text:
Learn About the Law
Get help with your legal needs
FindLaw's Learn About the Law features thousands of informational articles to help you understand your options. And if you're ready to hire an attorney, find one in your area who can help.
Respondent, who had been arrested for rape, was questioned by police. Before the commencement of the interrogation (which antedated this Court's decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 ),. respondent was advised of his right to remain silent and his right to counsel (but not of his right to the appointment of counsel if he was indigent). Respondent related an alibi that he was with a friend (Henderson), at the time of the crime, but the police later elicited from Henderson information tending to incriminate respondent. Before trial, respondent made a motion to exclude Henderson's expected testimony because respondent had revealed Henderson's identity without having received the full warnings mandated by the intervening Miranda decision. The motion was denied, Henderson testified, and respondent was convicted. Following affirmance on appeal, respondent sought habeas corpus relief, which the District Court granted, finding that Henderson's testimony was inadmissible because of the Miranda violation. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Held:
REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and STEWART, BLACKMUN, and POWELL, JJ., joined. STEWART, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 453. BRENNAN, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which MARSHALL, J., joined, post, p. 453. WHITE, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 460. DOUGLAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 461.
L. Brooks Patterson argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was Robert C. Williams.
Kenneth M. Mogill, by appointment of the Court, 415 U.S. 909 , argued the cause pro hac vice and filed a brief for respondent.
Edward R. Korman argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Bork, Assistant Attorney General Petersen, Deputy Solicitor General Frey, and Jerome M. Feit.
Roman S. Gribbs argued the cause and filed a brief for the Detroit Bar Assn. as amicus curiae urging affirmance. *
[ Footnote * ] Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Evelle J. Younger, Attorney General, Jack R. Winkler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, and Doris H. Maier, Assistant Attorney General, for the State of California, and by Frank G. Carrington, Jr., Fred E. Inbau, William K. Lambie, Wayne W. Schmidt, Glen Murphy, Paul Keller, and James B. Zagel for Americans for Effective Law Enforcement et al.
The Civil Liberties Committee, State Bar of Michigan, filed a brief as amicus curiae urging affirmance. [417 U.S. 433, 435]
MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether the testimony of a witness in respondent's state court trial for rape must be excluded simply because police had learned the identity of the witness by questioning respondent at a time when he was in custody as a suspect, but had not been advised that counsel would be appointed for him if he was indigent. The questioning took place before this Court's decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), but respondent's trial, at which he was convicted, took place afterwards. Under the holding of Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966), therefore, Miranda is applicable to this case. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan reviewed respondent's claim on a petition for habeas corpus and held that the testimony must be excluded. 1 The Court of Appeals affirmed. 2
On the morning of April 19, 1966, a 43-year-old woman in Pontiac, Michigan, was found in her home by a friend and coworker, Luther White, in serious condition. At the time she was found the woman was tied, gagged, and partially disrobed, and had been both raped and severely beaten. She was unable to tell White anything about her assault at that time and still remains unable to recollect what happened.
While White was attempting to get medical help for the victim and to call for the police, he observed a dog inside the house. This apparently attracted White's attention for he knew that the woman did not own a dog [417 U.S. 433, 436] herself. Later, when talking with police officers, White observed the dog a second time, and police followed the dog to respondent's house. Neighbors further connected the dog with respondent.
The police then arrested respondent and brought him to the police station for questioning. Prior to the actual interrogation the police asked respondent whether he knew for what crime he had been arrested, whether he wanted an attorney, and whether he understood his constitutional rights. 3 Respondent replied that he did understand the crime for which he was arrested, that he did not want an attorney, and that he understood his rights. 4 The police further advised him that any statements he might make could be used against him at a later date in court. 5 The police, however, did not advise respondent that he would be furnished counsel free of charge if he could not pay for such services himself.
The police then questioned respondent about his activities on the night of the rape and assault. Respondent replied that during the general time period at issue he had first been with one Robert Henderson and then later at home, alone, asleep. The police sought to confirm this story by contacting Henderson, but Henderson's story served to discredit rather than to bolster respondent's account. Henderson acknowledged that respondent had been with him on the night of the crime but said that he had left at a relatively early time. Furthermore, Henderson told police that he saw respondent the following day and asked him at that time about scratches on his face - "asked him if he got hold of a wild one or something." 6 Respondent answered: "[S]omething like [417 U.S. 433, 437] that." 7 Then, Henderson said, he asked respondent "who it was," 8 and respondent said: "[S]ome woman lived the next block over," 9 adding: "She is a widow woman" or words to that effect. 10
These events all occurred prior to the date on which this Court handed down its decision in Miranda v. Arizona, supra, but respondent's trial occurred afterwards. Prior to trial respondent's appointed counsel made a motion to exclude Henderson's expected testimony because respondent had revealed Henderson's identity without having received full Miranda warnings. Although respondent's own statements taken during interrogation were excluded, the trial judge denied the motion to exclude Henderson's testimony. Henderson therefore testified at trial, and respondent was convicted of rape and sentenced to 20 to 40 years' imprisonment. His conviction was affirmed by both the Michigan Court of Appeals 11 and the Michigan Supreme Court. 12
Respondent then sought habeas corpus relief in Federal District Court. That court, noting that respondent had not received the full Miranda warnings and that the police had stipulated Henderson's identity was learned only through respondent's answers, "reluctantly" concluded that Henderson's testimony could not be admitted. 13 Application of such an exclusionary rule was necessary, the court reasoned, to protect respondent's Fifth Amendment right against compulsory self-incrimination. The court therefore granted respondent's petition for a writ of habeas corpus unless petitioner [417 U.S. 433, 438] retried respondent within 90 days. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. We granted certiorari, 414 U.S. 1062 (1973), and now reverse.
Although respondent's sole complaint is that the police failed to advise him that he would be given free counsel if unable to afford counsel himself, he did not, and does not now, base his arguments for relief on a right to counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Nor was the right to counsel, as such, considered to be persuasive by either federal court below. We do not have a situation such as that presented in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), where the policemen interrogating the suspect had refused his repeated requests to see his lawyer who was then present at the police station. As we have noted previously, Escobedo is not to be broadly extended beyond the facts of that particular case. See Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S., at 733 -734; Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972); Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 739 (1969). This case also falls outside the rationale of United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967), where the Court held that counsel was needed at a post-indictment lineup in order to protect the "right to a fair trial at which the witnesses against [the defendant] might be meaningfully cross-examined." Henderson was fully available for searching cross-examination at respondent's trial.
Respondent's argument, and the opinions of the District Court and Court of Appeals, instead rely upon the Fifth Amendment right against compulsory self-incrimination and the safeguards designed in Miranda to secure that right. In brief, the position urged upon this Court is that proper regard for the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination requires, with limited exceptions not [417 U.S. 433, 439] applicable here, that all evidence derived solely from statements made without full Miranda warnings be excluded at a subsequent criminal trial. For purposes of analysis in this case we believe that the question thus presented is best examined in two separate parts. We will therefore first consider whether the police conduct complained of directly infringed upon respondent's right against compulsory self-incrimination or whether it instead violated only the prophylactic rules developed to protect that right. We will then consider whether the evidence derived from this interrogation must be excluded.
The history of the Fifth Amendment right against compulsory self-incrimination, and the evils against which it was directed, have received considerable attention in the opinions of this Court. See, e. g., Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972); Miranda v. Arizona, supra; Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964); Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 426 (1956); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892). At this point in our history virtually every schoolboy is familiar with the concept, if not the language, of the provision that reads: "No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . ." This Court's decisions have referred to the right as "the mainstay of our adversary system of criminal justice," Johnson v. New Jersey, supra, at 729, and as "`one of the great landmarks in man's struggle to make himself civilized.'" Ullmann, supra, at 426. It is not surprising that the constitution of virtually every State has a comparable provision. 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence 2252 (McNaughton rev. 1961) (hereinafter Wigmore).
The importance of a right does not, by itself, determine its scope, and therefore we must continue to hark back [417 U.S. 433, 440] to the historical origins of the privilege, particularly the evils at which it was to strike. The privilege against compulsory self-incrimination was developed by painful opposition to a course of ecclesiastical inquisitions and Star Chamber proceedings occurring several centuries ago. See L. Levy, Origins of the Fifth Amendment (1968); Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 34 Minn. L. Rev. 1 (1949); 8 Wigmore 2250. Certainly anyone who reads accounts of those investigations, which placed a premium on compelling subjects of the investigation to admit guilt from their own lips, cannot help but be sensitive to the Framers' desire to protect citizens against such compulsion. As this Court has noted, the privilege against self-incrimination "was aimed at a . . . far-reaching evil - a recurrence of the Inquisition and the Star Chamber, even if not in their stark brutality." Ullmann, supra, at 428.
Where there has been genuine compulsion of testimony, the right has been given broad scope. Although the constitutional language in which the privilege is cast might be construed to apply only to situations in which the prosecution seeks to call a defendant to testify against himself at his criminal trial, its application has not been so limited. The right has been held applicable to proceedings before a grand jury, Counselman v. Hitchcock, supra; to civil proceedings, McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34 (1924); to congressional investigations, Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957); to juvenile proceedings, In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); and to other statutory inquiries, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). The privilege has also been applied against the States by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment. Ibid.
The natural concern which underlies many of these decisions is that an inability to protect the right at [417 U.S. 433, 441] one stage of a proceeding may make its invocation useless at a later stage. For example, a defendant's right not to be compelled to testify against himself at his own trial might be practically nullified if the prosecution could previously have required him to give evidence against himself before a grand jury. Testimony obtained in civil suits, or before administrative or legislative committees, could also prove so incriminating that a person compelled to give such testimony might readily be convicted on the basis of those disclosures in a subsequent criminal proceeding. 14
In more recent years this concern - that compelled disclosures might be used against a person at a later criminal trial - has been extended to cases involving police interrogation. Before Miranda the principal issue in these cases was not whether a defendant had waived his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination but simply whether his statement was "voluntary." In state cases the Court applied the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, examining the circumstances of interrogation to determine whether the processes were so unfair or unreasonable as to render a subsequent confession involuntary. See, e. g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940); White v. Texas, 310 U.S. 530 (1940); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958); Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963). See also 3 J. Wigmore, Evidence 815 et seq. (Chadbourne rev. 1970). Where the State's actions offended the standards of fundamental fairness under the Due Process Clause, the State was then deprived of the right to use the resulting confessions in court. [417 U.S. 433, 442]
Although federal cases concerning voluntary confessions often contained references to the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, 15 references which were strongly criticized by some commentators, see 8 Wigmore 2266, 16 it was not until this Court's decision in Miranda that the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination was seen as the principal protection for a person facing police interrogation. This privilege had been made applicable to the States in Malloy v. Hogan, supra, and was thought to offer a more comprehensive and [417 U.S. 433, 443] less subjective protection than the doctrine of previous cases. In Miranda the Court examined the facts of four separate cases and stated:
To supplement this new doctrine, and to help police officers conduct interrogations without facing a continued risk that valuable evidence would be lost, the Court in Miranda established a set of specific protective guidelines, now commonly known as the Miranda rules. The Court declared that "the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination." Id., at 444. A series of recommended "procedural safeguards" then followed. The Court in particular stated:
The Court recognized that these procedural safeguards were not themselves rights protected by the Constitution but were instead measures to insure that the right against compulsory self-incrimination was protected. As the Court remarked:
A comparison of the facts in this case with the historical circumstances underlying the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination strongly indicates that the police conduct here did not deprive respondent of his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination as such, but rather failed to make available to him the full measure of procedural safeguards associated with that right since Miranda. Certainly no one could contend that the interrogation faced by respondent bore any resemblance to the historical practices at which the right against compulsory self-incrimination was aimed. The District Court in this case noted that the police had "warned [respondent] that he had the right to remain silent," 352 F. Supp. 266, 267 (1972), and the record in this case clearly shows that respondent was informed that any evidence taken could be used against him. 17 The record is also clear that [417 U.S. 433, 445] respondent was asked whether he wanted an attorney and that he replied that he did not. 18 Thus, his statements could hardly be termed involuntary as that term has been defined in the decisions of this Court. Additionally, there were no legal sanctions, such as the threat of contempt, which could have been applied to respondent had he chosen to remain silent. He was simply not exposed to "the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt." Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S., at 55 .
Our determination that the interrogation in this case involved no compulsion sufficient to breach the right against compulsory self-incrimination does not mean there was not a disregard, albeit an inadvertent disregard, of the procedural rules later established in Miranda. The question for decision is how sweeping the judicially imposed consequences of this disregard shall be. This Court said in Miranda that statements taken in violation of the Miranda principles must not be used to prove the prosecution's case at trial. That requirement was fully complied with by the state court here: respondent's statements, claiming that he was with Henderson and then asleep during the time period of the crime were not admitted against him at trial. This Court has also said, in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), that the "fruits" of police conduct which actually infringed a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights must be suppressed. 19 But we have already concluded that the [417 U.S. 433, 446] police conduct at issue here did not abridge respondent's constitutional privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, but departed only from the prophylactic standards later laid down by this Court in Miranda to safeguard that privilege. Thus, in deciding whether Henderson's testimony must be excluded, there is no controlling precedent of this Court to guide us. We must therefore examine the matter as a question of principle.
Just as the law does not require that a defendant receive a perfect trial, only a fair one, it cannot realistically require that policemen investigating serious crimes make no errors whatsoever. The pressures of law enforcement and the vagaries of human nature would make such an expectation unrealistic. Before we penalize police error, therefore, we must consider whether the sanction serves a valid and useful purpose.
We have recently said, in a search-and-seizure context, that the exclusionary rule's "prime purpose is to deter future unlawful police conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures." United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974). We then continued:
The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily assumes that the police have engaged in willful, or at the very least negligent, conduct which has deprived the defendant of some right. By refusing to admit evidence gained as a result of such conduct, the courts hope to instill in those particular investigating officers, or in their future counterparts, a greater degree of care toward the rights of an accused. Where the official action was pursued in complete good faith, however, the deterrence rationale loses much of its force.
We consider it significant to our decision in this case that the officers' failure to advise respondent of his right to appointed counsel occurred prior to the decision in Miranda. Although we have been urged to resolve the broad question of whether evidence derived from statements taken in violation of the Miranda rules must be excluded regardless of when the interrogation took place, 21 we instead place our holding on a narrower ground. For at the time respondent was questioned these police officers were guided, quite rightly, by the principles established in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), particularly focusing on the suspect's opportunity to have retained counsel with him during the interrogation if he chose to do so. 22 Thus, the police asked respondent if he wanted counsel, and he answered that he did not. The [417 U.S. 433, 448] statements actually made by respondent to the police, as we have observed, were excluded at trial in accordance with Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966). Whatever deterrent effect on future police conduct the exclusion of those statements may have had, we do not believe it would be significantly augmented by excluding the testimony of the witness Henderson as well.
When involuntary statements or the right against compulsory self-incrimination are involved, a second justification for the exclusionary rule also has been asserted: protection of the courts from reliance on untrustworthy evidence. 23 Cases which involve the Self-Incrimination Clause must, by definition, involve an element of coercion, since the Clause provides only that a person shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself. And cases involving statements often depict severe pressures which may override a particular suspect's insistence on innocence. Fact situations ranging from classical third-degree torture, Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936), to prolonged isolation from family or friends in a hostile setting, Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962), or to a simple desire on the part of a physically or mentally exhausted [417 U.S. 433, 449] suspect to have a seemingly endless interrogation end, Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949), all might be sufficient to cause a defendant to accuse himself falsely.
But those situations are a far cry from that presented here. The pressures on respondent to accuse himself were hardly comparable even with the least prejudicial of those pressures which have been dealt with in our cases. More important, the respondent did not accuse himself. The evidence which the prosecution successfully sought to introduce was not a confession of guilt by respondent, or indeed even an exculpatory statement by respondent, but rather the testimony of a third party who was subjected to no custodial pressures. There is plainly no reason to believe that Henderson's testimony is untrustworthy simply because respondent was not advised of his right to appointed counsel. Henderson was both available at trial and subject to cross-examination by respondent's counsel, and counsel fully used this opportunity, suggesting in the course of his cross-examination that Henderson's character was less than exemplary and that he had been offered incentives by the police to testify against respondent. 24 Thus the reliability of his testimony was subject to the normal testing process of an adversary trial.
Respondent contends that an additional reason for excluding Henderson's testimony is the notion that the adversary system requires "the government in its contest with the individual to shoulder the entire load." 8 Wigmore 2251, p. 317; Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S., at 55 ; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S., at 460 . To the extent that this suggested basis for the exclusionary rule in Fifth Amendment cases may exist independently of the deterrence and trustworthiness rationales, we think it of no avail to respondent here. Subject [417 U.S. 433, 450] to applicable constitutional limitations, the Government is not forbidden all resort to the defendant to make out its case. It may require the defendant to give physical evidence against himself, see Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973), and it may use statements which are voluntarily given by the defendant after he receives full disclosure of the rights offered by Miranda. Here we deal, not with the offer of respondent's own statements in evidence, but only with the testimony of a witness whom the police discovered as a result of respondent's statements. This recourse to respondent's voluntary statements does no violence to such elements of the adversary system as may be embodied in the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
In summary, we do not think that any single reason supporting exclusion of this witness' testimony, or all of them together, are very persuasive. 25 By contrast, we find the arguments in favor of admitting the testimony quite strong. For, when balancing the interests involved, we must weigh the strong interest under any system of justice of making available to the trier of fact all concededly relevant and trustworthy evidence which either party seeks to adduce. In this particular case we also "must consider society's interest in the effective prosecution of criminals in light of the protection our pre-Miranda standards afford criminal defendants." Jenkins [417 U.S. 433, 451] v. Delaware, 395 U.S. 213, 221 (1969). These interests may be outweighed by the need to provide an effective sanction to a constitutional right, Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), but they must in any event be valued. Here respondent's own statement, which might have helped the prosecution show respondent's guilty conscience at trial, had already been excised from the prosecution's case pursuant to this Court's Johnson decision. To extend the excision further under the circumstances of this case and exclude relevant testimony of a third-party witness would require far more persuasive arguments than those advanced by respondent.
This Court has already recognized that a failure to give interrogated suspects full Miranda warnings does not entitle the suspect to insist that statements made by him be excluded in every conceivable context. In Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), the Court was faced with the question of whether the statements of the defendant himself, taken without informing him of his right of access to appointed counsel, could be used to impeach defendant's direct testimony at trial. The Court concluded that they could, saying:
[ Footnote 2 ] 480 F.2d 927 (1973).
[ Footnote 3 ] Tr. of Prelim. Hearing 99.
[ Footnote 4 ] Ibid.
[ Footnote 5 ] Id., at 99-100.
[ Footnote 6 ] Tr. of Trial 223.
[ Footnote 7 ] Ibid.
[ Footnote 8 ] Id., at 224
[ Footnote 9 ] Ibid.
[ Footnote 10 ] Ibid.
[ Footnote 11 ] 19 Mich. App. 320, 172 N. W. 2d 712 (1969).
[ Footnote 12 ] 385 Mich. 594, 189 N. W. 2d 290 (1971).
[ Footnote 13 ] 352 F. Supp., at 268.
[ Footnote 14 ] The Court has also held that comment on a defendant's silence or refusal to take the witness stand may be an impermissible penalty on exercise of the privilege. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
[ Footnote 15 ] For example in Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897), the Court stated:
[ Footnote 16 ] Wigmore states his objection in the following terms:
[ Footnote 17 ] See n. 5, supra.
[ Footnote 18 ] See nn. 3 and 4, supra.
[ Footnote 19 ] In Wong Sun the police discovered evidence through statements made by the accused after he had been placed under arrest. This Court, finding that the arrest had occurred without probable cause, held that the derivative evidence could not be introduced against the accused at trial. For the reasons stated in the text we do not believe that Wong Sun controls the case before us.
[ Footnote 20 ] The opinion also relied upon Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961); Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966); and Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968). See 414 U.S., at 348 .
[ Footnote 21 ] Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 31 et seq.; Brief for Respondent 9 et seq.
[ Footnote 22 ] As previously noted, the defendant in Escobedo had repeatedly asked to see his lawyer who was available at the police station. Those requests were denied, and the defendant ultimately confessed. Thus, in direct contrast to the situation here, the defendant in Escobedo was told he did not have a right to see his lawyer, although he had expressly stated his desire to do so.
[ Footnote 23 ] The Court has made clear that the truth or falsity of a statement is not the determining factor in the decision whether or not to exclude it. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964). Thus a State which has obtained a coerced or involuntary statement cannot argue for its admissibility on the ground that other evidence demonstrates its truthfulness. Ibid. But it also seems clear that coerced statements have been regarded with some mistrust. The Court in Escobedo, for example, stated that "a system of criminal law enforcement which comes to depend on the `confession' will, in the long run, be less reliable and more subject to abuses" than a system relying on independent investigation, 378 U.S., at 488 -489. The Court then cited several authorities concerned with false confessions. Id., at 489 n. 11. Although completely voluntary confessions may, in many cases, advance the cause of justice and rehabilitation, coerced confessions, by their nature, cannot serve the same ends.
[ Footnote 24 ] Tr. of Trial 226-234.
[ Footnote 25 ] It has been suggested that courts should exclude evidence derived from "lawless invasions of the constitutional rights of citizens," Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S., at 13 , in recognition of "the imperative of judicial integrity." Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960). This rationale, however, is really an assimilation of the more specific rationales discussed in the text of this opinion, and does not in their absence provide an independent basis for excluding challenged evidence.
[ Footnote 26 ] Our Brother BRENNAN in his opinion concurring in the judgment treats the principal question here simply as a lineal descendant of the one decided in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965), to be analyzed only in terms of the retroactivity framework established in that and subsequent decisions. While his approach has a beguiling simplicity, we believe it marks a significant and unsettling departure from the past practice of the Court in this area. Our retroactivity cases, from Linkletter v. Walker, supra, to Gosa v. Mayden, 413 U.S. 665 (1973), all have in common a particular factual predicate: a previous constitutional decision of this Court governs the facts of an earlier decided case unless the constitutional decision is not to have retroactive effect. The doctrine of retroactivity does not modify the substantive scope of the constitutional decision but rather determines the point in time when it is held to apply.
That common factual predicate is absent here. No defendant in Miranda sought to block evidence of the type challenged in this case, and the holding of Miranda, even if made fully retroactive, would not therefore resolve the question of whether Henderson's testimony must also be excluded at trial. Contrary, therefore, to the suggestion in our Brother's opinion that the question here is whether to "limit the effect of Johnson v. New Jersey," post, at 454 n. 1, Johnson has never been thought controlling on the question of fruits, for the simple reason that the parent Miranda case did not reach that issue.
Our Brother BRENNAN'S method of disposition is to determine in the present case the retroactivity of a holding which the Court has yet to make. He would say, in effect, that if the Court should later determine that Miranda requires exclusion of fruits such as the testimony of Henderson, nonetheless that determination shall not be applied retroactively. But this approach wholly subverts the heretofore established relationship between the parent case and the subsidiary case determining whether or not to apply the parent case [417 U.S. 433, 453] retroactively. Under the framework of the analysis established in Linkletter, supra, and in subsequent cases, it would seem indispensable to understand the basis for a constitutional holding of the Court in order to later determine whether that holding should be retroactive. Yet ex hypothesi our Brother has no such analysis available, since the case has yet to be decided. Cases which subsequently determine the retroactivity of a constitutional holding have given the Court enough occasion for concern without substantially increasing the difficulty of that type of decision by making it before, rather than after, the constitutional holding.
MR. JUSTICE STEWART, concurring.
In joining the opinion of the Court, I add only that I could also join MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN'S concurrence. For it seems to me that despite differences in phraseology, and despite the disclaimers of their respective authors, the Court opinion and that of MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN proceed along virtually parallel lines, give or take a couple of argumentative footnotes. [417 U.S. 433, 453]
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL joins, concurring in the judgment.
The Court finds it unnecessary to decide "the broad question" of whether the fruits of "statements taken in violation of the Miranda rules must be excluded regardless of when the interrogation took place," ante, at 447, since respondent's interrogation occurred prior to our decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). In my view, however, it is unnecessary, too, for the Court to address the narrower question of whether the principles of Miranda require that fruits be excluded when obtained as a result of a pre-Miranda interrogation without the requisite prior warnings. The Court, in answering this question, proceeds from the premise that Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966), makes Miranda applicable to all cases in which a criminal trial was commenced after the date of our decision in Miranda, [417 U.S. 433, 454] and that, since respondent's trial was post-Miranda, the effect of Miranda on this case must be resolved. I would not read Johnson as making Miranda applicable to this case. 1
Frank acknowledgment that retroactive application of newly announced constitutional rules of criminal procedure may have a serious impact on the administration of criminal justice has led us, since Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965), to determine retroactivity in terms of three criteria: (1) the purpose served by the new rules; (2) the extent of law enforcement officials' justifiable reliance on prior standards; and (3) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new rules. See, e. g., Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47, 51 (1973); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967); Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 410 -418 (1966). We have as a general matter limited our discussion of the relevant "purpose" of new rules to their functional value in enhancing the reliability of the factfinding process. See, e. g., Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 653 (1971); id., at 663 (concurring opinion); Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 249 -250 (1969); Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293, 294 (1968); Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, supra; Linkletter v. Walker, supra, at 638-639. This limiting approach has been taken in recognition that "[t]he basic purpose of a trial is the determination of truth," Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, supra, at 416; see Stovall v. Denno, supra, at 297-298, and that the principal legitimate interest of a convicted defendant is therefore assurance [417 U.S. 433, 455] that the factfinding process at his trial was not unduly impaired by adherence to the old standards.
In Johnson v. New Jersey, supra, the Court was called upon to determine whether the newly announced procedures in Miranda v. Arizona should be retroactively applied to upset final convictions based in part upon confessions obtained without the prior warnings required by Miranda. Aware that Miranda provided new safeguards against the possible use at trial of unreliable statements of the accused, we nonetheless concluded that the decision should not be retroactively applied. 2 The probability [417 U.S. 433, 456] that the truth-determining process was distorted by, and individuals were convicted on the basis of, coerced confessions was minimized, we found, by the availability of strict pre-Miranda standards to test the voluntariness of confessions. 384 U.S., at 730 . In addition, we recognized that law enforcement agencies had justifiably relied on our prior rulings and that retroactive application would necessitate the wholesale release and subsequent retrial of vast numbers of prisoners. Id., at 731. Then, in statements unnecessary to our decision - since all of the convictions of the petitioners in Johnson had long since become final at the time of our decision in Miranda - we went on to say that our newly announced Miranda rules should be applied to trials begun after the date that decision was announced. Id., at 732.
The conclusion that the Miranda rules should be applied to post-Miranda trials made good sense, where criminal defendants were seeking to exclude direct statements made without prior warning of their rights. Exclusion of possibly unreliable pre-Miranda statements made in the inherently coercive atmosphere of in-custody interrogation, see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S., at 457 -458, 467, 470, could be obtained at a relatively low cost. For, although the police might have relied in good faith on our prior rulings in interrogating defendants without first advising them of their rights, Miranda put the police on notice that pre-Miranda confessions obtained without prior warnings would be inadmissible at defendants' trials. [417 U.S. 433, 457] Since defendants who had made pre-Miranda confessions had not yet gone to trial, and the police investigations into those cases were still fresh, Johnson envisioned "no undue burden [being] imposed upon prosecuting authorities by requiring them to find evidentiary substitutes for statements obtained in violation of the constitutional protections afforded by Miranda." Jenkins v. Delaware, 395 U.S. 213, 219 -220 (1969); see Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S., at 732 .
Application of the Miranda standards to the present case, however, presents entirely different problems. Unlike the situation contemplated in Johnson, the burden imposed upon law enforcement officials to obtain evidentiary substitutes for inadmissible "fruits" will likely be substantial. The lower courts, confronted with the question of the application of Miranda to fruits, have provided differing answers on the admissibility issue. 3 The police, therefore, could not reasonably have been expected to know that substitute evidence would be necessary. As a result, in a case such as the present one, in which law enforcement officials have relied on trial and appellate court determinations that fruits are admissible, a contrary ruling by this Court, coming years after the commission of the crime, would severely handicap any attempt to retry the defendant. The burden on law enforcement officers, in that circumstance, would be comparable to that in Jenkins v. Delaware, supra, where we declined to apply the Miranda rules to post-Miranda retrials of persons whose original trials were commenced prior to Miranda. There, we said:
Since excluding the fruits of respondent's statements would not further the integrity of the factfinding process and would severely handicap law enforcement officials in obtaining evidentiary substitutes, I would confine the reach of Johnson v. New Jersey to those cases in which the direct statements of an accused made during a pre-Miranda interrogation were introduced at his post-Miranda trial. If Miranda is applicable at all to the fruits of statements made without proper warnings, I would limit its effect to those cases in which the fruits were obtained as a result of post-Miranda interrogations. Cf. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967); Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969). 4 [417 U.S. 433, 459]
Since I agree that the judgment of the Court of Appeals must be reversed, I concur in the judgment of the Court. 5
[ Footnote 1 ] Although the petition for certiorari did not urge us to limit the effect of Johnson v. New Jersey, this issue was raised in petitioner's brief as well as in the amicus curiae brief of the State of California, filed in support of petitioner. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 646 n. 3 (1961); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 294 n. 1 (1967).
[ Footnote 2 ] In Johnson we commented - as we have on a number of occasions in deciding to apply new constitutional rules of criminal procedure retroactively - that "we do not disparage a constitutional guarantee in any manner by declining to apply it retroactively." 384 U.S., at 728 ; Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47, 55 n. 10 (1973). This is so, because a prospective application of new rules will often serve important purposes other than the correction of serious flaws in the truth-determining process.
The Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination - guaranteed full effectuation by the Miranda rules - serves a variety of significant purposes not relevant to the truth-determining process. See Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 415 -416 (1966). A number of these purposes were catalogued in Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964):
[ Footnote 3 ] Compare the decisions of the Michigan courts in the instant case, 19 Mich. App. 320, 172 N. W. 2d 712 (1969), and 385 Mich. 594, 189 N. W. 2d 290 (1971), with United States v. Cassell, 452 F.2d 533 (CA7 1971), and People v. Peacock, 29 App. Div. 2d 762, 287 N. Y. S. 2d 166 (1968).
[ Footnote 4 ] Three approaches have been taken in deciding what cases should be affected by prospective application of new constitutional rules of criminal procedure. In Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965), the Court held the exclusionary rule of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 [417 U.S. 433, 459] (1961), applicable to all cases in which direct review had not come to an end at the time Mapp was announced. See also Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966). That approach, as we have observed, was abandoned in Johnson v. New Jersey, where we stated that the Miranda rules were applicable to all trials commenced after the date of that decision. In more recent decisions, we have regarded the cutoff point as that at which law enforcement officials could first begin to guide their conduct in accordance with our new rules. Thus, in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967), the confrontation rulings of United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), and Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967), were made applicable to cases in which the confrontations took place after the date of those decisions, and in Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969), the exclusionary ruling of Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), was made applicable only to cases in which the search and seizure took place after the announcement of Katz. See also Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47, 57 n. 15 (1973); Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 656 -657 (1971). But cf. Fuller v. Alaska, 393 U.S. 80, 81 (1968) (holding that Lee v. Florida, 392 U.S. 378 (1968), which ruled evidence seized in violation of 605 of the Federal Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. 605, inadmissible in state trials, applicable to all cases in which the evidence was introduced after the date of decision in Lee).
The trend of our decisions since Johnson has thus been toward placing increased emphasis upon the point at which law enforcement personnel initially relied upon the discarded constitutional standards. See Jenkins v. Delaware, 395 U.S. 213, 218 and n. 7 (1969). As has been noted by an eminent judicial authority, such an emphasis is wholly consistent with the underlying rationale for prospective application of new rules, i. e., justified reliance upon prior judicial standards. Schaefer, The Control of "Sunbursts": Techniques of Prospective Overruling, 42 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 631, 645-646 (1967).
[ Footnote 5 ] My Brother REHNQUIST argues that this concurrence "marks a significant and unsettling departure from the past practice of the Court" in respect of retroactivity. Ante, at 452 n. 26. He argues that Miranda did not decide the question of the admissibility of fruits, and therefore that there is no "parent" decision for retroactive application. But the assumption upon which the concurrence rests, [417 U.S. 433, 460] namely, that Miranda requires the exclusion of fruits, necessarily treats Miranda as a "parent" decision. For the assumption is that exclusion is necessary to give full effect to the purposes and policies underlying the Miranda rules and to its holding that "unless and until [the Miranda] warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against [the defendant]." 384 U.S., at 479 (emphasis added). It necessarily follows that Miranda itself is the "parent" decision. [417 U.S. 433, 460]
MR. JUSTICE WHITE, concurring in the judgment.
For the reasons stated in my dissent in that case, I continue to think that Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), was ill-conceived and without warrant in the Constitution. However that may be, the Miranda opinion did not deal with the admissibility of evidence derived from in-custody admissions obtained without the specified warnings, and the matter has not been settled by subsequent cases.
In Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969), it appeared that petitioner, who was convicted of murder, had been arrested and interrogated in his home without the benefit of Miranda warnings. Among other things, petitioner admitted having a gun and told the police where it was hidden in the house. The gun was recovered and ballistic tests, which were admitted into evidence along with various oral admissions, showed that it was the gun involved in the murder. Petitioner's conviction was affirmed, the applicability of Miranda being rejected by the state courts. Petitioner brought the case here, urging in his petition for certiorari, which was granted, that the ballistic evidence was a fruit of an illegal interrogation - "the direct product of interrogation" without indispensable constitutional safeguards. His brief on the merits suggested that it was error under Miranda to admit into evidence either his oral admissions or the evidence of ballistic tests performed on the pistol, which [417 U.S. 433, 461] was referred to as "an illegally seized object." This Court reversed the conviction but after referring to the ballistic evidence, went on to hold only that the admission into evidence of Orozco's statements made without benefit of Miranda warnings was fatal error. Although the issue was presented, the Court did not expressly deal with the admissibility of the ballistic tests and gave no intimation that the evidence was to be excluded at the anticipated retrial.
Miranda having been applied in this Court only to the exclusion of the defendant's own statements, I would not extend its prophylactic scope to bar the testimony of third persons even though they have been identified by means of admissions that are themselves inadmissible under Miranda. The arguable benefits from excluding such testimony by way of possibly deterring police conduct that might compel admissions are, in my view, far outweighed by the advantages of having relevant and probative testimony, not obtained by actual coercion, available at criminal trials to aid in the pursuit of truth. The same results would not necessarily obtain with respect to the fruits of involuntary confessions. I therefore concur in the judgment.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissenting.
In this case the respondent, incarcerated as a result of a conviction in a state court, was granted a writ of habeas corpus by the District Court. The basis for the writ was the introduction at respondent's trial of testimony from a witness whose identity was learned solely as a result of in-custody police interrogation of the respondent preceded by warnings which were deficient under the standards enunciated in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The District Court concluded that "the introduction by the prosecution in its case in chief of testimony of a third [417 U.S. 433, 462] person which is admittedly the fruit of an illegally obtained statement by the [accused violates the accused's] Fifth Amendment rights." 352 F. Supp. 266, 268 (ED Mich. 1972). The Court of Appeals affirmed. 480 F.2d 927 (CA6 1973).
Prior to interrogation, respondent was told of his right to the presence of counsel but he was not told of his right to have an attorney appointed should he be unable to afford one. Respondent is an indigent who has been represented at all times in both state and federal courts by court-appointed counsel. In Miranda, supra, we said:
With the premise that respondent was subjected to an unconstitutional interrogation, there remains the question whether not only the testimony elicited in the interrogation but also the fruits thereof must be suppressed. Mr. Justice Holmes first articulated the "fruits" doctrine in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920). In that case the Government had illegally seized the petitioner's corporate books and documents. The Government photographed the items before returning them and used the photographs as a basis to subpoena the petitioner to produce the originals before the grand jury. The petitioner refused to comply and was cited for contempt. In reversing, the Court noted that "[t]he essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court but that it shall not be used at all." Id., at 392.
The principle received more recent recognition in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). There one Toy had made statements to federal agents and the statements were held inadmissible against him. The statements led the agents to one Yee and at Yee's home [417 U.S. 433, 464] the agents found narcotics which were introduced at trial against Toy. In reversing Toy's conviction the Court held that the narcotics discovered at Yee's home must be excluded just as Toy's statements which led to that discovery.
The testimony of the witness in this case was no less a fruit of unconstitutional police action than the photographs in Silverthorne or the narcotics in Wong Sun. The petitioner has stipulated that the identity and the whereabouts of the witness and his connection with the case were learned about only through the unconstitutional interrogation of the respondent. His testimony must be excluded to comply with Miranda's mandate that "no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation [not preceded by adequate warnings] can be used against" an accused. 384 U.S., at 479 (emphasis added).
In Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966), the Court held that statements obtained in violation of Miranda standards must be excluded from all trials occurring after the date of the Miranda decision. MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN suggests that Johnson be limited and that the fruits derived from unlawful pre-Miranda interrogations be admissible in trials subsequent to the Miranda decision. Though respondent's trial occurred subsequent to the Miranda decision, his interrogation preceded it. I disagree, as I disagreed in Johnson, that any defendant can be deprived of the full protection of the Fifth Amendment, as the Court has construed it in Miranda, based upon an arbitrary reference to the date of his interrogation or his trial.
In Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965), the Court held the exclusionary rule of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), inapplicable to convictions which had become "final" prior to the Mapp decision. As Mr. [417 U.S. 433, 465] Justice Black, joined by me, noted, the result was as follows:
As Mr. Justice Black said in Linkletter: "It certainly offends my sense of justice to say that a State holding in jail people who were convicted by unconstitutional methods has a vested interest in keeping them there that outweighs the right of persons adjudged guilty of crime to challenge their unconstitutional convictions at any time." 381 U.S., at 653 .
I would affirm the judgment below. [417 U.S. 433, 467]
A free source of state and federal court opinions, state laws, and the United States Code. For more information about the legal concepts addressed by these cases and statutes visit FindLaw's Learn About the Law.
Citation: 417 U.S. 433
Docket No: No. 73-482
Argued: March 20, 1974
Decided: June 10, 1974
Court: United States Supreme Court
Search our directory by legal issue
Enter information in one or both fields (Required)
Harness the power of our directory with your own profile. Select the button below to sign up.
FindLaw for Legal Professionals
Learn more about FindLaw's newsletters, including our terms of use and privacy policy. This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
Get help with your legal needs
FindLaw's Learn About the Law features thousands of informational articles to help you understand your options. And if you're ready to hire an attorney, find one in your area who can help.
Search our directory by legal issue
Enter information in one or both fields (Required)


text:
President Donald Trump says his administration will propose banning thousands of flavors used in e-cigarettes amid an outbreak of breathing problems tied to vaping.
State and federal health authorities are investigating hundreds of breathing illnesses reported in people who have used e-cigarettes and other vaping devices.
No single device, ingredient or additive has been identified.
Health and Human Services Secretary Alex Azar says the Food and Drug Administration will develop guidelines to remove all e-cigarette flavors from the market, especially those favored by children.
The FDA regulates e-cigarettes and has authority to ban vaping flavors, but has resisted calls to take that step.
Instead, the agency has said it is studying the role of flavors in vaping products, including whether they help adult smokers quit traditional cigarettes.

subset: commoncrawl


text:
An official website of the United States government
News Release 2010-91 | August 10, 2010
Share This Page:
WASHINGTON — The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) announced today the selection of Karen Solomon as Deputy Chief Counsel. Ms. Solomon succeeds Jeff Gillespie, who is retiring later this year. Ms. Solomon will report to Chief Counsel Julie Williams.
In her new role, Ms. Solomon will oversee three divisions in the Law Department – Legislative and Regulatory Activities, Bank Activities and Structure, and Securities and Corporate Practices. She will partner with Deputy Chief Counsel Dan Stipano, who will continue to oversee the Enforcement and Compliance, Litigation, Community and Consumer Law, and Administrative and Internal law divisions in the Chief Counsel's Office.
"Karen brings a wealth of knowledge and experience to her new position," said Ms. Williams. "She's a great lawyer and strategic thinker, and an outstanding manager, and she has an in-depth knowledge of the laws governing national banks. I have had the pleasure of working with Karen for many years, and she brings remarkable talents to her new position."
Ms. Solomon joined the OCC in 1995 as a Special Counsel, and played a major role in the OCC's Regulation Review Project. She next served as Assistant Director of the Legislative and Regulatory Activities Division and was promoted to Director in 1996.
Prior to the OCC, Ms. Solomon was a Deputy Chief Counsel at the Office of Thrift Supervision with responsibility for managing the Regulations and Legislation Division.
Ms. Solomon received her J.D. degree cum laude from the Catholic University of America, Washington, DC.
Dean DeBuck (202) 874-5770


text:
Icon of the Mother of God "The God Loving"
The Bogolub Icon of the Mother of God, one of the most ancient wonderworking icons of Russia, was written in the twelfth century at the request of Prince Andrew Bogolubsky, in memory of an appearance to him by the Mother of God.
In 1155, Prince Andrew, having resettled from Vishgorod to the Suzdal region of Russia, brought with him a wonderworking icon of the Mother of God, written by the Evangelist Luke (ultimately, it came to be called the Vladimir Icon). Seven miles from Vladimir, the cart carrying the wonderworking icon stopped and could not be moved. Prince Andrew asked the priest Nicholas, who accompanied him, to serve a Molieben before the Icon. For a long time Andrew prayed with tears before the venerable image. He later went into his tent and continued his fervent prayers. The Most Holy Theotokos appeared to him with a small scroll in Her hand and told the pious prince that the icon should remain at Vladimir, and that on the site of Her miraculous appearance a church and holy monastery should be built. She then prayerfully raised Her hand to Heaven, and received a blessing from Christ the Savior.
In fulfilling her command, Prince Andrew built a stone church and monastery in honor of the Nativity of the Most Holy Theotokos. Afterwards the prince commissioned iconographers and asked that the Mother of God be depicted as he had seen in the vision, in full stature, with the scroll in Her right hand, and Her face turned towards the Savior. When the church was completed, the icon was placed in it, and a yearly celebration in honor of the appearance of the Mother of God was established on June 18. The monastery, and the city which formed around it, was named Bogolub by St. Andrew, because in his own words, "the Mother of God loves this place," and the prince himself came to be called Bogolub or "God-lover."
This wonderworking icon of the Mother of God was afterwards transferred from the Bogolub Monastery to the Dormition Cathedral in Vladimir, but the icon of the Appearance remained at Bogolub.
The icon of the Bogolub Mother of God was glorified by innumerable miracles, and over the span of many centuries manifested its grace-filled help to the believers of Russia. The miracles and signs wrought by the icon inspired believers throughout Russia to make copies of the venerable image, some of which were also miraculous.
By permission of the Orthodox Church in America (www.oca.org)


text:
Most tax title property inventory consists of small narrow strips of land (5 ft. to 20 ft.) which are mainly beneficial to adjacent land owners. Some properties contain environmentally sensitive areas such as wetlands or steep slopes. Potential buyers should understand that some properties may also have assessments and fees that need to be paid in addition to the tax foreclosure cost.
Show All Answers
The Real Property Division does NOT manage the collection of property tax debt or foreclosure due to property tax default. Tax foreclosure questions must be directed to the Assessor-Treasurers office, Foreclosure Department: (253) 798-7133.
In most cases Pierce County must attempt to sell tax title property at auction before it is available for direct negotiation. Any tax title parcels not sold at auction are retained by Pierce County and once authorized, are available for private sale for one year following the date of the auction.
Pierce County wants to hear from you. Please select one of the following to talk to elected officials and staff, or to report problems in our community.


text:
6220.0 - Persons Not in the Labour Force, Australia, September 1996
ARCHIVED ISSUE Released at 11:30 AM (CANBERRA TIME) 28/02/1997
Page tools: Print Page Print All | |||||
Persons not in the labour force, September 1996 - ABS There were 3.7 million persons aged 15 to 69 years who were not in the labour force in September 1996. This amounts to almost 1 in 3 persons in the civilian population in this age group. Released today by the Australian Bureau of Statistics are results of the survey Persons Not in the Labour Force, conducted in September 1996. This survey provides information about the activities and employment aspirations of persons who are neither employed nor unemployed. Of the 3.7 million persons not in the labour force, nearly 1,130,000 wanted to work but were not actively looking for work. Of these, 118,900 were discouraged jobseekers, a slight increase (0.2 per cent) since September 1995. These were people who wanted to work and were available to start work, but were not doing anything to find a job mainly because they believed employers considered them too young or too old, or there were no jobs available in their area or their line of work. Of all discouraged jobseekers, 37 per cent were aged 15 to 44 years, 33 per cent were aged 45 to 59 years and 30 per cent were aged 60 to 69 years. There were another 621,700 persons who wanted to work and were available to start work, but who stated they were not doing anything to find a job for personal reasons (such as attending an educational institution, ill health/physical disability) or for family reasons (such as childcare). Copies of the publication Persons Not in the Labour Force, Australia, September 1996 (cat. no. 6220.0) available from ABS Bookshops. Document Selection These documents will be presented in a new window. |


text:
We think enjoying your favourite Harvester flavours should be as simple and straightforward as possible. With the Harvester UK app, you can get everything from exclusive offers and rewards delivered straight to your phone to a tasty takeaway in just a few taps – plus you can book your table, check out our menus and pay your bill, too.
Download it for free now for iOS or Android – just search for 'Harvester UK'.
Your loyalty means a lot to us, so for a limited time only we've launched a BRAND-NEW reward scheme on our app. Simply collect 4 stamps and you'll be rewarded with a FREE main meal on your next visit. It's as simple as catching up with friends and family over your favourite dishes.
It won't take you long to get set up – just:
1. Search for 'Harvester UK' on your app store and download the app
2. Open the app and tap the profile icon on the bottom right
3. Tap 'Sign up' and enter your details to create your account
Get our great offers and rewards delivered straight to your pocket ready to flash in your local Harvester whenever you fancy. Once you've registered, you'll be able to enjoy app-exclusive rewards that aren't available anywhere else, as well as get new offers as soon as they launch – just tap the heart to add them to your wallet.
Got somewhere to be? With our app, you can pay your bill as soon as you're ready in just a few taps. Whether it's your treat or you're splitting it between you, pay for your meal quickly and easily without the hard sums, so you can get on with whatever's waiting for you.
Whether it's mates night or date night, a family get-together or a treat for the little ones, our app lets you find your nearest Harvester and book a table quickly and easily, wherever you are. So now there's no excuse not to get everyone together and catch up over all your favourites.
Got your table booked but not sure what you fancy? We've got something for everyone here at Harvester, and our app makes it easy to browse our menus on the go – whether you're eyeing up our desserts or checking out our allergen information.
Fancy a Harvester at home instead? Browse our menu and order a takeaway straight from the app, then pick it up when it suits you. It's perfect for a big night in in front of the telly – just choose your time and away you go.
Whether you're a big kid or you want to keep the little ones entertained, we've always got a new game to keep you tapping on the app – and you could win some great prizes, too. Fingers crossed for a lucky streak…
What are you waiting for? Download the Harvester app now from the App Store or Google Play – just search for 'Harvester UK'.


text:
CRS: Western Sahara: Status of Settlement Efforts, December 11, 2008
From WikiLeaks
About this CRS report
This document was obtained by Wikileaks from the United States Congressional Research Service.
The CRS is a Congressional "think tank" with a staff of around 700. Reports are commissioned by members of Congress on topics relevant to current political events. Despite CRS costs to the tax payer of over $100M a year, its electronic archives are, as a matter of policy, not made available to the public.
Individual members of Congress will release specific CRS reports if they believe it to assist them politically, but CRS archives as a whole are firewalled from public access.
This report was obtained by Wikileaks staff from CRS computers accessible only from Congressional offices.
For other CRS information see: Congressional Research Service.
For press enquiries, consult our media kit.
If you have other confidential material let us know!.
For previous editions of this report, try OpenCRS.
Wikileaks release: February 2, 2009
Publisher: United States Congressional Research Service
Title: Western Sahara: Status of Settlement Efforts
CRS report number: RS20962
Author(s): Carol Migdalovitz, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Date: December 11, 2008
- Abstract
- Since the 1970s, Morocco and the independence-seeking Popular Front for the Liberation of Saqiat al Hamra and Rio de Oro (Polisario) have vied for control of the Western Sahara, a former Spanish territory. In 1991, the United Nations arranged a cease-fire and proposed a settlement plan that called for a referendum to allow the people of the Western Sahara to choose between independence and integration into Morocco. A long deadlock on determining the electorate for a referendum ensued. The U.N. then unsuccessfully suggested alternatives to the unfulfilled settlement plan and later called on the parties to negotiate. In April 2007, Morocco offered an autonomy plan. In 2007 and 2008, the two sides met under U.N. auspices, but made no progress due to their unwillingness to compromise. The issue has affected Algerian-Moroccan bilateral relations and wider regional cooperation. The United States supports the U.N. effort and has urged the parties to focus on autonomy-a solution that would not destabilize its ally, Morocco. Some Members of Congress support a referendum and are frustrated by delays. P.L. 110-161, December 26, 2007, contains a provision expressing concern about human rights in the Western Sahara.
- Download


text:
When we
hear the name Tory Burch, we
immediately think of the high-end, ready-to-wear American brand with the iconic
T-logo medallion. It is the brand that introduced the Reva Ballet Flats and whose bags,
sunglasses and shoes are flying off the shelves at Bloomingdale's, Nordstrom
and Saks. It is the brand
celebrities, including Catherine Zeta-Jones, Jessica Alba, Kerry Washington,
Jennifer Lopez, Reese Witherspoon and the Duchess of Cambridge Kate Middleton,
love to wear with its chic and feminine designs.
But who
really is Tory Burch? Who is the woman behind this multi-billion dollar
international brand other than the blonde beauty whom we see in the magazine
features and television?
Tory Burch |
are 10 things that will get you started in knowing this famous fashion
1. Tory
Burch was born as Tory Robinson
Robinson is the daughter of former actress, Reva Schapira, and investor, Earl
"Bud" Robinson. Tory Robinson became Tory Burch when she married her
second husband, investor and entrepreneur J. Christopher Burch, who she has
three sons and three stepdaughters with. Although they divorced in 2006, she
continues to use his last name.
2. Tory
grew up in a farmhouse and was a tomboy
Born on
June 17, 1966 in Valley Forge, Pennsylvania, Tory was raised in a 250-year old
Georgian farmhouse, along with her three brothers, Robert, James and Leonard.
As a
child, Tory has said that she was a tomboy and was not interested in fashion
but because of her stylish parents' influence, she developed a passion for it
later on. As an adult, she has attributed many of her qualities and love for
fashion to her parents.
3. She
started out as the girl who gets coffee
Tory moved to New York to pursue a career in the fashion industry, she started
working as an assistant to Yugoslavian fashion designer Zoran, followed by
Harper's Bazaar magazine. Then she became a copywriter for Ralph Lauren before
she worked with Vera Wang on the ready-to-wear division. But it wasn't until
she decided to start her own lifestyle brand that she attempted to design
4. She
started her brand at home
began designing clothes in her kitchen. She began her fashion label, "TRB
by Tory Burch"—later known as just "Tory Burch." Before long,
she had an important celebrity endorsement and soaring sales figures.
opened her first small boutique on Elizabeth Street in Manhattan, which was
designed to feel more like a residential space than a traditional retail store,
and since then the brand has grown into a global business with presence in more
than 50 countries.
made her big
business boomed after television mogul Oprah Winfrey, who was and still is a
fan of Burch's work, endorsed the designer calling her "the next big thing
in fashion." Oprah was certainly right. The next day, the Tory Burch
website received over 8 million visitors.
2009, Tory appeared on an episode of the popular television series "Gossip
Girl", which solidified her youth appeal. Her styles were very popular
with the viewers and fans of the television show, which they often appeared on
among different generations of the trendy Manhattan cast that included the teen
fashion icons Blake Lively and Leighton Meester.
She's a Fashion Week late bloomer
It is
somewhat shocking to know that this designer has not been showing at New York
Fashion Week for long. After years of holding presentations, her very first
full show at Lincoln Center was in 2011.
7. Tory
Burch is a Techie
Always ahead of the curb, in 2014 at New York
Fashion Week, the Tory Burch brand was the first to use Google's Lightbox,
which is Google's custom brand exchange, to live stream video of the runway
show. The designer also added a line of accessories for the Fitbit Flex
activity-tracking device, making hers the first major fashion brand to move
into wearable technology in 2014.
for digital innovation, the company also has websites in Europe and Asia; a
Webby-nominated app called the Tory Daily; and a robust social media presence.
8. Tory
takes inspiration from her mother
2006, Burch invented the 'Reva' ballerina flats, which were named after her
mother and were an instant hit with consumers and critics. Journalist, Michael
Shnayerson described Tory's designs as an homage to the 50s and 60s.
a stylish woman of that day who lived on the Philadelphia Main Line, shopped in
New York for the latest fashions from Rudi Gernreich, Hubert de Givenchy, and
Sonia Rykiel, vacationed every year in Europe, packing the latest French and
Italian styles into her Vuitton steamer trunks for the trip home, and on her
way stopped in Morocco for tunics. That woman was Tory Burch's mother, Reva. To
a great extent, Burch's clothes are inspired by what she coveted in her
mother's closets."
Social responsibility is an integral part of Tory's life.
As a
dedicated philanthropist, Tory launched the Tory Burch Foundation to support
the economic empowerment of women entrepreneurs and their families in the
United States. In 2014, the foundation
established the Elizabeth Street Capital, an initiative with Bank of America
that provides women entrepreneurs access to low cost loans, mentoring support
and networking opportunities. Burch's stores also sell products, in which
proceeds support the foundation.
Tory Burch is a Fashion Mastermind
fashion designer, businesswoman and philanthropist Tory Burch is most certainly
a fashion mastermind. Her American lifestyle brand is undoubtedly one of the
most prolific to have been launched in this century, going from a very small
operation out of an Upper East Side apartment in New York City to a $3.5
billion global business.
designer has been recognized with numerous awards, including the CFDA for
Accessory Designer of the Year, Glamour's Women of the Year, and Vanity Fair's
International Best-Dressed List. It is no surprise that as of 2014 Forbes lists
Tory as the 79th Most Powerful Woman In The World.
Get to
know more on how this fashion mastermind made it all the way to the top and
become a fashion billionaire. Let's explore the life and design evolution of
the iconic American designer on Fashion Masterminds: Tory Burch, exclusively on
Fashion One and Fashion First.


text: The Moment Collection from Milliken, designed by Kristin Gruenefeld, was recently awarded a GOOD DESIGN award. The PVC-free floorcovering line represents how life can be captured and stored forever in our memory thanks to beautiful photography. The GOOD DESIGN awards program is organized by The Chicago Athenaeum in conjunction with The European Centre for Architecture, Art, Design and Urban Studies.


text:
I read this book because I needed a summer beachy read and
saw that Hanauer was the editor of the collection The Bitch in the House.
Knowing she was a feminist, I hoped that this would be a light book that also
wouldn't make my reading stop short with some moment of feminist outrage.
It was all right but not nearly as great as it could have
been. Boy, does it ever capture something about the zeitgeist,
though—both of my own life right now and, as I understand it, of a big sliver
of lives of people in their 40s. So, on balance, I am glad I read it to the
end. Gone tells the story of Eve Adams (that name! So unsubtle—it in
itself almost made me stop), a nutritionist, and her husband, Eric, a sculptor.
When the novel starts, Eric has run off with the babysitter. I can see why.
Eve is my worst version of myself: wound way too tight,
working way too hard, primarily responsible for the home, food prep, and
children, she is also having a great moment in her career: things are really
taking off for her. Eric, by contrast, is struggling. Uninspired, he hasn't
completed—or sold—a sculpture in a long time and is wondering if he has it in
him to ever create art again. (Now, since I'm identifying, let me clarify and
say that this—the dry spell or the running off with the babysitter part—is
emphatically not a parallel to my beloved's life.) There's no room for
Eric in their lives at home and he's frustrated with his career. They need a
marriage reset. It's a great and interesting problem and the unfolding of the
novel is interesting—just the right combination of surprising and predictable
to make it a reasonable read. And, having spent time this year renegotiating
some of the balances in our marriage now that I'm (still) working too hard but
that our youngest is in school and the demands of parenting have changed, too,
I was interested in their problems.
But I was disappointed to see Northampton, Mass. given a
fake name: after all the pleasures of recognition in Goodbye, Columbus,
I felt the lack in Gone (which I read first) all the more keenly: why
not name the town where the poor, obese white client lives? The juxtaposition
of poverty with the appealing, fancy, yoga-and-tolerance filled communities of
the Happy Valley are one of the most interesting things about that region.
More than that, again and I again I found sentences that I
wanted tighter and assumptions that I wanted looser. Too often characters are
identified by their census categories and shown to be lovable for conforming to
what we expect of the black teen mom, the plump chatty Jewish lady, the hippie
white girl in the coffee shop. It was never offensive, but it felt lazy and
unimaginative. When Eve plays her "game" of trying to see if she can find
twenty people in the food court who do not need to lose twenty pounds, I hated
her. Listen, Eve, I wanted to scream, stop being so judgy!
Still, as a fictional counterpart to those lifestyle pieces
about families where the wife outearns the husband, Gone held my
interest even as it made me feel like I'd be boxed into one of Eve's narrow
categories: just another tired mommy in the food court who could stand to lose
a few pounds.


text:
BEIRUT (REUTERS) - More Syrians have been killed in the three weeks since peace talks began than at any other time in the civil war, activists said on Wednesday, as troops pounded rebel towns on the Lebanese border and negotiations faltered in Geneva.
More than 230 people have been killed every day in Syria since January 22, when international mediators brought President Bashar al-Assad's government and its opponents together, the British-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said. That is more than in any other three weeks since the war began in 2011.
It is unclear how far the bloodshed is a consequence of the talks, as both sides seek to improve their bargaining positions by gaining territory. On Wednesday, Assad's army and fighters from Lebanese ally Hezbollah pounded the strategic border town of Yabroud where rebels prepared to resist a ground offensive.
The United Nations says more than 130,000 Syrians have been killed in nearly three years of fighting. Totalling at least 4,959, the three-week death toll compiled by the Observatory included 515 women and children. The group estimated about a third of all the dead were civilians.
"This is the highest average we have had," said Rami Abdelrahman of the Observatory as the group urged a suspension of negotiations at Geneva if there was no immediate ceasefire.
There was little sign of an early breakthrough on the third day of a second round of talks in the Swiss city.
The opposition, which has little sway over rebels fighting on the ground, called for a transitional governing body to oversee a UN-monitored ceasefire and expel foreign fighters in a paper that avoided any mention of Assad - whose departure the government delegation has refused to discuss.
The confidential paper, seen by Reuters, did not draw an immediate official response from the government, although the foreign minister said driving out foreign fighters could be worth discussing in time - rare common ground.
Foreign, anti-Western Islamists are a major force among the otherwise Western- and Arab-backed rebels. The opposition wants rid of Hezbollah and Iranian auxiliaries fighting for Assad.
Wednesday was the last day of a three-day extension of a humanitarian ceasefire allowing the delivery of aid and evacuation of civilians from the city of Homs although it could be extended again, the city's governor Talal al-Barazi said.
Syrian army soldiers used mobile phones to try to take pictures of the evacuees, convinced they were among the rebels fighting there, in scenes illustrating the fear and suspicion unleashed by the conflict that has torn the country apart.
Another plainclothes member of the security forces was overheard saying his role was to greet each of the evacuees to see if their accents betrayed foreign nationality.
The fighting around Yabroud is part of a broader "Battle for Qalamoun", the mountainous border area near Damascus that offers control over routes to Lebanon and between the capital and the coastal stronghold of Assad's minority Alawite sect.
Government forces seem to have had the better of recent fighting, but outright victory seems out of reach. As US intelligence chief James Clapper put it on Tuesday, a "prolonged stalemate" seems likely, extending what he described as "an apocalyptic disaster" in Syria.
A spokesman for the rebel unit Liwa al-Ghuraba at Yabroud, said Hezbollah fighters and Assad forces were trying to position themselves on nearby hilltops to attack the town.
"They are gathering their forces with the hope of taking the border road," said spokesman Abu Anas. "Right now no one is moving in Yabroud. The rebels are blocking the offensive.
"The hospital is filling up with wounded." Assad's forces had, he said, sent envoys in the days leading up to the attack to try to convince leading citizens in nearby towns to accept a truce. Some villages accepted, but most towns, like Yabroud, refused, Abu Anas said.
"The battle for Qalamoun was supposed to just be a propaganda campaign," he said.
"But the regime got itself in a mess: the army sent people to convince us there could be a peaceful solution if we raised the government flag and took photos. Instead, we refused."
Concern about talks running into the sand prompted the mediator in Geneva, Lakhdar Brahimi, to bring forward by a day to Thursday a meeting with Russian and US officials in an effort to get Washington, which backs the rebels, and Assad's ally Russia, to press their proteges.
Continued strains between Russia and other world powers that have so far blocked UN action against the Syrian government showed little sign of easing. Russia said it would veto a UN resolution on aid, saying its wording seemed meant to open the way for foreign military action.
And a foreign ministry spokesman in Moscow said Mr Barack Obama had "intentionally distorted" the Russian position in remarks the US president had made on Syrian aid on Tuesday.
The struggle on the Syrian border risks fuelling sectarian tensions in Lebanon, where Sunni-Shi'ite divisions deepened by the conflict in Syria have already triggered instability.
The violence in Syria has set off a wave of tit-for-tat car bombings in Lebanon, as well as street clashes. On Wednesday, the Lebanese army arrested an al Qaeda militant whom security sources called a "mastermind of car bombs".
In Geneva, opposition and diplomatic sources said the transition proposal from the opposition avoided reference to Assad, in line with a text agreed by world powers in June 2012 which calls for a body with full executive authority but leaves the president's fate open - something Russia has insisted on.
Asked why the document did not go into the fate of Assad, the opposition's chief negotiator, Hadi al-Bahra, told Reuters: "We can no longer talk about one person as the sole embodiment of Syria. We deliberately presented a legal paper." The memorandum was presented to mediator Lakhdar Brahimi and the government delegation. The transitional authority will be"the only legitimate body that represents the sovereignty and independence of the Syrian state and is the only one that represents the Syrian state internationally", the paper said.
The Syrian government delegation said that negotiations must focus first on combating terrorism - its term for all anti-Assad fighters - and called parallel talks on the opposition's priority of a transitional government a "fruitless" idea.
The opposition document says the transitional body would"prepare and oversee a total ceasefire by taking immediate measures to stop military violence, protect civilians and stabilise the country in the presence of UN observers."


text:
The First Step to a Career In Science
As a chemistry student, you will learn how to use the measuring and analysis equipment in a modern chemistry lab while competently performing routine laboratory tasks. As you progress in the course, you will conduct experiments and solve problems based in general inorganic and organic chemistry principles in order to collect, interpret and communicate scientific data in multiple formats. The Chemistry degree program equips students with the foundation necessary for transfer to at a four-year institution, so you can confidently continue your studies in the chemical or physical sciences field.
The Academic Passport, a policy of the Pennsylvania State System of Higher Education (PASSHE), guarantees admission to any of the 14 PASSHE universities to a student with an earned AA or AS degree from a Pennsylvania public community college. A university can stipulate that the associate's degree contain at least 30 credits of liberal arts courses. The Academic Passport does not guarantee admission to specific majors.


text:
Greek Gods is not affected by 6oz price wars in Greek yogurt fixture, says Hain Celestial
Asked about pricing pressure in the increasingly crowded Greek yogurt fixture on the firm's Q1, 2013 earnings call last week, Hain USA CEO John Carroll said Greek Gods was not competing in the same part of the market as Dannon, Yoplait and Chobani.
They're all fighting in the 6-ounce place and moving price points way down
He told analysts on the call: "The price dealing is happening on low-fat Greek yogurt in 6-ounce cups. Greek Gods is a higher-fat, indulgent product sold [mainly] in 24-ounce cups and also used as an ingredient in Mediterranean diets.
"This has always been a key differentiating point for this brand… so we feel pretty comfortable with our positioning.
"We don't see anybody coming out directly at us. They're all just fighting in the 6-ounce place and moving price points on 6-ounce way down. "
Greek Gods set for UK debut in 300 Sainsbury's stores this month
The Greek Gods brand, which was turning over $12m when Hain acquired it in summer 2010 and is now generating more than $100m on an annualized basis, is also expanding into new product areas, with a new low fat, high protein kefir probiotic smoothie singled out as one of four new products "that have gotten the strongest response", said CEO Irwin Simon.
Greek Gods is also set to "become much more of a major brand within Hain" as it makes its UK debut in 300 Sainsbury's stores in the UK this month ahead of a national UK rollout in the spring, and continues to perform well in Canada, he added.
Demand for nut butters has rocketed post the Sunland recall: We just can't keep up with demand
Other brands demonstrating significant promise include the MaraNatha nut butter brand, which has seen a surge in demand following the Sunland peanut products recall, he said.
"With the Sunland issues - which we are not part of, remember, we produce our own product - there is a ton of demand for nut butters. So we are scrambling to get as much as we can.
"As a matter of fact, we pulled promotions on nut butters… to realign our supply and our demand. We expect that it will probably take until the third quarter to get back. We just can't keep up with demand."
We continue to be very bullish about our US business
While some of the biggest packaged food brands have suffered volume declines in the US and Europe, Hain Celestial has generated strong growth on both sides of the Atlantic, posting a 15% rise in operating income to $36.5m on sales up 25.4% to $359.8m in the three months to September 30 (Q1, 2013).
"We continue to be very bullish about our U.S. business", said Carroll, who said growth had been bolstered by "significant distribution wins" with Kroger, Publix, Wakefern, Wegman, Walmart, Target, Whole Foods, Earth Fare and Sprouts.
Hain has also increased production capacity on its MaraNatha nut butters by 20% and Earth's Best organic babyfood pouch lines by 50%, where demand outstripped supply, he said.
Top UK chilled soup brand New Covent Garden to be test marketed in New York City
Meanwhile, feedback on the first wave of new launches for fiscal 2013 had been encouraging, said Simon.
"We're on schedule to introduce over 100 new products, leveraging the hottest emerging trends across our key product categories.
To date, the new products generating the strongest response were Celestial Seasonings' Sleepytime Snooz Natural sleep shots; Greek Gods low fat kefir; and gluten-free café bake mixes, hot cereals and pancake and waffle mixes, he said.
"And finally, we're going to be introducing the New Covent Garden refrigerated soups - the UK's leading brand of chilled soups - into a limited test market in the New York area as a prelude to a wider expansion in Fall 2013."
Prop 37: We come out a winner no matter what
Asked about Californian GMO labeling initiative Prop 37, he said: "It's important to identify where there is GMOs or not and we do that on our products.
"But whatever happens [in the Nov 6 vote on Prop 37], there's just a lot of attention brought to and a lot of notice and I think you're going to see a lot of more states follow on here and maybe different language within the bill.
"But today, I sit here and say we come out a winner no matter what because 98% of our products are GMO-free."
Click here to read about Hain's plans for new raw juice cleanse brand BluePrint


text:
Metra acted hastily and ill-advisedly when it kicked out its executive director while handing him a severance package now said to be worth potentially as much as $871,000, the Regional Transportation Authority concluded Wednesday.
In the first official report on the propriety of the settlement deal awarded to ousted CEO Alex Clifford, the RTA determined that the process by which Metra's board made its June 21 decision was inadequate and insufficiently documented and produced a settlement that was "not financially prudent."
The report's findings have prompted calls from lawmakers and RTA Chairman John Gates Jr. to rescind the severance package, which is believed to be one of the largest in state history for a public official. That option, however, seemed unlikely Wednesday as Clifford's lawyer suggested that the only way Metra could break the contract is by hiring back Clifford.
If restored to his old post, Clifford would be willing to renegotiate the severance package, attorney Michael Shakman said. A significant portion of the deal, including more than $300,000 due to Clifford if he cannot find a job by the end of 2014, would be canceled automatically if he returned to the agency.
"Mr. Clifford would be happy to sit down and work something out," Shakman said. "His first choice was always to remain at Metra."
Shakman scoffed at the suggestion that Metra would — or even could — try to undo the severance agreement.
In additional to being a valid contract, there's no financial incentive for the agency to do so, he said. The agreement contains a clause that forces the parties into arbitration if Metra tries to sever the agreement, a process that would not be covered by an agency insurance policy.
This means Metra could be responsible for its own legal bills, any Clifford award and Shakman's fees if the matter went to arbitration — the exact expenses officials were trying to avoid by settling with Clifford two months ago.
"They can't just rescind it," Shakman said. "That's not the way it works."
Confirming details reported in Wednesday's Tribune, RTA Deputy Executive Director Michael Zumach said his two-month audit of the decision-making process and negotiations behind Metra's decision found that board members did not conduct a "full vetting" of the cost and options of the settlement.
Instead, the goal seemed to be getting rid of Clifford as quickly as possible and ignoring the fact that a special insurance policy Metra had would have minimized the agency's exposure to a threatened whistle-blower lawsuit, Zumach said in presenting the preliminary results of his audit to RTA officials.
"They were going down a path of settlement with nothing else considered," Zumach said.
In conducting the audit, Zumach said he and his staff scanned thousands of pages of documents and emails; listened to hours of recorded, closed-door Metra board meetings; and interviewed board members, attorneys and staff.
Zumach characterized the severance agreement as "definitely on the generous side." Rather than costing up to $718,000, as Metra has contended, Clifford's package could end up costing as much as $871,000, including payouts of $75,000 for legal fees and $78,000 in relocation costs, Zumach said.
As the Tribune reported, Metra's board did not take advantage of a liability insurance policy that would have provided the agency with up to $10 million worth of coverage against a lawsuit filed by Clifford. At most, Metra would have been liable for $150,000 in deductible costs, Zumach said.
Metra did not consider using the insurance policy instead of settling with Clifford, Zumach said. "Insurance was not discussed by the full board," he said.
Metra staffers were aware of the $98,000-a-year policy, but they were not involved in the discussions and negotiation of the Clifford settlement. Instead, Metra's board was advised by outside legal counsel, Zumach said.
Zumach confirmed what some critics have contended — that now-resigned Chairman Brad O'Halloran was the impetus behind Clifford's ouster. "It's obvious there was a power struggle between two strong-willed individuals," Zumach said.
RTA board member William Coulson, a former federal prosecutor who also presented a 10-page analysis he made of Clifford's claims against Metra, likewise cited O'Halloran's role in the controversy. O'Halloran and former board member Larry Huggins, who were both named in Clifford's April 3 memo in which he outlined allegations of political interference and other charges, should have recused themselves from the settlement vote, Coulson said.
O'Halloran and Huggins "faced real and potential conflicts as a result of (their) activism," said Coulson, the only RTA board member who also is a litigating attorney.
The men could not be reached Wednesday for comment.


text:
The cart is empty
Optima is a seemingly "normal" bicycle, but both the architecture and the ergonomics of the new Optima are innovative. It's a bike designed to be used as an electric bicycle from the conceptual design phase. This has meant revamping the product to the point that even its architecture changed.


text:
Senior Care at Home and Happy Healthy Halloween
Even though we are older than school-aged children and it seems we should stick to passing out the candy instead of trick-or-treating, it doesn't mean we can't get into the Halloween spirit! The holiday most widely known for sugary treats and candy will be here in just a few short days. Halloween is a fun day to dress up and indulge in candy and sweets. While these delectable treats are tasty, they aren't always the healthiest choice for a snack; especially for an elderly person who may be coping with health issues such as diabetes.
There's no reason to believe that a healthy holiday treat will be tasteless or boring. There are many ways to make a traditional holiday treat better for you. You could substitute unrefined whole wheat pastry flour, natural sweeteners, and nutrient-packed ingredients such as heart-healthy nuts, dried fruits and 60 percent dark chocolate to your tasty holiday treats. Many recipes allow for a substitution of olive or canola oil in place of fatty butter.
Great party foods are simple and usually don't require utensils. The more finger foods you prepare the better. Small ghost-shaped sandwiches, pizza bites and other smaller food items are great options for snacking at the party. Little tangerines or clementine oranges can be made into tiny pumpkins. Just cut up some celery to add a stem and a food-safe marker to draw a jack-o-lantern. This Halloween treat is not only adorable, but also packed in nutrients and vitamins that help protect eye sight and heart health. Caramel apples are a traditional treat during fall at Halloween. Instead of the sticky covering, try substituting dark chocolate which is rich in antioxidants. Foods high in antioxidants can help to prevent heart attacks and stroke. After dipping in melted dark chocolate chips, add some yummy decorations such as crushed nuts. A vegetable tray will come in handy to balance out the sugary foods.
It's officially time to carve the pumpkins and prepare the apple cider. Dashes of orange are spotted in decorations throughout neighborhoods. Some spookier decorative items such as ghosts and skeletons have made their appearance on doorsteps as well. While Halloween is mainly viewed as a child's holiday made for dressing up and gathering candy, there's no reason to believe that adults can't have any fun.
Halloween has always been a fun way to dress up and show off a creative side. Many like to get into the festive spirit and get spooky, funny and original. While the holiday is usually most known for children trick-or-treating door-to-door, Halloween doesn't have to be just for kids.
If you would like to learn more about caring and consistent in home elderly care and the many benefits of professional senior care or dementia and Alzheimer's care, call Senior Helpers of Santa Barbara to speak to a senior care specialist today 805-687-7777! The compassionate senior care specialists at Senior Helpers can also guide you through the process of receiving the Veterans Administration Aid and Attendance Benefit if your elderly loved one is a veteran. In home senior care allows your loved one to stay in the comforts of their own home for as long as possible while receiving the level of care they need. Senior Helpers of Santa Barbara provides a wide range of services including Alzheimer's and dementia care, personal assistance, companionship, peace of mind visits and so much more to all areas of Santa Barbara.