Reflection as a deliberative and distributed practice

Philosophy

In 1968, JÃ¼rgen Habermas claimed that, in an advanced technological society, the emancipatory force of knowledge can only be regained by actively recovering the âforgotten experience of reflectionâ. In this article, we argue that, in the contemporary situation, critical reflection requires a deliberative ambiance, a process of mutual learning, a consciously organised process of deliberative and distributed reflection. And this especially applies, we argue, to critical reflection concerning a specific subset of technologies which are actually oriented towards optimising human cognition (neuro-enhancement). In or- der to create a deliberative ambiance, fostering critical upstream reflection on emerging technologies, we developed (in the context of a European FP7 project on neuro-enhancement and responsible research and innovation, called NERRI) the concept of a mutual learning exercise (MLE). Building on a number of case studies, we analyse what an MLE involves, both practically and conceptually, focussing on key aspects such as ambiance and expertise, the role of âgenres of the imaginationâ and the profiles of various âsubcultures of debateâ. Ideally, an MLE becomes a contemporary version of the Socratic agora, providing a stage where multiple and sometimes unexpected voices and perspectives mutually challenge each other, in order to strengthen the societal robustness and responsiveness of emerging technologies.

ORIGINAL PAPER Reflection as a Deliberative and Distributed Practice: Assessing Neuro-Enhancement Technologies via Mutual Learning Exercises (MLEs) Hub Zwart & Jonna Brenninkmeijer & Peter Eduard & Lotte Krabbenborg & Sheena Laursen & Gema Revuelta & Winnie Toonders Received: 31 March 2016 /Accepted: 24 January 2017 /Published online: 24 March 2017 # The Author(s) 2017. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com Abstract In 1968, Jürgen Habermas claimed that, in an advanced technological society, the emancipatory force of knowledge can only be regained by actively recovering the 'forgotten experience of reflection'. In this article, we argue that, in the contemporary situation, critical reflection requires a deliberative ambiance, a process of mutual learning, a consciously organised process of deliberative and distributed reflection. And this especially applies, we argue, to critical reflection concerning a specific subset of technologies which are actually oriented towards optimising human cognition (neuro-enhancement). In order to create a deliberative ambiance, fostering critical upstream reflection on emerging technologies, we developed (in the context of a European 7th Framework Programme project on neuro-enhancement and responsible research and innovation, called NERRI) the concept of a mutual learning exercise (MLE). Building on a number of case studies, we analyse what an MLE involves, both practically and conceptually, focussing on key aspects such as ambiance and expertise, the role of 'genres of the imagination' and the profiles of various 'subcultures of debate'. Ideally, an MLE becomes a contemporary version of the Socratic agora, providing a stage where multiple and sometimes unexpected voices and perspectives mutually challenge each other, in order to strengthen the societal robustness and responsiveness of emerging technologies. Keywords Emerging technologies . Responsible research and innovation . Neuro-enhancement . Mutual learning exercises .Upstreampublic engagement .Moral deliberation Introduction Almost half a century ago, the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas argued that, in the positivistic and technocratic environment of contemporary society, the emancipatory force of knowledge can only be regained by actively recovering the 'forgotten experience of reflection' ([1], p. 9). Without reflection, Habermas argued, human beings will become the objects and targets (rather than the autonomous subjects) of technocratic knowledge production systems, so that ultimately, even cognitive labour (i.e. scientific research) will be transmitted to robotics and smart machines. Indeed, he anticipated that, notably on the mental level, human beings will become increasingly dependent on intelligent contrivances. And eventually, humans may become 'living accessories' in a planetary machine park. Yet, unfortunately, Habermas Nanoethics (2017) 11:127–138 DOI 10.1007/s11569-017-0287-4 H. Zwart (*) : J. Brenninkmeijer : L. Krabbenborg : W. Toonders Institute for Science, Innovation and Society, Department of Philosophy and Science Studies, Radboud University, P.O. Box 9010, 6500 GL Nijmegen, the Netherlands e-mail: firstname.lastname@example.com P. Eduard : S. Laursen Experimentarium, Copenhagen, Denmark G. Revuelta Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, Spain argued, in the contemporary world, reflection is increasingly discarded as irrelevant. In this paper, we will argue that, in the current situation, Habermas' diagnostics of the present seem more pertinent than ever. The question to be addressed is how critical reflection can be maintained or restored in a contemporary setting. We will argue that, compared to more traditional types of reflection ('desk-research' or 'armchair philosophy'), critical reflection requires a deliberative ambiance, a dialectical dialogue, a process of mutual learning, actively organised in various settings more or less simultaneously, in short, a process of deliberative and distributed reflection. And this especially applies, we will argue, to critical reflection concerning a specific subset of technologies which are actually oriented towards the human brain. By this, we mean particular substances and devices that are developed for the purpose of optimising cognitive performance, in other words, neuro-enhancement. Whilst new nootropic substances promise to allow individuals to become the managers of their moods, sleep behaviour and levels of attention, non-invasive brain stimulation (NIBS) devices such as tDCS, tACS, TMS and tFUS1 promise to help individuals to achieve everyday goals such as paying attention, relaxation, improving one's gaming skills or learning to play a musical instrument faster. To ensure that these developments will function as technologies of freedom, rather than as technologies of control, a process of critical, deliberative and distributed reflection is required, which should be hands-on and well-informed, rather than academic. Whereas, academic discourse has been dominated by the debate between 'transhumanists' and 'bioconservatives' concerning the question whether human nature should or should not be drastically rebooted, often building on rather far-fetched thought experiments, an upstream process of distributed reflection, involving multiple voices, may broaden the spectrum and add some realism to deliberations on these issues (cf. [2]). To achieve our goal, we participated in a European 7th Framework Programme (FP7) project called NERRI (neuro-enhancement responsible research and innovation).2 In the context of this project, more than sixty mutual learning exercises (MLEs) were organised in 11 European countries [3]. In this paper, we analyse these exercises primarily from a methodological and conceptual point of view. To what extent can MLEs indeed create an ambiance for critical, deliberative and distributed reflection? What are the key concepts, tools and methods that can help us to realise this objective? The design of our paper is as follows. First of all, we will briefly describe the ways in which the concept of reflection has been operationalised in the context of European research programmes, notably the 7th Framework Programme and the H2020 programme launched by the European Commission. We will especially focus on the ELSA concept (which stands for ethical, legal and social aspects of emerging science and technology) and the RRI concept (which stands for responsible research and innovation). Subsequently, we will explain the concept of a mutual learning exercise as a setting meant to foster deliberative and distributed reflection. Notably, attention will be given to key aspects such as ambiance and expertise, the role of 'genres of the imagination' and the profiles of various 'subcultures of debate'. Subsequently, theMLE concept will be elucidated with the help of three case studies taken from the NERRI experience. Finally, we will discuss the added value of a mutual learning approach as a way to operationalise the 'forgotten experience' of reflection. Operationalising Reflection: from ELSA to RRI The aim to initiate public deliberation concerning emerging technologies has been an important feature of European research policies since the 1990s. In the context of the 4th EU Framework Programme (1994– 1998),3 a new concept was launched, namely ELSA: research and public engagement concerning the ethical, legal and social aspects of emerging sciences and technologies [4, 5]. This label was subsequently adopted by several other funding initiatives [6]. Especially, in the period of 2002–2012, a broad range of ELSA studies were conducted in Europe. Interdisciplinarity and proximity to scientific research were important features of ELSA activities, which usually took the form of flanking projects, embedded within larger scientific research programmes and developed in big science areas such as genomics and nanotechnology. These ELSA activities were both applauded and criticised, however. Some commentators considered ELSA as too critical (focussing primarily on 1 These acronyms refer to transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS); transcranial alternating current stimulation (tACS); transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS); and transcranial focused ultrasound stimulation (tFUS). 2 http://www.nerri.eu/eng/home.aspx 3 https://ec.europa.eu/research/fp7/index_en.cfm 128 Nanoethics (2017) 11:127–138 possible downsides and risks of new technologies), whilst others considered it as too pro-science (or at least as preformatted by the scientific research programmes they intended to study, focusing on only a limited set of issues, often in the form of a case study research). In the context of the 7th Framework Programme of the European Commission (2007–2013), a new label was adopted, namely, responsible research and innovation (RRI; [7–9]). According to René von Schomberg [10, 11]), one of the advocates of this approach, RRI is 'a transparent, interactive process by which societal actors and innovators become mutually responsive to each other with a view to the (ethical) acceptability, sustainability and societal desirability of the innovation process and its marketable products (in order to allow a proper embedding of scientific and technological advances in our society)' (Schomberg [11], p. 9; [10], p. 19). At first glance, this definition does not add that much to the original ELSA concept, where interaction between societal actors and innovators was also a key component. Nonetheless, on closer inspection, some differences between RRI and ELSA can be discerned as well. In the context of RRI, for instance, ethics is primarily seen as a 'stimulus' for science and technology (Schomberg [12]). Another important difference, according to protagonists such as Von Schomberg, is that RRI is a more 'positive' concept, aiming to encourage innovation, rather than retarding it by dwelling on social concerns. Furthermore, much more attention is given to the macro-economic impacts. RRI aims to contribute to the ambition of the European Union 'to ensure that research and innovative ideas can be turned into products and services that create jobs and prosperity, as well as help preserve the environment and meet the societal needs of Europe and the world' ([10]; cf. [9], p. 15). RRI aims, one could say, to prepare the society for innovation and to create a more responsible innovation for and with society. Unlike ELSA, in short, RRI first and foremost focuses on enhancing the economic development. The inclusion of ethics at a relatively early stage of the innovation process, it is argued, will lead to less contestation further down the line. As a final distinctive feature, one could mention that, although ELSA already tended to display a relatively strong hands-on profile, in the case of RRI, the tendency towards pragmatism is even more outspoken. RRI documents reflect an explicit interest in the development of concrete tools for furthering responsible innovation in academia, industry and policy. One of the RRI projects funded under the FP7 call, for instance, is explicitly entitled RRI Tools. This project aims to 'foster responsible research and innovation with and for society'.4 According to RRI Tools, RRI is a 'dynamic, iterative process by which all stakeholders involved in the research and innovation practice becomemutually responsive and share responsibility regarding both the outcomes and process requirements'. It aims to create 'a society in which research and innovation practices strive towards sustainable, ethically acceptable, and socially desirable outcomes' and it 'does so in such a way that the responsibility for our future is shared by all people and institutions affected by and involved in research and innovation practices' (RRI [13]). This brief overview indicates that, although the definition of RRI is still relatively fluid, the concept seems to be evolving into a governance tool, aimed to encourage economic innovation by involving various (potential) stakeholders into the innovation process, thereby making them co-responsible for the process and its impacts. Hence, we would argue, RRImay be understood as a tool for research policy makers to engage society into policy decisions concerning emerging science and technology. Yet, this tendency towards governance and valorisation is counteracted by various initiatives to 'broaden' the RRI concept [14] and to open it up to multiple forms of societal dynamics. The NERRI project, we will argue, funded by the 7th Framework Programme, is an example of this latter trend. Here, the RRI concept was operationalised in such a way that it became a mutual learning endeavour. The realisation of such an ideal, however, is bound to encounter serious challenges in practice [15–17]. First of all, although various approaches are being developed, ranging from constructive technology assessment (CTA: [18, 19]) up to the use of techno-moral vignettes for exploring future scenarios [20], this type of activity has not yet evolved into an established routine. Challenges include the fact that many of these newly emerging technologies are still fairly esoteric (so that their future impacts are indeterminate as yet and the precise agenda for deliberations is far from clear). Also, there is the possibility that such public engagement activities may be (perceived as) 'symbolical': creating a semblance of legitimacy, whilst the actual influence of participants on the developments at hand is limited. Therefore, this paper aims to contribute to an ongoing debate on how to optimally mobilise 4 http://www.rri-tools.eu/; http://www.rri-tools.eu/about-rri Nanoethics (2017) 11:127–138 129 and involve stakeholders' views, both conceptually and practically. RRI in Practice: Mutual Learning Exercises As was already indicated, in the context of NERRI, the focus has been on mutual learning and upstream public engagement rather than on socio-economic impacts. There was hardly any involvement from industry in the project, for instance, although interviews with scientific experts as technology producers were part of the preparatory (reconnaissance) stage. In a recent NERRI report, the aim of RRI is described as follows: 'The RRI approach aims to make new scientific and technological developments more transparent, interactive and responsive, so that acceptability, sustainability and social desirability of future applications can be proactively strengthened' ([3], p. 9). Research and innovation are regarded as responsible insofar as they have the capacity 'to adapt its direction in response to societal concerns, needs and values'. RRI is not seen as a specific method, but rather as Ba basic attitude, an ethos if you like, seeing societal stakeholders not as 'consumers' of knowledge, but as sources of information and inspiration^ (idem). By sharing preliminary analyses and assessments, research can be made 'more relevant and socially robust'. RRI means that researchers and other producers of knowledge and technology see themselves as active participants in innovation and public debate. Promoting proximity of science, policy and social debate is of key importance ([3], p. 9). In other words, one might argue that NERRI is as much ELSA as it is RRI. The emphasis is more on promoting mutual learning than on boosting innovation. Mutual learning exercises (MLEs) aim to bring together various groups of stakeholders (researchers, potential users, intermediaries, professionals, students, media, broader publics) to facilitate an interactive learning process through mutual exposure of views and experiences, expectations and concerns. The idea is that, in contrast with more traditional forms of deliberation (such as lectures, panel discussions or question-and-answer sessions before a relatively large audience), innovative methods must be employed to encourage in-depth dialogues. An MLE, one could argue, aims to function as a contemporary version of the ancient Socratic agora, providing a stage where multiple (and sometimes unexpected) perspectives are mutually exposed to one another, in order to move beyond traditional 'experts vs. lay audience' forms of exchange, thereby allowing participants to mutually probe and question each other's views. The 60 MLEs represented a key element of the NERRI project and the aim of NERRI not only was to initiate a public debate on neuro-enhancement but also to explore and evaluate new formats for debate and interaction, so as to broaden the range of stakeholders/participants involved. Basically, an MLE addresses questions such as how will emerging neuro-technologies affect everyday lives of various segments of society? What are the anxieties and hopes, the expectations and concerns that are invoked and involved? These types of questions, anticipatory and open-ended, were addressed through deliberative and distributed forms of reflection. The goal was neither to reach consensus nor to further societal embedding, but rather to explore, articulate and open-up the issues at stake. An MLE aims to provide a deliberative laboratory where various hypothetical scenarios can be explored, developed and tested. By mutually sharing preliminary analyses and assessments, the deliberative process can be made more relevant, informed and socially robust. Distributed Expertise By implication, the MLE concept entails a specific understanding of the role of expertise in the deliberative process. The idea is, first of all, that 'all participants are experts' in the sense of representing important views and experiences concerning the impact of technology on the life-world. In other words, expertise has become ubiquitous ([21], p. 15). Rather than taking a presumed knowledge deficit as point of departure, different forms of knowledge are distinguished and acknowledged as relevant for the deliberative endeavour. Subsequently, besides the fact that we are all experts to some extent, we all suffer from various knowledge deficits as well, also in the sense that the future is open and indeterminate and it is difficult to predict how technologies will evolve and how the life-world will be affected, in view of the messiness of the real world, outside techno-scientific laboratories. We are dealing with complex innovation processes, with technologies pervading the life-world, whilst they themselves will be affected by the way they are put to use. Whilst 130 Nanoethics (2017) 11:127–138 emerging technologies will affect and infect social culture, they will be infected by social and cultural dynamics as well. While coming to terms with new technologies, in a process of 'vulnerability coping' [22], future users will inevitably co-shape the development of these technologies. Laboratories are simplified environments, protected from intrusion and complications ('noise'). Science tries to suspend or set aside the real messiness of the world in order to understand the noumenal dimensions of nature [23], but eventually, the real, phenomenal world as such cannot be understood or reached without acknowledging the complexity, the 'mess'. Therefore, in order to extrapolate laboratory knowledge to reallife conditions and real-world practices, mutual learning is indispensable. The objective of MLEs is not to popularise or legitimise new forms of knowledge and technology, but rather to emphasise the complexities of the social world and to improve the societal embedding of these technologies by actively involving future users in the development process at a relatively early stage and in a co-constructive, upstream way. Thus, rather than denying the expertise of academic specialists such as neuroscientists, multiple forms of relevant expertise are mobilised, taken into account and given the floor. In other words, the focus is not only on the expertise of the expert but also (or even more so) on the knowledge gaps, the uncertainties, the controversies, the unknowns, the blind spots, the epistemic vulnerabilities and the open future. Rather than disavowing expertise, the idea is that also for the expert, mutual learning is a more interesting and enriching experience than mere 'popularisation' of research, whilst other participants tend to learn more when they can enter into an active dialogue, compared to more passive forms of public involvement. Scientists work on multiple 'floors' (besides laboratory settings or academic podiums) where they may encounter various types of actors (journalists, funders, policy makers, entrepreneurs, etc.) and MLEs offer an additional floor [24]: an ambiance which fosters deliberation and reflection, not only for citizens (potential future users) but also for scientists themselves. Thus, MLEs are meant to provide a podium for actively exploring issues such as hands-on learning and the role of expertise. There is a shift of focus from what experts already know to the unknown (but nonetheless explorable) future. A special role may be played by genres of the imagination (art, novels, cinema and the like), inciting us and helping us to systematically explore multiple future scenarios. Cultures of Debate When analysing the results of the more than 60 MLEs organised by NERRI, the picture emerges that the neuro-enhancement debate actually unfolds on different levels or stages, involving different 'subcultures' of debate. Overall, our experience has been that at least three deliberative subcultures can be distinguished ([3], p. 12 ff.; p. 25). The first subculture consists of the so-called early adopters, eager to experiment with new nootropic substances or new types of non-invasive devices, in order to enhance, expand or boost the mind, for instance in the context of brain hackathon events and similar lab-like ambiances. Next, there are audiences who are interested in the neuro-enhancement topic in principle, but who remain nonetheless rather sceptical about the possible benefits of these new substances and devices, compared to the possible risks, side effects and collateral damage they may entail. Finally, there is a group of more cautious or even suspicious citizens who tend to critically oppose neuroenhancement innovations, not so much because of specific health risks involved, but rather because of the socio-cultural implications they entail. These innovations symbolise a society they do not want, reflecting for instance a neo-liberal atmosphere of cognitive capitalism, fostering socio-economic competition among individuals, who (according to these voices) are framed as brain managers or cognitive entrepreneurs. This triad division is still fairly general and may be differentiated further. MacNaghten et al. [25] for instance use five narratives to elaborate reluctance or even suspicion concerning emerging technologies (using nanotechnologies as their case study), namely (1) 'be careful what you wish for' (voicing reluctance concerning the seductive temptations of emerging technologies); (2) 'opening Pandora's box' (stressing uncertainties and potential catastrophic implications of meddling with things that should be left alone; (3) 'messing with nature' (emphasising disruptive impacts of tampering with nature); (4) 'kept in the dark' (articulating a sense of powerlessness, a (perceived) inability to have Nanoethics (2017) 11:127–138 131 any impact in these technological developments); and (5) 'the rich get richer and the poor get poorer' (fearing increase of injustice and inequality). In organising MLEs, it is important to keep such distinctive deliberative subcultures in mind. Developments which may seem highly futuristic or science-fictional to many may already be part of everyday life for others. The latter notably applies to avant-garde subcultures of youngsters who are keen on exploring options for enhancing oneself or embracing the technology dense, robotic future. One of the problems involved in distinctions between various deliberative subcultures is a semantic one, namely, the fact that the labels employed may convey pejorative or stereotypical associations. The concept of 'early adopter', for instance, was introduced by Rogers [26] in the context of his theory of diffusion: a theory which builds on the normative idea that 'early adoption' = good, whereas 'late' adoption or even 'resistance' = bad. From a mutual learning perspective, such normative framings of the various positions in the debate are questionable, to put it mildly. Openness to novel techniques is not necessarily good (it may rather involve a naïve underestimation of the collateral damage of certain drugs or certain brain-stimulating devices, for instance), whilst scepticism or conservatism are not necessarily bad (notably in view of the various hypes at work in the current innovation arena, for instance). Rather, the mutual learning model entails that all types of responses are to be taken equally seriously in the debate, and multiple factors may co-determine attitudes towards innovations in the neuro-enhancement field. We will now outline three other important factors that may either stimulate or thwart the deliberative reflection process which the MLE format aims to promote. The Role of Ambiance For conducting MLEs, location or, more generally, ambiance proves to be an important element (cf. [3], p. 28). Whereas, more traditional debates (lectures by, or panel discussions among, experts before a relatively large audience, for example) tend to be organised in more or less traditional settings (such as lecture halls at universities or debating centres), mutual learning exercises are preferably organised in more 'thought-provoking' environments such as brain labs, future labs, design labs, art labs, science cafés and science museums; settings that are optimally poised to serve as imaginative laboratories and to encourage societal 'experiments' (imaginative explorations of the future), or to demonstrate, in a hands-on fashion, novel various devices and ideas (cf. [27]). In science cafés, for instance, space can be consciously employed to create multiple perspectives within an informal setting (participants sitting in groups, on bar stools, standing at the bar, etc.), whilst the presence of enhancement devices (in science museums, for instance) may add a hands-on, explorative supplement to the deliberative debate. Several NERRI events were conducted in science museums as the spaces specialised in exploring the interface of science, technology, society and art. One event was organised in a planetarium, for instance,5 placing participants literally in the dark, contemplating enhancement underneath a celestial dome and respecting two rules: the silence rule (expecting participants to wait for a moment of silence before speaking) and the continuity rule (requesting that every intervention should be related to the preceding one). At a certain point, the lights were turned on once again so that participants could openly discuss the knowledge that was collaboratively (and more or less anonymously) created. Another NERRI event, dedicated to exploring the question of digitally 'dissecting' and subsequently 'improving' the 'criminal' brain, was organised in an exposition room located in a historical seventeenth-century building named Dolhuys, which literally means 'asylum for the insane'.6 The context itself already raised the question how to frame current brain enhancement debates against the backdrop of centuries of intervention, (mis-)treatment and (mis-)measurement. One of the brain hackathons in which NERRI partners participated was organised in a fifteenth-century building where (during the early modern period) an anatomical theatre had been located, thereby connecting old and new 'enactments' of brain research. Such settings add a sense of history, a temporal horizon to the debate and often provide room not only for deliberations but also for try-outs and demonstrations, whilst the atmosphere facilitates comparisons between past, present and future, seeing emerging trends against a broader cultural and epistemic backdrop. Besides arguments and words, also visualisations, colours, space, architecture, 5 http://www.nerri.eu/eng/mutual-learning-exercises/mle-32cosmological-caf%C3%A9.aspx [accessedMarch 29, 2016]; cf. [3], p. 29 6 http://www.nerri.eu/eng/mutual-learning-exercises/mle-55-haarlemdolhuys.aspx [accessed at March 29, 2016]. 132 Nanoethics (2017) 11:127–138 sound (acoustic ambiance or soundscape) and other sensory/spatial components contribute to and influence the debate. Traditional settings of public debates tend to be mono-logical or, at best, elliptic, with two focal points ('centres') as it were, for instance a neuroscientist and a bioethicist, addressing a largely passive, receptive audience, but NERRI aimed to provide testbeds for developing and probing innovative formats whose common objective has been to make the debate more horizontal and decentralised, topologically speaking. Employing Creative Tools A number of deliberative encounters organised by NERRI involved the use of games and special assignments, to be conducted in small groups. Several MLEs, for instance, used Play Decide, a conversation game involving between four and eight participants and a moderator, sitting around a table. Each kit contains a set of cards describing neuro-enhancement cases and raising legal and ethical issues. Participants share, discus and defend their viewpoints, until a certain level of agreement is reached. A similar exercise involved a 90-min 'discussion game' using various types of cards with information on technologies, prevalence and health issues: stories told from different angles and introducing various ethical and social questions. Another example of an innovative format is the socalled World Café.7 This format usually involves 20-min rounds of conversations in small groups seated around a table, prompted by specific questions, taking notes with the help of markers on large sheets of paper. After 20 min, group members move to a different table. Subsequently, participants are invited to share insights and deliberative results with the other teams. These results are reflected visually in a variety of ways, using white boards, graphics, posters and the like. Again, another examplewas a seminar in which participants were invited to write initial statements concerning techniques such as deep brain stimulation (DBS) and tDCS on cards, after which the group ranked these statements in order of importance. The most important statements subsequently served as input for a convergence exercise, during which participants changed tables between rounds. Such innovative deliberative tools often involve the use of multiple media. Thus, besides words, arguments and architecture (ambiance, topology), visualisation is an important dimension as well. For instance, creating specific props can be useful, such as the mock NE kit that was used during some NERRI MLEs, involving flasks with candies and electronic equipment, but also labels conveying basic information on enhancement drugs and devices, its effects, warnings, contexts of use and availability of funding to prompt the debate. And the World Café already mentioned above involved not only a professional video recording of the event but also a professional cartoon artist who produced a visual impression on site during the day (a fragment is displayed on the left). Her drawing provided an artistic reflection in the introductory talks and the workshop discussions, based on observations, associations and quotes. The result was discussed by participants at the end of the meeting. During another MLE, an artist commented on his personal experience with enhancement. And in again another MLE, participants witnessed artistic performances with EEG headsets, mind-ball game and other devices, trying it out on themselves. Still, another NERRI MLE involved a playful exploration of memory skills, demonstrating the potential of training yourmemorywith the help of various artistic mnemonic devices. The conclusion was that art may provide inspirational tools for boosting public awareness concerning the impact of on the one hand (visual, auditory or motor) handicaps or impairments and on the other hand, enhancements devices meant to optimise cognitive performance. In a hands-on way, and from a first-person perspective, both restricted and enhanced forms of mental functionality could be experienced and compared with normalcy. In other words, via imaginative tools, verbal deliberation may be complemented by thinking with your hands, with your sense organs, actively probing and trying out new options for mobility and perception. Genres of the Imagination Building on the experiences of others [28, 29],8 we explicitly explored how genres of the imagination 7 http://www.nerri.eu/eng/mutual-learning-exercises.aspx 8 Fascinating examples concerning the use of genres of the imagination in up-stream assessment of emerging technologies are provided by Biofaction (http://www.biofaction.com/) and the Critical Art Ensemble (http://critical-art.net/), among others. Nanoethics (2017) 11:127–138 133 (such as novels, plays, movies, poems and art-works) can be employed as imaginative laboratories of deliberative reflection, as windows into science and as podiums where future scenarios involving emerging technologies may be explored and assessed in a more or less experimental fashion. The idea that drama and theatre can play an inspirational role in deliberations on the future societal implications of science and technology, for instance, is wide-spread [30, 31]. Usually, this involves the performance of a play by professional or amateur actors before a live audience of, say, students or lay citizens, as happened for example during one particular MLE event where three scenarios were performed by a university theatre group presenting risks and various options, side effects and future perspectives of DBS. In another MLE (which will be discussed in more detail below), science students were invited to write and perform a play of their own, and thewinning teamwas asked to perform it during a science café. Several MLEs made use of cinema as a tool for opening up the field and for stimulating the debate. Two MLEs used the movie Limitless, for instance, released in 2011 and involving a writer suffering from a writer's block, until he tries a pharmaceutical brain enhancer. Gradually, the collateral damage of the experimental designer drug becomes increasingly evident (cf. [32]). In five NERRI MLE events, the documentary Fixed (an imaginative, multiple-voice portrayal of possible enhancement scenarios) was used, on one occasion in combination with a live testimony by a cochlear transplant patient. Such materials made the topic concrete and tangible for the audience. In evaluations, participants indicated that everyday consequences become more evident and memorable than those in the case of, say, academic discussions between experts. Fixed presents enhancement from multiple perspectives, each connected with a particular face and story line, which makes it particularly valuable for this purpose, allowing participants to identify with concrete individuals and their specific viewpoints, whilst at the same time, making it clear that a particular perspective is not the only one possible. This combination of a counter-balanced, but still touching and involving presentation, staging various 'voices' as it were, would have been difficult to reach through other means. During evaluations, attendants indicated that Fixed addresses controversial but fascinating issues, thereby providing plenty of food for thought and giving rise to engaged discussions ([3], p. 35–36). Rather than merely 'illustrating' moral dilemmas, moreover, documentaries, movies and theatre plays may present a stage for exploring, probing and reflecting on aspects that are more difficult to address with the help of usual methods (lectures, group discussions, panels and the like). Such performances may succeed in giving a face to a topic, and allow for emotional identification and reflective distancing at the same time. They may serve as windows into everyday life situations where neuro-enhancement may have an impact. More traditional and abstract methods (such as lectures or group discussions) appear to have a less memorable impact on participants (cf. [30]). MLE Case Studies To further explore the MLE concept, three examples of MLEs will now be presented in more detail. In the final section, the added value of such exercises will be outlined. Case Study 1: Super Me Case study 1 is an MLE organised in June 2014 by NERRI partner Experimentarium, a science museum/ science activity centre located in Copenhagen (Denmark).9 Experimentarium's aim is to encourage interest in science and technology especially among children and youngsters.10 The MLE aimed to challenge the way people think about human enhancement and to spur a debate on where the line for human enhancement should be drawn. To do this, a role-play game was developed entitled Super Me. Visitors were invited to participate in this game and to subsequently join the debate on how far we should go in optimising the brain. Role playing was expected to involve participants more actively in the discussion, allowing the organisers to present neuro-scientific developments in such a way that it became possible for young audiences to explicitly relate to them.11 The Super Me event staged a fictitious conference that was taking place in the future, exactly 50 years from now. The world would be in chaos because citizens of all nations were using brain optimisers. The aim of the 9 http://www.nerri.eu/eng/mutual-learning-exercises/mle-13-superme.aspx [accessed March 29, 2016] 10 http://en.experimentarium.dk/ 11 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Eioy_sIICiU 134 Nanoethics (2017) 11:127–138 game was to try and reach global agreement to regulate the enhancement arena. Visitors who joined the event were invited to enter into a dialogue with other rolegame players and to take a position vis-a-vis six ethical dilemmas. Furthermore, high school students who had been studying different areas of neuro-enhancement were invited to present their findings whilst the other attendants could pose questions to these students, for example in order to gain a more thorough understanding of a specific brain technology. Thus, visitors were invited to become part of a scenario and to experience the complexities of a specific topic in a situation where decisions had to be made. The idea was that live action role play would strengthen the learning process and make the issues involved more understandable, concrete and meaningful. Human enhancement is focussed on the individual self, but at the same time embedded in social relationships and cultural trends, and participants were invited to actively relate to these broader dimensions. The collective experience of setting up a role-game allowed the participant to use their imagination in order to connect neuroenhancement developments to daily life, thus making the dilemmas involved more striking and tangible. In terms of results, qualitative information concerning evaluations and experiences of visitors was collected via exit polls, snap-shot interviews and an online questionnaire. It indicated that the role play allowed a large number of visitors (circa 1200 in 2 days) to become actively involved in the debate and develop their views. Whereas, traditional setups such as lectures or panel debates tend to focus on the present and involve visitors primarily as audience, the role players acted as visitors from the future as it were, broadening the temporal horizon of the debate and allowing participants to articulate and develop their views through dialogue. A broad range of topics could thus be addressed (from the role of creative use by consumers in technology development via normalcy and competitiveness to good governance, equity and access). Many visitors indicated, moreover, that they saw enhancement as something that was already happening. Overall, participants confirmed that they not only increased their knowledge about the topic, but were also encouraged to explicitly consider their own opinion on the matter. Role-playing games are particularly an option when audiences are invited to discuss innovations which are potentially controversial, but at the same time relatively early stage. In order for the role-playing game towork andmutual learning to take place, however, some conditions have to be met. First of all, for visitors to successfully participate in such a learning event, a basic understanding of issues and current options is a prerequisite. But, also the role players themselves should be knowledgeable about the topic and trained to effectively engage with visitors. In this way, role playing allows participants to become part of the on-going, distributed deliberation concerning neuro-enhancement. But before assessing the added value of MLEs such as Super Me more elaborately, two other case studies will be briefly presented. Case Study 2: SuperMI Case study 2 is an MLE organised by the Universitat Pompeu Fabra (UPF), Barcelona (Spain), entitled SuperMI and aimed to provide an open platform for citizens to discuss neuro-enhancement technologies, notably technologies developed to optimise the cognitive capacities of healthy people. In terms of ambiance, the debate was organised in CosmoCaixa, a well-known science museum in Barcelona, in November 2014. The session had the format of a science café with participants seated around round tables whilst beverages and pastries were offered. The atmosphere was decidedly informal, and speakers (coming from various positions within the enhancement field) were encouraged to involve the audience, so that the whole session (facilitated by moderators) evolved into a dialogue. The topics discussed focused on neuro-ethics and the social and economic impacts of introducing neuro-enhancement in everyday life. Active involvement of the audience was also strengthened with the help of a voting system, as a preparatory exercise culminating in a final open debate among all participants. The interactive voting system12 used remote controls (user-friendly to all age groups) which allowed participants to respond to various options presented to them. These responses were publicly displayed and commented on the spot, to further enhance the debate. The majority of the audience approved the use of enhancement substances and technologies in healthy people to prevent or postpone age-related cognitive problems (such as memory loss), but tended to be more negative with regard to recreational enhancement tools.13 Evaluation questionnaires collected 12 http://www.powervote.com/nl/ 13 http://ccs.upf.edu/en/supermi-at-cosmocaixa-an-open-citizendebate-to-talk-about-neuro-enhancement/ Nanoethics (2017) 11:127–138 135 immediately after the event indicated that participants, besides being intrigued by the topics discussed, appreciated both the real dialogues during the session and the real-time voting system. The voting system provided a mirror to determine whether individual views are mainstream or exceptional. Thus, this combination of tools allowed participants to position themselves in the debate. Case Study 3. Drama in a Science Café Case study 3 is a science café organised by NERRI partner Radboud University Nijmegen. As a preparatory exercise, we invited 22 science students who participated in a philosophy course on neuro-enhancement to write and perform a play of their own addressing the social and ethical dilemmas involved. The plays were presented during one of the sessions of the course, and the winning team was invited to perform their play on stage during the NERRI Science Café, before a live audience of about 130 visitors ([3, 30], p. 34). Our question was: what will students gain from such an experience?We opted for drama because a basic affinity can be discerned between drama and experimental research. Whilst experimentation itself can be regarded as a dramatic form of research (often involving enactments in front of an audience of students, colleagues, or even journalists etc.), drama may function as an 'ethical laboratory' to explore and critically reflect on possible ethical and societal implications, now or in the near future ([3, 30], p. 34). To assess students' learning experiences, three questionnaires were developed and distributed, before, during and after the course. The winning team enacted a competition between a natural and an enhanced physician (equipped with a mnemonic device). The vicissitudes of both competitors were visible on the podium, for instance because, whilst one role was being performed, the other was temporarily frozen and vice versa, which strengthened the element of contrast: the awareness that there are multiple options. The dramatic performance proved rather effective and contributed to the liveliness of the ensuing debate; for instance, because several participants from the audience used the play to support their views. At a certain point, one of the visitors asked the rest of the audience to choose between the two protagonists: would they want to be treated by a natural or an enhanced physician? In response to this question, and somewhat surprisingly perhaps, about half of the audience indicated a preference for being treated by the enhanced expert, who was less sensitive to emotional and social aspects of illness, but hadmore factual knowledge available due to the mnemonic device. This stimulated the discussion as participants began to discuss and question the interpretations and preferences of others. In their assessment of impact and results, however, the organisers focussed on the learning experience of the students (N = 17). They measured self-reported learning outcomes using a five-level Likert scale, with responses ranging from 1 (totally disagree) up to 5 (totally agree). In response to the item 'The theatre assignment helped me to gain insight in how emerging technologies could influence daily life', the mean score was 4.24 (with 92% of the participants scoring 4 or 5). And in response to the item 'The theatre assignment helped me to gain insight in other people's opinions and arguments', the mean score was again 4.24 with 88% of the participants scoring 4 or 5 ([30], p. 885). Moreover, as one of the students commented: 'That we succeeded in stimulating thoughts on this issue was proven by the fact that a lot of the topics in the discussion following the play were directly linked to the issues we touched upon in our act, culminating in a debate with the audience on whether people would rather be treated by the rational and enhanced or by an empathic but non-enhanced doctor; a vote split the audience roughly in half' (p. 886). Discussion Building on the MLE concept, all three case studies discussed above adopted creative ways to literally involve the audience: allowing audiences to become an active actor in an experimental deliberative performance. In case study 1, the participants communicated with future generations about real-life experiences; in case study 2, the opinions of participants were projected real-time on stage, so that participants could actively relate to the evolving agreement or disagreement; and in case study 3, both the students and their audience became involved in enacting the moral dilemmas of enhancement technologies. In all three cases, the active involvement of the audience was used to stimulate and deepen the debate. The experimental performances became a kind of demonstration or public experiment, aimed at exploring future scenarios in outline. That is, these experimental tools not only affected the experiences of the participants who were directly involved in 136 Nanoethics (2017) 11:127–138 the performances, but also stimulated debates and learning processes among other sections of the audience. The question now is to what extent these case studies, in combination with the considerations concerning ambiance, expertise, creative tools and imagination presented above, allow us to further develop the MLE concept. The question 'what is (the general profile of) an MLE' has already been addressed above. An MLE, we argued, aims to bring together various groups of stakeholders (researchers, potential users, intermediaries, professionals, students, media, etc.) to facilitate an interactive learning process through mutual exposure of views and experiences, expectations and concerns. Innovative methods (such as drama or games or voting systems) are employed to encourage active participation, allowing the MLE to become a contemporary version of the Socratic agora, providing a stage where multiple (and sometimes unexpected) voices and perspectives mutually challenge each other: the deliberative version of the Bakhtin's concept of 'heteroglossia' [33]. An MLE aims to provide a deliberative and distributed form of reflection. Instead of allowing a limited number of 'reflection professionals' to analyse current developments in the neuro-enhancement arena, reflection ideally becomes a joint and mutual learning endeavour. Thus, a dialogue on neuro-enhancement ensues which exceeds traditional experts-versus-lay audience roles. This does not mean that the expertise of the scientific expert is disavowed; rather it is mobilised in more interactive ways, which entails a learning experience for the scientific experts involved as well. In the course of this joint endeavour, a living laboratory is created in which scientific and societal experts jointly develop plausible scenarios and critical assessments of controversial topics such as neuro-enhancement. Compared to more traditional deliberative settings such as lectures or panel debates, MLEs require more explicit planning, first and foremost during the preparatory stage. And this not only involves the design of the meeting and the development of innovative tools, but also aspects such as diversity and inclusion (the aim to reach out to broader sections of civil society) as well as responsiveness (the debate must be framed and phrased in such a way that it is responsive to current developments, not only in research laboratories, but also in society at large). This implies that MLEs are timeconsuming and cannot be regarded as mere add-ons to techno-scientific projects. As reflected in evaluations of MLE events, audiences appreciate active participation as it allows them to position themselves more explicitly in the debate. Whereas in this paper the focus was on conceptual and pragmatic considerations for organising such events, it would certainly be worthwhile to determine more precisely (and also more quantitatively) the learning effects entailed. Although in case studies 1 and 2 exit polls and snap-shot interviews suggested that mutual learning actually resulted from these activities, scales such as the ones adopted in case study 3 allow organisers to test their expectations more explicitly, thus furthering the learning process of the organisers themselves. In other words, employing calibrated evaluation tools (explicitly involving the role of ambiance, imaginative tools, role play etc.) may enable organisers to determine learning impacts with more precision. Further progress in this direction is implied in taking the MLE concept seriously. TheMLE concept reflects and builds on the tendency towards pragmatism of the RRI approach. With the help of MLEs, reflection becomes a deliberative praxis. Instead of the traditional situation of academic experts providing policy advice, experts are invited to become involved in a deliberative process meant to encourage reflection not as an isolated phenomenon (pursued by expert committees etc.), but emerging in the context of a broader deliberative culture, as a contemporary version of what Hegel [34] once referred to as Sittlichkeit: the ethical life, the practical realisation and enactment of the reflexive ideal, facilitated by a supportive, consciously organised deliberative environment. Via their active involvement in imaginative, social laboratory settings, designed to explore and critically assess possible scenarios, citizens become the co-authors rather than the targets of technological change. Acknowledgements This paper is based on experiences and results of a mobilisation and mutual learning project entitled NERRI (neuro-enhancement responsible research and innovation) funded by the European Commission in the context of the 7th Framework Programme. A draft version of this paper was presented and discussed during a NERRI consortium meeting in Vienna, November 11, 2015. This version profits from the comments received from various colleagues on that occasion. Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http:// creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made. Nanoethics (2017) 11:127–138 137 References 1. Habermas J (1968/1973) Erkenntnis und Interesse. 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Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main 138 Nanoethics (2017) 11:127–


Snapshot: P. F. Strawson

Philosophy

P.F. Strawson (1919-2006) was one of the most significant philosophers of the twentieth-century. His career centred around Oxford â first as Tutor and Fellow at University College, then as Waynflete Professor of Metaphysical Philosophy at Magdalen College. His careful, thoughtful, and characteristically elegant written work was influential in moving Oxford philosophy from the anti-metaphysical leanings of A.J. Ayer and J.L. Austin to a renewed and rejuvenated era of traditional philosophy theorising, albeit domesticated in a distinctively Strawsonian fashion. His influence on British philosophy persists through a generation of students who were brought up on his writings.

P.F. Strawson at 100 https://www.philosophersmag.com/essays/199-snapshot-p-f-strawson P.F. Strawson (1919-2006) was one of the most significant philosophers of the twentieth-century. His career centred around Oxford – first as Tutor and Fellow at University College, then as Waynflete Professor of Metaphysical Philosophy at Magdalen College. His careful, thoughtful, and characteristically elegant written work was influential in moving Oxford philosophy from the anti-metaphysical leanings of A.J. Ayer and J.L. Austin to a renewed and rejuvenated era of traditional philosophy theorising, albeit domesticated in a distinctively Strawsonian fashion. His influence on British philosophy persists through a generation of students who were brought up on his writings. Peter Frederick Strawson was born in London on November 23, 1919. He arrived in Oxford in 1937 on scholarship to study English at St. John's College, Oxford, but decided to change to Philosophy, Politics, and Economics (PPE), in part because of the international political climate. Philosophy, he found, 'congenial and absorbing' from the start. His main philosophy tutor was J.D. Mabbott, a respected political philosopher and later head of the college. And he also had one term's tuition with H. P. Grice, whom Strawson later described as 'one of the cleverest and most ingenious thinkers of our time'. St John's were initially reluctant to allow Strawson to change to PPE on the grounds that he would not get a first-class mark. This prediction was proved correct, but rumour had it that Strawson's second-class mark was a result, in part, of the younger of his two examiners leaving Strawson's exam scripts in the back of a taxi, and thus not being able to argue the case for a higher mark against the view of the older, more conservative, examiner. He was called up to military service, attaining the rank of captain, and when he left the military in 1946, took up a post in Philosophy at the University College of North Wales, Bangor. It was his award of the prestigious John Locke prize – awarded on the basis of a written examination to philosophy graduates in Oxford – which enabled his return to Oxford, his answers sufficiently impressing Gilbert Ryle that he recommended Strawson to University College, Oxford, where he was appointed first as a lecturer, and then as a Fellow in 1948. He had thus achieved what, at the age of 21 was his ambition: to be a Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy in Oxford. Strawon's name was made almost immediately through two articles published in 1950: 'On Referring', published in MIND, and a debate with J.L. Austin about truth, published in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. In both cases, Strawson was up against a big-name philosopher: Bertrand Russell, in the case of his paper in MIND, and J.L. Austin, the current dominant figure in Oxford philosophy, in the debate about truth. In both cases Strawson was judged by many to have won the battle. The debate with Austin was particularly important, since it was unheard of for someone to take Austin on at his own game: with a careful, almost forensic, analysis of the ordinary ways in which we talk. 'On Referring' is, in part, a criticism of Russell's famous article 'On Denoting'. The topic of both papers is reference – and, in particular, the ways in which we refer to things by use of the definite description 'the'. (It is a mark of philosophy that so much can turn on so little a word.) Consider the statement 'The Prime Minister is tired'. And contrast it with the statement 'A Prime Minister is tired'. How does the former differ from the latter? According to Russell, the latter statement tells you that there exists a Prime Minister, and it (she) is tired. The former statement, the one which uses a definite description, works exactly the same way except that it also adds that there are no other Prime Ministers. That is, 'The Prime Minister is tired' says 'There is one and only one Prime Minister and it is tired'. Perhaps this sounds strange – and Strawson's insight in his reply is based in part on the observation that it should sound strange – but Russell's theory had achieved orthodoxy by the time of Strawson's writing, and was thought to be a philosophically illuminating account of one small but important aspect of ordinary language. Strawson raised a range of objections to Russell's proposal. One of his points is that Russell's view implies that statements of the form 'The F is G' are false when there is no F in question. For Russell, this was a merit of the view. If I say to you 'The King of France is bald', my statement is false, precisely because there is no King of France. But Strawson pointed out that we do not always treat such statements as false. In some cases, perhaps in many cases, we would not say that the statement is false, but that it does not make sense – that it is not even false. For Strawson, sentences can be neither true nor false, and some of Russell's cases fall into that category. This showed, he thought, that Russell's analysis cannot be the whole story about reference. If it was these early papers which made Strawson's name, it was his books Individuals (1959) and The Bounds of Sense (1966) which cemented his reputation and helped move British philosophy in a new direction. In the first half of the twentieth-century, British philosophy was going through one of its regular periods of metaphysical hostility. For the logical positivists, such as A.J. Ayer, and for the careful, language-focused philosophers, such as J.L. Austin, metaphysics was a domain of wild speculation, where philosophical claims went beyond the limits of sense and significance. Strawson's writings allowed a return to metaphysical theorising, albeit theorising which was constrained by a lingering respect for the anti-metaphysical arguments of his predecessors. The return to a form of metaphysics is announced in the subtitle to Individuals: 'An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics'. The contrast, as Strawson outlines it in his Introduction, is with 'revisionary metaphysics'. 'Descriptive metaphysics', he tells us, 'is content to describe the actual structure of our thought about the world, revisionary metaphysics is concerned to produce a better structure'. Descriptive metaphysics takes there to be ways of thinking about the world which are common across time and space, and the role of the descriptive metaphysician is to outline these universal forms of thought. Revisionary metaphysics, in contrast, wants to emend or reject these ways of thinking. This contrast has entered the philosophical lexicon, and many philosophers have used it as part of their self-image. But one way to see the perhaps problematic nature of the contrast is to consider the five philosophers whom Strawson classes within his schema: Descartes, Leibniz, Berkeley, Aristotle, and Kant. Without looking, could one predict which category each is said to belong to? (Strawson gives the first three as examples of revisionary metaphysicians, and the latter two as descriptive.) The aim of Individuals is to outline the concepts used in thinking about particular things in the world. One of the most discussed chapters – and one which most readily illustrates the way in which the rarefied world of philosophical analysis can interact with the wildest science-fiction – is the second chapter in which Strawson attempts to determine how important our idea of space is for our thinking about an objective world. Strawson imagines in this chapter a sound world – one in which a person has only auditory experience – in order to see how much sense can be made of the idea of objectivity without the idea of space. The chapter is intellectually fascinating, and showcases a certain sort of British temperament and style which can be found in many writings from the period. Strawson wrote primarily on a range of issues in the philosophy of language, metaphysics, and epistemology, but his work on all of these topics was informed by a close engagement with people and ideas from the history of philosophy. Prime amongst these was Immanuel Kant. Strawson's introduction to Kant arose out of the historical peculiarities of the PPE degree. This was structured, in Strawson's day, such that there were two special subjects which those who wished to specialise in philosophy were obliged to take: Logic and Kant. The latter was to be studied through the Critique of Pure Reason and the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and when studying the first Critique, Strawson tells us, he found 'a depth, a range, a boldness, and a power unlike anything I had previously encountered'. The influence of Strawson's engagement with Kant can be seen in Individuals. But it was his ground-breaking and influential commentary on the Critique of Pure Reason, The Bounds of Sense (1966), which demonstrated the importance of Kantian ideas for contemporary philosophical discussions and, in the words of one philosopher, 'opened the way to a reception of Kant's philosophy by analytic philosophers'. Strawson's aim was to detach and defend what he saw as valuable in the first Critique from that which was dodgy and downright dubious, what Strawson called the 'imaginary subject of transcendental psychology'. The result was a fascinating and insightful account, not perhaps of what Kant said, but of what Kant ought to have said, had he had the good fortune to have read some recent Oxford philosophy. I have mentioned Strawson's work in language, mind, and metaphysics. And he always joked that he would turn to moral philosophy only when his powers were waning. Nevertheless, his most famous article, and the one which may persist the longest, is perhaps 'Freedom and Resentment', a small and suggestive paper which aims to dissolve the problem of determinism and responsibility. In this paper Strawson draws attention to our 'reactive attitudes': attitudes such as gratitude, anger, sympathy and resentment. These attitudes are part of our human life, we cannot imagine what it would be like to be human without them. They thus are not subject to justification or entitlement from grand metaphysical theses. The conflict, then, between determinism and responsibility is largely illusory. This paper captures one of the central themes of Strawson's work: a relaxed sympathy for our ordinary ways of thinking about ourselves and our role in the world. In his discussion with Russell, Strawson brought us back to the way in which we use definite descriptions, in our conversations with each other, in our talk about the world. In Individuals, it is our ways of thinking which are under consideration, not the ways of thinking of some purified, logical creatures which might be related to us, and which we might become. And in 'Freedom and Resentment', it is the ways in which we react to each other and hold each other to account which are the focus, ways which are insulated from philosophical theorising about grand metaphysics. Across these philosophical debates, Strawson never loses sight of our humanity. Strawson's commitment to our ordinary ways of thinking comes out in a certain sort of relaxed realism which became characteristic of a strand of Oxford philosophy. This relaxed realism – Strawson sometimes called it a liberal naturalism – stands in opposition to two pulls in philosophy. The first is that of scepticism or eliminativism which cannot find a way to make sense of some aspect of our ordinary life – say, the colours of objects, or moral values, or our capacity to make free decisions. The sceptic cannot find room for these items in the natural world, and thus recommends that we eliminate them from our ways of thinking. Objects are not really coloured, there are really no moral values, we are not really free. The sceptic is a revisionary metaphysician who charges our ordinary ways of thinking with confusion and error. The second pull is that of reductionism. The reductionist disagrees with the sceptic as to the existence of these ordinary items. But she agrees that if these things are to exist, it must be because space can be found for them in the natural world. She concludes, then, that these ordinary things can be reduced to something whose status as naturalistically respectable is not in doubt. Objects really are coloured – but that is because colours are nothing more than the microphysical reflectance properties of surfaces. There really are moral values – but that is because moral values are nothing more, say, than that which is beneficial to us. And we are really free – but that is because freedom requires nothing more than that we act in accordance with our desires, however those desires were formed. Strawson's instinctive tendencies lie opposed to each of these extremes, and one can see his work, in different ways across a wide variety of debates, as showing how ordinary thought can be defended against both of these tendencies. The mistake each makes is the mistake of thinking that justification for our ordinary ways of thinking can only be found by making those ways of thinking accord with some etiolated scientific conception of how things are. The sceptic cannot see a way of making an accord, and thus finds our ordinary ways of thinking to be wanting. The reductionist defends our ordinary ways of thinking, but only by reducing them to something more scientifically respectable. Strawson's relaxed realism has no truck with the idea that our natural metaphysics is beholden to the physical sciences for its legitimacy, and thus finds no need to eliminate or reduce. Indeed, not only is there no conflict between our ordinary ways of thinking and a scientific story about how the world works, Strawson argued that the former must itself take precedence. We are humans before we are scientists and philosophers, and it is to our human ways of thinking that our scientific and metaphysical stories must ultimately defer. Scientific ways of thinking are important to our lives, but they are only one way in which we can think about the world, and they neither show the falsity of nor take precedence over our ordinary forms of thought. Strawson often said that had he been able to choose his gifts, he would have chosen to be a poet. And there is something of the poet's careful attention to the ordinary and the words with which to express it in Strawson's measured prose. His original and important contributions shaped British philosophy in the twentieth-century, and continue to repay careful study. Anil Gomes Trinity College, Oxford March


Tomorrow Is Within Reach!

Philosophy

Tomorrow Is Within Reach! Once upon a time, everything was possible. Even the Moon was within reach - and the stars were next. Those days of hope and progress are not gone. We still can have the glorious future that we once foresaw - if we are willing to make it happen! Progress! The word stirs up mental pictures of a better tomorrow - of a future world in which human ingenuity, through technological innovation and social betterment, has overcome the limits of the human condition. The twentieth century was a century of progress. During those hundred years, humanity progressed from a world without airplanes, computers, or modern medicine to a new era in which these technological miracles were commonplace. These technical achievements were not the only accomplishments of that fateful century. There also were vast changes in social thought, with great steps forward toward human equality and freedom - the struggle for racial equality, the recognition of women's rights, and the defeat of the new, unprecedented menaces of Nazism and, in many places, of Communism. The story of the twentieth century showed, beyond a doubt, that real progress is possible. We knew this from the previous history of the world - but the achievements of the twentieth century confirmed it once again. In the 1950s, America was filled with a spirit of optimism. This attitude was neither excessive nor unreasonable. The facts of progress in the first half of the twentieth century justified this optimism. So did the steady march of progress throughout the previous history of the world. During the 1960s, faith in progress began to fade. Historians and social scientists have debated the causes of this decline, but one fact is clear: the loss of the spirit of optimism was entirely unnecessary. It is true that some terrible things happened during the sixties. That decade was the time of the Vietnam War, of the peak of the Cold War, and of the growth of the drug culture. But positive changes also happened during the sixties. There were medical breakthroughs and civil rights advances. In 1969 came the first human landing on the Moon. Progress did not stop! The foes of progress may have slowed down progress, but they could not stop it. The spirit of progress was alive and well during the sixties, even though that spirit was partly hidden behind the gloomy pronouncements of the pessimists. Near the end of the twentieth century, progress had gone far, but much work remained to be done. Humanity's technological conquest of illness and of other natural and artificial threats was far from complete. In the social and political realm, many serious injustices and unnecessary limits on freedom still existed. Menaces to the environment posed new challenges, as did new threats of war. Yet hope always was in sight, because it was obvious that progress could go much farther. We knew that progress was possible, and that progress was good. Today we are at a point of decision. Arrayed on one side are the antiprogress forces. There are the postmodernists, who ignore the facts and preach that progress is an illusion. There are the left-wing extremists, who use the discrimination that still existed in the fifties to argue that the good aspects of the fifties were not real. There are the right-wing extremists of all lands, who long for an imagined era of religious oppression and who want to revive only the worst parts of the past. Finally, there are the doomsayers, who believe that human resolve and ingenuity cannot overcome today's real threats and challenges. All of these factions oppose or doubt progress. On the other side are the friends of progress, who know that the forward movement of the world has not stopped, and that the best of the past is worth preserving as the planet Earth moves into its potentially brilliant future. The optimistic age of the fifties was not the high noon of progress, but only its morning. The friends of progress, united in a vision of the future, know that the optimism of the mid-twentieth century was not an idle dream. The wonders yet to come are even greater than those we once imagined. We must go forward! Our future demands it. We who look toward tomorrow, and who have the courage to dream cosmic dreams, will settle for nothing less. Mark F. Sharlow Revised version. Page updated 5/24/07. Minor edits and change to PDF format, 2022. Page copyright © 2005–2007 by Mark F. Sharlow. Graphics on page, copyright © 2005 by Mark F. Sharlow. All rights reserved.


Philosophy

Essay on police legitimacy through public reason and community policing.

Ice Cube and the philosophical foundations of community policing (Oxford University Press Blog, February 17, 2019) Luke William Hunt The recent "First Step Act" is the most significant federal criminal justice reform in decades. Still, it is a modest first step. The law eases the sentences of some inmates in federal prison, but it will not impact the problem of mass incarceration significantly because it does not address the many inmates incarcerated in state and local facilities. Nor does the law address problems within policing. In fact, the United States is moving away from policing reform. Despite the growing tension between many police departments and their communities, the Department of Justice has reduced oversight of cities that have demonstrated policing abuses and civil rights violations. This recent trend is occurring at a time when it is difficult to open a newspaper without seeing a tragic headline about police violence. Prominent cases have involved officers shooting persons in the back who were fleeing and not an imminent threat, and these cases are often along racial lines (see, for example the cases of Walter Scott and Laquan McDonald). The headlines are not only about shootings, but also about police officers who used unnecessary force-such as unauthorized chokeholds-that resulted in death (such as with Eric Garner). Practical problems of policing raise a variety of philosophical problems, including the problem noted by rapper Ice Cube in a well-known N.W.A. song: "F*** the police coming straight from the underground, a young n**** got it bad cause I'm brown, and not the other color so police think, they have the authority to kill a minority." In so many words, Ice Cube raised a question about the police's authority: On what basis do the police have the right to use deadly force, engage in deception, and exercise discretion generally? One way to answer the question is to say that police have authority by virtue of the state's legitimacy-the moral right to command and be obeyed. Community-oriented policing is often described as a way to achieve legitimacy because the strategy seeks to build community trust and promote procedural justice. But as illustrated by the trends noted above, some are seeking policies that are "tough on crime" at the expense of procedural justice and community-oriented policing. It is for this reason that we see a return to policies that emphasize security ("law and order"). Prominent examples include increased police militarization, re-escalation of the "war on drugs," and zero tolerance immigration policies that nullify prosecutorial discretion. Balancing security, legitimacy, and related rule of law principles is nothing new in liberal societies. It is illustrative to consider how the idea of public reason-the idea that government principles should be justifiable to all those to whom the principles are meant to apply-might help balance our policing goals and justify community-oriented policing. Public reason serves as a sort of moral foundation that justifies the strategy because community-oriented policing promotes legitimacy by bolstering autonomy, justice, and respect regarding the differences within a community. Draconian policies may reduce crime in the short term, but they promote a police "warrior" role and an "us versus them" mindset in the long run. Conversely, public reason is a doctrine about civic partnership and reciprocity: The enforcement of law is legitimate when it is based upon political arrangements that reasonable citizens could endorse. This includes arrangements that bolster public values-such as fairness, equality, and the rule of law-drawn from common sense principles of social cooperation. It follows that political power and coercive force based upon arbitrary authority is illegitimate. Legitimacy often begins with consent. If one agrees to some form of political authority, then we usually deem that authority to be legitimate. But we know that receiving explicit consent from everyone governed in the community is a practical impossibility. Public reason might thus be viewed as a middle ground for justifying our moral and political principles to everyone to whom the principles are meant to apply. And that is one way to achieve some form of legitimacy with respect to those principles-especially in the realm of policing. A first step toward addressing this problem through public reason is to acknowledge that policing is more than law enforcement. In addition to law enforcement officers, the police are emergency operators (responding to accidents on the highway) and social operators (responding to domestic disputes or other non-law-enforcement community problems). More broadly, the police are responsible for maintaining peace in a way that is consistent with the limits of the state's legitimate power-a responsibility that requires building community trust about that power. This is the basic idea behind procedural justice and community-oriented policing. A focus upon ethics in law enforcement training is central to community-oriented policing. This includes instruction that emphasizes each community member's dignity, including those who have broken the law. It likewise addresses how ethnicity, gender, age, and socioeconomic factors might impact an officer's interaction with the community, as well as how officers should deal with mental health-related issues. As the next steps in criminal justice reform are considered, one might hope that they promote the basic tenets of public reason through renewed emphasis on federal oversight of troubled departments in need of procedural justice and community-oriented policing strategies. Law enforcement is a big part of policing, but it's not the only part.