Metaphysics of States of Affairs: Truthmaking, Universals, and a Farewell to Bradleyâs Regress

Philosophy

Book Review Bo R. Meinertsen, Metaphysics of States of Affairs: Truthmaking, Universals, and a Farewell to Bradley's Regress, Springer 2018, 174 + xviii pp, ISBN: 978-981-13-3067-4. Reviewed by William F. Vallicella, E-mail: firstname.lastname@example.com https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2020-2019 Summary Bo Meinertsen's detailed treatment of states of affairs agrees with the spirit and much of the letter of David M. Armstrong's middle period as represented in his A World of States of Affairs (1997). States of affairs in this acceptation are not abstract objects, as they are for some philosophers, but concrete denizens of the natural world of space-time. They are "unified complexes that are instantiations of properties or relations by particulars." (1) Unlike Armstrong, however, Meinertsen is not concerned to argue for their existence (3, 13), or to show their utility in different philosophical areas. His focus is on states of affairs themselves, their main theoretical role, the nature of their constituents, and the problem of their unity. Their main role is to serve as truthmakers. Suppose it is contingently true that Tom is red, where 'Tom' denotes a tomato of our acquaintance. (The use and justification of such "toy examples" is nicely explained on p. 5) Intuitively, such a truth is not just true; it needs an ontological ground of its truth. What might that be? Rejecting both tropes (Chapter 3) and D. W. Mertz's relation instances (Chapter 4) as truthmakers, Meinertsen argues that states of affairs do the job. In this example, the truthmaker is Tom's being red. On Meinertsen's use of terms, all and only states of affairs are truthmakers (84–85). A state of affairs is a complex, and complexes are composed of distinct constituents. The composition of a state of affairs, however, is non-mereological. Mereological complexes are governed by the unrestricted composition axiom of classical mereology. (8) What the axiom states is that any plurality of items composes something: the existence of some items entails the existence of the sum of those items. The constituents of a state of affairs, however, can exist without the state of affairs existing. For example, Tom's being red entails the existence of the sum, Tom + instantiation + the universal redness. But the existence of the sum does not entail the existence of the state of affairs. A state of affairs, then, is a non-mereological complex. We will return to this important point when we come to the problem of the unity of a state of affairs. Metaphysica 2020; 21(1): 167–177 First-order states of affairs have as their constituents particulars and properties or relations. The particulars are bare or thin (Chapter 5). What makes them bare is not that they lack properties, but the way they have them. The bareness of a bare particular consists in its instantiating, as opposed to including, its properties. (73) The properties that enter into states of affairs are sparse as opposed to abundant: not every predicate picks out such a property. In addition, the properties in states of affairs are universals, and thus multiply instantiable. If an immanent (transcendent) universal is one that cannot (can) exist uninstantiated, then Meinertsen's universals are immanent. Immanence so defined admits of abstractness. Meinertsen's universals, however, are concrete. (Chapter 8) The concrete is that which is "spatially and/or temporally located." (119) Given naturalism, which Armstrong endorses and to which Meinertsen "inclines" (119), every existent is concrete and therefore located, including universals. The locatedness of universals, which is unlike that of particulars, has three implications. The first is that a universal is "wholly located in many places at the same time." (120) The second implication is that "the region occupied by any such universal is not a mereological part of the region occupied by the whole thick particular." (121) The third implication is that "more than one universal can have the same spatiotemporal location." (121) I note in passing that the banishing of so-called abstract objects demanded by uncompromising Armstrongian naturalism exacts a high price. The price is paid in the coin of the three implications just listed. The abstract-concrete distinction is replaced by a distinction between two categories of concreta, particulars and universals. This replacement requires that one accept the view that universals are ones-in-many (as opposed to ones-over-many) not merely in the sense that a universal cannot exist uninstantiated, but also in the sense that, if it exists, it is wholly present in each of its many spatiotemporal instances without prejudice to its being one and the same universal. This is a highly counter-intuitive consequence, as philosophers from Plato to R. Grossmann have appreciated, but it must be accepted by a state-of-affairs ontologist who is both a naturalist and an upholder of universals. (121) Chapter 7 is devoted to relations, but in the interests of brevity I will not report on this chapter but advance to Chapters 9 and 10 which treat the problem of unity and Bradley's Regress respectively. This is the most exciting and original part of the book. Meinertsen and I agree that the problem of the unity of a state of affairs is the central problem for a states of affairs ontology. The problem arises because states of affairs have "non-mereological existence conditions" (7): the existence of the constituents does not entail the existence of the state of affairs. What then accounts for there being one state of affairs having several distinct constitutents? 168 Book Review What makes a one out of the many? A state of affairs is not just its constituents; it is these constituents unified. Something more is needed to make of the constituents a state of affairs. "I believe that it is the relating of a unique relation that is needed." (8) We can call this 'something more' the unifier. On Meinertsen's approach the unifier is internal to the state of affairs: "the unifier of a state of affairs is a [proper] constituent of it." (135, emphasis in original) I added 'proper' in brackets to underscore that Meinertsen is not maintaining that states of affairs are selfunifying either in the positive sense that they unify themselves or in the privative sense that they are not unified by another. They are truth-making unities, but not as a matter of brute fact: they need a unifier to account for their unity. The unifier U is a special sort of relation, indeed it is a unique relation as I have just quoted him as saying. It relates the material constituents in the state of affairs, but it does so by being related to them. It is not just a relator of what it relates; it is a relator of what it relates by being related to what it relates. So if U relates the constituents of R(a, b), U does this by being related to each of them, including the relation R. This implies, of course, that U is not identical to R. Some say it is the business of a material relation to relate; not so on Meinertsen's view: it is the business of the formal relation U, and it alone, to relate. We also note that a consequence of U's being related to what it relates, and not merely a relator of what it relates, is that U enters as a constituent into every state of affairs. On an externalist view, by contrast, U unifies the constituents of a state of affairs S without entering into S as a constituent. Now U is either related by another to what it relates, or it is related by itself to what it relates. If the former, then Bradley's regress is up and running, a regress both infinite and vicious. (Chapter 10) To avoid it, Meinertsen posits that "The U-relation is related to its relata by itself." (143). This is what makes it unique: it is the only relation that has this "ability," a word Meinertsen employs. This view, which he dubs "self-relating internalism," has not been maintained before as far as I know. "To emphasize this unique self-relating ability of U on self-relating unternalism, I shall call it the 'U*-relation.'" (143) Because U* is a constituent of every state of affairs whose constituents it unifies, the monadic case of a's being F may be depicted as follows: U*(U*, F, a). The occurrence of the sign 'U*' both outside and inside of the parentheses indicates that the concrete universal U* is both the bringer of unity and one of the items brought into unity. It is a constituent of every state of affairs without which there would be no states of affairs. Is U* the same as the instantiation relation? Meinertsen waxes coy: he is "inclined" to say that it is, but this would be an "extrinsic thesis." What he means, presumably, is that a full assay of R(a,b) might list the following Book Review 169 constituents: U*, dyadic instantiation, R, a, and b. Or it might list the foregoing items except instantiation. In the latter case, U* is instantiation. For example, "Edinburgh's being north of London is unified if and only if the U*-relation relates itself to being north of, Edinburgh and London."(143). Either way, it would seem that U* must be a multi-grade relation, one that can be had by a variable number of items, and which therefore has different 'adicities.' For example, if U* is the instantiation relation, then U* is tetradic in U*(U*, R, a, b) but triadic in U*(U*, F, a). If U* is distinct from the instantiation relation I, then U* is pentadic in U*(U*, I, R, a, b) and tetradic in U*(U*, I, F, a). Meinertsen is aware of all this, and of the apparent problems that arise, but he thinks that they can be adequately dealt with. (157–159) The reasoning is intricate and obscure and to save space I will not comment on it. The main point is that U* is the master concrete universal without which no state of affairs could exist. A state of affairs exists if and only its constituents are unified, and no plurality of constituents is unified in the state-of-affairs way as a matter of brute fact; ergo, unity demands a unifier as its ground. This is my way of phrasing it; it is equivalent, however, to Meinertsen's talk of unity as an explanandum requiring an explanation in terms of U*. Being a universal, the unifier U* is multiply instantiable. Being concrete implies that U* cannot exist uninstantiated. It also implies that U*, if multiply instantiated, is multiply located and 'at work' in every state of affairs as that which ties its constituents into a state of affairs. As a self-relating relation, it does its work without igniting Bradley's vicious regress. (Chapter 10) To cop a line from Armstrong, "Nice work if you can get it." Critique: the Problem of Unity I will focus my critical remarks on Meinertsen's fascinating and original internalist theory of the unifier U*. What struck me about his theory is its structural similarity to the externalist suggestion I made in a number of my writings. (I thank Meinertsen for his close attention to them.) The points of similarity are the following. Meinertsen and my earlier self both accept that there are middleArmstrongian states of affairs; that their main role is to serve as truthmakers; that they are complexes composed of distinct constituents; that the composition of these complexes is non-mereological; that their material constituents are particulars and universals; that the unity of a state of affairs, and therewith its difference from the mere plurality of its constituents, needs accounting in terms of a unifier; and above all, that there is a very special, indeed a unique, entity 170 Book Review that serves as unifier. The main difference is that Meinertsen's unifier is a constituent of states of affairs while mine is external to states of affairs. Not only is there a similarity, but the two theories, as different as they are, are open to some of the same objections. But before discussing these objections, I want to state my objections to Meinertsen's account of unity, and how my theory avoids them. First Objection If there is a constituent of a state of affairs that explains its unity, this constituent must have a unique feature: it must be self-relating. But 'self-relating' has two senses, and this duality of senses give rise to a dilemma. Either (1) U* is selfrelating only in the privative sense that it is not related by another to what it relates, supposing it is actually related to what it relates, or (2) U* is self-relating in the positive sense that it actually relates itself to what it relates. If (1), then U* blocks Bradley's regress, but fails to ground unity. It fails to ground the difference between the state of affairs, which is one entity, and the corresponding plurality of its constituents, which is a mere manifold of entities. If (2), then U* is an active as opposed to an inert ingredient in the state of affairs. It is a unitymaker, if you will. It plays a synthesizing role. It brings together the constituents, including itself, which otherwise would be a mere plurality, into a truthmaking unity. It is (2) that Meinertsen intends with his internalism. But analysis cannot render this synthesizing intelligible, and therein lies the rub. All ontological analysis can do is to enumerate the constituents of a state of affairs, or, more generally, the parts of a whole. Analytic understanding proceeds by resolving a given whole into its parts, and ultimately into simple parts. But there is more to a (non-mereological) whole than its parts. There is the unity in virtue of which the parts are parts of a whole. The whole is one entity; the parts are many entities. Now if we try to understand this 'more' analytically we can do so only by positing a further part, a unifying part. I say 'posit,' not 'find.' In Fa, one can reasonably be said to find a particular and a character, but not a distinct copulative entity that grounds the truthmaking unity of the constituents. And so Meinertsen posits a unity-grounding entity. But the attempt to understand synthesis analytically is doomed to failure. First of all, no proper part of a whole is its unity, and this for the simple reason that the unity is the unity of all the parts. What one could say, though, is that the unity of the parts, which is distinct from any part, and from all of them, is brought about by a special part, the unifier. But then that special part, without ceasing to be a proper part, would Book Review 171 have to exercise a synthesizing function. This synthesizing is what eludes analytic understanding. Simply to posit that the unifier U* has the ability to synthesize is make a kind of deus ex machina move. Leaving God out of it, Meinertsen's U* is a principium ex machina. I will come back to this later in connection with Meinertsen's talk of "inference to the best explanation." (144) My present point is that even if there is some occult constituent internal to states of affairs that grounds and thus explains their contingent unity, its existence and its operation must remain a mystery and cannot be rendered perspicuous by the analytic method of constituent ontology. Let me explain further. Does Meinertsen's U* exist? If there are states of affairs as Meinertsen conceives them, then U* has to exist. But if U* exists, then it is (a) a distinct entity independent of us and our synthetic activities, and (b) a distinct item that we can single out in thought if not in perception. If I see that a book is on a table, then I see a book, a table, and possibly also the relation referred to by 'on.' What I don't see, however, is the referent of 'is': the being of the book's being on the table. Since I don't see the being of the book's being on the table, I do not see U*. I cannot single it out in perception. Can I single it out in thought? To do so I would have to be able to distinguish U* from S, the state of affairs the unity of whose constituents U* grounds. There is a problem here. The ordinary (material) constituents in a state of affairs S are weakly separable: each such constituent could exist apart from every other one in S and apart from S itself, but not apart from every other entity. For example, let S = Fa. If Fa is a Meinertsenian state of affairs, then a can exist without instantiating F, and F can exist without being instantiated by a, and each can exist without being constituents of S. (The separability is said to be weak because a cannot exist without properties, and F cannot exist uninstantiated.) Now the immanent universal relation U* can exist apart from a and apart from F provided it is instantiated elsewhere, but not if it is the actual unifier of a and F. As the latter, as the active ingredient in S, it is inseparable from a, from F, and from S. But then U* is quite unlike the material constituents in S, which are all inert, and it is unintelligible in what exact sense U* is a constituent of S. The analytic assay lays out the constituents of a state of affairs, but it can do this only because of the logically antecedent unity of the constituents in virtue of which there is a state of affairs to assay. To understand this unity analytically by positing a special unifying constituent would make sense only if said constituent were inert like the material constituents. But of course it cannot be inert if its is to be a unity-grounder. Another way of appreciating the problem is by asking what the difference is between U* as an active ingredient in S, and S. Clearly, S cannot exist without 172 Book Review U*. But it is also true that U*, as the active ingredient in S that unifies precisely a and F, cannot exist without S. This is because U* is a unifying unifier only when instantiated/located in a state of affairs with determinate material constituents. In every state of affairs S in which the in rebus immanent universal U* exists, it unifies precisely the constituents of S, and cannot do otherwise. So U* and S are mutually inseparable. It follows that U* both is and is not weakly separable from S. As a constituent of S, U* is weakly separable from S. As an active ingredient and unity-maker, however, U* is not weakly separable from S. We ought to conclude that it is unintelligible how a (proper) constituent of a state of affairs could serve as its unifier. As a constituent, U* must be inert in S; as unifier, U* must be active. But it can't be both because it cannot be both weakly separable from S and not weakly separable from S. An analogy I borrow from Grossmann (1992, 55–56) may help clarify my criticism. The existence of two boards and some glue does not entail the existence of two boards glued together. That is obvious. It is also obvious that there would be no need for super-glue to glue the glue to the boards should someone glue the boards together. If there were a need for super-glue, then one would need super-duper-glue to glue the super-glue to the glue and to the boards, and so on. We can express this by saying that ordinary glue glues itself to what it glues; it is not glued by another to what it glues. In this sense, ordinary glue is self-gluing. This is in analogy to Meinertsen's claim that U* is self-relating. But note that 'self-gluing' can only be taken in a privative, not a positive, sense. The same goes for 'self-relating.' By 'privative' I simply mean that the self-gluing glue is not glued by another. If the glue and the relation U* were self-gluing and self-relating in a positive sense, then they would be agents of an action. They would be active as opposed to passive or inert. But surely selfgluing glue does not do anything: it does not apply itself to the boards or bring it about that the two boards are glued together; self-gluing glue is merely such that if the two boards are glued together by a genuine agent, no further glue would be needed to glue the glue to what it glues. Likewise, self-relating U* does not do anything: it does not bring it about that U*, a, and F are 'cemented' into a state of affairs; it is merely such as to insure that if U*, a, and F are brought together to form a state of affairs, no further formal U-type relations are needed to do the job. Meinertsen credits me with appreciating that the problem of regress-avoidance and the problem of unity are two and not one. "As Vallicella (2004, 163) ... eloquently puts it: 'A regress-blocker is not eo ipso a unity-grounder, pace Russell, Alexander, Blanshard, Grossmann, et al.'" If I am right, however, Meinertsen has not really taken this insight on board. My point against him is Book Review 173 that his U* can do only the regress-blocking job but not the unifying job. The problem is that no constituent of a state of affairs can do the unifying job. A fortiori, no relational constituent can do the job. Bymy lights, Meinertsen fails to appreciate this, and it may be that he fails to appreciate it because he illicitly slides from the privative sense to the positive sense of 'self-relating.' Second Objection On Meinertsen's internalist theory, the unifier U* is a constituent of every state of affairs. Now corresponding to every state of affairs there is the sum of its constituents. So, corresponding to a's being F, there is the sum a + U* + F. Clearly, the particular a in the state of affairs is numerically the same as the particular a in the sum, and the universal F in the state of affairs is numerically the same as the universal F in the sum. The state of affairs and the sum share these material constituents and do not differ in respect of them. But what about the concrete universal U*? Is it numerically the same entity in the state of affairs and in the sum? If yes, then trouble, and if no, then trouble. States of affairs are contingent. The contingency of a state of affairs derives from the contingent unity of its constituents. So it must be possible that the same constituents exist either unified or not unified. Thus the state of affairs and the sum must have the same constituents. Now U* is a constituent. It follows that U* must be be numerically the same in both the state of affairs and the corresponding sum. Two items, x, y, are numerically the same just in case thay have all the same properties. So U* must be either inert in both state of affairs and sum, or active in both. Now if U* is inert in both, then no state of affairs is constituted. If, on the other hand, U* is active in both, then the unity of the state of affairs is necessary. (For if U* is active in both, then there is no difference between the state of affairs and the sum.) Either way, no contingent state of affairs is constituted. Therefore, U* cannot be numerically the same in both state of affairs and corresponding sum. If, on the other hand, U* is active in the state of affairs, but inert in the sum, we get the same problem. A state of affairs is contingent just in case its constituents can exist without forming a state of affairs. It must be possible for the same constituents to be either unified into a state of affairs or not so unified. But active U* is not the same as inert U*. It follows that the state of affairs and the sum do not have the same constituents, which implies that the state of affairs is not contingent, but necessary. We ought to conclude that the unifier of a state of affairs cannot be a constituent thereof. 174 Book Review Third Objection The first objection focused on the existence conditions of states of affairs; the third focuses on the existence conditions of concrete universals, in particular, the existence conditions of U*. What I will try to show is that Meinertsen's theory is involved in an explanatory circulus vitiosus. Roughly, he attempts to explain the unity, and thus the existence, of a state of affairs by positing a special unifying constituent when that very constituent can exist only in a state of affairs. Here is my argument: a) A state of affairs exists if and only if its constituents form a unity. b) U* is a constituent of states of affairs that explains their unity. Therefore c) U* is a constituent of states of affairs that explains their existence. (from a, b) d) U* cannot exercise its explanatory function unless it exists. Therefore e) The existence of U* explains the existence of states of affairs. But f) U* cannot exist except in a state of affairs. Therefore g) The existence of states of affairs explains the existence of U* h) Given the asymmetry of explanation, (e) and (g) are contradictory, and Meinertsen's explanation of the existence of states of affairs in terms of U* is viciously circular. The above argument rests on the following assumptions. First, there is such a procedure as metaphysical explanation. Second, it is asymmetrical: if x explains y, then it is not the case that y explains x. Third, a circular explanation, violating as it does the asymmetry of explanation, is not an explanation, or is not a successful explanation. Fourth, the unity/existence of states of affairs, being modally contingent, needs explanation, i. e. it cannot be a factum brutum. Meinertsen is committed to all four assumptions. He is committed to the first since he accepts truthmaking. The truthmaker metaphysically (not logically and not causally) explains the truth of the truth-bearer. He is obviously committed to the second and third. He is committed to the fourth because he takes seriously the problem of unity, which is the problem of explaining the difference between a state of affairs and the mere plurality of its constituents. Book Review 175 An External Unifier Avoids the above Objections I admit that the theory of my earlier self is not much better than Meinertsen's: in the final analysis they are both unsatisfactory, although for different reasons. But my theory does avoid the above objections. Meinertsen gets into trouble by making his unifier U* a constituent of states of affairs. This exposes him to the first objection because no constituent of a state of affairs could be an active, unity-grounding ingredient. Or at least it is unintelligible how anything like that could exercise a synthesizing function. A state of affairs is a synthetic unity the synthetic character of which cannot be understood by ontological analysis. Analytical understanding here reaches one of its limits. An ontological assay is merely a list of constituents. But the unity of these constituents is not a further item on the list. Nor can adding a special constituent to explain this unity avail anything. For either this further constituent is inert or it is active. If the former, no progress as been made in accounting for unity. If the latter, then the further constituent must be ascribed a special synthesizing power that nothing else has, and that nothing that analysis could reveal could have. How could analysis reveal such an occult power? U*'s being a constituent opens Meinertsen to the second objection because a state of affairs is contingent only if the same constituents can exist either unified or not. But this sameness is impossible if U* is both a constituent and a unifier. U*'s being a constituent also exposes him to the third objection because no constituent can exist without being a constituent of some state of affairs or other. So if the unifier is a constituent, then it cannot exist unless states of affairs exist. This however gives rise to the explanatory circle. We ought to conclude that if there is a unifier, then it cannot be internal. My external unifier unifies but without thereby entering into the states of affairs whose unity it brings about. It thereby evades all three of the objections lately listed. Kant's transcendental unity of apperception provides a model of an external unifier. That which brings about the synthesis of representations in the unity of one consciousness, thereby constituting an object of experience, is not itself a part of the object so constituted. One obvious objection from a realist, naturalist, and empiricist point of view to an external unifier, whether developed along transcendental lines or, as in my 2002, along onto-theological lines, is that it leads us away from realism to idealism. It brings mind into the picture as the synthesizing factor. But if (irreducible) mind is brought in, then naturalism is abandoned for some sort of 'spiritualism.' Empiricism too is abandoned if one invokes an external unifier along either transcendental or onto-theological lines. 176 Book Review The brings me to the deus ex machina objection that has been lodged against my proposal. Roughly, I put God to work to solve the problem of the unity of states of affairs. ("God has his uses," my teacher J. N. Findlay once said.) Curiously, Meinertsen is open to a similar objection, call it principium ex machina. He does not call upon God, but upon a sui generis entity, U*, which is unique among concrete universals due to its synthesizing power. Well, what exactly is wrong with these ex machina moves? Meinertsen and I will be told that the moves are objectionably ad hoc. Meinertsen is sensitive to the criticism: The U*-relation is of course an 'ad hoc' entity in the sense that it is only introduced to solve a problem, viz. the problem of unity. Some authors, such as Betti, would consider that a big drawback of self-relating internalism. However, one man's 'ad hoc' – solution is another man's inference to the best explanation. (143) If any of my three objections above are sound, however, Meinertsen's inference to the best explanation is an inference to an explanatory entity that cannot exist or at least cannot be intelligibly posited. References Armstrong, D. M. 1997. A World of States of Affairs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Grossmann, Reinhardt. 1992. The Existence of the World. London and New York: Routledge. Vallicella, William F. 2004. "Bradley's Regress and Relation-Instances." The Modern Schoolman LXXXI (3): 159–83. Book Review


Defending Plurality. Four Reasons Why We Need to Rethink Academic Freedom in Europe

Philosophy

Academic freedom is under attack, both in authoritarian democracies, such as Hungary and Turkey, and in liberal Western democracies, such as the United States, the UK, France and Germany. For example, Gender Studies are being targeted by right-wing governments in Eastern Europe, and in France President Emmanuel Macron has attacked post-colonial and critical theories as âIslamo-gauchismeâ, portraying them as a danger to the Republic. However, dominant discourses about academic freedom and free speech in the global north, lately especially in France and Germany, focus on an alleged threat to academic freedom through âpolitical correctnessâ and âcancel cultureâ, that, under scrutiny, often turn out to be exactly the opposite, namely defences of plurality and critical voices.

/5 Four Reasons Why We Need to Rethink Academic Freedom in Europe verfassungsblog.de/defending-plurality/ Karsten Schubert 19 April 2021 Defending Plurality Academic freedom is under attack, both in authoritarian democracies, such as Hungary and Turkey, and in liberal Western democracies, such as the United States, the UK, France and Germany. For example, Gender Studies are being targeted by right-wing governments in Eastern Europe, and in France President Emmanuel Macron has attacked post-colonial and critical theories as "Islamo-gauchisme", portraying them as a danger to the Republic. However, dominant discourses about academic freedom and free speech in the global north, lately especially in France and Germany, focus on an alleged threat to academic freedom through "political correctness" and "cancel culture", that, under scrutiny, often turn out to be exactly the opposite, namely defences of plurality and critical voices. 1. Threats to academic freedom from inside and outside of Universities Western discourse on academic freedom focuses on perceived threats to it from within academia itself. "Cancel culture", "political correctness" and "wokeness" are concepts that point to a perceived narrowing of discursive rules within academia through leftist "politicised" or "moralised" scholarship and public debate. It is also important to note that protests that seem external to academic discourse at first sight, such as student boycotts of events involving right-wing or racist speakers, are making their cases guided by academic theories, and thereby are not fully external to academia, but rather part of critical academic culture. What is perceived as a threat to academic freedom in this Western discourse is, therefore, the learning and research progress that takes place within academia regarding structural discriminations, such as racism, sexism and homophobia. External restrictions on academic freedom come from non-academic protest, on the one hand, as in post-truth discourses of climate change or Covid-19 denial, and from conservative and right-wing governments, on the other. In Western debates, restrictions on academic freedom by the state are often "othered", meaning that they are attributed solely to far away authoritarian regimes. State interference in Hungary (here and here) and Turkey is rightfully seen as a scandal. However, the myopic Western discourse about "cancel culture" that displays critical academic theories as the main threat to academic freedom fails to recognise that in the West, a new era of dangerous state interventions has also just begun. Disturbing examples of such state interventions into academic discourses are the French government's employment of the right-wing term "Islamo-gauchisme" 2/5 [conservative position] to interfere in academic discourse, as well as the attempts to silence anti-racist and postcolonial thought by politicians at different levels in the UK and the US. In the US, such state attacks on academic freedom intensified over the last years through republican campaigns against state universities that depend on public funding [here and here]. Another example is the anti-BDS resolution of the German parliament and the subsequent decision by the German Rectors' Conference to mainstream it in German universities. It is these state interventions, and not the evolving academic discussion and learning process concerning structural discrimination, such as racism, that are the real threat to academic freedom. 2. Academic freedom is political So we need to fight for academic freedom as a realm for open debate that is not politically pre-determined. Yet, is it really possible to work with such a politically neutral account of academic freedom? As the one-sided attacks on critical theories under the guise of defending academic freedom indicate, questions of academic freedom are political, and increasingly politicised. The success of right-wing populists around the world has led to open political battles regarding truth and knowledge production. While the intrinsic connection between knowledge and political power is well documented by political theorists, the dimensions and straightforwardness in which knowledge and truth, and with it academia, are part of political contestations today is an intensification. Therefore, we cannot hold onto a purely formal, neutral or objective understanding of academic freedom. Defending academic freedom without contextualising and localising such defences in the broader political landscape of knowledge-contests is empty and risks unintentional political side-effects. That is to say, joining the concert of concerns about restrictive "political correctness" in the name of free speech, such as the Harper's Letter on justice and open debate, risks supporting right-wing narratives. When academic theories are themselves the object of a general public debate fostered by right-wing forces, there is no innocent defence of academic freedom. A position on academic freedom is a position within these political debates. What is worse, formalisation and objectification are often intentionally used in the right-wing and conservative discourse on "cancel culture" to wrongly universalise one's own particular political position for defending unjustified privileges against social justice critiques. 3. Correcting the limitations on academic freedom requires changing systems of privilege If academic freedom is a political issue, does this lead to a reduction of science to political power? Luckily not, as there are plausible academic theories to make sense of this situation. Michel Foucault, feminist and postcolonial standpoint theories, and radical democratic theories all show that academic discourse cannot be politically neutral but is, as a whole, a reflection of current societal power structures and political hegemonies. And this is a serious problem for academic freedom. Access to academia, mainstream topics and funding structures all privilege hegemonic perspectives and researchers from specific backgrounds. Academia, in the West, is still White, cis-male, straight and upper-middle class. Diverse and pluralistic perspectives, especially those that research the fundamental 3/5 power-asymmetries and structures of oppression and exploitation on which our societies are built, are effectively "cancelled" from the outset. Correcting these limitations on academic freedom to foster a more pluralist and inclusive discourse requires changing these systems of privilege. It means that the currently privileged lose discursive power, air-time, or funding. The pluralisation of academia makes it necessary to redistribute resources so that the freedom of the currently privileged is reduced in order to establish freedom for all. This can be done by the techniques that are criticised as "political correctness": decolonizing syllabi, systematically privileging minority voices through inclusive conferences, or implementing inclusive language and employment policies at universities. This, however, does not limit academic freedom or freedom of expression, as do the external and state driven interventions that I have described above. To think that change will not redistribute power is to employ a wrong conception of freedom, and it is an equally wrong conception of academia that permits the fending off of progress in order to protect individual privileges. Such conservative defences of academic freedom lead to the continuity of mainstream academia's blindness towards social and political realities. Therefore, challenging social power structures within academia is not about reducing academia to power struggles, but, on the contrary, is to work towards the ideal of free academic discourse. 4. But... beware of the administrators and market-driven university management Be all that as it may, is there not a problem with moralisation limiting academic freedom nevertheless? While the real threat, and the "real cancel culture", is the state interference described above, we need to take seriously the examples given by the conservative "cancel culture" critique. A comparative view helps. The examples are mostly from private universities in the U.S., where students pay enormous tuition and have the role of consumers and customers. Here, overblown administrations do everything they can to keep scandals under the radar or solve them according to the perceived wishes of the customer. Furthermore, the absence of effective labour rights makes firing people easy. In this situation, the position of faculty who teach controversial material is weak and colleagues from the US report a heightened awareness with regards to "political correctness". Indeed, while this awareness is generally a good thing, potential selfcensorship or the danger of inappropriate sanctions are not, as they can limit academic freedom. From this some institutional conclusions can be inferred: the redistribution of privilege within academia for the pluralisation of academic discourse should not be in the hands of administrators and should not be guided by market rationales, such as in the US administrative logic. Precarious academic employment, especially of younger scholars, is not specific to the US, but a general threat to academic freedom. For example, in Germany, 90 per cent of academic personnel work under short fixed-term contracts without any long-term job security, while only senior professors are permanently employed. This neoliberal management effectively limits the options for younger scholars to voice critical positions and challenge established paradigms, minimizing innovation and stabilising structures of unjust privilege. Therefore, in addition to fending off the 4/5 conservative attacks on academic freedom through the state, key to the pluralisation of knowledge and the realisation of academic freedom are better and safer working conditions for scholars. This commentary was published simultaneously at Verfassungsblog and the European Feminist Platform. Editor's note: Some corrections were made after the text was first published. LICENSED UNDER CC BY SA SUGGESTED CITATION Schubert, Karsten: Defending Plurality: Four Reasons Why We Need to Rethink Academic Freedom in Europe, VerfBlog, 2021/4/19, https://verfassungsblog.de/defending-plurality/, DOI: 10.17176/20210419-184037-0. Karsten Schubert Dr. Karsten Schubert is lecturer in Political Theory and Philosophy at the Albert-Ludwigs-University of Freiburg. His work focuses on contemporary critical political theory and social philosophy, legal theory, and queer and intersectional theory. Explore posts related to this: Academic Freedom, Cancel Culture, plurality Other posts about this region: Europa, World 5/5 1 comment Join the discussion LICENSED UNDER CC BY SA


Book review of Perfect Me: Beauty as an Ethical Ideal by Heather Widdows (Princeton University Press, 2018)

Philosophy

Perfect Me: Beauty as an Ethical Ideal offers a unique approach to an old topic, that of human beauty, written by an ethicist specializing in global ethics who considers herself "an applied philosopher" (14). It seems to be written primarily for ethicists and not--of preferred interest to this reviewer--for aestheticians, that is, those who routinely write about the value of the complex notion of beauty and its many permutations that involve ethics. . . . Perfect Me: Beauty as an Ethical Ideal is a fascinating read that may raise more questions for scholars than it answers. Within the increasingly complex realm of physical beauty and feminist challenges to a white, heterosexual, female beauty ideal, this book should inspire responses that will definitely be a worthwhile result. We can all look forward to the future discussion that considering beauty as an ethical ideal will spawn.

Published on Hypatia Reviews Online (https://www.hypatiareviews.org) Home > Heather Widdows Perfect Me: Beauty as an Ethical Ideal Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2018 (ISBN 978-0-691-160078) Reviewed by Peg Brand Weiser, 2019 Perfect Me: Beauty as an Ethical Ideal offers a unique approach to an old topic, that of human beauty, written by an ethicist specializing in global ethics who considers herself "an applied philosopher" (14). It seems to be written primarily for ethicists and not--of preferred interest to this reviewer--for aestheticians, that is, those who routinely write about the value of the complex notion of beauty and its many permutations that involve ethics. Widdows admonishes moral philosophers for their surprising "lack of attention" to the contemporary beauty ideal as she aspires to bring together readers in the disciplines of cultural studies, psychology, sociology, medicine, bioethics, and law. The goal is laudatory--there is always a need for more fruitful exchange between scholars interested in the deep societal impact of contemporary beauty ideals--but the lack of acknowledgment of the philosophical subdiscipline of aesthetics weighs heavily upon the author's aim, namely, to argue that a new and unique, ever-evolving ideal of physical beauty--different from past beauty ideals--is increasingly dominant in our culture as both an ethical ideal and one in which individuals have little choice or agency. Some readers may see this book as a natural successor to the feminist critiques of Iris Marion Young, Sandra Bartky, Naomi Wolf, Susan Bordo, and Kathy Davis (Young 2005; Bartky 1990; Wolf 1990; Bordo 1993/2003; Davis 1995; Bordo 1997). It skillfully follows in this important tradition--plus it offers so much more from many diverse writers outside the philosophical tradition, revealing an explosion of research and theorizing from past decades on the modification and enhancement of the female body--as it challenges each reader to look inward at her own beauty beliefs as well as outward toward society's growing preoccupation with a pleasurable but ultimately harmful beauty ideal. The title of the book--Perfect Me--is intentionally provocative; it can be interpreted as "an aspiration to become perfect; a statement about the nature of perfections; and a command, 'Perfect Me!,' to be obeyed" (2-3). The author, who recently engaged in establishing a multidisciplinary "Beauty Demands Network" that was funded by the British Arts and Humanities Research Council--complete with workshops, website, co-authored blog, and a 2016 "Briefing Paper"--brings these field activities to bear on her written work. This is quite an unusual yet praiseworthy approach that turns feminist activism and hard-core data into philosophical argument. Is it sufficient to convince readers of the author's main thesis? The book has ten chapters, divided roughly in half with four main arguments guiding the discussion, as outlined in the "Introduction: Beauty Matters"[1]: (1) the current beauty ideal is not aesthetic but rather a dominant ethical ideal now understood as a moral duty; (2) the beauty ideal is new, more dominant than previous ideals, and trending toward global acceptance; (3) the power of ideal beauty lies in the self of the flawed actual body, which becomes the transforming body that holds potential, possibility, and promise to become the/an imagined body; and (4) as individuals, we do not choose our beauty ideals, or more precisely, we choose only the extent to which we conform to them within the overall context of the operative ideal. The first half of the book utilizes empirical evidence to bolster arguments (1) and (2), whereas the second half adopts a rigorous philosophical approach to arguments (3) and (4), particularly in chapters 7 and 8. Promotional material suggests that the book will explain "why beauty standards have shifted from a matter of taste to a moral imperative" as if the two options were exclusive; it is not clear why an ethicist would insist that to argue for the latter would necessitate a turn away from the former. Can the two not coexist, working simultaneously to inform the choices women make to conform to an ideal characterized by Widdows as a moral duty? We need to explore today's reigning beauty ideal and how it might differ from past feminine norms of appearance, for instance, those discussed by Diana Tietjens Meyers when she argued that patriarchal representations of gender constituted a hostile cultural environment inhibiting women's agency (Meyers 2002). Can Widdows be arguing that the crisis has indeed intensified over the intervening years? In chapter 1, Widdows argues that the contemporary beauty ideal is an ethical ideal; this is the foundation for all other claims that follow. She cites the historical record, namely, Plato's insistence that beauty is tied to a path toward moral virtue and goodness, but does not follow up with any other instances from the history of aesthetics, including eighteenth-century philosophers of taste or even twentieth-century proponents of theories of beautification such as Arthur Danto, whose examples include tattoos of indigenous New Zealanders as well as hair-straightening techniques used by Malcolm X and Madame C. J. Walker (Danto 2003). To divorce beauty from its aesthetic and ethical roots that intertwine outward, physical appearance and inner, nonphysical character impairs her main argument in which she insists that "in such instances, beauty does not simply represent, but has become goodness. . . . Beauty then becomes the (ethical) ideal to aspire to and strive for. . ." (18). Beauty seen as perfection of one's face and body becomes, in her words, an ethical--and elusive--goal. Philosophers, not generally known for invoking data, can surprise us, for instance, when philosophers of mind interested in the science of cognition use evidence from brain scans or psychological studies to bolster their claims. Widdows describes an enormous pressure for women (and increasingly, men) to conform to stated requirements of today's beauty ideal of being thin and slim, firm and buff, smooth and luminous, young and youthful (chapter 2). Scholars from various disciplines will welcome the immense amount of data compiled here, chronicling a relentless and yet ultimately futile pursuit of the beauty ideal by some persons-acolytes of a beauty standard that requires continual hard work, effort, time, money, and sacrifice. Widdows is careful to demarcate only "some" women, not all, while citing impressive numbers chronicling an increase in money spent (counted in the billions of dollars or pounds) and cosmetic procedures undergone. It is somewhat difficult to assess these numbers, however, as an accurate percentage of a portion of the overall population, but the comparative analyses undeniably show that the numbers have always been rising over the span of the past few years and/or decades. More women--and younger and younger girls-dissatisfied with their bodies are increasingly spending more money on working out, makeup, makeovers, cosmetic surgeries to improve their noses and eyes, breast implants, body hair removal, manicures, botox, liposuction, labiaplasty, and other "routine" to "extreme" procedures (chapter 4). The growing trend of more types of women doing these things, more often, for longer periods of time, leads Widdows to suggest in chapter 3 "that the extension of scope is potentially global" (70). She cites international data to back up her claim. Whether one is convinced that the beauty ideal is indeed ethical (and not just aesthetic) and that it is indeed going global is perhaps less important than the philosophical heart of the matter about how a woman who internalizes the pressure of an external ideal ends up feeling good about herself in spite of never attaining her ultimate goal. Widdows argues that a new and unprecedented elevated state of "normal" is currently operating as standard fare (chapter 5) and striving for unattainable perfection contains "hidden costs and guilty pleasures" (chapter 6). This is where the dual nature of the beauty ideal comes into play: it offers both pleasure in its pursuit and partial attainment as well as significant disappointment--even harm-both individually and communally in one's ultimate failure (chapters 7, 8, and 9). Widdows craftily examines the notions of self-objectification as compared to sexual objectification to conclude that the self who seeks beauty transitions from actual, to transformed, to imagined self, gains pleasure(s) along the way. This perpetuates the striving for perfection that is unattainable, thereby creating harm to one's self-confidence, perseverance, and self-esteem. Ultimately, Widdows asks, "More Pain, Who Gains?" in response to the slogan, "No pain, no gain" that motivates so many persons to persist and endure hardship and sacrifice while never attaining their goals (chapter 10). The beauty epidemic, cast as operating at unprecedented levels of conformity, is seen by Widdows as deluding women into thinking it will save them while it simultaneously entices them to think they are freely choosing to better themselves. But this autonomy and freedom of choice is only within controlled limits. This might be her most objectionable claim for readers who prefer to argue for more, not less, choice in terms of women's autonomy. Only in the last five pages of the book does Widdows briefly consider suggestions for change that might alleviate the pressures of the current beauty ideal and facilitate dialogue. She suggests a collective effort rather than individual ones (why not both?) and encourages (younger) generations not to dismiss "bad old feminists" out of hand as moralistic "kill joys" who are antibeauty (259). Resisting the normalization processes of the beauty ideal is a worthwhile goal for us all, but then she adds, "If we all saw more bodies and bodies of different types, perhaps we would feel less inadequate," concluding, "I'm not sure what else can be done . . ." (259). My suggestion would be to look to the art world where feminist artists have been resisting the beauty ideal, its norms and pressures, for at least the past fifty years. The revolution in women's art from the 1970s on by artists such as Judy Chicago, Hannah Wilke, Carolee Schneemann, Ana Mendieta, Cindy Sherman, Carrie Mae Weems, Lorna Simpson, ORLAN, Catherine Opie, and Jenny Saville--not to mention international artists contributing to "global feminisms" (Reilly and Nochlin 2007)--provides ample evidence of body types within aesthetic/ethical contexts of agentic, political resistance. Young girls might turn away from Madison Avenue advertising in creating self-absorbed selfies if they were encouraged to visit more galleries and art museums showcasing provocative feminist artwork. All in all, Widdows's concluding paragraphs contribute to a rather dull denouement of an exciting book. I recommend a more specific and workable set of recommendations found in the "Briefing Paper" issued by the Beauty Demands Network under the headings of ethical issues, psychological issues, and governance, regulatory, and legal issues. Several other topics are worth mentioning here. First, female colleagues may fail to identify with Widdows's reasoning that within our own discipline "so many female philosophers reject the beauty ideal" because, as women, "they enter an arena where they need to succeed [so] they must become as male as possible" (267). This generalization is problematic, particularly in describing young women entering the field. It also disregards the brilliantly manipulated "looked-at-ness" of the historically noteworthy Simone de Beauvoir, who was always photographed from the 1940s to the 1980s well-dressed, coiffed, and manicured. (In this respect, Beauvoir was much like the artist Georgia O'Keeffe, who carefully crafted her visual public persona in terms of fashion, jewelry, and bodily comportment within staged settings.) Second, who are these women who are obsessed--day and night, 365 days a year--with striving for physical beauty? And whose beauty ideal is being promoted here? As Widdows seems to isolate an ideal of white, privileged, middle-class women who can routinely afford the expense--in terms of time, effort, and money--of cosmetics, surgeries, and gym memberships, one wonders how this beauty ideal can ever be seen as "global," that is, operative for women who are economically disadvantaged, vulnerable to physical, mental, and emotional problems from a lack of adequate health care, women of color whose physical ideals clearly differ from those of women who are white, women with ethnic features inconsistent with so-called Western beauty ideals, women with impaired physical abilities (who are described as unable "to attain normal" [150]), as well as women whose physical bodies are technologically enhanced for elite athletic competition. Third, much analysis builds upon Laura Mulvey's 1970s influential but problematic notion of "the male gaze" and a preoccupation with looking at one's physical appearance (Mulvey 2009). Widdows cites recent scholarship involving the cosmetic gaze, the surgical gaze, the forensic gaze, the narcissistic gaze, the technological gaze, but never the female gaze invoked by contemporary women filmmakers or even the decades-old racially informed oppositional gaze advanced by bell hooks and the medical gaze subverted by the selfportraits (predating selfies) of artist Mary Duffy, who, born without arms, poses herself as Venus de Milo (hooks 1992; Millett-Gallant 2010). The gazes involved with the current obsession by many (young) people with selfies leads Widdows to claim, "Thus, when they are posted and evaluated, there is a real sense in which it is the self that is being evaluated" (192); this obscures the difference between visual representations and the objects or persons represented. In assessing such representations, just as with traditional works of art, content differs from form; it is neither new nor unique to judge portraits or self-portraits as depictions of the persons who appear. But it is problematic to collapse the aesthetic into the ethical/personal by disregarding the representation itself. Finally, there are serious problems with this manuscript in terms of errors: missing words, misspellings, incomplete editing references, and inaccurate dates of publication. Authors are routinely quoted without introduction, making it necessary to page back and forth between the text and endnotes. One particular annoyance is the consistent misspelling of "woman" as "women." A close reading by a copy editor would have improved the text considerably. Of course, many of us may be vulnerable to the millions of dollars spent on marketing beauty products and procedures as well as to peer pressure (although there is very little discussion about marketing; one could ask, for instance, why is succumbing to a beauty ideal any different from succumbing to the temptation to buy a pricey new car every year that will make one feel pleasure and empowerment?). Perfect Me: Beauty as an Ethical Ideal is a fascinating read that may raise more questions for scholars than it answers. Within the increasingly complex realm of physical beauty and feminist challenges to a white, heterosexual, female beauty ideal, this book should inspire responses that will definitely be a worthwhile result. We can all look forward to the future discussion that considering beauty as an ethical ideal will spawn. References Bartky, Sandra Lee. 1990. Femininity and domination: Studies in the phenomenology of oppression. New York and London: Routledge. Bordo, Susan. 1993/2003. Unbearable weight: Feminism, Western culture, and the body. Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press. ------. 1997. Twilight zones: The hidden life of cultural images from Plato to O. J. Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press. Brand, Peg Zeglin. 2000. Beauty matters. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. Danto, Arthur C. 2003. The abuse of beauty: Aesthetics and the concept of art. Chicago and LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Company. Davis, Kathy. 1995. Reshaping the female body: The dilemma of cosmetic surgery. New York and London: Routledge. hooks, bell. 1992. Black looks: Race and representation. Boston: South End Press. Meyers, Diana Tietjens. 2002. Gender in the mirror: Cultural imagery and women's agency. New York: Oxford University Press. Millett-Gallant, Ann. 2010. The disabled body in contemporary art. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Mulvey, Laura. 2009. Visual and other pleasures, 2nd ed. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. (The essay, "Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema," was originally published in 1975.) Reilly, Maura, and Linda Nochlin, eds. 2007. Global feminisms: New directions in contemporary art. London: Merrill Publishers Limited. Wolf, Naomi. 1990. The beauty myth: How images of beauty are used against women. London: Chatto and Windus. Young, Iris Marion. 2005. On female body experience: "Throwing like a girl" and other essays. New York: Oxford University Press. [1] In full disclosure, this reviewer is mentioned in a footnote on page 1 of "Introduction: Beauty Matters," in which Widdows writes, "The title of the introduction, as well as being a claim about beauty morally mattering is a homage to Peggy Brand's Beauty Matters (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2000)." Peg Brand Weiser is Emerita Professor of Philosophy and Women's Studies at Indiana University-Purdue University--Indianapolis and adjunct faculty in the philosophy department and honors college at the University of Arizona. Co-author with Edward Weiser of "Misleading Aesthetic Norms of Beauty: Perceptual Sexism in Elite Women's Sports," in Body Aesthetics, edited by Sherri Irvin (Oxford University Press, 2016), she is editor of Beauty Unlimited (Indiana University Press, 2013), Beauty Matters (Indiana University Press, 2000), and coeditor with Carolyn Korsmeyer of Feminism and Tradition in Aesthetics (Penn State University Press, 1995), among other publications in feminist aesthetics, including the writing of Simone de Beauvoir. Image not found file:///srv/bindings/cea0f3435c4e4bf6a281e99975cff973/code/sites/default/files/styles/large/public/Widdows.png?itok=fxLxwVki "The beauty epidemic, cast as operating at unprecedented levels of conformity, is seen by Widdows as deluding women into thinking it will save them while it simultaneously entices them to think they are freely choosing to better themselves." Hypatia Reviews Online email@example.com Website supported by Michael Digital Source URL: https://www.hypatiareviews.org/reviews/content/


The Simulated Universe

Philosophy

THE SIMULATED UNIVERSE By BRENT SILBY Learning Advisor in Philosophy UPT School Christchurch, New Zealand What is a Simulated Universe? The Simulated Universe argument suggests that the universe we inhabit is an elaborate emulation of the real universe. Everything we see, including people, animals, plants, and bacteria are part of the simulation. This also extends beyond Earth. The argument suggests that all the planets, asteroids, comets, stars, galaxies, black holes, and nebula are also part of the simulation. According to the argument, the entire Universe is a simulation running inside an extremely advanced computer system designed by a super intelligent species that live in a parent universe. In this article, I will provide an exposition of the Simulated Universe argument and explain why some philosophers believe there is a high probability that we exist in a simulation. I will then discuss the type of evidence that we would need to determine whether or not we exist in a simulation. Finally, I will describe two objections to the argument before concluding that although it is interesting, we should reject the Simulated Universe argument. The Possibility The possibility that we exist in a simulated universe is derived from the idea that it is possible for a computer to simulate anything that behaves like a The Simulated Universe Brent Silby 1 computer. A computer can run a simulation of any mechanistic system that follows a pre-defined series of rules. Now, because the Universe is a rule following system that operates according to a finite set of physical laws, it follows that it can be simulated by a computer. The proponents of the Simulated Universe argument suggest that if it is possible for us to simulate a universe, then it is likely that we actually exist inside a simulated universe. Why do they have this belief? Well, supporters of the Simulated Universe argument suppose that if it is possible for us to build such a simulation, then we will probably do so at some time in the future, assuming that our human desires and sensibilities remain much the same as they are now (Bostrom 2001:pg 9). They then reason that any species that evolves within the simulation will probably build their own Simulated Universe. We know that it is possible for them to do so because they, themselves, exist inside a simulated universe. It is possible to continue this nesting of universes indefinitely, each universe spawning intelligent species that build their own simulations. Now, given the near infinite number of child universes, it is more likely that we exist in one of the billions of simulations rather than the one parent universe. This becomes especially apparent when we consider the possibility that within these universes there may be many worlds with intelligent life, all creating their own simulations. So how does this all work? Well, when you look at a computer running a simulated universe it is not the case that you can switch on a video screen or computer monitor to peak inside the universe. The computer does not contain virtual reality creations of people living out their lives in their world. It is not like playing a videogame such as "The Sims" or "Second Life". There are no graphics involved. From the outside looking in, all you see are numbers. That's all it is; a complicated manipulation of numbers. As with all software, these numbers are instantiated through the computer hardware. They are stored on permanent storage devices such as Hard-drives, and they are moved into RAM to be operated upon by the Central Processing Units (CPUs). The numbers in a The Simulated Universe Brent Silby 2 simulated universe program represent the laws of physics in the universe. They also represent matter and energy in the universe. As the program runs, the numbers are manipulated by the program rules-the algorithms representing the laws of physics. This manipulation yields different numbers, which continue to be operated upon by the program rules. Large data structures of numbers are moved around within the computer's memory as they interact with other data structures. As the simulated universe grows, these structures become increasingly complex but the laws that govern their behavior remain constant and unchanged. So, from the designer's point of view the simulated universe contains nothing other than complicated data structures. But for the creatures that exist inside the simulated universe it is all real. They look out of their windows and marvel at beautiful sunsets. They walk around outside and enjoy the smell of freshly cut grass. They may study the stars in their sky and dream about one day visiting other worlds. For the inhabitants of the simulated universe everything is solid and tangible, but just like the real universe, it is all reducible to numbers and rules. It is important to note that the computer is not simulating every subatomic particle in the universe. In his 2001 article, Nick Bostrom points out that it would be infeasible to run a simulation down to that level of detail. He suggests that the simulation need only simulate local phenomena to a high level of detail. Distant objects such as galaxies can have compressed representations because we do not see them in enough detail to distinguish individual atoms (Bostrom 2001:pg 4). This is a point that we can take further. Perhaps the entire universe, including local phenomena, is compressed in some way. The simulation could be "interpreted" by its inhabitants as being made from individual atoms and subatomic particles, while in reality it is completely different. If we look at modern physics, we see that this is a reasonable possibility. Consider the The Simulated Universe Brent Silby 3 indeterminacy principle in quantum physics. An observer cannot measure the position and momentum of a particle simultaneously. Furthermore, it seems that subatomic particles have no definite position or momentum until an observation is made. This is because subatomic particles do not exist in the sense we are used to experiencing on the macro level. Given the fact that we do not directly see subatomic particles we can conclude that their existence is an interpretation of a reality of which we have no direct access. In a simulated universe, this reality could take the form of data arrays which represent matter and energy. The Original Simulated Universe The Simulated Universe argument is not new. Frank Tipler put forward the idea of a Simulated Universe in his 1994 book The Physics of Immortality. He suggests that we may all become immortal when we are recreated inside a simulation of the universe at some time in the distant future. Tipler argues that at some point in the future, humans (or some other advanced species) will develop the technological ability to simulate the universe. Humans that reach such a point in evolution will, according to Tipler, have an extremely advanced sense of morality. They will recognize a moral problem with the notion of intelligent conscious beings living their lives and then dying, so to correct this moral problem they will recreate everyone that came before and let them live an immortal life inside a simulated reality. There are problems with this view. The first, and most obvious, problem relates to the moral dilemma that these super advanced humans find themselves in. Why do we assume that there is a moral problem with people dying and no longer existing? Sure, from our perspective it seems wrong, but from the perspective of humans with a super-evolved moral sense it may be more problematic to recreate us. The Simulated Universe Brent Silby 4 The second problem with Tipler's idea is one of implementation. In order to recreate humans that once existed, future humans would require knowledge of each human being's unique properties. This includes their personality, their memories, and the structure of their brains. It is unlikely that future humans will be able to gather this sort of information. The best they could do would be to create a new universe from scratch, switch it on and hope for the best. Their simulation will unfold according to the preset collection of rules that they built into it. After time, their universe will evolve and planets may form within it. Life could evolve on those planets and one day become intelligent enough to build its own computer simulations of the universe. How would we know? If a simulated universe provides a perfect replication of the real universe, then how could we ever know that we exist in a simulation? One way to find out would be to appeal to statistical probability. As stated earlier, if we accept the possibility that advanced beings can create a simulated universe, then it is highly likely that we actually exist in a simulation. The reason for this is that there will be billions of simulations but just one original universe. So statistically there is a higher chance that we exist in a simulation than the original universe. Another way to determine whether we exist in the original universe or a simulation would be to look for clues, or hints that this is not a real universe. Such clues may come in the form of imperfections in the simulation. Now, it is unlikely that we would find an obvious imperfection such as a fuzzy border on the other side of a mountain, which has never before been observed. Imperfections in the simulated universe would be subtle and almost undetectable. They will be found in the laws of physics. The Simulated Universe Brent Silby 5 In 2001, physicists Paul Davies and John Webb published a discovery that has been interpreted by some as such an imperfection. Their discovery came from observations of distant astronomical structures known as quasars. Now, because information from distant objects travels to us at the speed of light, looking at quasars effectively means looking back in time. Davies and Webb observed quasars as they were billions of years ago and discovered what could be interpreted as a change in the speed of light. They observed a change in the so-called Fine Structure Constant. This is a ratio involving the speed of light, the charge on the electron, and Planck's constant (a unit involved in quantum physics). Webb admits that they cannot definitely say which aspect of the constant changed, but it could be the speed of light. Regardless of which aspect of the Fine Structure Constant has changed, the discovery is significant. This is because constants are universal and unchangeable. They are built into the laws of physics, and they are the same everywhere in the universe. Because these are fundamental laws of physics, evidence of a shift (or glitch) in any of these constants could be used as evidence that we live in a simulated universe. There are, of course, other explanations for the Davies/Webb observations. Some theorists believe that the speed of light has been dropping since the beginning of the universe, and that it was once 10^60 times its current speed. It is possible that this reduction in speed is caused by a cosmos-wide change in the structure of the vacuum (Setterfield 2002). Perhaps the space/time continuum is stretching in some way. Or perhaps the multi-dimensional gaps between superstrings is changing. There are many possibilities, but the point I am making is that this type of observation is what we should look for as evidence that we live in a simulated universe. The Simulated Universe Brent Silby 6 Problems The Simulated Universe argument relies on the assumption that future humans, or some advanced species, will have similar desires and sensibilities as current humans and will therefore want to create a simulated universe. In this section I will outline problems with this assumption. I will then suggest that the Simulated Universe argument should be rejected because it unnecessarily clutters our ontology. 1. The problem of morality The first problem with the simulated universe argument is related to the point made above in regards to Tipler's theory of immortality. I suggested that future humans may not feel a moral obligation to recreate humans. This is the thought that I would like to elaborate upon. Given our current human desires and sensibilities, it seems that if we could develop sufficient computing power then we would create a simulated universe. Now the whole Simulated Universe Argument rests on this assumption. The idea is that if we can create a universe, then we will, and if this is true, then it is likely that we exist inside a simulation. But we need to ask the question: would a super advanced species with sufficient computing capacity actually create a simulated universe? If we accept for the moment that it will be possible for a future species to do such a thing, we need to decide if a species would do such a thing. Would it be morally right to create a simulated universe? We can quickly state that it would definitely be the right thing to do, but that is from our current perspective and we are not yet advanced enough to create a simulated universe. Bostrom believes that an advanced civilization will choose to create a simulated universe. He suggests that humanity's existence is viewed as being The Simulated Universe Brent Silby 7 of high ethical value, and as such the world would be a better place if an advanced civilization created a universe containing creatures like us (Bostrom 2001:pg 9). But morality, like all cultural phenomena, evolves. It is a conceit to assume that our current state of moral reasoning will remain unchanged. Highly advanced civilizations may find it morally abhorrent to create a universe and populate it with living beings. Consider life on Earth. We live on a planet full of creatures that have to destroy each other to survive. Humans, who have arguably the highest level of intelligence on Earth, kill animals, pollute the environment, torture children, tell lies, commit crimes, and kill each other out of greed and jealousy. Would an advanced species think it is a good thing to create another universe that could possibly contain this level of pain and suffering? Its possible that a future species would choose not to create a simulated universe because doing so would increase pain and suffering in the world. The assumption that an advanced species will want to create a simulated universe relies too heavily on the idea that they will share our moral standards. We cannot make such an assumption, so the likelihood that we exist in a simulated universe may be a great deal lower than originally thought. I am not saying that it is impossible. All I am suggesting is that more thought needs to be put into the look of future moral reasoning before we can rest the Simulated Universe Argument on this assumption. 2. Are we replacing God with a Godlike species? Another problem with the Simulated Universe argument is that suffers from similar problems to arguments for the existence of God-specifically The Cosmological argument. The Simulated Universe Brent Silby 8 Traditionally, the Cosmological argument attempts to solve the problem of where the universe came from by stating that: 1. Everything that exists has a cause, 2. The universe exists, 3. Therefore, the universe was caused, 4. The name of the cause of the universe is God, 5. Therefore God exists. Now, the standard objection to this argument runs as follows: If everything has a cause, then God also has a cause. The cause of God must be something equally God-like. Therefore, there must be more than one God, and this does not fit the standard religious view. Supporters of the Cosmological argument then complain that there cannot be more than one God, and the God who created the universe is either uncaused, self-caused, or existed forever before the universe. But here they run into difficulty. As soon as they allow that at least one thing can be either uncaused, self-caused, or existed forever then they open the possibility that the universe could be uncaused, self-caused, or existed forever. And since we favor economy in our ontology, it is more rational to avoid invoking the existence of God to explain the universe. The Simulated Universe argument seems to suffer from the same problem. By allowing for the possibility that we exist in a simulation, we open up the possibility of an infinite number of parent universes. Supporters of the Simulated Universe argument may state that there is an ultimate parent universe, which was caused by a Big Bang or some similar event. Or they may The Simulated Universe Brent Silby 9 claim that the parent universe existed forever. But these responses are the same as responses from supporters of the Cosmological argument. They too suggest that there is an ultimate God, and it all stops there. I think that if this is unsatisfactory for the Cosmological argument, then it should be unsatisfactory for the Simulated Universe argument. Supporters of the Simulated Universe argument may complain here, and state that there is a fundamental difference between their view and the Cosmological argument. They may suggest that their argument is different because it is based on the existence of real creatures that have a biology and use technology, while the Cosmological argument is based on a supernatural God. But I am not sure that there is a difference. From our perspective there is no difference between a supernatural God and a super intelligent species from another universe. Both entities are equally difficult to describe. We can never know the nature of a parent universe. We cannot know about how their biology works because we are unable to visit and have a look. Creatures in the parent universe are unknowable, and from our perspective they are all-powerful. For reasons of Ontological economy I believe we must reject the Simulated Universe argument. It creates a cluttered world-view. Why suppose that there exists an virtual infinity of parent-child universes when we can simply assume that there is one universe. Conclusion The possibility that we exist in a simulated universe is based on the assumption that if it is possible for us to create such a simulation, then one day we will do so. I have questioned this on the basis that it assumes a future morality that resembles our current morality. The mere possibility that we can create a simulated universe does not mean that we will create a simulated The Simulated Universe Brent Silby 10 universe. This is because our future moral standards may lead us to view such a creation as a highly immoral act. In addition to questioning the likelihood that we will one day create a simulated universe, I have also questioned the argument on the basis that it is a variation of the cosmological argument. It suffers from the same problems. Accepting the possibility that we exist in a simulation allows for a virtual infinity of parent universes. It doesn't answer any questions about the origin of the universe; it just shifts the problem. Furthermore, it clutters our world view by introducing a multitude of universes when just one is required. The Simulated Universe argument is an interesting thought experiment, but I believe we should reject the possibility that we exist in a simulation and focus on discovering the origin of this, the actual universe. Copyright © Brent Silby 2007 The Simulated Universe Brent Silby 11 References Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 15 August 2001 Lateline. Interview with John Webb, Interviewed by Tony Jones http://www.abc.net.au/lateline/stories/s347215.htm, accessed August 2007. Bostrom, Nick. (2003). "Are You Living in a Computer Simulation?" in Philosophical Quarterly (2003), Vol. 53, No. 211, pp. 243-255. Davies, Paul. (2004). "Multiverse Cosmological Models" in Modern Physics Letter, Vol. 19, No. 10, pp. 727-743. Tipler, Frank. (1994). The Physics of Immortality, Macmillan 1995. Setterfield, Barry. (2002). Recent Lightspeed Publicity. http://www.ldolphin.org/recentlight.html, accessed July 2007. The Simulated Universe Brent Silby