Middle Age: Setiyaâs Philosophical Reflections

Philosophy

Open Journal of Philosophy, 2018, 8, 343-354 http://www.scirp.org/journal/ojpp ISSN Online: 2163-9442 ISSN Print: 2163-9434 DOI: 10.4236/ojpp.2018.84024 Jun. 26, 2018 343 Open Journal of Philosophy Middle Age: Setiya's Philosophical Reflections Ivan William Kelly Professor Emeritus, University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, Canada Abstract Philosophers often focus on topics such as death and old age, and much less on other stages of life. The British-American philosopher Kienan Setiya (2017) has recently taken on the topic of middle age from a philosophical perspective and offered suggestions for dealing with the angst often associated with mid-age. His suggestions are based on both his own experiences and practical thoughts based on his readings of other philosophers during their mid-life periods. My own contribution is to describe his thoughts and add a few observations of my own. Keywords Middle Age, Midlife, Midlife Crisis, Meaning of Life While the topics of old age and death have been ever-present topics in the philosophical literature, middle age has not had similar serous attention. In the last few years, only British philosopher Christopher Hamilton's (2014) and British-American philosopher Setiya's (2017) books have dedicated themselves to the topic. In this article I will describe Setiya's philosophical analysis and suggestions for dealing with midlife and its typically associated crisis since it deals with many of life's central (philosophical) concerns. Setiya's considerations in his book exemplify the traditional philosophical task of helping us live our lives well. This book is both thoughtful and thought-provoking. It is a philosophical reflection on the "existential questions of life"-"questions of loss and regret, success and failure, the lives you wanted and the life you have" (Setiya, 2017: pp. 2-3, 6-7). While such questions can occur at any age, they are more commonly asked during middle age (hence our talk of "the midlife crisis" and the title of his How to cite this paper: Kelly, I. W. (2018). Middle Age: Setiya's Philosophical Reflections. Open Journal of Philosophy, 8, 343-354. https://doi.org/10.4236/ojpp.2018.84024 Received: May 21, 2018 Accepted: June 22, 2018 Published: June 26, 2018 Copyright © 2018 by author and Scientific Research Publishing Inc. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution International License (CC BY 4.0). http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ Open Access I. W. Kelly DOI: 10.4236/ojpp.2018.84024 344 Open Journal of Philosophy book)1. We can sum up these questions under the larger philosophical question "What's it all about?" or "What's the point of it all"? A midlife crisis is often experienced as a "dip in life satisfaction" or a "phase of relative unhappiness" that typically occurs in middle age. Setiya distinguishes his book from the plethora of self-help books saturating the book market by focusing on "how to feel about your life," rather than concerns with outward change. Outward change is usually the domain of the therapist or counsellor. In spite of their differing interests, those in counselling, with its emphasis on the practical problems of life, can learn much from this book, since it addresses existential issues that may underlie some of the problematic feelings in the first place. Chapter One considers the history of what we now call "the midlife crisis," the "feeling of personal failure" reputedly common in people in the contemporary Western world. The expression "the midlife crisis" was only coined in 1965. Did those living earlier than 1965 experience what we would now call "midlife crises"? Historically, mid-life likely occurred at a much younger age than now – would that make a difference to how one perceives themselves? For example, as we get older, our physical and cognitive ability weakens. When we die in our 40's, as was historically common, perhaps the body and the mind were more vigorous and there was less angst about the process of aging and more on just survival. Also, those living in earlier centuries didn't have the protracted aging period that we have now. Retiring at say, age 65, and then possibly living another 25-30 years forces us to redefine ourselves/our goals in a way that we've not experienced in previous generations (Fisher, 2018). While we can identify episodes of people's lives in past centuries that seem to fit our modern stereotype of feelings of personal failure and missing out, we don't know how common they were in those earlier times, and further, "it is all too easy to project our [contemporary] image of the crisis back into lives that are radically different from our own" (Setiya, 2017: p. 9)2. The latter similarly restricts our theorizing about midlife crises in other non-Western cultures, although there is some evidence that there is a rough U-curve of psychological well-being prevalent across the world, with well-being tending to be lowest around middle age (Rauch, 2018). However, the meaning or shape of the crisis may differ in specific details for different people 1Indeed, the number of American teenagers who feel useless and joyless seems to have recently increased, along with the number of teen suicides over the last few years. This has occurred in teens across every background. See J.M. Twenge, T.E. Joiner, M.L. Rogers, and G.N. Martin (2018). The authors attribute this situation to the prevalence of on-line activities (notably smart phone usage). The ubiquitousness of constantly being online may also contribute to FOMO (Fear of Missing Out) that is present among many in the 20-30 age group, along with "predictive regret". This is amplified by the constant social comparisons available on social media such as Facebook and Instagram. Chapter Six of Setiya may be relevant here. It would be of interest to see if this relationship holds in other countries. 2A worthwhile read here is E. Sullivan (2016). This book does not address concerns related to what we would now call a "midlife crisis" but ideas of sadness and despondency in an earlier period. Within different frameworks (e.g. Protestant theology) of the time period under study emotions such as sadness and melancholy were often considered important in cultivating knowledge of oneself-quite different from how we view such emotions today. Mapping these differences onto modern conceptions of how life should be lived presents a variety of difficulties. I. W. Kelly DOI: 10.4236/ojpp.2018.84024 345 Open Journal of Philosophy (and those in different cultures) and indeed, may be absent in some cultures, and a number of Western individuals (Druckerman, 2018). Why might midlife be the typical time of this crisis? Well, for one thing, we find ourselves at the peak of the hill at that time and things look downward from there on. Another reason might be that many of our earlier idealistic views regarding how life should go have been either shattered or diminished3. Setiya reasonably chooses to focus on the midlife concerns of those living in the last half-century of Western culture(s). So, what have we learned about the midlife and this crisis? Finding out about it is not as easy as one might think-we need good research, not just stories/anecdotes, and we have to be careful since our stories are usually influenced by the popular psychological idioms and phrases of the time under consideration4. Setiya points out that the idea of the "midlife crisis" in the West became very popular in the early 1980's and was often applied by people in their later 30's and 40's to their own difficult experiences along with those of others. If you were going through a difficult time, why not just say you were having a midlife crisis? The label normalized what you were suffering and did not have the more abrasive stigmas associated with many other labels in the mental health field since such a crisis was often considered inevitable or at least common for people of your age. However, once such expressions become central in popular culture they tend to be employed in a loose fashion with the result that there is an inevitable backlash from the academic community against the overly simplistic popular notions. What should we do to avoid bottoming out in the U-curve? Setiya's first rule of crisis prevention is "to care about something other than yourself" (Setiya, 2017; p. 34). How might you accomplish this? Here Setiya distinguishes between activities that are means (ways to reach ends) and activities that are ends or endpoints (self-satisfying activities in themselves). Don't just make money as a means of going on vacation to Hawaii. Instead, engage in more activities you find enjoyable in themselves (not aimed at further ends, however laudable they may be): reading history or poetry, learning about wildlife, going to football games, break dancing, attending curling bonspiels, etc. You never know, in advance, what you might find enjoyable5. A second preventative tactic (which overlaps with the first to some degree) would be to make sure you engage in more "existential activities," those that are "sources of inward joy" (Setiya, 2017: pp. 47-48). "Examples range from philosophy and high art to telling funny stories, 3One of these unrealistic illusions is the belief that many of our individual laudable actions will not cause or be allied with suffering (e.g. the belief that if we don't buy jeans made by poor workers overseas we will be doing our bit). Alas, much of what we do individually will inevitably be tied to harm. None of us can be "pure" or "innocent" in our everyday activities. However, this does not mean that we cannot collectively engage in pursuits that reduce harms and suffering. See Shotwell (2016). 4One might remember the overly-excessive focus on co-dependency popular at the end of the 20th century. 5The philosopher John Wisdom (Wisdom, 1984: p. 33) alludes to this distinction. Wisdom criticizes our tendency to focus on the success or purpose of activities. Many activities such as "being before a warm fire, playing with a friend a game of draughts [checkers] or ludo [a family board game].... these things aren't means to [other ends] they are part of what makes our lives worthwhile....our personality finds expression in [many such activities]". I. W. Kelly DOI: 10.4236/ojpp.2018.84024 346 Open Journal of Philosophy swimming or sailing, playing games with family or friends" (Setiya, 2017: p. 48). The above two suggestions concern avoiding the midlife crisis in general. The subsequent chapters confront more specific aspects of the midlife crisis. The third chapter, "Missing out," confronts the common feeling of "lost opportunity, frustrated longing, and oppressive social constraint" (Setiya, 2017: p. 54). None of us are likely immune from feeling this way at times, however successful our life seems from the outside, but it is a characteristic part of our view of the midlife crisis. This may be partly a result of the trope that we are brought up with that tells us that we can do or be anything we want. This can lead to disappointment for many of us by raising our expectations-we can't all become football stars, super slam dancers, or millionaires. These feelings are unfortunately, to some extent, "fated from the start" (Setiya, 2017: p. 71), because we can't do or have everything6. By the time we have reached our mid-lives, our options have already narrowed. For most of us, we have already decided on a career, where to live, whether or not to have children, etc. We can feel locked-in to the lives we have. We have many different kinds of values (e.g. religious/secular, political, personal, etc.) and it will be useful to make a distinction here between two main types of values (and what we can do based on these values)7. Some can be realized together such as enjoying cooking and having a career, but other things we value open some doors and simultaneously close others. You can't, at the same time, be a full-time doctor and a full-time athlete. You can't (legally, in the West) marry both Bob and Rex at the same time. You often can't live in the suburbs and not have to commute into town for your job. You may not be able to both afford a house and have several children. The problems can get worse-we typically may not be able to rank which value we think is better or more important. A classic example, referred to by Setiya, is with the dilemma faced by a mother (Sophie) who, when entering a concentration camp in World War Two, is forced by Nazi SS guards to choose which of her two children will be killed. She values both children, but is literally forced make a decision (Styron, 1979)8. Few, if any, of our choices in our lives will be of such an extremely tragic nature, but still, many of the choices we make cannot be evaluated on a common scale. Should you have chosen to be a doctor, plumber, anthropologist, entrepreneur, or soldier? Whatever choice you make, other doors will be closed. Some choices based on our interests and values at an earlier time will exclude other choices 6A somewhat stronger view of "missing out" is taken by the psychoanalyst Adam Phillips (Phillips, 2013). Phillips contends that very often these imaginary wished-for lives are more important to us than our actual lived lives. 7This is the philosophical distinction between incommensurable values (those values that cannot be compared using a common scale) and commensurable values (those values that can be compared to each other and ranked). Traditionally, among the former we might include liberty (freedom) and equality. Among the latter we might include the salaries and benefits for the same work at different companies. 8This suggests that in some situations, whatever we do will result in loss and might perhaps even be considered immoral. Indeed, there may be times in our lives when we feel we have failed morally even when what we consider the right thing to do impossible! This position is defended by Tessman (2017). Such is the human condition. I. W. Kelly DOI: 10.4236/ojpp.2018.84024 347 Open Journal of Philosophy based on other interests and values9. This means that regret and feelings of missing out will be inevitable to some extent with all of us-"I should have gotten more education/gone into a different field," "I should have married Sue/Ted," "I should never have moved from Calgary," etc. This is the inevitable outcome of having incompatible values in the first place (and we all have these). Whatever choice you make will likely have some regret associated with it later in your life. Whatever you do will exclude other valuable possibilities. This is the price we pay for having many values and the freedom to act on our values. Setiya (2017: p. 60) asks. Why is midlife missing out? [It is because] we cannot have everything we want, and what we have does not ... compensate for what we don't [have]. ... it follows from the diversity of values in human life, from the fact that there are so many different things worth wanting, worth caring about, worth striving and fighting for, too many ever to exhaust. Only blindness to much that is of value or a pathological narrowness of taste could save you from [feelings] of missing out. And no one should want that. While acknowledging this won't help us avoid suffering regret and a midlife crisis, Setiya says this awareness can help us cope with it, because our loses are "fair payment for the surplus of being alive" (Setiya, 2017: p. 62). Chapter Four, "Retrospection," addresses "how to feel about the ways life is not what you hoped it would be ... the mistakes, misfortunes, failures" (Setiya, 2017: p. 78). When we are young, everything seems possible. We can have it all. Soon enough, we learn that many things are beyond our control, and that our own decisions often do not work out for our own good. Setiya (2017: p. 72) makes the distinction between mistakes ("things you should not have done") and regrets ("things you would take back" if you could)10. Both are inevitable to all of us11. We might try to reduce the number of mistakes we make in our lives but cannot eliminate them. We often act on incomplete information with limited cognitive abilities, which include in-built, sometimes misleading biases12. Feelings of "missing out" and regret are also inevitable to a large extent because of the richness of our actual lives. But let's say, despite the foregoing, you feel you should have chosen to become an entrepreneur rather than do what you are now 9Not only can our present values and interests conflict, but our interests and values (and experience) can change over time, making such feelings inevitable. Hence the expression "[What I did] seemed the right thing to do at the time". 10Regret can take several forms, Davidi and Gilovich (2018) contend that there are two main types of regret we have in our lives: those involving missed opportunities and those involving discrepancies between our actual and ideal selves. The authors provide evidence that the most enduring regrets concern the latter. This might be of interest to philosophers who focus on issues of self-identity over time. 11There's a conceptual distinction between mistakes and regrets (as described by Setiya), but why can't these be largely coextensive? I regret many things I shouldn't have done and wish I could take back some of my mistakes. I don't see the theoretical significance of the distinction in this context, since the salient points seem expressible either way. 12These biases are described in most introductory psychology books. At any age we might feel that life is offering us less than other people and this may strike us harder in middle age than at other times. However, this feeling itself might be due to psychological bias (Deri, Davidi & Gilovich, 2017). A good overview of the often misleading consequences of such biases in our thinking and actions can be found in Foresman, Fosl, and Watson (2017). I. W. Kelly DOI: 10.4236/ojpp.2018.84024 348 Open Journal of Philosophy doing. In the abstract, it may seem sensible to feel this way. We do often think our lives would have gone better had we taken an alternative route. However, lives are not lived in the abstract and the ideal. Our lives are lived in the world of unpredictable and messy details. There are many different things that constitute our lives (our career, finances, health, family, collegial relationships, children, interests/hobbies, economic ups and downs, etc.), and things can easily go well or badly within one or more of them over time. There are also so many different possibilities within each of these aspects of our lives which can go well or untwist in varying directions at different times in our lives. Even if you are wealthy you will likely still have neighbours you don't get along with, or have children that might be bullied in school, or have colleagues at work you don't get along with, or a bad marriage. You won't have it all13. What we need to do is focus on the complexity and specifics of the lives we do have (Setiya, 2017: p. 101). In the vast majority of our actual lives there are things that have happened that are positive (perhaps your children, your friends, you fill-in-the blanks here). Would you trade or risk those actualities for an unknown-idealistic sounding life, knowing that however much better an alternative life appears, much of our actual lives will always be beyond our control and unpredictable little things can have large consequences-"the butterfly effect" (Setiya, 2017: p. 85). We, unfortunately, tend to "fantasize about the best-case scenarios" (Setiya, 2017: p. 97). Chapter Five is entitled "Something to look forward to" and confronts the issue of our mortality. To start off, we need to distinguish between the process of dying and death14. The stoic philosopher Epicurus (4th century BC) thought that 13Further, some of our own values can, at times, conflict with each other. The paradigm empirical example here is between work and family. The answer usually given is to find the right balance-alas, the balance point will vary for different people, and how does one determine this balance point? And we may have to revisit this balance point over time in our lives (what works in our twenties may not work in our forties or fifties). The conflicts in other cases may be inherent in the values themselves. Again, this may be fated from the outset for all of us. Recognizing this "fated-ness" may help; after all, we are all in the same boat. Not only may some of our most important values conflict at times, many of the issues we care about may involve largely irresolvable value conflicts. For example, Stanovich (2018: p. 10) contends Issues like how much inequality of income to tolerate, how much pollution to tolerate, and how much we should sacrifice economic growth for potential future changes in global temperature represent issues of clashing values, not the inability to process information, or the lack of information, or the failure to show wisdom. They are fundamental differences in worldview and on such a large-scale basis are not driven by psychological characteristics that can be normatively evaluated. The sheer complexity of many such issues may not be realized until later in life, perhaps contributing to some of our feelings of lack of control in midlife. 14Setiya focuses on our fear of death itself rather than our concerns about the process of dying. There are good reasons for this emphasis on death, rather than dying-while dying for many can be a painful process, it isn't necessarily so (whereas fear of death for oneself or a loved one is universal). Further, many societies have been and are dealing with the process of dying in more palatable ways over time. We now have drugs that can numb the most severe pain, and palliative care where trained staff can look after many of the needs of the dying, and family and friends can visit (consult issues of the Sage Journal of Palliative Care). A comprehensive overview of palliative care around the world, and with respect to patients with varying physical and psychological conditions, can be found in C. Faull, S. de Caestecker, A. Nicholson and F. Black (2012). Other intriguing possibilities are on the horizon. For example, Weijiers and DiSilvestro (2017) contend that plugging terminally ill individuals into virtual reality machines could benefit those in strong pain and with a diagnosis of irreversible future pain. The authors discuss a variety of objections to this view and advocate for its plausible consideration I. W. Kelly DOI: 10.4236/ojpp.2018.84024 349 Open Journal of Philosophy our fear of death was both universal and irrational (after all, when we are dead, nothing matters to us). Setiya contends that while this way of thinking about death may work for some of us, it strikes many as not good enough to make us not fear death. After all, death deprives us of good things like friends, family, and hobbies we enjoy. The later Roman Stoic philosopher, Lucretius (1st century BC), on the other hand, doesn't know why people get into a frenzy biting the bulrushes about their deaths; after all, we don't freak out about not existing before we were born, so why do so in thinking about not existing after we jump the ship? Aren't these situations logically the same? Again, this may work for some of us, but not for many others; while we might recognize the intellectual force of the argument, we might still have emotional/psychological resistance to accepting the argument. We humans tend to be biased toward the future; future pleasures and harms seem to count more to us than past harms and pleasures15. Setiya cites contemporary philosopher Derek Parfit's "neutral temporal" response to this bias: "As life passes [you] have less and less to look forward to, but more and more [of your past] to remember.... And that is just as good" (Setiya, 2017: p. 116). This particular attempt at acquiring a neutral temporal attitude will, again, work for some but far from all of us. Apart from the difficulty of adopting this attitude, not all of us have pasts we might enjoy reflecting on. Some of us may view our past life (in both our middle-age and beyond) as did Stoner, the main character in the novel by John Williams, who had "little behind him that he cared to remember" (Williams, 2006: p. 181). For those who are unmoved by Epicurus, Lucretius, or Parfit, can philosophy offer more? Well, one possibility is to try and see our desire to avoid death (which corresponds to the wish to live forever) for what it is-an "expression of greed, an intemperate demand for superhuman powers" (Setiya, 2017: p.119)16. This is why immortality tends to be associated with the supernatural and religion17. We can also think of immortality 15Counselor Louise Blanchard tells me that she finds many clients ruminate less about death and dying and more about potential future suffering and losses, for example, the fears of illness, loss of parents, children leaving home and even diminished cognitive/physical ability. It's an anxiety based on "what ifs?" that preoccupies the mind, rather than on "what is". Ironically, such futurevs present-focused thinking can make life more miserable now. 16Some might object that they don't want to live forever, but only longer. But how much longer? And does this not just put off the problem of confronting death until a future time? Would living 500 years mean that, at the end of that long lifespan, there would be less fear of one's forthcoming death? Wouldn't most still want even more life? One is reminded of Voltaire's humorous tale "Micromegas" (1752), in which two extraterrestrial visitors to earth discuss their lifespans. One complains that his species lives only 15,000 earth years and observes "which, as you can see, is to die almost the moment one is born; our existence is a point in time, our [life]span is but an instant. ... No sooner do we begin to educate ourselves a little than death arrives before we have any experience of life." His companion says, "... our lifespan is seven hundred times greater than yours, but ... when the moment comes to return our body to the elements arrives... to have lived for an eternity or for a single day amounts to the same thing. I have been in places where they live a thousand times longer than [I do], and find that they still grumbled" (Voltaire, 2002: p. 21). 17Setiya does not examine the various options that religions offer regarding the specific form an afterlife might take, and rightly so, given this is secondary to the topic of the book. However, for those interested, there is philosopher Steven Cave's book (2012)], which provides a very engaging introduction to the topic. Cave is a skeptic about an afterlife. He points out that the desire to live forever has a long history, and claims that all of our proposals for living forever can be encompassed in four types: a special fountain/potion, resurrection, an immortal soul, and, lastly, through some kind of famous achievement(s). All four of these narratives are given a philosophical workover and found wanting. An entertaining history of recent (more scientific) attempts to extend lives over the past two centuries can be found in John Gray (2012). Gray considers the scientific attempts to circumvent death in a number of different ways over the past two centuries. Gray's book covers spiritualism in its various guises, parapsychological attempts to prove the immortality of the soul, the Communist Russian "God-builders" who preserved Lenin's remains, and contemporary technological attempts to freeze our bodies or upload our minds into cyberspace. I. W. Kelly DOI: 10.4236/ojpp.2018.84024 350 Open Journal of Philosophy as likely not being as good as we idealistically believe. While having projects and goals contributes meaning to our lives it might, after a while (maybe a few million years), become pretty boring and repetitive18. To actually enjoy (in some sense) an endless life, we would have to become a very different kind of being, far different from the human being that we are now. The almost magical changes required would be, "akin to growing wings or reproducing by fission... it is one thing to dream of living as a timeless deity, another thing to feel swindled by the fact that this is just a dream" (Setiya, 2017: p. 119). Chapter Six ("Living in the present") is a central chapter in the book. It discusses a serious contributing factor not only to midlife crises in the West, but also to the feelings of "repetition and futility and emptiness" (Setiya, 2017: p. 128) that often occur later in life. This factor is the continuous focus of so many of us on pursuing goals and projects (however worthwhile they seem). In everyday life we often call this situation "the rat race." Setiya tells us that, while projects and goals can contribute meaning and purpose to our lives (after all, who would not feel that combatting poverty or helping the homeless were not meaningful activities or projects?), the dominance of a project/goal driven mindset also has its downsides and can contribute to feelings of discontentment and emptiness. How can this be the case? Here Setiya alludes to nineteenth century German philosopher Schopenhauer's point that a project driven life endlessly leads to other projects, and every satisfied desire or completed project gives rise to a new one. We are caught between the endless engagement of projects and unendurable boredom. Setiya goes between the horns of Schopenhauer's dilemma by pointing out that goal-less activities also contribute meaning to our lives and we don't have to follow the project-driven life in all of its aspects to have a meaningful life. Other activities contribute meaning to our lives. Setiya (2017: p. 134) suggests many of us may be able to overcome this debilitating sense of being driven by a series of goals and projects (however laudable) by introducing more goal-less activities into our lives: listening to music, hanging out with friends or family, or thinking about midlife ... you can stop doing these things ... but you cannot complete them. They have no limit, no outcome, whose achievement exhausts them and thereby brings them to an end. Watching sports, parenting, playing video games, going to movies/theatre plays would be other examples. Setiya suggests we include more of these activities into our lives. In the capitalist Western world, this may be complicated. Part 18Some might claim that this ignores all the possible new interests and hobbies one might develop in such a life. Maybe not. Are we that plastic? I'm not sure if our human temperaments are that malleable. Many of us get bored pretty quickly even though there are many different possibilities always available-we just don't find most of the alternative possibilities that attractive. Hence, for many, our boredom on Sunday afternoons and holidays. Of course, genetic modifications or computerized implants might be used to modify our responses to new activities and promote new interests, but how far can such changes go before we are no longer the same person or even no longer a member of the human species? I. W. Kelly DOI: 10.4236/ojpp.2018.84024 351 Open Journal of Philosophy of the reason may be that envy and competition has been shaped from birth to be powerful motives for most of us. Further, some of us have what are sometimes called Type-A personalities (a label associated with being competitive, aggressive and ambitious). However, even here, such project-driven individuals can "find meaning in the process, not the project" (Setiya, 2017: p. 140), that is, they can try and focus on the process/journey, not the end. Meditation may help here by allowing us to refocus our attention on our own thoughts and feelings that are counterparts to the projects. Still, given the society that we live in, with its emphasis on productivity and "worthwhile activities," this will still be difficult to do for many of us: our not being engaged in "productive activities" that is, those related to goals, is discouraged and stigmatised. The image of the "couch potato" or labels such as "doing nothing with his/her life" are always hanging over our heads. Setiya does not recommend we spend all our time on such goal-less activities, but we need to find the right balance. Finding the right balance between goal-related and goal-less activities will differ among people, including partners and family members who may not view such a change positively. Many will likely need additional help from other approaches or other people in finding this balance19. An important point to make is that Setiya's book addresses the Midlife Crisis largely from a Western male perspective. The author points out that his interest in the topic stems from his own crisis in his thirties where he achieved what he wanted, but was not happy. Setiya does not say much about how women might experience a Midlife Crisis, only that life satisfaction for many women and men bottoms out during the middle years. Further, he adds, for women the crisis (if it happens) seems to occur a bit earlier and does not last as long as it does with men. However, one might expect the crisis to be more complex regarding women, despite some overlap in concerns with men. Women have additional concerns to deal with such as overt and implicit negative cultural biases, harassment at work, the ever-present cultural focus on appearance along with ageist 19The problems associated with allowing oneself to be dominated by a project-driven life have been long recognized and addressed in a number of different ways throughout history. Setiya's approach is more philosophical and existential in nature. It would be worthwhile to be cognizant in greater depth of other approaches, as a larger repertoire will make one more adaptable. Different approaches or mixtures of approaches will likely work with different people: adopting a Stoic life-style or a simpler life-style focus on one's outward responses/behaviours than feelings. For example, some have found adopting a stoic approach applicable to their lives. Stoic approaches have influenced several commonly used approaches to psychotherapy such as Rational Emotive Behavioural Therapy (REBT) and Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT). For those unacquainted with CBT, a useful introduction can be found in Sbarra (2017). Recent thoughtful books on Stoicism are Pigliucci (2017) and Irvine (2008, 2017). A main feature of Stoicism is on focusing on things under your control rather than those aspects of your life that are beyond your control. A recommended book by a philosophical counsellor integrating elements of both Buddhist and Stoic wisdom is Macaro (2018). Others have successfully adopted a simpler life by trying to avoid becoming saturated with stuff they don't really need. See E. Westacott (2016a). Those interested in living a more frugal life may also find the article by Westacott of interest: (Westacott, 2016b). Recent developments in counselling also addresses such issues. For example, ACT (Acceptance and Commitment Therapy) helps clients detach from anxiety and project driven struggles. (ACT has much in common with Buddhist beliefs). The classic reference is S. Hayes, K. Strosahl & K. Wilson (2016). I. W. Kelly DOI: 10.4236/ojpp.2018.84024 352 Open Journal of Philosophy stereotypes more prominent for women. We need to also emphasize the larger background family pressures on women. This book was an enlightening read. While philosophy cannot terminate the aging process, philosophy can provide us with a new or enlarged perspective in which to consider the pros and cons of our midlife. It will be interesting to discuss Setiya's writings on midlife with those from other cultures across the globe. Not only would I recommend this book to those entering or already in middle age, but also to counsellors (philosophical or psychological) and therapists who are dealing with clients of all ages. Students in counselling will find many of the topics relevant to their future practice. It will also give them a broader background in confronting and thinking about many of the personal issues that their clients experience, as well as their own future lives20. Acknowledgements Special thanks for their comments on an earlier draft go to philosophers Karl Pfeifer and Brian Zamulinski, as well as counsellor Louise Blanchard (founder of the Birch Wellness Center in Winnipeg, Canada, and President of the Manitoba Chapter of the Canadian Counselling and Psychotherapy Association). References Cave, S. (2012) Immortality: The Quest to Live Forever and How It Drives Civilisation. Danvers, MD: Crown Publishing Group. Davidi, S., & Gilovich, T. (2018) The Ideal Road Not Taken: The Self-Discrepancies Involved in People's Enduring Regrets. Emotion, 18, 439-452. https://doi.org/10.1037/emo0000326 Deri, S., Davidai, S., & Gilovich, T. (2017). Home Alone: Why People Believe Others' Social Lives Are Richer than Their Own. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 113, 858-877. https://doi.org/10.1037/pspa0000105 Druckerman, P. (2018). How the Midlife Crisis Came to Be. The Atlantic (online). https://www.theatlantic.com/family/archive/2018/05/the-invention-of-the-midlife-crisi s/561203/ Faull, C., de Caestecker, S., Nicholson, A., & Black, F. (2012) Handbook of Palliative Care (3rd ed.). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118426869 Fisher, G. (2018) The Changing Nature of Retirement. OupBlog. https://blog.oup.com/2018/01/changing-nature-retirement/ Foresman, G. A., Fosl, P. S., & Watson, J. C. (2017) The Critical Thinking Toolkit (pp. 195-214). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley Blackwell. 20Philosophers, along with those in counselling/psychotherapy will also find the jargon-free philosophy article by Setiya (2018) worth reading. This article overlaps with Setiya's (2017) book in many aspects but considers many of the existential issues people contend with under the larger issue of the meaningfulness of life. See also Landau (2017). Landau ties having a meaningful life with finding sufficient values in what we do. The overlap with Setiya is evident. But the concerns of Landau are wider, our living in a world where nothing is said to be absolutely certain, free-will is questioned, death confronts us all, and we are told we are insignificant specks in the universe. These issues will come up in discussions with a number of friends, colleagues and counsellor clients and this book, along with Setiya's writings will provide a larger philosophical framework that covers a gap ill-covered in most counselling programs. I. W. Kelly DOI: 10.4236/ojpp.2018.84024 353 Open Journal of Philosophy Gray, J. (2012) The Immortalization Commission: Science and the Strange Quest to Cheat Death. Toronto, ON: Anchor Canada. Hamilton, C. (2014) Middle Age (The Art of Living). Abingdon, UK: Routledge. Hayes, S., Strosahl, K., & Wilson, K. (2016) Acceptance and Commitment Therapy: The Process and Practice of Mindful Change (2nd ed.). New York, NY: Guilford Press. Irvine, W. B. (2008) A Guide to the Good Life: The Ancient Art of Stoic Joy. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Irvine, W. B. (2017) A Slap in the Face: Why Insults Hurt-And Why they Shouldn't. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Landau, I. (2017) Finding Meaning in an Imperfect World. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Macaro, A. (2018) More than Happiness: Buddhist and Stoic Wisdom for a Sceptical Age. London, UK: Icon Books. Phillips, A. (2013) Missing Out: in Praise of the Unlived Life. New York City, NY: Farrar, Straus & Giroux. Pigliucci, M. (2017). How to Be a Stoic: Using Ancient Philosophy to Live a Modern Life. New York City, NY: Basic Books. Rauch, J. (2018). The Happiness Curve: Why Life Gets Better after 50. New York, NY: Thomas Dunne Books. Sbarra, D. (2017). Psychology's Power Tools. Aeon Magazine. https://aeon.co/essays/this-is-why-cognitive-behavioural-therapy-works-so-well Setiya, K. (2017). Midlife: A Philosophical Guide. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Setiya, K. (2018). Philosophers Should Be Keener to Talk about the Meaning of Life. Aeon Magazine. https://aeon.co/ideas/philosophers-should-be-keener-to-talk-about-the-meaning-of-lif e Shotwell, A. (2016). Against Purity: Living Ethically in Compromised Times. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. Stanovich, K. E. (2018). How to Think Rationally About World Problems. Journal of Intelligence, 6, 1-12. https://doi.org/10.3390/jintelligence6020025 Styron, W. (1979). Sophie's Choice. New York City, NY: Vintage Books. Sullivan, E. (2016). Beyond Melancholy: Sadness and Selfhood in Renaissance England. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198739654.001.0001 Tessman, L. (2017). When Doing the Right Thing Is Impossible. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Twenge, J. M., Joiner, T. E., Rogers, M. L., & Martin, G. N. (2018). Increases in Depressive Symptoms, Suicide-Related Outcomes, and Suicide Rates among U.S. Adolescents after 2010 and Links to Increased New Media Screen Time. Clinical Psychological Science, 6, 3-17. https://doi.org/10.1177/2167702617723376 Voltaire (2002). Micromegas and Other Short Fictions (pp. 17-35, Trans. by T. Cuffe). London: Penguin Books, Originally Published in 1752. Weijers, D., & DiSilvestro, R. (2017). The Morality of Experience Machines for Palliative and End-of-Life Care. In M. Silcox (Ed.), Experience Machines: The Philosophy of Virtual Worlds (pp. 183-201). Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Westacott, E. (2016). The Wisdom of Frugality: Why Less Is More-More or Less. I. W. Kelly DOI: 10.4236/ojpp.2018.84024 354 Open Journal of Philosophy Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Westacott, E. (2016). Why Black Friday Sales Are Not for the Truly Frugal. MarketWatch. https://www.marketwatch.com/story/why-black-friday-sales-are-not-for-the-truly-frug al-2016-11-20 Williams, J. E. (2006). Stoner (p. 181). New York, NY: NYRB Classic Press. (Originally Published in 1965) Wisdom, J. (1984). What Is There in Horse Racing? In I. Dilman (Ed.), Philosophy and Life: Essays on John Wisdom (pp. 27-34). Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. (Originally Published in the Listener, 1954) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-6184-5_


Debating the Significance of Disagreement: A Review of John Pittard's Diagreement, Deference, and Religious Commitment

Philosophy

Richard Feldmanâs âReasonable Religious Disagreementsâ launched debates about the epistemic significance of disagreement that have been a dominant point of discussion in epistemology as of late. While most of these debates have been concerned with disagreement more generally, Feldmanâs original focus was religious disagreement, and John Pittard returns the focus to religious disagreement in Disagreement, Deference, and Religious Commitment. Pittardâs book delves deeply into debates about the significance of disagreement with a foot in both epistemology and philosophy of religion. It is the first book to look at these issues as they are being addressed within each of these sub-disciplines and is sure to be a significant contribution to the debates in both sub-fields.

http://social-epistemology.com ISSN: 2471-9560 Debating the Significance of Disagreement: A Review of John Pittard's Disagreement, Deference, and Religious Commitment Jonathan Matheson, University of North Florida, email@example.com –––––––––––––––––– Matheson, Jonathan. 2020: "Debating the Significance of Disagreement: A Review of John Pittard's Disagreement, Deference, and Religious Commitment." Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 9 (7): 36-44. https://wp.me/p1Bfg0-5dK. 36 9 (7): 36-44. 2020. https://wp.me/p1Bfg0-5dK Disagreement, Deference, and Religious Commitment John Pittard Oxford University Press, 2020. 360 pp. Richard Feldman's "Reasonable Religious Disagreements" launched debates about the epistemic significance of disagreement that have been a dominant point of discussion in epistemology as of late. While most of these debates have been concerned with disagreement more generally, Feldman's original focus was religious disagreement, and John Pittard returns the focus to religious disagreement in Disagreement, Deference, and Religious Commitment. Pittard's book delves deeply into debates about the significance of disagreement with a foot in both epistemology and philosophy of religion. It is the first book to look at these issues as they are being addressed within each of these sub-disciplines and is sure to be a significant contribution to the debates in both sub-fields. General Structure The book is divided into two sections. In the first section (chapters 1-5), Pittard makes his case for weak conciliationism-the view that while significant conciliation is called for in standard disagreement cases, it can be rational to remain steadfast in deep disagreements (like religious disagreements). In the second section of the book (chapters 6 and 7), Pittard examines the implications that strong conciliationism (the view that disagreement calls for significant conciliation across the board) has for religious commitment, and argues that there are more significant costs for religious commitment than there are typically thought to be. Pittard argues that strong conciliationism not only has it religious belief is irrational, it also makes religious commitment non-rational. In doing so, Pittard seeks to carve away any middle option for strong conciliationists who wish to maintain some kind of rational religious commitment. This starker contrast is meant to provide greater support for weak conciliationism. In what follows, I will give a brief description of each chapter and proceed to raise some critical concerns. Section 1 Chapter 1 In Chapter 1, Pittard lays out the master argument that is the backdrop of the book: 1. S's religious outlook is justified only if S has justification for believing that most of her religious beliefs are the result of a reliable process. 2. In light of S's knowledge of systematic religious disagreement, S should believe that the processes that (otherwise) epistemically qualified people rely on to form their religious beliefs are, taken as a whole, very unreliable. J. Matheson 37 3. S lacks justification for believing that her process of religious belief formation is significantly more reliable than the collective reliability of the processes that (otherwise) epistemically qualified people use to form religious beliefs. 4. If (2) and (3), then S lacks justification for believing that most of her religious beliefs are the result of a reliable process. 5. Thus, S lacks justification for believing that most of her beliefs are the result of a reliable process (2, 3, 4). 6. Therefore, S's religious outlook is not justified (1, 5) (Pittard, 19). Pittard identifies premise (3) as the argument's critical premise and focuses almost all of his discussion on this premise. Pittard dubs (3) 'Equal Estimated Reliability', where EQUAL ESTIMATED RELIABILITY: S lacks justification for believing SUPERIOR. and SUPERIOR: S's process of religious belief formation is significantly more reliable than the collective reliability of the processes that (otherwise) epistemically qualified people use to form religious beliefs (28). In discussing the motivation for (3), Pittard identifies what he sees as three central commitments of the defender of (3): INTERNAL REASONS CONSTRAINT: S has justification for believing SUPERIOR only if S has good internal (accessible) reasons for believing SUPERIOR (35). AGENT IMPARTIALITY CONSTRAINT: S has good internal reasons for believing SUPERIOR only if S has a good agent-neutral internal reason for believing SUPERIOR (38). REASONS IMPARTIALITY CONSTRAINT: S has a good agent-neutral internal reason for believing SUPERIOR only if S has a good disputeindependent agent-neutral reason for believing SUPERIOR (46). The first constraint requires that there be something from the subject's perspective that gives her a reason to believing SUPERIOR. The second constraint prevents first-person reasons from counting for more simply because they are one's own. The third constraint prevents one from relying on self-trust to navigate out of the effects of disagreement. Chapter 2 In Chapter 2, Pittard tries to demotivate reasons impartiality by looking at the cases for it made by both Christensen (2007; 2011) and Schellenberg (2007). Pittard argues that the cases 38 9 (7): 36-44. 2020. https://wp.me/p1Bfg0-5dK that motivate reasons impartiality (or independence), can be better explained by less radical, and independently plausible principles. (53) Christensen's motivation for reasons impartiality comes by way of his case for independence. INDEPENDENCE: In evaluating the epistemic credentials of another's expressed belief about p, in order to determine how (or whether) to modify my own belief about p, I should do so in a way that doesn't rely on the reasoning behind my initial belief that p.1 Christensen's case for independence comes from considering the restaurant check case. In the restaurant check case, two epistemic peers do mental math to calculate the shares. Upon discovering their disagreement about the shares, it seems that (i) they should reduce their confidence (and suspend judgment about the shares), and (ii) they cannot reason to the conclusion that the other party is mistaken simply since they have a different conclusion. Pittard claims that Bayesianism can capture these verdicts without appealing to Independence. The reason why it is wrong for a party in the restaurant check case to appeal to their own reasoning is not simply that it is their own reasoning, but rather that those reasons are no longer discernable from the subject's perspective and thus are not available as reasons to be used. Schellenberg's case for reason independence comes by way of his argument for doxastic minimalism-the claim that we should minimize the role of default trust in our lives as inquirers. Schellenberg argues that we should only have default trust in doxastic practices that are both universal and unavoidable. Pittard offers a Jamesian critique of Schellenberg's argument, claiming that Schellenberg presupposes that avoiding false beliefs if more important that acquiring true beliefs. Pittard claims that when proper value is put of each epistemic goal, doxastic practices that permit on to take a stance on some issues requires additional doxastic practices (like belief based on religious experience). Chapter 3 In Chapter 3, Pittard examines instrumentalist arguments for conciliationsim. According to instrumentalism, you should, at least as far as possible, treat the deliverances of your cognitive faculties like the readouts of an instrument (e.g. a thermometer). Pittard argues that instrumentalism supports conciliationism regarding 'superficial' disagreements but fails to support conciliationism regarding fundamental disagreements (or deep disagreements) that stem from different epistemic starting points (or fundamental plausibility judgments). Pittard calls this view 'weak conciliationism'. Pittard argues that instrumentalism has been misapplied in the core 'superficial' cases in the disagreement literature and that it fails to apply in deep disagreements. Regarding the first, Pittard argues that instrumentalists (calibrationists) have ignored the importance of one's prior probabilities and that the degree to which one should trust an instrument is a function 1 Christensen (2011), 2. J. Matheson 39 of both its reliability and your prior probabilities.2 Pittard argues that the 'splitting the difference' verdict only obtains when one's prior probabilities fail to support either of the resulting views. Regarding the second, Pittard argues that at the most fundamental level it is impossible to treat one's outputs instrumentally since some starting point must be presupposed. Fundamental disagreements do not allow for an antecedent perspective that both parties share and from which the disagreement can be assessed. Given this, the lessons from the easy cases of disagreement (horse races and check calculations) do not naturally extend to the hard cases (moral and religious disagreement). In making his positive case for weak conciliationism, Pittard argues that at least some fundamental plausibility judgments (ur-priors) are justified on 'partisan' grounds.3 Since there is no rationally antecedent perspective from which to judge one's fundamental plausibility judgments, people are justified in adopting the fundamental judgments that they are inclined to adopt, otherwise an infinite regress and skepticism looms. Since many deep disagreements (disagreements in ethics, philosophy, and religion) are due to differences in fundamental plausibility judgments, the rational response to such disagreements is different than the standard conciliationist response, though some mitigated conciliation is still called for. Pittard closes the chapter by defending weak conciliation from the objections that it is less accurate than strong conciliationism and that it collapses into strong conciliationism. Chapter 4 In Chapter 4, Pittard puts forward his rationalist account of partisan justification, after surveying some alternatives, and applies it to religious belief. Pittard argues that the most plausible way to deny the Reasons Impartiality Constraint is to embrace his form of rationalism. On Pittard's rationalist view, people sometimes have a priori rational insights into the plausibility of some claims. When one's fundamental plausibility judgments (or ur-priors) are based on such rational insight, this creates an important epistemic asymmetry which mitigates the skeptical force of disagreement allowing one to rationally remain steadfast or at least make much more minimal conciliation. Such an appeal to rational insight in the face of disagreement is reminiscent of Bogardus (2009) and van Inwagen (1996), but Pittard's version utilizes a Bayesian framework. Pittard also argues that his rationalist account better comports with common sense verdicts about cases and views about the nature of rationality than the other accounts of partisan justification. Chapter 5 In Chapter 5, Pittard makes the case that his rationalist account isn't only available to the analytically sophisticated. In defending 'affective rationalism,' Pittard attempts to make room for emotional experiences (like religious experience) to provide (or at least enable) the requisite insights to avoid the skeptical consequences of disagreement. Insightful experience, as Pittard understands them, involve a rational improvement in one's fundamental plausibility judgments, making them a kind of 'deep experience' in ways that typical 2 This bears some similarity of Lackey's (2008; 2010) Justificationist view, according to which one's antecedent justification for believing a proposition can mitigate the impact of a discovered disagreement. 3 Someone has partisan justification for a credence when their justification for that credence is not based on third-person, neutral reasons for believing they are reliable on the matter (118). 40 9 (7): 36-44. 2020. https://wp.me/p1Bfg0-5dK perceptual experiences are not (185). Insightful religious experiences can act like the earlier described rational insights in the face of disagreement, providing a reason to favor one's own perspective. Affective rationalism makes room for individuals to have insights that do not stem from philosophical accomplishment, but rather from an affective response to something. For instance, he claims that one's fundamental plausibility judgments about Christianity will depend upon how beautiful and excellent one finds the life of Jesus and other such 'worthiness judgments'. (195) Value judgments inform such plausibility judgments, and affections have an essential role in the formation of value judgments and can do so by providing genuine insights. Further, such experiences may equip one with requisite concepts to make sense of an outlook or to have a particular insight. Section 2 Chapter 6 Pittard begins the second section of the book in Chapter 6. In this chapter, Pittard argues that in deep disagreements, like religious disagreements, epistemic impartiality is elusive. Because of this, Pittard claims that there is good reason to doubt that the pursuit of epistemic impartiality leads to skepticism in such contexts. One of the reasons Pittard thinks that epistemic impartiality is elusive is the self-undermining problem for strong conciliationism. Here, drawing on previously published work, Pittard argues that the conciliationist who remains resolute about their conciliationism in the face of disagreement is no less committed to impartiality than the conciliationist who is conciliatory about their conciliationism-one is deferential in their credence, the other in their reasoning. So, Pittard maintains that his resolute conciliationism is a viable response to the self-undermining problem. Pittard then extends this response into the religious domain. Since some religious outlooks conflict with strong conciliationsim, impartiality can ground remaining resolute in those disagreements as well. Pittard then turns to examining how one might impartially navigate religious disagreement and finds all such prospects bleak. Messy real-world deep disagreements don't give a clear impartial answer in terms of what credence to have in the disputed propositions, and the prospects for an imprecise credence aren't much better. Religious impartiality is elusive since judgments about the epistemic credentials of others will themselves be informed by one's religious outlook. This makes an impartial ground from which to navigate the disagreement elusive. Chapter 7 In the final chapter, Pittard argues that the effects of religious skepticism are not purely doxastic. In contrast to other philosophers of religion, Pittard argues that the rationality of religious commitment is also threatened by disagreement skepticism, even if such commitment is non-doxastic. In this chapter, Pittard assumes that religious disagreement skepticism is correct in order to examine its consequences for religious commitment. The centerpiece of this chapter is Pittard's 'Nowhere to Stand Argument.' Pittard argues that disagreement skepticism results not only in uncertainty regarding first-order norms J. Matheson 41 governing religious decision-making, but also higher-order norms about how we should act in the face of first-order uncertainty. Given these levels of uncertainty, he claims that the very possibility of rational decision-making is undermined. (290) This, according to Pittard, is because rational action requires certainty (or at least justification for certainty) for a principle on at least one of these normative levels. Since disagreement skepticism prevents certainty (or justification for it) regarding any such principle, Pittard's 'Nowhere to Stand Argument' claims that disagreement skepticism also makes rational action impossible. Pittard sees this consequence as yet another reason to dismiss strong conciliationism. Commentary Now to the critical commentary. The first issue I want to raise concerns the master argument that Pittard is addressing. Pittard sets up the argument for disagreement skepticism in a way that makes it focused on the reliability of belief-forming processes, particularly those giving rise to religious beliefs. For one thing, this forces the discussion into thorny issues brought about by the generality problem. While Pittard gestures at the generality problem early on, much of the subsequent discussion involves identifying reliable/unrealiable process types with insufficient caution. The bigger problem here, however, is that in making the disagreement skeptic's argument about belief-forming processes, the master argument fails to get at the heart of the issue. To show that a belief was the product of an unrealiable process might show that this belief is unjusitified, that the subject is not doxastically justified in holding the belief (although generality worries again), but it will not show that the subject is not propositionally justified in believing the relevant proposition. Put differently, attacks on the formation of a belief may show that the belief itself is not good, but they cannot show that the proposition in question should not be believed by the subject. Subject S can have a belief that is produced by an unreliable process, yet the content of that belief is propositionally justified for S. This occurs when S has good reasons to believe p but happens to believe p on the basis of some other reasons, or perhaps using some unreliable process. This characterization of the issue is a problem since the disagreement skeptic isn't simply after the grounding of various religious beliefs (and other controversial beliefs) but is attacking the idea that such propositions should can be rationally believed at all given the controversy surrounding them. The issue is one of propositional justification. We can further see that the problem of disagreement is distinct from a problem of unreliable processes, since the skeptical threat from disagreement arises even when we stipulate that the disagreeing parties have both formed their respective beliefs using reliable belief-forming processes (of whatever the relevant level of generality is). In Christensen's familiar restaurant check case, both parties are good at doing the mental math of splitting the check. They both utilize reliable belief-forming processes in forming their respective beliefs (or so we can stipulate). Neither party needs to charge the other with deploying an unreliable beliefforming process. Reliable processes are often still fallible processes, so the fact that both parties use reliable belief-forming processes does not ensure that a mistake has not been made. The discovery of disagreement shows that something has gone wrong. Using a bad belief-forming process is one thing that may have gone wrong, but it is not the only thing. 42 9 (7): 36-44. 2020. https://wp.me/p1Bfg0-5dK Sometimes reliable processes misfire and sometimes good evaluators of the evidence make a mistaken evaluation. The skeptical threat of disagreement results from an inability to better explain the disagreement by positing a mistake to the other party. This skeptical threat can be appreciated without appeal to belief-formation process types and their reliability. So, for these reasons, Pittard's characterization of the master argument fails to get at the heart of the skeptical threat from disagreement. On Pittard's Positive Proposal But that's just about setting up the issue. What about Pittard's positive proposal? Here, there are several issues that I want to briefly sketch. First, there is Pittard's defense of partisan justification. Pittard defends the legitimacy of partisan justification by showing that a denial of its existence has skeptical consequences. Here, I think he is right that some justification must be partisan.4 However, the problem comes when Pittard takes this defense of the existence of partisan justification to show that partisan justification persists in the face of disagreement. There is an important difference here. The skeptical challenge isn't a defeat challenge. The external world skeptic presents the possibility of error, but fails to provide any reason to believe that we are in fact mistaken about our external world beliefs. In contrast, the challenge from disagreement is a defeat challenge.5 When confronted with disagreement, we are given a reason to think that we have made a mistake. Someone has made a mistake, at if the set-up is right, then it is no more likely that it is the other person than that it is me. The fact that partisan justification can exist in the absence of a challenge gives us no reason to believe that it can be used to fend off challenges. This mistake is particularly curious since Pittard utilizes this very distinction to dismiss proper functionalist accounts of the rationality of religious belief. Regarding proper functionalist accounts, Pittard notes that even if designed belief-forming processes produce rational beliefs, once we encounter a defeater for those beliefs, we need something more. This is correct, but the same is true of partisan justification. Pittard's weak conciliationism relies on genuine rational insights to mitigate the skeptical threat of disagreement. Pittard's claims that having a rational insight is often directly discernable to the subject, and thus the rational response to disagreement differs in cases where one has a rational insight and when one does not. This brings up a second issue. This account does not seem to divide the cases in the way that Pittard wants (or at least pictures). The rational insight/non-insight divide is not the same as the fundamental/superficial disagreement divide. Some 'superficial' disagreements, like the restaurant check case, can be seen as cases involving genuine rational insight (though Pittard agrees that significant conciliation is called for in the restaurant case). Further, some 'fundamental' disagreements needn't involve any rational insights at all, since having an 4 See Matheson (2018a) for more on this point. 5 See Pryor (2000), Huemer (2001), and Matheson (2015) for more on this point. J. Matheson 43 insight is a success. Given that whether one party is having an insight is entirely independent of whether the disagreement is deep or superficial, it does not seem that Pittard's account delivers his anticipated verdicts regarding when significant conciliation is called for. Further, since a genuine insight could be had in the restaurant check case, it seems that his account also simply delivers the wrong verdicts about cases. In addition, Pittard's appeal to insights does not seem to be up to the task. The problem is that it is typically not apparent to us whether we are having an insight or not. Sometimes we have genuine insights and sometimes we have merely apparent insights. Further, even if we are having a genuine insight, it is still possible that we misunderstand or misapply that insight (something Pittard notes in the text). Our mere fallibility here is not the problem. The problem is that in the face of disagreement, we would need to have an undefeated reason to believe that we are having the genuine insight (and not our disagreeing interlocutor). The mere fact that we are having an insight cannot be used as such a reason, since that would violate the Internal Reasons Constraint (which Pittard agrees should not be done). So long as there can be a good case and a bad case, we can only mitigate the effects of disagreement if we have an undefeated reason to think that we are in the good case. It's hard to see how a rational insight can do this.6 A Final Concern One final worry concerns Pittard's argument against rational religious commitment on the supposition that strong conciliationism is true. Here Pittard's argument relies on the fact that strong conciliationism would prevent one from being justifiably certain in principles guiding action, which results in corresponding actions being non-rational. However, if a lack of justified certainty in action-guiding principles is all that is required for actions to be nonrational, then the problem here affects far more than strong conciliationism. A justified certainty in action-guiding principles looks implausible independent of worries about disagreement. This gives good reason to believe the reasoning is faulty here. What might that problem be? For one thing, Pittard assumes a close parallel between epistemic reasons and practical reasons (that we must be aware of each to possess them and that they each can be defeated by our being justified in believing that they do not exists). However, unlike epistemic reasons, pragmatic reasons appear to exist independent of our awareness of them, and they are not defeated by our uncertainty of their existence.7 For instance, if Pascal is right that it is rational to wager on God's existence, then there is good pragmatic reason to believe that God exists. If he is right, then that reason to believe God exists is not simply there for those who have thought about Pascal's wager. It is a reason for everyone to so believe. Similarly, while the goodness of Pascal's wager is controversial, and thus the strong conciliationist will have us suspend judgment as to whether it is successful argument, a justified suspension of 6 Pittard does claim that rational insights involve aspects that are discernable to the subject. However, this does not entail that the fact that the subject is having an insight is itself discernable to the subject. It seems implausible to insist that insights are discernable in this way. So, the possibility of error remains. There is a parallel with memory here. Veridical memory involves discernable aspects to the subject, but the fact that the memory is veridical need not itself discernable (particularly in the face of disagreement). 7 For more detailed arguments concerning the existences of reasons independent of our awareness of them, see Littlejohn (2019) and Sepielli (forthcoming). 44 9 (7): 36-44. 2020. https://wp.me/p1Bfg0-5dK judgment about the successfulness of the wager would not prevent us from having those pragmatic reasons to believe (if Pascal is indeed correct).8 On this line of thought, pragmatic reasons work very differently than epistemic reasons, but we needn't be committed to treating every normative domain the same. References Bogardus, Tomas. 2009. "A Vindication of the Equal-Weight View." Episteme 6 (3): 324-355. Christensen, David. 2011.. "Disagreement, Question-Begging and Epistemic Self-Criticism." Philosophers' Imprint 11 (6): 1-22. Christensen, David. 2007. "Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News." Philosophical Review 116 (2): 187-217. Feldman, Richard. 2006. "Reasonable Religious Disagreements." In Philosophers Without Gods: Meditations on Atheism and the Secular Life edited by Louise Antony, 194-214. Oxford University Press. Huemer, Michael. 2001. Skepticism and the Veil of Perception. Rowman & Littlefield. Lackey, Jennifer. 2008. "A Justificationist View of Disagreement's Epistemic Significance." In Social Epistemology edited by Alan Millar, Adrian Haddock and Duncan Pritchard, 145-154. Oxford University Press. Lackey, Jennifer. 2010. "What Should We Do When We Disagree?" In Oxford Studies in Epistemology vol. 3 edited by Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne, 274-93. Oxford University Press. Littlejohn, Clayton. 2019. "Being More Realistic About Reasons: On Rationality and Reasons Perspectivism." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (3): 605-627. Matheson, Jonathan. 2018a. "Deep Disagreements and Rational Resolution," TOPOI. doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-018-9576-y Matheson, Jonathan. 2018b. "Disagreement Skepticism and the Rationality of Religious Belief." In The Mystery of Skepticism edited by Ted Poston and Kevin McCain, 83-104. Brill. Matheson, Jonathan. 2015. The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement. Palgrave Macmillan. Pryor, James. 2000. "The Skeptic and the Dogmatist." Noûs 34 (4): 517-549. Schellenberg, J.L. 2007. The Wisdom to Doubt: A Justification of Religious Skepticism. Cornell University Press. Sepielli, Andrew. forthcoming. "Subjective and Objective Reasons." In The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity, edited by Daniel Star. Oxford University Press. Van Inwagen, Peter. 1996. "Is It Wrong Everywhere, Always, and for Anyone to Believe Anything on Insufficient Evidence?" In Faith, Freedom and Rationality edited by Jeff Jordan and Daniel Howard-Snyder, 137–153. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. 8 See Matheson (2018b) for more on this argument.


Nasir al-din tusi

Philosophy

Nasir al-Din Tusi (1201-1274) Nasir al-Din Tusi was the most celebrated scholar of the 13th century in Islamic lands. Thomas Aquinas and Roger Bacon were his contemporaries in the West. The ensemble of Tusi's writings amounts to approximately 165 titles on astronomy, ethics, history, jurisprudence, logic, mathematics, medicine, philosophy, theology, poetry and the popular sciences. Tusi was born in Tus in 1201 and died in Baghdad in 1274. Very little is known about his childhood and early education, apart from what he writes in his autobiography, Contemplation and Action (Sayr wa suluk). He was apparently born into a Twelver Shi'i family and lost his father at a young age. Fulfilling the wish of his father, he took learning and scholarship very seriously and travelled far and wide to attend the lectures of renowned scholars and acquire the knowledge which guides people to the happiness of the next world. As a young boy, Tusi studied mathematics with Kamal al-Diin Hasib about whom we have no authentic knowledge. In Nishabur he met Farid al-Din 'Attar, the legendary Sufi master who was later killed in the hand of Mongol invaders and attended the lectures of Qutb al-Din Misri and Farid al-Din Damad. In Mawsil he studied mathematics and astronomy with Kamal al-Din Yunus (d. 1242). Later on he corresponded with Qaysari, the son-in-law of Ibn al-'Arabi, and it seems that mysticism, as propagated by Sufi masters of his time, was not appealing to his mind ,and once the occasion was suitable, he composed his own manual of philosophical Sufism in the form of a small booklet entitled The Attributes of the Illustrious (Awsaf al-ashraf). His ability and talent in learning enabled Tusi to master a number disciplines in a relatively short period. At the time when educational priorities leaned towards the religious sciences, especially in his own family who were associated with the Twelver Shi'i clergy, Tusi seems to have shown great interest in mathematics, astronomy and the intellectual sciences. At the age of twenty-two or a while later, Tusi joined the court of Nasir al-Din Muhtashim, the Ismaili governor of Quhistan, Northeast Iran, where he was accepted into the Ismaili community as a novice (mustajib). A sign of close personal relationship with Muhtashim's family is to be seen in the dedication of a number of his scholarly works such as Akhlaq-i Nasiri and Akhlaq-i Muhtashimi to Nasir al-Din himself and Risala-yi Mu'iniyya to his son Mu'in al-Din. Around 1236, he was in Alamut, the centre of Nizari Ismaili government. The scholarly achievements of Tusi in the compilation of Akhlaq-i Nasiri in 633/1235, seems, among other factors, to have paved the way for this move which was a great honou and opportunity for a scholar of his caliber, especially since Alamut was the seat of the Ismaili imam and housed the most important library in the Ismaili state. In Alamut, apart from teaching, editing, dictating and compiling scholarly works, Tusi climbed the ranks of the Ismaili da'wat ascending to the position of chief missionary (da'i al-du'at). Through constant visits with scholars and tireless correspondence, Tusi kept his contact with the academic world outside Ismaili circles and was addressed as 'the scholar' (al-muhaqiq) from a very early period in his life. The Mongol invasion and the turmoil it caused in the eastern Islamic territories hardly left the life of any of its citizens untouched. The collapse of Ismaili political power and the massacre of the Ismaili population, who were considered to be a serious threat to the Mongols, left no choice for Tusi except the exhibition of some sort of affiliation to Twelver Shi'ism, and he denounced his Ismaili allegiances. Although under Mongol domination, Tusi's allegiance to any particular community or persuasion could not have been of any particular importance, the process itself paved the ground for Tusi to write on various aspects of Shi'ism, both from Ismaili and Twelver Shi'i viewpoints, with scholarly vigour and enthusiasm. The most famous of his Ismaili compilations are Rawda-yi taslim, Sayr wa suluk, Tawalla wa tabarra, Akhlaq-i Muhtashimi and Matlub al-mu'minin. Tajrid al-i'tiqad, al-Risala fi'limama and Fusul-i Nasiriyya are among his works dedicated to Twelver Shi'ism. In the Mongol court, Tusi witnessed the fall of the 'Abbasid caliphate and after a while he secured the trust of Hulegu, the Mongol chief. He was given the full authority of administering the finances of religious foundations (awqaf). During this period of his life, Tusi's main concern was combating Mongol savagery, saving the life of innocent scholars and the establishing one of the most important centers of learning in Maragha, Northwest Iran. The compilation of Musari'at al-musari, the Awsaf alashraf and Talkis al-muhassal are the scholarly writings of Tusi in the final years of his life. The ensemble of Tusi's writings amounts to approximately 165 titles on a wide variety of subjects. Some of them are simply a page or even half a page, but the majority with few exceptions, are well prepared scholarly works on astronomy, ethics, history, jurisprudence, logic, mathematics, medicine, philosophy, theology, poetry and the popular sciences. Tusi's fame in his own lifetime guaranteed the survival of almost all of his scholarly output. The adverse effect of his fame is also the attribution of a number of works which neither match his style nor have the quality of his writings. Tusi's major works are the following: (1) Astronomy: al-Tadhkira fi 'ilm al-hay'a; Zij Ilkhani; Risala-yi Mu'iniyya and its commentary. (2) Ethics: Gushayish-nama; Akhlaq-i Muhtashami; Akhlaq-i Nasiri, 'Deliberation 22' in Rawda-yi taslim and a Persian translation of Ibn Muqaffa''s al-Adab al-wajiz. (3) History: Fath-i Baghdad which appears as an appendix to Tarikh-i Jahan-gushay of Juwayni (London, 1912-27), vol. 3, pp. 280-92. (4) Jurisprudence: Jawahir al-fara'id. (5) Logic: Asas al-iqtibas. (6) Mathematics: Revision of Ptolemy's Almagest; the epistles of Theodosius, Hypsicles, Autolucus, Aristarchus, Archimedes, Menelaus, Thabit b. Qurra and Banu Musa. (7) Medicine: Ta'liqa bar qunun-i Ibn Sina and his correspondences with Qutb al-Din Shirazi and Katiban Qazwini. (8) Philosophy: refutation of al-Shahrastani in Musara'at al-musari'; his commentary on Ibn Sina's al-Isharat wa'l-tanbihat which took him almost 20 years to complete; his autobiography Sayr wa suluk; Rawda-yi taslim and Tawalla wa tabarra. (9) Theology: Aghaz wa anjam; Risala fi alimama and Talkhis al-muhassal and (10) Poetry: Mi'yar al-ash'ar. References and Further Reading • Badakhchani, S. J. Contemplation and Action: The Spiritual Autobiography of a Muslim Scholar (London, I. B. Tauris in association with The Institute of Ismaili Studies, 1998). • Mudarris Radawi, Muhammad. Ahwal wa athar-i Abu Ja'far Muhammad b. Muhammad b. Hasan alTusi. Tehran, Intisharat-i Danishgah-i Tehran, 1345s/1975. • Mudarrisi Zanjani, Muhammad. Sargudhasht wa 'aqa'id-i falsafi-yi Khwaja Nasir al-Din Tusi. Tehran, Intisharat-i Danishgah-i Tehran, 1363s/1984. • Madelung, Wilferd. 'Nasir al-Din Tusi's Ethics Between Philosophy, Shi'ism and Sufism,' in Ethics in Islam, ed. R. G. Hovannisian, Malibu, CA, 1985, pp. 85-101. Author Information S. J. Badakhchani Email: firstname.lastname@example.com The Institute of Ismaili Studies United Kingdom