Review of Michelle Kosch *Freedom and Reason*

Philosophy

College of Arts and Letters Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007.01.19 Author Michelle Kosch Freedom and Reason in Kant Published: January 19, 2007 Michelle Kosch, Freedom and Reason in Kant, Schelling and Kierkegaard, Oxford University Press, 2006, 236pp., $65.00 (cloth), ISBN 0199289115. Reviewed by Alistair Welchman, University of Texas, San Antonio Kosch attempts to show that post-Kantian German idealism duplicates and exacerbates a kind of intelligible determinism that is incompatible with a muscular conception of human freedom. Schelling, in his Freedom essay of 1809, finally recognized this; and his attempt to reconfigure idealism from within was motivated by his recognition of the need to provide a place for human freedom. The attempt failed (even if interestingly) but is taken up again and more successfully by Kierkegaard. While the account of Kant draws on a quite familiar interpretive matrix, the application of this matrix to Schelling and Kierkegaard is novel, fruitful, compelling and extremely rigorously laid out. The book is written in a dense and very scholarly analytical style, freely deploying original sources in both German and Danish. It still bears some of the marks of its provenance as a Ph.D. dissertation. For many people (Kant included) there is something wrong with a picture of the world in which every event is determined by the events prior to it: it leaves no space for us as human beings to be practically engaged with the world, to be agents. If true, then my next action is not in fact my action, or anyone's action. It just happens. In the Groundwork (1785) Kant argues that it is simply impossible for us to conceive ourselves as unfree. We must view ourselves as able to set aside all empirical motives (causes), even when we choose in fact to do what we want. The argument is quite subtle (he never takes it as establishing that we actually are free). But the fact that we cannot escape thinking of ourselves as free is enough to establish that the moral law actually binds us. Kosch wants to interpret Kant as offering something like a transcendental argument against empirical determinism based on this simple phenomenology of free action. In other words, free action imposes transcendental constraints on metaphysics. Some metaphysical views are incompatible with agency and cannot therefore be possible beliefs for a free agent. Kosch's central conceptual insight is that the category of metaphysical positions that must be rejected on the basis of a deep understanding of the conditions of agency is wider than just that of empirical determinism. One might call this spectrum of metaphysical positions necessitarian (although Kosch doesn't). And the first thing she does is show that Kant himself falls prey to one of these species of necessitarianism. So, although Kant's conception of freedom escapes the frying pan of causal determinism, it can only do so by falling into the fire of another form of necessitarianism. Kant's problem, for Kosch, lies in his attempt to ground ethics in the structure of practical rationality itself -not in whether he manages this, but in the malign consequences of the possibility of success. Her interest is therefore not in the conditional: 'if I am rational, then I behave morally'; but rather in 'if I behave immorally, I am irrational.' To be sure, this is not equivalent to submerging action in mere happening. But there are disquieting similarities. For instance, if one acts irrationally (in a fit of madness, say), one is not responsible for one's actions -they are, in a sense, mere happenings. But then one can only be responsible for moral choices (i.e. choices for behavior in conformity with duty) and not for immoral ones. Perhaps it is not clear whether one is even free to choose rightly in this situation. But it is certainly incompatible with evil, understood as the clear, levelheaded, rational, knowing choice of an immoral act. Kosch argues that this, the problem of evil (or radical evil in Kant's formulation), is the crucial litmus test of a theory of freedom. To be an agent is to be deeply or transcendentally free, and that means being able to choose evil. Any metaphysical theory must be compatible with this condition, or it excludes agency. Kosch sees here a profound dichotomy between optimistic (ultimately Socratic) theories and Christian theories, starting off with Augustine. Kant, like Socrates, tries to build morality into action itself. But by doing so, some actions become metaphysically impossible, such as (for Socrates) knowingly causing harm, and (for Kant) rationally disobeying the categorical imperative. Kosch often prefers to focus on the problem of radical evil rather than that of positive necessitation because the case is easier to make out for theories of morality as autonomy or rational self-determination. But it is certainly possible to argue that such theories do more than exclude certain choices. Kant's understanding of intelligible causality as intrinsically law-like suggests that the alternative for Kant is between two types of laws, equally necessary. Kosch shows how these problems were a live concern among Kant's contemporaries, and especially C.E.E. Schmid who, to describe this situation (which Schmid regarded as a reductio of Kant's position), coined the memorable phrase 'intelligible fatalism' (pp. 50f). Schmid's particular account is quite specific, but the idea that Kant is committed to an intelligible as the alternative to a phenomenal determinism is at the center of Kosch's view. Kosch's picture of the origin of post-Kantian idealism is familiar both from the modern literature and the self-understanding of the protagonists. The dichotomies of Kant's system --most importantly between experience and action -must be overcome. Kant himself explores the possibility of a common source for theoretical and practical reason through the idea that history is an instrument for achieving moral perfection. Of course this idea has a purely regulative function in Kant's texts; but it is standard to argue that post-Kantian idealism can be understood by now considering the regulative actually to be constitutive of reality. What Kosch observes about this is that Kant's intelligible necessitarianism is now projected onto a cosmic scale, and that in these systems human freedom is understood as conformity to the laws being worked out through history. The systems of German Idealism (including the early Schelling) leave no place for human freedom. The beautiful image that Schelling uses of history as a drama whose rational coordination stems from the fact that each of us is both actor and author is ultimately just as determinist as empirical causality since the tale cannot unfold in any other way. And this, Kosch argues, is exactly what Schelling comes to see in the Freedom essay. In a sense, Schelling takes Kant's solution to the problem of radical evil in the Religion book to its logical conclusion (where Kant feared to tread because of his more fundamental commitment to autonomy). At the transcendental or intelligible level, each of us makes a core choice for good or evil. Where Kant equivocates on the consequences of this view, Schelling bites the bullet and accepts them. Most importantly, he realizes that he must reject the view that we give the law to ourselves. The primary interpretive problem that Kosch faces with the Freedom essay is that its focus is apparently cosmological rather than moral. As Kosch puts it, 'at the point in the essay at which he seems obliged to turn to ethics however Schelling turns instead to cosmology' (p. 98). Kosch's strategy here is two-fold. First she regards the cosmological points (and the famous discussion of evil as physical illness) as essentially 'metaphors' (p. 100) for the idea of individual rebellion against (one is tempted to say) 'the system'. This category of rebellion or defiance, rather familiar from English Romanticism, is undertheorized but clearly of some importance to Kosch. It is clear why she needs something like it, however: if the ability to choose between good and evil is (at least) a necessary condition for transcendental freedom, then one must of course be able to defy goodness. Ultimately Kosch does not feel the need to work all this out in too much detail because of the second aspect of her strategy here, which is to regard the middle period Schelling as an inadequate anticipation of the late Schelling. What is absent in the works from 1809 to 1815 is just the kind of 'metaphysical' empiricism that is required to tell us what (in particular) we ought and ought not to do. For it follows from Schelling's rejection of the Kantian understanding of morality as rational selfdetermination that whatever it is we ought to do, it doesn't stem from us and is not a function of rational agency. But then where can it come from and what could it be? Kosch treats Schelling's cosmological speculations as a stopgap measure preparing the way for the account of divine revelation he gives in his lectures in the 1830s and 1840s. We should do what god says; and what he says is given only 'empirically' in a revelation that cannot be deduced from his concept and which he could, if he had so chosen, have withheld from us. The fundamental motivation for Schelling's metaphysical empiricism and radical contingency is divine voluntarism about moral values (p. 121). Kosch often exhibits scholarly circumspection here, but certainly reiterates the point that metaphysical indeterminism is the result of the exercise of human freedom choosing evil (e.g. p. 103). In many ways the Kierkegaard chapters (and especially the first one) are the centerpiece of this book. Kosch's interpretation of Kierkegaard is clear and rigorous; it has a real explanatory depth to it, drawing together anomalies from both the texts themselves and contemporary readings of them and giving a satisfyingly clear indication of what is at issue and why it has been so hard to understand. On Kosch's reading, Kierkegaard is most fundamentally opposed to any system (metaphysical, ethical or 'religious') that does not meet the requirements for deep agency. Here Kosch does not follow secondary commentators, but has a quite new and fresh interpretation. To give one example: the traditional accounts of the aesthetic 'stage' as it is presented in Either/Or emphasize either the empirical fragility of hedonism or its perversity in relation to some teleological account of human flourishing. While superficially plausible, neither of these is able to make sense of the entire text. In the first case, if it is the thought of the possibility of failure that leads to despair, then this surely applies in spades to the genuinely religious life, where success and failure can barely be distinguished. In the second case it is hard to account for why Kierkegaard thinks that the aesthetic life can be a happy one and impossible to see why on earth 'the German philosophers' (Either/Or, cited p. 147) should be compared with the aesthete. Kosch's explanation makes everything clear: the aesthetic life is (at its most sophisticated) the view of Schelling's System of Transcendental Idealism, the conception of freedom in history as a drama in which each of us is an individual actor and at the same time co-author. Kierkegaard clearly refers to this analogy from Schelling in Either/Or, which explains why he calls the life 'aesthetic'. Kierkegaard's objection to it is the same as Schelling's (later) objection: since the drama cannot turn out otherwise than it does, the apparent freedom of the actors is nullified. The injunction 'live aesthetically!' cannot be addressed to anyone because the aesthetic life is a life without agents who can respond to injunctions (p. 149). This idea of pure spectatorship (p. 153) could in fact have been developed further: is there not in Kierkegaard some allusion to Kant's aesthetics of disinterest? What about Kant's own scopophilic relation to the political event of his lifetime, the French Revolution? But Kosch's interpretive gesture is immensely compelling here. This heuristic for understanding Kierkegaard also enables Kosch to give a compelling account both of why Kierkegaard sees the ethical life as superior to the aesthetic and why he sees it as ultimately flawed. The ethical life is superior because in it the subject can recognize itself as an agent with transcendental freedom. Thus the first disjunction of Either/Or is not between two different kinds of goal (hedonistic, moral) but between a necessitarian and hence agentless metaphysics on the one hand, and recognition of oneself as able to choose on the other. However Kosch is also able to explain exactly why in later works Kierkegaard attacks a position that looks very much like the Judge's ethical life from Either/Or. Kierkegaard's target here is exactly the Kantian understanding of an ethics of rational self-determination and autonomy. By making morality a (partial) function of rational agency one also drains the choice out of agency: as for Kant, it is impossible to choose evil because to do so is prima facie evidence that one was not choosing at all. Ethical values cannot be reduced to a function of practical subjectivity -instead (so Kierkegaard would say) they must come from god. The success of the Kierkegaard section of this book does however suggest a structural flaw in the overall work. By the end, it becomes retrospectively clear that the analyses of Schelling and Kant are really subordinated to the Kierkegaard interpretation. There is nothing wrong with this, but it makes the book really one about Kierkegaard. By comparison with the authority and confidence with which Kosch treats Kierkegaard, the Kant section is relatively unadventurous and the Schelling section rather selective in its interest. I was therefore left with the feeling of a certain confusion of motive. If the point of the earlier two parts of the book was really to establish a historical matrix for interpreting Kierkegaard, then what is the rationale behind, for instance, devoting a section to Schelling's unpublished 1804 system? Similarly (on a larger scale) the long and very scholarly excursus on the diffusion of Schelling's late ideas in Kierkegaard's direction makes one wonder about the point of devoting so much energy to analyzing Schelling's lectures in their modern forms, to which Kierkegaard could not have been exposed. The historical and analytical impulses of the book do not always work in harmony. While Kosch's basic thesis is novel, interesting and very well worked out, I did find the Schelling section somewhat disappointing. Kosch's essentially bipartite periodization of Schelling tends to view the Freedom essay and the Ages of the World as merely transitional to the philosophy of revelation. No one doubts that these works are flawed (in three drafts Schelling never managed to get beyond the first age of the world!) but many commentators regard these works as forming a genuine middle period between the naïve optimism of the early works and the fusty pessimism of the late thinking. These commentators, in particular Martin Heidegger, Jürgen Habermas and Slavoj Žižek, are conspicuous by their absence (or near absence) from what is otherwise an incredibly well-researched monograph: Heidegger and Habermas merit a couple of scholarly footnotes each and Žižek isn't mentioned at all. I can see a possible conflict of personalities between the hysterical Žižek and the sober-minded confrontation with idealist thought that Kosch engineers, but all the same Žižek is the single most famous Schelling commentator writing today and surely deserves at least dismissive refutation! It is interesting to speculate how the book might have developed both in a more political direction and in a direction more critical of Kierkegaard, if Kosch had attended more to the famous predecessors in Schelling interpretation. But that would clearly be to want Kosch to have written a different book. As it is, the actual version marks the emergence of an already strong scholar with the potential to become a major voice in Anglophone understanding of 19th century European thought. Copyright © 2017 ISSN: 1538 1617 College of Arts and Letters Accessibility Information Notre Dame, IN


A âCirculation Modelâ of Education: A Response to Challenges of Education at the New University

Philosophy

The protests at the Universiteit van Amsterdam (UvA) that began in November 2014 as a reaction to severe cuts in the department of humanities have sparked a broad debate nationally and even internationally about the future of the university and the values and ideals that should define it. It turned out that dissatisfaction was much more widespread in different parts of the university than some had previously thought, and many turned out to share the concerns first put forward in the humanities department, to extend beyond the borders of the university and the country. Increasing focus on getting as many students as possible to graduate promptly has shifted the attention ever more towards quantitative indicators for the evaluation of education rather than qualitative ones, leading to raising the question of whether the quality of education has suffered from these priorities. How did this come about and what could be done to improve this quality?
          In this essay we briefly consider the history of the university as an institute that aims to combine research and education, subsequently mentioning some more recent challenges for the university, finishing it with a brief description of a âcirculation model of educationâ that we consider to be a fruitful source for answering some of the challenges we identified from the current discussions. In this model circulation rather than unidirectional traffic occurs between different elements: circulation between research and education, between insights of teachers and of students, between disciplines, between general and contextualized knowledge, between disciplinary and experi- ential knowledge, between doing research and (meta-)reflection upon research, and so on.

Krisis Journal for contemporary philosophy 90 AMOS KEESTRA & MACHIEL KEESTRA A 'CIRCULATION MODEL' OF EDUCATION: A RESPONSE TO CHALLENGES OF EDUCATION AT THE NEW UNIVERSITY Krisis 2015, Issue 2: Perspectives for the New University www.krisis.eu Introduction The protests at the Universiteit van Amsterdam (UvA) that began in November 2014 as a reaction to severe cuts1 in the department of humanities have sparked a broad debate nationally and even internationally about the future of the university and the values and ideals that should define it. It turned out that dissatisfaction was much more widespread in different parts of the university than some had previously thought, and many turned out to share the concerns first put forward in the humanities department, to extend beyond the borders of the university and the country. Increasing focus on getting as many students as possible to graduate promptly has shifted the attention ever more towards quantitative indicators for the evaluation of education rather than qualitative ones, leading to raising the question of whether the quality of education has suffered from these priorities. The executive board of the UvA initially tried to ignore the criticisms and demands put forward by the protesters, but eventually recognized that this strategy was untenable and came forward with a substantial response to the protests: the board presented 'ten points' that would guide its discussion of the future direction of the university. Although in general everyone was happy with these points as they contained suggestions in response to important demands of the protesters such as the demand for increased democratisation, a broadly-shared criticism of the ten points was that they were very vague and imprecise and required specification if they were to be implemented. We would like to take the occasion of this special issue of Krisis on the future of the university to take up two of these ten points and discuss in this essay how they could be further elaborated and implemented in student education in the new university, explaining why this is not yet the case. The two points on which we would like to focus are closely related and connected. Point 6 reads: 'Priority to creativity and innovation in education and research' and Point 7: 'Link education with, and value it as highly as, research'.2 Here we have one point emphasizing creativity and innovation in education and research, and one point that stresses the connection between the two. A first reaction might be: isn't that just what the university should be about anyway? In what sense is this a new direction? Is it new at all or does it merely indicate that the traditional values of the university have been pushed too much to the background? We would like to suggest that all these responses are partly true at least. The fact that these two points are part of a plan to direct the future indicates that these points may have suffered under choices made in university governance in the past couple of years. We would like to stress, though, that the current situation is also a good occasion to reconsider the values of higher (academic) education and explore possibilities to implement these in the new university. We will do this by briefly considering the history of the university as an institute that aims to combine – more or less effectively – research and education, subsequently mentioning some more recent challenges for the university, and we will finish our essay with a brief description of a 'circulation model of education' that we consider to be a fruitful source for answering some of the challenges we identified from the current discussions. Krisis Journal for contemporary philosophy Amos Keestra & Machiel Keestra – A 'Circulation Model'... 91 A brief history of different educational models: from oral disputations via writing exercises to standardized education The university is often said to be the internationally most successful European social invention: other than many other inventions and institutions, the university has been adopted by most countries as an institution that combines research and education (cf. Lindberg 1992). Where previous interactions between scholars – 'masters' – and pupils were mostly organized at a relatively small scale in monasteries, cathedral schools or at private courts, from the 11th century a rapid change occurred. Increasing wealth, population growth and urbanization provided some of the material conditions for this, while the Renaissance and other cultural changes prepared the intellectual ground. Initially the 'universitas' referred to an independent association or guild of teachers and their students, without reference to a particular location or building. When these associations grew, the need for an organization and buildings increased as well. In 1088 freedom of teaching was granted to Bologna's school, which is considered by many to be the birth-date of the university.3 Papal involvement with the early universities and the recognition by the popes from the 13th century onwards of the universal validity of university degrees facilitated the further institutionalization of universities and the increasingly important status of university degrees as indicators of scholarly and professional qualification (Rüegg 2003b). When this new institution spread more and more through Europe, increasing numbers of individuals who participated in university training entered the ranks of the clergy, merchants, civil servants, medical doctors, lawyers, and so on.4 With this development, the direct and indirect impact of the university on the larger society grew as well, affected as it was by the students and their skills and expertise as these returned to societal positions after their stay at the university. Of particular interest to us in the present context is the changes that obtained regarding the educational models to be found in these institutions. These educational models affect the interactions between teachers and students and the role and nature of research with regard to education. Moreover, as we will argue, each model is associated with a specific perspective on students as independent learners and researchers. Medieval and early-modern university training consisted largely of oral exchanges, with the oral disputation being the most important form of assessment. This prominence of the oral nature of academic education and exchange was partly due to the limited distribution of written and printed materials and, consequently, their limited relevance. With the wider availability and distribution of printed publication of scientific results and the emergence of scientific journals, reading and writing largely came to replace the oral disputation – a process that began around 1750 at German universities and from there gradually spreading to other countries. Specific regulations were given as to how seminar writing exercises should be handled, because they were considered to be important as demonstrations of students' capacity to master original sources and to use these for their own independent research. Indeed, this rise in the prominence of writing reflected the university's recent emphasis on a student's individual development for becoming a creative and independent researcher (Kruse 2006). Motivating, supervising, commenting and assessing writing was considered to be the best way in guiding the student along this difficult path, initiating her in the practice and discourse of a particular discipline. This form of 'student socialization' (Kruse 2006) has been in place for nearly two centuries until a further development made it nearly impossible to maintain it. The development at stake is of course the more recent massification of higher education. After the Second World War, and particularly since the 1970s, the number of students has increased exponentially in many countries. In the last decade alone, a rise of 45% of tertiary educated young adults in the OECD and G20 countries has been observed (OECD 2015). This development took place during an economically challenging period, which has motivated European educational policies – more so than in the US – to emphasize higher education as preparation of students for the job market, rather than as preparation to become fully developed citizens (Keestra 2007; Wildemeersch 2013). These socio-economic changes went along with an ideological – neo-liberal – turn regarding higher education, together impacting the conditions of the latter in a negative way: '[i]n short, massification, the economic crisis, and a widespread acceptance of the private-good argument have led to a worldwide deterioration in conditions as exemplified by deteriorating student/ teacher ratios, problems for the academic profession, and the general impoverishment of academe' Krisis Journal for contemporary philosophy Amos Keestra & Machiel Keestra – A 'Circulation Model'... 92 (Altbach, Reisberg, & Rumbley 2010: 36).5 These developments have had a big impact on the education universities offer to their students and in particular on the amount of attention and supervision that each individual student can receive from professors. This is ironic, since for several decades so-called constructivist theories of learning have become more widely recognized, implying that students should not be treated as passive learners but instead must be actively engaged with teaching materials: teachers were facing demands to reconsider their role accordingly – 'from sage on the stage to guide on the side' (King 1993).6 Although this has contributed to the development of valuable pedagogical innovations, their implementation is constrained by the other trends mentioned here. This situation has resulted in a largely unchanged – if not increasing – focus on lectures as the main vehicle for transmission of teachers' insights and expertise to students, given that they can accommodate as many students as required without, in principle, any limits. In this context, programs and teachers have sought refuge in standardised methods of examination – instead of placing the earlier emphasis on creativity in disputation and writing – with standard questions for all students and often with standard answers for them to choose from (multiple-choice exams).7 Two current challenges of university education From this brief discussion of the history of university education we surmise that there have been at least three different media of teaching students at the university: a first phase in which verbal disputations occupied a central spot; a second phase in which reading and writing exercises were the main elements of training used at the university; and a third and current phase which seems to be focussed further still on elements such as listening, reading, making exercises and standardized exams, notwithstanding pedagogical and other reasons that point in a contrary direction. In this model of teaching the role of the teacher is not so much to facilitate the development of students as independent and creative scientists by engaging with their independent thinking through verbal interactions, and by guiding and providing feedback on their writing. Instead, university education in this model consists largely of making students reach certain standardized learning objectives according to predefined pedagogical and scientific methods and processes, preordained by experts whose knowledge and skills students should learn to emulate. In his much debated book The Ignorant Schoolmaster (1991), French philosopher Jacques Rancière has argued that there are a number of negative consequences to this approach to education. First of all it makes explanation the primary mode of engagement of teachers with their students and makes understanding its central goal. As a result, students are put in a relatively passive position. The presumption is that students are not yet capable of understanding a certain piece of information deemed important by the teacher, and that the relatively straightforward goal towards achieving comprehension is by way of the teacher explaining it to them. As Rancière points out, this undermines the confidence of students in their own intelligence and capacity and in fact creates a situation of continued 'enforced stultification' in which a separation continues to exist between the superior 'intelligence' of the teacher and the inferior intelligence of the students (Rancière 1991: 7 ff.). He contends that even sophisticated pedagogies can still not avoid this separation and that 'all the perfecting of the ways of making understood, that great preoccupation of men of methods and progressives, is progress toward stultification' (Rancière 1991: 8, italics in original).8 It should be rather obvious that such 'enforced stultification' is the opposite of what education should in fact achieve. There is however another, more subtle, effect of this predetermined and standardized model of education for which the traditional lecture is exemplary but not unique that should also be considered, because it is at least as important. Besides creating a distinction between the intelligence and understanding of the student and the teacher, it also creates a distinction between what the student does as against what the teacher does. Whereas the teacher himself, as a researcher, gets to engage directly with his subject matter in his research, the student is deemed unfit for this task. Indeed, Rancière emphasizes that education usually forces students to attend to subjects and contents that have been chosen by their teachers.9 As the understanding Krisis Journal for contemporary philosophy Amos Keestra & Machiel Keestra – A 'Circulation Model'... 93 of the student is only mediated by the necessary explanation by the teacher, the latter is directing and constraining the student's attention. Accordingly, the creativity of the individual student is not called into action, either for understanding the material presented to her or for any research or direct engagement with primary material. Thus, the traditional model (and many other models) of education not only undermines the confidence of students in their own intelligence, it also discourages the use of their own creativity. Indeed, creativity in research is considered to be the privilege of the teacher, which the student may reach only at a late phase – perhaps the master's phase of her studies, if at all. It might be surprising to apply this – admittedly somewhat provocative – analysis to the current situation of university education, given that most universities, including the UvA, still contend that their programs and courses are built upon a connection between research and education. However, this connection can be variously implemented and correspondingly offers students more or less exposure to a genuine research experience. Realizing this connection, any program or course must position itself along the following three dimensions: the emphasis is on research content or research processes; the students are treated as the audience or participants; the teaching is teacher-focused or student-focused. (Healey 2005: 187) It is not surprising that, with increasing numbers of students, universities construe most of their programmes and courses in such a way that students are given only limited experience with a research process as participants with their teachers focusing on such student work. This is not only hampering student development, it is the more worrying as scientific research and education has undergone another development in the last century, particularly in the last decades. We are referring to the growing importance and prominence of interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary teaching and research, already recognized nearly half a century ago by an international symposium at the OECD headquarters, presenting a crucial challenge to the modern university's structure and activities (Apostel, Berger, Briggs, & Machaud 1972). Several drivers have been recognized behind this development, ranging from the inherent complexity of society and nature to new problems emerging from particular technologies – such as the computer or MRI-scanner (National Academies of Sciences 2004). By their very nature, interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary research try not to abstract from, but rather focus on, the local, historical and contextual conditions that have an impact on a particular problem. As a result, the applicability of the general or nomothetic knowledge developed in separate disciplines is highly constrained in such cases in which causal and theoretical pluralism reigns in often unprecedented ways (Krohn 2010). This means that to engage in interand transdisciplinary research students need to be able to creatively combine different frameworks, methods and sources in order to address the questions and problems at hand. Given the increasing importance and relevance of such research, both inside and outside academia, it is all the more worrying that the education model that has become more and more dominant is not delivering students the expertise and skills necessary to become proficient in it and to perform adequately in future jobs both inside and outside academia. We thus identify two challenges for education at the new university: on the one hand the increasing numbers of students that universities have to accommodate with decreasing budgets, and at the same time an increasing need for universities to develop the creative skills of their students in order to engage in the modern forms of – oftentimes interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary – research that have become important for academia and society. Whereas universities have responded to the first challenge by relying on predetermined and standardized programs as their educational model, the second challenge cannot be met adequately by such a model. In fact, this model has a lot of undesirable consequences for the students, some even contrary to what education should in fact achieve.10 Therefore we would like to take this opportunity to investigate what might be an alternative model of education which would be more adequate and that incorporates the two points regarding creativity and innovation, and regarding the connection between research and education mentioned above. Krisis Journal for contemporary philosophy Amos Keestra & Machiel Keestra – A 'Circulation Model'... 94 The circulation model of education As we have seen from our brief history and our brief discussion of Rancière's analysis of the predetermined and standardized model, the students' confidence in their own intelligence and creativity is not strengthened and a separation between education and research has occurred, increasingly barring students from engaging in research. The current discussion about what education at the new university should look like therefore seems to ask for acknowledgment of the limited value of this model and an emphasis on another more recent model of education in which research and education are connected creatively. This type of education does exist, yet unfortunately due to economic conditions mostly in a very limited sense at smaller programs or colleges and for a selected group of students. We would like to sketch a few of the aspects of a Weberian ideal type of what we call a 'circulation model' of education, because within it circulation rather than unidirectional traffic occurs between different elements: circulation between research and education, between insights of teachers and of students, between disciplines, between general and contextualized knowledge, between disciplinary and experiential knowledge, between doing research and (meta-)reflection upon research, and so on. Let us explain. In a course that complies with the relevant features of the circulation model of education, students are preferably in a team project allowed to determine themselves a complex, real-world research problem, for which they need to articulate and analyze relevant conditions. As these conditions probably transcend their own disciplinary backgrounds and probably the expertise of their teacher(s), too their teacher should assist them in this difficult process. Assistance here can imply that she has to guide them in acquiring the necessary insights for determining their problem or re-defining it in such a way that they can handle it. Such an acquisition will in many cases imply that the students need to talk to other experts or stakeholders and then to consider how the insights that result from this can be combined with their preliminary insights. The teacher might need to help students to target and collect these different kinds of insights and then to circulate these with the already existing knowledgebase in a constructive way. Moreover, as it is unlikely that all insights, experts and stakeholder views can easily be put together, it will be necessary to reflect on how the different concepts, methods, assumptions and normative statements that have been assembled can be related to each other. Importantly, this can only be done by a teacher who is not only an expert in her field but also has the necessary meta-theoretical and philosophical insights and skills. This is likely to be challenging for her as well, as this process and the resulting problem definition will be at least partially new, preempting her completely relying on pre-existing knowledge. On the contrary, it will likely force her to participate actively in this research process, which allows students also to witness closely how she approaches this demanding situation which will in itself offer important insights to them. In such a situation, teacher and students are equally engaged in entering unknown territory, which emancipates the students in a way that other educational models hardly do. Similar forms of circulation will obtain in the next phases of such a research process, as when the now determined problem is subsequently investigated and the eventual research results are implemented in one way or another. Clearly, this process will look differently depending upon the problem at stake and the students involved. As a consequence, the modes of circulation will differ from case to case as well. An analysis of alternative interpretations of a Homeric simile which draws upon different theoretical frameworks and linguistic insights will yield a completely different process, including different types of circulation, than the development of policy advice in response to demographic and economic changes in a particular urban area, or the explanation of the role of maternal stress via a specific epigenetic factor in the development of a particular type of cancer. Depending upon the stage of the students' education whether at the undergraduate or graduate level they can perform a certain amount of original or empirical research themselves while relying for other insights upon already available resources, which the teacher must help to assess adequately. Referring to the three dimensions of research-based education mentioned above, this circulation model is very different from a process in which the teacher possesses and provides all necessary expertise and knowledge which is then transmitted to the student – perhaps in the form of predeKrisis Journal for contemporary philosophy Amos Keestra & Machiel Keestra – A 'Circulation Model'... 95 termined problem cases.11 Instead, in our model the research problem itself needs to be determined as must the necessary composition of the research team – including different disciplinary and stakeholder perspectives – even before the research itself can begin. Moreover, insights derived from new perspectives might force a revisitation of the initial problem definition, critiquing it for leaving out relevant features of the problem (Keestra 2012; Repko 2008). In our description of the ideal-type of such a research process, students are granted freedom in the choice of the problem they will be trying to solve and the teacher – or teachers – facilitating their research process will herself almost need to take up a role of a cocreating researcher. In such a circulation model of education the borders and distinctions between the intelligence and activity of the teacher and of the students are erased, and students and teachers are encouraged to benefit mutually from each others' activities. After this brief description of students' research projects that concurs with our idea of a circulation model, motivated by the aims of 1) connecting research and teaching and 2) stimulating creativity and innovation, while keeping an eye on the increasing demand for interand transdisciplinary research, what should the implication of this be for current academic programs? Moreover, what does the other development mentioned above, the still growing number of university students, imply for teaching such research projects? One of the consequences of our preceding analysis and description is that universities should offer students more opportunities for engaging in such team-research projects across the boundaries of their programs and disciplines than is now usually the case. Obviously, these should be offered in addition to and not as a substitution for courses that introduce students to particular contents and methods: we are not denying the merit of such predetermined and standardized courses as part of an academic program nor do we deny the importance of sound disciplinary training. However, only if students will have the opportunity to engage in such research projects can they truly be prepared for the work that most academics inside and outside of academia are performing. Such work will scarcely be conducted by an individual academic without interaction with individuals from other disciplines or other walks of life, on the contrary. Whether it is in the form of clients or customers, policy-makers or citizens, patients or other stakeholders, academics will need to be able to interact, communicate and collaborate adequately during such research projects. Another consequence is that it should be recognized that enabling students to participate in such research projects might require extra efforts and resources. Whereas it sometimes happens, for example at the UvA, that interdisciplinary or liberal arts programs are being proposed in parallel to budget-cuts measures (see footnote 1), these practices are questionable and often fail to reach such a goal (see Augsburg, Henry, Newell, & Szostak 2009). The non-standard teacher-student interaction upon which our circulation model relies is such that it requires even a senior teacher with extensive teaching and research experience extra time and efforts to prepare if she is to adequately facilitate and guide her students through the research process focused on the particular real-world problem that they have settled upon.12 Indeed, the new group of teachers that the Secretary of Education has recently promised to appoint could be put to optimal use in such projects.13 Though these observations may appear disheartening, we want to close with a final and more optimistic consequence that can be drawn. When teachers and students move away from the increasingly prominent predetermined and standardized model of education and engage with each other in the way captured by our circulation model, they will contribute to fulfilling the demands that were captured by the two points upon which the board, faculty and students of the UvA agreed and which were mentioned above: (6) to give priority to creativity and innovation in education and research and (7) link education with, and value it as highly as, research. Moreover, and perhaps even more importantly, they will revitalize and update the early modern 'universitas' or association between researchers, teachers and students from which the current universities stem. Through such projects, the circulation will be fostered between research and teaching, between teachers and students, between metareflection and research, between disciplines, between disciplinary and experiential knowledge, between doing research and (meta-)reflection upon research, contributing to the essential role that academia has to play in our current knowledge society. We hope that in future discussions about Krisis Journal for contemporary philosophy Amos Keestra & Machiel Keestra – A 'Circulation Model'... 96 the new university the importance of this interaction between students and teachers will be recognized and will be given the role it should have, to the benefit of all actors involved and of the society at large. Amos Keestra has finished his BSc in Psychobiology (cum laude) and his BSc in Natural and Social Sciences (Bèta-Gamma Bachelor), with a major in Philosophy at the University of Amsterdam. He is working as a teaching assistant in Psychobiology and as a research assistant at the SILS-Cognitive and Systems Neuroscience institute. Machiel Keestra, PhD, is Assistant Professor at the Institute for Interdisciplinary Studies at the University of Amsterdam, involved in its interdisciplinary Natural and Social Sciences bachelor's, Brain and Cognitive Sciences master's and Interdisciplinary Honours programs. His research focuses on the philosophy of cognitive neuroscience and interdisciplinarity. Dr. Keestra is the president of the international Association for Interdisciplinary Studies. Both Keestra's are involved in Rethink Science Park, it being part of the Rethink UvA movement. References: Altbach, P. G., Reisberg, L., & Rumbley, L. E. (2009) 'Trends in Global Higher Education: Tracking an Academic Revolution.' A Report Prepared for the UNESCO 2009 World Conference on Higher Education. Paris: UNESCO. Altbach, P. G., Reisberg, L., & Rumbley, L. E. (2010) 'Tracking a Global Academic Revolution. Change.' The Magazine of Higher Learning, 42, 2: 30-39. Apostel, L., Berger, G., Briggs, A., & Machaud, G. (Eds.). (1972) Interdisciplinarity: problems of teaching and research at universities. Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Augsburg, T., Henry, S., Newell, W. H., & Szostak, R. (2009) Conclusion. In T. Augsburg & S. Henry (Eds.), The politics of interdisciplinary studies: Essays on transformations in American undergraduate programs. Jefferson, NC: McFarland. Bain, K. (2004) What the best college students do. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Biesta, G. (2010) 'A new logic of emancipation: the methodology of Jacques Rancière.' Educational Theory 60, 1: 39-59. Cornelissen, G. (2010) 'The Public Role of Teaching: To keep the door closed. Educational.' Philosophy and Theory 42, 5-6: 523-539. Dagelijks bestuur van de faculteit der Geesteswetenschappen [Daily board of the department of Humanities] (2014) Ontwerp Profiel 2016. Retrieved on April 29, 2015 from http://www.studentenraad.nl/wp-content/uploads/141110-Brief-enProfiel-2016-versie-1.pdf Dolmans, D. H. J. M., De Grave, W., Wolfhagen, I. H. A. P., & Van Der Vleuten, C. P. M. (2005) 'Problem-based learning: future challenges for educational practice and research.' Medical Education 39, 7: 732-741. Halffman, W., & Radder, H. (2015) 'The Academic Manifesto: From an Occupied to a Public University.' Minerva 53, 2: 165-187. Healey, M. (2005) 'Linking Research and Teaching to Benefit Student Learning.' Journal of Geography in Higher Education 29, 2: 183-201. Keestra, M. (2007) 'Vliegles voor de uil van Minerva? Hoger onderwijs als voorbereiding op arbeidsmarkt en burgerschap.' Tijdschrift voor hoger onderwijs 25,2: 69. Keestra, M. (2012) 'Understanding human action: integrating meanings, mechanisms, causes, and contexts.' In A. Repko, W. H. Newell, & R. Szostak (Eds.) Interdisciplinary research: Case studies of interdisciplinary understandings of complex problems. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE publications: 225-258. Krisis Journal for contemporary philosophy Amos Keestra & Machiel Keestra – A 'Circulation Model'... 97 King, A. (1993) 'From Sage on the Stage to Guide on the Side.' College Teaching 41, 1: 30-35. Krohn, W. (2010) 'Interdisciplinary Cases and Disciplinary Knowledge – Epistemic challenges of interdisciplinary research.' In R. Frodeman, J. T. Klein, & C. Mitcham (Eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Interdisciplinarity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kruse, O. (2006) 'The Origins of Writing in the Disciplines: Traditions of Seminar Writing and the Humboldtian Ideal of the Research University.' Written Communication 23, 3: 331-352. Lindberg, D. C. (1992) The beginnings of Western science: The European scientific tradition in philosophical, religious, and institutional context, 600 BC to AD 1450. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Naidoo, R., & Jamieson, I. (2005) 'Empowering participants or corroding learning? Towards a research agenda on the impact of student consumerism in higher education.' Journal of Education Policy 20, 3: 267-281. National Academies of Sciences (2004) 'Facilitating Interdisciplinary Research.' Washington, DC: Committee on Facilitating Interdisciplinary Research. OECD (2015) 'How is the global talent pool changing (2013, 2030)?' Education Indicators in Focus April 2015. Retrieved on April 29, 2015 from http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/education/how-is-the-global-talent-poolchanging-2013-2030_5js33lf9jk41-en Rancière, J. (1991). The ignorant schoolmaster. (K. Ross, Trans.) Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Repko, A. F. (2008) Interdisciplinary Research: Process and Theory. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. Rüegg, W. (2003a) 'Foreword.' In H. de Ridder-Symoens (Ed.) A history of the university in Europe: Volume 1, Universities in the middle ages. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Rüegg, W. (2003b) 'Themes.' In H. de Ridder-Symoens (Ed.) A history of the university in Europe: Volume 1, Universities in the middle ages. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Schuman, R. (2013, November 19, 2013) 'The King of MOOCs Abdicates the Throne. Sebastian Thrun and Udacity's 'pivot' toward corporate training.' Slate. Retrieved July 23, 2015, from http://www.slate.com/articles/life/education/2013/11/sebastian_thrun_and _udacity_distance_learning_is_unsuccessful_for_most_students.html Universiteit van Amsterdam, Persvoorlichting, U. (2015) Uitwerking 10puntenplan. Retrieved on April 29, 2015 from http://www.uva.nl/nieuwsagenda/nieuws/uva-nieuws/content/nieuwsberichten/2015/03/uitwerking10-puntenplan.html [English version retrievable at http://www.uva.nl/en/news-events/news/uvanews/content/news/2015/03/elaboration-of-10-point-plan.html ] Wildemeersch, D. (2013) 'Transitions in a Life-World. Looking backward and forward after forty-five years of social-pedagogical research and teaching in Leuven.' education policy analysis archives 21, 38: 1-21. 1 Actually, the cuts were presented as a reform of the study programmes in which the humanities department would offer a broad liberal arts programme to all its students (Dagelijks bestuur van de faculteit der Geesteswetenschappen, 2014). What this meant in practice however was that all the students, irrespective of their specialization, would receive a rather similar programme with a lot of specialised disciplinary courses being cut away. Irrespective of its potential merits, the result of this package of measures was that many people at the UvA rejected interdisciplinarity altogether. However, the proposed measures were not in fact stimulating diversity and interdisciplinarity in ways such as we are further suggesting below. 2 Taken from the '10-points plan' in Dutch and English at the UvA website: (UvA Persvoorlichting, 2015). Krisis Journal for contemporary philosophy Amos Keestra & Machiel Keestra – A 'Circulation Model'... 98 3 Although not relevant here, it has to be noted that the date 1088 is disputed as the birthdate of the university of Bologna, as is the case with the precedence of Bologna over Paris university (Rüegg, 2003a). 4 It is estimated that in Germany during the 150 years between 1377 and 1520 more than 200.000 students had visited a university (Lindberg, 1992 209). 5 This is a conclusion drawn by the same authors of a 2009 UNESCO report on 'Trends in Global Higher Education' (Altbach, Reisberg, & Rumbley, 2009). 6 Problem-based education, for example, has been implemented particularly in academic programs preparing for certain professions, such as in medical, nursing and engineering programs. Overall, results of these programs conducive for 'constructive, self-directed, collaborative and contextual learning' appear to be positive in terms of skill learning, less so in terms of – new knowledge acquisition. There are specific challenges for such education, such as the number of well-trained tutors required for its implementation (Dolmans, De Grave, Wolfhagen, & Van Der Vleuten, 2005). 7 In a way, teaching masses of students intensifies the paradox of education that has been at the focus of (social) pedagogical discussions since Kant noted in his essay on Enlightenment a tension between emancipation and education: can education enhance students' emancipation and freedom, given the inequality that appears inevitable in educational relations between teachers and their pupils? See (Wildemeersch, 2013) for a succinct history of these discussions. 8 The French word 'abrutir' could also be translated as 'to numb (down)'. Stultification is also taken by Rancière as being opposed to emancipation as an educational goal. Stulfication and emancipation cannot be associated with 'traditional or authoritarian' versus 'new and active' methods, as Biesta points out that stultification can also continue to occur with those newer and activating pedagogies (Biesta, 2010). 9 Alternatively, an 'inter-esting' object for teaching would be an object that is placed between teacher and students, demanding attention equally of all those involved and thus creating an equality that leaves no room for the aforementioned stultification. Our current educational system, with its emphasis on differentiating between students and their learning trajectories, still offers rare opportunities for such situations (cf. Cornelissen, 2010). 10 Another fact that merits mentioning – especially in the context of this special issue's focus – is that universities have also increasingly approached their students as consumers. Adoption of such consumerist attitudes seems to produce negative effects in students and their education, e.g. enhancing their passivity and their taking a more instrumental view regarding their academic education. Institutions, for their part, tend to avoid risks and have increasingly commodified their programs (Naidoo & Jamieson, 2005). Related to this development is the 'occupation' of the university by management and its logic, which has been critically analysed in Krisis in 2013 recently published in English (Halffman & Radder, 2015). 11 In his epilogue to 'What the best college teachers do', Bain writes: 'Rather than thinking in terms of the traditional dichotomy of research and teaching, a separation that often paralyzed higher education in the twentieth century, we can begin to think of ourselves as a learning university concerned with the learning of both faculty (research) and students (teaching) and the ways in which the learning of the one can benefit the other' (Bain, 2004). 12 Since such research projects require a higher teacher/student ratio and more intensive feedback interactions than most other courses, this is another reason to reconsider university budgets and the precarious situation of increasing numbers of teachers – the latter being another reason for recent protests at the UvA. 13 It may be good to note that the pioneer of so-called Massive Open Online Courses has some time ago admitted that these turned out not to offer the solution to educational challenges for which they were initially developed. They appear to serve well primarily those students who already possess the necessary resources, attitudes and competencies instead of the group of underprivileged, more challenged students (Schuman, 2013). This work is licensed under the Creative Commons License (AttributionNoncommercial 3.0). See http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/nl/deed.en for more information.


Nietzsche on History

Philosophy

NIETZSCHE ON HISTORY by Alfredo Lucero-Montaño Nietzsche's On the Advantage and Disadvantage of History for Life (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1980) questions a common belief of his time, that historical knowledge is intrinsically valuable. Nietzsche argues that historical knowledge is valuable only when it has a positive effect on a human being's sense of life. Although he acknowledges that history does provide some benefits in this respect, he also argues that there are damages in which historical knowledge could produce negative effects to those who pursued it. Nietzsche asserts that history can play three positive roles, which he calls 'monumental,' 'antiquarian' and 'critical.' For Nietzsche, monumental history is the genre of history that brings the great achievements of humanity into focus, and it is valuable for contemporary men because it makes them aware of what is possible for human beings to achieve. Antiquarian history is motivated primarily out of a spirit of reverence for the past that can be valuable to contemporary individuals by helping them to appreciate their lives and culture - this is the positive effect. History belongs to the preserving and revering soul - to him who with loyalty and love looks back on his origin; through this reverence he, as it were, gives thanks for his existence. By tending with loving hands what has long survived he intends to preserve the conditions in which he grew up for those who will come after him - and so he serves life. (sec. 3, 19) Critical history is an effort to judge the past, and provides a counter-balancing effect to the inspired by antiquarian historiography; a balancing effect to the conservative approach of history. By judging the past, men engaged in critical history remain attentive to flaws and failures in the experience of their culture, thereby avoiding slavish blindness in their assessment of it. Nietzsche's work has cast serious doubts on the value of a certain 'historical' consciousness, stressing the fictitious character of historical knowledge, and challenging history's claims to a place among the sciences. We are shocked, we fly back: whither is all clarity, all naturalness and purity of that relation between life and history, how confused, how exaggerated, how troubled is this problem which Alfredo Lucero-Montaño: Nietzsche on History 2 now surges before our eyes! Is the fault ours, the observers? Or has the constellation of life and history really changed because a powerful, hostile star has come between them? May others show that we have seen falsely: we will say what we believe we see. Such a star has indeed intervened, a bright and glorious star, the constellation is really changed - through science, through the demand that history be a science. (sec. 4, 23) Here Nietzsche starts his polemic against Hegel's philosophy of history and the German historical school (Ranke) for inculcating 'that admiration for the 'power of history' which practically at every moment turns into naked admiration for success and leads to the idolatry of the factual' (sec. 8, 47). Nietzsche alerts us to the danger that contemporary culture fed from the springs of an antiquarian historiography. And he shows us the dissociation between life and history, knowledge and action: Knowledge, taken in excess without hunger, even contrary to need, no longer acts as a transforming motive impelling to action and remains hidden in a certain chaotic inner world. [Modern man] has the content and that only the form is lacking; [...] it is no real culture at all, but only a kind of knowledge about culture, it stops at cultured thoughts and cultured feelings but leads to no cultural decisions. (sec. 4, 24) That is, modern consciousness is pregnant of an excessive historical knowledge, and has lost the 'plastic powers of life' that makes men able to 'interpret the past only from the standpoint of the highest strength of the present.' This 'surfeit of history' is the negative effect of historical knowledge, that is, the conservative approach of history. Nietzsche argued against historical knowledge - when pursued its own sake - because its method was dependent on a false ideal of objectivity, that neutralized the standards necessary for life, and blocked the capacity, 'the strength [to] use it from time to time, to shatter and dissolve something to enable [man] to live [in the present].' By the same token, Nietzsche points out five dangers to life resulting from that objective approach of history, that it becomes a 'surfeit of history'. 1) Historical knowledge freezes the present, since it makes the present appear as just an external episode: 'the contrast of inside and outside [content and form] is generated and the [historical subject] weakened thereby' (sec. 5, 28). Alfredo Lucero-Montaño: Nietzsche on History 3 2) History knowledge inhibits creative activity by convincing those made aware of the vast sweep of historical currents that their present actions are too feeble to change the past they have inherited: 'an age comes to imagine that it possesses the rarest virtue... to a higher degree than any other age' (loc. cit.). 3) Historical knowledge encourages the sense that the inner person is disconnected from the outer world by assaulting the psyche with more information than it can absorb and assimilate: 'the instincts of a people are impaired and the maturing of the individual no less than the whole is prevented' (ibid.). 4) Historical knowledge encourages a relativism toward reality and present experience, motivated by a sense that because things keep changing present states of affairs do not matter: 'the belief... in the old age of mankind is implanted, the belief of being a latecomer and epigone' (ibid.). 5) Historical knowledge inspires irony and cynicism about the contemporary individual's role in the world; the historical subject comes to feel increasingly like an afterthought in the scheme of things, imbued by a sense of belatedness: 'an age acquires the dangerous disposition of irony with regard to itself, and from this the still more dangerous one of cynicism: in this... it ripens even more into clever egoistic practice through which the vital strength is paralyzed and... destroyed' (ibid.). Nietzsche was convinced that the objective - scientific - approach to history was psychologically and ethically devastating to contemporary men: For it is science which would speak of poisons [...] for it only takes the observation of things to be the true and correct one, that is, to be scientific observation, which everywhere sees what has come to be, the historical, and nowhere being, the eternal.' (sec. 10, 62) Nietzsche suggests the antidotes to the historical. One antidote is the unhistorical that is the ability to forget how overwhelming the deluge of historical information: 'the art and the strength of being able to forget and enclose oneself in a limited horizon' (ibid.). And the antidote of suprahistorical that consists in a shift of focus from the ongoing flux of history: 'the powers which guide the eye away from becoming and toward that which gives existence an eternal and Alfredo Lucero-Montaño: Nietzsche on History 4 stable character, toward art and religion' (ibid.). In sum, for Nietzsche, 'history must itself dissolve the problem of history, knowledge must turn its sting against itself' (sec. 8, 45). Alfredo Lucero-Montaño (Tijuana, México) holds a master's degree in philosophy from San Diego State University (San Diego) and a bachelors in philosophy from Universidad Iberoamericana (México City).