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The Cultural Contradictions of Democracy:
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A dialogue, which is the highest form of communication we know, is always a confrontation of irreducibly different viewpoints. —Octavio Paz
War and Democracy
Since September 11, 2001, the fog of war has enveloped political thought. Bright hopes of perpetual peace and prosperity collapsed in the debris of the World Trade Center. The fog grew thicker with the invasion of Iraq in 2003, as the nations of the Atlantic alliance collided over policy and principle, law and interests. By the time the postwar in Iraq became a civil war and produced more casualties than the war, the dominoes that neoconservatives dreamed would democratize the Middle East were falling helter-skelter into new uncertainties. On the other side of the debate, the most dire antiwar prophecies seemed exaggerated if not hollow, when Iraqis managed to hold elections for the first time in decades. Neither the advocates nor the opponents of the war in Iraq had any sure insights into the uses of war on behalf of democracy. When, by the fall of 2006, the number of Iraqis being killed every month as a result of civil strife exceeded the number of Americans who had been killed in the September 11 attacks that had supposedly justified the invasion of Iraq, American policy was losing its political as well as moral bearings.
Combatants easily lose their sense of direction in the midst of battle, confuse comrade and foe, mistake progress for setback and setback for advantage, and retreat when on the verge of victory or hurl themselves into certain devastation convinced of their invincibility. Nor does war spare political thought from disorientation and uncertainty. Fundamental questions of war and democracy had scarcely begun to emerge into public awareness after September 11 when they were swept up in the whirlwind of preemptive war in Iraq. Among those fundamental questions are:
What role do arms have in a democracy?
How does military power alter, as well as protect, the polity that uses it?
What is the possibility and even the meaning of the international rule of law?
Can force effectively spread liberty and democracy abroad?
The spectacularly successful interventions that overthrew the Taliban and then Saddam Hussein were quickly compromised by the occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq. A pattern emerged. The United States overestimates the effectiveness of military might and underestimates the ordeal of democracy. Responsibility for the appalling shortcomings of the postwar rebuilding of Afghanistan and Iraq falls squarely on the presidency of George W. Bush—but not exclusively. The crisis runs deeper than any one administration when the world's oldest democracy and sole superpower does not comprehend the wellsprings of democracy or understand the nature of might. Opponents of Bush, neoconservatives, and the Republican Party delude themselves when they are satisfied merely with opposition to administration policy. The fundamental questions of war and democracy are even more difficult to answer today than on September 11, 2001. The threat of terrorism has likely grown rather than shrunk since 2001, and the Middle East has been turned into a laboratory of democracy where any failed experiment risks producing civil war, dictatorship, theocracy, or worse.
Diplomatic and military decisions are prepared and justified by a discourse authored by many hands: historians and ideologues, politicians and journalists, scholars and pundits. A range of discourses, from think-tank manifestos to "Great Power" historiography, from secret reports to presidential speeches, from strategic studies to op-ed pieces, produces the intellectual—but also the symbolic—webbing of the decisions and actions taken in foreign affairs. Since September 11, this symbolic-conceptual webbing has teemed with terms like "lone superpower," "hyperpower," "liberal imperialism," and "progressive interventionism," and slogans like war on terror or power-vs-weakness and Hobbesian-vs-Kantian. All these slogans imply some understanding of power; they all imply, to draw on a distinction made by Hannah Arendt, some understanding of political power and military might. Metaphors as well as ideas are at work in foreign policy discourse, for not only are there conceptions of power—and various methods of analyzing, say, the relative power of states or calculating their interests—but there is also an imagination of power. When it comes to military force no one can truly know how its use will enhance or diminish the power of the state that wields it. Might exists primarily in potential, and therefore it always exists in the imagination.
In liberal democracies all newly elected leaders, all new heads of state, find themselves suddenly in possession of power. And, inversely, they find themselves possessed by power. There is an inescapable ambivalence in the enjoyment of power. Max Weber turned to a bodily image when he identified the greatest of the "inner enjoyments" of the vocation of politics: "the feeling of holding in one's hand a nerve fiber of historically important events."1 To enjoy power—or to be empowered—is at the same time to be enjoyed by power. Having the means of coercion and violence in your grasp puts you in the grip of those very means of coercion and violence. That is why Weber, attentive to the insights of Nietzsche and riveted to the upheavals of war and revolution in his own time, insisted that the ethics of political life must include an awareness of politics' inherent potential for tragedy. Such an awareness alone tempers the intrinsic temptation to a kind of power beyond responsibility.
To become president of the United States in 2001, as happened to George W. Bush, was to find oneself suddenly in possession of power-beyond-responsibility, since the American body politic itself had been in the grip of power in excess of responsibility for a decade. The collapse of the Soviet Union left the United States with unmatched military might. It faced historic questions: For what ends does the nation possess such means of violence? Should this nation, or any nation, have unmatched military might? What responsibilities attend overweening power? The body politic never answered these questions or even seriously debated them. There were, of course, many discussions in the government, foreign policy think tanks, and opinion and policy journals, but the presidential campaigns of 1992, 1996, and 2000 avoided the controversy altogether. It became commonplace to refer to the Gulf War as the watershed of the United States's emergence as sole superpower, and politicians and theorists coined such grandiose names for the new era of American supremacy as the New World Order, the end of history, hyperpuissance, Empire. None of the labels took into account the stark fact that the American body politic remained silent and indecisive.
September 11 changed all that, though not because a great national debate finally occurred. Such a debate did not occur. Rather, after the Taliban and al Qaeda were routed in Afghanistan, the Bush administration was emboldened to advance an answer to the historic post–Cold War questions. In the 2002 document called The National Security Strategy of the United States, President Bush called upon the United States to embrace the role of supreme global power. With this appeal came the declaration of America's unique right over other nations, a threefold right to preemptive war, the overthrow of regimes considered hostile, and immunity from treaties and constraints imposed on other nations.
Hobbes versus Kant?
The doctrine of unilateralism and preemption contributed perhaps more than anything else to the showdown between the United States and major European allies, especially France and Germany, in the buildup to the war in Iraq. The U.S.-European divergence seemed neatly to confirm Robert Kagan's diagnosis that "Americans are from Mars and Europeans from Venus." Kagan is a particularly pertinent reference point, since the vision put forth in the Bush doctrine finds its intellectual backing in that strand of contemporary conservative thought represented by Kagan and preoccupied with the theory of "great powers." In his book Of Paradise and Power, which grew out of the essay "Power and Weakness" that stirred considerable discussion in the United States and Europe in the summer of 2002, Kagan ostensibly attempts to explain the markedly different views of Americans and Europeans in foreign affairs, in particular, the American inclination to unilateralism and force and the European preference for internationalism and negotiation in responding to crises: "On the all-important question of power—the efficacy of power, the morality of power, the desirability of power— American and European perspectives are diverging. Europe . . . is entering a post-historical paradise of peace and relative prosperity, the realization of Kant's "Perpetual Peace." The United States, meanwhile, remains mired in history, exercising power in the anarchic Hobbesian world where international laws and rules are unreliable and where true peace and security and the defense and promotion of a liberal order still depend on the possession and use of military might."2 Kagan makes many interesting arguments and observations on U.S.-European relations, all more or less debatable, but it is the axioms that frame his whole discussion which throw a light on the mentality of the Bush administration and its understanding of power and military force. The fundamental axiom is simply a tautology: weak is weak, strong is strong: "When the United States was weak [in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries], it practiced the strategies of indirection, the strategies of weakness; now that the United States is powerful, it behaves as powerful nations do. When the European great powers were strong, they believed in strength and martial glory. Now, they see the world through the eyes of weaker powers. These very different points of view, weak versus strong, have naturally produced differing assessments of threats and of the proper means of addresing threats, and even differing calculations of interest."3 The tautology radiates out into the entire essay as the words nature, normal, perfectly normal, predictable, naturally alight on every aspect of current American policy just to say that a powerful nation does as powerful nations do. Policy flows from might. This axiom, presented by Kagan in the flat, frankly amoral tones of the historian of "great powers," undergirds the moral hyperbole by which the politicians Bush and Cheney justify the ambitious designs of the new National Security Strategy.
Is is it really Kantians versus Hobbesians, Venus versus Mars? Both slogans are catchy, and Kant-versus-Hobbes has even caught on among serious political philosophers. But these oppositions do not hold up philosophically or politically. It is hard to imagine a thinker less venereal than Kant. And, just as strikingly, there is nothing at all martial about Hobbes. For starters, Hobbes fled England during the Civil War and wrote Leviathan in Paris in order to exorcise his horror at the image of civil order breaking down. Such a breakdown exposes a "state of nature" in which every man would have the right to do whatever he deems necessary "for the preservation of his own Nature; that is to say, of his own life." A commonwealth, Hobbes reasoned, arises from the fear of death that pervades the hypothetical state of nature, that is, the "condition of Warre of every one against every one."4
Contrary to Kagan's depiction, Hobbes's view of international relations little resembles that of the neoconservatives. "An anarchic Hobbesian world where international laws and rules are unreliable" is in fact not Hobbesian at all. Hobbes considered states to be less prone to violence than individuals, primarily because a ruler has responsibility for the peace and security of his subjects, and thus was inclined in Hobbes's view to be measured in assessing when their benefit and general welfare was best served by war or conquest.
Although Hobbes's ideas do not truly support the neoconservatives' vision of power, there is surely something that prompts Kagan and others aptly to consider the Bush doctrine Hobbesian. What stirs their imagination is the image of the body politic as leviathan. This image evokes something that is conveyed less in Hobbes's own words than in the famous engraving that graced the first edition of Leviathan. The monarch, his body composed of nothing but the multitude of his subjects, a scepter in one hand and a sword in the other, wearing a crown, rises above the land, whose gently rolling hills and little villages are at once the realm his outstretched arms protect and a kind of robe spread out around him. The undulations of the hills also suggest the waves that are the element in which the biblical leviathan lives. For the leviathan, as Melville well knew, is a sea monster, the whale as grasped in the ancient Hebrew imagination. There, in the more symbolic stew of Hobbes's thought, where body politic, sea monster, and monarch blend together, the Anglo-Saxon political imagination has found, precisely, an image of state power. The state is a monster, the One preventing the anarchy of the Many, that floats unperturbed in the sea or sails the oceans of the world to keep its multitude at peace, prosperous, and safe. That Britain—the island commonwealth, the commonwealth as island—would imagine the body politic a great sea monster makes nearly immediate sense. Hobbes has not, however, enjoyed extensive influence on American political thought. The American imagination of power has historically been more isolationist (the stay-at-home leviathan of the Monroe Doctrine) and territorial (the land-bound behemoth of Manifest Destiny). So how has the Hobbesian image come to fit America?
In a news conference in April 2004, as Iraq was being shaken by the simultaneous insurgencies of Sunnis in Falluja and militia loyal to Moktada al-Sadr in the Shiite South, and as the 9–11 Commission was probing how much warning the administration had prior to the al Qaeda attacks, President Bush uttered, as though revealing something for the first time, an astonishing anachronism. "We can no longer hope," he declared, "that oceans protect us from harm." Americans have, of course, been quite aware that oceans do not protect us from harm ever since 1957, when the Soviets sent the first Sputnik into space and raised the specter of intercontinental ballistic missles raining nuclear warheads on American cities. Bush's own chief preoccupation in defense matters before September 11 had been the renewal of Star Wars, the missile shield project that was predicated on just such vulnerability across oceans. Not only had Americans known for nearly fifty years that the Atlantic and Pacific afforded no guarantee against attack, but the September 11 attacks themselves, though they were an unprecedented assault by foreigners against American civilians at home, did not originate from abroad: the planes all took off on American soil.
Was Bush's anachronism then simply a historical lapsus? Not at all. For what it did, like so many other carefully crafted misstatements and innuendoes of that moment, was to associate the September 11 attacks carried out by al Qaeda with the presumed weapons of mass destruction in the hands of the United States's self-styled enemy Saddam Hussein. The anachronistic image of the protective oceans created a link between September 11 (attack on U.S. soil) and Saddam Hussein (weapons of mass destruction). According to polls, by the time the war in Iraq began 45 percent of Americans believed Saddam Hussein had planned September 11, just as many believed that his missiles with their range of a few hundred kilometers could reach the United States.
The war on terrorism and the war in Iraq had nothing to do with one another. We are engaged in the first because we have to be; we engaged in the second because the Bush administration wanted to, and could. They could because they took office in possession of unmatched military might. The attack on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon showed our vulnerability; the invasion of Iraq was meant to show our superior strength. The illusion of invulnerability that had shattered on September 11 was quickly transformed into an illusion of insuperability in preparation for war in Iraq. Put the two scenarios together and America becomes Hobbesian: the American body politic, no longer unperturbed floating in its oceans, gets transformed in the political imagination into the unvanquishable monster sailing the seas of the world. Shock and awe in Iraq answered, in symbol and fantasy, the shock and awe of September 11. Americans were called upon to see America the global power in leviathan imagery: "When he raiseth up himself, the mighty are afraid. . . . The sword of him that layeth at him cannot hold: the spear, the dart, nor the habergon. . . .Upon earth there is not his like, who is made without fear" (Job 42:25–33).
The new national leviathan, however, hardly seems like one "who is made without fear." After September 11, political leaders and the media cultivated and relentlessly fertilized an all-pervasive fear within the American body politic. The sense of vulnerability and dread often seemed far more intense in the country at large than among the New Yorkers who had actually witnessed the destruction in their own city. Small towns in rural areas believed themselves to be targets in imminent danger when they learned that the federal government was furnishing local authorities with gas masks or special medical supplies. Unlike Roosevelt declaring that the only thing to fear was fear itself or Churchill exhorting Londoners to persevere in the face of the bombings that nightly ravaged their city, President Bush used September 11 to stoke citizens' fear for their lives. The most striking characteristic of the national mood between September 11 and the invasion of Iraq was how this excessive fear was strangely combined with inordinate confidence that military might could guarantee international and national security. Even as the administration purveyed fear and vulnerability, it promised that the army would topple dangerous tyrants armed with weapons of mass destruction and create new democracies. Therein is the mainspring of the administration's pseudo-Hobbesian vision and rhetoric. The national leviathan fuses an all-pervasive amorphous fear of death and an overweening faith in military power.
What are the origins of this combination of fear and hubris? Why was this combination so effective in cementing public opinion in support of the war? The answer undoubtedly has a lot to do with the post-Vietnam demise of a military of citizen-soldiers. Having first professionalized and now increasingly privatized the nation's armed forces, the Pentagon has so separated citizens from soldiers that citizens are free to indulge in debilitating fear while fully expecting their soldiers to bravely conquer all. Another factor is the tendency within contemporary culture to privilege the figure of the victim. Symbolizing oneself as a victim lends an aura of moral rightness, a privileged viewpoint on what is just and unjust—and considerable entitlement and ultimately a certain license. The shock of September 11 was from the beginning nurtured into this dangerous mix of victimage, righteousness, and license. The leviathan motif expresses well the post–September 11 fear. This cultivated fear, this exaggerated yet real fear of death, has been integrated into the symbolic-discursive webbing of foreign policy. A wounded, half-blind leviathan thrashing about in geopolitical seas does not see the fragility of democracy at home and the difficulty of inaugurating it abroad.
The Neoconservative Illusion
The neoconservatives confuse power and might. Hannah Arendt makes the distinction in the sharpest of terms. Power "corresponds to the human ability not just to act but to act in concert." It is utterly distinct from might and violence. Might is the capacity for violence, and violence itself marks the breakdown of power, whether within the polity (where "violence functions as the last resort of power against criminals or rebels—that is, against single individuals who, as it were, refuse to be overpowered by the consensus of the majority") or externally in war, where in fact strength or might does not in itself secure power: "as for actual warfare, we have seen in Vietnam how an enormous superiority in the means of violence can become helpless if confronted with an ill-equipped but well-organized opponent who is much more powerful."5
From the Arendtian standpoint, all the tautologies of the neoconservative hawks exemplified by Robert Kagan's writings are false. Policy does not flow naturally, normally, predictably, from might. The nature of the polity is not immune to the effects of wielding the available means of violence. The unilateral exercise of force does not necessarily defend and protect the polity. That the colossal failure of America's anticommunist foreign policy in Vietnam, which stimulated the creation of neoconservatism in the first place, might turn out to be the very model of their own deepest errors is more than an exquisite irony. It risks becoming a historic tragedy. The consequences of the neoconservatives' conflation of power and might are seen not simply in theory but in practice. The crisis-ridden occupation of Iraq exposed the fundamental flaws in neoconservative thought, especially its Great Power discourse. The neoconservative hawks seem to have seriously believed that once American military might overthrew Iraqi tyranny, Iraqi democracy would spontaneously flower in its place; meanwhile, the more hard-nosed members of the administration assumed, just as naïvely though callously, that a strongman allied with the West could always step in to impose order if need be. The two attitudes resulted in gross negligence when it came to planning the occupation. Defense Department planning, directed by Donald Rumsfeld's undersecretary Douglas Feith, thoroughly ignored the need for civil order. The American occupation created the conditions for Hobbesian anarchy inside Iraq. Iraq turned into a breeding ground for Islamic terrorism because it lacked civil order and was awash in weapons and rife with contending factions. The Coalition Provisional Authority headed by L. Paul Bremer III replaced Sad-dam Hussein's rogue state with an insecure failed state.
Iraqis owe their tyrant's overthrow to the Americans, but those Iraqis who heroically risked life and limb in an effort to salvage a democratic path owe Americans little else. For months on end after the invasion, Iraqis were driven to arm themselves and ally, often unwillingly, with militias or mullahs in the face of absolute uncertainty over their own safety. They felt the naked insecurity of the state of nature. The millions who exercised their right to vote under threat of death added a new and poignant symbol to democratic imagery—and, indeed, to the Hobbesian image-bank too: their ink-stained fingers are forever an emblem of individuals mastering the fear of death in order to create a civil order that might protect them all. What these Iraqis have Rumsfeld and Bush, Feith and Bremer, to thank for is leaving them unprotected. Fear and death swirled around their first election and continued to plague their civil covenant.
The neoconservative understanding of power also fails to comprehend that the might which a democracy possesses and uses can flow back—or blow back—to alter the very nature of its own democratic institutions. The neoconservatives conceive of the nation's liberal order and rule of law as an unalterable internal feature of American democracy, while armed force is simply the means of protecting the nation against external threats. The illusion that American democracy itself cannot be harmed by the might it wields abroad has proved costly. Consenting to war is the most serious decision that citizens have to make. When the reasons by which citizens are persuaded to give their consent are, as with Iraq, erroneous (weapons of mass destruction) and deceptive (Iraqi ties to al Qaeda), the very fabric of democratic deliberation is damaged. The insistence that the errors and deceptions did not ultimately matter, since the result was good, even further undermined the very principle of accountability; a re-elected George Bush retained or promoted all the officials most responsible for the errors and deceptions. The posture that right-or-wrong we are right weakened the value put on truth in public affairs; the administration successfully fostered, with the help of the Fox-led media, a hatred of dissent, all the more intensely when the dissenters accurately exposed administration falsehoods. The willful distortion of international and domestic law through enemy combatants, detainees, homeland security, coercive interrogations, extraordinary rendition eroded civil liberties and the rule of law at home just as it severely damaged the United States's moral standing abroad. And the transformation of the border into a digital fortress that indiscriminately makes every visitor and immigrant a suspect has estranged the very foreigners most likely to value the United States as a symbol and example of a democratic way of life. So many essential features of American democracy—open deliberative politics, a public sphere valuing debate and truthfulness, due process, the furnishing of a symbolic and real haven of freedom for people around the globe—have been strained and damaged by the use of force in Iraq.
The reassuring view that arms are merely the instrument of a secure democracy in an insecure world is the fateful illusion at the heart of American policy. This illusion has its pseudo-Hobbesian variation in Kagan's equation of political power and military might in the amoral language of Great Power discourse, and it has its romantic-messianic variation in Bush's rhetoric of the axis of evil, the forward strategyof freedom, the end of evil, and so on. In calling this vision of foreign affairs an illusion, I have in mind the sense that Freud gave to the term in The Future of an Illusion, namely, an account of reality that coincides with what one wishes reality to be. An illusion in this sense is not necessarily demonstrably false, but wherever reality seems to coincide with one's wishes, doubt and skepticism ought to precede action, especially when the action is making war.
The Frailty of Human Affairs
It is almost impossible for Americans to entertain the idea that their democracy might be fragile. The political system after all has endured for 220 years under the same Constitution. The duration perhaps fosters a false sense of continuity, since there may well be as many discontinuities as continuities between the United States of 1787 and today. Moreover, American democracy has been dramatically depleted or renewed at crucial moments in its history. The 1850s were the darkest decade in America's political life; the crisis that was leading to the Civil War revealed that neither of the great strands of American democratic values, neither liberalism nor republicanism, could light a path to the end of slavery. The 1960s were a moment of extraordinary democratic renewal, though the conservative opinion on the ascendancy today looks back and sees cultural and moral decline. The civil rights movement overturned apartheid in America by using civil disobedience to extend fundamental rights, including voting rights, to blacks, and the antiwar movement initiated another innovation in citizenship as young people organized to protest the purposes and effects of a war they were called upon to fight in; these movements in turn inspired a new wave of feminism and the creation of movements for gay rights. Democratic renewal lay in the innovation of rights and invention of freedoms. The upheavals of the 1850s and the 1960s are a reminder that even the most durable democracy undergoes erosions and needs reinaugurations.
Hannah Arendt relates the inherent fragility of democracy to the frailty of human affairs, but she also ties this frailty and fragility to the wellsprings of human creativity and political inventiveness. The Greeks founded their polis, she argues, in response to the frailty of what they most valued in their pre-polis experience for "mak[ing ] it worthwhile for men to live together (syzen), namely, the 'sharing of words and deeds' [Aristotle]." The polis was "to multiply the chances for everybody to distinguish himself, to show in deed and word who he was in his unique distinctness." And secondly it was "to offer a remedy for the futility of action and speech; for the chances that a deed deserving fame would not be forgotten, that it actually would become immortal, were not very good." The polis was the boundaried, organized, sheltering space where individuals' words and deeds could appear and endure. The bid for immortality paradoxically rendered the polis itself mortal: "One, if not the chief, reason for the incredible development of gift and genius in Athens, as well as the hardly less surprising swift decline of the city-state, was precisely that from beginning to end its foremost aim was to make the extraordinary an ordinary occurrence of everyday life."6
The Athenian paradox illuminates a dynamic of the political realm in general, namely, that its power and its fragility have the same source. The human gathering that lets speech and action appear, that is, manifest themselves publicly, to those that gather and participate defines power in the Arendtian sense: "Power is what keeps the public realm, the potential space of appearance between acting and speaking men, in existence." Forms of government in her definition are "the various forms in which the public realm can be organized." A political community depends on "the unreliable and only temporary agreement of many wills and intentions." Therein lies at once the power and the fragility of political community: "[Power's] only limitation is the existence of other people, but this limitation is not accidental, because human power corresponds to the condition of plurality to begin with. For the same reason, power can be divided without decreasing it, and the interplay of powers with their checks and balances is even liable to generate more power, so long, at least, as the interplay is alive and has not resulted in a stalemate."7 If a body politic endures, it is not because there is anything unalterable in its institutions and values, but because this pluralistic agreement is continually replenished, renewed, reinaugurated.
Conversely, the body politic becomes more fragile with every separation of decision and participation, every undoing of checks and balances, and every divergence of word and deed. These temptations are all the more insidious because they so easily mask themselves as ways of enhancing power, especially for a political communty in the thrall of fear and the fog of war—as when the president usurps the judiciary and its principles to better "protect" the American people, or when the Congress abdicates its role in determining the legitimate cause for war and scrutinizing the conduct of war, or when the press lets itself be embedded in the war machine, or when the Supreme Court refuses to shield reporters from the government and thereby shields government from reporters. Arendt once more: "Power is actualized only where word and deed have not parted company, where words are not empty and deeds not brutal, where words are not used to veil intentions but to disclose realities, and deeds are not used to violate and destroy but to establish relations and create new realities."8
Crises of the Republic
Mindful of the extraordinary legacy of Arendt's political thought, I hope to preserve something of her spirit of inquiry and interpretation in the following chapters. Trying to reflect on the crises of the republic in the midst of those crises is an abrupt reminder that political thought never enjoys a firm grounding. Such intellectual ideals as the unity of theory and practice, the proceduralist commitment to philosophically justified norms, or the pragmatist belief in shared values and tested methods all prove rather feeble when it comes to understanding a democracy at war. The difficulties are all the more acute because the crises of the American republic since September 11 have disguised themselves by masquerading as the self-assured, democracy-protecting, faith-soaked assertion of national strength. The temptations to deception and self-deception are always great in the midst of war, and in some fundamental way they are intrinsic to political life. The public realm, in Arendt's account, is where individuals "disclose themselves as subjects, as distinct and unique persons" through "their deeds and words." It is a space of appearance but not transparence, of self-revealing but not necessarily self-understanding: "Although nobody knows whom he reveals when he discloses himself in deed or word, he must be willing to risk disclosure. . . .It is more than likely that the 'who,' which appears so clearly and unmistakably to others, remains hidden from the person, like the daimon in Greek religion which accompanies each man throughout his life, always looking over his shoulder from behind and thus visible only to those he encounters."9
While Arendt renewed the import of ancient democracy for modern politics, no one revealed the ethical paradoxes of modern politics more penetratingly than Max Weber. Looking at the professional politician's psychological and ethical existence, Weber identifies the enjoyments of this vocation in the "feeling of power" and "knowledge of influencing men." The aptitude for such a career amalgamates "passion" for a cause, "a feeling of responsibility" for the consequences of decisions and actions, and "a sense of proportion." Passion, responsibility, and proportion are, however, perpetually vulnerable to two essential instruments of political power: pretending and violence. Since every politician "works with the striving for power as an unavoidable means," he "is constantly in danger of becoming an actor as well as taking lightly the responsibility for the outcome of his actions and of being concerned merely with the 'impression' he makes." The politician is, moreover, drawn into a realm of recurrent ethical paradox, since at bottom "politics operates with very special means, namely, power backed up by violence." Whoever holds or vies for political power "lets himself in for the diabolical forces lurking in all violence."10
Max Weber and Hannah Arendt are largely irreconcilable thinkers. The sociologist of modernity and the political philosopher of the ancient polis diverge sharply in their understanding of power and violence, and their respective projects are more dissonant than consonant. And yet Weber's thoughts on the vocation and ethics of modern politics and Arendt's on the ancient resources of the modern polis create a productive strife, a meaningful dissonance, for an understanding of democracy at war today. Drawing on the contradictory traditions of democratic thought is in fact vital to political thinking. The plurality and debate so essential to democracy render disputes over the meaning of democracy a feature of democracy itself. Just as I draw on the contradictory ideas of politics and power developed by Weber and Arendt, so too I will adhere to the contradictory ideas of freedom found in Arendt and Isaiah Berlin. Arendt's supreme value is self-rule through participation in a body politic, that is, in government; Berlin's supreme value is the individual's freedom from the constraints of others and especially government, that is, the body politic. Therein lies the permanent clash between the civic and the liberal dimensions of modern democracy. As American democracy plunged into war, it fused its justifications for self-defense with the ambition to overthrow tyrannies and spread democracy. Its understanding of self-rule, liberty, and power is at stake in these acts and justifications, just as the acts and justifications are at stake in the understanding of self-rule, liberty, and power.
What then is the vantage point from which I undertake the work that follows? I consider the war against terrorism a necessity in which the democratic world will be engaged for several years. The overthrow of the Taliban in Afghanistan was in my view a justified and measured response to September 11. Moreover, I do not think that the invasion of Iraq to overthrow Saddam Hussein was immoral or illegal. It was, however, ill-advised and ill-conceived, and the failure to secure civil order in Iraq was unconscionable. American arrogance was matched by American ignorance. However, "withdrawal," "exit," and "bring the troops home" are the empty slogans of an antiwar movement without a vision of what role the United States needs to play in the Middle East. American policy under Bush has probably spread terrorism more than democracy and intensified rather than diminished international insecurity. By the same token, the status quo ante in the Middle East was untenable, and Islam's geo-civil war could not, and cannot, simply be "contained" on the Cold War model of containing communism.
I also start with the premise that while the flaws in American policy are decidedly the responsibility of the Bush administration, their source lies deep within the body politic itself. Overestimating the effectiveness of military force, Americans dangerously disregard the fragility of democracy at home and the ordeal of democracy abroad. Such disregard for the conditions of democratic life compounds the bad judgments made in Iraq and elsewhere. The next administration can easily temper Bush's brashness and de-emphasize unilateralism, and it is certainly unlikely to look forward to invading and occupying any other country in the axis of evil. The next president might even boldly shut down Guantánamo and undo all the executive orders that have permitted false imprisonment, torture, and "rendition." But will a new president and administration know how to pursue the war against terrorism without exacerbating the breeding grounds and motives of terrorism? Will they know how to lead the world's democracies' response to Islam's geo-civil war without ultimately simply aligning with the friendliest autocrats capable of repressing the restless Muslim masses? Will they know how to repair the American commitment to the rule of law and civil liberty enough to rescue America's standing as an inspiration for those who aspire to freedom and self-rule?
In taking democracy at war as my theme, I am looking to understand how political thought faces the difficult questions prompted by September 11 and the war in Iraq. These two unprecedented events have forced new avenues of inquiry and interpretation. Al Qaeda's September 11 attacks were an act of war by a nonstate actor, whereas political thought and foreign policy have long understood war as armed conflict between states or, in civil war, within a state. Unsettled questions abound concerning sovereignty, the meaning of the "war against terrorism," and its sources of legitimacy. The invasion and occupation of Iraq were no less unprecedented than September 11. The United States under George W. Bush not only justified the invasion of another country on the grounds of overthrowing tyranny and spreading democracy, but did so under the banner of unilateralism and preemption and in effect as a display of its own global supremacy. This step onto uncertain terrain was taken without public deliberation and decision, for even though the invasion itself had overwhelming public support, the reasons for going to war in Iraq were to overcome the impending if not imminent danger of its weapons of mass destruction and to sever its ties with Islamic terrorism. There were no weapons of mass destruction and no link existed between Iraq and Islamic terrorism until the American invasion and occupation created one. Whether the overthrow of tyranny and inauguration of democracy were the real motive of the invasion all along or the rationale retrofitted to an intervention that lost its original justification or, as is most likely, some mix of the two, the United States has been firmly set on a course in which the spreading of democracy is now the principal justification of its foreign policy, and the precedent of unilateral preemptive intervention remains for the moment unchallenged.
This situation poses a major question with which political thought is now grappling: Is there a vision of foreign policy uniquely suited to democracy? I myself am extremely skeptical—and often alarmed—when it comes to various efforts to claim a kind of organic connection between democracy at home and policy abroad. The post–Cold War swing of the pendulum away from Realpolitik as practiced by Nixon and Kissinger was undoubtedly an advance; their policies were often diabolic in outcome (as in Cambodia) or in intention (as in Chile), and the end of the Cold War certainly opened the possibility of a more principled adherence to political ideals. Nevertheless, I am going to question at various points the different visions of foreign policy as an organic extension of democracy. I have already begun to criticize how the neoconservatives' version of American exceptionalism promotes military supremacy as the natural way for a democracy to sustain and protect its liberal order at home. More idealistic visions of democracy's rightful recourse to violence as a means of spreading democracy have also been articulated. Paul Berman, for example, looks to weld liberal idealism to American military supremacy and make the elimination of tyranny the guiding principle of foreign affairs. Against neoconservative and liberal efforts to synthesize military might and democratic ideals, Jürgen Habermas advances the idea of cosmopolitanism. He envisions another kind of organic relation between democracy and foreign affairs, arguing that the rule-governed, deliberative democratic state should be the model for the international order just as it has been for the transnational order of the European Union. Where Robert Kagan foresees the American leviathan endlessly lashing out to destroy enemies of its democratic commonwealth, Habermas advocates a postnational order whose ultimate goal would be to transform action against terrorists, rogue states, and criminal cartels into the policing of a "global domestic policy."
Democracy at war stirs turmoil in political thought because the very aim of the internal workings of a democracy is to eliminate or transcend the use of force. Its institutions sustain that "unreliable and only temporary agreement of many wills and intentions" in which the democratic mentality delights. Neither military action abroad nor national-security measures at home foster such delight. On the contrary, military action stirs profound uncertainty, and security measures introduce the risk that the steps taken to protect democracy will dessicate its very values and institutions. By the same token, any realistic assessment of the threats and dangers posed by terrorism, rogue states, and weapons of mass destruction confirms that the security of democratic nations requires concerted action on the international scene backed by the capacity and willingness to use force. It all depends on judgment, and one role that political thought ought to play in the political life of a democracy is to broaden and enrich the capacity for judgment.
The Argument
My intention in the course of writing this book has been to probe the drama of political thought in the face of the war against terrorism, the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, and occupation of Iraq. In each chapter, the uncertain events of contemporary history are measured against, and are used to measure, the ideas that animate democratic traditions and political debate:
"Seized by Power": From his days as governor in Texas to his role as commander in chief, George W. Bush embraced politics as vocation by eschewing rather than assuming responsibility. The ideological architects of his foreign policy were likewise seduced by the power-beyondresponsibility of American military might. As the United States has attempted to confront radical Islamism's "ethic of ultimate ends"under the aegis of neoconservative ideas and democratic messianism, it has put its own democratic "ethic of responsibility" at risk.
"The Imagination of Power": The view that American global power exemplifies the "state of exception" as developed in the ideas of Carl Schmitt and Giorgio Agamben has been taken up with renewed intensity after the scandal of Abu Ghraib and Guantánamo. I argue that the conception of sovereignty that emerges from Agamben's appropriation of the Nazi jurist's theory of power is a deceptively appealing criticism of the modern state and a symptom of the malaise of contemporary "radical" political thought.
"September 11 and Fables of the Left": Beyond the ill-tempered response of some leftists immediately after the terrorist attacks against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the unprecedented confrontation between Western democracy and Islamic radicalism has brought out how thoroughly the political judgment and imagination of the so-called Left is limited by its underlying sensibility now that the world is no longer defined by the polarities of the Cold War. The faultlines of this sensibility become discernible in Noam Chomsky's moral absolutism and Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri's prophetic lyricism.
"Iraq: Delirium of War, Delusions of Peace": The claims of American unilateralism and the invasion of Iraq unleashed intellectual and diplomatic disputes that suggest that no simple dichotomy of Left and Right explains international politics. Leftists are split on questions of values as well as strategy. Paul Berman's defense of the war in Iraq evoked an idealism of ends (and the supreme value of freedom from tyranny), while Jürgen Habermas's opposition to the war drew on an idealism of means (and the supreme value of the international rule of law). The very idea of an international rule of law in the framework of the United Nations was, by the same token, belittled from the neoconservative perspective of Michael J. Glennon and the neo-Marxist perspective of Perry Anderson. On the diplomatic scene, the Atlantic alliance was shaken by the dispute that pitted Germany and France against the United States and Britain. In scrutinizing this dispute, it becomes apparent that it derived from a complex weave of principles and interests, not a clearcut division between Kantian peacemakers and Hobbesian warriors. Moreover, even as the justifications for the war were soon exposed as unfounded and erroneous, many of the premises of peace—including the effectiveness of sanctions—turned out to have strengthened rather than challenged Saddam Hussein's tyranny.
"The Ordeal of Universalism": While the neoconservatives' freedom-versus-tyranny theme and Habermas's postnational cosmpolititanism have the look of a sharp Right-Left dichotomy, neither adequately grasps the international conflicts it is supposed to address. Islam, which is often said to be engaged in a civil war, is embroiled rather in a geopolitical civil war. American policy ran aground in Iraq because it misunderstood this geo-civil war and then exacerbated it by neglecting to secure the country after the invasion. The grand project of overthrowing a tyrant in order to initiate democracies throughout the Muslim world yielded, instead, a civil war within Iraq itself that drew terrorists from all over the world, strengthened the radical regime in Iran, and trained suicide bombers to be sent back to London. As alternatives to the Bush doctrine are sought by Western thinkers and politicians, the interpretation of Europe's postwar project has become crucial. Is it the delusional Kantian paradise caricatured by Kagan or the beginnings of the "global domestic policy" idealized by Habermas? Or is it, as I argue, an innovative political body—an Empire of Rights—that is still reluctant to embrace its own transformative ambitions? In light of Islam's geo-civil war and Europe's halting project of extending democracy and capitalism, I challenge Walter Russell Mead's vision of a global neoliberal religious conservatism that would unite the capitalist West and conservative Islam.
"Prelude to the Unknown": Admittedly, this is an equivocal title for a conclusion, but it is true I think to the fact that as American ambitions in Iraq have faltered, the global situation of terrorism, geo-civil war, and tyranny is more desperately than ever in need of vigorous responses. Have the failings in Iraq and elsewhere squandered the very idea that freedom and democracy be the guideposts of American foreign policy? Or, conversely, might the rich tradition of ideas of self-rule (Arendt's positive liberty) and individual freedom (Berlin's negative liberty), both of which affirm human plurality, serve as a language of political criticism for assessing the failures and dilemmas of American policy itself?
Threaded throughout the book is a reflection on two political thinkers, Hobbes and Kant, whose ideas are as irreconcilable as those of Arendt, Weber, and Berlin. The evocation of Hobbes and Kant in debates over American foreign policy has simplified and warped the relation between their respective ideas; irreconcilable though they are, Hobbes and Kant do not conform to the current caricatures, and their relevance for the dilemmas and problems of the present can be startlingly unexpected, when it is recognized that Hobbes's thought hinges just as much on the body politic's founding covenant as on the war of all against all, and that Kant puts the darkness of human nature at the very heart of his reflection on perpetual peace.
The idealistic fervor and self-confident messianism that have infused American declarations of an armed crusade for democracy betray a dangerous disregard for the prospect of tragedy that Weber said inevitably accompanies politics when it turns to violence as a means for achieving its ends. The denial of tragedy amounts to a denial of responsibility. Not just moral responsibility, but ultimately political responsibility. Consider the silence regarding civilian casualties in Iraq. The United States made no effort to estimate civilian deaths, or even to assist Iraqis in accounting for their dead. Neither the press nor the Democrats insisted that an invading force and occupying power had such an obligation and duty. The gross negligence should arouse the intensest moral outrage, but also patriotic outrage. Our country has gone to war not wanting to know what it does. From the day of the invasion right through the destruction and depopulating of Falluja and beyond, America's leaders, its press, its representatives, its public—in short, ourselves—have indulged in this cowardly wanting-not-to-know. The silence is a form of lying. But the deception may be nearer self-deception than deceit. For it is well-known in much of the world that America does not have the courage to take a real look at the destructiveness of its own acts. The country's prevaricating silence on the tens of thousands of Iraqis killed is all the starker when juxtaposed to the exaggerated and vociferous fear of death in the United States since September 11. There is no reliable calculus for measuring what damage this kind of irresponsibility does to American interests abroad and the spirit of American democracy at home.
Political decisions and military actions are often thoroughly justified even though they violate valid moral standards. This is why, as Weber argued, politicians and statesmen must take responsibility for the foreseeable consequences of their decisions. A body politic incapable of accepting responsibility for politically justified but morally wrong acts cannot long operate effectively on the stage of world affairs. A body politic that wants not to know the harm it does loses its capacity to judge how its use of force accords with its political goals. How long before such refusal of responsibility and loss of judgment destroy the legitimacy of the foreign policy itself? I do not pose this question in order to launch into a jeremiad. Nor can the question be answered empirically. A body politic seldom has the benefit of reliable warning lights. A different metaphor is perhaps more apt. The body politic's institutions and, in Montesquieu's phrase, the spirit of its laws are its skeleton. Silence, lying, Orwellian misnaming, hypocrisy and hubris, negligence and bravado, wanting-not-to-know: these are all processes that resorb a democracy, ravaging the bones at a rate that is unfelt and unseen.
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Bridge nears completion as festival approaches
Bridge nears completion as festival approaches
MERIDEN — The new bridge at the exit of Hubbard Park is nearing completion and expected to be ready for the start of the Daffodil Festival, which has preliminary activities beginning this weekend.
The bridge at the West Main Street exit of Hubbard Park was closed in early January due to concerns that it had been failing in recent years. The bridge had noticeably sunken and a long-term fix was needed, said Parks and Recreation Director Mark Zebora.
LaRosa Construction Co. has been working for close to a month to build a new bridge along Notch Road. Also included in the project are site work, drainage improvements and the installation of a culvert. Part of the contract stipulated that the project had to be completed by the start of the festival.
"If it was not going to rain (today), they would be out there paving," Zebora said. "They will pave on Wednesday and then they just have to put the railing up on the east side of the bridge and (the railing) has already been ordered."
The total cost of the bridge project is expected to be $90,500, according to a quote submitted by LaRosa to the city's Purchasing Department. Because of time constraints, the city requested quotes from four companies for the project and received two responses. The other response came from Meriden-based D&V Morin Construction and the estimate was for $99,500.
City Councilor Cathy Battista said she drove to the park to check on progress Monday, but was unsure how close the project was to completion.
"I think it's going to get done, but I couldn't believe how much it looked like they have left to do," Battista said. "But they have done a lot of work."
Since the Festival of Lights ended, Notch Road has been blocked from the parking lot across from the swimming pool to the exit. A detour has taken motorists passed the pool and toward Reservoir Road where they can navigate through the neighborhood.
With the Daffodil Festival nearing, motorists have been required to turn left onto Notch Road and follow Reservoir Avenue out of the park, to the north of the park's playground.
The Daffodil Festival's first round of events are scheduled to begin this weekend with a tag sale and fishing derby scheduled for Saturday. Next week, the Little Miss Daffodil contest will be held, in addition to the full festival next weekend, with other events scattered throughout the week.
firstname.lastname@example.com 203-317-2266 Twitter: @DanBrechlinRJ
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By Geoff Unger
From: Moab, UT
Dec 16, 2010
|This must be an old photo. The underclings he is grabbing are now sitting on the ground covering his bouldering pad. According to local Lisa Hathaway, it only to 'light pressure' to bring all of those flakes crashing down. Tons and tons of rock. Now the giant slabs are good places to sit as opposed to good underclings.
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I have always used Martha Stewarts Sugar Cookie Recipe but I have heard so much about the No Fail Sugar Cookies so I gave it a try twice. I'm sorry to all of you No Fail Cookies Fans but I prefer Martha's. I think hers' just taste so much better. There's no spreading problems as with the No Fail and I though the No Fail cookies were too soft. I used the No Fail to make cookie bouquets and they were so soft that they just broke on the stick. So far Martha's are doing great. Just my opinion. If you'd like to try her cookies here's a thread
Nothing wrong with that. The No-Fails won't spread if the dough is kept cold. If they were breaking then you probably needed to bake them longer, I had that problem at first as well.
I made one of Martha's chocolate cut outs and they were extremely dry. I tried one this week but I can't remember from where and they are dry, too; definitely need icing but I still can't find a *good* chocolate cookie. I am trying one from Nestle and if that doesn't work, then I don't know.
YES I am still on strike!
Zamode - The roll out chocolate cookie recipe from kitchengifts.com is wonderful!!!
Isakov, yes, I have been using that one last few times that I did make cookies--it is the best so far but still a wee bit dry for me. I think I may change to a different kind of cocoa to see if it helps. Everyone likes them, though.
it's all a matter of presonal taste, I think. I used to use Martha's cut out cookie recipe. Then I tried the no-fail several months ago, and I never went back to Martha's recipe! I think the no-fail is easier to work with and keeps it's shape better.
Yes, it is interesting the different opinions. I think Martha's works well. It doesn't spread either and before it's even frosted I just can't stop eating them! With the No Fail, I had one and was done (maybe that's a good thing as far as weight control is concerned). I think I'll stick with Martha's, it works for me.
it's all a matter of presonal taste, I think. I used to use Martha's cut out cookie recipe. Then I tried the no-fail several months ago, and I never went back to Martha's recipe! I think the no-fail is easier to work with and keeps it's shape better.
I agree. I tried the Martha's this evening because of this topic and I like No Fail muchhhh better. The family agreed that the No Fail tasted better and I like the texture better. When I put Martha's dough in the freezer for a few minutes to get ready to cut the dough-it just wasn't as easy to work with. Also, the cookies 'flattened' after cooling and was 'crunchy'-I like the No Fail's soft texture and the tops don't get that 'sweaty'-look texture to them. I am definately going to stick with the No Fails. It's all personal preference and what works for one may not for another....


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Top Administration Official Responsible for Law's Implementation Repeatedly Tells Subcommittee, "I Think We Have to Wait and See" What Costs Will Be
WASHINGTON, DC – The Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, chaired by Rep. Tim Murphy (R-PA), today held a hearing on "The Center for Consumer Information and Insurance Oversight (CCIIO) and the Implementation of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act." With the January 1, 2014, deadline for full implementation of the president's health care law rapidly approaching, the subcommittee heard from CCIIO Director Gary Cohen, who leads the agency responsible for implementation of the law.
"The American people have been promised good coverage that is also affordable. We all remember the many promises that were made in the rush to pass the PPACA by any means necessary. That if you liked your coverage you could keep it. Yet, we see many stories about impending doctor shortages, and companies faced with the tough decision of whether to continue providing coverage," said Chairman Murphy. "Most recently we have heard many stories about the health care law's Prevention and Public Health Fund — most notably that money from this fund is being utilized to hire thousands of health care 'navigators' who will assist the public in signing up for Obamacare. Considering that we have also heard that funding from the Prevention fund is being used on many different projects, we are concerned that it is being raided as an ever-ready piggy bank to throw money at and hide the many problems inherent with implementing Obamacare."
Energy and Commerce Committee Chairman Fred Upton (R-MI) added, "We are just eight months from the full implementation and by all accounts the Obama administration does not have its act together. It does not bode well when, just last week, a top supporter of the president and leading Senate architect of the law publicly warned the HHS Secretary that he sees a 'train wreck' coming. The alarm bells over how Obamacare will unfold are getting louder by the day: costs are going up, insurers are warning about premium increases, and small businesses are struggling with the choice about whether they can provide employees with coverage."
Rep. Steve Scalise (R-LA) highlighted a list of Obamacare programs that have been "either delayed, closed enrollment because they weren't ready for prime time, or just outright repealed because they were so bad." When responding to Scalise's questioning, Cohen maintained that implementation of the affordable care act is "on track." Watch their exchange here.
Rep. Bill Johnson (R-OH) questioned whether premiums would decrease $2,500 as promised repeatedly by President Obama. Cohen repeatedly told the subcommittee, "I think we have to wait and see" what happens next year. Johnson responded, "That's a theme that has persisted in this law: 'wait and see.' Pass it and let's see what happens down the road. Well I'll tell you what, that's a dangerous way to navigate a ship like America's economy." Watch their exchange here.
Rep. Cory Gardner (R-CO) followed-up and asked Cohen point blank, "Will health care costs be less next year after the implementation of this bill?" Cohen responded that he can't answer what is going to happen to costs next year. Watch their exchange here.


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(Pic) Vending Machine Gives People A Break, Literally
The Anger Release Machine by artists Katja Kublitz and Ronnie Yarisal gives people the satisfaction of breaking things for a small fee.
The problems of modern life are well-documented, from crises on a global scale – economic turmoil and environmental collapse – to those on a more personal level – malfunctioning electronic devices and overcrowded subways – meaning that even on the best days, maintaining a cheery outlook can require a complicated cocktail of different defense mechanisms. But when achieving this delicate mental balance becomes a stressful act in and of itself, we're left with few adult choices that allow us to "act out" without turning too many heads.
To that end, we especially appreciated the Anger Release Machine created by artists Katja Kublitz and Ronnie Yarisal. The pair has converted a snack vending machine into a dispenser of cheap psychological therapy, filling the rows with various breakable tschotskes that invite passerbys to vent their frustrations for a few coins each. Simply insert money into the slot, make a selection and wait for the sound of the satisfying crash as the vase or ceramic cat hits the deck.
While it might not be the most sustainable method for airing our grievances, it certainly is a playful one. We also think the project serves as an apt metaphor for our increasing disconnect with the physical world, particularly as we spend more time escaping online. Though something tells us that smashing virtual objects wouldn't feel nearly as good.
[via mental_floss]


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Medifast KitsProven, healthy weight loss
Medifast MealsProven, healthy weight loss
Thrive by MedifastEffective weight maintenance
Lean & Green Meals
Other Great Stuff
From the warm tropics comes the cool flavor of mango in a rich-tasting, nutritious Medifast Meal. It's so easy to make using your HealthMate Blender (or any mini-blender). Mix with ice cubes to create a smooth, delicious, and satisfying treat.
Ingredients: Calcium caseinate, sugar, fructose, sunflower oil, chicory root extract (inulin), dextrin, maltodextrin, whey protein concentrate, cellulose gum, natural flavors, dried egg whites, sodium caseinate, citric acid, xanthan gum, acesulfame potassium, mono and diglycerides, malic acid, turmeric (color), carrageenan, soy lecithin.
Vitamins and Minerals: Potassium chloride, potassium phosphate, magnesium oxide, calcium carbonate, ascorbic acid, calcium phosphate, ferric orthophosphate, vitamin E acetate, niacinamide, zinc oxide, calcium pantothenate, manganese sulfate, copper sulfate, pyridoxine hydrochloride, riboflavin, thiamin mononitrate, vitamin A palmitate, chromium chloride, folic acid, sodium molybdate, biotin, potassium iodide, sodium selenite, vitamin K1, vitamin D3, vitamin B12.
*Use pre-crushed ice for even faster prep time.
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Davis, L.M., Coleman, C.D., Kiel, J., Rampolla, J., Hutchisen, T., Ford, L., Andersen, W.S., Hanlon-Mitola, A. (2010). Efficacy of a meal replacement diet compared to a food-based diet after a period of weight loss and weight maintenance: a randomized controlled trial. Nutrition Journal, 9(11). View Study


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Since the mid-1990s there has been an active effort to develop hydrocarbon-fueled power generation and propulsion systems on the scale of centimeters or smaller. This effort led to the creation and expansion of a field of research focused around the design and reduction to practice of Power MEMS (microelectromechanical systems) devices, beginning first with microscale jet engines and a generation later more broadly encompassing MEMS devices which generate power or pump heat. Due to small device scale and fabrication techniques, design constraints are highly coupled and conventional solutions for device requirements may not be practicable.
This thesis describes the experimental investigation, modeling and potential applications for two classes of microscale jet pumps: jet ejectors and jet injectors. These components pump fluids with no moving parts and can be integrated into Power MEMS devices to satisfy pumping requirements by supplementing or replacing existing solutions. This thesis presents models developed from first principles which predict losses experienced at small length scales and agree well with experimental results. The models further predict maximum achievable power densities at the onset of detrimental viscous losses.
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The Jack French Fulham Bag is designed to accentuate outfits, from vibrant party dresses to detailed denim. Team this with a statement jacket for a more sassy style. Perfect when all you need is your phone, purse and lipstick.
Crafted from soft leather, details include: a gold chain to the edge of the front clasp, a Jack French emblem and an adjustable buckle shoulder strap. The interior is lined with violet suede and features two storage pockets, including one zipped.
About the brand
Jack French, formerly a consultant for brands such as Jimmy Choo and Christian Louboutin, took his knowledge of the luxury sector and turned it into a fab collection of handbags with appealing down-to-earth prices.
Jack French London launched its first collection in 2011. It was an instant success and attracted celebrity customers. All the pieces are made from the highest quality leather and are named after iconic London fashion districts.
Please remember to add postal time (2-3 working days) to obtain a complete estimate of delivery to your door.
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Profile for Kim2cat - Threads
Member Since: 11/16/2009
Re: Project Runway Season 11: Episode 3, "Surprise Me"
visited mood today, but could not make a fabric choice in 30 mins!! - am impressed with the designers ability to sketch and select in an hour ..really enjoyed episode #4 ..love the show and the store
Re: BOOK GIVEAWAY: "The Art of Fashion Draping" by Connie Amaden-Crawford
have always wanted to know the secret to "draping" ..want to use this method on most of the garments i wish to construct ..wish me good luck with this entry!
Re: Cheery gifts for kids in need
i'm retro-fitting drapes which were donated to the summer musical theater here in Ogunquit, ME - The Ogunquit Playhouse
Re: Oscar Fashion 2011
Reese Witherspoon - what a beautiful dress - perfect for her, too
Re: Mark a Dart and Learn a No-Tie Finish
i always used the "clip and pin" method, but did not know of the "needle thread and back stitch" ..thanks for this wonderfully simple completion
Re: Machine Quilt a Supple and Stylish Garment
the gold jacket appears to have flat felled seams ..and, yes,i wished that the article would have gone on longer


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If you are like millions of naïve Italians, Greeks, Spaniards, and Americans, it is likely that the "EVOO" in your kitchen cabinet is no vestal virgin but rather a slatternly and adulterous trollop.
(If this scandalizes you, hooray! You're probably one of Charles Murray's sheltered cognitive elites!)
Title: Extra Virginity: The Sublime and Scandalous World of Olive Oil, by Tom Mueller
Motivation: A superb title—how can a gourmand resist such marketing genius?
Completed: May 30, 2012 (#34)
Recommendation: Superfluous Man Guarantee. Absolutely worth your time and treasure.
J'accuse! The olive oil business is dirty. What you believe to be extra virgin is in all likelihood actually lampante (Italian for "suitable for burning in a lamp"). Or worse: it might not even be made from olives at all.
Consider one consumer advocate profiled in Mr. Mueller's two-thousand-years-overdue exposé:
In 2004, he began his own investigation. He bought thirty-one bottles of extra virgin oil in supermarkets throughout Germany, and sent them to Florence for testing by three highly trained taste panels. The results were unanimous. Only one of the thirty-one oils was actually extra virgin grade. Nine were virgin, a grade below extra virgin. The rest, including oils by Bertolli, Carapelli, Rubino, and other major Italian names, were adjudged to be lampante, and therefore legally unfit for human consumption.
Dio mio! One of thirty-one! Picture a roulette wheel in your mind's eye and give it a spin: you're roughly as likely to land on Lucky 7 as you are to choose a random bottle of genuine EVOO at a supermarket…in Europe. Imagine your odds at an American or Asian supermarket, where consumer familiarity with the product is far less than in the very cradle of oleology!
By comparison, the wine business is relatively clean. Unless you buy your Lafite Rothschild in Shenzhen, the label you see on the shelf is almost certainly reflective of the bottle's true contents. Whether the wine is good, bad, or indifferent is a matter of taste, vintage, price, and a host of other factors, but its quality is not likely to be affected by the mafia or smuggled Turkish grapes.
Grapes contain not wine but grape juice, which must be transformed by the vintner's art. Oil is already there in the olive, if we can only coax it free. Wine in the final analysis is man-made, while oil is made by nature, through the medium of the strange tree—mysterious, because it comes from something greater than ourselves. Wine in a meal is the soloist, set apart in its gleaming glass, while oil permeates the food, losing itself but subtly changing everything. Wine's effects on us are vivid and swift, while oil works on the body in hidden ways, slow and lingering in the cells and in the mind, like myths. Wine is merry Dionysus; oil is Athena, solemn, wise, and unknowable.
Olive oil is just the juice of olives, and that's the way you should think of it. Like orange juice, if it's pressed under hygienic conditions, bottled and shipped promptly, and stored at an appropriate temperature, olive oil will be at its freshest and best. On the nose, extra-virgin olive oil will have a fresh, pungent, olive-like smell; in the throat, it may burn a bit. That's what true olive oil is, not the insipid granola-canola-motor oil knock-offs that your local supermarket pushes, which in addition to carrying a musty rancid odor shares none of the extraordinary health benefits of olive oil.
Mr. Mueller's fine book introduces the reader to the science, art, and (dark) history of the olive. A Superfluous Man guarantees absolutely that you will enjoy this book—it just may change your culinary life for the better.


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Poetry Reading
The Department of Modern Languages and the Creative Writing Program present a poetry reading by Nicky Sa-eun Schildkraut. The reading will take place from 5 p.m. to 7 p.m. on Monday in the Harris Gallery.
The theater department will present "Mirandolina: Mistress of the Inn" at 7:30 p.m. from March 7 to 9 in Dailey Theatre. General admission is $5, and student admission is $3.
Ravelers Show
The Ravelers will perform an intimate acoustic electric concert at 7:30 p.m. next Friday in Morgan Auditorium. General admission is $10, and student admission is $5.
'Spirit of Ireland'
Michael Ryan and Friends will present "Spirit Of Ireland: An Evening of Music, Song and Dance" at 7:30 p.m. March 9 in Morgan Auditorium. General admission is $15, and student admission is $5.
Chamber Music Concert
Morgan Auditorium will host an early twentieth century chamber music concert at 6 p.m. March 10 in Morgan Auditorium. Admission is free.
Piano Festival
The music department will host a weeklong piano festival from March 11 to 17 with concerts starting at 8 p.m. each night in Morgan Auditorium. Admission is free for students and $10 for the general public. For a complete schedule visit sites.laverne.edu/music/concert-series.
–Alison Rodriguez


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My Pitbull Massage By The KittyFor year we dont have dog and I decide to have a dog ther i found Rex i bought him in my neighbors his an American PitBull Terrier as we all know pitbull had a bad reputation i i search and read a lot about pitbulls it was scary for me to see the victims that was attack by pitbulls but i haven't change my mind about that.
April 2 2011 i bring Rex home he was 2months old his a sweet puppy he sleep with me in my room i dont cage him we just keep him inside the house we just dont let him out...but he got out sometime he never attack anyone one time i was embarassed he got out and was wandering in backyard of our neighbors were they have party when thery see Rex they were all running going inside houses hiding even dogs there doesnt play with Rex i get him there bring him home....and apologies to the people there.
i took him for a walk every morning months passed by he grow past at 10months now his about 30 kilos i walk him in the morning we go jog together, most people scared of Rex because his a big strong Dog everytime we walk in the street people try to avoid us, think he was dangerous,...
i got an idea so people will not be scared of Rex i put him a shades so he looks cool i tie it on his collar he looks really good at it and plus he likes it people laughing when we pass even bus stop by just to watch Rex his a good dog i have sometime to exercise Rex for now i let him drag two tires he likes it he getting stronger when typhoon hits mt town last Dec 4, 2012 New Bataan Compostela Valley we evacuate my town and look some place were we can stay in the city i take Rex with me but my cats we leave it in the house we have about 6cats there theyu were all freinds with Rex.. but i go gome lastweek they seems fine.
I have a Video here of Rex and the kitty it was his friend please watch it im sure this will put smile on ur face.. by nextmonth i think we can go back home and there we can go walk and jog again...;)
flux99 31-35, F 0 Dec 26, 2012


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Eurocopter exhibited the first example of the EC145 Mercedes-Benz at Ebace in Geneva in May. Unveiled last year as a scaled-down mock-up, the new version consists of aesthetic and practical innovations, aimed at making the cabin more comfortable for passengers accustomed to the luxury of fixed-wing cabins.
The cabin of the EC145 Mercedes-Benz Style can seat up to eight passengers in comfort. The Mercedes-Benz Advanced Design Studio in Como, Italy, is also proposing to rearrange the cabin to accommodate up to four passengers with space to carry surfboards or a pair of mountain bikes for weekend excursions.
To enable configuration changes, the seats are mounted on rails. "Multifunction boxes" that can house a cooler, a DVD player or a table can also slide on the rails. Finally, the aft separation wall can slide to change the size of the luggage compartment and sports gear can be secured at several attachment points.
Passengers can adjust both the intensity and color of the cabin's ambient lighting. The customer can choose from several kinds of wood for the floor and ceiling. Externally, even the nose has been redesigned to avoid what was perceived as a too tech-looking avionics compartment.
The airframe changes (such as the nose and landing skids) necessitate fresh certification, which Eurocopter expects this year. The airframer has received a firm order for one machine so far, and the delivery, to a European customer, is planned by year-end. The EC145 Mercedes-Benz is priced between €6 and €6.5 million ($8.4 to $9.1 million) depending on the level of completion, Patrice Royer, Eurocopter's director for market development, commercial business and private segment, told AIN.
Market Effort
Eurocopter launched the Mercedes-Benz version of the EC145 on a relatively quiet market. "We are seeing a progressive recovery," Royer asserted. The company felt the downturn primarily between late 2008 and last year. While business is now stabilizing, it is not growing.
In 2007, Eurocopter delivered 167 business and private helicopters. The year after was almost as good, at 150 deliveries. This dwindled to 49 in 2009, before a slight increase, to 58, in 2010. Royer said his company is on track to deliver 50 to 60 helicopters in that segment this year.
"The glut of [recently built] helicopters on the second-hand market will take a couple of years to be absorbed," Royer explained. In the meantime, sale cancellations have virtually disappeared this year. During the "golden years," between 2005 and 2008, delivery lead times were reaching 36 months.
The light helicopter segment seems to have suffered the most in the years since the downturn began. Private customers, such as wealthy individuals, have not cancelled their orders; commercial operators have felt the impact more strongly.
From a geographic perspective, the downturn has not hit all regions similarly. According to Royer, North America has suffered from the same syndrome as business aviation in general. In Europe, "people stopped buying," Royer said. Latin America has been almost unaffected. Asia has been hit "but is starting to recover." Finally, Africa and the Middle East have been affected little, Royer noted.
The manufacturer sees reasons for optimism about sales in new markets. India is opening its doors "but there is still a lot of red tape to go through for each contract." Russia, which is "waking up," has helicopter buyers behaving "more and more like Western Europeans." China, where airspace is opening, is more oriented toward luxury, Royer said.
He distinguished between two kinds of customer. Private customers who favor speed tend to opt for the 140-knot AS350 B3 Ecureuil. Those who prefer comfort select the EC130 for the size of the cabin, the reduced noise and vibration levels and the visibility.
Corporate customers clearly rate comfort over speed. The equipment they ask for includes satellite phone, power outlets and air conditioning. Video players tend to be less in fashion. "We are making efforts in mood lighting, as in the EC145 Mercedes-Benz," Royer added.


text: The mess has arrived. Teeth are gnashed. Puffs fly freely. Pears fall. Water is spilled. Action must be taken, but how. I'll tell you how, by using the Tiny Diner mat by Kiddopotamus. Sure LTD is in the high chair at home, but we have to be on damage control when eating at a restaurant or visiting friends and family. The TinyDiner is one of those products you appreciate because clearly someone put a lot of thought and experience into it. Unlike some products that don't seem like they were designed by a human being for real world use, the TinyDiner is a game day player. The first thing you notice is that the mat has suction cups on the bottom to hold it in place when the little guy tries to yank it off the table. The mat is also washable and is made without BPA and other harmful leaching toxins. Perhaps the best feature is what I call the trap trench that hangs under the table and catches all the food bits. Lastly, the mat folds up (sort of neatly) for easy transport. My only sadness is that I would love to use the TinyDiner when I pig out, but I fear the stares I would attract would outweigh the joy I would feel by making a mess of myself.


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Look at it this way. The average American working stiff makes $548 a week--before taxes. Michael Jordan makes $576,923 a week--before the sneaker company and the cereal maker and the burger chain and the people who provide his underwear can even line up to add their huge endorsement checks to the pile.
Does a guy who throws a leather ball through a steel ring merit this kind of dough?
Like it or not, America says yes. Last week the Chicago Bulls agreed to pay their star $30 million for one year (that's $3,424.66 per hour--every hour, even while he's sleeping), and they didn't blink a corporate eye or even think about calling a personal foul. For his part, Jordan termed his raise "fair" and went about his business.
Down in Florida, meanwhile, Shaquille O'Neal was weighing offers from his present team, the Orlando Magic, and from the Los Angeles Lakers. "I just want a comfortable deal," he said, "and hopefully I can get signed pretty soon." (He did. He picked the Lakers.)
A "comfortable deal," by the O'Nealean definition, is something like $20 million a year, give or take the price of a fleet of Rolls-Royces, and the figure doesn't daunt big Shaq any more than it daunts the team owners who are so eager to pay it. In fact, neither the English language nor mere numbers themselves seem capable of expressing what has happened to National Basketball Association salaries in the past two weeks. It's a little like the surreal inflation that afflicted Germany in the months following defeat in World War I. "Interested in this nice loaf of bread, mein herr? Fine. That'll be 538 million marks, bitte."
Speaking of the limits of language, consider the term "free agent."
Dikembe Mutombo, an NBA center who demonstrated in his years with the Denver Nuggets that he cannot run, shoot, handle the ball or close his mouth in the presence of an official, was a "free agent" this summer. That means the Atlanta Hawks were willing to pay him $58 million for five years of work--$11.5 million a year to block shots, which is the only thing he's good at, besides speaking seven or eight languages that all come equipped with full sets of numbers.
Mutombo's new boss, Atlanta coach Lenny Wilkens, has the easiest job on the planet this summer--he's coaching "Dream Team 3," the NBA-loaded U.S. Olympic basketball squad that beat the Greeks 128-62 and the Argentinians 96-68 last week and is expected to demolish every team it faces at the Atlanta Summer Games by thirty or forty points. Obviously underworked, Wilkens had time to discuss the new free-agent salaries, and he did so with the same absence of astonishment that characterizes the comments of everyone else around the game:
"Hey, more power to them," he said. "It's a short period of time in their life, and they have to make the most of it. So it's whatever the market will bear."
In the short period of time Jordan or O'Neal or the Miami Heat's Alonzo Mourning ($112 million for seven seasons) have to make hay, Wilkens seemed to be saying, there's no use trying to scrape by on a lousy seven or eight mil a year. The first time a family emergency came up--the necessity of buying a 300-foot yacht with two galleys, say, or forming your own government--where would you be then? Flat out of luck, that's where.
So the orgy of free agency has, if anything, picked up steam, and the inmates are now running the asylum. Seattle's Gary Payton, for one, signed up for seven more seasons with the Sonics for $85 million. "I love Seattle," he said, as soon as the check was cut. "I been there six years. I just wanted them to step up to the plate and promise me the way I promised them. I was there six years, worked hard, did a lot of good, won a lot of ballgames. And that's what they did--they stepped up."
Despite Payton's seeming confusion about what sport he's playing--it's probably Ken Griffey Jr. who should be asking Seattle to step up to the plate--he's pretty clear about where he stands for a while. His deal makes him worth two-thirds the entire value of his team, a concept that redefines the term "franchise player." But he's an orphan cousin compared to Mourning, the ex-Georgetown center who went to Miami from Charlotte. His contract is worth $112 million; the team value is $97 million; the Heat came into the league seven years ago for a cost of $32.5 million. But the Heat weren't done yet: They got Juwan Howard out of a Washington Bullets uni for, let's see here, just $110 million over seven years. That probably means Mourning will get stuck with the lunch check at the hotel: He's the rich guy.
Not to be outdone, the beleaguered New York Knicks have outspent just about everybody but Miami in their frustrated quest for another NBA title. Larry Johnson came in from Charlotte for $84 million; Chris Childs crossed the Hudson from the New Jersey Nets for six years worth $24 million (we trust his new club picked up the cab fare), and the New Yorkers lured three-point specialist Allan Houston away from Detroit with a $56 million contract. But that wasn't the only inducement: They also showed Houston a custom-shot video in which Spike Lee and Robin Williams begged him on bended knee to become a Knick. No ploy is too rude these days in the drive for NBA glory.
The bizarre verbal beat goes on. John Calipari, who would have coached Childs in New Jersey, expressed no regret when his star went over to New York. On the contrary. "I'm so happy for him," Calipari said. "I told him when I met with him: If you can get $4 million a year, you gotta take it. Because this is your livelihood. Isn't this a great country we live in?"
On the other hand, some teams are so scared of being frozen out of a rejuggled win column that they're throwing fresh bundles of cash in the paths of players whose deals haven't even expired yet. In Houston, star center Hakeem Olajuwon has three years left on his contract, but rather than let him get happy feet, the Rockets re-signed him for another five years at a reported $11 million per. Like a lot of these astronomical numbers, the Olajuwon figures are estimated figures. Little matter: What's three or four hundred dollars an hour difference among friends?
All right, then. Where is all this loot coming from? Even your hapless (and now Dikembe-, Jalen- and Mahmoud-less) Denver Nuggets, the fourth most popular pro franchise in this town these days, have an annual budget that could keep Somalia and Qatar solvent for decades, and there seems to be no end in sight to the league's free-agent shopping spree.
For one thing, network and cable TV deals now pour a quarter-billion dollars into the NBA every year, and ticket and merchandise sales have inflated average team revenues from $22 million in 1991 to a whopping $52 million per club today. NBA players like Jordan and Shaq are not just hometown heroes, either: They are international sports icons almost as well-known on the dirt roads of Kenya or the boulevards of Paris as in the high school gyms of Keokuk.
Wilkens's new Dream Team--led by behemoths like O'Neal, Olajuwon, Charles Barkley and Grant Hill--will certainly do nothing to devalue the NBA's preferred stock. Indeed, if the Croatians finish a distant second at the Olympics, as expected, it's a pretty good bet that kids in Rio de Janeiro and Riyadh won't spend much time trying to remember their names; it's Michael and Shaq and Sir Charles every kid in the world wants to see, and the Olympics offer some of the most valuable free advertising the league ever gets--even if the games look like Hitler blitzing Poland.
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It's their own fault, after all. The losers' fault. It wasn't the NBA that pushed American pros into the Games; it was the rest of the world. Julius Erving, a great NBA star in the days before players owned fewer pairs of shoes than Imelda Marcos, said it plainly last week: "The world wanted to find out how they really stacked up in basketball. Now they know." Does that mean the charade should now be ended, that American college players should return to the Olympics in the name of a fair fight? Not according to the Good Doctor. "Once the door is open," Erving said, "it has to remain open."
Is it some kind of coincidence that the Olympic Games have gotten under way just as the NBA free-agent frenzy hits its peak? Maybe, but don't count on it. Is it coincidence that $100 million men in the NBA arrive just a month after the spectacular season of Jordan and the Chicago Bulls reveals a team that could dominate the league for years to come? Not likely, either. The Knicks and the Heat, to name but two, now look willing to try anything short of a compact with the Devil to unseat Chicago--and if the Devil asked for $110 million over seven years, he'd probably get it.
And the losers? Are there losers amid the frenzy? Sure are. As superstar salaries continue to rise, the league's less talented players will probably have to play for fewer and fewer bucks, perhaps provoking resentments on some teams. But that isn't where the real hurt will come, is it? To feel the real hurt, ask the person earning $548 a week how many NBA tickets he or she can afford at this season's prices--or next season's. That could strain the limits of the English language, too.


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The Conti Road Dual Sport Attack 2 Tire was developed specifically for large dual sport machines. The 100% on road "hyper sport touring" radial delivers the mileage of a sport touring radial with the grip of a sport radial. The revolutionary technology offers a level of grip, confidence, mileage and dynamics never known before in the sport-touring radial market.
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Welcome toHoles Bay
from Carlos and the team
Are we not your local? Change location
Ideally located close to Sandbanks Beach, Poole Harbour and Upton Country Park is the Holes Bay, which was built on the site of a former lighthouse. Today, we offer a tempting menu of freshly cooked pub classics, all served up with a smile by our friendly team. Plus, with a dedicated kids' menu, you'll want to come back time and time again!
Opening times
Mon-Sat: 12pm-11pm
Sun: 12pm-10.30pm
Breakfast serving times
Weekdays: 6.30am-10.30am
Weekends: 7am-11am
How to find us
Holes Bay Road
Tel: 01202 661 385
View on Bing Maps
- Accessible
- Free Parking
- Premier Inn
- Outdoor seating area
- Garden
- WiFi


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Changes between Version 64 and Version 65 of Records
- Timestamp:
- Mar 3, 2012 4:52:27 PM (6 years ago)
- Unmodified
- Added
- Removed
- Modified
v64 v65 53 53 5. '''[wiki:Records/DeclaredOverloadedRecordFields Declared Overloaded Record Fields] (DORF)'''. Tweak to SORF. (Plan B) 54 54 6. '''[wiki:Records/SyntaxDirectedNameResolution Syntax Directed Name Resolution]'''. Alternative that relies on syntactic rewriting and lenses. 55 7. '''[wiki:Records/TypeIndexedRecords ]'''. (Plan B) 55 7. '''[wiki:Records/TypeIndexedRecords]'''. (Plan B) 56 56 8. '''Are there any other approaches?''' 57 57 … … 69 69 70 70 71 The DORF proposal is a variant of SORF with similar goals. ~~~However, it only solves the narrow name-spacing issue within a module. If a record is imported into another module, it will still clash.~~~ It is perfectly possible to import Declared Overloaded Record Fields into other modules, and 'share' them in records declared in the importing module (and use the selector function for both the declared records and records imported). Alternatively, if the names are an 'accidental' clash, use qualified naming. (The type system prevents using the 'wrong' selector for a record type.). This is no worse than existing H98 modules/qualified naming. -- corrected by AntC, author of DORF. 71 The DORF proposal is a variant of SORF with similar goals. . 72 72 73 73 DORF and SORF abstract over fields. The benefit of abstracting over field names is being able to write code that works against any Record with a given field. So I can have a function: