Philosophy

The ânature or nurtureâ problem concerning the debate on the innate features with respect to the
          acquired ones is approached in terms of information, from the perspective of the Informational Model
          of Consciousness. This model reveals seven distinct informational systems reflected in consciousness as
          informational centers, i.e. memory (Iknow-Ik), decisional info-operational center (Iwant-Iw), emotions
          (Ilove-Il), metabolic operations (Iam-Ia), genetic transmission (Icreate-Ic), genetic info-generation
          (Icreated-Icd) and the anti-entropic center (Ibelieve-Ib). Ib is a life-assisting beneficial center, because
          it is opposed to the entropic action of matter, eliminating or reducing the uncertainty characteristic of
          unknown possibilities to certainty, and inducing in this way the trust and confidence in own actions.
          The pro and contra arguments of the ânature or nurtureâ are shortly presented, noting the large range of
          divergent opinions and concepts on the approached problem. It is shown that the information concept
          acting both as informal and matter-related information, specifically referred to the embodiment/
          disembodiment mechanisms for the transmission of information during the epigenetic processes, can
          coherently approach and explain the transgenerational transmission of the traits acquired during the life
          span of the predecessors. The concepts of tendency, affinity, propensity, predisposition, aptitude, vocation
          and talent, specific for inheritable properties described by Icd are discussed, pointing out the large pallet
          and variety of such concepts describing the evidences detected by external observers on the inherited
          behaviors, and that of self-perceived by the implicated individual, as a silent voice of whose are no
          longer. The external manifestation of such inherited features and traits depends on practice, because the
          characteristic operation of the nervous system and of epigenetic processes is based on repetition and/or
          intensive practice, but these are permanently guided by the silent voice of those who are no longer, with
          various signal intensities.

The Silent Voice of Those Who are no Longer: Transgenerational Transmission of Information from the Perspective of the Informational Model of Consciousness Florin Gaiseanu* Science of Information and Technology, Romania and Spain Abstract The "nature or nurture" problem concerning the debate on the innate features with respect to the acquired ones is approached in terms of information, from the perspective of the Informational Model of Consciousness. This model reveals seven distinct informational systems reflected in consciousness as informational centers, i.e. memory (Iknow-Ik), decisional info-operational center (Iwant-Iw), emotions (Ilove-Il), metabolic operations (Iam-Ia), genetic transmission (Icreate-Ic), genetic info-generation (Icreated-Icd) and the anti-entropic center (Ibelieve-Ib). Ib is a life-assisting beneficial center, because it is opposed to the entropic action of matter, eliminating or reducing the uncertainty characteristic of unknown possibilities to certainty, and inducing in this way the trust and confidence in own actions. The pro and contra arguments of the "nature or nurture" are shortly presented, noting the large range of divergent opinions and concepts on the approached problem. It is shown that the information concept acting both as informal and matter-related information, specifically referred to the embodiment/ disembodiment mechanisms for the transmission of information during the epigenetic processes, can coherently approach and explain the transgenerational transmission of the traits acquired during the life span of the predecessors. The concepts of tendency, affinity, propensity, predisposition, aptitude, vocation and talent, specific for inheritable properties described by Icd are discussed, pointing out the large pallet and variety of such concepts describing the evidences detected by external observers on the inherited behaviors, and that of self-perceived by the implicated individual, as a silent voice of whose are no longer. The external manifestation of such inherited features and traits depends on practice, because the characteristic operation of the nervous system and of epigenetic processes is based on repetition and/or intensive practice, but these are permanently guided by the silent voice of those who are no longer, with various signal intensities. Introduction Since a long time, probably since always, people did not wonder that the newborn and the future child resembled the mother, the father, the grandparents or even great-grandfather or great-grandmother, both as a physiognomy or behavioral style and preoccupations, because this seems to be a natural common situation. However, the science, starting with philosophy and continuing with branches such as psychology and psychiatry, the humanities and social sciences, as well as the behavioral and cognitive sciences, are still wondering since about 50 years, which is the appropriate answer to the "nature or nurture" problem. That means-in inheritability terms-what is determinant for the new generation: the inherited or the acquired properties during the span life? In other words, if the characteristics of a person in a certain field of activity, usually in music, in art in general, in mathematics or other sciences, in athletic or other performance fields requiring a distinct level of intelligence and/or dexterity, are the result of predispositions, innate aptitudes, of talent, or rather of the technical skills and of the exercise practiced with abnegation and tenacity [1]. For this purpose, the testing methods and especially the approaching mode of this problem were brought into discussion, both from a conceptual or interpretation point of view, and the balance between the two fundamental alternatives was discussed, but surprisingly, under the form of "all or nothing", which means, one excludes the other [1]. Could be this the right answer to such a fundamental question, defying sometimes even the evidences? We do not have yet enough research tools and knowledge to elucidate this Crimson Publishers Wings to the Research Research Article *Corresponding author: Florin Gaiseanu, Science of Information and Technology, Romania and Spain. Submission: August 14, 2019 Published: September 06, 2019 Volume 5 Issue 1 How to cite this article: Florin Gaiseanu. The Silent Voice of Those Who are no Longer: Transgenerational Transmission of Information from the Perspective of the Informational Model of Consciousness. Gerontol & Geriatric stud.5(1). GGS.000604.2019. DOI: 10.31031/GGS.2019.05.000604 Copyright@ Florin Gaiseanu, This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits unrestricted use and redistribution provided that the original author and source are credited. ISSN: 2578-0093 482Gerontology & Geriatric Studies 483 Gerontol & Geriatric stud Copyright © Florin Gaiseanu GGS.000604. 5(1).2019 "problem", intervening this time from the perspective of the modern sciences of information, of neurosciences and of genetics? As expected, a series of interventions to this surprising result, trying to restore, from various points of view, the balance lost in such an exclusionist conclusion, have outlined the followings aspects: (i) It is not suitable to reduce the "nature – nurture" problem to only two extreme alternatives, this asking for instance to apply a asymptotic comparative analysis within so-called testing-the-limits method [2], or other elaborated models [3]; (ii) The identification and testing of the fundamental specific parameters of the human "processor", like working memory capacity, learning rates, and forgetting rates should be taken into account [4]; (iii) It is wrong to exclude the motivation and self-confidence in the personal training, because these comes from an intimate discovery of special sensitivity, and even worse, to reduce this problem to a ban-imposed egalitarianism ideology, justified by a false interpretation of the equality of opportunities [5]; (iv) It is absurd to ignore the heritability of musical talent, evoking only the "environmentalism" factor [6]; (v) The perseverance, the hard but gradual work and the industriousness cannot be underestimated [7]; to explain suitably the relation between innate talent and high levels of ability, it is necessary to consider the differences in structure between most everyday abilities and expert performance [8]; (vi) Practice and other factors are important contributors to outstanding performance, but not enough to explain great creative works [9]; (vii) Experience is no improvement over talent [10]; (viii) General intelligence is central to many forms of talent [11]; (ix) Talent scouts, not practice scouts: talents are real [12]; (x) Creativity is an important factor over the practice [13]; (xi) The inborn talent yes, does exist [14]. Taking into account the large range of disperse and not coherent opinions on this topic, in order to try to clarify some fundamental aspects concerning it, in this paper it is discussed the transgenerational transmission of information and the innate predispositions from the perspective of the recently elaborated Informational Model of Consciousness [15-18], which explains the nature and structure of consciousness [17,19-21], its properties [22-24] and the neuro relations with the body [24-26], allowing to develop useful applications [27-29]. The Informational Model of Consciousness: Basic Structure and Transmission of Information In the left side of (Figure 1) it is shown schematically the structure of consciousness, based on the concept of information. To understand this concept in its various forms, we have to point out that information could be interpreted as an informal property, like that received from the mass media or surrounding sources by our own senses (sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch), or intrinsic matter-related information, intervening into the intimate microscopic structure of matter [16,18]. A much more quantity of information is integrated into the living structures, in the human body, where practically all the constituting components-the living cells-communicate with themselves and with the others in a continuous and intimate manner [15]. For this reason, we may define the human body as an informed matter structure. Therefore, consciousness could be regarded as the representation/reflection in the mind of the functionality of specific informational systems which refer to: Figure 1: Schematic representation of the components of the Informational Model of Consciousness, their connections with the corresponding body execution elements and the transgenerational transmission of information. 484 Gerontol & Geriatric stud Copyright © Florin Gaiseanu GGS.000604. 5(1).2019 i. Accumulation of information (memory), marked suggestively in Figure 1 as the informational center I know (I k); ii. Operation with information and decision, marked as the center I want (I w); iii. Emotional activities, defined as I love (Il), love being the most representative of them; iv. Metabolic activities for body maintenance, connected to nourishment matter, marked as the informational center I am (Ia), indicating the self-status, power and health; v. The living/genetic creation assuring the reproduction, reflected in consciousness as the informational center Icreate (Ic); vi. Info-genetic generation, transmitting the genetic characteristics from the parents (informed matter A and B in Figure 1) to the new body (informed matter C), and represented by the informational center suggestively called I created (I cd); vii. Info-connection activities, consisting especially in the control of the certainty/uncertainty balance, which reinforces the confidence, trust and equilibrium, the power to choose and believe, therefore defined as the informational center Ibelive (Ib). Each of informational system relates to specific areas of the brain and with the specific execution system by means of the neuro cord and neuro derivations to the body organs [26], schematically represented in Figure 1 left side. The center Ib and its connections explain the near-death phenomena (ex-corporal view, "tunnel" crossing, peace and light feeling, virtual meeting with the members of family who are no longer) during the clinical arrest of the heart and cease of the brain activity [22], the special properties of the mind like premonition, clairvoyance, telepathy and psychokinetic phenomena [19,23], religious and mystic experience [15,21], and even the possibility of an after-life existence of consciousness as an independent entity [24]. During the day by day activities, the main role of this center is to function as a life "navigation lighthouse" and "helm", assuring the right/believed way to the life objectives and mobilizes, maintains and focuses the internal forces to the fulfilling of these objectives. In informational terms, this center represents an anti-entropic pole of information, because I believe signifies the selection from an uncertainty range of informational possibilities (which expresses actually the entropy of such an informational field) a certain information, which induces in consciousness and body security, trust and confidence, helping in this way the living prerogatives. Therefore, this center could be also regarded as an anti-entropic pole of the organism, assisting and supporting the living processes. The memory (Ik) accumulates not only the life experience, as informational and emotional remembrances [17], but also the decision criteria, according to the mentality, especially acquired and consolidated during the childhood [20]. During the life span, this accumulation allows to attain the wisdom in the advanced age, when new criteria are added from the analysis of the various events of the life experience, from the selection between "Good" and "Bad" induced results. The life itself is a base of continuous learning for adaptation. The adaptation process is managed by the operational/ decisional center of information Iw. Although the entire information is memorized as a life experience by Ik, only Iw may select and activate only the necessary information which serves as a basis of informational analysis and decisional process. The qualities of this center could be associated with the intelligence, speed of reaction/ operation and the correctness of the solution. However, this center operates based on decision criteria, most of them acquired in the familial ambient, enriched with that acquired during the life experience, including the professional and social one [20]. Besides the quantity and quality of the acquired and stoked information (Ik), emotions (Il), familial and social relations (Ic), inherited affinities (Icd), certitude/belief (Ibelieve) and the personal power state (Ia) contribute also to the final decision, so this will depends actually on signals received from the all other centers. The main result of the decision center Iw is the Attitude, which is the informational output of the conscious component of the informational system of the human body, necessary for immediate and/or medium-term adaptation to the environmental requirements. Emotions, activated and managed by Il, could play an important role in decision. Emotions represents information stoked also in memory (Ik), but these are reactions of the body to the primary information, received or activated by Iw from the data library Ik. The emotions could be activated automatically, as a defense reaction, so are triggered very quickly by the alarm system of the brain (amygdala) or could be the result of some slower chemicaltype processes [30]. We defined such emotions based on chemical agents as emo-states and could be triggered consciously by the memorized or acquired information [15]. From this point of view, while the activities of Ik, Iw are conscious, the activity of Il is rather combined between conscious and unconscious one. The practice for a long time of the same type of emotions could create an emodependence on such induced states, with favorable consequences or not, so the activity of Il should be closely observed and suitably controlled [20]. As emotions can be therefore still controlled by conscious mind, the activities of Ik, Iw and Il represent the so-called operative informational system, which basically determines the reaction to information and is expressed by Attitude (Figure 1, upper right side). The center Ia reflects the status of the autonomic and automatic metabolic processes, because of the body connection to the external necessary matter (foods, air, water). Besides the common signals detected by the internal sensors and transmitted to the brain referring to the nourishment needs, like hungry and thirsty, this center vigils also the general situation of the body itself, the health, power and appropriate energy. By means of the autonomic execution systems managed by the programmed informational center of the brain, the absorbed matter is converted into the useful nutrients for the cells, assuring energy and substitution or reproduction materials for the body. The self-appreciation and selfesteem are close components of the characteristic range of qualities of this center. 485 Gerontol & Geriatric stud Copyright © Florin Gaiseanu GGS.000604. 5(1).2019 The center lc is closely linked to the relations with the partner of life, with the members of own formed family and with the society. The high objective of life is to create offspring and to form and educate the new generation, assuring in this way the species continuity and survival. The information is transmitted as a genetic output (Figure 1, right side), which is a codified ("imprinted)" form of living informed matter, participating together with the complementary genetic information of the partner to the creation of the new member of the family. The relative relations between generations are very close, as could be expressed in popular terms by consanguinity. Such term is a result of ancient multigenerational observations, claiming that the constituent common genetic information is a basic support of common physical and psychical features. The information baggage genetically transmitted, and the information transmitted by education especially within the first years of life, when the nervous system of the child is under intensive structuration, is fundamental for the formation of mentality of the new individual. Mentality includes a set of guiding rules and automatic chain-thinking prototypes inherited from parents and acquired by education, which states the fixing points and criteria of informational processing for own decision making. The capacity of conscious acquirement and processing of information is limited, so many of our typical behavioral manifestations are integrated into the automatic informational system, as less thinking-effort consuming [27]. The parent attitude on the children comportment is therefore of great importance during this stage and not only. Within the confrontation with the life problems, the silent voice of the parents and their advising recommendations accompanies everywhere and whenever the future adolescent and adult, even toward the ancient age. This close relation is reflected within the informational activity of the center Icd of the new generation (C in Figure 1, right downside). Within Icd are manifested the inherited properties of the new nascent child and future adult. The genetic information is transmitted by the genetic system and is manifested both in the similarity of the body and psychological features. During the life span this center manages also the typical characteristics of the age, from infancy to convenience. As conscious cannot have access and interventions in the activities of the informational systems supporting the centers Ia, Ic and Icd, which are based, as it commented above on intimate molecular processes, the sum of these systems forms the unconscious component of the informational system of the human body (marked in obscure color in the right side of the Figure 1). The info output of the unconscious system is represented by the genetic transmission of information. The information in this case is supported by genetic matter, so according to the Informational Model of Consciousness, the transfer of information is done as a matter-related information. The Silent Voice of Those Who Are no Longer: Transgenerational Transmission of Information We name aptitude a series of manifested easiness with which somebody can think or make something specific. This is noted by the person himself or herself, and by the others. Such a behavior it is not qualified as a "hard" or difficult task. That is because the silent voice of the inherited properties is manifesting on this way. The affinity for a certain type of activity, expressed by the easy acceptance and ability to reproduce it without efforts is also due to the inherited features. On an increasing amplitude scale of the inherited qualities could be placed the tendency, affinity, propensity, predisposition, aptitude, vocation and talent. The silent voice of those who are no longer is manifested in various tones, registries and intensities; natural grace, innate gift, ability, skill, aptness, flair, knack, brilliance, belong to such a category. The large range of existing words and concepts attributed to the inheritance qualities reflects the fine, graduated tuning scale of such qualities and the large recognition of the info-transference phenomenon from the predecessors to the offspring. If we want to refer to the info-material support of such inherited transference and to the related mechanisms, we should look no further than the early 90's, when the new branch of genetics science, known now as epigenetics, started to flourish. Within the Informational Model of Consciousness, it was recently shown that the specific epigenetics mechanisms, allowing the intimate transference of information inside and between cells can be interpreted in terms of information science, by a process of embodiment/disembodiment of information [15]. Epigenetics studies the mechanisms which determines the acquisition of information at cellular level, induced by the environmental cues and stress. By stress we have to understand the factors situated outside of the commonly accepted range in the natural living ambient, and could be referred to whether, foods, or any other factor which can intervene to change the individual or group behavior, submitted under such circumstances to an adaptation process, but without change the genetic configuration. One effect of this epigenetic process could be the transmission of the acquired traits to the next generation or generations, if this stress continues to persist (Figure 1). Such factors like drug or alcohol addiction were demonstrated to have influence on the next generation, specifically on the female (mother) line [31]. Epigenetics processes are also implicated in memory formation [32]. In a recent study it was shown that parents' stressful experiences can influence an offspring's vulnerability to many pathological conditions, including psychopathologies, and their effects may even endure for several generations. In this recent study it was confirmed that the main types of such epigenetic dynamic processes could be direct, when the changes occur during the lifespan of an individual due to a direct exposure to the environment experience, or indirect, both when it concerns changes that occur inside of the womb due to events during gestation and changes that affect the individual's predecessors (parents, grandparents, etc.), due to events that occur even long before conception and that are somehow (e.g., through gametes, the intrauterine environment setting) transmitted across generations [33]. The intimate epigenetic process consists in three main steps as follows. During the first step, the signal which originates the interaction of the perceived information with the body itself is the 486 Gerontol & Geriatric stud Copyright © Florin Gaiseanu GGS.000604. 5(1).2019 "epigenator", which can be molecules of the cell, "informed" by an info-embodiment process [15,27] and this signal triggers a cascade of cell molecular signal response, if the epigenetic is sufficiently persistent. Therefore, a repetitive and/or intensive signal is an imprescriptible condition that the epigenetic process should be initiated. In terms of epigenetics, the cell response signal is the "initiator", which acts on the chromosomes, composed by DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid 30-40%), RNA (ribonucleic acid 1-10%), and histones (50-60%), which are some proteins anchoring the DNA helix structure. The proportion of these components varies not only for different species and for various tissues of the same organism, but even in the same cell, depending on the various stages of the cell cycle [15]. Finally, the epigenetic "maintainer" signal conserves the stable embodied information which will be transmitted to the daughter cells. In terms of the Informational Model of Consciousness, the insistent repetition of an information from the environment is a key factor for the epigenetic processes, allowing the transgenerational transmission of the traits. The repetition and/or intensive exposure to the epigenetic signal allows the initial informational signal to be transferred from the short-term memory to the long-term memory and from here to the memory of the skills, a complex and complete set of info-abilities automatically triggered [27], as it is for instance the playing an instrument or driving a bike [15]. The practice is therefore an important component of the performance, because by its natural form of working, the brain asks repetitive steps for a stable info-integration into the cells. However, what are the "epigenetics" and info-"initiators" of such a process? Who calls a child or young person to dedicate his time, energy and internal forces to a certain type of activity? This is the silent voice of those who are no longer (Figure 1, right lower side-transmitted epigenetic traits). As external observer, we call the manifestation of this voice affinity, propensity, predisposition, aptitude, vocation or talent. As personal self-own observers, we follow the calling of this voice, which indicates us that a certain activity is easy and pleasant to be done, stimulating the creativity, dedication and perseverance in practice and/or in a deep and profound study. This depends of course on the intensity of this voice, which means the intensity which the transgenerational signal was epigenetically transmitted by Icd. If this signal is weak and fragile, as often could happen at the children, whose power of Ia, Il and Ib is still low, it is necessary of course a stimulating impulse and encouragement from the side of parents, educators or instructors. If this signal is sufficiently high to be self-detected, the personal center Ib has a sufficient force to maintain the "navigation helm" on the right direction, assuring the confidence, trust and tenacity for the fulfilling of the final objective: the talent full manifestation. Conclusion It was shown that the old controversy on "nature or nurture" problem referring specifically to the inherited properties of the human like predispositions and talent with respect to the acquired ones by practice, can be approached in terms of transgenerational transmission of information, from the perspective of the Informational Model of Consciousness. This model reveals the existence of seven informational centers with specific activities, each of them with distinct tasks but interacting and collaborating each other's for suitable adaptation to the environmental cues and stressors. The center Ik is the memory, Iw the operational decision, Il the emotion center, Ia self-status center reflecting the state of the metabolism operations, Ic the genetic transmission, Icd the info genetic generator and Ib the anti-entropic center, assisting the life prerogatives, because it reduces to certainty the large range of uncertainty possibilities. As the Informational Model of Consciousness is able to describe in terms of information the intimate cellular transmission by mechanisms of embodiment/ disembodiment of information, it was shown that the epigenetic processes acts as convertors of the received information from the environment into the matter-related epigenetic information, transmissible by Ic to the offspring as genetic output. The center Icd reflects the inherited physiological and psychological properties, particularly the affinity, propensity, predisposition, aptitude, vocation and talent. The large spectrum of the observed and defined inherited qualities shows the fine degree of variety and of signal intensity with which the silent voice of those who are no longer, the family predecessors, may express their acquired traits to the present generation. This signal is manifested to the own person and to the external observers. The practice is an important requirement that the talent become an evidence for the external observers, because the acquirement of stable information both by nervous system and epigenetic processes is based on repetitive and intensive training. However, the various self-observed internal signals coming from the precedent generations marking predispositions and affinities are easily detected, indicating that certain activities are facile and pleasant to be done. Just these signals are the predispositions, aptitudes, affinities and the entire range of the inherited tendency qualities. If the voice of those who are no longer is low at the children, then encouragement and stimulation impulses from the side of parents, teachers and instructors should be expressed. If these voices are sufficiently high, then the child or the young person himself or herself will meet the force (Ia), mental capacity (Ik, Iw) and tenacity (Iw), attachment feeling (Il), trust and confidence (Ib) to follow the voice calling (Icd) to attain the performance lciated by the external observers as talent. Acknowledgment As a continuity of life and information, the author dedicates this work to his son Adrian Gaiseanu and his family, together with special appreciations for his dedicated work and results. To his daughter Ana with special appreciations and to all members of family who appreciate and love him. In the memory of his eminent and exemplar parents, the distinguished (Magna cum Laude) Professor Emanoil Gaiseanu and distinguished (Emeritus) Professor Florica Gaiseanu and of all Members of Family who were part of his life: his brother Professor Constantin Gaiseanu, Fam. 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Arguing With Asperger Syndrome

Philosophy

The study examines the argumentative competencies of people with Asperger syndrome (AS) and compares this with those of normal â or what are called neurotypical (NT) â subjects. To investigate how people with AS recognise, evaluate and engage in argumentation, we have adapted and applied the empirical instrument developed by van Eemeren, Garssen and Meuffels to study the conventional validity of the pragma-dialectical freedom rule (van Eemeren, Gars- sen & Meuffels 2003a; 2003b; 2005a; 2005b; van Eemeren & Meuffels, 2002). Our paper begins with some background information on Asperger syndrome and how it impacts upon communication and argumentation; then it addresses the research questions and methods used; thirdly, it presents some initial findings; finally, it will conclude with some im- plications for those people with AS, for those they come into contact with and for the pragma-dialectic model in general.

1. introduction The study examines the argumentative competencies of people with Asperger syndrome (AS) and compares this with those of normal – or what are called neurotypical (NT) – subjects. To investigate how people with AS recognise, evaluate and engage in argumentation, we have adapted and applied the empirical instrument developed by van Eemeren, Garssen and Meuffels to study the conventional validity of the pragma-dialectical freedom rule (van Eemeren, Garssen & Meuffels 2003a; 2003b; 2005a; 2005b; van Eemeren & Meuffels, 2002). Our paper begins with some background information on Asperger syndrome and how it impacts upon communication and argumentation; then it addresses the research questions and methods used; thirdly, it presents some initial findings; finally, it will conclude with some implications for those people with AS, for those they come into contact with and for the pragma-dialectic model in general. 2. asperger syndrome (AS) Asperger Syndrome is a neurological disorder named after Hans Asperger. In 1944, Asperger published a paper that described patterns of behaviour in young men who had normal intelligence and language development, but who also had deficiencies in social and communication skills. Despite being identified in the 1940s, Asperger syndrome (AS) is a relatively new category of developmental disorder, and was only 'officially' recognized in 1994, in the fourth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM IV) of the American Psychiatric Association. AS is often associated with what is called the high functioning end of the autistic spectrum (Frith, 1991) although there is considerable debate about whether AS is high-functioning autism, or something else (Frith, 2004). It is generally accepted that AS, like autistic conditions, is a neurologically-based developmental disorder, in which there are deviations in three broad aspects of development: first, social relatedness and social skills; second, impaired communication, and a lack of pragmatic skills in particular; and third, certain behavioural characteristics involving repetitive, or what are called perseverative features, often accompanied by an intense interest in a limited range of subjects. It is the level of deficiency in these three categories – social-relatedness, communication & behaviour (which Wing (1993) has called the "triad of impairments") – which can range from relatively mild to severe, that defines all of the pervasive developmental disorders, from those with mild AS through to the profoundly autistic. Recently, however, there has been a move away from defining AS in terms of weaknesses, deficiencies and deviance. For example, Dickerson et al (2005: 20) point out that much research on autism, in general, is "comparative, framed around notions of identifiable 'deficit' in Autism and juxtaposed against assumed 'normal' capabilities". This, they argue, is an unhelpful approach, borne of a diagnostic agenda, focusing on what people with autism cannot do, rather than looking at the ways that they actually deploy communicative skills in interaction – and hence ways that practice can be improved. The study of AS has previously been placed in a negative frame whereby the aspects most worthy of attention are those that are considered not normal. There is little room left for the strengths of the individual to come through, and little opportunity for people with AS to appear as real people in the research as opposed to subjects with a syndrome. Notably, in contrast with the diagnostic DSM IV, Gray and Attwood (1999) offer the 'discovery criteria' that define AS in terms of the strengths of people they call 'Aspies'. But it remains the case that there are clear problems associated with having AS. So while it is not uncommon to see people with AS in mainstream educational or professional settings – and they can hold down jobs and can be quite successful – their social and communicative problems may lead to intense frustration, feelings of worthlessness and social isolation. Estimates of the rates of depression for people with AS or high-functioning autism range from 30% (Wing, 1981) to 37% (Ghaziuddin et al, 1998). Similarly raised rates of other psychiatric disorders have also been found (Ghaziuddin, 2002). One particularly interesting feature of AS (like other autistic conditions) is the lack of what has been called a 'theory of mind': the ability to understand that others have beliefs, desires and intentions that are different from one's own. What this amounts to is that people with Asperger's find it difficult "to put themselves into another person's shoes and to imagine what their own actions look like and feel like from another person's point of view" (Frith, 2004: 676). While some people with autism may never gain this ability to empathize, people with AS may be able to develop such an ability. While they lack an inborn ability to perceive the mental or emotional states of others – what Frith has called an "intuitive mentalising" (Frith, 2004: 667) – they can learn and, when conversing, arguing with asperger syndromeJohn E. Richardson Loughborough University Chris Blackmore University of Sheffield Albert Atkin University of Glasgow 1142 1143 use "an explicit theory of mind to compute effects on the recipient of the[ir] message" (Ibid.). Amongst other things, this means that through treatments such as language-communication therapy – where the implicit rules of interaction are taught explicitly – the disaffection felt by people with AS can be reduced (Ozonoff et al, 2002: 90). The communicative competencies of people with AS are discussed in more detail in the next section 3. AS and communication It is clear from anecdotal and clinical experience, as well as from research, that people with AS display problems with discourse – with language in use. In fact these "communicative problems constitute some of the most significant social handicaps in the syndrome, leading to frustration and distress for the individuals and others" (Adams et al, 2002: 680). These difficulties are displayed in a number of ways: first, how they speak. Although people with AS (particularly children) "speak grammatically, they do not always speak appropriately" (Kremer-Sadlik, 2004: 185). They display a number of characteristic features, including "formal pedantic language, odd prosody, peculiar voice characteristics, literal interpretation of meaning, too much or too little talk, lack of cohesion, idiosyncratic use of words and repetitive patterns of speech" (Szatmari, Bartolucci & Brenner, 1989; Gillberg, 1989). Similarly, Frith (1998: 54) has come across complaints about AS speech patterns that suggest they speak in "too much of a monotone, too much like sing-song, too soft, too loud, too fast, too slow, wooden and stilted. This diversity", she argues, suggests that "there is nothing wrong with the voice, only the modulation and the use of the voice in the service of communication." Second, non-verbal cues can be a problem for people with AS – particularly eye contact, which is noticeably different. Often someone with AS will look away when you are talking to them, but will look at you when they are talking to you. This might seem subtle, but it can be very unnerving for neurotypical subjects, who often find themselves feeling uncomfortable or unsure that the person is actually listening to them. Tantam (2003) argues that this is in fact a very profound aspect of AS people do not have the ability to use gaze as a social cue or to signify attention; this in turn can lead to breakdown in communication with the end result that the person feels rejected and, after repeated 'failures', can even withdraw from communicating altogether. Third, as Grice (1975) observed: "Talk is not a series of disconnected remarks." To construct coherent speech effectively, "a speaker needs to construct what he or she knows about the listener's thoughts, knowledge, desires and intentions, in order to tailor the content and other aspects of his or her talk to the listener" (Kremer-Sadlik, 2004: 187). But because of their difficulties perceiving others' intentions and perspectives and their impaired capacity to read the unspoken gestures and nuances in everyday social communication, individuals with AS often respond inappropriately or not at all in interaction. This impairment is noticeable at a number of discursive levels, and appears to be fundamentally related to the theory of mind hypothesis. Pragmatic accounts of communication, such as Grice's, stress "the importance of mentalizing for intentional communication" (Ziatas, Durkin & Pratt, 2003: 75). For example, in a study of conversational implicatures, Surian et al (1996) investigated the ability of children with autism to identify violations of Gricean maxims. They found that the "children with autism able to pass the theory of mind task also did well in identifying violations of Gricean maxims" (Ziatas, Durkin & Pratt, 2003: 76). That said, the overly pendantic style of speech that characterises some people with AS – in which "the speaker conveys more information than the topic and goals of the conversation demand" (Ghaziuddin & Gerstein, 1996) – does contravene the Gricean maxims of quantity and (sometimes) relevance. At a micro level, Happé (1993) looked at the role of theory of mind in understanding similes, metaphors and irony. And the relationship is very clear: "those children who were unable to pass even the first order theory of mind task were able to pass the simile task but not the metaphor or irony tasks. Those able to pass the first order but not the second order theory of mind task were able to complete both the simile and metaphor tasks, and those able to pass both first and second order theory of mind tasks were able to comprehend similes, metaphors and irony" (Ziatas, Durkin & Pratt, 2003: 76). To summarise, the communicative problems of people with AS centre on pragmaticson prosody and voice modulation, on recognizing and adhering to Gricean maxims and on recognizing certain tropes such as metaphors and irony. 4. AS and argumentation There does not appear to be any existent research on the argumentation of people with AS, despite the fact that they often find themselves in conflict situations due, in part, to their inability to read social cues accurately. The lack of such research suggests that researchers are unwilling or unable to engage with those with AS and this is supported by the apparent bias in the research literature towards quantitative research and away from qualitative studies. Mercier et al comment on the restricted interests in high functioning persons with pervasive developmental disorders: When one reviews the literature, it is striking how little use is made of certain methodological approaches in seeking to understand high-functioning autism. In the last few years, populational epidemiology, neuropsychology, and the various branches of neurobiology, especially genetics, have permitted significant advances (for a review, see Bailey et al., 1996; Bryson, 1997; Happé and Frith, 1996). On the other hand, qualitative approaches linked to psychosocial research and based on methods such as in-depth interviews, discourse analysis or case studies have remained greatly underused (Denzin and Lincoln, 1142 1143 1994; Miles and Huberman, 1994). Only a few qualitative studies are to be found in the literature in this field. They primarily deal with case reports (Williams et al., 1996) or with the way families come to terms with autism and with the relations between professionals and parents (Gray, 1993; 1994; 1997). (Mercier, Mottron, & Belleville, 2000: 408) Another striking characteristic of much of the available research is that it relies much more on the opinions and views of parents or caregivers than the person(s) with AS themselves. Whilst this may be a result of the difficulties which people with AS have in maintaining social relationships with others, it also suggests that people with AS are not considered capable of speaking up for themselves, or that their accounts are not accepted as reliable unless corroborated by another. Based on general communicative difficulties, summarised in the preceding section, we expect that people with AS will have argumentative competencies different to neurotypical (NT) people and may not always follow the accepted rules of argumentation. Superficially, we expect that their argumentation will be overly logical and, as Stenning and van Lambalgan (nd: 220) have claimed, driven by "an obsessive attempt to extract exceptionless truth about a complicated world." In their discovery criteria, Attwood and Gray (1999: 2) put it slightly differently, suggesting that AS discourse is often characterised by an "ability to pursue personal theory or perspective despite conflicting evidence" – which is a nice spin on saying that they may perseverate or just not listen to other people's point of view. Perseverative thoughts – where the person with AS returns to a particular line of thinking unexpectedly or without apparent linking from the directly previous content of conversation, resulting in incohesive communication may cause particular problems in interaction. More specifically related to pragma-dialectics, and the pragmatic difficulties in recognising or observing the Gricean maxims, a small amount of other research has been done on the use of assertive speech acts, but none of this relates explicitly to expressing standpoints or advancing argumentation. Ziatas, Durkin & Pratt (2003) for example, studied assertive speech acts produced by children, focusing on assertives that relate closely with a theory of mind. That is: internal reports, expressing emotions, intents & other mental states; attributions, expressing beliefs about another's state; and explanations, expressing reasons or relationships between phenomena. The children with AS used more internal state assertions than the other groups (with autism, SLI & NT), though some of these were inappropriate (echolalia); correspondingly, children with AS used fewer assertions relating to another's mental state ('you're thinking...', 'you don't know...', 'you believe...') than the other groups. Clearly this isn't argumentation, because the discourse didn't take place in a context of disagreement. But these findings – essentially showing the difficulties that people with AS have in discerning another's point of view when it isn't fully externalised – may be significant in studying their argumentation. Anecdotally, it does appear as though people with AS often lack the necessary social skills to persuade other people. This deficit in interpersonal communication has implications for their ability to function independently in a complex social world where persuasion plays an important role in ensuring that one's needs are met. This may also relate to Michael Gilbert's recent work on emotional argumentation – specifically, the "dissonance between a logical discursive message and the emotional content or context of that message" (2005: 44-45). People with AS seem particularly prone to feeling this dissonance or are unable to understand the emotional perspective of others and hence to decode this dissonance. This seems like it could be a particularly fruitful avenue to explore when analysing the argumentation of AS. 5. research questions The review of current literature around AS and argumentation has thrown up a series of research questions. They are formulated as questions, rather than hypotheses, due to the exploratory nature of the work. These first two are the focus of work currently in progress: 1. Will AS respondents evaluate speech acts involving ad hominem fallacies as less reasonable than non-fallacious speech acts? 2. Does the evaluation of fallacious/non-fallacious speech acts by AS respondents show greater variance than the data of NT respondents? The next four may be the focus of future work. It seems the main argumentative problems of people with AS are felt during social interaction as a result of inabilities to pick up and/or translate emotional or other pragmatic cues. On this basis: 3. Is AS face-to-face argumentation more or less reasonable than NT participants? In what ways (if any) do AS arguers find face-to-face argumentation problematic? 4. Are AS written arguments (both A1 and A2, in O'Keefe's (1977) terms) more or less reasonable than NT participants? In what ways (if any) do AS arguers find written arguments problematic? 5. Are certain pragma-dialectical rules of reasonableness more problematic (in terms of their recognition and application) for AS arguers? 6. Conversely, are certain pragma-dialectical rules of reasonableness less problematic (in terms of their recognition and application) for AS arguers? It may be that some rules are easy for Aspies to follow in advancing their own arguments, but very problematic when it comes to the arguments of others. For example, the ambiguity rule or the standpoint rule may not be especially difficult 1144 1145 for Aspies to follow: they tend to be very literal, or in the words of Attwood and Gray (1999: 2), to communicate in a style that is "free of hidden meaning or agenda". However, unless the standpoint of the other party is fully externalised, and argument presented in an explicit, accurate and literal way, the application of these rules in context may be difficult. 6. methods To explore our first two questions, we have taken 12 of the short discourse fragments constructed by van Eemeren, Garssen and Meuffels (2003a; 2003b; 2005a; 2005b) nine of which contain fallacies and three of which do not (see APPENDIX 1). Respondents were asked to judge the reaction of the antagonist and rate it on a 7 point Likert scale – though, to make the scale was clearer to the AS respondents, the labels were changed slightly from those used in van Eemeren, Garssen and Meuffels' work, to 1 meaning 'entirely unreasonable' to 7 meaning 'entirely reasonable'. The research instrument includes exchanges in three settings: domestic, political and scientific (or academic). For each of these settings there are 4 exchanges: a direct ad hominem, an indirect or circumstantial ad hominem, a tu quoque ad hominem and a non-fallacious standpoint. There is a sizable body of literature summarising the findings of these studies, and it would therefore be interesting to see if these results are replicated for AS respondents. The second group of questions are for future research – though initial results do suggest some interesting things relating to question 4, on written arguments. Eventually we intend to collect data from face-to-face interviews with AS clients (ASIn) in which they discuss personal histories of communicative problems. We also intend to collect data from focus groups with AS clients (ASFg) where participants will be presented with a series of contentious or perhaps controversial standpoints and asked to evaluate them. These will then be compared to similar focus group sessions with NT subjects (NTFg). 7. initial results From only three respondents thus far, there are some interesting though extremely tentative findings. The table here shows the average judgements for the three respondents: Table 1: AS respondents' evaluation of fallacious and non-fallacious exchanges Respondent All fallacies Nonfallacies Direct fallacies Indirect fallacies Tu quoque 1 4.33 7.00 3.00 5.00 5.00 2 4.33 5.67 4.00 4.33 4.67 3 4.11 5.00 3.67 5.00 3.67 Mean 4.26 5.89 3.56 4.78 4.45 Given the extremely small n-base, it is not possible to offer any firm conclusions, but the table does suggest three things: first, the respondents do appear to consider violations of the freedom rule to be less reasonable than non-fallacious responses. However, the fallacious responses, as a whole, were considered to be just this side of reasonable. This is slightly higher than the Amsterdam studies – which found a mean of 3.75. Looking at the three variants of the ad hominem fallacy, the respondents were more critical of the direct or abusive variant than they were of the other two. This finding is in agreement with the findings of the Amsterdam studies, although again our average here is slightly higher than their NT respondents. But these averages do cover up some significant differences between the three respondents. Respondent 1 – a woman in her early 20s – answered either a 1 or a 7 to every fragment: it was either 'entirely unreasonable' or 'entirely reasonable'. In a follow-up email she said: I found it difficult to make decisions about degrees of reasonableness. I tend to see things as OK or not OK with no grey areas. I hope that is alright. Each of the non-fallacious responses she judged correctly (which is why her average is 7), but her judgments of the fallacies were less successful: she thought that 5 of the 9 fallacious responses were 'entirely reasonable' which reduced her average. This was different to the other two respondents – both male, one 21 and the other 18. The judgements of these two respondents had less variance: on only 2 occasions did they judge a fragment to be either a 1 or a 7. This may be due to their respective experiences of AS: both of the men were diagnosed as children, whereas the female was only diagnosed as a young adult. This meant that the two men benefited from specialised schooling. The mother of one of the men wrote to explain that since 2000 her son had been at a school for young people with communication difficulties. He had benefited from having a weekly session with a speech and language therapist, and a lot of work had been done with him "on his social skills and relating to others, not least helping him to appreciate that others have different points of view and that it is right to respect this." Nonetheless, he still found the exercise difficult – he stated at the end that he found it difficult because of the "Lack of facts about the argument". Nevertheless, he still provided more finely graded judgements of the discourse fragments than our first respondent. When the first respondent was asked why she found it difficult and whether there was any problem with the clarity of the questionnaire, her reply was revealing: In reality if I heard two people having any of the exchanges listed I would probably feel confused as to how they meant it... Were they being aggressive?, joking?, cruel?, friendly? [...] When I was reading person B's responses I struggled to imagine what they meant or why they were saying it in the way they did. The only reasoning I could use to decide whether they were being reasonable or not was to decide whether or not their response was justified given the apparent 1144 1145 circumstances [...] I know that people's feelings should be important too, but I could not imagine what the people involved might be feeling given the limited information. This excerpt is interesting for a number of reasons. It suggests the importance of contextual cues in the way that ordinary language users reconstruct argumentation in order to analyse it. Here she tries to use an explicit theory of mind that she's learnt to try and decide whether B's responses were justified. Emotional cues are one of perhaps many inputs used in this reconstruction, which – in the case of this woman and perhaps people with AS as a whole – is what creates difficulties in judging the reasonableness of certain speech acts. 8. conclusion: the study's contribution This ongoing study will hopefully contribute to a better understanding of the condition of AS in general; and of the discourse of adults with AS in particular, who tend to be under-represented in the literature. In terms of argumentation theory, our study should be viewed as part of the pragma-dialectical research programme, and will add further detail to the data collected thus far on the conventional validity of the freedom rule. In addition, our results may contribute to the more analytical work by Gilbert (2005) on the emotional content of argumentation and specifically on the role that emotional cues play in ordinary language users' reconstruction of argument. But primarily the study is a practical piece of researchonce complete: a list of "guidelines for good arguing" will be produced which will hopefully help people with AS to engage in arguments more appropriately. Therefore this study can be classed as "Action Research" in that the results will hopefully directly benefit the participants themselves and people like them. references Adams, C., Green, J., Gilchrist, A. & Cox, A. (2002) Conversational behaviour of children with Asperger syndrome and conduct disorder, Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 43,5, 679-690 Dickerson, P., J, Rae, P. Stribling, K. Dautenhahn & I. Werry (2005) Autistic Children's co-ordination of gaze and talk: re-examining the 'asocial' autist, in K. Richards & P. Seedhouse (eds.) Applying Conversation Analysis, pp. 19-37. Houndmills: Palgrave Eemeren, F. H. van, B. Garssen and B. Meuffels (2003a) The conventional validity of the pragma-dialectical freedom rule, in F.H. van Eemeren, J.A. Blair, C.A. 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Domestic 3 (tu quo que ad hominem) A: I think you'd better not eat so much chocolate; it affects your weight. B: Look who's talking! Your own tummy is getting bigger and bigger. Domestic 4 (no fallacy) A: I think you can safely trust me with that car; my driving is fine. B: I don't believe a word you're saying! You've borrowed my car twice and both times you've damaged it. Scientific 1 (direct ad hominem) A: In my opinion, you have been acting unethically; you failed to inform your patients about what they would be exposed to. B: What do you know about medical ethics? You are not a medical specialist yourself. Scientific 2 (indirect ad hominem) A: In my view, it is highly questionable whether smoking really causes cancer; there are studies which deny it. B: Do you want me to accept that opinion from you? Everyone knows your research is sponsored by the tobacco industry. Scientific 3 (tu quo que ad hominem) A: I believe the way in which you processed your data statistically is not entirely correct; you should have expressed the figures in percentages. B: You're not being serious! Your own statistics aren't that good either. Scientific 4 (no fallacy) A: I believe my scientific integrity to be impeccable; my research has always been honest and sound. B: Do you really want us to believe you? You have been caught tampering with your research results twice. Political 1 (direct ad hominem) A: In my opinion, making people work on a Sunday is terrible they'll never get any relaxation. B: But you belong to a religious party! How could you ever objectively assess the pros and cons of such a decision? Political 2 (indirect ad hominem) A: In my view, the best company for improving Social Services is Capita. They are the only contractor in Britain that can handle such an enormous job. B: Do you really think that we can believe you? It's not a coincidence that you recommend this company – it's owned by your father-in-law. Political 3 (tu quo que ad hominem) A: I believe that a minister should not withhold any information from Parliament; this would mean the end of democracy. B: Of all people, I can't believe you're saying this! You once tried for months to keep a case of subsidy fraud secret. Political 4 (no fallacy) A: In my view, we have never used empty election slogans; we have always kept our promises. B: No one believes you! You promised lower taxes in the last election campaign but people have to pay considerably more taxes since you have come to power.