Book review: the textbook and the lecture: education in the age of new media by Norm Friesen

Philosophy

Does it seem that education is somehow always lagging behind the latest technologies? In The Textbook and the Lecture: Education in the Age of New Media, Norm Friesen presents a longue durÃ©e study of the historical relationship between education and technologies of reading and writing in order to reframe accusations of âinertiaâ in education. This is a useful introduction to a media history of education, finds Lavinia Marin, that offers insight for researchers and educational practitioners into the longstanding philosophical assumptions underpinning their teaching practice.

Book	Review:	The	Textbook	and	the	Lecture: Education	in	the	Age	of	New	Media	by	Norm	Friesen Does	it	seem	that	education	is	somehow	always	lagging	behind	the	latest	technologies?	In	The	Textbook	and	the Lecture:	Education	in	the	Age	of	New	Media,	Norm	Friesen	presents	a	longue	durée	study	of	the	historical relationship	between	education	and	technologies	of	reading	and	writing	in	order	to	reframe	accusations	of	"inertia"	in education.	This	is	a	useful	introduction	to	a	media	history	of	education,	finds	Lavinia	Marin,	offering	insight for	researchers	and	educational	practitioners	into	the	longstanding	philosophical	assumptions	underpinning	their teaching	practice. This	review	originally	appeared	on	LSE	Review	of	Books	and	is	published	under	a	CC	BY-NC-ND	2.0	UK	license. The	Textbook	and	the	Lecture:	Education	in	the	Age	of	New	Media.	Norm	Friesen.	Johns	Hopkins	University Press.	2017. Find	this	book: "Our	educational	system	is	outdated."	Anyone	following	the	news	has	stumbled	upon this	statement,	be	it	on	TV,	radio,	or	the	internet.	From	the	USA	to	India	and	Australia, a	strange	consensus	unifies	public	opinion	against	one's	own	educational	system: namely,	the	perception	that	it	is	not	up	to	the	task.	One	important	argument	in	this ongoing	critique	of	education	lies	in	the	slow	adoption	of	media	technologies.	It	would appear	that	education	is	somehow	always	lagging	behind	the	newest	technologies: pupils	were	still	writing	by	hand	and	reading	paper-based	textbooks	while	outside school	walls	computers	were	the	norm;	when	computers	entered	classrooms,	the outside	world	had	already	switched	to	laptops;	when	laptops	finally	landed	on student's	desks,	the	world	was	turning	to	mobile	phones	and	tablets.	The	race	with technology	seems	to	be	already	lost	from	the	school	side. However,	education's	slow	adoption	of	emergent	media	technologies	is	not	a	new issue.	On	the	contrary,	as	Norm	Friesen	shows	in	his	latest	book,	The	Textbook	and the	Lecture,	educational	resistance	to	new	media	has	been	occurring	for	centuries. Friesen's	book	is	concerned	with	the	relation	between	media	technologies	and	education,	especially	technologies	of writing	and	reading.	One	of	the	book's	central	arguments	is	that	we	cannot	discuss	education	and	its	media separately	as	they	always	condition	one	another.	Friesen	argues	that	the	most	basic	educational	practices	–	learning to	read,	write	and	count	–	are	actually	operations	of	rewiring	the	brain.	Education	is,	then,	a	commitment	to	this process	through	special	media	techniques	such	as	reading	and	writing.	However,	this	rewiring	has	a	certain	cultural history:	it	has	acquired	different	significations	throughout	time.	By	looking	at	these,	Friesen's	book	helps	its	readers understand	what	is	at	stake	in	the	current	educational	debates	surrounding	media. The	book	is	structured	into	three	main	parts.	The	first	introduces	the	main	theoretical	approach	of	the	book:	namely, the	focus	on	media	as	"an	intermediate	agency"	(13),	a	means	which	make	possible	for	something	else	to	be expressed	or	communicated.	Media	have	three	major	features:	they	require	literacies;	give	rise	to	their	own	cultures; and	new	media	"remediate"	older	media.	Friesen	argues	that	media	are	not	just	one	way	of	acquiring	knowledge,	but the	major	way	of	doing	so:	"what	we	know	[...]	is	almost	always	mediated"	(14).	The	chapter	also	outlines	the historical	approach	of	the	book	as	performing	a	history	"over	the	longue	durée"	of	educational	forms.	Inspired	by historian	Fernand	Braudel,	this	type	of	research	studies	slow	changes	and	continuities	instead	of	focusing	on ruptures	and	revolutions,	which	are	understood	as	being	relatively	rare	events. Impact of Social Sciences Blog: Book Review: The Textbook and the Lecture: Education in the Age of New Media by Norm Friesen Page 1 of 4 Date originally posted: 2018-08-26 Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/impactofsocialsciences/2018/08/26/book-review-the-textbook-and-the-lecture-education-in-the-age-of-new-media-by-norm-friesen/ Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/impactofsocialsciences/ The	second	chapter	offers	an	illustration	of	how	to	do	history	over	the	long	duration	by	tracing	writing	instruction,	the oldest	education	practice,	over	4,000	years	of	history.	The	history	of	education	starts	with	the	history	of	writing,	and these	two	have	been	almost	indistinguishable	for	long	stretches	of	time.	Text	is	the	"most	important	for	the	culture	of education"	(16)	because	education	has	writing	at	its	centre,	understood	as	a	system	of	inscription.	Passing	on	this system	requires	a	lot	of	instruction	and	effort,	because	our	brains	are	not	naturally	wired	to	learn	how	to	write	or	to use	inscriptions.	Friesen	reconstructs	the	history	of	education	as	the	history	of	the	effort	to	rewire	the	brain	into learning	to	write	and	to	use	writing	for	thinking.	The	chapter	compares	ancient	techniques	of	writing	from	Sumer, Jewish	education	and	the	Chinese	imperial	age	with	current	writing	practices.	Friesen	shows	that	writing	instruction historically	was	standardised	through	repetitive	exercises	and	dictation.	Learning	to	write	was	about	acquiring patterns	of	behaviour	in	designated	spaces,	separating	pupils	from	the	productive	world	and	allocating	for	this	a designated	time:	the	time	of	the	school.	The	similarity	with	current	learning	practices	is	striking.	Friesen	shows	that children	today	"still	learn	writing	through	a	set	of	steps	with	carefully	sequenced	arrangements	of	instructional methods,	materials	and	content"	(29). Image	credit:	lecture	hall	/	university,	by	Markus	Spiske.	This	work	is	licensed	under	a CC	BY	2.0	license. Friesen's	review	of	more	than	4000	years	of	educational	continuity	is	meant	to	reframe	current	accusations	of "inertia"	in	education.	Critics	of	educational	traditionalism	are	usually	the	proponents	of	novel	methods	and technologies	that	should	bring	education	up	to	our	current	needs.	But	can	we	explain	this	educational	continuity	over thousands	of	years	by	calling	it	inertia?	Could	humanity	have	been	so	foolish	as	to	maintain	useless	forms	of education	while	it	changed	everything,	from	religion	to	political	systems	and	social	structures? By	using	insights	from	neurology,	Friesen	proposes	the	hypothesis	that	the	practices	of	reading	and	writing	demand a	rewiring	of	neurons	in	the	brain.	The	commitment	to	the	same	educational	forms	for	millennia	has	not	been	a commitment	to	tradition	or	to	fixed	values.	Culturally	speaking,	reading	and	writing	have	served	remarkably	different purposes	throughout	history:	for	the	small	scribal	class	of	ancient	Sumer,	reading	and	writing	was	related	to	bookkeeping,	advancing	commerce	and	the	first	markets.	Nowadays,	reading	and	writing	fulfil	multiple	purposes,	keeping alive	a	culture	and	a	form	of	life,	cultivating	imaginations	and	allowing	for	critical	thinking.	Yet	pupils	today	learn	to read	and	write	with	methods	remarkably	similar	to	those	in	ancient	Sumer:	repetitive	exercises,	dictations,	rote memorisation,	artificial	problems	and	examples.	Thus,	the	reformist	demand	to	drop	a	certain	medium	from educational	practices	will	understandably	be	met	with	scepticism.	This	commitment	to	the	preservation	of	particular media	in	education	–	such	as	handwriting	training	in	early	grades,	in	spite	of	the	possibility	of	replacing	writing	with typing	–	is	a	commitment	not	to	the	medium	itself,	but	to	the	techniques	which	make	a	rewiring	of	the	brain	possible. It	is	through	exercise	and	repetition,	through	the	complex	intermixing	of	speech	and	writing,	looking	and	reading,	that educational	training	techniques	become	most	effective.	We	do	not	(yet)	know	how	to	achieve	the	same	effects	with digital	technologies,	perhaps	because	we	are	lacking	centuries	of	experience	from	which	to	draw. Impact of Social Sciences Blog: Book Review: The Textbook and the Lecture: Education in the Age of New Media by Norm Friesen Page 2 of 4 Date originally posted: 2018-08-26 Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/impactofsocialsciences/2018/08/26/book-review-the-textbook-and-the-lecture-education-in-the-age-of-new-media-by-norm-friesen/ Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/impactofsocialsciences/ The	third	part	illustrates	these	debates	with	the	two	case	studies	that	give	the	title	of	the	book	–	the	textbook	and	the lecture.	Friesen	positions	media	as	inextricably	linked	to	education,	while	also	pointing	out	that	education	has	never been	just	about	speech/orality	nor	writing/	literacy.	Chapters	Three	to	Five	give	an	ample	description	of	the	debate between	the	proponents	of	speech	and	those	of	writing.	Friesen	shows	how	the	speech/writing	debate	is	at	the	core of	many	educational	divisions	between	key	figures	in	the	history	of	education.	Friesen	traces	the	roots	of contemporary	debates	to	an	old	dualism	between	the	partisans	of	education	through	speech	(the	Romantics,	led	by Jean-Jacques	Rousseau,	who	saw	spoken	language	as	the	natural,	genuine	language	based	on	"expression	and feeling"),	and	the	Rationalists,	led	by	John	Amos	Comenius,	for	whom	Nature	is	like	a	book	that	one	must	learn	to read	or	decipher.	Rationalists	also	posit	a	universal	language	of	nature,	which	led	centuries	later	to	Noam	Chomsky's universal	grammar.	While	each	tradition	privileges	one	medium	over	the	other,	Friesen's	argument	is	that	education is	impossible	with	only	one	medium.	Speech	and	writing	have	always	been	"inseparably	intertwined"	in	education (68). One	of	the	unanswered	questions	of	the	book	is	how	this	debate	between	speech	and	writing	is	reflected	in	the	case of	the	university.	If	school	is	arguably	about	learning	the	basic	habits	of	reading,	writing	and	arithmetic,	university	is about	something	else.	The	last	two	chapters,	Eight	and	Nine,	focus	on	the	university	lecture,	which	is	decidedly different	from	speaking	to	a	classroom	of	pupils.	Friesen	points	to	reconceptualisations	of	the	lecture	from	the medieval	transmission	of	knowledge	–	mostly	an	oral	enterprise	–	to	Romantic	and	postmodern	transformations. There	was	a	clear	Romantic	perspective	on	the	lecture,	inspired	by	Johann	Gottlieb	Fichte	and	his	follower	Wilhelm von	Humboldt,	which	attributes	to	it	a	certain	communion	of	the	spirits	and	an	immediacy	that	cannot	be	achieved	in the	absence	of	speech.	However,	it	is	hard	to	find	a	Rationalist	stance	concerning	the	lecture.	There	is	a	difficulty here	in	connecting	the	lecture	chapters	to	the	rest	of	the	book	because	university	education	seems	to	be	about something	other	than	a	rewiring	of	the	brain.	What	the	university	or	any	other	forms	of	complex	education	do	with	the brain	is	therefore	a	question	left	open	by	this	book. One	can	also	question	the	entire	"neurological	explanation"	angle	that	the	book	adopts.	Indeed,	neurology	offers	a nice	explanation	of	why	education	prefers	certain	well-tested	methods	to	newer	approaches,	but	in	the	current philosophy	of	education	there	is	a	heated	debate	about	the	explanatory	power	of	neurological	insights	and	there	are concerns	that	the	"neurological	turn"	might	be	another	form	of	revived	scientism,	a	debate	left	unaddressed	by Friesen.	Even	if	we	accept	this	neurological	angle,	in	the	end	the	book	does	not	help	us	take	a	stance	on	the	"digital revolution"	sweeping	schools	and	universities.	In	the	general	debate	between	speech	and	writing,	digital technologies	seem	to	lie	on	the	side	of	speech,	with	their	promise	of	instant	access	akin	to	unmediated	immediacy. On	the	other	hand,	digital	technologies	do	involve	a	lot	of	writing	and	are	based	on	coding.	Our	conceptualisation	of the	digital	is	culturally	determined	just	as	much	as	previous	technologies.	While	Friesen	does	not	set	out	to	answer the	digital	question,	but	rather	to	subvert	or	dissolve	it	via	historical	contextualisation,	we	are	still	left	with	a	quandary: what	do	we	do	with	digital	technologies	in	education?	The	book's	greatest	strength	is	that	it	makes	us	reflect	on	the historicity	of	technological	discourse	in	education,	but	this	turns	into	a	weakness	once	we	arrive	at	the	moment	of taking	a	concrete	step. The	Textbook	and	the	Lecture	addresses	both	a	general	and	a	specialised	audience.	The	latter	consists	of educational	theorists	and	philosophers,	especially	those	working	around	educational	media,	who	will	be	interested	in the	theoretical	intervention	of	the	book.	For	practitioners,	it	opens	up	the	black	box	of	educational	practices	by showing	why	they	may	still	be	using	"outdated"	media	in	their	classrooms.	For	any	member	of	the	general	public	who might	feel	tempted	to	get	sucked	into	the	debate	about	the	outmoded	nature	of	educational	forms	and	methods, policymakers	and	other	stakeholders	such	as	parents,	educational	workers	and	school	managers,	this	book	offers	a good	introduction	to	a	media	history	of	education.	Through	its	multiple	examples	and	case	studies,	The	Textbook	and the	Lecture	shows	the	philosophical	assumptions	underpinning	longstanding	debates	and	serves	to	inform	and perhaps	even	empower	educational	workers	by	helping	them	understand	why	they	do	what	they	do. Lavinia	Marin	is	a	doctoral	researcher	at	the	Education,	Culture	and	Society	research	centre	at	KU	Leuven, Belgium.	Her	work	focuses	on	the	specifics	of	thinking	at	the	university	and	on	the	media	technologies	which	make thinking	possible,	such	as	textual	and	digital	technologies.	Her	latest	published	article	argues	for	the	fundamental role	played	by	technologies	of	the	text	in	the	foundation	of	the	first	universities,	inspired	by	the	work	of	Ivan	Illich. Note:	This	review	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	and	not	the	position	of	the	LSE	Impact	Blog,	or	of	the	London	School of	Economics. Impact of Social Sciences Blog: Book Review: The Textbook and the Lecture: Education in the Age of New Media by Norm Friesen Page 3 of 4 Date originally posted: 2018-08-26 Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/impactofsocialsciences/2018/08/26/book-review-the-textbook-and-the-lecture-education-in-the-age-of-new-media-by-norm-friesen/ Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/impactofsocialsciences/ Impact of Social Sciences Blog: Book Review: The Textbook and the Lecture: Education in the Age of New Media by Norm Friesen Page 4 of 4 Date originally posted: 2018-08-26 Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/impactofsocialsciences/2018/08/26/book-review-the-textbook-and-the-lecture-education-in-the-age-of-new-media-by-norm-friesen/ Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/impactofsocialsciences/


Evolutionary Theory in Seven Articles

Philosophy

Neo-Darwinism is an outdated theory. It has never been updated for the computer age, despite the fact that the subject matter can only be investigated with the aid of computers. Come on biologists! Get programing!

Charles Darwin's views on a comprehensive theory of evolution. A very careful reading and indeed a re-reading of On the Origin of Species is required in order to fully understand Darwin's view on Evolutionary Theory. The one thing that he did not claim is that his theory of natural selection was the full story of evolution. In his own words he states I am convinced that natural selection has been the main but not the exclusive means of modification. Darwin was a competitive scientist and in his great book he treads a fine line between expounding his theory in order to convince the public of its efficacy and pointing out the fact that it was an incomplete explanation of evolution. He knew that natural selection was a systematic mechanism but in order for it to create new species this mechanism required a constant supply of variation or new design. Unlike neo-Darwinism's reliance on the copying error as the source of variation Darwin was convinced that there was a system for generating variety which was nonrandom, I have hitherto sometimes spoken as if variations were due to chance. This, of course, is a wholly incorrect expression, but it serves to acknowledge plainly our ignorance of the cause of variation. At many points in his book he admits to this missing link in his theory. In chapter five for example he refers to a tendency to vary, due to causes of which we are quite ignorant. He coins the term generative variability to emphasize his belief in the existence of laws of variety-generation and talks of an innate tendency to new variations. But he admits that Our ignorance of the laws of variation is profound. He is convinced that There must be some efficient cause for each slight individual difference. When discussing the evolution of instincts he speaks of variations produced by the same unknown causes which produce slight deviations of bodily structure. The "one mistake" of Richard Dawkins. Charles Darwin, the greatest ever thinker on evolution was convinced that there would eventually be discovered the laws of variation. Why did twentieth century biology completely ignore Darwin's views on the source of variety? Neo-Darwinism refutes Darwin's ideas and claims that the incredible outpouring of new variety, which acts as the source of the raw material required by natural selection, is due to copying errors, a rather lame, nonscientific claim. The majority of modern thinkers on evolutionary theory seem to ignore the fact that evolution requires both a mechanism and the raw material required by this mechanism. This modern view was summarised by one of the greatest ever advocates for neo-Darwinism, Richard Dawkins, when in an article in New Scientist magazine he wrote, Natural selection is quintessentially non-random, yet it is lamentably often miscalled random. This one mistake underlies much of the sceptical backlash against evolution. Chance cannot explain life. Design is as bad an explanation as chance because it raises bigger questions than it answers. Evolution by natural selection is the only workable theory ever proposed that is capable of explaining life, and it does so brilliantly. No, Mr Dawkins, natural selection, by itself, does not explain life brilliantly and no one is saying that natural selection is a random process. With the benefit of Darwin's insight we can now see that natural selection is an obvious and simple consequence of reproduction and overcrowding. It eliminates the less fit but it does not design or create new organisms. It works on what is already there and leaves behind organisms and their genes that are better survivors. It can only work when it has a variety of organisms to choose from. It does not create those survivors. It merely changes the average characteristics of future generations by eliminating some and letting others continue into the future. It is a pure mechanistic non-random process, but it does not design new organisms. Derek Hough's new theory The 20th Century version of the theory of evolution, namely neo-Darwinism, is incorrect; it is simply wrong. What is most surprising about this statement is the fact that so few academics recognize its validity and are therefore reluctant to consider alternative science-based explanations for evolution. The first problem is that it is difficult to find a succinct and unambiguous definition of neo-Darwinism in any reputable book on the subject of evolution. With luck you might find one or two sentences giving a brief summary of the theory somewhere in the text and a trawl through the literature will give a definition of neo-Darwinism something like this: Evolution proceeds by the action of natural selection (the mechanism) on the variety created by copying errors (the raw material). Nobody is disputing or denying the efficacy of natural selection but it is the copying errors part of this theory which is questionable. Darwin himself would never have believed in neo-Darwinism. He was convinced that there were unknown laws of variation which were required to fully explain the variety of life on earth. When given two choices as an explanation of the origin of the most complex structures in the universe, firstly, the guiding hand of God, or secondly, the action of natural selection on an accumulated series of copying errors, then there is absolutely nothing to choose between them. Both theories are highly improbable and totally unscientific. For more than thirty years academics have had available to them access to computers with which to explore the world of evolution. They should now be able to understand that what we understand as evolution is in itself an evolved system. For some years Derek Hough has laid out the logical arguments in favor of non-random mutations and has campaigned for an amendment to the definition of the Theory of Evolution. Any new definition would exclude any reference to the concept of the copying error and would be theoretically underpinned by the important phenomenon of the algorithmic process, an understanding of which is vital to an understanding of evolution. The key principles of Derek Hough's thesis can be explained by following some of the stages through which life's genetic algorithm has passed since it first appeared, possibly four billion years ago. Each of the following stages (except the first) can be simulated and explored with the use of computerized genetic algorithms. 1. The origin of life. Inert chemicals happen upon self-replication. 2. Exponential growth in numbers soon leads to the filling up of any initial space available to these primitive replicators. 3. Competition for survival leads to improved copying fidelity and differential fitness. 4. There will be a tendency for the early biosphere to automatically condense into species. The creation of niches being driven by the elimination of types or extinction in a knockout competition; a phenomenon well understood and explained by Darwin in On the Origin of Species. 5. Perfect copying fidelity would be a certain road to extinction. A species composed entirely of clones would soon be eliminated when faced with competition from any other species with the slightest advantage. Copying fidelity would now be selected against and regularly occurring copying errors that in any way create useful variety would be retained by natural selection and form the basis of a variety maintenance system. It is important at this stage to understand that Hough is talking about the retention of the mechanism for creating this useful variety and not the retention of the variety per se. Any such variety-generating mechanism must not violate the important principle of the selfish-gene. 6. The environment of each unit of inheritance is composed of all other units of inheritance. This environment is never stable. Each heritable unit is always faced with an endlessly varying or variable environment. With an environment that consists of a range of possibilities each species will maximise its fitness by maintaining an appropriate range of characteristics and skills. Genes that influence the outcome of reproduction will control the maintenance of this variety. 7. Design possibility is not unlimited and heritable units learn, in an algorithmic sense, that maintenance of variety around a specific, limited range of possibilities enhances the average survival chances of these units. There is an element of predictability in the large but essentially limited range of environmental variation, and life's genetic algorithm learns to predict some of this variation and each species can then cope better with the vicissitudes of a varying environment by maintaining an appropriate degree of variety, either in its gene pool or via regularly occurring relevant mutations. The maintenance of variety is facilitated by mutator genes which, although not directly selected by the environment, survive because of their ability to maintain useful variety. Our own immune system presents us with a model for understanding how a species can quickly adapt to an environmental challenge. The limit to design possibility is exemplified in the phenomenon of Convergence. 8. At the same time as heritable units are maintaining variety, they are also co-operating with other heritable units. Working in teams has proved to be an advantage almost from day one, and these twin characteristics of cooperation and variety maintenance lead to the creation of unique combinations of sub-units. These new combinations of sub-units will lead to the creation of unique organisms, which, whilst not directly demanded by the environment, will survive if there is an available niche. Empty niches will rapidly be filled and convenient niches will become rarer. But the niche requiring sophistication and complexity beyond anything previously achieved will always be available and will always be sought out by this algorithmic search. Evolution can then be seen as a systematic search through the expanse of design possibility or Design Space. Summary The fundamental question asked by Hough is how do we get from simple organisms to complex ones over a period of 3-4 billion years. The next question is how does life achieve this without violating the important principle of the selfish gene. Natural selection plays an important role but, like Darwin, Hough recognises that there must exist laws of variation in order that there is always an abundant supply of variety from which to select. Hough uses the term mutator gene as an aid to model building but in reality evolution has created systems of immense complexity which maintain variety within every level of life whether it be genes, proteins, metabolisms, individuals, populations or species. Perhaps the most important characteristic created by the early primordial replicator was the ability to survive in a variable or varying environment. Hough's ideas give more importance to preadaptation and he recognises that natural selection can only demonstrate its power to achieve improved levels of fitness when it is accompanied by variety-generating systems. These variety-generating systems create the astonishing plasticity of every physical and mental feature of an organism which ensures, as Darwin realised, that variety is always available when it is needed. The essence of Hough's thesis is that it is not only organisms that are acted upon by natural selection but more importantly natural selection also ensures that the best systems for creating those organisms are also selected. One of the key points which investigators into evolutionary mechanisms must understand is that universal or partially universal inherited characteristics of life such as the functioning of cells, sexual reproduction, multicellularity and the genetic code itself have all been created by evolution. The system of maintaining variety from one generation to the next as outlined above is just another such universal characteristic and it is maintained because of its usefulness to life as a whole. The genes for such characteristics are not subject to the same environmental scrutiny as the genes for creating the physical characteristics of an organism. Derek Hough has previously described his thesis as the theory of the self-developing genome.The idea that certain genes control the reproductive success of other genes has profound implications for evolution. It explains phenomena that sit uncomfortably with neo-Darwinism such as sexual reproduction and group selection, both of which seem to break the rule of selfish survival. The new theory also accounts for the rapid evolution of antibiotic resistance. Natural selection will now exert a two-fold influence in order to maintain an appropriate level of variety within each species. It acts on genes that maintain the variety-generating system and it also acts on body-building genes to eliminate designs that sit uncomfortably at the edge of the fitness landscape. Occasionally, however, organisms of novel design escape from the straightjacket of the niche and jump into a new niche with their own fitness landscape, thereby facilitating speciation and evolution. The self-developing genome encourages pre-adaptive moves in Design Space whilst speciation separates out these new designs from the parental species and therefore allows the self-developing genome to drive further differentiation. The most important consequence of Hough's idea is that evolution can now be seen as endowing life with the ability to automatically search for empty niches wherever they are available. A wonderful emergent consequence of variety maintenance at the level of the sub-unit is the constant search for evolutionary novelty and complexity at the level of the organism. Towards a new definition of the theory of evolution According to Derek Hough's theory of the self-developing genome, it is the rate and degree of variation that is being selected and this variation can be maintained in every organismic feature, from protein structure and neural connections to body size. Life on earth now has all the tools and building blocks required to explore all potentially available regions of biological Design Space. The evolution of variety-generating systems was driven by the competition engendered by the exponential increase in numbers of the original primordial self-replicators. These early replicators would have created messy and inaccurate copies of themselves. The initial competitive environment faced by these primitive organisms would have been incredibly variable. The first priority for this early algorithmic search would have been for the primitive self-replicators to make a good copy of themselves and the second priority would then have been to evolve characteristics that would enable these organisms to survive in a very variable biosphere. The ultimate success of any gene is for it to exist in every organism on earth. Such highly successful universal genes eventually achieve a degree of perfection and can't easily be improved upon and they are then able to dominate other selfish genes who continue to exist in a varying and variable competitive environment. Hough explains that by following the twin axioms of firstly, genes (or systems) which influence the outcome of reproduction and secondly, cooperation between varying heritable sub-units, then evolution as we know it, including the evolution of increasing complexity, is inevitable. The would lead to a new definition of evolution something like this: Life on earth constitutes an interrelated network linked by common descent and universal systems. Natural selection has evolved systems that endow organisms and their species with a degree of non-developmental (i.e. evolutionary) plasticity which facilitates adaptation to an ever-varying or variable environment as an alternative to extinction. These systems, which maintain a defensive degree of variation at the lowest level of inheritance, can ultimately lead to increasing complexity and evolution due to the fact that lower level heritable units combine and cooperate within genomes to create functioning organisms. In other words, the genes that code for individual characteristics, which have evolved to exist in a limited and useful variable state, combine at the level of the organism in unique combinations with the potential for the emergence of novel or more complex characteristics. These new characteristics might become established in a vacant niche or could proliferate via natural selection. Evolutionary change is facilitated by the naturally occurring phenomenon of speciation. The existence of universal variety-maintaining genes or systems can have profound effects on the usual rules of selfish survival and can lead to selection at a higher level than individual genes. Life on earth, as we now have it, could not be possible without the evolution of variety-generating systems. Copying errors are destructive and perfect copying fidelity is the road to extinction. There are still unknowns to be explained if we are to fully understand evolution. Firstly, how did the original primordial replicator come into existence and secondly, how did it evolve into the incredible DNA-based duplicating machine that is first seen in the fossil record? It is said that we are within fifty years of solving the first problem and then the solution to the second problem might be amenable to simulation by computer. Thomas Kuhn, the philosopher of science, might have had something interesting to say about the reluctance of the academic establishment to let go of the copying errors theory and he might have suggested that we will have to wait for the next generation of bright young biologists before encountering the inevitable paradigm shift Critique of Douglas Futuyma's book Evolution. There are many excellent text books for undergraduates on the subject of evolution. One of the best is by Douglas Futuyma and is titled Evolution. The book is beautifully written. It is clear, concise, well-argued and all the salient points logically explained. It is almost a latter-day On the Origin of Species written for the genetic age. How does Futuyma define the currently accepted version of the theory of evolution? Straightaway in chapter one he states that mutation and natural selection together cause adaptive evolution: mutation is not an alternative to natural selection, but rather its raw material. We could find similar definitions in other literature but it is important here to understand the exact meaning of the word mutation. When trying to explain the evolutionary route from simple organisms to human beings we clearly need more than a remixing of established genes and a crop of regularly re-occurring mutations. What is needed is a steady supply of novel genes which could give rise to novel features. This is where the concept of the copying error would come in. In 2009 The Royal Society in London produced a small booklet to celebrate the 150th anniversary of the publication of On the Origin of Species and in this booklet the meaning of mutation in this context is made very clear: We know that inherited variation is caused by changes in gene sequences of organisms, called mutations. They can arise from errors introduced when DNA is copied, and from damage due to background radiation or chemical reactions. And then as if to re-emphasize the point they go on to say Sometimes errors result in the duplication of a gene...such that new functions can arise. Many examples of this process are known. So, we can be in no doubt that the currently accepted theory of evolution is about natural selection acting on the variety created by copying errors. Are there in fact any examples of this process? Let us now return to Futuyma. In chapter eight he states Mutations occur at random. He explains that they are random in the sense that they are not influenced by the environment in which they would be advantageous. This is fine. But then he goes on to say .... although we may be able to predict the probability that a certain mutation will occur, we cannot predict which of a large number of gene copies will undergo the mutation. Futuyma gives examples of mutations in the text but all his examples are of regularly re-occurring mutations. Surely, mutations that regularly and reliably re-occur need not be viewed as copying errors? And surely Futuyma is viewing these phenomena at the wrong level? After all, we are not sat around looking at an individual gene in order to measure evolutionary change. We must view the whole population of that gene. This discussion concerning the exact meaning of the word mutation may seem like just a case of semantics but this is a vitally important point. Radio-active decay may be a random process when viewed at the level of an individual atom but when a large population of atoms is viewed then radio-active decay proceeds at an incredibly reliable, predictable, non-random rate measured in half-life's. Surely, Futuyma must have at least considered the idea that the mutations required as the raw material for natural selection are actually nonrandom in their nature? He could then have considered the possibility that evolution does not rely on copying errors but is in fact an evolved, automated system. He seems to accept most of the tenets of Hough's theory of the selfdeveloping genome. He recognizes that mutations are the raw material of evolution. He accepts that there will be mutator genes, genes that influence the rate of mutation. He accepts that natural selection can act to maintain variety. He acknowledges that neither natural selection nor genetic drift accounts for the origin of variation. He accepts the idea of the varying or variable environment. But he rejects the idea of the universality of mutator genes because the mutator allele is likely to decline in frequency because copies of the allele are permanently associated with the mutations they cause, and far more mutations reduce than increase fitness. And here is the last hurdle for Futuyma to jump over before entering the brave new world of automated evolution. Hough's theory of automatic variety generation pays no regard to deleterious mutations. In the main these do not affect evolution and usually would get eliminated. His new theory relies on the existence of mutator genes that create useful variation. These mutator genes have been selected because this limited, useful variation, at the lower levels of inheritance, is maintained in order to cope with environmental variation that the heritable unit has previously encountered during its evolutionary history. The selfish, variety-maintaining mutator genes can overcome the selfishness of body-building genes which no longer have it all their own way. Complexity evolves because varying heritable units can combine in unique combinations and could create pre-adapted organisms which will prosper if an empty niche exists to which they are better suited. At least Futuyma concedes that such mutator alleles do actually occur and he cites the example of such genes seen in E. coli. Futuyma's book is a work of immense scholarship. It covers evolution in great detail and does not hesitate to introduce the reader to some difficult arithmetic concepts but nowhere in this great book does he mention the allimportant phenomenon of the algorithmic process. Hough claims that it is only by studying the outcome of a competition between millions of separate genetic algorithms that we can understand where this process leads to. Hough's conclusion is that this competition leads to the evolution of a system which is the very thing that we refer to as evolution. His contention is that systems for variety-generation and variety-maintenance were evolved at a very early stage in the history of life on earth. These systems, which endow organisms and their species with a degree of plasticity, allow them to morph their way to survival. Copying errors or random mutations are simply not necessary (although chance and probability play a part). The really complex part of evolution ended way before the Cambrian explosion when systems were evolved which allowed organisms, over time, to change from one form to another in an attempt to avoid extinction. Futuyma's book is littered with examples of the ability of organisms and their species to morph from one form to another and he lists the numerous ways in which genomes can rearrange themselves but he refuses to acknowledge that an evolved system may be behind this plasticity. He often describes the ease with which new species can evolve in rapid radiations or can repeatably converge on the same idea but he does not recognize that systems exist to facilitate these phenomena. He accepts that the existence of variety within a population is vital for evolution and even quotes Lewontin and Hubby who asked Do forces of natural selection maintain this variation? but he refuses to acknowledge that there exists a system that automatically creates this variety and therefore makes evolution possible. He sticks to the opposite idea that mutations are random and are generally thought to be not an adaptation, but a consequence of unrepaired damage. Futuyma is wrong to state that Darwin believed in random, purposeless variation. Darwin was convinced that there were unknown laws of variation. Futuyma recognizes all the evidence for the existence of variety-generating systems; many populations contain enough genetic variation to evolve rapidly when environmental conditions change, rather than having to wait for new favourable mutations and furthermore he says, Species contain genetic variation that could easily serve as the foundation for the evolution of many characteristics and that many or most characteristics should be able to evolve quite rapidly far more quickly than Darwin ever imagined. He even talks of the evidence for evolution of mutation rates. Futuyma's book chronicles the reliability of variety-generation when viewed from different perspectives. Surely he can see that this phenomenon of variety-generation must be explained by a most fundamental characteristic of all living organisms? His book describes the classic experiment on penicillin-resistance but Hough's theory would say that this experiment does not demonstrate how a genetic copying error endows anti-biotic resistance but it demonstrates that E.coli learnt the trick way back in its evolutionary history when it was previously exposed to this enemy. The variety-generating system created by evolution then ensures that anti-biotic resistance will always occur occasionally as a safeguard against the species being entirely eliminated. Similarly, the classic study of black and white moths in industrial Britain, as cited by Futuyma, is not an example of evolution at all. It merely demonstrates the existence of a system for varietymaintenance created by evolution. Hough's ideas give no hint of Lamarckian-type evolution. There exists no design goal or aim but what has evolved is a tool kit to enable change to happen in any possible direction. The types of building blocks are limited; what creates complexity is the fact that individual cells co-operate to build organisms and sometimes this co-operation can create new and unique combinations. Futuyma's book does not tackle the most important overall question of how life navigates from simple single-celled organisms to things like humans and butterflies in a step-by-step process in which each useful step has to hit on a target which is hidden within an unimaginably large number of possibilities. The question of why evolution inevitably climbs a ladder from simple organisms is not answered in Futuyma's book but at least he provides every possible clue to the solution to that problem. Altruism and Group Selection Arguments have always raged on the issue of whether altruism can easily evolve and whether group selection can somehow facilitate the evolution of this trait. The opinions of Richard Dawkins and the late John Maynard Smith both lean towards the idea that selfish genes, within the group, will always overcome any advantage that altruistic genes gain due to the altruists' contribution to group fitness. Indeed they argue strongly against the importance of group selection as an evolutionary driving force generally. Wikipedia gives an example of how altruism might be favoured. The article on Group Selection asks the reader to imagine a group composed of four selfish organisms and one altruistic organism. When a selfish organism meets the altruistic organism he wins 6 units of fitness whilst the altruist gets only 4 units of fitness. But the selfish organisms avoid other selfish organisms (because they know that they will do badly) and instead queue up for a meeting with the sole altruistic gene. In this scenario each selfish organism only gets 6 units of fitness but the altruist, because he has met selfish organisms 4 times, actually does better with 4 times 4 units of fitness. In the survival stakes, his 16 units easily outcompetes the 6 units of each selfish individual and his genes for altruism comfortably get into the future. This scenario, as outlined in the Wikipedia article, is not only highly contrived but it is also not sustainable because sooner or later an even more selfish gene will come along which, in the meeting with the altruistic gene, will take all the fitness units for himself leaving the altruist with zero fitness units. Selfish genes will always eventually win out; they will not be thinking of the survival of their species; sheer, instant brutality will always give an individual an immediate advantage. So far, advantage Dawkins and Maynard Smith. It is easy to demonstrate with the use of routine computerised genetic algorithms that any advantage that altruistic genes might give to themselves because of their contribution to group fitness cannot overcome the gene-level or organism-level brutality of selfish genes. Any advantage an altruist is given because of group selection will eventually be eliminated by the evolution of an even more vicious degree of brutality by selfish genes. This advantage, which is due to the presence of the altruists, is eliminated simply because the altruist himself is eliminated. Again, in this scenario, selfish genes always win out. Selfish genes easily overcome the group-level advantage given to altruistic genes because the altruists are eliminated at a faster rate than group selection can increase their numbers. It sounds like game, set and match to Dawkins and Maynard Smith. But surely we do observe altruism in nature? And not only due to kin relatedness. How on earth can it evolve? The answer lies with Hough's new theory. All that is needed is the appearance of a mutator gene, a gene that works behind the scenes, to ensure that the outcome of reproduction is, for example, always 50% selfish organisms and 50% altruistic organisms. The routine computerised genetic algorithm as mentioned in the previous paragraph would now need to be amended to include genes that affect the outcome of reproduction, i.e. mutator genes. Unlike the scenario outlined above, where within-group selection is more powerful than between-group selection, the odds in favour of the altruists are now improved because selfish organisms within groups cannot eliminate mutator genes hidden inside other selfish organisms. New altruistic genes can always appear because of the ever-presence of these mutator genes. In the organism versus organism competition natural selection is blind to these mutator genes. As well as natural selection, the presence of mutator genes ensures that the laws of probability now play a part in the survival of specific characteristics. We can easily envisage the extreme case of two groups, one with mutator genes (and therefore with some altruistic organisms) and one without. Because of the units of fitness which the altruists now contribute at the group level the groups containing mutator genes will now be selected along with their potential for creating more altruistic genes. The groups without mutator genes (and therefore without the accompanying altruistic genes) have no such advantage. This differential advantage, at the group level, will continue to be created and the fitness of the groups can be gradually ratcheted up via group selection. What are really being selected are the mutator genes and groups without them will be eliminated. Mutator genes survive because of their presence in both winners and losers in competitions between organisms; they do not get eliminated because they are not exposed to competition in the same way as the genes that directly create differentiated bodies and behaviours Even with the existence of these mutator genes selfish genes will never abandon their attempt to eliminate the altruistic genes. In the example as outlined above where the presence of the mutator gene ensures reproductive output of 50% selfish organisms and 50% altruists the altruists will always remain as a minority within each group. Although selfish organisms continue to outcompete altruistic organisms, the existence of altruistic genes is always guaranteed by the presence of mutator genes. If there is an advantage at the group level leading to selection for an even higher proportion of altruistic genes then these selective pressures can ultimately lead to the selection of genetic systems of the kind seen amongst social insects. All the above scenarios can be explored with computerised genetic algorithms. Anyone interested in evolution should write their own simple programs for research. It is both rewarding and fun! Kettlewell's Moths In pre-industrial Britain, peppered moths were nearly all of white coloration and when they settled on the white colored lichen that covered the trees they were well and truly camouflaged. This camouflage was crucial to their survival as the moths are a tasty part of the diet of birds. However, the industrial revolution brought with it pollution which killed off the lichen and left the dark coloured bark exposed thus neutralising the camouflage advantage of the white moths. Fortunately the original moths were not all white and there was the odd black one in the population and these black ones now had the advantage of camouflage over the white ones. Natural selection was now able to swing into action and black moths survived at a much higher rate than white moths and therefore genes for black coloration were passed onto future generations at an ever increasing rate at the expense of genes for white coloration which were rapidly reduced in the gene pool. The technical name for these moths is Biston Betularia but they are commonly known as Kettlewell's moths in deference to the biologist who carried out the original field research. This classic study of natural selection in action has all the ingredients for academic discussion change of environment, mutant black moths, struggle for existence, survival of the fittest what a marvellous vindication of Darwin's Theory. But is it? The change from white to black in peppered moths was not an example of evolution; it was an example of a survival mechanism which evolution has created. Similarly the development of bigger muscles as a result of manual labour is also not an example of evolution but merely an example of a short-term survival mechanism conferred by evolution. The study of the peppered moth does not help us understand the evolution from simple organisms to human beings; the change from white to black demonstrates no advancement at all, it is really just a sideways movement. In fact, if the white lichen returned then the moths would revert to their white color and back to square one. In this particular example the environmental change did not encourage the evolution of the new trait of blackness. The trait was already there; the genes for that trait were already present in the gene pool even before they were needed. Interesting though it is, the ability of peppered moths to change from black to white and back again gives us no definite clues in our quest to understand evolution. If the hierarchy from simple organisms to humans can be regarded as vertical then the example of the peppered moth is a horizontal phenomenon, half way up the vertical ladder. Of course, biologists will still jump up and down saying that the peppered moths of Kettlewell's research are a fine example of the power of the environment. I would agree that changes in the environment of the moths had a definite effect on their average characteristics but natural selection can only act on available variety. Biologists will still have to explain the source of the raw material that is essential to the well-understood mechanism of natural selection. Selective breeders rely on variety stored within the gene pool. If random mutations or copying errors are an unlikely source of this variety then what other possible mechanism could be responsible for this indispensable variety generation? In the absence of neo-Darwinian dogma there is no logical reason why we must assume that the order of events in evolution is first, environmental change and second, the occurrence of suitable mutations. The field research on peppered moths in fact demonstrates the exact opposite suitable black coloured mutants first and environmental change second. Clearly the genome could not possibly predict the future so why do we so often find that suitable variety in ready and waiting in preparation for environmental change? The above story of the peppered moth is, like the occurrence of anti-biotic resistance, an example of the variety-creating mechanism of evolution which Derek Hough has named the self-developing genome.


Retractions: the good, the bad, and the ugly

Philosophy

What researchers stand to gain from taking more care to understand errors in the scientific record. 8 September 2020 Quan-Hoang Vuong Tara Moore/Getty While it seems obvious that withdrawing papers, which contain errors or misconduct, helps to keep the literature healthy, researchers want to avoid retractions at all costs. Indeed, no editorial practice in academia can affect an academic reputation as much as a retraction. The stigma is rooted in the fear of every researcher that a retracted article, which would remain accessible online with an additional tagline of retraction notice, is like a scar seared into the public profile of an author. But, just as every scar is a reminder of a past mistake or injury, every retraction, regardless of the reasons – an honest mistake or a deliberate fraud, also has something to teach us. https://www.natureindex.com/news-blog/academic-research-papers-scientists-gain-retractions-the-good-the-bad-the-ugly 1 of 4 9/9/2020, 6:11 PM A recent analysis of 2,046 retraction records, cleaned upon extraction from the Retraction Watch (RW) Database and major publishers' websites, brings attention to how retractions are not always initiated by the editors and publishers, but also by the authors themselves. As Figure 1 shows below, although half of the retraction notes do not reveal the initiators, 301 notices, or 15%, were made solely by the authors. These 'heroic souls', despite knowing the stigma associated with a retracted article, willingly make that request and even provide reasons for why they think the findings should be removed from the literature. If between 2008 and 2016, the number of such 'heroic acts' was consistently below 10 each year, by 2017 and 2018, it had spiked to 27 and 55, respectively. At first look, this could spark concerns about the rising number of inadequate publications. Yet, one should also be hopeful that the competitive world of academia has not completely extinguished scientists' motivations for genuine selfcorrection and transparency. Figure 1. Learned Publishing The overall landscape, however, is not so optimistic. More worrying signs emerge in Figure 1 when one looks at a large number of retraction initiators (53%) and a small number of retractions (11%) mutually agreed by the editors and the authors. https://www.natureindex.com/news-blog/academic-research-papers-scientists-gain-retractions-the-good-the-bad-the-ugly 2 of 4 9/9/2020, 6:11 PM Even though publishing retraction notes is a required practice, there is clearly a lack of consistency and consensus across journals in the writing of notice content. For instance, the Committee of Publication Ethics (COPE), an established organization in publishing best practices with thousands of journals and publishers as members, does recommend the notes to disclose who is retracting the paper and their reasons, but this practice is not enforced well enough in practice. Digging deeper, my study confirmed the obscurity in disclosing the person who first requested the retraction. This means that the 91% of retracted articles with adequate notes detailing the reasons still fall short of the COPE recommendation. Knowing who initiated the retraction is not merely a matter of curiosity, but also one of acknowledgement. It benefits the authors who bravely admit their errors as much as their fellow researchers, who would look up to such candidness and realize that not all retracted papers are related to scientific misconduct. The more retracted papers overlook this piece of information, the more suspicion they garner, and consequently, the more injustice is done to authors who honour the self-correcting spirit of science in coming forward. It takes courage to own up to one's mistakes as much as to be self-reflective of one's shortcomings. A close-up analysis of 434 retracted articles shows the devastating loss of a limitation section in a research paper. To write a limitation section is to self-acknowledge the weaknesses, and ultimately, represents an expression of humility and readiness for improvement. Yet, a strict categorization yields only 8 articles with this section, and even a more flexible approach that counts some kind of self-evaluated 'discussion' or 'future research directions' gives only 38 articles. What is the correlation between these numbers and retraction? Remarkably, only 4 of the 38 retracted articles touch on weaknesses that to different extents reflect the actual reasons for withdrawing the articles. By overlooking the ugly side of a research project, researchers are giving up the chance to re-examine it, an act that is essentially counter to the critical nature of scientific research. The beauty in science does not lie in the eyes of the beholders as conventional wisdom would have it, but instead in our commitment to upholding its values and ideas. It is thus important to also own up to one's ugliness in a project, a step that may prevent the future embarrassment of a more egregious error. Retracted papers, no matter how undesirable they are, poke right at the heart of https://www.natureindex.com/news-blog/academic-research-papers-scientists-gain-retractions-the-good-the-bad-the-ugly 3 of 4 9/9/2020, 6:11 PM scholarly publishing. A serious existential question arises regarding the health of the industry: What to do if an author is not coming forward to recall an inaccurate published paper, and the editorial board which accepts the paper is not aware of such inaccuracy or misconduct? Are we doomed to rely entirely on the heroic souls to be open about their shortcomings? After all, scientists are humans, and humans are fallible. It is unavoidable that our research has its limitations and may be retracted under certain circumstances. When a retraction happens, scientists and editors/publishers alike should cooperate to make the information as detailed and transparent as possible. This article was originally published on the LSE Impact Blog. Read the original article. https://www.natureindex.com/news-blog/academic-research-papers-scientists-gain-retractions-the-good-the-bad-the-ugly 4 of 4 9/9/2020, 6:11 PM


Philosophy

Does Science Provide Us with the Methodological Key to Wisdom? Nicholas Maxwell University College London Abstract Science provides us with the methodological key to wisdom. This idea goes back to the 18th century French Enlightenment. Unfortunately, in developing the idea, the philosophes of the Enlightenment made three fundamental blunders: they failed to characterize the progress-achieving methods of science properly, they failed to generalize these methods properly, and they failed to develop social inquiry as social methodology having, as its basic task, to get progress-achieving methods, generalized from science, into social life so that humanity might make progress towards an enlightened world. Instead, the philosophes developed social inquiry as social science. This botched version of the Enlightenment idea was further developed throughout the 19th century, and built into academia in the early 20th century with the creation of university departments of social science. As a result, academia today seeks knowledge but does not devote reason to the task of helping humanity make progress towards a better, wiser world. Our current and impending global crises are the outcome. We urgently need to bring about a revolution in universities throughout the world so that the blunders of the Enlightenment are corrected, and universities take up their proper task of helping humanity make progress towards a wiser world. Nearly forty years ago I discovered a profoundly significant idea – or so I believe. Since then, I have expounded and developed the idea in six books1 and countless articles published in academic journals and other books.2 I have talked about the idea in universities and at conferences all over the UK, in Europe, the USA and Canada. And yet, alas, despite all this effort, few indeed are those who have even heard of the idea. I have not even managed to communicate the idea to my fellow philosophers. What did I discover? Quite simply: the key to wisdom.3 For over two and a half thousand years, philosophy (which means "love of wisdom") has sought in vain to discover how humanity might learn to become wise – how we might learn to create an enlightened world. For the ancient Greek philosophers, Socrates, Plato and the rest, discovering how to become wise was the fundamental task for philosophy. In the modern period, this central, ancient quest has been laid somewhat to rest, not because it is no longer thought important, but rather because the quest is seen as unattainable. The record of savagery and horror of the last century is so extreme and terrible that the search for wisdom, more important than ever, has come to seem hopeless, a quixotic fantasy. Nevertheless, it is this ancient, fundamental problem, lying at the heart of philosophy, at the heart, indeed, of all of thought, morality, politics and life, that I have solved. Or so I believe. When I say I have discovered the key to wisdom, I should say, more precisely, that I have discovered the methodological key to wisdom. Or perhaps, more modestly, I should say that I have discovered that science contains, locked up in its astounding success in acquiring knowledge and understanding of the universe, the methodological key to wisdom. I have discovered a recipe for creating a kind of organized inquiry rationally 2 designed and devoted to helping humanity learn wisdom, learn to create a more enlightened world. What we have is a long tradition of inquiry – extraordinarily successful in its own terms – devoted to acquiring knowledge and technological know-how. It is this that has created the modern world, or at least made it possible. But scientific knowledge and technological know-how are ambiguous blessings, as more and more people, these days, are beginning to recognize. They do not guarantee happiness. Scientific knowledge and technological know-how enormously increase our power to act. In endless ways, this vast increase in our power to act has been used for the public good – in health, agriculture, transport, communications, and countless other ways. But equally, this enhanced power to act can be used to cause human harm, whether unintentionally, as in environmental damage (at least initially), or intentionally, as in war. It is hardly too much to say that all our current global problems have come about because of science and technology. The appalling destructiveness of modern warfare and terrorism, vast inequalities in wealth and standards of living between first and third worlds, rapid population growth, environmental damage – destruction of tropical rain forests, rapid extinction of species, global warming, pollution of sea, earth and air, depletion of finite natural resources – all only exist today because of modern science and technology. Science and technology lead to modern industry and agriculture, to modern medicine and hygiene, and thus in turn to population growth, to modern armaments, conventional, chemical, biological and nuclear, to destruction of natural habitats, extinction of species, pollution, and to immense inequalities of wealth across the globe. Science without wisdom, we might say, is a menace. It is the crisis behind all the others. When we lacked our modern, terrifying powers to act, before the advent of science, lack of wisdom did not matter too much: we were bereft of the power to inflict too much damage on ourselves and the planet. Now that we have modern science, and the unprecedented powers to act that it has bequeathed to us, wisdom has become, not a private luxury, but a public necessity. If we do not rapidly learn to become wiser, we are doomed to repeat in the 21st century all the disasters and horrors of the 20th: the horrifyingly destructive wars, the dislocation and death of millions, the degradation of the world we live in. Only this time round it may all be much worse, as the population goes up, the planet becomes ever more crowded, oil and other resources vital to our way of life run out, weapons of mass destruction become more and more widely available for use, and deserts and desolation spread. The ancient quest for wisdom has become a matter of desperate urgency. It is hardly too much to say that the future of the world is at stake. But how can such a quest possibly meet with success? Wisdom, surely, is not something that we can learn and teach, as a part of our normal education, in schools and universities? This is my great discovery! Wisdom can be learnt and taught in schools and universities. It must be so learnt and taught. Wisdom is indeed the proper fundamental objective for the whole of the academic enterprise: to help humanity learn how to nurture and create a wiser world. But how do we go about creating a kind of education, research and scholarship that really will help us learn wisdom? Would not any such attempt destroy what is of value in what we have at present, and just produce hot air, hypocrisy, vanity and nonsense? Or 3 worse, dogma and religious fundamentalism? What, in any case, is wisdom? Is not all this just an abstract philosophical fantasy? The answer, as I have already said, lies locked away in what may seem a highly improbably place: science! This will seem especially improbable to many of those most aware of environmental issues, and most suspicious of the role of modern science and technology in modern life. How can science contain the methodological key to wisdom when it is precisely this science that is behind so many of our current troubles? But a crucial point must be noted. Modern scientific and technological research has met with absolutely astonishing, unprecedented success, as long as this success is interpreted narrowly, in terms of the production of expert knowledge and technological know-how. Doubts may be expressed about whether humanity as a whole has made progress towards well being or happiness during the last century or so. But there can be no serious doubt whatsoever that science has made staggering intellectual progress in increasing expert knowledge and know-how, during such a period. It is this astonishing intellectual progress that makes science such a powerful but double-edged tool, for good and for bad. At once the question arises: Can we learn from the incredible intellectual progress of science how to achieve progress in other fields of human endeavour? Is scientific progress exportable, as it were, to other areas of life? More precisely, can the progressachieving methods of science be generalized so that they become fruitful for other worthwhile, problematic human endeavours, in particular the supremely worthwhile, supremely problematic endeavour of creating a good and wise world? My great idea – that this can indeed be done – is not entirely new (as I was to learn after making my discovery). It goes back to the 18th century Enlightenment. This was indeed the key idea of the Enlightenment, especially the French Enlightenment: to learn from scientific progress how to achieve social progress towards an enlightened world. And the philosophes of the Enlightenment, men such as Voltaire, Diderot and Condorcet, did what they could to put this magnificent, profound idea into practice in their lives. They fought dictatorial power, superstition, and injustice with weapons no more lethal than those of argument and wit. They gave their support to the virtues of tolerance, openness to doubt, readiness to learn from criticism and from experience. Courageously and energetically they laboured to promote reason and enlightenment in personal and social life. Unfortunately, in developing the Enlightenment idea intellectually, the philosophes blundered. They botched the job. They developed the Enlightenment idea in a profoundly defective form, and it is this immensely influential, defective version of the idea, inherited from the 18th century, which may be called the "traditional" Enlightenment, that is built into early 21st century institutions of inquiry. Our current traditions and institutions of learning, when judged from the standpoint of helping us learn how to become more enlightened, are defective and irrational in a wholesale and structural way, and it is this which, in the long term, sabotages our efforts to create a more civilized world, and prevents us from avoiding the kind of horrors we have been exposed to during the last century. The task before us is thus not that of creating a kind of inquiry devoted to improving wisdom out of the blue, as it were, with nothing to guide us except two and a half thousand years of failed philosophical discussion. Rather, the task is the much more straightforward, practical and well-defined one of correcting the structural blunders built 4 into academic inquiry inherited from the Enlightenment. We already have a kind of academic inquiry designed to help us learn wisdom. The problem is that the design is lousy. It is, as I have said, a botched job. It is like a piece of engineering that kills people because of faulty design – a bridge that collapses, or an aeroplane that falls out of the sky. A quite specific task lies before us: to diagnose the blunders we have inherited from the Enlightenment, and put them right.4 So here, briefly, is the diagnosis. The philosophes of the 18th century assumed, understandably enough, that the proper way to implement the Enlightenment programme was to develop social science alongside natural science. Francis Bacon had already stressed the importance of improving knowledge of the natural world in order to achieve social progress. The philosophes generalized this, holding that it is just as important to improve knowledge of the social world. Thus the philosophes set about creating the social sciences: history, anthropology, political economy, psychology, sociology. This had an immense impact. Throughout the 19th century the diverse social sciences were developed, often by non-academics, in accordance with the Enlightenment idea. Gradually, universities took notice of these developments until, by the mid 20th century, all the diverse branches of the social sciences, as conceived of by the Enlightenment, were built into the institutional structure of universities as recognized academic disciplines. The outcome is what we have today, knowledge-inquiry as we may call it, a kind of inquiry devoted in the first instance to the pursuit of knowledge. But, from the standpoint of creating a kind of inquiry designed to help humanity learn how to become enlightened and civilized, which was the original idea, all this amounts to a series of monumental blunders. In order to implement properly the basic Enlightenment idea of learning from scientific progress how to achieve social progress towards a civilized world, it is essential to get the following three things right. 1. The progress-achieving methods of science need to be correctly identified. 2. These methods need to be correctly generalized so that they become fruitfully applicable to any worthwhile, problematic human endeavour, whatever the aims may be, and not just applicable to the one endeavour of acquiring knowledge. 3. The correctly generalized progress-achieving methods then need to be exploited correctly in the great human endeavour of trying to make social progress towards an enlightened, civilized world. Unfortunately, the philosophes of the Enlightenment got all three points wrong. They failed to capture correctly the progress-achieving methods of natural science; they failed to generalize these methods properly; and, most disastrously of all, they failed to apply them properly so that humanity might learn how to become civilized by rational means. Instead of seeking to apply the progress-achieving methods of science, after having been appropriately generalized, to the task of creating a better world, the philosophes applied scientific method to the task of creating social science. Instead of trying to make social progress towards an enlightened world, they set about making scientific progress in knowledge of social phenomena. That the philosophes made these blunders in the 18th century is forgivable; what is unforgivable is that these blunders still remain unrecognized and uncorrected today, over two centuries later. Instead of correcting the blunders, we have allowed our institutions of learning to be shaped by them as they have 5 developed throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, so that now the blunders are an allpervasive feature of our world. The Enlightenment, and what it led to, has long been criticized, by the Romantic movement, by what Isaiah Berlin has called 'the counter-Enlightenment', and more recently by the Frankfurt school, by postmodernists and others. But these standard objections are, from my point of view, entirely missing the point. In particular, my idea is the very opposite of all those anti-rationalist, romantic and postmodernist views which object to the way the Enlightenment gives far too great an importance to natural science and to scientific rationality. My discovery is that what is wrong with the traditional Enlightenment, and the kind of academic inquiry we now possess derived from it – knowledge-inquiry – is not too much 'scientific rationality' but, on the contrary, not enough. It is the glaring, wholesale irrationality of contemporary academic inquiry, when judged from the standpoint of helping humanity learn how to become more civilized, that is the problem. But, the cry will go up, wisdom has nothing to do with reason. And reason has nothing to do with wisdom. On the contrary! It is just such an item of conventional 'wisdom' that my great idea turns on its head. Once both reason and wisdom have been rightly understood, and the irrationality of academic inquiry as it exists at present has been appreciated, it becomes obvious that it is precisely reason that we need to put into practice in our personal, social, institutional and global lives if our lives, at all these levels, are to become imbued with a bit more wisdom. We need, in short, a new, more rigorous kind of inquiry which has, as its basic task, to seek and promote wisdom. We may call this new kind of inquiry wisdom-inquiry. But what is wisdom? This is how I define it in From Knowledge to Wisdom, a book published some years ago now, in 1984, in which I set out my 'great idea' in some detail: "[wisdom is] the desire, the active endeavour, and the capacity to discover and achieve what is desirable and of value in life, both for oneself and for others. Wisdom includes knowledge and understanding but goes beyond them in also including: the desire and active striving for what is of value, the ability to see what is of value, actually and potentially, in the circumstances of life, the ability to experience value, the capacity to use and develop knowledge, technology and understanding as needed for the realization of value. Wisdom, like knowledge, can be conceived of, not only personal terms, but also in institutional or social terms. We can thus interpret [wisdom-inquiry] as asserting: the basic task of rational inquiry is to help us develop wiser ways of living, wiser institutions, customs and social relations, a wiser world." (From Knowledge to Wisdom, p. 66.) What, then, are the three blunders of the Enlightenment, still built into the intellectual/institutional structure of academia? First, the philosophes failed to capture correctly the progress-achieving methods of natural science. From D'Alembert in the 18th century to Karl Popper in the 20th, the widely held view, amongst both scientists and philosophers, has been (and continues to be) that science proceeds by assessing theories impartially in the light of evidence, no permanent assumption being accepted by science about the universe independently of evidence. Preference may be given to simple, unified or explanatory theories, but not in 6 such a way that nature herself is, in effect, assumed to be simple, unified or comprehensible. This orthodox view, which I call standard empiricism is, however, untenable. If taken literally, it would instantly bring science to a standstill. For, given any accepted fundamental theory of physics, T, Newtonian theory say, or quantum theory, endlessly many empirically more successful rivals can be concocted which agree with T about observed phenomena but disagree arbitrarily about some unobserved phenomena, and successfully predict phenomena, in an ad hoc way, that T makes false predictions about, or no predictions. Physics would be drowned in an ocean of such empirically more successful rival theories. In practice, these rivals are excluded because they are disastrously disunified. Two considerations govern acceptance of theories in physics: empirical success and unity. In demanding unity, we demand of a fundamental physical theory that it ascribes the same dynamical laws to the phenomena to which the theory applies. But in persistently accepting unified theories, to the extent of rejecting disunified rivals that are just as, or even more, empirically successful, physics makes a big persistent assumption about the universe. The universe is such that all disunified theories are false. It has some kind of unified dynamic structure. It is physically comprehensible in the sense that explanations for phenomena exist to be discovered. But this untestable (and thus metaphysical) assumption that the universe is physically comprehensible is profoundly problematic. Science is obliged to assume, but does not know, that the universe is comprehensible. Much less does it know that the universe is comprehensible in this or that way. A glance at the history of physics reveals that ideas have changed dramatically over time. In the 17th century there was the idea that the universe consists of corpuscles, minute billiard balls, which interact only by contact. This gave way to the idea that the universe consists of point-particles surrounded by rigid, spherically symmetrical fields of force, which in turn gave way to the idea that there is one unified self-interacting field, varying smoothly throughout space and time. Nowadays we have the idea that everything is made up of minute quantum strings embedded in ten or eleven dimensions of space-time. Some kind of assumption along these lines must be made but, given the historical record, and given that any such assumption concerns the ultimate nature of the universe, that of which we are most ignorant, it is only reasonable to conclude that it is almost bound to be false. The way to overcome this fundamental dilemma inherent in the scientific enterprise is to construe physics as making a hierarchy of metaphysical assumptions concerning the comprehensibility and knowability of the universe, these assumptions asserting less and less as one goes up the hierarchy, and thus becoming more and more likely to be true, and more nearly such that their truth is required for science, or the pursuit of knowledge, to be possible at all. In this way a framework of relatively insubstantial, unproblematic, fixed assumptions and associated methods is created within which much more substantial and problematic assumptions and associated methods can be changed, and indeed improved, as scientific knowledge improves. Put another way, a framework of relatively unspecific, unproblematic, fixed aims and methods is created within which much more specific and problematic aims and methods evolve as scientific knowledge evolves. There is positive feedback between improving knowledge, and improving aims-and-methods, improving knowledge-about-how-to-improve-knowledge. This is the nub of scientific rationality, 7 the methodological key to the unprecedented success of science. Science adapts its nature to what it discovers about the nature of the universe. This hierarchical conception of physics, which I call aim-oriented empiricism, can readily be generalized to take into account problematic assumptions associated with the aims of science having to with values, and the social uses or applications of science. It can be generalized so as to apply to the different branches of natural science. Different sciences have different specific aims, and so different specific methods although, throughout natural science there is the common meta-methodology of aim-oriented empiricism. So much for the first blunder of the traditional Enlightenment, and how to put it right.5 Second, having failed to identify the methods of science correctly, the philosophes naturally failed to generalize these methods properly. They failed to appreciate that the idea of representing the problematic aims (and associated methods) of science in the form of a hierarchy can be generalized and applied fruitfully to other worthwhile enterprises besides science. Many other enterprises have problematic aims – problematic because aims conflict, and because what we seek may be unrealizable, undesirable, or both. Such enterprises, with problematic aims, would benefit from employing a hierarchical methodology, generalized from that of science, thus making it possible to improve aims and methods as the enterprise proceeds. There is the hope that, as a result of exploiting in life methods generalized from those employed with such success in science, some of the astonishing success of science might be exported into other worthwhile human endeavours, with problematic aims quite different from those of science. Third, and most disastrously of all, the philosophes failed completely to try to apply such generalized, hierarchical progress-achieving methods to the immense, and profoundly problematic enterprise of making social progress towards an enlightened, wise world. The aim of such an enterprise is notoriously problematic. For all sorts of reasons, what constitutes a good world, an enlightened, wise or civilized world, attainable and genuinely desirable, must be inherently and permanently problematic. Here, above all, it is essential to employ the generalized version of the hierarchical, progressachieving methods of science, designed specifically to facilitate progress when basic aims are problematic. It is just this that the philosophes failed to do. Instead of applying the hierarchical methodology to social life, the philosophes sought to apply a seriously defective conception of scientific method to social science, to the task of making progress towards, not a better world, but to better knowledge of social phenomena. And this ancient blunder, developed throughout the 19th century by J.S. Mill, Karl Marx and many others, and built into academia in the early 20th century with the creation of the diverse branches of the social sciences in universities all over the world, is still built into the institutional and intellectual structure of academia today, inherent in the current character of social science. Properly implemented, in short, the Enlightenment idea of learning from scientific progress how to achieve social progress towards an enlightened world would involve developing social inquiry, not primarily as social science, but rather as social methodology, or social philosophy. A basic task would be to get into personal and social life, and into other institutions besides that of science – into government, industry, agriculture, commerce, the media, law, education, international relations – hierarchical, 8 progress-achieving methods (designed to improve problematic aims) arrived at by generalizing the methods of science. A basic task for academic inquiry as a whole would be to help humanity learn how to resolve its conflicts and problems of living in more just, cooperatively rational ways than at present. The fundamental intellectual and humanitarian aim of inquiry would be to help humanity acquire wisdom – wisdom being, as I have already indicated, the capacity to realize (apprehend and create) what is of value in life, for oneself and others. One outcome of getting into social and institutional life the kind of aim-evolving, hierarchical methodology indicated above, generalized from science, is that it becomes possible for us to develop and assess rival philosophies of life as a part of social life, somewhat as theories are developed and assessed within science. Such a hierarchical methodology provides a framework within which competing views about what our aims and methods in life should be – competing religious, political and moral views – may be cooperatively assessed and tested against broadly agreed, unspecific aims (high up in the hierarchy of aims) and the experience of personal and social life. There is the possibility of cooperatively and progressively improving such philosophies of life (views about what is of value in life and how it is to be achieved) much as theories are cooperatively and progressively improved in science. Wisdom-inquiry, because of its greater rigour, has intellectual standards that are, in important respects, different from those of knowledge-inquiry. Whereas knowledgeinquiry demands that emotions and desires, values, human ideals and aspirations, philosophies of life be excluded from the intellectual domain of inquiry, wisdom-inquiry requires that they be included. In order to discover what is of value in life it is essential that we attend to our feelings and desires. But not everything we desire is desirable, and not everything that feels good is good. Feelings, desires and values need to be subjected to critical scrutiny. And of course feelings, desires and values must not be permitted to influence judgements of factual truth and falsity. Wisdom-inquiry embodies a synthesis of traditional Rationalism and Romanticism. It includes elements from both, and it improves on both. It incorporates Romantic ideals of integrity, having to do with motivational and emotional honesty, honesty about desires and aims; and at the same time it incorporates traditional Rationalist ideals of integrity, having to do with respect for objective fact, knowledge, and valid argument. Traditional Rationalism takes its inspiration from science and method; Romanticism takes its inspiration from art, from imagination, and from passion. Wisdom-inquiry holds art to have a fundamental rational role in inquiry, in revealing what is of value, and unmasking false values; but science, too, is of fundamental importance. What we need, for wisdom, is an interplay of sceptical rationality and emotion, an interplay of mind and heart, so that we may develop mindful hearts and heartfelt minds (as I put it in my first book What's Wrong With Science?). It is time we healed the great rift in our culture, so graphically depicted by C. P. Snow. The revolution we require – intellectual, institutional and cultural – if it ever comes about, will be comparable in its long-term impact to that of the Renaissance, the scientific revolution, or the Enlightenment. The outcome will be traditions and institutions of learning rationally designed to help us realize what is of value in life. There are a few scattered signs that this intellectual revolution, from knowledge to wisdom, is already under way. It will need, however, much wider cooperative support – from scientists, 9 scholars, students, research councils, university administrators, vice chancellors, teachers, the media and the general public – if it is to become anything more than what it is at present, a fragmentary and often impotent movement of protest and opposition, often at odds with itself, exercising little influence on the main body of academic work. I can hardly imagine any more important work for anyone associated with academia than, in teaching, learning and research, to help promote this revolution. Notes 1 What's Wrong With Science? (Bran's Head Books, 1976), From Knowledge to Wisdom (Blackwell, 1984), The Comprehensibility of the Universe (Oxford University Press, 1998, paperback 2003), and The Human World in the Physical Universe: Consciousness, Free Will and Evolution (Rowman and Littlefield, 2001), Is Science Neurotic? (Imperial College Press, 2004), Cutting God in Half – And Putting the Pieces Together Again (Pentire Press, 2010). 2 See, for example, "Science, Reason, Knowledge and Wisdom: A Critique of Specialism", Inquiry 23, 1980, pp. 19-81; "What Kind of Inquiry Can Best Help Us Create a Good World?", Science, Technology and Human Values 17, 1992, pp. 205-227; "What the Task of Creating Civilization has to Learn from the Success of Modern Science: Towards a New Enlightenment", Reflections on Higher Education 4, 1992, pp. 139-157; "Can Humanity Learn to Become Civilized? The Crisis of Science without Civilization", Journal of Applied Philosophy 17, 2000, pp. 29-44; "A new conception of science", Physics World 13, no. 8, 2000, pp. 17-18; "Do We Need a Scientific Revolution?", Journal of Biological Physics and Chemistry, vol. 8, no. 3, September 2008, pp. 95-105. All my articles are available online at http://philpapers.org/profile/17092 . 3 But see note 4. 4 Note that the outrageous claim with which I began – my claim to have discovered "the key to wisdom" – has become, step by step, very much more modest, even if still a claim concerning a matter of very great importance. I now claim only to have discovered how to correct mistakes made by Enlightenment philosophes when they developed their magnificent idea that we need to learn from scientific progress how to achieve social progress towards a wise, enlightened world. Why then did I make the outrageously immodest claim at the beginning of this paper? It is a desperate attempt to catch the reader's attention. The present paper represents one more attempt of mine to alert philosophers to the damaging philosophical blunder inherent in the intellectual/institutional structure of academia as it exists at present, the vital need, for the future of humanity, to bring about an academic revolution so that the basic task becomes to devote reason to helping humanity make progress towards a wise world. Doubtless, this paper will fail in this objective, as all my previous publications, so far, have failed as well. 5 For further details see my The Comprehensibility of the Universe: A New Conception of Science, Oxford University Press, 1998; Is Science Neurotic?, Imperial College Press, 2004; and From Knowledge to Wisdom, especially chs. 5, 9, and 2nd ed., ch. 14.