âBut didnât he kill his wife?â

Philosophy

If there is one thing that everyone knows about Louis Althusser, it is that he killed his wife - the sociologist and rÃ©sistante HÃ©lÃ¨ne Rytmann-LÃ©gotien. In this article, William S. Lewis asks how should this fact effect the reception of Althusser's work, and how should those who find Althusser's reconceptualisation of Marx and Marxism usefully respond?

William S. Lewis 29 May 2019 "But didn't he kill his wife?" If there is one thing that everyone knows about Louis Althusser, it is that he killed his wife the sociologist and résistante Hélène Rytmann-Légotien. In this article, William S. Lewis asks how should this fact effect the reception of Althusser's work, and how should those who find Althusser's reconceptualisation of Marx and Marxism usefully respond? There is a common reaction when people find out that the work of Louis Althusser significantly informs your thinking.[1] If the person knows who Althusser is–and especially if the acquaintance identifies as female–you will often be met with a stunned silence, followed by: "But didn't he kill his wife?" How to respond? The banal and facile reply is: "Yes, but this fact doesn't matter philosophically." However, given the frequency of this and similar reactions, to say that the killing does not matter at all is plainly wrong. For those of us who find Althusser's rethinking of Marxism of theoretical or practical relevance, a pressing moral and political question is, therefore, how can we continue to think with Althusser. Can we continue to employ Althusser's philosophical ideas politically in light of this offense? The ways in which theorists and activists have typically dealt with the uncomfortable fact that Althusser ended the life of his wife, the sociologist and résistante Hélène Rytmann-Légotien, have undoubtedly hindered the reception of Althusser's ideas.[2] Two years ago and in preparation for a conference supporting Althusser's 2018 centenary, I prepared a list of every philosopher, political theorist, or social scientist whose work was significantly informed by Althusser's ideas. The male to female ratio of the list was somewhere around11/1, making Althusser studies worse in terms of gender equity than academic philosophy as a whole, and probably much worse than political philosophy as a sub-discipline.[3] That Marxism, socialism, and the far left have their own gender problems presents confounding variables. But, having researched Althusser for over twenty years and having corresponded or visited with folks interested in Althusser from all over the world, I am only too aware that the Althusser-citing crowd overwhelmingly identifies as male. Further, more than one student has told me of graduate seminar debates regarding whether one should teach, read, or cite Althusser given his history. Clearly, we have evidence to suggest that the fact of Althusser killing his wife is generally off-putting, perhaps particularly to women, who might otherwise be interested in his thought. During the year following Althusser's centenary, when his life is temporally connected to his work and to its ongoing influence, it is more than appropriate to think about the relation of his biography to his ideas and to the history of their reception.[4] If one made two stacks of the literature written about Althusser, the mound that puts the killing of Rytmann-Légotien front and center–what I will call the externalist or biographical approach– would far outweigh the pile that exclusively treats of Althusser's contributions to political philosophy. That said, the latter–philosophy first or internalist approach–is the one that I have taken for most of my career. I then want to examine the arguments for and against it first.[5] The externalist approach takes two forms: one from those interested in the history of philosophy, and another to those in political philosophy. History of philosophy types consider Althusser's work in its historical context and look to understand how it contributed to contemporaneous theoretical debates–biographical claims only enter when they help to explain things like formation, or the effect of these on the work's production or reception. Political philosophers or theorists, by way of contrast, tend to elaborate, reconstruct, criticize, apply, or reject the arguments and concepts that he developed in political philosophy in order to solve philosophical or political problems. Therefore, they give even less attention to his biography than do those in history of philosophy. Despite differences in focus and methodology, the arguments for treating Althusser exclusively as a political philosopher are basically identical for history of philosophy and for contemporary political philosophy. The first argument is very rough and may be contestable given the definition of philosophy it includes. From the standpoint of history, it is that the history of philosophy consists of a history of ideas about ourselves, our universe, and about our place within it. Philosophy in this definition is about finding the truth of things or, better put, about developing concepts adequate to the conceptualization of the universe that we inhabit and about deciding how we should live in it. Correspondingly, political philosophy is about creating, analyzing, and defending adequate or true ideas about how we should live with others. Combining the former and the latter, history of political philosophy surveys, critiques, or applies ideas from the past regarding how we should live together and about who has legitimate power over others. For both, and regardless of whether we are doing straight political philosophy or history of political philosophy, it is the ideas and arguments that matter and–as with the development of other sciences–the biography of the thinker of the ideas and arguments is irrelevant to the utility, adequacy, or truth value produced by this practice. The second argument for treating Althusser exclusively as a political philosopher, rather than just implying a duty to treat ideas in the abstract as the first, fleshes out why it matters that ideas are tied to a specific person. Brian Leiter makes the case for such reference succinctly in a recent essay for the Chronicle of Higher Education titled: "Academic Ethics: Should Scholars Avoid Citing the Work of Awful People?"[6] There, he argues that scholarship is about advancing knowledge within a discipline and that, within a discipline, scholarly citation has only two purposes. These are "to acknowledge a prior contribution to knowledge on which your work depends" and "to serve as an epistemic authority for a claim relevant to your own contribution to knowledge." According to Leiter, failure to cite relevant knowledge is harmful because scholarship is thereby not advanced. Therefore, if an idea or argument is relevant to one's scholarship, then our duty as scholars is to cite it and to name the originator of that knowledge. Combined, the first and second arguments suggest that not only must we do philosophy by reference to past ideas–even if awful people originate these notions–but also that we have a duty to explicitly reference these people. Notice, however, that these two arguments do not imply that we have a duty to skip over the wrongful deeds and characters of the originators of philosophical concepts; merely that any such mention is extraneous to the purpose of scholarship, which is to advance knowledge on a specific topic in a specific discipline. As mentioned above, I have embraced the internalist or philosophy-first approach. Though I had never worked it out as clearly as I just did, I believe these arguments have merit and that philosophy would be irremediably harmed if we were to expunge the ideas of vicious philosophers. Rousseau and Peirce would have to be thrown in the dustbin and that is to name only two thinkers who treated others horribly.[7] Yet, I must also confess another–more practical and less principled–motive. This purpose was to get Althusser's ideas accepted and discussed within Anglophone analytic political philosophy. In this tradition, it is the norm to discuss ideas irrespective of the context of their production. So, to slip a French, Marxist, murderer into conversation with John Rawls and Iris Marion Young, there was an all too convenient disciplinary norm where all three strikes against his ideas being entertained in the Anglosphere could be ignored; one could just focus on "advancing political philosophy." Strategically convenient, yes, but the response obviously flees from the question this essay poses: that of whether and how to employ Althusser's ideas in light of his killing of Rytmann-Légotien. In order to answer this question, we should seek a better understanding of what harms are associated with both the externalist and the internalist methods. The approach outlined so far, which puts the content of the philosophy first, has three central problems. First, internalism ignores the direct interpersonal harms caused by Althusser's offense. Second, not only it is oblivious to the impersonal harm to the discipline of philosophy such ignorance may precipitate. It also ignores the damage to Marxist practice that occurs when people who may otherwise advance Marxist philosophy or practice are turned off by the fact that leftists discuss the ideas of vicious people in the same way that we discuss the ideas of virtuous ones. Third, and particularly apposite to the subject of this essay, the philosophy first approach disregards the impersonal harms to society when we do not hold someone accountable for his or her crimes. Althusser was judged non culpable and let off for the homicide due to his being mentally unstable at the time the killing was committed.[8] More than a few critics have argued that patriarchal dominance and structural misogyny were the reasons for this verdict, that the victim herself was silenced (while Althusser kept on speaking) and that to continue to read Althusser is to contribute to women's ongoing oppression.[9] Of these three problems with the philosophy first approach, it is the impersonal wrongs–being widespread and persistent––that perhaps most deserve our consideration. As for direct harms, the person Althusser maltreated is deceased and so cannot be harmed any further. That those close to Rytmann-Légotien were directly robbed of her care and friendship is also true. However, lacking children and being born in 1910, the number of people who knew her is small. If, there are friends and relations of Rytmann-Légotien still hurting because the killer of a loved one is discussed while his victim is forgotten, then this is a type of direct harm, albeit limited in scope and becoming daily more restricted. As for the wrong of profiting from ones notoriety, Althusser is dead and so he cannot be said to directly benefit in prestige or lucre from the harm he committed when one reads, discusses, or cites his work. Richard Seymour suggests that there is another source of direct injury in that, by shortening Rytmann-Légotien's life, we all lose the benefit of hearing her ideas.[10] Temporally, this is, indeed, a permanent loss. However, RytmannLégotien published and lectured little in her lifetime and there is no indication that, at the age of 70, her public career was about to accelerate.[11] Plus, and noted with shameful irony, it is almost certain that we know as much as we do of Rytmann-Légotien's life and ideas precisely because Althusser killed her and wrote a book about the murder. Without the autobiography and its sales figures, the couple's correspondence would most probably never have been published. [12] Further, it is indubitable that the success of the autobiography led to articles and investigations into the life and work of Rytmann-Légotien, studies which would not otherwise have been undertaken.[13] In contrast to the direct harms, that, while serious, are limited in scope or time, the impersonal harms associated with ignoring the killing of RytmannLégotien and simply reading and using Althusser for his ideas are both persistent and grave. First among them, we should consider the injury to the discipline of philosophy and to political movements done by alienating those who might otherwise be interested in Althusser's thinking but who are put off by scholars' and activists' easy embrace of the internalist approach. Similarly, there is much to be said on behalf of the argument that failing to punish violence against women and continuing to ignore female victims of male violence by not discussing past harms reinforces patriarchy and contributes to women's ongoing oppression. Ignoring a victim of male violence who can no longer speak for herself as a result of that violence is perhaps the most egregious form of "testimonial smothering."[14] This silencing is compounded when theorists and activists seek to limit discussions to ideas and arguments and to bracket past misogynistic offenses as unrelated to present egalitarian political strategies and struggles. The recent Brett Kavanaugh Supreme Court confirmation hearing in the United States Senate, where senators and pundits demanded that the yet-to-be appointed Justice be scrutinized only for his jurisprudential record, should be exhibit "A" in this regard.[15] Consequently, if there be plausible impersonal harms to the discipline of philosophy, to women, and to an egalitarian future by ignoring the inconvenient facts of Althusser's biography, then it would seem that the externalist or biographical approach to Althusser's philosophy has merit. This is because those who consider Althusser's philosophy in relation to his life and his life in relation to his philosophy cannot be considered to have similarly ignored the female victim of male violence while celebrating the male's achievements. Moreover, rather than alienation by omission, externalist accounts invite those potentially interested in Althusser's philosophy to think of him as a whole person, embedded in history, who had severe mental health problems, who manifested both virtues and vices, but who also had interesting ideas about ideology, causality, and class struggle. As mentioned above, the scholarship on Althusser that takes the externalist approach is voluminous. Can one name another 20th century political philosopher who has had multiple volumes written about their inner life and television and radio documentaries similarly devoted?[16] For that matter, name another thinker who has had multiple dramatic pieces mounted exploring their dreams and their inner monologues.[17] And these are just the large pieces: there exist dozens of opeds, essays in literary reviews, and book chapters relating Althusser's philosophy to the internal and external events of his life. Given the sheer amount of material, we may use this body of work to determine whether the biographical approach may plausibly diminish the harms associated with the philosophy first approach. To aid us in this assessment, we might think a bit with the philosopher under consideration. Famously, Althusser maintained that the truth of a philosophy is in its effects.[18] If all of the pieces that attempt to understand Althusser's philosophy by his biography are themselves a type of externalist philosophy, then at this point in the game, their effect is quite noticeable. However, and again to follow with Althusser's ideas about overdetermination and uneven development, the effects of philosophical ideas are not always and everywhere the same and they do not happen at the same time.[19] In different countries, at different periods, externalist approaches have had different results. In France, the obsession with Althusser's biography and especially with psychoanalytic explanations of his behavior and ideas has largely occluded these ideas' philosophical consideration. As a once prominent intellectual and Marxist, Althusser is not alone in this occlusion: lingering romantic obsessions with madness and genius as well as French anti-communism have overdetermined the production and reception of externalist work. The result is that Althusser has been reduced to a caricature: the mad Marxist philosopher whom history passed by and who remains only of pathological, nostalgic, or dramatic interest. The result of this is an industry– the Althusser industry–where plays, documentaries, and staged readings compete with texts of dream narratives and personal letters for notices in Le Monde littéraire.[20] The most recent and perhaps most egregious in this regard was France Culture's "La vie secrète des philosophes : Le procès Althusser" which dwelt almost wholly on murder and pathology and only tangentially on his importance as a philosopher.[21] Unlike Greece, Turkey, Japan, Germany, Italy, and much of North and South America where the level of scholarship on Althusser is fairly high (and everywhere mostly male), this obsession with the past has stunted Althusser studies within the country of his birth. In France, Althusser scholarship seems stuck in 1978 and the same texts: the ISA essay, For Marx, Reading Capital, and the published "Philosophy of the Encounter" texts are discussed ad nauseum. Too often these works are read sloppily, subjected to "immanent" or "psychoanalytic" critique or supplemented with inaccurate accounts of the theoretical, political, or biographical conjuncture that produced them. It is as if Althusser's ideas were hermetically sealed on the eve of Mitterand's election. There are exceptions to this quarantine, but these pieces and their authors are the exception and not the rule.[22] In Anglophone countries, but particularly in the United Kingdom, the level of theoretical engagement outside of specialist circles has been even lower.[23] While novel interpretations and usages of Althusser's thought flourished among Analytic Marxists, Critical Realists, and NeoMarxists in the 1970s and 1980s, these research programs declined with Cold War budgets. Now, the most prominent English-language voices that "deal with" Althusser are writers and historians like Anne Boyer, Sunil Khilnani, and Tony Judt. In essays like "The Paris Strangler," such critics have constructed a faulty syllogism that functions as an ad hominem attack on Marxism.[24] It goes something like this: • Althusser killed his wife. • Killing is Bad. • Althusser was communist and Marxist. • Communists also killed people • .: Marxism and communism are bad. When these scholars do a little research, they read so far as Althusser's autobiography and there discover self-incrimination: astonishingly, the most celebrated post-war Marxist philosopher declares in The Future Lasts Forever that he did not even read Marx![25] These writers never bother to check the archives to see Althusser's meticulous notes. Neither do they bother reading any contemporary scholarship, research that makes a strong case for the continuing relevance of his political philosophy. Unlike in France where the externalist approach has ossified Althusser's reception, in the case of Anglophone externalists, the biographical approach has rendered his philosophy invisible, if not anathema. Of course, part of the problem with both the Anglophone and Francophone externalist approaches to Althusser's philosophy is that the biographical methods employed are reductivist and facile. The former is animated by anticommunism and anti-intellectualism. The latter stems from fascination with intellectual celebrity, armchair psychoanalysis, and notoriety. These deficiencies mean that we must suppose a methodologically rigorous biographical account in order to test if externalist accounts avoid the harms associated with externalism. Thorough biographical work would take seriously the fact Althusser was a product of his times and that he also contributed to them. They would look at the totality of available archival documents that relate his biography to his philosophy and–in order to give the best possible exposition of this philosophy–they would consider the relevant internalist research. Finally, such accounts would distinguish as best they can between a mentally well Althusser and one suffering from mental health issues, giving primacy to the former when his philosophical ideas are discussed and elaborated. Such methodological rigor would, no doubt, give us a much better idea of how Althusser's ideas are the product of a socially and historically embedded life. But would they solve the problems noted above as well as have the advantages that the internalist account offers for the due philosophical consideration of Althusser's ideas? That is, would they or could they: (a) attract those who might be interested in Althusser's ideas but who are alienated by internalist approaches that do not acknowledge the killing; (b) work against the existing narrative that silences female victims and thereby contributes to women's ongoing oppression; (c) adequately consider his work in its historical context as to how it contributed into debates of the time and shaped these debates such that his contributions to the history of Marxism and political philosophy be recognized; and (d) elaborate, reconstruct, criticize, and apply the arguments and concepts that he developed such that philosophers, activists, and political strategists can make use of them? If we set to one side questions of format and disciplinary norms such as those within Anglophone analytic philosophy, and further, if we suppose that authoring and publishing rigorous externalist accounts is possible, then my rough answer to these questions is that methodologically exacting externalist accounts could fulfill some of these desiderata but not others. Clearly, the condition that Althusser's work be considered in its historical context could be met. More specifically, sensitively written pieces that take the facts of Althusser's biography seriously may invite into the theoretical and practical conversation those put off by existing accounts. In their obsession with the homicide, current externalist work ends up making this one act the truth of Althusser's philosophy. It thereby replicates some of the impersonal harms catalogued above and compounds most of the direct ones. While a relationship between the murder and his thought may be uncovered, it is unquestionably true that Althusser's philosophy, the killing, his victim's status, the police response, and the French court's verdict were overdetermined by the masculine dominated, social institutions and practices which formed, employed, and, eventually, judged him. The same true is for Althusser's posthumous reception. Thoroughgoing externalist approaches could elucidate these causal relations. Rigorous biographical approaches may also overcome the distantiation effect that externalist accounts trigger as they do not ask the reader to dismiss the killing and to focus exclusively on Althusser's ideas and arguments. Further, in well-done externalist scholarship, Rytmann-Légotien would be given a voice and a history. Thereby, the tragedy of her demise would be felt and recognized independently of Althusser's and post-war Marxism's demise, two events under which it is facilely and all too frequently subsumed. Despite these benefits, the principal problem with rigorous externalist accounts is that, inevitably, the philosophy gets muddled with the history. The irony to Althusser's reception is that he worked diligently to extract and clarify Marxian philosophical concepts for the use of egalitarian political movements yet the facts of his life and his autobiography serve to occlude these notions from the circumstances for which they were intended. [26] A perhaps deeper irony is some of this work is not only deeply and presciently feminist but that feminist theorists have made interesting and productive use of Althusser's ideas.[27] Sometimes, as with Laura Mulvey's work on the visual pleasure and Judith Butler's on gender, these applications have changed the direction of entire academic disciplines.[28] Simply put, for philosophy and for political practice, there are certain times when we need to interrogate the assumptions and notions that undergird our analyses and our practices and there are other times when we simply need to focus on the construction of new strategies and concepts. Yes, Althusser probably would not have become a communist were he not imprisoned in a Stalag or if he never met Rytmann-Légotien. However, the adequacy and utility of his idea of communism as mutual relations of amity and respect under condition of non-domination and non-exploitation can and sometimes need to be debated independently of these facts.[29] Linking biography with philosophy as intellectual historians often do tends to causally reduce the latter to the former. Internalist approaches, by way of contrast, allow us to elaborate, reconstruct, criticize, and apply the arguments and concepts Althusser developed in their autonomy. They then become tools whose usefulness to the movement can be assessed, applied, and then independently verified in terms of their helpfulness to philosophers, activists, and political strategists. Fortunately, we are not stuck with a choice between philosophy first and biographical approaches to Althusser's political theory. There are publishing venues and discussion opportunities for both. Due to the horrific political conjuncture we now collectively face, these fora are multiplying. Both methods therefore can proliferate and both are useful; we can have internalist accounts which advance political theory and political strategy and we can produce sophisticated externalist accounts which do the same but which simultaneously redress the harms done by ignoring Rytmann-Légotien's death. Further, by incorporating mention of the uxoricide, internalist accounts can reduce the impersonal harms to women, left theory, and left strategy that caused by ignoring it. Yes, inasmuch as Althusser advanced political philosophy and philosophy is about ideas, those concerned with refuting or reconstructing his ideas have a duty to cite him. However, we do not have to do so unreflectively. In time, by incorporating these changes, the damages to political philosophy and to left political movements by treating Althusser like any other philosopher might be reduced. Similarly, if these paths are pursued, it could no longer be said that those who study or use Althusser's ideas continue to ignore past and present female victims of male violence. How though to address the challenge of the colleague or student who is potentially interested in Marxian political theory but who meets the seminar assignment of "Contradiction and Overdetermination" with stunned silence or even with protest? What then, to do, when an activist calls out a comrade for using the concepts of ISA and RSA to explain racial disparities in sentencing and arrests? Will the combination and proliferation of rigorous externalist methods help here? I think that it might, but only to a small extent. There will be some trickle-down as the scholarship improves and, perhaps, rebarbative or hostile receptions will become less frequent. However, the real work is and will only be accomplished when those of us who do find Althusser of theoretical and practical interest begin to take these moments seriously. Taking these moments in earnest means that we pause and that we listen to comrades, colleagues, and students when they express apprehension or reprobation about employing Althusser's ideas. After listening, we may dialogue together about the right way to proceed. Yes, concepts like Ideological State Apparatus, problematic, and overdetermination are theoretically and politically useful. However, no one will be engaged with Althusserian ideas if they are stuck wondering why someone would teach, research, or apply the thoughts of a man who killed his wife. William S Lewis is Professor of Philosophy at Skidmore College, Saratoga Springs (New York). He is the author of Louis Althusser and the Traditions of French Marxism (Lexington Books, 2005). He has published widely on Social and Political Philosophy, American Pragmatism, and in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences. [1] I am grateful to Banu Barga, Arne de Boever, Fabio Bruschi, Thomas Carmichael, Caren Irr, Asad Haider, Alexander Gorman, Geoff Pfeifer, Hasana Sharp, and Panagiotis Sotiris for their comments on this paper, many of which have been incorporated. [2] "Légotien" was the nom de guerre which Hélène Rytmann continued to use after the conflict. See: Yann Moulier-Boutang, Louis Althusser, une biographie 1. 1918-1945, 1. 1918-1945, (Paris: Grasset, 1992), 345. Various texts render her surname as Rytmann, Rittman, Rytman, Légotien as well as with the hyphenates Légotien-Rytmann and Rytmann-Légotien. [3] Eric Schwitzgebel, "What Proportion of Philosophy Majors Are Women?," Daily Nous, December 9, 2017, http:// dailynous.com/2017/12/09/women-majoring-philosophyschwitzgebel/. There is data to suggest that women gravitate to Value Theory rather then LEMM fields as well: Carolyn Dicey Jennings, "Women in Philosophy 1930-1979: What Can It Tell Us about Diversity Today? (Updated Numbers, 5/29/16)," New APPS: Art, Politics, Philosophy, Science, accessed January 13, 2019, https://www.newappsblog.com/2016/05/women-inphilosophy-1930-1979-what-can-it-tell-us-about-diversitytoday.html; Carolyn Dicey Jennings and Eric Schwitzgebel, "An Empirical Look at Gender and Research Specialization" (May 2015), http://faculty.ucmerced.edu/ cjennings3/Hypatia.pdf. [4] In this essay, I do not weigh in on the question of whether Althusser's mental health in November of 1980 makes him culpable or inculpable of murder. The ultimate answer to this question is unknowable and the juridical response has been rendered. Instead, I focus on the consequences of this act in contemporary theory and politics, an area where we can have some knowledge and where we can possibly make changes. [5] Donald R. Kelley, "Intellectual History and Cultural History: The inside and the Outside," History of the Human Sciences 15, no. 2 (May 2002): 3, https://doi.org/ 10.1177/0952695102015002123. [6] Brian Leiter, "Academic Ethics: Should Scholars Avoid Citing the Work of Awful People?," The Chronicle of Higher Education, October 25, 2018, https://www.chronicle.com/ article/Academic-Ethics-Should/244882. [7] For more on this line of argument see: "Why Sexist and Racist Philosophers Might Still Be Admirable – Julian Baggini | Aeon Ideas," Aeon, accessed January 16, 2019, https://aeon.co/ ideas/why-sexist-and-racist-philosophers-might-still-beadmirable. [8] "Meurtrier de sa femme, M. Louis Althusser bénéficie d'un non-lieu et demeure interné," Le Monde.fr, January 26, 1981, http://www.lemonde.fr/archives/article/1981/01/26/meurtrierde-sa-femme-m-louis-althusser-beneficie-d-un-non-lieu-etdemeure-interne_3041332_1819218.html. "Meurtrier de sa femme M. Louis Althusser bénéficie d'un non-lieu et demeure interné," Le Monde.fr, January 26, 1981, http:// www.lemonde.fr/archives/article/1981/01/26/meurtrier-de-safemme-m-louis-althusser-beneficie-d-un-non-lieu-etdemeure-interne_3041332_1819218.html. [9] Francis Dupuis-Déri, "La banalité du mâle. Louis Althusser a tué sa conjointe, Hélène Rytmann-Legotien, qui voulait le quitter," Nouvelles Questions Féministes Vol. 34, no. 1 (May 29, 2015): 84–101; Geraldine Finn, Why Althusser Killed His Wife: Essays on Discourse and Violence (Humanities Press, 1996); Richard Seymour, "The Murder of Hélène Rytman," Versobooks.com, July 24, 2017, https://www.versobooks.com/ blogs/3324-the-murder-of-helene-rytman; Anne Boyer, "Kill the Philosopher in Your Head," The New Inquiry (blog), February 11, 2014, https://thenewinquiry.com/kill-thephilosopher-in-your-head/; Finn, Why Althusser Killed His Wife. [10] Seymour, "The Murder of Hélène Rytman." [11] Dupuis-Déri, "La banalité du mâle. Louis Althusser a tué sa conjointe, Hélène Rytmann-Legotien, qui voulait le quitter," 99. [12] Louis Althusser, Lettres à Hélène: 1947-1980, ed. Olivier Corpet, 1 vols. (Paris: B. Grasset IMEC, 2011). [13] Dupuis-Déri, "La banalité du mâle. Louis Althusser a tué sa conjointe, Hélène Rytmann-Legotien, qui voulait le quitter"; Francis Dupuis-Déri, "Post-scriptum de l'article « La banalité du mâle : Louis Althusser a tué sa conjointe, Hélène RytmannLegotien, qui voulait le quitter »," Nouvelles Questions Féministes 35, no. 1 (May 18, 2016): 131–35, https://doi.org/ 10.3917/nqf.351.0131; Seymour, "The Murder of Hélène Rytman." [14] Kristie Dotson, "Tracking Epistemic Violence, Tracking Practices of Silencing," Hypatia 26, no. 2 (2011): 244, https:// doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.2011.01177.x; Kate Manne, Down Girl: The Logic of Misogyny (Oxford University Press, 2017), 17. [15] Diane L. Rosenfeld, "Does the Law Hear Women?," CNN, accessed January 14, 2019, https://www.cnn.com/2018/09/29/ opinions/metoo-laws-rosenfeld/index.html. [16] Gérard Pommier, Louis du Néant: la mélancolie d'Althusser (Paris: Aubier, 1998); Gérard Pommier, La mélancolie: vie et oeuvre d'Althusser (Paris: Flammarion, 2009); MoulierBoutang, Louis Althusser, une biographie 1. 1918-1945, 1. 1918-1945,; Laure Adler, "Figures de Louis Althusser (1/5)," France Culture, accessed January 14, 2019, https:// www.franceculture.fr/emissions/hors-champs/figures-delouis-althusser-15; Benedjaïzou, "Louis Althusser, un marxiste imaginaire," France Culture, accessed January 14, 2019, https://www.franceculture.fr/emissions/une-vie-une-oeuvre/ louis-althusser-un-marxiste-imaginaire; "« Louis Althusser : L'énigme du philosophe meurtrier »," France Inter, accessed January 14, 2019, https://www.franceinter.fr/emissions/ affaires-sensibles/affaires-sensibles-30-mars-2018; "La vie secrète des philosophes (1/5) : Le procès Althusser," France Culture, accessed January 14, 2019, https:// www.franceculture.fr/emissions/les-chemins-de-laphilosophie/la-vie-secrete-des-philosophes-15-le-procesalthusser; "Les lettres de Louis Althusser à Hélène," France Culture, accessed January 14, 2019, https:// www.franceculture.fr/emissions/latelier-fiction/les-lettres-delouis-althusser-a-helene; Louis Althusser et al., Des rêves d'angoisse sans fin: récits de rêves (1941-1967) ; suivi de, Un meurtre à deux (1985), 2015. [17] "Sami Frey lit : Lettres d'Althusser à Hélène 1/9," France Culture, accessed January 14, 2019, https:// www.franceculture.fr/emissions/denis-podalydes-lit/samifrey-lit-lettres-dalthusser-helene-19; Michael Billington, "After The Gods, Hampstead Theatre, London," The Guardian, June 19, 2002, sec. Stage, https://www.theguardian.com/stage/ 2002/jun/19/theatre.artsfeatures1; "'Le Caïman', 'très proche' d'Althusser," February 2, 2006, https://www.lemonde.fr/ culture/article/2006/02/02/theatre-le-caiman-tres-proche-dalthusser_737257_3246.html. [18] Etienne Balibar, Margaret Cohen, and Bruce Robbins, "Althusser's Object," Social Text, no. 39 (July 1, 1994): 157–58, https://doi.org/10.2307/466368. [19] Louis Althusser, "Contradiction and Overdetermination," in For Marx; (London: Allen Lane, 1969), 87–128. [20] "Repas de famille ou folie d'Althusser : état(s) de crise(s) en scène," France Culture, July 24, 2017, https:// www.franceculture.fr/theatre/repas-de-famille-ou-foliedalthusser-etats-de-crises-en-scene. [21] "La vie secrète des philosophes (1/5)." [22] Cf. Anthony Crèzegut, Pascale Gillot, Geoffrey Goshgarian, and Guillaume Silbertin-Blanc. [23] Specialist circles where very good Althusser scholarship is advanced and his ideas interestingly applied include Viewpoint Magazine, Historical Materialism, and Décalages. [24] Boyer, "Kill the Philosopher in Your Head"; Tony Judt, Past Imperfect: French Intellectuals, 1944-1956 (Berkeley: University of California press, 1992); John Sturrock, The Word from Paris: Essays on Modern French Thinkers and Writers (Verso, 1999), 43–51; Sunil Khilnani, Arguing Revolution: The Intellectual Left in Postwar France (New Haven [etc.: Yale University Press, 1993). [25] L. Althusser, O. Corpet, and Y.M. Boutang, The Future Lasts Forever: A Memoir (New Press, 1995), 165–66. [26] Louis Althusser and Etienne Balibar, Reading "Capital" (London: NLB, 1970), 32–33. [27] Hasana Sharp, "'Is It Simple to Be a Feminist in Philosophy?': Althusser and Feminist Theoretical Practice," Rethinking Marxism 12, no. 2 (June 1, 2000): 18–34, https:// doi.org/10.1080/08935690009358999. [28] Laura Mulvey, "Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema," Screen 16, no. 3 (October 1, 1975): 6–18, https://doi.org/10.1093/ screen/16.3.6; Judith Butler, The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1997), 1–31, 106–32. [29] William S. Lewis, "Sur Un Voyage En Grèce," accessed January 15, 2019, https://www.imec-archives.com/papiers/ william-lewis/. TaggedphilosophyWestern MarxismMarxismAlthusser Verso LogoAboutBooksAuthorsBlogEvents Terms and ConditionsFrequently Asked Questions Sign up for our email newsletter


Professor William Craig's Criticisms of Critiques of Kalam Cosmological Arguments By Paul Davies, Stephen Hawking, and Adolf Grunbaum

Philosophy

Professor William Craig's Criticisms Of Critiques Of Kalam Cosmological Arguments By Paul Davies, Stephen Hawking, And Adolf Grunbaum Graham Oppy In some recent articles, Professor William Craig (1986) (1990) (1992) has argued that critiques of kalam cosmological arguments by Paul Davies, Stephen Hawking, and Adolf Grunbaum are superficial, ill-conceived, and based on misunderstanding. These judgements seem to me to be unfair. While I concede that some of the discussion of Davies and Hawking is not philosophically sophisticated, it seems to me that Davies, Hawking and Grunbaum do raise serious difficulties for the view that kalam cosmological arguments are rationally compelling pieces of natural theology. Of course, this is not to say that Davies, Hawking and Grunbaum offer compelling reasons for Craig to give up his belief that kalam cosmological arguments are sound -but it is important to see that this is an entirely separate issue. At several points in his critiques, Craig makes things easy for himself by supposing that Davies, Hawking and Grunbaum must demonstrate that he -Craig -ought to give up his belief in the soundness of the argument; when, in fact, all that Davies, Hawking and Grunbaum need to show is that there is no good, non-question-begging, reason for them to be persuaded that the arguments which Craig offers are sound. What is at issue is a choice between two quite different kinds of models of the origins of the universe; if it turns out that there are no suitably independent reasons for preferring Craig's favoured theistic model, then there is sufficient justification for those who wish to pursue alternatives.1 We may suppose that the standard form for kalam cosmological arguments is as follows: Whatever begins to exist has a cause; the universe began to exist; therefore the universe has a cause.2 Different arguments are obtained by providing different supporting arguments for the two premises. Both premises admit of different kinds of subsidiary justification -e.g. by appeal to broadly logical or metaphysical arguments or by appeal to the current physical evidence. Craig contends that there are broadly logical or metaphysical arguments, concerning the metaphysical impossibility of physically instantiated infinities, which establish the second premise independently of the current physical evidence, though he also holds that the current physical evidence strongly supports the second premise. Moreover, Craig contends that the first premise is a fundamental metaphysical principle which cannot be intelligibly denied, and that there is nothing in the physical evidence which suggests that it could conceivably turn out to be false. However, it seems to me that one could reasonably reject all of these contentions -and that the discussions provided by Davies, Hawking, and Grunbaum all contain important clues about how to do so. 1 Grunbaum (1990) (1991) worries about the propriety of the claim, that the universe began to exist, in the context of classical Big Bang models of the origins of the universe. In particular, he considers two cases: (i) models which are closed at the Big Bang instant t=0, in which t=0 is the location of a singular, temporally first event in the history of the universe; and (ii) models which are open at the Big Bang instant t=0, in which there is no singular, temporally first event in the history of the universe. In connection with the first type of model, Grunbaum observes that it is misleading to say that in these models the universe began because this suggests that there were moments of time before t=0. Craig (1992:237f.) objects that "x begins to exist" should not be analysed as "x exists at time t and there are times immediately prior to t at which x does not exist", but rather as "x exists at t and there is no time immediately prior to t at which x exists". Of course, this analysis would commit Craig to the unwanted claim that God began to exist -since , on the theistic version of this model, there is no time immediately prior to t=0 at which God exists -so Craig further suggests that, within a theistic context, the analysis should be amended to "x exists at t; there is no time immediately prior to t at which x exists; and the actual world contains no state of affairs involving x's timeless existence". But this amended suggestion invokes the extremely puzzling notion of "(God's) timeless existence". Moreover, even the unamended analysis naturally provokes the question whether anything which begins to exist in this sense must have a cause. Craig (1992:238) claims that it is "philosophically unobjectionable" to conceive of God as causally prior to the Big Bang, since "God's act of creation may be regarded as simultaneous with the origin of the universe". However -as Grunbaum observes on several occasions -many of us find it hard to make any sense of this suggestion. It is true that there are contexts in which it clearly makes sense to speak of "simultaneous causation" -e.g. as Craig notes, there is no impropriety in the claim that the downward pressure exerted by the otherwise unsupported head causes the indentation in the pillow -but this is compatible with the claim that, strictly speaking, causation must be local and mediated by finite signals. On this view, given a sufficient margin of error, causation can appear simultaneous -but there is no reason to think that there is any genuinely simultaneous causation.3 Of course, the above considerations are not incompatible with the view that simultaneous causation is narrowly logically possible -but they do suggest that one could reasonably hold that simultaneous causation is not broadly logically, or metaphysically, possible. Furthermore, even if it is conceded that simultaneous causation is broadly logically possible, it is far from clear that we can make sense of the idea that the creative actions of a rational agent could be simultaneous with the effects of those actions. In particular, it seems plausible to think that the creative actions of rational agents require lapses of time between the formation of appropriate intentions and the carrying out of those intentions. At the very least, Craig's "philosophically unobjectionable" conception involves the application of a range of concepts to a situation which lacks many of the features which characterise all situations in which many of us ordinarily apply those concepts. Of course, there is much more which could be said here. However, the most important point to note is that many obviously reasonable people find it far easier to believe that the universe has no cause than to believe that the universe was instantaneously created by a supernatural agent. In order to give these people a reason to change their minds, Craig needs to make it clear to them both (a) that it is metaphysically impossible for the universe to have no cause; and (b) that it is metaphysically possible that the universe was instantaneously created by a supernatural agent. Here, it seems to me that Grunbaum is clearly in the right: it is very hard to see how one could formulate a good, non-question-begging argument for the view that a closed Big Bang universe requires a cause. Reasonable people can differ about ever so many things; here is one. In connection with the second type of model, Grunbaum observes that, since there is no first moment of time, it is correct to say that the universe has always existed, and not correct to say that the universe began to exist. Perhaps surprisingly, it seems that Craig ought to agree with this judgement; for, following his analysis discussed above, there is no time t0 of which it is true both (i) that the universe exists at t0; and (ii) there is no time immediately prior to t0 at which x exists. No doubt, Craig would object that this is to countenance physically instantiated infinities of a paticularly objectionable kind -since it suggests a temporal model which is analogous to certain kinds of infinity machines -but it should hardly comes as news to him that Grunbaum is prepared to countenance such models. Craig (1992:239) also claims that Grunbaum's objection is "mere word play -the key concept here is permanence, and that is a much more subtle issue than Grunbaum allows. The universe has 'always' existed in the sense that there is no past moment of physical time at which it did not exist; but it has not always existed in the strong sense of being permanent, since it had a beginning of its existence". But as we have just seen, this isn't correct: even by Craig's own lights, it isn't necessarily true that a temporally finite universe begins to exist -unless, of course, there are successful objections to physically instantiated infinities. Given the subtlety and care of Grunbaum's well-known defences of the possibility of various kinds of physically instantiated infinities, I conclude that here it is Craig, not Grunbaum, who is guilty of superficiality. On the basis of the above discussion, I conclude that Grunbaum does raise a legitimate worry about the conjunction of the premises in the kalam cosmological argument. A nontheist may concede that there is a sense in which everything which begins to exist has a cause, namely: that for each thing which begins to exist, there is an earlier state of the universe which caused that thing to come into being; and a non-theist may concede that there is a sense in which the universe began to exist, namely: that it is finite in time; but a non-theist almost certainly will not concede -what is required for the kalam cosmological argument -that anything which is temporally finite has a cause. As Grunbaum claims, slipperiness in such notions as "beginning to exist", "create", etc. helps to give the kalam cosmological argument an air of cogency which it does not genuinely possess.4 2 Davies (1983) raises objections to the first premise of the argument. As Craig (1986:165) puts it, what he hopes to show is that "it is physically possible that the universe originated uncaused out of nothing, space-time springing spontaneously into being in accordance with a theory of quantum gravity". A natural first thought is that the spontaneous production of subatomic particles in a vacuum fluctuation is an instance of things beginning to exist uncaused. However, while it may be true that these vacuum fluctuations lack efficient causes, it is certainly not true -as both Davies and Craig note -that they lack material causes: these processes merely involve the possibly uncaused conversion of pre-existing energy into material form. Perhaps the same is true of the spontaneous production of virtual particles in the quantum-mechanical vacuum - though here the issue seems much less clear. At the very least, it seems to me that, in virtue of its treatment of the spontaneous production of virtual particles in the quantum-mechancial vacuum, current physics may already tell us that it is possible for things to begin to exist uncaused, i.e. without either material or efficient cause.5 A natural second thought is that, even if there are no processes in nature in which things begin to exist without material causes, nonetheless, there may be reason to think that the universe could have evolved from a state of zero mass-energy without violating conservation of mass-energy, provided that the total mass-energy of the universe -ignoring the fluctuating contribution of the quantum-mechanical vacuum -is zero.6 Craig [1986:165] objects: "Davies' examples [of the spontaneous production of subatomic particles in a vacuum fluctuation] only serve to underscore that ex nihilo creation is not at issue here: in an intense electric field surrounding an atomic nucleus no new input of energy is required for spontaneous pair production when the negative energy generated by the new pair of particles offsets the energy of their masses." But this is irrelevant: in the case under consideration, there is no prior state from which the system evolves -rather a system with neither efficient nor material cause evolves in such a way as to preserve certain zero sums. Admittedly, Davies muddies the water by suggesting that the evolving system evolved "out of empty space" by a quantum conversion of the energy of the curved space into matter, on the analogy of pair production. For this suggests that "empty space" should be invested with some kind of reality, to parallel the role of the vacuum in pair production. And, as Craig points out, there are numerous questions which are raised by this suggestion -e.g. whether the notion of empty space-time is compatible with relationalist accounts of space-time; whether one can be justified in accepting substantivalist accounts of space-time; etc. However, it seems to me that this is an uncharitable construal of Davies' suggestion. What he ought to be taken to be suggesting is that a quantum theory of gravity might provide the foundations for a descriptive account of the uncaused evolution of space-time.7 Craig [1986:169] claims that Davies is faced by a fundamental dilemma: "Either the necessary and sufficient conditions for the appearance of spacetime existed or not; if so, then it is not true that nothing existed; if not, then it would seem ontologically impossible that being should arise out of absolute non-being". But -harking back to the discussion of the previous section -it should be noted that many non-theists would object to the idea that their position can be encapsulated in the slogan that "being arises out of absolute non-being". On the view in question, the universe does not "arise" from anything: there are no external conditions -necessary, sufficient, or otherwise -which need be invoked in a complete explanation of the evolution of the universe. It should be noted that it might be possible to hold a less ontologically spartan view of the origins of the universe than the one sketched above. In particular, it seems that one might take the universe to be a distribution of properties across an at-least-four-dimensional manifold, and also hold that time is merely a local phenomenon -i.e. that none of the dimensions of the manifold is essentially temporal. Those parts of the manifold which are non-temporal might be able to provide an explanation of the origins of the temporal parts. Of course, this picture still leaves one with an ontic surd; but then so does Craig's version of theism.8 Moreover, one might not wish to embrace the four-or-more-dimensionalism and substantivalism which seem to be required. However, it seems dubious that Craig's kind of theist is well-placed to make this kind of objection: for it is surely clear that his theism is no better placed in point of commitment to controversial metaphysical doctrine. Finally, it is perhaps worth noting that often when physicists talk about "explanation", what they mean is "subsumption under a mathematical model". In this mode of talk, the evolution of the universe is "explained" provided that one has a set of equations which correctly predicts the currently available evidence. Of course, this notion of explanation will hardly be acceptable to a metaphysician; and it leaves open the question of how best to assign ontological commitments to the theories in question in order to get explanations in a more substantial sense. While this is a controversial matter, it is not clear that there is a way of making such an assignment on which it turns out that Craig's favoured position has the minimal commitments which he supposes that it has.9 The problem is that Craig requires that the physical theories are ontically committed to the temporal boundedness of the universe -i .e. it won't do for his purposes to allow merely that the theories assign, say, instrumental utility to that hypothesis. However, it is far from clear that Craig can get a suitably grounded commitment to the reality of the initial space-time singularity -or even to the reality of the very early stages of the standard cosmological models -without taking on the commitments which he seeks to disparage in his opponents. Consequently, it is not clear that his theism is even as well placed as the naturalism of his opponents in point of commitment to controversial metaphysical doctrine. Moreover, if we use a Quinean criterion to measure ontic commitment, then it seems fairly plausible to suggest that Craig's theism must carry an extra ontic load, allegedly justified by the further explanatory power which it provides. 3 Hawking (1988) raises objections to the second premise of the argument. As Craig (1990:478) puts it, he "challenges the assumption that a beginningless universe entails an infinite past". Now, in fact, as we have already seen, there is an easy way to challenge this assumption, by countenancing models which are both bounded and open in the past. But, of course, this challenge does not amount to much in the context of the attempt to produce physically realistic models of the universe which are beginningless and yet finite. The achievement of Hartle and Hawking is to have produced a physically plausible model of the universe which has these features -i.e. to use the mathematical formalism of quantum field theory and general relativity to generate a model of the universe in which space-time is a fourdimensional analogue of the surface of a sphere. In this model -which, as far as I know, has not yet been shown to be inconsistent with the available evidence -space-time is finite, but possesses no initial or terminal singularities. Craig objects to various features of Hawking's model including: (i) its use of Feynman's sum-over-histories approach to quantum field theory; (ii) its use of "imaginary time" in summing the waves for particle histories; and (iii) its alleged reliance on the EverettWheeler interpretation of quantum mechanics. In particular, Craig (1990:483) claims that Hawking's need to treat the resulting model as physically realistic entails that his use of these devices involves him in dubious metaphysical commitments and "egregious self-deception". However, these alleged problems do not seem to be very pressing. It is true that a realistic interpretation of Hawking's model requires some kind of commitment to the reality of the space over which the histories are summed -but this implies no further commitment to a realistic interpretation of the formalism of quantum mechanics. In particular, pace Craig (1990:480), it does not require commitment to the claim that "an elementary particle really does follow all possible space-time paths".10 Moreover, it may be that all that is required is a commitment to the instantiation of certain kinds of spatial relations -i.e. it is far from clear that Hawking is committed to a substantivalist interpretation of the space over which the histories are summed. For similar reasons, Hawking's use of "imaginary time" seems innocous, especially since it is modelled on the standard formalism for the description of quantum-mechanical tunnelling. In the end, it may be that all that one is really committed to by the Hawking model is the instantiation of a particular kind of geometry, where this instantiation can be given either a relationist or a substantivalist construal. That this geometry is described using complex numbers is neither here nor there.11 Craig is especially upset by Hawking's [1988:139] suggestion that "the so-called imaginary time is really the real time, and that what we call real time is just a figment of our imaginations. In real time, the universe has a beginning and an end at singularities that form a boundary to space-time and at which the laws of science break down. But in imaginary time, there are no singularities or boundaries. So maybe what we call imaginary time is really more basic, and what we call real is just an idea that we invent to help us describe what we think the universe is like". However, while I agree that this formulation of Hawking's view is obnoxious, it seems to me that there is a way of restating Hawking's view which makes it more palatable. What he ought to say is that what we call "real time" is not a physically fundamental property of the universe; i.e. from the standpoint of basic physical description, what we call "real time" has the same status as "potable water" or "visible light". Of course, contra Hawking, this is not to impugn the reality of real time -and nor is it to impugn the reality of the singularities in real time -though it will, I think, require the insistence that real time is merely a local feature of the universe. Since, on this view, the singularities in real time are properly contained in the universe, one can be a realist about them without giving up the idea that the universe has no boundaries. Now, of course, Craig will object that this interpretation of Hawking's claim involves "naive ontologising", especially in virtue of features (i)-(iii) cited above. However, there are various avenues of reply. First, one might be a Quinean about ontological commitment; in that case, one is necessarily committed to whatever it is that one's best physical theory quantifies over, at least absent consideration of niceties about the possibility of paraphrase. As suggested above, this view is not necessarily incompatible with relationalism about space-time, though it does seem to sit more naturally with substantivalism. Second -as suggested in the previous section -one might not be a realist about the model and its allegedly problematic features, but then insist that, from this standpoint, there is no good reason to be a realist about the intial singularities in space-time either. After all, in order to move from the observations which we make to the conclusion that there was an initial space-time singularity, we need to use a lot of high-powered theory; but, if we are instrumentalists about that theory, it is far from clear that we shall be entitled to be anything other than instrumentalists about the theoretical conclusions which we draw from the theory: that the universe began from a space-time singularity is hardly an observational consequence of the theory! Either way, the alleged need to invoke God as the best explanation of the available evidence seems to be removed.12 To sum up: In the abstract, there are two ways in which one can accomodate the data which point to an initial singularity while allowing that the universe is temporally finite but unbounded, viz: (i) by excising the singularity; and (ii) by embedding the space which contains the singularity in a more extensive, appropriately contoured, manifold. On the former approach -favoured by Grunbaum -one will simply deny that the resulting theory is in any way incomplete. On the latter approach -favoured by Davies and, on my construal, Hawking -one will also deny that there is any good reason to invoke further entities in order to explain the existence of the entities required by the theory. Either way, it seems that a reasonable proponent of these theories can reasonably resist the conclusion of kalam cosmological arguments. Postscript Prompted by some very helpful comments from an anonymous referee for Faith and Philosophy, I add here some remarks about the nature of my criticisms of Craig's arguments, and, in particular, about my contentions: (i) that all Davies, et. al. need to show is that there is no good, non-question-begging reason for them to be persuaded that the arguments which Craig offers are sound; and (ii) that Craig's arguments are not rationally compelling pieces of natural theology. There are many controversial issues which arise; but even the sketchy remarks which I do make will, I think, be of some use. The worry raised by the referee is this: It seems plausible to think that no "positive" philosophical argument is rationally compelling in the following sense: the argument is logically valid, and it would be irrational for someone who can see that it is valid, who understands its premises, and who knows all of the relevant facts which can be established by everyday methods of enquiry and the special sciences, to reject its conclusion. But this seems to be the relevant standard of rational compulsion invoked in my assessment of Craig's arguments; so all that my arguments show is that Craig's arguments fail to pass a test which no philosophical argument has ever passed. Moreover, this feature of my argument would not be mitigated even if it were true: (i) that Craig writes in such a way as to suggest that his argument is designed to meet this standard; and even (ii) that most philosophers write in such a way as to suggest that the arguments which they are presenting meet this standard. Why should Craig's arguments be criticised for failing to meet a standard which philosophical arguments never achieve, even if he seems to suggest that his arguments do meet that standard? In order to keep my discussion brief, let me grant that no "positive" philosophical argument is rationally compelling in the sense described: no "positive" philosophical argument can be compelling for all rational beings, because the procedural constraints on belief revision which are constitutive of rationality do not sufficiently constrain the sets of beliefs which can be adopted by reasonable beings. Some alternative conception of the virtue of arguments is now required. I suppose that it is something like this: an argument is provisionally rationally compelling for its intended audience if it is logically compelling and proceeds from premises to which the intended audience is committed; a provisionally rationally compelling argument for an intended audience is rationally compelling for that audience if it is also true that the audience will accept the conclusion of the argument rather than give up one of the premises without violating any of the canons of rationality. I then suppose that the dialectical situation is like this: One begins with the assumption that one's dialectical opponents -the intended audience -are reasonable, in the sense that they respect procedural constraints on belief revision, e.g. to aim for consistency, coherence, simplicity, unity, explanatory power, etc. One endeavours to construct an argument for the conclusion which one wishes to have accepted which is at least provisionally rationally compelling for the intended audience. If one is lucky -or if one possesses further knowledge about the psychological dispositions of one's opponents -one may hit upon an argument which is in fact rationally compelling for the intended audience. However, even to hit upon an argument which is provisionally rationally compelling counts as a success: for it forces one's opponent either to accept one's conclusion (outright success) or to revise other beliefs (which may then leave room for follow-up successes). In some circumstances, one will go wrong because one advances arguments with premises which one supposes one's opponents will accept -perhaps because one thinks that any reasonable person will accept those premises -when, in fact, it turns out that one's opponents do not accept those premises. In such a case, one has two options: one can give up on the argument; or one can seek to construct arguments for the contentious premises. In the former case, one may be led to revise one's opinion of the reasonableness of one's opponent, at least with respect to the subject matter in question: perhaps they are insincere, or cognitively divided, or prone to dissociation, etc. If so, then one can conclude that one's argument failed through no fault of one's own; but one mustn't make the further, mistaken claim, that one's own argument prevailed. Once the conditions for debate -including the possession of respect for one's opponents -break down, questions about dialectical success or failure become nugatory. How do these remarks bear upon Craig's kalam cosmological arguments? Well, I take it that the intended audience for these arguments consists of presumptively reasonable agnostics and atheists who hold a wide range of physical and metaphysical beliefs. Moreover, I take it that the members of the intended audience are perfectly entitled to draw on those prior physical and metaphysical beliefs in responding to Craig's argument. But then, as I attempted to show in my paper, it seems quite clear that Craig's argument are not even presumptively rationally compelling: they rely on physical and metaphysical theses which members of the target audience reject. Since I take it that Craig is not unaware of this fact, I find it completely mysterious why he then continues to advance the arguments. Perhaps Craig could reply that his argument is intended just for those atheists and agnostics who buy all of the required physical and metaphysical theses; the problem with this line is that it is fairly plausible to think that there are no such people. Must all "positive" philosophical argument fall in the same manner as Craig's kalam cosmological arguments? Surely not! In particular, "positive" philosophical arguments directed at specific target audiences are very often successful: philosophers do modify their positions in response to "positive" (and "negative") arguments all the time. Of course, philosophers also modify their positions for lots of other reasons as well: it isn't always the force of argument which leads to the acceptance of the conclusions of an argument. But I don't see any reason, in anything which I have just said, to be sceptical about the utility of "positive" philosophical argument. Consider the following: (i) Putnam's "twin earth" argument for the view that, in some sense, the content of beliefs supervenes on, or is partly determined by, what's outside the head; (ii) Black's "two sphere" argument for the view that objects are more than bundles of properties; (iii) Mundy's "embedding" arguments for the possibility of relationist construals of STR; and (iv) Grunbaum's argument that the story of the Thomson lamp is kinematically consistent. I hold that, at the times at which these arguments were propounded, at least, these were paradigm examples of good "positive" philosophical arguments. Moreover, these examples are easily multiplied.13 Perhaps it might be objected that I have incorrectly identified the intended audience of Craig's argument. In particular, it might be suggested that the argument is intended for theists -i.e. people who already accept the conclusion -and that it can show them something about the structure or rationality of their own beliefs, or about the structure or irrationality of the beliefs of non-theists. I think that these suggestions are massively implausible. Of course, theists are committed to the claim that non-theists make a mistake in failing to believe that God exists, but it is hard to see how the construction of kalam cosmological arguments could provide evidence of further, independent errors which are made by non-theists. In particular, there is a question about the robustness of the theistic conclusion vis a vis the physical and metaphysical premises of the argument which needs to be addressed. I am fairly confident that there are virtually no theists for whom the premises of, e.g., kalam cosmological arguments are more epistemically robust -less open to revision, less centrally placed in the web of belief -than the theistic conclusion. Or, to put the point another way, I find it quite implausible to think that there are theists for whom the belief in the theistic conclusion is dependent upon their acceptance of the premises of a kalam cosmological argument. But then, I take it that the construction of kalam cosmological arguments doesn't really show anything interesting about the structure of theistic beliefs, or about the rationality of acceptance of the conclusion of those arguments. Nor does the construction of these arguments show anything about the structure or rationality of non-theistic arguments either. What the arguments do show, if valid, is that one could not accept a particular package of physical and metaphysical theses and also reasonably deny that God exists. But, if there is no suitably independent attraction in the package of physical and metaphysical theses amongst likely target audiences for the argument -i.e. attraction which is independent of belief in the conclusion of the argument -then it seems to me that there will be no real work which the constructed argument can do.14 References Craig, W. (1986) "God, Creation, And Mr. Davies" British Journal For Philosophy Of Science 37, pp.163-175 Craig, W. (1990) "'What Place Then For A Creator?': Hawking On God And Creation" British Journal For Philosophy Of Science 41, pp.473-491 Craig, W. (1992) "The Origin And Creation Of The Universe: A Reply To Adolf Grunbaum" British Journal For Philosophy Of Science 43, pp.233-240 Davies, P. (1983) God And The New Physics New York: Simon And Schuster Grunbaum, A. (1990) "The Pseudo-Problem Of Creation In Physical Cosmology" in Leslie, J. (ed.) Physical Cosmology And Philosophy New York: MacMillan, pp.92-112 Grunbaum, A. (1991) "Creation As A Pseudo-Explanation In Current Physical Cosmology" Erkenntnis 35, pp.233-254 Hawking, S. (1988) A Brief History Of Time New York: Bantam Books Notes 1. My assessment of the dialectical situation is discussed further in an appendix to the present paper. See also my Ontological Arguments And Belief In God, forthcoming, Cambridge University Press, and my "Weak Agnosticism Defended", forthcoming, International Journal For Philosophy Of Religion. 2. See Craig (1992:235). 3. Craig (1990:486ff.) suggests that Aspect's experimental work in connection with Bell's Theorem appears to show that there are non-local correlations in nature. But other interpretations -e.g. in terms of backwards causation -are available. Moreover, as Craig notes, it might well be held that the correlations in question are acausal -i.e. that the synchronised correlations are not cases of simultaneous causation. 4. Note, by the way, that this is not to say that Craig is unreasonable in supposing that the argument is sound -i.e. it is not to say that he should suppose that the argument involves a fatal equivocation; rather, it is to say that non-theists can justifiably contend that, by their lights, the most plausible construal of the arguments imputes a fatal equivocation. But, if the argument is not dialectically effective, then it is useless. So this is to say that the argument is a failure. 5. Note that the virtual particles in question have detectable effects; i.e. it won't do simply to dismiss them as unreal. 6. Here, we are to imagine that there is neither efficient nor material cause; rather, there is an uncaused evolution in which certain zero-quantities are preserved. 7. Here, I pass over Davies' further suggestion that such a theory would entail a certain mathematically determined probability that a blob of space would appear where none existed before. As Craig notes, this seems to involve an incoherent understanding of the notion of something's coming from nothing -incoherent because it supposes that something which comes from nothing comes from a preexistent state -and a consequently incoherent understanding of the notion of the probability of something's coming from nothing. 8. If Craig replies that God requires no cause because he did not begin to exist, the non-theist can make the same point about the non-temporal parts of the manifold. 9. Recall that one of Craig's gambits is to object to heavily ontological committing construals of physical theories -substantivalism about space-time; four-or-moredimensionalism about space-time; the Everett-Wheeler interpretation of quantum mechanics; ontically committing interpretations of Feynman's sum-over-histories approach to quantum field theories; etc. 10. Recall that the sum-over-histories approach is one of several mathematically equivalent methods for solving the Shroedinger (Wheeler -De Witt) equation; its advantages lie merely in its technical and conceptual simplicity. 11. Of course, none of the above should be taken to deny that Hawking might take himself to have far more substantive commitments; the point is that one should distinguish between what he takes to be his ontic commitments -e.g. to the worlds of the Everett-Wheeler interpretation of quantum mechancis -and what one is obliged to take as the ontic commitments of his model. 12. Perhaps I should add that I am inclined to favour the first strategy: if it turns out that there are independent reasons for supposing that the Hartle-Hawking model is the best physical theory -assessed in terms of simplicity, explanatory power, fit with data, etc. -then we have good reason to believe in the reality of all the entities which the theory quantifies over. However, for current purposes, I don't need to insist on this choice. 13. I am indebted to John O'Leary-Hawthorne for suggesting the first two examples, and for discussion of the issues involved here. 14. One last possibility is that Craig -following the Thomistic tradition -supposes that his kalam cosmological argument has the virtue that it consists of premises which any non-theist would grant were she free of the tainting effects of sin and were she to attend seriously to them. If this is the case, then my main complaint is that he doesn't say so clearly, and at the outset, so that non-theists are made aware: (i) that the argument isn't in any sense intended as an internal challenge to their beliefs or rationality; and (ii) that the argument is predicated on the assumption that the argument would not be dialectically effective for a typical audience of non-theists because that audience is rendered constitutionally incapable of appreciating the argument by the debilitating effect of sin. At this point, dialogue is at an end, and rationalisation takes over -as it does when non-theists turn to Marx, or Feuerbach, or Neitzsche, or Freud, or other debunking theorists, in order to explain to each other why theists accept false premises. Moreover, there is still the further question what the construction of such an argument is supposed to show to theists; in particular, there is a hard question about the direction of the doxastic connections between (i) the claim that anyone free of the incapacitating influence of sin would accept the premises, and (ii) the conclusion, i.e. the claim that God exists. And it is also unclear to me why even theists should grant that the premises have the status which this interpretation requires; surely sinless belief in God could perfectly well go along with rejection of Craig's controversial physical and metaphysical premises.