the Freeway Airport in Bowie, Maryland, about 20 miles west of Washington. He wants to rent a single engine Cessna airplane. However, when two instructors take him on three test runs, they find he has trouble controlling and landing the plane. One instructor has to help him land. Due to his poor skills, therefore, he is not allowed to rent one of their planes without more lessons. Further, while Hanjour appears to have logged over 600 hours of flying experience and possesses a valid pilot's license (though it has in fact expired), he refuses to provide contact information: He gives no phone number and only gives his address as being a hotel in Laurel. In spite of Hanjour's lack of flying skills, chief instructor Marcel Bernard later claims, "There's no doubt in my mind that once [Flight 77] got going, he could have pointed that plane at a building and hit it." [Capital News, 9/19/2001; Gazette (Greenbelt), 9/21/2001; Newsday, 9/23/2001; Washington Post, 10/15/2001] However, on 9/11, in piloting Flight 77 into the Pentagon, Hanjour would have needed to do much more than simply point the plane at a target. Because Flight 77 at first seemed to overshoot its target, the Washington Post will note that "the unidentified pilot executed a pivot so tight that it reminded observers of a fighter jet maneuver. The plane circled 270 degrees to the right to approach the Pentagon from the west, whereupon Flight 77 fell below radar level.… Aviation sources said the plane was flown with extraordinary skill, making it highly likely that a trained pilot was at the helm." [Washington Post, 9/12/2001] One Washington air traffic controller will later comment, "The speed, the maneuverability, the way that he turned, we all thought in the radar room, all of us experienced air traffic controllers, that that was a military plane." [ABC News, 10/24/2001] One law enforcement official who will study Flight 77's descent after 9/11 will call it the work of "a great talent… virtually a textbook turn and landing." [Washington Post, 9/10/2002] Remarkably, the 9/11 Commission will overlook the numerous accounts of Hanjour's terrible piloting skills (see April 15, 1999 and January-February 2001) and state that 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed assigned the Pentagon target specifically to Hanjour because he was "the operation's most experienced pilot." [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 530]
Entity Tags: Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Hani Hanjour, 9/11 Commission, Marcel Bernard
Category Tags: Hani Hanjour, Alleged Hijackers' Flight Training
Mohamad Kamal Elzahabi moves to Minneapolis, Minnesota. Elzahabi has a long association with al-Qaeda, and has just returned from Chechnya where he fought as a sniper (see April 16, 2004-June 25, 2004). His "name was known to the FBI well before the Sept. 11 attacks, according to law enforcement officials who declined to be identified. He also was on a list of possible or suspected terrorists" circulated to foreign airlines and banks shortly after 9/11. [Fox News, 6/26/2004; Star-Tribune (Minneapolis), 6/30/2004] In fact, Canadian intelligence began investigating him for suspected militant ties in 1997, and the Boston FBI began investigating him in 1999, but lost track of him when he left the US later that year (see 1997 and 1999). He was connected to al-Qaeda operatives Raed Hijazi, Nabil al-Marabh, and Bassam Kanj. He worked as a Boston taxi driver with them (see June 1995-Early 1999), and also fought with them in Afghanistan (see Late 1980s). Fox News will later note that Elzahabi has a "potential link to Zacarias Moussaoui" since Moussaoui moved to Minneapolis in early August 2001 and is arrested on August 15, but no firm connection between the two has been shown. It has not been reported exactly when Elzahabi arrives in Minneapolis, but he applies for a commercial driver's license on August 23, 2001. He is fingerprinted for a criminal background check at that time, which presumably would alert the FBI that he is living in Minneapolis if they do not know already. But it is not known if Minneapolis FBI agents, desperately trying to get a warrant for Moussaoui, are told about Elzahabi before 9/11. In January 2002, the FBI will run his name through a database. Despite the FBI's knowledge of his al-Qaeda ties, he is cleared to get the license. This allows him to haul hazardous materials. His friend and al-Qaeda operative Nabil al-Marabh received a similar license the year before (see August 2000-January 2001). Elzahabi will apply for a license allowing him to carry general freight in September 2003 and he will get insurance clearance to start work in April 2004. However, he will be arrested by FBI that same month (see April 16, 2004-June 25, 2004). [Fox News, 6/26/2004; Star-Tribune (Minneapolis), 6/30/2004]
Entity Tags: Mohamad Kamal Elzahabi, Nabil al-Marabh
Category Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui, Nabil Al-Marabh
About 100 members of the 174th Fighter Wing, part of the New York Air National Guard, are deployed to Sultan Air Base, Saudi Arabia, to patrol the no-fly zone over southern Iraq, as part of the ongoing Operation Southern Watch. This is the unit's second deployment there, its first having been in March 2001. [Post-Standard (Syracuse), 9/11/2001; Post-Standard (Syracuse), 9/12/2001; US Congress, 3/1/2005; 174th Fighter Wing, 12/9/2005] The 174th FW is located at Hancock Field Air National Guard Base, five miles north of Syracuse, in Central New York State. It is currently equipped with 17 F-16 fighters. These are kept in a six-bay shelter where they are, reportedly, "ready to fly in any weather, at a moment's notice." [Airman, 1/2001; Post-Standard (Syracuse), 9/25/2001; GlobalSecurity (.org), 4/26/2005] However, Hancock Field is not one of NORAD's two "alert" sites in the northeast US. [9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004] The unit has 350 full-time staff and 650 part-timers, who work one weekend each month plus two full weeks a year. [Post-Standard (Syracuse), 9/25/2001; Post-Standard (Syracuse), 10/24/2001] The 100 members of the unit who go to Saudi Arabia are due to arrive back at Hancock Field at around 3 p.m. on 9/11, but as a consequence of the day's events are diverted to Canada. [Post-Standard (Syracuse), 9/14/2001] They will eventually arrive back at the base on September 14. [Post-Standard (Syracuse), 9/15/2001] In the months after 9/11, 174th FW fighters are involved in flying combat air patrols over New York City. [Post-Standard (Syracuse), 12/8/2001; New York State, 3/26/2003]
Entity Tags: Operation Southern Watch, New York Air National Guard, 174th Fighter Wing
Zacarias Moussaoui after his arrest. [Source: FBI]After being warned that Zacarias Moussaoui has raised suspicions at flight school (see August 11-15, 2001 and August 13-15, 2001), the FBI learns they can arrest him because he is in the US illegally. Four agents, Harry Samit, John Weess, Dave Rapp (all FBI) and Steve Nordmann (INS), drive to the Residence Inn, where Moussaoui and his associate Hussein al-Attas are staying. At the hotel Samit speaks on the phone to Joe Manarang from FBI headquarters; Manarang appeals for them to take the "cautious route" and not arrest Moussaoui. However, Samit refuses, as he has already notified the hotel clerk of their interest. Moussaoui is arrested around 4:00 p.m. on an immigration violation. At first Moussaoui shows the agents some documents, but then he becomes upset at missing his flight training. The FBI confiscates his belongings, including a computer laptop, but Moussaoui refuses permission for the belongings to be searched. A search of Moussaoui's person yields a dagger with a two-inch blade, and another knife with a three-inch blade belonging to Moussoaui is found in the car. He also has boxing gloves and shin guards, and the arresting agents note he has prepared "through physical training for violent confrontation." Al-Attas allows the agents to search his belongings and they believe al-Attas is in the US legally, so he is not arrested. However, al-Attas tells the FBI that Moussaoui is a radical religious Muslim and later makes several statements indicating Moussaoui may be a terrorist (see August 16, 2001). [MSNBC, 12/11/2001; US Congress, 10/17/2002; US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, 3/9/2006; Minneapolis Star Tribune, 6/4/2006] Al-Attas is arrested the next day (see August 17, 2001).
Entity Tags: John Weess, Zacarias Moussaoui, Steve Nordmann, Joe Manarang, Harry Samit, David Rapp, FBI Minnesota field office, Hussein al-Attas
A letter that Zacarias Moussaoui had in his possession when he was arrested. It is signed by Yazid Sufaat, whose apartment was used for a 9/11 planning meeting in January 2000 that was monitored by the authorities. [Source: US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division] (click image to enlarge)After Zacarias Moussaoui is arrested, the FBI wishes to search his possessions (see August 16, 2001 and August 23-27, 2001). According to a presentation made by FBI agent Aaron Zebley at Moussaoui's trial, the belongings are sufficient to potentially connect Moussaoui to eleven of the 9/11 hijackers: Mohamed Atta, Marwan Alshehhi, Ziad Jarrah, Hani Hanjour, Khalid Almihdhar, Nawaf Alhazmi, Fayez Banihammad, Ahmed Alhaznawi, Hamza Alghamdi, Satam Al Suqami, and Waleed Alshehri. The connections would be made, for example, through Ramzi bin al-Shibh, who spoke with Moussaoui on the telephone and wired him money (see July 29, 2001-August 3, 2001), and who was linked to three of the hijacker pilots from their time in Germany together (see November 1, 1998-February 2001). Bin al-Shibh also received money from Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi, who was connected to hijacker Fayez Ahmed Banihammad (see June 25, 2001). [US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, 7/31/2006] Moussaoui's notebook contained two recognizable control numbers for the Western Union wire transfers from bin al-Shibh and, according to McClatchy newspapers, a check on these numbers "would probably have uncovered other wires in the preceding days" to bin al-Shibh from al-Hawsawi. [McClatchy Newspapers, 9/11/2007] The discovery of the eleven hijackers could potentially have led to the discovery of some or all of the remaining eight plot members, as they were brothers (Wail and Waleed Alshehri, Nawaf and Salem Alhazmi), opened bank accounts together (see May 1-July 18, 2001 and June 27-August 23, 2001), lived together (see March 2001-September 1, 2001), obtained identity documents together (see April 12-September 7, 2001 and August 1-2, 2001), arrived in the US together (see April 23-June 29, 2001), and booked tickets on the same four flights on 9/11 (see August 25-September 5, 2001).
Entity Tags: Saeed Alghamdi, Salem Alhazmi, Satam Al Suqami, Waleed Alshehri, Zacarias Moussaoui, Ziad Jarrah, Wail Alshehri, Mohand Alshehri, Nawaf Alhazmi, Marwan Alshehhi, Ahmed Alhaznawi, Ahmed Alghamdi, Mohamed Atta, Fayez Ahmed Banihammad, Abdulaziz Alomari, Hani Hanjour, Hamza Alghamdi, Ahmed Alnami, Majed Moqed, Khalid Almihdhar
Category Tags: Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Marwan Alshehhi, Mohamed Atta, Hani Hanjour, Ziad Jarrah, Other 9/11 Hijackers, Zacarias Moussaoui, Key Hijacker Events
Key Events
Day of 9/11
The Alleged 9/11 Hijackers
Alhazmi and Almihdhar: Specific Cases
Projects and Programs
Before 9/11
Warning Signs: Specific Cases
The Post-9/11 World
Investigations: Specific Cases
Other Al-Qaeda-Linked Figures
Receive weekly email updates summarizing what contributors have added to the History Commons database
Developing and maintaining this site is very labor intensive. If you find it useful, please give us a hand and donate what you can.Donate Now
If you would like to help us with this effort, please contact us. We need help with programming (Java, JDO, mysql, and xml), design, networking, and publicity. If you want to contribute information to this site, click the register link at the top of the page, and start contributing.Contact Us
Except where otherwise noted,
the textual content of each timeline is licensed under a
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike