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Theory of Games and Economic BehaviorJohn von Neumann, Oskar Morgenstern
This is the classic work upon which modern-day game theory is based. What began more than sixty years ago as a modest proposal that a mathematician and an economist write a short paper together blossomed, in 1944, when Princeton University Press published Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. In it, John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern conceived a groundbreaking mathematical theory of economic and social organization, based on a theory of games of strategy. Not only would this revolutionize economics, but the entirely new field of scientific inquiry it yielded--game theory--has since been widely used to analyze a host of real-world phenomena from arms races to optimal policy choices of presidential candidates, from vaccination policy to major league baseball salary negotiations. And it is today established throughout both the social sciences and a wide range of other sciences.
This sixtieth anniversary edition includes not only the original text but also an introduction by Harold Kuhn, an afterword by Ariel Rubinstein, and reviews and articles on the book that appeared at the time of its original publication in the New York Times, tthe American Economic Review, and a variety of other publications. Together, these writings provide readers a matchless opportunity to more fully appreciate a work whose influence will yet resound for generations to come.
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^ CO DO [<OU_1 66986 ^ Osmania University Library Call No. "7 ^ ' ' " "* Accession No. G? 3 *> Author Title This book should be returned on or before the date last marked below. THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR By JOHN VON NEUMANN, and OSKAR MORGENSTERN PRINCETON PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS 1953 Copyright 1944, by Princeton University Press PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OP AMERICA Second printing (SECOND EDITION), 1947 Third printing, 1948 Fourth printing, 1950 Fifth printing (THIRD EDITION), 1953 Sixth printing, 1955 LONDON: GEOFFREY CUMBERLEGE OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS PREFACE TO FIRST EDITION This book contains an exposition and various applications of a mathe- matical theory of games. The theory has been developed by one of us since 1928 and is now published for the first time in its entirety. The applications are of two kinds: On the one hand to games in the proper sense, on the other hand to economic and sociological problems which, as we hope to show, are best approached from this direction. The applications which we shall make to games serve at least as much to corroborate the theory as to investigate these games. The nature of this reciprocal relationship will become clear as the investigation proceeds. Our major interest is, of course, in the economic and sociological direction. Here we can approach only the simplest questions. However, these ques- tions are of a fundamental character. Furthermore, our aim is primarily to show that there is a rigorous approach to these subjects, involving, as they do, questions of parallel or opposite interest, perfect or imperfect infor- mation, free rational decision or chance influences. JOHN VON NEUMANN OSKAR MORGENSTERN. PRINCETON, N. J. January, 1943. PREFACE TO SECOND EDITION The second edition differs from the first in some minor respects only. We have carried out as complete an elimination of misprints as possible, and wish to thank several readers who have helped us in that respect. We have added an Appendix containing an axiomatic derivation of numerical utility. This subject was discussed in considerable detail, but in the main qualita- tively, in Section 3. A publication of this proof in a periodical was promised in the first edition, but we found it more convenient to add it as an Appendix. Various Appendices on applications to the theory of location of industries and on questions of the four and five person games were also planned, but had to be abandoned because of the pressure of other work. Since publication of the first edition several papers dealing with the subject matter of this book have appeared. The attention of the mathematically interested reader may be drawn to the following: A. Wald developed a new theory of the foundations of statistical estimation which is closely related to, and draws on, the theory of vi PREFACE TO SECOND EDITION the zero-sum two-person game (" Statistical Decision Functions Which Minimize the Maximum Risk," Annals of Mathematics, Vol. 46 (1945) pp. 265-280). He also extended the main theorem of the zero-sum two- person games (cf. 17.6.) to certain continuous-infinite-cases, (" Generalization of a Theorem by von Neumann Concerning Zero-Sum Two-Person Games," Annals of Mathematics, Vol. 46 (1945), pp. 281-286.) A new, very simple and elementary proof of this theorem (which covers also the more general theorem referred to in footnote 1 on page 154) was given by L. H. Loomis, ("On a Theorem of von Neumann," Proc. Nat. Acad., Vol. 32 (1946) pp. 213- 215). Further, interesting results concerning the role of pure and of mixed strategies in the zero-sum two-person game were obtained by /. Kaplanski, ("A Contribution to von Neumann's Theory of Games," Annals of Mathe- matics, Vol. 46 (1945), pp. 474-479). We also intend to come back to vari- ous mathematical aspects of this problem. The group theoretical problem mentioned in footnote 1 on page 258 was solved by C. Chevalley. The economically interested reader may find an easier approach to the problems of this book in the expositions of L. Hururicz, ("The Theory of Economic Behavior," American Economic Review, Vol. 35 (1945), pp. 909- 925) and of J. Marschak ("Neumann's and Morgenstern's New Approach to Static Economics," Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 54, (1946), pp. 97-115). JOHN VON NEUMANN OSKAR MORGENSTERN PRINCETON, N. J. September, 1946. PREFACE TO THIRD EDITION The Third Edition differs from the Second Edition only in the elimination of such further misprints as have come to our attention in the meantime, and we wish to thank several readers who have helped us in that respect. Since the publication of the Second Edition, the literature on this subject has increased very considerably. A complete bibliography at this writing includes several hundred titles. We are therefore not attempting to give one here. We will only list the following books on this subject: (1) H. W. Kuhn and A. W. Tucker (eds.), " Contributions to the Theory of Games, I," Annals of Mathematics Studies, No. 24, Princeton (1950), containing fifteen articles by thirteen authors. (2) H. W. Kuhn and A. W. Tucker (eds.), " Contributions to the Theory of Games, II," Annals of Mathematics Studies, No. 28, Princeton (1953), containing twenty-one articles by twenty-two authors. (3) J '. McDonald, Strategy in Poker, Business and War, New York (1950). (4) J. C. C. McKinsey, Introduction to the Theory of Games, New York (1952). (5) A. Wald, Statistical Decision Functions, New York (1950). (6) J. Williams, The Compleat Strategyst, Being a Primer on the Theory of Games of Strategy, New York (1953). Bibliographies on the subject are found in all of the above books except (6). Extensive work in this field has been done during the last years by the staff of the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California. A bibliography of this work can be found in the RAND publication RM-950. In the theory of n-person games, there have been some further develop- ments in the direction of " non-cooperative" games. In this respect, particularly the work of J. F. Nash, " Non-cooperative Games," Annals of Mathematics, Vol. 54, (1951), pp. 286-295, must be mentioned. Further references to this work are found in (1), (2), and (4). Of various developments in economics we mention in particular "linear programming" and the " assignment problem" which also appear to be increasingly connected with the theory of games. The reader will find indications of this $gain in (1), (2), and (4). The theory of utility suggested in Section 1.3., and in the Appendix to the Second Edition has undergone considerable development theoretically, as well as experimentally, and in various discussions. In this connection, the reader may consult in particular the following: M. Friedman and L. J. Savage, "The Utility Analysis of Choices Involv- ing Risk," Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 56, (1948), pp. 279-304. vii viii PREFACE TO THIRD EDITION J. Marschak, "Rational Behavior, Uncertain Prospects, and Measurable Utility/' Econometrica, Vol. 18, (1950), pp. 111-141. F. Mosteller and P. Nogee, " An Experimental Measurement of Utility," Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 59, (1951), pp. 371-404. M. Friedman and L. J. Savage, "The Expected- Utility Hypothesis and the Measurability of Utility," Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 60, (1952), pp. 463-474. See also the Symposium on Cardinal Utilities in Econometrica, Vol. 20, (1952): H. Wold, "Ordinal Preferences or Cardinal Utility?" A. S. Manne, "The Strong Independence Assumption Gasoline Blends and Probability Mixtures." P. A. Samuelson, "Probability, Utility, and the Independence Axiom." E. Malinvaud, "Note on von Neumann-Morgenstem's Strong Inde- pendence Axiom." In connection with the methodological critique exercised by some of the contributors to the last-mentioned symposium, we would like to mention that we applied the axiomatic method in the customary way with the cus- tomary precautions. Thus the strict, axiomatic treatment of the concept of utility (in Section 3.6. and in the Appendix) is complemented by an heuristic preparation (in Sections 3.1.-3.5.). The latter's function is to convey to the reader the viewpoints to evaluate and to circumscribe the validity of the subsequent axiomatic procedure. In particular our dis- cussion and selection of "natural operations" in those sections covers what seems to us the relevant substrate of the Samuelson-Malinvaud "inde- pendence axiom." JOHN VON NEUMANN OSKAR MORGENSTERN PRINCETON, N. J. January, 1953. TECHNICAL NOTE The nature of the problems investigated and the techniques employed in this book necessitate a procedure which in many instances is thoroughly mathematical. The mathematical devices used are elementary in the sense that no advanced algebra, or calculus, etc., occurs. (With two, rather unim- portant, exceptions: Part of the discussion of an example in 19.7. et sequ. and a remark in A.3.3. make use of some simple integrals.) Concepts originating in set theory, linear geometry and group theory play an important role, but they are invariably taken from the early chapters of those disciplines and are moreover analyzed and explained in special expository sections. Neverthe- less the book is not truly elementary because the mathematical deductions are frequently intricate and the logical possibilities are extensively exploited. Thus no specific knowledge of any particular body of advanced mathe- matics is required. However, the reader who wants to acquaint himself more thoroughly with the subject expounded here, will have to familiarize himself with the mathematical way of reasoning definitely beyond its routine, primitive phases. The character of the procedures will be mostly that of mathematical logics, set theory and functional analysis. We have attempted to present the subject in such a form that a reader who is moderately versed in mathematics can acquire the necessary practice in the course of this study. We hope that we have not entirely failed in this endeavour. In accordance with this, the presentation is not what it would be in a strictly mathematical treatise. All definitions and deductions are con- siderably broader than they would be there. Besides, purely verbal dis- cussions and analyses take up a considerable amount of space. We have in particular tried to give, whenever possible, a parallel verbal exposition for every major mathematical deduction. It is hoped that this procedure will elucidate in unmathematical language what the mathematical technique signifies and will also show where it achieves more than can be done without it. In this, as well as in our methodological stand, we are trying to follow the best examples of theoretical physics. The reader who is not specifically interested in mathematics should at first omit those sections of the book which in his judgment are too mathe- matical. We prefer not to give a definite list of them, since this judgment must necessarily be subjective. However, those sections marked with an asterisk in the table of contents are most likely to occur to the average reader in this connection. At any rate he will find that these omissions will little interfere with the comprehension of the early parts, although the logical TECHNICAL NOTE chain may in the rigorous sense have suffered an interruption. As he proceeds the omissions will gradually assume a more serious character and the lacunae in the deduction will become more and more significant. The reader is then advised to start again from the beginning since the greater familiarity acquired is likely to facilitate a better understanding. ACKNOWLEDGMENT The authors wish to express their thanks to Princeton University and to the Institute for Advanced Study for their generous help which rendered this publication possible. They are also greatly indebted to the Princeton University Press which has made every effort to publish this book in spite of wartime difficulties. The publisher has shown at all times the greatest understanding for the authors' wishes. CONTENTS PREFACE v TECHNICAL NOTE ix ACKNOWLEDGMENT x CHAPTER I FORMULATION OF THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM 1. THE MATHEMATICAL METHOD IN ECONOMICS 1 1.1. Introductory remarks 1 1.2. Difficulties of the application of the mathematical method 2 1.3. Necessary limitations of the objectives 6 1.4. Concluding remarks 7 2. QUALITATIVE DISCUSSION OF THE PROBLEM OF RATIONAL BEHAV- IOR 8 2.1. The problem of rational behavior 8 2.2. "Robinson Crusoe" economy and social exchange economy 9 2.3. The number of variables and the number of participants 12 2.4. The case of many participants: Free competition 13 2.5. The "Lausanne" theory 15 3. THE NOTION OF UTILITY 15 3.1. Preferences and utilities 15 3.2. Principles of measurement: Preliminaries 16 3.3. Probability and numerical utilities 17 3.4. Principles of measurement: Detailed discussion 20 3.5. Conceptual structure of the axiomatic treatment of numerical utilities 24 3.6. The axioms and their interpretation 26 3.7. General remarks concerning the axioms 28 3.8. The role of the concept of marginal utility 29 4. STRUCTURE OF THE THEORY: SOLUTIONS AND STANDARDS OF BEHAVIOR 31 4.1. The simplest concept of a solution for one participant 31 4.2. Extension to all participants 33 4.3. The solution as a set of imputations 34 4.4. The intransitive notion of "superiority" or "domination" 37 4.5. The precise definition of a solution 39 4.6. Interpretation of our definition in terms of "standards of behavior" 40 4.7. Games and social organizations 43 4.8. Concluding remarks 43 CHAPTER II GENERAL FORMAL DESCRIPTION OF GAMES OF STRATEGY 5. INTRODUCTION 46 5.1. Shift of emphasis from economics to games 46 5.2. General principles of classification and of procedure 46 CONTENTS 6. THE SIMPLIFIED CONCEPT OF A GAME 48 6.1. Explanation of the termini technici 48 6.2. The elements of the game 49 6.3. Information and preliminary 51 6.4. Preliminarity, transitivity, and signaling 51 7. THE COMPLETE CONCEPT OF A GAME 55 7.1. Variability of the characteristics of each move 55 7.2. The general description 57 8. SETS AND PARTITIONS 60 8.1. Desirability of a set-theoretical description of a game 60 8.2. Sets, their properties, and their graphical representation 61 8.3. Partitions, their properties, and their graphical representation 63 8.4. Logistic interpretation of sets and partitions 66 *9. THE SET-THEORETICAL DESCRIPTION OF A GAME 67 *9.1. The partitions which describe a game 67 *9.2. Discussion of these partitions and their properties 7 1 *10. AXIOMATIC FORMULATION 73 *10.1. The axioms and their interpretations 73 *10.2. Logistic discussion of the axioms 76 *10.3. General remarks concerning the axioms 76 *10.4. Graphical representation 77 11. STRATEGIES AND THE FINAL SIMPLIFICATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OF A GAME 79 11.1. The concept of a strategy and its formalization 79 11.2. The final simplification of the description of a game 81 11.3. The role of strategies in the simplified form of a game 84 11.4. The meaning of the zero-sum restriction 84 CHAPTER III ZERO-SUM TWO-PERSON GAMES: THEORY 12. PRELIMINARY SURVEY 85 12.1. General viewpoints 85 12.2. The one-person game 85 12.3. Chance and probability 87 12.4. The next objective 87 13. FUNCTIONAL CALCULUS 88 13.1. Basic definitions 88 13.2. The operations Max and Min 89 13.3. Commutativity questions 91 13.4. The mixed case. Saddle points 93 13.5. Proofs of the main facts 95 14. STRICTLY DETERMINED GAMES 98 14 1. Formulation of the problem 98 14.2. The minorant and the majorant games 100 14.3. Discussion of the auxiliary games 101 CONTENTS 14.4. Conclusions 105 14.5. Analysis of strict determinateness 106 14.6. The interchange of players. Symmetry 109 14.7. Non strictly determined games 110 14.8. Program of a detailed analysis of strict determinateness 111 *15. GAMES WITH PERFECT INFORMATION 112 * 1 5 . 1 . Statement of purpose. Induction 112 *15.2. The exact condition (First step) 114 *15.3. The exact condition (Entire induction) 116 *15.4. Exact discussion of the inductive step 117 *15.5. Exact discussion of the inductive step (Continuation) 120 *15.6. The result in the case of perfect information 123 *15.7. Application to Chess 124 *15.8. The alternative, verbal discussion 126 16. LINEARITY AND CONVEXITY 128 16.1. Geometrical background 1 28 16.2. Vector operations 129 16.3. The theorem of the supporting hyperplanes 134 16.4. The theorem of the alternative for matrices 138 17. MIXED STRATEGIES. THE SOLUTION FOR ALL GAMES 143 17.1. Discussion of two elementary examples 143 17.2. Generalization of this viewpoint 145 17.3. Justification of the procedure as applied to an individual play 146 17.4. The minorant and the majorant games. (For mixed strategies) 149 17.5. General strict determinateness 150 17.6. Proof of the main theorem 153 17.7. Comparison of the treatment by pure and by mixed strategies 155 17.8. Analysis of general strict determinateness 158 17.9. Further characteristics of good strategies 160 17.10. Mistakes and their consequences. Permanent optimality 162 17.11. The interchange of players. Symmetry 165 CHAPTER IV ZERO-SUM TWO-PERSON GAMES: EXAMPLES 18. SOME ELEMENTARY GAMES 169 18.1. The simplest games 169 18.2. Detailed quantitative discussion of these games 170 18.3. Qualitative characterizations 173 18.4. Discussion of some specific games. (Generalized forms of Matching Pennies) 175 18.5. Discussion of some slightly more complicated games 178 18.6. Chance and imperfect information 182 18.7. Interpretation of this result 185 *19. POKER AND BLUFFING 186 *19.1. Description of Poker 186 *19.2. Bluffing 188 *19.3. Description of Poker (Continued) 189 *19.4. Exact formulation of the rules 190 CONTENTS *19.5. Description of the strategy 191 *19.6. Statement of the problem 195 *19.7. Passage from the discrete to the continuous problem 196 *19.8. Mathematical determination of the solution 199 *19.9. Detailed analysis of the solution 202 *19.10. Interpretation of the solution 204 *19.11. More general forms of Poker 207 19.12. Discrete hands 208 *19.13. m possible bids 209 *19.14. Alternate bidding 211 *19.15. Mathematical description of all solutions 216 * 19. 16. Interpretation of the solutions. Conclusions 218 CHAPTER V ZERO-SUM THREE-PERSON GAMES 20. PRELIMINARY SURVEY 220 20.1. General viewpoints 220 20.2. Coalitions 221 21. THE SIMPLE MAJORITY GAME OF THREE PERSONS 222 21.1. Definition of the game 222 21.2. Analysis of the game: Necessity of "understandings" 223 21.3. Analysis of the game: Coalitions. The role of symmetry 224 22. FURTHER EXAMPLES 225 22.1. Unsymmetric distributions. Necessity of compensations 225 22.2. Coalitions of different strength. Discussion 227 22.3. An inequality. Formulae 229 23. THE GENERAL CASE 231 23.1. Detailed discussion. Inessential and essential games 231 23.2. Complete formulae 232 24. DISCUSSION OF AN OBJECTION 233 24.1. The case of perfect information and its significance 233 24.2. Detailed discussion. Necessity of compensations between three or more players 235 CHAPTER VI FORMULATION OF THE GENERAL THEORY: ZERO-SUM n-PERSON GAMES 25. THE CHARACTERISTIC FUNCTION 238 25.1. Motivation and definition 238 25.2. Discussion of the concept 240 25.3. Fundamental properties 24 1 25.4. Immediate mathematical consequences 242 26. CONSTRUCTION OF A GAME WITH A GIVEN CHARACTERISTIC FUNCTION 243 26.1. The construction 243 26.2. Summary 245 CONTENTS 27. STRATEGIC EQUIVALENCE. INESSENTIAL AND ESSENTIAL GAMES 245 27.1. Strategic equivalence. The reduced form 245 27.2. Inequalities. The quantity y 248 27.3. Inessentiality and essentiality 249 27.4. Various criteria. Non additive utilities 250 27.5. The inequalities in the essential case 252 27.6. Vector operations on characteristic functions 253 28. GROUPS, SYMMETRY AND FAIRNESS 255 28.1. Permutations, their groups and their effect on a game 255 28.2. Symmetry and fairness 258 29. RECONSIDERATION OF THE ZERO-SUM THREE-PERSON GAME 260 29.1. Qualitative discussion 260 29.2. Quantitative discussion 262 30. THE EXACT FORM OP THE GENERAL DEFINITIONS 263 30.1. The definitions 263 30.2. Discussion and recapitulation 265 *30.3. The concept of saturation 266 30.4. Three immediate objectives 271 31. FIRST CONSEQUENCES 272 31.1. Convexity, flatness, and some criteria for domination 272 31.2. The system of all imputations. One element solutions 277 31.3. The isomorphism which corresponds to strategic equivalence 281 32. DETERMINATION OF ALL SOLUTIONS OF THE ESSENTIAL ZERO-SUM THREE-PERSON GAME 282 32.1. Formulation of the mathematical problem. The graphical method 282 32.2. Determination of all solutions 285 33. CONCLUSIONS 288 33.1. The multiplicity of solutions. Discrimination and its meaning 288 33.2. Statics and dynamics 290 CHAPTER VII ZERO-SUM FOUR-PERSON GAMES 34. PRELIMINARY SURVEY 291 34.1. General viewpoints 291 34.2. Formalism of the essential zero sum four person games 291 34.3. Permutations of the players 294 35. DISCUSSION OF SOME SPECIAL POINTS IN THE CUBE Q 295 35.1. The corner /. (and V., VI., VII.) 295 35.2. The corner VIII. (and //., ///., 7F.,). The three person game and a "Dummy" 299 35.3. Some remarks concerning the interior of Q 302 36. DISCUSSION OP THE MAIN DIAGONALS 304 36.1. The part adjacent to the corner VIII.' Heuristic discussion 304 36.2. The part adjacent to the corner VIII. : Exact discussion 307 *36.3. Other parts of the main diagonals 312 CONTENTS 37. THE CENTER AND ITS ENVIRONS 313 37.1. First orientation about the conditions around the center 313 37.2. The two alternatives and the role of symmetry 315 37.3. The first alternative at the center 316 37.4. The second alternative at the center 317 37.5. Comparison of the two central solutions 318 37.6. Unsymmetrical central solutions 319 J8. A FAMILY OP SOLUTIONS FOR A NEIGHBORHOOD OP THE CENTER 321 *38.1. Transformation of the solution belonging to the first alternative at the center 321 *38.2. Exact discussion 322 *38.3. Interpretation of the solutions 327 CHAPTER VIII SOME REMARKS CONCERNING n ^ 5 PARTICIPANTS 39. THE NUMBER OF PARAMETERS IN VARIOUS CLASSES OF GAMES 330 39.1. The situation for n - 3, 4 330 39.2. The situation for all n ^ 3 330 10. THE SYMMETRIC FIVE PERSON GAME 332 40.1. Formalism of the symmetric five person game 332 40.2. The two extreme cases 332 40.3. Connection between the symmetric five person game and the 1, 2, 3- symmetric four person game 334 CHAPTER IX COMPOSITION AND DECOMPOSITION OF GAMES 11. COMPOSITION AND DECOMPOSITION 339 41.1. Search for n-person games for which all solutions can be determined 339 41.2. The first type. Composition and decomposition 340 41.3. Exact definitions 341 41.4. Analysis of decomposability 343 41.5. Desirability of a modification 345 12. MODIFICATION OF THE THEORY 345 42.1. No complete abandonment of the zero sum restriction 345 42.2. Strategic equivalence. Constant sum games 346 42.3. The characteristic function in the new theory 348 42.4. Imputations, domination, solutions in the new theory 350 42.5. Essentiality, inessentiality and decomposability in the new theory 351 13. THE DECOMPOSITION PARTITION 353 43.1. Splitting sets. Constituents 353 43.2. Properties of the system of all splitting sets 353 43.3. Characterization of the system of all splitting sets. The decomposi- tion partition 354 43.4. Properties of the decomposition partition 357 14. DECOMPOSABLE GAMES. FURTHER EXTENSION OF THE THEORY 358 44.1. Solutions of a (decomposable) game and solutions of its constituents 358 44.2. Composition and decomposition of imputations and of sets of impu- tations 359 CONTENTS 44.3. Composition and decomposition of solutions. The main possibilities and surmises 361 44.4. Extension of the theory. Outside sources 363 44.5. The excess 364 44.6. Limitations of the excess. The non-isolated character of a game in the new setup 366 44.7. Discussion of the new setup. E(e Q ) t F(e ) 367 45. LIMITATIONS OF THE EXCESS. STRUCTURE OF THE EXTENDED THEORY 368 45.1. The lower limit of the excess 368 45.2. The upper limit of the excess. Detached and fully detached imputa- tions 369 45.3. Discussion of the two limits, |r|i, |r| 2 . Their ratio 372 45.4. Detached imputations and various solutions. The theorem con- necting E(e ), F(e ) 375 45.5. Proof of the theorem 376 45.6. Summary and conclusions 380 46. DETERMINATION OF ALL SOLUTIONS OF A DECOMPOSABLE GAME 381 46.1. Elementary properties of decompositions 381 46.2. Decomposition and its relation to the solutions: First results con- cerning F( ) 384 46.3. Continuation 386 46.4. Continuation 388 46.5. The complete result in F(e ) 390 46.6. The complete result in E(e ) 393 46.7. Graphical representation of a part of the result 394 46.8. Interpretation: The normal zone. Heredity of various properties 396 46.9. Dummies 397 46.10. Imbedding of a game 398 46.11. Significance of the normal zone 401 46.12. First occurrence of the phenomenon of transfer: n - 6 402 47. THE ESSENTIAL THREE-PERSON GAME IN THE NEW THEORY 403 47.1. Need for this discussion 403 47.2. Preparatory considerations 403 47.3. The six cases of the discussion. Cases (I)-(III) 406 47.4. Case (IV) : First part 407 47.5. Case (IV): Second part 409 47.6. Case (V) 413 47.7. Case (VI) 415 47.8. Interpretation of the result: The curves (one dimensional parts) in the solution 416 47.9. Continuation: The areas (two dimensional parts) in the solution 418 CHAPTER X SIMPLE GAMES 48. WINNING AND LOSING COALITIONS AND GAMES WHERE THEY OCCUR 420 48.1. The second type of 41.1. Decision by coalitions 420 48.2. Winning and Losing Coalitions 421 CONTENTS 49. CHARACTERIZATION OP THE SIMPLE GAMES 423 49.1. General concepts of winning and losing coalitions 423 '49.2. The special role of one element sets 425 49.3. Characterization of the systems TF, L of actual games 426 49.4. Exact definition of simplicity 428 49.5. Some elementary properties of simplicity 428 49.6. Simple games and their W, L. The Minimal winning coalitions: W m 429 49.7. The solutions of simple g^mes 430 50. THE MAJORITY GAMES AND THE MAIN SOLUTION 431 50.1. Examples of simple games: The majority games 431 50.2. Homogeneity 433 50.3. A more direct use of the concept of imputation in forming solutions 435 50.4. Discussion of this direct approach 436 50.5. Connections with the general theory. Exact formulation 438 50.6. Reformulation of the result 440 50.7. Interpretation of the result 442 50.8. Connection with the Homogeneous Majority game. 443 51. METHODS FOR THE ENUMERATION OF ALL SIMPLE GAMES 445 51.1. Preliminary Remarks 445 51.2. The saturation method: Enumeration by means of W 446 51.3. Reasons for passing from W to W m . Difficulties of using W m 448 51.4. Changed Approach: Enumeration by means of W m 450 51.5. Simplicity and decomposition 452 51.6. Inessentiality, Simplicity and Composition. Treatment of the excess 454 51.7. A criterium of decomposability in terms of W m 455 52. THE SIMPLE GAMES FOR SMALL n 457 52.1. Program, n = 1, 2 play no role. Disposal of n = 3 457 52.2. Procedure for n ^ 4: The two element sets and their role in classify- ing the W m 458 52.3. Decomposability of cases C*, C n _ 2 , C n _i 459 52.4. The simple games other than [1, , 1, n 2]* (with dummies): The Cases C k , k 0, 1, , n - 3 461 52.5. Disposal of n = 4, 5 462 53. THE NEW POSSIBILITIES OF SIMPLE GAMES FOR n ^ 6 463 53.1. The Regularities observed for n ^ 6 463 53.2. The six main counter examples (for n * 6, 7) 464 54. DETERMINATION OF ALL SOLUTIONS IN SUITABLE GAMES 470 54.1. Reasons to consider other solutions than the main solution in simple games 470 54.2. Enumeration of those games for which all solutions are known 471 54.3. Reasons to consider the simple game [1, , 1, n 2] A 472 *55. THE SIMPLE GAME [1, , 1, n - 2] h 473 *55.1. Preliminary Remarks 473 *55.2. Domination. The chief player. Cases (I) and (II) 473 *55.3. Disposal of Case (I) 475 *55.4. Case (II): Determination of Y 478 *55.5. Case (II): Determination of V 481 *55.6. Case (II): a and S* 484 CONTENTS *55.7. Case (II') and (II"). Disposal of Case (IF) 485 *55.8^ Case (II"): a and V. Domination 487 *55.9. Case (II"): Determination of V 488 *55.10. Disposal of Case (II") 494 *55.11. Reformulation of the complete result 497 *55.12. Interpretation of the result 499 CHAPTER XI GENERAL NON-ZERO-SUM GAMES 56. EXTENSION OF THE THEORY 504 56.1. Formulation of the problem 504 56.2. The fictitious player. The zero sum extension r 505 56.3. Questions concerning the character of r 506 56.4. Limitations of the use of r 508 56.5. The two possible procedures 510 56.6. The discriminatory solutions 511 56.7. Alternative possibilities 512 56.8. The new setup . 514 56.9. Reconsideration of the case when T is a zero sum game 516 56.10. Analysis of the concept of domination 520 56.11. Rigorous discussion 523 56.12. The new definition of a solution 526 57. THE CHARACTERISTIC FUNCTION AND RELATED TOPICS 527 57.1. The characteristic function: The extended and the restricted form 527 57.2. Fundamental properties 528 57.3. Determination of all characteristic functions 530 57.4. Removable sets of players 533 57.5. Strategic equivalence. Zero-sum and constant-sum games 535 58. INTERPRETATION OF THE CHARACTERISTIC FUNCTION 538 58.1. Analysis of the definition 538 58.2. The desire to make a gain vs. that to inflict a loss 539 58.3. Discussion 541 59. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 542 59.1. Discussion of the program 542 59.2. The reduced forms. The inequalities 543 59.3. Various topics 546 60. THE SOLUTIONS OF ALL GENERAL GAMES WITH n ^ 3 548 60.1. The case n - 1 548 60.2. The case n - 2 549 60.3. The case n = 3 550 60.4. Comparison with the zero sum games 554 61. ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE RESULTS FOR n = 1, 2 555 61.1. The case n - 1 555 61.2. The case n = 2. The two person market 555 61.3. Discussion of the two person market and its characteristic function 557 61.4. Justification of the standpoint of 58 559 61.5. Divisible goods. The "marginal pairs" 560 61.6. The price. Discussion 562 CONTENTS 62. ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE RESULTS FOR n = 3: SPECIAL CASE 564 62.1. The case n = 3, special case. The three person market 564 62.2. Preliminary discussion 566 62.3. The solutions: First subcase 566 62.4. The solutions: General form 569 62.5. Algebraical form of the result 570 62.6. Discussion 571 63. ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE RESULTS FOR n = 3: GENERAL CASE 573 63.1. Divisible goods 573 63.2. Analysis of the inequalities 575 63.3. Preliminary discussion 577 63.4. The solutions 577 63.5. Algebraical form of the result 580 63.6. Discussion 581 64. THE GENERAL MARKET 583 64.1. Formulation of the problem 583 64.2. Some special properties. Monopoly and monopsony 584 CHAPTER XII EXTENSION OF THE CONCEPTS OF DOMINATION AND SOLUTION 65. THE EXTENSION. SPECIAL CASES 587 65.1. Formulation of the problem 587 65.2. General remarks 588 65.3. Orderings, transitivity, acyclicity 589 65.4. The solutions: For a symmetric relation. For a complete ordering 591 65.5. The solutions: For a partial ordering 592 65.6. Acyclicity and strict acyclicity 594 65.7. The solutions: For an acyclic relation 597 65.8. Uniqueness 'of solutions, acyclicity and strict acyclicity 600 65.9. Application to games: Discreteness and continuity 602 66. GENERALIZATION OF THE CONCEPT OF UTILITY 603 66.1. The generalization. The two phases of the theoretical treatment 603 66.2. Discussion of the first phase 604 66.3. Discussion of the second phase 606 66.4. Desirability of unifying the two phases 607 67. DISCUSSION OF AN EXAMPLE 608 67.1. Description of the example 608 67.2. The solution and its interpretation 611 67.3. Generalization: Different discrete utility scales 614 67.4. Conclusions concerning bargaining 616 APPENDIX: THE AXIOMATIC TREATMENT OF UTILITY 617 INDEX OF FIGURES 633 INDEX OF NAMES 634 INDEX OF SUBJECTS 635 CHAPTER I FORMULATION OF THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM 1. The Mathematical Method in Economics 1.1. Introductory Remarks 1.1.1. The purpose of this book is to present a discussion of some funda- mental questions of economic theory which require a treatment different from that which they have found thus far in the literature. The analysis is concerned with some basic problems arising from a study of economic behavior which have been the center of attention of economists for a long time. They have their origin in the attempts to find an exact description of the endeavor of the individual to obtain a maximum of utility, or, in the case of the entrepreneur, a maximum of profit. It is well known what considerable and in fact unsurmounted difficulties this task involves given even a limited number of typical situations, as, for example, in the case of the exchange of goods, direct or indirect, between two or more persons, of bilateral monopoly, of duopoly, of oligopoly, and of free compe- tition. It will be made clear that the structure of these problems, familiar to every student of economics, is in many respects quite different from the way in which they are conceived at the present time. It will appear, furthermore, that their exact positing and subsequent solution can only be achieved with the aid of mathematical methods which diverge considerably from the techniques applied by older or by contemporary mathematical economists. 1.1.2. Our considerations will lead to the application of the mathematical theory of "games of strategy " developed by one of us in several successive stages in 1928 and 1940-1941. 1 After the presentation of this theory, its application to economic problems in the sense indicated above will be undertaken. It will appear that it provides a new approach to a number of economic questions as yet unsettled. We shall first have to find in which way this theory of games can be brought into relationship with economic theory, and what their common elements are. This can be done best by stating briefly the nature of some fundamental economic problems so that the common elements will be seen clearly. It will then become apparent that there is not only nothing artificial in establishing this relationship but that on the contrary this 1 The first phases of this- work were published: J. von Neumann, "Zur Theorie der Gesellschaftsspiele," Math. Annalen, vol. 100 (1928), pp. 295-320. The subsequent completion of the theory, as well as the more detailed elaboration of the considerations of loc. cit. above, are published here for the first time. 1 2 FORMULATION OF THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM theory of games of strategy is the proper instrument with which to develop a theory of economic behavior. One would misunderstand the intent of our discussions by interpreting them as merely pointing out an analogy between these two spheres. We hope to establish satisfactorily, after developing a few plausible schematiza- tions, that the typical problems of economic behavior become strictly identical with the mathematical notions of suitable games of strategy. 1.2. Difficulties of the Application of the Mathematical Method 1.2.1. It may be opportune to begin with some remarks concerning the nature of economic theory and to discuss briefly the question of the role which mathematics may take in its development. First let us be aware that there exists at present no universal system of economic theory and that, if one should ever be developed, it will very probably not be during our lifetime. The reason for this is simply that economics is far too difficult a science to permit its construction rapidly, especially in view of the very limited knowledge and imperfect description of the facts with which economists are dealing. Only those wlio fail to appreciate this condition are likely to attempt the construction of universal systems. Even in sciences which are far more advanced than economics, like physics, there is no universal system available at present. To continue the simile with physics: It happens occasionally that a particular physical theory appears to provide the basis for a universal system, but in all instances up to the present time this appearance has not lasted more than a decade at best. The everyday work of the research physicist is certainly not involved with such high aims, but rather is con- cerned with special problems which are " mature." There would probably be no progress at all in physics if a serious attempt were made to enforce that super-standard. The physicist works on individual problems, some of great practical significance, others of less. Unifications of fields which were formerly divided and far apart may alternate with this type of work. However, such fortunate occurrences are rare and happen only after each field has been thoroughly explored. Considering the fact that economics is much more difficult, much less understood, and undoubtedly in a much earlier stage of its evolution as a science than physics, one should clearly not expect more than a development of the above type in economics either. Second we have to notice that the differences in scientific questions make it necessary to employ varying methods which may afterwards have to be discarded if better ones offer themselves. This has a double implica- tion: In some branches of economics the most fruitful work may be that of careful, patient description; indeed this may be by far the largest domain for the present and for some time to come. In others it may be possible to develop already a theory in a strict manner, and for that purpose the use of mathematics may be required. THE MATHEMATICAL METHOD IN ECONOMICS 3 Mathematics has actually been used in economic theory, perhaps even in an exaggerated manner. In any case its use has not been highly suc- cessful. This is contrary to what one observes in other sciences: There mathematics has been applied with great success, and most sciences could hardly get along without it. Yet the explanation for this phenomenon is fairly simple. 1.2.2. It is not that there exists any fundamental reason why mathe- matics should not be used in economics. The arguments often heard that because of the human element, of the psychological factors etc., or because there is allegedly no measurement of important factors, mathematics will find no application, can all be dismissed as utterly mistaken. Almost all these objections have been made, or might have been made, many centuries ago in fields where mathematics is now the chief instrument of analysis. This " might have been" is meant in the following sense: Let us try to imagine ourselves in the period which preceded the mathematical or almost mathematical phase of the development in physics, that is the 16th century, or in chemistry and biology, that is the 18th century. Taking for granted the skeptical attitude of those who object to mathe- matical economics in principle, the outlook in the physical and biological sciences at these early periods can hardly have been better than that in economics mutatis mutandis at present. As to the lack of measurement of the most important factors, the example of the theory of heat is most instructive ; before the development of the mathematical theory the possibilities of quantitative measurements were less favorable there than they are now in economics. The precise measurements of the quantity and quality of heat (energy and temperature) were the outcome and not the antecedents of the mathematical theory. This ought to be contrasted with the fact that the quantitative and exact notions of prices, money and the rate of interest were already developed centuries ago. A further group of objections against quantitative measurements in economics, centers around the lack of indefinite divisibility of economic quantities. This is supposedly incompatible with the use of the infini- tesimal calculus and hence ( !) of mathematics. It is hard to see how such objections can be maintained in view of the atomic theories in physics and chemistry, the theory of quanta in electrodynamics, etc., and the notorious and continued success of mathematical analysis within these disciplines. At this point it is appropriate to mention another familiar argument of economic literature which may be revived as an objection against the mathematical procedure. 1.2.3. In order to elucidate the conceptions which we are applying to economics, we have given and may give again some illustrations from physics. There are many social scientists who object to the drawing of such parallels on various grounds, among which is generally found the assertion that economic theory cannot be modeled after physics since it is a 4 FORMULATION OF THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM science of social, of human phenomena, has to take psychology into account, etc. Such statements are at least premature. It is without doubt reason- able to discover what has led to progress in other sciences, and to investigate whether the application of the same principles may not lead to progress in economics also. Should the need for the application of different principles arise, it could be revealed only in the course of the actual development of economic theory. This would itself constitute a major revolution. But since most assuredly we have not yet reached such a state and it is by no means certain that there ever will be need for entirely different scientific principles it would be very unwise to consider anything else than the pursuit of our problems in the manner which has resulted in the establishment of physical science. 1.2.4* The reason why mathematics has not been more successful in economics must, consequently, be found elsewhere. The lack of real success is largely due to a combination of unfavorable circumstances, some of which can be removed gradually. To begin with, the economic problems were not formulated clearly and are often stated in such vague terms as to make mathematical treatment a priori appear hopeless because it is quite uncertain what the problems really are. There is no point in using exact methods where there is no clarity in the concepts and issues to which they are to be applied. Consequently the initial task is to clarify the knowledge of the matter by further careful descriptive work. But even in those parts of economics where the descriptive problem has been handled more satisfactorily, mathematical tools have seldom been used appropriately. They were either inadequately handled, as in the attempts to determine a general economic equilibrium by the mere counting of numbers of equations and unknowns, or they led to mere translations from a literary form of expression into symbols, without any subsequent mathematical analysis. Next, the empirical background of economic science is definitely inade- quate. Our knowledge of the relevant facts of economics is incomparably smaller than that commanded in physics at the time when the mathe- matization of that subject was achieved. Indeed, the decisive break which came in physics in the seventeenth century, specifically in the field of mechanics, was possible only because of previous developments in astron- omy. It was backed by several millennia of systematic, scientific, astro- nomical observation, culminating in an observer of unparalleled caliber, Tycho de Brahe. Nothing of this sort has occurred in economic science. It would have been absurd in physics to expect Kepler and Newton without Tycho, and there is no reason to hope for an easier development in economics. These obvious comments should not be construed, of course, as a disparagement of statistical-economic research which holds the real promise of progress in the proper direction. It is due to the combination of the above mentioned circumstances that mathematical economics has not achieved very much. The underlying THE MATHEMATICAL METHOD IN ECONOMICS 5 vagueness and ignorance has not been dispelled by the inadequate and inappropriate use of a powerful instrument that is very difficult to handle. In the light of these remarks we may describe our own position as follows: The aim of this book lies not in the direction of empirical research. The advancement of that side of economic science, on anything like the scale which was recognized above as necessary, is clearly a task of vast propor- tions. It may be hoped that as a result of the improvements of scientific technique and of experience gained in other fields, the development of descriptive economics will not take as much time as the comparison with astronomy would suggest. But in any case the task seems to transcend the limits of any individually planned program. We shall attempt to utilize only some commonplace experience concern- ing human behavior which lends itself to mathematical treatment and which is of economic importance. We believe that the possibility of a mathematical treatment of these phenomena refutes the "fundamental' 1 objections referred to in 1.2.2. It will be seen, however, that this process of mathematization is not at all obvious. Indeed, the objections mentioned above may have their roots partly in the rather obvious difficulties of any direct mathematical approach. We shall find it necessary to draw upon techniques of mathe- matics which have not been used heretofore in mathematical economics, and it is quite possible that further study may result in the future in the creation of new mathematical disciplines. To conclude, we may also observe that part of the feeling of dissatisfac- tion with the mathematical treatment of economic theory derives largely from the fact that frequently one is offered not proofs but mere assertions which are really no better than the same assertions given in literary form. Very frequently the proofs are lacking because a mathematical treatment has been attempted of fields which are so vast and so complicated that for a long time to come until much more empirical knowledge is acquired there is hardly any reason at all to expect progress more mathematico. The fact that these fields have been attacked in this way as for example the theory of economic fluctuations, the time structure of production, etc. indicates how much the attendant difficulties are being underestimated. They are enormous and we are now in no way equipped for them. 1.2.6. We have referred to the nature and the possibilities of those changes in mathematical technique in fact, in mathematics itself which a successful application of mathematics to a new subject may produce. It is important to visualize these in their proper perspective. It must not be forgotten that these changes may be very considerable. The decisive phase of the application of mathematics to physics Newton's creation of a rational discipline of mechanics brought about, and can hardly be separated from, the discovery of the infinitesimal calculus. (There are several other examples, but none stronger than this.) 6 FORMULATION OF THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM The importance of the social phenomena, the wealth and multiplicity of theii manifestations, and the complexity of their structure, aie at least equal to those in physics. It is therefore to be expected or feared that mathematical discoveries of a stature comparable to that of calculus will be needed in ordei to produce decisive success in this field. (Incidentally, it is in this spirit that our present efforts must be discounted.) A fortiori it is unlikely that a mere repetition of the tricks which served us so well in physics will do for the social phenomena too. The probability is very slim indeed, since it will be shown that we encounter in our discussions some mathematical problems which are quite different from those which occur in physical science. These observations should be remembered in connection with the current overemphasis on the use of calculus, differential equations, etc., as the main tools of mathematical economics. 1.3. Necessary Limitations of the Objectives 1.3.1. We have to return, therefore, to the position indicated earlier: It is necessary to begin with those problems which are described clearly, even if they should not be as important from any other point of view. It should be added, moreover, that a treatment of these manageable problems may lead to results which are already fairly well known, but the exact proofs may nevertheless be lacking. Before they have been given the respective theory simply does not exist as a scientific theory. The move- ments of the planets were known long before their courses had been calcu- lated and explained by Newton's theory, and the same applies in many smaller and less dramatic instances. And similarly in economic theory, certain results say the indeterminateness of bilateral monopoly may be known already. Yet it is of interest to derive them again from an exact theory. The same could and should be said concerning practically all established economic theorems. 1.3.2. It might be added finally that we do not propose to raise the question of the practical significance of the problems treated. This falls in line with what was said above about the selection of fields for theory. The situation is not different here from that in other sciences. There too the most important questions from a practical point of view may have been completely out of reach during long and fruitful periods of their develop- ment. This is certainly still the case in economics, where it is of utmost importance to know how to stabilize employment, how to increase the national income, or how to distribute it adequately. Nobody can really answer these questions, and we need not concern ourselves with the pre- tension that there can be scientific answers at present. The great progress in every science came when, in the study of problems which were modest as compared with ultimate aims, methods were devel- oped which could be extended further and furthei. The free fall is a very trivial physical phenomenon, but it was the study of this exceedingly simple THE MATHEMATICAL METHOD IN ECONOMICS 7 fact and its comparison with the astronomical material, which brought forth mechanics. It seems to us that the same standard of modesty should be applied in economics. It is futile to try to explain and " systematically 1 ' at that everything economic. The sound procedure is to obtain first utmost precision and mastery in a limited field, and then to proceed to another, some- what wider one, and so on. This would also do away with the unhealthy practice of applying so-called theories to economic or social reform where they are in no way useful. We believe that it is necessary to know as much as possible about the behavior of the individual and about the simplest forms of exchange. This standpoint was actually adopted with remarkable success by the founders of the marginal utility school, but nevertheless it is not generally accepted. Economists frequently point to much larger, more " burning " questions, and brush everything aside which prevents them from making statements about these. The experience of more advanced sciences, for example physics, indicates that this impatience merely delays progress, including that of the treatment of the " burning " questions. There is no reason to assume the existence of shortcuts. 1.4. Concluding Remarks 1.4. It is essential to realize that economists can expect no easier fate than that which befell scientists in other disciplines. It seems reasonable to expect that they will have to take up first problems contained in the very simplest facts of economic life and try to establish theories which explain them and which really conform to rigorous scientific standards. We can have enough confidence that from then on the science of economics will grow further, gradually comprising matters of more vital impoitance than those with which one has to begin. 1 The field covered in this book is very limited, and we approach it in this sense of modesty. We do not worry at all if the results of oui study conform with views gained recently or held for a long time, for what is important is the gradual development of a theory, based on a careful analysis of the ordinary everyday interpretation of economic facts. This preliminary stage is necessarily heuristic, i.e. the phase of transition from unmathematical plausibility considerations to the formal procedure of mathematics. The theory finally obtained must be mathematically rigor- ous and conceptually general. Its first applications are necessarily to elementary problems where the result has never been in doubt and no theory is actually required. At this early stage the application selves to corroborate the theory. The next stage develops when the theory is applied 1 The beginning is actually of a certain significance, because the forms of exchange between a few individuals are the same as those observed on some of the most important markets of modern industry, or in the case of barter exchange between states in inter- national trade. 8 FORlVgJLATION OF THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM to somewhat more complicated situations in which it may already lead to a certain extent beyond the obvious and the familiar. Here theory and application corroborate each other mutually. Beyond this lies the field of real success: genuine prediction by theory. It is well known that all mathematized sciences have gone through these successive phases of evolution. 2. Qualitative Discussion of the Problem of Rational Behavior 2.1. The Problem of Rational Behavior 2.1.1. The subject matter of economic theory is the very complicated mechanism of prices and production, and of the gaining and spending of incomes. In the course of the development of economics it has been found, and it is now well-nigh universally agreed, that an approach to this vast problem is gained by the analysis of the behavior of the individuals which constitute the economic community. This analysis has been pushed fairly far in many respects, and while there still exists much disagreement the significance of the approach cannot be doubted, no matter how great its difficulties may be. The obstacles are indeed considerable, even if the investigation should at first be limited to conditions of economics statics, as they well must be. One of the chief difficulties lies in properly describing the assumptions which have to be made about the motives of the individual. This problem has been stated traditionally by assuming that the consumer desires to obtain a maximum of utility or satisfaction and the entrepreneur a maximum of profits. The conceptual and practical difficulties of the notion of utility, and particularly of the attempts to describe it as a number, are well known and their treatment is not among the primary objectives of this work. We shall nevertheless be forced to discuss them in some instances, in particular in 3.3. and 3.5. Let it be said at once that the standpoint of the present book on this very important and very interesting question will be mainly oppor- tunistic. We wish to concentrate on one problem which is not that of the measurement of utilities and of preferences and we shall therefore attempt to simplify all other characteristics as far as reasonably possible. We shall therefore assume that the aim of all participants in the economic system, consumers as well as entrepreneurs, is money, or equivalently a single monetary commodity. This is supposed to be unrestrictedly divisible and substitutable, freely transferable and identical, even in the quantitative sense, with whatever " satisfaction" or " utility" is desired by each par- ticipant. (For the quantitative character of utility, cf. 3.3. quoted above.) It is sometimes claimed in economic literature that discussions of the notions of utility and preference are altogether unnecessary, since these are purely verbal definitions with no empirically observable consequences, i.e., entirely tautological. It does not seem to us that these notions are quali- tatively inferior to certain well established and indispensable notions in THE PROBLEM OF RATIONAL BEHAVIOR 9 physics, like force, mass, charge, etc. That is, while they are in their immediate form merely definitions, they become subject to empirical control through the theories which are built upon them and in no other way. Thus the notion of utility is raised above the status of a tautology by such economic theories as make use of it and the results of which can be compared with experience or at least with common sense. 2.1.2. The individual who attempts to obtain these respective maxima is also said to act "rationally." But it may safely be stated that there exists, at present, no satisfactory treatment of the question of rational behavior. There may, for example, exist several ways by which to reach the optimum position; they may depend upon the knowledge and under- standing which the individual has and upon the paths of action open to him. A study of all these questions in qualitative terms will not exhaust them, because they imply, as must be evident, quantitative relationships. It would, therefore, be necessary to formulate them in quantitative terms so that all the elements of the qualitative description are taken into con- sideration. This is an exceedingly difficult task, and we can safely say that it has not been accomplished in the extensive literature about the topic. The chief reason for this lies, no doubt, in the failure to develop and apply suitable mathematical methods to the problem; this would have revealed that the maximum problem which is supposed to correspond to the notion of rationality is not at all formulated in an unambiguous way. Indeed, a more exhaustive analysis (to be given in 4.S.-4.5.) reveals that the significant relationships are much more complicated than the popular and the " philosophical" use of the word " rational" indicates. A valuable qualitative preliminary description of the behavior of the individual is offered by the Austrian School, particularly in analyzing the economy of the isolated " Robinson Crusoe." We may have occasion to note also some considerations of Bohm-Bawerk concerning the exchange between two or more persons. The more recent exposition of the theory of the individual's choices in the form of indifference curve analysis builds up on the very same facts or alleged facts but uses a method which is often held to be superior in many ways. Concerning this we refer to the discussions in 2.1.1. and 3.3. We hope, however, to obtain a real understanding of the problem of exchange by studying it from an altogether different angle; this is, from the perspective of a "game of strategy." Our approach will become clear presently, especially after some ideas which have been advanced, say by Bohm-Bawerk whose views may be considered only as a prototype of this theory are given correct quantitative formulation. 2.2. "Robinson Crusoe" Economy and Social Exchange Economy 2.2.1. Let us look more closely at the type of economy which is repre- sented by the "Robinson Crusoe" model, that is an economy of an isolated single person or otherwise organized under a single will. This economy is 10 FORMULATION OF THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM confronted with certain quantities of commodities and a number of wants which they may satisfy. The problem is to obtain a maximum satisfaction. This is considering in particular our above assumption of the numerical character of utility indeed an ordinary maximum problem, its difficulty depending appaiently on the number of variables and on the nature of the function to be maximized; but this is more of a practical difficulty than a theoretical one. 1 If one abstracts from continuous production and from the fact that consumption too stretches over time (and often uses durable consumers' goods), one obtains the simplest possible model. It was thought possible to use it as the very basis for economic theory, but this attempt notably a feature of the Austrian version was often contested. The chief objection against using this very simplified model of an isolated individual for the theory of a social exchange economy is that it does not represent an individual exposed to the manifold social influences. Hence, it is said to analyze an individual who might behave quite differently if his choices were made in a social world where he would be exposed to factors of imitation, advertising, custom, and so on. These factors certainly make a great difference, but it is to be questioned whether they change the formal properties of the process of maximizing. Indeed the latter has never been implied, and since we are concerned with this problem alone, we can leave the above social considerations out of account. Some other differences between " Crusoe " and a participant in a social exchange economy will not concern us either. Such is the non-existence of money as a means of exchange in the first case where there is only a standard of calculation, for which purpose any commodity can serve. This difficulty indeed has been ploughed under by our assuming in 2.1.2. a quantitative and even monetary notion of utility. We emphasize again: Our interest lies in the fact that even after all these drastic simplifications Crusoe is confronted with a formal problem quite different from the one a participant in a social economy faces. 2.2.2. Crusoe is given certain physical data (wants and commodities) and his task is to combine and apply them in such a fashion as to obtain a maximum resulting satisfaction. There can be no doubt that he controls exclusively all the variables upon which this result depends say the allotting of resources, the determination of the uses of the same commodity for different wants, etc. 2 Thus Crusoe faces an ordinary maximum problem, the difficulties of which are of a purely technical and not conceptual nature, as pointed out. 2.2.3. Consider now a participant in a social exchange economy. His problem has, of course, many elements in common with a maximum prob- 1 It is not important for the following to determine whether its theory is complete in all its aspects. 2 Sometimes uncontrollable factors also intervene, e.g. the weather in agriculture. These however are purely statistical phenomena. Consequently they can be eliminated by the known procedures of the calculus of probabilities: i.e., by determining the prob- abilities of the various alternatives and by introduction of the notion of " mathematical expectation." Cf . however the influence on the notion of utility, discussed in 3.3. THE PROBLEM OF RATIONAL BEHAVIOR 11 lem. But it also contains some, very essential, elements of an entirely different nature. He too tries to obtain an optimum result. But in order to achieve this, he must enter into relations of exchange with others. If two or more persons exchange goods with each other, then the result for each one will depend in general not merely upon his own actions but on those of the others as well. Thus each participant attempts to maximize a function (his above-mentioned "result") of which he does not control all variables. This is certainly no maximum problem, but a peculiar and dis-~ concerting mixture of several conflicting maximum problems. Every parti- cipant is guided by another principle and neither determines all variables which affect his interest. This kind of problem is nowhere dealt with in classical mathematics. We emphasize at the risk of being pedantic that this is no conditional maxi- mum problem, no problem of the calculus of variations, of functional analysis, etc. It arises in full clarity, even in the most " elementary" situations, e.g., when all variables can assume only a finite number of values. A particularly striking expression of the popular misunderstanding about this pseudo-maximum problem is the famous statement according to which the purpose of social effort is the "greatest possible good for the greatest possible number. " A guiding principle cannot be formulated by the requirement of maximizing two (or more) functions at once. Such a principle, taken literally, is self-contradictory, (in general one function will have no maximum where the other function has one.) It is no better than saying, e.g., that a firm should obtain maximum prices at maximum turnover, or a maximum revenue at minimum outlay. If some order of importance of these principles or some weighted average is meant, this should be stated. However, in the situation of the participants in a social economy nothing of that sort is intended, but all maxima are desired at once by various participants. One would be mistaken to believe that it can be obviated, like the difficulty in the Crusoe case mentioned in footnote 2 on p. 10, by a mere recourse to the devices of the theory of probability. Every participant can determine the variables which describe his own actions but not those of the others. Nevertheless those "alien " variables cannot, from his point of view, be described by statistical assumptions. This is because the others are guided, just as he himself, by rational principles whatever that may mean and no modus procedendi can be correct which does not attempt to under- stand those principles and the interactions of the conflicting interests of all participants. Sometimes some of these interests run more 01 less parallel then we are nearer to a simple maximum problem. But they can just as well be opposed. The general theory must cover all these possibilities, all inter- mediary stages, and all their combinations. 2.2.4. The difference between Crusoe's perspective and that of a par- ticipant in a social economy can also be illustrated in this way: Apart from 12 FORMULATION OF THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM those variables which his will controls, Crusoe is given a number of data which are "dead"; they are the unalterable physical background of the situation. (Even when they are apparently variable, cf. footnote 2 on p. 10, they are really governed by fixed statistical laws.) Not a single datum with which he has to deal reflects another person's will or intention of an economic kind based on motives of the same nature as his own. A participant in a social exchange economy, on the other hand, faces data of this last type as well : they are the product of other participants' actions and volitions (like prices). His actions will be influenced by his expectation of these, and they in turn reflect the other participants' expectation of his actions. Thus the study of the Crusoe economy and the use of the methods applicable to it, is of much more limited value to economic theory than has been assumed heretofore even by the most radical critics. The grounds for this limitation lie not in the field of those social relationships which we have mentioned before although we do not question their significance but rather they arise from the conceptual differences between the original (Crusoe's) maximum problem and the more complex problem sketched above. We hope that the reader will be convinced by the above that we face here and now a really conceptual and not merely technical difficulty. And it is this problem which the theory of " games of strategy" is mainly devised to meet. 2.3. The Number of Variables and the Number of Participants 2.3.1. The formal set-up which we used in the preceding paragraphs to indicate the events in a social exchange economy made use of a number of " variables" which described the actions of the participants in this economy. Thus every participant is allotted a set of variables, "his" variables, which together completely describe his actions, i.e. express precisely the manifes- tations of his will. We call these sets the partial sets of variables. The partial sets of all participants constitute together the set of all variables, to be called the total set. So the total number of variables is determined first by the number of participants, i.e. of partial sets, and second by the number of variables in every partial set. From a purely mathematical point of view there would be nothing objectionable in treating all the variables of any one partial set as a single variable, "the" variable of the participant corresponding to this partial set. Indeed, this is a procedure which we are going to use frequently in our mathematical discussions; it makes absolutely no difference con- ceptually, and it simplifies notations considerably. For the moment, however, we propose to distinguish from each other the variables within each partial set. The economic models to which one is naturally led suggest that procedure; thus it is desirable to describe for every participant the quantity of every particular good he wishes to acquire by a separate variable, etc. THE PROBLEM OF RATIONAL BEHAVIOR 13 2.3.2. Now we must emphasize that any increase of the number of variables inside a participant's partial set may complicate our problem technically, but only technically. Thus in a Crusoe economy where there exists only one participant and only one partial set which then coin- cides with the total set this may make the necessary determination of a maximum technically more difficult, but it will not alter the "pure maxi- mum " character of the problem. If, on the other hand, the number of participants i.e., of the partial sets of variables is increased, something of a very different nature happens. To use a terminology which will turn out to be significant, that of games, this amounts to an increase in the number of players in the game. However, to take the simplest cases, a three-person game is very fundamentally different from a two-person game, a four-person game from a three-person game, etc. The combinatorial complications of the problem which is, as we saw, no maximum problem at all increase tremendously with every increase in the number of players, as our subsequent discussions will amply show. We have gone into this matter in such detail particularly because in most models of economics a peculiar mixture of these two phenomena occurs. Whenever the number of players, i.e. of participants in a social economy, increases, the complexity of the economic system usually increases too; e.g. the number of commodities and services exchanged, processes of production used, etc. Thus the number of variables in every participant's partial set is likely to increase. But the number of participants, i.e. of partial sets, has increased too. Thus both of the sources which we discussed contribute pari passu to the total increase in the number of variables. It is essential to visualize each source in its proper role. 2.4. The Case of Many Participants : Free Competition 2.4.1. In elaborating the contrast between a Crusoe economy and a social exchange economy in 2.2.2.-2.2.4., we emphasized those features of the latter which become more prominent when the number of participants while greater than 1 is of moderate size. The fact that every partici- pant is influenced by the anticipated reactions of the others to his own measures, and that this is true for each of the participants, is most strikingly the crux of the matter (as far as the sellers are concerned) in the classical problems of duopoly, oligopoly, etc. When the number of participants becomes really great, some hope emerges that the influence of every par- ticular participant will become negligible, and that the above difficulties may recede and a more conventional theory become possible. These are, of course, the classical conditions of "free competition." Indeed, this was the starting point of much of what is best in economic theory. Com- pared with this case of great numbers free competition the cases of small numbers on the side of the sellers monopoly, duopoly, oligopoly were even considered to be exceptions and abnormities. (Even in these cases the number of participants is still very large in view of the competition 14 FORMULATION OF THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM among the buyers. The cases involving really small numbers are those of bilateral monopoly, of exchange between a monopoly and an oligopoly, or two oligopolies, etc.) 2.4.2. In all fairness to the traditional point of view this much ought to be said: It is a well known phenomenon in many branches of the exact and physical sciences that very great numbers are often easier to handle than those of medium size. An almost exact theory of a gas, containing about 10 26 freely moving particles, is incomparably easier than that of the solar system, made up of 9 major bodies; and still more than that of a mul- tiple star of three or four objects of about the same size. This is, of course, due to the excellent possibility of applying the laws of statistics and prob- abilities in the first case. This analogy, however, is far from perfect for our problem. The theory of mechanics for 2, 3, 4, bodies is well known, and in its general theoretical (as distinguished from its special and computational) form is the foundation of the statistical theory for great numbers. For the social exchange economy i.e. for the equivalent " games of strategy " the theory of 2, 3, 4, participants was heretofore lacking. It is this need that our previous discussions were designed to establish and that our subsequent investigations will endeavor to satisfy. In other words, only after the theory for moderate numbers of participants has been satisfactorily devel- oped will it be possible to decide whether extremely great numbers of par- ticipants simplify the situation. Let us say it again: We share the hope chiefly because of the above-mentioned analogy in other fields! that such simplifications will indeed occur. The current assertions concerning free competition appear to be very valuable surmises and inspiring anticipations of results. But they are not results and it is scientifically unsound to treat them as such as long as the conditions which we mentioned above are not satisfied. There exists in the literature a considerable amount of theoretical dis- cussion purporting to show that the zones of indeterminateness (of rates of exchange) which undoubtedly exist when the number of participants is small narrow and disappear as the number increases. This then would provide a continuous transition into the ideal case of free competition for a very great number of participants where all solutions would be sharply and uniquely determined. While it is to be hoped that this indeed turns out to be the case in sufficient generality, one cannot concede that anything like this contention has been established conclusively thus far. There is no getting away from it: The problem must be formulated, solved and understood for small numbers of participants before anything can be proved about the changes of its character in any limiting case of large numbers, such as free competition. 2.4.3. A really fundamental reopening of this subject is the more desirable because it is neither certain nor probable that a mere increase in the number of participants will always lead in fine to the conditions of THE NOTION OF UTILITY 15 free competition. The classical definitions of free competition all involve further postulates besides the greatness of that number. E.g., it is clear that if certain great groups of participants will for any reason whatsoever act together, then the great number of participants may not become effective; the decisive exchanges may take place directly between large " coalitions, " l few in number, and not between individuals, many in number, acting independently. Our subsequent discussion of " games of strategy" will show that the role and size of " coalitions " is decisive throughout the entire subject. Consequently the above difficulty though not new still remains the crucial problem. Any satisfactory theory of the " limiting transition " from small numbers of participants to large numbers will have to explain under what circumstances such big coalitions will or will not be formed i.e. when the large numbers of participants will become effective and lead to a more or less free competition. Which of these alternatives is likely to arise will depend on the physical data of the situation. Answering this question is, we think, the real challenge to any theory of free competition. 2.5. The "Lausanne" Theory 2.6. This section should not be concluded without a reference to the equilibrium theory of the Lausanne School and also of various other systems which take into consideration " individual planning " and interlocking individual plans. All these systems pay attention to the interdependence of the participants in a social economy. This, however, is invariably done under far-reaching restrictions. Sometimes free competition is assumed, after the introduction of which the participants face fixed conditions and act like a number of Robinson Crusoes solely bent on maximizing their individual satisfactions, which under these conditions are again independent. In other cases other restricting devices are used, all of which amount to excluding the free play of " coalitions " formed by any or all types of par- ticipants. There are frequently definite, but sometimes hidden, assump- tions concerning the ways in which their partly parallel and partly opposite interests will influence the participants, and cause them to cooperate or not, as the case may be. We hope we have shown that such a procedure amounts to a petitio principii at least on the plane on which we should like to put the discussion. It avoids the real difficulty and deals with a verbal problem, which is not the empirically given one. Of course we do not wish to ques- tion the significance of these investigations but they do not answer our queries. 3. The Notion of Utility 3.1. Preferences and Utilities 3.1.1. We have stated already in 2.1.1. in what way we wish to describe the fundamental concept of individual preferences by the use of a rather 1 Such as trade unions, consumers' cooperatives, industrial cartels, and conceivably some organizations more in the political sphere. 16 FORMULATION OF THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM far-reaching notion of utility. Many economists will feel that we are assuming far too much (cf . the enumeration of the properties we postulated in 2.1.1.), and that our standpoint is a retrogression from the more cautious modern technique of " indifference curves." Before attempting any specific discussion let us state as a general excuse that our procedure at worst is only the application of a classical preliminary device of scientific analysis: To divide the difficulties, i.e. to concentrate on one (the subject proper of the investigation in hand), and to reduce all others as far as reasonably possible, by simplifying and schema- tizing assumptions. We should also add that this high handed treatment of preferences and utilities is employed in the main body of our discussion, but we shall incidentally investigate to a certain extent the changes which an avoidance of the assumptions in question would cause in our theory (cf. 66., 67.). We feel, however, that one part of our assumptions at least that of treating utilities as numerically measurable quantities is not quite as radical as is often assumed in the literature. We shall attempt to prove this particular point in the paragraphs which follow. It is hoped that the reader will forgive us for discussing only incidentally in a condensed form a subject of so great a conceptual importance as that of utility. It seems however that even a few remarks may be helpful, because the question of the measurability of utilities is similar in character to corresponding questions in the physical sciences. 3.1.2. Historically, utility was fiist conceived as quantitatively measur- able, i.e. as a number. Valid objections can be and have been made against this view in its original, naive form. It is clear that every measurement or rather every claim of measurability must ultimately be based on some immediate sensation, which possibly cannot and certainly need not be analyzed any further. 1 In the case of utility the immediate sensation of preference of one object or aggregate of objects as against another provides this basis. But this permits us only to say when for one person one utility is greater than another. It is not in itself a basis for numerical comparison of utilities for one person nor of any comparison between different persons. Since there is no intuitively significant way to add two iUtilities for the same person, the assumption that utilities are of non- Jnumerical character even seems plausible. The modern method of indiffer- ence curve analysis is a mathematical procedure to describe this situation. 3.2. Principles of Measurement : Preliminaries 3.2.1. All this is strongly reminiscent of the conditions existant at the beginning of the theory of heat: that too was based on the intuitively clear concept of one body feeling warmer than another, yet there was no immedi- ate way to express significantly by how much, or how many times, or in what sense. 1 Such as the sensations of light, heat, muscular effort, etc., in the corresponding branches of physics. THE NOTION OF UTILITY 17 This comparison with heat also shows how little one can forecast a priori what the ultimate shape of such a theory will be. The above crude indica- tions do not disclose at all what, as we now know, subsequently happened. It turned out that heat permits quantitative description not by one numbei but by two: the quantity of heat and temperature. The former is rather directly numerical because it turned out to be additive and also in an unexpected way connected with mechanical energy which was numerical anyhow. The latter is also numerical, but in a much more subtle way; it is not additive in any immediate sense, but a rigid numerical scale for it emerged from the study of the concordant behavior of ideal gases, and the role of absolute temperature in connection with the entropy theorem. 3.2.2. The historical development of the theory of heat indicates that one must be extremely careful in making negative assertions about any concept with the claim to finality. Even if utilities look very unnumerical today, the history of the experience in the theory of heat may repeat itself, and nobody can foretell with what ramifications and variations. 1 And it should certainly not discourage theoretical explanations of the formal possibilities of a numerical utility. 3.3. Probability and Numerical Utilities 3.3.1. We can go even one step beyond the above double negations which were only cautions against premature assertions of the impossibility of a numerical utility. It can be shown that under the conditions on which the indifference curve analysis is based very little extra effort is needed to reach a numerical utility. It has been pointed out repeatedly that a numerical utility is dependent upon the possibility of comparing differences in utilities. This may seem and indeed is a more far-reaching assumption than that of a mere ability to state preferences. But it will seem that the alternatives to which eco- nomic preferences must be applied are such as to obliterate this distinction. 3.3.2. ILet us for the moment accept the picture of an individual whose system ol preferences is all-embracmg^md-eemplete, i^e^who^for any two objects or rather for any two imagined events, possesses a clear intuition of preference. More precisely we expect him, for any two alternative events which are put before him as possibilities, to be able to tell which of the two he prefers. It is a very natural extension of this picture to permit such an individual to compare not only events, but even combinations of events with stated probabilities. 2 By a combination of two events we mean this: Let the two events be denoted by B and C and use, for the sake of simplicity, the probability 1 A good example of the wide variety of formal possibilities is given by the entirely different development of the theory of light, colors, and wave lengths. All these notions too became numerical, but in an entirely different way. 2 Indeed this is necessary if he is engaged in economic activities which are explicitly dependent on probability. Of. the example of agriculture in footnote 2 on p. 10. 18 FORMULATION OF THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM 50%-50%. Then the " combination" is the prospect of seeing B occur with a probability of 50% and (if B does not occur) C with the (remaining) probability of 50%. We stress that the two alternatives are mutually exclusive, so that no possibility of complementarity and the like exists. Also, that an absolute certainty of the occurrence of either B or C exists. To restate our position. We expect the individual under consideration to possess a clear intuition whether he prefers the event A to the 50-50 combination of B or C, or conversely. It is clear that if he prefers A to B and also to C, then he will prefer it to the above combination as well; similarly, if he prefers B as well as C to A, then he will prefei the combination too. But if he should prefer A to, say B, but at the same time C to A, then any assertion about his preference of A against the combination contains fundamentally new information. Specifically: If he now prefers A to the 50-50 combination of B and C, this provides a plausible base for the numer- ical estimate that his preference of A over B is in excess of his preference of C over A. 1 - 2 If this standpoint is accepted, then there is a criterion with which to compare the preference of C over A with the preference of A over B. It is well known that thereby utilities or rather differences of utilities become numerically measurable. That the possibility of comparison between A, B, and C only to this extent is already sufficient for a numerical measurement of " distances " was first observed in economics by Pareto. Exactly the same argument has been made, however, by Euclid for the position of points on a line in fact it is the very basis of his classical derivation of numerical distances. The introduction of numerical measures can be achieved even more directly if use is made of all possible probabilities. Indeed: Consider three events, C, A, B, for which the order of the individual's preferences is the one stated. Let a be a real number between and 1, such that A is exactly equally desirable with the combined event consisting of a chance of probability 1 a for B and the remaining chance of probability a. for C. Then we suggest the use of a as a numerical estimate for the ratio of the preference of A over B to that of C over B. 8 An exact and exhaustive 1 To give a simple example: Assume that an individual prefers the consumption of a glass of tea to that of a cup of coffee, and the cup of coffee to a glass of milk. If we now want to know whether the last preference i.e., difference in utilities exceeds the former, it suffices to place him in a situation where he must decide this: Does he prefer a cup of coffee to a glass the content of which will be determined by a 50 %-50 % chance device as tea or milk. 1 Observe that we have only postulated an individual intuition which permits decision as to which of two "events" is preferable. But we have not directly postulated any intuitive estimate of the relative sizes of two preferences i.e. in the subsequent termi- nology, of two differences of utilities. This is important, since the former information ought to be obtainable in a reproduci- ble way by mere "questioning." 1 This offers a good opportunity for another illustrative example. The above tech- nique permits a direct determination of the ratio q of the utility of possessing 1 unit of a certain good to the utility of possessing 2 units of the same good. The individual must THE NOTION OF UTILITY 19 elaboration of these ideas requires the use of the axiomatic method. A sim- ple treatment on this basis is indeed possible. We shall discuss it in 3.5-3.7. 3.3.3. To avoid misunderstandings let us state that the " events" which were used above as the substratum of preferences are conceived as future events so as to make all logically possible alternatives equally admissible. However, it would be an unnecessary complication, as far as our present objectives are concerned, to get entangled with the problems of the preferences between events in different periods of the future. 1 It seems, however, that such difficulties can be obviated by locating all "events" in which we are interested at one and the same, standardized, moment, preferably in the immediate future. The above considerations are so vitally dependent upon the numerical concept of probability that a few words concerning the latter may be appropriate. Probability has often been visualized as a subjective concept more or less in the nature of an estimation. Since we propose to use it in con- structing an individual, numerical estimation of utility, the above view of probability would not serve our purpose. The simplest procedure is, there- fore, to insist upon the alternative, perfectly well founded interpretation of probability as frequency in long runs. This gives directly the necessary numerical foothold. 2 3.3.4. This procedure for a numerical measurement of the utilities of the individual depends, of course, upon the hypothesis of completeness in the system of individual preferences. 8 It is conceivable and may even in a way be more realistic to allow for cases where the individual is neither able to state which of two alternatives he prefers nor that they are equally desirable. In this case the treatment by indifference curves becomes impracticable too. 4 How real this possibility is, both for individuals and for organizations, seems to be an extremely interesting question, but it is a question of fact. It certainly deserves further study. We shall reconsider it briefly in 3.7.2. At any rate we hope we have shown that the treatment by indifference curves implies either too much or too little: if the preferences of the indi- be given the choice of obtaining 1 unit with certainty or of playing the chance to get two units with the probability <*, or nothing with the probability 1 a. If he prefers the former, then a < 5; if he prefers the latter, then a > g; if he cannot state a preference either way, then a = q. 1 It is well known that this presents very interesting, but as yet extremely obscure, connections with the theory of saving and interest, etc. 2 If one objects to the frequency interpretation of probability then the two concepts (probability and preference) can be axiomatized together. This too leads to a satis- factory numerical concept of utility which will be discussed on another occasion. 8 We have not obtained any basis for a comparison, quantitatively or qualitatively, of the utilities of different individuals. 4 These problems belong systematically in the mathematical theory of ordered sets. The above question in particular amounts to asking whether events, with respect to preference, form a completely or a partially ordered set. Cf. 65,3. 20 FORMULATION OF THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM vidual are not all comparable, then the indifference curves do not exist. 1 If the individual's preferences are all comparable, then we can even obtain a (uniquely defined) numeiical utility which renders the indifference curves superfluous. All this becomes, of course, pointless for the entrepreneur who can calculate in terms of (monetary) costs and profits. 3.3.5. The objection could be raised that it is not necessary to go into all these intricate details concerning the measurability of utility, since evidently the common individual, whose behavior one wants to describe, does not measure his utilities exactly but rather conducts his economic activities in a sphere of considerable haziness. The same is true, of course, for much of his conduct regarding light, heat, muscular effort, etc. But in order to build a science of physics these phenomena had to be measured. And subsequently the individual has come to use the results of such measure- ments directly or indirectly even in his everyday life. The same may obtain in economics at a future date. Once a fuller understanding of economic behavior has been achieved with the aid of a theory which makes use of this instrument, the life of the individual might be materially affected. It is, therefore, not an unnecessary digression to study these problems. 3.4. Principles of Measurement : Detailed Discussion 3.4.1. The reader may feel, on the basis of the foregoing, that we obtained a numerical scale of utility only by begging the principle, i.e. by really postulating the existence of such a scale. We have argued in 3.3.2. that if an individual prefers A to the 50-50 combination of B and C (while preferring C to A and A to JB), this provides a plausible basis for the numer- ical estimate that this preference of A over B exceeds that of C over A. Are we not postulating here or taking it for granted that one preference may exceed another, i.e. that such statements convey a meaning? Such a view would be a complete misunderstanding of our procedure. 3.4.2. We are not postulating or assuming anything of the kind. We have assumed only one thing and for this there is good empirical evidence namely that imagined events can be combined with probabilities. And therefore the same must be assumed for the utilities attached to them, whatever they may be. Or to put it in more mathematical language: There frequently appear in science quantities which are a priori not mathematical, but attached to certain aspects of the physical world. Occasionally these quantities can be grouped together in domains within which certain natural, physically defined operations are possible. Thus the physically defined quantity of "mass" permits the operation of addition. The physico-geometrically defined quantity of "distance" 2 permits the same 1 Points on the same indifference curve must be identified and are therefore no instances of incomparability. f Let us, for the sake of the argument, view geometry as a physical discipline, a sufficiently tenable viewpoint. By "geometry" we mean equally for the sake of the argument Euclidean geometry. THE NOTION OF UTILITY 21 operation. On the other hand, the physico-geometrically defined quantity of " position" does not permit this operation, 1 but it permits the operation of forming the " center of gravity" of two positions. 2 Again other physico- geometrical concepts, usually styled " vectorial" like velocity and accelera- tion permit the operation of " addition." 3.4.3. In all these cases where such a " natural" operation is given a name which is reminiscent of a mathematical operation like the instances of " addition" above one must carefully avoid misunderstandings. This nomenclature is not intended as a claim that the two operations with the same name are identical, this is manifestly not the case; it only expresses the opinion that they possess similar traits, and the hope that some cor- respondence between them will ultimately be established. This of course when feasible at all is done by finding a mathematical model for the physical domain in question, within which those quantities are defined by numbers, so that in the model the mathematical operation describes the synonymous " natural" operation. To return to our examples: " energy" and "mass" became numbers in the pertinent mathematical models, "natural" addition becoming ordinary addition. "Position" as well as the vectorial quantities became triplets 3 of numbers, called coordinates or components respectively. The "natural" concept of "center of gravity" of two positions {#1, x%, x 3 ) and \x' ly x' 2 , z'a}/ with the "masses" a, 1 a (cf. footnote 2 above), becomes {ax, + (1 - a)x(, ax, + (1 - a)*J, ax, + (1 - <*X). 5 The "natural" operation of "addition" of vectors {zi, x 2 , x*\ and [x(, z, x' z \ becomes {xi + x[, x 2 + x 2 , x* + ZgJ. 6 What was said above about "natural" and mathematical operations applies equally to natural and mathematical relations. The various con- cepts of "greater" which occur in physics greater energy, force, heat, velocity, etc. are good examples. These "natural" relations are the best base upon which to construct mathematical models and to correlate the physical domain with them. 7 ' 8 1 We are thinking of a "homogeneous" Euclidean space, in which no origin or frame of reference is preferred above any other. 2 With respect to two given masses a, occupying those positions. It may be con- venient to normalize so that the total mass is the unit, i.e. ** 1 *. 3 We are thinking of three-dimensional Euclidean space. 4 We are now describing them by their three numerical coordinates. 8 This is usually denoted by a (xi,z 2 ,z 8 1 + (1 - a)js|, xj, *',) Cf. (16:A:c) in 16.2.1. 8 This is usually denoted by (xi, x*, x s \ -f (z'i, zj, xj|. Cf. the beginning of 16.2.1. 7 Not the only one. Temperature is a good counter-example. The "natural" rela- tion of "greater," would not have sufficed to establish the present day mathematical model, i.e. the absolute temperature scale. The devices actually used were different. Cf. 3.2.1. 8 We do not want to give the misleading impression of attempting here a complete picture of the formation of mathematical models, i.e. of physical theories. It should be remembered that this is a very varied process with many unexpected phases. An impor- tant one is, e.g., the disentanglement of concepts: i.e. splitting up something which at 22 FORMULATION OF THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM 3.4.4. Here a further remark must be made. Assume that a satisfactory mathematical model for a physical domain in the above sense has been found, and that the physical quantities under consideration have been correlated with numbers. In this case it is not true necessarily that the description (of the mathematical model) provides for a unique way of correlating the physical quantities to numbers; i.e., it may specify an entire family of such correlations the mathematical name is mappings any one of which can be used for the purposes of the theory. Passage from one of these correlations to another amounts to a transformation of the numerical data describing the physical quantities. We then say that in this theory the physical quantities in question are described by numbers up to that system of transformations. The mathematical name of such transformation systems is groups. 1 Examples of such situations are numerous. Thus the geometrical con- cept of distance is a number, up to multiplication by (positive) constant factors. 2 The situation concerning the physical quantity of mass is the same. The physical concept of energy is a number up to any linear trans- formation, i.e. addition of any constant and multiplication by any (posi- tive) constant. 8 The concept of position is defined up to an inhomogeneous orthogonal linear transformation. 4 - B The vectorial concepts are defined up to homogeneous tiansformations of the same kind. 5 ' 6 3.4.6. It is even conceivable that a physical quantity is a number up to any monotone transformation. This is the case for quantities for which only a "natural" relation " greater " exists and nothing else. E.g. this was the case for temperature as long as only the concept of " warmer " was known; 7 it applies to the Mohs' scale of hardness of minerals; it applies to superficial inspection seems to be one physical entity into several mathematical notions. Thus the "disentanglement" of force and energy, of quantity of heat and temperature, were decisive in their respective fields. It is quite unforeseeable how many such differentiations still lie ahead in economic theory. 1 We shall encounter groups in another context in 28.1.1, where references to the literature are also found. * I.e. there is nothing in Euclidean geometry to fix a unit of distance. 3 I.e. there is nothing in mechanics to fix a zero or a unit of energy. Cf . with footnote 2 above. Distance has a natural zero, the distance of any point from itself. 4 I.e. |*i, x, X|| are to be replaced by {xi*, x a *, x 9 *\ where -f OU.TI 4- 013X3 + 61, *i* - 0*1X1 -f 022X1 -f 023X3 -f 62, ^i* - 031X1 -f as2X S + 033X3 + &3, the a</, bi being constants, and the matrix (a,/) what is known as orthogonal. I.e. there is nothing in geometry to fix either origin or the frame of reference when positions are concerned; and nothing to fix the frame of reference when vectors are concerned. f I.e. the bi in footnote 4 above. Sometimes a wider concept of matrices is permissible, all those with determinants ^ 0. We need not discuss these matters here. ' But no quantitatively reproducible method of thermometry . THE NOTION OF UTILITY 23 the notion of utility when this is based on the conventional idea of prefer- ence. In these cases one may be tempted to take the view that the quantity in question is not numerical at all, considering how arbitrary the description by numbers is. It seems to be preferable, however, to refrain from such qualitative statements and to state instead objectively up to what system of transformations the numerical description is determined. The case when the system consists of all monotone transformations is, of course, a rather extreme one; various graduations at the other end of the scale are the transformation systems mentioned above: inhomogeneous or homo- geneous orthogonal linear transformations in space, linear transformations of one numerical variable, multiplication of that variable by a constant. 1 In fine, the case even occurs where the numerical description is absolutely rigorous, i.e. where no transformations at all need be tolerated. 2 3.4.6. Given a physical quant