'Beyond consensus? A Reply to Alan Irwin.'

Philosophy

This paper is a rejoinder to Alan Irwin's constructive response "Agreeing to Differ?" to our (2017) paper. We zoom in on the three main issues Irwin raises, namely (a) How to understand consensus? (b) Why are so many public participation activities consensus-driven? (c) Should we not value the art of closure, of finding ways to make agreements, particularly in view of the dire state of world politics today? We use this opportunity to highlight and further develop some of our ideas.

http://social-epistemology.com ISSN: 2471-9560 Beyond Consensus? A Reply to Alan Irwin, Jeroen Van Bouwel and Michiel Van Oudheusden Jeroen Van Bouwel, Ghent University, Belgium Michiel Van Oudheusden, University of Leuven, Belgium –––––––––––––––––– Van Bouwel, Jeroen; Van Oudheusen, Michiel. "Beyond Consensus? A Reply to Alan Irwin." Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 6, 10 (2017): 48-53. http://wp.me/p1Bfg0-3Pq (provided by WordPress) 48 Vol. 6, no. 10 (2017): 48-53. http://wp.me/p1Bfg0-3Pq We are grateful to Alan Irwin for his constructive response, "Agreeing to Differ?" to our paper and, notwithstanding differences between his view and ours, we agree with many of his comments. In this short rejoinder, we zoom in on the three main issues Irwin raises. We also use this opportunity to highlight and further develop some of our ideas. The three issues Irwin brings up are: A. How to understand consensus? Rather than, or along with, a thin 'Anglo-Saxon' sense of consensus as mutual agreement, one could adopt a thick conception of consensus, implying "faith in the common good and commitment to building a shared culture" (Irwin 2017). The thick sense (as enacted in Danish culture) suggests that disagreement is an integral part of consensus. Therefore, we would do well to pay more attention to conflict handling and disagreement within consensus-oriented discourse. B. Why are so many public participation activities consensus-driven? We should question the institutional and political contexts within which consensus-seeking arises and how these contexts urge us to turn away from conflict and disagreement. And, why do public participation activities persist at all, given all the criticism they receive from various sides? C. Should we not value the art of closure, of finding ways to make agreements, particularly in view of the dire state of world politics today? These are legitimate questions and concerns, and Irwin is right to point them out. However, we believe some of the concepts discussed in our paper are helpful in addressing them. Let us start with the first issue Irwin raises, which we will link to the concept of meta-consensus. Meta-Consensus It is indeed helpful to draw a distinction between the thinner Anglo-Saxon sense of consensus and the thicker sense of consensus as faith in the common good, as Irwin suggests. In the latter sense, disagreement and dissensus can be seen as part of the consensus. We fully agree with Irwin that consensus and dissensus should be thought together rather than presented only in terms of contradiction and opposition. This is why we analytically distinguish a (simple) consensus from a meta-consensus. As we sketch in our article, at the simple level, we might encounter disagreement and value pluralism, whereas at the meta-level, the meta-consensus provides a common ground for participation by explicitly or implicitly laying out the rules of engagement, the collective ways to handle conflict, and how to close or disclose discussion. The meta-consensus also impinges on the scope of issues that is opened to discussion, who may or may not participate, the stopping rules, the structure of interaction, and the rationales and procedures that guide participation in general. We have sought to put this meta-consensus center stage by comparing and contrasting how it is enacted in, or through, two participation cases (participatory TA and the NIH consensus J. Van Bouwel, M. Van Oudheusden 49 conference). In this way, we seek to give due attention to the common ground that enables and constrains consensus and dissensus formation, and to different institutional designs impinging on participation, without insisting on the necessity of a simple consensus or the need for closure. Drawing attention to the meta-consensus that governs participation may help to facilitate more reflexive modes of engagement that can be opened to joint discussion rather than imposed on participants. It should also help participants to better understand when and why they are in disagreement and determine courses of action when this is the case. As such, it may contribute to "building a shared culture" by facilitating and by establishing a shared adhesion to the principles of inclusion, mutual listening, and respect (cf. Horst and Irwin 2010; Irwin 2017). However, we believe it is equally important to emphasize that there is always the possibility of dissensus, irreconciliation, and further conflict. As we see it, entertaining this possibility is an important prerequisite or condition for genuine participation, as it creates an open and contested space in which participants can think, and engage, as adversaries. Thus, we concur with Irwin that consensus and dissensus both have a place in public participatory exercises (and in the public sphere more generally). However, when we are faced with a choice between them (as with fundamental disputes, such as those over abortion or human enhancement), we must carefully consider how, whether, and why we seek (dis)agreement. This is not to argue against consensus-seeking, but to insist on the importance of constructing and sustaining an agonistic, contestable order within participation. Different Democratic Models of Participation Irwin appropriately proposes to reflect more on the institutional and political contexts in which participation is organized. The question why we aim for consensus in public participation activities, as well as the broader question of why public participation activities persist at all, do indeed deserve more attention. We have not addressed these questions in our paper, but we do think being more explicit about the aims of participation is an integral part of the approach that we are advocating. In order to discuss and choose among the different democratic models of participation (aggregative, deliberative, participatory, and agonistic), it is imperative that we understand their political, economic, and social purposes or roles and make these explicit. Similarly, we may ask how the models serve different aims within specific institutional and political contexts. Here, the notion of political culture springs to mind, as in our region (Flanders) and country (Belgium), conflicts and divisions between groups are often managed through social concertation between trade unions, employers' organizations, and governments. This collective bargaining approach both challenges and complements more participatory modes of decision making (Van Oudheusden et al. 2015). As mentioned earlier, we do not consider this issue in our paper but it is well worthy of further reflection and consideration. Irwin also wonders whether policy makers might think our concepts and models of participation miss the point as many of them see it. It is an interesting question (we wonder 50 Vol. 6, no. 10 (2017): 48-53. http://wp.me/p1Bfg0-3Pq whether Irwin has any particular cases in mind), but one thing we can do is to insist that there is no one-size-fits-all approach to participation. Different options are available, as each participation model has strengths and weaknesses. It seems important to us to attend to these strengths and weaknesses, as the models designate roles and responsibilities (e.g. by specifying who is included in participation and how), foresee how the collective should interact and indicate what kinds of results may ensue from participatory practice. By juxtaposing them, we get a better picture of how problems, contexts, and challenges are framed and handled differently within each participatory setting. As making trade-offs between approaches is at the heart of policymaking, we invite policy makers (and decision makers more broadly) to explore these settings with us, and carefully consider how they embed multiple social and techno-scientific values and orientations. Disclosure As Irwin rightly notes in his reply, we do not propose one final alternative to existing practice but entertain the possibility of mobilizing more than one model of democracy in participation. This implies that we also allow for a consensual approach when it is warranted. However, in developing ideals that contrast with consensus, we open onto disclosure and a more agonistic appraisal of participation, thereby abandoning the ideal, and appeal, of final closure. In response to this move, Irwin wonders whether we should not value the art of closure, especially in these times. While we agree on the dire state of world politics, we are not convinced that replacing closure by disclosure would aggravate the present situation. Perhaps the contrary is true. What if the quest for consensus brought us to this situation in the first place? As the political theorist Chantal Mouffe argues, in a world of consensual politics (also characterized as neoliberal, de-politicized or post-political, or in Mouffe's words as a "politics of the center"), many voters turn to populists to voice their dissatisfaction (Mouffe 2005: 228). Populists build on this dissatisfaction, publicly presenting themselves as the only real alternative to the status quo. Thus, consensual politics contributes to hardening the opposition between those who are in (the establishment) and those who are out (the outsiders). In this antagonistic relation, the insiders carry the blame for the present state of affairs. This tension is exacerbated through the blurring of the boundaries between the political left and right, as conflicts can no longer be expressed through the traditional democratic channels hitherto provided by party politics. Thus, well-intentioned attempts by "Third Way" thinkers, among others, to transcend left/right oppositions eventually give rise to antagonism, with populists (and other outsiders) denouncing the search for common ground. Instead, these outsiders seek to conquer more ground, to annex or colonize, typically at the expense of others. Whether one agrees with Mouffe's analysis of recent political developments or not, it is instructive to consider her vision of radical, agonistic (rather than antagonistic) politics. Contrary to antagonists, agonistic pluralists do seek some form of common ground; albeit a contested J. Van Bouwel, M. Van Oudheusden 51 one that is negotiated politically. In this way, agonists "domesticate" antagonism, so that opposing parties confront each other as adversaries who respect the right to differ, rather than as enemies who seek to obliterate one another. Thus, an agonistic democracy enables a confrontation among adversaries for instance, among liberal-conservative, socialdemocratic, neo-liberal and radical-democratic factions. A common ground (or metaconsensus) is established between these adversaries through party identification around clearly differentiated positions and by offering citizens a choice between political alternatives. To reiterate, antagonistic democracy is characterised by the lack of a shared contested symbolic space (in other words, a meta-consensus) and the lack of agonistic channels through which grievances can be legitimately expressed. This lack emerges when there is too much consensus and consensus-seeking, as is arguably now the case in many (but not all) Western democracies. We therefore need to be explicit about the many aspects and different possible democratic models of participation. Rather than emphasize the need for more consensus and for closure, we would do well to engage with the notions of dissensus and disclosure. This, in our mind, seems to be a more fruitful venue to sort out various political problems in the long run than attaching to the ideal of consensus and consensus-seeking. Disclosure keeps the channels open. It is a form of opening joint discussion on the various models of participation, not with the aim of inciting endless debate but of making the most of them by reflectively probing their strengths and weaknesses in specific situations and contexts. Rather than aiming for closure beyond plurality, it urges us to articulate what is at stake, for whom, and why, and what types of learning emerge in and through participation. It should also increase our understanding of what "game" – participatory model – we are enacting. Beyond Consensus? At the end of his response, Irwin raises the very pertinent question as to whether we need more disclosure now around climate change. For Irwin, "certain consensual ideals seem more important" (Irwin 2017). There are many aspects to Irwin's big question, but let us pick out a couple and start sketching an answer. First, calling for a consensual approach or a consensus regarding climate change risks backfiring. A demand for consensus in science may lead to more doubt mongering (cf. Oreskes & Conway 2010), not so much because of disagreement among scientists, but due to external pressures from various lobby or pressure groups that gain from manufacturing controversy (e.g. industry players and environmental NGOs). A lack of scientific consensus (within a framework that emphasizes the importance of achieving a scientific consensus) might, in turn, be used by politicians to undercut or criticize science or policies based on scientific evidence and consensus. Even the slightest doubt about a claimed consensus may erode public trust in climate science and scientists, as was the case in 2009 with Climategate. Second, the demand for consensus in science might also set too high expectations for scientists (neglecting constraints on all sides, such as lack of time, scientific pluralism, and so on) and suggest that dissent in science is a marker of science failing to deliver. 52 Vol. 6, no. 10 (2017): 48-53. http://wp.me/p1Bfg0-3Pq Third, granting too much importance to scientific consensus risks silencing legitimate dissent (e.g. controversial alternative theories), whereas dissent and controversies also drive science and innovation. (There are, as we all know, many important scientific discoveries, paradigms, and theories that were for a long time ignored or suppressed because they went against the prevailing consensus.) We are thus led to say that seeking a consensus on climate change does not result in effective policies and policymaking. Taking to heart Irwin's plea "to imagine the kinds of closure which might be fruitfully established," we think it is important to ask if closure here necessarily unfolds with consensus seeking, and if so, how consensus is best understood. Finding ways to break the antagonism invoked by a (depoliticized) scientific consensus on climate change may ultimately be more fruitful to forge long-term durable solutions among particular groups of actors, something that might be done by publicly disclosing the divergent agendas, stakes, and power mechanisms at play in "climate change." (A scientific consensus does not tell us what to do about climate change anyway.) Seen in this way, and again drawing on Mouffe, an agonistic constellation might have to be put in place, where disclosure challenges, or even breaks, the sterile opposition between outsiders and insiders. This is because disclosure requires that insiders clearly distinguish and differentiate their policies from one another, which urges them to develop real alternatives to existing problems. Ideally, these alternatives would embed a diversity of values around climate change and engender solutions that make use of the best available science without threatening a group's core values (cf. Bolsen, Druckman & Cook 2015). To give some quick examples, a first example could center on reducing the amount of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases by adjusting consumption patterns; a second could insist on private enterprise-driven geo-engineering to mitigate global warming and its effects (e.g. technology to deflect heat away from the earth's surface); a third alternative on making cash from carbon by emission-trading systems; a fourth on moving to Mars, etc. Whichever political options are decided on, we again emphasize the importance of questioning the rationales and processes of consensus-seeking, which to our mind, are too often taken for granted. Creating a more agonistic setting might change the current stalemate around climate change (and related wicked problems), by re-imagining the relationships between insider and outsider groups, by insisting that different alternatives are articulated and heard, and by publicly disclosing the divergent agendas, stakes, and power mechanisms in the construction of problems and their solutions. Conclusion Thanks in large part to Alan Irwin's thoughtful and carefully written response to our article, we are led to reflect on, and develop, the concepts of meta-consensus, disclosure, and democratic models of participation. We are also led to question the ideals of consensus and dissensus, as well as the processes that drive and sustain them, and to find meaningful and productive ways to disclose our similarities and differences. By highlighting different models of J. Van Bouwel, M. Van Oudheusden 53 democracy and how these models are enacted in participation, we want to encourage reflection upon the different implications of participatory consensus-seeking. We hope our article and our conversation with Irwin facilitates further reflection of this kind, to the benefit of participation scholars, practitioners, and decision makers. Contact details: firstname.lastname@example.com References Bolsen, Toby; Druckman, James; and Cook, Fay Lomax. "Citizens', Scientists' and Policy Advisors' Beliefs about Global Warming." Annals of the AAPSS 658 (2015): 271-295. Horst, Maja; and Irwin, Alan. "Nations at Ease with Radical Knowledge: on Consensus, Consensusing and False Consensusness." Social Studies of Science 40, no. 1 (2010): 105-126. Irwin, Alan. 2017. "Agreeing to Differ? A Response to Van Bouwel and Van Oudheusden." Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 6, no. 10 (2017): 11-14. Mouffe, Chantal. "The Limits of John Rawls' Pluralism." Politics, Philosophy and Economics 4, no. 2 (2005): 221-31. Oreskes, Naomi and Erik Conway. Merchants of Doubt: How a Handful of Scientists Obscured the Truth on Issues from Tobacco Smoke to Global Warming. London: Bloomsbury Press, 2010. Van Bouwel, Jeroen and Michiel Van Oudheusden. "Participation Beyond Consensus? Technology Assessments, Consensus Conferences and Democratic Modulation." Social Epistemology 31, no. 6 (2010): 497-513. Van Oudheusden, Michiel, Charlier, Nathan, Rosskamp, Benedikt & Pierre Delvenne. "Broadening, Deepening, and Governing Innovation: Flemish Technology Assessment in Historical and Socio-Political Perspective." Research Policy 44, no. 10 (2015): 1877-1886.


Philosophy

For liberalism, values such as respect, reciprocity, and tolerance should frame cultural encounters in multicultural societies. However, it is easy to disregard that  power  differences  and  political  domination  also  influence  the  cultural  sphere  and  the  relations  between  cultural  groups.  In  this  essay,  I  focus  on  some challenges for cultural pluralism. In relation to Indian political theorist Rajeev Bhargava, I discuss the meaning of cultural domination and epistemic injustice  and  their  historical  and  moral  implications.  Bhargava  argued  that  as  a  consequence  of  colonialism,  âindigenous  culturesâ  were  inferiorized,  marginalized,  and  anonymized.  Although  cultures  are  often  changing  due  to external influences, I argue that epistemic injustice implies that a culture is  forced  to  subjection,  disrespected,  and  considered  as  inferior  and  that  it  threatens  the  dominated  peopleâs  epistemic  framework,  collective  identity,  and  existential  security.  Finally,  I  refer  to  John  Rawlsâs  theory  of  political  liberalism  as  a  constructive  approach  to  avoid  parochialism  and  Western  cultural domination

Cultural Pluralism and Epistemic Injustice Göran Collste Linköping University Abstract For liberalism, values such as respect, reciprocity, and tolerance should frame cultural encounters in multicultural societies. However, it is easy to disregard that power differences and political domination also influence the cultural sphere and the relations between cultural groups. In this essay, I focus on some challenges for cultural pluralism. In relation to Indian political theorist Rajeev Bhargava, I discuss the meaning of cultural domination and epistemic injustice and their historical and moral implications. Bhargava argued that as a consequence of colonialism, "indigenous cultures" were inferiorized, marginalized, and anonymized. Although cultures are often changing due to external influences, I argue that epistemic injustice implies that a culture is forced to subjection, disrespected, and considered as inferior and that it threatens the dominated people's epistemic framework, collective identity, and existential security. Finally, I refer to John Rawls's theory of political liberalism as a constructive approach to avoid parochialism and Western cultural domination. Keywords cultural pluralism; epistemic injustice; liberalism; colonialism; historical justice; globalization; Rajeev Bhargava; John Rawls Introduction For liberalism, values such as respect, reciprocity, and tolerance should frame cultural encounters in multicultural societies. However, it is easy to disregard that power differences and political domination also influence the cultural sphere. In the age of colonialism, Europe controlled large parts of the world for more than 400 years. In this essay, I discuss cultural pluralism from this historical point of departure. In relation to Indian political theorist Rajeev Bhargava, I discuss the meaning of cultural domination and epistemic injustice and their historical and moral implications. Finally, I refer to John Rawls's theory of political liberalism as a constructive approach to avoid parochialism and Western cultural domination. © 2019 Göran Collste, published by Sciendo. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 4.0 License. Journal of Nationalism, Memory & Language Politics Volume 13 Issue 2  DOI 10.2478/jnmlp-2019-0008 * Göran Collste, Linköping University, Centre for Applied Ethics, 58183 Linköping, Sweden; Goran. email@example.com Unauthentifiziert | Heruntergeladen 01.10.19 07:33 UTC 2 Journal of Nationalism, Memory & Language Politics 13(2) Culture is a broad and vague concept. In this essay, culture and cultural differences relate to questions of epistemic frameworks, religions, traditions, and political principles. It could be questionable to use such a broad concept of culture, but it does not pose a problem for my argument. Epistemic Injustice For many years, I was responsible for an international master's program in applied ethics. I taught a course on globalization and global justice, and one aspect was global rectificatory justice: how can we understand global justice from the perspective of historical justice? What are the implications of colonialism for today's global relations? Is the legacy of colonialism still visible? I raised the question whether colonialism had left any morally relevant traces in the present, and a student from Pakistan spoke out and explained with some anger in her voice: "Yes, certainly! Everything Pakistani is today considered of less worth compared to the West: we consider our own history as shameful and we feel that we are still slaves under the British rulers. These feelings have also a cultural impact today; to be beautiful is to have blond hair, not black, to be civilized is to eat with knife and fork, not to eat in our traditional way, and our traditional languages are superseded by English." The student from Pakistan felt that her culture is of less worth than the Western. This experience has its background in the history of colonialism: a history of domination, exploitation, and marginalization. The problem she points at has several ethical aspects. First, her basic sense of self-respect is violated; second, she does not perceive herself as equal to the "Western"; and third, her autonomy, i.e. her capability to determine her life and destiny, is put in question by her cultural heritage. Hence, the experience of being subject to cultural domination threatens her human dignity, equality, and autonomy. The story told by the master student illustrates what Rajeev Bhargava calls "epistemic injustice" (Bhargava 2013). Enduring social relations of the superior and subordinate has a tendency to create images of the Other and of oneself, and these images are shared by both the superior and the subordinate. We can notice this phenomenon in the history of class relations, gender relations, race relations, and colonial relations. In the history of colonialism, the master, the white, is looked up to and the servant, the slave, the colored, is someone to look down on. Unauthentifiziert | Heruntergeladen 01.10.19 07:33 UTC 3 Göran Collste Cultural Pluralism and Epistemic Injustice Cultural images stamped by colonialism have been analyzed in postcolonial studies (Said 2003, Loomba 2005). I here limit my discussion to Bhargava's ideas of how colonialism implied epistemic injustice. Colonialism meant occupation of lands and a flow of resources from the colonies to the colonial powers, disempowering the former and enriching the latter. It also presupposed physical violence to keep the subaltern in place. However, colonialism implied more than that. Cultures and minds were also "colonized," according to Bhargava. When trying to explain and theorize what colonization of cultures and minds means, Bhargava introduced the concept of "epistemic framework." He defined it as follows: "An epistemic framework is a historically generated, collectively sustained system of meanings and significance, by reference to which a group understands and evaluates its individual and collective identity" (Bhargava 2013, 401). An epistemic framework helps us to interpret, understand, and categorize our impressions and experiences, so that they are manageable and possible to communicate and assess. Bhargava's definition also emphasizes the importance of an epistemic framework for identity formation (individual and collective). A shared epistemic framework is important – indeed necessary – for any social group, such as ethnic, cultural or religious group. It provides basic hermeneutical tools for understanding the world and ourselves. An epistemic framework is also a hermeneutical resource for individuals to interpret and respond to new situations. According to Bhargava, epistemic injustice means that "concepts and categories" providing self-understanding and orientation are replaced or marginalized by a dominant power, in his case the colonizer. It was, Bhargava wrote, "... important/for the colonizer/to conquer not only the land and goods of the colonized but also their culture and minds" (Bhargava 2013, 414). How did this materialize? According to Bhargava, cultural and epistemic injustice can take different forms and the epistemic framework of the colonized was overthrown and lost by different processes. First, one form of epistemic injustice is when the dominant epistemic categories are the ones of the colonizers and the traditional, domestic, historical and cultural traditions become "scattered and diffused." Bhargava wrote, "If the members of a group are denied access to their own culture then they suffer from cultural injustice" (Bhargava 2007, 218). Another form of epistemic injustice implies that the epistemic framework of the colonized is preserved, but it is considered of less worth and is inferior and marginalized in the society. A third form of epistemic injustice implies that the content of Unauthentifiziert | Heruntergeladen 01.10.19 07:33 UTC 4 Journal of Nationalism, Memory & Language Politics 13(2) the colonized epistemic framework is distorted. Bhargava gave an example: For the colonizer, the colonized appeared as a collective, a mass of people and not as individuals. They then transferred this view to the epistemic framework of the colonized, portraying it falsely as "collectivist" (Bhargava 2007, 231). This resulted in colonial policies "... based on the idea that the conception of an individual was simply absent among the colonized and that only group identity mattered in their traditions" (Bhargava 2013, 415). So, in sum, according to Bhargava, epistemic injustice implies that the local epistemic framework is dissolved, marginalized, or distorted. Why then was it important to conquer the minds of the colonized? It is because, in this way, they overtook views and values of the colonizers. They internalized them, and they then saw themselves as inferior and colonialism as beneficial and fair. Cultures, epistemic frameworks, and traditions are constantly changing. This is not the problem Bhargava wanted to highlight. No, the moral problem lies in the fact that the "... disapproval stems from the fact that this change is partly orchestrated by an authority with enormous political and economic power ..." (Bhargava 2015, 415). Thus, epistemic injustice was an integrated part of the colonial venture. Bhargava managed to provide a theoretical explanation of the experience of my master student. However, his texts also raised some questions. The first question is what exactly his argument refers to. Bhargava argued that as a consequence of colonialism, "indigenous cultures" were inferiorized, marginalized, and anonymized. This is a very general statement. One could question whether his analysis is equally valid for all kinds of cultural manifestations (academic, religious, literary, folkloristic, etc.) or if there are cultural zones that are more or less resilient and then, if there are cultural zones that could resist colonization better than others. Although the three continents Africa, Asia and Latin America were colonized, they were affected in different ways. For example, in contrast to Africa, India's religious life seems to have been rather unaffected by British colonialism. In English school books for Indian children, Hinduism was represented in a distorted form and the representation was shaped by Christian presuppositions and categories (Balaji 2015). One could even say that Hinduism, as a religion, did not exist before it was so constructed by Western scholars. However still, the religious life of Indians, as well as customs and family life, was rather unaffected by colonialism. In Africa, on the other hand, the indigenous religions were to a large extent superseded by Christianity, although Christianity with an African stain. Unauthentifiziert | Heruntergeladen 01.10.19 07:33 UTC 5 Göran Collste Cultural Pluralism and Epistemic Injustice Furthermore, Bhargava argued that "... every group must have access to its own systems of meanings and interpretations ..." and they form "epistemic communities" (Bhargava 2013, 414). Bhargava's theory needs clarifications. First, it is not clear what he means by a "group" and a "community." For Bhargava, the colonization of India led to the epistemic domination of the colonizer and epistemic marginalization of indigenous Indian epistemic frameworks. Although it makes sense to speak of Indian indigenous cultures including not only Hindus but also Sikhs, Muslims, etc. having common ethos, habits, rituals, etc., the precolonial Indian society was also divided into castes, with – possibly – their own epistemic frameworks and forming their own epistemic communities.1 Thus, the idea of different epistemic communities does not only refer to different ethnic groups or nations but also to religious and social groups. While an epistemic framework refers to how a group "understands and evaluates its individual and collective identity," it seems that, for example, also socialism, feminism, and Catholicism could be described as epistemic frameworks. This opens up for multiple and overlapping epistemic frameworks; for example, an Indian socialist refers to both an Indian and a socialist epistemic framework and an African Catholic to both an African and a Catholic epistemic framework. As we noticed, the idea of epistemic injustice presupposes relations of inequality and domination. Drawing on Philip Pettit's analysis of political domination, Amandine Catala introduced the term "hermeneutical monopoly" when a minority in a society is "hermeneutically dominated by a majority." Then, the minority lacks the resources to raise their voices in the public discourse and their views are dismissed by the majority (Catala 2015, 430). Hence, epistemic domination is one form of domination in parallel to other forms, such as economic and political. However, when Catala spoke of cultural and ethnical minorities in Western countries, Bhargava spoke of dominated majorities in colonized nations. Second, the idea that each group has its own "... system of meanings and interpretations ..." could be interpreted as implying a kind of relativism, because if each group has its own epistemic framework, it is difficult to see how they could communicate with each other: We know the world from our epistemic framework and you from yours and there is no way your interpretation could challenge ours. Without doubt, such a view would have some very problematic epistemic implications. However, Bhargava did not adhere to relativism because he also argued for the possibility of "biculturalism," which means a "potentially common tradition." Yes, he even foresaw "... the renewal of western traditions by non-western 1 See Fricker (2007) and Catala (2015) for analyses of epistemic dominations within societies. Unauthentifiziert | Heruntergeladen 01.10.19 07:33 UTC 6 Journal of Nationalism, Memory & Language Politics 13(2) people ..." (Bhargava 2013, 416-417). Hence, epistemic frameworks differ and overlap and communication is possible. In fact, there are reasons to believe that the Indian and Western traditions can co-exist and even integrate. Liberal ideas inspired the leaders of the new nation after independence from Britain, in particular Nehru who said "I am the last Englishman to rule in India." Progress and Cultural Change Bhargava argued that colonialism implied that local cultures were marginalized. But are not cultures normally in a state of constant change? When we look at history, we find many examples of how one culture has been superseded by another. Is that always something to regret? Perhaps, the new culture is preferable? Was it for example a misfortune that Christianity superseded the Roman religion in the first centuriesy AD or that Islam superseded the Arabic religions in the sixth to seventh centuries? What was lost and what was gained? Did perhaps the new religion and culture offer an enhanced collective identity and existential security compared to the old ones? In line with Charles Taylor, one could presume that cultures have intrinsic value. He wrote: "... it is reasonable to suppose that cultures that have provided the horizon of meaning for large numbers of human beings, of diverse characters and temperaments, over a long period of time – that have, in other words, articulated their sense of the good, the holy, the admirable – are almost certain to have something that deserves our admiration and respect, even if it is accompanied by much that we have to abhor and reject." (Taylor 1994, 72-73). On the other hand, even if we acknowledge the intrinsic value of cultures, it does not necessarily mean that all cultures have equal value. Brian Barry wrote: "... some cultures ... are better than others: more just, more free, more enlightened, and generally better adapted to human flourishing" (Barry 2001, 267). So, following Taylor, cultures are valuable because they provide "horizons of meaning," but – as Barry argued – some are more valuable than others due to their capacity to make humans flourish. So, what is then morally wrong with epistemic injustice? Let me suggest the following answer. Epistemic injustice 1. implies that a culture is forced to subjection; 2. implies that the dominated culture is disrespected and considered as inferior; 3. implies a threat to the dominated people's epistemic framework, collective identity, and existential security; and 4. implies an enduring sense of inferiority among the adherents of the old culture. Unauthentifiziert | Heruntergeladen 01.10.19 07:33 UTC 7 Göran Collste Cultural Pluralism and Epistemic Injustice So, epistemic injustice implies force and subjection. If a culture is valuable while it provides its adherents with instruments to interpret, understand, and provide meaning to their existence and, also in Taylor's terms, articulate a sense of the good and holy, epistemic injustice is also morally wrong while it means an infringement of these valuable instruments and states of mind. Given that Bhargava's description of the colonization of epistemic frameworks is correct, the indigenous cultures were dominated by force and were considered inferior, and the consequences were a loss of collective identity and a sense of existential insecurity among the colonized people. This sense of inferiority is enduring. Hence, the moral problem with epistemic injustice in the wake of colonialism is that it implied an enduring dominance and a sense of inferiority among the subaltern. Globalization and Epistemic Injustice Is then epistemic injustice in Bhargava's sense a phenomenon of the colonial past – although with enduring consequences? Today, we live in an age traced by globalization. The meaning and impact of globalization are much discussed, and I will only focus on some aspects. To the present, globalization is not characterized by equality and reciprocity. Many facets of globalization mean the dominance of powerful economic organizations and multinational companies and a Westernization or Americanization of cultures and values. From this perspective, globalization implies neocolonization of cultures and minds. Globalization implies epistemic injustice in various forms, and I will distinguish between an apparent and a subtle form. The apparent form is illustrated by the global implementation of intellectual property rights, which is an example of globalization of parochial Western values at the expense of local and indigenous. Let me explain with the help of an example. One feature of the last decades' globalization is the global commercialization of all sorts of goods, including medicines, herbs, and seeds. This was manifested by the so-called Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement in 1994. According to the TRIPS agreement, intellectual property such as medicines and genetic material should be protected globally, and the TRIPS agreement was institutionalized when ratification of TRIPS became a condition for membership of the World Trade Organization (WTO). One of the controversial aspects of the global intellectual property regime is the extension of property rights to cover also traditional knowledge In a Unauthentifiziert | Heruntergeladen 01.10.19 07:33 UTC 8 Journal of Nationalism, Memory & Language Politics 13(2) number of cases, plants and herbs used for ages by traditional communities and indigenous peoples have been patented by Western firms. Here, traditional knowledge and communal ownership come into conflict with privatization and property rights. This value conflict is an example of when globalization means the domination of Western values at the expense of the values of weaker and more vulnerable communities and people (Shiva 2001, Commission 2002, Anderson 2015). Through the many ways that Western ideals are permeating the world through adverts, news media, and Hollywood films, globalization also implies a subtler form of cultural injustice. Here, the Western ideals of beauty, life style, and consumption are becoming global norms, which on the receiving side of the globe may lead to a contempt for one's own culture and tradition. As a consequence, many women in Africa and Asia are whitening their skin and straightening their hair to live up to the Western ideals of beauty. According to a report from the University of Cape Town, 77% of women in Nigeria and 35% of women in South Africa use skin lighteners (http://www.bbc.com/ news/world-africa-20444798). So, what then are the remedies for epistemic injustice in the past and how can we avoid that also globalization will imply epistemic injustice? First and probably most important is that intellectuals in the countries who are subjects of epistemic injustice rediscover their own intellectual and epistemic traditions. This is also Bhargava's strategy. In his ambition to rediscover the Indian tradition in political theory, he studied the edicts of the progressive Emperor Asoka from the third century BC. Similarly, African philosophers are developing the idea of Ubuntu, which expresses deep values of community in the African tradition (Metz and Gaie 2010). When commenting on the discussion of global justice, the Indian theorist Aakash Singh wrote: "[...] as the global justice debate amplifies unreflexively this increasingly discredited tendency of the wider social sciences to favour the epistemology and centrality of Anglo-American political theory/ theorists, generally excluding non-western voices from participation. Here, the term 'global' seems to signify outward expansion from the center; our attempt to extend our conception/demands of justice to them. Many non-western scholars, therefore, see the global justice debate as a recapitulation of the characteristic practices and attitudes of colonial liberalism" (Aakash 2014). What can we who are ancestors of the colonizers and who represent the global rich do today? How can we avoid "one-directional" communication, and how Unauthentifiziert | Heruntergeladen 01.10.19 07:33 UTC 9 Göran Collste Cultural Pluralism and Epistemic Injustice can we avoid epistemic injustice in the wake of globalization? As philosophers, Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth have emphasized, "recognition" is a central concept here. Fraser wrote, "Misrecognition ... means social subordination in the sense of being prevented from participating as a peer in social life" (Fraser 2001, p.24). Misrecognition seems to be one condition for epistemic injustice. Hence, the social subordination of the Other could be overcome by recognition, i.e. to ensure that everyone has an equal say in conversations and dialogs. Listening to the Other follows from recognition. To listen is more than to hear. Michael Purdy defined listening as "... the active and dynamic process of attending, perceiving, interpreting, remembering, and responding to the expressed (verbal and nonverbal) needs, concerns, and information offered by other human beings" (Purdy 1991). Listening is a crucial condition for communication and a requirement for reciprocity, i.e. for "fair terms of cooperation" to quote Rawls (Rawls 1993, 16). Avoiding Parochialism As Aakash reminds us, in order to remedy for the colonial past and avoid epistemic injustice in the present, we have to reconsider the way we philosophize about global justice and international relations. In The Law of Peoples (1999), which is a treaty on international relations and justice, John Rawls took much efforts in developing a theory characterized by non-parochialism, meaning that the theory should avoid cultural biases and one-sidedness and instead accept pluralism and respect different traditions of how a society is formed. Already in his work Political Liberalism from 1993, Rawls distanced himself from a view of justice that universalizes western liberal values. He admits that his own theory of justice from 1971 suffers from this limitation. For example, the principle of moral autonomy developed in A Theory of Justice "... fails to satisfy the criterion of reciprocity required of reasonable political principles ..." (Rawls 1996, xlv). As an alternative, in Political Liberalism, he developed a theory of reasonable pluralism and justification of a political conception of justice based on an "overlapping consensus" of different – what he called – "comprehensive doctrines," and comprehensive liberalism is one of them (ibid xlii). This implies that basic political institutions and rights are justified by all reasonable doctrines, although the reasons will differ between different doctrines. In Political Liberalism, Rawls's aim was to develop criteria of justification of a theory of justice in plural societies. The aim of The Law of Peoples (1999) was to develop a theory of international relations in a plural world, and Rawls Unauthentifiziert | Heruntergeladen 01.10.19 07:33 UTC 10 Journal of Nationalism, Memory & Language Politics 13(2) raises the question how to achieve an inclusive Society of Peoples, i.e. a global community of peoples who cooperate and live peacefully together. According to Rawls, not only liberal peoples but also – what he called – "decent hierarchical peoples" are full members of the Society of Peoples. He takes the conceived Islamic people Kazanistan as his case in point. Islam is the favored religion, and only Muslims can have governmental positions. Other religions are tolerated, and their believers have civic rights. They are also included in a "decent consultation hierarchy," and they are able to influence the political decisions from this position (Rawls 1999, 75-77). However, Kazanistan deviates in important respects from liberal ideals. The contrast between a cosmopolitan, liberal global order and the Society of Peoples that Rawls favors became clear when Rawls discussed human rights. In The Law of Peoples, Rawls only included "urgent human rights," i.e. freedom from slavery, liberty of conscience and security of ethnic groups from mass murder and genocide. However, he did not include equal individual rights or liberal democracy (ibid, 78-81). The reason as he explained it is that "Human rights, as thus understood, cannot be rejected as peculiarly liberal or special to the Western tradition. They are not politically parochial" (ibid, 65). Rawls's theory has been the target of critique by some liberals. Why, they ask, should we be satisfied with anything less than a society that implements full and universal human rights, and why should we in the long run tolerate political systems that are hierarchical and that distinguish between different ethnical and religious groups with respect to rights of influence? Why should non-Muslim citizens in Kazanistan accept the role as secondary members of their society? (Li 1995, Nickel 2006) These critical questions are indeed challenging. On the other hand, with Bhargava's critique of epistemic injustice in mind, there are good reasons for Rawls's position. In view of the history of colonialism – and the present globalization – we should be more cautious to assume that Western values, Western political systems, and Western political principles are universally valid and applicable. We must acknowledge that there are other political cultures and traditions that are acceptable and worthy of respect. Following Rawls, this acceptance of different political traditions does not mean that liberals should abstain from working for extension of human rights in any society they live in; only that liberalism is not a necessary requirement for inclusion in the Society of Peoples, the global community. This does not imply that a wider conception of human rights necessarily mirrors a Western or liberal comprehensive doctrine. The main human rights treaties have been ratified by a large majority of the nations of the world, and Unauthentifiziert | Heruntergeladen 01.10.19 07:33 UTC 11 Göran Collste Cultural Pluralism and Epistemic Injustice as a German philosopher Heiner Bielefeldt remarked, human rights can be understood "... as the centre of a cross-cultural 'overlapping consensus' on basic normative standards in our increasingly multi-cultural societies." No, what Rawls's proposal might avoid is a "... cultural essentialist occupation" of human rights (Bielefeldt 2016, 86). Should we then accept this more limited human rights conception as the ground for a Society of Peoples or should we assume a broader liberal conception of human rights? It is not an easy choice. However, it seems to me that Rawls's position avoids that faults of the past are repeated in the present. We should bear in mind that Rawls does not accept any kind of hierarchical societies. They have to live up to the conditions of respecting urgent human rights, i.e. respect for human beings' freedom of thought and organization and their right to influence the government (although in different ways and perhaps within different institutions). Conclusion The aim of this essay was to discuss the meaning of epistemic and cultural injustice and how to overcome it in the present age characterized by globalization and the encounter of different cultures. The history of colonialism is a history of enduring cultural domination and epistemic injustice. Epistemic injustice is prima facie problematic from a moral point of view, while it implies domination, disrespect, a sense of inferiority and erosion of dominated people's epistemic framework, collective identity, and existential security. Today's possibilities of cultural encounters and emerging multicultural societies offer a potential for learning, cultural enrichment and plurality. However, the realization of this potential presupposes that we recognize the others and listen to their beliefs and values. As Rawls showed, avoiding parochialism is both necessary and possible in present plural societies. References Anderson, Jane.2015. Indigenous Knowledge and Intellectual Property Rights. International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, 2nd edition, Volume 11, Elsevier. pp 769779. Balaji, Murali. 2018. "The Colonized Mind. Thoughts on colonialism, Christianity and the relinquishment of Hindu consciousness." Hinduism Today. https://www.hinduismtoday. com/modules/smartsection/item.php?itemid=3103. Barry, Brian. 2002. Culture and Equality. An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism. Harvard: Harvard University Press. Unauthentifiziert | Heruntergeladen 01.10.19 07:33 UTC 12 Journal of Nationalism, Memory & Language Politics 13(2) Bhargava, Rajeev. 2007. "How Should We Respond to the Cultural Injustices of Colonialism?" In Reparations: Interdisciplinary Inquiries, edited by J. Miller and R. Kumar. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bhargava, Rajeev. 2013. "Overcoming the Epistemic Injustice of Colonialism." Global Policy 4 (4): 413-417. Bielefeldt, Heiner. 2016. "'Western' versus 'Islamic' Human Rights Conceptions? A Critique of Cultural Essentialism in the Discussion on Human Rights," In Ethics and Communication. Global Perspectives, edited by G. Collste. London: Rowman & Littlefield International. Catala, Amandine. 2015. "Democracy, Trust, and Epistemic Injustice." The Monist, 98 (4): 424-440. Collste, Göran. 2015. Global Rectificatory Justice. Basingstoke: Palgrave. Fricker, Miranda. 2007. Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. Oxford: Oxford University Press Kymlicka, Will. 1996. Multicultural Citizenship A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press Metz, Thaddeus and Gaie Joseph, B. R. 2010. "The African Ethic of Ubuntu/Botho: Implications for Research on Morality." Journal of Moral Education 39 (3): 273-290. Nickel, James. 2006. "Are Human Rights Mainly implemented by Intervention?" In Rawls's Law of Peoples. A Realistic Utopia?, edited by R. Martin and D. Reidy. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. Rawls, John. 1996. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. Rawls, John. 1999. The Law of Peoples. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Sen, Amartya. 1999. Development as Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Singh, Aakash. 2013. "Deparochializing the Global Justice Debate, Starting with Indian Political Theory." Global Policy 4 (4): 418-419 Li, Xiarong. 1995. "A Critique of Rawls's Freestanding Justice." Journal of Applied Philosophy, 12 (3): 263-271. Taylor, Charles. 1994. "The Politics of Recognition." In Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition, edited by Amy Gutman. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Unauthentifiziert | Heruntergeladen 01.10.19 07:33 UTC


Review of Matters of Spirit: J.G. Fichte and the Technological Imagination, by F. Scott Scribner

Philosophy

College of Arts and Letters Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2012.04.18 Everything F. Scott Scribner Matters of Spirit: J.G. Fichte and the Technological Imagination Published: April 19, 2012 F. Scott Scribner, Matters of Spirit: J.G. Fichte and the Technological Imagination, The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2010, 205pp., $60.00 (hbk), ISBN 9780271036212. Reviewed by Michael Baur, Fordham University In recent years, philosophers have recognized the richness and contemporary relevance of J.G. Fichte's philosophy. Arguably, it was Dieter Henrich who initiated this pro-Fichte trend when (in his 1967 work, "Fichte's Original Insight") he argued that Fichte identified a serious shortcoming in all so-called philosophies of "reflection." All philosophies of reflection are flawed since they presume that a conscious subject's knowledge of itself is representational in character, when in fact all representation presupposes that the subject is already possessed of a non-representational kind of self-knowledge. If the subject were not already possessed of such nonrepresentational self-knowledge, then the subject would not be in a position to ascribe its representations to itself rather than to some object other than itself. More recently, philosophers have mined Fichte's thought for further insights which shed light on contemporary problems and their possible resolution. Axel Honneth has argued that Fichte's innovative account of a "summons" (Aufforderung) between free selves importantly anticipates key elements of the theory of communicative action as it is found in contemporary critical social theory. In a similar vein, Stephen Darwall has argued that Fichte's notion of intersubjective recognition is an illuminating precursor to his own theory of how the "second-person standpoint" plays an essential role in moral reasoning and moral decision-making. In Matters of Spirit, F. Scott Scribner adds to the recent literature on the originality and contemporary significance of Fichte's philosophy. Scribner accepts the basic premise of Henrich's Fichte-interpretation, but then goes on to argue that the Fichtean critique of reflection opens up a new set of questions about the role of the imagination (Einbildungskraft) in Fichte's thought, and about the susceptibility of the imagination to possible usurpation by technological means of image-production. These concerns allow Scribner to bring Fichte into fruitful dialogue with later continental thinkers such as Michel Henry, Walter Benjamin, Theodor Adorno, and Martin Heidegger. Scribner's accomplishment in this book is important and original. He has an impressive knowledge of the entirety of Fichte's philosophy, and of the relevance of Fichte's thought to later developments in nineteenthand twentieth-century continental philosophy. He has made a complex, compelling, and challenging case for reading Fichte's thought in general, and in particular Fichte's thought about the centrality of the imagination, in light of later philosophical worries about the technologization of the imagination. Interestingly, the great strengths of Scribner's book -its erudition, its scope, and its relevance -are linked to the book's main weakness. Scribner, immersed as he is in Fichtean and post-Fichtean continental philosophy, relies often on the technical terminology (some might call it jargon) that permeates a great deal of contemporary discourse in continental philosophy. Because of this, his account -as original and insightful as it is -will be less than clear and convincing to readers who are not already familiar with Fichte's thought and with later developments in continental philosophy. What follows is an attempt to re-state the broad outlines of Fichte's contribution, as discussed by Scribner. In his Foundations of the Entire Wissenschaftslehre (1794/95), Fichte argues for what has been called (following Brentano and Husserl) the "intentional" character of all consciousness. For Fichte, all consciousness is intentional, which is to say that a subject is conscious only to the extent that something that counts as an instance of "otherness" appears to the subject as an instance of otherness (or as an "object"). But, Fichte goes on to argue, nothing can appear as an instance of otherness to the subject, if this otherness were not related to the subject and thus if this otherness did not render the subject finite or limited. On Fichte's account, then, that which renders the subject conscious is also that which renders the subject finite. For Fichte, there can be no such thing as a conscious subject which is not also a finite subject (it follows from this that the idea of a conscious, infinite, personal God is unintelligible for Fichte, just as it was for Spinoza). In Fichte's Foundations of the Entire Wissenschaftslhere, the otherness which appears as an otherness to the subject and thus which renders the subject both conscious and finite, is called the "nicht-ich" or "not-I." In his Foundations of Natural Right (1795/96), Fichte goes on to argue that it is impossible to conceive of this finitizing not-I as something that operates merely in accordance with the causal-mechanistic laws governing the interactions of objects within space and time. This is because the not-I must render the subject finite, yet without destroying the subject's free and rational nature. If the not-I were thought to operate merely in accordance with causal-mechanistic laws, then it would be impossible to conceive how the not-I could determine (i.e., cause) the subject to be finite and yet also allow the subject to remain free (uncaused). It is necessary, says Fichte, to conceive of the not-I not merely as an instance of otherness that causally determines the subject to be finite; it is necessary to conceive of the not-I as another I which -precisely because its actions are not governed by causal-mechanistic laws alone -is able to determine the subject to be self-determining. Thus for Fichte, the not-I must be conceived as another I which "calls" the subject to free and conscious selfhood by means of a primordial "summons" (Aufforderung) to enter into a relationship of reciprocal recognition. For Fichte, then, the condition of the possibility of the existence of any free, rational, conscious self is the existence of an intersubjective relationship in which at least two selves interact and reciprocally recognize one another as free. The relationship by means of which they do so is called a relationship of right or rightfulness (Recht). It is Fichte's argument about the necessity of intersubjective interaction and recognition which gives rise to a central problem addressed in Scriber's book. If intersubjective interaction is the condition of the possibility of the existence of any free, rational, and conscious selfhood, then on what grounds can there be communication between the selves which interact and reciprocally recognize one another? Such communication is necessary, since without it no reciprocal interaction or recognition between free selves would be possible. But this communication cannot be achieved on the basis of any deliberate and conscious acts undertaken by the interacting selves, since on Fichte's account it is this very act of primordial communication which makes possible the existence of free and conscious selfhood in the first place. As Scribner shows, Fichte had begun to address this question in his Foundations of the Entire Wissenschaftslehre, when he argued that it is by means of the imagination ("an absolute activity that determines reciprocity") that the subject maintains an oscillation (Schweben) between itself and the not-I and thereby posits itself as the finite (self-striving and self-limiting) subject that it is. In the Foundations of Natural Right, the important oscillation or interaction to be explained is no longer one between the I and the not-I, but rather one between one I and another I. And so in the Foundations of Natural Right, the crucial task is no longer to show how a reciprocity between I and not-I takes place by means of the imagination, but rather how a reciprocal interaction and communication takes place between one I and another I. For Fichte, the two selves communicate -they mutually influence one another but in a way that is "free of the necessities of causality" (p. 134) -by means of what is called "subtle matter." As Scribner admirably shows, "subtle matter" in Fichte's Foundations of Natural Right can be interpreted as a kind of "materialization" or "exteriorization" of the imagination as portrayed in Fichte's earlier work, and thus might be understood on the model of Kant's notion of aesthetic judgment. Fichte's quasi-materialization of the imagination also opens the way towards what Scribner calls the "first displacement" in Fichte's thinking about the imagination. This first displacement is marked by Fichte's shift (at the end of his Wissenschaftslehre period) from thinking about the imagination as a faculty of the subject to thinking about it as the non-subjective, transparent locus for the selfmanifestation of Being as such. With this first displacement, Scribner suggests, Fichte's thought moves interestingly into the vicinity of Heidegger's later ruminations about the question of Being and the possibility of metaphysics. On Scribner's reading, the first displacement in Fichte's thinking about the imagination was soon to be threatened by a "second displacement." This second displacement consists in a shift of focus from the externalization of the imagination (as already affirmed in the first displacement) to the technologization of the imagination. With this second displacement, Fichte's attempt at a nonsubjectivistic metaphysics of spirit (and thus his attempt at raising anew the question of Being) stood in danger of becoming appropriated and usurped by the material technology of image-production. For Scribner, one can discern just how Fichte sought to grapple with this insidious possibility by attending to Fichte's theoretical interests in, and later resistance to, the phenomenon of "magnetic psychology" or mesmerism. According to the theory of magnetic psychology, the entire physical world was permeated by a kind of quasi-material fluid substance (something akin to Fichte's own "subtle matter") which allowed spirits to communicate with one another and thus bring about the restoration of individual health and social harmony. As Scribner points out, Fichte actually attended a firsthand demonstration of the technique of magnetic psychology (September 14, 1813, to be exact) and kept a private diary (which he never intended to publish) on the topic of animal magnetism (this was Fichte's 1813 "Tagebuch über den animalischen Magnetismus"). According to Scribner, Fichte was attracted to the phenomenon of magnetic psychology since it seemed to provide him with a "material proof" of his externalized theory of the imagination, or spirit. But Fichte later resisted the theory of magnetic psychology or magnetic rapport, since -according to Scribner -he realized "that this technique of rapport was a material technology that threatened to overcome and transform the very metaphysics it was first intended to prove" (180-181). But in confronting the possible technologization of the imagination, Scribner argues, Fichte was at least able to broach some of the basic questions that were later to be addressed by Walter Benjamin in "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction" (1936) and by Martin Heidegger in "The Age of the World Picture" (1938). Scribner's arguments regarding the "second displacement" in Fichte's thought may strike some readers as being insufficiently documented; and his account of an aestheticized doctrine of intersubjective recognition in Fichte may seem to some as being overly speculative. But even if doubts such as these remain unabated, there can be little doubt that Scribner has provided us with an illuminating and original account that does justice to the broad outlines of Fichte's philosophy, and at the same time demonstrates Fichte's lasting relevance for us today. Copyright © 2021 ISSN: 1538 1617 College of Arts and Letters Accessibility Information Notre Dame, IN


Philosophy

Epistemic communities are informal networks of knowledge-based experts who influence decision-makers in defining issues they face, identifying different solutions, and evaluating results. Epistemic communities have the greatest influence in conditions of political uncertainty and visibility, usually following a crisis or triggering event. Counterintelligence is primarily considered an analytical discipline, focusing on the study of intelligence services. The basis of all counterintelligence activities is the study of individual intelligence services, an analytical process to understand the behavior of foreign entities (formal mission, internal and external policy, history and myths within the entity, the people who compose it).
          DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.22837.52962

Epistemic Intelligence Communities. Counterintelligence Nicolae Sfetcu March 15,2019 Sfetcu, Nicolae, "Epistemic Intelligence Communities. Counterintelligence", SetThings (March 15, 2019), MultiMedia Publishing (ed.), URL = https://www.telework.ro/en/epistemicintelligence-communities-counterintelligence/ Email: email@example.com This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivatives 4.0 International. To view a copy of this license, visithttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/. A partial translation of: Sfetcu, Nicolae, "Epistemologiaserviciilor de informații", SetThings (4 februarie 2019), MultiMedia Publishing (ed.), DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.19751.39849, ISBN 978-606-033-160-5, URL = https://www.telework.ro/ro/e-books/epistemologia-serviciilor-de-informatii/ Epistemic Intelligence Communities. Counterintelligence Epistemic communities Epistemic communities are informal networks of knowledge-based experts who influence decision-makers in defining issues they face, identifying different solutions, and evaluating results.(Hsu and Hasmath 2017) Peter M. Haas defined the conceptual framework of an epistemic community as "... a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy relevant knowledge within that domain or issuearea." (Haas 1992, 3) Members of an epistemic community come from academic or professional backgrounds and are characterized by a set of unifying features. (Sebenius 1992) Epistemic communities are socio-psychological entities that create and justify knowledge. Michel Foucault referred to the mathesis as a rigorous episteme appropriate to allow the cohesion of a discourse and thus the unification of a community. In the philosophy of science and system science, the process of forming a self-sustaining epistemic community is sometimes called a mentality, like a trend or a faction in politics. A counterpart of what is NOT an epistemic community is provided by Mai'a K. Davis Cross, considering the European Defence Agency (EDA) and the EU Intelligence Analysis Center (IntCen). (Cross 2015)Cross claims that although they are composed of high-level security experts, these two organizations are not epistemic communities. Real epistemic communities, diplomats, military experts, security researchers and civilian crisis management experts have significantly influenced EU security policy. Expert groups that are not epistemic communities are not poor or becoming cases. They can fundamentally be different types of actors with divergent features. An epistemic community rarely includes all members of a formal organization. A strong epistemic community is trying to overcome its professional role as a group and is often able to persuade decision makers to fundamentally change the nature of their political goals. An epistemic community is a group of people who do not have a specific history together but seek a common idea of origin as if they were an intentional community. For example, an epistemic community can be found in a network of professionals from a wide variety of disciplines and backgrounds, (Keman 1998) including intelligence services. According to Haas, the epistemic communities: (1) share the professional opinion on a policy issue, (2) weigh the validity of their political objectives in their field of expertise, (3) engage in a common set of practices on the problematic area with the goal of improving human well-being, and (4) sharing beliefs in principle. (Haas 2001, 11578–79) Epistemic communities also have a "normative component," meaning that the ultimate goal is always an improvement in society, rather than the own gain of the community itself. (Haas 1992) In international relations and political science, an epistemic community can also be referred to as a global network of knowledge-based professionals in science and technology that often affects political decisions. (Morin and Louafi 2017) Epistemic communities have the greatest influence in "conditions of political uncertainty and visibility," (Radaelli 1999, 763)usually following a crisis or triggering event. The European Union, with its ongoing processes of integration, shared democratic values, supranational institutions and transnational interactions, is very favorable to the formation of epistemic communities. (Loik 2013)The EU's security policy is an area where there are more epistemic communities based on Brussels. Counterintelligence According to William Johnson's definition counterintelligence (CI) is an activity designed to protect an intelligence organization against state or non-state agents. (Johnson and Hood 2009)It includes the collection and analysis of specific information, and preventive and counteroffensive activities against intentions and actions directed against national security, including terrorism. (Conrad 1985) In US doctrine, CI is now seen primarily as a counterbalance to the actions of foreign intelligence services (FIS HUMINT). In the US Army's counterintelligence manual of 1995, CI had a broader scope. More recently, the American Doctrine of the Information Community (Matschulat 2007) limits the main purpose to activities that usually include counter-terrorism. The scope of the doctrine of US military counterintelligence has been shifted to a classified publication, Joint Publication (JP) 2-01.2, Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Support to Joint Operations. For each type of specific foreign action, countermeasures are provided both with defensive and offensive role. Counter-HUMINT deals with the detection of hostile or potentially hostile HUMINT sources, responsible for monitoring reliable staff to prevent and neutralize risks. (US Department of the Army 1981) Offensive techniques in today's counterintelligence doctrine are directed mainly against human sources, so counterintelligence can be considered synonymous with offensive counterintelligence. Offensive counter-attack (and counter-terrorism) acts either by manipulating an opponent (FIS or terrorist) or by interrupting the opponent's operations. Counterintelligence is primarily considered an analytical discipline, focusing on the study of intelligence services. Taking this into consideration, John Ehrman(Ehrman 2009) proposes an appropriate definition of CI: "Counterintelligence is the study of the organization and behavior of the intelligence services of foreign states and entities, and the application of the resulting knowledge." (Samuelson and Nordhaus 1992, 53) The basis of all counterintelligence activities is the study of individual intelligence services, an analytical process to understand the behavior of foreign entities (formal mission, internal and external policy, history and myths within the entity, the people who compose it). CI operations are a specialized subassembly of intelligence operations in general, usually trying to create endless feedback loops. In general, there are three types of counterintelligence operations: classic penetration, double agents, and identification and monitoring of the agents of the concerned service. Counterintelligence is an under-theoreticized field without a clearly defined methodology. John Ehrman identifies several future research directions, such as service policy, service sociology, and counterintelligence economy. Also, future counterintelligence studies in the construction of theory should include comparative and literary studies. A robust counterintelligence theory will have to put the analysis at the center of counterintelligence activity and allow for a multidisciplinary and integrated approach to analytical and operational activities. Bibliography Conrad, Sherri J. 1985. "Executive Order 12,333: Unleashing the CIA Violates the Leash Law." https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4410. Cross, Mai'a K. Davis. 2015. "The Limits of Epistemic Communities: EU Security Agencies." ResearchGate. 2015. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/270578352_The_Limits_of_Epistemic_Commu nities_EU_Security_Agencies. Ehrman, John. 2009. "Toward a Theory of CI - Central Intelligence Agency." 2009. https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csistudies/studies/vol53no2/toward-a-theory-of-ci.html. Haas, Peter M. 1992. "Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination | International Organization | Cambridge Core." 1992. https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-organization/article/introductionepistemic-communities-and-international-policycoordination/CE9CFC049E0F2A14635F1E3EB51960C9. ---. 2001. "Policy Knowledge: Epistemic Communities." In International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences, edited by N. J. Smelser and B. Baltes, 17–11578. Hsu, Jennifer Y. J., and Reza Hasmath. 2017. "A Maturing Civil Society in China? The Role of Knowledge and Professionalization in the Development of NGOs." SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 2563696. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network. https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2563696. Johnson, William R., and William Hood. 2009. Thwarting Enemies at Home and Abroad: How to Be a Counterintelligence Officer. 3.2.2009 edition. Washington, D.C: Georgetown University Press. Keman, Hans. 1998. Autonomous Policy Making By International Organisations. Edited by Bob Reinalda and Bertjan Verbeek. London ; New York: Routledge. Loik, Ramon. 2013. "Security Integration in Europe: How Knowledge-Based Networks Are Transforming the European Union, by M.K. Davis Cross (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2012, ISBN 9780472117895); Xviii+281pp., £55.95 Hb." JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 51 (3): 576–77. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12016_5. Matschulat, Austin B. 2007. "Coordination and Cooperation in Counterintelligence - Central Intelligence Agency." 2007. https://web.archive.org/web/20071010091345/https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-thestudy-of-intelligence/kent-csi/docs/v13i2a05p_0001.htm. Morin, Jean-Frederic, and Selim Louafi. 2017. "Boundary Organizations in Regime Complexes: A Social Network Profile of IPBES." ResearchGate. 2017. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/320657829_Boundary_Organizations_in_Regi me_Complexes_A_Social_Network_Profile_of_IPBES. Radaelli, Claudio M. 1999. "The Public Policy of the European Union: Whither Politics of Expertise?" Journal of European Public Policy 6 (5): 757–74. https://doi.org/10.1080/135017699343360. Samuelson, Paul Anthony, and William D. Nordhaus. 1992. Economics. McGraw-Hill. Sebenius, James K. 1992. "Challenging Conventional Explanations of International Cooperation: Negotiation Analysis and the Case of Epistemic Communities." International Organization 46 (1): 323–65. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300001521. US Department of the Army. 1981. "Executive Order 12333. (1981, December 4). United States Intelligence Activities, Section 3.4(a). EO Provisions Found in 46 FR 59941, 3 CFR." https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm34-60/.


[Aristotle], On Trolling

Philosophy

Journal of the American Philosophical Association, page 1 of 3 C© American Philosophical Association doi: 10.1017/apa.2016.9 This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. [Aristotle], On Trolling That trolling is a shameful thing, and that no one of sense would accept to be called 'troll', all are agreed; but what trolling is, and how many its species are, and whether there is an excellence of the troll, is unclear. And indeed trolling is said in many ways; for some call 'troll' anyone who is abusive on the internet, but this is only the disagreeable person, or in newspaper comments the angry old man. And the one who disagrees loudly on the blog on each occasion is a lover of controversy, or an attention-seeker. And none of these is the troll, or perhaps some are of a mixed type; for there is no art in what they do. (Whether it is possible to troll one's own blog is unclear; for the one who poses divisive questions seems only to seek controversy, and to do so openly; and this is not trolling but rather a kind of clickbait.) Well then, the troll in the proper sense is one who speaks to a community and as being part of the community; only he is not part of it, but opposed. And the community has some good in common, and this the troll must know, and what things promote and destroy it: for he seeks to destroy. Hence no one would troll the remotest Mysian, or even know how, but rather a Republican trolls a Democratic blog and a Democrat Republicans. And he destroys the thread by disputing what is known to be true, or abusing what is recognised as admirable; or he creates fear about a small problem, as if it were large, or treats a necessary matter as small; or he speaks abuse while claiming to be a friend. And in general the troll says what is false but sounds like the truth-or rather he does not quite say it, but rather something very close to it which is true, or partly true, or best of all merely asks a simple question about the evidence for climate change. Hence the modes of trolling are many: the concern-troll, the one who 'sees the other side', the polite inquirer into the obvious. For the perfected troll has no need of rudeness or abuse, or even of fallacy (this belongs rather to sophistic or eristic, and requires making an argument): he only makes a suggestion or indication [sêmainein]. And this is how the troll generates strife. For what he indicates is known to be false or harmful or ignorant; but he does not say that thing, but rather something close. In this way he retains the possibility of denial, and the skilled troll is always surprised and hurt, or seems to be, when the others take his comments up. And so he sets the community apart from each other, and introduces strife where before there was scarcely disagreement. For each person who takes up what was said grasps only a part of it, and insists on that, and is annoyed when others affirm something different. For some indeed see that the troll trolls, and 2 aristotle are harsh; but others think that they ought to be more gentle, and others again do not even see the falsity, but grasp the truth which is nearby and insist that the troll 'has a decent point'. And this is excess of charity and the death of the board. The end of the troll is not in his own speech, then, but in that of the others, when they take up his comments in as many ways as bring regret. For there is excess or deficiency in each response, and then more again in each response to that; and every responder chooses his own words lightly but demands exactitude from the rest, and while correcting the others he introduces something new and questionable. And so resentment is built up, and the slighting begins; and the strife is the work of the troll but the origin is not clear. Trolls differ primarily in their for-the-sake-of-which: at any rate some troll for amusement, and a few for profit, but most as enemies and members of a faction. (Hence the troll is thought to be weak, and one who sits in pyjamas: for the advantage to the faction is not worth much, and a courageous enemy would fight in some other way.) And of these the amusement-troll is in a way the worst, for he aims only at his own gratification. But this one is also the least harmful; for he is careless and easy to discern, coming close to being a lover of controversy. And since trolling is in each case a matter of choice, no one is ever a troll involuntarily or by accident, but only an idiot who has posted in the wrong thread. One might wonder whether there is an art of trolling and an excellence; and indeed some say that Socrates was a troll, and so that the good man also trolls. And this is in fact what the troll claims: that he is a gadfly and beneficial, and without him to 'stir up' the thread it would become dull and unintelligent. But this is incorrect. For Socrates was speaking frankly when he told the Athenians to care for their souls, rather than money and honors, and showed that they lacked knowledge. And this is not trolling but the contrary, exhortation and truth-telling- even if the citizens get very annoyed. For annoyance results from many kinds of speech; and the peculiarity [idion] of the troll is not annoyance or controversy in general, but confusion and strife among a community who really agree. And since the one who does this on every occasion must act with knowledge, and on the basis of practice and care, he has a kind of art-just as one might speak of the art of the hack or of the grifter. But it is not really an art, being without any function; and it belongs not to the serious person to be a troll but to the one who lacks education. What the troll is, and in what way he trolls and for what, has now been said. And it is clear from this that there can be trolling outside the internet. For every community of speakers holds certain goods in common, and with them the conversation [dialegesthai] as an end in itself; and the troll is one who seeks to damage it from within. So a questioner can troll a political meeting, and academics troll each other in committees when they are bored; and a newspaper columnist may be a profit-troll towards a whole city. But blogs and boards and forums and comments sections are where the troll dwells primarily and for the most part. For these are weak communities, and anyone may be part of them: and so their good is easily destroyed. Hence the saying, 'Trolls are not to be fed'. But though on trolling 3 everyone knows this, everyone does it; for the desire to be right on the internet is natural and present to all. translated by rachel barney university of toronto firstname.lastname@example.com