Movind the Debate Forward. Interculturalism's contribution to multiculturalism

Philosophy

In this article, we compare Ricard Zappata-Barreroâs interculturalism with Tariq Modoodâs multiculturalism. We will discuss the relation between distinct elements that compose both positions. We examine how recent discussions on interculturalism have the potential to contribute to theories of multiculturalism without undermining their core principles. Our position is close to that of Modoodâs as he has already carefully tried to incorporate interculturalist insights into his own multiculturalism. Yet we provide a raise a few questions regarding Modoodâs treatment of the relation between multiculturalism and interculturalism. After summarizing each authorâs potion (I), we will comment on the following set of relations between their basic elements: (II) The relation between intercultural contact and intercultural dialogue; (III) The relation between contact at the local level and the societal/state level; (IV) The relation between group-specific measures, intercultural contact and mainstreaming.

COMMENTARY Open Access Moving the debate forward: interculturalism's contribution to multiculturalism François Boucher1* and Jocelyn Maclure2 * Correspondence: email@example.com 1Centre for Ethics, Social and Political Philosophy, KU Leuven, Institute of Philosophy, Kardinaal Mercierplein 2, 3000 Leuven, Belgium Full list of author information is available at the end of the article Abstract In this article, we compare Ricard Zappata-Barrero's interculturalism with Tariq Modood's multiculturalism. We will discuss the relation between distinct elements that compose both positions. We examine how recent discussions on interculturalism have the potential to contribute to theories of multiculturalism without undermining their core principles. Our position is close to that of Modood's as he has already carefully tried to incorporate interculturalist insights into his own multiculturalism. Yet we provide a raise a few questions regarding Modood's treatment of the relation between multiculturalism and interculturalism. After summarizing each author's potion (I), we will comment on the following set of relations between their basic elements: (II) The relation between intercultural contact and intercultural dialogue; (III) The relation between contact at the local level and the societal/state level; (IV) The relation between group-specific measures, intercultural contact and mainstreaming. Keywords: Contact hypothesis, Intercultural dialogue, Integration, Interculturalism, Multiculturalism, Ricard Zapata-Barrero, Tariq Modood Introduction Zapata-Barrero (2017) offers an accurate and nuanced depiction of the dominant political narrative of the rise and fall of interculturalism and multiculturalism. The diagnostic he poses has three moments: the fall of multiculturalism, the rise of civic integration and the rise of interculturalism. After enjoying tremendous popularity in the 1990s, multiculturalism came under attack from both ends of the political spectrum in the 2000s. The discontent with multiculturalism reached its peak in 2010 when its death was proclaimed by European leaders (Cameron, Merkel and Sarkozy). The dominant discourse claims that multiculturalism celebrates difference but not unity, that it grants rights to immigrants without imposing duties to integrate to the host society, and that it leads to the fragmentation of society by enabling them to live in parallel micro-societies. Two political reactions came out of the proclaimed fall of multiculturalism. On the one hand, a nationalist discourse of civic integration emerged, promoting a duty-based approach according to which government should enforce the obligation to integrate and to embrace the values of the host societies, mostly through citizenship tests (Goodman, 2010; Joppke, 2007; Joppke, 2012; Joppke, 2017). On the other hand, interculturalism emerged as an allegedly © The Author(s). 2018 Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made. Boucher and Maclure Comparative Migration Studies (2018) 6:16 https://doi.org/10.1186/s40878-018-0078-2 more diversity-friendly discourse refusing both the multicultural fragmentation of society and the nationalistic and coercive overtone of civic integration. Although we agree with this picture of the state of the political discourse on multiculturalism today, we embrace Modood's (2017) claim that this widespread view is not critical enough of the dominant narratives on multiculturalism. The discourse on the death of multiculturalism, and the accompanying celebration of either civic integration or interculturalism, distorts and misrepresents multiculturalism both in theory and in practice. On the one hand, interculturalism and multiculturalism, at least in their liberal-egalitarian variants, share a common normative core at the level of political morality, as they both reject cultural assimilationism and promote the respect of ethnocultural practices compatible with basic liberal democratic principles (Maclure, 2010). In recent years, theoretical accounts multiculturalism have mostly adopted a civic variant of multiculturalism, one that emphasize cross-cultural interactions and dialogue as a way of creating new forms of belonging in diverse societies (Maclure, 2010, p. 41). On the other hand, multiculturalism is not against promoting integration, it seeks to provide immigrants with fair terms of integration (Balint & de Latour, 2013; Kymlicka, 1995). As such, it not incompatible with liberal measures of civic integration, although it severely condemns illiberal projects of civic integration as assimilationist projects in disguise (Kymlicka, 2012, pp. 15–16). Nonetheless, in comparing both papers, it appears that important differences arise between Zapata-Barrero's (2017) interculturalism and Modood's (2017) multiculturalism. To comment on those two important contributions, we propose to do a bit of chemistry. We will comment on the relation between the distinct elements that form the composite substance of both positions in order to find our way to a mixture optimally adapted to the current predicament of immigration societies. We believe such mixture has a similar taste than Modood's brew as he has already carefully tried to incorporate interculturalist insights into his own multiculturalism, yet some fermentation is still needed. After summarizing each author's potion (I), we will comment on the following set of relations between basic ingredients: (II) The relation between intercultural contact and intercultural dialogue; (III) The relation between contact at the local level and the societal/state level; (IV) The relation between group-specific measures, intercultural contact and mainstreaming. I interculturalism and multiculturalism: distinction and incorporation According to Zapata-Barrero (2017), the three distinctive features or basic elements of interculturalism as a policy paradigm distinct from both civic integration and multiculturalism are (1) that it promotes contacts and interactions between individuals with different ethnocultural backgrounds, (2) that it focuses on the local level and (3) that it relies on mainstreaming strategies. Interculturalism encourages "contact between people from different backgrounds" (p. 7–8). Here, 'contact' refers to face-to-face interactions between individuals of different ethnocultural groups (p. 14). Those interactions are distinct events located in space and time involving real persons and therefore, as we will explain later, the notion of intercultural contact is distinct from that of intercultural dialogue. Moreover, Zapata-Barrero insists that contacts cannot be obtained by coercive means (p. 9). It is because of this emphasis on contacts that interculturalism operates at the local level, that is, the level where face-to-face interactions happen. In contrast, both multiculturalism and civic integration, with their respective focus on Boucher and Maclure Comparative Migration Studies (2018) 6:16 Page 2 of 10 rights and duties, operate exclusively at the state level (p. 13). According to him, interculturalism ignores the dead-end task of specifying the rights and duties of immigrants and turns to the more productive one of promoting contact zones and shared spaces within cities. Finally, he adds that both civic integration and multiculturalism design policies which target immigrant groups as their recipients, thereby creating a distinction between "us", the natives, and them, the newcomers. The former singles out immigrants as the bearers of duties to integrate and as subjects to citizenship tests (Goodman, 2010), the latter targets immigrants as the bearers of group-specific rights (Kymlicka, 1995). Interculturalism aims to avoid reinforcing this us/them distinction by relying exclusively on mainstreaming policies, that is, on measures that do not specifically target immigrant groups but rather the whole population (p. 15–16).1 Modood (2017) disagrees with the claim that there is a sharp contrast between interculturalism and multiculturalism. He notes that within the fields of political theory and political philosophy, researchers have for long emphasized the role of intercultural dialogue as well as the qualified importance and recognition of the majority. To oppose interculturalists such as Cantle (2016) and Zapata-Barrero who claims that their views are radically new because they emphasize intercultural interactions, he carefully draws on the scientific literature on multiculturalism to show, convincingly, that most canonical texts in this field, Taylor's (1994) The Politics of Recognition, Young's (1990) Justice and the Politics of Difference, Parekh's (2000) Rethinking Multiculturalism, Tully's (1995) Strange Multiplicity and his own Multiculturalism: A Civic Idea (Modood, 2007) embrace dialogue between different cultural traditions as a method to arrive at fundamental political principles. To counter the claim that multiculturalists are insensitive to the legitimate goals and aspirations of the ethnocultural majority-a claim championed by Bouchard (2015)-he explains how the recognition of the majority in his theory is compatible with group recognition. To show this, he claims that symbolic recognition of minorities can be done in an even-handed fashion, without removing existing privileges for the majority, and that instead of removing existing religious instruction for the majority religion, we should offer religious instruction for religious minorities as well.2 The picture of multiculturalism drawn by Modood (2017) clearly differs from the caricature promoted by the post-multiculturalism discourse, but it also differs sensibly from Zapata-Barrero's (2017) interculturalism, for whom the three pillars of interculturalism are the promotion of contacts between individuals with different cultural attachment, the rejection of a state-centric policy paradigm and the corresponding promotion of the role of cities, and the promotion of mainstreaming as opposed to group-targeted measures. Modood's view in comparison is still, for the most part, statecentric, as we explain in the next section (and this is not necessarily a problem as we will explain in section III) and emphasize group-targeted measures and group recognition. Modood's multiculturalism is thus much closer to Bouchard's majoritarian interculturalism than it is to Zapata-Barrero's "interactionist" variant (Rocher & White, 2014).3 II contact and dialogue The notion of intercultural contact or interaction is conceptually distinct from the broader notion of intercultural dialogue, which normally refers to the societal process Boucher and Maclure Comparative Migration Studies (2018) 6:16 Page 3 of 10 by which ideas, values and practices emerging from different traditions adjust to one another and negotiate their expression within a shared public sphere. Intercultural dialogue refers to the meeting of ideas, values, symbols and arguments, whilst intercultural contact refers to the meeting of real people in specific physical places. Of course, the two notions are not logically mutually exclusive, but they do not imply one another. A specific intercultural contact between two individuals from different backgrounds may or not lead to an intercultural dialogue-it can for instance consist of a discussion about the weather occurring at the park-and intercultural dialogue may or not be a process involving widespread intercultural face-to-face contacts in daily life-it can for instance consists of a series of written communications in newspapers or academic journals. Most importantly, emphasizing the value of one or the other may command different policies. The importance of intercultural dialogue is likely to require that government be more sensitive to the values and practices of minority groups expressed by their elites in various formal settings (courts, official public consultations, legislative assemblies and so on), whereas the importance of intercultural contacts is likely to require policies of urban planning emphasizing the creation of urban spaces conductive to positive intercultural encounters. Modood's (2017) contribution highlights that the multiculturalism literature in political theory relies on intercultural dialogue as a method to build normative political principles: Multiculturalists have rejected abstract reasoning by a sole reasoner or identical identity– less individuals in favour of dialogue. They assume that the context for politics is already thoroughly imbued with dominant ways of thinking and doing-with cultural orientations such as national history and language, with religious and/or secular perspectives, with institutional norms and so on-and that these contextual factors cannot be abstracted out so as to identify a set of principles of justice independent of cultural interpretations. (p. 5). This, however, in addition to failing to recognize that Rawls's "original position" thought experiment is a heuristic device designed to bolster philosophical imagination and not an alternative to inclusive public deliberation between flesh and blood citizens (Maclure & Weinstock, in press), is insufficient for challenging the distinctiveness of interculturalism. As we have explained, dialogue and contact differ, a point that Modood (2017) himself acknowledges (p. 6–7). However, his discussion of the place of intergroup contact within the theory of multiculturalism is rather short (as compared to the central place given to dialogue). We believe that there is more to be said on the value of contact within a theory of multiculturalism. Interculturality plays a similar role in dialogue-based political theories and in contact theories: that of reducing racial and ethnocultural prejudice and bigotry. The promotion of face-to-face interactions draws on an insight theorized by Gordon Allport in The Nature of Prejudice. The simple idea is that by communicating and interacting with people from different racial and cultural background under conditions of (rough) equality, we are inclined to abandon our prejudices and stereotypes. The idea of a dialogical political theory is akin to this. By incorporating cross-cultural dialogue, we ensure that political principles do not only reflect the dominant culture, that principles remain open to discussion and negotiation and we build trust between communities (Modood, 2017, p. 5). When discussing the topic of intercultural dialogue, Modood (2017) mentions several of the main contributors to the field of multicultural theory (Benhabib, 2002; Parekh, 2000; Boucher and Maclure Comparative Migration Studies (2018) 6:16 Page 4 of 10 Taylor, 1994; Tully, 1995; Young, 1990). What is striking is that one of the main pioneers of this field, Kymlicka, is missing from this picture. This is no surprise, as a normative political philosopher, Kymlicka practices a different style of political theory. He seeks to specify the institutional background conditions–the distribution of rights and duties–that needs to be in place so that each is treated in a fair way. The topic of intercultural contact, as different from intercultural dialogue, finds little examination in his work. He addressed intercultural dialogue mostly through the claim that although multiculturalism needs intercultural citizens capable of interacting constructively despite their different ethnocultural and religious affiliations, there are unresolved tensions between intercultural civic virtues and the multicultural state.4 He focused mostly on the educational implications of intercultural citizenship rather than on the importance of promoting face-to-face contact within urban settings (Kymlicka, 2003). However, his account of multiculturalism is not incompatible with the promotion of intercultural interactions. Polyethnic groups in his theory are owed fair terms of integration to the societal cultural of the host society, not autonomous self-government with the capacity to maintain a distinct societal culture (Kymlicka, 1995). The logic of fair integration is to lift obstacles to participation to common societal culture. This, one may argue, will lead to more interactions, not parallel lives. Kymlicka does not link fair terms of integration to Allport's hypothesis, and does not elaborate on the implications of this for urban planning, which is central in the interculturalism literature (see for instance Landry & Wood, 2007). His more recent engagement with the inter/multi-culturalism debate reasserts that multiculturalism needs to educate citizens to be able to engage in positive interactions with one another and takes for granted Modood and Meer's view that there is little difference between the theories of interculturalism and multiculturalism, albeit it is currently politically (rhetorically) useful to promote the interculturalism label given the unpopularity of the term 'multiculturalism' (Kymlicka, 2016). Yet, although under-theorized in Kymlicka's work, the role of municipalities in promoting face-to-face contact by designing urban physical spaces conducive to it is not incompatible with his understanding of fair terms of integration. Moreover, as we suggest in the next section, certain propositions of state-based multiculturalism (such as Modood or Kymlicka) are necessary conditions for contact to lead to positive outcomes. This resonates with Kymlicka's view that intercultural citizenship and the multicultural state are complementary.5 III face to face contact and the state level One reason why Zapata-Barrero (2017) rejects the multiculturalism policy paradigm is that it is state-centred. Just as, in his view, civic integration focuses exclusively on the duties that the state must enforce, multiculturalism focuses exclusively on the rights that the state must protect. Both paradigms fail to see the role that municipal policies can play in setting up physical spaces conducive to intercultural contacts, which are likely to generate social cohesion, social capital and mutual understanding. We would like to suggest that it is not clear that the promotion of contacts at the local level is likely to lead to those desirable outcomes without support from the state. Contact, to work, presupposes equality of status. This is recognized by Allport himself, who added several necessary or facilitating conditions to the simple formulation of the contact hypothesis (1954, p., 281; as recognized by Zapata-Barrero on p. 8). He believes that were contact to happen between individual who do not enjoy equal status, it Boucher and Maclure Comparative Migration Studies (2018) 6:16 Page 5 of 10 is not likely to undermine intergroup prejudice. In addition to the equality of status condition, Allport adds that, to generate positive outcomes, contact must benefit from institutional support, must be sustained and must happen between people who have common goals. It is true that local communities and municipalities can do a lot to promote face-to-face contact: they can design enjoyable public spaces – parks, markets, sidewalks, attractive neighbourhoods (Council of Europe, 2008, 2013; Landry & Wood, 2007). However, most of the triggering conditions above-mentioned are items that the state usually provides and secures. Equal-status of all citizens is best promoted when the state avoids symbolically representing some citizens as inferiors, adopts anti-discrimination laws and redistributes wealth more equally. The state is also a key actor in providing institutional support for long-term contact. For instance, public schools are one of the most important places where meaningful intercultural contact can happen. In employment, the public sector is another important place where contact on a daily basis can be maintained. The national level of politics can also be the locus of important common goals when citizens gather around a collective societal project: rebuilding the economy after a crisis, getting rid of corruption, facing an environmental crisis, etc. Zapata-Barrero (2017) seems to worry that the only thing that the state can do is to use its coercive power to enforce duties and protect rights. This would be an inherent limitation of state-centred multiculturalism. In contrast, interculturalism, focused on the promotion of contact, cannot be compulsory, given the well-known limits of political perfectionism: "We cannot perceive interculturalism as something that should be compulsory, as if it were a perfectionist philosophy. If people do not want to communicate, we cannot force them" (pp. 8–9). Although, we endorse the rejection of political perfectionism in relation to intercultural contact, the allegedly non-compulsory character of interculturalism offers no basis to sharply distinguish this policy paradigm from the multicultural one. To see this, we believe that Zapata-Barrero's characterization of interculturalism as non-compulsory needs to be unpacked. Four things need to be said. Firstly, a liberal state should obviously not force people to adopt a conception of the good life based on interacting with people from different ethnocultural backgrounds. That a life shaped by cross-cultural friendships and deep understanding of various cultures is superior to a life deeply immersed into one single culture is perhaps a worthy personal ethical ideal, but it cannot be the justification of an enforceable public norm. Secondly, it is not illegitimate to encourage cross-cultural interactions if there is reasonable evidence that this will lead to greater toleration and respect between different ethnocultural groups. Having citizens who can tolerate one another and respect one another's rights is a political value, not a comprehensive personal ethical ideal. Thirdly, although one can identify public reasons to encourage contact, directly forcing people to interact is not likely to be feasible for pragmatic reasons. Fourth, that being said, we could still maintain that, on the basis of the instrumental value of interactions, public authorities can nudge people into having more intercultural contacts by creating contact zones and shared spaces of face-to-face interactions: "community gardens, libraries, public amenities, festivals and neighbourhood spaces" (p. 14). However, to conclude from this that interculturalism is not coercive (as opposed to the multicultural or civic integration paradigms) presupposes an unduly narrow Boucher and Maclure Comparative Migration Studies (2018) 6:16 Page 6 of 10 conception of state coercion. Indeed, many things that the state and municipalities can do to promote contact is at least indirectly coercive. To promote contact within libraries, park, public squares and public markets and cultural festivals, governments, national or municipal, need funding that they get from mandatory taxation. Moreover, intercultural urban planning decisions are made to shape urban spaces in certain ways. Desirable and justifiable as this may be, such decisions impose one spatial configuration rather than another onto citizens who move through to the cities. Intercultural urban planning is not individualist libertarian laisser-faire. In sum, we can welcome the claim that multiculturalists should think more about the key role of the municipal level of government. This, however, does not mean that a sound policy paradigm dealing with the challenges of post-immigration diversity can do away with the role of the state. This is especially not the case of a paradigm based on the contact hypothesis, as the state has an important role in ensuring the conditions for the success contact between citizens belonging to different cultural groups. IV group recognition and intercultural contact Modood (2017) welcomes the claim that multicultural political theory should incorporate a reflection on the value of face-to-face interaction and the means to better promote them. On the other hand, he also emphasizes the importance of recognizing groups as such. He embraces the commonplace criticism of groupism and essentialism, but thinks that group belonging is still politically salient and that groups can and should be the recipients of certain policies and rights. How well can this recognition of the salience of groups mesh with the promotion of intercultural contact? Would special representation for cultural minorities undermine deliberation with outsiders? Won't separate ethnoreligious schools prevent pupils to interact with people who do not share their ethnic and religious identity? Won't cultural festivals only attract members of the culture being celebrated and thus reinforce in-group boundaries? Those are legitimate concerns and perhaps they provide support to Zapata-Barrero's willingness to do without group-specific treatment and to his reliance on mainstreaming policies. However, one must keep in mind that group-specific treatment may be necessary to correct patterns of discrimination and injustices that hinder the equal status of minority groups, which is, again, one of the preconditions of the contact hypothesis. Immigrant minorities are vulnerable to specific patterns of exclusion and discrimination that require group specific measures (language acquisition, diploma recognition, anti-racism, ensuring the visibility of minorities in the medias and public offices, accommodation in public institutions, etc.). This implies that mainstreaming cannot be a fundamental overarching principle that rule out all specific treatment targeting immigrant groups. Moreover, it is not clear that avoiding measures targeting specific minorities is always better at fostering contact. Targeted measures aimed at accommodating minority cultural practices within shared public institutions and at increasing minorities' presence in the medias and public offices are likely to make diversity more visible and thus to make contact more meaningful and conductive to real engagement with differences. One may think that public funding of minority cultural festivals and cultural organizations will lead to ghettoization and the celebration of diversity at the expense of unity. However, it is through such events and through the work of such organizations that minority cultures Boucher and Maclure Comparative Migration Studies (2018) 6:16 Page 7 of 10 become visible to the rest of society and that opportunities for meaningful exchanges are created (Boucher, 2016). Once tangible in this way, differences can be acknowledged, discussed and accepted. Interactions which actively engage with cultural differences may be more likely to lead to positive outcomes than interactions which do not explicitly engage with cultural differences. Even the most difficult cases of group recognition may hinder contact less than is often thought. For instance, special political representation, in the form of reserved seats in the legislatures or ethnocultural quotas within political parties, does not amount to creating separate ethnic parties and it could perhaps lead to putting diversity issues on the democratic agenda, thus leading to deliberation that engages with minority points of view rather than ignoring it. Separate ethnoreligious schools pose a greater threat to intercultural contact. As we have highlighted, not all multiculturalists are in favour of them (Kymlicka, 2009). Still, we should note that such schools may contain hidden layers of diversity within a distinct group (class, ethnic and racial diversity within a single religious schools) and that in certain geographic areas which do not have a diversified population, common schools are not necessarily more diverse than separate schools. Conclusion In this paper, we have argued that as a civic and liberal political theory, multiculturalism is not a policy paradigm promoting ethnocultural seclusion and the relinquishment of cultural continuity (see Maclure, 2010, pp. 40–41).. Secondly, although the goal of promoting contact is not incompatible with multiculturalism (and is often embraced by multiculturalists), it is conceptually distinct from the notion of intercultural dialogue central in several multicultural theories. Moreover, even though the theorization of face-to-face contacts in urban spaces is neglected in traditional multicultural theories, intercultural contact is only effective when supported by national or state-based policies of multiculturalism. Finally, in order to promote positive intercultural contacts, we cannot abandon group-targeted measures in order to rely exclusively on mainstreaming, although there are some tensions between group recognition and the promotion of intercultural contact. Endnotes 1See also Collett & Petrovic (2014). 2One could also add that in his liberal theory of multiculturalism, Kymlicka (1995, 2001) is quite comfortable with the view that the culture of the majority is given a privileged status as compared to that of immigrants. To start with, he claims that immigrants cannot hope to recreate their societal cultural in their host society and must integrate it. Also, he maintains that host societies cannot abandon promoting and privileging certain cultural practices. The main example of this is language. Although societies can (and should) avoid having an official religion, they cannot avoid functioning with one particular language and adopting the language of the historical majority is natural. He further claims that several measures of accommodation of immigrant groups (group-specific polyethnic rights) are in fact a form of compensation for the impossibility of having a fully culturally neutral public sphere. 3We don't have the space to expand here, but it should be noted that the object of Bouchard's theory is what Quebec's interculturalism policy ought to be (according to him), not a description of Quebec's past or current policy of immigrant integration and inclusion. Boucher and Maclure Comparative Migration Studies (2018) 6:16 Page 8 of 10 See the references to interculturalism in Government of Quebec (1990) and Government of Quebec (2015). 4To be more specific, Kymlicka believes that although intercultural citizenship supports the multicultural state and vice-versa, there are unresolved tensions as 1) people are often more interested in gaining cultural understanding of global cultures rather than learning a the cultures of those who share the state with them (Belgian francophone more interested in learning English than Flemish); 2) some ethnocultural groups (conservative religious groups) have isolationist preferences accommodated by the multicultural state but irreconcilable with intercultural citizenship and 3) sometimes the goal of intercultural understanding is unrealistic and what is needed for toleration in the multicultural state is acceptance that others have deeply-held commitments, not a deep mutual cross-cultural understanding on the content of those differences. (see Kymlicka, 2003, pp. 159–165). 5More specifically on the complementarity between intercultural cities and the multicultural state, see Boucher (2016). Authors' contributions Both authors read and approved the final manuscript. Competing interests The authors declare that they have no competing interests. Publisher's Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Author details 1Centre for Ethics, Social and Political Philosophy, KU Leuven, Institute of Philosophy, Kardinaal Mercierplein 2, 3000 Leuven, Belgium. 2Faculty of Philosophy, Université Laval, Pavillon Félix-Antoine-Savard, 2325, rue des Bibliothèques, Université Laval, Québec, QC G1V 0A6, Canada. Received: 4 December 2017 Accepted: 21 January 2018 References Allport, G. (1954). The nature of prejudice. Cambridge: Addison-Wesley. Balint, P., & de Latour, S. G. (2013). Liberal multiculturalism and fair terms of integration. 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Philosophy

BMCR Bryn Mawr Classical Review BMCR 2000.03.12 The Cambridge Companion to Early Greek Philosophy A.A. Long, The Cambridge Companion to Early Greek Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. + 427. $19.95 (pb). Review by Monte Johnson, Philosophy, University of Toronto. email@example.com The format of this book is not a new one for treating the early Greek philosophers. The first 'companions' were composed by Fifth Century B.C. sophists, and were consulted by Plato and Aristotle. For most of the last two and a half millennia, some form of 'companion' volume was used by just about everyone who worked on ancient philosophy. These books have always been organized either according to individual philosophers, or by topic. (The present volume contains both types of essay.) Several of these, treating similar subject matter as the present volume, have been published in the last thirty years (see bibliographic entries #139-161). This volume compares favorably, but does not totally supersede them. The Cambridge Companion to Early Greek Philosophy (CCEGP) is recommended especially to undergraduates interested in any aspect of philosophy, graduate students specializing in ancient philosophy, and professional scholars interested in the history of philosophy. As a graduate student specializing in ancient philosophy, I find the book a tremendous resource, which manages to consolidate a lot of information, summarize recent scholarship, and, in many cases, introduce novel ways of approaching the material. Professional ancient philosophers might find the volume more hit-and-miss than I do. But even they will probably find it a useful 'conspectus of recent developments', a sort of Presocratics version 9.0 or Presocratics 2000, for those who have not updated their files and operating system lately. The first two essays deal with overarching issues fundamental to the study of the early Greek philosophers - their scope and sources. The following two essays deal with two tribes of early Greek philosophers, the Milesians and the Pythagoreans. The next five deal with individual philosophers, followed by four topical essays. Finally, there are two essays on the sophists, and a 'coda' on poetics. Rounding the volume out is a 553entry annotated bibliography (focusing on recent, standard, or English works), an index of passages (sources and philosophers), and a crucial name and subject index (many of the philosophers and topics are treated in multiple essays). The official program starts with the editor's effort to define "the scope of early Greek philosophy." This is difficult in the extreme, because we are dealing with several figures and movements that are discrete geographically, temporally, and in dialect, yet interpenetrate intellectually and topically. Already in the ancient world some of them were considered 'ancient' and obscure. They are far-flung: they spanned about 20 degrees of longitude, and two and a half centuries; they practiced variously as doctors, lawyers, politicians, priests, professors, engineers, and entertainers; they wrote in poetry, prose, paradoxes, and technical handbooks. (So the CCEGP conveniently contains a map, chronology, and summary of what is known about their lives and writings.) The question of what unites them, besides the fact that they lived before, say, Aristotle (some of the most important of them were contemporaries of Socrates), is basically a question about what kind of person was a 'philosopher' before people started self-consciously designating themselves as such, when 'philosopher' became a term of art in Academic circles. The answer to this question obviously adverts to one of the hardest in the world, namely, what is philosophy? With the possible exception of Pythagoras, none of the philosophers treated in this volume "identified himself expressly as a 'philosopher' or called his project 'philosophy'" (p. 3). But nonetheless they each contributed in important ways to what later became definitive philosophical topics, such as cosmology, chemistry, physics, rhetoric, linguistics, logic, literary and political theory, etc. But we do not merely confer honorary philosophy degrees upon them as thanks for all this important work. We call them philosophers because they attempted to explain all things - literally everything, the universe, τὸ πᾶν -, and 'philosopher' is the only term we have ever had for people adventuresome enough to engage in that kind of investigation. So Long at the beginning of the Companion, and Most at the end, uses as a touchstone the idea of giving an account of "all things" (p. 10, p. 348). Consider the following: "The first principle is ... some other nature which is indefinite, out of which come to be all the heavens and the worlds in them" (Anaximander, DK 12B1). "All things that come into being and grow are earth and water" (Xenophanes, DK 21B29). "All things come to be in accordance with this logos" (Heraclitus, DK 22B1). "There is a need for you to learn all things" (Parmenides, DK 28B1). "All things were together" (Anaxagoras, DK 59B1). "the four roots of all things" (Empedocles, DK 31B6). 1 "No thing happens at random but all things as a result of a reason and a necessity" (Leucippus, DK 67B2). "A human being is the measure of all things" (Protagoras, DK 80B1). "In my opinion, to sum it all up, all things that are, are differentiated from the same thing and are the same thing" (Diogenes of Apollonia, DK 64B2). Of course, Hesiod had also endeavored to tell about all things, that is, "of things that are and that will be, and were before" ( Theogony 38). But we do not label him, nor Homer, as 'philosophers' (and certainly not as 'Presocratics'). That is because the logoi of the philosophers are fundamentally different from the mythoi of their predecessors. Long sums up the "general project of early Greek philosophy" as "giving an account of all things that is (1) explanatory and systematic, (2) coherent and argumentative, (3) transformative, (4) educationally provocative, and (5) critical and unconventional" (p. 13). Long succeeds in carving out a space for early Greek philosophy that is broad, inclusive, and workable. He makes several important methodological points: against anachronism, for a full consideration of the poetic aspects, for the inclusion of sophistical, medical, and historical material. In the middle of it all he delivers a trenchant critique of the name "Presocratics". All in all it is an admirable overview of considerations that should be taken into account as we pursue early Greek scholarship into the next millennium. The second great difficulty in dealing with the early Greek philosophers is the status of their texts - they don't really exist anymore. We don't possess any complete works by any of the figures treated in the CCEGP. We are totally dependent upon quotations and reportage found in later writers. What we would like to have is a direct tradition, manuscripts of original works that we could use as a basis for authoritative texts. What we have are bits and pieces embedded in many different contexts, which range from biographical, doxographical, and exegetical, to dialectical and polemical. These bits and pieces were extracted by Hermann Diels, organized according to individual philosophers, and published in 1903 under the title Fragmente der Vorsokratiker. The work was later revised by his associate Walther Kranz. This volume, known as "Diels-Kranz" or simply "DK", has been for the last century the basic text for the 'Presocratics', on which all subsequent texts, translations, and commentaries are dependent. Everyone cites the fragments according to the DK code (as in the passages quoted above), often supplementing this information by citing the original source in which it was found by Diels. Everyone depends on DK, directly or indirectly, but few of us know much about the complicated story of how the book came together as it did, and what are the methodological assumptions of its compilers. Professor Mansfeld deals with all of the important source issues and the nature and status of Diels' work in a thorough and pithy essay on sources. For many readers, this will be the most informative piece in the book. After explaining the basic notion of doxography, established by Diels, Mansfeld moves on to discuss the key sources themselves, Plato, Aristotle, Theophrastus, Diogenes Laertius, Hippolytus, Sextus, Clement, Stobaeus, and the commentators, especially Simplicius. He shows how the compilation of quotations by philosophers started in antiquity, and how such collections were continually revised, augmented, edited, cut and pasted, reassembled, and edited anew. We may not be able to reconstruct the original sourcebooks, as the ideal doxographer would, but by paying attention to the advice and warnings of Professor Mansfeld, we can at least be critical and realistic about the sources that we do have. In Keimpe Algra's essay "The beginnings of cosmology" we get a treatment of the Milesians (Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes). Algra compares myth and cosmology, especially Hesiod and Thales, using the Aristotle passage from Metaphysics A (983b6-984a4) as a source for Thales. This serves as another lesson in source criticism: Algra shows how to differentiate between what Thales probably said and what Aristotle is interpreting him to have meant. It might have been better to devote some of this space to Anaximander, who gets a meager two and a half pages (compared to 5 for Thales). But beginning students at least will benefit from a careful dissection of the Aristotelian passage. Anaximenes gets a further two and a half pages, and then the essay concludes with some brief comments on "Milesian cosmology and the history and philosophy of science". The main point here is that we can't assign Baconian standards of experimental science to the Presocratics, for theirs were questions of a different order and they made fundamental contributions nonetheless. Algra concludes by recommending that we regard them as "protoscientists" (p. 63). Carl Huffman's chapter on "The Pythagorean tradition" is an insightful summary of recent research into Pythagoreanism. The textual problems surrounding Pythagoreanism are a worst-case scenario, even by 'Presocratic' standards, for there are layers upon layers of legend and myth that must be removed before one can begin to get a clear picture of what exactly Pythagoreans contributed to Greek philosophy. It is hard, by focusing on the figure of Pythagoras himself, to make any real progress. Pythagoras can be all things to all people: to scientists the paragon of rationality, who made mathematics the key to the order of nature, and to mystics a "wonder-working shaman" (p. 67). Huffmann tries to combat both of these tendencies, and this is certainly needed, but he perhaps closes too many doors by asserting that the Pythagorean transmigration theory is unrecoverable (p. 70). And it might be a little bit too pessimistic to say, regarding the correspondence of the first four whole number ratios with the concordant musical intervals, that "none of the late stories that assign the discovery of these correspondences to Pythagoras are in fact scientifically possible" (p. 74). Huffman does not give reasons for this depressing assertion. Huffman shifts the focus of Pythagorean research to Philolaus of Croton, for whom we do actually have some credible evidence in fragments, which, although fragmentary, are "crucial primary texts for early Pythagoreanism" (p. 78). Philolaus offers a complex metaphysics of the Limit and the Unlimited, which Huffman makes comprehensible by explaining it as at least in part a response to Parmenides and Anaxagoras (although Huffman does not tell what evidence there is that Philolaus actually read or intended to respond to them; see p. 81-3). There is a fruitful discussion at the end of the use and abuse of Pythagoreanism and of Philolaus by Plato and Aristotle. Edward Hussey's article on Heraclitus is an adequate introductory summary of the points in Heraclitean scholarship about which there is now more or less agreement. There is a good discussion of the significance of logos, of the unity-in-opposites theory, process oriented cosmology and the significance of fire, and finally, the application of all of the foregoing to a theory of the soul. I especially appreciated Hussey's emphasis on the "unity" part of the "unity-in-opposites" doctrine (p. 96) as a welcome departure from the popular caricature of Heraclitus as a "flux" theorist. Hussey ends with the intriguing methodological comment that "the interpreter has to construct Heraclitus as a Heraclitean unity-in-opposites, with the systematic and the aporetic as his opposed aspects" (p. 109), reminding us that Heraclitus is more useful as a provocation to private philosophic meditation and exercise than as a springboard for a grand theory or doctrine. Hussey's article successfully conveys this idea, even if it doesn't break much new ground. David Sedley's contribution on "Parmenides and Melissus", on the other hand, does forge a new path for the interpretation of 'Eleacticism'. He starts out with the provocative assertion that, "too much has been written on Parmenides ... too little on Melissus" (p. 113). He cuts right to the chase, not attempting to do justice to the proem (which is fortunately treated in several other contributions), and begins analysis of "The Way of Truth". Sedley does not get bogged down in a minute discussion of the sense of the verb ἐστι, and he recommends glossing it as "is something." As for all of the 'predicates', he argues for a "unashamedly spatial reading" (p. 117), so that Parmenides is literally talking about a sphere. He treats "The Way of Seeming" as an attempt by Parmenides to offer a cosmology that, "will be the best of its kind, a successful competitor" (p. 123). He points out passages from the second part of the poem that support his spatial reading of the first part. A full third of the article is devoted to Melissus. Melissus is presented as an Ionian physicist who is addressing in plain language a scientifically sophisticated audience. The main difference between Parmenides and Melissus is that the former steps out of, but the latter remains steadfastly in, the bonds of the great physical tradition. But they are both at the forefront of a new metaphysically oriented viewpoint which, by appealing to "a priori" principles, breaks out of the strictly empirical methodology of the earlier cosmologists and paves the way for the development of inferential methods. Each of the subsequent articles on individual philosophers assumes or argues that their subjects are in some way influenced by Parmenides. It is a little bit odd that this is more or less taken for granted in the case of the pluralists and the atomists, but considered with hesitation only in the case of Zeno. McKirahan's article on Zeno is framed by the question of whether or not Zeno was actually defending Parmenides (a question that, in my humble opinion, is more of a red herring than a clear framework for thinking about the paradoxes). I will discuss McKirahan's article in a minute. But I want to pause to consider why it has become so easy to assume that Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and Democritus all accepted Parmenides' arguments and built their cosmologies on the foundation of his logic. For example, Graham argues that "both Empedocles and Anaxagoras wholeheartedly endorse Parmenides' rejection of coming-to-be and perishing, without qualification or implied criticism. And neither one ever argues explicitly against him in the fragments on any other issue... Empedocles and Anaxagoras agree with Parmenides without explicitly disagreeing" (p. 167). Taylor simply asserts that "Atomistic physics is one of a number of attempts to accommodate the Ionian tradition of comprehensive natural philosophy to the demands of Eleatic logic" (p. 199). Patricia Curd's recent book, The Legacy of Parmenides, which I reviewed for this journal (BMCR 99.06.21), also takes this stance (1998; see pages 8, 128, 171, 242). I think that there are some good interpretations which have been advanced under this assumption, but it might be going too far to consider these people "eleatic pluralists" (p. 176). It might be the case that, since there is no explicit criticism of Parmenides by these thinkers, they must have accepted all of his arguments. But there are alternatives: that they didn't read him at all; that they read him and didn't understand; or that they understood, but considered the position weak and ignored it (Inwood, p. 23-4); or that they accepted some of the arguments but not all (Schofield in KRS, p. 351). The inference from lack of disagreement to agreement seems particularly questionable since all of this work survives only in fragments. McKirahan's article is concerned to show that the purpose of Zeno's treatise was in fact to vindicate the Eleatic philosophy, as Plato had claimed ( Parm. 128bc). After considering two of the paradoxes about infinity, McKirahan goes on to discuss the differences between apeiron and infinity. He says, "Zeno's conception of apeiron is not identical with our notion of the infinite, to state the paradox in terms of the infinite and solve it in those terms is to state and solve a different paradox" (p. 141). McKirahan's discussion of the difference is good and right, but he then confusingly goes on to use the term 'infinite', both in his translations and commentaries (pp. 145ff.). When dealing with the arguments against motion, many will, I suspect, disagree with McKirahan's conclusions that the problems have been solved. See if you agree with the following: "The Dichotomy fails" (p. 148); "The Achilles fails because it trades on ambiguity" (p. 150); and "again, the problem of how the arrow gets from one position to another or from one time to another during its flight is solved by pointing out that that is precisely what it means for the arrow to be flying" (p. 155). I am not in a position to say whether Professor McKirahan has or has not shown that these paradoxes 'fail' or can be 'solved.' But I am concerned that readers for whom this book is an introduction will hastily conclude that there is not much point in researching further into this difficult philosopher who, at any rate, has already been refuted. Daniel Graham's essay, "Empedocles and Anaxagoras: Responses to Parmenides," is another adequate summary of the standard interpretation of these two. He discusses Empedocles' positions on love and strife, zoogony, and psychology, without getting drawn into the scholarly quagmire of the debate about love and strife. He proceeds to discuss Anaxagoras according to Kerferd's (1969) five postulates, which twenty years later still makes for a clear exposition. Graham's comparison of the two 'pluralists' is insightful, and this is the justification for treating them together, although some readers will have wanted a separate chapter on Anaxagoras, about whom Vlastos once remarked, "no Pre-Socratic system has been studied more intensively" (p. 459). I have already commented briefly on Graham's treatment of the pluralists under "the Parmenidean model of explanation" (p. 169ff.), and I leave it to the readers to evaluate that position for themselves. C.C.W. Taylor's essay, "The Atomists," is concise and incisive. He manages to discuss physical principles, chance, necessity, epistemology, psychology, ethics, and politics in twenty fast-paced and exciting pages. All this he does while linking atomism with preceding, contemporary, and subsequent doctrines. But one wonders if Taylor has done too good a job of showing the continuities with the tradition. His characterization of their world-view as "mechanistic" (p. 185-6) is fair (and we moderns are accustomed to thinking of atomism as a 'mechanistic' model), but Taylor does not really emphasize how radical this must have been when the dominant model (one that remained dominant for another thousand plus years) was a biologized one, holding that the universe was like a natural living thing, not a machine (a point that other contributors rightly emphasize in their own sections). Taylor ends with an appendix in which he takes a "middle of the road" position on the relation between atomistic physics and ethics, and this rounds off an exposition worthy of the intellectual strength of the movement he is discussing. The first of the topical essays is Sarah Broadie's "Rational Theology." Professor Broadie reminds us that we can't really draw a sharp line between the theology of the early Greek philosophers and the rest of their accomplishments. For one thing, they usually label that which is fundamental to their cosmologies 'divine' (with the interesting exception of Parmenides, whom Broadie treats at length). She expounds Xenophanes' rejection of anthropomorphism and then describes his unique brand of theism, which she argues is not monotheistic, as has often been thought. She carefully considers the various roles of the divine in Empedocles' poem, and discusses the implications of the atomists' "truly naturalized natural world" (p. 221). James Lesher's "Early Interest in Knowledge" and André Laks' "Soul, sensation, and thought" overlap considerably, as is to be expected in a discussion of Greek epistemology and psychology, which are never totally separable. Both essays start with a consideration of the poetic precursors to their subjects, and these are both valuable discussions. Lesher focuses on Xenophanes, Heraclitus, Parmenides, and Empedocles, and he brings out several compelling parallels. Most important, of course, is the tendency to emphasize physis and logos, which will have a major impact on both Plato and Aristotle. Laks mentions that the distinction between the sensation and thought was "a matter of course" (p. 257), but he goes on to discuss what exactly this amounted to. The notion that Parmenides "rejected the senses" is a popular one, and Laks responds to this with effective commentary on two key passages and a vivid comparison of these to a passage in Empedocles. Mario Vegetti's essay on "Culpability, responsibility, and cause" is unique for this type of volume, since it focuses on historical and medical texts roughly contemporaneous with the figures treated in the book. Vegetti begins by pointing out that the early Greek philosophers were not in possession of a concept of causality in the Humean sense. He references, approvingly, Michael Frede's description of the later notion of cause (p. 274), and proceeds to flesh it out with a wealth of historical, rhetorical, and medical examples. Readers of G.E.R. Lloyd's numerous writings about the intersection of the medical and philosophical traditions will already have been convinced that it is absolutely necessary to deal with this material in a discussion of the early Greek philosophers, but Professor Vegetti's article, which will perhaps be circulated more widely, will serve to underscore that point well. The most popular previous 'companion' volumes, such as those edited by Mourelatos (1974), and Allen and Furley (1970/1975) did not include any complete essays on the sophists (although there are exceptions, the most notable being Barnes 1979). Even the most widely-used sourcebook, KRS, does not provide any material on the sophists (though McKirahan 1994 does). In 1980, Kerferd called for a new interpretation of the sophists, asserting that the need for a reassessment was by then "a matter of some urgency" (p. vii). The inclusion in the CCEGP of two essays on the 'sophists' is a good sign that we are finally beginning to admit the likes of Protagoras, Gorgias, and Antiphon into the club of early Greek philosophers, after two thousand years of more or less complete exclusion. The first essay, Paul Woodruff's "Rhetoric and relativism" treats Protagoras and Gorgias. Professor Woodruff wants to fundamentally revamp our perspective, arguing that "the traditional view that the sophists are relativists must give way to the recognition that what most characterizes the sophists as a group is their commitment to human nature as a subject of study. We must also give up the idea that the sophists are skeptics" (p. 305). The focus on 'human nature' would appear to situate Gorgias and Protagoras directly within the mainstream of the Greek philosophical tradition, except that Woodruff thinks that they, at the same time, turned away from the philosophers' "fascination with knowing the hidden natures of things" (p. 309). If this is true, it would seem to set them even further away from the philosophers than they appeared to be before. Woodruff further argues that their central concerns, practical politics and law, forced them to emphasize good judgment ( euboulia), instead of knowledge, as an expedient to deal with the reasoning by appeal to probability ( eikos) that is inevitably employed in forensic deliberation. In the end, we are left with a sense that the philosophical importance of the sophists was more as challengers to the assumptions of the philosophers than as contributors to their projects. Fernanda Decleva Caizzi's essay, "Protagoras and Antiphon: Sophistic debates on justice," treats the issue of justice with historical, poetical, philosophical (i.e. Platonic), and sophistic material. She frames the discussion of justice with the first two books of Plato's Republic, especially the thought experiment of the ring of Gyges. In an insightful comparison of Plato's and Herodotus' versions of the Gyges story, she shows how Protagoras' position is close to Herodotus', while Antiphon's is more like Glaucon's. Another salient point of comparison (given Woodruff's conclusions) is their "two radically different views on human nature" (p. 317). One interesting result of her study, however, is a conjecture that Antiphon was working in "a larger scientific context, marked by a concept of nature (and not just human nature)" (p. 327). If this is right, then we see just how much difference there must have been within what we often call "the sophistic movement", since Antiphon would have exploited a 'philosophical' concept of nature in his critique of law or convention ( nomos), while Protagoras (who was unwilling to polarize nomos and physis) did not. My favorite essay of the volume was the last, Glenn Most's "The poetics of early Greek philosophy." The article makes a forceful case for the consideration of poetic issues in the interpretation of early Greek philosophy, something that is all too often ignored by commentators who are overly confident about their ability to determine the properly 'philosophical' content of the fragments. Most provides a useful taxonomy of the poetic aspects of early Greek philosophy: he uses the terms 'immanent,' 'explicit,' and 'implicit' to describe their poetics. Writers are immanently poetic when they use poetic devices in order to convey their philosophic messages. An obvious case of this would be writing in hexameters, as did Empedocles. Many of the early Greek philosophers explicitly wrote about and interpreted the poets. Examples of this are invective against the poets (and the 'quarrel between philosophy and poetry'), and the development of allegorical techniques. Finally, all of the early Greek philosophers are implicitly poetic as a result of their educational system which was focused on Homer and Hesiod. This is simply a recognition that those poets "inevitably shaped the discursive parameters within which the early Greek philosophers operated" (p. 334). The result is that we are obligated to examine the poetic aspects of these writers, even those that wrote in prose, or that seem to effect a transition out of the 'mytho-poetic' mindset. As Most says, very forcibly and very rightly, "it is particularly true in the case of the early Greek thinkers as a group that no account of their philosophy that considers only the structure of their arguments, and not also the form in which they chose to communicate those arguments to their public, can be considered fully satisfactory" (p. 335). This statement likely comes as no surprise to classicists, who would probably be shocked at how often this point is explicitly denied in 'Presocratic' scholarship, especially in reference to Parmenides, who wrote in fact a beautiful philosophical poem about logic and ontology in dactylic hexameters. Many common themes run through several of the articles. In some cases these represent new positions on the interpretation of the early Greek philosophers, and in others they solidify positions that have been developed over the last century. Four examples stand out. The first is the necessity to consider many 'nonphilosophical' genres in doing early Greek philosophy, such as the historians, medical writers, dramatists, orators, and poets. The second is the admission that the term 'sophistic' does not designate a natural kind opposed to philosophy but is an extremely diverse philosophical movement. The third is the recognition of the centrality of Parmenides, and the question of the extent to which his successors incorporated his logic into their own cosmological speculations. The fourth is the reconsideration of traditional oppositions and alliances. For example, it is possible that Parmenides and Heraclitus might be closer together than it seems on the surface, or that Philolaus ought to be separated out from the Pythagorean morass. The contributors to the CCEGP challenge us to think about all of these things, and lots more. In philosophy, the best companions are the ones that challenge us. References and Abbreviations Furley, D.J. and R.E. Allen, eds., Studies in Presocratic Philosophy, 2 vols. (London, 1970/1975). Curd, P. The Legacy of Parmenides (Princeton, 1998). DK. The translations are McKirahan's, in P. Curd (ed.), A Presocratics Reader (Indianapolis and Cambridge, 1995). Inwood, B. The poem of Empedocles (Toronto, 1992). Kerferd, G.B. (1981). The Sophistic Movement (Cambridge, 1981). Kerferd, G.B. (1969). Anaxagoras and the concept of matter before Aristotle. Reprinted in Mourelatos 1974 (489503). Mourelatos, A.P.D. (1974) ed., The Pre-Socratics, (Garden City, NY, 1974). KRS. Kirk, G.S., J.E. Raven, and M. Schofield, The Presocratic Philosophers (Cambridge, 1983). McKirahan, R.D. (1994). Philosophy before Socrates (Indianapolis and Cambridge, 1994). Vlastos, G. The physical theory of Anaxagoras. Reprinted in Mourelatos 1974 (459-488). Notes 1. Fragments are listed by their number in the standard edition of H. Diels and W. Kranz; translations are by R.D. McKirahan in A Presocratics Reader, ed. P. Curd (Indianapolis 1995).