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Tufts University
Okun moves to Porter Wright
Okun is a first-chair trial and appellate lawyer with experience in product liability, commercial contracts, toxic torts, litigation management, class actions, criminal defense and the RICO Act.
In-house career changes
6 noteworthy in-house career moves
Charting some of the most recent GC and in-house appointments
Top sports lawyer excels as GC of Brooklyn Nets, Barclays Center
Jeff Gewirtz says his job is a slam-dunk
Extended interview: Sandra Leung, GC of Bristol-Myers Squibb
Leung talks in-depth about her position at the biopharmaceutical company.
GC Sandra Leung forms connections within the Bristol-Myers Squibb legal department
Leung is proudest of working with management to guide the company through past crises.


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Super Mario World
Review by SDJaY
"My first 16 bit game and its one of the best"
Super Mario 1, 2, and 3 for the NES were great games that put Super Mario on the map. When I got my Super, this was the first game I got. Actually it game with it. But I couldn't put this game down. When I beat this game without all the secrets and everything, I wanted to play it again to get it all. This game does everything right, and I can't think of what it did wrong. It's too late to get a Super Nintendo, but this game will remind you of all the great times you had because this game started it all.
Graphics: 10/TeN- It was my first game, I was stunned at the graphics. I'm trying to think back of how stunned I really was. This game is really colorful and the backgrounds are beautifully drawn. Even Mario and Luigi look great for a Super Nintendo. The only little problem I had was in a level (I think it was the Forest Illusion Secret). The background started moving very fast and it got me so dizzy. I tried not to look, but it was hard to do that. Other than that, for a Super, the graphics in this game is better than average. For my first Super Nintendo game, the graphics are perfect.
Sounds: 9.5/TeN- I love the sound Mario makes when he jumps. The music is great. The dungeon music makes an evil tone. The sound the football player guy makes when you step on him on the head. The sound that you make when you get a mushroom, feather, or fire flower. All these little sounds are very good for the game, and I like it a lot. The Star Road music is entertaining, and the Ghost House music is eerie and scary. To make a long story short, there is nothing wrong here. It's a 9.5 because there isn't enough Music. I hear a lot of the same thing, but thats fine. I think I'm getting too picky.
Gameplay: 10/TeN- The story is the same. Save that same Princess for the 100th time. This game doesn't have as much levels as Super Mario 3, but each level has as much fun as the other levels. Some levels are very easy, some are very hard. This game is very balanced, and there isn't going to be a part where you're just going to turn off the game because it's too hard. You're going to keep on trying until you get it right. At least that's what I did. The only problem I had was the saves. When I had to go out and I was 3 levels to a Ghost House, I was really mad because I know that I'm not going to finish the levels in tine to save the game. But thats okay, I'd love to do the levels over again. What replaces the leaf is the feather which is the same thing. Instead of an almost unlimited amount of objects Mario 3 had, this game just has a little box at a top. But what Mario 3 didn't have was Yoshi. He is the best. He can eat many of the enemies for the same price of a coin, he can take a hit and when you do that he gets off of you and runs around but you can get him back, if you fall off a cliff you can sacrafise him to save your own life and get another one. This guy is just too cool. There are even different kinds of Yoshi's that are strong in different ways. Like a blue Yoshi flies on any shell it eats. Little things in this game also make it so fun. There are too many little things though.
Control: 10/TeN: I press B, it jumps. I press A, It spin jumps. There is no problems unless your controller is borken.
Replay: 10/TeN: I've played this game like 100 times and every time I've played it, I had the same fun I had (well, I had more fun the first time). This has good replay value for fans of the game.
I don't know if you can find this game, but if you do, get it, it's one of the best Super Nintendo games ever! If you're reading this and have the game, play it again! Get back to all those 16-bit 2D days. Sometimes I do put my Playstation down to play a little Mario. All in all, I loved this game. This game marked the direction Super Nintendo was heading, and Super Nintendo went to that right direction until its 32 bit cousins continued where Super Nintendo couldn't go further.
Reviewer's Rating: 5.0 - Flawless
Originally Posted: 07/02/00, Updated 01/13/01
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subset: commoncrawl


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The Retired Senior Volunteer Program is to provide a variety of opportunities for retired persons or semi-retired persons age 55 and older to meet their community needs. RSVP Volunteers may serve from a few to over 40 hours a week providing their skills talents and experience to services in community organizations education hospitals faith-based groups and Homeland Security.
|Mailing Address
|4 Moore Road - DN 2030
Cape May Court House, NJ 08210
|Main Branch
|30 Mechanic Street-CMCH
Cape May County, New Jersey 08210


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KALEIDOSCOPE is a quarterly contemporary art and culture periodical. Their new issue for Winter 2012 brings in new art direction from London's OK-RM design house. Issue 13 is available now and focuses on responding to various questions on the mind of their writers and editor-in-chief, Allesio Ascari. The main theme, "How Does Fashion Look at Art" does some exploring on what the term means through four case studies on the matter.
More looks inside KALEIDOSCOPE Magazine issue #13 after the click.


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Funny expression, but it is true for many things, including organizing.
It is the middle of summer and my son is growing out of his clothes weekly. The t-shirts that fit last week are now looking like 'The Hulk' clothes after he turns green, the clothing shrinking fairy has once again visited overnight.
In the past I would have assumed the rest of his t-shirts are no longer going to fit because of the way I used to put his clothes away. You know the way, fold,stack, place in drawer, never really seeing the clothes at the bottom.
If your child is anything like mine he can't see futher than the end of his nose when looking for anything. Open the drawer pick up the top item put it on. This can probably be said for many of us. The problem with this, is that we miss what is on the bottom, until the morning after the growth spurt, when we find they have outgrown clothes they haven't even worn.
This year I discovered a pin on pinterest that has changed the way I put my clothes away.http://www.simpleorganizedliving.com/2011/08/13/clothes-clutter-organizing-all-your-accessories/. I love it when I find a gem like this on pinterest, so thank you Andrea!
I have used this technique in my son's drawer and what a difference.
My son has ADD and OCD, so he likes things neat and tidy, but gets overwhelmed when faced with too many choices, too much jumble, he gets irritated and takes him a long time to dress.
Since I have adopted this method it has been like night and day, now it takes him seconds to choice his clothes ( the getting them on his still a challenge, as he still gets easily distracted) but he is able to get himself dressed in a timely manner.
Sometimes changing just one way in which you do something can change your life in a way you never would have imagined. So try a new way tomorrow and see how it can help you.


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Combination Chemotherapy in Treating Patients With Non-Metastatic Extracranial Ewing Sarcoma
This study is ongoing, but not recruiting participants.
Children's Oncology Group
National Cancer Institute (NCI)
Information provided by (Responsible Party):
Children's Oncology Group
ClinicalTrials.gov Identifier:
First received: October 29, 2010
Last updated: February 8, 2017
Last verified: February 2017
- Full Text View
- Tabular View
- No Study Results Posted
- Disclaimer
- How to Read a Study Record
No Study Results Posted on ClinicalTrials.gov for this Study
|Study Status:
|This study is ongoing, but not recruiting participants.
|Estimated Study Completion Date:
|September 2019
|Estimated Primary Completion Date:
|September 2019 (Final data collection date for primary outcome measure)


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A reaction favorable to the economic prosperity of Palestine can be traced directly to Hitler's anti-Semitic persecutions in Germany, reports a writer in the July 21 issue of The Magazine of Wall Street.
The article, which surveys present business conditions in the Holy Land, follows in excerpt:
"While most countries of the world still suffer the lingering pains of post-war convalescence, Palestine stands out as an isolated example of rejuvenated economic virility and commercial well-being.
"The boom started by persecuted German Jews, is based on sound business principles. Capital salvaged from their wrecked commercial enterprises has been consolidated and re-invested in real estate purchased from the native population, in industrial plant and equipment and as working capital to finance export trade.
"Immigrants are allotted land, loaned tools, provisions, personal necessities. Modern methods of intensive cultivation soon showed handsome profits. These profits are credited on the books of the central finance administration for the account of individual land tenants or industrial workers against previous advances.
"The Promised Land is at last flowing with milk and honey and it may be said, without undue exaggeration, that Hitler unwittingly has become the greatest Zionist of them all."


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Ben makes websites. All sorts of websites.
Born and raised in South Africa, Ben now lives near the riverbanks of South-West London. He has a BTech qualification (equivalent to BA Hons; w/Distinction) in Graphic Design from the Durban University of Technology.
Clients have included all manner of corporates, resorts, online stores, record labels, recording studios, bands, musicians, photographers and writers, to name a few. Ben has been working as a professional web designer since 2006, but has an association with web and graphic design that stretches over more than a decade. This measure of experience in the field has led him to become an efficient front-end interface and user experience designer and developer, whilst keeping in mind essential aspects of the trade like aesthetics, accessibility, standards compliance and progressive enhancement.
This site includes a Professional Journal, which contains a handful of testimonials. Take a look at the Portfolio if you'd like to see a sample of Ben's solo freelance work, from 2009 onwards.
If you'd like to get in touch, please feel free to use the Contact Form.


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Curlies in Dove Pro-Age ads
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Join Date: Jan 2007
Posts: 1,741
Tuesday, February 13, 2007 at 08:25PM
Know what? I tried to use the moisturizing line before going CG and they did nothing good at all for my hair, not even the condish. Plus they all have cones anyway so no dice now either. Kinda disappointing really, I like the bar soap, tho not on my face like my grams used to. I get breakouts, but bodywise, smooooth....lol
I must give Dove serious props however, their Real Beauty campaign is really good. Very good "alterna-beauty" commercials and ads.
Cincinnati Ohio>>>Coarse protein sensitive 3a, Jessicurl WDT as a leave in, Biotera gel, White Boots, PW= coffeecurls
"Man tries to exaggerate what nature has given him," Charles Darwin (1809-1882).
"Nothing makes a woman more beautiful than the belief that she is beautiful." -Sophia Loren


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Silver Alert issued for missing man in Angier
Posted May 13, 2014
Angier, N.C. — The North Carolina Center for Missing Persons issued a Silver Alert Tuesday for a man reported missing in Angier.
Jesse Irvine, 28, is white, stands 5 feet 4 inches and weighs 156 pounds. He has short brown hair and hazel eyes and was last seen on North Willow Street.
A photo of Irvine wasn't immediately available Tuesday afternoon.
Anyone with information about his whereabouts should call the Angier Police Department at 910-893-9111.


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For every Boston Red Sox hit in the month of June, EchoStor Technologies will donate $50 to The Shawn Thornton Foundation to support Parkinson's and pediatric cancer research.
Company Overview
The Shawn Thornton Foundation is dedicated to helping find cures for diseases close to Shawn's heart, specifically, Parkinson's and cancer. The Foundation will work toward this mission by raising awareness, funding innovative research and helping to relieve the burden and improve the quality of life for patients and their families.
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|Sacred Shakespeare
|Written by Peter J. Leithart
|Friday, 17 September 2010 08:51
Closely following Hamlet, the conflict in Disney's The Lion King begins with a regicide, Uncle Scar's murder of King Mufasa. Instead of rising to vengeance, Prince Simba runs away to live a life of hakuna matata with a wise-cracking Meerkat and a noisesome warthog until his father appears in a vision and urges him to go home to reclaim his patrimony. Disney's leonine Hamlet is, of course, thoroughly Disneyfied: Simba not only takes vengeance on Claudius-Scar, but lives to inherit the kingdom, and the athletic Nala-Ophelia is a far cry from the wispy fragility of Shakespeare's play. Hamlet's tragedy turns to low-budget comedy in Strange Brew, as Bob and Doug McKenzie uncover the evil doings of the brewmaster at Elsinore Brewery and help the founder's daughter, Pam, regain control of the business. There is even a holographic paternal ghost.
Burlesque parodies of Shakespeare have been popular since the nineteenth century and culminated in Tom Stoppard and the Reduced Shakespeare Company. From the other direction, the accommodation of "serious" Shakespearean productions to pop culture standards is striking – from Baz Luhrmann's MTV Romeo + Juliet, through Michael Keaton's Monty-Pythonesque Dogberry, to a Royal Shakespeare Company poster for Coriolanus with the caption, "a natural born killer too."
But this raises a question: How Shakespeare did become, in Douglas Lanier's phrase, "unpopularized" in the first place? How was Shakespeare sacralized?
As Lawrence Levine has shown, through much of the nineteenth century Shakespeare's plays were produced regularly throughout the United States all the way to the frontier, often interspersed with vaudevillian entertainments, as in an 1839 production of As You Like It that shared a playbill with Il Diavolo Antonio and His Sons, who promised a "magnificent display of position in the Science of Gymnastics." Shakespeare was popular culture, in the sense that Shakespeare was widely enjoyed across the spectrum of American life. Shakespearean quotations larded political rhetoric, and the Bible and Shakespeare were among the essential books in American homes, such that Tocqueville read Henry V for the first time in a log cabin. Shakespeare was well enough known to be parodied, both in novels like Huckleberry Finn and among minstrels who appealed to the authority of the "Bird of Avon." Shakespeare was honored as a man of the people. His plays were not treated as sacred texts, as is evident from the popularity of adaptations and parodies. Performances were accompanied by catcalls, nut-cracking and apple-crunching from the mixed-class audiences, and at times the boundary between audience and performers dissolved.
By the end of the century, Shakespeare was being detached from the "singers, jugglers, dancers, acrobats, orators" that once surrounded the plays. Critics increasingly complained that audiences flocked to Shakespeare for the wrong reasons; Shakespeare, it has often been said, wrote for the groundlings, and in America he was discovered by a nation of groundlings. To accept this consensus, Levine argues, is to project later attitudes toward Shakespeare into the nineteenth century. Shakespeare was popular with American audiences because they found him so American. America was still a largely oral civilization that reveled in three-hour political speeches and the Lincoln-Douglas debates, and Shakespearean rhetoric appealed to them. Performed melodramatically in adapted form, Shakespeare's plays often appeared to reinforce American moral sensibilities, their understanding of the clarity of good and evil, and Shakespeare personalized moral and political issues in a way that matched American sensibilities. In short, "nineteenth-century Americans were able to fit Shakespeare into their culture so easily because he seemed to fit."
Levine notes several factors that help to explain the elevation of Shakespeare from American popular entertainment into the epitome of high literary and dramatic art. As immigration increased and the American population became more ethnically and linguistically diverse, oratory declined in importance. Rising literacy rates had a similar effect, encouraging private reading of newspapers in place of public declamations. Nativist sentiments among popular audiences also contributed to Shakespeare's de-popularization. A speech exalting the virtues of England might be taken as unpatriotic, and in some cases riots ensued.
Yet, the extraction of Shakespeare from popular theater was also partly a deliberate effort on the part of upper class theatergoers to rescue the Bard from an inappropriate setting and audience. Shakespeare, some argued, was so archaically difficult that he could be understood only by specialists who read the plays rather than hearing them performed. As Shakespeare moved from stage to page, he became part of the sacralized literate culture of the universities and schools. Upper class Americans were also appalled by the behavior of their fellow citizens in the theaters, and sought out their own theaters where stamping and shouts would be prohibited and everyone would sit in cultivated silence. As they left, middle and upper-class theater goers took Shakespeare with them. Norman Hapgood argued at the time that high quality plays needed their own high-quality theaters, since "the most ignorant spectators, who formerly followed the lead of the educated, now read, have opinions, and enforce them. Caliban is in power and sits in judgment at the theatre." Hapgood and many others wanted to reclaim the theater for Prospero. The clash of popular and elite Shakespeare turned violent in the famed Astor Place Riot, revealing, as one newspaper correspondent put it at the time, that "there is now in our country, in New York City, what every good patriot hitherto has considered it his duty to deny – a high and a low class."
If this history throws "high" culture's monopolization of Shakespeare under suspicion, it equally challenges popular culture's frequent concession of that monopoly, seen in the tendency to assume that parody is the only available mode of popular appropriation of Shakespeare. As many producers and directors in the last century have recognized, the most faithful presentations are those that are serious and popular.
But this means that faithful presentations are, in the nature of the case, assaults on the high/popular hierarchy, and implicit assaults on the "civilizing process" as well as the state formation to which it has been twinned since birth. Shakespeare has been a battleground of culture war for centuries, and no wonder, since he is Exhibit #1 of literary and theatrical high culture, at least in English. Sacred Shakespeare is one of the untouchable holy things belonging to the priests of high culture, and popularization is rightly perceived as subversive, a transgression and a sacrilege.
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Tag Butterfly Canvas
- 3-5 Hours
- Beginner
Additional Information
- Various colors/designs of scrap book paper in the below colors:Shades of greens & greens = background & leavesShades of purple & brown = butterflyShades of pink & orange = flowers
- Cricut® with Tag cartridge
- Mod Podge®
- 2" foam brush
- Foamcore board
- Canvas
- Foam adhesive tape
- X-Acto® knife
- Pencil
Read through the directions before starting & use the photo as a guide.
1. Map out design on canvas with a pencil, marking where flowers, leaves and butterfly will go.
2. Cut out Tag shapes with Cricut® to fill in the designated areas, vary the sizes of the tag to add interest. Fill in green & blues for the background and leaves and orange & pink where the flowers will go. Glue down the tags with Mod Podge®. For the flowers leave the ends unglued, so they can be curled up to add dimension.
3. Once the background and flowers and in place, cut out a butterfly shape from the foam core using an X-Acto® knife.
4. Glue the purple tags to the wings of the butterfly mirroring the wings to look the same. Add brown down the center as the body.
5. Cut two pieces of foam core to fit under the center of the butterfly. Add adhesive to the two pieces and attach them one on top of the other and then to the back of the butterfly. Add another piece of adhesive tape and attach the butterfly to the canvas.


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New Delhi - Controversial former Pakistani fast bowler Shoaib Akhtar said on Friday the cricketers are being tempted into fixing matches because they are underpaid by their board.
"Fixing happens in our culture because there's less money, there are even lesser opportunities. Cricketers victimised by their boards return (to the team) to mint money," Akhtar, 37, told the Headlines Today news channel.
"In 2008, I had no money to even buy a car. I had to borrow money from a friend. I handled it, others go astray.
"Your friends ditch you, (the cricket) board doesn't back you. They all run you down. So when you return you think 'let me teach them a lesson'. Some are corrupt, but some cricketers are turned into criminals by the system."
Three Pakistani stars - Test captain Salman Butt and pacemen Mohammad Aamer and Mohammad Asif - were jailed last year after being found guilty of spot-fixing during the 2010 Lord's Test against England.
It was the first time international cricketers were handed prison sentences, a scandal described by then-ICC chief executive Haroon Lorgat as the worst corruption case since the Hansie Cronje episode.
Former South African captain Cronje, who died in 2002, was banned from the game for life in October 2000, six months after New Delhi police accused him of taking money from a bookie during his team's Indian tour that year.
"We (in Pakistan) don't have much money in cricket. I wasn't playing for India you know. I was an elite star, still after playing for 14 years I only made seven-eight crore rupees ($1.35-1.54 million)," said Akhtar.
Akhtar, whose career was marked by allegations of drug abuse and ball-tampering, bagged 178 wickets in 46 Tests and 247 in 163 one-day internationals between 1997 and 2011.
"I was cleared on all drug charges," he said.
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The 2017/18 PSL season is under way. Can Bidvest Wits defend their title? Will Soweto giants Kaizer Chiefs or Orlando Pirates emerge victorious? Or will the bookies' favourites, Mamelodi Sundowns, taste success for a record eighth time? Stay glued to Sport24 to find out!
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IOL Motoring Staff
Munich, Germany - BMW's X3 has come in for a midlife makeover, gaining a fresh look and a range of new-generation diesel engines that produce more power and drink less fuel.
The front end is notably different. Mimicking the new X5, the X3 gains new twin circular headlights that now run into the grille, which itself has been redesigned along with the front and rear bumpers and the mirrors. New colours and alloy wheel designs round off the external upgrade.
On the engine front, the German market is offered a choice between four diesel engines and three petrol units, with outputs ranging from 110kW to 230kW.
The oil-burning highlight is the new generation 2-litre turbodiesel, with increased injection pressure of 2000 bar. Its outputs climb to 140kW and 400Nm (from 135 and 380) and this model can now run to 100km/h in a claimed 8.1 seconds. Fuel consumption, meanwhile, drops by 7.1 percent to 5.0 litres per 100km.
BMW also offers a less powerful 2-litre turbodiesel at the bottom of the range, which is still good for 110kW and 360Nm, with claimed fuel consumption of just 4.7 l/100km.
At the top end of the diesel range, BMW offers the six-cylinder 30d with 190kW/560Nm and consumption of 5.9 l/100km and the 35d, which pushes 230kW/630Nm and sips 6.0 l/100km.
Petrol options in the new X3 include the 135kW/270Nm 20i, 180kW/350Nm 28i and 225kW/400Nm 35i. The latter will scream from 0-100km/h in just 5.6 seconds.
While entry-level models have rear-wheel drive, most of the X3 range comes with BMW's xDrive all-wheel drive system, with need-based power distribution between all four wheels.
The transmission menu, depending on the engine choice made, comprises the usual six-speed manual, eight-speed automatic and eight-speed sports automatic with flappy paddles.
BMW has made some minor changes to the X3's cabin, including various chrome applications and four new upholstery colours and trim strips.
Furthermore, all X3s are now fitted with BMW's Radio Professional with Central Information Display and iDrive Controller.


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Don't miss any of the 2014 Arctic Winter Games news with KUAC's daily updates and reports (HERE) of the events, the athletes, and the cultures coming together in Interior Alaska.
All sports will be on display March 15-22 in venues across the Fairbanks area: Alpine Skiing, Arctic Sports, Badminton, Basketball, Biathlon/Ski, Biathlon/Snowshoe, Cross Country Skiing, Dene (Traditional) Games, Dog Mushing, Figure Skating, Gymnastics, Ice Hockey, Indoor Soccer, Snowboarding, Snowshoeing, Speedskating, Table Tennis, Volleyball and Wrestling.
Listen for our FM updates with Matthew Schroder anchoring from the studio and Tim Ellis at the games starting Saturday, March 15th with stories at 7:30 am & 8:30 am. Weekday extended coverage will air Monday-Friday at 7:30 am, 8:30 am, 9:30 am & 12:30 pm, and Sunday at 8:30 am & 9:30 am.
There are many ways to listen: on the radio at 89.9 FM, stream us at kuac.org, or tune in through your television, on KUAC TV Channel 9.5. See you at the Games!
KUAC's coverage of the
Fairbanks 2014 Arctic Winter Games is made possible by:
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Do Scots want a referendum on independence from UK?
Politicians in Edinburgh and London are arguing over plans for a referendum on Scottish independence.
First Minister Alex Salmond is accusing the UK government of trying to interfere in plans for a vote.
He insisted people in Scotland should get to decide in autumn 2014 - despite calls from Prime Minister David Cameron for the issue to be dealt with sooner.
Scottish Secretary Michael Moore said a plan to hold a referendum without Westminster's involvement would be unlawful.
Greater powers
The Scottish government wants to break free from the rest of Britain.
Polls suggest that only a third of Scots would back the idea though, so the SNP also wants to allow a vote on a second option.
That's been nicknamed "devolution-max" and would ask whether Scots want full decision-making powers on raising and spending tax money, even though things like defence and foreign affairs would stay under Westminster's control.
The SNP propose the Scottish Parliament should be responsible for "all laws, taxes and duties in Scotland".
Paul Scullion - an engineer from Edinburgh - isn't sure his country is ready to break away.
"I admire what Alex Salmond is trying to do, but I wouldn't vote yes at the moment," he says.
Full independence could see Scotland with its own government, own prime minister, maybe even its own army.
It may join the European Union as a separate country, and start using the Euro currency.
"Scotland as an independent country wouldn't survive, I don't think," says Paul.
"We still depend a lot on handouts from Westminster, with things like defence and jobs," he admits.
The Scottish government believe "devolution max" will secure a "yes" vote and so is the party's back-up plan.
It could see a difference in taxes paid by Scottish people and the rest of the United Kingdom.
For example, the rate of income tax could vary by up to 10p in the pound compared with the rest of the UK.
'Totally for it'
The SNP maintain full independence is the party's long term ambition, so this is seen as a stepping stone and a way of achieving independence in the long run.
Scotland's First Minister Alex Salmond hopes by promising to maintain UK links in the short term, independence could be achieved in the long run.
Twenty-one-year-old Asha Rennie is studying to become a teacher at Aberdeen University. She is a big SNP supporter.
"I'm totally for it [independence]. It means being our own country.
"Without being attached to the rest of Britain there would be more opportunity to let our culture shine through," she says.
"Maybe there should be a balance where we are independent but where we could come together on some things," suggests Asha.


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Daily Mass from St. Agnes & St. Patrick's Cathedral: The heart of our broadcast day focuses us on the "summit and source" of our lives - the Celebration of the Eucharist. Celebrate Daily Mass from St. Agnes Cathedral, St. Patrick's Cathedral in New York City, and Our Lady of Loretto.
Catholic Perspectives: The news flow in America is constant and immediate. As Catholics it is often difficult to understand the news in light of our Catholic faith. Moral and ethical challenges exist in the midst of the news every day. Catholic Perspectives unpacks...Read More...
CHS Presents: Lifestyles at the Heart of Health is a new series on Telecare that provides viewers with medical, nutritional, and fitness information they need to improve their health and well-being, either in their daily lives or for specific ailments... Read More...
CHS Presents: Health Connect: Tune in each week as we bring you the latest in research and information on medical procedures and advancements from our integrated health care delivery system... Read More...
Encounter, hosted by Bishop John Barres, offers reflections on Pope Francis' "Culture of Encounter" and celebrates the different ways to encounter Jesus and one another through prayer, solidarity and understanding.
|Everyday Faith Live: Everyday Faith Live! Telecare's live news show is returning for its 9th season. Every Wednesday and Friday Telecare's anchor team report on the latest in church and social news, issues, and events. Correspondents report from national and international locations including USCCB news from Washington and Papal news from Vatican City, Rome.
|Family Comes First: Each week our hosts Vincent J. Russo and Victoria Roberts Drogin will take a look at the challenges that real-life families face everyday and offer resources and advice from experts. We will share amazing stories of extraordinary people and their devotion to family that surely will inspire you. Remember family truly does come first!
|God is Good: Fr. Charles Mangano and his sister Laurie are back again as our dynamic duo sharing their gifts of song and prayer!
|Guided by Grace: Guided by Grace is a panel discussion program where Catholic women share their experiences and journeys of faith and spirituality as they explore issues with views rooted in foundations of Catholic beliefs and tradition.
|Hope & Mercy - The Key to Transformation with Fr. Francis Pizzarelli, SMM. Each week our host, Fr. Francis (Frank) Pizzarelli, SMM addresses how parents can help their teens and young adults live their lives amidst the challenges of modern society...(read more)...
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text:
"Little yellow sons-of-bitches"
In all the many volumes of documents, testimony, and commentary about the intelligence failure of 1941, there are no more telling words than an informal confession made by Admiral Kimmel while the congressional hearings of 1945–46 were taking place.
Although the commanders in Pearl Harbor had received a "war warning" message from Washington on November 27, ten days before the attack, when the first wave of Japanese planes swept in, General Short was caught with his air force tightly bunched on the ground, most of his ammunition locked away, and major airfields such as Hickam without any antiaircraft guns. Admiral Kimmel's Pacific Fleet (except the carriers, which by sheer good fortune had put out for maneuvers) was peacefully at anchor in the harbor. These were the shocking failures that led the first post–Pearl Harbor investigation to charge the two officers with dereliction of duty, later tempered in the findings of the congressional inquiry to grave errors of judgment.
Both Short (who died in 1949) and Kimmel (who passed away in 1968, at eighty-six) argued that Washington failed to share all the information about Japanese plans it had gleaned through the still-secret Magic code-breaking operation. Never, they claimed, were they explicitly instructed to prepare for an actual attack. The two officers were given the opportunity to defend themselves in the postwar hearings, where Short read a 61-page typed statement and Kimmel's prepared statement ran to 108 pages. The disgraced admiral's most cryptic and persuasive explanation of why he had been caught by surprise, however, came in a lunch-break conversation with Edward Morgan, a lawyer who eventually drafted the majority report. As Morgan recalled it years later, the exchange went as follows:
Morgan: Why, after you received this 'war warning' message of November 27, did you leave the Fleet in Pearl Harbor?
Kimmel: All right, Morgan — I'll give you your answer. I never thought those little yellow sons-of-bitches could pull off such an attack, so far from Japan.1
Although unvarnished language like this did not make it into the transcript of the hearings, the majority report did take care to argue that "had greater imagination and a keener awareness of the significance of intelligence existed . . . it is proper to suggest that someone should have concluded that Pearl Harbor was a likely point of Japanese attack." Failing to think outside the box is a theme that surfaces and resurfaces in the serious general literature. Gordon Prange, for example, speaks of "psychological unpreparedness"; Roberta Wohlstetter, of "the very human tendency to pay attention to the signals that support current expectations about enemy behavior."2
Admiral Yamamoto, like his American navy counterpart, also put the American failure in plain language — in his case, in two personal letters written shortly after the attack. On December 19, he wrote this to a fellow admiral:
"Such good luck, together with negligence on the part of the arrogant enemy, enabled us to launch a successful surprise attack."3
Two days later, writing to the student son of a personal friend, Yamamoto made a bit clearer what he had in mind in speaking of American arrogance. This letter, in its entirety, read as follows:
"22 December 1941
"My dear Yoshiki Takamura,
"Thank you for your letter. That we could defeat the enemy at the outbreak of the war was because they were unguarded and also they made light of us. 'Danger comes soonest when it is despised' and 'don't despise a small enemy' are really important matters. I think they can be applied not only to wars but to routine matters.
"I hope you study hard, taking good care of yourself.
"Isoroku Yamamoto"4
Yamamoto obviously misread American psychology disastrously when expressing hope that the surprise attack would strike a crippling blow at morale. The Americans, however, also disastrously misread and underestimated the Japanese. Can there be a more precise confirmation of Yamamoto's perception of Japan being "despised" and made light of as a "small enemy" than Kimmel's frank reference to "those little yellow sons-of-bitches"?
In a rational world, this should not have been the case. American perceptions of Japan as a potential foe traced back to the turn of the century, when Japan startled the world by defeating China and Tsarist Russia in quick succession (in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95 and Russo-Japanese War of 1904–5), thereby joining the Western, Caucasian, and Christian expansionist nations as one of the world's few imperialist powers. Financiers in New York and London had helped finance the Russo-Japanese War, and many Western observers expressed admiration for the doughty "Yankees (or Brits) of the Pacific," but such support and praise were hardly unalloyed. The obverse side of support and respect for Japan and its spectacular accomplishments in "Westernization" was fear of the "Yellow Peril" — fear, that is, that Asia's masses would acquire the scientific skills and war-making machinery hitherto monopolized by the West.5
From the 1890s to the eve of Pearl Harbor, influential U.S. media such as the Hearst newspapers relentlessly editorialized that Japan posed a direct threat to the United States. Concurrent with Japan's formal surrender in September 1945, the Hearst syndicate ran a two-page advertisement in Business Week proudly itemizing how "for more than 50 years, the Hearst Newspapers kept warning America about JAPAN." The spread reproduced "a startling prophetic cartoon" from 1905 depicting a Japanese soldier standing in Korea with the sun behind him and his shadow falling across the Pacific onto the west coast of the United States. It boasted about how "the Hearst Newspapers first pointed out the 'Yellow Peril' of Japan to U.S. aims and interests in the Pacific" in the 1890s; how in 1898 it had "urged the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands by the United States as a defense measure against growing Japanese power in the Pacific"; how in 1912 the paper had "focused national attention on Japanese attempts to colonize Lower California"; and on, and on, up to 1941, when "the Hearst Newspapers, right up to the time that bombs fell on Pearl Harbor, were still hammering for increased naval appropriations and for strengthened fortifications in the Pacific."6
Here, it would seem, was imagination and "psychological preparedness" in abundance; and the United States did, in fact, adopt strategic policies that took the rise of Japan into consideration. Hawaii was annexed in 1898, and from 1905 Navy planners identified Japan as the major hypothetical enemy in the Pacific; there was, of course, no other candidate. In the color-coded contingency plans the Navy introduced before World War I, war plans vis-à-vis Japan were coded "Orange." It has been calculated that, over ensuing decades, officers at the Naval War College tested and refined the Orange plan at least 127 times.7
In May 1940, the clarity of Japan's intent to advance into Southeast Asia and the South Pacific led to transfer of the U.S. Pacific Fleet from the west coast of the United States to Hawaii, as a more visible "deterrent." Several months prior to the Pearl Harbor attack, this ostensible deterrent was augmented by carefully leaked plans to strengthen U.S. forces in the Philippines with advanced B-17 "Flying Fortress" bombers. (In October 1941, Secretary of War Stimson expressed hope that the threat of these bombers would suffice to keep Japan from going after Singapore "and perhaps, if we are in good luck, to shake the Japanese out of the Axis.") Three times in 1941 — in June, July, and October — the army and navy in Hawaii were placed on alert during particularly tense moments in the deteriorating relationship between the two countries.8
Beyond this deep history of mistrust and fear, it might have been expected that the plain nuts-and-bolts of military developments — the huge buildup of warships, aircraft, and ground forces that took place in the years preceding Pearl Harbor — would have made it apparent that Japan would be a formidable foe. This was not the case, and as a consequence it was more than just the unexpected attack that shocked Americans. Even more unnerving was the competence of the Japanese military.
This, at least, should not have come as a surprise. Japan had been working toward a capability for waging "total war" since the early 1930s. (Such thinking dated back to lessons drawn from World War I, which stimulated military strategists everywhere to consider how to mobilize the total resources of the nation in the eventuality of another great war.)9 Isolation from the world community after the takeover of Manchuria in 1931 accelerated these plans, and from 1932 on the military establishment dominated the Japanese government. The nation had been at war with China for over four years at the time Pearl Harbor was attacked; and while the interminable nature of this conflict could be taken as a sign of military shortcomings and overextension, the other side of the coin was that the China war had created an experienced fighting force and spurred major advances in military technology.
These developments were not hidden, but even the experts failed to see them clearly — or, at least, to see them whole. Thus, the list of Japan's military capabilities that caught the Americans by surprise seems quite astounding in retrospect. Their torpedoes were more advanced than those of the Americans. (It was last-minute development of an airplane-launched torpedo with fins, capable of running shallow, that made the Pearl Harbor attack so deadly.) Their sonar, which the Americans believed inferior, was four to five times more powerful than what the U.S. military had at the time. Although the high-speed Mitsubishi "Zero," introduced to combat in China in August 1940, was more effective than any U.S. fighter plane at the time, the Americans underestimated its range, speed, and maneuverability.
The list goes on. According to testimony introduced at the congressional hearings, the Japanese had "better material in critical areas such as flashless powder, warhead explosives, and optical equipment." Japan's monthly output of military aircraft by December 1941 was more than double what the Americans estimated it to be. Their pilots, intensively trained and also seasoned by combat in China, were among the best in the world. As noted in an authoritative history of the U.S. air forces in World War II, "the average pilot in the carrier groups which were destined to begin hostilities against the United States had over 800 hours" of flying experience. The "first-line strength" of the imperial air forces "gave them a commanding position in the Pacific."10
In Prange's emphatic estimation, on December 7, 1941, "Japan stood head and shoulders above any other nation in naval airpower." The British military historian H. P. Willmott concludes that "in December 1941 the Imperial Japanese Navy possessed clear superiority of numbers in every type of fleet unit over the US Pacific and Asiatic fleets"; that it had "superiority over its intended prey" in the crucial category of aircraft carriers; and that in tactical technique, it was "second to none" at the opening stage of the war. Willmott also observes that the land-based Betty medium bomber developed by the Japanese in the 1930s "possessed a range and speed superior to any other medium bomber in service anywhere in the world." Other sources call attention to the Imperial Navy's exceptional skill in night gunnery, and its initial advantage in launching torpedoes from cruisers. As the audacious December 7 attack made painfully obvious, the ability of Japan's naval officers to plan and execute an exceedingly bold and complex operation — particularly one involving carriers — was simply beyond imagining. Except, of course, that the Japanese had imagined it down to the last detail.11
What accounts for this American failure of imagination?
Racism is part of the answer, but only part. The Japanese were not merely "sons-of-bitches." They were "little," and they were "yellow." In the American vernacular, the phrase "little yellow men" had become so common that it almost seemed to be a single word. To be "yellow" was to be alien as well as threatening (as in the "Yellow Peril"); but the reflexive adjective "little" was just as pejorative, for it connoted not merely people of generally shorter physical stature, but more broadly a race and culture inherently small in capability and in the accomplishments esteemed in the white Euro-American world.
Such contempt was not peculiar to Americans. It was integral to the conceit of a "white man's burden" and sneering animus of white supremacy that invariably accompanied Western expansion into Asia. When, after Pearl Harbor, the Japanese swept in and conquered their supposedly impregnable outpost in Singapore, the British also expressed disbelief (and engaged in the same sort of racial invective). Wherever and whenever objectivity overrides prejudice, it is usually the exception that proves the rule.12
Still, racial blinders alone do not adequately account for the failure to anticipate Pearl Harbor. The Americans also were unable to imagine what it was like to look at the world from Tokyo. From the Japanese perspective, the entire globe was in turbulent flux and grave crisis. The nation's situation was desperate. Its cause was just. And things had come to such a pass that there was no alternative but to take whatever risk might be necessary.13
Rationality, Desperation, and Risk
The top-secret policy meetings that took place at the highest level in Japan from the spring of 1941, including "Imperial Conferences" at which diplomatic and military decisions were approved by the emperor, are provocative in retrospect because of the generic, rather than uniquely Japanese, outlook they reveal. It was unthinkable for the nation's leaders to question the assumption that China, including Manchuria, was Japan's economic lifeline, or that the war there was not merely essential to national survival but also moral and just. Indeed, with Japan having already "sacrificed hundreds of thousands of men" in invading and occupying China, it was all the more inconceivable to consider military withdrawal from the continent as the United States had demanded in pre–Pearl Harbor negotiations. It also was taken for granted that the nation could not break the military stalemate in China without access to the strategic resources of Southeast Asia, and time was running out. "Our Empire's national power," explained the head of the Planning Board at one critical meeting, "is declining day by day." The argument that creation of a "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" would ensure not only the "security and preservation of the nation" and well-being of all Asia, but ultimately "world peace," went unchallenged.14
This was not propaganda intended for domestic or international consumption. It was what these men believed — the assumptions and emotions that guided their deliberations and decisions. And so, in the end, the policy makers agreed there was no choice but to break off relations with the United States and "move South." To give in to U.S. demands would be "national suicide." "I fear," Prime Minister T?j? stated at a critical meeting in early November, "that we would become a third-class nation after two or three years if we just sat tight."15
The fateful decision to secure their nation's position in Asia by pursuing a war of choice against the United States and other Allied powers was reinforced by a number of seemingly sane and rational projections. These included German victory in Europe, particularly against England and the Soviet Union; U.S. difficulties in fighting a two-front war; the strength of isolationist sentiment in the United States, and consequently probable domestic opposition to a protracted war in the Pacific; and the fact that there was a current of thinking in U.S. ruling circles, exemplified by Joseph Grew, that saw a constructive role for Japan as a "stabilizing force" against "chaos and communism" in China. Additionally, it was argued that while Japan lacked the industrial potential of the United States, its army and navy were huge; its forces, including air forces, were seasoned by combat in China; and the esprit de corps of the emperor's loyal soldiers and sailors was superior to whatever fighting spirit the Americans could hope to marshal. (In a casual conversation a few months after arriving in defeated Japan, General MacArthur told a British diplomat he "would have given his eyeballs to have such men" as the Japanese forces he encountered in the Philippines.) Given such considerations, it did not seem unreasonable to hope that the war would end in some sort of negotiated settlement with the United States, with both sides cooperating in maintaining peace in Asia.16
Counterfactual rumination (the "what if" school of history) also helps illuminate the misplaced optimism of Japan's war planners. That Japan was able to drag out the war for over three and a half years after Pearl Harbor was due in considerable part to the priority the United States gave to the European theater. At the same time, with a little more luck and operational shrewdness Japan might have prolonged the war even longer. For example, what if: (1) Germany had not attacked the Soviet Union while the Japanese were descending their slippery slope to war, thus leaving resistance to U.S. and British forces stronger on the European front; (2) the U.S. carriers had been berthed at Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack, and had not been by sheer chance at sea; (3) the Pearl Harbor attack force had launched a third wave of strikes and destroyed repair facilities and critical fuel sources; (4) the Japanese had changed their military code in 1942, thus thwarting major post–Pearl Harbor U.S. breakthroughs in cryptanalysis that proved critical not only in decisive battles such as Midway but also in the ongoing decimation of Japanese warships and merchant vessels by American submarines; (5) Japanese naval commanders had been less timid at decisive battles such as Midway and the Solomons? (The counterfactual question that trumps all others is what if Japan had excluded Pearl Harbor and the Philippines from the December 1941 offensive? This would have eliminated the "Remember Pearl Harbor" rage that solidified the nation behind retaliation, and forced the Roosevelt administration to decide whether or not to declare war in the face of continuing isolationist opposition.)
There is almost no end to the "what ifs" of history, and perhaps military history in particular. (Hitler's folly in deciding to attack the Soviet Union is the great strategic what if where the war in the West is concerned.) Be that as it may, Japan's desperation and consequent willingness to take extreme risks also enter the strategic equation. It was irrational to miscalculate the psychological impact the Pearl Harbor attack would have among Americans, and hope instead that demoralization would be the result. By the same measure, however, the U.S. leadership was grievously negligent in ignoring the possibility of direct attack once it became clear the Japanese had concluded they could not retreat in China and, unless the Western powers lifted their embargoes on strategic exports, had no alternative but to move into Southeast Asia.
Military men, like politicians, cherish cherry-picked history and the symbolism and rhetoric of past challenges and glories. When MacArthur took the Japanese surrender on the Missouri in September 1945, the flag raised at Morning Colors was the same Stars and Stripes that had flown over the Capitol in Washington on December 7, 1941, while the bulkhead overlooking the ceremony displayed the thirty-one-star flag Commodore Matthew Perry had flown on his flagship in 1853, when he initiated the gunboat diplomacy that forced Japan to abandon its feudal seclusion. In the surprise attack of December 7, the Japanese engaged in similar symbolism. As the attack force approached Pearl Harbor, the flagship Akagi ran up the "Z" flag signal that had been hoisted more than thirty-five years earlier by Admiral Heihachir? T?g? in the decisive 1905 Battle of Tsushima, in which T?g?'s modern warships destroyed a huge Russian armada that had sailed all the way from the Baltic, thereby assuring Japan's emergence as a great power. The signal read, "The rise and fall of the Empire depends upon this battle; everyone will do his duty with utmost efforts."
Shortly before this, the commander of the Pearl Harbor attack fleet read an "imperial rescript" to his men that had been prepared earlier by the emperor. "The responsibility assigned to the Combined Fleet is so grave that the rise and fall of the Empire depends upon what it is going to accomplish," the message said. Japan's sovereign placed his trust in the fleet to accomplish what it had long been training for, "thus destroying the enemy and demonstrating its brilliant deed throughout the whole world."17
One side's infamy was the other's brilliant deed, on which the very fate of the empire depended.
Aiding and Abetting the Enemy
Al Qaeda commanded no military machine on September 11. It had been engaged in no negotiations with the United States, nor could it have been, not being a nation-state. Although Osama bin Laden's ambitions had grown ever more expansive over the years since Al Qaeda's founding in 1988, and although U.S. intelligence specialists took seriously his vision of a "great Caliphate," he was not engaged in an escalating quest for autarky — for military and economic domination of a formal, secure, and self-sufficient sphere of influence — comparable to the quest that had obsessed Japan ever since its takeover of Manchuria in 1931.18
Even here, however, certain points of comparison merit attention. A full decade of mounting tensions preceded Pearl Harbor, beginning with the impasse over Manchuria. In the case of Islamist terrorism, the first attack in the United States took place in 1993, when the World Trade Center suffered extensive damage from explosives detonated in a parked van. Although later intelligence connected this to Al Qaeda, this was not clear for a number of years. A National Intelligence Estimate distributed in July 1995 predicted future terrorist attacks against and in the United States, but the 9-11 Commission concluded that Al Qaeda itself was not identified in a conspicuous manner until around 1999 — three years after the NSC's Richard Clarke dates this "discovery," eleven years after the organization was founded, six years after the first attack on the World Trade Center, and only two years before the September 11 attack.19
Where the actual attack plans for 1941 and 2001 are concerned, both were quite long in the hatching. The Pearl Harbor operation was conceived by Admiral Yamamoto at the end of 1940, probably in December, and the first draft of an operational plan was drawn up the following March (by Commander Minoru Genda and Rear Admiral Takijir? ?nishi, who in late 1944 would become the prime mover behind the kamikaze attacks). By April, the project had been moved into command channels, and training in activities such as aerial torpedo practice commenced in May and June. War games for the entire "Southern Operation," including Hawaii, were carried out in Tokyo over a ten-day period beginning September 11.
The "Operation Hawaii" plan was accepted in principle by the navy chief of staff in mid-October, and Emperor Hirohito was briefed on this at the imperial palace some time between October 20 and 25. "Dress rehearsals" by the fleet began in October, and the plan received final approval by the navy general staff in early November. On November 17, vessels assigned to the attack force began making their way to Hitokappu Bay in the Kurile Islands (under Japanese control since the Russo-Japanese War), from where — on November 25 (November 26, Japan time) — the fleet would depart for the attack. In Al Qaeda's case, where there is less information, the 9-11 Commission simply concluded that the complex September 11 operation was "the product of years of planning."20
It is also provocative to note that collusion or at least mixed signals between the American side and the enemy preceded both catastrophic surprise attacks. In U.S.–Japanese relations, this took several forms. Despite the fact that the 1937 invasion and occupation of China provoked fairly widespread sympathy for China and condemnation of Japan in the United States, until around mid-1940 pressures to appease Japan came from many directions. For all practical purposes, isolationists associated with "Fortress America" and "America First" activities often found themselves on the same page with peace and antiwar groups. Both desired that the United States isolate itself from foreign conflicts and avoid provoking Japan in any way that might lead to hostilities. As late as October 1941, one informal council devoted to "prevention of war" that included several well-known scholars of Far Eastern relations was still urging the government to "make a deal" with Japan. At both official and public levels, attention focused far more on Europe than on Asia, particularly after Germany unleashed its blitzkrieg in 1939; to some degree, this fixation on the war in Europe strengthened popular opposition to any involvement in the conflict in Asia.21
Japanese leaders, naturally attentive to such sentiments, found them in more explicitly governmental circles as well, where officials like Ambassador Grew were cautiously receptive to the argument that Japan could be a bulwark against both domestic chaos in China and Soviet-led international communism. Although Grew became increasingly critical of Japan's actions beginning in mid-1940, as late as September 1941 he was still urging "constructive conciliation."22
Just as encouraging, if not more so, was the attitude within U.S. business circles. The dollar value of U.S. exports to Japan in 1937 was more than five times that of the export trade with China, and in 1940 still amounted to roughly three times the China trade. A major portion of these exports consisted of strategic materials such as aviation fuel, crude and refined oil, scrap iron, and steel — all critical to the Japanese war machine. A fair indication of sentiment in the business community emerged in a survey published in Fortune magazine in September 1940, allegedly tapping the views of some "15,000 businessmen" including directors of the 750 largest American corporations. Forty percent of respondents chose to "appease" the Japanese, and another 35 percent to "let nature take its course."23
The United States did not begin to impose serious controls over exports until mid-1940, when Japan, following the fall of France to the Nazis, moved troops into the northern half of French Indochina and began the courtship that would culminate in the Axis alliance in September. Part of the U.S. concern involved old-fashioned colonial interests — namely, fear that losing Southeast Asia would deprive Britain of critical resources. The scenario that unfolded thereafter became an all-too-familiar tit-for-tat game: the more the U.S. government tightened economic screws to deter Japanese aggression, the more persuaded Japanese leaders became that their empire faced disaster and there was no alternative but to "move South."
Although there was no comparable economic dimension in the rise of Islamist terrorism, there was an analogous prehistory of support and appeasement prior to September 11. In the closing decade of the Cold War, U.S. strategic planners embraced the prospect of an anticommunist "arc of Islam" stretching east from the Middle East along the underbelly of the atheistic Soviet Union. The policy birthed by such thinking took the form of covert collaboration with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in recruiting, training, and arming radical mujahideen for the war against Soviet forces in Afghanistan between 1979 and 1989. President Ronald Reagan posed for a photograph with mujahideen leaders in the White House in 1986, and at one point CIA director William Casey, a devout Catholic, sponsored a translation of the Qur'an for dissemination to Uzbek-speaking holy warriors. More striking is the weaponry provided to these anti-Soviet zealots by true believers in Washington who were persuaded that a shared monotheism made Christians and radical Islamists kindred souls. As itemized by Steve Coll, these weapons included "antiaircraft missiles, long-range sniper rifles, night-vision goggles, delayed timing devices for plastic explosives, and electronic intercept equipment." Also part of this covert support were Japanese-made pickup trucks, Chinese and Egyptian rockets, Milan antitank missiles, and somewhere between 2,000 and 2,500 heat-seeking Stinger missiles. Although material U.S. aid was directed primarily to the Afghan resistance forces rather than volunteer Arab fighters (like bin Laden), the U.S. government looked favorably on the latter.24
Benazir Bhutto, the Pakistani political leader assassinated in 2008, dwelled on this shortsighted Realpolitik in a book completed only days before her death. In her view, the blowback from covert engagement in the anti-Soviet Afghanistan war (which involved close U.S. collaboration with Bhutto's political adversaries in Pakistan) was by no means an exceptional instance of myopic Western policies in the Middle East. On the contrary, the United States and European powers had a long history of engaging in "double standards" by preaching freedom and development while in actual practice supporting both dictators and, in Afghanistan, the most radical and oppressive Islamist fundamentalists. Over the course of decades, she concluded, the West had "unintentionally created its own Frankenstein's monster." These were harsh words and more than a little disingenuous, since while she was prime minister of Pakistan from 1993 to 1996, her own government — alarmed by the civil strife that followed the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 — had provided covert financial support, supplies, and military advisers to the extremist Taliban who later provided a haven for bin Laden.25
Monsters commonly have multiple creators, but this does not diminish the U.S. role in helping to promote Islamist radicalism early on. Like the Japanese soldiers and sailors who became seasoned veterans in the war against China and initially benefitted materially from U.S. support through trade in strategic goods, the mujahideen — once proxy soldiers for the U.S. government and romanticized "freedom fighters" in Washington and the U.S. media — emerged from Afghanistan as hardened fighters primed for new missions. It fell to Al Qaeda, birthed in Afghanistan in 1988, to define that mission for them.
"This little terrorist in Afghanistan"
The stunning "asymmetrical" victory of Afghan and Muslim fighters over the Soviet Union emboldened Islamist radicals to believe they could prevail over U.S. military power as well. In a television interview more than three years before 9-11, bin Laden boasted that the victory of lightly armed holy warriors in Afghanistan "utterly annihilated the myth of the so-called superpowers." (This interview was rebroadcast on Al Jazeera nine days after 9-11.) By contrast, U.S. policy makers drew few if any counterpart lessons. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the politicized zealotry they had encouraged in Afghanistan no longer attracted top-level attention. Even within the U.S. military, the effectiveness of Islamist insurgency and terror did not prompt serious attention to counterinsurgency doctrine.26
This was true when the Soviet Union withdrew its humiliated forces from Afghanistan in 1989 and official Washington proceeded to remove the latter nation from its radar. It was still true in 2001, when the United States invaded Afghanistan and routed the Taliban in the wake of the 9-11 attacks. And, despite belated attention to counterinsurgency tactics in Iraq beginning around 2006, it would remain largely true where Afghanistan was concerned to the end of the Bush presidency, when the Taliban were on the upsurge and again helping shelter bin Laden. At the beginning of 2009, as a new administration assumed power in Washington, Russia's ambassador to NATO looked back on the twentieth anniversary of the Soviet withdrawal and held this up as a mirror to the beleaguered U.S. military mission in Afghanistan. "They have repeated all our mistakes," he observed, "and they have made a mountain of their own."27
Why did top military and civilian leaders fail to take asymmetrical threats from Al Qaeda and the Islamists seriously? As with the earlier failure to take Japanese military capabilities seriously, part of the answer lies in racial arrogance and cultural condescension. When Charles Freeman, the U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia at the time of the first Gulf War in 1991, tried to draw attention to the mujahideen after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, for example, he found no one interested, including top leaders at the CIA. "Part of the attitude in Washington," he recalled, "was, 'Why should we go out there and talk to people with towels on their heads?'"28
Michael Scheuer, who headed the CIA's "bin Laden unit" until being cashiered in 1999, tells a similar story in even grittier language. Washington's top personnel and policy makers, he declared, are "so full of themselves, they think America is invulnerable; cannot imagine the rest of the world does not want to be like us; and believe an American empire in the twenty-first century not only is our destiny, but our duty to mankind, especially to the unwashed, unlettered, undemocratic, unwhite, unshaved, and antifeminist Muslim masses." One could only describe this hubris as "arrogance (or is it racism?)," Scheuer went on. The elites simply could not fathom that "a polyglot bunch of Arabs wearing robes, sporting scraggly beards, and squatting around campfires in Afghan deserts and mountains could pose a mortal threat to the United States."29
This was the "little yellow men" mindset transferred to the Middle East. As in 1941, civilian and military planners underestimated the enemy and failed to grasp both the depth of their self-righteousness and their willingness to take enormous risk as well as heavy losses. Most disastrously, they were unable to imagine this enemy possessing the cunning and competence to pull off a complex and imaginative act of aggression. None of his peers challenged Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz when, five months before 9-11, he dismissed bin Laden as "this little terrorist in Afghanistan."
Once again, as with system breakdown and leadership negligence, the diagnostic language in postmortems of the failure of imagination exposed on September 11 is essentially the same as that which analysts have long used in describing the disbelief that greeted Pearl Harbor: psychological unpreparedness, prejudices and preconceptions, gross underestimation of intentions and capabilities. There is a sense of encountering a pathologist's repetitive case book, glossing near-identical cases. Thus, to crib from Roberta Wohlstetter: prior to September 11, American analysts (with some marginalized exceptions) and decision makers simply were unable "to project the daring and ingenuity of the enemy." To borrow from Admiral Yamamoto's letter to a young student: Bush administration planners were undone by the arrogance of despising a small enemy. To appropriate Admiral Kimmel's pithy words: no one in a position of command thought that those little Muslim sons-of-bitches could pull off such a spectacular attack, so far from home.
World Trade Center on September 11, 2001
In this ethnocentric world, terrorists of the twenty-first century were "little men" in a compound sense — little because they were racially, ethnically, culturally, and religiously alien; and little because, unlike Japan sixty years earlier, and unlike the Soviet Union or China or even Iraq, Iran, and North Korea, they were not a nation-state. When Richard Clarke criticized the Bush administration's disregard of the Al Qaeda threat, and its subsequent misguided response to September 11, his most vivid revelations concerned the immediate response — and disbelief — of the president's inner circle of advisers:
On the morning of the 12th, DOD's [the Department of Defense's] focus was already beginning to shift from al Qaeda. CIA was explicit now that al Qaeda was guilty of the attacks, but Paul Wolfowitz, Rumsfeld's deputy, was not persuaded. It was too sophisticated and complicated an operation, he said, for a terrorist group to have pulled off by itself, without a state sponsor — Iraq must have been helping them.
On the same day, September 12, Clarke went on to record, President Bush "grabbed a few" intelligence experts including himself: "'Look,' he told us, 'I know you have a lot to do and all . . . but I want you, as soon as you can, to go back over everything, everything. See if Saddam did this. See if he's linked in any way.'"30
These responses, revealed after the invasion of Iraq, can be interpreted as genuine or Machiavellian (already preparing to use the 9-11 outrage to initiate a long-desired war against Iraq) — but in all likelihood they were both. Ensuing use of the "war on terror" to invade Iraq, with all the distortion of intelligence data this involved, was duplicitous; but the prior failure to take Al Qaeda or the terrorist threat really seriously reflected a lingering Cold War mindset. The 9-11 Commission singled out "imagination" as one of "four kinds of failures" revealed by the attacks of September 11. (The other three were "policy, capabilities, and management.") The commission even went so far as to recommend remedying this by "institutionalizing imagination" — an oxymoron one could easily imagine the bureaucratic behemoth taking seriously to heart by forming committees, preparing flow charts, and perhaps even creating a supersecret NIA (National Imagination Agency).31
President Bush proclaims "Mission Accomplished aboard the USS Lincoln on May 1, 2003 following US invasion of Iraq
In a passing comment, the 9-11 Commission also took note of what happens when, after unexpected catastrophe, erstwhile little men prove to be formidable adversaries:
Al Qaeda and its affiliates are popularly described as being all over the world, adaptable, resilient, needing little higher-level organization, and capable of anything. The American people are thus given the picture of an omnipotent, unslayable hydra of destruction. This image lowers expectations for government effectiveness.
What the commission was evoking was what one U.S. counterterrorism official called "the superman scenario." The shocking success of the little Muslim men abruptly endowed them with hitherto undreamed-of powers and capabilities — to the extent of precipitating a declaration of a global war on . . . what? On a tactic (terror). On a worst-case scenario where Al Qaeda or other terrorists might obtain weapons of mass destruction. Eventually, this paranoia reached such a level that deflating hyperbole became almost a category in itself in the burgeoning popular literature on terrorism. As another counterterrorism expert put it, writing specifically about Al Qaeda, "by failing to understand the context of the organization, its very strengths and weaknesses, we magnified our mental image of terrorists as bogeymen." Yet another posed the rhetorical question "Are they ten feet tall?" and deemed it necessary to answer this. "They're not," he assured his audience.32
A comparable cognitive dissonance took place after Pearl Harbor. In American eyes, the Japanese foe morphed, overnight, from little men into supermen. Until 1943 or even 1944, when the war turned unmistakably against Japan, the cartoon rendering of the enemy was often a monstrously huge figure. Like the 9-11 Commission, more sober commentators responded by warning of the danger of exaggerating the enemy's resources and capabilities to the point where this became demoralizing. A typical essay in the Sunday New York Times Magazine in March 1942, for example, might have served as a draft for post–September 11 warnings about being carried away by the specter of an unslayable hydra of destruction. It was titled "Japanese Superman? That, Too, Is a Fallacy."33
1 Prange, Pearl Harbor, 515. Morgan recounted this to Prange in an interview in October 1976.
2 Report of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, 259; Prange, At Dawn We Slept, 689; Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor, 392.
3 Prange, Pearl Harbor, 552; Goldstein and Dillon, The Pearl Harbor Papers, 121.
4 Goldstein and Dillon, The Pearl Harbor Papers, 122.
5 The conflicting images of Japan at the turn of the century emerge vividly in several lavishly illustrated units on the "Visualizing Cultures" website produced at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology by John W. Dower and Shigeru Miyagawa. See visualizingcultures.mit.edu, and particularly "Throwing Off Asia" (in three parts), "Asia Rising," and "Yellow Promise/Yellow Peril." The latter two units are based on Japanese and foreign postcards of the Russo-Japanese War in the Leonard Lauder Collection at the Museum of Fine Arts, Boston, and "Yellow Promise/Yellow Peril" is particularly illuminating on the ambiguous European response to Japan's stunning emergence as a powerful imperialist power.
6 Business Week, September 1, 1945. This ad is reproduced in John W. Dower, "Graphic Japanese, Graphic Americans: Coded Images in U.S.-Japanese Relations," in Akira Iriye and Robert A. Wampler, eds., Partnership: The United States and Japan, 1951–2001 (Kodansha International, 2001), 304–5.
7 For general treatments of these matters, see Akira Iriye, Pacific Estrangement: Japanese and American Expansion, 1897–1911 (Harvard University Press, 1972); also Spector, Eagle against the Sun, esp. chs. 1–5. The 127 tests and revisions of Orange are noted in ibid., 57.
8 On the B-17 bombers, see Prange, Pearl Harbor, 145–52, 290–93; also Spector, Eagle against the Sun, 74–75. The three Pearl Harbor alerts are described in detail in Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor, 71–169.
9 See, for example, Michael A. Barnhart, Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919–1941 (Cornell University Press, 1987).
10 Prange, Pearl Harbor, 537, 555–56; Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor, 336–38; E. Kathleen Williams, "Air War, 1939–41," in Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., The Army Air Forces in World War II, vol. 1: Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942 (University of Chicago Press, 1948), 79–80. On the development of the Mitsubishi Zero as seen from the Japanese side, see the translated account by the chief designer Jiro¯ Horikoshi, Eagles of Mitsubishi: The Story of the Zero Fighter (Washington University Press, 1980); also Akira Yoshimura, Zero Fighter (Praeger, 1996).
11 Prange, Pearl Harbor, 550, 569; H. P. Willmott, The Second World War in the Far East (Smithsonian Books, 1999), 54, 66, 78, 83–84; Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy (Indiana University Press, 1973), 276.
12 For an archives-based analysis of World War II in Asia that is acutely sensitive to (and quotable about) Anglo racism, see Christopher Thorne, Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain, and the War against Japan, 1941–1945 (Oxford University Press, 1979). American racism vis-à-vis Asians was complicated by the positive attitude many Americans had come to hold toward China by the late 1930s. Although "anti-Oriental" movements and legislation constitute a deep stain in U.S. history of the nineteenth and early twentieth century, sympathy toward the Chinese in their struggle against the Japanese was strong — a development that derived in considerable part from the exceedingly effective positive image of the Chinese purveyed by popular writers such as the Nobel Prize–winning Pearl Buck. I address these matters at length in War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War (Pantheon, 1986).
13 It is worth keeping in mind that surprise attacks have been common in modern times. These include the attack by Germany on the Soviet Union in 1941; by North Korea on South Korea in 1950, and soon after this the entry of the People's Republic of China into the Korean War; and the Tet offensive in the Vietnam War in 1968.
14 For examples of the bedrock assumptions noted here, see Ike, Japan's Decision for War, 78, 80, 82, 148, 152, 160.
15 Ike, Japan's Decision for War, 238, 246.
16 Katharine Sansom, Sir George Sansom and Japan: A Memoir (Diplomatic Press, 1972), 156 (MacArthur's quote).
17 Goldstein and Dillon, The Pearl Harbor Papers, 155. For the Missouri surrender ceremony, see Samuel Eliot Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, vol. 14: Victory in the Pacific (Little, Brown, 1960), 362–63. The flag that had been flying over the Capitol on December 7 had previously been displayed at Casablanca (where the Allied policy of "unconditional surrender" was announced in February 1943), Rome, and Berlin.
18 Japan's vision of what was needed to be secure and self-sufficient escalated steadily after the Manchurian Incident of 1931, with huge leaps taking place in 1937, with the invasion of China; in mid-1940, with the movement of Japanese forces into northern French Indochina; and of course in 1941, when the "move South" precipitated the attack on Pearl Harbor. As the empire expanded, so inevitably did the political rhetoric that accompanied it. Thus, the proclaimed "New Order" of 1938 (embracing Japan, China, and the puppet state of Manchukuo) metamorphosed into the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in 1940. Until around 1936, advocates of the "move South" fought a vigorous internecine battle with proponents of a "move North" against the Soviet Union, aimed at seizing the strategic resources of the Soviet Far East. (The Japanese army was more inclined to "move North" than the navy.) The "move North" argument continued to be advocated up to the eve of the Pearl Harbor attack, and the Americans were well aware of this from their intercepts of the Japanese diplomatic code. This was yet one more distraction — one more example of "noise" — that compounded the analysis of Japan's intentions. Some high-level U.S. planners (such as Rear Admiral Richmond Turner of the War Plans Division) were so fixated on the "move North" possibility that, in the eyes of later critics, they seriously impeded balanced intelligence analysis; Prange, Pearl Harbor, 326–31, is strong on this. For a close analysis of the "rational" quest for autarky or autonomy that drove Japanese expansion from the Manchurian Incident to the war with China, see James B. Crowley, Japan's Quest for Autonomy: National Security and Foreign Policy, 1930–1938 (Princeton University Press, 1966).
19 The 9-11 Commission Report, 341–42; Clarke, Against All Enemies, ch. 6 (133–54), esp. 148. Terrorist attacks on U.S. targets abroad also mark this period, of course, notably those in Beirut (1982), Libya ("Pan Am 103" in 1988), Somalia (1993, later identified as involving Al Qaeda), Saudi Arabia (1995–96), and Kenya and Tanzania (1998, instigated by Al Qaeda).
20 This timetable for planning the Pearl Harbor attack has been extracted from Prange, At Dawn We Slept, 15, 27–28, 101, 106, 157–58, 223–31, 299, 309, 324, 328, 345, 372. On Al Qaeda's planning, see The 9-11 Commission Report, 365.
21 Warren I. Cohen, "The Role of Private Groups in the United States," in Borg and Okamoto, Pearl Harbor as History, 421–58. The well-known scholars of Far Eastern affairs who urged conciliation with Japan included Payson Treat, A. Whitney Griswold, and Paul Clyde; ibid., 452–53. Cohen concludes his detailed study with the observation that "the American people remained overwhelmingly opposed to involvement in the Far Eastern conflict or in any war"; ibid., 456.
22 Grew abandoned his general policy of appeasing Japan in a famous "green light" cable to the State Department on September 10, 1940, but continued to maintain hope that U.S. responsiveness to Japan's perceived interests would strengthen the influence of "moderates" within the Japanese government. His September 1941 advocacy of "constructive conciliation" came in conjunction with proposals for a personal meeting between Roosevelt and Prime Minister Konoe.
23 Mira Wilkins, "The Role of U.S. Business," in Borg and Okamoto, Pearl Harbor as History, 341–76. This excellent analysis includes useful tables and charts. For the Fortune opinion poll, see 350–51; Wilkins speculates that the poll, published in September 1940, was probably conducted in early July — just before the Roosevelt administration imposed the first serious restrictions on strategic exports.
24 Steve Coll's Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (Penguin, 2004), won the Pulitzer Prize. See esp. 92–93, 97–98 on Casey; 90, 104 on translation of the Qur'an; 11, 125–37, 149–51, 175 on weapons and other support for the Afghan fighters; and 155 on moral support for the non-Afghan mujahideen. The U.S. role in playing midwife to the mujahideen is also documented in vivid detail in Robert Dreyfuss, Devil's Game: How the United States Helped Unleash Fundamentalist Islam (Metropolitan, 2005), esp. ch. 11. The photograph of President Reagan meeting with mujahideen "freedom fighters" from Afghanistan is reproduced on the cover of Eqbal Ahmad, Terrorism: Theirs and Ours (Seven Stories Press, 2002).
25 Benazir Bhutto, Reconciliation: Islam, Democracy, and the West (HarperCollins, 2008), ch. 3, esp. 81–85, 149–55. Bhutto's secret role in providing covert aid to the Taliban is noted in Coll, Ghost Wars, 289–94, 298–300.
26 Bin Laden, Messages to the World, 48 (March 1997), 65, 82 (December 1998), 109 (October 21, 2001), 192–93 (February 14, 2003). On the absence of counterinsurgency doctrine and training, see chapter 5 (notes 176–178 of this book).
27 Clifford J. Levy, "Poker-Faced, Russia Flaunts Its Afghan Card," New York Times, February 22, 2009.
28 Freeman is quoted in Dreyfuss, Devil's Game, 290–91 (from an April 2004 interview with the author).
29 Scheuer, Imperial Hubris, 197–98.
30 Clarke, Against All Enemies, 30–32, 232.
31 The 9-11 Commission Report, 339–48.
32 The 9-11 Commission Report, 364; Hersh, Chain of Command, 91–92; Michael A. Sheehan, Crush the Cell: How to Defeat Terrorism without Terrorizing Ourselves (Crown, 2008), 6, 14. Jack Goldsmith, a conservative lawyer who became head of the president's Office of Legal Counsel in October 2003, devotes an entire chapter of his book to the role of "fear bordering on obsession" in driving post–9-11 administration policies; The Terror Presidency: Law and Judgment inside the Bush Administration (Norton, 2007), ch. 3 (esp. 71–76), also 165–67.
33 Nathaniel Pfeffer, "Japanese Superman? That, Too, Is a Fallacy," New York Times Magazine, March 22, 1942. In a book written many years ago, I dwelled at length on images of the enemy from both sides of the war in the Pacific, including the metamorphoses of the Japanese from little men to supermen. See War Without Mercy, esp. ch. 5 ("Lesser Men and Supermen"). This is not a unique phenomenon, and need not involve race. A similar "little men to supermen" transformation took place, for example, in the so-called missile-gap crisis that followed the Soviet test of an intercontinental ballistic missile in 1957.
John Dower is Ford International Professor of Japanese history at M.I.T. His numerous publications include War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War, and Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II, which won the Pulitzer Prize and the National Book Award. He is an Asia-Pacific Journal Associate. His new book, from which the present article is excerpted is, Cultures of War: Pearl Harbor / Hiroshima / 9-11 / Iraq.


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The Kawasaki City Museum has a tradition of creating exhibitions that explore the relationship between technology and art, and this one, coinciding with the museum's 25th anniversary, is no exception.
As society becomes progressively more wired, and the Internet a common way to connect people across the globe, our world view changes. Through the work of young Japanese and foreign artists, this exhibition explores our relationship with technology. Using various media, including video installations and textiles, the artists comment on controversial issues such as privacy, changing outlooks on life, and the effect of technology on human relationships; July 20-Sept. 29.
Kawasaki City Museum; 044-754-4500; 1-2 Todoroki, Nakahara-ku, Kawasaki, Kanagawa; Musashi Kosugi Station, Toyoko Line. 9:30 a.m.-5 p.m. ¥800. Closed Mon. (except Sept. 16, 23), Sept. 17, 24. www.kawasaki-museum.jp


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I have an appointment for a Juvederm touch-up in my nasio-labial folds, and i wanted the Dr. to place the leftovers around my tear trough area. I don't want the trough resolved completely, I just want the line where the eye hollow meets the cheek to be a bit softer. Many have had terrible experiences with Juvederm under the eyes, but most of the "horror stories" are when too much is injected. Is conservative use viable?
Is Juvederm Contra-indicated for Undereye Use?
Doctor Answers 11
Nonsurgical treatment for bags under the eyes
The appearance of bags, dark circles, and "tear troughs" under the eyes is a troublesome consequence of the loss of the cheek fat pads and the downward displacement of the shriveled remnants of these pads with aging and gravity. These problems commonly appear in the late thirties and become more pronounced with the passage of the decades.
Where once the lower lids were full and rounded with little evidence of crinkling and puffiness, they now become darkened, crinkled, and baggy, like the skin of a balloon deflated of all its air. Moreover, without the presence of the fat pads, the very thin and delicate skin of the lower lid region reflects the dark color of the tiny blood vessels below and of the muscles surrounding the eye giving rise to a "Panda" eyes appearance.
When we believed that all these changes resulted from skin laxity, it seemed logical to perform aggressive, invasive surgical procedures s to address these problems. However, thankfully, today, with our improved understanding of the importance of volume loss and displacement, we are able to address these issues nonsurgically--simply by restoring the volume.
Owing to its smooth consistency, I have found Juvederm, a hyaluronic acid injectable filler, to be particularly useful for tear troughs and bags. Iin experienced hands, it can be precisely, gently and artfully placed, in minute amounts, along the tear trough and then molded to achieve the desired result. Restylane has also been used successfully for this region, but I find the more homogeneous consistency of Juvederm better suited for these purposes.
Learn more: http://www.cosmedispa.co.il
Juvederm around lower lids
Juvaderm ultra is a nice product to fill out the nasojugal groove. I have been using alot of restylane there as well They both can produce a nice result.
Juvederm is good for the tear trough. The result is dependant on the surgeon's experience and expertise. Discuss your concerns and needs with your plastic surgeon and he/she will be able to advise you
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Conservative use is fine
I see a beautiful softening of the tear trough with both Juvederm and Restylane.
The key is that the filler should only be injected medial to the mid-pupillary line (the inner half of the eye), deep enough (right on the bone), and in very small amounts. Of course, no aspirin or ibuprofen for 1 week prior to the procedure to decrease the chance of bruising.
Juvederm contra-indicated for undereye use
Easy answer is NO! But find an expert injector to inject this delicate area. I recommend a series of visits every 2 to 3 weeks to slowly build up the area. Be careful of bruising.
From MIAMI Dr. B
Juvederm for tear troughs
Both Juvederm and Restylane are used by doctors for the tear troughs. When placed underneath the muscle there is less concern of lumpiness or exagerated swelling. The placement in this area is an off-label use for both the Juvederm and Restylane. Neither are contraindicated for this area but it takes a gentle hand to deliver the correct amount.
Juvederm and Restylane work well under the eyes
Juvederm works very well in this area but must be injected very deeply, under the muscle, otherwise it can look blue in color. It must also be injected in small amounts as too much can look like a blue bulge. If you go to an expert Juvederm injector who has done many patients in this area, your risks of side effects will be much lower. Experience is very important in this area to avoid problems, but even with an experienced injector, side effects can sometimes happen.
How to avoid tear trough deformity problem
It's very common to want to use any extra juvederm/ restylane from your visit applied alsewhere including under the eyes.
As you probably have heard already this can create a whole host of problems including swelling, baggy puffiness, as well as the occasional blue hint from the filler.
Juvederm is slightly more crosslinked than restylane and as such appears to both last a little longer as well as draw in more water. That is why many doctors prefers juvederm for the correction of the nasolabial folds, but it is also the reason why you may be hearing that more patients are having problems when it is injected under the eyes.
We find that the safest approach in this regards is to either avoid the problem entirely by using your own fat, or if we are going to use fillers, to use only a very small amount to see how the patient reacts and then build accordingly. It takes a little while longer to accomplish the end goal, but we can avoid the problems that can otherwise occur.
I hope this helps and let us know if we can be of more help.
Warm Regards.
Conservative is the ONLY way to go.
I prefer Restylane to Juvederm in this area, but Juvederm is not contraindicated even though it is "off-label", meaning its use in this area has not been evaluated and approved by the FDA. Doctors do "off-label" all the time (like Botox in the crow's feet, and fillers into the cheeks). I tell my patients, I am going for a base hit (improvement), not a home run. If you are aggressive, you can see more swelling and lumping. Injections always need to be under the muscle, but inferior to the orbital rim in this delicate area.
Learn more: http://www.drmarylupo.com
Use Restylane for Lower Eye Lid Hollows
Many of us have stopped using Juvederm to fill under eye hollows because of excessive swelling in this delicate and unforgiving area. Many times it works fine, but in those cases where it swells too much, it can be very difficult to correct.
I would suggest that you only have Restylane placed in this area to avoid becoming one of the complication "stories" here on the web. Have the extra Juvederm injected anywhere else on your face other than the eyelid hollows. Good luck and be well.
Dr. P
These answers are for educational purposes and should not be relied upon as a substitute for medical advice you may receive from your physician. If you have a medical emergency, please call 911. These answers do not constitute or initiate a patient/doctor relationship.