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Contemporary Intellectual Assessment: Theories, Tests, and IssuesDawn P. Flanagan, Patti L. Harrison
In one volume, this authoritative reference presents a current, comprehensive overview of intellectual and cognitive assessment, with a focus on practical applications. Leaders in the field describe major theories of intelligence and provide the knowledge needed to use the latest measures of cognitive abilities with individuals of all ages, from toddlers to adults. Evidence-based approaches to test interpretation, and their relevance for intervention, are described. The book addresses critical issues in assessing particular populations—including culturally and linguistically diverse students, gifted students, and those with learning difficulties and disabilities—in today's educational settings. New to This Edition *Incorporates major research advances and legislative and policy changes. *Covers recent test revisions plus additional tests: the NEPSY-II and the Wechsler Nonverbal Scale of Ability. *Expanded coverage of specific populations: chapters on autism spectrum disorders, attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, sensory and physical disabilities and traumatic brain injury, and intellectual disabilities. *Chapters on neuropsychological approaches, assessment of executive functions, and multi-tiered service delivery models in schools.
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THIRD EDITION CON T E M P O R A R Y INTE L L ECTUAL AS S E S S M E N T THEORIES, TESTS, AND ISSUES Edited by Dawn P. Flanagan and Patti L. Harrison ebook THE GUILFORD PRESS CONTEMPORARY INTELLECTUAL ASSESSMENT CONTEMPORARY INTELLECTUAL ASSESSMENT THIRD EDITION Theories, Tests, and Issues Edited by Dawn P. Flanagan Patti L. Harrison THE GUILFORD PRESS New York London © 2012 The Guilford Press A Division of Guilford Publications, Inc. 72 Spring Street, New York, NY 10012 www.guilford.com All rights reserved No part of this book may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, microfilming, recording, or otherwise, without written permission from the publisher. Printed in the United States of America This book is printed on acid-free paper. Last digit is print number: 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 The authors have checked with sources believed to be reliable in their efforts to provide information that is complete and generally in accord with the standards of practice that are accepted at the time of publication. However, in view of the possibility of human error or changes in behavioral, mental health, or medical sciences, neither the authors, nor the editors and publisher, nor any other party who has been involved in the preparation or publication of this work warrants that the information contained herein is in every respect accurate or complete, and they are not responsible for any errors or omissions or the results obtained from the use of such information. Readers are encouraged to confirm the information contained in this book with other sources. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Contemporary intellectual assessment : theories, tests, and issues / edited by Dawn P. Flanagan, Patti L. Harrison.–3rd ed. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-60918-995-2 (hardcover) 1. Intelligence tests. 2. Intelligence tests—History. I. Flanagan, Dawn P. II. Harrison, Patti L. BF431.C66 2012 153.9`3—dc23 2011019751 About the Editors Dawn P. Flanagan, PhD, is Professor of Psychology and Director of the School Psychology Training Programs at St. John's University in Queens, New York. She is also Assistant Clinical Professor at the Yale Child Study Center. Dr. Flanagan serves as an expert witness, learning disability consultant, and psychological test and measurement consultant and trainer, and has published widely on cognitive assessment, specific learning disabilities, and psychometric theories of the structure of cognitive abilities. Patti L. Harrison, PhD, is Professor in the Department of Educational Studies in Psychology, Research Methodology, and Counseling at the University of Alabama. She has conducted research on intelligence, adaptive behavior, and preschool assessment. Dr. Harrison has published and presented on assessment topics in school psychology, clinical psychology, and special education venues. She is a past editor of School Psychology Review. v Contributors Vincent C. Alfonso, PhD, Graduate School of Education, Fordham University, New York, New York John B. Carroll, PhD (deceased), Department of Psychology, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, North Carolina Kristina J. Andren, PsyD, School Psychology Program, University of Southern Maine, Gorham, Maine Jie-Qi Chen, PhD, Erikson Institute, Chicago, Illinois Kathleen Armstrong, PhD, Department of Pediatrics, University of South Florida, Tampa, Florida Erin Avirett, BA, Department of Psychology and Philosophy, Texas Women's University, Denton, Texas J. P. Das, PhD, Department of Educational Psychology, University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada John L. Davis, MA, Department of Educational Psychology, Texas A&M University, College Station, Texas Nayena Blankson, PhD, Department of Psychology, Spelman College, Atlanta, Georgia Scott L. Decker, PhD, Department of Psychology, Barnwell College, University of South Carolina, Columbia, South Carolina Bruce A. Bracken, PhD, School of Education, College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, Virginia Melissa DeVries, PhD, Neurology, Learning, and Behavior Center, Salt Lake City, Utah Jeffery P. Braden, PhD, Department of Psychology, North Carolina State University, Raleigh, North Carolina Felicia A. Dixon, PhD, Department of Educational Psychology, Ball State University, Muncie, Indiana Kristina C. Breaux, PhD, The Psychological Corporation, San Antonio, Texas Shauna G. Dixon, MS, Graduate School of Education, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts Rachel Brown-Chidsey, PhD, School Psychology Program, University of Southern Maine, Gorham, Maine Lisa Whipple Drozdick, PhD, The Psychological Corporation, San Antonio, Texas vii viii Agnieszka N. Dynda, PsyD, Department of Psychology, St. John's University, Jamaica, New York Colin D. Elliott, PhD, Gervitz School of Education, University of California, Santa Barbara, California Julia A. Englund, BA, Department of Psychology, University of South Carolina, Columbia, South Carolina Catherine A. Fiorello, PhD, NCSP, School Psychology Program, Department of Psychological Studies in Education, College of Education, Temple University, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania Dawn P. Flanagan, PhD, Department of Psychology, St. John's University, Jamaica, New York Randy G. Floyd, PhD, Department of Psychology, University of Memphis, Memphis, Tennessee Laurie Ford, PhD, Department of Educational and Counseling Psychology, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada Howard Gardner, PhD, Graduate School of Education, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts Sam Goldstein, PhD, Neurology, Learning, and Behavior Center, Salt Lake City, Utah James B. Hale, PhD, Department of Psychology, University of Victoria, Victoria, British Columbia, Canada Jason Hangauer, EdS, Department of Pediatrics, University of South Florida, Tampa, Florida Julie N. Henzel, PsyD, The Nisonger Center, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio Contributors Alan S. Kaufman, PhD, Child Study Center, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut James C. Kaufman, PhD, Department of Psychology, California State University, San Bernardino, California Nadeen L. Kaufman, EdD, Child Study Center, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut Timothy Z. Keith, PhD, Department of Educational Psychology, University of Texas at Austin, Austin, Texas Sangwon Kim, PhD, Department of Child Development, Ewha Womans University, Seoul, South Korea Laura Grofer Klinger, PhD, TEACCH Autism Program, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, North Carolina Michelle L. Kozey, MA, Department of Educational and Counseling Psychology, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada John H. Kranzler, PhD, Special Education Program, College of Education, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida Elizabeth O. Lichtenberger, PhD, private practice, Carlsbad, California Denise E. Maricle, PhD, Department of Psychology and Philosophy, Texas Women's University, Denton, Texas Jennifer T. Mascolo, PsyD, Department of Health and Behavior Studies, Teachers College, Columbia University, New York, New York John L. Horn, PhD (deceased), Department of Psychology, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California Nancy Mather, PhD, Department of Disability and Psychoeducational Studies, College of Education, University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona Randy W. Kamphaus, PhD, College of Education, Georgia State University, Atlanta, Georgia Robb N. Matthews, MA, Department of Educational Psychology, Texas A&M University, College Station, Texas Contributors ix R. Steve McCallum, PhD, Department of Educational Psychology and Counseling, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, Tennessee Samuel O. Ortiz, PhD, Department of Psychology, St. John's University, Jamaica, New York George McCloskey, PhD, Department of Psychology, Philadelphia College of Osteopathic Medicine, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania Tulio M. Otero, PhD, Clinical PsyD and School Psychology Programs, Chicago School of Professional Psychology, Chicago, Illinois Kevin S. McGrew, PhD, Institute for Applied Psychometrics, St. Cloud, Minnesota Eric E. Pierson, PhD, NCSP, Department of Educational Psychology, Ball State University, Muncie, Indiana David E. McIntosh, PhD, Department of Special Education, Ball State University, Muncie, Indiana Daniel C. Miller, PhD, Department of Psychology and Philosophy, Texas Women's University, Denton, Texas Ryan Murphy, EdS, Department of Psychology, Philadelphia College of Osteopathic Medicine, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania Joanna L. Mussey, MA, Department of Psychology, University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, Alabama Joshua Nadeau, MS, Department of Pediatrics, University of South Florida, Tampa, Florida Jack A. Naglieri, PhD, ABAP, Curry School of Education, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia; Devereux Center for Resilient Children, Villanova, Pennsylvania Juliana Negreiros, MA, Department of Educational and Counseling Psychology, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada Bradley C. Niebling, PhD, Midwest Instructional Leadership Council, Urbandale, Iowa Salvador Hector Ochoa, PhD, Department of Educational Psychology, University of Texas– Pan American, Edinburg, Texas Sarah E. O'Kelly, PhD, Civitan International Research Center, Sparks Clinics and Department of Psychology, University of Alabama at Birmingham, Birmingham, Alabama Mark Pomplun, PhD, Assessment and Accountability Department, St. Charles School District, St. Charles, Illinois Tara C. Raines, PsyS, Gwinnett County Public Schools, Gwinnett County, Georgia Cecil R. Reynolds, PhD, Department of Educational Psychology, Texas A&M University, College Station, Texas Matthew R. Reynolds, PhD, Department of Psychology and Research in Education, University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas Cynthia A. Riccio, PhD, Department of Educational Psychology, Texas A&M University, College Station, Texas Alycia M. Roberts, BA, Department of Psychology, University of South Carolina, Columbia, South Carolina Jane Rogers, MA, Department of Psychology, Philadelphia College of Osteopathic Medicine, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania Gale H. Roid, PhD, Department of Institutional Research, Warner Pacific College, Portland, Oregon Ellen W. Rowe, PhD, Center for Psychological Services, George Mason University, Fairfax, Virginia Andrea N. Schneider, BA, Department of Psychology, University of Victoria, Victoria, British Columbia, Canada x W. Joel Schneider, PhD, Department of Psychology, Illinois State University, Normal, Illinois Fredrick A. Schrank, PhD, ABPP, Woodcock– Muñoz Foundation, Olympia, Washington Jennie Kaufman Singer, PhD, Criminal Justice Division, California State University, Sacramento, California Marlene Sotelo-Dynega, PsyD, Department of Psychology, St. John's University, Jamaica, New York Robert J. Sternberg, PhD, Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, Oklahoma Dustin Wahlstrom, PhD, The Psychological Corporation, San Antonio, Texas John D. Wasserman, PhD, American Institute of Psychology, Burke, Virginia Lawrence G. Weiss, PhD, The Psychological Corporation, San Antonio, Texas Contributors Barbara J. Wendling, MA, Woodcock–Muñoz Foundation, Dallas, Texas James Whitaker, PsyD, Department of Psychology, Philadelphia College of Osteopathic Medicine, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania Gabrielle Wilcox, PsyD, Providence Behavioral Health, Lancaster, Pennsylvania Anne Pierce Winsor, PhD, private practice, Atlanta, Georgia Kirby L. Wycoff, PsyD, NCSP, Milton Hershey School, Hershey, Pennsylvania Megan Yim, BA, Department of Psychology, University of Victoria, Victoria, British Columbia, Canada Jianjun Zhu, PhD, The Psychological Corporation, San Antonio, Texas Preface The history of intelligence testing has been well documented from the early period of mental measurement to present-day conceptions of the structure of intelligence and valid assessment methods. The foundations of psychometric theory and practice were established in the late 1800s and set the stage for the ensuing measurement of human cognitive abilities. The technology of intelligence testing was apparent in the early 1900s, when Binet and Simon developed a test that adequately distinguished children with mental retardation from children with normal intellectual capabilities, and was well entrenched when the Wechsler–Bellevue was published in the late 1930s. In subsequent decades, significant refinements and advances in intelligence testing technology have been made, and the concept of individual differences has remained a constant focus of scientific inquiry. Although several definitions and theories have been offered in recent decades, the nature of intelligence, cognition, and competence continues to be elusive. Perhaps the most popular definition was that offered by Wechsler in 1958. According to Wechsler, intelligence is "the aggregate or global capacity of the individual to act purposefully, to think rationally and to deal effectively with his environment" (p. 7). It is on this conception of intelligence that the original Wechsler tests were built. Because for decades the Wechsler batteries were the dominant intelligence tests in the field of psychology and were found to measure global intelligence validly, they assumed "number one" status and remain in that position today. As such, Wechsler's definition of intelligence continues to guide and influence the present-day practice of intelligence testing. In light of theoretical and empirical advances, however, it is clear that earlier editions of the Wechsler tests were not based on the most dependable and current evidence of science, and that overreliance on these instruments served to widen the gap between intelligence testing and cognitive science. From the 1980s through the 2000s, new intelligence tests have been developed to be more consistent with contemporary research and theoretical models of the structure of cognitive abilities. In addition, changes in services, programs, legislation, and policy in psychology and education have had many implications for practical uses of cognitive assessments and the client populations for whom they are applied. Since the publication of the first edition of Contemporary Intellectual Assessment: Theories, Tests, and Issues in 1997, there has been tremendous growth in research about cognitive constructs. Contemporary purposes of cognitive assessment in psychology and education have been framed in light of, for example, xi xii Preface recent research in neuropsychology and executive functioning; multi-tiered service delivery for children experiencing learning problems; and increasing uses of cognitive and neuropsychological assessment for people who have autism spectrum disorders, attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), and other challenges. The information presented in this text on modern intelligence theory and assessment technology suggests that clinicians should be familiar with the many approaches to assessing intelligence that are now available. In order for the field of intellectual assessment to continue to advance, clinicians should use instruments that operationalize empirically supported theories of intelligence and should employ assessment techniques that are designed to measure the broad array of cognitive abilities represented in current theory and research. It is only through a broader measurement of intelligence, grounded in well-validated theories of the nature of human cognitive abilities, that professionals can gain a better understanding of the relationship between intelligence and important outcome criteria (e.g., school achievement, occupational success) and can continue to narrow the gap between the professional practice of intelligence and cognitive ability testing and theoretical, empirical, and practical advances in psychology and education. PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES The purpose of the third edition of this book is to provide a comprehensive conceptual and practical overview of current theories of intelligence, individual measures of cognitive ability, and uses of intellectual assessments. This text summarizes the latest research in the field of intellectual assessment and includes comprehensive treatment of critical issues that should be considered when the use of intelligence tests is warranted. The three primary objectives of this book are as follows: (1) to present in-depth descriptions of prominent theories of intelligence, tests of cognitive abilities, and neuropsychological instruments, and issues related to the use of these tests; (2) to provide important information about the validity of contemporary intelligence, cognitive, and neuropsychological tests; and (3) to demonstrate the utility of a well-validated theoretical and research foundation for developing cognitive tests and interpretive approaches, and for guiding research and practice. The ultimate goal of this book is to provide professionals with the knowledge necessary to use the latest cognitive instruments effectively. Practitioners, university faculty, researchers, undergraduate and graduate students, and other professionals in psychology and education will find this book interesting and useful. It would be appropriate as a primary text in any graduate (or advanced undergraduate) course or seminar on cognitive psychology, clinical or psychoeducational assessment, or measurement and psychometric theory. ORGANIZATION AND THEMES This book consists of 36 chapters, organized into six parts, as well as an appendix. Part I, "The Origins of Intellectual Assessment," traces the historical roots of test conceptualization, development, and interpretation up to the present day. The updated chapters provide readers with an understanding of how current practices evolved, as well as a basis for improving contemporary approaches to test interpretation. Chapters provide a necessary foundation from which to understand and elucidate the contemporary and emerging theories, tests, and issues in the field of intellectual assessment that are presented in subsequent sections of this volume. Preface Part II, "Contemporary Theoretical Perspectives," updates several models presented in the previous editions of this text. These theories are described in terms of (1) how they reflect recent advances in psychometrics, neuropsychology, and cognitive psychology; (2) what empirical evidence supports them; and (3) how they have been operationalized and applied. A comprehensive description of each theory is provided, focusing specifically on its historical origins, as well as the rationale and impetus for its development and modification. The theories represent viable foundations from which to develop and interpret cognitive measures—measures that may lead to greater insights into the nature, structure, and neurobiological substrates of cognitive functioning. Part III, "Contemporary Intelligence, Cognitive, and Neuropsychological Batteries (and Associated Achievement Tests)," includes comprehensive chapters on the most widely used individual intelligence batteries and their utility in understanding the cognitive capabilities of individuals from toddlerhood through adulthood. The third edition of Contemporary Intellectual Assessment: Theories, Tests, and Issues updates information found in the second edition and provides current research about the most recent revisions of the Wechsler intellectual, memory, and achievement scales; the Stanford–Binet Intelligence Scales, Fifth Edition; the Kaufman Assessment Battery for Children—Second Edition and the Kaufman Test of Educational Achievement—Second Edition; the Woodcock–Johnson III Normative Update; the Differential Ability Scales—Second Edition; the Universal Nonverbal Intelligence Test; the Cognitive Assessment System; and the Reynolds Intellectual Assessment Scales. A new chapter on the NEPSY-II, added to the third edition, provides a focus on assessment of neuropsychological components of cognition. In general, the authors provide descriptions of their assessment instruments and discuss the instruments' theoretical and research underpinnings, organization and format, and psychometric characteristics. The authors also summarize the latest research and practical uses and provide recommendations for interpreting the abilities measured by their instruments. Part IV, "Contemporary Interpretive Approaches and Their Relevance for Intervention," includes chapters about the latest research and models for interpretation of intelligence test results. The third edition updates second edition chapters on topics such as the cross-battery approach to interpretation based on the Cattell–Horn–Carroll theory, information-processing approaches, interpretation that addresses needs of culturally and linguistically diverse populations, and linking cognitive assessment with academic interventions for students with learning disabilities. A new chapter in Part IV focuses on cognitive hypothesis testing. A key feature of the chapters in Part IV is the implications of contemporary psychometric research for practical and valid interpretive approaches. Part V, "Assessment of Intelligence and Cognitive Functioning in Different Populations," addresses a number of the populations with whom individual intelligence, cognitive ability, and neuropsychological tests are widely used. Chapters on early childhood, giftedness, and learning disabilities were updated from the second edition. The third edition includes new chapters about individuals for which cognitive assessment is increasingly a key component of diagnoses and/or programming, including individuals with autism spectrum disorders, ADHD, sensory and physical disabilities, traumatic brain injury, and intellectual disabilities. Part VI, "Contemporary and Emerging Issues in Intellectual Assessment," includes updated chapters related to the validity of intelligence batteries. In the third edition, Part VI also adds a number of important new chapters on significant current issues and new directions for individual intellectual assessment, including neuropsychological approaches, assessment of executive functions, and implications for problem-solving and multi-tiered approaches to learning problems of children in schools. Suggestions and recommendations regarding the appropriate use of intelligence, cognitive ability, and neuropsychological tests, as well as future research directions, are provided throughout this section of the book. xiii xiv Preface Because of the many significant contributions made by John B. Carroll (1916–2003) to our understanding of the structure of cognitive abilities, the chapter that he wrote for the first edition of this book is included in the Appendix. Likewise, John L. Horn's (1928–2006) contributions to and extensions of Cattell's original Gf-Gc theory were monumental. His chapter from the second edition of our book is reprinted here in Chapter 3. Both Carroll and Horn's landmark contributions to the field of cognitive psychology over a period of several decades paved the way for the present-day Cattell–Horn–Carroll theory of cognitive abilities, which is described in Chapter 4. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS We wish to thank the individuals who have contributed to or assisted in the preparation of this book. We are appreciative of the editorial assistance of Alla Zhelinsky, whose close attention to detail improved the quality of this work. We are also extremely grateful for the extraordinary contributions of our chapter authors. It has been a rewarding experience to work with such a dedicated group of people who are nationally recognized authorities in their respective areas. The contributions of Natalie Graham, Mary Beth Wood, Laura Specht Patchkofsky, and the rest of the staff at The Guilford Press are also gratefully acknowledged. Their expertise, and their pleasant and cooperative working style, made this project an enjoyable and productive endeavor. DAWN P. FLANAGAN, PhD PATTI L. HARRISON, PhD REFERENCE Wechsler, D. (1958). The measurement and appraisal of adult intelligence (4th ed.). Baltimore: Williams & Wilkins. Contents I. THE ORIGINS OF INTELLECTUAL ASSESSMENT 1. A History of Intelligence Assessment: The Unfinished Tapestry 3 John D. Wasserman 2. A History of Intelligence Test Interpretation 56 Randy W. Kamphaus, Anne Pierce Winsor, Ellen W. Rowe, and Sangwon Kim II. CONTEMPORARY THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 3. Foundations for Better Understanding of Cognitive Abilities 73 John L. Horn and A. Nayena Blankson 4. The Cattell–Horn–Carroll Model of Intelligence 99 W. Joel Schneider and Kevin S. McGrew 5. Assessment of Intellectual Profile: A Perspective from Multiple-Intelligences Theory 145 Jie-Qi Chen and Howard Gardner 6. The Triarchic Theory of Successful Intelligence 156 Robert J. Sternberg 7. Planning, Attention, Simultaneous, Successive: A Cognitive-Processing-Based Theory of Intelligence 178 Jack A. Naglieri, J. P. Das, and Sam Goldstein III. CONTEMPORARY INTELLIGENCE, COGNITIVE, AND NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL BATTERIES (AND ASSOCIATED ACHIEVEMENT TESTS) 8. The Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale—Fourth Edition and the Wechsler Memory Scale—Fourth Edition 197 Lisa Whipple Drozdick, Dustin Wahlstrom, Jianjun Zhu, and Lawrence G. Weiss xv xvi Contents 9. The Wechsler Preschool and Primary Scale of Intelligence— Third Edition, the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children— Fourth Edition, and the Wechsler Individual Achievement Test— Third Edition 224 Dustin Wahlstrom, Kristina C. Breaux, Jianjun Zhu, and Lawrence G. Weiss 10. The Stanford–Binet Intelligence Scales, Fifth Edition 249 11. The Kaufman Assessment Battery for Children—Second Edition and the Kaufman Test of Educational Achievement—Second Edition 269 12. The Woodcock–Johnson III Normative Update: Tests of Cognitive Abilities and Tests of Achievement 297 13. The Differential Ability Scales—Second Edition 336 14. The Universal Nonverbal Intelligence Test: A Multidimensional Nonverbal Alternative for Cognitive Assessment 357 15. The Cognitive Assessment System: From Theory to Practice 376 16. The Reynolds Intellectual Assessment Scales and the Reynolds Intellectual Screening Test 400 17. The NEPSY‑II 422 18. The Wechsler Nonverbal Scale of Ability: Assessment of Diverse Populations 436 Gale H. Roid and Mark Pomplun Jennie Kaufman Singer, Elizabeth O. Lichtenberger, James C. Kaufman, Alan S. Kaufman, and Nadeen L. Kaufman Fredrick A. Schrank and Barbara J. Wendling Colin D. Elliott R. Steve McCallum and Bruce A. Bracken Jack A. Naglieri and Tulio M. Otero Cecil R. Reynolds, Randy W. Kamphaus, and Tara C. Raines Robb N. Matthews, Cynthia A. Riccio, and John L. Davis Jack A. Naglieri and Tulio M. Otero IV. Contemporary Interpretive Approaches and Their Relevance for Intervention 19. The Cross‑Battery Assessment Approach: An Overview, Historical Perspective, and Current Directions 459 20. Cognitive Hypothesis Testing: Linking Test Results to the Real World 484 21. Processing Approaches to Interpretation of Information from Cognitive Ability Tests: A Critical Review 497 22. Testing with Culturally and Linguistically Diverse Populations: Moving beyond the Verbal–Performance Dichotomy into Evidence‑Based Practice 526 Dawn P. Flanagan, Vincent C. Alfonso, and Samuel O. Ortiz Catherine A. Fiorello, James B. Hale, and Kirby L. Wycoff Randy G. Floyd and John H. Kranzler Samuel O. Ortiz, Salvador Hector Ochoa, and Agnieszka M. Dynda Contents 23. Linking Cognitive Abilities to Academic Interventions for Students with Specific Learning Disabilities xvii 553 Nancy Mather and Barbara J. Wendling V. ASSESSMENT OF INTELLIGENCE AND COGNITIVE FUNCTIONING IN DIFFERENT POPULATIONS 24. Cognitive Assessment in Early Childhood: Theoretical and Practice Perspectives 585 Laurie Ford, Michelle L. Kozey, and Juliana Negreiros 25. Use of Intelligence Tests in the Identification of Giftedness 623 David E. McIntosh, Felicia A. Dixon, and Eric E. Pierson 26. Use of Ability Tests in the Identification of Specific Learning Disabilities within the Context of an Operational Definition 643 Dawn P. Flanagan, Vincent C. Alfonso, Jennifer T. Mascolo, and Marlene Sotelo-Dynega 27. Assessment of Intellectual Functioning in Autism Spectrum Disorder 670 Laura Grofer Klinger, Sarah E. O'Kelley, Joanna L. Mussey, Sam Goldstein, and Melissa DeVries 28. Cognitive and Neuropsychological Assessment of Attention-Deficit/ Hyperactivity Disorder: Redefining a Disruptive Behavior Disorder 687 James B. Hale, Megan Yim, Andrea N. Schneider, Gabrielle Wilcox, Julie N. Henzel, and Shauna G. Dixon 29. Intellectual and Neuropsychological Assessment of Individuals with Sensory and Physical Disabilities and Traumatic Brain Injury 708 Scott L. Decker, Julia A. Englund, and Alycia M. Roberts 30. Use of Intelligence Tests in the Identification of Children with Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities 726 Kathleen Armstrong, Jason Hangauer, and Joshua Nadeau VI. CONTEMPORARY AND EMERGING ISSUES IN INTELLECTUAL ASSESSMENT 31. Using the Joint Test Standards to Evaluate the Validity Evidence for Intelligence Tests 739 Jeffery P. Braden and Bradley C. Niebling 32. Using Confirmatory Factor Analysis to Aid in Understanding the Constructs Measured by Intelligence Tests 758 Timothy Z. Keith and Matthew R. Reynolds 33. The Emergence of Neuropsychological Constructs into Tests of Intelligence and Cognitive Abilities 800 Daniel C. Miller and Denise E. Maricle 34. The Role of Cognitive and Intelligence Tests in the Assessment of Executive Functions Denise E. Maricle and Erin Avirett 820 xviii Contents 35. Intelligence Tests in the Context of Emerging Assessment Practices: Problem-Solving Applications 839 Rachel Brown-Chidsey and Kristina J. Andren 36. Intellectual, Cognitive, and Neuropsychological Assessment in Three-Tier Service Delivery Systems in Schools 852 George McCloskey, James Whitaker, Ryan Murphy, and Jane Rogers Appendix. The Three-Stratum Theory of Cognitive Abilities 883 John B. Carroll Author Index 891 Subject Index 908 PART I THE ORIGINS OF INTELLECTUAL ASSESSMENT CHAP TER 1 A History of Intelligence Assessment The Unfinished Tapestry John D. Wasserman When our intelligence scales have become more accurate and the laws governing IQ changes have been more definitively established it will then be possible to say that there is nothing about an individual as important as his IQ, except possibly his morals; that the greatest educational problem is to determine the kind of education best suited to each IQ level; that the first concern of a nation should be the average IQ of its citizens, and the eugenic and dysgenic influences which are capable of raising or lowering that level; that the great test problem of democracy is how to adjust itself to the large IQ differences which can be demonstrated to exist among the members of any race or nationality group. —LEWIS M. TERMAN (1922b) T his bold statement by the author of the first Stanford–Binet intelligence scale captures much of both the promise and the controversy that have historically surrounded, and that still surround, the assessment of intelligence. Intelligence tests and their applications have been associated with some of the very best and very worst human behaviors. On the one hand, intelligence assessment can provide a meaningful basis for understanding the strengths and weaknesses of misunderstood children, adolescents, or adults—thereby providing data that can be used to design and implement interventions to help people reach their potential more effectively. On the other hand, intelligence assessment can be used to segregate and label people—treating their future as a fixed outcome, an unchangeable fate. The history of forced sterilizations of individuals with intellectual disabilities in the United States and many other countries is a tragic example of how intelligence tests may be misused, exceeded only by the systematic extermination of intellectually disabled individuals in Nazi Germany (e.g., Friedlander, 1995). The topic of intelligence and its assessment deservedly elicits many strong feelings. Intelligence is arguably the most researched topic in the history of psychology, and the concept of general intelligence has been described as "one of the most central phenomena in all of behavioral science, with broad explanatory powers" (Jensen, 1998, p. xii). Still, social, legal, and political forces have in some instances excluded intelligence test results from important types of educational and personnel decision-making processes. Tangible advances in assessment practices have been slow and episodic. Following Alfred Binet's initial successes, the beginning of the 20th century saw an accelerated pace of small- and large-scale applied intelligence testing, but many anticipated educational and occupational benefits were never realized. Buros (1977) considered 1927 as the " banner year" in which "the testing movement reached maturity" (p. 9). The middle of the century saw only incremental gains in testing, such as electronic scoring, analysis, and reporting of test results, but with comparatively "little progress" (Buros, 1977, 3 4 T H E O R I G I N S O F I N T E L L EC T UA L A S S E S S M E N T p. 10) and more than a little "stagnation" (Carroll, 1978, p. 93). A landmark quantitative review of factor-analytic investigations near the end of the 20th century (i.e., Carroll, 1993) stimulated a new school of thinking about intelligence assessment, but the story remains unfinished. In the United States, federal educational reforms and civil rights legislation have had pronounced effects upon the use of intelligence tests in education. It is possible to see the history of intelligence assessment as an unfinished tapestry depicting the rich saga of a developing discipline, with recurrent characters interwoven through different narratives, as well as more than a few loose and unresolved thematic threads. In this chapter, the origins of intelligence assessment are recounted, with an emphasis on milestone events and seminal individuals. Thematic strands present from the early days are traced, including some that were resolved and some that remain unresolved. An effort has been made whenever possible to provide samples of primary source material. Finally, although we all tend to view history through the lens of our own experiences, it is helpful to appreciate the sociocultural context, institutional traditions, and professional Zeitgeist associated with historical events, as well as the experiences and personal motivations that may have driven the ideas and behaviors of historical figures. PSEUDOSCIENTIFIC ANTECEDENTS: PHRENOLOGY IN THE 19TH CENTURY The first science purporting to be a "true science of mind" that could measure mental qualities and functions was cranioscopy, introduced at the beginning of the 19th century by Franz Joseph Gall, and later renamed phrenology by Gall's associate, Johann Gaspar Spurzheim. Gall (1758–1828) was a Viennese physician and neuroanatomist, and Spurzheim (1776–1832) was a physician and colleague who would ultimately be responsible for the widespread dissemination of phrenology. But it would be a Scotsman, George Combe (1788–1858)—who developed and published a two-volume system of phrenology in 1824, as well as launching a phrenology journal with his brother—who would prove most instrumental in the popularization of phrenology. Combe's system appears in Figure 1.1. He also wrote the immensely successful book The Constitution of Man, which advanced the idea that all the laws of nature were in harmony with one another, and that people could best fulfill God's will and obtain the greatest happiness by discovering these laws and obeying them. The book went through eight editions and sold approximately 350,000 copies between 1828 and 1900. The basic tenets of phrenology can be summarized easily. In a letter to a Viennese official, Gall (1798/1857) asserted that the brain was the organ of the mind, that the mind could be reduced to a number of faculties, that the faculties were innate, that the faculties were located in distinct and particular organs of the brain, that the surface of the skull was determined by the external form of the brain, and that phrenologists could judge the development of individual faculties merely by examining the form of the skull. A well-developed faculty was thought to have a large cerebral organ that corresponded to a cranial protuberance. Gall originally described and localized 27 distinct faculties; Spurzheim (1815) increased the list to 32 faculties; Combe (1853) further expanded the list to 35; and others expanded the list to 43 (e.g., Payne, 1920). Gall and Spurzheim traveled through Europe promoting phrenology, which Gall advocated as a science and Spurzheim as a way to reform education, religion, and penology. It quickly became popular in the United Kingdom, and Spurzheim came to the United States in 1832 to promote phrenology to a scientific community that was already quite familiar with it. By the time Combe conducted his 1839 American phrenology lecture tour, audiences averaged over 500 across each of the 16 lectures (Walsh, 1976). A satirical depiction of a phrenological examination from about the same time appears in Figure 1.2. Gall and Spurzheim are today credited with recognizing the significance of gray matter as the source of nerve fibers; most importantly, they are credited with introducing the neuroscientific concept of functional localization in the cerebral cortex (Simpson, 2005). Dallenbach (1915) provides evidence that they should be credited with the terms mental functions and faculties. British philosopher and critic G. H. Lewes (1867) went a step further, asserting that Gall laid the groundwork for psychology as a science rather than philosophy: "Gall rescued the problem of mental functions from Metaphysics and made it one of Biology" (p. 407). Even so, there is a long history of disparaging efforts to localize mental functions in specific regions in the brain by calling them a new "phrenology" (e.g., Franz, 1912; Fuster, 2008, p. 346). A History of Intelligence Assessment 5 FIGURE 1.1. George Combe, the best-known phrenologist of the 19th century, divided the brain into intellectual faculties and feelings. The plate of the phrenological bust faces the title page in Combe (1830). In the public domain. 6 T H E O R I G I N S O F I N T E L L EC T UA L A S S E S S M E N T FIGURE 1.2. Illustration from a fictional story of a member of a phrenology society who decides to use phrenology to identify a possible thief in his household. The drawing shows a servant who was paid five shillings to shave his head so that the phrenological organs could be traced in ink, not a standard part of phrenology practice. From Prendergast (1844, p. 17). In the public domain. PHILOSOPHICAL AND SCIENTIFIC ANTECEDENTS The most prominent British philosopher of his era, Herbert Spencer (1820–1903) sought to synthesize universal natural laws (especially evolution) across the disciplines of biology, psychology, sociology, and ethics. Spencer coined the phrase "survival of the fittest" (p. 444) in The Principles of Biology (1864) after reading Charles Darwin (1859), although he was reluctant to accept Darwin's evolutionary mechanism of natural selection. In The Principles of Psychology (1855), Spencer described how the behavior of the individual organism adapts through interaction with the environment, and defined intelligence as a "continuous adjustment" of "inner to outer relations" (p. 486). Spencer's ideas persist in a number of ways to this day. Intelligence, as we shall see, is still widely considered to represent a capacity associated with adaptation to one's environment. In a critical review of Spencer's synthesis, John Dewey (1904) was struck by the luck that Spencer and Darwin published almost simultaneously, thereby making their very different concepts of evolution indistinguishable to the public. Beyond Spencer's philosophical influence, the foundation for psychology as a science, as well as for the scholarly study of intelligence, was laid by naturalist Charles Darwin (1809–1882), who is most remembered for his theory of evolution by natural selection. In his writings, Darwin frequently referred to adaptive behavior in animals and humans as "intelligent"; more importantly, he argued that the same forces that act on animal evolution also apply to human mental abilities: "There is no fundamental difference between man and the higher mammals in their mental faculties" (Darwin, 1871, p. 35). In The Descent of Man, Darwin (1871) went even further in applying his evolutionary theory to human mental characteristics—probably after reading the work of his half-cousin Francis Galton, the Victorian polymath, whose drive for scientific measurement of human capabilities would start the race to develop measures of intelligence in motion. It is difficult to overstate the impact of Darwin's theory of evolution on psychology. By considering human behavior in an evolutionary context, Darwin treated the study of psychology as no less a science than biology and other natural sciences. His influence was substantial and may be seen, for example, in Joseph Jastrow's (1901) American Psychological Association (APA) presidential address to start the 20th century. Jastrow described psychology as both a laboratory science and an applied science, setting the study of intelligence in a somewhat Spencerian evolutionary context: Intelligence must first be realized as an advantagegaining factor in the evolutionary struggle; that struggle is not merely, and indeed in all the stages that here come into consideration, not mainly a conflict of tooth and nail, a contest of strength of claw and fleetness of foot, but a war of wits, an encounter of skill and cunning, a measure of strategy and foresight. (p. 9) Francis Galton and the Anthropometric Laboratory If you lived in London in the mid-1880s or 1890s, you could pay three- or fourpence for you or your children to undergo a variety of physical measurements and tests, with the option to register results for future reference and follow-up. The measure- A History of Intelligence Assessment ments were available from Francis Galton's Anthropometric Laboratory, first located at the International Health Exhibition (see Figure 1.3), then at the University of Cambridge, the South Kensington Museum, and finally at the Clarendon Museum at Oxford. Anthropometry referred to the "measurement of man," and Galton's laboratory was, according to Diamond (1977), "a device to tease the public into providing the data he needed for his research" (p. 52). As a lifelong advocate for objective scientific measurement, Galton (1822– 1911; see Figure 1.4) was a pioneer in the use of test batteries and questionnaires for data collection, the concept of control groups in research, and statistical methods (as developer of the techniques of regression and correlation). Galton introduced his system of anthropometric measurements in Inquiries into Human Faculty and Its Development (1883), where he wrote, "It is needless for me to speak here about the differences in intellectual power between different men and different races, or about the convertibility of genius as shown by different members of the same gifted family achieving eminence in varied ways" (pp. 82–83). He conceptualized his measurements as constituting indicators of physical efficiency to complement performance on formal academic written literary examinations, which he thought were the best available measures of intelligence (e.g., Galton, 1884, 1891). FIGURE 1.3. Francis Galton's first Anthropometric Laboratory was featured at the International Health Exhibition held in London in 1884–1885. Nearly 10,000 people paid threepence each to be examined and receive a copy of their measurements. From Pearson (1924, Plate L). Reprinted by permission of Cambridge University Press. 7 FIGURE 1.4. Francis Galton in 1888 at the age of 66, when the Anthropometric Laboratory remained active. From the copperplate prepared for Biometrika. In the public domain. The examination took less than 1 hour. Although the makeup of the battery changed slightly over time, each session began with the examinee's completing a card recording age, birthplace, marital status (married, unmarried, or widowed), residence (urban, suburban, or country), and occupation. The examinee's name, birth date, and initials were collected in the laboratory's later years, with the full name indexed in a separate list. The examiner then recorded the color of the examinee's eyes and hair, followed by tests and measurements of sensory acuity, stature, strength, and lung capacity: u Eyesight keenness, color sense, and judgment in estimating length and squareness u Hearing keenness and highest audible note u Height standing, without shoes u Height sitting, from seat of chair u Span of arms (between opposite fingertips, with arms fully extended) u Weight, in usual indoor clothing u Breathing capacity (volume of air exhaled after a deep breath) u Strength of pull (as an archer draws a bow) u Strength of grasp (squeeze with the strongest hand) u Swiftness of blow with fist (against a flat bar with pad at one end) 8 T H E O R I G I N S O F I N T E L L EC T UA L A S S E S S M E N T Specialized instruments (some invented by Galton) were employed, such as the spirometer, which required exhaling into a tube to measure the number of cubic inches of water displaced in a tank. Galton (1890b) interpreted breathing (lung) capacity as an indicator of energy level: The possession of a considerable amount of breathing capacity and of muscular strength is an important element of success in an active life, and the rank that a youth holds among his fellows in these respects is a valuable guide to the selection of the occupation for which he is naturally fitted, whether it should be an active or a sedentary one. (p. 238) Galton constructed normative distributions for each measurement, including mean values and percentile ranks (i.e., the percentage of cases falling below the obtained score) in specified age ranges, differentiated by gender. Some measures, like breathing capacity and strength of grip, were assessed in relation to stature. It was possible to look at a normative chart and instantly know your approximate percentile rank. After collecting data on nearly 10,000 examinees at the International Health Exhibition, Galton's laboratory at South Kensington collected data on an additional 3,678 examinees (Galton, 1892), so adult norms were based on fairly large samples. Galton never directly asserted that his tests measured intelligence. Instead, he observed that sensory measures are relevant in determining the breadth of experience upon which intelligence can operate: The only information that reaches us concerning outward events appears to pass through the avenue of our senses; and the more perceptive our senses are of difference, the larger is the field upon which our judgment and intelligence can act. (Galton, 1907, p. 19) In 1890, he acknowledged that only research could reveal the most important areas of human functioning to measure, through careful examination of test results and correlations with external criteria: One of the most important objects of measurement is hardly if at all alluded to here and should be emphasized. It is to obtain a general knowledge of the capacities of a man by sinking shafts, as it were, at a few critical points. In order to ascertain the best points for the purpose, the sets of measures should be compared with an independent estimate of the man's powers. We thus may learn which of the measures are the most instructive. (Galton, 1890a, p. 380) The uncertainty, of course, was where to sink the "shafts"—or, in other words, which abilities to measure. With the methods proposed by Galton, a belief in scientifically based mental measurement of individual differences began to crystallize in the 1890s, and many independent research efforts were launched in the United States and Europe. Charles E. Spearman (1904, pp. 206–219) counted over 30 international investigators studying mental tests, and this was probably an underestimate. The quest for mental tests is generally agreed to have started in Great Britain with Galton's initiatives, but Spearman's (1904) discovery of a general intellectual factor, described in a later section, would almost immediately begin to guide theory development. The earliest U.S. efforts in mental testing came through large-scale studies from James McKeen Cattell (Cattell & Farrand, 1896) at Columbia University; Franz Boas, then at Clark University (see Bolton, 1892); J. Allen Gilbert (1894) at Yale University; and Joseph Jastrow (1893) at the University of Wisconsin, Madison. In France, Alfred Binet and his colleagues (principally Victor Henri and then Théodore Simon) were the pioneers. Germany's early contributors included Hermann Ebbinghaus and Emil Kraepelin, especially his student Axel Oehrn (1896). It is debatable whether efforts to develop a working intelligence test ever became a scientific race, like the competitive quest to identify the molecular structure of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) or the pursuit of space travel technology to become the first nation to land a person on the moon. Certainly, there was constant comparison between test development efforts in different nations. For example, Sharp (1899) reviewed the competing perspectives of "M. Binet and the French psychologists," "Prof. Kraepelin and the German psychologists," and the American psychologists (p. 334), pitting the assertions of each research group against one another. In journals like L'Année Psychologique, Binet and his colleagues could be found reviewing work by all competing laboratories, even commenting on Sharp's paper. After Spearman (1904) described his statistical method of quantifying "general" intelligence, competition between research groups may have become even more pronounced because a more focused end goal had been specified (i.e., a test of "general" intelligence per se, rather than random tests of associated mental processes). As shown in Figure 1.5, the practice of intelligence assessment in the earliest years of the 20th century essentially consisted of an array of sensory A History of Intelligence Assessment FIGURE 1.5. A photograph depicting the array of tasks used to measure intelligence at Lightner Witmer's Psychological Clinic at the University of Pennsylvania in about 1908. On the table are a Galton whistle for testing the upper limit of sound perception; a dynamometer for testing hand strength; colored yarns and blocks for testing counting skills and color perception; toys to test common knowledge, play, instinctive reactions, and coordination; and the formboard for identifying nonverbal problem solving and detecting feeble-mindedness. From Carter (1909, p. 166). In the public domain. and motor measures, with a formboard to measure higher mental processes. James McKeen Cattell and the End of Anthropometrics If there were royalty in the field of psychology, James McKeen Cattell (1860–1944) might qualify. He was the son of a professor at (and later the president of) Lafayette College in Easton, Pennsylvania, where he graduated as valedictorian in 1880. After studying for 2 years in Germany, he won a fellowship at Johns Hopkins University, where he began researching the timing of various mental processes in G. Stanley Hall's "physiologico-psychological laboratory" (Sokal, 1981, p. 64). He left to study with Wilhelm Wundt, the father of experimental psychology, at the University of Leipzig, Germany, 9 where he worked from 1883 to 1886 before receiving his doctorate. His article "The Time It Takes to See and Name Objects" (Cattell, 1886) summarized two of his studies on basic reading processes, which are now considered to be the first research studies to support a whole-word, sight-reading approach to reading instruction (Venezky, 2002, p. 6). Rejecting Wundt's reliance on experimenter introspection, Cattell conducted reaction time experiments with some of his own instruments, growing interested in the measurement of individual differences. According to his biographer, Michael M. Sokal, Cattell "refocused psychological research away from experimenters' self-observation of their mental activity and toward subjects' behavior in a laboratory setting precisely defined by experimenters" (Sokal, 2006, p. 25). In just a few years, Cattell would become the leading American experimental psychologist of his time. In 1887, Cattell took a position at the University of Cambridge, where he came to know and work closely with Francis Galton. Cattell's data card from his personal anthropometric measurements appears in Figure 1.6. Cattell helped Galton set up the Anthropometric Laboratory at South Kensington. Cattell would remain devoted to Galton for the rest of his life, acknowledging in his late 60s that Galton was "the greatest man whom I have known" (Cattell, 1930, p. 116). For 2 years, Cattell split his time between work in Galton's laboratory, lecturing and establishing a laboratory at Cambridge University, and lecturing also at Bryn Mawr College and the University of Pennsylvania in the United States. In 1888, Cattell became a professor of psychology at the University of Pennsylvania (the first such professorship established anywhere, he claimed). In 1891, Cattell relocated to Columbia University, where he became the administrative head—beginning Columbia's experimental psychology laboratory and mentoring doctoral students like Edward L. Thorndike, Robert S. Woodworth, and Harry L. Hollingworth, who would themselves become faculty and leading figures in psychology. Over 40 students would take their doctorates with Cattell, seven of them becoming presidents of the APA. Cattell himself served as president of the APA in 1895. With respect to intelligence testing, Cattell is a seminal historical figure due to his tireless advocacy for psychology as a science, his own test development efforts, and his advocacy for psychometrics and testing, as well as his emphasis on statistical analyses of individual differences, all of 10 T H E O R I G I N S O F I N T E L L EC T UA L A S S E S S M E N T FIGURE 1.6. Measurement data card recorded in 1888 at Galton's Anthropometric Laboratory for J. McKeen Cattell, who was deeply influenced by Francis Galton. Papers of James McKeen Cattell, 1835–1948, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. In the public domain. which established a fertile environment for test development at Columbia University and in American psychology in general. In the British journal Mind, Cattell (1890) used the term mental tests for the first time: Psychology cannot attain the certainty and exactness of the physical sciences, unless it rests on a foundation of experiment and measurement. A step in this direction could be made by applying a series of mental tests and measurements to a large number of individuals. The results would be of considerable scientific value in discovering the constancy of mental processes, their interdependence, and their variation under different circumstances. Individuals, besides, would find their tests interesting, and perhaps, useful in regard to training, mode of life or indication of disease. (p. 373) Cattell made his principal research initiative at Columbia an investigation to determine whether a battery of Galtonian anthropometric tests and sensory, motor, and higher cognitive tasks could constitute a measure of intelligence. Beginning in 1894, the Cattell– Columbia Tests (as Cattell referred to them in 1924) were given to freshmen at Columbia's School of Arts and School of Mines. With student consent, the tests were to be repeated at the end of the sophomore and senior years. In the course of an hour, 26 measurements were made in the laboratory, and 44 observations were recorded. Later, each student sent in answers to 50 questions with regard to background, health, physical condition, habits (including coffee, smoking, alcohol use, and exercise), and interests. Cattell also had access to student academic records and athletic accomplishments. Tests and measurements conducted in the laboratory included some of Galton's sensory measures; some of Cattell's reaction time measures; and some newer measures, including letter cancellation, rapid color naming, memory for digits, logical memory, self-reported retrieval of mental images, and a word association test. The battery was something of a hybrid between anthropometric, lower-order, and higher-order measures. Cattell had always relied on the experimental approach as producing descriptive results that would speak for themselves; he did not offer a priori hypotheses or even articulate his concept of intelligence. Cattell's commitment to quantitative measurement and statistical analysis of experimental results was unshakeable, and as late as 1924, Cattell, pictured in Figure 1.7, still expressed a belief that his test battery might correlate with long-term student accomplishments. He would not have the chance to find out, as two studies would put a conclusive end to Cattell's approach to intelligence testing and his experimental research efforts. A History of Intelligence Assessment FIGURE 1.7. James McKeen Cattell at the age of 63 in December 1923. Long after the failure of his anthropometric testing program and after his 1917 dismissal from Columbia University, Cattell founded The Psychological Corporation and continued to edit several scientific journals. From the chapter author's collection. First, a dissertation completed by Stella Sharp (1899) in Edward B. Titchener's laboratory at Cornell University sought to examine the variability of complex mental processes and the relations between complex mental processes, with the intention of demonstrating the practicality of testing complex processes rather than the simpler mental processes endorsed by Cattell and Galton. She assessed seven advanced philosophy students at the university with the test battery formulated by Binet and Henri (1895), including measures of memory, mental images, imagination, attention, observation/comprehension, suggestibility, and aesthetic tastes. Her results listed the scores of individual participants and described these results in terms of rank order and variability. Sharp concluded: We concur with Mm. Binet and Henri in believing that individual psychical differences should be sought for in the complex rather than in the elementary processes of mind, and that the test method is the most workable one that has yet been proposed for investigating these processes. (Sharp, 1899, p. 390) She further concluded that the Binet–Henri measures required modification but were practical and yielded considerable variation in scores. She of- 11 fered only qualitative observations about relations between tests of different mental processes, however. Although she did not collect data on other assessment approaches, she was critical of the anthropometric tests as unproven and lacking an explanatory theory. The second blow to Cattell's testing program, and its coup de grâce, came from a Columbia University psychology graduate student, Clark Wissler (1901). Wissler examined the correlations between the Cattell– Columbia Tests and student grades for 300 undergraduates at Columbia and Barnard Colleges. He reported that while isolated correlations were large (e.g., height and weight r = .66; Latin and Greek grades r = .75), the laboratory mental tests had negligible correlations with each other and with college class grades. The failure to correlate with academic grades was considered fatal to Cattell's testing program because academic performance had long been considered an independent criterion measure of intelligence. In the words of Cattell's biographer, Wissler's analysis would definitively "discredit anthropometric testing" (Sokal, 2006, p. 29). It remains to note that over a century after Galton's and Cattell's testing programs were discredited, the relations of elementary cognitive processes (reaction time and sensory discrimination) to mental abilities and intelligence are now being revisited. Jensen (2006) has effectively summarized the literature relating reaction time to intelligence, while Deary and his colleagues (Deary, 1994; Deary, Bell, Bell, Campbell, & Fazal, 2004) have documented findings with sensory discrimination and intelligence. There is uniform agreement as to the serious methodological flaws in the Sharp and Wissler studies, including small sample size, restriction of range, and unreliability of measures (e.g., Buckhalt, 1991; Deary, 1994; Jensen, 2006). THE ORIGINS OF CONTEMPORARY INTELLIGENCE TESTING I have described the pseudoscience of phrenology and the visionary science of Galton, who inspired the search for effective ways to measure intelligence and who pioneered many statistical methods that would be critical for norm-referenced assessment. I have also recounted the tale of the psychologist that Galton so profoundly influenced, J. McKeen Cattell, who threw down a gauntlet of sorts when proposing that mental tests should constitute part 12 T H E O R I G I N S O F I N T E L L EC T UA L A S S E S S M E N T of establishing psychology as a science that can measure individual differences. The unfortunate fate of Cattell's test battery has been told. Even after his assessment work was discredited, however, Cattell remained a highly connected institutional scientist and a pioneer in the development of scientific psychology in American universities. Ironically, the problem of developing a working intelligence test would be solved by an outsider, a man with few friends, who worked without pay and who had no institutional connections of any benefit. He did have his own journal, however, where he reviewed the work of his contemporaries. His name was Alfred Binet. Alfred Binet: The Innovative Outsider Alfred Binet (1857–1911) is generally acknowledged as the father of intelligence tests, having developed the first working measure of intelligence. Binet's remarkable history has been most definitively documented by biographer Theta Wolf (1973). He was educated as a lawyer but chose not to practice; some historical accounts also report that Binet studied medicine until his father, a physician, traumatized him by showing him a cadaver. As an only child of a wealthy family he could afford to pursue a career with little remuneration, and he developed a consuming interest in the study of psychology. He was a voracious reader across several languages who educated himself as a psychologist, spending considerable time studying in the Bibliothèque Nationale [French National Library]. He wrote his first article at age 23 and completed a doctorate in the natural sciences at age 37. According to long-time colleague Théodore Simon, for most of Binet's career "psychology was his sole occupation" (quoted by Wolf, 1973, p. 9). Although he is remembered for his intelligence test (from which he does not appear to have profited financially), Alfred Binet was a remarkably productive and versatile researcher, authoring nearly 300 works during his career; he is now credited with pioneering experimental investigations in areas of abnormal, cognitive, developmental, educational, forensic, personality, and social psychology (e.g., Siegler, 1992; Wolf, 1973). Regrettably, most of his work has never been translated into English, although nearly all of it has been brought back into print in the last decade. Personally, he has been described as a loner, "a reserved man with few friends" (Tuddenham, 1974, p. 1071), and as a domineering individual who antagonized many of his coworkers (cf. Henri Piéron, according to an interview with Wolf, 1961, p. 246). In 1901, Binet wrote a friend, "I educated myself all alone, without any teachers; I have arrived at my present scientific situation by the sole force of my fists; no one, you understand, no one, has ever helped me" (quoted by Wolf, 1973, p. 23). Lacking patronage, he was denied academic positions in France (Nicolas & Ferrand, 2002), and his efforts for educational reform and mental measurement in the military were resisted by a rigid French establishment (e.g., Carson, 2007; Zazzo, 1993). Several scholars have sought to explain why so much of his work was forgotten after his death (e.g., Fancher, 1998; Schneider, 1992; Siegler, 1992; Wolf, 1973), and the answer seems to lie in his disconnection from the professional and academic community in France: He did not present at conferences, he did not leave students to continue his work, and he preferred to work alone or with a collaborator. Only at the 2005 centennial of the first Binet–Simon scale did he begin to garner national recognition in his native France for his remarkable contributions. A devastating early career setback left Binet careful to avoid preconceptions and reticent to form theories in his experimental work. In one of his first positions, Binet's work with collaborator Charles Féré at Jean Martin Charcot's clinic in the Salpêtrière Hospital in Paris was publicly discredited. In working with Charcot's hysterical patients in the 1880s (at a time when Sigmund Freud was also studying with Charcot), Binet and Féré thought they had proven that movements and perceptions could be shifted from one side of the body to the other, and that emotions could be reversed (e.g., from love to hate) through the application of magnets while participants were hypnotized. Their demonstrations could not be independently replicated, presumably because participants were prone to dissimulation or demand effects. Charcot's approach and the Binet–Féré studies were effectively challenged in a series of articles by a Belgian psychologist, Franz Joseph Delboeuf. Gradually Binet realized he had been "taken in" by Charcot's reputation; suitably chastened, he learned painful lessons about the need for careful experimentation, objective observation, and skepticism about a priori theoretical assumptions. Binet left the Salpêtrière in 1890, ending his connections with Charcot and Féré. For the rest of his life, he remained wary of theories that might bias his research findings. From 1890 through his death, Binet published more than 200 articles, many in the journal L'Année Psychologique, which he cofounded and A History of Intelligence Assessment edited. In 1891, he became an unpaid staff member at the Laboratory of Physiological Psychology at the Sorbonne. Three years later, he became director of the laboratory, a position he held until his death. Between 1894 and 1898, Binet and Victor Henri sought new methods that would "substitute for vague notions of man in general, of the archetypal man, precise observations of individuals considered in all the complexity and variety of their aptitudes" (Binet & Henri, 1894, p. 167; translated and cited by Carson, 2007, p. 132). In 1899, Binet was approached by a young intern physician and aliéniste (psychiatrist), Théodore Simon, who had access to clinical populations (Wolf, 1961). Simon completed his doctoral thesis under Binet's supervision, and their subsequent collaborations included Binet's most important work in intelligence assessment. The creative work that culminated in the intelligence scales began in 1890, when Binet published three papers describing experimental studies with his two young daughters, Madeleine and Alice (given the pseudonyms Marguerite and Armande), whom he had carefully observed and tested with a variety of cognitive and personality tasks. Binet's wife and daughters appear in Figure 1.8. In describing their attentional styles, he wrote that Madeleine was "silent, cool, concentrated, while Alice was a laugher, gay, thoughtless, giddy, and turbulent" (translated by Wolf, 1966, p. 234). Many of the tasks Binet gave his daughters will be familiar to contemporary psychologists—word generation, word association, sentence generation, 13 sentence completion, thematic composition for various pictures, description of objects or pictures, design reproduction, letter cancellation, digit repetition, reaction time after stimulation, recall of unrelated words, recall of prose passages, recall of pictured objects, recall of nonsense sentences (i.e., sentences presented in a foreign language unknown to the girls), and verbal responses to inkblots. Binet was careful to analyze the quality of response content. For example, he classified verbal responses as personal, unelaborated, abstract, or imagined; prose recall was scored according for verbatim recall and gist recall; thought processes were described according to linearity, conventionality, and originality. Binet continually made qualitative observations of performance styles that differentiated his daughters. Madeleine had greater "stability" and had better voluntary control of her attention; she could more effectively focus on assigned work and memorize neutral, uninteresting material; and she tended to respond with shorter and more constant reaction times. Alice presented more "variability"; she was more imaginative and emotional; and material to be learned had to be of interest to her, or she would have difficulty. She could not memorize long literary passages verbatim as her sister could, but she could accurately remember a series of ideas provided just once (see Wolf, 1973, p. 132). Binet continued to test his daughters through midadolescence with a battery of cognitive and personality tests, including measures of attention, language, reasoning, and memory (many repeated multiple times in alternative FIGURE 1.8. Alfred Binet; his wife, Laure Balbiani Binet; and his daughters, Madeleine and Alice, whom he tested extensively with cognitive and personality tasks through their midadolescence. In his writings, Binet described the girls under the pseudonyms Marguerite and Armande. Madeleine was said to be "silent, cool, concentrated, while Alice was a laugher, gay, thoughtless, giddy, and turbulent" (translated by Wolf, 1966, p. 234). Theta H. Wolf Papers, Archives of the History of American Psychology, Center for the History of Psychology, University of Akron. Reprinted by permission. 14 T H E O R I G I N S O F I N T E L L EC T UA L A S S E S S M E N T forms over several years), always accompanied by careful qualitative observation and interview inquiries. He reported the results in 1903 in L'étude Expérimentale de l'Intelligence [The Experimental Study of Intelligence]. Comparison of his children's performances with each other and with those of adults led Binet to conclude that complex, multidimensional tasks were more sensitive to developmental changes than narrow, unidimensional tasks. He further concluded that a mental developmental progression from childhood through adulthood should be reflected in task performance: In case one should succeed in measuring intelligence—that is to say, reasoning, judgment, memory, the ability to make abstractions—which appears not absolutely impossible to me, the figure that would represent the average intellectual development of an adult would present an entirely different relation to that of the figure representing the intellectual development of a child. (Binet, 1890, p. 74, translated by Wolf, 1966, p. 235) In 1895, Binet and Henri outlined the project for the development of an intelligence test, specifying 10 discrete mental faculties that would be measured: memory, imagery, imagination, attention, comprehension, suggestibility, aesthetic sentiment, moral sentiment, muscular strength/willpower, and motor ability/hand–eye coordination. Binet and Henri, along with other colleagues from Binet's laboratory, appear in Figure 1.9. Higherorder, complex processes were considered to show greater variability among individuals and to constitute better measures of intelligence than simpler sensory and motor processes: The higher and more complex a process is, the more it varies in individuals; sensations vary from one individual to another, but less so than memory; memory of sensations varies less than memories of ideas, etc. The result is, that if one wishes to study the differences existing between two individuals, it is necessary to begin with the most intellectual and complex processes, and it is only secondarily necessary to consider the simple and elementary processes. (Binet & Henri, 1895, p. 417; translated by Sharp, 1899, p. 335) In a passage that made direct reference to the work of Galton and Cattell, Binet and Henri (1895) rebutted the claim that greater experimental precision was possible in the measurement of simpler mental processes: If one looks at the series of experiments made—the mental tests as the English say—one is astonished by the considerable place reserved to the sensations and the simple processes, and by the little attention lent to the superior processes. . . . The objection will be made that the elementary processes can be determined with much more precision than the superior processes. This is certain, but people differ in these elementary ones much more feebly than in the complex ones; there is no need, therefore, for as precise a method for determining the latter as for the former. . . . Anyway, it is only by applying one's self to this point that one can approach the study of individual differences. (Binet & Henri, 1895, pp. 426, 429; translated by Siegler, 1992, p. 181) The formal mandate that led to the development of the intelligence test came in October 1904, when Joseph Chaumié, the Minister of Public Instruction, established a commission chaired FIGURE 1.9. Alfred Binet and colleagues in the 1890s: J. Courtier, J. Philippe, and Victor Henri. This group collaborated in the work involved for Binet's (1894) book on experimental psychology. Photo from Binet's Laboratoire de Psychologie Physiologique de la Sorbonne (École des Hautes-Études). Theta H. Wolf Papers, Archives of the History of American Psychology, Center for the History of Psychology, University of Akron. Reprinted by permission. A History of Intelligence Assessment by Léon Bourgeois and charged it with studying how France's 1882 mandatory public education laws could be applied to abnormal [anormaux] children, including students who were blind, deafmute, and backward [arriérés] (Carson, 2007; Wolf, 1969). The ministry was persuaded to take this initiative by public pressure, including a resolution from the 1903 Third National Congress of Public and Private Welfare held at Bordeaux, where critics noted France's failure to comply with its own special education laws. A resolution from an educational advocacy group, La Société Libre pour l'Étude Psychologique de l'Enfant [Free Society for the Psychological Study of the Child], was also a reason for creation of the Bourgeois Commission. Binet was a leader of La Société Libre and an author of the resolution, and he became a member of the commission, which began its work by circulating questionnaires to teachers and principals throughout France. The commission met on numerous occasions in 1904 and 1905, issuing its report in 1906. Binet saw in the commission's mandate an opportunity to complete his efforts toward a normreferenced standard for diagnosis and educational decision making. Building on the earlier work with Henri (who had departed), Binet and Simon developed and tested a series of cognitive tests. Their collaborations worked in tandem: One of them would talk with and question the examinee, while the other wrote the replies and noted salient behaviors. The assessments had "the air of a game" for children, with encouragement being constantly provided (Binet & Simon, 1905/1916a, p. 141). The work culminated in the 1905 publication of the Binet–Simon Intelligence Scale (Binet & Simon, 1905/1916c), consisting of 30 items that could be given in about 20 minutes; it was normed on some 50 children from ages 3 through 11 years; and one of its chief advances may have been to combine a wide range of cognitive tasks to obtain a global estimate of intelligence (e.g., DuBois, 1970). Binet and Simon (1905/1916c) sequenced tasks in a cognitive-developmental order from easy to hard and from simpler to more complex, while sampling a wide range of tasks tapping various abilities. In general, they sought tasks that tapped the higherorder ability of judgment—especially procedures that had demonstrated the capacity to differentiate groups on the basis of intelligence. For example, individuals considered idiots generally could not move beyond the 6th of the 30 tasks; individuals considered imbeciles rarely went beyond the 15th task (Binet & Simon, 1905/1916a). 15 The Bourgeois Commission issued its report early in 1906, based primarily on a subcommittee report drafted by Binet. Recommendations were that the anormaux be educated through classes spéciales annexed to ordinary primary schools and, in certain situations, through separate institutions. A five-part classification of exceptional students was proposed, identifying students who were blind, deaf, medically abnormal, intellectually backward, and emotionally unstable. The commission recommended that students who did not benefit from education, teaching, or discipline should receive a "medico-pedagogical examination" before being removed from primary schools, and that such children, if educable, should be placed in special classes. The examination was to be overseen by an examination committee consisting of an inspector of primary schools, a physician, and a director of the separate special school. The commission did not offer any specific content for the examination, recommending that the Minister of Public Instruction appoint a competent person to draw up a scientific guide for the school examination committee (Carson, 2007). Undoubtedly Binet hoped to draw up the scientific guide, and Binet and Simon's (1907/1914) book Les Enfants Anormaux was probably intended to serve as the guide; it even contained a preface by Léon Bourgeois, the head of the commission. Unfortunately, Binet's efforts were almost completely rebuffed by the French establishment. When the French legislature enacted the law of April 15, 1909, on the education of the anormaux, it stated that the commission determining eligibility for special education should be composed of a physician, school inspector, and director or teacher at an école perfectionnement. It highlighted the medical examination and made no mention of any role for psychologists or use of special methods (i.e., intelligence tests) for assessing students (Carson, 2007). Binet's efforts had little visible impact on practice in his native France. In the 1908 revision, the Binet–Simon Scale took its definitive revolutionary form, the "graded scale of intelligence" [L'échelle métrique de l' intelligence], which was easier to use and interpret (Binet & Simon, 1908/1916b). It featured 56 tests arranged by difficulty so that tests were placed at levels, or grades, corresponding to approximately a 75% pass rate for children of a given age, based on normative performances of about 200 children between the ages of 3 and 15. The 1908 scale permitted a student's mental level [niveau mental] to be estimated through what later became interpreted 16 T H E O R I G I N S O F I N T E L L EC T UA L A S S E S S M E N T in the United States as a mental age level. The mental level was determined by the highest age at which a child passed four or five tests (the basal year), with an additional year credited for each of the five tests passed beyond the basal. By the completion of the 1911 edition (Binet, 1911/1916), the scale was extended from age 3 through adult- hood, with 11 levels and five items administered at each level. Table 1.1 lists content from the final 1911 scale. The Binet–Simon Scale never yielded an intelligence quotient (IQ), but Binet endorsed the convention of identifying intellectual disability [arriérés] for a mental level delay of "two years when the child is under [age] nine, and three TABLE 1.1. Contents of the Binet–Simon (Binet, 1911/1916) Intelligence Scale [L'Échelle Métrique de l' Intelligence] Three years Nine years Show eyes, nose, mouth Name objects in a picture Repeat 2 figures Repeat a sentence of 6 syllables Give last name Give change out of 20 sous Definitions superior to use Recognize the value of 9 pieces of money Name the months Comprehend easy questions Four years Ten years Give sex Name key, knife, penny Repeat 3 figures Compare 2 lines Place 5 weights in order Copy a design from memory Criticize absurd statements Comprehend difficult questions Place 3 words in 2 sentences Five years Compare 2 boxes of different weights Copy a square Repeat a sentence of 10 syllables Count 4 sous Put together two pieces in a "game of patience" Twelve years Resist the suggestion of lines Place 3 words in 1 sentence Give more than 60 words in 3 minutes Define 3 abstract words Comprehend a disarranged sentence Six years Distinguish morning and evening Define by use Copy diamond Count 13 pennies Compare 2 pictures esthetically Fifteen years Repeat 7 figures Find 3 rhymes Repeat a sentence of 26 syllables Interpret a picture Solve a problem composed of several facts Seven years Right hand, left ear Describe a picture Execute 3 commissions Count 3 single and 3 double sous Name 4 colors Adults Comprehend a cut in a folded paper Reversed triangle Answer the question about the President Distinguish abstract words Give the sense of the quotation from Hervieu Eight years Compare 2 objects from memory Count from 20 to 0 Indicate omission in pictures Give the date Repeat 5 digits Note. The final 1911 Binet–Simon Scale extended from 3 years into adulthood. In this edition, an individual's mental level [niveau mental] was estimated by identifying the highest age at which all the tests were passed (the basal year), to which is added one-fifth of a year for every test passed. The Binet–Simon Scale never yielded an intelligence quotient (IQ), but Binet endorsed the convention of identifying intellectual disability for a mentallevel delay of 2 years when a child is under age 9, and 3 years past his or her 9th birthday. From Binet (1911/1916). In the public domain. A History of Intelligence Assessment years when he is past his ninth birthday" (Binet & Simon, 1907/1914, p. 42). Long after Binet's death, Simon indicated that the use of a summary IQ score was a betrayal [trahison] of the scale's objective (cited by Wolf, 1973, p. 203). In the spring of 1908, Henry H. Goddard, director of the psychological research laboratory at the New Jersey Training School for Feeble-Minded Girls and Boys (later known as the Vineland Training School), traveled to Europe. He visited doctors and teachers working in 19 different institutions and 93 special classes. Ironically, he did not even look up Binet in Paris, having been told by Pierre Janet that "Binet's Lab. is largely a myth . . . Not much being done—says Janet," according to his journal (cited by Zenderland, 1998, pp. 92–93). In Brussels, he met Ovide Decroly, a Belgian teacher, physician, and psychologist, engaged in a tryout of the 1905 Binet–Simon Scale. Decroly provided him with a copy of the test, and upon his return home, Goddard began to use the test on the children at the training school. In the words of Goddard's biographer Leila Zenderland (1998), Goddard immediately understood the significance of the Binet–Simon Scale: Two years of frustrating institutional experience had prepared him to see what Janet, Cattell, and even [G. Stanley] Hall, the most prescient of contemporary psychological entrepreneurs, had missed. Contained within Binet's articles, Goddard quickly realized, was an entirely new psychological approach toward diagnosing and classifying feeble minds. (p. 93) In a short time, Goddard would become the United States' leading advocate for Binet's approach to assessment and diagnosing intellectually disabled individuals. He described his evaluation of the ease, simplicity, and the utility of the 1908 scale as "a surprise and a gratification" (Goddard, 1916, p. 5), and he promoted the test widely. The Binet–Simon Scale was both praised and criticized widely in professional journals; for example, several consecutive issues of the Journal of Educational Psychology in April, May, and June 1916 were dedicated to "Mentality Tests: A Symposium," a wide-ranging exchange of experiences with the Binet–Simon Scale (and other tests) by 16 leading psychologists. Goddard arranged for Elizabeth S. Kite, his laboratory's field worker and contributor to the famous Kallikak study, to complete the definitive translations into English of Binet and Simon's writings on their intelligence scale. By 1916, the Vineland laboratory had distributed 22,000 copies of a pamphlet describing administration of 17 the Binet–Simon Scale and 88,000 record forms, as well as publishing a two-volume translation of the Binet–Simon articles (Goddard, 1916). By 1939, there were some 77 available adaptations and translations of the Binet–Simon Scale (Hildreth, 1939), including the most used psychological test of all, the Stanford–Binet. According to Théodore Simon, Binet gave Lewis M. Terman at Stanford University the rights to publish an American revision of the Binet–Simon Scale "for a token of one dollar" (cited by Wolf, 1973, p. 35). Terman's work would change the landscape for mental testing in the United States. The Binet–Simon Intelligence Scale represented a major paradigm shift for the young field of psychology. It tapped intelligence through assessment of complex mental abilities, as opposed to the narrow sensory and motor measures dominating the Galton– Cattell batteries. It was standardized, with explicit procedures for administration and objective scoring guidelines. It was norm-referenced, permitting an individual's performance to be compared with that of his or her age peers. It was reliable, yielding consistent scores from one occasion to another. It was developmentally sensitive, recognizing that mental abilities in children develop in a meaningful progression and that the abilities of children differ substantially from that of adults. It was efficient and engaging, administered in an adaptive format in which content changed frequently. It offered clinical assessment, aimed at diagnosing intellectual disabilities, identifying cognitively advanced students, and describing the characteristics of both "normal" and "abnormal" individuals. Finally and most importantly, it seemed to work fairly well, providing an empirical foundation for the nascent study of intelligence and cognitive abilities. Lewis M. Terman: Defender of the Discipline I hate the impudence of a claim that in fifty minutes you can judge and classify a human being's predestined fitness in life. I hate the pretentiousness of that claim. I hate the abuse of scientific method which it involves. I hate the sense of superiority which it creates, and the sense of inferiority which it imposes. —WALTER LIPPMANN (1923) When journalist Walter Lippmann launched the first high-profile public attack on intelligence testing in a series of articles in The New Republic (Lippmann, 1922a, 1922b, 1922c, 1922d, 1922e, 18 T H E O R I G I N S O F I N T E L L EC T UA L A S S E S S M E N T 1922f, 1923), it was Lewis M. Terman (1922a) who responded and defended the new discipline. He was the natural choice— developer of the Stanford University revision of the Binet–Simon Intelligence Scale (later called the Stanford–Binet Intelligence Scale); member of the National Research Council team that created the Army mental tests in 1917 and 1918; coauthor of the National Intelligence Tests and Terman Group Test of Mental Ability, released in 1920; principal investigator on the longitudinal Genetic Studies of Genius, initiated in 1921–1922; and coauthor of the Stanford Achievement Test, which would be released in 1923. For decades, Terman would be the living American most strongly associated with intelligence testing and its value for educational decision making. The 12th of 14 children from a rural Indiana farming family, Lewis M. Terman (1877–1956) was a brilliant, hard-working, and determined student from an early age; he accelerated from first grade to third grade and memorized most of his textbooks. Graduating early from eighth grade (the conclusion of education in typical Midwest farming communities of that era), he began teacher's college at the age of 15, attending when he could and taking breaks to earn enough money to return. He pursued training in education, as teaching was the "only avenue of escape for the youth who aspired to anything beyond farm life" (Terman, 1932, p. 300); eventually he would teach for one year in a one-room schoolhouse. By the age of 21, he had earned three baccalaureate degrees from Central Normal College in Danville, Indiana, and he became a principal of a small high school. He then pursued a master's degree in psychology at Indiana University, followed by a doctorate at Clark University. In 1905, recurrent tubercular hemorrhages in his lungs (eventually the cause of his death) forced Terman to relocate his family to Southern California, where he worked again as a high school principal and then as a professor of pedagogy at Los Angeles State Normal School (later UCLA) before accepting a position in 1909 at Stanford University, where he remained for the duration of his career. Figure 1.10 shows Terman at about the time he started his career at Stanford University. Terman is described by two biographers, Henry L. Minton (1988) and May V. Seagoe (1975), as having been a highly gifted man and voracious learner, who was tirelessly persistent, intense, and sensitive. As a rigorous and careful researcher, he became a pioneer in mental testing by creating the best of many adaptations of the Binet–Simon FIGURE 1.10. Lewis M. Terman in 1910, the year he arrived at Stanford University. Terman was the leading advocate for intelligence testing in the first half of the 20th century. Reprinted by courtesy of the Department of Special Collections and University Archives, Stanford University Libraries. Scale. He also harbored a progressive vision of large-scale testing to identify the individual differences and needs of schoolchildren, as well as to identify intellectually gifted children (Chapman, 1988). Like Cattell, Terman had been seen by a phrenologist as a child; he was deeply impressed by the experience and remembered that the phrenologist "predicted great things of me" (Terman, 1932, p. 303). Having spent 6 months each year during his adolescence toiling at farmwork from 5:00 A.M. through about 7:00 or 8:00 P.M., Terman considered his intellectual abilities to have been inherited; he remembered his lengthy stints at farmwork as periods without mental stimulation, contributing to his conviction that environment was substantially less important than heredity in explaining intelligence. Terman's master's thesis on leadership, his doctoral dissertation on genius, and his longitudinal study of gifted children beginning in 1921–1922 all contributed to his status as founder of the "gifted child" movement. Terman's thesis, published as a journal article in 1904, used experimental methodology (from Binet's suggestibility studies), teacher ratings, and questionnaires to examine leadership in male and female schoolchildren from grades 2 through 8. It is a qualitatively rich study A History of Intelligence Assessment that identifies different types of leaders and subtly links leadership with perceived intelligence. Terman's dissertation, completed in 1905 and published as a journal article in 1906, was entitled "Genius and Stupidity: A Study of Some of the Intellectual Processes of Seven 'Bright' and Seven 'Stupid' Boys." For his dissertation, Terman administered a variety of higher-order mental tests to seven boys identified by teachers as the "brightest" and seven boys identified as the "dullest," based upon a holistic review (i.e., not merely based on classwork) of willing boys. All of the boys were 10–13 years of age. Terman tested the boys for about 20–40 hours in each of eight areas: creative imagination, logical processes, mathematical ability, mastery of language, interpretation of fables, ease of learning to play chess, powers of memory, and motor abilities. Some tests were culled from the literature, including measures from Binet and Henri, Ebbinghaus, and others; other tests were tasks developed by Terman that would reappear in the Stanford–Binet. Terman found that the bright boys were superior to the dull boys in all but the motor tests, with creative imagination tests showing modest differences between bright and dull boys. Most tests administered tended to agree with one another—a finding that Terman interpreted as supporting the presence of Spearman's general factor. Bright children preferred to read, while dull children preferred to play games; there was little difference between the two groups in terms of persistence. In 1910, Terman began his revision of the Binet– Simon Scale, a technical tour de force that would be published in 1916. Terman began initial studies by administering the 1908 Binet–Simon Scale to some 400 schoolchildren, as well as examining all available published studies of age-level placement for the Binet tests. It soon became evident that some tests were misplaced, with tests at the lower age levels too easy and those at the upper age levels too hard. He also wanted to add tests to reach six at each age level, eventually augmenting the Binet–Simon with 36 new tasks and clarifying administration and scoring criteria. Terman, his students, and his colleagues tested some 700 additional children in pilot studies. Some of Terman's new tasks were noteworthy, including a 100-word vocabulary test yielding full credit for correct definitions, half credit for partially correct definitions, and no credit for incorrect responses; and (arguably) the first executive function measure, the Ball and Field Test of Practical Judgment (see Littman, 2004, for an account of its origins). Terman and 19 Childs (1912a, 1912b, 1912c, 1912d) published a "tentative revision and extension" of the Binet– Simon Scale, but further revision was necessary, given the 1911 extension of the Binet–Simon Scale through adulthood. As Seagoe (1975) reports, Terman's "unfamiliarity with statistics" and dislike of the "drudgery of computation" (p. 47) caused him to rely heavily on Arthur S. Otis, and for later editions on Truman L. Kelley and Quinn McNemar, for statistical analyses and data management. Dahlstrom (1985) notes the contribution of Otis's statistical knowledge and skills for the 1916 Stanford–Binet: "The efforts of Arthur S. Otis . . . were particularly important in this entire venture. He carried out the work on the item analyses and try-outs of the various early combinations of these items in tentative scales" (p. 76). Otis would later make important contributions to the development of the Army mental tests. Terman's final standardization sample for the 1916 Stanford–Binet included 905 participants between the ages of 5 and 14 years, all within 2 months of a birthday and drawn from public schools in California and Nevada. No foreignborn or minority children were included. Special population studies included 200 "defective" and "superior" children. The adult sample consisted of 150 adolescent delinquents, 150 unemployed men, 50 high school students, and 30 businessmen across California and Oregon. The overall sample was predominantly white, urban, and middle-class, with an average adult mental age of 15–17 years. The final 1916 Stanford–Binet consisted of 90 items—six at each age level from ages 3 to 10; eight items at age 12; six items at age 14; and six items at each of two adult levels (average adult, superior adult). Sixteen alternative tests were available for tests that were inappropriate or otherwise spoiled. Of the final 90 items, 60% were drawn from the Binet–Simon and 40% from Terman and other sources. Terman adapted William Stern's (1914) "mental quotient" to generate the IQ (mental age divided by chronological age, with the product multiplied by 100 to remove decimals). Although Terman was critical of Spearman's work, he explicitly stated that the Stanford–Binet measured general intelligence, in effect making the single IQ score a functional estimate of Spearman's g and treating intelligence as a unitary construct: The scale does not pretend to measure the entire mentality of the subject, but only general intelligence. There is no pretence of testing the emotions or the will beyond the extent to which these naturally dis- 20 T H E O R I G I N S O F I N T E L L EC T UA L A S S E S S M E N T play themselves in the tests of intelligence. (Terman, 1916, p. 48; emphasis in original) Terman retained Binet's adaptive testing format, which permitted flexibility in determining at which level to start the test, and different item types were intermixed to make the testing experience a fast-moving experience with tasks changing frequently. Terman's Stanford–Binet was a resounding success, becoming the most frequently used psychological test (and intelligence test) in the United States for decades (Louttit & Browne, 1947). The Stanford–Binet would be renormed and expanded to create two parallel forms (Form L for Lewis, and Form M for coauthor Maud A. Merrill) spanning the ages 2 years through Superior Adult III in a remarkable 1937 revision (Terman & Merrill, 1937). The best items from the two forms would be retained in a single form for two updates (Terman & Merrill, 1960, 1973). From sales of test record forms, R. L. Thorndike (1975) estimated that the Stanford–Binet was administered to an average of about 150,000 persons a year from 1916 to 1937, to about 500,000 persons a year from 1937 to 1960, and to about 800,000 a year from 1960 to 1972. The fourth edition would make radical changes, including conversion to a point scale format and assessment of discrete factors of ability according to extended Gf-Gc theory (Thorndike, Hagen, & Sattler, 1986), but the fifth edition would endeavor to restore some of the features that distinguished the Stanford–Binet from its start (Roid, 2003). Terman was also responsible, more than any other psychologist, for the rapid growth of intelligence and achievement tests in schools. The "Oakland experiment" of 1917–1918 was one of the first systematic attempts to use intelligence/ability tests as a basis for grouping students—a movement that is well documented in Chapman's Schools as Sorters (1988). Beginning in 1917, one of Terman's students, Virgil E. Dickson, became director of research for the Oakland Public Schools and organized the testing of 6,500 schoolchildren with the Stanford–Binet, the Otis Absolute Point Scale, and other tests in all of Oakland's 45 elementary schools. From his findings, Dickson concluded that many students fail because their ability levels make mastery of the ordinary curriculum impossible; furthermore, he asserted, the "mentally superior" are in need of accelerated curricula. Dickson called for segregation of students into special classes based on their ability levels. Figure 1.11 depicts the introduction of intelligence tests in FIGURE 1.11. After the success of the "Oakland experiment" of 1917–1918, Terman and other psychologists advocated successfully for the use of intelligence tests to group students according to their ability levels. Educators recognized the value of measuring "individual differences" but were wary of the proliferating tests (e.g., Hines, 1922). From Heaton (1922). In the public domain. A History of Intelligence Assessment the schools. Receiving enthusiastic endorsements from administrators and teachers, Dickson (1919) concluded: Standard tests, both psychological and pedagogical— group and individual— should be of great assistance in classification of pupils according to ability and capacity to do the work. They should inspire better teaching and better educational guidance through a more intimate knowledge of the individual child. (p. 225) In 1923, Dickson published Mental Tests and the Classroom Teacher, the first in a series of "measurement and adjustment" books to be edited by Terman and published through the World Book Company. In 5 years, Terman would oversee nine additional titles, each focusing on problems of student testing and "adjustments to meet the problems of instruction and school administration arising out of individual differences" (see Chapman, 1988, p. 104, for a description of Terman's blueprint for the series). Large-Scale Assessments an