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Winterizing your home is a great way to stay warm and save on energy bills. This is just as true for your mobile home or trailer, even more so if it is an older model. This is a guide about winterizing your mobile home.
My mobile home is a 1992 with a garage. I have noticed the only room in the house that's even remotely warm is the small bathroom. I have shut down 3 rooms so far and it's still cold. Plastic has been put up on the windows but it seems there are not enough vents in any of the rooms. The walls are also cold.
Does anyone know if it is alright to close off registers and put blankets on the bottom of the doors in a mobile home?Any advice?
By RD
A mobile home needs to be skirted, and it is better to insulate that skirt, or when it snows, bank the snow up around the skirting. By "skirt", we mean that it needs to have the open area under the home boarded off with a permanent "skirt", that will look like a foundation. Plywood or orientated strand board is used. A frame of two by fours is necessary.
You will likely also need to have heat tape wrapped around your water lines. Heat tape is an electrical tape/cord that you wrap around the exposed water lines and keep plugged in. If your mobile home is too cold, then you run the risk of freezing the water lines, which is far more expensive to repair than the cost of keeping things warm. If you do not know about any of this stuff, than you'd best find a carpenter/home repair handyman who can help you winterize your home.
If your furnace is not adequately heating the place at this time of year, than you need to do all these things. I have lived in mobile homes that were very snug - old ones, too, back in the 70's and 80's. And we have temperatures here in Saskatchewan that go to -40F. You should not be shutting off rooms completely, as you run the risk of freezing your water lines, which run through the floors of your home. The cold rooms will not keep the pipes warm enough. I had a renter who caused a lot of problems and burst the pipes because of this very thing.
I need some advice about a mobile home/trailer. Here's the situation. I bought my father a mobile home back in 93. It is a nice well maintained home, but it is now 30 years old. My father recently passed away and now I have this trailer to deal with.
I was there yesterday and the kerosene furnace is almost out of fuel. Kerosene is around $3 a gallon here, so I would like to put a minimal amount in the tank for now and possibly winterize the home, drain the water, close it up until it's sold.
I was told I can expect to use around 4-5 gallons a day to heat it. I simply can't afford to waste this money heating an empty home. Does anybody have any thoughts on how to go about this, what do I need to do, who I should contact? The expenses are going to start piling up shortly (fuel, taxes, lot fees, etc.).
I have other issues with this, but I will post them separately. I'm 20 minutes south of downtown Pittsburgh in case anybody here needs a nice, cheap place to live. Thanks for reading!
By Sandy from Pittsburgh, PA
I want to thank you all for your answers so far. I'm glad I didn't drain the lines completely because the pipes are a little bit corroded already, and I'd have trouble when I turned the water back on. After almost a week of not running water, it came out all rusty for a few long seconds on all faucets. To the person who feels sorry for me for my "lack of knowledge", in my day I used to do heavy duty demolition, put a kitchen in my own home, laid flooring, built decks, etc. I am now a 53 year old disabled woman, so crawling under a freezing cold trailer was not my idea of a good time. My husband is in even worse shape than I am, through no fault of our own. So I'm sorry, but that is why I posted here, hoping closing it up was something simple we could maybe do on our own.
Any ideas to insulate my mobile home? The floors and walls are cold and I am restricted on money.
By lrrn567 from Bristol, CT
I also live in a mobile home. I have done a few things that I believe have helped with energy costs!! My home is not that old, so I have wonderful Lockheed windows, which help a LOT, but I also have a "chair railing" of paneling throughout, which adds a touch more help along the walls.
I make sure all blinds go down past the window sills in late afternoon, and they make really nice thermal curtains which will help as well. I put in a good quality carpeting in all rooms but the kitchen which help with the cold underneath the skirting. I also have heated pipes which (it may be my imagination) help too...lol.
I put something against all outer doors too. Was thinking of spray in insulation...but not sure of the cost. You may want to consider a kerosene space heater....not scary at all anymore, and a few dollars a day will keep the chill out. Hope you all have a warm and cozy winter!
My husband and I spend the winters in the southern states, living in a travel trailer. We have a string of days where the weather is very cool and that is when I do my cooking and baking, enough to get us by for several days' meals. It eliminates the need to keep our electric heater running and warms up the unit at the same time.
I also leave the dish water in the sink and put the plug in the bathtub when taking a shower, until the water has become cold. That adds moisture to the air, which makes it feel warmer.
By annelaundrie from Green Bay, WI
Thanks for the good idea! We too are "snowbirds"
Over the past winter, our mobile home's linoleum floor split in several places. There was no sign of water damage -no leaks - just several slits in the linoleum. It was a very cold winter. What flooring would hold up best during another very cold winter?
By BJK
One that's insulated from underneath - depending on how old your MH is, and how well it's been maintained over the years, you may not have sufficient insulation under there from the factory, or there at all any more - critters love to go under your easy to access MH (even with properly installed skirting) and use the insulation to build their nests.
Go under and have a look. If you still have the MDF (usually what they use to cover the insulation from the underneath of a MH) intact, it may be that this was a winter your manufacturer wasn't counting on when installing the grade of insulation ordered for your model sub-flooring.
We gutted a 1962 Douglass of Georgia MH (ok, it was a single wide, lol!) in the late 80s and part of the reno included installing new insulation to the subfloors. Made a huge difference in how well the home stayed warm, and how well the vinyl floor covering and good-grade carpeting held up. Sold the MH on in 2001 to friends who still live in it (retirees) and they say it's all holding up well.


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Link of the Month
InHouse, an integrated communications website
August 18, 2010 marked the beginning of a new era at UNT as far as campus communication for UNT faculty and staff is concerned. The newly revised InHouse website is designed to be the the primary source of information for faculty and staff, to keep them informed, "build unity and pride in UNT and describe how the university is adhering to its core values to accomplish great things."* It will be the default Internet browser homepage in all UNT offices so that information is easy to access and easy to find. It also has new features that allow faculty and staff to post their own stories about important events or news from their departments and divisions and people will also be able to share their photos of campus life and events.
Follow InHouse on Twitter too! http://twitter.com/InHouseUNT
*Quoted from the "Campus Computing News" article in this issue of Benchmarks Online.

subset: commoncrawl


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We're excited to announce that the city of Rockford is joining our cause and has become an official End Demand Illinois Community. Using our campaign's resources and philosophy as a starting point, they are seeking to reshape Rockford's response to prostitution.
To learn more about the efforts in Rockford or to inquire about becoming an End Demand Illinois community, please contact Lynne Johnson at email@example.com.
Rockford Steps Up to End Demand
Jennifer K. Cacciapaglia, a city attorney in Rockford, shared the story of how her group decided to focus on ending demand.
"Rockford has suffered for a long time from the sex trade," Jennifer said. "When police went out and did stings, they only focused on women in prostitution." She discovered that johns (men who buy sex) were not being arrested. "I thought that was completely outrageous."
Jennifer works with Weed and Seed, a coalition in Rockford that weeds out blight and crime to create renewal. They asked the Rockford City Police Department to start targeting the johns, too, instead of only arresting women in prostitution. This progress inspired the group, and they wanted to do more. "We started looking around at a broader picture of what could be done," she said. That's when they contacted the End Demand Illinois campaign.
"We really are finding our way, and CAASE's guidance has been wonderful. We're very proud to be partnering with them and working toward an EDI community," Jennifer said. CAASE trained the group using its new Community Response Toolkit--a collection of background research, action steps, media campaigns and other tools to help a community fight sexual exploitation.
By this time, many different organizations in Rockford were interested in joining the local effort: the Salvation Army, local rape crisis centers, anti-domestic violence groups and member of Zonta International. Recently, Jennifer made a presentation to the local Zonta chapter about prostitution and sex trafficking. "Many women came up to me after the presentation and said 'We needed to hear this.' We've been successful at raising awareness that this is not a victimless crime."
Jennifer said that most people are shocked to hear that women often enter prostitution before their 16th birthday. "The neighborhood had been so angry with the women, but there's been no anger toward the pimps and the johns." By becoming an End Demand community, Rockford is working to change that.
Look for upcoming events with the Rockford End Demand community on our events page.
The End Demand Illinois campaign is shifting law enforcement's attention to sex traffickers and people who buy sex, while proposing a network of support for survivors of the sex trade.


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FBC Jonesboro
Monday, May 30, 2016
Welcome to First Baptist Jonesboro!
Welcome Video From Our Pastor
What We Believe
How to Find Us
Service Times
What to Expect on Sunday
How Can We Help?
FBC Jonesboro / 147 Church Street / Jonesboro GA 30236 / 770.478.6710 /
Contact Us
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DLC content
Hi all first post here is a question regarding DLC content as above.
My oldest came home today and said his friend gave him a USB with some DLC stuff on it so he didn't have to pay for it himself?? so my question is can he do this or will the content be linked only to the origional account that was used to get it and is it a breach of any xbox licence?
I've told him he's not putting it on my machine until I find out if it is possible.
I think I've found the answer to my own question Am I able to transfer DLC with my friend without transferring licenses witha USB? - Xbox.com
DLC is linked to both the Account and Console.
The account that pays for the dlc can download and play it on any console.
The original console that the dlc was payed for and first downloaded on; anyone can use that dlc.
It can get a little tricky with console licenses (needing to be re-validated or re-downloaded) but in theory if you take the time to buy all your dlc on a friends console you will both be able to make use of it. I have done this with my kids console.
You need to have control of the content that the DLC is linked too, and when you recover the gamertag, you also need to perform a download licenses transfer to your current console so everyone on that system can use it.
Due note, once this license transfer happens, your friend loses control of his XBL Account, and DLC untill he transfers control back, but you cant transfer more then once per year. This is mainly used for buying new systems or repairs for when they have to swap out systems.
Thanks for the replys guys but I think he already gave back the usb.
Guess he'll just have to get a job and pay for his own DLC lol he is 18 after all. :D
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Meet and Communicate with Fun Singles Near You on JDate
Register now to search thousands of members and post your FREE profile!
See who's on JDate:
I'm one of those obnoxiously happy people and full of energy. I love music and early mornings, watching football and going to the beach...
Scintilating is a 64yr-old single woman in Woodstock, ConnecticutView Profile


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Defeat the grease! Easy Greasy simplifies the often-awkward process of draining away grease from ground meat, helping you conquer a common cooking problem. Simply slide cooked ground meat into the strainer, and grease drains away into the heat-resistant container--without making a mess on the counter! An included lid lets you use the container for storage, too.
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There's no question that Napa rules when it comes to California — make that New World — wine, especially cabernet. No other region outside of France makes red wine as delicious, famous, and collectible as Napa.
That's exactly why wine lovers should set themselves a challenge when they're pondering a shelf or a wine list: Try something not from Napa. It'll be a trip out of your comfort zone, for sure. And even if that touriga nacional from Portugal (for example) turns out not to be your new favorite, you will be changed. You will get a red with more native flavors, unmasked by heavy-handed oak flavors and proud of its local distinctiveness. I guarantee you'll save money, too.
I gave myself an especially difficult version of this challenge at a fancy steak house recently. For what I bagged on my safari out of Napa, click here:
The reason this was a particularly difficult challenge is because (like most steak houses of its class) Ruth's Chris in Scottsdale, Arizona has a wine list that is sizable but dominated by Napa cabernet. Shiraz from Australia, red Bordeaux from France, and sangiovese from Italy all get a nod, but usually in the amount of four or five selections from only very recognizable producers.
Plus, last Friday our enthusiastic waiter came right out with a hard sale on a 2003 bottle of Beaulieu Vineyards Tapestry, a cabernet-based blend from, yes, Napa Valley. I have nothing against BV's Tapestry. It would have been a safe choice, and at the 25% mark up the restaurant was featuring that night, a great buy.
But I tied myself like Ulysses to the mast of my convictions and narrowed things down to two single-vineyard cabernets, one from Washington State and the other from Chile. I was just about to go with the latter, a 2003 Vina Montes Alpha Apalta (about $55), when the waiter insisted that Chateau Ste. Michelle's Cold Water Creek 2004 ($67) was "far superior."
The result? A dark purple cabernet with slightly earthy, super cedary aromas. Good with our steaks, and we drank the whole bottle, but overall we thought that the wine was tannic — that drying, puckering feel a red wine can give your mouth — so much so that one of our friends choked a little on her first sip. There was some complexity, with berries and a bit of forest floor, but I thought the wine was woody and showed signs of spending way too much time in new oak.
In short, we tried to escape Napa–but it followed us! Next time I will stick with my convictions and head south of the border.


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Im looking through the brochure and these both catch my eye. Are they both pretty much the same just at different places or is one better than the other ?
Im looking through the brochure and these both catch my eye. Are they both pretty much the same just at different places or is one better than the other ?
Wow. Impossible to answer that one. They are both essentially the same architecture, but that is where the similarity stops.
I love them both, but for very different reasons.
I LOVE the wilderness lodge, it was my dream resort and when I got to stay there this past summer, it lived up to everything I had hoped!
Both are terrific. Haven't stayed at either, but have visited both.
In terms of location, AKL is near AK park. WL is a boat ride away from MK, which can be an advantage if you're going to spend more time at MK than the other parks.
The longest ride between resorts and parks on WDW buses is about 20 to 25 minutes. All of the resorts are closer to one or two parks than the others, so it's a matter of budget, theming preference and location.
We had planned to stay in the Animal Kingdom Lodge summer 2007, but due to the building work going on at the time in the actual lodge we decided to change to the Wilderness Lodge.
We fell in love with the place. The staff were fantastic from the moment we arrived to the moment we left. It is such a relaxing resort. The boat to the magic Kingdom was great. Even if you had spent the whole day in another park or outside Disney if you had any energy left, you could hop on the boat for a wee wander up <?xml:namespace prefix = st1 ns = "urn:schemas-microsoft-com</st1:Street><st1:address w:st="on">Main Street</st1:address> just to take in the atmosphere in the evening.
We could also see the ELP from our balcony which was fab.
We did go and visit the Animal Kingdom Lodge and had our dinner there, it is a fantastic hotel also and we would really love to stay one day, but I think the Wilderness lodge will always have our heart.
Warm muffins from roaring forks!!!!Yummmmm!
Our View!
WOW BambiBelle that looks well WOW!
ok I think my preference may be shifting towards the wilderness hotel now
My veiw was right in the middle, it was fanastic!!!
We love them both but AKL wins out because of the theming, restaurants and bar.
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To the world you may be one person, but to one person you may be the world. - Heather Cortez
When the power of love overcomes the love of power the world will know peace. - Jimi Hendrix
We've stayed at AKL twice & at WL twice & i really like them both. I don't see them as similar really, I think they are very unique. I guess I tend to have a bit of a warmer spot towards WL but not really sure if it's for any other reason than memories (first went when our kids were tiny, etc.). I cannot imagine you would be disappointed with choosing either of these two places. I mean the pools, the dining, the rooms...you just can't go wrong with either!
Only thing i can think of WL had, for us, over AKL is that we like to resort hop when we are at WDW & you can catch a boat over to the Contemporary & if you wanted to do more hopping you can catch a monorail to the other MK resorts. This is something that my family enjoys a lot tho not every family would. Other than this can't really think of anything one has over the other.
[SIGPIC]The Family![/SIGPIC]


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Threadwell In New Industrial Era After
Decades of Varying Fortunes
Now the third largest industry in Greenfield, Threadwell Tap and Die Company
on Arch Street seemed to have a dark future a few years before WW II when the
plant operations were at a low ebb.
Revived by the many defense contracts it received during the war, Threadwell
was solidly on its feet again at the close of the conflict. Then its condition
was improved even more by the purchase of the old factory by a prospective Dayton,
O., industrial organization. Today Threadwell Tap and Die is probably in the
most favorable position it has held since it was established here in 1892 for
the manufacture of butcher's tools.
Threadwell Tap and Die was purchased in 1946 by the Sheffield Corporation of
Dayton, second largest manufacturer of precision gages in the U. S., during
a program of post-war expansion that is still being carried on. Sheffield has
installed a considerable amount of new equipment in the old plant which was
owned by a group of local business men at the time of the sale.
In 1892 Walter E. Nichols and his brother, J. Henry, of Bernardston bought
the failing plant of the Greenfield Tool Company and formed the firm of Nichols
Brothers, manufacturers of butchers' tools. Walter Nichols learned the cutlery
trade at the age of 10 but when the brothers started to turn out butchers' tools
they were laughed at by hardware men who argued that Yankee craftsmen could
not manufacture suitable knives and meat cutters. Only the English were adept
at this trade and the Nichols brothers were foolish to attempt this enterprise,
they were told.
Gamble Pays Off
But they were stubborn. Walter made the tools and J. Henry Nichols loaded a
wagon with these Yankee-made items and left town with only $2 in his pocket.
These brothers didn't refer to their butchers' tools as cutlery because to a
maker of butchers' tools, cutlery indicated a low grade. But after giving the
butchers a chance to try out the Nichols line of tools to prove their serviceability,
J. Henry pulled back into town loaded with orders; from then on they had it
These tools, finished from Sheffield steel, were hand-ground on grindstones
brought from Ohio and weighing a ton apiece. Many veterans of the J. Russell
Cutlery in Turners Falls were employed by Nichols Brothers who realized they
had reached their sales maximum in the butchers' tools line and decided to branch
into a new field. They built a plant on Arch Street for the manufacture of threading
tools and this became known the American Tap and Die Company which was merged
three years later with the original plant under the name of American Tap and
Die Corporation.
In 1920 the Nichols brothers retired from the business and three years later
the firm sold to the Wells Tool Company. But in the absence of these plucky
Yankees, in 1926 the Wells Tool Company found it necessary to withdraw from
the business. That same year the Threadwell Tool Company was formed and after
four years of operation, a foreclosure sale on real estate, plants and equipment
took place in order to pay the interest on a bond issue on behalf of the new
In 1930, the Mechanics Tool and Wrench Company, which leased a part of the
plant, leased the entire layout and continued the Threadwell line of taps, dies
and small tools. This was in addition to the pipe wrenches it had manufactured
Sparked by a New Device
In 1934 the Threadwell Tap and Die Company was formed and installed new gas
and electric hardening equipment and soon after business showed a fair increase.
A new device, developed by Treas. George H. Wilkins and Sec. Herbert J. Smith
of the Threadwell Company, provided a new method for thread cutting and restoring
trimmed threads. This arrangement, patented soon afterwards, helped the company
in its efforts to gain new business inasmuch as it could be used with any wrench
and does not require a die stock.
In February, 1941, W. Scott Keith, president of Threadwell, informed stockholders
that 1940 showed the first "satisfactory" profit the company had seen
since 1929, with exception of the year 1936. He also revealed the firm had a
backlog of orders amounting to three times the total of 1939 sales, consisting
principally of Navy and Army defense items.
The most essential World War II products turned out by Threadwell Tap and Die
on a round-the-clock employment schedule were cutting tools used in boring the
Garand rifle and the .30 and .50 caliber machine guns manufactured in the Springfield
Armory. The number of employes during World War II rose to nearly 400 and this
company, which a few years previously had struggled to keep itself in the black,
was one of this nation's many defense plants turning out valuable items for
war use.
When the Sheffield Corporation took over the Threadwell plant in 1946 the officers
of the local firm were Herbert J. Smith, president; the late W. D. duMont, chairman
of the board; Miss Esther Herter present Threadwell corporation clerk, was secretary;
W. Scott Keith, treasurer, and Herbert V. Erickson, Nathan Tufts, George C.
Lunt, and Philip Rogers, directors.
Polk Takes Charge
Paul W. Polk, son of the founder of the Sheffield Corporation, Oscar M. Polk,
assumed charge of the local firm as vice-president and manager. His brother,
Louis of Dayton, is president. John P. Bernard of Dayton is vice-president,
R. F. Whisler of Dayton is vice-president and assistant treasurer and Edward
T. Noe, JR., of Dayton, is secretary.
Threadwell, which was forced to release some of its employes following the
war, now employes 200. New tools and new equipment have been installed since
it was taken over by Sheffield which has announced plans to promote the local
firm sales as much as possible along with a general policy of expansion of its
other holdings. If business proves favorable in the near future, Sheffield hopes
to add new machinery and employes to meet sales demands.
Threadwell dies are non-adjustable while in Dayton Sheffield turns out the
collapsible type. It was the relation of these two items that made the purchase
of Threadwell appear to be a practical move, according to Mgr. Polk. This decision
has turned out to be an advantageous move inasmuch as the Threadwell products
have tied in neatly with the many types of tools manufactured by Sheffield at
its other plants. The Sheffield line includes machine tools, cutting tools such
as taps and dies, gages and precision- measuring instruments and the tooling
used with them.
Sheffield is manufacturer of large dies, such as those that stamp out a refrigerator
door or fender in a single operation. It sells its products to practically every
industry in the metal working field, including appliance, auto and aviation
manufacturer. The Sheffield Corporation operates plants at Dayton, Melbourne,
Australia, Greenfield and Conway, Mass. Engineering design offices are operated
in Cleveland, Cincinnati, and Richmond, Ind., in addition to similar facilities
in Dayton.
Award Scholarships
In May of last year Sheffield Corporation, through the Threadwell organization,
announced that it would award four scholarships to Franklin County youths who
are high school graduates. These scholarships would provide up to $1,200 each
for tuition and living expenses the first year at the University of Cincinnati.
The corporation would also provide these scholars an opportunity to work during
vacation periods at the Threadwell plant to earn money for succeeding years
of study. Sheffield established the first scholarship in engineering at the
University of Cincinnati 12 years ago.
In June, 1949, Sheffield Corporation acquired the old Conant and Donaldson
Manufacturing Company in Conway and after more than two years of preparations
announced the reopening of this firm under the name of Conway Manufacturing
Company. This company handles some of the processes formerly done in Greenfield
and its new products include standard adjustable snap gages, adjustable length
gages, adjustable inside block gages and gage blanks.
The principal item turned out by Conant and Donaldson was a replaceable and
adjustable chaser collet type die. However, this plant which had been formed
in Greenfield in 1904 and moved to Conway five years later, saw a decline in
business during its later years and when Sheffield took over, more than half
the personnel roster was drawing unemployment compensation.
Once a site of a cutlery business that was unproven when established by its
owners, the Threadwell Tap and Die today is one of Greenfield's outstanding
industrial organizations that promised to play a prominent role in the lives
of hundreds of present and future working men of Franklin County.
There is currently no available "Beginner" label. The following is the default level label: This 1953 newspaper article from the Greenfield Recorder-Gazette in Greenfield, Massachusetts, describes the Threadwell Tap & Die Company as the third largest industry in Greenfield. Faced with a "dark future" before World War II (WWII), the company was revived by the many defense contracts it received during the war. The company was established in 1892 for the manufacture of butchers' tools when the Nichols brothers bought the failing plant of the Greenfield Tool Company. Despite being laughed at by hardware men who argued that Yankee craftsmen could not manufacture suitable knives and meat cutters, the brothers loaded up their wagon with only $2 in their pocket and were inundated with orders. Eventually, they branched out into the manufacture of threading tools, and in 1934 the Threadwill Tap & Die Company was formed, 14 years after the Nichols brothers retired. The company was purchased in 1946 by the Sheffield Corporation of Dayton, Ohio, the largest manufacturer of precision gauges in the United States during a program of post-war expansion. The company was bought out by Bendix, then merged with Besley, and is now located in China.
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See Also...
"Threadwell The Greenfield Plant That Is Making History In The Precision Tool Field!" ad from Greenfield Recorder-Gazette
Threadwell Tap and Die Company's Tap & Die set made in WWII
Partial sample of Saleman's Kit marketed by Threadwell Tap and Die Company
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Website Design and Development
Website design to perfectly reflect you or your business's branding guidelines. Our professional looking websites are custom made using Opensource technology and include additions such as product pages, image galleries, social network integration, contact forms and image banners to enhance your user experience. Please email us to discuss your requirements.
All websites have integrated CMS (content management systems) so you can update your website content live. This is the most cost effective and convenient way of keeping your website current. So you can have a 5 page website created for less than the cost of a conventional yearly advert. You simply login and update the text when you need to. We can host it for you or you may decide to host it yourself, saving you even more.
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Over the past few years there has been a transformation in how people view websites. To accommodate this need Howlett Design can produce Responsive Websites that resize accordingly to browser size. So are legible and user friendly when viewed on desktops, laptops, tablets and phones.
Many solutions require you to have multiple addition websites created for tablets and mobiles, not any more. Using technologies which are supported by Android, Opera Mini and iOS mobile browsers we can make your website adapt to each devices screen resolution, orientation and browser size. This means rather than having an additional mobile site, you main site will automatically re-positioning the page, scale the images and change its layout for convenient scrolling and panning. This requires more thought and planning than a conventional static site, so if you would like to include this in your new website build please let us know and we would be happy to discuss your needs.
This is a responsive website, feel free to play around with the browser size or view it on multiple devices and you'll see what we mean.
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Call or email us to discuss how we can improve your network pages to keep your brand consistency.
For information on web services contact us now!


text:
Technote (troubleshooting)
Starting OpenPages Framework Model Generator service from within Windows Services explorer may fail to start.
Windows OS may throw a generic message that service could not be started.
IT Administrators may have accidentally uninstalled JDK 1.5, which is referred by OpenPages Framework Model Generator service
Windows 2003, OpenPages 5.5.2.x
Diagnosing the problem
Check the logs under tomcat directory located under - ..\OpenPages\CommandCenter\apache-tomcat\logs. Logs may indicate that the JDK 1.5 path is missing.
Also check the following .exe file - ..\OpenPages\CommandCenter\apache-tomcat\bin\tomcat5w.exe and open the JAVA tab, which would have the JDK 1.5 path for jvm.dll file.
Resolving the problem
Install JDK 1.5 if it is uninstalled from the system or if the JDK 1.5 is located in a different path then update the JDK 1.5 path in Tomcat as follows -
1) Run the following .exe file - ..\OpenPages\CommandCenter\apache-tomcat\bin\tomcat5w.exe
2) open JAVA tab and ensure that the JDK path is correct.
Related information
OpenPages Framework Model Generator would not start


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Edward Downing
Edward C. Downing, 85, of Le Mars, Iowa passed away on Tuesday, May 28, 2013 at the Plymouth Manor Care Center in Le Mars following a brief illness. A Celebration of Life Service will take place at 2:00 p.m. on Saturday, June 1, 2013 at the United Methodist Church of Le Mars. Rev. John Battern will officiate. Burial will take place at a later date at Hillside Cemetery in Merrill, Iowa. Visitation will begin at 2:00 p.m. on Friday, May 31, 2013 at the Mauer – Johnson Funeral Home in Le Mars. The family will be present from 5-7 p.m. with a prayer service scheduled at 7:00 p.m. Visitation will resume at 1:00 p.m. on Saturday at the church. Expressions of sympathy may be directed through www.mauerjohnsonfh.com
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How to Write a Good College Essay
No task is more demanding for a senior in high school than writing an essay for a college entrance application. Whether it's a mundane question about an experience you had in life, or about some controversial political or social issue, students even tremble at the very thought of writing a college essay for entrance as well as being judged on it.
Tips for Writing a College Essay
We wondered what tips can be offered to ease your pain. Here are the best tips for writing a college essay.
- Be concise. Although writing a good college essay for an application has a suggested minimum of 250 words, without an upper limit, any admissions officer has a big stack to read every day; the officer wants to spend only a few minutes on each essay. In case you go over 700 words, you're straining their patience.
- Be honest. Do not embellish your titles, achievements, and offices. Not everybody has to be a star at everything. You'll feel better if you do not strain to inflate yourself. So when you're writing a good college essay, you should be as honest as possible.
- Be an individual. In writing an essay, ask yourself, "How can I distinguish myself from thousands of others who are applying to college?" It is in your interests. If you are going just from high school to college, you are simply a teenager, doing your teenage things.
- Be coherent. Of course you do not want to babble, write about just one topic at a time. Do not try to write about everything in your essay. Doing this can make you sound busy, however, at the same time, superficial and scattered. The whole application is a number of snapshots of what you do. It's inevitably incomplete.
- Be accurate. We do not mean simply use spell check. Attend to the other principles of good writing, consisting of conventional punctuation in the use of semi-colons, commas, etc. If you don't know how to write a good college essay without mistakes, just make yourself aware of how to do it beforehand.
- Be vivid. A good essay is usually compared to a story. Give some details to assist the reader in seeing the setting. Use the names for other people in the story, consisting of your teacher, brother, friends, etc. This makes it more human. It also demonstrates to their reader that you're thinking about their appreciation of your writing.
- Be likable. Colleges present themselves as communities, where people should get along with others, in classes, dorms, and so on. Are you a person they would like to communicate with, hang out with, or have in a discussion?
- Be cautious in the use of humor. You don't know how someone unknown to you is going to respond to your joke. Humor is usually in the eye of the beholder. Be funny if you think you have to.
Still, if you don't know how to write a good college essay or just can't do it on your own, BuyEssay.org will help you. Our experienced writers can write any type of essay on any topic, according to all your recommendations.
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The Hills: The Pussycat Dolls Will Play In The Finale
December 22, 2008 02:00 PM by Joe Reality
The fourth season of The Hills is coming to an end, and the stars are coming out. The Hills 4 Season Finale will feature a live performance by The Pussycat Dolls. To kick off the finale, the entire The Hills cast will join fans live at the Tavern On The Green in New York City.
The Hills 4 finale pre-show will start on Monday, December 22 at 8 PM ET/PT on MTV. The pre-show will be hosted by MTV News Tim Kash, and The Hills cast will walk the red carpet and give fans the inside scoop as the last three episodes re-air.
The Hills 4 Season Finale will start at 10 PM ET/PT on MTV. On the finale, Lauren and Heidi will put their feud aside and try to remember why they used to be friends. Also, Heidi's mother comes to town and Spencer and Heidi have to deal with the fallout from their elopement. One of the big surprises of the finale will be when Justin whisks Audrina away to Palm Springs.
After The Hills 4 Season Finale, The Hills Live After Show will start at 10:30 PM ET/PT on MTV. During the after show, The Pussycat Dolls will perform their hit "I Hate This Part," which is from their platinum-selling album Doll Domination. Jessi Cruickshank and Dan Levy will host the after show, and they will give fans the opportunity to ask questions to the cast.
Also, The Hills fourth season DVD will hit stores on March 3, 2009. The Hills: The Complete Fourth Season DVD will feature all twenty episodes of the season, plus deleted scenes, cast interviews and more.
Reality TV Magazine is your source for reality news and information. For more on The Hills and its stars, or the The Pussycat Dolls check out SirLinksALot: The Hills.
Photo Credit: MTV
Topics: MTV Reality TV Shows, Pussycat Dolls Present: Girlicious, The Hills |
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|Lee selected as March Senior of the Month
Candace Lee has recently been selected as the Beta Sigma Phi March "Senior of the Month."
Lee, a student at Perkins County High School, is the daughter of Barb and Kevin Hatch and the late Doug Lee.
Throughout her high school career, Lee has shown many interests in a variety of activities.
She has participated in volleyball and basketball for four years, has been a cheerleader for three years, a band and chorus member.
She has been involved in two fall musicals.
She has held the class office of secretary and was a member of National Honor Society.
She lettered in mock trial all four years, and was a scholastics winner four years.
In community service, Lee has served as a T-ball coach, youth basketball coach, and has helped with school music contests and fundraisers for Perkins County Youth Council.
She has also lectored at Mother of Sorrows Catholic Church, has been a 4-H member, and attended the Citizens Washington Focus trip.
She has been employed at Hatch's Super Foods and Image Total Fitness in Grant.
After graduation in May, Lee plans to attend the University of Nebraska-Lincoln, and major in political science, specializing in pre-law, with a goal of attending law school.
For being selected as Senior of the Month, Lee's picture will hang in the lobby of Pinnacle Bank in Grant and she will be eligible for a scholarship awarded at the end of the school year.
The Student of the Month and scholarship program are sponsored jointly by Beta Sigma Phi Sorority and Pinnacle Bank in Grant.


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Reviewed By Tonya K (TOLLEY, ND) Reviewed for a 2016 Chevy Silverado —5/5/2016 6:32 AM
We are very happy with our seal! It works great to eliminate dust from our gravel roads!
Reviewed By Raymond H (Appleton, WI) Reviewed for a 2016 Ford F-150 —12/24/2015 7:52 AM
1st, my 2011 tacoma have 4 storage spaces vs this 2016 F150 supercrew with 0; I was ecstatic to find this product! Solid aluminum, nicely sized, big enough to stuff a few duffle bags plus behind them. Relatively easy to install although some screws can protrude out so some mods is needed. My only complaint is the edges of this aluminum plates are not smooth off so they are sharp, I did cut myself installing them. I used my dremel tool to lightly smooth off the edges. Otherwise would recommend it


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Textualism and originalism, a follow-up
A number of interesting questions arose overnight concerning intentionalism as it obtains in the realm of legal interpretation, a few of which I'll try to address here. This post was originally written as a comment, so allow for some haste of thought.
Still, as a way to spur discussion further, my responses my prove useful — particularly inasmuch as I've tried to circle back to the linguistic questions that provide the impetus for the legal questions raised as a result.
First, Fred C Dobbs writes
Here is my question: If a textualist like Scalia interprets a law using the conventions and limits himself to the text of the law, why should he not conclude that his interpretation represents the intent of the author?
How can any interpreter know if his interpretation is true to the intent of the author?
To take the latter first, the answer is, no one can ever know for certain. Because, to bring back my irony example, it is always possible in theory that a text is presented completely ironically, such that it's author means precisely the opposite of what conventions tell us the text says. An interesting example would be, say, the instructions for putting together an IKEA bookshelf. If, after you read and interpret, you have a perfectly put together bookshelf, you will (naturally) assume you have gauged the manual writer's intent correctly and so interpreted his instructions perfectly. That is, you have understood precisely what he meant.
But imagine that the manual writer was being ironic, and every sign actually meant — to him — its opposite. You will have interpreted what he wrote in good faith — assuming that he was using the conventions of language and context (convention tells you that rarely are shelving manuals written in anything other than straightforward, simple language), and the fact that you came away with the shelf, which you assumed to be the purpose of the manual, would further convince you that you'd interpreted properly.
But of course, in reality — from a linguistic perspective — though you followed all the rules for interpretation (you assumed what you were reading was language, and so intended; you paid attention to convention, both for plain meaning of terms and for the general purpose of manuals of the type you were engaging; you 'checked your work' at each stage by seeming to match the manual's directions with your results, etc), you interpreted incorrectly: the manual writer meant what he meant.
Now, you have no way of knowing this, most likely; and the fact that you got what you want out of the engagement with the manual leaves you content. But in this (highly unusual) instance, the fact is, though you've done everything correctly as an interpreter, you didn't correctly interpret what the manual writer meant.
Now, why does that matter?
It matters because, in an infuriating way, it illustrates how language functions in terms of where meaning resides, how meanings are transferred, and what happens during the various stages of interpreting a speech act. To wit: the manual writer turned signifiers into signs through the process of adding signifieds. The resultant text is a document of his intent, his meaning fixed at the moment of signification. If, in this example, we now know that his signs mean precisely the opposite of what convention tells us they mean, we realize that we missed the writer's meaning — that we interpreted him incorrectly.
This is potential failing in all communication based around arbitrary signifier/signified relationships.
The problem comes, though, when we notice the failing and try to "fix" the issue by taking intent out of the relationship. And that's where I've tended to concentrate my attentions, because the fix — while it may certainly feel right — is linguistically incoherent, and the ramifications for accepting the assumptions that "allow" for the fix are far reaching and dangerous.
So to get back to your original question, "If a textualist like Scalia interprets a law using the conventions and limits himself to the text of the law, why should he not conclude that his interpretation represents the intent of the author?"
If Scalia concluded such — and used as a rule that his interpretations best matched what he believed to be the intent of the author — he would be acknowledging the intentionalist that he is, and that we all are. As I've said several times now, intentionalism just is — meaning problems only arise when people like Scalia, or the New Critics, or Derrida, or De Man, or Gadamer, etc., try to will their way out of the relationship whereby original intent is the locus of meaning in a speech act if what we are after is to interpret that communication. To do this — to assert their preeminence as readers in the relationship between author and receiver — they have come up with a number of places to privilege the anchor of meaning other than with the original author: convention, code, reader response, dialogical webs, historical moment, etc.
But try as they might, they cannot make language function in the way they describe.
Fred writes:
If we're all intentionalists, then intentionalism doesn't mean anything. My understanding was that intentionalism meant interpretation to determine the original intent. Not any intent. After all, any interpretation has intent. I thought intentionalism was concerned with orginal intent only.
"Interpretation" of a speech act presupposes intent; and that's the point: any interpretation has intent, as you say; but not everyone recognizes this, and as a result, they don't believe they are privileging intent when in fact they are. Whose intent they are privileging, however, is the important observation. If they are privileging the author's intent, they are interpreting. If they are privileging their own intent, they are not.
Given that in both cases the receiver lays claim to interpretation, I disagree with the conclusion you draw that, all of us being intentionalists, "then intentionalism doesn't mean anything." In fact, it means everything. The problem is not with intentionalism. It is with those who believe they've been able to escape it.
Scalia, worried about "secret meanings" (to go back to my example of the shelving, the author's insidious "irony" has problematized our ability to interpret him correctly — though we don't much care, having gotten what we wanted out of the engagement), wants to say that, because authors can mean what they don't appear to mean, we are justified in dismissing intent as a function of intepretation.
But of course, Scalia never does dismiss intent. He simply replaces the emphases of intent, and privileges his own agency over that of the author(s).
Simply by virtue of accepting that what he's charged with interpreting is language, Scalia is accepting that he is dealing with a text, with signs, signifiers that have been signified. Were he not, he'd have no reason to try to "interpret" to begin with, because there would be nothing to interpret: signifiers are marks or sound forms; they don't "mean" anymore than do bird tracks that resemble language, or cloud formations that resemble horny lambs. And so from the outset — and despite his protestations to the contrary — Scalia has marked himself as an intentionalist. And that's because he has no choice.
Again. Intentionalism just is. Problems arise only when we pretend we can interpret outside that truism.
Now, Scalia — knowing as he does the potential pitfalls of language, recognizes that, at least potentially, lawmakers could have given him a document that resembles straightforward and conventional legal language, but attached to it might be some insidious secret meaning that is not readily apparent from a conventional engagement with the signs during the course of normal interpretation. That is, Scalia recognizes that the lawmakers may have hidden their intent in language that doesn't readily make that intent apparent — and yet there it lies, this intent, like soldiers inside a Trojan horse ready to unleash fury once the law has been accepted into usage.
So Scalia's response is to say that, to avoid such concerns, intent is no longer to be considered — that the "plain text" of a statute, as judged by convention, is what the law means.
But he's wrong. What the law means is what it means. And you can't lay claim to interpreting law if you aren't interpreting it for what its writers meant.
Where people seem to get hung up, though, is on the belief that what a law means — no matter how that meaning is expressed — is determinative for how we must interpret it.
But again, the man putting together the shelving would have virtually no way of knowing that he was interpreting incorrectly. And that's because the writer subverted a number of conventions, provided no ironic or parodic cues, was unnamed (and so made intertextual considerations impossible), and — most importantly to the man who bought the shelves — what the writer intended didn't much matter in the end because the man got his shelving. And so even though his interpretation was wrong, it was still useful.
More, had the original author really wanted his intentions known, he would have been more careful in signaling them. In nearly every case, the best way to ensure that your intent is read is to follow convention. And that's because convention is a second order system "designed" to help us better divine intent. A failure to follow convention can cause all sorts of problems for receivers who, in good faith, try to decode your speech act. But what a failure to follow convention doesn't do is change your meaning.
Which is why when I noted in an earlier discussion that textualists and originalists who appeal to intent will most often come to the same reading of a statute, I was noting that, for the most part, what matters is what we think we are doing when we interpret, because convention — as a rule — is a highly functional guide for divining intent.
But what convention isn't is the locus of meaning. Because to say that is to say that, regardless of what a person meant when he crafted a communication he desired to have interpreted, his meaning rests with the way signifiers are most typically signified. That is, his meaning rests with convention — or general group usage of signifiers — and not with his own desire to express meaning.
And this is not only wrong but dangerous. First, if meaning did rest with convention, convention would remain static. How could convention change, after all, if it prevented any meaning-making to exist outside of its own parameters for determining meaning?
Second, by taking meaning away from the intentional actor and giving it over to convention, you are taking meaning away from the individual and giving it over to the consensus of a community or culture (convention being nothing more than that consensus meaning spread out and institutionalized). In that way, you are allowing a community or culture to determine what it is an individual means — and so taking away that individual's autonomy and demanding he surrender his own will to group generalizations.
None of which is a repudiation of intentionalism. Instead, it is nothing more than a transfer of whose intent is privileged disguised as a bracketing of intent.
Because to say that the author doesn't mean what he meant — that what his "plain text" means is what "convention" tells us it means — is to say that our intent to privilege group generalizations about signification trumps your ability to signify. Or, to put it more bluntly, our intent to attach to your signifiers what we as a group want to see there supplants your intent to signify as you have.
There is a difference — and it is an important one — between demanding that writers of law follow convention as closely as possible to ensure the most accurate interpretations of their intent; and maintaining that what the writer intended doesn't matter, because convention is the locus of meaning.
Scalia and others push for the latter in order to get the former. But in doing so, they open up avenues that legitimize an idea of "interpretation" that is not interpretation at all.
To look at someone's intended text — his signs — and try to decode them as part of a speech act is to interpret. To look at someone's signs, remove the intent that turned them into signs in the first place, and then react to signifiers, which you then resignify solely based on convention, is to write your own signs — to create your own text.
And at that point, it is your intent that you have privileged, and your meaning that is the endproduct of what you have called "interpretation," but which is no such thing.
My argument is, how you get there matters. To privilege your own intent is to rob others of their meaning. And the consequences of such a maneuver are far reaching, and go to the heart of the will to power / consensus meaning paradigm I've been at pains to dissect here over the years.
Comments (58)
If this doesn't explain how intentionalism relates to the law, I don't think anything else will.
Subverting the subversive Or Two Intentionalists at Work on an Intentionalist at Work on Intentionalists.
Pingback: Cranky-D » Textualism and Originalism
"If this doesn't explain how intentionalism relates to the law, I don't think anything else will."
Seriously. Jeff, you simply couldn't have made it any more plain. In my humble opinion, any misunderstanding at this point is purposeful.
Thanks for the detailed response, Jeff. I believe I have a much better understanding now. Not complete understanding, but better.
A question on convention. If the author doesn't use convention, but uses cues within the text to denote how to interpret the "unconventional", wouldn't a textualist like Scalia still interpret, not "interpret", the text? And if so, the only instance Scalia would "interpret" instead of interpret is when convention is not used by the author and the text doesn't have the necessary cues/hints/etc within the text to denote "unconventional"?
If the author doesn't use convention, but uses cues within the text to denote how to interpret the "unconventional", wouldn't a textualist like Scalia still interpret, not "interpret", the text? And if so, the only instance Scalia would "interpret" instead of interpret is when convention is not used by the author and the text doesn't have the necessary cues/hints/etc within the text to denote "unconventional"?
Well, most of the cues are also conventional — clues to signaling intent that have been well established, and as such are conventional signals — and so are part and parcel of what we consider when we interpret.
But just so I'm clear, when you use "interpret" and interpret, which is which?
I think you have overlooked a possibility, one that laws happen to realize: texts whose actual authors are trying to convey not their own intentions, but the intentions of other people. The author of a law does not speak for himself; he speaks for the sovereign, which in the USA means the citizens as a body. Therefore a law ought to be interpreted according to the citizens' intention, not the legislator's, if those disagree; not because group consensus is the locus of all meaning, but because, for a law, a group's consensus is the intention the signs are meant to convey.
A legal text is much more like the instruction manual example you gave than you seem to recognize. The manual's author is conveying not his own intention, but the intention of the bookshelf's designers, exactly as the legislator conveys the citizens' intention rather than his own. If we supposed that a legislator wrote a law ironically, saying A in its text but meaning B in his secret heart, the discovery of his secret meaning after the law went into effect would have exactly the same effect on the courts' behavior that discovery of the ironical manual writer's secret meaning would have on its readers; which is to say, none whatever. The courts would enforce A, and be right to do so, because A is the meaning the citizens agreed to by enacting the law. As B was not conveyed at the time, it has no relevance in court.
The takeaway here is to keep in mind that our reliance on convention is a reliance on a construct we've adopted to aid us in doing what is necessary, namely, reconstructing intent.
I think you have overlooked a possibility, one that laws happen to realize: texts whose actual authors are trying to convey not their own intentions, but the intentions of other people. The author of a law does not speak for himself; he speaks for the sovereign, which in the USA means the citizens as a body. Therefore a law ought to be interpreted according to the citizens' intention, not the legislator's, if those disagree; not because group consensus is the locus of all meaning, but because, for a law, a group's consensus is the intention the signs are meant to convey.
What you are saying is merely that the legislature's role is to capture in their crafting of the law the will of the citizenry — or at least, the will of that portion of the citizenry that supports the legislation (in itself a debatable proposition: what is the "conventional" wisdom on the role of the legislature? To act as a phenomenological conduit for the desires of those they represent? Or to act as a trusted proxy for the people they represent, voting on their behalf but, insofar as they consider themselves more informed than those they represent, ultimately given to voting their own consciences?)
But while that is the goal they set for themselves, they still must nevertheless express that goal in the language they use to craft the law — and that language, once it is signified, is the record of whatever the intent is of those who brought it into existence
A legal text is much more like the instruction manual example you gave than you seem to recognize. The manual's author is conveying not his own intention, but the intention of the bookshelf's designers, exactly as the legislator conveys the citizens' intention rather than his own. If we supposed that a legislator wrote a law ironically, saying A in its text but meaning B in his secret heart, the discovery of his secret meaning after the law went into effect would have exactly the same effect on the courts' behavior that discovery of the ironical manual writer's secret meaning would have on its readers; which is to say, none whatever.
How it effects the court's behavior with respect to the particular law is not what this is about, necessarily. If the court is now aware that the text of the law means B — and that they in good faith misinterpreted what the legislators meant — they are in a coherent position to point out that their interpretation was done in good faith, that it assumed the legislature had an intent and that they, as a judicial body, tried to discern that intent using the text, legal conventions, and all manner of cues necessary to make their determination.
Therefore, they can tell the legislature that, if what was meant differs from the good faith interpretation of what was meant as decided upon by the court, the legislature needs to amend the law to make signal that intent more clearly.
Conversely, if the court began by treating the legislation as if intent didn't matter, they have merely written their own legislation. As such, they would be responding to the revelation of the legislature's now revealed intent by telling them it doesn't matter either way what it intended; because the court is responsible for providing a statute with its intent.
That is not the proper role of the court – nor is it the proper role of anyone claiming to interpret. In both instances, we have the same practical effect. But in the former, we maintain a coherent notion of language that doesn't legitimize an idea of interpretation that is not interpretation, and so it doesn't hijack individual meaning and turn it over to the collective as a rule.
The courts would enforce A, and be right to do so, because A is the meaning the citizens agreed to by enacting the law. As B was not conveyed at the time, it has no relevance in court.
The courts would enforce A because A is a legitimate product of intepretation. And as such, B has less standing than it would if what we were left with was a competition between a judiciary who "wrote" its own law pitted against a legislature who first intended.
This entire discussion is based on the notion that the primary purpose of language is communication. It is not.
Before you can ever use language to communicate an idea (of any complexity above the direct perceptual level), you must first use it to think of that idea. So even when our ultimate goal is to communicate in a language, we first must think in it. But we also use language all the time to think about ideas we never communicate to anyone else.
As you're working out a strategy for hunting, planting, or modern business; a design for a tool; a chemical reaction… you are thinking using symbols that represent ideas. You don't necessarily need to use the same symbols the same way as I do, but you must choose meanings for those symbols that are consistent within your own usage, or you won't be able to think clearly.
When someone comes along and redefines the meaning of words that I may not even be using to communicate to anyone else, or was using within a limited community of people who share the context in which I use them, they display an arrogance that is truly breathtaking. They claim to tell me what I am thinking.
I believe the greatest damage done by these pricks is to our ability to think. It is 1984 come to life; people like Cont(essa) Brewer are simply incapable of forming Politically Incorrect ideas in their brains; the programming is so powerful.
to act as a trusted proxy for the people they represent, voting on their behalf but, insofar as they consider themselves more informed than those they represent, ultimately given to voting their own consciences
This one. I consider the legislator's job to vote according to a system of values, such that if I were sitting in his office with him reading all of the research his staff brings, listening to all the testimony in the committee hearings, etc., we would vote the same way on the legislation. I don't have time to do all of that; I'm hiring him to do it for me.
Seriously. Jeff, you simply couldn't have made it any more plain. In my humble opinion, any misunderstanding at this point is purposeful
Not really. I'm just thick.
Sorta OT but would someone please go back to Pat's post and see if my comment posted at 6:51 am #93 is there?
It was posted from my home 'puter this morning. I got to work and it wasn't there, only a rather off-putting message from Pat at 6:45 explaining he put two comments in moderation
95.I put only two comments in moderation, and neither is offensive per se; A.W.'s is a "can't you guys learn to disagree" sort of comment, and the other (unnamed) commenter's comment was, I thought, just a touch dismissive in tone, which I fear could lead us down a counterproductive road.
Obviously I'm the "unnamed" commenter and I have no idea what was "a touch dismissive in tone".
I'm home now and I can see my comment on my home 'puter but I have no idea whether its in moderation or has been released.
Very annoying. Oh and here's what Pat objected to:
93.What gives the judge the right to take a law, duly passed by the legislature, and void it when he knows its meaning?
Pat, your own stated standard "the written law fails to apprise citizens what is required of them". It contains a fatal flaw. Just as an RN rejects a legitimate doctor's order if s/he knows the order is in error.
Contrary to what Leviticus is saying, intentionalism isn't a philosophy. It is a method of describing communication. HOW does "meaning" get from one human brain to the other?
In most circumstances, humans can communicate in a back and forth manner until the meaning is clarified between creator and receiver to the satisfaction of both. IE I hosted Japanese exchange students for six years. They came to America in the summer specifically to hone their conversational English. The huge stumbling block at first for them is the very informal way we speak – clipped sentences, idioms, slang. I had to shift my way of speaking for at least a few weeks to be much more precise and correct in order for my student to understand what I was saying. But at no time did it shift my meaning to her. She couldn't just "make up" a meaning for my words just because she didn't quite understand them. My signs are my own, even if I'm not signaling correctly.
For practicality and in protection of the mass of people the law will affect, the convention of a formal procedure of how law will be reviewed within the legal realm. That doesn't negate how language works. Meaning comes from the creator, even if the creator fails at clearly communicating it.
But if you DO accept the premise that unexpressed intent governs the law's meaning, regardless of the words used in the text
You keep referring to a descriptive process as if the description is a judgment. It is NOT. The words in the text have meaning. WHO puts that meaning there? The person/people who wrote them or the person/people who reads them? Once you honestly answer that THEN you can move onto judging whether the meaning was clearly communicated or not.
I don't know how we got from technical error to unexpressed intent (? what is unexpressed intent?). Certainly a judge has a lot more than the mere text of the law under consideration. As has been pointed out on JeffG's thread, that's what amicus curiae is for …
It's there, D.
Wait, was that a death threat?
Been alerted to another post on the subject from Mr Frey. If he raises any points I haven't covered, or offers any new arguments I haven't dealt with and that you'd like to have me tackle here, let me know and I'll be happy to do so.
Judging from the tepid response to this post though, it seems many of you are tired of the subject.
It's been pretty dense, for a blog. I think at least some people may be off letting it digest a bit, sort of like the afternoon after Thanksgiving dinner.
Judging from the tepid response to this post though, it seems many of you are tired of the subject.
Nah. What you have done here is (as #1 and #4 said) made things so perfectly clear that there is little to say. Bravo Professor.
For myself, I just don't have much of anything worthwhile to say.
The posts are interesting to read though and many of the comments are as well.
It really is okay to be tired of the subject. I know I am.
Well, let's say it might be done for now, and that I don't think further discussion will enlighten the unenlightenable.
thanks, bh
I guess sometime later this afternoon whatever I said that annoyed Mr. Frey had lessened and he took the comment from moderation.
Well, if Leviticus is commenting freely, I'm puzzled how your comment could have given any offense, D.
If I'm tired of anything, it's every new hypothetical Pat conjures up that keeps missing what you are explaining.
What is bothersome is that the hypotheticals he's using are rather…well, outlandish, as instances of supposedly plausible legal documentation in need of interpretation — and yet the posts are designed to show how intentionalism gets problematized in "real world" situations (where, according to some textualists who've bothered to reply, law is not even considered in language).
In this post, I used an equally outlandish hypothetical (the ironized shelving manual); but I did so to show that even with outlandish hypotheticals weighted in favor of "convention" over intent, intent still holds as the locus of meaning in a speech act.
Beyond that, the example is designed to show how (and ultimately why) one needs to accept certain preconditions about intent to even engage in an instance of "interpretation" — and why that matters, even if the interpretation they arrive at is entirely wrong.
Anyhow, I'm tired. Taking care of a sick kid is draining; and so I think I'll just watch a 70s flick and drift to sleep.
G'night all.
Ready for some dummy talk? Here goes:
Intentionalism is physics. The various versions of legal interpretation are competing schools of chemistry. Choose your favorite frame at that level but it's always physics when you look deeper. May as well pick a frame that doesn't immediately yield to the most obvious reductionism.
Later, chief.
We had the "F" lectures, these are the "G" lectures.
Book coming. "Surely You're Joking, Mr. Goldstein!"
This might be the time to ask Ernst Schreiber to please continue commenting beyond these sorts of threads. You're a clever fellow.
Speaking of which, psycho is now a mere dash. I'm curious to see what happens but I'm not sure I'll be perceptive enough to notice it.
"Intentionalism is physics. The various versions of legal interpretation are competing schools of chemistry. Choose your favorite frame at that level but it's always physics when you look deeper. May as well pick a frame that doesn't immediately yield to the most obvious reductionism."
It's all ball bearings these days bh ;)
Only half-clever, bh. But thank you for the compliment.
I comment when I find the topic interesting and I think I have something to add. (I mean c'mon, how many people do you need to slap nishi around like that hysterical woman in Airplane! No need to get in that line.) I stopped commenting because I though Michael Brazier's comment above resolved my issue re: the legal mind and linguistic intent on the one hand and mental intention/volition on the other.
And besides, I have this unfortunate habit of showing up at the end of dead or dying threads. It's like being the socially awkward kid who somehow wrangles an invite to the party, only to show up after the party's moved elsewhere.
Oh wait.
Book coming. "Surely You're Joking, Mr. Goldstein!"
Isn't there already a Book of Leviticus?
Jeff–Does your analysis change if you consider that there is no genuine authorial intent in legislature? For example, assume an ironic legislator, who writes a law that says something other than what he means. But, his is not the final word. Assume further that the bill becomes a law without modification of the proposed language. It still has to clear several committees, and then pass the whole body my a majority vote. Because the speaker is the entire legislature, not the individual legislator, the drafter's intent is meaningless. What matters is what the legislature, as a whole, understood the law to mean. The simplest way to determine that is "plain meaning."
This is a convention, yes, but it is necessary for two reasons. First, it priviliges representatrive democracy. The whole point of the exercise is to have our representatives create laws that bind us. The convention therefore ensures that the majority will (as demonstrated by the legislative roll call) is upheld. Second, it is necessary to make stable something that is inherently indeterminate: language. Most of legal interpretation is predictive; the basic question is how do I model my behavior to comply with the law? The inquiry them becomes, what will a court say the law means? To ask what did the lawmaker intend is to begin that inquiry. If the law is subject to secret meanings, irony, etc., legal analysis cannot be predictive. You could drive 55, but how could you be sure that the ironic legislator didn't mean 55kph? Or 65mph? Or 35mph? Absent fixedness, law becomes mere words. This is a naive notion of language, but it is functional: law is a tool, not a meta- playground. The conventions of statutory interpretation privilege not the writer or the reader, but the polity. I would not advocate interpreting poetry with these conventions, and I think it's a mistake to do the reverse.
This is a convention, yes,
Full stop right there, Andrew.
As has been argued by many throughout these exchanges is that convention is useful but it doesn't trump where meaning originates.
For instance, My right to my own life is inherent in me. My right to my life isn't granted or created by the state or by other individuals or groups. Now the state can secure and protect my right, or it can interfer with my right (either by due process or maliciously) but my right always originates with me.
The path that makes creation or locus of "rights" the state or any other group is dangerous. Why would making "meaning" the property of the receiver or groups of receivers of the message any less dangerous?
Andrew —
The intent I speak of is at the moment of enacting. Various intentions of the legislators are being used for convenience in this discussion, but as I've explained in the past, where you place the intent really doesn't much matter, for linguistic purposes. What matters is the fact of it.
Again, the problem with Scalia's results aren't at issue. He doesn't believe he's appealing to intent, but he is (which is why his own description of his method, as others have pointed out, is rather uneven).
My concern is that what he thinks he's doing is something he's okay with being done — namely, allowing that intent doesn't govern meaning. Because others will use that same formulation in a way that Scalia likely wouldn't in order to usurp meaning from the intending agency and call it "interpretation."
What about your right to property? Is that inherent in you, too? Does your right to claim a patch of land and exclude others from it originate from your own creation of meaning? If the receiver is the source of meaning here–as opposed to a community–then there's nothing to stop such a receiver from taking another's property.
When I spoke about the legislature, I was assuming the interpretive task concerned a statute. The same is true with any other legal authority or document, be it the coomon law, the constitution, or a contract. (Wills are different, because their is only one author, but their premise is similar, I.e., effectuating the speaker's will). All if this reveals that legal interpretation is a mode of being-at-hand. It's functional. Ignoring the conventions undermines functionality. Indeeed, the legal opinions that read like literature are the hardest to apply because the meaning is open and indeterminate. It's difficult enough to apply abstraction to concrete circumstances without subverting the meaning of the text. Plus, laws that are passed by a legitimate legislature deserve respect. A receiver that undermines such laws is, well, a douche that would probably be better suited to inquiring about marginal things, like the meta-meaning of parentheses.
Why "ignoring the conventions"? (After all, it's Scalia who claims to be do the ignoring, vis a vis the intentions of the writers.) Taking conventions into account doesn't mean stopping with them does it?
I assume you're responding to Darleen, Andrew, but allow me to jump in. Nowhere have I ever said anything about ignoring conventions. In fact, I said specifically in this post that if you want your meaning understood, you'd be best served by adhering to convention.
Conventional word usage, syntax usage, etc., is one cue we use for divining intent. There are others — context, for instance, or formal aspects of the construction — but all lead us to one end, if what we are doing is interpreting: trying to determine intent.
Oops. See that sdferr beat me to it.
It seems I've noted all this before. That people are consistently coming to the same objections means I'm either doing a bad job of explaining my position, or else someone else is.
There's a third option that has more to do with faulty receiving.
Well, I've had ample opportunity to correct mistakes on the receiving end, Pablo. In fact, that's the part about doing this on a blog I like: I can react, respond, answer, clarify, etc.
In theory, I mean.
In practice, I'm left with things like "Does intentionalism sanction fraud?"
You can only lead a horse to water, Jeff. Else you could be blogging at HuffPo and resolving all of America's political differences.
As for that thing, he's just throwing shit at the wall as he seems to think that if you're still talking, you couldn't have lost the argument. You've done your part well, and you're under no obligation to clean that mess up.
"…he's just throwing shit at the wall…"
Not that I intend to be disagreeable Pablo, but I view him as throwing shit at himself, at this point, and become quite besmeared with it.
Hey, look! It stuck! ;-)
What about your right to property? Is that inherent in you, too?
The right to property originates with the right to your own life. "Own", you own yourself if not then someone owns you. Physical property is an extension of this as it needed to maintain your life and it is through the efforts of "you" that the physical property is acquired.
Society simply affirms and protects this right and provides for orderly transfers of property. Or it does not and provides for slavery and theft by the most powerful to be the order of the day.
What about your right to property? Is that inherent in you, too? Does your right to claim a patch of land and exclude others from it originate from your own creation of meaning? If the receiver is the source of meaning here–as opposed to a community–then there's nothing to stop such a receiver from taking another's property.
Ok, maybe I signaled insufficiently. I was attempting as analogy – "meaning" belongs to the creator of it as rights belong to the individual.
It just is
And mischief and madness lie along the path that would pretend otherwise.
Jeff, Darleen, Sdferr, et al.:
Please allow me to clarify. When a legal practitioner engages in interpretation, the practitioner is the locus of meaning. The act is, itself, the creation of meaning. What is more, the practitioner is (generally) called upon to apply abstract, imperative norms to concrete, factual circumstances. In one sense, the practitioner is a receiver of meaning–after all, the practitioner did not originate the imperative norms. In another sense, however, the practitioner's interpretation creates meaning by putting the imperative norm at play.
This suggests two things. First, the imperative norms come from somewhere else. Some positive rights, like copyright or patent, were created by the Sovereign, who may act through legislation. Other rights are based on tradition and custom, like riparian water rights. The acceptance of these norms is usually a function of politics or efficacy. A law that is enacted by a Sovereign is obeyed if it is legitimate (a value determined by various concepts, e.g., consent of the governed, divine right, etc) and/or because the Sovereign's threat of violence compels obedience. A tradition or custom is followed for as long as it "works" and it is not overtaken by current events (e.g., horse-and-buggy rules-of-the road). Second, and as a consequence of the first, the practitioner's legal interpretation is subsidiary to the imperative norm. However, certain interpretations, like judicial decisions or significant legal commentary, can become convention, in the sense of a Gadamerian tradition, because they will guide later practitioners' interpretations of the particular imperative norm at issue to other factual circumstances.
Because the practitioner is aware that his or her interpretation can become convention, special care must be taken in the interpretive task. Take, as an example, section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. §1. This particular statute, unlike many, does not define any of the terms it uses. Practitioners must therefore define each term through interpretation. Interpretive meaning, arising from various acts over the years, steadily gloms on to the statute, such that it begins to control the meaning of the text.
But this accretion of meaning is in tension with, if not contrary to, the premise of legal interpretation. Instead of applying the imperative norm to the circumstances, practitioners begin to apply convention. The political legitimacy of such practice is arguable. (Some might argue that the interpretive norms are "living" and must change and adapt, but that a particular interpretation is wrong, while others might argue that by subverting the statute, the legal practitioner is a usurper, insofar as he or she does not enjoy the same legitimacy as the Sovereign). As such, it is important to ground the interpretive act epistemologically and politically. The ideologies of statutory interpretation, i.e., textualism, orginalism, contextualism, developmentalism, arise out of such needs.
For example, a textualist seeks to determine the meaning of a law from an exegesis of it text, and applies sub-conventions (the canons of construction) to arrive at the meaning. The textualist refuses to look to sources of authorial intent not included in the text itself, because the drafter of the law is not always the Sovereign, especially where there is a collective body of law makers. The textualist also attempts to restrain interpretation out of deference to the Sovereign. While this method privileges some texts above others (and indeed, the recipient-translator's interpretation above others), the reason for such privileging is to purchase epistemic and political legitimacy.
What is more, if the canons of construction are epistemologically sound, use of those conventions maintains the functionality of interpretation. That is to say, if all practitioners are using the same rules to guide their interpretations, it follows that they will understand each other, even across time and space. This increases the utility of interpretation as convention, but perversely reifies the interpretive acts' subversive position to the imperative norm. The perceived value of such acts is contingent on whether one accepts the imperative norm as legitimate in the first instances. So, for example, if one believed that a norm was illegitimate, an interpretation that subverts the norm would be legitimate.
At the end of the day, a theory of legal interpretation is ideological, insofar as it must be politically and epistemologically legitimate, but it must also be useful, given that legal interpretation is a practice that is intended to resolve or prevent disputes. Convention, more than merely a way to make oneself understood, is vital to both aspects.
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I think Andrew and Darleen are talking past each other. Andrew is talking about the community as the originator of meaning, rightfully expecting its meaning to be understood. Darleen is talking about the community as the a recipient of meaning wrongly empowered to decide for itself what the originator(s) meant regardless of the intentions of the originator(s). Andrew is worried about malfeasance on the part of an agent empowered to speak on the community's behalf (when I authored the revision of the traffic code, I meant Meters Per Hour suckers!). Darleen is worred about malfeasance on the part of an agent empowered to (re)interpret meaning on the communities behalf (This court finds, relying on international standards, scottish common law and the desires of the Carter administration, that henceforth "miles" shall mean "kilometers", and the bitter clingers can suck it!)
Andrew's point is that the legal profession has a convention that works. Jeff, Darleen et. al. are just pointing out that the convention is a structure, and if you aren't aware of the foundations upon which that structure rests, some gypsy contractor from the Frankfurt School of Critical Engineering is going to talk you into knock out the walls of your basement.
And if I'm wrong, at least I'll have brought Andrew and Darleen together in piling upon me.
knocking! knocking out the basement walls. Damn you lazy editing eye!
I'm going to start surfing porn so I have an excuse.
At the end of the day, a theory of legal interpretation is ideological, insofar as it must be politically and epistemologically legitimate, but it must also be useful, given that legal interpretation is a practice that is intended to resolve or prevent disputes. Convention, more than merely a way to make oneself understood, is vital to both aspects.
Convention is vital when you want to be understood and you are using a sign system that is arbitrary. It is not vital where meaning is concerned. And it is not essential to making your meaning understood.
Recognizing that — and what the distinction is important — is, well, important.
For reasons Ernst hints at when he talks about the Frankfurt School.
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And whoosh. Again.
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text:
Take Monday Off: Cuban Miami
Three sunny days packed with the flavors and flair of the off-limits Caribbean island
Imagine a place without a Starbucks, where the bars fill at three in the afternoon and hotels look like they were pulled from an old Dick Tracy comic. To visit Cuba is to visit a lost world. But until everyone can legally travel to one of the Western Hemisphere's most beautiful, challenged and historically significant destinations, there's Miami. With Art Deco finery, open-air domino games, salsa dancing, bustling street-side cafés, hand-rolled cigars, cabaret shows, white beaches and warm waters, this Florida escape is the best way to experience the forbidden Caribbean island without violating any embargoes. Art Basel Miami Beach is drawing visitors next month, but the spirit of Cuba lures all year.
5 p.m.Arrive at Miami International Airport. Like Havana, with its fleet of gorgeous, rusting "Yank tanks"—classic American sedans tweaked by Cuban mechanics to run for half a century or more—Miami is a car town, and the roads along the beach are lined with Chevy Camaros. If you really want to pop (and splurge), rent a Lamborghini Gallardo from South Beach Exotic Rentals (from $1,200 per day; southbeachexoticrentals.com).
6 p.m. Check in to the Miami River Inn(from $89 per night, 118 S.W. South River Dr.; miamiriverinn.com), a cozy complex of restored cottages within sight of the Miami River and a 10-minute drive from the heart of Little Havana.
7 p.m. Drive several minutes to Viernes Culturales(viernesculturales.org), a vibrant street festival that takes place on the last Friday of each month along Calle Ocho in Little Havana. Begin with a free tour of the neighborhood guided by local historian Paul George, which starts on the sidewalk beneath the neon-and-chrome marquee of the 85-year-old Tower Theatre(1508 S.W. 8th St.). Miami's blocks of bungalows will take on new significance as Dr. George narrates the evolution of the neighborhood from a sleepy community of Jewish retirees to Cuba's capital-in-exile during the late 1960s. Then fill up on the food samples and enjoy the handicrafts and live entertainment around Domino Stage(15th Ave. and S.W. 8th St.), where sequined dancers perform salsa routines.
10 p.m. End the night with a can of cold beer at El Pub(1548 S.W. 8th St., 305-642-9942), a gritty neighborhood standby with a giant rooster statue out front. Order a Hatuey (ah-TWAY), named for the Taíno chief who battled against Cuba's Spanish invaders in the 16th century and whose rugged profile resembles the Taíno found on boxes of Cohiba cigars.
10 a.m. Spend a few hours exploring Little Havana on your own, beginning at Cuban Memorial Plaza(13th Ave. and S.W. 8th St.). Between rows of monuments, including homages to revolutionary scribe José Martí, independence warrior Antonio Maceo Grajales and the Virgin Mary, is an old ceiba tree, sacred to the Santería religion, where you'll find offerings like candy and cow's tongues. (Plus some of the roosters and chickens that roam the neighborhood.) Speaking of Santería, head across the street and browse the problem-solving potions at Botanica Negra Francisca (1323 S.W. 8th St., 305-860-9328) and leave a few coins as an offering to San Lazaro, the uncanonized Cuban saint who is said to protect the poor and cure diseases.
Have a cup of fresh guarapo (sugarcane juice) at Los Pinareños Fruteria (1334 S.W. 8th St., 305-285-1135). Nurse the drink as you stroll through Maximo Gomez Park(801 S.W. 15th Ave.), where seniors spend hours playing dominos and chess in the shade. Wrap it up with the Cold War nostalgia of the Bay of Pigs Museum(1821 S.W. 9th St.; bayofpigs2506.com), commemorating Brigade 2506's notorious failure to wrest Cuba from Fidel Castro's hands in April 1961.
1 p.m. Lunch on chicken and rice at Versailles (3555 S.W. 8th St.; versaillesrestaurant.com), the headquarters of Miami's older Cuban generation. Reasonable prices, freshly baked pastries and numerous visits from presidential candidates have made Versailles an institution.
3 p.m. Little Havana has inherited a considerable share of Big Havana's famous expertise with tobacco. Cigar lovers can watch stogies being cut and rolled with a chaveta (a fan-shaped knife) and cortadora (cutter) at the third-generation Cuba Tobacco Cigar Co.(1528 S.W. 8th St.; cubatobaccocigarco.com). For smoking, Top Cigars(1551 S.W. 8th St.; cubantopcigars.com) makes a "double wrap" cigar that's striped like a candy cane. If you want a different sort of guilty pleasure, head to tiny Azúcarfor an ice cream in tropical flavors like banana and avocado (1503 8th St., 305-381-0369).
6 p.m. Stop by the Freedom Tower, known as the "Ellis Island of the South" for its role as an assistance center for Cuban refugees in the '60s and '70s (600 Biscayne Blvd.) on your way to the pre-Castro luxury of the Fontainebleau Miami Beach (from $349 per night, 4441 Collins Ave.; fontainebleau.com). Check into the modern Deco mega-palace, which has more than 1,500 rooms and the exquisite Lapis spa. In "Scarface," fictional Tony Montana, who gave the real Mariel boatlift exiles a bad name, delivered one of his capitalist rants beside the pool here.
7 p.m. Dine on fried yuca and fresh snapper at Puerto Sagua (700 Collins Ave., 305-673-1115), an understated diner-style restaurant with a traditional menu, long favored among South Beach locals for its authentic interpretations of Cuban cuisine.
10 p.m. Take in the show at Aché Supper Club(3600 S.W. 8th St.; achemiami.com), featuring comedians, singers, live salsa bands and lines of showgirls with feathered hats. This is as close as Miami gets to Havana's famed Tropicana.
8 a.m. Drive three hours south along U.S. Highway 1 through the Florida Keys for a day trip to Key West, just 90 miles away from Cuba. Slicing through miles of bright turquoise water, the highway has long been a conduit for illegal Cuban immigrants making the trek from Havana to Miami.
11 a.m. Arrive at the South Florida residence of the man who was perhaps America's greatest cultural ambassador to Cuba, Ernest Hemingway. Many believe that Santiago, the fisherman from "The Old Man and the Sea," was based on someone Hemingway met near his house in the Havana suburbs. The Ernest Hemingway Home & Museum in Key West is equally grand, with a 60-foot-long saltwater swimming pool, a Cuban cigar-maker's chair and an old Royal typewriter used by Papa himself. ($10, 907 Whitehead St.; hemingwayhome.com)
12:30 p.m. Brave the noise and lunchtime crowds for mouth-watering roast pork and croquettes at El Siboney Restaurant. The rough-and-ready ambiance is worth it; this is arguably the finest outpost of traditional Cuban cuisine in South Florida. (900 Catherine St.; elsiboneyrestaurant.com)
1:30 p.m. Hunt for marlin, tuna and snapper on a chartered fishing expedition. Some of the first European visitors to Key West were Spanish fishermen who fed colonial Havana from these depths ($450 for a four-hour tour; islandtimecharterskeywest.com).
5:30 p.m. Watch the sun set across the Gulf while heading back to Miami along Highway 1. Consider a stop at Island Smoke Shop in Key Largo, with its walk-in humidor (103400 Overseas Hwy.; islandsmokeshop.com).
8:30 p.m.If you make it back in time, take a Latin dance class at lesson with Salsa Mia at Yuca (501 Lincoln Rd.; salsamia.com). Classes spill over into a free-flowing dance party.
10 a.m. After breakfast in the hotel, walk south from the hotel along Collins Avenue, and allow yourself to be transported by the Art Deco splendor preserved well enough to evoke present-day Havana. Finish at The Wolfsonian(1001 Washington Ave.; wolfsonian.org), a museum devoted to tracing the modernist origins of Deco and other design movements from the late 19th to mid-20th centuries.
1 p.m. After lunch, depart for Biscayne National Park (nps.gov/bisc). Less than a two-hour drive from Miami Beach, this is the area's closest approximation of Cuba's abundant marine life. Cruise over the reef in a glass-bottomed boat or get closer with a snorkel or scuba dive (from $45 for a three-hour guided snorkel trip; biscayneunderwater.com). Or, head home.


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text:
New York Brownies
Author: Cookie Madness
Prep time: 10 mins
Cook time: 22 mins
Total time: 32 mins
New York Brownies are very fudgy and at their best on Day 2. Waiting to try them is definitely the hardest part.
1 cup (4.5 ounces) flour (Measure carefully)
1 teaspoon of baking powder
1/4 teaspoon salt (decrease to 1/8 if using salted butter)
5 ounces unsweetened chocolate (99%) — try to use a really good brand
8 ounces unsalted butter
4 large eggs
2 cups granulated sugar
1 teaspoon vanilla
1/2 cup toasted pecans or walnuts of desired
Preheat oven to 350 degrees F. Line a 13×9 inch metal pan with nonstick foil.
Sift together flour, baking powder and salt; Set aside.
Melt the chocolate and butter together in a small saucepan set over low heat, stirring often.
In a large mixing bowl, beat eggs with electric mixer until light. Slowly beat in sugar. Beat for about a minute or until light and fluffy. Beat in vanilla. Add melted chocolate to sugar mixture. By hand, stir in flour mixture. Pour into pan and bake for 22-24 minutes – no longer. The toothpick test doesn't really work here, but if you want to test anyway then keep in mind the toothpick should come out with chocolate on it.
Now comes the hard part! Let cool completely, then chill overnight. Yes, they really do need to chill for 24 hours to be at their best.
Lift from pan, place on a cutting board and cut into large or small squares.
Every time I pull these out of the oven I worry that they are underbaked, however, having been warned in the original version from The Loaves and Fishes cookbook, 22 minutes is all you need. I have cheated and gone up to 24. The brownies seem undercooked at first, but after cooling completely and sitting in the refrigerator for at least 12 hours, they are fudgy and delicious. When I put these up in taste tests with other brownies, they usually win.
Recipe by
Cookie Madness
at http://www.cookiemadness.net/2006/08/new-york-brownies/