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The Magnetar Trade: How One Hedge Fund Helped Keep the Bubble Going
Update June 21, 2011: JP Morgan Chase has agreed to pay a $154 million penalty to settle SEC charges that the bank misled investors about a complex mortgage-securities deal during the waning days of the housing boom. The SEC charged that JP Morgan neglected to tell investors that the hedge fund Magnetar helped create the deal and was betting against it. This story was the first to detail Magnetar's role.
Update October 29, 2010: This story has been corrected in response to a recent letter from Magnetar. Read their letter, along with our response.
In late 2005, the booming U.S. housing market seemed to be slowing. The Federal Reserve had begun raising interest rates. Subprime mortgage company shares were falling. Investors began to balk at buying complex mortgage securities. The housing bubble, which had propelled a historic growth in home prices, seemed poised to deflate. And if it had, the great financial crisis of 2008, which produced the Great Recession of 2008-09, might have come sooner and been less severe.
At just that moment, a few savvy financial engineers at a suburban Chicago hedge fund helped revive the Wall Street money machine, spawning billions of dollars of securities ultimately backed by home mortgages.
When the crash came, nearly all of these securities became worthless, a loss of an estimated $40 billion paid by investors, the investment banks who helped bring them into the world, and, eventually, American taxpayers.
Yet the hedge fund, named Magnetar for the super-magnetic field created by the last moments of a dying star, earned outsized returns in the year the financial crisis began.
How Magnetar pulled this off is one of the untold stories of the meltdown. Only a small group of Wall Street insiders was privy to what became known as the Magnetar Trade. Nearly all of those approached by ProPublica declined to talk on the record, fearing their careers would be hurt if they spoke publicly. But interviews with participants, e-mails, thousands of pages of documents and details about the securities that until now have not been publicly disclosed shed light on an arcane, secretive corner of Wall Street.
According to bankers and others involved, the Magnetar Trade worked this way: The hedge fund bought the riskiest portion of a kind of securities known as collateralized debt obligations -- CDOs. If housing prices kept rising, this would provide a solid return for many years. But that's not what hedge funds are after. They want outsized gains, the sooner the better, and Magnetar set itself up for a huge win: It placed bets that portions of its own deals would fail.
Along the way, it did something to enhance the chances of that happening, according to several people with direct knowledge of the deals. They say Magnetar pressed to include riskier assets in their CDOs that would make the investments more vulnerable to failure. The hedge fund acknowledges it bet against its own deals but says the majority of its short positions, as they are known on Wall Street, involved similar CDOs that it did not own. Magnetar says it never selected the assets that went into its CDOs.
Magnetar says it was "market neutral," meaning it would make money whether housing rose or fell. (Read their full statement.) Dozens of Wall Street professionals, including many who had direct dealings with Magnetar, are skeptical of that assertion. They understood the Magnetar Trade as a bet against the subprime mortgage securities market. Why else, they ask, would a hedge fund sponsor tens of billions of dollars of new CDOs at a time of rising uncertainty about housing?
Key details of the Magnetar Trade remain shrouded in secrecy and the fund declined to respond to most of our questions. Magnetar invested in 30 CDOs from the spring of 2006 to the summer of 2007, though it declined to name them. ProPublica has identified 26.
An independent analysis commissioned by ProPublica shows that these deals defaulted faster and at a higher rate compared to other similar CDOs. According to the analysis, 96 percent of the Magnetar deals were in default by the end of 2008, compared with 68 percent for comparable CDOs. The study was conducted by PF2 Securities Evaluations, a CDO valuation firm. (Magnetar says defaults don't necessarily indicate the quality of the underlying CDO assets.)
From what we've learned, there was nothing illegal in what Magnetar did; it was playing by the rules in place at the time. And the hedge fund didn't cause the housing bubble or the financial crisis. But the Magnetar Trade does illustrate the perverse incentives and reckless behavior that characterized the last days of the boom.
At least nine banks helped Magnetar hatch deals. Merrill Lynch, Citigroup and UBS all did multiple deals with Magnetar. JPMorgan Chase, often lauded for having avoided the worst of the CDO craze, actually ended up doing one of the riskiest deals with Magnetar, in May 2007, nearly a year after housing prices started to decline. According to marketing material and prospectuses, the banks didn't disclose to CDO investors the role Magnetar played.
Many of the bankers who worked on these deals personally benefited, earning millions in annual bonuses. The banks booked profits at the outset. But those gains were fleeting. As it turned out, the banks that assembled and marketed the Magnetar CDOs had trouble selling them. And when the crash came, they were among the biggest losers.
Some bankers involved in the Magnetar Trade now regret what they did. We showed one of the many people fired as a result of the CDO collapse a list of unusually risky mortgage bonds included in a Magnetar deal he had worked on. The deal was a disaster. He shook his head at being reminded of the details and said: "After looking at this, I deserved to lose my job."
Magnetar wasn't the only market player to come up with clever ways to bet against housing. Many articles and books, including a bestseller by Michael Lewis, have recounted how a few investors saw trouble coming and bet big. Such short bets can be helpful; they can serve as a counterweight to manias and keep bubbles from expanding.
Magnetar's approach had the opposite effect -- by helping create investments it also bet against, the hedge fund was actually fueling the market. Magnetar wasn't alone in that: A few other hedge funds also created CDOs they bet against. And, as the New York Times has reported, Goldman Sachs did too. But Magnetar industrialized the process, creating more and bigger CDOs.
Several journalists have alluded to the Magnetar Trade in recent years, but until now none has assembled a full narrative. Yves Smith, a prominent financial blogger who has reported on aspects of the Magnetar Trade, writes in her new book, "Econned," that "Magnetar went into the business of creating subprime CDOs on an unheard of scale. If the world had been spared their cunning, the insanity of 2006-2007 would have been less extreme and the unwinding milder."
Magnetar Gets Started
The guiding force behind Magnetar was Alec Litowitz, a triathlete, astronomy buff and rising star in the investing world. In 2003, Litowitz retired from a Chicago-based hedge fund, Citadel, one of the most successful in the world, where he had spent most of his career and became a top executive. He promised to stay out of the business for two years.
As he waited for his non-compete agreement to expire, Litowitz and his wife traveled through Europe collecting antiques to stock a big house they were building on the shores of Lake Michigan.
By spring 2005, Litowitz's wait was over. Then 38 years old, Litowitz quickly raised money to start his own hedge fund. The fund, Magnetar, attracted $1.7 billion from investors and opened in April.
Litowitz, who declined to be interviewed, had an approach to investing that emphasized scale and simplicity. He told those he hired: "Figure out a way to make money and figure out how to repeat it and do it over and over again," according to a former employee. The firm handed out T-shirts emblazoned with a confident slogan: "Very Bright, Very Magnetic." Employees privately joked about working for a fund named after something like a black hole.
Litowitz brought on board David Snyderman. A New Yorker with a serious mien, Snyderman, in his mid-30s, began hunting for investment opportunities in Wall Street's burgeoning market in mortgage-backed securities.
It didn't take them long to find something promising.
Snyderman and Magnetar focused on Wall Street's mortgage assembly line, which had been super-charged during Litowitz's time away from the business. Banks bundled pools of mortgages into large bonds, which they combined to create even larger investments. These were the now-infamous collateralized debt obligations. Each month, homeowners paid their mortgages. Each month, payments flowed to investors. (Here is an excellent video explaining CDOs.)
Large investors across the globe snapped up the CDOs, which took the hottest investment around -- the U.S. housing market -- and transformed it into something that supposedly had little or no risk. Wall Street preached that the risk had been diluted because it was spread out over such large collections of mortgage bonds. (CDOs can also be based on side bets that rise and fall with the value of other mortgage bonds. These are known as "synthetic" CDOs. Magnetar's deals were largely synthetic.)
Just as they did with mortgage-backed securities, investment banks divided CDOs into different layers, called tranches. As the mortgages were paid, money flowed to investors holding the top tranche. Since they were the first to get paid, and thus took the least amount of risk, they earned low interest rates. Next came the middle levels -- the so-called mezzanine tranches.
Last in line for money were investors in what's known as the equity. In return for being at the bottom, equity investors got the highest returns, sometimes 20 percent interest -- money they would receive only as long as the vast majority of mortgage holders made their payments.
Even back then, Wall Street insiders called the equity "toxic waste," and as anxiety built in late 2005 that the housing boom was over, investment banks struggled to find takers.
To Magnetar, the toxic waste was an opportunity.
At a time when fewer investors were stepping up to buy equity, the little-known hedge fund put out the word that it wanted lots and lots of it. Magnetar concentrated in a particularly risky corner of the CDO world: deals that were made up of the middle, or mezzanine, slice of subprime mortgage-backed bonds. Magnetar CDOs were big, averaging $1.5 billion, about three times the size of earlier deals built on subprime mortgages.
Magnetar's purchases solved a crucial problem for the banks. Since the equity was so risky and thus difficult to sell, banks didn't like to create new CDOs unless someone committed to buy them. Indeed, such buyers were so crucial that Wall Street referred to them as the CDOs' "sponsors."
Without sponsors, Wall Street's mortgage bond assembly line could grind to a halt, and with it bank profits and banker bonuses. A top CDO banker could earn $3 million to $4 million annually on the CDOs he created and sold.
Usually, investment banks had to go out and find buyers of the equity. With Magnetar, the buyer came right to the bank's doorstep. Wall Street was overjoyed.
"It seemed like a miracle," says one mortgage market investment banker, because "no one" had been buying equity.
"By the end of 2005, the general sense was that the CDO market would slow down. These trades continued to fuel the fire," says Bill Tomljanovic, who worked for a firm that helped build a Magnetar CDO. Magnetar was "a driving force in the market."
According to JPMorgan data, Magnetar's deals amounted to somewhere between a third and half the total volume in the particularly risky corner of the subprime market on which the fund focused.
Outsiders thought Magnetar was piling in at exactly the wrong time. A March 2007 Business Week article titled "Who Will Get Shredded?" would later put Magnetar near the top of its list. The hedge fund, said the magazine, "showed bad timing."
How could Magnetar hope to make money on such risky stuff? It had a second bet that was known only to insiders.
At the same time it was investing in the equity, the fund placed bets that many of the same CDOs it had helped create would actually blow up. It did that using one of the most opaque corners of the investment world: credit default swaps, which function as a kind of insurance on CDOs and other types of bonds.
Credit default swaps work roughly like an insurance policy: You pay a small premium regularly, on any bond you want -- whether you own it or not -- and if it goes bust, you get paid off in full.
Nobody but Magnetar knows the full extent of its bets. Hedge funds are private and they don't disclose the details of their trades. Also, credit default swaps are mostly unregulated and not publicly disclosed. Magnetar says it didn't bet only against its own CDOs. The majority of its credit default swaps, says Magnetar, were on other CDOs. (Update April, 9:We have added additional detail from Magnetar's response in which the hedge fund says it was "net long" on its own CDOs, an assertion on which the fund has declined to elaborate.)
Since it was the sponsor, Magnetar had privileges. Placing the risky equity was so important to banks that they typically gave those who bought it a say in how the deal was structured. Like all investors, equity buyers had to weigh risk and reward, the goal being to maximize returns while minimizing the chances that your investment will blow up.
But people involved in Magnetar's deals say the hedge fund took a different tack, pushing for riskier bonds to go inside its CDOs. Doing that would make it more likely that Magnetar's bets against the CDO would pay off.
The equity bought by Magnetar represented just a tiny fraction of the overall CDO. If it costs, say, $50 million, an entire CDO could be 20 times that, $1 billion. And if the CDO begins to go south and you're smart enough to have taken out enough insurance, you can make hundreds of millions of dollars. That, of course, would take a bit of the sting out of losing your original $50 million investment in the equity.
Magnetar Does Its First Deal
As Magnetar set up its CDO shop, the hedge fund hired Jim Prusko, a smart and affable investor who had worked previously at the Boston money-manager Putnam Investments. He would shoulder much of the work of courting Wall Street bankers and managers who worked with the hedge fund. He operated out of Magnetar's office in midtown Manhattan around the corner from Saks Fifth Avenue. In an office of 20-somethings, Prusko, then 40 years old, stood out as the "old man."
Prusko and his boss at Magnetar, Snyderman, began approaching investment banks, offering to buy the riskiest, highest-yielding portion of CDOs. They always wanted a middleman, known as a CDO manager, on their deals. Many CDOs are operated day to day by such independent firms, who are often brought in by investment banks.
The managers also played a vital role in creating deals. When an investment bank created a CDO, it would often give what amounted to blueprints to the managers, who would then go out and find the exact bundles of bonds to fill the CDO. The managers had a fiduciary duty to represent the CDO fairly to all investors, ensuring investors got accurate and equal information.
Magnetar's deals were numerous and big, and just like for investment banks, the bigger the deal, the larger the fee for managers.
"Prusko's job was to butter up the CDO managers and the bankers," said one banker who dealt with him.
By relying on a manager rather than managing the deal itself, Magnetar had no legal obligations to the CDO or others who bought it.
Magnetar completed its first deal in May 2006. In what became a habit, it named the CDO after a constellation, in this case, "Orion," known for the trio of stars that form the mythological Greek hunter's belt. For its maiden CDO, Magnetar enlisted a partner to buy risky equity alongside it, an internal investment fund within Deutsche Bank.
Deutsche and Magnetar didn't reach for a Wall Street powerhouse to put the deal together. Instead the investors worked with Alex Rekeda, a young Ukrainian immigrant who was then working for Calyon, the investment banking arm of the French bank Crédit Agricole.
Magnetar and Deutsche were deeply involved in creating Orion. "We want to make sure we control the deal," a banker who worked on it recalls them emphasizing.
One person involved in Orion recalls Deutsche's point person, Michael Henriques, and Magnetar's Prusko pressuring the CDO manager, a division of the Dutch bank NIBC, to include specific lists of bonds in the deal.
Prusko and Henriques told this person that the investors "needed more spread in the portfolio." More "spread" means more return and more risk.
This person recalled Magnetar asking, "Would you consider these bonds?" Their suggestions were invariably for riskier bonds. "Let's just say we didn't think their suggestions made a lot of sense," the person said.
He said the CDO manager refused Magnetar's requests to put riskier bonds in the deal. Still, it was an eye-opening experience. "I began to realize there were things you had to defend yourself against," he said.
Magnetar and Deutsche declined to comment on Orion specifically. Magnetar says it made suggestions about the general outlines of the CDOs. But, the hedge fund says, it "did not select the underlying assets of the CDO at any time prior to or subsequent to transaction issuance."
Other buyers of the CDO could have figured out they were getting relatively risky bonds, but they would have had to look hard at the minutiae of the deal. By this point in market history, the ratings had less and less meaning. Two sets of bonds rated AA could have very different levels of risk. Most investors chose not to dig too deeply.
One investor in Orion was a fund affiliated with IKB, a small German bank. Eventually, it invested in at least four more Magnetar deals. In mid-2007, because of the disastrous investments in subprime securities, the German government was forced to bail out IKB. The failure of the bank was an early warning sign of the global financial crisis.
Deutsche's Henriques would later quit the bank and join Magnetar.
Orion lost value but never defaulted. That was better than every subsequent CDO that Magnetar helped create, according to ProPublica's research.
Magnetar's (Nearly) Perpetual Money Machine
By buying the risky bottom slices of CDOs, Magnetar didn't just help create more CDOs it could bet against. Since it owned a small slice of the CDO, Magnetar also received regular payments as its investments threw off income.
With this, Magnetar solved a conundrum of those who bet against the market. An investor might be confident that things are heading south, but not know when. While the investor waits, it costs money to keep the bet going. Many a short seller has run out of cash at the gates of a big payday.
Magnetar could keep money flowing -- via its small investments in CDOs -- and could use that money to pay for its bets against CDOs.
Similar, commonly traded, assets appeared in multiple Magnetar CDOs. Experts say the benefit of that overlap to Magnetar was that when the hedge fund bet against non-Magnetar CDOs, the CDOs still had similar characteristics to the ones Magnetar had invested in.
Soon enough, bankers and CDO managers had a sense of how it worked. "Everyone knew," said one person who managed Magnetar CDOs. "They used the equity to fund the shorts."
Magnetar further increased its odds by insisting that the CDOs it helped create had an unusual construction. Typically, cash flowing to the last-in-line equity buyers is cut off at the first signs of trouble -- such as a rise in mortgage delinquencies. Those at the top of the CDO -- who accepted lower returns for less risk -- received that cash, leaving none for the high-risk holders.
Magnetar wanted its deals to be "triggerless," meaning lacking these cash-flow dams. When the market turned shaky and homeowners began to default, money kept flowing down to the risky slices that Magnetar owned.
Even today, bankers and managers speak with awe at the elegance of the Magnetar Trade. Others have become famous for betting big against the housing market. But they had taken enormous risks. Meanwhile, Magnetar had created a largely self-funding bet against the market.
E-mails Give Glimpse of How Magnetar Worked
By the fall of 2006, housing prices had already peaked and Magnetar's assembly line started producing, helping to create CDOs it would bet against. The hedge fund's appetite seemed insatiable. The deals were the talk of CDO desks across Wall Street.
Between the end of September and the middle of December 2006, Magnetar had a hand in spawning at least 15 CDOs, worth an estimated $23 billion. Among the banks involved with those deals were Citigroup, Lehman Brothers and Merrill Lynch.
E-mails obtained by ProPublica from that time suggest Magnetar's clout. The firm was involved at the start of deals and pushed for riskier bonds to be included.
After Magnetar expressed interest in buying the equity, the French bank Société Générale began to build the CDO, and selected a New York-based manager, Ischus Capital Management, which would choose the exact bonds to go into the CDO.
Magnetar wanted to name the CDO after a small constellation in the southern sky called Hydrus, which means "male water snake." But by late September, Magnetar and Ischus began sparring over the composition of the deal.
Magnetar pressed Ischus to buy lower-quality assets for the deal, according to three people familiar with Hydrus. In an e-mail to bankers at Société Générale and Ischus executives, Magnetar's CDO specialist, Jim Prusko, wrote on Sept. 29, 2006, "The original portfolio target spreadsheet that I have... had a strangely low spread target. That of course would not at all be beneficial to us. I have attached the target portfolio that I would like for this deal with target spreads."
The portfolio Magnetar outlined didn't list specific bonds, but executives at the CDO manager Ischus felt that they understood what Prusko wanted. A request for higher-spreading assets means more risk in the deal.
Andrew Shook, an Ischus executive, answered forcefully on Oct. 3, "We will not assemble a portfolio we are not proud of and feel strongly about in the name of a spread target."
Prusko dialed down the pressure, responding within an hour. "Of course, the actual security selection is totally your purview," he wrote. "I just wanted to make sure the overall portfolio characteristics worked for our strategy."
Shook declined to comment on the e-mail exchange. Magnetar says that the deal as originally conceived wouldn't have been profitable and that it was merely trying to get a higher return -- a higher "spread" -- to balance out the risk it was taking in owning the bottom-rated slice of the CDO.
The two sides subsequently drifted apart, partly over Ischus's unease with Magnetar's pressure, and the deal was never completed.
Concerns About 'Reputational Risks'
As part of the big business Magnetar was doing in the fall of 2006, the hedge fund put together a CDO with Lehman Brothers named for the constellation Libra. John Mawe, a banker who worked on Libra, remembers that "there was a back-and-forth fight" about the assets between the bank's CDO manager and Magnetar, with the hedge fund pushing for riskier assets.
Mawe says Lehman's CDO in-house-management arm, which handled the deal, never put assets into Libra that it thought were bad investments.
Among the other banks that Magnetar approached during that time was Deutsche Bank, with whom it had teamed up to do its first deal months earlier. Deutsche Bank was anxious for business in order to maintain its standing as one of the top CDO banks, according to one of its bankers. Deutsche recommended CDO manager State Street Global Advisors.
The State Street managers were "highly skeptical" of doing a deal with Magnetar, according to one participant. "State Street wanted their deals to do well," said the participant, and with Magnetar, there was "a lot of reputational risk to be concerned about."
Hoping to close the deal, Magnetar's master salesman Jim Prusko drove up from his home in the New York suburbs to State Street's headquarters in Boston, to mollify executives in the management team. After the meeting, the deal went forward. As one banker explained, "there were other managers who were dying to do this deal" and get the millions in fees.
After subprime losses, State Street closed the business that managed its CDOs in late 2007. Frank Gianatasio, who worked in State Street's CDO business says, "We were comfortable with every transaction we put into our CDOs."
Deutsche, Magnetar and State Street called the $1.6 billion CDO they created Carina, a constellation whose name in Latin means a ship's keel. In November 2007, Carina had the distinction of being the first subprime CDO of its kind to be forced into liquidation.
State Street and Magnetar declined to comment on their negotiations over Carina.
A Lawsuit Suggests Merrill Lynch's Role
By early 2007, the mortgage market was falling apart. Lenders were reporting big losses, delinquencies were mounting -- and Magnetar's business was booming.
Between late February and April, banks rolled out five Magnetar-sponsored deals, with a value of about $7.2 billion. Among them was a $1.5 billion CDO named Norma. Following Magnetar's branding convention, Norma is a constellation in the Southern Hemisphere named for the Latin word for "normal." This CDO was anything but.
Details about Norma, which was created by Merrill Lynch, have emerged through an ongoing lawsuit between Merrill and Dutch bank Cooperatieve Centrale Raiffeisen-Boerenleenbank, known commonly on Wall Street as Rabobank. (The Wall Street Journal had the first detailed report of Norma, in late 2007.) The dispute involves a side transaction that Rabobank made with Merrill involving Norma. Magnetar is not a party to the litigation. Yet the allegations are scathing in their depiction of how the CDO was developed.
"Merrill Lynch teamed up with one of its most prized hedge fund clients -- an infamous short seller that had helped Merrill Lynch create four other CDOs -- to create Norma as a tailor-made way to bet against the mortgage-backed securities market," the complaint reads. (Emphasis in the original.)
"[T]o facilitate the selection of assets that would allow Norma to operate as a hedging instrument rather than an investment vehicle, Merrill Lynch hand-picked a beholden collateral manager that was willing to ignore its fiduciary duties to Norma's investors."
The manager for Norma was a small shop out of Long Island, N.Y., called NIR Capital Management. Run by Corey Ribotsky, the firm's primary line of business before entering CDOs was speculating in penny stocks.
NIR brought in a team of experienced bankers to run its CDO business. The firm also had a variety of other ventures. At one point, they put money into a documentary called "American Cannibal," that profiled the aborted launch of a reality television show in which contestant were stranded on an island and goaded into cannibalism. (The New York Times found it "absorbing.") Ribotsky is now under investigation by federal authorities for misleading clients about its investment returns. NIR and Merrill Lynch declined to comment on dealings with Magnetar; Merrill Lynch denies liability in the litigation. Magnetar declined to comment.
Norma began to suffer setbacks even before the deal closed in March 2007. According to the lawsuit, by the time Norma was completed, its value had already declined by more than 20 percent.
JPMorgan Gets Into the Game -- And Loses
Despite the bad news in the mortgage market, Magnetar continued to find a few willing bankers to do CDOs, including a new one: JPMorgan Chase.
JPMorgan had avoided many of the complex financial transactions that decimated the banking industry. As the market grew frothier, JPMorgan pulled back from the CDO business. In 2005, the men who ran JPMorgan's CDO unit told their bosses that they couldn't see how to complete a CDO without sticking the bank with the large top tier, which would not appeal to investors because of its low returns. Other banks dealt with this problem by retaining these CDO layers on their books.
But by mid-2006, JPMorgan joined the herd. It hired bankers to expand its CDO team and got to work.
A few months later -- in early 2007 -- Magnetar and JPMorgan banged out a deal. Unlike the earlier CDOs Magnetar helped create, this one wasn't named after a constellation. Instead, the deal was called "Squared," after the term for a CDO that was made up of other CDOs. Squared was filled in part with other CDOs Magnetar had helped create.
According to a person familiar with how the deal came together, Magnetar committed to purchase $10 million worth of Squared's equity. Magnetar's purchase allowed JPMorgan to create and sell a $1.1 billion CDO. As it had on previous deals, Magnetar pushed the bankers to select riskier bonds. "They really cared about it," said the person involved in the deal. "They wouldn't pull punches. It was always going to be crappier."
The hedge fund requested that Squared have slices from many Magnetar CDOs, including Auriga, Carina, Libra, Pyxis and Virgo. They all went into the deal. Magnetar also successfully pushed for Squared to include slices from one of the Abacus deals, a group of CDOs that, as the New York Times later reported, Goldman Sachs had created and bet against.
JPMorgan earned $20 million in creating Squared, according to the person involved in the deal.
JPMorgan's sales force fanned out across the globe. It sold parts of the CDO to 17 institutional investors, according to a person familiar with the transaction. The deal closed in May 2007, nearly a year after housing prices had peaked. Within eight months, Squared dropped to a fraction of its initial value.
Just about everybody lost out, including Thrivent Financial for Lutherans, a Minnesota-based not-for-profit fraternal organization, whose $10 million investment was wiped out. Thrivent declined to comment.
Small pieces of Squared, as well as Magnetar's CDO Norma, also ended up in mutual funds run by Morgan Keegan, a regional investment bank based in Memphis, Tenn.
The funds, advertised as conservative investments, cratered after betting on various exotic assets. Morgan Keegan was sued by individual investors who claimed that they were misled about the risks. Among the investors was former Chicago Bulls player Horace Grant, who was awarded $1.4 million in arbitration. This week, the SEC accused two Morgan Keegan employees of misleading fund investors about the value of its holdings in CDOs. Morgan Keegan called the charges "factually inaccurate" and promised to defend itself "vigorously." Morgan Keegan did not respond to a request for comment on the specifics of the two Magnetar CDOs.
The biggest loser was JPMorgan Chase itself, which had kept the large, supposedly safe top slices of Squared on its books, without hedging itself. The bank lost about $880 million on the CDO. JPMorgan declined to comment on the details of the transaction.
Magnetar came out a winner. The fund earned about $290 million on its bet against Squared, according to a person familiar with the deal. Magnetar declined to comment.
Magnetar's Exit: A Deal so Bad Even a Credit-rating Agency Balked
Prusko was buoyant as Magnetar's trades began to make money as its short bets rose in value. One friend recalls Prusko ribbing him: "What are you going to do after this blows up?" (Magnetar declined to comment on the exchange.)
In the spring of 2007, Magnetar began to have a problem: The hedge fund was sitting on hundreds of millions of dollars' worth of CDO equity and other low-rated portions of its deals. With the decline of housing prices accelerating, off-loading these pieces would be very hard.
Magnetar needed a buyer and some deft financial engineering. It found the answer through its former partner, Alex Rekeda, who had been the banker on Magnetar's first CDO. Rekeda now worked at Mizuho, one of Japan's biggest banks. Mizuho was eager to get into the CDO world. It hired Rekeda in part because he could bring Magnetar's business, according to one CDO manager who worked with him.
Rekeda and Magnetar came up with a remarkable CDO. They took their risky portions of 18 CDOs they had helped created -- and repackaged them to sell them to others. Bundling up the dregs of a CDO was rare, if not unprecedented.
This deal, Tigris, which closed in March 2007, tied together $902 million of Magnetar's risky assets. Rekeda convinced two rating agencies, Standard & Poor's and Fitch, to rate it. Fitch designated $259 million of it as triple A, the highest rating. S&P rated nearly $501 million as triple A. (When contacted for this article, S&P said it was comfortable rating Tigris; Fitch didn't respond to questions about the deal.)
In a highly unusual move, the third major rating agency, Moody's, refused to rate Tigris. Rekeda lobbied Moody's for a rating, according to a person familiar with the deal. But Moody's then-head of CDOs, Eric Kolchinsky, wouldn't budge.
Magnetar got $450 million from Mizuho, which in return received income from assets in Tigris, according to several people familiar with the transaction. It was what's known as a non-recourse loan: If things went wrong, Mizuho could only lay claim to what was in Tigris.
In response to ProPublica's questions about this deal, Magnetar said the fund "as a matter of general practice, and as do most hedge funds, enters into non-recourse financing on specific assets in its portfolio."
By September, just six months after Tigris had been created, Fitch downgraded most of the CDO's slices. By the end of January 2008, the CDO had gone into default. The Japanese ended up with the paper, which was worthless. Mizuho eventually wrote Tigris off, as part of about $7 billion in total losses from its subprime missteps. Mizuho declined to comment, as did Magnetar.
Just as with a refi gone bad, when Tigris was wiped out, the hedge fund walked away from the house -- in this case its collateral. A person who worked on Tigris boasted about how innovative the deal was. If it hadn't blown up, he says, it would have been "deal of the year." For Magnetar, it may have been.
Records it shared with investors show Magnetar had a spectacular 2007. Founder Alec Litowitz pulled down $280 million, according to Alpha Magazine. That spring, a trade journal awarded Prusko and Snyderman "Investor of the Year" honors. The Magnetar Constellation Fund, the firm's fund that had the most exposure to the CDO trades, was up 76 percent in 2007, according to a presentation Magnetar gave to investors in early 2009. The main fund, the Magnetar Capital Fund, was up 26 percent that year. By the end of 2007, Magnetar had $7.6 billion under management, up from the $1.7 billion it began with two years earlier. Magnetar declined to comment on its performance.
ProPublica has learned that the SEC has been looking into how the Magnetar deals were created, but it's not clear how much progress the investigation has been made or who might be the target. In a statement yesterday, Magnetar said:
Our understanding is that for some time, the SEC staff has been looking broadly at the sales, marketing, and structuring of CDOs. In connection with that inquiry, the SEC staff has from time to time requested information from Magnetar and other market participants, and Magnetar has been cooperating and responding to the requests. We are not aware that this inquiry is focused on any particular person or firm.
ProPublica Research Director Lisa Schwartz and researcher Kitty Bennett contributed to this story. ProPublica's Ryan Knutson also helped with research. Finally, a big thanks to This American Life's Alex Blumberg.
8 comments
My 2003 book, "Collateralized Debt Obligations & Structured Finance," includes the "Magnetar" structure as applied to corporate CDOs. I don't know the first person to use that structure, but contrary to many finance articles and recent books, the "Magnetar" structure itself wasn't new when it was applied to mortgage loans and other asset backed securities. For example, it wasn't developed by any of the people in Greg Zuckerman's book, The Greatest Trade Ever. Furthermore, there are a large variety of structured products and a huge network of players. Magnetar was a cog in the wheel, but the story is much bigger then just this one hedge fund.
One of the key people at Magnetar, David Snyderman, was in the structured products group at Citadel in August 2004. At that time, the group asked me to meet with them and asked if I would help them with this structure for the ABS market after reading about it in my CDO book (Wiley, 2003, Chapter 6 (especially Pp. 184-194, and this information is also in the 2008 updated edition). They said my book gave them the idea to apply the structure to the other loan markets. As I recall, Snyderman did not attend his group's meeting on that day.
My CDO book was written as a caution to investors not a handbook for guys like this. I declined to get involved. In my opinion, the investment banks that got involved in these structures should have declined to do so, too. To the best of my knowledge, Citadel got rid of the entire group and they scattered to various shops.
The SEC should have shut down this kind of activity, but the SEC dropped seminal investigations into CDOs and failed to act on information in the public domain.
The Magnetar strategy story was already told by the Wall Street Journal, before Bear Stearns imploded (March 2008), and before Fannie, Freddie, Lehman, AIG, and TARP. This was before the meltdown, when it mattered most, but regulators and most of main stream media ignored the significance of these issues.
The following is a link to a December 2007 Wall Street Journal story explaining the creation and implosion of a CDO called "Norma" with which Magnetar was involved. It was written by Serena Ng and Carrick Mollenkamp. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119871820846351717.html
The following is an excerpt of story the same reporters did for WSJ on Magnetar's strategy on January 14, 2008 (link at bottom). (I am also quoted in this article.) The WSJ has to work within space limitations, but it got the word out on many of the key issues, and it did a good job.
There is obviously a lot more to this. I wrote about many of the structures and players in STRUCTURED FINANCE (Wiley, 2008) and in my book on the financial crisis and how to fix it, DEAR MR. BUFFETT (Wiley, 2009).
A Fund Behind Astronomical Losses
By SERENA NG and CARRICK MOLLENKAMP
January 14, 2008
The trading strategy of a little-known hedge fund run by an astronomy buff contributed to billions in losses on Wall Street, even as the fund itself profited from the subprime-mortgage crisis.
Its trading highlights the important role some hedge funds played in the great debt unwind that is now plaguing financial markets. Many hedge funds realized early on "that the loans and securities that went into CDOs were extremely toxic, and they designed structures to exploit that," says Janet Tavakoli, a structured-finance consultant.
Is it any wonder we are in this mess. These investors were suppose to be sophisticated institutional investors. Let's see, the housing mkt is collapsing or at the very least has corrected in '06-07 and thus it makes sense to invest in the highest risk CDO's in the market. Really? Magnetar might have been sleazy but the investors were stupid and lacked risk tolerance. On the synthetic CDO's like Goldman's Abacus it was blatantly obvious that there needed to be a short position (investor) to make the deal work. The IKB's of the world were arrogant that their view was correct and the shorts would fail and thus they were willing to take the long side of these CDO's. Again, they never bothered to understand that if they were wrong they were taking a position in the riskiest CDO's in the market. So why take the risk for a few extra basis points in return? The German government should have no recourse except to their banks' stupid employees.
Remember the movie, A Beautiful Mind? What did the graduate student, John Nash, say in the bar? Do you remember? http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v5jrNoNNtrE
The best result is when the individual players do what's best for them selves AND the group. He said Adam Smith needs revision. Obviously, the people who championed the creation of CDO with low credit quality, then bet against them, understood how to game a flawed system. Unfortunately for all of us, they also failed to understand that Adam Smith was revised by John Nash. Did Magnetar and similar players understand the concept of personal gain? Sure they did. Did they see the larger picture? Ah, no. Try again.
Interesting article and comment. The problem that seems fundamental in all the financial coverage is that the US somehow became not so much a nation as a gigantic criminal conspiracy. Impunity for the rich and powerful is a world wide and growing problem. Hard to believe that progress can be made on any other of our problems, war, poverty, climate chaos, etc., without dealing with this one first. Weird how a law and order position has become a radical one.
I admit to being an ingenue when it comes to financial matters, so perhaps I am wrong or simply being overly cynical when I note that the sophisticated CDO operators constructing these financial instruments for Magnetar were "perplexed" about weighting toward ultra high risk securities. Even the most obtuse amongst them ought to have realized that Magnetar was not stupid; rather, the fund was likely betting against them. Right?
Keith's comment is on target. Personal gain? I think in the financial markets it is buyer beware when it comes to privately placed investments (these CDO's) which are only traded amongst large "knowledgeable" institutional investors which by definition means that most SEC regulations don't apply, unlike a public company. I think no matter what you think of Magnetar's ethics they were looking for a sucker and they found some and hoped to make money without any clue that the entire global financial system would come tumbling down. Criminal conspiracy? I think you are giving Wall St too much credit for what they thought was a free lunch: above market yield for what was perceived as low risk investments. Don't disagree that some participants walked off with $millions as did many last year. I attribute most of this to shareholders who allowed this pre-crisis and to policy makers in the past year.
In '06 and '07 when Magnetar put the deals together there were glimpses that the housing market was slowing down and would have problems. Magnetar in its wildest dreams probably figured it could make $millions although they probably never expected the home run they realized. If they did then they would have made a much more massive bet. Other hedge funds would have also. In hindsight it is easy to label those who bet against the CDO's and the health of subprime housing as geniuses but a little luck sometimes can go a long way. At the time everyone (the economists, Bernanke, etc.) was saying that housing was only 7% of GDP and thus the economy wouldn't collapse. Unfortunately, again easier to see in hindsight (how many of non-market participants were thinking about the housing problem in '07?), one event led to another to another to another. Note, one would need to go back to the news impacting different parts of the financial system in '07 and '08 to see that the subprime problem caused a series of cascading events. Eventually this led to the failure of and in some cases subsequent bailouts of Bear Stearns, Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae, Lehman, Wachovia, Washington Mutual, and AIG and the potential failure of multiple other large banks. These companies had combined multiple trillions in assets and thus similar liabilities owed to others including deposits and lots of debt. They were the lifeblood of the U.S. economy even if this wasn't right.
The global economy and specifically the global financial system are tied together and what happened in early '07 through late '08 proved just how tied together this system was. I would argue that there were 3 key government factors that helped create this crisis. First, is the anti-trust (Dept of Justice and the Federal Reserve) policies. The lack of understanding how big and intertwined these banks became as they merged and grew their balance sheets over the past 10-15 years became very clear in '08. Second, the federal government agencies and politicians that were responsible for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac completely failed in terms of oversight. Third, the Fed, especially the Geithner run New York Fed, responsible for open market activity (i.e. treasury trading) and officially and unofficially overseeing Wall St, was asleep at the wheel. Anyone who knows how rapidly information flows across the financial markets could tell you this (wall street is just like mingling at a large water cooler dominated by gossip). The Fed had to be hearing/seeing plenty of data and anecdotal information about how things were getting out of control pre-07.
Finally, everyone blames Wall St which is fair. However, many people don't want to admit that we were all enjoying the fruits of housing prices rising, directly or indirectly and pretty much nobody said this is wrong and needs to stop.
Should we have bailed out these enterprises? Not sure but look at their presence in the economy and most likely a disaster would have ensued if any one of these truly went bankrupt. For perspective, the U.S. GDP is about $14-15 trillion. The total assets of the companies (AIG, Lehman, Bear, Wachovia, Merrill, Citi, BkAmer, Morgan Stanley, Goldman, Washington Mutual)excluding the government mortgage co's) bailed out in one way or another were approximately $9-10 trillion. Like many government officials stated there was no easy solution.
Fannie & Freddie owed $5 trillion in liabilities vs. $9.5 trillion total U.S. govt debt. Fannie was 20x levered (a typical homeowner who makes a 20% downpayment is 5x levered) and Freddie was 70x. They own or guarantee 56% of the single family mortgages in this country, or $5.4 trillion of the total $11.9 trillion in outstanding mortgage debt.
I just finished listening to the podcast on This American Life which examines the Magnetar investment strategy. The podcast did a wonderful job of explaining the circumstances and context within which this fund operated. I couldn't help thinking as I was listening, isn't this like buying a life insurance policy on someone and assisting, if not perpetrating, their death? The managers of the hedge fund had to be aware that by promoting these CDO's and their creation, they would ultimately be increasing the likelihood of their demise. Not only that, they apparently actively sought riskier assets for the funds to increase the risk of failure. Wouldn't that be the equivalent of putting the insured under that life policy in a car that has no brakes and inviting them to drive on the freeway? That is not only illegal, it may cross the line into criminal behavior. The rationale that these investors were only doing what was legal seeks to elevate form over substance. While I realize that we can't legislate moral behavior, we can and should legislate destructive behavior, especially when that behavior threatens the greater good.
Yes, they are doing just that in terms of life insurance analogy. Are they doing something illegal is more difficult to answer. Question 1-Part A: In the case of cash based CDO's the underwriter and the managers of these assets had a fiduciary obligation to create and manage a CDO that would presumably remain solvent. If either party were influenced by Magnetar personnel in making investment decisions, then they weren't making an independent fiduciary decision for their investors. Question 1-Part B: If the underwriter turned around and sold CDS that allowed Magnetar to buy insurance on the CDO, thus profiting from its demise, one would have to see who actually remained the insurer to Magnetar. If the underwriter turned around and transfered the insurance risk to another party it could be inferred that the underwriter profited from both underwriting the CDO and in turn selling insurance to Magnetar and thus profited from being on both sides of the table. If the underwriter held onto the insurance risk it could be inferred that their interests were aligned with the investors & manager as they were taking as much risk in the CDO tranches. Question 2 - Was Magnetar guilty of fraud? There were no rules that restricted a hedge fund from owning a CDO tranch and buying insurance (CDS) against either the owned tranch or other tranches. This the problem with the overall financial markets and especially with hedge funds. Often hedge funds because of their purpose: generate return minimizing riks, will take investment positions that seem to contradict themselves. A stock hedge fund may own the stock of company A but they actually also have a short position against company A that allows the hedge fund to profit either way depending on the relationship of long vs. short (it may 2x long to 1x short or vice versa). This is a very simplistic example of a hedge fund but the conflict between long and short occurs frequently and raises all sorts of issues.
Where do you draw the line?
The whole point of CDS on CDO's was to create more supply of CDO's when the supply of mortgages slowed significantly in late '06 and to allow people to short the bonds and the market. The problem with CDS is that it is much more open ended and complex then borrowing stock to short stocks in the stock market or even to borrow U.S. treasury bonds to short in the govt bond marke, both activities have taken place for years without significant problems. CDS by their very nature of not having to be tied 1-1 to the corresponding bond they reference and the complex financial math underlying them, have wreaked havoc on the financial system. Something needs to be done to constrain their impact on borrowers and the financial markets.
Commenting on this story is closed.
Enticed by profits and bonuses, Wall Street took advantage of complicated mortgage-based instruments to reap billions, only to exacerbate the eventual crash.
The Story So Far
As the housing market started to fade, bankers and hedge funds scrambled for ways to maintain the lavish bonuses and profits they had become so accustomed to, repackaging mortgages in complex securities called collateralized debt obligations. The booming CDO market masked how weak the housing market was, and exacerbated its collapse.


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James Jackson Jr. & LaDonna Burns to Bring THE BLACK-UPS to Joe's Pub, 8/10
Performance Artist and lover of tight jeans, James Jackson, Jr. has teamed with long time friend and hair-changing Diva-About-Town, LaDonna Burns (Rent Nat'l Tour, Seussical Nat'l Tour) for a show they've written based on the early years of their friendship and careers singing behind several New York City acts.
What happens when the only two members of America's newest soul-sensation, "Becky & The Whiteboys", to show up at their New York City debut are the black-up singers? Can these two over-worked and under-used talents find a band in time? More importantly, who's going to sing lead? "Becky & The Whiteboys" are not only the band these two sing behind. They also represent the things The Black-Ups have been stumbling over for years while searching for a reason to step out from behind that up-stage-left microphone and into the spotlight.
With the sexiest soul band in town, lead by the multi-talented, ever-charming, birthday boy Elliot Roth, James and LaDonna are taking a trip, meeting center stage, basking in the spotlight, and ready to blow the roof off the place.
Tickets: http://joespub.publictheater.org/en/Tickets/Calendar/PlayDetailsCollection/Joes-Pub/The-Black-Ups-featuring-James-Jackson-Jr--LaDonna-Burns/
Sunday, Aug. 10th @ 7PM (doors open at 6:00PM)
James Jackson, Jr. Lover of tight jeans, too much jewelry, and good soul searching music, the diamond-hearted, sharp-witted, Boston native Mr. Jackson was undergraduately reared by lesbians in the New England Berkshires after artistically growing up on the south shore of Massachusetts under the soul-food tutelage of a deep southern family. The shoes; Birkenstocks. The music; Indigo, Simone, Franklin & Difranco. The relationships; many, lost, and strong.
Deposited in New York City over a decade ago & the real work began. Dance belts, regional stage yelts, never fitting in with the in-crowd, a team of demanding Brits, and even a rather unfortunate stop in Branson, Missouri all lead to his discovery of artistic truth on prestigious stages like Radio City Music Hall and Carnegie Hall. His highly emotional, devastatingly funny cabaret act has been seen at Joe's Pub, 54 Below, Duane Park, DROM, The A.R.T.'s Club Oberon, and Los Angeles' Lyric Theatre. James' razor-sharp wit, unique sense of humor, talent, and on & off stage persona have become an artistic force to be reckoned with as well as a voice people want to hear as he changes the face of the concert stage.
LaDonna Burns is originally from Indianapolis. Her National Tour credits include Rent ("Seasons of Love" Soloist/Joanne understudy), and Seussical the Musical (Sour Kangaroo). LaDonna has appeared as Teen Angel/Miss Lynch in Grease at the International Music Festival in Macau, China. She was last seen in NYC playing Momma in Supersoldier by Jim Rado. Regional credits include All Shook Up (Sylvia), Smokey Joes Café (BJ), Ain't Misbehavin' (Armelia), Beehive (Diane Ross/Aretha Franklin/Patti LaBelle/Ikette), Crowns (Jeanette) and Satchmo: The Life and Times of Louis Armstrong (Ella Fitzgerald/Bessie Smith). LaDonna can be heard singin at Brandy's Piano Bar and spreading the joys of singing Pop/Rock music at The New York Film Academy.

subset: commoncrawl


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Kim Kardashian's Wedding Dresses Revealed
Check out each of Kim's three (yes, three) Vera Wang gowns.
-Lucia Peters
We all know that People coughed up a ridiculous amount of money for the exclusive rights to run the first photos from Kim Kardashian and Kris Humphries' wedding, but guess what? Glamazonsblog (which we found via Fashionista) scanned in the photos so the rest us mere mortals can drool over them. Want to finally see what Kim's three– yes, three–Vera Wang dresses looked like? Feast your eyes…
The Wedding Dress
The dress Kim actually got married in was a princess dress, with a full skirt and a long train.
Read 10 Must-Have Makeup Brushes
The First Dance Dress
Kim's first dance as a newly-married woman happened in this frothy mermaid dress.
The Reception Dress
Kim donned this "Old Hollywood"-style gown for the reception. Simpler than the other two, it is no less elegant.
Tell us: Which of Kim's three gowns is your favorite?
For more pics of the wedding, head on over to Fashionista.
Lucia Peters is BettyConfidential's associate editor.


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FORMER Bolton Wanderers boss Sam Allardyce's England team lost 4-2 to Jose Mourinho's Rest of the World XI at Old Trafford tonight (Sunday).
Paddy McGuinness and Danny Jones both started for England, with Bromley Cross rock pop star Danny impressing in attack.
Bolton funnyman Paddy also made a name for himself in defence as referee Phil Dowd had to have words with the Take Me Out presenter for some of his more robust tackles.
Mourinho also provided some light relief after he ran on to the pitch to tackle pop star Olly Murs.
Murs was proving a nuisance down England's left wing when the manager stepped in to chop him down.
Would you like to see Jose Mourinho putting one through @ollyofficial? #socceraid2014 (Cc. @bbcsporf) https://t.co/uzLb2jVYil— Soccer Aid (@socceraid) June 8, 2014
The yearly match, which is held in aid of Unicef, features celebrities who wish they had grown up to be footballers and former football stars whose best days are behind them.
More than £4.2 million was raised this year. It will go towards getting food, medicine and clean water to the world's poorest and most vulnerable children.
Soccer Aid said a crowd of around 70,000 fans had turned out for the game.
Aside from the Mourinho/Murs fracas there was a more serious case of handbags when TV presenter Jonathan Wilkes clashed with Edgar Davids on a couple of occasions.
Wilkes drew first blood by tackling the Dutch midfielder from behind but Davids was quick to respond with a harsh tackle of his own and the two squared up.
Westlife star Nicky Byrne provided the most spectacular moment of the night after clinically lobbing England goalkeeper Jamie Theakston for the Rest of the World team to put his team 2-0 up.
England pulled two back through former Liverpool player and Sky pundit Jamie Redknapp, with a swerving strike from outside the box, and recently retired former England international Kevin Phillips from the penalty spot.
But Dutch talent proved decisive and current AC Milan manager and four-time Champions League winner Seedorf scored twice to give the ROW their second Soccer Aid title.


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SWINDON Supermarine failed to score for the first time in the league this season as a 0-0 draw away at Cirencester brought their 10-game winning run to an end.
Prolific strikers Josh Parsons and Ash Edenborough both had chances to win the game for Dave Webb's side on a heavy pitch at the Corinium, but Marine were forced to settle for a hard-earned point.
Despite their run of victories coming to an end Webb was pleased to keep the unbeaten record intact, and admitted it was a case of his side just failing to make their chances count.
"It was one of those games where we started slowly in the first 20 minutes, and we couldn't seem to get into the game," he said.
"We didn't concede and we eventually got back into the game, and we started to make some chances.
"We missed some decent opportunities and to be fair to Ciren they worked really hard and had a good go, and it was a local derby.
"You don't automatically go into every game and score three goals, we have to earn that right, and we didn't earn it against Ciren.
"We should have won the game, but we didn't deserve to because we didn't take the chances we had, but we defended well and haven't conceded. We are disappointed we didn't win the game, but that will happen, and we need to learn from it."
The game was the first time Marine have failed to find the net in the league all season, which Webb puts down to a depleted fixture schedule which saw games postponed in the days following Christmas.
"We have been so strong up front be it up front or in the wide areas, and we normally manage to score one," he said.
"We didn't do that, but it is the first time we have failed to score.
"Maybe we were a bit rusty because we haven't played for 16 days, but I am pleased we played and it was good for us to get up there and get a game.
"Even though we missed a few chances we did manage to create some, just like we always do, and we will be looking to get back scoring again in our next game."
When the two sides met at the Webb's Wood Stadium earlier in the season they produced a feisty affair which ended 1-1, and Webb was pleased the teams' second meeting of the season was a quieter one.
"It wasn't quite as bad even though there were big tackles going in and a few bookings too, but it was a game in good spirits," he said. "Both sides played their part, and it was a proper local derby which is always fun to be involved in."
In the Premier Division, Chippenham Town squandered a 2-0 half-time lead to draw 2-2 with Frome at Hardenhuish Park.
Ryan Bennett's own goal and Alan Griffin's header put the Bluebirds firmly in command but Mike Perrott reduced arrears and Dean Evans fired in a spectacular last-minute equaliser.


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From the Viette's Views Gardening Blog
A toasty warm fire in the fireplace or wood stove is a great comfort on cold winter days but what can be done with the wood ashes that accumulate over the winter season? A common question that we get this time of the year is whether or not it's a good idea to spread these wood ashes in the garden.
In many circumstances, wood ashes can be very beneficial to lawns and gardens by providing important nutrients such as potassium, calcium, magnesium, and some trace elements to the soil. Good stuff, right?
Whether or not it is beneficial to YOUR garden depends a lot on the makeup of your soil and even what you are growing in the garden.
You see, wood ashes are quite alkaline and unless they are used carefully, they can significantly raise the pH of your garden soil. This might be okay if your soil tends to be naturally acidic but for areas where the soil tends to be more alkaline like here in the Shenandoah Valley, wood ashes can raise the pH to the point that it becomes detrimental to many garden plants.
Maintaining proper pH levels in your soil is as important to the overall health of your plants as fertilizing, watering, and pest control. Why?
Soil pH affects nutrient availability for one thing. Certain nutrients like iron, copper, and aluminum become less available to plants in alkaline soils and other nutrients such as calcium and phosphorus become less available in moderately acidic soils.
The optimum pH for most garden plants is between 6.0 and 6.5 which is slightly acidic. Certain plants, however, prefer more extreme pH conditions. Shrubs such as rhododendrons, azaleas, camellias, and blueberries prefer a more acidic soil; between 4.5 and 6.0. That's why we often have a hard time growing beautiful, lush rhodies and azaleas here in the Shenandoah Valley unless we add a soil acidifier; our limestone-based soil has a naturally high pH.
Before you spread any wood ashes on your lawn or in your vegetable or flower gardens, have your soil tested – at least for pH but knowing the nutrient content would be helpful, too.
If your soil is low in potassium, wood ashes can provide this important nutrient but in general, it isn't advisable to spread wood ashes in your garden if your soil pH is above 7.0 and you definitely should never spread them around acid loving plants such as rhododendrons, azaleas, and blueberries.
For use on the lawn, wood ash works much like lime except that it is more water soluble and thus works more quickly to change the soil pH. If lime is recommended, dry wood ash can be substituted at the same rate (or even a little higher) – just don't spread them on a windy day!
In the vegetable garden, wood ashes can be used sparingly around tomatoes which grow fine in slightly alkaline soil and the extra calcium in the ashes can help prevent blossom end rot. Root crops like carrots, beets, and turnips can benefit from the extra potassium that the ashes provide.
A few words of caution about spreading ashes in the garden:
If a soil test indicates that your soil will benefit (or at least not suffer) from a slight increase in pH and some additional potassium and/or lime, then by all means spread your wood ashes! It's a great use for them and is certainly a cheap source of nutrients and trace elements. However, never use the ash from burning coal, pressure treated or painted wood, or from burned trash or cardboard in the garden as these contain harmful byproducts.
Wood ashes can be a great soil amendment if used carefully and moderately. BUT, before you start spreading, be sure to have your soil tested!


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this picture of the three children is fantastic
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this picture of the three children is fantastic
American Civil War notable. Alice Eliza Humiston was the little girl in the famous ambrotype found in the hands of an unidentified Union soldier who died at Gettysburg. The poignant image of "Alley" and her brothers Frank and Fred, dubbed "Children of the Battlefield", launched a newspaper campaign throughout the North to discover the fallen soldier's identity, in addition to inspiring the establishment of a home in Gettysburg for orphans of the war. In November 1863, Alley's mother, Philinda Ensworth Humiston, confirmed that the soldier was her husband, Sgt. Amos Humiston of the 154th New York Infantry, who'd been missing since the first day of the battle four months earlier. Alice was then six years old, and like her parents and brothers, a native of western New York. The fatherless Humiston family faced an uncertain future there, however, and in 1866 left their home in Portville to take up residence in the new Gettysburg orphanage, where the widowed Mrs. Humiston had accepted a position as housekeeper. Unhappy in the battle-scarred Pennsylvania town, possibly because she'd begun to have doubts about the integrity of her employers, in 1869 she remarried and moved to Massachusetts with her new husband, Asa Barnes, a retired clergyman who was 24 years her senior. She remained devoted to her children, however, each of whom joined her again as soon as their respective schooling was finished. Alice lived with her mother, who died in 1913, for many years. Never married, she worked at various jobs and at one point managed a chicken farm. She eventually settled in Glendale, California, to be with her brother Frank's daughter, who was employed as a cataloguer in the UCLA library. The last of the iconic siblings to die, Alice was fatally burned in a household accident. On December 16, 1933, her skirt caught fire while she was sweeping the floor near an uncovered heater. Rushed to the hospital, she died of her injuries two days later at the age of 76. Her niece and namesake, UCLA Head Librarian Alice M. Humiston, is also buried in this plot.
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Ganga Yamunaa 24-11-2016 Raj TV Ganga Yamunaa 24.11.2016 Tamil Serial Online | Ganga Yamunaa 24/11/2016 Raj TV Serial 24th November 2016
Watch Raj TV Ganga Yamuna 24.11.16 Serial Ganga Yamuna 24/11/16 Latest Today Episode 135 Online. Ganga Yamuna 24-11-2016 – Raj tv Serial | Raj tv Ganga Yamunaa 24-11-16
Synopsis: Couple Shekar and Sharmistha decide to break up their relationship and move on in life with their respective families. But, their daughters, Ganga and Yamuna, plan to unite them.
Directed By : Ravi Raj
Editor : Hemant Kumar
Story By : Mahesh Pandey / Akash Deep
Concept & Brief Story : Rashmi Sharma
Screenplay & Dialogues : Gautam H, Janki V, Sharad C. Tripathi
Produced By : Rashmi Sharma Telefilms Limited
Cast : Helly Shah, Varun Kapoor, Tejaswi Prakash Wayangankar, Namish Taneja
Raj tv Serials, Ganga Yamunaa
Raj TV Ganga Yamunaa 24th November 2016 Episode 135 Review/Discussion:
A story of two sisters and the way they are made for each other even after being bought up in different environments and taught to hate each other.
More Video's from this Category: Ganga Yamunaa | Raj tv Serials


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Cook beans per package directions. When done, drain and allow to cool. Combine all ingredients in a medium bowl, mix, cover and chill for 1 hour, allowing the flavors to blend. Serve with Eden Brown Rice Chips, or organic corn chips.
Per serving - 15 calories, 0 gram fat (3% calories from fat), 2 gram protein, 6 gram carbohydrate, 3 gram fiber, 0 milligram cholesterol, 98 milligram sodium


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National YoungArts Foundation Honors Debbie Allen, Joshua Bell and Adrian Grenier Tonight
The National YoungArts Foundation (YoungArts) will honor director and choreographer Debbie Allen, violinist Joshua Bell and actor and alumnus Adrian Grenier at An Affair of the Arts Performance and Gala tonight, January 12, 2013, held in Downtown Miami at the Olympia Theater at the Gusman Center for the Performing Arts and the Historic Alfred I. DuPont Building. The evening will bring together prominent artists, community leaders, philanthropists and celebrities to applaud the participants in the 2013 edition of YoungArts' signature program, YoungArts Week, which provides 150 of the nation's most outstanding young talents in the visual, literary and performing arts with life-changing experiences, including master classes, workshops, inter-disciplinary activities, performances and exhibitions.
"An Affair of the Arts celebrates the accomplishments of our amazing alumni such as Adrian Grenier, and honors individuals including Debbie Allen and Joshua Bell who are making meaningful contributions to the arts," stated Paul T. Lehr, Executive Director of the National YoungArts Foundation. "The work of these great arts leaders shows our next generation, here for YoungArts Week, that they, too, can become a part of the continuing artistic tradition in American society."
Heading this year's event are Honorary Gala Chairs Plácido Domingo and Mikhail Baryshnikov, with Marile and Jorge Luis Lopez. Once again, SunTrust is the event's presenting sponsor with additional support provided by MIAMI Magazine.
Debbie Allen continues to be one of the most respected, relevant, and versatile talents in the entertainment industry and is an internationally recognized director, choreographer and author. As a Culture Connect Ambassador, Ms. Allen represented the United States in visits to Brazil, China, Italy, and India expanding the opportunities in arts education for young people all over the world. She is a member of the prestigious President's Committee on the Arts and Humanities, a board member of the American Film Institute, and an Executive Committee member of UCLA's School of Theater, Film, and Television. Debbie Allen has received three Emmy Awards honoring her choreography, and two Emmys and one Golden Globe for her role as "Lydia Grant" in the hit series, "Fame." She then forayed from acting to directing-first with the series "Fame," followed by "Family Ties" and "Bronx Zoo," before taking the reins at NBC's "A Different World" as director and producer in 1988. Ms. Allen has choreographed for artists such as Michael Jackson, Mariah Carey, and Janet Jackson, and also holds the distinction of having choreographed the Academy Awards ten times. To date, Ms. Allen directed the second highest rated original movie in Lifetime Channel history, Life is Not A Fairytale: The Fantasia Barrino Story.
Often referred to as the "poet of the violin," Joshua Bell is one of the world's most celebrated violinists, who brings a new generation of audiences to classical concert halls, and new music to classical audiences. Among numerous awards and honors, he is an Avery Fisher Prize recipient and Musical America's 2012 Instrumentalist of the Year. Recently appointed Music Director of the Academy of St. Martin in the Fields, he is the first person to hold this title since Sir Neville Marriner formed the orchestra in 1958. An exclusive Sony Classical artist, Mr. Bell has recorded more than 40 CDs garnering Mercury, Grammy, Gramophone and Echo Klassik awards. Recent releases include French Impressions with pianist Jeremy Denk, the eclectic At Home with Friends, the Defiance soundtrack, Vivaldi's The Four Seasons, and Tchaikovsky's Violin Concerto with the Berlin Philharmonic. His discography encompasses critically acclaimed performances of most of the major violin repertoire, in addition to John Corigliano's Oscar-winning soundtrack, The Red Violin.
Adrian Grenier is a 1994 YoungArts alumnus in theater. Graduating from New York's high school for the arts, LaGuardia Arts, Mr. Grenier began acting in 1997 making his film debut in the independent film, "The Adventures of Sebastian Cole." From there, he went on to work with esteemed directors such as Steven Spielberg and Woody Allen until landing the role of Vincent Chase in the HBO series "Entourage." As a director Mr. Grenier has led the creation of "Shot in the Dark," his first feature film chronicling his journey to reconnect with his estranged father; "Alter-Eco" a sustainable lifestyle television series; "Don't Quit Your Daydream," the story of two life-long musicians who are in a band together called The Good Listeners; and soon to be released "How to Make Money Selling Drugs," a tongue-in-cheek look at what is considered to be one of the worst domestic policy failures in recent American history. In 2010 Mr. Grenier' s Production Company, Reckless Productions, completed "Teenage Paparazzo" which premiered at the Sundance Film Festival and is currently touring universities and town halls throughout North America. Mr. Grenier recently launched the Teenage Paparazzo Empowerment Tour, hoping to reach more than 80 high schools in the US. In addition to acting, Mr. Grenier is a member of The Honey Brothers, a Brooklyn-based band, and in 2012, he started Wreckroom Records a gathering place for bands, friends and fellow musicians to write, record and play music.
An Affair of the Arts Performance and Gala will kick off with an interdisciplinary performance by YoungArts alumni from around the nation in the Olympia Theater at the Gusman Center for the Performing Arts. Following the performance and awards ceremony, guests will walk across the street to the Historic Alfred I. DuPont Hotel that will be transformed into a classic supper club where music by YoungArts alumni will set the stage for a relaxing dinner and conversation. Dinner will be followed by dancing in the street, to the music of DJ Irie.
Affairs for the Arts honorees have included Robert Redford (Arison Award), Doug Aitken (Alumni Award), and Robert L. Lynch (YoungArts Leadership Award) in 2012 and Bill T. Jones (Arison Award), Kerry Washington (Alumni Award), and Michael M. Kaiser (YoungArts Leadership Award) in 2011.
YoungArts Week which takes place in Miami each year enables approximately 150 participants in the YoungArts program to work with distinguished master teachers and mentors such as Robert Redford, Branford Marsalis and Debi Mazar. Like all YoungArts programs, YoungArts Week is designed to support young artists at a critical juncture in their lives and encourage their decision to pursue a career in the arts.
The National YoungArts Foundation (formerly known as the National Foundation for Advancement in the Arts) was established in 1981 by Lin and Ted Arison to identify and support the next generation of artists, and to contribute to the cultural vitality of the nation by investing in the artistic development of talented young artists in the visual, literary, and performing arts. YoungArts provides emerging artists with life-changing experiences with renowned mentors, access to significant scholarships, national recognition, and other opportunities throughout their careers to help ensure that the nation's most outstanding emerging artists are encouraged to pursue careers in the arts.
To date, YoungArts has honored more than 16,000 young artists with over $6 million in monetary awards; facilitated in excess of $100 million in college scholarship opportunities; and enabled its participants to work with master teachers who are among the most distinguished artists in the world, such as Mikhail Baryshnikov, Jacques d'Amboise, Plácido Domingo, Bill T. Jones, Quincy Jones and Martin Scorsese. In addition, at the request of the Commission on Presidential Scholars, which is appointed by the President of the United States, YoungArts serves as the exclusive nominating agency for the U.S. Presidential Scholars in the Arts, the country's highest honor for artistically talented high school seniors.
In early October 2012, YoungArts acquired the historic Bacardi buildings in Miami and began converting the organization's first national headquarters into a campus that will become a thriving arts and cultural center for young artists ages 15 and up, and allow YoungArts to carry forward an expansion of activities unprecedented in its history. World-renowned architect Frank Gehry has been commissioned to design the master plan for the historic Bacardi campus, creating a multi-disciplinary arts complex that will include a park with state-of-the-art video projection capabilities and arts programming for the benefit of the community. In order to help with its expansion, YoungArts has named Frank Gehry, Plácido Domingo and Bill T. Jones as Artistic Advisors. As part of this initiative, the organization will produce events year-round in New York City, including performances programmed by Mikhail Baryshnikov, master classes and screenings at The Museum of Modern Art, and performances at The Metropolitan Museum of Art. In Los Angeles, YoungArts will inaugurate a new program, providing young artists with master classes, workshops, performances and exhibitions. The new YoungArts campus will host year-round programming in Miami, including master classes and forums, interdisciplinary performances and exhibitions, screenings of the Emmy-nominated HBO YoungArts MasterClass series, and an art gallery offering exhibitions with free admission, curated in partnership with Miami Art Museum.
YoungArts alumni who have gone on to become leading professionals in their fields include actresses Vanessa Williams, Viola Davis, and Kerry Washington; four-time Tony Award nominee Raúl Esparza; Executive Director of American Ballet Theatre Rachel Moore; recording artists Nicki Minaj and Chris Young; musicians Terence Blanchard, Eric Owens, and Jennifer Koh; choreographer Desmond Richardson; and internationally acclaimed multimedia artist Doug Aitken. For more information, visit www.youngarts.org.


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Zadarska 3
From the main bus, train, ferry or airport terminal go to the Diocletian palace and walk till the end of the south wall of the palace. Then turn right and cross the little square leaving the monument of Marko Marulic on your right side. Pass the entrance of Billa shop and then turn first street left. Walk for about 20m till Pipe and Tobacco Shop and then turn left through the little passage on which end on your left side are the stairs to the apartment.
Hostelworld モバイルアプリ
Hostelworld モバイル用アプリで外出中でも予約可能です。


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Accredited, affordable, flexible.
Missouri State Online provides accredited, affordable, and flexible undergraduate and graduate degree and certificate options.
Whether you are just starting a degree or are transferring from another institution, our friendly staff will help make your transition to Missouri State go smoothly!
Request information using our online form, email email@example.com or call (417) 836-6929, toll-free (877) 678-2005, now!


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Traumatic facial injuries — from motor vehicle accidents, gunshots, military combat, or other incidents — can cause debilitating effects, such as sunken, jagged facial features and increased scarring.
While surgeons can often reconstruct the bones of the face, it's difficult to return the soft tissue back to its original form.
Experts at the UPMC Center for Innovation in Restorative Medicine are researching a new form of facial reconstruction, called fat grafting, to improve soft tissue deformities in the head and face.
While fat grafting is a common procedure — plastic surgeons performed approximately 65,000 in 2011 — using it for facial reconstruction is a completely new, experimental use of this well-known treatment. We believe this technique of fat grafting could be of significant benefit to patients with severe head and face injuries.
Fat grafting is a minimally invasive facial reconstructive surgical procedure. Surgeons remove a patient's own fat from an area where it is less needed and transfer it to areas that have lost shape or fullness.
Because fat does not have much structure or volume, facial fat grafting is especially challenging.
Surgeons and researchers at UPMC are now able to maximize the effectiveness of fat grafting by:
Researchers believe that this stem cell-rich fat promotes blood vessel growth and blood flow, volume, and lift, which is crucial for not only the survival of the fat graft but also to promote healing and stability.
Learn more about these current clinical trials:
Affiliated with the University of Pittsburgh Schools of the Health Sciences
| Supplemental content provided by Healthwise, Incorporated. To learn more, visit www.healthwise.org
For help in finding a doctor or health service that suits your needs, call the UPMC Referral Service at 412-647-UPMC (8762) or 1-800-533-UPMC (8762). Select option 1.
UPMC is an equal opportunity employer. UPMC policy prohibits discrimination or harassment on the basis of race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, age, sex, genetics, sexual orientation, gender identity, marital status, familial status, disability, veteran status, or any other legally protected group status. Further, UPMC will continue to support and promote equal employment opportunity, human dignity, and racial, ethnic, and cultural diversity. This policy applies to admissions, employment, and access to and treatment in UPMC programs and activities. This commitment is made by UPMC in accordance with federal, state, and/or local laws and regulations.
Medical information made available on UPMC.com is not intended to be used as a substitute for professional medical advice, diagnosis, or treatment. You should not rely entirely on this information for your health care needs. Ask your own doctor or health care provider any specific medical questions that you have. Further, UPMC.com is not a tool to be used in the case of an emergency. If an emergency arises, you should seek appropriate emergency medical services.
Pittsburgh, PA, USA | UPMC.com


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How to write them, or how they look?Lol yes I do forget.
Esperanto allows for spelling reforms, doesn't it? It's not a big deal to change from Pekino to Bejĝingo if it reflects the modern pronunciation better.It should be bejkingo by that pronunciation. And they should have changed it a while ago to bejghingo. It follows all the other rules of romanization in Esperanto with actual cities. Why should Chinese people learn extra words just for Europeans' sake.
Although I can't stress how little I care about it.
Barely.Just curious, you speak Chinese right?
It's not hard to install a Chinese keyboard if you use Windows.Because it's easier to type pinyin, and most of my friends are more proficient in pinyin than characters. It's so much more complex to typpe in Chinese and I haven't figured out how to type Chinese on this computer. I can on my computer but not this one.


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bucket truck load of money. I wouldn't pay that much either!
Plus there are so many loopholes in the tax system - its beneficial for a person with a lot of money to pay $100k for an good accountant than $700Million in taxes!
This is the biggest problem with America. How the rich don't pay taxes . I don't know why, they should pay the same taxes per dollar like we do.
8.25% flat tax rate would be equal but not equal at the same time.
Rich people not wanting to pay there share fking a**holes.
"America made them rich, why not give back to the place that got you rich?" hence taxes...tax breaks or not it's not like apple will hire anyone in America. Jobs didnt make jobs...
Seems kind of mean to be making negative comments about people a few weeks after a member of their family dies. It's not their fault they've now got so much money. As to taxes, show me one person on this forum who WANTS to pay taxes. I think we need to, to pay for the services we receive, and to keep the country going, but I sure don't like paying them. No one here does, but they need to be paid. But I bet everyone here makes every attempt possible to NOT pay any more than is absolutely required. We all take our deductions, don't we? Why shouldn't they have the same right? If they want to save money, until the laws change they can use the current tax code as they like. Is it fair or not is another question- if you don't like how taxes are levied disproportionately to the rich and the not rich, tell your elected representative. Or better yet, vote him/her out of office and try another one who hasn't sold his/her soul yet. As to a flat tax, that's a real crock. You make 50K and pay 10%. You have 45K left over. Someone else makes 1M and pays 10%. S/He has 900K left over. You can maybe make your rent and drive a 5-year-old car, they can buy a new house every year and send their kid to Europe to a nice private school. The French Revolution started in part because the First and Second Estates (Nobles and Church-who were also Nobles) paid no taxes and voted against every attempt by the Third Estate (the middle and lower classes) to stop being the ONLY ones paying taxes. But until we change things (with our votes), there is no reason that the Jobs family can't do whatever they want with their money. Oh, and WE gave them that money, when WE bought all the cute things Steve created. It's a bit late now to begrudge them for having the money we gave them, isn't it?


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Hey there, time traveller!
This article was published 4/11/2012 (1752 days ago), so information in it may no longer be current.
Winnipeg Blue Bombers head coach Tim Burke says he made clear in his closing address to his players at Canad Inns Stadium on Sunday that they better show up to training camp next year with a much better attitude than they did this year.
Burke said he sensed a complacency in the team last June when they returned after a 2011 season that saw them go to the Grey Cup.
"I told them that we're going to come back and we are going to start strong next year. We cannot come back with the same attitude we had this last year when we showed up for training camp," Burke told reporters on Sunday. "As a team, the players approached the season as if, 'Well, this is just going to happen every year, we're this good and we're always going to go to the Grey Cup.' It doesn't work that way. You have to have a burning desire to be in the Grey Cup and you have to train with that burning desire to be in the Grey Cup.
"It has to be every fibre in your body, your heart, soul and mind to get back there. And if it isn't, we're going to replace you. We will bring in enough competition that if you don't have that burning desire, we will find someone who does... I want them to know right now that you're coming back with a great attitude and a great work ethic or you're not going to be here."
Burke was asked to address what some of the biggest shortcomings were in 2012 for his club, which finished the season with 6-12 after a 19-11 win over the Montreal Alouettes at Canad Inns Stadium on Saturday.
"I think overall defensively we didn't play very well. I don't think we covered very well in the secondary. I think our man coverage was poor most of the year. So, I think there will be some competition there. I think we still have to find more ways to get a pass rush. I think we were really good until we got banged up on the defensive line and then I think we fell off there.
"So whether it's getting more competition for the D-line or it's scheme, we have to find a way to get more pressure on the quarterback."
Burke shared some other thoughts:
-- Whoever he hires as his defensive co-ordinator will have to share his philosophy that speed kills. "I think you win with speed on defence and you win with aggressive players who aren't afraid of hitting people."
-- Asked if he will live in Winnipeg all winter, Burke hedged. "I will be in and out of town," he said. "If you asked me right now, am I a full-time resident of Winnipeg, I'd say yes and I vacation in the U.S." Burke added he is very familiar with prairie winters from the three seasons he coached at UND in the '80s.
-- Burke said he liked the way Johnny Sears played the strong-side linebacker position and suggested Sears would have the inside track for the job next season if he re-signs with the team this winter. If Sears doesn't come back, Burke said he was comfortable giving Demond Washington a long look at the SAM job next year.
-- Burke said a few players are due to undergo surgery this season, but he didn't say who. One player who won't be undergoing the knife, however, is QB Buck Pierce, who said he has no surgery scheduled this winter.
-- Burke said he'd like to bring in some more veteran Canadian content over the winter, but he knows that's tough. "We'll look and see what's available in free agency. But they have to be better than what we have."
-- Burke sounds like he agrees with GM Joe Mack that CFL free agents are overpaid. "Free agents tend to make more money than probably they should."
-- Burke said he was pleased with the improvement in his offensive line during the second half of the season. "There's no doubt... I thought we got a lot better on the offensive line."


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Ensemble Studio Theatre Extends ISAAC'S EYE Through 3/10
Lucas Hnath's new play, Isaac's Eye directed by Linsay Firman, has had its world premiere run extended through March 10, Ensemble Studio Theatre Artistic Director William Carden announced today (2/19).
The Ensemble Studio Theatre/Alfred P. Sloan Project for New Plays on Science and Technology is presenting Isaac's Eye at the Ensemble Studio Theatre, 549 West 52nd Street.
As directed by Ms. Firman, the Ensemble Studio Theatre/Sloan Project Associate Director, Isaac's Eye is the tale of an emotionally immature, 25-year-old Isaac Newton, his drive to become a fellow of The Royal Society and the great scientist Robert Hooke who, in Mr. Hnath's play, is the nemesis standing in his way.
Isaac's Eye is brash, irreverent, often comical, and ultimately scrupulous in dissecting fact from fiction in search of what history may have been hiding all these years. Iaaac's Eye opened February 9.
Mr. Hnath's play re-imagines the contentious, plague-ravaged world in which, the young Isaac Newton and the older Robert Hooke are a Mozart and Salieri, a Tesla and an Edison, who wrangle over the physics of white light and its separation by refraction. In the course of their dispute Newton risks blinding himself by conducting optical experiments on his own eyes to prove to Hooke that his theory is right and that he is worthy of admission to The Royal Society.
Far from a costume drama, Isaac's Eye is original in its presentation and contemporary in its tone. Mr. Hnath's play occupies its own time and space as it explores the dreams and longings that drove the rural farm boy Isaac Newton to become one of the greatest thinkers in modern science.
Haskell King plays Newton and Michael Louis Serafin-Wells plays the hot-headed, randy polymath Robert Hooke. Rounding out the cast are Kristen Bush and Jeff Biehl. Mr. King and Ms. Bush, who both appeared in the EST/Sloan Project's 2010 Photograph 51, are being reunited with director Firman who directed the Anna Ziegler play about Rosalind Franklin.
Mr. Hnath's Death Tax was one of the most talked-about productions at last spring's Humana Festival of New American Plays. Many of his other recent plays, both unproduced and produced, also take on contemporary or historical events and people: Unproduced Screenplay about the Death of Walt Disney, Red Speedo, Hillary and Clinton, Sake Tasting with a Séance to Follow, The Courtship of Anna Nicole Smith, Odile's Ordeal, Tonguetied, and Three Attempts at Corrective Eye Surgery. Mr. Hnath has been a resident playwright at New Dramatists since 2011 and has had his plays produced at Actors Theatre of Louisville, University of Miami, The Culture Project, Target Margin and Ontological-Hysteric Theater. In addition to EST, his plays have been developed at Rattlestick Playwrights Theater and Cleveland Public Theatre.
The 32-year-old Mr. Hnath is a two-time winner of the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation Grant for his feature-length screenplays. Isaac's Eyewon the 2012 Whitfield Cook Prize, an annual award given by New Dramatists for an unproduced, unpublished play deemed worthiest by an outside panel of judges
Linsay Firman, Associate Director of the EST/Sloan Project and Literary Manager at EST, directed the 2010 NY premiere of Anna Ziegler's Photograph 51 at the Ensemble Studio Theatre later reprised at World Science Festival. Other NYC productions include Rachel Bond's Anniversary, Garrett M. Brown's Americana and Jose Rivera's Flowers, all in the EST Marathon; Perdita by Pierre Diennet (Lion Theater), Joy Tomasko's Unfold Me, Catherine Trieschmann's Crooked, Heather Lynn MacDonald's Pink (all at Ariel Tepper's Summer Play Festival); Anne Washburn's Apparition (chashama) named one of Time Out New York's ten best plays of 2003, Howard Barker's The Power of the Dog and The Possibilities, Joe Orton's Loot, and Peter Rose's Snatch (Soho Rep). She began working in new play development as the Associate Director of Soho Rep, where she worked from 1998 - 2004.
Nick Francone is designing the scenery, Les Dickert, the lighting, SuzAnne Chesney, the costumes, and Shane Rettig, the sound.
Isaac's Eye performs Wednesday through Sundays evenings at 7:00pm. Matinees are Saturdays at 2:00pm, and Sundays at 2:00pm except for Sunday, March 3, when there is no matinee. ALL MATINEES and SUNDAYS AT 7:00PM FOR THE ENTIRE RUN ARE PICK YOUR OWN PRICE. Regular tickets are $30, $20 for student/seniors. To order tickets call 866.811.4111 or click <www.ovationtix.com/trs/cal/134>.