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World War II was the largest and most violent armed conflict in the history of mankind. However, the half century that now separates us from that conflict has exacted its toll on our collective knowledge. While World War II continues to absorb the interest of military scholars and historians, as well as its veterans, a generation of Americans has grown to maturity largely unaware of the political, social, and military implications of a war that, more than any other, united us as a people with a common purpose.
Highly relevant today, World War II has much to teach us, not only about the profession of arms, but also about military preparedness, global strategy, and combined operations in the coalition war against fascism. During the next several years, the U.S. Army will participate in the nation's 50th anniversary commemoration of World War II. The commemoration will include the publication of various materials to help educate Americans about that war. The works produced will provide great opportunities to learn about and renew pride in an Army that fought so magnificently in what has been called "the mighty endeavor."
World War II was waged on land, on sea, and in the air over several diverse theaters of operation for approximately six years. The following essay is one of a series of campaign studies highlighting those struggles that, with their accompanying suggestions for further reading, are designed to introduce you to one of the Army's significant military feats from that war.
This brochure was prepared in the U.S. Army Center of Military History by Charles R. Anderson. I hope this absorbing account of that period will enhance your appreciation of American achievements during World War II.
M. P. W. Stone
Secretary of the Army
Victory at Casablanca, Oran, and Algiers gave the United States Army and its British ally solid toeholds in the western Mediterranean Theater of Operations. But it offered no guarantee of easy access to Italy or southern Europe, or even to the eastern end of the Mediterranean, where the British desperately needed assistance to secure Egypt and strategic resources in the Near East. The sudden entrance of American forces during 8-11 November 1942 created an awkward deployment in which two pairs of opposing armies fought in North Africa, one in Tunisia, the other in Libya. Neither Axis nor Allies found any satisfaction in the situation; much fighting remained before either adversary could consider North Africa secure.
Even before the fighting in northwest Africa ended, intense negotiations between American and French officials began. On the morning of 10 November in Algiers Lt. Gen. Mark W. Clark, deputy to Lt. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Commander in Chief, Allied Force, met Admiral Jean Francois Darlan, commander in chief of the collaborationist Vichy government's military forces. The different motives and needs of the two sides made these sessions difficult for all. The Allies were in a hurry to gain French help in fighting the Germans and Italians before the Axis could reinforce its units in Africa. On the same day talks in Algiers opened, British Lt. Gen. Kenneth A. N. Anderson began moving his Eastern Task Force into position off Tunisia for the next series of landings. With Clark and Darlan still in the early stages of negotiations, the enemy acted. On 11-12 November German submarines fired several near-misses at the American aircraft carrier Ranger, scored hits against three ships, and sank three transports off Casablanca. Intelligence sources reported Axis aircraft and transports en route to Tunis. Meanwhile, across the negotiating table General Clark found a frustrating lack of urgency in his French counterparts.
Ever since France had surrendered to Adolf Hitler in June 1940, French officers had been struggling with Nazi demands that they fight the Allies on the one hand and with their need to retain a measure of
sovereignty on the other. When Operation TORCH began, German and Italian units crossed Vichy borders to complete the conquest of France begun over two years before. In response, the French fired on Axis units in Tunisia, which only brought closer Nazi supervision at Vichy. At Algiers Admiral Darlan thus found himself performing a delicate balancing act. As a member of the Vichy government he could not simply turn over French forces in North Africa to the Allies. But he also refused even to deal with his subordinate commanders in North Africa whom he suspected of pro-Allied sympathies. And, to the exasperation of the Allies, Darlan's cease-fire order to the Oran and Casablanca garrisons was countermanded by officials in Vichy. Generals Clark and Eisenhower saw no alternative to continuing reinforcement while the talks went on.
On the day a cease-fire went into effect in Morocco and Algeria, 124,760 Allied troops were ashore, and dozens of transports were steaming toward Casablanca, Oran, and Algiers. By the end of November the Allies would have 253,213 troops in North Africa. The Axis buildup began at an equally frenzied pace. As early as 10 November the Italian Air Force sent to Tunis a flight of 28 fighters. Two days later an airlift began that would bring to Tunisia over 15,000 men and 581 tons of supplies. During November transports brought to the ports of Tunis and Bizerte 176 tanks, 131 artillery pieces, 1,152 vehicles, and 13,000 tons of supplies. To strengthen Axis units already in North Africa, the Germans sent three fresh divisions, the Italians two. Due to limited Allied naval capability, Axis submarines could attack Allied ships in waters between Sicily and Tunisia with little worry about Allied antisubmarine retaliation. The longer Darlan delayed committing to the Allies, the more costly the ensuing battle would become.
Finally, on 13 November, Clark and Darlan reached a workable agreement. The Allies gained their major objective: French forces in North Africa would immediately assist American and British forces in liberating Tunisia and, later, metropolitan France. Political fragmentation in the French armed forces was for the moment subordinated to the common purpose of defeating Axis armies. General Eisenhower quickly cabled his approval of the Clark-Darlan agreement, and Allied field commanders added French units to their operational plans.
Soon after the signing of final terms with Darlan on 22 November, however, political squabbles within the French Army threatened to disrupt the Allied war effort. General Charles de Gaulle and his Free French followers in London opposed any agreement
reached with an official they considered a traitor. Civilian reaction as well dampened official enthusiasm. Public opinion in the United States and Britain did not welcome the news that Allied governments had negotiated with Darlan, who shared an extremely negative reputation with Vidkun Quisling, the Norwegian Army officer who had facilitated the surrender of his own country to Hitler's armies. With both President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill speaking of the need to accept a "temporary expedient" with Darlan, the issue was contained, but Allied planning proceeded in an atmosphere of some uncertainty.
To liberate Tunisia from Axis influence, the Allies would have to conduct operations whose character was entirely different from those at Casablanca, Oran, and Algiers. The Allies had entered northwest Africa by executing simultaneous amphibious operations at separate points. But in Tunisia Axis air power based in Sicily would make an amphibious assault risky, necessitating an overland advance from Algeria, the only route that provided a secure base of support. Major Allied objectives were the port cities of Bizerte and Tunis, only forty miles apart.
In Tunisia the United States Army for the first time had to operate far inland on the African continent. The task brought Americans into terrain much different from what they had found in Morocco and Algeria. Some 400 miles east of Algiers, Tunisia enclosed a much smaller area, stretching only 160 miles from east to west and 500 miles from north to south. Hills and mountains in the north leveled to sandy expanses in the south, the northern reaches of the Sahara Desert. With the northern coast of Tunisia obviously accessible to the Axis, most combat would be there. The port cities of Bizerte and Tunis lay on separated coastal flatlands interrupted by lakes and marshes and surrounded by hill masses extending from higher ranges to the west. Half-a-dozen rivers radiated west and southwest of the two ports. Because these rivers afforded the best routes through the mountains, the most heavily traveled roads and rail lines ran along their banks. With their hubs of radiating roads and rail lines, the towns of Mateur and Djedeida, in different valleys, were obvious intermediate objectives. Possession of Mateur opened a path to Bizerte, only twenty-two miles away, while control of Djedeida left only a thirteen-mile run to Tunis. A dry climate left the flatlands hard from March to November, ideal for mechanized and armored operations and for airfield construction.
While General Clark negotiated with Admiral Darlan in Algiers, the Axis continued pushing reinforcements across North Africa. By mid-November about 15,000 German and 9,000 Italian troops manned two beachheads radiating between five and ten miles from Bizerte and Tunis, and patrols were extending their perimeters. French and Italian crews manned coastal batteries around the two ports. Uncertain of the response of French troops in the area to an Allied attack, the Germans placed a civil-military detachment in the two cities to neutralize civilians and continued efforts to win over local French commanders. Of great concern to Allied leaders was the strong Axis air force in the area. Five groups of fighters and a group of dive bombers had recently transferred to Tunisian airfields. General Walther Nehring, commanding general of the German XC Corps, directed Axis units in Tunisia, while Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, Commander in Chief, South, controlled Axis operations in both Tunisia and Tripolitania, the western region of Libya.
The Allied plan for Tunisian operations called for Eastern Task Force to move between Bizerte and Tunis, capture the latter as soon as possible, then surround Bizerte and build up sufficient force to bring
For the present, Anderson's lone division, the British 78th Infantry, under Maj. Gen. Vyvyan Evelegh, would attack east on three axes. On the north, the 36th Infantry Brigade Group would move toward Bizerte on a road roughly ten miles inland. Another brigade-size unit, Blade Force, would advance in the center toward Tunis some twenty miles inland. On the south, the 11th Infantry Brigade Group would move on a northeasterly course about forty miles inland toward Tunis. Blade Force and the 11th Group would meet at Tebourba, then move six miles east on Djedeida, the key to Tunis. Each of the three columns was reinforced by American units. Company E, 13th Armored Regiment, supported the 36th Group; the
1st Battalion, 1st Armored Regiment, advanced with Blade Force; and four American units supported the 11th Group: the Reconnaissance/Intelligence platoon and the 2d Battalion (less Company E) of the 13th Armored Regiment, the 175th Field Artillery Battalion, and Company C of the 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion.
Anxious to push east before Axis forces became any stronger, Evelegh began moving his troops into jump-off positions on 16 November. The next day a British unit guarding a bridge and highway intersection at Djebel Abiod, on the route soon to be used by the 36th Infantry Brigade Group, clashed with a German-Italian armored column moving west. In a three-hour fight, the first of the Tunisia Campaign, the Allies lost more men than the Axis but drove the enemy back toward Bizerte with a loss of eight tanks. For the next week similar encounters occurred at several sites as both sides tried to determine the location of each other's forward elements and to break up concentrations of men and equipment that could evolve into attack spearheads. Despite these actions and German air raids on Allied positions as far west as Algiers, Evelegh had his three brigades in position by 24 November.
The Allied attack began the night of 24-25 November when the 11th Infantry Brigade Group troops set out on the southern axis toward Medjez el Bab under bright moonlight. They were soon stopped by heavy fire and in daylight driven back with many casualties. A second element of the brigade was also stopped while approaching the town from another direction. To the Allies' surprise, however, the Germans withdrew the night of 25-26 November; after an artillery preparation, the troops walked into Medjez el Bab unopposed. Quickly moving east, the 11th Group took the town of Tebourba in the early hours of the 27th. The Germans fought the rest of the day but withdrew to Djedeida.
In the center Blade Force jumped off at 0700 on the 25th when more than one hundred British and American tanks rumbled east into a dusty sunrise. Within a few hours the 1st Battalion, 1st Armored Regiment, began meeting and pushing through light resistance from enemy reconnaissance patrols. The next day the first American-German tank battle of the war developed at the Chouigui Pass north of Tebourba. Skillfully coordinating infantry, antitank, and tank forces, the Americans knocked out seven German tanks and drove off enemy ground troops at a cost of six tanks.
On the northern axis the attack got off to a poor start when the 36th Infantry Brigade Group missed its H-hour by a full day. Finally
On 28 November the Allies began to encounter strong Axis defenses. Near the coast the 36th Group ran up against a mass of concealed machine-gun positions near Djefna, thirty miles west of Bizerte, and turned back with a loss of 30 men killed and 86 taken prisoner. In the south the 11th Group found a strong German force,
augmented by four new 88-mm. Mark VI Tiger tanks in their first field test, at Djedeida, thirteen miles west of Tunis. Enemy antitank and artillery fire stopped the brigade with a loss of five tanks. An Allied attempt to reinforce overnight only brought more frustration. The U.S. 5th Field Artillery Battalion, recently arrived from Oran, ran into an ambush and lost its command group. The next day both the 36th and 11th Groups renewed their attacks, and again they were stopped.
Special operations in support of these attacks proved ineffective. An amphibious landing of British and American infantry to assist the drive on Bizerte found no friendly troops to join because the 36th Infantry Brigade Group had been stopped miles west of the rendezvous point. The battalion-size unit ran out of supplies and withdrew with casualties. A parachute drop of 500 British troops twentyfive miles south of Tunis cut a few Axis phone lines, but the men had to make their way back to Medjez el Bab, harried by the enemy. Their losses were 19 killed, 4 wounded' and 266 missing. By nightfall on the 30th the Allies were stopped everywhere.
The decisive Axis advantage in these five days of fighting was above the battlefield. In fact, the Axis maintained several hard-surface airfields east of the Atlas Mountains until late in the campaign. In November Luftwaffe squadrons often flew several on-call missions each day from fields on the outskirts of Tunis, while Allied squadrons
had time for only one planned daylight mission from more distant fields. The Atlas Mountains also created a weather difference that worked against the Allies in the early months of the campaign. Axis pilots enjoyed more clear days east of the mountains, while Allied pilots west of the range lost many days to rain. These conditions meant that Axis squadrons had the time and weather to react to targets of opportunity such as armor columns and infantry concentrations, while Allied air units had to be content to bomb fixed targets such as airfields and supply areas.
Kesselring and Nehring allowed their bloodied adversaries no rest. Early on the morning of 1 December a strong counterattack came out of Djedeida. In two columns spearheaded by forty tanks and supported by deadly dive bombers, the German-Italian attackers hit Blade Force, sending its units into a hasty withdrawal south. The road quickly became congested with vehicles of all types, which only made a more inviting target for enemy artillery and dive bombers. In the first four days of December the Germans and their Italian allies built up momentum and pushed the Allies back from Djedeida, securing it as an Axis strongpoint, then farther west to take Tebourba. After a brief pause the Germans resumed their offensive, taking Djebel el Guessa, a key hill mass four miles south of Tebourba, and in the process mauling elements of the U.S. 6th Armored Infantry Regiment. Still the German tanks and dive bombers came and for the next four days pushed the Allies farther west. Finally on the 10th, Allied units held a defensive line just east of Medjez el Bab. The string of defeats in December cost them dearly: over 1,000 missing (prisoners of war), and 73 tanks, 432 other vehicles, and 70 artillery pieces lost.
Frustrated and furious, Eisenhower wrote a scathing description of Allied performance in the Tunisia Campaign. To Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall he confided his view that American and British operations had thus far managed to violate every accepted tactical principle of warfare and would be condemned in the military school system for decades to come.
Despite the string of defeats, General Anderson aimed another attack at Tunis, this one scheduled for 22 December. The continued but slow buildup had brought Allied force levels up to a total of 20,000 British, 11,800 American, and 7,000 French troops. A hasty intelligence review showed about 25,000 combat and 10,000 service troops, mostly German, across their line of departure. Allied commanders hoped that a quick strike and numerical superiority would offset Axis air support and the increasingly heavy rains which had begun to affect Allied mobility. The first contact seemed to justify such hopes.
On the night of 16-17 December a company of the U.S. 26th Regimental Combat Team (RCT), 1st Infantry Division, made a successful raid on Maknassy, 155 miles south of Tunis, and took twenty-one Italian prisoners. The main attack began the afternoon of 22 December and pointed toward continued success. Despite rain and insufficient air cover, the U.S. 18th Regimental Combat Team and British Coldstream Guards made good progress up the lower ridges of the 900-foot Longstop Hill that controlled a river corridor to Tunis. But two days later a German counterattack stopped the advance, and by the 26th the Allies had withdrawn with heavy losses to the line they had set two weeks earlier. Without gaining even their preliminary objective the Allies had taken 534 casualties.
The run for Tunis had been stopped. Acceptance of this bitter reality, as well as cool analysis and united effort to prevent a recurrence, was made more difficult by a most unwelcome political development. Late in the year factionalism again erupted in the French Army. On 24 December Darlan was assassinated. Although the French quickly named General Henri Giraud as replacement, his acceptance by de Gaulle's
Free French government was questionable, and the issue of French reliability arose all over again in Allied command bunkers and foxholes.
General Eisenhower found nothing to celebrate over Christmas 1942. He and his subordinate commanders concluded that their string of defeats could be ended only by making major changes in the way they were fighting Axis armies. They would have to do more than simply replace personnel and equipment losses and try another dash to Tunis. They would have to build a multi-division force with hundreds of tanks and much stronger air support, and they would have to coordinate pressure against the Axis on a front hundreds of miles long. They would also have to wait for the weather to clear. These preparations required a minimum of two months.
With the Allies still trying to carry out a quick thrust to Tunis in December, the shape of the opposing orders of battle that would decide the outcome of the Tunisia Campaign could already be discerned. Kesselring was bringing up to full strength General Juergen von Arnim's Fifth Panzer Army, successor headquarters to Nehring's XC Corps, consisting of the Division von Broich, a heavily armored unit in the Bizerte area, the 10th Panzer Division in the center before Tunis, and the Italian Superga Division on the southern flank. On the opposite side, Eisenhower transferred units from Morocco and Algeria eastward into Tunisia, bringing in fresh troops as fast as they could be prepared. On the north, Anderson's Eastern Task Force would become the five-division British First Army, with three more divisions soon joining the 6th Armoured and 78th Infantry Divisions already in Tunisia. On the south the basis of a two-division anti-Nazi French corps was being laid. In the center Eisenhower planned a full American corps, to be commanded by Maj. Gen. Lloyd R. Fredendall. With regiments from Algeria and Morocco, the U.S. II Corps would eventually include the larger part of six divisions: the 1st, 3d, 9th, and 34th Infantry and the 1st and 2d Armored.
The stage of conflict shifted south in January 1943. As the British Eighth Army pushed the German-Italian Panzer Army west across Libya, General Field Marshal Erwin Rommel sent staff officers to the port of Sfax, 150 miles south of Tunis, to prepare for a juncture of Axis forces in Tunisia and Libya. The possibility of a Rommel-von Arnim link-up greatly concerned Allied planners because these combined armies could sweep westward into Algeria and Morocco, where the Allies held only coastal enclaves. To head off this threat Eisenhower subordinated capture of the Bizerte-Tunis bridgehead to operations in central and southern Tunisia.
While both sides waited for better weather they also grew stronger. With a dominant naval presence in the western Mediterranean and large garrisons in Morocco and Algeria, the Allies had little difficulty continuing their buildup in Tunisia. But the amount of Axis troops and supplies that infiltrated by sea and air from Italy was frustrating. From the surrender of Algiers in mid-November through January 112,000 men and 101,000 tons of supplies and equipment arrived in Tunisia to join enemy forces already there.
During the last week of 1942 and the first six weeks of 1943 the opposing armies sparred to improve positions in central Tunisia. Road-rail routes leading from ports on the east to the Algerian border on the west provided stages for these actions. From the port of Sousse, 75 miles south of Tunis, one line ran west through Fondouk el Aouareb; another stretched from Sfax through Faid, then joined the first at Sbeitla to continue west through Kasserine. A third route began at Mahares, 25 miles south of Sfax, and ran west through Maknassy; a fourth started at Gabes, 60 miles south of Mahares, and joined the third at Gafsa. All of these routes had to cross a north-south mountain range, making the passes for each a critical point. To effect the von Arnim-Rommel linkup they desired' Axis units would
have to move through the passes; to prevent the linkup, the Allies would have to block them.
In late December and mid-January the French took important gaps in the mountains near Ousseltia, but in a retaliatory strike the Germans inflicted over three hundred casualties. A more serious challenge developed in late January when Axis units attacked at the juncture of the British and French sectors and pushed the line ten miles west. The French took the brunt of this assault, losing 21 tanks, 52 artillery pieces, and over 200 vehicles as well as 3,500 troops missing. The American Combat Command B, 1st Armored Division, was also involved in this action, taking 202 casualties while destroying 9 tanks and capturing 21 1 enemy. While not a major attack, the action alarmed the Allies because it exposed coordination problems at the critical points where national sectors joined.
In their January attacks Axis units puzzled Allied commanders by limiting their own advances and abandoning key positions. Soon, however, the enemy displayed more determination. On 30 January the 21st Panzer Division blasted through French defenders at Faid Pass, then drove off an American relief column the next day. The attack on Faid interrupted preparations for an assault by the U.S. II Corps on
dissension appeared in the Alliance when the French protested ineffective American support.
While Eisenhower struggled to contain squabbles on the Allied side, the Germans refueled their tanks and continued west. On the 14th they hit Sidi Bou Zid, ten miles beyond Faid. With over 200 tanks on both sides, a huge, drawn-out battle appeared in the making. But American armor was spread too thin, and the panzers punched through in only one day. An ineffective counterattack the next day and the stunning capture of some 1,400 troops forced the Americans to undertake a major withdrawal. As the 1st Armored Division fell back, enemy pressure eased. However, on the 16th the panzers resumed their westward push, seizing Sbeitla, twenty-five miles beyond Sidi Bou Zid. Again the Americans scrambled back to establish a new defensive position, this time at Kasserine Pass. Four days of successive defeats cost II Corps dearly. The Americans lost 2,546 missing, 103 tanks, 280 vehicles, 18 field guns, 3 antitank guns, and 1 antiaircraft battery. Even service and medical companies, miles behind the infantry and armor, had been reached by the onrushing panzers.
The succession of II Corps defeats did not end with the loss of Sbeitla. Rommel saw the opportunity to keep his battered adversary reeling with a push for an even bigger prize: Kasserine Pass, gateway to Algeria. Adding the 10th and 21st Panzer Divisions to his German-Italian Panzer Army, Rommel struck the II Corps on 19 February. By the next afternoon the pass was in Axis hands. Only the valiant stands of individual battalions and companies on isolated hilltops interrupted Rommel's progress. As an alarming indication of falling morale, American troops abandoned huge stocks of equipment. In a final insult, the disastrous series of defeats was ended not by stiffening American resolve but by a shift in Axis priorities. Concerned that the British Eighth Army might attack from Libya while he was moving west, Rommel turned back to the east.
The conduct of Allied operations in both northern Tunisia in December 1942 and the central mountain ranges in February 1943 forced a total reexamination of Allied organization and plans. In short order General Eisenhower restructured the Allied command and changed key personnel. A new command-the 18th Army Group under British General Sir Harold R. L. G. Alexander-tightened operational control over the combat corps and armies of the three Allied nations. With the British Eighth Army now close enough to the Allied southern flank to affect Axis operations, the three national commands in Tunisia narrowed their battlefronts and shifted north. Because the U.S. II Corps had taken high casualties and lost so much
equipment during the February battles, and-in the British view- shown tactical incompetence, the Americans were to play a role auxiliary to the British in the next phase of the campaign. Accordingly, Alexander's staff was primarily British.
During late February and early March Allied units in Tunisia increased their combat power. Two fresh British divisions arrived and the British 6th Armoured Division refitted with American Sherman tanks. The French XIX Corps turned in its prewar equipment for the latest American weapons. The U.S. II Corps received the rest of the 1st, 9th, and 34th Infantry Division components from Algeria and replaced lost tanks and equipment as fast as ships, trains, and trucks could bring them to the front. Engineer and other support specialists improved and expanded ports, rail lines, and roads. Best of all for the troops on the ground, Allied air support soon improved. The Mediterranean Air Command under British Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder went into operation in late February. Consisting of the U.S. Ninth and Twelfth Air Forces and four major Royal Air Force commands, Mediterranean Air Command could put over the battlefield enough aircraft to challenge seriously the air superiority enjoyed by the Axis thus far in the campaign.
The Americans received the highest-level personnel change when in early March Eisenhower selected Maj. Gen. George S. Patton, Jr., to command II Corps. Now the Allies had a field
commander who would cause his adversaries genuine concern for his willingness to attempt maneuvers others thought rash. With Maj. Gen. Omar N. Bradley as his deputy, Patton set about rebuilding the II Corps into the panzer-killing force he knew it could become. Overlooking no detail-including neckties in the heat of North Africa-Patton pushed his men to fight and dress like the best soldiers in the world. Within days they knew they were led by a commander who would not let them fail.
But these preparations did not take place with Axis cooperation. Kesselring kept up the pressure, this time in the north. On 26 February von Arnim launched an offensive against the British in an effort to push his front west to give the Axis a wider secure zone around Tunis. This offensive, which Rommel labeled the brainchild of "nincompoops," failed but served as a painful reminder that Axis units were capable of much hard fighting. Paired with the Axis northern thrust was another in the south. In his last battle in Tunisia, Rommel on 6 March struck the British Eighth Army at Medenine soon after its arrival from Libya. The British blunted the attack and in doing so may have found the tactic that could stop the panzers: massed artillery and antitank fire combined with air raids.
In mid-March the Allies went back on the offensive. General Sir Bernard L. Montgomery's Eighth Army hit the Axis southern flank around Mareth with a multi-division force. In a month-long series of battles, the British, hampered by heavy rains but assisted by worsening German-Italian relations, pushed Axis units over 150 miles north to Enfidaville, only 47 miles from Tunis.
With Montgomery rolling up the enemy's southern flank Patton launched his first offensive. Reinforced combat power made another American failure unlikely. The II Corps now consisted of three full infantry and one armored divisions plus the 1st Ranger Battalion, soon to be famous as Lt. Col. William O. Darby's Rangers; the 13th Field Artillery Brigade; the 213th Coast Artillery Regiment; the 19th Engineer Combat Regiment; and seven battalions of the 1st Tank Destroyer Group. These units with service components totaled 88,287 men. Patton's mission was to drive east into the Axis flank to draw enemy units from the south, thereby weakening the opposition
Montgomery faced in his push north. The objective for II Corps was a string of towns and hill masses beginning at Gafsa, 180 miles south of Tunis and 105 miles northwest of Mareth, where the British Eighth Army was pounding Rommel's line. Spearheaded by Maj. Gen. Orlando Ward's 1st Armored Division, Patton's men took Gafsa on 17 March but were denied the satisfaction of victory when the enemy withdrew without a fight. Urging on his tankers and their attached 60th Regimental Combat Team, Patton was soon raging at the enemy's alliance with "General Mud"; heavy rains stopped his tanks and trucks for two days. Finally, on 21 March, the Americans covered the 28-mile distance to Sened and took their second objective, this time against light opposition. Again in high gear, Ward's tankers pushed on 20 miles to Maknassy, only to see enemy troops evacuate the village. Continuing east, Ward soon found determined opposition in hills around the village and stopped his column on 22 March to await stronger support.
While the tankers rushed eastward' the infantrymen found themselves in a major battle forty miles back to the west at El Guettar. As Allied planners hoped, Kesselring had released the 10th Panzer Division for a counterattack on II Corps. While the German attack pleased strategists waiting for an enemy diversion from the south, the troops of Maj. Gen. Terry Allen's 1st Infantry Division who had to face it saw nothing to celebrate. Over three days from 21 March Allen's men turned back two strong attacks. In fighting that often came down to the "him-or-me" terror of hand-to-hand combat, 1st Division troops pushed the Germans out of their fighting positions and off hilltops. Fortunately, Allen's men could call on strong air and artillery support. Massed artillery and tank destroyers knocked out nearly thirty enemy tanks while mines stopped eight more. American casualties were heavy but the 10th Panzer Division had to withdraw.
Anxious to move beyond El Guettar, Patton planned a two-division attack to the sea that would divide enemy forces. The experienced 1st Infantry Division would advance on the north. On the south Maj. Gen. Manton S. Eddy's 9th Infantry Division would make its first attack as a unit. The 9th would also be making its first attack at night, a difficult tactic in the easiest terrain and in the rocky hills east of El Guettar probably impossible for a unit with only five months' experience. When the attack began before dawn on 28 March three battalions of the 9th soon became lost, and two remained out of touch for thirty-six hours. On the left the 1st Infantry Division made faster progress but was unable to push too far ahead of Eddy's men without inviting envelopment. Soon both
divisions were exhausting themselves in futile attacks against enemy units dug into rock-face positions with interlocking fields of fire. In nine days the 9th Infantry Division alone lost 120 killed, including 5 battalion commanders, 872 wounded, and 820 missing, injured, or ill.
Frustrated at the pace of the American infantry attack, General Alexander directed Patton to send an armored column on a quick thrust to Gabes, the seaport whose possession would complete the division of Axis forces. Patton sent; task force ahead at noon on 30 March, but in three days it made little progress and lost thirteen tanks. The task force was halted, and the emphasis returned to the infantry struggling in the hills. More than a tough Axis defense was stalling II Corps. During the advance from Gafsa to Maknassy, Alexander had told Patton not only what to do but how to do it and then changed the American mission several times. Now in the attempt to advance beyond Maknassy, Alexander again gave orders Patton considered overly detailed and, again, changed them to produce the infantry-first, armor- first, infantry- first sequence the troops found confusing and exhausting. An exasperated Patton, prevented by Eisenhower from saying anything that might upset Allied harmony, complained bitterly in letters to General Marshall in Washington.
Held in place by a tenacious enemy defense and irritated by changing instructions, Patton took a hard look at his command. Deciding a personnel change would help, he chose Maj. Gen. Ernest
Seventy miles north of Maknassy Maj. Gen. Charles W. Ryder's 34th Infantry Division fought to open the pass at Fondouk el Aouareb for another Allied attempt to cut off Axis units retreating north. Preceded by a massive artillery barrage, Ryder's men began their attack on 27 March, but after repeated assaults over three days the pass was still in Axis hands. Alexander next directed a trinational attack after a week of preparation. This second attempt at the pass confused most participants and severely strained Allied cooperation. Crossing the line of departure on 8 April, the Americans soon stopped to await an air strike that failed to materialize as scheduled, was then postponed, and finally was canceled altogether. Five hours later a British armored brigade suddenly ran through the 34th Division area without warning, and the commanders had to suspend the attack to sort out respective units while under fire. The next morning tanks supporting the 34th ran too far ahead of the infantry and had to be recalled under fire. These blunders prevented an early seizure of the pass, and by the time British armor had pushed through late on 9 April the Axis main
body had escaped the trap. Worst of all for the Allies, the botched attacks touched off arguments in headquarters tents which were contained only by the most pointed intervention of Eisenhower and Alexander.
By mid-April Axis forces had been pushed into a perimeter at the northeast corner of Tunisia, an area about the same size as their bridgehead of six months before. The initiative in North Africa had clearly swung toward the Allies. While Allied forces had gained experience and strength over the last six months, Axis units had been increasingly hampered by growing Allied air and naval raids on their supply line from Sicily, with supplies reaching North Africa falling below the minimum needed to sustain operations. But much hard fighting remained before the Allies could stage a victory parade, and several American units had to show marked improvement before they could claim a measure of the credit.
General Alexander laid out several missions for the next phase of the campaign: tighten the enemy perimeter, split the Tunis and Bizerte objective areas, seal off the Cap Bon peninsula, and take Tunis first and then Bizerte. The American role in these plans would be to assist the British First Army in pushing back the enemy perimeter and later to take Bizerte. To carry out its missions the II Corps would have the same three infantry and one armored divisions plus three battalions of the French Corps d'Afrique. During 14-18 April these units repositioned to the northernmost Allied sector, from the sea about thirty-seven miles inland and thirty miles west of Bizerte. On 15 April General Bradley took command of the II Corps, allowing Patton to begin planning the invasion of Sicily.
With the Allies still preparing their next move, the Germans tested the British V Corps in a strong attack by the Hermann Goering Division the night of 20-21 April. Though enemy forces penetrated five miles at some points, they could not force a withdrawal and returned to their lines with British tanks in pursuit. On the 22d the British 46th Division struck back at the Hermann Goering Division to open the southwest-to-northeast line of attack General Anderson would take to Tunis, about thirty-five miles away. Losses were high on both sides but the British inched ahead. On the 23d, Bradley launched the American part of 18th Army Group's attack. Both the 9th Division along the coast and the 1st Division to the south found enemy defenses very strong despite American artillery superiority. Progress came in yards, not miles, and some units like the 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry, in the 1st Division area had to retake the same hill three times.
Only extraordinary personal courage enabled the II Corps to maintain its advance. Sgt. William L. Nelson gave his 9th Division comrades one such example. From an exposed position Nelson directed mortar fire effective enough to stop a German counterattack, an act which brought down on him a rain of enemy grenades. Though mortally wounded, Nelson crawled to another position and directed more devastating fire on the enemy. For his heroism, Sergeant Nelson was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor. Convinced of American determination by acts such as Nelson's, enemy units withdrew on 25 April.
The next day the 34th Division entered the line between the 1st and 9th Divisions. Under pressure to compensate for its poor performance of eighteen days before, the division mounted a determined assault the night of 26-27 April on a cluster of ridges topped by Hill 609. At the same time, the 1st Division to the south attacked Hill 523. Both divisions were supported by battalions of the 1st Armored Division and by the 27th, 68th, and 91st Field Artillery Battalions. The Americans found desperate defenders and had to take high casualties but steadily gained inches and yards. As happened a few days before in the 9th Division's advance, progress often came only after the most extreme demonstrations of personal courage. On the 28th the 6th Armored Infantry Regiment was pinned down by German machine guns. Rather than await support, Pvt. Nicholas Minue crawled through the enemy line and-using only a bayonet-cleared several machinegun positions before he was killed. For his heroism Minue was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor.
After nearly three days of continuous combat the II Corps had its immediate objectives surrounded but at high cost, particularly in the southern part of the line. Allen's and Ryder's divisions had lost 183 killed, 1,594 wounded, and 676 captured or missing. But with captured German and Italian troops reporting rations and ammunition low, General Bradley believed the enemy was near the breaking point. He quickly reinforced and reorganized his corps to present a four-division front of, from north to south, the 9th, 1st Armored, 1st, and 34th Divisions. On the morning of 30 May II Corps kicked off a general offensive that set in motion an Axis collapse in the north. When American troops overran Hills 609 and 523, 1st Armored Division tanks roared eastward. After nightfall 1 May the Germans again withdrew, this time into Mateur. But two days later General Harmon's tankers drove the enemy out of the town. The Americans had won an important urban center and one only twenty miles from their ultimate objective, Bizerte.
The final American offensive of the campaign began 6 May. The 1st Armored and 9th Infantry Divisions coordinated an envelopment of Bizerte and the next day pushed retreating enemy into and through the city. At nearly the same time the British V Corps entered Tunis. In the southern half of the American sector the 1st Infantry Division found strong opposition but maintained pressure to prevent the enemy from reinforcing other areas. Next to the British sector, the 34th Infantry Division proved it had overcome its tactical inexperience by taking a key pass on the road to Tunis. As II Corps units pushed on to cut the Bizerte-Tunis road, they found Axis units in a state of collapse. Enemy troops were surrendering in such large numbers that they clogged roads, impeding further advance. In the second week of May enemy prisoners totaled over 275,000. When Axis generals began surrendering on 9 May the six-month Tunisia Campaign entered its final days. As General Bradley turned his attention from fighting a determined enemy to governing large numbers of civilians and prisoners, his troops composed doggerel about a memorable lady they had discovered: "Dirty Gerty from Bizerte."
If American commanders and troops thought their brief combat experience in French Morocco and Algeria in November 1942 was adequate preparation to face hardened Axis units in a lengthy campaign, the fighting in Tunisia brought about a harsh reappraisal. With few exceptions, French units in North Africa had been more intent on upholding national honor than inflicting casualties and damage; those that offered determined resistance were at a marked disadvantage in terms of weapons, equipment, supplies, and numbers. In Tunisia, however, American soldiers found themselves faced with well-trained, battle-tested units skillfully using the most advanced weapons and innovative combined arms tactics repeatedly to frustrate Allied plans. The result was painful to Army units involved and a shock to the American public: five months of almost continuous setbacks with commensurably high casualties.
The fighting in Tunisia underlined both the strengths and weaknesses of the Western Alliance and the United States Army. On the political level the successful conclusion of the Tunisia Campaign left one Allied problem unsolved: factionalism among the French. Followers of Generals de Gaulle and Giraud were still unable to unite in a common cause. In the victory parade in Tunis on 20 May Gaullist troops refused to march with those loyal to Giraud. Until some basis for political cooperation was found, the French would likely remain unable to make more of a military contribution to Allied operations than their two-division XIX Corps. But that was perhaps not so bleak a prospect when considered against enemy losses in Tunisia: nearly 200,000 battle casualties (an entire field army), 275,000 prisoners of war, tons of equipment and supplies, and the mortal wounding of Italy as an Axis partner.
On the tactical level the Allies were slow to amass the naval and air forces necessary to stop the flow of Axis supplies from Sicily. Not until the last month of the campaign did the Allies push enemy supply levels below the minimum tonnages Kesselring needed to continue offensive operations. Of more immediate concern to Allied ground commanders, theater-level air forces were unable to neutralize enemy airfields on Sicily despite frequent attacks. In addition, enemy airfields in Tunisia, even those outside the Tunis bridgehead, remained operational well into April.
The last weeks of the campaign also saw troubling, and somewhat unexpected, problems arise between American and British ground
commanders. After nearly six months of working together in the field, British headquarters officers and their II Corps counterparts found a new area of dispute in their respective missions. American commanders were unhappy with the abrupt mission changes ordered by British commanders, and the latter became at least temporarily disillusioned with American tactical capabilities. In order for the American-British partnership to remain functional, headquarters staffs of the two allies would have to do a better job of assigning missions and managing accomplishment, and American units would have to give better accounts of themselves tactically, a problem which they recognized openly and had begun to solve in the latter stages of the campaign.
At the beginning of the Tunisian battle the United States Army had in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations parts of four divisions which had acquired only limited experience at a cost of very light casualties in only four days of combat. The remainder of the force was completely "green." At the end of the battle the Army had five full divisions in the field, four of which had gained extensive experience although the cost had been high. American divisions carried out major and minor missions during the campaign in a generally successful manner, but notable failures occurred at Kasserine Pass and Fondouk el Aouareb. After these battles, they were given supporting roles to gain experience. Although American commanders chafed under this British-inspired practice, it allowed the divisions to recover from each setback, and all showed later improvement. Particularly satisfying to Eisenhower and Bradley, the 34th Infantry Division began showing commendable tactical maturity in the final weeks of the campaign. Despite casualty levels that would enervate a green unit, the 34th skillfully coordinated air and artillery support to enhance the effectiveness of its infantry-armor team advancing along the II Corps southern flank.
All ground combat arms showed varying degrees of improvement during the campaign. American infantrymen deserve much praise for the persistence they showed against a skilled enemy, most notably on 23-24 April when the 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry, had to take the same objective three times before the enemy quit the fight. One week later the 1st Division continued the successful attack on Hill 523 despite crippling casualties in the 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry. The weakest aspect of infantry operations was coordination with other arms. Too often, gaps opened between troops and tanks, forcing armor to pull back and slowing the tempo of the attack. Some battalions had waited too long to advance after their artillery support was lifted, allowing enemy troops to resume fighting positions, largely nullifying
the artillery fire. In other instances, artillery stopped too soon after the seizure of objectives, inviting successful enemy counterattacks.
In Tunisia American commanders showed a preference to begin attacks in the last hour of darkness, a tactic which gave the infantry an advantage but created problems for the artillery. Night movement is more difficult for artillerymen because of their heavier equipment and the time needed to prepare and survey gun positions. To lessen chances of detection, artillerymen also tended to accelerate gun repositioning by sacrificing adequate defensive measures. As a result, enemy counterattacks occasionally captured howitzers before machine guns could be placed to cover approach routes.
In their many battles against panzer units, American tankers learned much. Tank doctrine before the Tunisia Campaign called for rapid thrusts deep into enemy territory far in advance of infantry. But the devastating effect of accurate enemy artillery, antitank guns, and Stuka dive bombers forced a reconsideration. Greater success with armor came when panzer tactics were adopted: a deliberate tank-infantry advance preceded by intensive reconnaissance and heavy artillery. In the latter stages of the campaign a formula was laid down: one tank battalion in the attack should have three artillery battalions in support.
The greater lesson for armored units in Tunisia was to maintain concentration of tanks. Too often, armored units were dispersed to fill gaps or served as emergency reaction forces. These stopgap missions used the mobility of armor but ignored the greater advantages of its shock effect and massed firepower. When the 2d Armored Division operated as a unit in the battles for Mateur and Bizerte, the spearhead potential of armor was at last realized, and the enemy had to deal with sudden breaches in defensive lines, disruption of command links, and chaos in supply dumps. Best of all, American casualties fell dramatically.
The mission of tank destroyers (self-propelled antitank vehicles) was clarified somewhat in Tunisia. Battle experience confirmed the fear of tank destroyer crews: their thin armor made them easy targets for enemy tank and antitank gunners in open terrain. They were most effective in an ambush role, digging into a "hull down" position and awaiting a panzer assault. Success in this role, however, depended on accurate intelligence about enemy routes of approach. Over the course of the campaign tank destroyers expended more ammunition in the traditional artillery support mission than in any other role.
Air support of ground operations remained a problem throughout the campaign. Not only were there not enough squadrons in the
theater to support all combat units but the system of requesting air support was cumbersome as well, with ground commanders having to go through several echelons of control. Tactical commanders pressed for the assignment of specific squadrons to specific regiments or divisions, but air commanders successfully argued against this policy as wasteful of air resources. The results on the ground were too often confusion and higher casualties. Air support had to be scheduled hours or days in advance and on a few occasions was postponed or canceled altogether, as the 34th Division found at Fondouk el Aouareb on 8 April. When air strikes did occur they were of limited duration, so that if the infantry and armor achieved a breakthrough, aircraft were often no longer overhead when the opportunity for exploitation developed. Only in the last stage of the campaign did air support take forms satisfactory to ground commanders: interdiction attacks on enemy assembly areas and routes of approach. Solution of the air support problem would have to await increased aircraft availability.
With victory in Tunisia, the Allies had expelled Axis forces from North Africa and thereby taken a giant step toward victory in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations. The United States Army had contributed mightily toward that accomplishment. The victory in northwest Africa, however, did not come cheaply. Of 70,000 Allied casualties, the United States Army lost 2,715 dead, 8,978 wounded' and 6,528 missing. At the same time, however, the Army gained thousands of seasoned officers, noncommissioned officers, and troops whose experience would prove decisive in subsequent campaigns. These seasoned soldiers of all ranks would not have long to wait or far to go, for the next test was only two months and 150 miles away: the island of Sicily.
Readings on the Tunisia Campaign are to be found in both broader studies of Operation TORCH and the European Theater of Operations, as well as in autobiographical accounts by key participants and analyses of the battle for Kasserine Pass. General Eisenhower recounts the challenges of international command in his Crusade in Europe (1948). Harry C. Butcher, a naval officer on Eisenhower's staff, gives another view from headquarters in his My Three Years with Eisenhower (1946). The views of armor commanders are to be found in George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It (1947), and Ernest N. Harmon, Combat Commander: Autobiography of a Soldier (1970). Brief but professional treatment of an American setback in North Africa is Martin Blumenson, "Kasserine Pass, 30 January-22 February 1943," chapter 8 of Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft, eds., America s First Battles, 1776-1965 (1986). The most exhaustive treatment of the battle for Tunisia remains George F. Howe, Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West (1957), a volume in the series United States Army in World War II.
CMH Pub 72-12
Cover: General Grant Medium Tank M3 in the Kasserine Pass area.
(DA photograph)
Last updated 3 October 2003


text: Energy | 12. July 2010 | posted by Jan Oliver Löfken Energy question of the week: Can the human body be used as a power plant? A human being performing light physical activity needs between 1800 and 3000 calories of energy each day. With hard work and sports, this energy requirement can double. Is it possible to obtain usable electricity or heat from this energy expenditure? Many suggestions have been made in recent years for producing energy from physical activity. The idea of the human body functioning as a power plant, or even as a battery, has lead to some useful and some very strange concepts. Each person generates about 60 watts of power while walking, and the Swedish company Jernhusen AB uses this to heat the 13-storey 'Kungsbrohuset' office building. The neighbouring Stockholm railway station, through which about 250,000 people pass every day, acts as a power plant. Using a special ventilation system, the accumulated body heat passes through a heat exchanger and heats water for central heating. The developers estimate that it reduces the energy demand for office heating by about 15 percent. Electricity from typing Computer keyboards that can charge laptop batteries using the energy input from typing are conceivable, although still far from ready for commercial exploitation. The computer manufacturer Compaq has already developed a prototype in which each key has a tiny magnet, weighing a fraction of a gram, attached to it. This is moved through a coil when the key is pressed and creates a small, induced current that is temporarily stored in a capacitor. When this capacitor is charged after repeated keystrokes, it transfers its power to the battery and can extend the battery life by several hours. This patented method (U.S. patent 5 911 529) is, however, certain to be complex and expensive. Knee dynamo delivers over 50 watts Electricity on the move: knee dynamo. Credit: Science. Not only cyclists, but also runners could soon be generating electricity with a dynamo. Similar to orthopaedic support stockings, the mini power plant – developed at the Simon Fraser University in Burnaby, Canada – fits around the knee. With each step, forces act on a gear mechanism, so each leg movement turns a generator. With the 1.6-kilogram prototype, fast runners generated up to 54 watts of power. Strolling pedestrians were able to generate at least five watts. In Rotterdam, a sustainable nightclub is already a reality. At Club Watt, each dancer produces about ten watts by moving on the elastic dance floor. The floor moves and this kinetic energy is converted into electric power. Overall, the power conversion efficiency in this eco-disco is so low that it is more likely to be a publicity stunt for the club. Small powerplants for implants On the other hand, methods by which sensors or tiny pumps can be operated in the body by self-generated electricity are more meaningful. For example, glucose in the bloodstream can be used for electricity generation. Chemists at the University of Texas at Austin have built a battery from two thin carbon fibres coated with different catalysts. Using the enzyme glucose oxidase, electrons can be extracted from blood sugar at one fibre, while, at the other fibre, they are given up to oxygen dissolved in the blood. A prototype employing this technique is already producing nearly two microwatts. This is similar to a button cell and is sufficient for the operation of implanted sensors, but not yet enough for pacemakers. But scientists in this field regularly report on new approaches that have higher current yields. Because long-term high prices are paid for medical products, it is to be expected that tiny, mass-producible power plants fuelled by the body itself will become available. The DLR Energy question of the week in 'The future of energy' Year of Science The Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) has given the Year of Science 2010 the motto 'The future of energy'. For this reason the science journalist Jan Oliver Löfken will this year answer a question on the subject of energy in his blog each week. Do you have a question about how our energy supply might look in the future? Or do you want to know, for example, how a wave power plant works and how it can efficiently generate electricity? Then send us your question by email. Science journalist Jan Oliver Löfken will investigate the answers and publish them each week in this blog.

subset: commoncrawl


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In my family, Thanksgiving is not the only important November celebration. My mom and my niece have birthdays one day apart, and this year the party called for cheesecake.
This is a creamy, melt-in-your-mouth kind of cake with a traditional graham cracker crust, adapted from the one we made at SFBI. The topping was inspired by this one at Epicurious.
I'm not a cheesecake expert, but here are a few tips I've learned that have helped mine be better:
- To make a smooth batter, the cream cheese needs to be very soft. Leave it out to soften overnight, or put it in the microwave a few seconds at a time.
- Keep the mixer on low-medium speed, to avoid incorporating too much air. Scrape the bowl and paddle frequently.
- Avoid using a Springform pan, which can allow water to seep into the crust when you bake the cake in a water bath (even if you protect the bottom with foil). A deep, straight-sided cake pan works just fine.
- Cool the cake completely at room temperature before refrigerating or freezing.
- To cut cleanly, dip the knife in hot water and dry it with a towel before cutting each slice.
Caramel Cheesecake
(Cake adapted from SFBI. Topping adapted from Epicurious.)
Yield: one 8-inch cake
- Mix: 15 minutes
- Bake: 1 hour 15 minutes
- Cool: at least 2 hours
- Chill: overnight
- Unchill and top: about an hour
- Chill: 2 hours or longer
Crust Ingredients:
- 132 g graham cracker crumbs
- 44 g sugar
- 64 g butter, melted
Filling Ingredients:
- 532 g cream cheese, softened
- 160 g sugar
- 26 g melted butter
- 10 (2 t.) g lemon juice
- 5 g (1 t.) vanilla extract
- 139 g (3 medium) eggs at room temperature
- 46 g heavy cream
- 46 g sour cream
Topping Ingredients:
- 150 g sugar
- 14 g (2 T.) water
- 1/4 t. lemon juice
- 120 g heavy cream
- pinch of salt
- 2 Heath Bars, coarsely chopped
- Preheat the oven to 285F if you have a convection setting, or 325F for the regular bake setting. Start boiling water for the water bath.
- Butter the bottom and sides of a 2-inch deep x 8-inch diameter cake pan. Line the bottom of the pan with parchment paper, and butter the parchment.
- Mix the crust ingredients together well with your fingers. Press the crust into the pan and partway up the sides, to a thickness of 1/4 inch.
- In a small bowl, blend the cream and sour cream together.
- In a stand mixer with the paddle attachment, cream the cream cheese on medium-low speed until it is very smooth.
- Add the following ingredients is this order, mixing on medium-low speed until smooth after each addition and scraping the bowl frequently:
- butter
- sugar, lemon juice, and vanilla
- eggs, one at a time
- cream/sour cream mixture
- Pour the batter over the crust in the prepared pan. Tap the pan on the counter a few times to release any air bubbles.
- Place the cake on a rimmed sheet pan and set it in the oven. Pour boiling water in the sheet pan to just below the rim.
- Bake until the cake has just a slight wobble in the center when nudged.
- Remove the cake from the oven and let it cool, still in its water bath, to room temperature.
- Run a knife around the edge to make sure it is free of the pan, then invert the cake onto a plate and again onto a second plate so that it is right-side-up.
- Cover the cake with plastic wrap directly on its surface, and chill overnight.
- Remove the cake from the refrigerator and let it unchill slightly while you prepare the topping. Keep the plastic wrap on during this time so any condensation forms on the plastic and not on the cake.
- In a medium saucepan, stir together the topping sugar, water, and lemon juice over medium-high heat to dissolved the sugar. Heat on medium-high without stirring, washing down the sides with a wet pastry brush occasionally, until the mixture turns an amber color.
- Add the cream and the salt and simmer over medium-low heat, stirring from time to time, until the caramel is thick but not chewy (gauge the consistency by dripping a bit onto a metal spoon).
- Remove from the heat and pour into a metal bowl. Cool at room temperature until it is slightly warmer than body temperature; it should still be quite pourable at this point.
- Pour the topping over the cake; use an offset spatula to spread it to the edges and let it drip down the sides.
- Top with chopped Heath Bars.
- Cover with a cake dome and chill for 2 – 6 hours before serving.


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Mythic Wonders: The Philosopher's Stone
You are awakened by a strange premonition concerning your uncle. Your intuition tells you something is wrong, and the project you were collaborating on may have put his life in danger. You will use the portal you built together to enter a new and mythical world, and along the way, you'll discover the secrets and powers of the Philosopher's Stone! Explore magical realms on your journey to save him. Overcome obstacles created at every turn by a strange and magical creature. Who is he? What is his agenda? Perhaps not everything is as it seems.


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I have a pricing plan table with multiple payment options. I'm not sure whether it is best to place the pricing options in a drop-down (and fire off the submit on the "onchange" event) or simply have buttons for the user to choose (there are only 2 choices). I would also like suggestions on my wording for the payment plans. Currently, I am simply listing the price whether it is monthly or annually. Users do get 1 month free though if they choose the annual plan. Is simply saying "1 month Free" sufficient or enticing enough?
Here is my wireframe for the drop-down version:
Here is my wireframe for the individual buttons version:
Any suggestions would be greatly appreciated! =)


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There's only one thing that I love more than a side-by-side diagram. A side-by-side-by-side diagram! This way we can really single out one feature and study the difference between three different application techniques. Yes, I left out a brow pencil, one of the most popular brow products, but only because I'm saving it for my next brow study. Today we're focusing on bare, brow shadow and wet brow shadow.
- BARE: This look is for those of us who like a soft and effortless look. Use a spooly brush or disposable mascara wand to follow the natural brow direction: 1. brush the base hairs upward and 2. brush the "tail" diagonally downward.
- BROW SHADOW: This look is for those of us who like to frame the eyes and define the brow. With a stiff, angled brow brush (my favorite is MAKE UP FOR EVER's Angled Eyebrow Brush #270) and a brow powder (I love Laura Mercier's Brow Powder Duo because you can dip the brush back and forth into both shades), draw individual brow hairs in upward motions as you work your way from the inside of the brow to the tail. For more comprehensive instructions, revisit my Brow 101 Tutorial.
- WET BROW SHADOW: This look is for those of us who like a really bold brow to make a statement. It's also a great way to change the shape of the brow (see how I made Lacy's more angular and pointed above). To do this, simply wet the same brow brush (revisit my Retro Brow Tutorial for more details), dip it into the brow shadow, draw the outline of the brow you want, then fill it in. You can also do this technique with a Brow Stencil.
Please take a second to take our poll!


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2012 Nissan Rogue
TRIM | Original MSRP | 5-Year Cost to Own | Compare |
2012 Nissan Rogue Expert Review
Staff Writer
Attempting to cash in on the small car-based crossover craze, Nissan introduced the Rogue to the market a bit too late to make any lasting impact. Still, the 2012 Nissan Rogue crossover offers a sportier alternative to some other vehicles in its class, including the Honda CR-V and Toyota RAV4. A single drivetrain combination serves as motivation for the Rogue, and is comprised of a 177-hp 2.5-liter I-4 and continuously variable transmission (CVT). Both front- and all-wheel drive are available, giving the option of added capability to those who need it.
The Rogue rides on Nissan's C-platform, which also underpins the compact Sentra. Unlike its platform-mate, though, the Rogue features an independent multi-link rear suspension. This engineering choice was made to keep the Rogue on the sportier side of "sport utility," something that would have been difficult to achieve with a torsion beam rear suspension. The Rogue's designers were going for an urban contemporary theme when they penned the muscular lines of the small crossover. That feeling is conveyed through the design of the final product, which still looks modern today, despite being introduced for the 2008 model year.
Though sportiness was a major focus in the Rogue's development, the crossover also provides usable space. With the standard 60/40 split rear seat folded down, 57.9 cubic feet of cargo room is available. With the rear seats up, the Rogue still has adequate storage volume at 28.9 cubic feet. Available equipment includes a power sliding glass moonroof, HID headlights, roof rails with available crossbars, and standard under-floor storage.
Body style: Crossover SUV
Engine: 2.5L I-4
Transmission: CVT
Models: Rogue S, Rogue SV
The Rogue received a face-lift in 2011, which added redesigned headlights and a new front fascia. For 2012, the Rogue gets a new Special Editon package, as well as content shifts in its existing packages. A new "Sport Mode" switch makes an appearance on all models, while SV models get new 17-inch alloy wheels, and the Special Edition model gets new 16-inchers.. A new paint color is added for 2012, called Graphite Blue. Package content is revised, with the SL package gaining Nissan's Around View Monitor, a feature that displays a composite image of the vehicle's surroundings on the optional five-inch touch screen.
Compared to other vehicles in its class, the Rogue is a stylish, sporty crossover that puts both form and function at the top of its list of priorities. The Rogue's long, curvaceous front end which flows into the sculpted roofline and shapely rear liftgate makes it hard to believe this vehicle has anything to do with the frumpy and awkward Sentra. Helping to further distance itself from its platform-mate are standard 16- and 17-inch alloy wheels. A five-spoke 18-inch alloy wheel is also available, offered through the SL package. Chrome exterior accents come standard, as do a chrome grille and body-color rear spoiler.
The Rogue's interior is a bit more conservative than its exterior, with a dashboard and center console design derived from other Nissan models. The electroluminescent gauges lend a sporty touch to the otherwise civilian cabin. Two grades of cloth upholstery come standard, a regular cloth for the S, and a Premium cloth material for the SV, though leather is available through the SL package. A six-way adjustable driver's seat is also standard - manual on the S and power on the SV. Nissan's hard drive-based navigation system is available through various packages, and comes with a five-inch touch-screen display. Under-floor storage is standard, as are 60/40 split rear seats.
As Nissan had already arrived late to the small crossover party, the automaker chose a sporty angle with the Rogue in order to recover lost ground and make it stand out among the competition. A 2.5-liter I-4, similar to the engine found in the Sentra SE-R sport compact, produces 170 hp and 175 lb-ft of torque in the Rogue, and is mated to a CVT transmission. This drivetrain combination moves the sub-3500-lb Rogue with relative ease, and the CVT is capable of popping off crisp simulated gear shifts when in manual mode -- though that method of shifting isn't any faster than letting the variable transmission just do its thing. The rear torsion beam suspension of the Rogue's platform-mate, the Sentra, is ditched in favor of an independent multi-link setup. This makes the Rogue a decent handler in its class, and also contributes to a relatively fun driving experience.
The Rogue gets dual-stage supplemental front airbags with seat-mounted sensors, driver and passenger front side impact airbags, and front and rear roof-mounted side-curtain airbags with head protection as standard equipment across its model range. Also standard is Nissan's Vehicle Dynamic Control (VDC) system with traction control, along with an ABS system with Electronic Brake force Distribution, Active Brake Limited Slip system, and Tire Pressure Monitoring system. Child safety seats can be fitted inside the Rogue through the standard LATCH seat-anchoring system. A rear-view camera is available through various packages.
Rogue (front-wheel drive models): 23 mpg city/28 mpg highway
Rogue (all-wheel drive models): 22 mpg city/26 mpg highway
- Stylish exterior design
- Relative sportiness
- Less cargo room than competition
- Single drivetrain choice
Style seekers apply here.
- Toyota RAV4
- Subaru Forester
- Honda CR-V
2012 Nissan Rogue Specifications
Engine Name | 4-Cyl, 2.5 Liter |
Trim | S 2WD |
Horsepower | 170@6,000 |
Torque | 175@4,400 |
Number Of Cylinders | 4 |
Front Headroom | 40.4 in |
Rear Headroom | 38.3 in |
Front Legroom | 42.5 in |
Rear Legroom | 35.3 in |
Front Shoulder Room | 55.9 in |


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PC specialists Paradox unveiled three new games at GDC yesterday. One is The Showdown Effect, which if you can make it past the intro in the trailer above unfurls into something that looks like Worms and Quake III had a tiny, split-screen baby.
The basic premise is recreating action movie insanity. Up to eight players will have everything from guns to bigger guns to swords to lightsabers at their disposal.
If the focus on multiplayer mayhem on a PC sounds familiar, it's being developed by Arrowhead, the guys behind 2011's Magicka. The Showdown Effect will be out on PC and Mac in Q3 this year.


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December 3, 2008
Dear Members of Our University Community:
Earlier this semester, I wrote to you regarding the turmoil in the American capital and credit markets, and how this economic instability was affecting our University. Since the time of that communication, the volatility of the economy has continued unabated. During the month of October alone, the Standard & Poor's index of 500 stocks declined 16.8%. Major U.S. corporations, girding for a sustained economic downturn, undertook the highest number of mass layoffs since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The U.S. auto industry edged closer to the precipice of bankruptcy.
In my last communication, I indicated that I would keep members of the Penn community informed as this situation evolves. I am writing now to update you on how the University is responding to a more protracted and deeper downturn in the economy.
Because Penn's financial management stood on a solid foundation at the beginning of this economic downturn, our mission of eminence in teaching, research and service continues without interruption. As a result of the record-breaking success of our first year of the Making History campaign, coupled with the prudent choices we made before the economy worsened, we are well-positioned to weather the economic storm. We will continue to plan for the future just as we always have, by implementing sound budgets, by managing our costs, and by maintaining focus on our highest school and institutional priorities.
Several current and prospective students and their families have asked how the downturn will impact tuition and financial aid. Penn's commitment to need-blind admissions and need-based financial aid remains resolute. Our financial aid packages will continue to meet the full need of every Penn undergraduate. Our no-loan initiative in undergraduate financial aid and our greatly improved graduate student stipends have never been more important. We remain steadfast that increasing access to Penn for students from all economic backgrounds is an intractable core principle of the Penn Compact. Although tuition is a critical source of revenue, we also recognize that in these extraordinary times, when students and families are facing unprecedented financial pressures, increases in tuition must be moderate.
While we remain confident that the financial markets will eventually rebound, no one can predict when that day will come. So we at Penn must take control of our own fate. As the largest private employer in the City of Philadelphia, and one of the largest in the Commonwealth, Penn has long been a stable and supportive employer. And although we are on solid ground today, we must prepare for an economic downturn of uncertain length and depth. This could result in decreases in enrollment for certain fields of study, reductions in federally-sponsored research, and reduced philanthropy. In the short- to intermediate-term, the economic downturn is certain to reduce support from our endowment. In response to the projected State budget deficit, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has already reduced our appropriation for the current fiscal year, and may impose further reductions later in the year.
In the face of these challenges, we must begin to reduce our expenditures now, in advance of significant reductions in revenue. I have met with the Deans and senior leadership, and all have agreed to be strategic and disciplined in reducing their costs. Because compensation – both salaries and benefits – represents the single largest expense in the University's operating budget (more than 52% of our total expenditures), each School and Center will implement these following University-wide actions, effective immediately and continuing for the next 18 months:
- Eliminate reclassifications of positions and in-grade salary adjustments. Any request for an exception (based on compelling circumstances) will require the approval of the Executive Vice President.
- Discontinue recruitment bonuses and discretionary bonuses that are not part of established compensation plans. No new incentive or bonus programs or new acting rates will be created during this time period.
- Fill open staff positions only if essential to the operational needs of the School or Center, or needed to fulfill the requirements of sponsored research. Continuation of existing faculty searches and initiation of new searches will be determined by each Dean.
- Reduce the use of temporary employees, including those on payroll and those employed through agencies.
While we are not implementing broad-scale layoffs, hiring freezes, or across-the-board budget reductions, individual Schools and Centers have the flexibility to implement additional cost-cutting measures as needed to create balanced and sustainable budgets. As we plan our Fiscal Year 2010 budget, we will moderate our salary pool in order to conserve resources and to preserve jobs. The senior leadership of the University – including Deans, Vice Presidents, senior officers, and me – will receive no salary increases next year.
In addition, we have asked each School and Center to:
- Reduce non-compensation related expenditures such as travel, meals, and professional conference participation; and
- Review capital projects, moving forward only with those that are fully funded via gifts and/or grants, or those of the highest priority with a certain funding strategy.
Baseline budgets for core administrative service centers will be held at FY2009 levels.
Because of the generous and creative spirit of the Penn community, many staff members have asked me how they can help the University in this time of economic crisis. I encourage the same strong stewardship of our resources that has led Charity Navigator – our nation's largest independent evaluator of nonprofits – to rank Penn as one of the top universities in the country for our performance. Penn also has a well-deserved reputation for innovation. While I am asking every School and business unit to develop savings plans, I am also seeking bold ideas for generating new sources of revenue. If you have any specific ideas that we should consider implementing University-wide, I encourage you to contact our Executive Vice President, Craig Carnaroli, at firstname.lastname@example.com.
Penn's total compensation includes a market competitive benefits package for faculty and staff. If you have any questions regarding your benefits please visit the Human Resources website at http://www.hr.upenn.edu/ We also offer substantial resources to individuals and families who are going through a difficult time via our Employee Assistance Program (EAP). More information is available at: www.hr.upenn.edu/quality/wellness/eap.aspx
If you have further questions, please email them to me at firstname.lastname@example.com. I will continue to keep you apprised of the University's fiscal health during these tough economic times.
Amy Gutmann


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Explore the European Space Agency's Earth Observation satellite missions. Learn all about ESA's dedicated Earth Explorers or collaborations with other agencies through the Third Party Missions programme.
Mission - Heritage Missions
The ERS programme was composed of two missions, ERS-1 and ERS-2, which together observed the Earth for 20 years, from 1991 to 2011.


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Main Content
BS50-4As, BS60-4As - 4 stroke rammer: Long service life and strong performance
Wacker Neuson's 4 stroke rammers are classified by an excellent performance which is sustainably convincing. The high stroke energy, high percussion rate and long shoe stroke combined with a fast advance travel achieve excellent compaction results. Well thought-out features make the use of the 4 stroke rammers even more user-friendly, extend the service life and reduce maintenance to a minimum.
- Fast starting due to a small pump to the carburetor
- Strong stroke for heavy, cohesive soils
- Integrated oil deficiency protection with automatic shutdown when the engine is started with insufficient oil level
- Premium air filter ensures an almost dust-free engine operation and provides three times longer change intervals
Comfortable transport
- Large and flexible transport lug
- Easy loading and stowing by transport rollers on the handle
4-stage air filter system
- Very good filter performance thanks to 4-fold air filter (consisting of cyclone filter, paper lamella filter and double foam filter)
- Clean intake air ensures optimum engine performance
- Long service intervals due to high filter capacity
An engine with a strong reserve
The robust GXR 120 engine from Honda operates in normal operation well below its performance limit. This protects the engine and extends its service life.
Comfortable operation
- Only one lever for idling, starting and stopping
Please note that product availability can vary from country to country. It is possible that information / products may not be available in your country.
BS50-4As, BS60-4As 4 Stroke Rammer


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Local sports groups to benefit from £40 million Lottery fund
Sport England invites local projects getting more people into sport to bid for funding.
The new Community Sport Activation Fund has been set up through National Lottery funding to support grassroots activity right across the country. It is part of Sport England's strategy to deliver a lasting sporting legacy from last year's successful Olympic and Paralympic Games.
Launching the fund, Sport England's Chief Executive, Jennie Price said: "We want to hear from sports groups across the country that have innovative ideas to get more people involved in sport."
Welcoming the announcement, Sports Minister Hugh Robertson said: "I encourage clubs, councils and sports groups across the country to put bids in and help increase the sporting opportunities for people in their local areas. We have already seen more people participating in sport since the Games and we want grassroots sport to continue to grow."
Open for bidding
Sport England will invest around £12.5 million in the first two rounds of the Community Sport Activation Fund, with more funding available in 2014 and 2015. First round bids will be accepted until 4 February 2013.
Community groups, charities and councils are among those that can bid for funding for up to three years, with grants of between £50,000-£250,000 on offer for a wide range of projects. Successful projects will demonstrate:
- A focus on a defined geographical area and community
- Understanding of what local people want from sport with ambitious but realistic plans to get more people involved
- Strong local partnerships, including other funding sources


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Welcome to MyRapName.com
Now everyone can have a rap name thanks to our free rap name generator. Having the right name is essential whether you are DJing, Emceeing, beatboxing, graffiti painting, break dancing, or just sitting at your desk. Our rap name maker is based on an advanced rules engine to give you personalized results superior to anything else on the web. To get started simply enter your first name and the first initial of your last name. Then choose whether you want a male rapper name or a female rapper name. If you don't like our first suggestion, try it again. Enjoy.
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Discover Tidelands Health Get Care Now
I am looking for...
WEDNESDAY, Aug. 18, 2021 (HealthDay News) -- Texas Governor Greg Abbott has tested positive for COVID-19 but has not experienced any symptoms, his office announced Tuesday.
Abbott, who is fully vaccinated, is being treated with Regeneron's monoclonal antibodies in an effort to shorten the duration of the infection, his communications director Mark Miner said in a statement Tuesday afternoon, CBS News reported.
"The governor has been testing daily, and today was the first positive test result," the statement said. It also said that Abbott will isolate in the governor's mansion and continue to be tested daily.
The governor's wife, Cecilia Abbott, has tested negative, Miner said.
Texas has seen a spike in cases due to the Delta variant. On Tuesday, the state health department reported 20,123 new COVID-19 cases, which is among the highest number of positive daily cases in Texas since the pandemic began, CBS Newsreported.
More than 12,000 patients were hospitalized with the virus as of Monday, the most since January.
Last week, Abbott announced that he had arranged for more than 2,500 medical personnel to help hospitals handle the surge in cases. Earlier this month, he also asked Texas hospitals to voluntarily postpone elective procedures.
And on Friday, he announced a plan to launch nine monoclonal antibody infusion centers across the state equipped with Regeneron's antibody cocktail. Former President Donald Trump was also treated with the drug company's monoclonal antibodies after he tested positive for COVID-19 last October.
But Abbott has resisted enacting new restrictions to prevent the spread of the virus. He recently banned local governments from putting COVID restrictions back in place and has challenged local school districts that have tried to institute mask mandates.
More information
Visit the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention for more on breakthrough infections.
SOURCE: CBS News
© Tidelands Health.


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PARIS -- A French contraceptive maker said Tuesday its morning-after pill is ineffective when taken by women who weigh more than 80 kilograms (176 pounds).
The decision by HRA Pharma follows a publication of results of a study of levonorgestrel, one of the active ingredients in its Norlevo emergency contraceptive, said Frederique Welgryn, HRA Pharma's head of women's health.
Welgryn said that while the results of the study conducted by the Edinburgh University in 2011 were "quite surprising," the last few years have seen "a lot of discussions" about contraceptives' efficacy in overweight or obese patients.
HRA Pharma Chief Executive Erin Gainer estimated that "millions" of women across Europe use emergency contraceptives identical to Norlevo. Gainer declined to give sales figures for Norlevo alone.
Anna Glasier, a lead researcher in the study, said that their research wasn't designed to look specifically at the effect of weight on emergency contraception. She said their study only included about 1,700 women.
"It is not my place to comment as to whether the company's decision to change advice is premature," she said in an email.
She also noted another previous analysis that found there was no solid evidence to show that hormonal contraceptives were less effective in overweight women, but the quality of the studies was low.
Welgryn said a dose of HRA's drug contains 1.5 mg of levonorgestrel, identical to that found in Plan B One-Step, manufactured by Teva Pharmaceuticals, use identical ingredients.
Denise Bradley, a spokeswoman for Teva Pharmaceuticals, declined to comment.
HRA began the process of consulting with French regulators about changing the pill's labeling in 2012 and it has taken until now for Europe's drug regulators to approve the change, Welgryn said.
The new warning also says that the drug's efficacy is reduced in women who weigh more than 75 kilograms (165 pounds), and it is ineffective in women who weigh more than 80 kilograms.
Dr. Diana Mansour, a spokeswoman for Britain's Faculty of Sexual and Reproductive Healthcare, said in overweight and obese women the drug probably gets absorbed into their fat more quickly and doesn't have enough time to work in their bodies.
"It has less of a chance to delay ovulation and there are lower levels (in the blood) of the drug to have an effect," she said. Mansour said there wasn't enough information to know if simply giving obese women a higher dose of the drug would solve the problem.
In the U.K., doctors haven't been given any advice to stop giving overweight or obese women Levonnelle, which contains the same active ingredient as Norlevo.
Lynn Hearton, clinical lead for the FPA sexual health charity, said any overweight or obese women concerned about emergency contraception should speak to a medical professional.
"It is particularly important we don't put some women off taking emergency contraception because they think it won't work anyway," she said.
She said women should consider using an IUD, a small plastic birth control device which can be inserted in the womb up to five days after unprotected sex.
HRA markets Norlevo in about 50 countries worldwide. It began marketing the pill in France in 1999.
It will begin printing the warning on packaging in the first half of 2014.


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"The Gospel and Romantic Love," New Era, Feb. 2002, 10
The Gospel and Romantic Love
Adapted from a September 28, 1982, BYU devotional address.
Gospel teachings about romantic love are full of hope, peace, and joy.
The idea of romantic love, so commonplace that it is touched upon in virtually every book or movie or magazine, is also at the very center of the gospel of Jesus Christ. As President Boyd K. Packer put it, "Romantic love is not only a part of life, but literally a dominating influence of it. It is deeply and significantly religious. There is no abundant life without it. Indeed, the highest degree of the celestial kingdom is unattainable in the absence of it" (BYU Fireside, Nov. 3, 1963).
The other side of this coin, of course, is represented by what Alma told his wayward son, Corianton, who had gone after the Lamanite harlot Isabel. He said to his son: "Know ye not, … that these things are an abomination in the sight of the Lord; yea, most abominable above all sins save it be the shedding of innocent blood or denying the Holy Ghost?" (Alma 39:5).
Why the law of chastity?
Sometimes we give as reasons for the law of chastity the risk of pregnancy or abortion, the possibility of an unwanted or embarrassing marriage, or the chance of a terrible venereal disease. With adultery, we talk about the damage of destroying an existing marriage or family. As serious as these things are, I'm not sure they are the fundamental reason for the Lord's having placed this commandment ahead of armed robbery and fraud in the seriousness of sins.
Think of it—unchastity is second only to murder. Perhaps there is a common element in those two things—unchastity and murder. Both have to do with life, which touches upon the highest of divine powers. Murder involves the wrongful taking of life; sexual transgression may involve the wrongful giving of life, or the wrongful tampering with the sacred fountains of life-giving power.
I have been around enough to know that this is not the first time you have ever heard this subject mentioned. But I have also been around enough to know that no matter what you have heard and no matter how often, today we live in a world so completely soaked through with tragically wrong and evil ideas about sex that you must be warned—in love and kindness, but warned—lest the moral sleeping sickness that is overcoming the whole world calm you into deadly slumber.
Nuclear-powered sin
It's now simply a fact that most of those who write and most of those who produce today's movies, TV programs, and popular music, as well as those who set the editorial policies of many magazines, believe that sex outside of marriage is really quite harmless. On this particular subject of sexual morality, I honestly believe our society is within the grip of the evil one.
Can you see why the Brethren tell us to stay away from X- and R-rated movies? Can you see why they plead with us to avoid drugs, alcohol, vulgar music, and the other products of the carnal environment that now surrounds us almost as water surrounds the fish of the sea? These aren't trivial things. If the H-bomb symbolizes our age, we are playing now not just with fire, but with nuclear power. The prince of darkness has dragged out the heavy artillery.
The highway to love
Let me talk now, on the other hand, about the more positive aspects of the law of chastity, because that part of the law is fundamental and important. President Packer said:
"Oh, youth, the requirements of the Church are the highway to love, with guardrails securely in place, with help along the way. How foolish is the youth who feels the Church is a fence around love to keep him out. How fortunate is the young person who follows the standards of the Church, even if just from sheer obedience or habit, for he will find rapture and a joy fulfilled."
Properly understood, then, the scriptures counsel us to be virtuous not because romantic love is bad, but precisely because romantic love is so good. It is not only good; it is pure, precious, even sacred and holy. For that reason, one of Satan's cheapest and dirtiest tricks is to make profane that which is sacred.
Eight steps to true love
May I suggest now eight brief, practical steps for those who would one day be true sweethearts, based on a foundation of righteous living.
1. Have reverence for the human body and the life-giving powers of that body. Your body is a temple. It is sacred and holy. It is also the dwelling place of the seeds of human life, the nurturing of which, with your chosen companion, within the bounds set by God himself, is lovely, of good report, and praiseworthy (see A of F 1:13).
2. During the time of courtship, please be emotionally honest in the expression of affection. Sometimes you are not as careful as you might be about when, how, and to whom you express your feelings of affection. You must realize that the desire to express affection can be motivated by other things than true love.
In short, save your kisses—you might need them someday.
3. Be friends first and sweethearts second. University professor Lowell Bennion once said that relationships between young men and young women should be built like a pyramid. The base of the pyramid is friendship. And the ascending layers are built of things like time, understanding, respect, and restraint. Right at the top of the pyramid is a glittering little mystery called romance.
Now, you don't have to be very smart to know that a pyramid won't stand up very long if you stand it on its point instead of its base. In other words, be friends first and sweethearts later, not the other way around. Otherwise, people who think they are sweethearts may discover they can't be very good friends, and by then it may be too late.
4. Develop the power of self-discipline and self-restraint. Please remember that nobody ever fell off a cliff who never went near one. You've got to be like Joseph, not like David. When Potiphar's wife tried to seduce him, the scripture says, Joseph "fled, and got him out" (Gen. 39:12). Joseph knew that it is wiser to avoid temptation than to resist it.
In your courtships, even when you feel there is a growing foundation of true love, show your profound respect for that love and the possibilities of your life together by restraining your passions. Please don't be deceived by the false notion that anything short of the sex act itself is acceptable conduct. That is a lie, not only because one step overpoweringly leads to another, but also because the handling of another's body is in an important sense part of the sexual act that is kept holy by the sanctuary of chastity.
If ever you are in doubt about where the line is between love and lust, draw the line toward the side of love.
5. Live for the presence of the Holy Spirit, that you may have it as your constant guide. Don't date someone you already know you would not ever want to marry. If you should fall in love with someone you shouldn't marry, you make it more difficult for the Lord to guide you away from that person after you are already emotionally committed. It is difficult enough to tune your spiritual receiver to the whisperings of heaven without jamming up the channel with the loud thunder of romantic emotion.
The key to spiritual guidance is found in one word: worthiness. Those who garnish their thoughts with virtue have the Spirit and have confidence in God's presence (see D&C 121:45–46). Those who have lust in their hearts can't have the Spirit (see D&C 63:16–17).
6. Avoid the habit of feeling sorry for yourself, and don't worry excessively about those times when you feel socially unsuccessful. Everybody in the world doesn't have to marry you—it only takes one. Remember: "Worry not that you are not well known. Seek to be worth knowing."
There are times when we wonder if the Lord loves us; we wonder if other people love us. And so we mistakenly seek the symbols of success—whether that is being popular or being rich or being famous within our own sphere. You might be tempted to let someone take improper liberties with you, or you may indulge yourself in some practice that seems to bring temporary relief but only makes you feel worse in the long run.
Ultimately, however, only the Lord's approval of our lives really matters. If you seek to be worth knowing and seek to do His will, all the rest will take care of itself. Never forget that all things work together for good to them who love God (see Rom. 8:28).
7. Avoid at all costs, no matter what the circumstances, abortion and homosexuality. As serious as is fornication or adultery, you must understand that abortion and homosexuality are equally wrong and may be worse. Even persons who only assist others, much less pressure them, to have an abortion are in jeopardy of being denied the privilege of missionary service. They may also be called upon to face a Church disciplinary council, at the peril of their membership in the Church.
8. If, through some unfortunate experience in your past, you have committed a moral transgression of this kind, there is a way by which you may receive full forgiveness. There is no more glorious language in all scripture than the words of Isaiah, speaking as if it were by the voice of the Lord himself:
"Though your sins be as scarlet, they shall be as white as snow; though they be red like crimson, they shall be as wool.
"If ye be willing and obedient, ye shall eat the good of the land" (Isa. 1:18–19).
If your transgressions are of the serious kind, you will need to see your bishop and voluntarily offer a full and complete confession. As frightening as that experience may seem to you, by this means you will find purpose and a peace of mind more hopeful and uplifting than you can now imagine.
Our ultimate happiness
For all that I have said by way of warning about the social conditions of the day or the limits we must place on ourselves, I'd like you to remember that the teachings of the gospel about romantic love are full of hope and peace and joy of the most uplifting and everlasting kind.
I testify to you with all my heart that the commandments of God are designed for our ultimate happiness, and that being sweethearts in the way the Lord intended it is worth waiting for.