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The Supernatural
THE Supernatural — what is it? What do we mean by it? How do we define it? M. Guizot1 tells us that belief in it is the special difficulty of our time — that denial of it is the form taken by all modern assaults on Christian faith; and again, that acceptance of it lies at the root, not only of Christianity, but of all positive religion whatever. These questions, then, concerning the Supernatural are questions of first importance. Yet we find them seldom distinctly put, and still more seldom distinctly answered. This is a [1/2] capital error in dealing with any question of philosophy. Half the perplexities of men are traceable to obscurity of thought hiding and breeding under obscurity of language."The Supernatural" is a term employed often in different, and sometimes in contradictory, senses. It is difficult to make out whether M. Guizot himself means to identify belief in the Supernatural with belief in the existence of a God, or with belief in a particular mode of Divine action. But these are ideas quite separable and distinct. There may be some men who disbelieve in the Supernatural only because they are absolute atheists; but it is certain that there are others who have great difficulty in believing in the Supernatural who are not atheists. What they doubt or deny is, not that God exists, but that He ever acts, or perhaps can act, unless in and through what they call the"Laws of Nature." M. Guizot, indeed, tells us that"God is the Supernatural in a Person." But this is a rhetorical figure rather than a definition. He may, indeed, contend that it is inconsistent to believe in a God, and yet to disbelieve in the Supernatural; but [2/3] he must admit, and indeed does admit, that such inconsistency is found in fact.
Theological and philosophical writers frequently use the Supernatural as synonymous with the Superhuman. But of course this is not the sense in which any one can have any difficulty in believing in it. The powers and works of Nature are all superhuman — more than Man can account for in their origin — more than he can resist in their energy — more than he can understand in their effects. This, then, cannot be the sense in which so many minds find it hard to accept the Supernatural ; nor can it be the sense in which others cling to it as of the very essence of their religious faith. What, then, is that other sense in which the difficulty arises? Perhaps we shall best find it by seeking the idea which is competing with it, and by which it has been displaced. It is the Natural which has been casting out the Supernatural — the idea of Natural Law, — the universal reign of a fixed Order of things. This idea is a product of that immense development of the physical sciences which is characteristic of our time. We cannot read a [3/4] periodical, or go into a lecture — room, without hearing it expressed. Sometimes, but rarely, it is stated with accuracy, and with due recognition of the limits within which Law can be said to comprehend the phenomena of the world. But generally it is expressed in language vague and hollow, covering inaccurate conceptions, and confounding under common forms of expression ideas which are essentially distinct. The mere ticketing and orderly assortment of external facts is constantly spoken of as if it were in the nature of Explanation, and as if no higher truth in respect to natural phenomena were to be attained or desired. And herein we see both the result for which Bacon laboured, and the danger against which Bacon prayed. It has been a glorious result of a right method in the study of Nature, that with the increase of knowledge the"human family has been endowed with new mercies." But every now and then, for a time at least, from" the unlocking of the gates of sense, and the kindling of a greater natural light, incredulity and intellectual night have arisen in our minds."
"This also we humbly beg that human things may not preju — [5] But let us observe exactly where and how the difficulty arises. The Reign of Law in Nature is, indeed, so far as we can observe it, universal. But the common idea of the Supernatural is that which is at variance with natural Law, above it, or in violation of it.' Nothing, however wonderful, which happens according to Natural Law, would be considered by any one as Supernatural. The law in obedience to which a wonderful thing happens may not be known; but this would not give it a supernatural character, so long as we assuredly believe that it did happen according to some law. Hence, it would appear to follow that a man thoroughly possessed of the idea of Natural Law as universal, never could admit anything to be supernatural; because on seeing any fact, however new, marvellous, or incomprehensible, he would escape into the conclusion that it was the result of some natural Law of which lie had before been ignorant. No one will deny that, in respect to the vast dice such as are Divine, neither that from the unlocking of the gates of sense, and the kindling of a greater natural light, anything of incredulity or intellectual night may arise in our minds towards Divine mysteries." — The Student's Prayer, Bacon's Works. [5/6] majority of all new and marvellous phenomena, this would be the true and reasonable conclusion. It is not the conclusion of pride, but of humility of mind. Seeing the boundless extent of our ignorance of the natural laws which regulate so many of the phenomena around us, and still more of so many of the phenomena within us, nothing can be more reasonable than to conclude, when we see something which is to us a wonder, that somehow, if we only knew how, it is"all right" — all. according to the constitution and course of Nature. But then, to justify this conclusion, we must understand Nature in the largest sense, — as including all that is
"In the round ocean, and in the living air,
And the blue sky, and in the mind of man."2
must understand it as including every agency which we see entering, or can conceive from analogy as capable of entering, into the causation of the world. First and foremost among these is the agency of our own Mind and Will. Yet, strange to say, all reference to this agency is often tacitly excluded when we speak of the laws [6/7] of Nature. One of our most distinguished living teachers of physical science — 'began, not long ago, a course of lectures on the phenomena of Heat by a rapid statement of the modern doctrine of the Correlation of Forces — how the one was convertible into the other — how one arose out of the other — how none could be evolved except from some other as a pre — existing source." Thus," said the lecturer, "we see there is no such thing as spontaneousness in Nature." 'I What! — not in the lecturer himself? Was there no"spontaneousness" in his choice of words — in his selection of materials — in his orderly arrangement of experiments with a view to the exhibition of particular results? It is not probable that the lecturer was intending to deny this; it simply was that he did not think of it as within his field of view. His own Mind and Will were then dealing with the" laws of Nature," but it did not occur to him as forming part of those laws, or, in the same sense, as subject to them.
Does Man, then, not belong to Nature? Is he above it — or merely separate from it, or a — [7/8] violation of it? Is he supernatural? If so, has he any difficulty in believing in himself? Of course not. Self — consciousness is the one truth, in the light of which all other truths are known. Cogito, ergo sum —; or volo, ergo sum — this is the one conclusion which we cannot doubt, unless Reason disbelieves herself. Why, then, are the faculties of the human mind and body not habitually included among the"laws of Nature?" Because a fallacy is getting hold upon us from a want of definition in the use of terms."Nature" is being used in the narrow sense of physical nature; and the whole world in which we ourselves live, and move, and have our being is excluded from it. But these selves of ours do belong to Nature. If we are ever to understand the difficulties in the way of believing in the Supernatural, we must first keep clearly in view what we are to understand as included in the Natural. Let us never forget, then, that the agency of Man is of all others the most natural — the one with which we are most familiar — the only one, in fact, which we can be said, even in any measure, to understand. When any wonderful event can [8/9] be referred to the contrivance or ingenuity of Man, it is thereby at once removed from the sphere of the Supernatural, as ordinarily understood. It must be remembered, however, that we are now only seeking a clear definition of terms; and that provided this other meaning be clearly agreed upon, the Mind and Will of Man may be considered as separate from" nature," and belonging to the Supernatural. This view is taken in an able treatise on"Nature and the Supernatural," by Dr Bushnell, an American clergyman.3 Dr Bushnell says: —" That is supernatural, whatever it be, that is either not in the chain of natural cause and effect, or which acts on the chain of cause and effect in nature, from without the chain." Again —" If the processes, combinations, and results of our system of nature are interrupted or varied by the action, whether of God, or angels, or men, so as to bring to pass what would not come to pass in it by its own internal action, under the laws of mere cause and effect, such variations are in like manner supernatural." There is no other [9/10] objection to this definition of the Supernatural, than that it rests upon a limitation of the terms"Nature" and"natural," which is very much at variance with the sense in which they are commonly understood. There is, indeed, a distinction which finds its expression in common language between the works of Man and the works of Nature. A honeycomb, for example, would be called a work of Nature, but not a steam — engine. This distinction is founded on a true perception of the fact that the Mind and Will of Man belong to an order of existence very different from physical laws, and very different also from the fixed and narrow instincts of the lower animals? It is a distinction bearing witness to the universal consciousness that the Mind of Man has within it something of a truly creative energy and force — that we are in a sense, "fellow-workers with God," and have been in a measure "made partakers of the Divine nature." But in that larger and wider sense in which we are here speaking of the Natural, it contains within it the whole phenomena of Man's intellectual and spiritual nature, as part, and the most familiar of all parts, of the visible system of [10/11] things. In all ordinary senses of the term, Man and his doings belong to the Natural, as distinguished from the Supernatural.
We are thus coming nearer to some precise understanding of what the Supernatural may be supposed to mean. But before we proceed, there is another question which must be answered. What is the relation in which the agency of Man stands to the physical laws of Nature? The answer, in part at least, is plain. His power in respect to those laws extends only first to their discovery and ascertainment, and then to their use. He can establish none: he can suspend none. All he can do is to guide, in a limited degree, the mutual action and reaction of the laws amongst each other. They are the tools with which he works — they are the instruments of his Will. In all he does or can do he must employ them. His ability to use them is limited both by his Want of knowledge and by his want of power. The more he knows of them, the more largely he can employ them, and make them ministers of his purposes. This, as a general rule, is true; but it is subject to the second limitation just [11/12] pointed out. Man already knows far more than he has power to convert to use. It is a true observation of Sir George Lewis4 that Astronomy, for example, in its higher branches, has an interest almost purely scientific. It reveals to our knowledge perhaps the grandest and most sublime of the physical laws of Nature. But a much smaller amount of knowledge would suffice for the only practical applications which we have yet been able to make of these laws to our own use. Still, that knowledge has a reflex influence on our knowledge of ourselves, of our powers, and of the relations which subsist between the constitution of our own minds and the constitution of the universe. And in other spheres of inquiry, advancing knowledge of physical laws has been constantly accompanied with advancing power over the physical world. It has enabled us to do a thousand things, any one of which, a few generations ago, would have been considered supernatural. Nor can it be said that this judgment of their character would have been erroneous. These things would have been superhuman then, though they [12/13] are not superhuman now. The same lecturer who told his audience that there was nothing spontaneous in Nature proceeded, by virtue of his own knowledge of natural laws, and by his selecting and combining power, to present a whole series of phenomena — such as ice frozen in contact with red — hot crucibles — which certainly did not belong to the "ordinary course of Nature." Such an exhibition a few centuries ago, would beyond all doubt have subjected the lecturer on Heat to painful experience of that condition of matter. Nevertheless the phenomena so exhibited were natural phenomena — in this sense, that they were the product of natural laws. Only these laws were combined in action under extraordinary conditions, and these conditions were governed by the purpose and design of the lecturer, which design was"spontaneous," if there is any meaning in the word. In like manner, if the progress of discovery is as rapid during the next 400 years as it has been during the last period of the same extent, men will be able to do many things which would now appear to be"supernatural". There is no difficulty in conceiving how a complete knowledge of [13/14] all natural laws would give, if not complete power, at least degrees of power immensely greater than those which we now possess. Power of this kind, then, however great in degree, clearly does not answer that idea of the Supernatural which so many reject as inconceivable. What, then, is that idea? Have we not traced it to its den at last? By" supernatural" power, do we not mean power independent of the use of means, as distinguished from power depending on knowledge even infinite knowledge — of the means proper to be employed?
This is the sense — probably the only sense — in which the Supernatural is, to many minds, so difficult of belief. No man can have any difficulty in believing that there are natural laws of which he is ignorant; nor in conceiving that there may be Beings who do know them, and can use them, even as he himself now uses the few laws with which he is acquainted. The real difficulty lies in the idea of Will exercised without the use of means — not in the exercise of Will through means which are beyond our knowledge."
Now, have we any right to say that belief in this [14/15] is essential to all Religion? If we have not, then it is only putting, as so many other hasty sayings do put, additional difficulties in the way of Religion. The relation in which od stands to those rules of His government which are called " laws," is, of course, an inscrutable mystery to us. But those who believe that His Will does govern the world, must believe that ordinarily, at least, He does govern it by the choice and use of means. Nor have we any certain reason to believe that He ever acts otherwise. Extraordinary manifestations of His Will — signs and wonders — may be wrought, for aught we know, by similar instrumentality — only by the selection and use of laws of which Man knows and can know nothing, and which, if he did know, he could not employ.5
Here, then, we come upon the question of miracles. Beyond the immediate purposes of benevolence which were served by almost all the miracles of the New Testament, the only other purpose which [15/16] miracles — how we understand them? what we would define them to be? The common idea of a miracle is, a suspension or violation of the laws of Nature. This is a definition which places the essence of a miracle in a particular method of operation. But there is another definition which passes this by altogether, and dwells only on the agency by which, and the purpose for which, a wonderful work is wrought."We would confine the word miracle," says Dr M'Cosh,6 "to those events which were wrought in our world as a sign or proof of God making a supernatural interposition, or a revelation to Man." This definition is defective in so far as it uses the word" supernatural," which, as we have seen, itself requires definition as much as miracle. But from the general context and many individual passages in his treatise, it is sufficiently clear that the two conditions essential in Dr is ever assigned to them is an" evidential purpose" — that is, a purpose that they might serve as signs of the presence of superhuman knowledge, and of the working of superhuman power. They were performed — in short — to assist faith, and not to confound reason. [16/17]
M'Cosh's view of a miracle, are that they are wrought by a Divine power for a Divine purpose, and are of a nature such as could not be wrought by merely human contrivance. In this sense a miracle means a superhuman work. This definition of a miracle does not exclude the idea of God working by the use of means, provided they are such means as are out of human reach. Indeed, in an important note, (p. 149,) Dr M'Cosh seems to admit that miracles are not to be considered"as against Nature" in any other sense than that in which" one natural agent may be against another — as water may counteract fire." Mr Mansel, in his" Essay on Miracles," adopts the word"superhuman" as the most accurate expression of his meaning. He says,"A superhuman authority needs to be substantiated by superhuman evidence; and what is superhuman is miraculous."7 It is important to observe that this [17/18] definition does not necessarily involve the idea of a"violation of the laws of Nature." It does not involve the idea of the exercise of Will apart from the use of means. It does not involve, therefore, that idea which appears to many so difficult of conception. It simply supposes, without any attempt to fathom the relation in which God stands to His own" laws," that out of His infinite knowledge of these laws, or of His infinite power of making them the instruments of His Will, He may and He does use them for extraordinary indications of His presence.
The reluctance to admit as belonging to the domain of Nature any special exertion of Divine power for special purposes, stands really in very close relationship to the converse notion, that where the operation of natural causes can be clearly traced, there the exertion of Divine power and Will is rendered less certain and less convincing. This is the idea which lies at the root of Gibbon's famous chapters on the spread of Christianity. He labours to prove that it was due to natural causes. In proving this, he evidently thinks he is disposing of the notion that [18/19] Christianity spread by Divine power; whereas he only succeeds in pointing out some of the means which were employed to effect a Divine purpose. In like manner, the preservation of the Jews as a distinct People during so many centuries of complete dispersion, is a fact standing nearly if not absolutely alone in the history of the world. It is at variance with all other experience of the laws which govern the amalgamation with each other of different families of the human race. The case of the Gipsies has been referred to as somewhat parallel. But the facts of this case are doubtful and obscure, and such of them as we know involve conditions altogether dissimilar in kind. It is not surprising, therefore, that the preservation of the Jews, partly from the relation in which it stands to the apparent fulfilment of Prophecy, and partly from the extraordinary nature of the fact itself, is tacitly assumed by many persons to come strictly within the category of miraculous events. Yet in itself it is nothing more than a striking illustration how a departure from the "ordinary course of nature" may be effected through the instrumentality [19/20] of means which are natural and comprehensible, An extraordinary resisting power has been given to the Jewish People against those dissolving and disintegrating forces which have caused the disappearance of every other race placed under similar conditions. They have been torn from home and country, and removed, not in a body, but in scattered fragments, over the world. Yet they are as distinct from every other people now as they were in the days of Solomon. Nevertheless this resisting power, wonderful though it be, is the result of special laws, overruling those in ordinary operation. It has been effected by the use of means. Those means have been superhuman — they have been beyond human contrivance and arrangement. But they belong to the region of the Natural. They belong to it not the less, but all the more, because in their concatenation and arrangement they seem to indicate the purpose of a living Will seeking and effecting the fulfilment of its designs. This is the manner after which our own living Wills in their little sphere effect their little objects. Is it difficult [20/21] to believe that after the same manner also the Divine Will, of which ours is the image only, works and effects its purposes?
Our own experience shows that the universal Reign of Law is perfectly consistent with a power of making those laws subservient to design — even when the knowledge of them is but slight, and the power over them slighter still. How much more easy, how much more natural, to conceive that the same universality is compatible with the exercise of that Supreme Will before which all are known, and to which all are servants! What difficulty in this view remains in the idea of the Supernatural? Is it any other than the difficulty in believing in the existence of a Supreme Will — in a living God? If this be the belief of which M. Guizot speaks when he says that it is essential to religion, then his proposition is unquestionably true. In this sense the difficulty of believing in the Supernatural, and the difficulty of believing in pure Theism, is one and the same. But if he means that it is necessary to Religion to believe in even the occasional" violation of law," — if he means that without such belief [21/22] signs and wonders cease to be evidences of Divine power, — then he announces a proposition which cannot be sustained. There is nothing in Religion incompatible with the belief that all exercises of God's power, whether ordinary or extraordinary, are effected through the instrumentality of means — that is to say, by the instrumentality of natural laws brought out, as it were, and used for a Divine purpose. To believe in the existence of miracles, we must indeed believe in the Superhuman and in the Super material. But both these are familiar facts in Nature. We must believe also in a Supreme Will and a Supreme Intelligence; but this our own Wills and our own Intelligence not only enable us to conceive of, but compel us to recognise in the whole laws and economy of Nature. Her whole aspect answers intelligently to our intelligence — mind responding to mind as in a glass."8 Once admit that there is a Being who — irrespective of any theory as to the relation in which [22/23] the laws of Nature stand to His own Will — has at least an infinite knowledge of those laws, and an infinite power of putting them to use — then miracles lose every element of inconceivability. In respect to the greatest and highest of all — that restoration of the breath of life which is not more mysterious than its original gift — there is no answer to the question which Paul asks, 'Why should it be thought a thing incredible by you that God should raise the dead?
This view of miracles is well expressed by Principal Tulloch: —
"The stoutest advocate of interference can mean nothing more than that the Supreme Will has so moved the hidden springs of nature that a new issue arises on given circumstances. The ordinary issue is supplanted by a higher issue. The essential facts before us are a certain set of phenomena, and a Higher Will moving them. How moving them? is a question for human definition; but the answer to which does not and cannot affect the Divine meaning of the change. Yet when we reflect that this Higher Will is everywhere reason and wisdom, it seems a juster [23/24] as well as a more comprehensive view to regard it as operating by subordination and evolution rather than by 'interference' or 'violation.' According to this view, the idea of Law is so far from being contravened by the Christian miracles, that it is taken up by them and made their very basis. They are the expression of a Higher Law, working out its wise ends among the lower and ordinary sequences of life and history. These ordinary sequences represent nature — nature, however, not as an immutable fate, but a plastic medium through which a Higher Voice and Will are ever addressing us, and which, therefore, may be wrought into new issues when the Voice has a new message, and the Will a special purpose for us."9
It is well worthy of remark, that Locke, who laid great stress on the Christian miracles, as attesting the authority of those who wrought them, declines, nevertheless, to adopt the common definition of that in which miraculous agency consists.10 "A miracle then," he says,
"I take to be a sensible operation, which, [24/25] being above the comprehension of the spectator and, in his opinion, contrary to the established course of nature, is taken by him to be Divine." And in reply to the objection, that this makes a miracle depend on the opinions or knowledge of the spectator, he points out that this objection cannot be avoided by any of the definitions commonly adopted; because"it being agreed that a miracle must be that which surpasses the force of nature in the established steady laws of cause and effect, nothing can be taken to be a miracle but what is judged to exceed those laws. Now every one being able to judge of those laws only by his own acquaintance with nature, and his own notions of its force, which are different in different men, it is unavoidable that that should be a miracle to one man which is not so to another." In this passage Locke recognises the great truth, that we can never know what is above Nature unless we know all that is within Nature. But he misses another truth quite as important, that a miracle would still be a miracle even though we did know the laws through which it was accomplished, provided those laws, though not beyond human knowledge, [25/26] were beyond human control. We might know the conditions necessary to the performance of a miracle, although utterly unable to bring those conditions about. Yet a work performed by the bringing about of conditions which are out of human reach, would certainly be a work attesting superhuman power.
Nevertheless so deeply ingrained in popular theology is the idea that miracles, to be miracles at all, must be performed by some violation or suspension of the laws of Nature, that the opposite idea of miracles being performed by the use of means is regarded by many with jealousy and suspicion. Strange that it should be thought the safest course to separate as sharply and as widely as we can between what we are called upon to believe in Religion, and what we are able to trace or understand in Nature! With what heart can those who cherish this frame of mind follow the great argument of Butler? All the steps of that argument — the greatest in the whole range of Christian philosophy — are founded on the opposite belief, that all the truths, and not less all the difficulties of Religion, have their type and [26/27] likeness in the "constitution and course of Nature." As we follow that reasoning, so simple and so profound, we find our eyes ever opening to some new interpretation of familiar facts, and recognising among the curious things of earth, one after another of the laws which, when told us of the spiritual world, seem so perplexing and so hard to accept or understand. To ask how much further this argument of the Analogy is capable of illustration and development, is to ask how much more we shall know of Nature. Like all central truths, its ramifications are infinite — as infinite as the appearance of variety, and as pervading as the sense of oneness in the universe of God.
But what of Revelation? Are its history and doctrines incompatible with the belief that God uniformly acts through the use of means? The narrative of Creation is given to us in abstract only, and is told in two different forms, both having apparently for their main, perhaps their exclusive object, the presenting to our conception the personal agency of a living God. Yet this narrative indicates, however slightly, [27/28] that room is left for the idea of a material process."Out of the dust of the ground;" that is, out of the ordinary elements of Nature, was that Body formed which is still upheld and perpetuated by organic forces acting under the rules of Law. Nothing which Science has discovered, or can discover, is capable of traversing that simple narrative. On this subject M. Guizot lays great stress, as many others do, on what he calls the Supernatural in Creation, as distinguished from the operations now visible in Nature."De quelle façon et par quelle puissance le genre humain a — t — il commencé sur la terre?" In reply to this question, he proceeds to argue that Man must have been the result either of mere material forces, or of a supernatural power exterior to, and superior to matter. Spontaneous generation, he argues, supposing it to exist at all, can give birth only to infant beings — to the first hours, and feeblest forms of nascent life. But Man — the human pair — must evidently have been complete from the first; created in the full possession of their powers and faculties." C'est â cette condition seulement qu'en [28/29] apparaissant pour la première fois sur la terre fhomme aurait pu y vivre — s'y perpétuer, et y fonder le genre humain. Evidemment l'autre origine du genre humain est seul admissible, seul possible. Le fait surnaturel de la creation explique seul la première apparition de l'homme ici — bas."
This is a common, but not a very safe argument. If the Supernatural — that is to say, the Superhuman and the Supermaterial — cannot be found nearer to us than this, it will not be securely found at all. It is very difficult to free ourselves from this notion that by going far enough back, we can" find out God" in some sense in which we cannot find Him now. The certainty not merely of one, but of many successive Creations in the history of our Planet, and especially of a time comparatively recent, when Man did not exist, is indeed an effectual answer to the notion, if it be now ever entertained, of" all things having continued as they are since the Beginning." But those who believe that the existing processes of Nature can be accounted for by"Law," may as reasonably believe that those processes were commenced by the same vague [29/30] and mysterious agency. To accept the primeval narrative of the Jewish Scriptures as coming from authority, and as bringing before us the personal agency of the Creator, but without purporting to reveal the method of His work, — this is one thing. To argue that no other origin for the first parents of the human race is conceivable than that they were moulded perfect, without the instrumentality of any means, — this is quite another thing. The various hypotheses of Development, of which Darwin's theory is only a new and special version, whether they are probable or not, afford at least a possible escape from the logical puzzle which M. Guizot puts. These hypotheses are indeed destitute of proof; and in the form which they have as yet assumed, it may justly be said that they involve such violations of, or departures from, all that we know of the existing order of things, as to deprive them absolutely of all scientific basis. But the close and mysterious relations between the mere animal frame of Man, and that of the lower animals, does render the idea of a common relationship by descent at least [30/31] conceivable. Indeed, in proportion as it seems to approach nearer to processes of which we have some knowledge, it is, in a degree, more conceivable than Creation without any process, — of which we have no knowledge and can have no conception.
But whatever may have been the method or process of Creation, it is Creation still. If it were proved to — morrow that the first man was " born" from some pre — existing Form of Life, it would still be true that such a birth must have been, in every sense of the word, a new Creation. It would still be as true that God formed him" out of the dust of the earth," as it is true that He has so formed every child who is now called to answer the first question of all theologies. And we must remember that the language of Scripture nowhere draws, or seems even conscious of, the distinction which modern philosophy draws so sharply between the Natural and the Supernatural. All the operations of Nature are spoken of as operations of the Divine Mind. Creation is the outward embodiment of a Divine Idea. It is in this sense, apparently, that the narrative of Genesis speaks of every plant being [31/32] formed"before it grew." But the same language is held, not less decidedly, of every ordinary birth."Thine eyes did see my substance, yet being imperfect. In Thy book all my members were written which in continuance were fashioned, when as yet there were none of them." And these words, spoken of the individual birth, have been applied not less truly to the modern idea of the Genesis of all Organic Life. Whatever may have been the physical or material relation between its successive forms, the ideal relation has been now clearly recognised, and reduced to scientific definition. All the members of that frame which has received its highest interpretation in Man, had existed, with lower offices assigned to them, in the animals which flourished before Man was born. All theories of Development have been simply attempts to suggest the manner in which, or the physical process by means of which, this ideal continuity of type and pattern has been preserved. But whilst all these suggestions have been in the highest degree uncertain, some of them violently absurd, the one thing which is certain is the fact for [32/33] which they endeavour to account. And what is that fact? It is one which belongs to the world of Mind, not to the world of Matter. When Professor Owen tells us, for example, that certain jointed bones in the Whale's paddle are the same bones which in the Mole enable it to burrow, which in the Bat enable it to fly, and in Man constitute his hand with all its wealth of functions, he does not mean that physically and actually they are the same bones, nor that they have the same uses, nor that they ever have been, or ever can be, transferable from one kind of animal to another. He means that in a purely ideal or mental conception of the Plan of all Vertebrate skeletons, these bones occupy the same relative place — relative, that is, not to origin or use, but to the Plan or conception of that skeleton as a whole.
Here the Supermaterial, and in this sense the Supernatural, element, — that is to say, the ideal conformity and unity of conception, is the one unquestionable fact, in which we recognise directly the working of a Mind with which our own has very near relations. Here, as elsewhere, [33/34] we see the Natural, in the largest sense, including and embodying the Supernatural ; the Material, including the Supermaterial. No possible theory, whether true or false, in respect to the physical means employed to preserve the correspondence of parts which runs through all Creation can affect the certainty of that mental plan and purpose which alone makes such correspondence intelligible to us, and in which alone it may be said to exist.
It must always be remembered that the two ideas, — that of a Physical Cause and that of a Mental Purpose, — are not antagonistic only the one is larger and more comprehensive than the other. Let us take a case. In many animal frames there are what have been called" silent members"members which have no reference to the life or use of the animal, but only to the general pattern on which all vertebrate skeletons have been formed. Mr Darwin, when he sees such a member in any animal, concludes with certainty that this animal is the lineal descendant by ordinary generation of some other animal in which that member was not silent but turned to use. [34/35] Professor Owen, taking a larger and wider view, would say, without pretending to explain how its presence is to be accounted for physically, that the silent member has relation to a general purpose or plan which can be traced from the dawn of Life, but which did not receive its full accomplishment until Man was born. This is certain
the other is a theory. The assumed physical cause may be true or false. But in any case the mental purpose and design — the conformity to an abstract idea — this is certain. The relation in which created Forms stand to our own mind, and to our understanding of their Purpose, is the one thing which we can surely know, because it belongs to our own consciousness. It is entirely independent of any belief we may entertain, or any knowledge we may acquire, of the processes employed for the fulfilment of that Purpose.
And yet scientific men sometimes tell us that "we must be very cautious how we ascribe intention to Nature. Things do fit into each other, no doubt, as if they were designed; but all we know about them is that these [35/36] correspondences exist, and that they seem to be the result of physical laws of development and growth." Very likely; but how these correspondences have arisen, and are daily arising, is not the question, and it is immaterial how that question may be answered. Do those correspondences exist, or do they not? The perception of them by our mind is as much a fact as the sight or touch of the things in which they appear. They may have been produced by growth — they may have been the result of a process of development, — but it is not the less the development of a mental purpose. It is the end subserved that we absolutely know. What alone is doubtful and obscure is precisely that which alone we are told is the legitimate object of our research, — viz., the means by which that end has been attained. Take one instance out of millions. The poison of a deadly snake — let us for a moment consider what this is. It is a secretion of definite chemical properties which have reference, not only — not even mainly — to the organism of the animal in which it is developed, but specially to the organism of another animal which it is [36/37] intended to destroy. Some naturalists have a vague sort of notion that, as regards merely mechanical weapons, or organs of attack, they may be developed by use, — that legs may become longer by fast running, teeth sharper and longer by much biting. Be it so: this law of growth, if it exist, is but itself an instrument whereby purpose is fulfilled. But how will this law of growth adjust a poison in one animal with such subtle knowledge of the organisation of another that the deadly virus shall in a few minutes curdle the blood, benumb the nerves, and rush in upon the citadel of life? There is but one explanation — a Mind, having minute and perfect knowledge of the structure of both, has designed the one to be capable of inflicting death upon the other. This mental purpose and resolve is the one thing which our intelligence perceives with direct and intuitive recognition. The method of creation, by means of which this purpose has been carried into effect, is utterly unknown.
Perhaps no illustration more striking of this principle was ever presented than in the curious volume published by Mr Darwin on the [37/38] "Fertilisation of Orchids."11 It appears that the fertilisation of almost all Orchids is dependent on the transport of the pollen from one flower to another by means of insects. It appears, further, that the structure of these flowers is elaborately contrived, so as to secure the certainty and effectiveness of this operation. Mr Darwin's work is devoted to tracing in detail what these contrivances are. To a large extent they are purely mechanical, and can be traced with as much clearness and certainty as the different parts of which a steam — engine is composed. — The complication and ingenuity of these contrivances almost exceed belief. "Moth — traps and spring — guns set on these grounds," might be the motto of the Orchids. There are baits to tempt the nectar loving Lepidoptera, with rich odours exhaled at night, and lustrous colours to shine by day; there are channels of approach along which they are surely guided, so as to compel them to pass by certain spots; there are adhesive plasters [38/39] nicely adjusted to fit their probosces, or to catch their brows; there are hair — triggers carefully set in their necessary path, communicating with explosive shells, which project the pollen — stalks with unerring aim upon their bodies. There are, in short, an infinitude of adjustments, for an idea of which I must refer my readers to Mr Darwin's inimitable powers of observation and description — adjustments all contrived so as to secure the accurate conveyance of the pollen of the one flower to its precise destination in the structure of another.
Now there are two questions which present themselves when we examine such a mechanism as this. The first is, What is the use of the various parts, or their relation to each other with reference to the purpose of the whole? The second question is, How were those parts made, and out of what materials? It is the first of these questions — that is to say, the use, object, intention, or purpose of the different parts of the plant,which Darwin sets himself instinctively to answer first; and it is this which he does answer with precision and success. The second question, [39/40] that is to say, how those parts came to be developed, and out of what"primordial elements" they have been derived in their present shapes, and converted to their present uses — this is a question which Darwin does also attempt to solve, but the solution of which is in the highest degree difficult and uncertain. It is curious to observe the language which this most advanced disciple of pure naturalism instinctively uses when he has to describe the complicated structure of this curious order of plants."Caution in ascribing intentions to nature" does not seem to occur to him as possible. Intention is the one thing which he does see, and which, when he does not see, he seeks for diligently until he finds it. He exhausts every form of words and of illustration by which intention or mental purpose can be described." Contrivance" "curious contrivance" — "beautiful contrivance," — these are expressions which recur over and over again. Here is one sentence describing the parts of a particular species;" the Labellum is developed into a long nectary, in order to attract Lepidoptera, and we shall presently give reasons for suspecting that [40/41] the nectar is purposely so lodged that it can be sucked only slowly, in order to give time for the curious chemical quality of the viscid matter setting hard and dry." Nor are these words used in any sense different from that in which they are applicable to the works of man's contrivance — to the instruments we use or invent for carrying into effect our own preconceived designs. On the contrary, human instruments are often selected as the aptest illustrations both of the object in view, and of the means taken to effect it. Of one particular structure Mr Darwin says: — "This contrivance of the guiding ridges may be compared to the little instrument sometimes used for guiding a thread into the eye of a needle." Again, referring to the precautions taken to compel the insects to come to the proper spot, in order to have the"pollinia" attached to their bodies, Mr Darwin says: —"Thus we have the rostellum partially closing the mouth of the neetary, like a trap placed in a run for game, and the trap so complex and perfect!"12 But this is not all. The idea of special use, as the [41/42] controlling principle of construction, is so impressed on Mr Darwin's mind, that, in every detail of structure, however singular or obscure, he has absolute faith that in this lies the ultimate explanation. If an organ is largely developed, it is because some special purpose is to be fulfilled. If it is aborted or rudimentary, it is because that purpose is no longer to be subserved. In the case of another species whose structure is very singular, Mr Darwin had great difficulty in discovering how the mechanism was meant to work, so as to effect the purpose. At last he made it out, and of the clue which led to the discovery he says: —"The strange position of the Labellum perched on the summit of the column, ought to have shown me that here was the place for experiment. I ought to have scorned the notion that the Labellum was thus placed for no good purpose. I neglected this plain guide, and for a long time completely failed to understand the flower."13
When we come to the second part of Mr Darwin's work, viz., the Homology of the Orchids, we find that the inquiry divides itself into two separate [42/43] questions, — first, the question what all these complicated organs are in their primitive relation to each other; and secondly, how these successive modifications have arisen, so as to fit them for new and changing uses. Now, it is very remarkable that of these two questions, that which may be called the most abstract and transcendental — the most nearly related to the Supernatural and the Supermaterial — is again precisely the one which Darwin is able to solve most clearly. We have already seen how well he solves the first question — What is the use and intention of these various parts? The next question is, What are these parts in their primal order and conception? The answer is, that they are members of a numerical group, having a definite and still traceable order of symmetrical arrangement. They are expressions of a numerical idea, as so many other things — perhaps as all things — of beauty are. Mr Darwin gives a diagram, showing the primordial or archetypal arrangement of Threes within Threes, out of which all the strange and marvellous forms of the Orchids have been developed, and to which, by careful counting and dissection, they can still be ideally [43/44] reduced. But when we come to the last question — By what process of natural consequence have these elementary organs of Three within Three been developed into so many various forms of beauty, and made to subserve so many curious and ingenious designs? — we find nothing but the vaguest and most unsatisfactory conjectures. Let us take one instance as an example. There is a Madagascar Orchis — the"Angro — — cum sesquipedale" — with an immensely long and deep nectary. How did such an extraordinary organ come to be developed? Mr Darwin's explanation is this. The pollen of this flower can only be removed by the proboscis of some very large Moths trying to get at the nectar at the bottom of the vessel. The Moths with the longest probosces would do this most effectually; they would be rewarded for their long noses by getting the most nectar; whilst, on the other hand, the flowers with the deepest nectaries would be the best fertilised by the largest Moths preferring them. Consequently, the deepest — nectaried Orchids, and the longest — nosed Moths, would each confer on the other a great advantage in the"battle of life." [44/45] This would tend to their respective perpetuation, and to the constant lengthening of nectaries and of noses. But the passage is so curious and characteristic, that it is well to give Mr Darwin's own words: —
"As certain Moths of Madagascar became larger, through natural selection in relation to their general conditions of life, either in the larval or mature state, or as the proboscis alone was lengthened to obtain honey from the Angrxcum, those individual plants of the Angraecum which had the longest nectaries, (and the nectary varies much in length in some Orchids,) and which, consequently, compelled the Moths to insert their probosces up to the very base, would be the best fertilised. These plants would yield most seed, and the seedlings would generally inherit longer nectaries; and so it would be in successive generations of the plant and Moth. Thus it would appear that there has been a race in gaining length between the nectary of the Angroccum and the proboscis of certain Moths; but the Angrxcum has triumphed, for it flourishes and abounds in the forests of Madagascar, and still troubles each Moth to insert its [45/46] proboscis as far as possible in order to drain the last drop of nectar . . . . . We can thus," says Mr Darwin,"partially understand how the astonishing length of the nectary may have been acquired by successive modifications."
It is indeed but a"partial" understanding. How different from the clearness and the certainty with which Mr Darwin is able to explain to us the use and intention of the various organs! or the primal idea of numerical order and arrangement which governs the whole structure of the flower! It is the same through all Nature. Purpose and intention, or ideas of order based on numerical relations, are what meet us at every turn, and are more or less readily recognised by our own intelligence as corresponding to conceptions familiar to our own minds. We know, too, that these purposes and ideas are not our own, but the ideas and purposes of Another of One whose manifestations are indeed superhuman and supermaterial, but are not" supernatural," in the sense of being strange to Nature, or in violation of it.
The truth is, that there is no such distinction between what we find in Nature, and what we are [46/47] called upon to believe in Religion, as that which men pretend to draw between the Natural and the Supernatural. It is a distinction purely artificial, arbitrary, unreal. Nature presents to our intelligence, the more clearly the more we search her, the designs, ideas, and intentions of some
"Living Will that shall endure,
When all that seems shall suffer shock." [In Memoriam]
Religion presents to us that same Will, not only working equally through the use of means, but using means which are strictly analogous — referable to the same general principles — and which are constantly appealed to as of a sort which we ought to be able to appreciate, because we ourselves are already familiar with the like. Religion makes no call on us to reject that idea, which is the only idea some men can see in Nature — the idea of the universal Reign of Law — the necessity of conforming to it — the limitations which in one aspect it seems to place on the exercise of Will,the essential basis, in another aspect, which it supplies for all the functions of Volition. On the contrary, the high regions into which this idea is found [47/48] extending, and the matters over which it is found prevailing, is one of the deepest mysteries both of Religion and of Nature. We feel sometimes as if we should like to get above this rule — into some secret Presence where its bonds are broken. But no glimpse is ever given us of anything, but" Freedom within the bounds of Law." The Will revealed to us in Religion is not — any more than the Will revealed to us in Nature — a capricious Will, but one with which, in this respect,"there is no variableness, neither shadow of turning."
We return, then, to the point from which we started. M. Guizot's affirmation that belief in the Supernatural is essential to all Religion is true only when it is understood in a special sense. Belief in the existence of a Living Will — of a Personal God — is indeed a requisite condition. Conviction"that He is" must precede the conviction that" He is the rewarder of those that diligently seek Him." But the intellectual yoke involved in the common idea of the Supernatural is a yoke which men impose upon themselves. Obscure thought and confused language are the main source of difficulty. [48/49] Assuredly, whatever may be the difficulties of Christianity, this is not one of them, — that it calls on us to believe in any exception to the universal prevalence and power of Law. Its leading facts and doctrines are directly connected with this belief, and directly suggestive of it. The Divine mission of Christ on earth — does not this imply not only the use of means to an end, but some inscrutable necessity that certain means, and these only, should be employed in resisting and overcoming evil? What else is the import of so many passages of Scripture implying that certain conditions were required to bring the Saviour of Man into a given relation with the race He was sent to save?" It behoved Him . . . . to make the Captain of our Salvation perfect through suffering."" It behoved Him in all things to be made like unto His brethren, that He might be," &c. with the reason added:"for in that He himself hath suffered being tempted, He is able to succour them that are tempted." Whatever more there may be in such passages, they all imply the universal reign of Law in the moral and spiritual, as well as in the material world: that those laws in [49/50] had to be — behoved to be — obeyed; and that the results to be obtained are brought about by the adaptation of means to an end, or, as it were, by way of natural consequence from the instrumentality employed. This, however, is an idea which systematic theology generally regards with intense suspicion, though, in fact, all theologies involve it, and build upon it. But then they are very apt to give explanations of that instrumentality which have no counterpart in the material or in the moral world. Perhaps it is not too much to say that the manifest decay which so many creeds and confessions are now suffering, arises mainly from the degree in which at least the popular expositions of them dissociate the doctrines of Christianity from the analogy and course of Nature. There is no such severance in Scripture — no shyness of illustrating Divine things by reference to the Natural. On the contrary, we are perpetually reminded that the laws of the spiritual world are in the highest sense laws of Nature, whose obligation, operation, and effect are all in the constitution and course of things. Hence it is that so much was capable of being conveyed [50/51] in the form of parable — the common actions and occurrences of daily life being often chosen as the best vehicle and illustration of the highest spiritual truths. It is not merely, as Jeremy Taylor says, that "all things are full of such resemblances,"it is more than this — more than resemblance. It is the perpetual recurrence, under infinite varieties of application, of the same rules and principles of Divine government, — of the same Divine thoughts, Divine purposes, Divine affections. Hence it is that no verbal definitions or logical forms can convey religious truth with the fulness or accuracy which belong to narratives taken from Natureman's nature and life being, of course, included in the term
And so, the Word had breath, and wrought
With human hands the Creed of creeds.14
The same idea is expressed in the passionate exclamation of Edward Irving: — We must speak in parables, or we must resent a wry and deceptive form of truth of which choice the first is to be preferred, and our Lord adopted it. Because parable is truth veiled, not truth dismembered [51/52] and as the eye of the understanding grows more piercing, the veil is seen through, and the truth stands revealed." Nature is the great Parable; and the truths which she holds within her are veiled, but not dismembered The pretended separation between that which lies within Nature and that which lies beyond Nature is a dismemberment of the truth. Let both those who find it difficult to believe in anything which is"above" the Natural, and those who insist on that belief, first determine how far the Natural extends. Perhaps in going round these marches they will find themselves meeting upon common ground. For, indeed, long before we have searched out all that the Natural includes, there will remain little in the so — called Supernatural which can seem hard of acceptance or belief — nothing which is not rather essential to our understanding of this otherwise "unintelligible world."
Last modified 10 December 2008


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In 2009, the Carrboro Board of Aldermen passed a resolution committing the Town to take steps to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases. In doing so, and through work both before and after the resolution, the Town has joined a group of more than 1000 cities, towns and metropolises around the world who are taking part in the Cities for Climate Protection Campaign.
In the fall of 2014, Carrboro held a series of 3 forums related to climate action planning at the ArtsCenter. Shortly thereafter, a Task Force was created and worked to draft a Community Climate Action Plan. Drafts of the plan were presented to the Board of Aldermen and Carrboro advisory boards and a public hearing on the plan was held in 2016. The Board of Aldermen accepted the plan in January 2017. The Town Council accepted an updated version of the plan in October 2020.
The plan recommends that Carrboro adopt a goal of an 80% reduction of per capita greenhouse gas emissions by 2030, cutting the carbon footprint in half over the next decade for the entire community, Town operations, the buildings and transportation "sectors", and ultimately each resident and business.
The plan provides recommendations to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, while raising the community's awareness of and involvement in solutions to global climate change and a post-carbon energy future, adaptation to changes, and enhancement of ecosystem resilience. Recommendations are provided around the themes of community integration, energy efficiency of buildings, transportation, renewable energy, ecosystem protection and restoration, and food choices. Measures outlined in the plan to reduce greenhouse gas emissions not only contribute to overall climate change mitigation, but can also provide the community with many local benefits such as financial savings through energy efficiency, the creation of new jobs, improved air quality and public health, and a healthier forest and streams.

subset: commoncrawl


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Pervious Concrete
You are probably here because you want to know more about Pervious Concrete. Welcome! Some know very little about it, while others may have heard or read a lot about it. It can be a wonderful, sustainable Green Product that will help heal the environment, or it may become a snake that can hurt you. The snake is incompetent installation or poor mix design.
We know Pervious Concrete can help develop land for the best intended use, feed the aquifer and can reduce cost when designed and installed right. We want you to know the difference between fiction and fact. For starters, don't believe everything you read or hear about it.
We are different. Gerald Mims pictured here, who heads our Concrete Division is a specialist with more than three decades of experience installing pervious concrete. Gerald says: "We don't just sell, write or talk about it, we have the more than 35 years of proven track-record working with pervious concrete!" Gerald is a hands-on leader with the integrity and wisdom to do it right the first time.
We were the first to put our widely accepted pervious concrete specification on the internet. We have updated and expanded it to prevent some serious problems we have observed because of developers and installers who do not understand what they are working with or how they are doing it! To some degree, methods, materials and responsibilities have changed so we continue to update our specification. The latest up date is posted on this site. We are not just builders who occasionally work with concrete. We are not concrete contractors who sub contract it. We clearly focus on pervious concrete and with our growing experience, we can still offer a 10-year warranty on it.
Reading other pages of our web site will help you understand how Pervious Concrete works to protect the environment while channeling rain water to the aquifer. You will learn what minimal maintenance is needed and why it continues to work well for decades.
We will also acquaint you with our other skills in working with concrete, creating functional and esthetically pleasing installations. If you look through our site you will learn more about the history and chemistry of concrete, its environmental considerations, and the many other skills that we have acquired while working with it for more than three decades. You will also learn the economics of using concrete vs. competing products. Read as much as you wish, and give us any feedback to help with future updates. We invite you to browse our site and educate yourself about all that we can offer you.


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Cheese Stuffed Crust Pizza
Perfect for a friday night!
There's nothing quite like Pizza Hut Stuffed Crust Pizza.
Sure, as low-carbers we've successfully been able to find ways around wishing for pizza, but the elusive cheese-in-the-crust was a pipe dream (like wrestling in the ECW) until now.
This recipe is a take from the cauliflower recipe. (Zucchini is a perfect choice for folks who don't appreciate the slightly pungent flavors of cauliflower florets.)
Unlike the original cauliflower (or zucchini) pizza crusts, an added dimension of Paremsan cheese, sprinkled on the pan serves two purposes:
1. It adds flavor;
2. When the crust is rolled to cover the addition of string cheese around the edges, the crust crisps up during the second baking, adding a slightly breadier quality to the crust.
This recipe is induction friendly and gluten-free.
Cauliflower Cheese Stuffed Crust Pizza
1 cup cooked, riced cauliflower*
1 egg
1 cup mozzarella cheese
1/2 tsp fennel
1 tsp oregano
2 tsp parsley
Parmesan cheese
3-4 packets of string cheese (individual)
pizza or Alfredo sauce**
toppings (make sure meats are cooked)
mozzarella cheese
Preheat oven to 450 degrees Fahrenheit.
Spray a cookie sheet with non-stick spray. Sprinkle with Parmesan cheese.
In a medium bowl, combine cauliflower, egg and mozzarella. Press out evenly on the pan. Sprinkle evenly with fennel, oregano and parsley.
Bake at 450 degrees for 12-15 minutes (15-20 minutes if you double the recipe). Remove from oven while pizza is golden but without turning edges dark.
Remove the pan from the oven. Allow to cool slightly (say, 15 minutes. This is important; you don't want to melt the cheese). Run a metal spatula around the outside edge of the crust to loosen it from the pan.
Working with string cheese, peel each into 3-4 strips. Take each strip and place them around the perimeter of the crust, making sure all strips are touching (for a thicker edge, use half to an entire piece of cheese per section). Carefully, roll the edge of the crust over to cover the cheese, and press down into the top of the crust. Continue working around the pan until the entire pizza's edges have been folded and pressed over the cheese.
Place pizza in the refrigerator for 30 minutes to cool completely.
After removing the crust from the refrigerator, and prior to baking, add sauce, toppings and cheese.
Place under a broiler (grill for the Europeans) at high heat just until cheese is melted **. Remove the pizza from the oven and slice through the center only, halving the pizza (you'll see why in a moment).
At this point the cheese in the crust will not be melted.
Reheat the oven to 450 degrees.
Bake pizza for 10 more minutes. Check to see if crust cheese is gooey by lifting up slightly near the cut line with a spatula. Bake until cheese in crust is melted and goo effect is achieved through the spatula lift test (should take no longer than 15 minutes). With practice, you won't need to cut the pizza anymore.
Serve warm. Can be reheated perfectly, and the cheese re-melts.
Serves: 8
Nutritional Information for 4-pieces string cheese around edge: 207 calories, 13 grams fat, 3 net carbs, 1.5 grams fiber, 18.5 grams protein.
Nutritional Information for 8-pieces string cheese around edge: 279 calories, 17 grams fat, 4 net carbs, 1.5 grams fiber, 24 grams protein.
** The pizza sauce I use is Great Value Pizza sauce from Wal-Mart. At only 4 net carbs per quarter cup, you get a lot of punch for little carbohydrate pow.


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Source: Courtesy of Wikimedia Commons
LEFROY, Sir JOHN HENRY, soldier, scientist, and colonial administrator; b. 28 Jan. 1817 in Ashe (Hampshire), England, the fourth son and sixth child of the Reverend John Henry George Lefroy and Sophia Cottrell; m. first 16 April 1846 Emily Merry (d. 1859), daughter of Sir John Beverley Robinson*, and they had two sons and two daughters; m. secondly 12 May 1860 in London, England, Charlotte Anna Mountain, née Dundas; d. 11 April 1890 in Lewarne, Cornwall, England.
John Henry Lefroy was educated in private schools before entering the Royal Military Academy in Woolwich (now part of London) in January 1831. Upon graduation he was appointed a 2nd lieutenant in the Royal Artillery on 19 Dec. 1834. A deeply religious man throughout his life, while he was stationed at Woolwich for the next few years he joined with fellow officers in weekly Bible readings and prayer meetings and in conducting a Sunday school for soldiers' children. He displayed an early aptitude for science, describing himself as a "zealous labourer in a field of real interest," and during a three-month posting at Chatham in 1837 he studied practical astronomy at the Royal Engineers Establishment.
In 1839 the British government began in earnest to create a network of colonial observatories and to launch a series of expeditions to study terrestrial magnetism, both under the direction of Edward Sabine. Lefroy was one of the first three officers chosen for the observatories planned for Upper Canada, St Helena, and the Cape of Good Hope. Shortly after their selection they proceeded to Dublin for instruction from Britain's foremost expert in magnetism, Professor Humphrey Lloyd of Trinity College. On 25 Sept. 1839 Lefroy embarked for St Helena.
The Toronto observatory, which was to become the foremost post in the imperial network, had been in operation for about two years when Lefroy arrived in October 1842 to take up the superintendency. He found that "the work had fallen terribly in arrears." Nevertheless, planning began almost immediately on an expedition to the northwest to ascertain the geomagnetic characteristics of British North America and to attempt to locate the magnetic north pole. With his assistant, William Henry, ra, and in the company of a brigade headed by John McLean, Lefroy left Lachine, Canada East, on 1 May 1843, beginning a 5,000-mile trek which was to last 18 months and bring him back to Toronto in November 1844.
Lefroy and his assistant took magnetic observations at more than 300 stations. While wintering at Fort Chipewyan (Alta) they took observations every hour from 16 Oct. 1843 to 29 Feb. 1844, and every two minutes, for hours at a time, during high magnetic disturbances. Later at Fort Simpson (N.W.T.), from 26 March to 25 May, Lefroy "carried on hourly observations as assiduously . . . as I had at Fort Chipewyan." He travelled as far north as Fort Good Hope (N.W.T.) on the Mackenzie River and as far west as Fort Simpson. In Notes of a twenty-five years' service McLean noted "his gentlemanly bearing and affable manners [which] endeared him to us all" and also called him "the ablest mangeur de lard [novice] we have had in the country for a number of years." The scientific findings of the trip were communicated to the Royal Society by Sabine and later published jointly in 1855 with findings of Sir John Richardson* at Fort Confidence (N.W.T.); in 1883 Lefroy published his Diary of a magnetic survey thus providing a personal account of his most significant scientific work.
During his travels in the northwest Lefroy met some of its leading and most colourful figures including Sir George Simpson* and the Reverend James Evans*, and he became interested in the "general condition of the Indians," especially "the strong desire which pervades many of them for Christian Instruction." His journals of the expedition are filled with notes on geology, people, customs, and traditions. His personal observations, moralistic and anecdotal, were recorded in his Autobiography, which was published posthumously by his widow "for private circulation only," and can be found as well in In search of the magnetic north, a collection of his letters from the northwest edited for publication in 1955.
Shortly after his marriage in 1846 Lefroy and his wife left Toronto, accompanied by George William Allan and his bride (also a daughter of Sir John Beverley Robinson), to honeymoon in Europe. While in England Lefroy visited Sabine who was "very hot" to introduce photography to magnetic registration at Toronto; Lefroy, however, felt that it was "altogether premature." It was not their first disagreement. In his autobiography Lefroy complains that Sabine had given him no credit for the intense effort involved in the hourly observations at Fort Chipewyan and that when the trip's expenses were much higher than expected Sabine "threw the blame on me, even to the extent of denying that he had ever authorized me to winter in the north-west." Nevertheless Lefroy returned to Toronto on 21 Nov. 1846 and spent the next few years "endeavouring to reduce the registration of magnetic phenomena by photography to a practical certainty" as well as carrying on the current work of the observatory. The observations at Toronto during Lefroy's tenure were perhaps the most complete of any taken throughout the British network. Before he returned to England in April 1853 he was involved in the transfer of the observatory to the provincial government on 31 March 1853; as president of the Canadian Institute he worked with the members to persuade the government to purchase the observatory's instruments and books, and to continue at its expense the high standard of the operation which occasioned intense local pride [see George Templeman Kingston].
During his sojourn in Toronto Lefroy carried on a host of activities, mostly connected with the scientific community. On 9 June 1848 he was elected a fellow of the Royal Society; he was later elected a fellow of the Royal Geographical Society, the Geological Society of London, and the Society of Antiquaries. He was 1st vice-president in 1851–52 and then president in 1852–53 of the Canadian Institute, the founding of which in 1849 was a major sign of the scientific ferment in Canada at the time. Toronto's first book club, whose membership included some of the city's leading citizens, was founded and managed by Lefroy. On travels to the United States he became acquainted with some of the leading American scientists, including Alexander Dallas Bache, Joseph Henry, and Jean Louis Rodolphe Agassiz. Lefroy also published papers in American and Canadian journals on scientific subjects and on the Indian population.
Back in England with a reputation based on his work in Toronto, Lefroy became a scientific adviser on artillery to the War Office during the Crimean War, was involved in reform of the armed forces, and served on numerous military committees before being appointed inspector-general of army schools and later director-general of the Ordnance Office (from 1868 to 1870). During this period he became increasingly involved in the activities of the Royal Artillery Institution and contributed to its professional journal. Following his retirement from the army on 1 April 1870 with the honorary rank of major-general, he served as governor of Bermuda (1871–77) and briefly, beginning in 1880, as governor of Tasmania. After his return to England he published a number of papers on a wide range of subjects, mainly military. He was awarded a cb in 1870 and a kcmg in 1877.
Lefroy returned to Canada twice, the first visit being a brief one in 1877 when illness forced him to leave Bermuda for England. His final visit was in 1884 when as president of the geographical section of the British Association for the Advancement of Science he delivered the presidential address at its annual meeting in Montreal. While there he was awarded an lld from McGill College, "so that I have at last the right to a cap and gown, the object of my ambition." He and his second wife were entertained by Governor General Lord Lansdowne [Petty-Fitzmaurice*] at Quebec City and by Lieutenant Governor John Beverley Robinson*, his brother-in-law, in Toronto. Lefroy journeyed to the Canadian west with the object of viewing the Rockies, but in Winnipeg his strength waned and he had to return to England. Conditions on this trip were significantly different: the crossing of Lake Superior, which had earlier taken him a week, was accomplished in one day by steamer. He was taken sick the day he landed in England, from "heart weakness" and bronchitis. His remaining days were marked with frequent attacks of illness "always borne with patience and cheerfulness."
Perhaps the most significant appraisal of Lefroy's importance to science came in 1874 from his former mentor, Humphrey Lloyd, who described his work as "probably the most remarkable contribution to our knowledge of the phenomena of magnetic disturbances." Although his scientific accomplishments were more the result of diligence than inspiration, his work at Toronto and in the northwest earned a great deal of admiration for both himself and the observatory, in Britain as well as in Canada.
Carol M. Whitfield and Richard A. Jarrell
Sir John Henry Lefroy was the author of Autobiography of General Sir John Henry Lefroy, C.B., K.C.M.G., F.R.S., etc., colonel commandant Royal Artillery, ed. [C. A.] Lefroy (London, [1895]); Diary of a magnetic survey of a portion of the dominion of Canada chiefly in the northwestern territories executed in the years 1842–1844 (London, 1883); In search of the magnetic north: a soldier surveyor's letters from the north-west, 1843–1844, ed. G. F. G. Stanley (Toronto, 1955); "The president's annual address," Canadian Journal, 1 (1852–53): 121–24; "Sir Henry Lefroy's journey to the north-west in 1843–4," ed. W. S. Wallace, RSC Trans., 3rd ser., 32 (1938), sect.ii: 67–96; and, with John Richardson, of Magnetical and meteorological observations at Lake Athabasca and Fort Simpson, by Captain J. H. Lefroy, Royal Artillery; and at Fort Confidence, in Great Bear Lake, by Sir John Richardson, C.B., M.D. (London, 1855).
PAC, MG 24, H25. PRO, Meteorological Office, BJ 3 (Sabine papers) (mfm. at PAC). John McLean, Notes of a twenty-five years' service in the Hudson's Bay territory (2v., London, 1849; repub. as John McLean's notes of a twenty-five year's service in the Hudson's Bay territory, ed. W. S. Wallace, Toronto, 1932). "Memorial of the Canadian Institute to the three branches of the legislature to continue the Royal Magnetic Observatory under provincial management," Canadian Journal, 1 (1852–53): 145–47. "The observatory," Canadian Journal, 1: 282–83. DNB. Morgan, Bibliotheca Canadensis, 220–21. W. S. Wallace, "A soldier-scientist in the north-west," Queen's Quarterly, 45 (1938): 394–400.
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Carol M. Whitfield and Richard A. Jarrell, "LEFROY, Sir JOHN HENRY," in Dictionary of Canadian Biography, vol. 11, University of Toronto/Université Laval, 2003–, accessed February 22, 2024, http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/lefroy_john_henry_11E.html.
The citation above shows the format for footnotes and endnotes according to the Chicago manual of style (16th edition). Information to be used in other citation formats:
Permalink: | http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/lefroy_john_henry_11E.html |
Author of Article: | Carol M. Whitfield and Richard A. Jarrell |
Title of Article: | LEFROY, Sir JOHN HENRY |
Publication Name: | Dictionary of Canadian Biography, vol. 11 |
Publisher: | University of Toronto/Université Laval |
Year of publication: | 1982 |
Year of revision: | 1982 |
Access Date: | February 22, 2024 |


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What do Makeup Artists typically charge for bridal makeup in Delhi?
I finally called up my roka MUA and asked her how much she will charge for bridal makeup. She quoted INR 7,000 (excluding hairstyling) which I am not comfortable paying, considering a few months back I was her first client for a makeover at MAC. Am I being unfair?
Madonna at Kailash Colony market charges INR 10,000 for bridal makeup, hairstyle, hairwash, lehenga draping - the works. For the same services, b:blunt at Greater Kailash II charges INR 14,000 (they use only MAC products). But for both of them, you need to go to their parlor to get it done. I don't know, I'm so confused! SOS fellow brides and MUAs!


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The first comprehensive map of hummingbirds' 22-million-year-old family tree — reconstructed based on careful analysis of 284 of the world's 338 known species — tells a story of rapid and ongoing diversification. The decade-long study reported in the Cell Press journalCurrent Biology on April 3 also helps to explain how today's hummingbirds came to live where they do.
Part of the secret to the birds' remarkable success lies in the formation of nine principal groups or clades, hummingbirds' unique relationship to flowering plants, and the birds' continued spread into new geographic areas, the researchers say.
"Hummingbirds have essentially been reinventing themselves throughout their 22-million-year history," says Jim McGuire of the University of California, Berkeley.
While all hummingbirds depend on flower nectar to fuel their high metabolisms and hovering flight, coordinated changes in flower and bill shape have helped to drive the formation of new species of both hummingbirds and plants. Remarkably, as many as 25 hummingbird species are able to coexist in some places.
"One of the really cool features of hummingbird evolution is that they all eat the same thing yet have diversified dramatically," McGuire says. "It really is a big surprise that hummingbirds have divided the nectarivore niche so extensively."
The new, time-calibrated evolutionary tree shows that ancestral hummingbirds split from the swifts and treeswifts about 42 million years ago, probably in Eurasia. By about 22 million years ago, the ancestral species of all modern hummingbirds had made its way to South America, and that's when things really took off.
The Andes Mountains are a particular hotspot for hummingbird evolution, because diversification occurred along with the uplift of those peaks over the past 10 million years. About 140 hummingbird species live in the Andes today.
The availability of new land areas in North America and the Caribbean has also played an important role in the evolution of new hummingbird species. For example, McGuire says, the bee hummingbirds colonized North America about 5 million years ago and consequently experienced rates of speciation that rival textbook examples of adaptive radiation.
The new picture of the birds' past is an important step toward understanding how they have adapted to novel environments, like those found at low-oxygen, high-altitude mountain peaks. It also points to an exciting future.
"Our findings strongly indicate that hummingbirds remain engaged in a dynamic diversification process, filling available ecological and spatial niches across North America, South America, and the Caribbean," the researchers write. "Thus, the dramatic radiation of this unique avian lineage is far from complete."


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Shifting the world's reliance on fossil fuels to renewable energy sources is important, certainly. But the world's best chance for achieving timely, disaster-averting climate change may actually be a vegetarian diet eating less meat, according to a recent report in World Watch Magazine. (While I'd happily nudge the world toward a vegetarian diet, the report authors are more measured and simply suggest diets containing less meat.)
"The entire goal of today's international climate objectives can be achieved by replacing just one-fourth of today's least eco-friendly food products with better alternatives," co-author Robert Goodland, a former World Bank Group environmental advisor wrote in an April 18 blog post on the report.
A widely cited 2006 report estimated that 18% of worldwide greenhouse gas emissions were attributable to cattle, buffalo, sheep, goats, camels, pigs and poultry. However, analysis performed by Goodland, with co-writer Jeff Anhang, an environmental specialist at the World Bank Group's International Finance Corporation, found that figure to now more accurately be 51%.
Consequently, state the pair, replacing livestock products with meat alternatives would "have far more rapid effects on greenhouse gas emissions and their atmospheric concentrations — and thus on the rate the climate is warming — than actions to replace fossil fuels with renewable energy."
The pair describe several areas related to anthropogenic (human-caused) greenhouse gases that have been overlooked or underestimated. For example, livestock breathing. They explain:
[L]ivestock (like automobiles) are a human invention and convenience, not part of pre-human times, and a molecule of CO2 exhaled by livestock is no more natural than one from an auto tailpipe. Moreover, while over time an equilibrium of CO2 may exist between the amount respired by animals and the amount photosynthesized by plants, that equilibrium has never been static. Today, tens of billions more livestock are exhaling CO2 than in preindustrial days, while Earth's photosynthetic capacity (its capacity to keep carbon out of the atmosphere by absorbing it in plant mass) has declined sharply as forest has been cleared. (Meanwhile, of course, we add more carbon to the air by burning fossil fuels, further overwhelming the carbon-absorption system.)
The human population is expected to grow by 35% between 2006 and 2050, while livestock numbers are expected to double during the same period.
"This would make the amount of livestock-related emissions even more unacceptable than today's perilous levels," states the report. "It also means that an effective strategy must involved replacing livestock products with better alternatives, rather than substituting one meat product with another that has a somewhat lower carbon footprint."
Food companies, Goodland and Anhang believe, have at least three incentives to respond to current risks in their industry. The first is that companies already suffer from disruptive climate events — floods, hurricanes, etc. — and so it's in their best interests to not worsen the situation.
Second, they expect the demand for oil to rise to point of collapsing "many parts of today's economy." One way in which this will be particularly troublesome for livestock producers will be that crops grown for feed will be refocused on biofuel sources.
A third incentive is to offer "alternatives to livestock products that taste similar but are easier to cook, less expensive and healthier, and so are better than livestock products."
Sales of just soy "analogs," or alternatives to livestock products — such as ice cream, milk and cheese — totaled $1.9 billion in 2007. That same year, sales of U.S. meat and poultry products totaled $100 billion — which they optimistically suggest means there's much room for growth.
"Worldwide, the market for meat and dairy analogs is potentially almost as big as the market for livestock products," they write.
Still further motivation, they note: "Meat and dairy analog projects will not only slow climate change but also help ease the global food crisis, as it takes a much smaller quantity of crops to produce any given number of calories in the form of an analog than a livestock product."
Plus, meat alternatives would help to alleviate the global water crisis, since livestock production uses a tremendous amount of water; it could have health and nutritional benefits; and, given that meat alternatives are more labor intensive, they would create both more jobs and more skilled jobs — while workers in the livestock industry could be retrained for jobs in meat-alternative industries.
"The case for change is no longer only a public policy or an ethical case, but is now also a business case," write Goodland and Anhang. "We believe it is the best available business case among all industries to reverse climate change quickly."


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According to Obama, in one of his interminable speeches which all run together and sound the same, there really isn't a war, just a mission, and the old mission is now becoming a new sort of mission, and the missions, all of them, whether in Afghanistan or Iraq, have been successful which is why we are wrapping them up, except that we aren't really. And that's about as clear as the message from the big white building with the neatly mowed lawn out front gets, except for the part about how its occupant singlehandedly parachuted into Pakistan, killed Bin Laden, and then stopped off for some curry and a humanitarian award.
Had McCain won in 2008, we would no doubt he hearing a lot about the "D" word and the quagmire in Afghanistan. But the "Q" word doesn't really get mentioned either. No war has been lost. Only a mission is ending. And missions, unlike wars, can be defined in so many creative ways that it's hard to know what to make of them. It's easy to tell when a war has been lost, but a mission can never be lost, only renamed. And renaming is what Obama did to the Iraq War and the War in Afghanistan. Those wars weren't lost; they're only hiding out in the history books under new names and identities.
Wars are usually remembered according to the proclivities of their historians. The history books tend to record the Republican presidents of the last hundred years as either losing wars or winning wars that weren't worth winning. Democrats however usually win every one.
The Korean War and the Vietnam War were not that far in perception at the time, but are worlds apart in the history books. Had John F. Kennedy lived to serve out two terms and then passed on the big chair to his brother, would the history books even record that the United States lost the Vietnam War? Or would it, like Afghanistan, have gone down as a story about a difficult temporary intervention that ended successfully under the leadership of a wise and caring president?
It is difficult to imagine the left's narrative of the last century with such a big and meaty chunk taken out of it. What would have become of Oliver Stone's career without the JFK assassination and the mythology of a cruel and senseless war in Vietnam? Or imagine the last decade if Biden and Gore had managed to talk Clinton into going after Saddam. As entertaining as such speculations might be, renaming missions and tampering with the history books does not alter the outcome of wars.
From the early days, the left had gloated that Afghanistan would become another Vietnam. And like the appointment in Samarra, in attempting to escape that Vietnamness, it repeated many of the follies of Vietnam and few of its triumphs, failing to press the advantage while expending thousands of lives based on abstract theories hatched by the bright boys in Washington and fraudulent books passed on by the wives of generals to their husbands.
We are now in the Afghanistanization stage, hanging around a country for no particular purpose, except that we aren't very good at departures and the men who made this mess still think that Karzai and his crew can make this work if we provide them with some more training and air support without being shot in the back.
And when we have finally left and Karzai's cobbled together government collapses, its ministers absconding to Paris and Pakistan with suitcases full of stolen aid dollars, what comes after the war?
The old conflict aimed at denying Al Qaeda one base of operations had been outdated a few years after it began. That was something that Bush instinctively understood and that his critics have only slowly become aware of. Al Qaeda is not a country or an ethnic group. It is a religious vanguard that was always meant to serve as the core of an international Islamist terrorist movement. That function had been fulfilled long before an old man watching porn in a covert compound with no authority over anyone except his many wives was finally put down the hard way.
Al Qaeda, like the Communist Party, can rise anywhere. It rose in Iraq, in Somalia, in Mali, in Syria and in countless other places. Like Burger King, the franchise possibilities are endless and the brand name recognition is universal. And unlike Burger King, you don't even need to pay for the privilege of using the name. Set off a few bombs or kill a few foreigners and watch the money start rolling in from the fat sheiks of the oil-swollen Gulf who have never slit the throat of anything larger than a goat, but like having their own terror armies.
Obama, despite his third culture cred and his ability to carry around important books about world events while on vacation, has no clue what to do about any of that. Obama at War is really a dumber Bush at War, rehashing Bush era ideas and tactics with completely botched implementations. With Kabul in the rear-view mirror, all he has left is Bush's policy of targeted drone strikes on Al Qaeda terrorist leaders.
The only other foreign policy idea that the Obama crew brought to the table, aside from ending the support for the dictators, which ushered in the Arab Spring and the Islamization of the region, was to avoid ground wars and focus on limited drone strikes and intelligence operations.
This approach has been rebranded as the smarter and smaller war. A true conflict for the 21st with Muslim grad students in Yemen chatting on XBox Live with Muslim teenagers in Jersey City to convince them to make and carry liquid explosives on board a plane in tiny shampoo bottles while overhead a drone piloted by a formerly unemployed middle-aged professional skier with a degree in drone piloting from Kansas State hunts for them silently in their clan territories. It's the world of a William Gibson novel, except it's also our world now.
The targeted strike approach was largely borrowed from the Israeli playbook. Like Israel, the United States is in a tangled conflict that won't end any time soon. And like Israel, it's relying on saving some lives and weakening the terrorist infrastructure by taking out a few leaders here and there. Israel's targeted strikes on Hamas and Islamic Jihad leaders never ended the conflict, but aborted more than a few terrorist plots by killing the bomb-makers and planners who were making them happen.
The actual conflict did not end. Neither did the attacks. Rather than shooting soldiers, Israel was shooting officers, because shooting soldiers required extended ground engagements and occupations that had become politically untenable. The United States has embraced the same strategy for the same reasons using technology that came out of Israel. But it hasn't given much thought to what comes after that.
The failure of the targeted strikes and arrests of terrorist leaders led Israel to pursue a physical separation through barriers and fences. The terrorists compensated for that with rockets and shelling. That led Israel to develop the Iron Dome, a defensive anti-rocket system. The suicide bomber, once ubiquitous, became a rarity, but the attacks have grown more powerful as the terrorists used the territory that they gained through Israeli withdrawals to deploy heavier long-range weapons that can reach major cities.
If the United States follows this same pattern of withdrawal and fortification, then by 2028, there might be an actual Fortress America guarded by anti-missile systems against Pakistani, Iranian and Egyptian nukes. And that scenario, as troubled as it sounds, is probably one of the better ones.
Israel withdrew from physical territories opening the way for a Hamas takeover of Gaza. Obama withdrew from geopolitical territories, announcing in Cairo that the United States would no longer support the undemocratic dictators of the Muslim world unless they had oil. Hamas, or its Egyptian parent organization, took over Egypt. Across the region, Islamist regimes rose and American allies fell. The Islamist winners of democratic elections turned into dictators leaving the United States in the awkward position of supporting new dictators while being jeered and denounced by the Arab Street.
What's the next step? It doesn't appear that there is one. Geniuses like Brennan only thought as far ahead as draining Muslim anger by rewarding political Islamists while using drone warfare to decimate violent Islamists. Not only is this distinction mostly imaginary, but the rise of political Islamists has made for more Al Qaeda takeovers and more work for the drones in North Africa.
The plan has failed and the second term is underway. It is very doubtful that Obama, whose big plan for Afghanistan was to copy the Bush plan for Iraq that he denounced in the Senate, has a backup plan. Brennan certainly does not. Secretary of State John Kerry is spending a lot of time talking about Global Warming while waiting a week for a callback from Russia. It's hard to think of a worse bunch of people in whose hands to put the fate of the nation and the world.
Both Bush and Obama largely missed the point of September 11, which is that it matters less how many training camps Al Qaeda has in some desert where there are more drugs and RPGs than people, but how many operatives they have in the United States. The terrorist attacks carried out by Al Qaeda in America all required that their operatives either be in the United States or have permission to enter it. The truly dangerous training camps aren't in Mali or in Afghanistan; they are in Jersey City and Minneapolis. The easiest way to stop the next Al Qaeda terrorist attack is to end immigration from the Muslim world.
That is not a position that any presidential candidate, Republican or Democrat, is likely to run on any time soon. Instead anyone who wants the job is salivating at the prospect of pinning Green Cards to anyone with a university degree. Articulating it is taboo even in Israel. And yet after Afghanistan, the United States might find that it has no choice but to build that southern border fence and to slash immigration from the more explosive parts of the world. That revelation may not come tomorrow, but it likely will come.
In Israel, it was Rabin who stated that Gaza had to be taken out of Tel Aviv and who began the construction of the West Bank security barrier because he realized that terrorism would destroy the peace process. An American Rabin may well be a liberal who is forced to come to the realization that the only way to avoid constant conflicts with the Muslim world is to begin cutting off the flow of Muslim immigrants to America.
Such a realization, if it ever comes, is still a long way off. For now the drone war remains a clumsy fallback position. As long as there are no major terrorist attacks, the limited drone strikes are enough to satisfy most Americans. But when one of the Al Qaeda franchises begins poring over blueprints of a major American landmark and another September 11 follows, then the question that has been held in abeyance after Afghanistan will suddenly reappear. What do we do now?


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SYDNEY – Former U.S. Open champion Samantha Stosur has split with coach David Taylor and says Australian Fed Cup captain Alicia Molik will fill in on an interim basis.
Stosur won the U.S. Open in 2011, beating Serena Williams, and was a French Open finalist in 2010.
She says on the Tennis Australia website Saturday that "after six years working together my coach David Taylor and I have decided to part ways ... I owe so much of my success to Dave's hard work and enduring support."
The Australian won nine of 10 matches before being defeated by Simona Halep in the third round at Cincinnati on Thursday.
Taylor resigned as Australia's Fed Cup captain in December 2012 after seven years in the position to concentrate solely on coaching Stosur.