Stefan Roski, Bolzanoâs Conception of Grounding

Philosophy

I review Stefan Roski's "Bolzano's Conception of Grounding".

Pre-print of a review published in Phenomenological Reviews, 6 April 2017, http://reviews.ophen.org/2017/04/06/stefan-roski-bolzanos-conception-of-grounding/ Stefan Roski: Bolzano's Conception of Grounding Title: Bolzano's Conception of Grounding Series: Studies in Theoretical Philosophy vol. 5 Author: Stefan Roski Publisher: Vittorio Klostermann Release Date: January 2017 Format: Paperback €59 Pages: X+270 Reviewed by: Petter Sandstad (Universität Rostock) Bernard Bolzano (1781-1848) was a Catholic priest and held, until his politically motivated dismissal by the Austrian Emperor Franz in 1819/20, a professorship on religious doctrine at the University of Prague. He was a polymath, writing on philosophy of religion, political philosophy, ethics, aesthetics, and social reform (and engaged in philanthropic work). Yet his most notable and original work, largely ignored during his life, is on mathematics, logic, and philosophy of science. This part of Bolzano's work was influential upon many students of Franz Brentano (Smith 1994:156), e.g., Carl Stumpf, Alexius Meinong, Kazimierz Twardowski, and not least Edmund Husserl: "Bernard Bolzano's Wissenshaftslehre [...]far surpasses everything the world-literature has to offer in the way of a systematic sketch of logic. [...]we must count him as one of the greatest logicians of all time" (Prolegomena, appendix to §61, Husserl 2001:142). Bolzano's notion of 'proposition in itself' (Sätze an sich) is a predecessor of Brentano's 'immanent content', Frege's 'thought' (Gedanke), and Husserl's 'ideal meaning'; and more generally, Bolzano's view that propositions are, in Husserl's terminology, ideal or abstract entities was highly influential (Smith 1994:185-190). There has recently been a vast expansion in the literature on Bolzano's theoretical philosophy. In 2014 the first complete English translation of Bolzano's main work from 1837, the Wissenschaftslehre (Theory of Science), was published in four volumes (Bolzano 2014). Some noteworthy recent monographs are Morscher's (2008) Bolzano's Life and Work and Lapointe's (2011) Bolzano's Theoretical Philosophy. For a brief introduction see Morscher (2014) and Šebestik (2016). What is of interest for the purpose of this review is the fact that Bolzano was, as claimed by Roski, perhaps the first to have a proper, though tentative and fragmentary, theory of grounding (55; here and henceforth references to page numbers alone refer to the book here under review). 2 Grounding is a topic which has received immense attention these last 15 years or so (see Correia & Schnieder 2012; Bliss & Trogdon 2016). It is often seen as a replacement for the controversial notions of truth-makers and of supervenience, where it is taken as a virtue of all these notions that they allow for non-eliminative theories, for instance of the mental or of social reality. Still, grounding is perhaps an even more controversial notion. For instance, the notion is criticized for being too coarse-grained (Wilson 2014). Some examples of grounding, especially conducive to Bolzano's conception, are (216): *Moral facts obtain because non-moral ones do. E.g., Metternich's actions are bad because they yield to a decrease of the overall distribution of happiness. *It is true that p because p. E.g., it is true that Socrates is brave because Socrates is brave. *A conjunction is true because its conjuncts are true. E.g., Socrates is Greek and Socrates is a philosopher because Socrates is Greek, and because Socrates is a philosopher. The use of 'because' indicates that a relation of grounding holds between two true propositions (the relata). 'Because' is here not used in an evidential and epistemological sense; rather, but rather to express an explanatory metaphysical priority-relation. Roski's Bolzano's Conception of Grounding is the first book-length treatment solely devoted to Bolzano's theory of grounding. The author is concerned with Bolzano's mature theory of grounding as expressed in his main work, the Wissenschaftslehre (especially WL §198-221). Aside from a few notes, the book does not discuss Bolzano's transition from his immature to his mature theory (especially, both from 1810, the Aetiologie and the Beyträge zu einer begründeteren Darstellung der Mathematik; but cf. Centrone 2016). Nor does it discuss Bolzano's influence on his successors, e.g., Husserl. By all meanings of the term, this is a scholarly work-both in its varied use of texts from Bolzano's collected works (the Bernard Bolzano Gesamtausgabe), and in its discussion of relevant secondary literature. As I am no scholar of Bolzano, I will not engage with Roski's interpretation. Rather, I will focus on the value of this book for a general reader, who is either already familiar with the recent grounding-literature and interested in learning more on Bolzano's view, or interested in a historically guided introduction to grounding. The book is a revision of Roski's 2013 doctoral dissertation, from which two chapters have been omitted (one on Bolzano's early work and one on his conception of science) and one chapter added (ch.5). It consists of an introduction (ch.1); a presentation of key notions from the Wissenschaftslehre, especially deducibility (ch.2); one chapter on Bolzano's pure logic of grounding (ch.3), and a very long chapter on his impure logic of grounding (ch.4). Roski takes the distinction between pure and impure from Fine (2012). The pure logic of 3 grounding "contains principles that hold for every case of grounding, irrespective of [...]the relata", whereas impure logic of grounding "consists of more specific principles that mostly apply only to truths from deductive or a priori sciences" (16). The book concludes with a comparison between Bolzano's theory and contemporary theories of grounding (ch.5). Chapter 1. Introduction The introduction not only contains the customary brief description and motivation of the book, methodological remarks, and outline of the chapters. It further gives a brief description of grounding. Bolzano's terminology is that of a relation of grounding (Abfolge) which holds between two relata (both truths), the ground (Grund) and the consequence (Folge). Unfortunately, the translation of 'Abfolge' as 'grounding' is nowhere defended in the book; in Bolzano (2014) it is translated as 'the relation of ground and consequence', and 'grounding' might be a misleading translation. Roski characterizes grounding as an explanatory consequence relation-thus, the consequence not only follows deductively (Roski explains this notion in ch.2, see below) from the ground(s), but the ground is also explanatory of the consequence (2). Further, grounding is an ordering relation and is as such asymmetric: a grounds b, yet b does not ground a. Roski presents two of Bolzano's examples of grounding (for both these examples, though presumably not in general, either proposition is deducible from the other): First, the truth that the atmospheric pressure has dropped partially grounds the truth that the barometer stands lower. Second, from Euclid's Elements (Prop I.1), the truth that for every two points a and b, there is a point c such that lines ab = ac = bc grounds the truth that the circumferences of any two circles with common radius ab and centres a, b, lying on the same plane, intersect at a point c equidistant from a and b. Historically, Roski situates Bolzano within what he names, following Betti & de Jong (2010), the Classical Model of Science. This model goes back to Aristotle's Posterior Analytics, and Roski says that similar views are defended inter alia by Arnauld & Nicole's Port Royal Logic, Leibniz, and Wolff. Its central idea is that science should be structured axiomatically (e.g., Euclid's axiomatization of geometry). Earlier discussions of this model simply call it the Ancient Axiomatic Theory (Scholz 1930/1975). This accords with the traditional interpretation of Aristotle's Posterior Analytics (dating back at least to Philoponus' 6 th century commentary), although it is by no means the only possibility (for an interpretation more along the line of a Husserlian formal ontology, where each science is a regional ontology, see my (2016)). In the remainder of the book Euclid, not Aristotle, will represent this model (although Bolzano considered Euclid's Elements to be highly flawed). 4 Roski notes strong similarities between Bolzano's two examples (especially the barometer) and Aristotle's example that "it is not because the planets [C] do not twinkle [B] that they are near [A] – rather, because they are near they do not twinkle." (APo I 13, 78 a 3738) For one, we have a similar use of 'because'. Further, Aristotle says that either truth deductively follows from the other: 'B belongs to C, and A belongs to B, therefore A belongs to C' is a valid syllogism, but it gives the wrong explanation (aitia). The correct explanation has A (being near) as the explanatory middle term: 'A belongs to C, B belongs to A, therefore B belongs to C.' This illustrates Aristotle's distinction between a merely valid and a demonstrative (explanatory) syllogism (a modern variant is Bromberger's flagpolecounterexample to the Hempel-Oppenheim-account). Similarly, Bolzano speaks of demonstrations (Begründungen) which present the objective ground for a truth (10-11). A further similarity, unremarked by Roski, is Bolzano's distinction between objective and subjective grounds, where the latter corresponds to the evidential/epistemological use of 'because'. Thus, while the fall in atmospheric pressure is the objective ground of the fall of the barometer, conversely the fall of the barometer is the subjective ground of the fall in atmospheric pressure. This is the same as Aristotle's distinction between what is prior to us and what is prior in nature/simpliciter (APo I 2, 72 b 25-32). Third, Roski does not mention the strong similarity between Aristotle's view throughout the Posterior Analytics and Bolzano's view that the "generality of the premises is thus, as it were, measured in terms of the terminus medius. [...]the highest possible generality is given by the case in which terminus medius and predicate idea have the same extension." (179) Finally, Roski presents six claims central to Bolzano's conception of grounding (12): (I) Grounding proceeds from more to less general truths. (II) Grounding proceeds from simple to more complex truths. (Roski argues in ch.4 that Bolzano came to reject this claim). (III) The grounds of a given consequence are uniquely determined. (IV) There are ungrounded truths. (V) Grounding is an asymmetric relation. (VI) Grounding gives rise to deductive economy. Chapter 2. Objective truth, variation & truth-preservation Roski presents some key notions from Bolzano's Wissenschaftslehre, which are prerequisites for understanding Bolzano's theory of grounding. 5 For Bolzano, the relata of grounding are true propositions (Sätze an sich). Propositions are abstract objects (Bolzano merely speaks of non-existing objects), bearers of truth and falsity, and composed of ideas in themselves (Vorstellungen an sich) (20-21). Ideas are in turn either complex (zusammengesetzt), e.g. [prime number] and also [prime], or simple (einfach), e.g. [not] (as is customary in Bolzano-scholarship, square brackets indicate propositions or ideas). Further, ideas can either refer to one or more objects, or to no object at all. Both propositions and ideas Bolzano sharply distinguishes from their corresponding mental items, viz. judgements and subjective ideas (in Husserlian terminology, propositions and ideas are ideal, not immanent, contents). Bolzano understands the distinction between intuitions (Anschauungen) and concepts (Begriffe) somewhat different from Kant. An intuition "is defined as a simple idea that has exactly one object" (24), e.g., 'this pen', and a concept is "(a)ny idea that is not an intuition and that does not contain an intuition as a part" (25). The third group, "ideas that aren't intuitions, but contain at least one intuition as a part" (25), Bolzano calls mixed ideas (gemischte Vorstellung). Correspondingly, Bolzano distinguishes between intuitional propositions, i.e. propositions containing at least one intuition, and conceptual propositions: for Bolzano roughly equivalent to a posteriori and a priori truths (26). Bolzano holds that all propositions have the form [A has b]; [has] is an objectless idea (copula), [A] is a subject-idea and [b] is a predicate-idea. This requires Bolzano to heavily paraphrase ordinary propositions, e.g. 'there are cows' into [[Cow] has objectuality] and 'there are no real square roots of -1' into [[Real square root of -1] has lack of objectuality]. A proposition, [A has b], is then defined by Bolzano as true "just in case A is objectual and all objects that fall under [A] have at least one of the properties that fall under [b]." (29) Bolzano's notion of deducibility (Ableitbarkeit) constitutes not only a significant improvement compared to his contemporaries' alternative accounts (19), but is also, with its focus on truth-preservation under variation, close to the now standard Tarskian definition (43-44). However, it is highly unorthodox in that it is a ternary relation: deducibility holds "between a collection of premises, a collection of conclusions and a collection of ideas that are considered to be variable." (45) Thus "Bolzano's notion validates many arguments that are not logically valid on a modern understanding of the notion." (47) Fortunately, Bolzano also has a binary relation of logical deducibility which is close to our modern understanding, defined such that the collection of premises Δ is logically deducible from Γ iff Δ is deducible from Γ when all non-logical ideas are considered to be variable. It is logical deducibility that is important for Bolzano's theory of grounding (47). Further relevant to grounding, Roski 6 presents a notion of mutual deducibility/equivalence (Gleichgüldigkeit), e.g. as in the example of the barometer; and a notion of exact deducibility (genaue Ableitbarkeit) i.e. an argument containing no redundant premises or ideas. Chapter 3. Explanatory priority: Bolzano's pure logic of grounding Roski reconstructs Bolzano's theory of the pure logic of grounding, i.e. the logical properties of grounding independent of its relata. Bolzano distinguishes between complete and partial grounds, and between immediate and mediate grounds. A partial ground is a part of a complete ground, e.g., the truth of a conjunct is a partial ground of the truth of a conjunction. A mediate ground is a ground of an immediate ground, e.g., in Euclid's Elements Post I.1 is a mediate ground of Prop I. 19, while Prop I.5 and I.18 are its immediate (complete) ground (64). Bolzano only applies the partial/complete distinction to immediate grounds (65), and thus we have a tripartite distinction between partial immediate grounds, complete immediate grounds, and mediate grounds (and correspondingly for consequences). Bolzano explicitly takes the complete immediate ground to be the only genuine case of grounding (66). However, Bolzano-scholars disagree on which of the following two cases should be considered basic: Either the relation of a complete ground to its complete consequence, or the relation of a complete ground to one of its partial consequences. Roski favours the second alternative, thus naming this relation 'grounding'. The first he names 'complete grounding'. Roski first roughly follows Bolzano's presentation of immediate grounding (WL §198-215) in his section 3.4, and then gives a more concise reconstruction in 3.5. In the latter, Roski shows that most properties of pure grounding can be derived from three basic principles: The asymmetry of partial grounding, the uniqueness of grounding (i.e., there is only one complete ground of a consequence), and the existence of fundamental truths (i.e., some truths are ungrounded). Both partial grounding and complete grounding are defined in terms of the primitive notion of grounding. From this Roski derives, first, the theorem that there is no overlap between any complete ground and its complete consequence; second, the asymmetry of complete grounding; third and fourth, the irreflexivity of complete grounding and partial grounding; fifth, that complete consequences do not overlap; sixth, the uniqueness of complete grounds; seventh and eighth, anti-monotonicity of grounding and of complete grounding; and, ninth, failure of transitivity and cut. In order to derive the last properties of pure ground, two further principles must be supplied, corresponding to what is sometimes called Aristotle's insight (cf. Metaphysics Θ 9, 1051 b 6-9; and Categories 5, 4 b 8-10 and 12, 7 14 b 18-22): "Every truth φ and every collection of truths {φ1,...,φn}is the complete ground of a truth of the form [φ is true] and [Each proposition in {φ1,...,φn} is true] respectively" (71). From this Roski derives, first, the seriality of complete grounding, grounding, and partial grounding (i.e., every collection of truths has another collection of truths as its complete consequence, every collection of truths is a complete ground of another truth, and every truth is a partial ground of another truth); second, linkedness of partial grounds (i.e., there are truths φ, θ, ψ such that φ partially grounds θ and θ partially grounds ψ); third, internal dependence (i.e., "that truths which form the complete ground of a given truth may themselves stand in grounding relations" (97)); and fourth, anti-amalgamation (i.e., pairs of complete grounds and consequences cannot be fused). The chapter also discusses mediate grounding, showing it to be irreflexive, transitive, and asymmetrical (103), and briefly discusses the possibility of infinite grounding trees. Chapter 4. Simplicity and economy: Bolzano's impure logic of grounding The main source for Bolzano's impure logic of grounding, where only conceptual truths are the relata of impure grounding, is WL §221. In what is by far the longest chapter of the book (109-213), Roski gives a very thorough discussion of §221 (most of which I am unable to discuss here for reasons of space), including a discussion of some tensions between Bolzano's pure and impure logic. The fundamental notion in this chapter is complexity. Grounds are required to be less complex than their consequences. Bolzano strictly defines complexity in terms of the number of 'simple parts' in a proposition, such that a proposition with more simple parts is more complex than a proposition with less simple parts. Roski here argues that the relevant parts are not the type but rather the token occurrences (e.g. of the simple idea [not]) (115). In addition, grounds should avoid redundancy and therefore not contain logically analytic truths nor consist of logically dependent propositions. Here enters the tension with Bolzano's pure logic, which says that every truth and every collection of truths grounds some other truth. Yet, not every truth satisfies the simplicity and economy principles. To resolve this tension, Roski argues that "Bolzano should let go of the seriality of grounding, and consequently of (Truthcoll)" (159), where '(Truthcoll)' is Aristotle's insight applied to collections of truths. Chapter 5. Bolzano's logic of grounding and the logic of metaphysical grounding 8 Roski generally notes much convergence between Bolzano's and contemporary theories of grounding, most strongly for his pure logic of ground. However, Bolzano held pretty much the opposite view from the contemporary, regarding ground of quantificational truths (229231): He took truths containing an existential quantifier, e.g., 'there is something', as basic, rather than as grounded in a truth without the existential quantifier; and he took a truth containing a universal quantifier as partially grounding one of its instances. Further, Roski earlier (10) notes that grounding does not hold among two truths because a relation of ontological dependence holds between the objects mentioned in the truths. Dependenceor priority-relations has no further explicit role in Roski's discussion of Bolzano, yet they are central to many contemporary theories of grounding (especially to Benjamin Schnieder's work). I would have liked some discussion on this point. Summary The book is written in clear and concise English, and does not presuppose previous knowledge of Bolzano. There are some typos, none of which should present any obstacle to understanding the text. The logical notation used is introduced and explained, and a list of symbols, definitions, and principles is included. However, I must note some shortcomings of the index. Preferably, the index should have contained names of other scholars of Bolzano discussed in the book. Similarly, some of the entries are incomplete (e.g., a number of passages mentioning Aristotle have not been included in the index). Further, the Bolzanoscholar would, I think, appreciate an index locorum for passages from Bolzano. While the book is mainly a scholarly work rather than a theoretical contribution, Roski is too modest when he asserts that "the book will not contribute anything new to the debate on metaphysical grounding" (2-3). For he later says: "Bolzano did not merely anticipate many views that are part and parcel of the current debate. He also went beyond them in interesting ways." (232) The presentation of these ideas can be said to be an addition to the debate, even though this still leaves the possible application and defence of these ideas as a task for future research. In conclusion, Roski's book should be of strong interest to anyone interested in Bolzano or grounding. Acknowledgements: Ansten Klev, Ludger Jansen, and Georg Fuellen provided helpful feedback to a draft of this review. 9 Bibliography: Betti, A. & de Jong, W.R.(2010) "The Classical Model of Science: A Millenia-old Model of Scientific Rationality", Synthese 174:185-203. Bliss, R. & Trogdon, K.(Winter 2016) "Metaphysical Grounding", Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, E.N. Zalta (ed.), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/grounding/ Bolzano, B.(2014) Theory of Science, 4 vols., P. Rusnock & R. George (translators), Oxford: OUP. Centrone, S.(2016) "Early Bolzano on Ground-Consequence Proofs", Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 22:215-237. Correia, F. & Schnieder, B.(eds.)(2012) Metaphysical Grounding: Understanding the Structure of Reality, Cambridge: CUP. Fine, K.(2012) "The Pure Logic of Ground", Review of Symbolic Logic 5:1-25. Husserl, E.(2001) Logical Investigations Vol. 1, J.N. Findlay (translator), London/New York: Routledge. Lapointe, S.(2011) Bolzano's Theoretical Philosophy, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Morscher, E.(2008) Bolzano's Life and Work, Sankt Augustin: Academia. Morscher, E.(Fall 2014) "Bernard Bolzano", Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, E.N. Zalta (ed.), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/bolzano/ Sandstad, P.(2016) "The Formal Cause in the Posterior Analytics", Filozofski vestnik 37:726. Scholz, H.(1930/1975) "The Ancient Axiomatic Theory", J. Barnes (translator), Articles on Aristotle: 1. Science, Barnes/Schofield/Sorabji(eds.), London: Duckworth:50-64. Šebestik, J.(Spring 2016) "Bolzano's Logic", Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, E.N. Zalta (ed.), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/bolzano-logic/ Smith, B.(1994) Austrian Philosophy: The Legacy of Franz Brentano, Chicago/La Salle, Illinois: Open Court. Wilson, J.M.(2014) "No work for a theory of Grounding", Inquiry 57:535-579.


Review of:  Philosophy and Psychiatry: Problems, Intersections, and New Perspectives

Philosophy

If we already had a periodic table of mental illness in hand, there would be less need for a book of this type. Although some psychiatrists do think of themselves as chemists, the analogy is without warrant. Not only does psychiatry lack an analogue of the periodic table, its principal tool -- the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) -- is a contentious document. Even subsequent to the publication of DSM-III in 1980, which was intended to serve as an operational guideline for clinical practice, it and its heirs (DSM-V was published in 2013) have often fueled rather than quelled controversy. Although beginning with that third major revision of DSM a concerted effort has been made to ensure greater consistency in diagnoses, psychiatry remains beset by concerns that it is insufficiently scientific, unduly influenced by the pharmaceutical industry, indecisive as to whether it should focus on the mind or the brain, incapable of distinguishing among types of diseases, inclined to expand illness criteria without adequate justification, overly reliant on subjective judgments, wont to conflate clinical and ethical judgments, and engaged in indiscriminate use of psychoactive drugs. These worries concerning its scientific and ethical status are among the reasons that psychiatry attracts the attention of philosophers.

Skip To Content Skip To Navigation University of Notre Dame College of Arts and Letters Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews About Recent Reviews Review Archive Editorial Board Reviewer's Guidelines Free Subscription 2017.04.01 Search: Search NDPR Search Author Daniel D. Moseley and Gary J. Gala (eds.) Philosophy and Psychiatry: Problems, Intersections, and New Perspectives Published: April 02, 2017 Daniel D. Moseley and Gary J. Gala (eds.), Philosophy and Psychiatry: Problems, Intersections, and New Perspectives, Routledge, 2016, 304pp., $148.00 (hbk), ISBN 9780415708166. Reviewed by Timothy Joseph Lane, Taipei Medical University https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/philosophy-and-psychiatry-problems-intersections-and-new-perspectives/ 4/4/17, 09?03 Page 1 of 9 If we already had a periodic table of mental illness in hand, there would be less need for a book of this type. Although some psychiatrists do think of themselves as chemists, the analogy is without warrant. Not only does psychiatry lack an analogue of the periodic table, its principal tool -the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) -is a contentious document. Even subsequent to the publication of DSM-III in 1980, which was intended to serve as an operational guideline for clinical practice, it and its heirs (DSM-V was published in 2013) have often fueled rather than quelled controversy. Although beginning with that third major revision of DSM a concerted effort has been made to ensure greater consistency in diagnoses, psychiatry remains beset by concerns that it is insufficiently scientific, unduly influenced by the pharmaceutical industry, indecisive as to whether it should focus on the mind or the brain, incapable of distinguishing among types of diseases, inclined to expand illness criteria without adequate justification, overly reliant on subjective judgments, wont to conflate clinical and ethical judgments, and engaged in indiscriminate use of psychoactive drugs. These worries concerning its scientific and ethical status are among the reasons that psychiatry attracts the attention of philosophers. Although these worries incline some to think that modern psychiatry is in a hopeless muddle, perspective is needed. Psychiatry might never be replaced by neurology or neuroscience, but 21stcentury clinicians provide much better treatments than were on offer in previous centuries. As many among the authors in this volume make clear, a principal difficulty confronted by psychiatry is that it remains wedded to a nosology of signs and symptoms, or diagnostic criteria, and that it lacks biomarkers. But it is equally clear that the importance of those criteria should not be taken lightly: in the 21st century they are part of a rough-and-ready arsenal whereby treatment for mental disorders can be bootstrapped from primitive rituals to the discovery of extremely effective, biomarker-guided, therapeutic treatments. To cite just one example, in 2007 anti-NMDA receptor encephalitis, manifestations of which were once regarded as indicating demonic possession, was finally identified as an autoimmune disorder, and it is now an eminently treatable disease (Sébire 2010, Cahalan 2012). The discovery that a majority of these patients respond well to immunotherapy was in no small measure facilitated by the meticulous description of psychiatric symptoms recorded in DSM (Barry et al. 2015). However the authors who have contributed to this book regard contemporary psychiatry and its engagement with philosophy, no one among them yearns for return to a time when symptoms and signs were regarded with less consistency, treated less systematically, or divorced from a search for biomarkers. The editors, Daniel D. Moseley and Gary J. Gala, pitch the book as consisting of three types of conversation. Part I focuses on philosophy of psychiatry: the application of philosophical methods to psychopathology as well as mental health research, services, law and policy. Part II focuses on philosophy in psychiatry: reflection on assumptions that are commonplace in psychiatric method, research, and practice. Part III focuses on philosophy out of psychiatry: attempts to derive insights from psychiatric practice that can inform reflection on philosophical issues. This distinction-bypreposition, however, reflects more an ambition than a substantive difference in content. Indeed, the https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/philosophy-and-psychiatry-problems-intersections-and-new-perspectives/ 4/4/17, 09?03 Page 2 of 9 imbricate relationship of Parts I and II indicates the degree to which both address psychiatry's struggle to refine DSM and tease out its ethical implications. Parts I and II are also alike in structure; both comprise four paired essays, lead and commentary. Part III, however, comprises only two paired essays, one of which deals with psychiatry just tangentially. For some of the issues covered, psychiatrists take the lead and philosophers comment; for others, the order is reversed. By and large, commentaries are designed to amend or extend, rather than incite controversy. Nevertheless, disciplinary differences being what they are, psychiatrists often find fault with the philosophers for their scientific or clinical naiveté, and philosophers find fault with psychiatrists for their unwieldy application of conceptual scalpels. Nicholas Kontos begins Part I by reminding readers of the "imperative to act" (p. 7): when clinicians treat suicidal patients, there is no time to engage in deep reflection on the scientific or ethical status of DSM. Real time for clinicians is calculated in seconds; so aspiring for a scientific theory that asymptotically approaches the truth about mental illness, or mulling over the ethical significance of therapeutic interventions, are necessarily reserved for off-duty hours. Philosophers, however, are expected to engage in these reflections while they are on the job. Of course this distinction should be obvious, but it is important that critics of DSM keep in mind that rational deliberation in the clinic cannot be the same as rational deliberation in the philosopher's cloister. Kontos's principal concern is with "psychological symptom amplification" (PSA), the idea that psychological symptoms are no less subject to distortion than are somatic symptoms. Patients often give pathological interpretations of their experiences, interpretations taken at face value by clinicians and that influence a patient's sense of self in significant ways. For example, patients who believe that they suffer from bipolar disorder tend to regard themselves as mercurial and irresponsible, even if these dispositions are not caused by actual pathology. PSA presents a dilemma for the clinician: to believe what a patient says can lead to misdiagnosis, but so too can the disinclination to believe. What is more, the seeming "invisibility" of PSA can also hinder psychiatry in its quest for scientific legitimacy; distinguishing the effects of placebos from antidepressants is difficult because distorting psychological symptoms confound data, "negatively skewing active drug response rates" (pp. 20-21). Deriving lessons from the history of psychiatry, Justin Garson attempts to explain why PSA is invisible. He argues that prior to DSM III, psychiatrists tended to regard mental disorders as strategies deployed unconsciously "to cope with unpleasant situations" (p. 31). But through the 1970s and culminating with DSM III's publication, behaviorally and biologically attuned psychiatrists carried the day over those who favored psychodynamic approaches; this led to a shift from regarding mental disorders as strategies to seeing them as dysfunctions. From the post-DSM III perspective, just as no one would regard cancer as a patient's strategy for achieving an unconscious goal, neither should mental disorders be so regarded. The problem with this view is that it ignores the likelihood that some patients do indeed amplify symptoms in order to achieve particular ends, albeit non-consciously. The suggestion then seems to be that disorder-as-strategy should continue to play some role in psychiatric science and therapy. https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/philosophy-and-psychiatry-problems-intersections-and-new-perspectives/ 4/4/17, 09?03 Page 3 of 9 Marc Lange's essay and the commentary by Abraham Nussbaum consider whether psychiatric diseases differ from somatic. Lange argues that diseases, mental and somatic, are both "natural kinds of incapacities" that play a role in functional explanations. Lange considers and rejects several rationales for distinguishing the mental from the somatic: both types of disease can be heterogeneous, have vague boundaries and multiple causes, and also require a social context. In short, what applies to the mind also applies to the body. Nussbaum, in his commentary, allows that mental diseases might be natural kinds, but sees them as distinct in one respect. He contends that mental disorders intrinsically involve incapacities of agency. The idea is that psychiatric patients "have an impaired ability to actuate their desires." For example, depressed persons are incapable of engaging in intentional actions that they enjoy, and those who suffer from alcohol use disorder lack the capacity to seek their own wellbeing (pp. 55-57). The dialogue between Warren Kinghorn and Christian Perring reveals the degree to which DSM can be a flashpoint for controversy, though readers might wonder whether the heat derives more from a clashing of metaphors than from substantive disagreement. Kinghorn offers a defense of DSM that is atypical for a clinician: he defends it on moral grounds. He does not deny that it usefully organizes empirical research, reflects the collective judgments of American psychiatry, and provides a shared language for nosology and diagnosis. Nevertheless, despite its status as a unifying document, it is not objective, apolitical, or timeless. He holds that it is best understood when interpreted as "a moral document," more "genealogical" than "encyclopedic," that evolved within a particular socio-historical context as "a form of moral inquiry" (p. 66). The point is not that DSM is an account of how to live, per se. Rather, it defines normative parameters for what counts as a good life; in this way, it indicates when clinical intervention is needed. He speculates that this moral status has been conferred upon DSM because traditional institutions seem "increasingly tentative"; accordingly, DSM has evolved so as to fill the vacuum and "provide a comforting moral framework." Perring doesn't buy this. He rejects the analogy to moral enquiry (p. 80). Perring does not deny that DSM's tradition is "checkered," but he takes seriously psychiatry's aim to categorize actual mental disorders, as well as identify their causes and optimal treatments. Moreover, despite its warts, DSM does allow for a "scientific piecemeal" approach, whereby diagnoses can be evaluated for reliability and validity vis-à-vis competitors, making progress in the understanding of pathology possible. Perring's preferred analogy is that DSM resembles a guide to edible plants; each edition improves upon its predecessors, and serves as a better guide to action. In the same way, DSM diagnoses and treatments can exhibit "piecemeal" improvements. Putting the tropes aside, however, what troubles Perring most is that Kinghorn believes we should "celebrate" DSM. Perring thinks this to be wrongheaded: rather than celebrate DSM, we should grimly acknowledge the lack of good alternatives, adopt a "critical and skeptical stance," and busy ourselves with piecemeal refinements. Benjamin Kozuch and Michael McKenna's essay and the commentary by Chandra Sripada concern moral responsibility. Although I find the concept of "free will" that they invoke nonessential to their analyses, there is much to like here. Especially noteworthy is their decision not to focus on the https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/philosophy-and-psychiatry-problems-intersections-and-new-perspectives/ 4/4/17, 09?03 Page 4 of 9 dramatic cases that so often appear in discussions of free will; rather, they attend to more pedestrian, mild cases of generalized anxiety disorder, clinical depression, and attention deficit disorder. Their goal is to help show how mundane but widespread disorders can play a "non-trivial causal role," without necessarily undermining the status of these persons as morally responsible agents. Sripada endorses much that is written in the target essay, but distinguishes between being-in-control and the failure to express self in the actions one takes -a failure to express one's concerns on matters of value. He argues that it should be the latter, not the former, which can serve "as the basis for excuse" (p. 115), for even if an action feels as though it eludes self-control, whether the action expresses who we are is a separate and morally more relevant issue. As for Part II, philosophy in psychiatry, here too the issues are urgent, the exchanges constructive, and the essays well-executed. This sense of urgency is underscored by the special attention devoted to involuntary treatment. But the pivotal concerns from philosophy of psychiatry carry over. As the first pair of essays seems to imply, sound evaluation of distinct positions will turn largely on the future of DSM, how future editions are interpreted and, arguably of greater importance, the future of more recent initiatives, in particular the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) -an attempt begun in 2013 to construct a "periodic table" for mental illness, while also identifying genetic, biological and environmental factors that cause malfunction (pp. 155-156). Much of what can be said about the status of assumptions in psychiatry awaits progress in psychiatric science, progress that will also be subjected to investigations of psychopathology and mental health research. If significant scientific progress is in the offing, new departures and discoveries will motivate philosophical investigations of psychiatric science's evolving status, and these investigations will necessarily involve a rethinking of underlying assumptions. In short, although this volume is not explicit on this point, the tentative nature of many exchanges seems less a reflection of psychiatry's past antagonisms and more an anticipation of potential scientific game changers. George Szmukler is concerned with assumptions concerning the imposition of involuntary treatment. Motivated by worries about discrimination against those who suffer from mental illness, he advocates a Fusion Law, "a single, generic statute, covering everyone" who suffers from an impairment of "decision-making capability" (DMC). Whether the impairment of DMC is due to a psychiatric disorder, a neurological disorder, an infection, or an adverse drug reaction is irrelevant. Under the Fusion Law, involuntary treatment could only be considered if a person suffers impairment to DMC and if it would be in the patient's best interest, without regard to the cause of the impairment. Ken Levy and Alex Cohen's principal objection is that Szmukler gives short shrift to the problem of nonor pre-criminal danger. Szmukler suggests that "danger" can be explicated with reference to the concept of "best interest," but he is silent as regards to how. Levy and Cohen correct for this omission, a critical one given its relevance for decisions concerning involuntary treatment, by incisively distinguishing among various types of danger -infectious disease, suicide, and homicide -usefully identifying many of the legal and empirical factors that are invoked to justify differential treatment. Jesse S. Summers and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong stake out new territory, asking whether psychiatric https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/philosophy-and-psychiatry-problems-intersections-and-new-perspectives/ 4/4/17, 09?03 Page 5 of 9 treatment is warranted in cases where persons seem excessively concerned about morality. Their analysis targets "scrupulosity" which can be thought of as seeing sin where there is none or dwelling on minor issues while neglecting more important ones (p. 163). They construct a cogent argument for regarding scrupulosity not so much as a religious or moral problem; instead, they argue that it is better understood as a form of Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder. On this interpretation, they suggest that therapy is sometimes advisable in order to assuage anxiety and even, arguably, enhance the internal coherence of patients' moral and religious views (pp. 175-176). In her commentary, Hanna Pickard expresses concern that Summers and Sinnott-Armstrong might be suggesting treatment even when the scrupulous person objects, treatment that aims at changing beliefs and behavior, changes that would, from the first-person point of view, make the individual less moral (p. 184). Pickard adds that expecting internal coherence for moral or religious views should not be among the criteria used for assessing scrupulosity. Her reasoning is that even the less scrupulous among us would be hard pressed to present more than a "mish-mash" of poorly integrated beliefs. Scott Kim, like Szmukler, is concerned with DMC. His project begins with the worry that DMC models attend to the ability to understand and express preferences, but they omit much that takes place in between -e.g. authenticity assessments, emotive reactions, or valuation. His ambitious goal is to construct a comprehensive framework that reveals how these components fit together within an integrated process. In her commentary, Jennifer Hawkins endorses Kim's ambition and acknowledges that he is sensitive to the distinction between judging a person's values and judging the "ability to value." But she finds fault with his framework's management of this distinction. Whereas Kim strives to avoid saying "certain illnesses distort our values in ways that make them off-base, flawed, mistaken, or simply bad," Hawkins argues that adopting such positions is precisely what is called for, especially if we are to deal with the most important cases (p. 210). Franklin Worrell and Alison Denham are concerned with Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID), holding that it can be genuine and is not necessarily iatrogenic. They take it for granted that some forms of dissociation (e.g., mind wandering while driving) are commonplace, but that something goes awry in DID patients, typically as the result of a traumatic experience, one that precipitates discontinuities in the sense of self and agency, discontinuities that are insulated by amnesic barriers. Their principal concern is to question whether the integration or fusion of distinct selves is "in every case a proper therapeutic goal" (p. 217). Invoking a notion that they dub "Sophoclean agency," they argue that to be divided is not necessarily a state we should seek to eliminate. They "take seriously the possibility that a better, more authentic . . . life may be had by multiple agents than by one who persists in reaching for a form of unity that lies beyond his grasp" (p. 234). In his commentary, Richard Chefetz, reaches conclusions that do not differ from those of Worrell and Denham. But he rightly chides them for relying upon archaic, dramatic cases, and for failing to cite clinical data. He points out that disproportionate attention delivered to the sensational -- "multiple personality" -aspects of DID tends to obscure "underlying ubiquitous dissociative processes" (p. 239). He avers that to better understand DID we need to understand how normally integrated neuronal https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/philosophy-and-psychiatry-problems-intersections-and-new-perspectives/ 4/4/17, 09?03 Page 6 of 9 functions can dissociate, and how such dissociation can cause depersonalization experiences. He does not deny that some people believe that other people live within them, but he regards this delusion to be derivative of insufficient "internally integrated experience" (p. 242). It seems that the belief that other people are living within oneself is an attitude adopted by patients in order to explain depersonalization, or poorly integrated experiences. As to whether integration is a proper therapeutic goal, Chefetz emphasizes that determination in any given case should result from a "relational" view of psychology, which is a view that does not privilege the clinician's knowledge and that leaves open the possibility of multiple selves living flexibly, without dissociative disruption. In Part III, David Rubinow asks: why do people respond differently to the same stimuli? Taking the effects of reproductive steroids on affective regulation as an example, he provides a meticulous characterization of endocrine-related mood disorders. Throughout, he emphasizes the importance of context: critical periods, age, timing, and different hormonal states all play roles in determining sensitivity or susceptibility. To illustrate how much context matters, he observes that a genetic female salmon can be transformed into a functioning male, simply by exposing it to two hours of an aromatic inhibitor, which prevents conversion of testosterone to estradiol. His main point is that failure to study the interplay of genotype, cognition, behavior, and hormonal activity yields conclusions about behavioral phenotypes that are likely to be erroneous, a fact that should matter as much in the clinic as in basic science. In her commentary, Valerie Hardcastle adds yet another layer of complexity: where Rubinow goes small, e.g. discussing the presence of a single nucleotide and the increased likelihood of mortality among the depressed, Hardcastle goes large, emphasizing that change in neighborhood, e.g. the world of the urban poor, can play a role that is no less vital. She observes that overblown expectations for the Human Genome Project -that in the 21st century it would significantly reduce the pernicious effects of major diseases -have gone unrealized, due in large part to neglect of the role played by knowledge, neighborhood, and lifestyle. Strikingly, this is no less true for mental health disorders than it is for, say, cardiovascular problems; indeed, by the year 2020, Major Depressive Disorder is projected to be the second leading cause of disability, worldwide, and social factors are among the major reasons for this. Although Hardcastle does not mention it, her essay makes the 19th century sociologist Émile Durkheim's work on suicide seem not only prescient, but also highly relevant to basic research and clinical practice of the 21st century. On balance, this is an excellent collection, one that can serve as a model for constructive dialogue between those charged with the imperative to act in clinical time and those whose job it is to reflect in philosophical time. Most of the lead essays raise important issues, both lucidly and cogently. In turn, most of the commentaries amend or complement, effectively and incisively. What I do find a bit disappointing, however, is that some issues are tantalizingly on display but left, regrettably, unexplored. One among these is the relationship between initiatives like the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) and DSM. Not unlike Gothic architecture, now that DSM has reached a definitive form, its "progress" seems to rely on ever-increasing internal complexity. The worry is not that this complexity is lacking clinical import; instead, it is that these intricacies might be of a sort that hinder rather than promote scientific progress. It might not be far-fetched to expect that neuroscience will witness a https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/philosophy-and-psychiatry-problems-intersections-and-new-perspectives/ 4/4/17, 09?03 Page 7 of 9 revolution similar to that which visited chemistry and physics in the latter part of the 19th and the early part of the 20th centuries, a revolution that would transform psychiatry. Even if such a revolution is beyond our reach, however, I would have found an assiduous attempt to situate DSM-V in the context of RDoC-inspired 21st-century neuroscience helpful in trying to assess its scientific and ethical status. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I gratefully acknowledge the institutional support of Taipei Medical University's Research Center for Brain and Consciousness, Graduate Institute of Humanities in Medicine, and Shuang-Ho Hospital; Academia Sinica's Institute of European and American Studies; and, National Chengchi University's Research Center for Mind, Brain, and Learning. Financial support for his research is provided by grants from Taiwan's Ministry of Science and Technology: 102-2420-H-038-001-MY3, 104-2420-H038-001-MY3, 105-2410-H-038-004-MY, and 105-2632-H-038-001-MY3. REFERENCES Barry, H. et al. (2015) Anti-N-methyl-D-aspartate receptor encephalitis: review of clinical presentation, diagnosis and treatment. BJPscyh Bulletin 39, 1, 19-23. Cahalan, S. (2012). Brain on fire. Simon and Schuster. Sébire, G. (2010). In search of lost time from "Demonic Possession" to anti -N-methyl-D-aspartate receptor encephalitis. Annals of Neurology 67, 141 -142. doi:10.1002/ana.21928 About Recent Reviews Review Archive Editorial Board Reviewer's Guidelines Free Subscription Copyright © 2017 Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews ISSN: 1538 1617 College of Arts and Letters Accessibility Information Notre Dame, IN 46556 Share https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/philosophy-and-psychiatry-problems-intersections-and-new-perspectives/ 4/4/17, 09?03 Page 8 of 9 https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/philosophy-and-psychiatry-problems-intersections-and-new-perspectives/ 4/4/17, 09?03 Page 9 of


Social Movements and the Pandemic

Philosophy

The COVID-19 pandemic worsens the crises generated by neoliberal capitalism. The âeconomic
          resiliencyâ of the Philippines is not a strength for the struggling masses rather a âfinancial strengthâ
          for the exporter and importer of surplus capital, e.g. the creditors and investors, favoring the few against the many. The lens and jargon of multilateral development banks bear bourgeois morality
          and myth describing the Philippine economy and the Filipinos âresilientâ amid perennial crises
          brought by neoliberal ideology. Emphasizing âeconomic infrastructureâ over the âsocial
          infrastructureâ, e.g. public healthcare, the Philippines attracts the surplus capital of foreign
          investors but not the confidence of the people as bureaucrat capitalists gain from contracts with the government. When COVID-19 strikes, the Filipinos remind themselves of the need for
          âsocial infrastructureâ in public health. The COVID-19 pandemic is a reminder since the people already recognize the governmentâs lack of capacity in dealing with regular maladies like dengue. Though many are organizing themselves in addressing the negligence of âsocial infrastructureâ by the government, a lot more clamor individually through social media for quality public service during the pre-pandemic period, amid the COVID-19, and most likely in the post-pandemic time. It is in this context that this practice note asks: how do Filipinos respond to the governmentâs response and how should they respond amid and during the post-COVID period? The note benchmarks from the theoretical foundations of social movements as it learns from people providing praxis of mobilizations in different countries for the Filipinos to adopt in their activism and to adapt their strategies when dealing with the ânew normalâ.

Social Movements and the Pandemic The COVID-19 pandemic worsens the crises generated by neoliberal capitalism. The "economic resiliency" of the Philippines is not a strength for the struggling masses rather a "financial strength" for the exporter and importer of surplus capital, e.g. the creditors and investors, favoring the few against the many.[1] The lens and jargon of multilateral development banks bear bourgeois morality and myth describing the Philippine economy and the Filipinos "resilient" amid perennial crises brought by neoliberal ideology. Emphasizing "economic infrastructure" over the "social infrastructure", e.g. public healthcare, the Philippines attracts the surplus capital of foreign investors but not the confidence of the people as bureaucrat capitalists gain from contracts with the government.[2] When COVID-19 strikes, the Filipinos remind themselves of the need for "social infrastructure" in public health. The COVID-19 pandemic is a reminder since the people already recognize the government's lack of capacity in dealing with regular maladies like dengue. Though many are organizing themselves in addressing the negligence of "social infrastructure" by the government, a lot more clamor individually through social media for quality public service during the pre-pandemic period, amid the COVID-19, and most likely in the post-pandemic time. It is in this context that this practice note asks: how do Filipinos respond to the government's response and how should they respond amid and during the post-COVID period? The note benchmarks from the theoretical foundations of social movements as it learns from people providing praxis of mobilizations in different countries for the Filipinos to adopt in their activism and to adapt their strategies when dealing with the "new normal". The plight of the people amid the COVID-19 pandemic tests the limits of patience in the inutility of elite politics but the people do not have their own machinery as powerful as the mainstream parties enabling "fair" play in the political arena. Some are asking the whereabouts of party-list representatives while others are conscious of how progressive lawmakers work with the grassroots. With the clamor for mass-oriented politics, Lenin (22 April 2020 marked his 150th birthday), then, lives; he lives among the people who realize the need for genuine people's party in achieving emancipatory politics free from the dominance of the bureaucrat capitalists. While there are people who do not agree to Lenin's single-party system, state repression does not discriminate whether one is an anarchist, social democrat, centrist, rightist, leftist, or apolitical. As COVID-19 exposes the crises of neoliberal capitalism, critics are compelled to conceive creative ways of amplifying the material condition in quarantined communities. Myrmidons maligning critics failed to stop netizens criticizing elitist and unscientific responses from the state. As President Duterte gains additional powers in addressing the COVID-19 pandemic, social movements lose the chance of heightening mobilizations at the ultimate place of the political arena, i.e. the public spaces especially the streets. But "social distancing" does not deter social movements. The religious concept of retreat bears resemblance to the isolation provided by the pandemic. Such isolation is nevertheless useful for the sincere activists to think ways of mobilizing amid the coronavirus and in the coming of the "new normal". Lenin did this fruitful isolation when he was in exile during the pre-1917 Bolshevik Revolution.[3] Though the pandemic halted the global protests against the intensification of neoliberal policies, activists are resorting to online meetings, educational discussions, and protests. Since the public gathering is not allowed, online study groups create ways to think collectively concerning the COVID-19, the crises it brought, the material condition, and the material solution. Provided that it is the material condition that shapes the material solution, lots of the intelligentsia from the petty-bourgeois stratum are cut off from the society's basic sector unable to immerse with the masses. Though this does not mean that there's no way to get data from the latter by the former, it is still advisable to immerse with the masses as soon as the situation warrants. It is not amid the pandemic that the social movement theory matures vis-à-vis the capitalist crises; rather, in the post-pandemic period when activists and academicians alike can go through the theory-praxis route and vice versa. The neoliberal model of "development" has kept the public healthcare of "developing" countries inferior in quality and service; it is unfavorable to the people but profitable to the investors. The technological advancement of the Global South is hostage to the subservience of political economy to the Global North who control the International Financing Institutions like multilateral development banks. Hence, there is a failure by the state to provide cheaper but quality health equipment to public hospitals. Neoliberal exploitation of the country's resources keeps the "social infrastructure" sluggish in responding to the needs of the people. Neoliberal capitalism had been generating crises since the pre-COVID period and the post-pandemic time cannot go back to the "new normal". In the first place, the pre-COVID "normal" was never normal. Its design fails. Despite the decade-old World Health Organization regulation on responding pandemic, global capitalism failed to coordinate countries in combating against the COVID-19.[4] If the global interconnection of contemporary capitalism fails in engaging capitalist countries coordinately, Cuba, on the other hand, extends humanitarian work abroad sending its health workers to help other countries fight against the coronavirus amid the US-imposed sanction. Consequently, a reexamination of ideology resurges and the Covid-19 intensifies the class war, especially when news reminds the people of the public healthcare suffering budget-cut anew shortly before the coronavirus strikes. Reducing funding for public healthcare leaves the have nots at greater risk than the haves. The COVID-19 pandemic is not only a health issue but also a political, economic, and ideological crisis. In the United States, the crises brought by the coronavirus is not isolated from the rise of neofascist Right which traces its birth back to the 2008 global financial meltdown.[5] The same is observable in other countries especially the Philippines. But right-wing populism is relatively effective in a country having no political maturity opiated with patronage politics – a representation of ideology and politics in superhero films. Social Amelioration Program (SAP) and other aids from the local and national governments and the private sector do not warrant economic security amid the quarantine period. They help, and they help a lot, but they need reformulation as to the roots of the crises perpetuating the ideological representation of the Hollywood heroes in Philippine politics. It may be trite but still very relevant to maintain the Maoist line that the masses can create history if they act consciously and collectively. There is then a greater need to study collectively the material condition along with the COVID-19 pandemic. The quarantined people may have docile bodies but the intellect and will are not. The COVID-19 calls for contemplation on the country's condition. Those who have violated curfew policy were subjected to the militarist method of discipline. Containing COVID-19 meant restricting not only the people's mobility but cracking down dissent. A fascist response cannot cover the capitalist crises. Macho-fascist measure enhances repression along with the Enhanced Community Quarantine. Prior to this year's pandemic, mass mobilizations exposed the socio-politicoeconomic crises in Algeria, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, France, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Sudan, and Zimbabwe. However, a lot of these social movements across the world may end up hijacked by those who are already powerful who cannot afford to give birth to a "new normal" beyond the horizon of neoliberal capitalism. Though the COVID-19 pandemic halts the mass movements, it does not and cannot stop them from flaring up. They're gaining strength as they pause occupying the ultimate political arena. Online protests and educational discussions are constantly upheld by different people's organizations, academic circles, cause-oriented groups, think tanks, and trade unions exposing the moldy material condition left by neo-liberalized basic social services. In the Philippines, Filipinos are opiated with the "greener" pastures overseas works offer. Except for the few personal choices, many are compelled by the country's incapacity to provide jobs and if there are any, the wages won't suffice the cost of commodities, housing amortization, education, hospitalization, and other needs which lead to surmounting personal debt reflecting the country's subjugation to the International Financing Institutions like the multilateral development banks. The crises brought by the coronavirus is a reminder of the 2011 Occupy Movement in Wall Street and the 2017 Occupy Bulacan Movement in Pandi, Bulacan. Both are socio-political movements blowing against social inequality in a creative but concrete way of expressing public indignation against neoliberal policies privatizing basic social services. While the former was an awakening from the economic liberalism daydream, the latter was an actual occupation of dilapidated public housing demystifying the bourgeois morality and myth. Lesson learned hence is the need to counter bourgeois morality of mainstream news anchors and columnists. But the intelligentsia can hardly arrive at a materialist and mass-oriented analysis without immersing with the masses. Sadly, the situation does not warrant but they can join with online discussions of different groups from society's basic sector. The COVID-19 pandemic divulges certain "crass"[6] character of capitalism.[7] Community kitchens reflect the state's failure to provide basic needs. Worse, state security forces rounded up volunteers running community kitchens as the latter amplified advocacies along with their humanitarian activity.[8] It is not only in the Philippines that right-wing responses intensify. Thus, the COVID-19 crisis calls for a coordinated global response to the crises generated by contemporary capitalism. The global social movements will have wider and deeper issues to advocate, especially in the post-pandemic period. But can the post-COVID capitalism stand up where it falls? "Healing as one" is not even synonymous with the "Community and the Common Good" as posited by the key principles of Catholic Social Teachings. No Corporate Social Responsibility can cover up corporate greed in unbridled capitalism. Continue criticizing the crises brought by the coronavirus to arrive at the "new normal" beyond the horizon of neoliberal capitalism! Though the material condition itself arouses the consciousness of our health workers, they should organize themselves (and/or be organized) so they can mobilize collectively to advocate for reforms (at least, a good start in revolutionizing the public healthcare system) that better public healthcare, better working conditions, higher salary, and more benefits can be realized. As such reiterates their need to have their own party-list. Healthcare in the Philippines can literally bankrupt the retirees. How much more if hospitalization comes while one is still working? Right now, the government can hardly subsidize public hospitals. Since genuine development creates wealth, national industrialization is vital in achieving quality and accessible healthcare and in controlling national health emergency. National industrialization is an agendum in the GRP-NDFP Peace Talks. Health care issues then require peace talks between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front of the Philippines. But many of the majority Catholics do not stand by the key principle of the Catholic Social Teachings on the "Promotion of Peace".[9] There is a need to conscienticize the "apathetic and apolitical" Catholics. If Paulo Freire posits the "see-comprehend-act" method in his Pedagogy of the Oppressed, the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines exhorts "Discern! Decide! And act with Mary our Mother!" in its guidelines reflecting on the current socio-politico-economic conditions of the country.[10] On 23 May 2020, the Makabayan Bloc held an online forum assessing the COVID-19 pandemic response by the Duterte administration. Kabataan Representative Sarah Elago cites the United Nations in observing the Philippines' "highly militarized" response. "Emergency powers should not be a weapon governments can wield to quash dissent, control the population, and even perpetuate their time in power... should be used to cope effectively with the pandemic – nothing more, nothing less," UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet explains. Elago recognizes the public health emergency reflecting the pre-COVID crises. She elucidates the changing of the term from mass testing to expanded and/or targeted testing calling the former antielitist empowering the masses in demanding quality and accessible public healthcare. Alliance of Concerned Teachers Representative France Castro observes the insufficient protection for frontline health workers. Castro cites the World Health Organization's concern on the percentage of death and/or infection-rate among the frontliners in the Philippines. She correlates the incident with the limited Personal Protective Equipment procurement and its late procurement and distribution. COVID-19, Castro claims, divulges the neoliberal character of contemporary capitalism. She reiterates the need for the filling up of 17,000 unfilled plantilla positions in public hospitals operating under their capacities. The disqualified Aksyon Health Workers party-list could have given relief to the underpaid and overworked health workers. Castro cites also the congested quarantine centers halting the accommodation of repatriates. She recommends the enhancement of medical strategy, i.e. testing, tracing, isolation, and treatment. Bayan Muna Representative Ferdinand Gaite says that the target set is unmet after eight weeks. He also cites the pressing concerns of the dismissal of government job orders and contractuals, and the stringent qualification, bureaucratic processes, late start payout for Small Business Wage Subsidy (SBWS) and Social Amelioration Program (SAP). Bayan Muna Representative Eufemia Cullamat cites the continuous attacks on Lumads amid the COVID-19 pandemic. Gabriela Representative Arlene Brosas cries foul about the mass arrests silencing critics. She said the people face fascism amid the pandemic and that the lockdown in the Philippines is longer than in Wuhan. Bayan Muna Representative Carlos Zarate criticizes the Duterte administration in its inconsistency in its statements on whether public funds are sufficient or not. After assuring the public of sufficient funds, President Duterte entertains the idea of selling government properties. Zarate disagrees citing the reenacted budget, and calamity and contingency funds. Zarate notes the president belittling the COVID-19 yet the administration loans nearly five billion dollars from multilateral agencies making the country reaching a new high record in its loans. Dr. Joshua San Pedro of Coalition For People's Right To Health reiterates the physical distancing with social solidarity vital to collective struggle towards the new normal. Alienation, bankruptcy, dehumanization, and exploitation are characteristics of neoliberal capitalism. In congested communities, there are individualists expressing liberalism whereas they could have survived strategically with communal way. Economic inequality is the common denominator among the recent social movements. They should work together redefining the least upheld principle and/or method of reaching the new horizon beyond the shadow of neoliberal capitalism. The "new normal" would not be new if it can't step forward away from neoliberal capitalism. Frantz Fanon's "new humanism" and/or Marx's "positive humanism" cannot realize its being in neoliberal capitalism. "Positive change in the conditions of life and labor will occur only with the development of a radical class politics independent of the current civilian leadership", Kevin Anderson, Peter Hudis, Jens Johansson, Karel Ludenhoff, and Lilia Monzo, the steering committee of the International Marxist-Humanist Organization, maintain.[11] As people are becoming more conscious of the crises brought by the coronavirus, will they be conscious of capitalist contradictions? The capitalist crisis conditions the consciousness. If the problem is capitalism, the solution cannot be capitalism but surely it comes through the crises generated by capitalism. Hence, understand and challenge the right-wing populism amid the pandemic. The post-COVID period will require new pedagogical practices for social movements to solidify subjective sentiments despite social distancing. Benchmarking across the globe, activism in the Philippines can create a creative type of social movement considerate to the threat of coronavirus while maintaining vigilance to the fangs of the state. One good thing to note was the car caravan in Portland's May Day 2020 protests and during the indignation rally over the killing of Jory Poquia, coordinator of Bayan Muna partylist in Iloilo City, by suspected state security agents. COVID-19 pandemic changes the landscape of social movements. How to organize and where to mobilize amid and after the pandemic is a critical question needing collective contemplation. The pandemic is crucial not only to the capitalists but also to the social movements. It invites a reexamination of ideologies and strategies calling for cooperation and coordination among the powerless to "cut the balls" (as worded by Slavoj Zizek) of the powerful.[12] Notes [1] Sonny Africa, "Financial strength, development weakness," Ibon, May 14, 2020 (https://www.ibon.org/financial-strength-development-weakness/). See also Lenin's Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism. [2] Jose Lorenzo Lim, "The fate of BBB in the time of COVID-19," Ibon, May 7, 2020 (https://www.ibon.org/the-fate-of-bbb-in-the-time-of-covid-19/). [3] Kevin Anderson, "Notes on Lenin at 150: Theoretical Preparation for Revolution in the Time of COVID-19," The International Marxist Humanist Organization Journal, May 4, 2020 (https://imhojournal.org/articles/notes-on-lenin-at-150-theoretical-preparation-for-revolution-inthe-time-of-covid-19/). [4] Kevin B. Anderson, Peter Hudis, Jens Johansson, Karel Ludenhoff, Lilia D. Monzo, "Where to Begin? Growing Seeds of Liberation in a World Torn Asunder", The International Marxist Humanist Organization Journal, April 10, 2020 (https://imhojournal.org/articles/where-to-begingrowing-seeds-of-liberation-in-a-world-torn-asunder/). [5] Ibid. [6] Heather Brown uses the term "crassness" of capitalism in her paper COVID-19 Lays Bare Capitalism's Deference to Profits over Lives published by The International Humanist-Marxist Organization at https://imhojournal.org/articles/covid-19-lays-bare-capitalisms-deference-toprofits-over-lives/ [7] Kevin B. Anderson, Peter Hudis, Jens Johansson, Karel Ludenhoff, Lilia D. Monzo, "Where to Begin? Growing Seeds of Liberation in a World Torn Asunder". [8] See the story of Sitio San Roque in Quezon City at https://www.cnnphilippines.com/news/2020/4/1/quezon-city-protesters-arrested-.html and at https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2020/04/06/2005868/conducting-dialogue-cops-raid-sanroque-community-kitchens-tear-protest-materials [9] See https://www.cctwincities.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Key-10-Principles-of-CST_1pager.pdf [10] See https://cbcpnews.net/cbcpnews/cbcp-pastoral-guidelines-for-discerning-the-moraldimension-of-the-present-day-moves-for-charter-change/ [11] Kevin B. Anderson, Peter Hudis, Jens Johansson, Karel Ludenhoff, Lilia D. Monzo, "Where to Begin? Growing Seeds of Liberation in a World Torn Asunder". [12] Laurence Cox, "Learning in movements: how do we think about what we are doing?," Interface: a journal for and about social movements, Volume 11(2):91-105 (December 2019) (https://www.interfacejournal.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Interface-11-2-full-PDF.pdf).


Philosophy

University of Windsor Scholarship at UWindsor Electronic Theses and Dissertations 1989 A cognitively oriented examination of belief perseverance. Michael David. Kurak University of Windsor Follow this and additional works at: http://scholar.uwindsor.ca/etd This online database contains the full-text of PhD dissertations and Masters' theses of University of Windsor students from 1954 forward. These documents are made available for personal study and research purposes only, in accordance with the Canadian Copyright Act and the Creative Commons license-CC BY-NC-ND (Attribution, Non-Commercial, No Derivative Works). Under this license, works must always be attributed to the copyright holder (original author), cannot be used for any commercial purposes, and may not be altered. Any other use would require the permission of the copyright holder. Students may inquire about withdrawing their dissertation and/or thesis from this database. For additional inquiries, please contact the repository administrator via email (firstname.lastname@example.com) or by telephone at 519-253-3000ext. 3208. Recommended Citation Kurak, Michael David., "A cognitively oriented examination of belief perseverance." (1989). Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 530. http://scholar.uwindsor.ca/etd/


Review of Susan James, Spinoza on Philosophy, Religion, and Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012)

Philosophy

College of Arts and Letters Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2012.11.25 Author Susan James Spinoza on Philosophy, Religion, and Politics: The TheologicoPolitical Treatise Published: November 25, 2012 Susan James, Spinoza on Philosophy, Religion, and Politics: The Theologico-Political Treatise, Oxford University Press, 2012, 348pp., $55.00 (hbk), ISBN 9780199698127. Reviewed by Yitzhak Y. Melamed, The Johns Hopkins University Spinoza's Tractatus Theologico Politicus appeared anonymously in 1670. The identity of the author became known shortly after its publication, and the work made Spinoza one of the most notorious spirits hovering under the skies of Europe. To this very day, Spinoza retains his reputation as an iconoclast. Yet, in spite of the great interest and respect Spinoza's metaphysics has recently gained among analytic philosophers, his political philosophy has failed to achieve any such esteem. Prima facie, this may seem quite surprising, since Spinoza's political theory is far bolder, and arguably more sophisticated, than that of Hobbes or Locke. But the reasons for this neglect are not difficult to pin down. First, you have Spinoza's ironic style and habit of writing between the lines, which make it somewhat hard to rephrase his claims by "if and only if" formulae (though I would not assign much weight to this issue). Then, you have the seizure of the discourse on Spinoza's political philosophy by Leo Strauss and his crowd during the 1970s and 1980s. Typically, Strauss turned Spinoza into an Athenian in Jerusalemite garb, and presented him as attempting to employ the masses in the service of the secret elites. While Strauss was right to stress the multi-layered style in Spinoza's writing (a style that was quite transparent to Spinoza's contemporaries), he reduced Spinoza's claims to a childish game of secret societies and a gross dichotomy between faith and reason. Over the past two decades there has been a somewhat opposite trend, and some scholars have attempted to turn Spinoza into a late twentieth-century liberal democrat, advocating separation of church and state, freedom of expression, and even gender equality. I will spare the reader a listing of the absurdities of this view, but let me just suggest that Spinoza's political thought may not fit well into our categories. Spinoza clearly has some conservative tendencies (he was strongly averse to any political upheavals), yet other elements in his theory anticipate Marxist and Nietzschean views (such as the identification of right and power, namely, the view of morality as a superstructure grounded in power relations). Against this background, Susan James's new book is a fresh and welcome contribution. Essentially, it is an attempt to explicate and contextualize the Theologico-Political Treatise. James's style is elegant, and her reading of Spinoza's text is both perceptive and thorough. The twelve chapters of her book follow the order of the topics discussed in the twenty chapters of the TTP (roughly one book chapter per two chapters of the TTP). In her introduction, James explains her methodology by pointing out that "in order to follow Spinoza, and to grasp the significance of his claims, it is not enough to explicate the text: one must also set it in the context of the sequence of theological and political debates to which he is contributing" (4). Though not myself a card-carrying member of the contextualist school, I believe that at least in the case of the TTP this attitude is quite fruitful and apt for a rather simple reason. The most salient feature of the text (as James points out) is its polemical nature, and it is hard to grasp the full meaning of a Spinoza on Philosophy, Religion, and Politics: The Theologico-... http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/35808-susan-james-spinoza-on-philoso... 1 of 3 11/26/12 11:56 AM claim made as part of a debate when that claim is abstracted from its setting. Obviously, this interpretative attitude makes the decision about the proper context for understanding the book utterly critical. James views the TTP as a book targeting primarily late seventeenth-century conservative Dutch Calvinism, and she is clearly right. The rhetorical devices Spinoza employs in the book make clear that its intended audience is neither Jews nor Catholics. But James interestingly suggests that, in spite of this historical grounding, the book should not be read merely as an "active theological-political intervention in the politics of its time," but also as a work which "yields insights of general philosophical interest, bearing on our own predicament as much as that of the Dutch state in the second half of the seventeenth century" (6). Indeed, recent events both in Europe and in the United States show that many of the problems addressed in Spinoza's book are still with us. Consider, for example, the recent decision in Switzerland (presumably a modern, liberal state) to ban the building of minarets, or the even more recent court ruling in Germany prohibiting circumcision. In explicating the claims of the TTP, James weaves in many additional texts: Spinoza's Ethics and letters, the works of other early modern political and religious theorists (such as Calvin, Grotius, Hobbes, Voetius, and Cunaeus), and classical sources. The fact that James hardly ever discusses Spinoza's Political Treatise -a work written just a few years after the publication of the TTP and addressing many of the same issues -is salient. Presumably, James wished to secure the historical integrity of the TTP, but since she does address the Ethics (which was published simultaneously with the Political Treatise in 1677), this practice is somewhat surprising. One of the impressive features of the book is its erudition. James discusses numerous contemporary sources, by both major and minor figures, in a manner that truly illuminates Spinoza's claims. But it is precisely against this background that James's discussion of Jewish and biblical sources is quite disappointing. About three-quarters of the TTP addresses the nature and authority of the Bible (in the rest of the book Spinoza presents his political theory and his views on the relation between church and state). Thus, it is simply impossible to analyze the Treatise adequately without a proper understanding of the biblical text and its hermeneutic history. Regrettably, James's book contains many factual errors when addressing these issues (most of these errors could have been picked up by a good editor). For example, she writes that in 1666 "a charismatic Ashkenazi Jew from Smyrna called Shabbetai Zevi had arrived in Amsterdam" (41), even though Shabbetai Zevi was not Ashkenazi, nor did he ever set a foot in Amsterdam, or anywhere west of Greece. (It is quite intriguing to speculate how dramatically the course of Dutch and western European Jewry might have changed had Shabbetai Zevi traveled to Amsterdam, but this is a mere imaginary exercise). Similarly, James refers to an alleged biblical scene "when Pharaoh tells Daniel" (48), conflating figures from two unrelated narratives. Later she describes how "Isaiah [!] struck a rock with his staff and water flowed out of it" (62) (this confusion is apparently a misreading of Spinoza's comment (III/94) on Isaiah 48:21). Let me note in passing that errors of this kind (and even worse) are quite common in recent scholarship and even translations of the TTP. Do these errors undermine the scholarly achievement of James's book? Probably not. I did not come across any place where she bases a major interpretative claim on such a mistake. Still, this leaves the reader with an impression that the author's command of the biblical text is unequal to her impressive knowledge of early modern literature. In the case of the TTP, this is an undesirable position, since Spinoza is quite a manipulative and creative interpreter, and without good command of his subject matter one is likely to miss many of the subtleties, ironies, and manipulations of the text. James is a very sympathetic reader (and also very fair in her treatment of secondary literature). At times I suspect she is a bit too sympathetic. She accepts Spinoza's characterization of his own method of interpreting the Bible as Spinoza on Philosophy, Religion, and Politics: The Theologico-... http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/35808-susan-james-spinoza-on-philoso... 2 of 3 11/26/12 11:56 AM historical (161). I would take this characterization with a grain of salt (if we take "history" to mean anything close to what we currently understand by the term). Take, for example, Spinoza's notion of "the Pharisees," under which he lumps together his contemporaries in the Jewish community of Amsterdam, as well as early rabbinic figures from the fourth century BCE. Can we make sense of such a historical category? Or should we rather say that this category, which is quite significant in the book, belongs to a certain religious discourse? There are several other issues on which I found myself in disagreement with James. I would, for example, doubt her claim that "the imaginative powers of the prophets . . . enables them to articulate a class of moral truths that are difficult to come by" (63). For Spinoza, the morality preached in the Bible is very simple, and does not require any special talents. The imagination is also not the proper mental capacity for uncovering truths. But, regardless of these disagreements, I would highly recommend James's book. It is a serious and important work in which the author reads Spinoza's text very closely. It uses early modern and classical texts to contextualize Spinoza's work in a very sensitive manner. It is a thoughtful and illuminating work that should become part of the canon of scholarship on Spinoza's Theologico-Political Treatise. Copyright © 2012 ISSN: 1538 1617 College of Arts and Letters Notre Dame, IN 46556 Spinoza on Philosophy, Religion, and Politics: The Theologico-... http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/35808-susan-james-spinoza-on-philoso... 3 of 3 11/26/12 11:56 AM