The Kalam Cosmological Argument and the Possibility of an Actually Infinite Future

Philosophy

VOL. 2, No.2 PHII9 FALL-VVJl\TER 1999 THE KALAM COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT AND THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ACTUALLY INFINITE FUTURE Eric Sotnak Abstract: Part of the kalam cosmological argument draws upon the claim that an actual infinite cannot exist. Classical theists also maintain both that some individuals will earn eternal life and that God infallibly foreknows the future. The claim that these latter two theses do not require that an actual infinite exists because God possesses an intuitive, rather than propositional intellect, is examined and rejected. Although the future is potential, rather than actual, classical theism requires that the future be, in a sense, actually infinite. A skeptic died and to his surprise he found himself before the Pearly Gates facing none other than St. Peter. "Is this heaven?" he asked. "As a matter of fact it is," replied St. Peter. "And all the people here-they are happy?" asked the skeptic. "Indeed, they are," said St. Peter, "blissfully happy." "Eternally?" asked the skeptic. St. Peter quipped, "Well, not yet." The subject of this essay is a variant of the cosmological argument for the existence of God, or more accurately, a part of that argument. This argument, which has been referred to as the kalam cosmological argument, has been defended recently by several philosophers of religion. Perhaps the best known such defender is William Lane Craig. l I will confine my attention in this essay almost exclusively to the argument as it has been formulated and defended by Craig. Craig's version of the kalam argument may be expressed as follows: (Kl) Everything that begins to exist has a cause of its existence. Eric Sotnak is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Akron, Akron, Ohio. 41 42 PHII9 (K2) The universe began to exist. (K3) Therefore, the universe has a cause of its existence. The argument must be extended, of course, to show that the cause of the universe's existence is God,2 but ilt will not be my concern to address that extension of the argument. Nor will it be my concern to address premise (Kl) of the argument. The concern of this paper, rather, is one particular line of argument in defense of (K2). Specifically, I have in mind one of the supporting arguments for (K2) which depends on denying the possibility of an actually infinite collection. I will call this argument the kalam supplement: (KS I) An actual infinite cannot exist. (KS2) An infinite temporal regress of events is an actual infinite. (KS3) An infinite temporal regress of events cannot exist. (KS4) If an infinite temporal regress of events cannot exist, then the universe began to exist. (K2) Therefore, the universe began to exist. Premise (KSl) claims that an actual infinite is impossible. Presumably, it makes no difference whether what is proposed as actually infinite is a magnitude, a collection, a subdivision,3 or a series of events; all of these we are to consider impossible. Although actual infinites are impossible, there may still be collections, magnitudes, subdivisions, or series which increase (or diminish) without limit. These are potential infinites. Craig explains: \Vhcn Aristotle spcaks of the potential infinite, what he refers to is a magnitude that has the potency of being indefinitely divided or extended. Technically speaking, then, the potential infinite at any particular point is always finite" A potentially infinite collection (or magnitude or series) is a sort of work in progress. Although at any particular time the collection is finite, it is continually being augmented, and at no time does this augmentation terminate. The idea behind a potentially infinite collection is not merely that of a finite collection to which some new addition could be made, but rather that of a collection that is growing without limit. In contrast, an actual infinite is described as "a determinate whole actually possessing an infinite number of members."5 " ... In an actual infinite, all the members exist in a determinate, completed whole .... "6 According to Craig, while there is no barrier to a potential infinite's existing, the same cannot be said of an actual infinite. Since an actual infinite is an impossibility, the series of past events in the universe cannot be actually infinite. Neither does it make sense to suggest that the series of past events is potentially infinite (in the past) since we cannot say that new past events are being continually added to the beginning of the series (though, of course, it is perfectly possible to add new events to the end ofthe series). The universe must, therefore, have come to exist at some definite point in the past. William Lawhead has offered a criticism of Craig's thesis that an actual infinite is impossible in the f<)fm of what he calls the "neo-kalam arguSotnak: The Kalam Cosmological Argument 43 ment.'" Lawhead's argument is intended to show that denying the possibility of an actual infinite is at odds with the classically theistic doctrine that God possesses infallible foreknowledge of all future events. Lawhead's neokalam argument is as follows: (NK 1) An actual infinite cannot exist. (NK2) If the series of future events is unending, then there exists an actual infinite. (NK3) Therefore, there cannot be an unending series of future events. On Craig's view, (NK2) ought to be rejected. The premise Craig would recommend in its place would be: (NK2*) If the series offuture events is unending, then there exists a potentially infinite collection. Since there are no obstacles standing in the way of potentially infinite collections, Craig can replace (NK2) with (NK2*) and reject the conclusion of Lawhead's neo-kalam argument. Lawhead, however, has argued that Craig is committed to (NK2) because it is implied by claims that Craig, as a classical theist, must accept. Lawhead's neo-kalam supplement in support of (NK2) deserves careful inspection. (NKS I) The series of future events in unending. (NKS2) God has perfect knowledge of all future events. (NKS3) The set of future events contained within God's knowledge constitutes a determinate, complete, actually infinite set. (NK2) If the series of future events is unending, then there exists an actually infinite collection." Craig has replied to Lawhead's neo-kalam supplement by denying (NKS3). William Alston has recently defended the view that God's knowledge is non-propositional in nature. His is a simple, intuitive knowledge that embraces all truth. Finite creatures break up the whole of what God knows into propositions which they know. But the fact that God's simple intuition can be broken down into a potentially infinite number of propositions does not entail that what God knows is an actually infinite number of propositions which he knows. In the same way one can admit potential infinites of extendability or divisibility without entailing actual infinities of positions of extension or division.' If we are to accept that God's knowledge is intuitive and not propositional, we must distinguish between: (A) All truth And (B) The set of all true propositions Somehow God knows (A) without knowing (B). Yet at the same time, (A) must somehow include or subsume (B) in such a way that (B) is implied by or deducible from or otherwise "sunk in" (A). It is by no means clear how 44 PHII9 this is to be understood. Perhaps we should try to construe this along the following lines. Consider a collection of dots which I shall call (a): . . . (a) can be perceived in two ways. First, it can be perceived as a set consisting of three distinct dots. But second, it can be perceived as a single visual (or conceptual?) object, that is "taken in all at once" so to speak; it is not constructed serially by adding each successive dot in the collection to the previous one until all dots are accounted for. The eyes, looking at the page, simply see the dots as a given whole. Then, the object can be broken down into its constituent parts to see it as consisting of three dots. Perhaps the relation between (A) and (B) is supposed to be like that, somehow. God sees all truth as a single cognitive object in much the same way as someone might perceive (a) as a single visual object. It is by no means clear that this is adequate. Consider the following collection, which I shall call (~): . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . This is also a line of dots that can be taken in as a single visual object rather than as a serially constructed set. But how many dots are there in the collection? The vast majority of people will be unable to answer that question without re-examining the line of dots and counting them. That there are twenty-four clots in the line is something I will not know until I have counted them. Therefore, the proposition "There are twenty-four clots in (~)" is a proposition which is only potentially known for me; I do not know the particular number of dots in (~) until I count them. Are we to understand the set of all true propositions as being, for Cod, somehow like the proposition "There are twenty-four clots in (~r for a person who takes in (~) as a single visual object-a single line of dots? If so, we have a very curious sort of situation. If that is how Cod's intuitive knowledge is to be understood, then it seems that we must accept that God's knowledge is what Descartes would have considered "confused."IO Imagine trying to persuade Descartes or any of his near-contemporaries that Cod's knowledge, including his knowledge of the world, is in many cases less clear and distinct than ours. Furthermore, one has to wonder whether or not it is really plausible to identify this sort of indistinct intuitive perception as knowledge. Here is another line of dots which I shall call (y): • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • Are there the same number of dots in (y) as in (~)? I t seems this cannot be answered without knowing how many dots there are both in (y) and in (~). That is, it seems that in order for someone to be said to know (intuitively or otherwise) a line of dots, more is required than that the person merely be aware of the line of dots." The person must also either know how manv dots are in the line, or else be able to distinguish that line of dots from all other lines of dots, and this latter ability appears to presuppose the first. In addition, when we ask what is involved in God's knowing all truth, it seems that more is required than God's simply being able to know any true Sotnak: The Kalam Cosmological Argmnnlf 45 proposition. This would appear to make God's knowledge, itself, potentially infinite. But this does not seem to be what Craig and Alston have in mind. God's knowledge is not itself potentially infinite, but rather it somehow encompasses a potentially infinite number of true propositions, each of which could be "discovered" so to speak, by some finite creature endowed with a propositional, rather than intuitive, intellect. Otherwise there would be no way to distinguish between God's intellect and that of some propositional knower who was endlessly engaged in a process of discovering truths, for such a finite knower could also be said to know a potentially infinite number of propositions. But let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that there is some sense in which God can be said to be omniscient, and to have an intellect which somehow embraces all truth without that consisting in a set whose members are all true propositions. We would then have reason to follow Craig in rejecting: (l\'KS3) The set ofhlture evems contained within God's knowledge constitutes a determinate, complete, actually infinite set. Rather, we would have to accept something like: (NKS3*) The set of future e\'ents encompassed by God's intuitive intellect constitutes a potentially infinite set. Clearly, replacing (NKS3) with (NKS3*) renders Lawhead's neo-kalam supplement invalid. EH"n if it is conceded that God's intellect is intuitive, it need not follow that God's foreknowledge does not imply the existence of an actually infinite collection. Let us consider the collection of days of the afterlife of some particular individual, say, St. Peter. Peter's afterlife is unending. Is it actually infinite? I shall argue that it must be considered so. The afterlife argument, as I shall call it, is as follows: (ALl) God's intellect apprehends Peter's afterlife as unending. (AL2) If God's intellect apprehends Peter's afterlife as unending, then God's intellect either apprehends Peter's afterlife as potentially infinite or as actually inflIlile. (AL3) If God's intellect apprehends Peter's afterlife as potentially infinite, then there will be days of Peter's afterlife that will come to pass that are not included in God's intuitive apprehension of it. (AL4) There is nothing that will come to pass that is not included in God's innJitive intellect. (AL::» Therefore, Cod's intuitive intellect apprehends Peter's afterlife as actually infinite. (AL6) If God's intuitive intellect apprehends Peter's afterlife as actually infinite, then Peter's afterlife is actually infinite. (AL7) Therefore Peter's afterlife is actualh infinite. (AUl) If Peter's afterlife is actually infinite, 'then an actual infinite is possible. (AL9) Therefore, an actual infinite is possible. From St. Peter's own perspective, or that of any finite being, at any point during Peter's afterlife it will be seen as potentially infinite, since it will not 46 PHII9 have been completed. But the divine intellect, extending intuitively to all truth, would apprehend Peter's afterlife as actually infinite. But whatever God's intellect (intuitively) apprehends to be the case, or encompasses, or includes as true, must actually be the case. Craig's insistence on God's intellect being intuitive rather than propositional notwithstanding, it is (NKl) that must be rejected rather than (NK2). Whereas Lawhead's argument makes God's intellect actually infinite in the respect that it includes an actual infinity of true propositions, the afterlife argument makes Peter's afterlife itself actually infinite. Several possible replies to this line of argument must be considered. The first objection to consider is that the future does not exist yet, and thus it is simply a confusion to think of the future as having any actuality. The future is potential, rather than actual, and so Peter's afterlife must be potentially infinite, rather than actually infinite. Craig, anticipating arguments such as the afterlife argument, attempts to forestall them as follows: ... Past events have really existed; they have taken place in the real world, while future events have not, since they have not occurred. In no sense does the future actually exist-we must not be fooled by Minkowski diagrams of four-dimensional spacetime depicting the world line of some entity into thinking that future events somehow subsist further down the line .... The fact that we can mark out the future world line of an object in no way implies that these future events actually exist. Only the sequence of past events can [or rather; could, conceivably 1 count as an actual infinity. 12 Some of this is, I think, quite correct. As Craig says, "clearly, past events are actual in a way that future events are not."I' Still, past events are not (currently) actual. The future does not actually exist, at least not yet. But it is at precisely this point that we must think extra carefully. The future will actually exist. Furthermore, God, according to the classical theist, foreknows what the actual future will be. So, from the standpoint of divine foreknowledge (even if we assume that the divine intellect is intuitive, rather than propositional) it seems that there is a sense in which the future is actual after all, viz., it is an actual object of divine omniscience. 14 From God's perspective (even if intuitive), the future is fully determinate in the sense that every event that will ever occur is included in God's knowledge. According to the afterlife argument, the theist cannot insist that the future is merely potentially infinite. Craig would have us accept that "In the real sense, the set of all events from any point into the future is not an actual infinite at all, but a potential infinite. It is an indefinite collection of events, always finite, and always increasing."15 This is inconsistent with (AL4), however. Uthe future is only potentially infinite from the standpoint of the divine intellect, then there will be days of Peter's afterlife that will not be foreknown by God (or even included in God's intuition) as part of Peter's future. What is right about Craig's position is that when Peter's afterlife is considered from the perspective of any finite knower, it will always be potentially infinite. But there is a difference between saying that Peter's afterlife is always potentially infinite from the standpoint of any Sotnak: The Kalam Cosmological Argument 47 finite knower, and saying that Peter's afterlife itself is only potentially infinite. Peter's afterlife itself (not his afterlife as it is considered by any finite knower) either constitutes a potentially infinite series or an actually infinite series. The former is inconsistent with classical theism's insistence on divine omniscience, and therefore Peter's afterlife itself must be actually infinite. Still, the point remains that the future is potential, rather than actual. But this does not necessarily imply that the future is potentially infinite rather than actually infinite. This is because the word "potential" means slightly different things when applied to the potential future and when applied to a potential infinite. When talking about the potential future, the subject is (all) the days which have yet to occur. The emphasis is on what will be, or what might be. In this sense of "potential" it makes perfect sense to say that an actual infinite is potential. Suppose (pace Craig's arguments against such a suggestion) an actually infinite number of acorns were to spring into existence, all at once, on August 5,2162. From the standpoint of the present, this collection is potential in the sense that it will exist, but does not yet. Now, when talking about a potential infinite, the subject is not the collection of members yet to be added to the series, but rather the series insofar as it has already been partially completed and to which more members will be added. The emphasis here is on the incompleteness of the series. In fact, it is concerns about completeness that motivate, in part, Craig's rejecting the possibility of an actual infinite. A second reply to the afterlife argument, then, is that it is impossible for Peter's afterlife to be actually infinite because an actual infinite must be complete."; Since Peter's afterlife will never be complete, it cannot be actually infinite. This could be called the argument from incompleteness (AI), and runs as follows: (All) There will never be a day of Peter's afterlife upon which Peter's afterlife will be complete. (AI2) If (All), then Peter's afterlife will never be actually infinite. (AI3) Therefore, Peter's afterlife will never be actually infinite. One reply to this argument is to suggest that there will, in fact, be a day (perhaps even infinitely many days) on which Peter's afterlife is complete, but that day is infinitely removed from the beginning of Peter's afterlife. To suppose that this is impossible presupposes that between any two determinate members of a series there must always be a finite number of intermediate members. When dealing with infinite series however, it is not uncontroversially clear that this must be granted, Infinite series may have some very odd properties, indeed. Still, I will grant that this first reply has little intuitive plausibility, and so I will not attempt to defend it further. The second reply to (AI) is to suggest that Peter's afterlife can be complete, and can, in fact, be actually infinite without there ever being any day on which it is actually infinite. Just as no number in the series of positive integers is infinitely large, but the series as a whole is actually infinite, in the same way, Peter's afterlife can be actually infinite without there being any 48 PHII9 day on which his afterlife is actually infinite. The completeness of Peter's afterlife just is his infinite afterlife taken as a whole. Suppose there were an actually infinite number of days before the present in the universe's history. There would not, then, be any particular day in the past on which there were an infinite number of days until the present day, but that would not prevent the past from being actually infinite. To be sure, Craig has argued that it is impossible for the universe to have an actually infinite past history. For example, Craig argues that if the past history of the universe were actually infinite, then any given event that occurs would already have happened somewhere in the infinite past. But consider the claim that if the future were actually infinite, then any event that happens now would happen somewhere in the infinite future, instead. There is no plausibility to this argument, however, and the corresponding argument for the impossibility of an infinite past is equally bad. 17 Perhaps the most important objection to the argument from incompleteness is that it presupposes that the sense in which an actually infinite collection would have to be complete is for it to be completed by terminating construction of the collection with a last member. But to terminate the collection through the addition of a last member would render the collection finite, rather than infinite. IS A preferable account of the wayan actually infinite series may be considered complete is for there to be no member of the collection that is left out or missing. An actually infinite collection would thus be complete (but neither finite nor completed) if nothing that is part of the collection at some time is left: out. Of course, at any particular time in the course of Peter's afterlife, his afterlife will be finite, and thus not actually infinite; some days (an infinite number, in fact) will still be missing from the collection. But if one considers whether there are any days missing from God's intuitive apprehension of Peter's afterlife, the answer must be "no." The completeness of Peter's afterlife just is the totality of days included in the collection, and each day included in this totality will exist. 19 To look at it another way, (AI) improperly assumes that the number of events that occur in the universe must always be totaled up at some particular time. Let us assume that the universe began to exist at a definite time. Since at any particular time the number of events in the universe's history will be finite, there will be no particular time at which the number of such events will be (actually) infinite. So far, so good. But this need not be taken to imply that the number of events in the universe will never be actually infinite. That only follows if the number of events in the history of the universe must always be considered relative to some particular time. Yet this forces a too-narrow view of what is involved in considering the universe's history. In the first place, it is contrary to the classical theist's view of divine omniscience. If God must always consider universal history relative to some particular time, he cannot simply know all the events that ever occur in the history of the universe, past, present, and future (especially not in a single intuition), but must, rather, always "time-stamp" his assessment of universal events. It is as though he may only say to himself that at thus-and-such Sotnak: The Kalam Cosmological Argument 49 a time, thus-and-so many events will have occurred in the universe's history (or he must intuit only a portion of the universe's total history). God's knowledge of universal history would thus be constrained by time indices. Although some theists may be willing to accept this, most would not. Nor are we mere mortals restricted to speaking meaningfully of the universe's history only relative to particular time-indices. There is no reason to think we cannot talk meaningfully about, simply, "all the events that will ever occur in the history of the universe" rather than "all the events that will ever occur in the history of the universe up to time index t." If it is, indeed, possible to consider the entire future as a totality of events that have not yet occurred, but which will occur (and especially if this totality is infallibly foreknown by God), it is possible to respond to (AI) with the following supplement to the afterlife argument: (SALl) There is no day of Peter's afterlife comprehended in God's intuitive apprehension of it that will not become actual. (SAL2) [=AL5] God's intuitive intellect apprehends Peter's afterlife as actually infinite. (SAL3) Therefore, Peter's afterlife will come to exist as actually infinite. Craig is mistaken, therefore, in saying, "When we speak of the potential existence of a statue we mean that there will be an actual statue. It is not so with the infinite. There will not be an actual infinite."20 There will, indeed, be an actual infinite. Even if it is true that there will be no particular time at which Peter's afterlife is actually infinite,zl it does not follow that Peter's afterlife will not be actually infinite in its totality. The foregoing reply to (AI) also serves to address the second of Craig's philosophical arguments in support of the claim that the universe began to exist (premise K2 of the Kalam argument). This argument, which I will call the addition argument is as follows: (AAI) The temporal series of events is a collection formed by successive addition. (AA2) A collection formed by successive addition cannot be an actual infinite. (AA3) Therefore, the temporal series of events cannot be an actual infinite. The second premise of this argument, however, (AA2) , need not be granted. In defense of this premise, Craig argues: Sometimes it is wrongly alleged that the reason an actual infinite cannot be formed by successive addition is that there is not enough time. But this is wholly beside the point. Regardless of the time involved an actual infinite cannot be completed by successive addition due to the very nature of the actual infinite itself. No matter how many elements one has added, one can always add one more. A potential infinite cannot be turned into an actual infinite by any amount of successive addition; they are conceptually distinct. 22 It is true that no amount of time will allow an actual infinite to be formed by successive addition if the amount of time is finite. Nor will any 50 PHII9 additional amount of time allow the collection to be completed through the addition of a last member. But if one is given an infinite amount of time, then one can construct an actual infinite-what will be actually infinite is the collection itself. Craig gives the following example: ... Suppose we imagine a man running through empty space on a path of stone slabs, a path constructed such that when the man's foot strikes the last slab, a new one appears immediately in ii"ont of him. It is clear that even if the man runs for eternity, he will never run across all the slabs." Perhaps it is not so clear, after all. If the man runs for eternity, there will be no slab added to the path that the man will not run across. So, given infinite time, the man will run across all the slabs. If the afterlife argument is sound, then the kalam cosmological argument is weakened, because one line of justification for the premise that the universe began to exist is seriously flawed, viz., the argument that an actual infinite is impossible, and so there cannot be an actually infinite regress of past events. Even if it is granted that God's intellect is intuitive rather than propositional, the definition of a potential infinite as an uncompleted collection in-process rules out the possibility that God's intellect grasps an unending series of future events as potentially infinite. Intuitive or not, God's intellect (if he is to be truly omniscient) must at least somehow comprehend all reality, past, present, and future. If the future is unending, then it must be actually infinite from the standpoint of the divine intellect, since otherwise there will be future events that God's intellect does not comprehend. Although it may be true that future events are not actual until they occur, the thesis that God has perfect foreknowledge about future occurrences requires that there be no future events that God does not know. If he does not know future events by knowing an actually infinite number of propositions, but rather by a single intuition, that intuition must still be considered as encompassing an actually infinite number of future events. None of this bears on Craig's arguments that there is empirical confirmation of the premise (K2) that the universe began to exist. Even if an actual infinite is possible, and it is, therefore, possible for the universe to have an actually infinite history, this possibility may not be realized. If this is so, then the kalam argument is not entirely dead in the water. Whether it is successful will depend both on its first premise, and on the extension of the argument which purports to show that only God could be the cause of the universe's existence. REFERENCES l. William Lane Craig, The Kalam Cosmological Algument (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1979) and William Lane Craig, Theism, Atheism, and Big Bang Cosmology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). 2. This argument is strikingly similar to the argument given by Pope Pius XII, commenting on the significance of the Big Bang theory of the origin of the universe: "With that concreteness which is characteristic of physical proofs, [science] has confirmed the contingency of the universe .... Hence, creation took place in Sotnak: The Kalam Cosmological Argum.ent 51 time. Therefore there is a Creator. Therefore, God exists!" The Proofs for the Existence of God in the Light of Modern Natural Science; Address oj Pope Pius XII to the Pontifical Academy of Sciences (Washington, D.C.: National Catholic Welfare Conference, 1951), p. 17. 3. By a "subdivision" T mean a magnitude that is obtained by dividing a larger magnitude. I include geometric points as subdivisions, even though they are not really obtained by dividing any larger magnitude. Little hinges upon this, however. 4. Craig, Theism, Atheism, and Big Bang Cosmology, p. 5. 5. Ibid. p. 9. 6. Craig, The Kalarn Cosmological Argument, p. S4. 7. William F. Lawhead, "The Symmetry of The Past and The Future in The Kalam Cosmological Argument," in The Logic of Rational Theism, ed. William Lane Craig and Mark S. McLeod, (Lewiston, NY: The Edwin Mellen Press. 1990), pp. 99-111. S. Lawhead, p. 106. 9. Craig, Theism, Atheism, and Big Bang Cosmology, p. 94 . See also William Lane Craig, Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom. (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1991), p. 288, note 12. 10. See John Cottingham, Robert Stoothof{ and Dugald Murdoch, trans., The Philosophical Writings oj Descartes, Vol. I, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 19S5), pp. 207-S. 11. This is contrary to Alston's characterization of intuitive knowledge. See William Alston, "Does God Have Beliefs?" Religious Studies, 22 (l9S6). p. 294. In fairness, Alston does sav that [intuitive] knowledge of a fact is the immediate awareness oj that fact, but more than this, it seems that knowledge of a fact requires that one be aware that it is a fact. For example, I might be aware of my brother's presence in the room without knowing that it is my brother who is in the room. In this situation I surely do not have intuitive knowledge of my brother's being in the room. At best, I have intuitive knowledge onlv that someone is in the room. 12. Craig, The Kalam Cosmological Argument, pp. 96-7. 13. Ibid. p. 97. 14. A comment by Robert Prevost is appropriate here:" God's mode of knowledge, that is, how God knows particulars. intuitivelv or discursively, does not affect the object of knowledge." See Robert Prevost, "Classical Theism and the Kalam Principle," in The Logic of Rational Theism, pp. 113-123. IS. Craig, The Kalam Cosmological Argument, p. 97. 16. Ibid. pp. 67-S. 17. More extensive criticism of Craig's arguments along these lines for the impossibility of an infinite past can be found in David Conway, '''It Would Have Happened Already': On One Argument for a First Cause." Analysis, 44 (l984) pp. 159-66. IS. This supposes, as I have conceded for the sake of argument above, that it does not make sense to suppose the last member to be infinitely removed from the first. 19. This also suggests a sort of resolution of the 'li'istram Shandy paradox which Craig invokes as part of his case against the possibility of an actual infinite. In writing his autobiography, Tristram Shandy requires one year to write about each day of his life. If he is mortal, he will never finish the work. But suppose he is immortal, and has an infinite amount of time to write the autobiography. 1\ ow since there are the same number of years as there are days in his eternal life, he can, according to Bertrand Russell, complete the work. But this is impossible, Craig maintains, since Tristram Shandy will fall farther and farther behind as time goes by. But if we understand "complete" to mean that nothing is left out, the situation is as follows: There is no day of Tristram Shandy's life that will be left out of the autobiography, and so the autobiography, while never completed, will nevertheless 52 PHII9 be complete. Every day of Tristram Shandy'S life will, eventually, be recorded. (See Craig, Theism, Atheism, and Big Bang Cosmology, pp. 33-34.) 20. Ibid. p. 5. 21. Notice that if arguments against the possibility of an actually infinite past are unsound, and the past really is actually infinite, then it will be false that there is no particular time at which the number of events in the universe's history is actually infinite. On the contrary, at any panicular time in the universe's history, the number of events in the universe's history will be actually infinite. Nor must it be granted that because new events are taking place, the past is therefore incomplete because some events are missing from the universe's history until they occur. An infinite past can still be complete in the sense that if one were to count backward endlessly from a particular event in the universe's history, there would be no preceding event that would go uncounted. 22. Craig, The Kalam Cosmological Argument, p. 104. 23. Ibid. p. 104.


The Metaphysics of Consciousness

Philosophy

Some time ago, in an article for the Journal of Consciousness Studies, David Chalmers challenged his peers to identify the ingredient missing from our current theories of consciousness, the absence of which prevents us from solving the 'hard' problem and forces us to make do with nonreductive theories. Here I respond to this challenge.  I suggest that consciousness is a metaphysical problem and as such can be solved only within a global metaphysical theory. Such a theory would look very like the information theory proposed by Chalmers, but with the addition of an extra phenomenon that would allow it to become fundamental.

The Metaphysics of Consciousness Peter G. Jones Consciousness is deemed a 'hard' problem in modern scientific consciousness studies wherever it is identified as a metaphysical problem, a problem of first principles, since it is widely assumed that all such problems are intractable to the human intellect. If the problem is sometimes seen as 'easy' this is because not everyone sees it as a metaphysical problem. It was christened 'hard' by David Chalmers on this basis, that Mind-Matter is a metaphysical dilemma and not a problem that can be addressed within the natural sciences. Metaphysics has always known that neither Mind nor Matter is a plausible basis for a fundamental theory, for the failure of extreme metaphysical positions is what makes the subject so difficult in the first place, but philosophers of mind do not always take much notice of metaphysics, and scientists may sometimes be contemptuous. There is a view that metaphysical analysis need not be a constraint on theories of consciousness and this allows many logically indefensible ideas to survive and flourish. But if we are to honestly face up to the 'hard' problem then we must pay metaphysics its rightful dues and concede, with Chalmers, that it cannot be solved within the worldview or mindset that currently prevails in scientific consciousness studies. This is a worldview and mindset for which it has never been possible to solve metaphysical problems and it would make no sense if Mind-Matter were to suddenly become the single exception. In two short articles for The Journal of Consciousness Studies, 'Facing up to the problem of consciousness' and 'Moving on from the problem of consciousness',1 Chalmers proposes that we cannot hope to do in scientific consciousness studies what we cannot do in metaphysics and must settle for a nonreductive theory. He names this approach naturalistic dualism. The name suggests that we cannot transcend dualism for a fundamental solution without abanding the conception of Nature that currently prevails in scientific consciousness studies. Opponents of this pessimistic view, if they are to argue from within the same worldview, must disregard the results of metaphysical analysis and assume that Mind or Matter are, after all, fundamental categories, and hope that we we will eventually discover some scientific evidence that this is the case. This position is not easy to sustain. No amount of scientific evidence would be enough to alter the fact that this profound assumption is logically indefensible and 1 Journal of Consciousness Studies 2(3):200-19 & 4(1):3-46 (1995) 2 thus perverse. There can be no evidence to support it unless the universe is paradoxical. If the assumption that Mind or Matter are fundamental categories were logically defensible then metaphysics would be a simple affair. As it is, and it is quite easy to verify, all metaphysical problems are found to be intractable once this assumption has been made. These problems are intricately and intimately connected, and every one of them is found to be 'hard' in exactly the same way. The idea that we might overturn the result of some thousands of years of rational analysis by discovering new scientific evidence is incredible, and a clear misunderstanding of the relationship between physics and metaphysics. From the point of view of the metaphysician to even bother looking for such evidence would be a waste of time. It would simply be a fact that all selective conclusions about the world as a whole are undecidable. This is inevitable, since all selective, extreme or partial metaphysical views are found to be logically indefensible. We cannot choose between them because they are both as bad as each other. Many philosophers have concluded that metaphysics is a waste of time for precisely this reason, that it does not produce a positive result, but this criticism only serves to show that that its result is completely secure. Truly facing up to the problem of consciousness would mean accepting this result of metaphysics as an incontrovertible and directly relevant fact. Naturalistic dualism concedes this fact and is an immediate response to it. We would work only on the easy part of the problem of consciousness and not bother with metaphysics. In this way we can acknowledge the result of metaphysics without having to change our ideas about Nature in any way. This cannot be called facing up to the problem, however, for it is designed as a means of entirely avoiding it. Facing up to the problem would mean conceding that the intractability of Mind-Matter and all other metaphysical problems from within the prevailing worldview is not a plausible coincidence. If it is not a plausible coincidence then it must be the case that it would be impossible to solve the problem of consciousness without solving all other metaphysical problems at the same time. Consciousness would be no more or less important or 'hard' than any other metaphysical question. The prevailing worldview in scientific consciousness studies has to be the source of the 'hard' problem and its associated metaphysical problems; solipsism, freewill, scepticism, knowledge, origins, ethics and so on. Its failure as a solution for metaphysics is there for all to see. It is logically flawed such that according to reason it must be wrong. It describes a universe that is incomprehensible to us. If it is 'scientific' or 'naturalistic' then it would only be in the same sense as is the theory of philostogen. It renders consciousness 'hard' in exactly the way that Chalmers proposes and demonstrates. Not necessarily intractable, but having no solution that 3 can be reconciled with the worldview that currently prevails in the natural sciences and mainstream western metaphysics. So what is wrong with this worldview? It is often the outcome of an initial assumption stating that metaphysical problems such as Mind-Matter are either decidable or intractable, so that when we fail to decide them we conclude they are intractable. A great many 'hard' problems are created by this assumption. It entails that in respect of the Mind-Matter problem we have only two options. We can assume that it is decidable and endorse one of two counterposed extreme metaphysical positions where all such positions are known to fail, or we can assume that it is intractable and walk away. This is the stark choice with which Chalmers presents us. No other option would be possible for this worldview, for this is the assumption on which it rests. The assumption that metaphysical questions must be decidable or intractable is not actually necessary for science or naturalism. It is so often made, however, that it is also widely assumed, as a corollary, that the metaphysically flawed and inevitably nonreductive worldview that arises from it must be the only one that can be considered 'scientific' or 'naturalistic'. We must then conclude that in order for a theory to be considered 'scientific' or 'naturalistic' it must fail in metaphysics. And so we are led to the idea that for a naturalistic and scientific worldview we must disregard the results of human reasoning. But, of course, a little thought shows that it is simply not the case that this assumption about metaphysical questions or the worldview that emerges from it is uniquely or even necessarily scientific or naturalistic. If a worldview can legitimately call itself scientific or naturalistic then it would not inevitably follow that it is consistent with the scientific data or survives logical analysis. It may yet be a poorly constructed or hopelessly wrong theory. If it is found to have ramifications inconsistent with logic and reason then calling it 'scientific' or 'naturalistic' is not going to make it any more plausible. Once we have assumed that metaphysical problems are either intractable or decidable, however, then for a 'scientific' or 'naturalistic' theory of consciousness we must stay well clear of metaphysical issues, and we could certainly never revisit this metaphysical assumption to examine it more closely. According to our assumption there would be no point in doing so. We abandoned metaphysics when we start making assumptions instead of doing the calculations. Having made this assumption we have no choice but to conclude, not a little ironically, that the problem of consciousness is too 'hard' for the natural sciences and scientific consciousness studies and that its solution, if there is one, would have to be found elsewhere. Thus Chalmers concludes that if professional consciousness studies is to remain 'scientific' and 4 'naturalistic' then the problem of consciousness must be deemed intractable. We would stop looking for a fundamental theory and restrict ourselves to those we would judge scientific or naturalistic, where all theories that would qualify under the current rules are known to fail in metaphysics. In this way we end up with a consciousness studies that we can proudly call scientific and naturalistic and which is doomed to failure for this very reason. This muddle can be disentangled only if we concede that science is a method and not a set of preconceptions about Nature, and that 'naturalism' is a rejection of the miraculous and paradoxical and not otherwise a limit on our imagination as we try to understand ourselves and our world. We do not have to start by assuming that metaphysical problems are intractable, nor that their solution would have to contradict our reason or be 'unscientific' or 'unnaturalistic'. We would only need to concede that at this time there is something wrong with the way we are looking at these problems and thus at Nature herself. This is clearly the case, for otherwise we would be able to solve these problems and comprehend Nature. It remains possible, therefore, as a consequence of all this, to argue that the 'easy' part of the problem of consciousness would be the more difficult of the two to solve. It would be an endless task. We would want to know everything we can know about consciousness by the methods of the natural sciences, and then understand the ramifications of this knowledge for cosmology, philosophy, physics, neurophysiology, biology, psychology, psychiatry, artificial intelligence, mathematics, soteriology, religion, the occult, morality, advertising, education, management training, sporting performance and who knows what else. It would be impossible to say what would be required to solve this part of the problem other than a lot of time and money. There is also a deeper issue. If we cannot solve the 'hard' part of the problem in metaphysics then there must be a strict limit on our ability to solve the 'easy' part of it in any other discipline. By such methods we could certainly never hope to learn anything about consciousness that would enable us to decide a metaphysical question, and this places a narrow limit on what we can learn about consciousness as an imputed third-person or intra-subjective phenomenon. Chalmers proposes that we must respect this limit for a naturalistic consciousness studies, one that does not immediately drag us off into the murky waters of metaphysics and mysticism. It would be an impassable barrier to knowledge standing between us and a fundamental theory. But this pessimistic view is not a result of analysis. It is an artefact of an unnecessary assumption about metaphysics and Nature. It is a man-made barrier, not a reason to suppose that a theory which is fundamental, scientific and naturalistic would be impossible. 5 The 'hard' part of the problem is more clear-cut, or it can be made so. It is a finite problem, a problem of first principles, a single problem requiring a unique once-and-for-all solution. Crucially, it has not yet been demonstrated that it is intractable. We can concede that it cannot be solved in scientific consciousness studies as currently defined and practised, even insist upon it, and also concede that it is a metaphysical problem, intractable for two millennia or more in the mainstream of European philosophical thought. Yet we can still suppose that it is tractable. This is because it is not yet certain that the prevailing paradigm in European thought and modern scientific consciousness studies, for which these problems are intractable, is in fact naturalistic. Indeed, the intractability of these problems makes it obvious that it is not. If a scientific theory does not describe Nature correctly then it is not naturalistic in anything more than intent. If a theory of consciousness is beset by metaphysical problems then according to reason it is wrong, and if it is wrong then it is not a description of Nature. If naturalism is the claim that all phenomena are natural and subject to natural laws, and if science is defined as a method of data-collection and theory-generation, then unless the universe is paradoxical a truly scientific and naturalistic consciousness studies would encounter no terminally 'hard' problems. Indeed, this would be a crucial test of whether it is naturalistic, that it gives an unproblematic description of Nature. The task for the natural sciences is to establish what is the case, and if we do not yet understand Nature fully then we are forced to remain openminded as to what 'naturalistic' should mean in relation to a fundamental theory of consciousness. If we accept this then the door is thrown open to solutions not available to us when we restrict our ideas about consciousness to exclude those that do not seem 'naturalistic' to us according to some conjectural view of Nature that does not work in metaphysics. For a solution we need not abandon the idea that all phenomena are natural, merely accept that there is much we do not yet know about Nature. Chalmers must be correct in saying that for an orthodox scientific consciousness studies we must settle for a nonreductive theory, for if we set out to pursue the problem of consciousness to its end we cannot avoid becoming enmired in metaphysics and religion. But this would mean that the solution for consciousness would have to be sought beyond consciousness studies, in metaphysics and religion. This does not seem like progress. Do we really want to emasculate consciousness studies in this way? It would then be beyond the remit of scientific consciousness studies to declare consciousness an 'easy' or a 'hard' problem, since which it is would depend entirely on how difficult it would be to solve in metaphysics or religion. Narrowing the scope of consciousness studies in this way in order to protect an incomprehensible naturalism would not be necessary if we say that science is a 6 method and not a theory, and that naturalism is a commitment to the laws of Nature and not a statement of what they are. There is then some reason to think that the 'hard' problem might not be terminally difficult. The difficulty may be only that our incorrect preconceptions about Nature make it so. Is this not certain? It is not as if we need more data. If we cannot solve this problem then where else can the fault lie than in our preconceptions about Nature? For the natural sciences we usually begin by assuming that 'Mind' and 'Matter' are categories within which we can place all natural phenomena. This is to assume that we know a lot more about Nature than we actually do. It is a metaphysical assumption, a gamble, and there is nothing particularly scientific or naturalistic about it. Only if we allow ourselves to be dragged into metaphysics and religion can we abandon this assumption, for here we find a different idea. We need not abandon naturalism and science, only certain orthodoxies, preconceptions, assumptions and dogmas. As for whether we would be abandoning our traditional metaphysics, the intractability of the problem of consciousness and other related problems is conclusive proof that our usual metaphysical approach is fundamentally flawed. Why would we not want to abandon it? Every one of its problems is caused by the assumption that some distinction or categorisation such as Mind-Matter is fundamental, while the only available solution for them would be to assume otherwise. The problem is only this. In order to assume that Mind-Matter and all such distinctions are emergent we would have to abandon the assumption that metaphysical problems are decidable or intractable, and this cannot be done within the prevailing paradigm. We can briefly examine one case to illustrate the possibility of a different approach. In one of its guises the problem of consiousness appears as the problem of matter-mind causation. The idea that a corporeal phenomenon can act causally on a mental phenomenon goes largely unquestioned in the sciences, but it is no less problematic than the idea that mind can act on matter. The mismatch of phenomena is the same in both directions. One is material and the other is not, and we have no theory for how this gap can be bridged by any form of causation even at the moment of their creation. Not even the existence of consciousness can be established in physics. But we can use our reason. In metaphysics we find it impossible to reduce Mind and Matter one to the other or to make them identical, and their causal relationship seems to be miraculous. Unless, that is, we hypothesise another phenomenon, something that cannot be classified as Mind or Matter. Given an extra ingredient we no longer have to suppose that there is a paradoxical causal link between the physical and the mental worlds, nor that one is fundamental and the other emergent. This is a plausible solution because 7 it represents a paradigmatic change of approach. For the prevailing view we must assume that one or both of Mind and/or Matter takes precedence in the evolution of the universe. Usually one would be original and cause the other. As this idea does not make sense all sorts of problems arise for it that seem impregnable to human reason and cannot be solved in metaphysics, consciousness studies or physics. It cannot be a correct assumption. The present state of western academic metaphysics and consciousness studies represents a highly successful reductio argument against it. With a third phenomenon ontologically prior to mental and corporeal phenomena, however, we can suppose that these two emerge as dual-aspects in mutual-dependence and can be described within a dual-aspect theory very much as Chalmers proposes. We need not imagine that either can exist independently, that one or the other sprang into existence from nothing at all, nor that one directly causes the other. They would share a common source and a mediated relationship. This is mysticism, of course, the 'nondual' or advaita view, the doctrine of 'dependent origination ', the realm of Lao Tsu's Tao. In the context of consciousness studies it has been called 'relative phenomenalism'. It would also be very nearly the solution proposed by Chalmers' with his dual-aspect theory of information, where these two aspects would be the mental and the corporeal. It is only that now it would contain an extra ingredient, a third theoretical primitive, one that would allow the theory to be fundamental. As well as the parts there would be the whole. So similar is this to Chalmers' theory, being merely an extension of it, and so obvious is it that it might be a solution for the problem, that it can only be an unnecessarily narrow interpretation of the words 'scientific' and 'naturalistic' that prevent it from being a well-regarded theory in scientific consciousness studies. In one of its guises it is Middle Way Buddhism, and so the reason cannot be a lack of publicity. Its lack of credibility seems more likely to be due to certain assumptions about science and naturalism that prevent those who make them from seeing the full possibilities of Nature. It is at least possible, therefore, that the 'hard' problem of consciousness is a tractable one and even, at the level of principles, a fairly straightforward one. The solution would be to assume that the Buddha and Lao Tsu knew what they were talking about. It is often forgotten that they predicted the Mind-Matter problem, our inability to reduce this dualism, and all such metaphysical dilemmas, when they told us that the categories of thought are not fundamental, that all distinctions are emergent. Even if we do not believe them we can at least be sure, after all this time, that Chalmers is right, and that it would be impossible to gainsay them. ____