Risky Giving

Philosophy

We might worry that Peter Singerâs argument from âFamine, Affluence, and Moralityâ is unconvincing to non-consequentialists who accept moral constraints against imposing significant risks of harm on individuals. After all, giving to overseas charities often comes with such risks. I argue that plausible non-consequentialist criteria imply that it is not wrong to give to at least some of the charities that Singer and other effective altruists recommend.

Forum: Effective Altruism Risky Giving Theron Pummer on doing good without harming others Peter Singer famously argues that it is wrong of us not to give to effective charities helping people in extreme poverty. In "Famine, Affluence, in Morality", published in 1972, he offers an elegant argument for this conclusion. The ethical premise of his argument is that, if we can prevent something very bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything nearly as morally significant, then it would be wrong not to do so. In case this premise isn't obvious enough on its own, Singer offers an example: suppose you're walking past a shallow pond and you see a child drowning in it; you realise that the only way to save the child's life is by rushing in quickly, ruining your clothes and shoes. Virtually everyone agrees that it would be wrong of you not to save the child. What seems relevant in this case is that you can prevent something very bad from happening (the child drowning) without sacrificing anything nearly as morally significant (the loss of your clothes and shoes isn't nearly as morally significant as the loss of this child's life). Arguably, given that we think it's wrong to let the child drown, we should also accept the ethical premise of Singer's argument. The empirical premise of his argument is that in fact we can prevent very bad things from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything nearly as morally significant, by giving to effective charities helping people in extreme poverty. So, it is wrong of us not to give to such charities. One of the most impressive features of Singer's argument is that it builds from premises that look plausible, independently of the broader ethical theory, if any, one accepts. Singer himself accepts consequentialism, the ethical theory according to which an act is wrong if it fails to bring about the overall best outcome available to the agent. But many philosophers and non-philosophers alike instead accept non-consequentialism, and recognise the existence of moral options and moral constraints. Moral options entail that it is sometimes not wrong for an agent to do less than what would result in the overall best outcome. For example, even if it would make the world a better place if you gave up your kidney to stranger in need, intuitively it would not be wrong of you not to. Moral constraints entail that it is sometimes wrong for an agent to do what would result in the overall best outcome. For example, even if it would make the world a better place if you stole someone's kidney and gave it to someone else in need, intuitively this would be wrong. It isn't that non-consequentialists deny the moral importance of making the world a better place, or helping others; what they 63 deny is that this is the only thing that is fundamentally morally important. Given the entrenched disagreement between consequentialists and non-consequentialists, an argument for giving to charity that takes consequentialism for granted would have limited appeal. But the ethical premise of Singer's argument is compatible with consequentialism as well as non-consequentialism. The premise leaves unspecified what counts as "nearly as morally significant" as preventing a very bad thing from happening. Bringing about something else that's very bad, or failing to bring about something that's very good, could presumably be roughly as morally significant as preventing a very bad thing. But arguably doing something that's substantially costly to you or to those near and Risky Giving Esther McManus dear to you, or doing something against which there is plausibly a moral constraint (such as harming, killing, stealing, lying, promise-breaking, and so on) can also be roughly as morally significant as preventing a very bad thing. The ethical premise would not imply that it would be wrong to refuse to give until you're poor yourself, as – from the perspective that you have the moral option not to do what results in the best outcome – that is arguably as morally significant as preventing much greater bad things. The ethical premise would also not imply that you have a moral obligation to steal from the rich and give the money to charity, as – from the perspective that you are under a moral constraint not to steal even if this results in the best outcome – that is arguably as morally significant as preventing much greater bad things. Singer intentionally leaves it quite unspecified what counts as "nearly as morally significant" in order to give his argument wide appeal. On any serious, minimally reasonable way of filling in "nearly as morally significant", the ethical premise will appeal to consequentialists and non-consequentialists alike as well as work together with the empirical premise to deliver Singer's famous conclusion. One might fail to be convinced of Singer's argument on empirical grounds. In particular, one might doubt that in fact we can prevent very bad things from happening by giving to effective charities helping people in extreme poverty. One might doubt whether there are any such effective charities. The causal processes by which your money does things for those in extreme poverty are, I am afraid, far more complex than most charities let on. Worse still, taking the bad effects of charities together with the good ones, it is for very many charities extremely unclear whether your donations are likely to prevent more bad than they produce. While experts on government aid for international development have been around for decades, until fairly recently one would have been hard-pressed to find anyone who might reasonably qualify as an expert on individual giving: someone who has carefully and systematically empirically studied the net impact per dollar that everyday individual donors can have by giving to various charities. Of course, we've long been exposed to the claims of impact embedded in advertisements from the charities themselves, but, to put it gently, these aren't always the most unbiased sources of information. Many of us have come across websites (like Charity Navigator) that impartially rank charities according to what proportion of their donations they spend on administrative costs rather than their actual programs. But in the absence of information about the likely effectiveness of these programs, such websites are pretty pointless as a guide to individual giving. Fortunately, for almost ten years now, two independent, transparent, rigorous, and reputable charity evaluators have come on the scene. These are GiveWell and Giving What We Can. After reviewing thousands of different charities, these organisations together recommend only about half a dozen. It is worth noting that both organisations have ranked Against Malaria FounForum: Effective Altruism 64 dation (which distributes insecticide-treated bednets) and Schistosomiasis Control Initiative (which distributes deworming tablets) in their highest categories. In light of the convergence among the experts on individual giving, I believe that the everyday individual donor can be reasonably confident that donations to these and similar charities are very likely to prevent much more bad than they produce. Indeed, impressed with the amount of good individuals can do with relatively small contributions, and with the enormous differences in cost-effectiveness between different charities, many now subscribe to the philanthropic philosophy and social movement known as effective altruism. There is excellent evidence of the existence of effective charities helping people in extreme poverty, which supports Singer's empirical premise. However, one might doubt the empirical premise in another way: one might doubt that in fact we can prevent very bad things from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything nearly as morally significant, by giving to effective charities helping people in extreme poverty. In particular, one might worry that in giving to charity, unlike rescuing the child from the shallow pond, you significantly risk harming individual people. In his 2010 essay "Poverty is No Pond", Leif Wenar writes: "From the perspective of an individual living in poverty, a particular aid effort may harm more than it helps. The aid may strengthen the autocrats, corrupt bureaucrats, warlords, soldiers or criminals that have power over that person. A humanitarian effort may draw the person away from their self-sustaining livelihood; a development project may draw them into acquiring skills for which there is no employment. Aid in aggregate may increase inflation, reduce employment, or weaken the provision of public services. Aid flowing into this person's country may delay needed political reforms, and make both the government and the citizens more responsive to foreigners than to each other. Aid may inflame economic inequalities or ethnic antagonisms in ways that are bad for this person, or damage his or her self-esteem. And so on. Even assuming an aid project or official aid to a country helps overall, it may leave at least some people worse off than before." Wenar spells out each of these risks in detail in his essay, which I highly recommend reading. In the case of the drowning child, you can allow harm to befall an individual, Risky Giving 65 We can prevent very bad things from happening, without sacrificing anything nearly as morally significant leaving the child as badly off as she'd be if you did nothing. In the case of giving to charity, on the other hand, not only can you allow harm to occur, but you can also impose harms on individuals, making these particular individuals worse off than they'd be if you did nothing. The latter is of special moral concern to non-consequentialists. While it's wrong to fail to save a drowning child, intuitively it is morally worse to grab a child off her tricycle and drown her (even assuming the outcome is the same either way). Consequentialists believe it is morally permissible to impose risks of harm on individuals, provided that it's part of what's likely to be best overall. Many non-consequentialists do not. It is not generally morally acceptable, on their view, to impose harms on some people, even if other people benefit enough such that things are better overall. Benefits to some do not straightforwardly morally cancel out the harms imposed on separate persons (e.g., it is not the case that drowning one child and rescuing another is morally equivalent to doing neither). One might object that Singer's argument fails to be convincing to non-consequentialists, despite his efforts. In particular, one might claim that, as long as the notion of "nearly as morally significant" leaves room for moral constraints against risking harm to individuals, the empirical premise will fail to obtain (however plausible the ethical premise is). I believe this is a mistake, and that such concerns about risks of harming individuals should not deter non-consequentialists from embracing Singer's conclusion. The short version is that in some realistic cases of giving to charity, it is not wrong to impose these risks; typically they are not aimed at in order to achieve further ends but instead are generated as side effects of interventions that are likely to do a lot of good overall, and often they are distributed across people in a way that is morally acceptable. In their important new book Responding to Global Poverty, Christian Barry and Gerhard Øverland claim that it can be morally acceptable to impose a risk of harm on someone if doing so is part of providing that same person with a chance of benefit, such that, taking into account the likelihood of the harm as well as the benefit, things are on balance likely to be better for this perForum: Effective Altruism 66 It is for very many charities unclear whether your donations are likely to prevent more bad than they produce son. Call such balancing intrapersonal risk balancing. On the other hand, consider imposing a risk of harm on someone as part of providing someone else with a chance of benefit, even if things are on balance likely to be better overall. Call such balancing interpersonal risk balancing. According to many non-consequentialists, this latter type of risk balancing is, other things being equal, more morally objectionable than intrapersonal risk balancing. To get a more concrete handle on these two types of risk balancing, let's have a look at a pair of imaginary cases. The first is called Risks to the Ill: One hundred people are dying of a terrible illness. If left alone, they'd each have only a 20% chance of survival. However, they can take drug X, which would increase their chances of survival to 80% each. The only way to get drug X to them is by putting it in the water supply, and, we can suppose, there are no other people nearby to drink this water. However, drug X has a negative side effect. It risks liver damage, imposing a 10% chance of death on each of the one hundred ill people who take it (absent this risk taking drug X would increase their chances of survival to 90% each). Now let's consider a second case, called Risks to the Healthy: One hundred people are dying of a terrible illness. If left alone, they'd each have only a 20% chance of survival. However, they can take drug Y, which would increase their chances of survival to 90% each. The only way to get drug Y to them is by putting it in the water supply, which, we can suppose, would mean one hundred healthy people would also receive drug Y. And, while drug Y has no negative side effects when ingested by people with the illness, it risks liver damage when ingested by healthy people, imposing a 10% chance of death on each of them. Risks to the Ill is an example of intrapersonal risk balancing, whereas Risks to the Healthy is an example of interpersonal risk balancing. Other things being equal, intrapersonal risk balancing seems morally acceptable given that each person is likely to be better off on balance. Interpersonal risk balancing seems more morally problematic, even if it is likely to be best overall. It's not that non-consequentialists must be absolutists about this, claiming that it is always wrong to engage in interpersonal risk balancing, no matter how small the risks to others are and no matter how good things will likely be overall. That would be implausibly extreme, and it would imply that virtually all of our actions are wrong. No matter what you do, there is always some risk that through some butterfly effect an individual elsewhere will be harmed. Instead, what the non-consequentialist should say is that interpersonal risk balancing can be morally justified, but that to the extent that the risks to others are large, and to the extent that the harms they might incur are large, the imposition of such risks would have to make things likely to go proportionally much better overall, to be morally justified. And perhaps when the risks and associated harms are large enough, some non-consequentialists would be attracted to a kind of absolutist view, claiming that such interpersonal balancing is wrong, no matter how good overall the effects are likely to be. Risky Giving 67 The imaginary cases described are unrealistic in the following respect: Risks to the Healthy is a purely interpersonal risk balancing case, and Risks to the Ill is a purely intrapersonal risk balancing case. In the real world, often cases will be mixed, being more or less like one of the pure cases. There is a further complication. In intrapersonal risk balancing cases like Risks to the Ill, each of those who would receive the risks of harm alongside the chances of benefit is on balance likely to be better off. But suppose that, on reflection, these ill people prefer not to have the intervention simultaneously bringing risk of harm and chance of benefit. Then it may seem that nonetheless imposing the intervention on them would be disrespectful and morally problematic. But what if only one out of the one hundred in Risks to the Ill prefers not to have the intervention, while the other ninety-nine very much do prefer it? Again, a non-consequentialist need not be an absolutist about this, claiming that it's wrong to engage in intrapersonal risk balancing whenever anyone involved prefers not to have the intervention, no matter how many others prefer it and no matter how good things will likely be overall. That would be implausibly extreme, and it would imply that virtually all policy decisions are wrong. For any policy decision, it is likely that at least one person affected by it will prefer not to be so affected. Instead, what the non-consequentialist should say is that intrapersonal risk balancing can be morally justified even when it is not preferred by some of those affected, if enough others affected do prefer it and if it makes things likely to go sufficiently better overall. What all this suggests is that, when our charitable giving would impose risks of harm on particular individuals, there are a number of things we need to know to determine whether it would be wrong to proceed. First, we need to know how good overall each of our acts is likely to be. According to consequentialists, this is all we need to know. But according to non-consequentialists who believe there are moral constraints on imposing risks of harm on individuals, we need to know more. To what extent would we be engaged in intrapersonal rather than interpersonal risk balancing? (Again, realistic cases will often involve a mixture of the two types of risk balancing.) How serious are these risks to individuals, in terms of degree of likelihood and degree of harm? To what extent do those affected by our act prefer the package of risks of harms and chances of benefits it delivers to them? I believe that several effective charities do quite well in terms of these non-consequentialist criteria, in addition to the consequentialist one. You can assess this for yourself. Visit the GiveWell website (givewell.org) and the Giving What We Can website (givingwhatwecan.org). Look up their top charities, particularly Against Malaria Foundation (AMF) and Schistosomiasis Control Initiative (SCI). Read their detailed reports and follow links to other documents where appropriate, etc. In addition to studying the positive effects of these charities, be sure to have a look at GiveWell's analysis on "possible negative or offsetting impact" (e.g., they discuss the risk that distributing bednets in certain areas will lead to overfishing, if they are misused). Consider this empirical data on Forum: Effective Altruism 68 AMF and SCI from GiveWell and Giving What We Can against the backdrop of the general risks of giving to overseas charities, discussed by Wenar. Seek out and listen to the views of experienced people who have worked in development overseas. Giving to AMF or SCI is certainly not riskfree, but in my view it involves relatively little risk of doing serious harm. Moreover, it is important to keep track of which particular people these risks of harm accrue to. To the extent that the risks of harm are imposed strictly on those immediately affected by AMF, for example, there may be no non-consequentialist objection here at all. This is because the likely benefits to those immediately affected by AMF's operations are large enough that it'd be plausible to classify this as a purely intrapersonal risk balancing case. But going back over Wenar's list of risks of harm, one might observe that these risks pertain to people well beyond those immediately affected by the given charity's operations. Indeed, nearly everyone within the country or broader geographic region of the charity's operations is potentially exposed to these sorts of risks. And it is harder to morally justify imposing such risks on people who do not at the same time enjoy chances of benefiting. One of the particularly brilliant things about charities like AMF and SCI, however, is that they bring with them significant chances of benefits to these wider groups, too. GiveWell and Giving What We Can cite research suggesting that fighting malaria and neglected tropical diseases are likely to have positive economic effects, which extend to everyone within the country or broader geographic region of these interventions. This fact makes giving to AMF or SCI more like a case of intrapersonal risk balancing, and so more morally acceptable. To the extent that these chances of benefits to each of those in the wider region outweigh the risks of harms to each of those in this wider region, we'd again have a case of purely intrapersonal risk balancing, which is morally acceptable. A consequentialist might view such chances of wider benefits as merely another factor increasing the likelihood of making things better overall. But to a non-consequentialist concerned about the morality of imposing risk of harm on particular individuals, they can serve to partially or fully remove what otherwise would have been a moral obstacle to giving. All things considered, my view is that AMF and SCI do well in terms of the non-consequentialist criteria outlined above, and that we can prevent very bad things from happening, without Risky Giving 69 Concerns about risks of harming individuals should not deter one from embracing Singer's conclusion thereby sacrificing anything nearly as morally significant, by giving to them. Not everyone will, upon studying the empirical data, come to the same conclusion I have. But even if we should not give to any overseas charities, on grounds of risk of harm, does this mean that Singer's conclusion is false? Not exactly, as we could save up and grow our money rather than give it away now; we could instead give at a later time when presumably the risks of giving to charities are better understood. Of course, this carries with it the risk that we will never actually give! Another option is to give to promote charity research (for example by giving to GiveWell's Open Philanthropy Project), so that our donations can be used to accelerate progress on understanding the likely benefits and harms of giving to charities helping those in extreme poverty. This form of giving carries virtually no risk of harming others, and it is likely to do considerable good in the long run. This is another way of preventing very bad things from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything nearly as morally significant. Theron Pummer is a lecturer in philosophy and director of the Centre for Ethics, Philosophy and Public Affairs at the University of St Andrews. 70 Forum: Effective Altruism Esther McManus


The Shared Concerns of Nietzsche and Rumi on Humanity

Philosophy

THE SHARED CONCERNS OF NIETZSCHE AND RUMI ON HUMANITY S.H.H. Akhlaq Center for the Study of Culture and Values (CSCV) The Catholic University of America Gibbons Hall, B–9, 620 Michigan Ave., N.E. Washington, DC 20064 Nietzsche and Rumi belong to two different time and spaces: one a Germen Post-modern Philosopher, the other an Afghani Middle Ages Sufi. After an introduction about both figures and methodology used here, this paper presents a detailed discussion on commonalities between Nietzsche and Rumi. The first section illustrates on the shared methodology of writings which are the rousing language, hidden ideas amid simple points, and the paradoxical teachings. The second part studies the shared fundamental concepts among these philosophers. These concepts are Anti-idolism, the intuitional knowledge, and the authenticity of person. The last section of this paper called "inspirations" explains how those shared methodology and ideas serve two aims: mutual understanding between two different philosophies as well as enhancing our comprehension of humanity. Key words: Nietzsche, Rumi, anti-idolism, institution, paradoxical teachings, criticism, humanism BACKGROUND Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) and Jalal ad-Din Muhammad Balkhi Rumi (1207-1273) belong to two different times and spaces: one a Germen Post-modern Philosopher, the other an Afghani Middle Ages Sufi. The former can be understood in the context of history of Western philosophy and the latter in the Islamic mysticism. Nietzche is known for his shocking announcement: "God is dead", and Rumi for his vital invitation to fully dedicate oneself to God. However, they are outstanding and appealing to other cultures as well. By focusing on the existential demands of humanity, they, more or less, go beyond their historical and geographical limits. Since their work concentrated on the core of their culture, dealing with them connects readers with various fundamental aspects of their respective civilization. Nietzsche's books are very popular within Muslim intellectuals, particularly Farsi readers in Iran and Afghanistan, including the hometown of Rumi; and Rumi's poems are very popular among Western audiences, particularly North Americans. Both have been greatly inspiring to their adherents and for subsequent philosophical movements. Nietzsche is considered as a precursor to expressionism, existentialism, and postmodernism. The German philosopher Martin Heidegger canonized Nietzsche as the "last metaphysician", as such; Nietzsche's works reflect the entire potential of Western metaphysics in multiple aspects. In salient ways, Nietzsche is also considered the greatest metaphysician because not only did he develop the apex of metaphysical thought, but he prepared the ground for the possibility of a fundamental ontology, thus, as Heidegger noted, a seminal turning-point in the history of philosophy [1. P. 9]. Rumi is one of the most important figures of Islamic Sufism, promoting the idea of love, highlighting the merciful aspect inherent in Islam. His followers established a mystical order called the "Mawlawiya", well known in Western culture as the "WhirlAkhlaq S.H.H. The shared concerns of Nietzsche and Rumi on humanity 105 ing Dervishes" or performing "Sama" (1). Through meeting with an itinerant Sufi named Shams ad-Dın of Tabriz (1185-1248), Rumi experienced a full change from an ordinary Muslim scholar to a great Sufi. He described his spiritual change in this famous quote: "The outcome of my life is not more than three key words: I used to be raw, then I was cooked, and now I am on fire". Rumi's most influential work is the 27,000-verse didactic poem, Spiritual Couplets (Mathnawı-yi Ma'nawı) which explores the discovery of his Sufi experience. Recognized by many commentators, both within the Sufi tradition and outside it, the collection is considered the greatest mystical poem ever written [2. P. 13]. It is a more didactic book in Islamic Sufism than Divan-e Kabir, another of Rumi's poems. Referring constantly to Quranic verses, and Islamic authorized narrations, Rumi's work seeks to explain mystical issues in metaphors and examples in order to help people reach God. Moreover, it plays a big role in spreading Sufi ideas worldwide. For many intellectuals and for Sufis, Mathnawi is as important as the Holy Quran is among Muslims. This paper explains the subject matter of Mathnawi which is more detailed, systematic, and methodical than another poetic work of Rumi. While Rumi was concerned with the true nature of religion, thus contributing to a Sufi version of Islam, Nietzsche was concerned with the health of civilization suffering greatly from the "nihilism", characterized in his own term of the "death of God." In a philosophical attempt, Nietzsche dedicated himself to "de-deification of nature", the "translation of man back into nature", the "reevaluation of values", the tracing of the "genealogy of morals" and their critique, and the elaboration of "naturalistic" accounts of knowledge, value, morality, and our entire "spiritual" nature. While Rumi worried about replacement of the substantive with growing superficial religiosity in Islam, Nietzsche distinguished between "master" and "slave" moralities, warning that the latter threatened to become the dominant type of morality in the modern world. Thus, both figures illustrate the possibility of overcoming the faithful and infidel or good and evil dualism. Nietzsche's first book, The Birth of Tragedy (1872), represented both a break from classical scholarship and a highly critical rethinking of Socrates and modern scholarship. In The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzche looked to the Greek myth for clues and to the German composer Richard Wagner (1813-1883) for inspiration, in order to nurture human flourishing in the face of superficial religious faith and their substitutes, namely reason and sciences. However, Nietzsche's book remains one of the three most significant philosophical treatments of tragedy along with those of Aristotle and Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) and the soil from which Nietzsche's later philosophy grew (REP. N). Regarding Nietzsche, this article refers to his various books since they together give a clearer image of his work. Although he passed three different phases in his productive period of work, in all stages Nietzsche remained dissatisfied and critical of many aspects of modern Western culture, though in his middle period he celebrated the valuing of sciences and empirical truth. Consequently, his original thought must be understood throughout the totality of his work. In contrast, Rumi's work is understood only during the second half of his life which is centered with Mathnawi. Вестник РУДН, серия Философия, 2016, No 3 106 SHARED METHODOLOGY OF WRITINGS Although Nietzsche and Rumi bestowed extraordinary pieces of literature, philosophically their thoughts are more important than their written forms. Tiring of repeating ideas, they felt what might be termed a "prophetic mission" to transport their audiences to a new realm. To break the common sphere of thoughts and values, they chose a different style of writing: a non systematic method which paves the way for opposite interpretations. This fact also connects their special way of writing to their unique ideas. There are three common features in their writings: The rousing language: Nietzsche and Rumi do not consider themselves teachers to deliver information to the audiences, but missioners who want to wake up their audiences. The aim of teaching changes to guidance and the informative language changes to evoking create spirit of hesitation about accepted concepts. Rumi exhibits how guidance requires a continuous struggle, rebirth, and a full resurrection instead of organized and clear propositions. This guidance is associated with the language of love which consists of a strong dynamic rather than the static tongue of science (see Mathnawi, Book 2:1878-1922; 4: 1468-1481). This is the same for Nietzsche who calls himself "Dynamite" instead "human being" [3. P. 143-144] and believed that seeking to establish a system of thought contradicts integrity of humanity [3. P. 159]. The Zarathustra, in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, finally leaves his disciples saying, lose me and find yourselves, "Alone I go now, my disciples! You also should go now, and alone! Thus I want it. Indeed, I counsel you to go away from me and guard yourselves against Zarathustra! And even better: be ashamed of him! Perhaps he deceived you" [4. P. 58-59]. Hidden ideas amid simple points: Nietzsche and Rumi apply two different meanings to their words and distinguish between their esoteric and exoteric ones. The latter is for ordinary people and pave the path to systematize; however, the former, the real ones, are not for the public and need a heart similar to the authors, a heart wanting movement and authenticity. What is nourishes and cultures nature, can be harmful and unhealthy if they taken superficially (2). Rumi's words work like a sword - if there is no protection, it is better to not approach (see, Rumi: 1-691-2). He concludes, "When I speak of "lip", 'tis the lip (shore) of the Sea; when I say "not", the intended meaning is "except". By reason of (inward) sweetness I sit with sour face: from fullness of speech I am silent" (1:1759-1760). Nietzsche also distances himself from his writings. His beloved protagonist Zarathustra keeps people busy with loud sounds without letting them know his intention, "My favorite malice and art is that my silence learned not to betray itself through silence. Rattling with diction and dice I outwit the solemn waiting ones; my will and purpose shall elude all these fierce watchers" [4. P. 139]. Beyond Good and Evil explicitly distinguishes between exoteric and esoteric teachings, the same teachings have an inverse value for the soul and the body, and they are dangerous, disturbing, unsettling for those with lower vitality because they are herald-calls which makes the brave even braver [5. P. 30-31]. Thus they both call readers to remove masks and leave masks for ordinary people. The true audiences must transcend, removing the mask. Again, Rumi and Nietzsche reproach people for their masks and they seek to address minds similar to their own because lack of common blood between them may cause death to readers. Akhlaq S.H.H. The shared concerns of Nietzsche and Rumi on humanity 107 The paradoxical teachings: both thinkers clearly espouse paradoxical statements because they open the field for a strong mind to exercise their will. While will is the substance of humanity, it appears in a contradictory state. Rums narrates how the Prophet confirmed two opposite claims about himself, to being beautiful and ugly at the same time, providing an opportunity for the audiences to reflect on their inner characteristics (Rumi, 1:2362-2370). As we saw earlier, once Rumi said by "exclusion" he means "inclusion". This is why there are huge controversies among Rumi scholars on his theological, epistemological, or social perspectives. A stronger case appears in Nietzsche so that, for example, within the same text he denounces and recognizes socialism [6. P. 77]. His position on women, human rights, justice, virtues, the death of God, belief and faith, all move between two extremes. The Jesuit philosopher Frederick Copleston also observes there is a capacity to deduce opposite ideas from within Nietzsche's philosophy. This is why there is a huge dispute going on about his position on socialism, human rights, justice, moral values, the death of God, and feminism. As the result, the "perfect person" in Rumi and Nietzsche's "true philosopher" represent the richness of the whole world with all its contradictory and opposite phenomena; Rumi discussed this issue when discussing God's manifestation and opposite names [7]. Nietzsche believed that the true "philosopher is a brief abstract of the world"; the quality "that usually destroys a man" [6. P. 511-12]; If Rumi's desired man reflects God's attributes, then Nietzsche's man reflects a Dionysian relationship to existence as well [6. P. 536-537]. These common features in the writings of Nietzsche and Rumi bring the two closer together. For some, however, these features make it difficult to interpret and to take them seriously so that some have taken them to repudiate the traditional philosophical enterprise of seeking reasoned conclusions. For example, some readers draw attention to Rumi's belief that philosophy in and of itself is impractical; it is based on syllogism, a weak form of argumentation that Rumi saw as akin to a "wooden column", adding that, "the leg of the syllogisers (3) is of wood: a wooden leg is very infirm" (Rumi, 1:2128). However, this interpretation ignores both Rumi's emphasis on rationality and his own illuminative philosophy. He exalts rationalization so greatly that he prays God keeps his enemies alive with it, because a lack of rationality creates much suffering for humanity. Rumi concludes that religious founders love rational enemies more than non-rational friends (4:1944-1951; also see 2:277-9). Similarly, some erroneously conclude that Nietzsche heralds in the "death" not only of religious and metaphysical thinking, but also of philosophy itself. They overlook how Nietzsche suggested a way of overcoming the nihilism, recasting notions of truth and knowledge, and his last attempts to contribute to the comprehension of a broad range of phenomena [8. P. 1-18]. We can see now that Rumi's and Nietzsche's methodology is sometimes similar. Their content is sometimes similar as well. SHARED FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPT Nietzsche and Rumi were very critical of their contemporary dominant world views, seeing them as characterized by uncritical "idol" worship. Human life and spirit, they believed, is needlessly sacrificed to these idols. Both encourage their audiences to follow their guidance by evaluated common ideas with inherent human intuition. Вестник РУДН, серия Философия, 2016, No 3 108 Anti-idolism: Rumi considers himself a successor to the historical chain of idolbreakers. The prophets and original thinkers have not come to construct ideology for humanity to imprison them within. While prophets and original thinkers are sometimes associates with idols and temples, Rumi is solely concerned with highlighting how these figures expose idols as fake; ideas and concepts have to serve humanity, humanity should not serve ideas (Rumi, 4:814-817). Ironically, people often make icons and idols of the prophets or leading intellectuals, while, in reality, they were idol-breakers. They have invited people to an absolute free-consciousness. Thus, Rumi calls people to thank previous idol-breakers, and to free both their minds and their hearts from all idols, regardless of their labels (2:74; 366; 370). Nietzsche accuses the pervious philosophers of neglecting a historical approach, one lacking the courage to face change, one constantly creating new idols. The "Twilight of the Idols" attempts to show, "How to Philosophize with a Hammer" and be strongly critical of all accepted philosophical concepts and propositions. The intuitional knowledge: Rationality is common good for humanity, although it depends on its meaning and application. It is inherently gifted, and - like dignity - it is inseparable from human nature. Philosophers consider rationality as composed of at least two opposite ideas: first, logical arguments based on clear and distinct concepts; second, justified arguments based of personal intuition. While the former focuses on fixed and stabilized concepts the latter precipitates vital and flexible ideas. Some emphasize this difference by distinguishing reason from intellect. However, there is no doubt that some great ideas come from in-depth intuition as a result of individual achievement, not the conclusions of others. Although philosophy in general advocates individual exploration and an original struggle for the truth, an illustrative philosophy looks for a particular type of individuality. This individuality leads Nietzsche and Rumi to emphasize love and intuition rather than rationalism and common sense. They share a common perspective regarding the supremacy of love and intuition. Rumi is well-known as the master of love, experiencing love in his entire being, especially after meeting with Shams. Rumi talks about nothing but love in the form of stories. "The King and the Maid" in Book I, "Moses and the Shepherds" in Book II "the life of Sadr-e-Jahan" in Book Ill and IV, "The story of Mahmood and Ayaz" in Book V, and "Leili and Majnoon" in the Book VI provide only a few examples of Rumi's concept of love. The combination of love and intuition in Rumi has a different echo in Nietzsche's "Gay Science." Nietzsche passionate style and missionary feel reflects his intuition or "instinct", a unique property of authentic original thinkers. Nietzsche demands that philosophers be honest in declaring their ideas as being "a prejudiced proposition, idea, or 'suggestion,' which is generally their heart's desire abstracted and refined, defended by them with arguments sought out after the event" [5. P. 5]. The classical philosophers - "these lords of concept idolatry" - kill the things they love Nietzsche observes. Thus, with such dead ideas, philosophers look for reasons why their ideas are in disharmony with reality [3. P. 167]. Here, there is a sort of harmony between the philosophers' weak character and impractical teachings [6. P. 235, 276-281]. To conclude, since the intuition is not transferable, societal teaching and informative language does not work. Rumi and Nietzsche's thinking is merely based on their personal and unique experiences, both in style of comprehension and style of life. Moreover, their word is more a kind of self-unveiling. Akhlaq S.H.H. The shared concerns of Nietzsche and Rumi on humanity 109 The authenticity of a person: Uniqueness and associated individuality is central for both Rumi and Nietzsche. Rumi, like all Sufis, believes there is no repeated entity in all of nature (4:423-4). He sees each person as a unique reflection of God as well as humanity as the prefect reflection of God. "Therefore Man is in appearance a derivative of the world, and intrinsically the origin of the world. Observe this!" Rumi says, "A gnat will set his outward frame whirling round (in pain and agitation); his inward nature encompasses the Seven Heavens" (4:3767-8). Thus the love of God leads Rumi to love of humanity in each individual. Nietzsche's idea of "having the courage to confront the eternal recurrence of the same" links him to openness to others, each single person, no matter who they are. This context brings both thinkers to see humanity in a vast graded circle, "The eternal recurrence, a prophecy" [6. P. 35, 543]. For Rumi, humanity begins from dust and finishes with God; for Nietzsche, humanity moves from the animal - "herd" - to the superhuman, or "Ubermensch". The point is, there is an open field for everyone, one that gives the individual the opportunity to determine their own spot. This is the matter of movement and change, not of fixed stability. Humans must determine what they want to be, as opposed to what is given to them. To Rumi and Nietzsche, such distinctions are necessary in order to highlight the difference between the current and the desired states of humanity. The first one is given and based on nature, in Nietzsche, or God in Rumi. The second is based on human actualized will, the "will to power" for Nietzsche, the "will to annihilate in God" for Rumi. The authenticity of a person comes from his/her will to be. However, regardless of the present state of each person, Rumi and Nietzsche advocate a different individualism, one which respects the diversity of humanity because all people emerge from their will, whether consciously or not. These two features of human dignity, namely that the current situation of a person is not a desired state and that the very highly esteemed dignity of a person depends on each individual and must be actualized, motivates Nietzsche to criticize rationalism and modern humanism. Similarly, Rumi to criticize rationalism and the superficial understanding of religion, particularly Islam. Modern humanism is based on a stable nature of humanity which defines people as limited rational animals, reducing them to a very low level of commonality. The superficial understanding of Islam, as Rumi criticizes, leads to a high respect of mosques but severely insults a realized man (2:3109-11). It reduces humanity from a manifestation of God to a tool for the interests of religious leaders. At the realm of ordinary people, Rumi and Nietzsche do not devaluate common sense and rationality, but in terms of the ultimate ideal, they radically criticize rationalism. Rumi considers it improper to categorize animals and other temporal beings with humans who are eternal manifestations of God. Nietzsche considers it living in everydayness and gregarious morality [9]. INSPIRATIONS The above-shared ideas serve two aims: mutual understanding between two different kinds of thought as well as enhancing our comprehension of humanity. Regarding humanity, the German philosopher and Muslim Sufi from two opposite contexts, antiВестник РУДН, серия Философия, 2016, No 3 110 religious and religious, philosophical and mystical, Western and Eastern, Post Modern and Pre-Modern perspectives, Nietzsche and Rumi come to the same point of a unique dignity of humanity. The core of their thought is human dignity and actualization of their own unlimited capacity. According to Rumi, the real identity of mankind is the awareness of the particular relation to God. It also means self-improvement, a fact that has an interconnection with individuality connected with authenticity. A Sufi tries to discover his/her inner capacity and the names and attributes of God within. Since there is a unity between different names and attributes of God as well as similar and distinct features, humans can learn through communication, to explore the beauty of the "other"; "Know the truth to be this, (that) all these (various persons) are not in the right; nor (again) are this herd entirely astray", Rumi states, "He that says, 'All are true'-'tis folly (on his part); and he that says, 'All are false'-he is damned" (2:2927 & 2942). Everybody discovers a side of reality that is one shade of truth. This knowledge leads to love of life in all its manifestations. Then we not only have to tolerate and accept "others", but must also respect them as several manifestations of God and as the best guide to self-improvement. One outcome of self-consciousness is awareness of the essential differences of people. There is only one reality; God (Haq). Other entities are only His manifestations [7]. God changes to "becoming" in Nietzsche. The superhuman fully actualized himself and wants everybody be an authorized self. All are diverse manifestations of "becoming". Regardless of how people possess authenticity, they have value. Value is not something external or to be given. A noble soul "has no doubt that the exchange of honors and rights, as the essence of all intercourse, belongs also to the natural condition of things" [5. P. 212]. The "Gay Science" requires not taking anything serious, including the external position of the superhuman. The superhuman truth is true merely to him. He is valid merely for himself; inspiring to others but nobody knows what will be inspired because there are not simple, passive and active roles [5. P. 48]. As a result, the positive sides of both thoughts are to respect and to accept the differences; the uniqueness of every person means we can't anticipate others to live, think, believe, behave and feel like us. Plus, if they are in a situation that seems wrong and bad to us, it is not actually so. They expose God's name and attributes in Rumi and faces of "becoming" in Nietzsche. They also inspire us that we are not allowed to reduce humanity to rational beings; rationality is a common base but not the last step. Awareness of this limitation paves the path to intuition/instinct which, in turn, breaks the dominance of totalitarianism. However, here a new meaning of humanism appears; love of each single part of humanity as a huge potential and open world rather than a fixed and defined entity. This meaning of humanity covers various stages of people with different backgrounds, races, cultures, interests, and needs. Humanity is not more a special species of beings, but everybody is a unique species. This approach can be related to cultural and social aspects as well. Thus, categorizing people under fixed sorts only keeps philosophers inside humanmade limitations. They need to break the intellectual idols, to explore their inner conAkhlaq S.H.H. The shared concerns of Nietzsche and Rumi on humanity 111 sciousness, and to connect people directly. In addition, going beyond good and evil in both Nietzsche and Rumi calls for people to overcome the institutionalized category of sacred and secular, black and white, false and true, and material and spiritual. Nietzsche and Rumi seem elitist, but they do not want to kill ordinary people in favor of selected peoples. Finally, when Nietzsche highlights Zarathustra as the origin of ongoing metaphysical dualism of the Western civilization in philosophy, ethics and even sciences, he clearly wants to show how world civilizations are interrelated together and borrow from each other in their substantial nature. Also, when Rumi criticizes dominant ideas in the Islamic world and concentrates on all peoples as various manifestations of God, he apparently inspires them to be constructive contributors to world life. Thus, they both encourage us to mutual cooperation for a meaningful life. NOTES (1) Sama is a significant part of the Mawlawiya spiritual path. The word Sama in Arabic means "the audition". As such, the Sama dance consists of three parts: classical music, recitation of mystical poetry, and various forms of ritual and whirling movement. In Islamic mysticism, Sama historically started with Abu Said Ibn Abi L-Khayr (967-1049), who first introduced this dance. Ahmad Ghazzali (d. 1126) expanded the theory of Sama. Attar (1145-1221) and Iraqi (1213-1289) developed rules for the dance. Finally, it was perfected by Rumi. See Akhlaq, 2012, p. 183. (2) An example of this is Nazi interpretation of Nietzsche's philosophy. With Rumi, Similar misunderstandings include narrow-minded Shariah practitioner or Western perceptions that Rumi's philosophy is limited to simple notions of "love". (3) Syllogism in the classic thought of Islam equates philosophy, in contrast to the path of love and intuition referring to Sufism. Both are different of polemic arguments which associate with the revealed theology (Kalam). REFERENCES [1] Howey R.L. Heidegger and Jaspers on Nietzsche, Springer, 2012. [2] Mojeddedi J. (translated and introduced), Rumi The Masnavi, Oxford University Press, 2004. [3] Nietzsche F. The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and Other Writings, Judith Norman (Trans.), Cambridge: Cambridge Press, 2006. [4] Nietzsche F. Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None, Adrian Del Caro (Trans.), Cambridge: Cambridge Press, 2006. [5] Nietzsche F. Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future, Judith Rorman (Trans.), Cambridge: Cambridge Press, 2002. [6] Nietzsche F. The Will to Power, Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale (Trans.), New York: Vintage Books, 1976. [7] Akhlaq Sayed Hassan. The Theoretical Foundations of Tolerance in Rumi, in "Philosophy, Culture, and Traditions: A Journal of the World Union of Catholic Philosophical Societies. 2013. No. 9. P. 165-187. [8] Magnus Bernd and Higgins Kathleen (ed.). The Cambridge Companion to Nietzsche. Cambridge, Cambridge Press, 2006. [9] Akhlaq Sayed Hassan. From Mawlana to Nietzsche. Iran: Qum: Sulok-e Javan: 1386/2007. Вестник РУДН, серия Философия, 2016, No 3 ОБЩЕЕ В ПОНИМАНИИ ГУМАННОСТИ НИЦШЕ И РУМИ С.Х.X. Аклак Центр изучения культуры и ценностей Американский католический университет Гиббонс Холл, B-9, 620 Мичиган Авеню, Вашингтон 20064 Ницше и Руми принадлежат к разным эпохам и культурам: один - немецкий философ постмодерна, а второй - афганский суфий Средневековья. После введения в философию обоих авторов, в статье детально рассматриваются общие для Ницше и Руми взгляды. Первая часть раскрывает общую методологию мыслителей, которые анализируют фигуры речи, скрытые смыслы в простых положениях, а также их парадоксальные учения. Вторая часть посвящена общим фундаментальным понятиям в трудах обоих философов, таким как анти-идол, интуитивное знание и подлинность человеческого бытия. Последняя часть статьи под названием «вдохновение» объясняет как общая методология и идеи мыслителей служат двум целям: взаимопониманию между двумя философами и расширению нашего понимания гуманности. Ключевые слова: Ницше, Руми, анти-идол, институт, парадоксальные учения, критицизм, гуманизм