text: With Winter Storm Iago expected to hit Carroll County sometime around noon today (Jan. 17), local officials have already been making precautions to try to best handle the storm.Like most of Appalachia, Carroll County is in a winter storm warning as the National Weather Service calls for heavy wet snow this afternoon into early tonight. The heaviest snowfall is expected to occur along the higher elevations of North Carolina and Southwest Virginia with snowfall rates within the heavier snow bands possibly reaching one to two inches per hour. Some forecasts are calling for between six and 12 inches of snow locally.Carroll County Public Schools will dismiss early at noon today in an effort to get students and faculty home before the storm begins. Additionally, Virginia Department of Transportation crews are on standby waiting for the storm to hit. Unfortunately, the rain that is falling ahead of the snow is preventing VDOT from pretreating roads, said Brad Phillips, VDOTs Maintenance Manager for Carroll County.Were on standby waiting. We cant pretreat roads when it is raining like this. It just washes the brine out we treat with, so pre-treating does no good with the rain, Phillips said. Weve got trucks on standby and contractors ready to go as soon as we need them.In anticipation of heavy snowfall in Carroll County, Phillips said VDOT has more people on standby for this storm than normal.Weve got what we call our on-call people ready to go. Also we are pulling them from our administrative staffs to be placed in certain staging areas to be used, Phillips said. I want folks to be careful. Make plans on maybe getting home early today. During rush hour is when the snow is supposed to be the heaviest, and that is when we are worried about it the most. That is our biggest concern now. If you dont have to be on the roads, dont be on them.Phillips is expecting the snow to begin sometime after noon and last for about 12 hours.Carroll County Emergency Services Coordinator Mike Mock said his department is also taking extra precautions to prepare for the storm.What we normally do is our rescue squads will usually try to get an extra crew to cover when we have storms like this and I have already talked to most of those squads and they are ready with extra people for tonight, Mock said. And we always coordinate with extra agencies in case we do need sheltering or things like that. You have to be prepared for those things. Its one of those things where you know you have to do a little extra just to make sure you have things covered.Additionally, the Virginia State Police released the following winter weather driving tips earlier Thursday. Leave early and allow yourself extra time to get to your destination Obey all the traffic laws and buckle up Slow Down The posted speed limit is for driving during prime road conditions Increase your following distance and brake earlier. A wet surface increases your need for stopping distance Never drive through standing or high water Turn your headlights on during inclement weather. This increases your visibility. If your windshield wipers are not on the intermittent cycle, then you must have your headlights on. If you feel your vehicle hydroplane, let your foot off the gas and steer straight until you regain control. Do not slam on your brakes. Always drive distraction freeIf you are involved in a crash, you can dial #77 from your cell phone. This call will go directly to a Virginia State Police Communications Center. When you call, the dispatcher will ask for your location, so it is important to know your route of travel to expedite our response time to your call for service.


text:
Well, while speaking to the Brazilian edition of The Metro, Silva was reportedly asked if he will move to light-heavyweight, provided he loses to Weidman a second time. The 38 year-old responded by saying (transcription via MMA Fighting.com):
There are a bunch of 205-pound guys on my team, Silva said. Rafael Cavalcante, Rogerio Nogueira, Glover Teixeira I have no intentions to move up.

subset: commoncrawl


text:
Faculty Spotlight on Dr. Qunxing Ding
Spotlight On: Dr. Qunxing Ding
Kent State University Professor Focuses Research on Helping Alzheimer's Patients
While at a scientific conference that focused on Huntington's Chorea years ago, Kent State University biologist, Dr. Qunxing Ding, recalls listening to a presentation from a 12-year-old boy. "He was so polite, talking with us, showing us his artwork," Ding recalls. "Then our hosts said he had the modified gene formation that would result with him having Huntington's disease before he was 21."IMAGE: Dr. Qunxing Ding
Dr. Qunxing Ding
Having the modified gene meant the then pre-teen would experience the neurodegenerative genetic disorder that would lead to cognitive decline and psychiatric problems. "It was so sad," Ding said of the diagnosis.
To Ding, research is not a lifestyle. "It's about making a difference," he says. "I do research because I care about the patients."
Currently, Ding focuses on Alzheimer's disease, and finding a way to slow down protein aggregation, or the clumping of proteins. In normal, mainly younger cells, the body cleans the cells so this biological phenomenon doesn't occur. However, often times in older cells, protein aggregation occurs. Hypothetically, this phenomenon is linked to several neurodegenerative diseases such as Alzheimer's, Huntington's Chorea and Parkinson's and Ding is looking to create a medicine that could be put on the market to slow down protein aggregation, thus slowing the onset of Alzheimer's disease.
To establish this medicine, Ding is testing 17 FDA approved compounds on earthworms, as these creatures' mechanical make-up mirror humans' and are easy to work with. In addition to recording the compounds that slow down protein aggregation, he is tracking the compounds that speed up this process.
Understanding this possible side-effect could help doctors determine the best medicines for their patients.
This research, one of multiple tracks of research Ding is working on, is being conducted at Kent State University at East Liverpool. As part of his classes, Ding often uses examples from his research to describe a specific point. "Occasionally students want to know more about what I'm doing in my research and they help me during the semester," Ding says. Most often, Ding teaches a microbiology class and lab, along with human anatomy and physiology.
Although Ding greatly enjoys research and working the laboratory equipment, he says, "As a scientist, most of the time you fail. It's constantly trial and error. As a professor, you can see the success of your students every day."


text:
FIG. 1 is a perspective view of a shoe outsole and periphery in accordance with my new design.
FIG. 2 is a left side view thereof;
FIG. 3 is a right side view thereof;
FIG. 4 is a top plan view thereof;
FIG. 5 is a bottom plan view thereof;
FIG. 6 is a rear elevation view thereof; and,
FIG. 7 is a front elevation view thereof.
Broken lines showing the remainder of the shoe in the figures are for illustrative purposes only and form no part of the claimed invention.


text:
Here's a great video feature for the BMW M4 (F82) Coupe.
We recently traveled to Road America in Wisconsin to sample the new M4 and M3 for the North American press launch. As a previous owner of a Silverstone II 6 speed E90 M3, I was excited to drive the new Ms to find out how they compare!
Manual Purists Rejoice
The first piece of great news about the new M4 and M3 is that BMW offers the three pedal manual transmission as standard.
Some members have asked whether the new manual transmission retains the same rubbery shift … CONTINUED
Have a look at an Alpine White F82 M4 coupe walk-around after it arrived at a US dealership.
Congratulations to Josh (tightie) for being our very first US F80 M3 delivery!
Sportauto has also put the F82 M4 on a dyno. Here is the resulting plot graph.
BMW and GoPro have teamed up to integrate the GoPro App with ConnectedDrive BMW cars. A GoPro camera may now be configured and controlled using BMW's iDrive controller and screen. Take a ride with Justin Bell as he takes the barnd-new BMW M4 out for laps and finds the entire lineage of BMW M3 performance cars.
Here is a translated version of some of the highlights of Sport Auto review of the F80 M3 and F82 M4.
No rpm, no sound and irritating turbo lag? By corner 9 and 11 all the concerns of the traditionalist have disappeared. Lightfooted the M3 storms through the Samsung corner and up the hill.
5600, 6600, 7600rpm, the new engine doesn't reach the high 8300rpm limit of the old V8. But for a turbo it revs astonishingly high. … CONTINUED
First good look at a Mineral Grey F80 M3, with 18″ wheels.
Big gallery of photos from the BMW M Sales Awards Event at the Istanbul Park Track in Turkey. Featuring all F80 M3 / F82 M4 colors, including Frozen Black, Frozen Red, Frozen Silver and Frozen White. Also some looks at BMW Individual interiors.
At the PDC for a 2-Day M School and noticed these guys hanging out. Apparently they were here for some press drives. M4 in Sakhir Orange. M3 in Austin Yellow and Alpine White.
Rear tires on the AW M3…toast. I tried to get a good pic of the driver seat with the cloth, but with the windows closed and the way the lighting was, it just washed out.
As far as when the M3/4 will become part of the fleet for the M Schools, … CONTINUED
Check out the first look at the BMW Individual Pyrite Brown M4 Coupe!
Preview of the much anticipated F80 M3 / F82 M4 video review by Chris Harris.
Here are his testing notes:
Weird noise to begin with. No word of a lie, I laughed out loud when trying to define it – all I could think was 'mapped 335d'. It's less musical, lower frequency and less clearly straight-six than the M235i I'm currently driving. At first I didn't like it much, then it became a non-issue and after thrashing around a circuit for a while I almost liked … CONTINUED
In the today print issue of AMS (Auto Motor Sport) is an track driving review of the MotoGP M4 on Losail Circuit in Qatar. They also claimed the S55 as not so sharply throttle responsive as the old S65, but because of the overall performance this doesn´t matter much, there is enough power out of the engine and with the Akrapovic Performance Exhaust it sounds like an/the V8.
Included is an small article about an comparison between M3 vs. M4 … in this article they … CONTINUED
As said by head of BMW M Product Management, Carsten Pries:
BMW M's product planning chief says the next-generation M3 model family could be powered by a four-cylinder engine, despite the fact the Bavarian performance brand is currently without any four-cylinder models.
Speaking at the international launch of the all-new F80/82 M3 and M4 in Portugal over the weekend, BMW M Division Head of Product Management Carsten Pries told motoring.com.au it was "foreseeable" that a four-cylinder engine could power the next generation of the iconic model.
"We … CONTINUED
It's the battle of the performance coupes as BMW's new M4 takes on the Mercedes-Benz C63 AMG. Can the M4′s turbocharged 425bhp six-cylinder petrol engine compare to the 6.2-litre V8 of the C63 AMG? Steve Sutcliffe has the keys to both, and he's about to find out.
BMW M3 and BMW M4 Inside (part 5): smartly light, rigid, precise. Interview with M engineer Florian Staiger.
BMW M3 and BMW M4 project engineer Florian Staiger.
Florian was in charge of integration of the complete vehicle.
It is generally the case that the top model of the regular series is lighter than the M automobile that is derived from it. Why is this so?
Historically, the M automobile always used to weigh about 100 kg more than the BMW vehicle it was based on.
Right away … CONTINUED
2015 BMW M4 Coupe (F82) – Test drive, review and hands-on test by Ausfahrt.tv.
Some beautiful BMW M4 wallpapers for your desktop.


text:
Fresh and lively like the season.
Here for a limited time, this complex coffee originates from the world's three treasured coffee-growing regions. After gathering the finest arabica beans at their peak flavor, we harmoniously blend and roast them together as one.
Balanced, Smooth & Rich
Recipe for great coffee
- Use cold, filtered water and a clean machine.
- Grind beans just before brewing:
- Coarse for coffee press
- Medium for automatic drip
- Measure 2 tbsp (10 g) ground coffee for every 6 fl oz (180 ml) water.
To help preserve that fresh flavor, keep this bag sealed tight in a cabinet (not in the refrigerator) and brew within a week of opening.
Each coffee requires slightly different amounts of time and temperature during the roasting process to create a cup at its peak of aroma, acidity, body and flavor. We classify our coffees in three roast profiles so you can easily find your desired flavor and intensity.
- Blonde: Blonde-roasted coffees have a shorter roast time, lighter body and mellow flavors.
- Medium: Medium-roasted coffees are balanced with smooth and rich flavors.
- Dark: Dark-roasted coffees feature a fuller body and robust, bold flavors.
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Comments about Starbucks 3 Region Blend:
This is my all time favorite when are you bringing it back?
Comments about Starbucks 3 Region Blend:
This is a fantastic coffee for any coffee drinker. Not over - powering but also no wimp. I have been waiting for this to reappear but haven't seen it yet. Anyone know when it's coming out in 2014?
Comments about Starbucks 3 Region Blend:
I got this coffee a couple months back and just got around to tasting it. It has such a citrus lemony flavor - and would taste good with lemon cake! For a blonde coffee drinker only It was not overpowering! I like it if you want something that will be tasteful but won't knock you out.
Comments about Starbucks 3 Region Blend:
I always look for a particular coffee to pair up with my typical activities of the season, i.e. sitting on the porch in the mornings on my days off. This particular coffee is a great roast - it's not so bold as to knock me out of my chair, and it's not so light that I want to drink 5 cups at a time. It's great tasting, and goes perfectly with a warm sunrise in southwest Virginia and eggs in a basket for breakfast. I love the floral notes that add a sort of freshness to the taste that you don't find in most coffees.
Comments about Starbucks 3 Region Blend:
It is a rich full body coffee. Not too heavy but light with citrus and herbal overtones
Comments about Starbucks 3 Region Blend:
Excellent coffee! Bold Rich Full Bodied yet light fruity flavorful! You have got to try it! Perfect for summer!
Comments about Starbucks 3 Region Blend:
One of my favorite varieties. I love the floral and citrus notes in this perfectly balanced coffee that is not only an excellent morning blend, but a wonderful cup to be had after dinner with dessert. If you like the medium-bodied coffees like the Guatamala coffee, you'll love this one. Get it while it lasts!
Comments about Starbucks 3 Region Blend:
The Starbucks "3 Region Blend" is as Smooth as Silk, yet very Rich and Substantial. These characteristics remind me of the great Starbucks Coffees of the past. The blend is not particularly esoteric, but it is simply superb! This selection has brought me back to Starbuck's coffee.
Comments about Starbucks 3 Region Blend:
It's a great tasting coffee--noting else--no sugar or cream---the coffee is great. The package description lush and herbal is spot-on. I never could verbalize the word lush as a taste but I can now. This package I purchased was for a coffee lover friend.
Comments about Starbucks 3 Region Blend:
This was the first time we tried this blend. It was excellent. We will definitely buy this again.
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text:
Asymmetric Hammered Necklace
Style # 214215
Instantly elevate any outfit with this glamorous bebe necklace, featuring metal ornaments in luxe hammered shapes.
- Metal
- Imported
Rated 1 out of 5�by 1 reviewer.
Rated 1 out of 5�by BlackBeauty Not what I expected I thought this necklace would have more substance. It looks a lot cheaper in person and on the dull side. In not sure if I will keep it or return it. July 18, 2013
1-1 of 1


text: Lone Mountain alumnae returned to campus Oct. 18 for their annual reunion. Special recognition was given to members of classes celebrating milestone reunions: Class of 1969 (40th reunion), Class of 1959 (50th reunion), and Class of 1949 (60th reunion).USF Chancellor John Lo Schiavo, S.J. celebrated Mass in the Del Santo Reading Room on Lone Mountain before alumnae socialized at a wine reception and lunch.During their reunion, alumnae honored two individuals who have been instrumental in the ongoing story of the Religious of the Sacred Heart and the Lone Mountain Alumnae Association: Mary "Be" Mardel, R.S.C.J. and Elvera "Ellie" Fusco '50. Sr. Mardel has had a long and successful ministry in Sacred Heart schools up and down the West Coast. Ellie was instrumental in making sure the Lone Mountain Alumnae Association did not fall by the wayside after Lone Mountain college closed.The 2010 Lone Mountain Alumnae reunion is scheduled for Oct. 17.


text:
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text:
Experience the first cloth diaper loved by every-day people - like your babysitter, grandparents and even dad! The bumGenius one-size cloth diaper is the first cloth diaper to feature stretch-to-fit tabs (patent pending), making cloth diapering as easy and comfortable as using disposables.
New 4.0 Features:
- NEW! Generous sizing accommodates larger babies.
- NEW! Easily replaceable elastic keeps your diapers fresh.
- 3x3 snap down design adjusts the sizing to fit small, medium and large sizes (approximately 7-35+ pounds).
- Trim, snug and comfortable stretchy tabs provide a custom fit.
- Waterproof insert stopper prevents leaking at the tummy.
- Diapers are bundled with two inserts: a newborn insert for newborns and a one-size insert for your older baby.
- Wide slot opening makes it easy to stuff and remove insert.
- Slot cover protects your baby from wetness.
One Size Fits All!
bumGenius one-size cloth diapers fit babies from 7 to 35 pounds. No more sorting by size or having to carry multiple diapers when going out. Three by three snap-downs on the front of the diaper (patent pending) adjust the rise as your baby grows. For newborns, fold down the insert stopper for an extra-small rise.
Highly Absorbent
Every bumGenius one-size cloth diaper includes the highly acclaimed Cotton Babies Microfiber Insert. If you are using this diaper on a small newborn (under 10 pounds), we recommend purchasing microfiber diaper doublers to use until your baby is a little bit bigger.
Available in a variety of colors perfect for any baby.


text:
21 July, 2009 | (01 hr)
Sign In to access this Webcast
Economic recoveries have historically relied on the use of overtime, as companies look to rebuild their output without demolishing their bottom line. Mature workers have so far faced fewer layoffs than their younger colleagues, which means that more of the recovery will be on their shoulders. Given the steep recovery now needed, however, can employers count on the productivity of mature workers when they work overtime? Are they mentally and physically fit enough for the tasks at hand? This webcast will help participants to learn from The Conference Board's Mature Workforce Initiative how to assess, motivate, and monitor the productivity of their older workers.
This webcast will discuss:
- Recent published research on the impact of overtime on health, safety, and productivity
- The varying risks and rewards of older workers working overtime
- The realities that should underlie companies' overtime policies
Harris Allen, Ph.D.
Harris Allen, Ph.D., is principal of Harris Allen Group, LLC, an independent consulting firm in Brighton, Massachusetts, that promotes strategy development and performance improvement in the area of health and productivity. He is also a lecturer i... Full Bio
Thomas J. Slavin
Christopher Woock
Christopher Woock is a former Researcher in the Human Capital Program and a former labor economist at The Conference Board. His research explores the links between human capital and business performance, including assessing the implications of lab... Full Bio
Linda Barrington, Ph.D.
Linda Barrington, Ph.D. is Executive Director of the Institute for Compensation Studies in the ILR School at Cornell University.
Dr. Barrington has published academic articles in the Review of Economics and Statistics, the Jou... Full Bio


text:
A number of systems and methods, alone, or in combination, achieve various levels of protection against unauthorized modification and distribution of digital content. This encompasses at least unauthorized study, modification, monitoring, reconstruction, and any other means for subversion from the originally intended purpose and license model of the digital content. The invention combines a number of techniques that in whole, or in part, serve to protect such content from unauthorized modification, reconstructive engineering, or monitoring by third parties. This is accomplished by means of methods which protect against subversion by specific tools operating on specific platforms as well as general tools operating on general platforms. Specific time domain attacks are identified, code modification can be identified and reversed, and virtual and emulated systems are identified. In addition, identification of in-circuit emulator tools (both software and hardware), debuggers, and security threats to running programs can be achieved.
1. A method for preventing unauthorized use of digital content data in a computer system comprising:
examining system devices that are operational in the computer system to determine features of hardware included in the system devices;
determining whether the computer system is a virtual machine or emulation;
generating a signature unique to the computer system based on the features of the hardware included in the system devices of the computer system;
encrypting the digital content data using the signature unique to the computer system based on the features of the hardware included in the system devices, wherein the encrypted digital content is specific to the computer system; and
preventing distribution of the digital content to the computer system if the computer system is determined to be a virtual machine or emulation.
2. The method of
3. The method of
4. The method of
5. The method of
6. The method of
7. A method for preventing unauthorized use of digital content data in a computer system comprising:
requesting an installation of the digital content data at a client;
examining system devices of the client that are operational in the client to determine features of hardware included in the system devices of the client;
determining whether the client is a virtual machine or emulation;
generating a signature representative of the client based on the features of the hardware included in the system devices of the client;
transmitting the request for installation to a server, said request including the signature;
verifying, at the server, whether the requested installation is authorized, if the installation is unauthorized, transmitting an installation denial message to the client, and if the installation is authorized, transmitting an installation authorization message to the client;
installing the digital content data at the client if the requested installation is authorized; and
preventing distribution of the digital content to the client if the client is determined to be a virtual machine or emulation.
8. The method of
9. A method for preventing unauthorized use of digital content data in a computer system comprising:
requesting use of the digital content data at a client;
examining system devices of the client that are operational in the client to determine features of hardware included in the system devices of the client;
determining whether the client is a virtual machine or emulation;
generating a signature representative of the system based on the features of the hardware included in the system devices;
transmitting the request for use to a server, said request including the signature;
verifying, at the server, whether the requested use is authorized, if the installation is unauthorized, transmitting a use denial message to the client, and if the installation is authorized, transmitting a use authorization message to the client;
utilizing the digital content data at the client if the requested installation is authorized; and
preventing distribution of the digital content to the client if the client is determined to be a virtual machine or emulation.
10. The method of
11. The method of
12. The method of
generating numeric values from the features of the hardware; and
generating the signature by combining the numeric values.
13. The method of
14. The method of
15. The method of
determining whether a number of previously authorized installations exceeds a predetermined number greater than 1.
16. The method of
determining whether a number of previously authorized installations exceeds a predetermined number greater than 1.
This application is a divisional application of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 10/142,366, filed May 9, 2002, which application claims the benefit of U.S. Provisional Application No. 60/289,773, filed May 9, 2001, U.S. Provisional Application No. 60/290,813, filed May 14, 2001, U.S. Provisional Application No. 60/294,112 filed May 29, 2001, and U.S. Provisional Application No. 60/309,650, filed Aug. 2, 2001. The contents of the applications referenced above are incorporated herein by reference in their entirety.
1. Field of the Invention
This invention is related to the protection of digital information in various forms from unauthorized distribution, use or modification. The protective systems and methods described herein are intended to detect or prevent successful deployment and utilization of many of the tools and techniques of such unauthorized use when applied to executable content, or other digital content, on a computing device.
2. Description of the Related Art
The digital content industry has been aware for some time of the problem of unauthorized use and distribution of digital content and unauthorized subversion of control mechanisms designed to control the distribution of such content. Such control mechanisms take the form of protective systems that control the installation or usage of such content. The control mechanisms may authenticate locally and/or remotely, and may refuse to allow the usage of unauthorized copies and/or report such usage. Such subversions can include modification of licensing control logic (i.e. making a copy work) or the complete stripping and modification of digital content to remove all licensing and protective logic from it.
Before subversion becomes possible, the protective system for the digital content is disabled. This form of attack usually begins by using tools that provide an understanding of the protective system, and from that understanding, successful alterations and subversions of system functions become possible. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that many of the more significant tools used for subversion are powerful and legitimate tools commonly used in the software and hardware development industry; for example In Circuit Emulation (ICE) tools, debugger tools, and disassembly tools. Such tools are legal to own, easy to obtain, and continue to become more advanced and effective. Examples of these widely known and deployed tools include SoftIce, available from NuMega, any of the debuggers available from Microsoft or Borland, the powerful protection-removal tool ProcDump, a shareware tool available free by download on the Internet, and many others.
A number of mechanisms are currently available that may be used to limit or prevent the execution of certain tools, such as debuggers and ICE tools. The primary method of detection of a subversion tool is usually tool-specific, where overt aspects of a specific version of a specific tool are known (filenames, in-memory file signatures, execution-time strings in system data structures) and actively sought.
The most popular among methods that use techniques such as those described above are only marginally effective today. In one example, a popular implementation of a protective system searches for the NuMega SoftIce tool by such overt means. There exists a specially crafted stealth-layer known as "Frogs Ice" that is created solely to hide SoftIce. When this popular protective implementation is debugged with SoftIce when hidden by Frogs Ice, the protective system fails to see the threat and is subverted.
Conventional implementations of some significance that protect digital content using other approaches include methods that obfuscate the operation of a system and related data payload. This is usually accomplished by means of sophisticated encryption and/or information hiding schemes, some involving client-server models. These approaches are usually quite strong in the areas of encryption and hiding, but may be compromised by the skilled memory lifting of the information after it has been found and decrypted during the legitimate-use operation of the protected component. Information is most vulnerable when it has been made ready for normal usage because it is much more complete and immediately usable in that form.
Despite such developments, no current mechanism of this type has proven to be entirely effective. The reasons for this are apparent; while encryption is an important part of any protective system, it should not represent the sole, or primary, method of protection, since encrypted content must at some time be decrypted for use, and may, for example, be subject to piracy following decryption. Such methods, when used as the sole protective means, are vulnerable to approaches that analyze and then modify the mechanism, and over time, with some persistence, can be broken. Any changes to the algorithm (cracking the decryptor for example) or attacks directly on the encrypted payload (using a computer system to crack the encryption), although theoretically effective, are not the attack of choice when a payload is of interest to an intruder; these approaches are much more challenging and take much more time than simply stealing the data after it has been decrypted by the protective system during normal use. The common denominator of successful attacks against such protective mechanisms come in the form of tools that attack this weakest link in the chain, as in the "ProcDump" memory-lifting tool, or other memory lifters or memory dumpers. This class of web-distributed enhanced dumping tools have a great many features which include the ability to steal-after-decryption any 32 bit executable on any Windows-based operating system, to restore the Import table and PE header, reoptimize lifted executable, and even establish a client-server relationship with a second dumping tool which is awaiting the (specifically timed) opportunity to lift a target executable. These functions require some degree of sophistication to understand and use but enable a somewhat experienced intruder to steal almost any such protected payload at the moment of authorized usage of the payload. Tools such as memory lifters or memory dumpers are an example of the kinds of attack mechanisms that have rendered most content protection schemes for digital content, especially executable content, much less effective. This is true especially since 1998, when these tools and associated reverse-engineering techniques became widely disseminated on the World Wide Web.
In view of the fact that digital piracy is a widespread problem, and one that has been around since the ability to copy or record digital information has been provided to consumers, there are a large number of historic countermeasures of varying degrees of effectiveness. Each generation of these solutions has a causal effect on the creation of reverse engineering tools and techniques to counter it. In most cases these anti-piracy methods have been subverted, or easily compromised when desired, by such opponent "hackers" tools and techniques. Over the years, the tools and techniques of such attacks have improved to the point where much of contemporary anti-modification technology can be bypassed by determined intruders within hours, or at most, days. Any number of public domain references to these reverse engineering tools and techniques, even entire groups of people dedicated to the task of reverse engineering and defeating protective inventions such as those described herein, may be found on the World Wide Web simply by typing such phrases as "reverse engineer" or "disassemble executable" into any search engine.
The present invention is directed to systems and methods for the protection of digital content that overcome the limitations of the conventional approaches. The systems and methods of the present invention encompass a number of approaches, which, alone, or in combination, achieve various levels of protection against unauthorized modification and distribution of digital content. This encompasses at least unauthorized study, modification, monitoring, reconstruction, and any other means for subversion from the originally intended purpose and license model of the digital content.
This system combines a number of techniques that in whole, or in part, serve to protect such content from unauthorized modification, reconstructive engineering, or monitoring by third parties. This is accomplished by means of methods which protect against subversion by specific tools operating on specific platforms as well as general tools operating on general platforms. Specific time domain attacks are identified, code modification can be identified and reversed, and virtual and emulated systems are identified. In addition, identification of in-circuit emulator tools (both software and hardware), debuggers, and security threats to running programs can be achieved.
As described above, subversive In Circuit Emulator and debugger tools allow an intruder to interactively observe a system, in some cases by emulating the system and observing the execution from the perspective of a hardware system the code is executing on, and also provide the power to penetrate the operation of the system and modify it during operation. These are significant threats to security programs because they can allow an intruder to render the security system ineffective. The protection systems and methods of the present invention respond to intruders or threats by taking action in any of a number of ways. The preferred action in many cases is to respond by exiting from operation in an irrevocable immediate, or non-deterministic deferred, fashion, at any time. This is based on the principal that an exit may leave the intruder confused and unsure of the cause of the exit, which may cause an intruder to give up over time. An overtly aggressive response, such as killing the intruder's tools, can also be deployed.
In one aspect of the present invention, the presence of in-circuit emulators, virtual machines, or other emulation systems are detected, for example, by means of analysis of the operating environment. This includes, but is not limited to, enumeration and detailed study of devices and system bus and component information. This may, for example, include PCI bus and device "walking", where each device in turn is discovered and analyzed. This approach includes, but is not limited to, such techniques as analyzing the configuration BIOS memory of the emulated PCI cards of such a system. Certain in-memory information is provided to the host computer by each device attached to the system bus during system startup. This information is stored within the device, in an area of memory sometimes referred to as "BIOS" or "BIOS ROM". Within these areas of memory are fields denoting the type of device, some number of device attributes, and manufacturer's identifying information for the device. The emulated or virtual devices that populate the target emulated or virtual environments usually present some of these items correctly, but often omit some, or present inappropriate or unreasonable information in such fields, which can be determined to be false upon analysis and comparison with both stored known data and actual system performance or behavior.
In another aspect of the present invention, a system exists that obscures and obfuscates the flow of certain critical data items between entities (whether process, thread, task, or device driver), and by means of this data transmission, provides an additional, and equally important, function of detection and notification of system tampering, monitoring, modification or subversion. A deferred or immediate response to such detection can be initiated. This aspect of the invention comprises components including, but not limited to, a constant data flow message passing process in which the data is passed from entity to entity in a predetermined, or dynamically arrived at, secure ordering. This can be accomplished regardless of point of origin or intended recipient, with the messages encrypted and securely time stamped, passed between each and every such authorized and designated entity of a given system, with a known periodicity, such that late arrival of the message, missing messages, out of sequence messages, or forged or improperly encrypted messages, all indicate that a subversion may be in process. In response the system may be disabled with respect to the transmission of further messages, or may otherwise be labeled by an entity elsewhere in the entity chain that the system has been compromised. The response to a detected intrusion can be passive or active, implicit or explicit.
In another aspect of the present invention, a secure time stamp and comparison process is created and used to detect by analysis of time domain effects, evidence of system tampering, monitoring, modification and subversion. This aspect, may, for example, utilize timers and timing services which are always present on certain systems (for example Intel-processor-compatible systems), and cannot be subverted by manipulation of trivially settable time values such as the system clock. An immutable, non-arbitrarily settable, aspect of one such hardware feature is, for example, used as the cornerstone of the measuring process.
In another aspect of the present invention, a system and method for secure data flow through a system are provided. This aspect is based on the principal that since the flow of communication and data cannot be hidden, they should instead be passed openly, but in a way that the flow is not made evident. Therefore, this aspect utilizes a constant data flow, a data transfer method by which the data is passed in the same manner between all recipients, in the same order regardless of origin or intended recipient so that data flow parameters such as content, origin, and destination have no bearing on the flow. In this manner, no external analysis of the data flow will result in an understanding of system behavior, as all messages of any kind are always passed between all members of the message-passing network.
In another aspect of the present invention, a system and method are provided to reverse modification of any such protected content. Reversal of modification can be done repeatedly, with a frequency and redundancy that greatly increases the difficulty of imparting effective modification to the content. In an alternative embodiment, intentionally corrupted content can be reverse-modified just in time for execution, on a non-page basis, then re-corrupted following execution. In this manner, this approach can defeat memory lifting by having any amount of memory content, up to entire pages or sections of memory, in some cases pre-processed and corrupted in advance of execution, and then upon execution, each such memory location or group of locations may be corrected just-in-time for the executing process to use them, but when accessed by any other process in the system they are left uncorrected, so that in the event of a memory-lift or other unauthorized access, the pages are simply not corrected. Through this passive approach (i.e., doing nothing in the event of unauthorized access) the memory lift is rendered ineffective.
In another aspect of the present invention, a system and method detect the modification of any such protected content. In one example, modification of certain protected elements in digital content is detected and a response is initiated. The response may take any of a number of different forms, including, but not limited to, initiation of a system exit event, and/or other responses.
In another aspect of the present invention, access to input devices such as the mouse and keyboard is controlled. Such access is locked out at will, on multiple levels, including at the operating system level, at the device level, or at the application level. For example the mouse and keyboard can be permitted to interact only with desired secure windows on the desktop, and, even then, certain keying or mouse activity can be prevented.
In another aspect of the present invention, direct action is taken to halt or disable the discovered execution of unauthorized programs by actions that include, but are not limited to, directly killing the program, disabling input and output capabilities, disabling or hindering display capabilities, or otherwise interfering with normal usage. The discovery process includes, but is not limited to, enumeration of running tasks and processes via standard operating system interfaces and privileged interfaces and tools.
In another aspect of the present invention, the in-memory fingerprints of known "adversarial" system debug and analysis tools are known, and are, for example, stored in encrypted form in system memory, such that they may not be recognized by outside entities. In this aspect, a process is activated that has access to all system memory, and that continuously searches through that memory for any such fingerprints. The search process and associated comparisons can be, for example, performed in an encrypted environment such that the target strings are encrypted and a special encrypted-comparison routine is used so that the desired match is less likely to be visible to an outside process.
In another aspect of the present invention, the in-memory effects of virtual machine, emulator, and debugging tools are detected. Such detection is accomplished through the analysis and study of the partitioning of the system's physical memory as dictated by the operating system. It is made possible by examining the lowest level of system memory, below any tools or instrumented operating system constructs that may be in place. Low level assembly language commands such as those that are always present on Intel-processor-based systems are employed, for example the EAX command. These assembly language commands and other programming techniques used in this fashion are not restricted in the timing of their use, whether initiated early or late in the running history of the machine. They may be initiated at boot up, during normal operation, or at any time.
In another aspect of the present invention, large amounts of obfuscating saturation traffic are generated, which can be used to overwhelm the usefulness of debugger, or logging, monitor and journaling tools. This service is adjustable to the needs of the system and can vary the intensity of such traffic across desired interfaces on demand.
In another aspect of the present invention, enhanced hardening in the generation of highly secure executable content for high security applications and environments is provided. This is accomplished by various types of modifications to executable code, performed in environments including but not limited to the compilation environment, and also as a post process to existing executable code as needed. In one example, certain elements of the code can be processed and replaced with synonymous code (that performs the same function as the original) and said code synonym is selected, or designed, to have as a secondary attribute, a negative effect on the process of disassembly (it may be inherently difficult to disassemble) or may have other attributes that make it difficult to debug. For example, it may be intentionally confusing in its design, may obfuscate data flow or program flow, or may defy casual observational debugging.
In another aspect of the present invention, security oriented detection of software emulation and virtualized-machinery-based system environments and their associated emulated system hardware features is achieved. This is accomplished by the creation of sections of self-modifying code that induce system memory access timing and execution performance anomalies which can be detected and contrasted with the expected performance of such systems. Any code that attempts to do so under this architecture will be at a tremendous and measurable speed disadvantage. This aspect includes, but is not limited to, a security-oriented detection of hardware-based in-circuit emulators and hardware-CPU-based hybrid in-circuit emulators. This is accomplished by time domain analysis of performance anomalies which can be detected and contrasted with the expected performance of such systems. Systems that are not burdened by subversive instruments are capable of, for example, processing rates on the order of billions of instructions per second; however, memory access is orders of magnitude slower. However, in the In Circuit Emulator scenario, when being journaled, these differences are not as extreme and the performance of the processor and memory will be measurably closer to each other. In this manner, such subversive tools are detected by their performance effect on the system, providing an additional level of detection.
In another aspect of the present invention, digital content is security-married to a unique computer system signature such that it may only be used and/or run on that system thereafter. This aspect includes, but is not limited to, performing an analysis of the purported physical characteristics of the machine. Multiple encryption-component entities can be utilized; each such component being responsible for a physical aspect or attribute of the delivery platform to be authenticated against. Any physical (non-virtual) system device that has any unique attributes may be used, and all such devices are first authenticated to be actual, non-virtual devices (for example using techniques described elsewhere in this specification) before being considered for such use. Each component arrives at an encrypted value representing the state and identity of its target hardware device and encrypts that value in order to then send it to other components of the system. These assorted device signatures are accumulated during this process and merged algorithmically into a single value which represents the summation of all such devices. Some or all of these values, or the final merged aggregate value, may be used to generate encryption or decryption keys to secure content to a particular system, or may be used to form part or all of a secure identifier used to authenticate content on the specific system, such as being passed as part of a network handshaking protocol which authenticates the system and executing content.
In another aspect of the present invention, it is ensured that encrypted content, once decrypted, cannot be "lifted" or "dumped" in a trivial manner from system memory with successful results. Content is modified by a process, to make certain data elements, usually on the boundary of the system page size and location in multiples of page size, "incorrect" (corrupted) or "correct" (usable as intended) depending on their prior state. Memory on such a system may be thought of as being organized into pages or groups of memory bytes, where for example a byte is 8 bits, bytes may be grouped into groups of 1024 bytes (k-bytes) and these k-bytes may be grouped into pages of 512 k-bytes. The operating system may choose to move data into and out of memory (from the hard disc or other media to memory, then back to the hard disc at times) in units of one or more pages at a time for efficiency. This aspect includes, but is not limited to, two complementary approaches; one in which pages (for example a grouping of memory bytes, 512 units of 1024 bytes each, otherwise referred to as 512K) are made correct just-in-time for licensed usage, or another where pages are made incorrect just-in-time when being lifted or dumped, to deter unlicensed usage. In all cases, the original content stored on the original media, or on hard disc, when not in use, may be wholly or partly correct in nature, and may be wholly or partly encrypted. In an example, given a program foo.exe, the program may be preprocessed such that it is divided up into N segments of 512K each, and the 3rd and 34th of these pages may be copied to another location, and the original pages overwritten with junk data. The foo.exe program is then packaged and sold to a consumer on CD, with the now-modified foo.exe and the 3rd and 34th pages hidden in an archive on the same CD. When foo.exe is run, the process and system of the present invention note access to the 3rd page and, before it is needed, replaces the page in memory with the correct 3rd page taken from the archive where it was previously stored. When the page is no longer needed, it is then modified back to the original state it was in on the distribution CD. When the 34th page is needed, it too is corrected just in time, and it is then copied back to the damaged state it was in on the distribution CD. In this manner, there is no time at which the program foo.exe is ever in a state where all pages in memory are entirely correct, such that if the program were memory lifted or dumped at least one or more pages are in an incorrect state.
In another aspect of the present invention, there is provided a cooperative function between at least two interoperating systems, for example a secure installer that binds or marries the content to an authorized machine or machines, the protective features of which include, but are not limited to, the protective features described elsewhere in this specification. This aspect of the invention also includes a cooperating network service entity that tracks the number of authorized installations, for example on a per-product and/or per-user and/or per-machine basis. In this manner, this aspect of the present invention allows for the binding of an instance of a product to an instance of a machine, securely, and also allows for the tracking of a total number of such instances, so that in a corporate setting for example, a vendor could track the installations of their product and account for licensing fees based on the number of installed instances.
In another aspect of the present invention, an interface layer provides device specific, device class specific and device bus specific access through a generalized mechanism, which may also serve as a proxy mechanism between levels of operating system interface and function access and authorization. Non-device-aware-access is thus provided to specific device features and commands that would otherwise be inaccessible to all except device driver levels of privilege and interface access. This therefore allows for the authors of application programs to have access to lower level device features which would otherwise be hidden from them by the device drivers themselves. For example, if an attempt is made to read from a drive, the low level driver may retry any number of times until success, without the operator's request or even knowledge. However, it is possible to formulate a command wherein only a single attempt is made for a read operation, or wherein a read succeeds despite the presence of warnings or errors that might otherwise invoke a retry. Typically only a skilled device driver engineer would know of these features or how to use them. This aspect of the invention exports these powerful features to a level of high abstraction so that they may be used both by the other approaches described herein, or as a standalone utility so that any program may employ them.
The foregoing and other objects, features and advantages of the invention will be apparent from the more particular description of preferred embodiments of the invention, as illustrated in the accompanying drawings in which like reference characters refer to the same parts throughout the different views. The drawings are not necessarily to scale, emphasis instead being placed upon illustrating the principles of the invention
The systems and methods of the present invention and various embodiments thereof may be implemented on any of a number of media reading device platforms, including, for example, a personal computer or general purpose digital computer 7 as shown in
As shown in
As a first step, the process attempts to ascertain the identities and configuration information relevant to each device attached to or within the system. It does so by enumerating the devices 8 by means of operating system services and device registration information stored by the computing device's operating system in various forms and locations. Each such enumerated device is selected and is queried for configuration information, and the stored configuration information about the device maintained by the operating system is also considered as the device's apparent characteristics are compared 9 to known, or canonical, emulated device characteristics and to the results of the redundant device query. Using this preliminary screening of information for each device gathered by means of this system-wide survey 8,9 a decision is made 13 as to whether the device is an obviously emulated device 12, a device which is suspicious but may be real 16 or a device whose configuration information was incomplete or garbled 15. In this latter case 15 the device or list of devices are re-enumerated 8 and re-queried 9 to provide the system with another opportunity to prove or disprove definitively 12, 16 that the device is, or is not, virtual. If the device is deemed to be a definitive virtual or emulated device 12 it triggers a defensive response case 11, which may consist of an exit response, or any number of subtle (for example memory corruption) or direct responses (for example an immediate or deferred exit, or a process kill, or a input or output device manipulation) which are discussed elsewhere in this specification.
In the case in which the device is suspicious, but may in fact be a real device 16, the device is tested further to determine whether it is in fact real. Closer examination of the device is initiated 17, and the device is called upon to report its status, firmware version if any, and memory configuration if any, and these values are compared with known canonical real values for such devices 18. Certain physical tests 19 are initiated. These tests 19 may include, but are not limited to, the attempted loading or execution of certain elements of canonical or common device drivers iteratively (where it is known that only the real device can possibly support a load and execution of an actual device-specific driver in properly, or execute a broad range of device specific commands properly, and that a failure of device X to load the current driver for device X, or to execute commands that would normally succeed on a real device X is deemed to indicate a flawed virtual or emulated device and or system) for that class of device, as well as performance and time-domain related tests discussed in more detail below with reference to
The results of the canonical device comparison, physical and device driver loading tests, command and parameter setting tests, and performance test (
An example of the system and process described in
The mechanism operates as follows, with reference to
If however the message and its header are not deemed a threat, they may either be immediately forwarded to the next entity in the message passing sequence 41 and transmitted directly 39, or they may be parsed in detail 34, contents acted upon 35 (there may be commands in the message, or encrypted data needed by the system, or it may simply command the message passing entity to re-package and re-encrypt the message either modified in content or unchanged 37, reset the header values (timestamp, allowed hops before message destruction, any header-embedded handling rules) appropriately 38, and send on 39). The system then waits 27 for either the next message event or an appropriate timeout event in the absence of a next message.
An example embodiment of this message passing process begins with a set of computer instructions which initiate the first message passing sequence entity/process. The process then waits for the next entity in the message passing sequence to be created; each message passing sequence/entity process in turn can then initiate the next process in the message passing sequence, if desired. Then, each message passing entity in turn creates the message passing buffer where each listens for messages. At creation time, each such entity is provided with its own optional decryption key, as well as the optional decryption keys of the message passing system entity directly following it in the ordered sequence. All such messages are decrypted using the local message buffer decryption key, then re-encrypted using the recipient buffer's encryption key, and then passed to the recipient buffer. Messages are sent to an entity within a specified time period, and any such message contains certain authenticating information that confirms it was sent by the correct preceding entity and that its destination is valid. In one embodiment, the initiator of a message waits for the message to propagate through the sequence for the first time, in order to ensure message passing sequence completeness, and proving that the message passing system is fully operational.
In a preferred embodiment, only one such entity or process owns each message passing buffer, and after creating the message passing buffer to which it listens (and which each such previous member of the message passing sequence is waiting for) it then tries to pass an initial message to the next member of the message passing sequence's message passing buffer. Each entity then sends a message that directs each other message passing sequence member to be alerted to its identity and to take action should the entity that initiated the contact exit from the system or otherwise "disappear" from the system (for example if it were "killed" by a malicious intruder or entity), in which case the whole message passing sequence comes to a halt and may trigger any number of system defensive responses, including a system-wide exit response as discussed elsewhere in this specification.
Invention mechanisms that provide capability for deferred or delayed exits or propagation of such exit activities may be implemented in this aspect of the invention. Such mechanisms include the accumulation of "Watch Lists" of processes to watch. These may be passed during normal execution as messages. In the event of the disappearance of any such process, the watching process itself will choose to exit. In addition there are "Kill Lists" which are used during the exit process, whose entries are also accumulated by means including, but not limited to, passing these identifiers as messages to one, some, or all members of the message passing system, in which processes are listed and some or all of them are killed by an exiting entity before it itself exits. The message passing sequence may also choose to send a self-destructive system-wide kill message to the next process in the message passing system. Such a message may be acted upon, resulting in the message being passed to the next entity, the process choosing to kill others, itself, or some or all of these actions.
In one embodiment, a non-resettable time value is recorded 41. An example of such are the non-resettable timers found in Intel and AMD processors, which tally CPU uptime from last boot and may only be reset to 0, never arbitrarily reset, regardless of the system clock state or setting capabilities. Various system time values are captured 42 and an initial delta is computed 43 based on the non-resettable uptime and the (somewhat arbitrarily settable) system clock values available through various programmatic interfaces on various operating systems and computing devices. This process then waits on a number of externally set event triggers 44, which may be set for instance by the message sending system of
An embodiment of such time-domain ratio delta validation as shown in
When initialized and initially launched, capture the current counter value for the secure system uptime counter. Store that value in a variable, referred to in this example as "Uptime1". Capture the current system time value using the system's System Clock time service. Store that value in a variable, referred to in this example as "SysClock1". Re-Capture the current counter value for the secure system uptime counter. Store that value in a variable, referred to in this example as "Uptime2". Re-Capture the current system time value using the system's System Clock time service. Store that value in a variable, referred to in this example as "SysClock2". Compute the following ratio: (Uptime2-Uptime1) divided by (SysClock2-SysClock1). Store that resultant division (ratio) value in a variable, referred to in this example as "Ratio1". Save Ratio1 for future reference.
Then, when called subsequently (for example when the message passing system described elsewhere in this document needs to validate the elapsed time and uptime as accurate and non-tampered) perform the following computational steps: capture the current counter value for the secure system uptime counter. Store that value in a variable, referred to in this example as "Uptime3". Capture the current system time value using the system's System Clock time service. Store that value in a variable, referred to in this example as "SysClock3". Re-Capture the current counter value for the secure system uptime counter. Store that value in a variable, referred to in this example as "Uptime4". Re-Capture the current system time value using the system's System Clock time service. Store that value in a variable, referred to in this example as "SysClock4". Compute the following ratio: (Uptime4-Uptime3) divided by (SysClock4-SysClock3). Store that resultant division (ratio) value in a variable, referred to in this example as "Ratio2". Compare Ratio1 and Ratio2; if they are equal, or if they are close within a specified tolerance (this allowable difference may be set by the system's implementers and may vary based on the system's expected loading and other performance attributes) then a status is provided to indicate that the system clock and uptime counter have not been tampered with. If they are outside the expected range of equivalence, then a status is provided that indicates that the system clock and or the uptime counter have been tampered with. Such tampering is a strong indication that debugging or other intrusive unauthorized tampering activity is ongoing or has occurred since the first time Ratio1 was captured. Save Ratio1 for other future comparisons as needed in the case where no tampering was detected.
The following example of the process of
In the example of
In other words, using an analogy of an English sentence rather than a stream of assembly language executable code so that the reader may more easily understand the concept of just in time overwrite as protection against memory lifting; if the sentence to be secure was "Mary had a little lamb" and this sentence was pre-processed or "pre-corrupted" for security purposes to be "Fred ate a big cheeseburger", this system and method of the present invention would determine that the sentence was about to be read, and would correct each word of the sentence just-in-time right before it was to be read, such that, for example, immediately before the word "big" were to be read, this invention would overwrite it with the word "little" in a just-in-time fashion. When the next word "cheeseburger" was about to be read it would be changed to "lamb" and at that same invocation time the word "little" (having already been read and no longer required to be correct" would be changed back to "big", or may in fact be changed to any other incorrect value like "red"). Thus if memory is lifted at any time, the memory lift or dump performed at any time would be one of "Mary ate a big cheeseburger", "Fred had a big cheeseburger", "Fred ate a little cheeseburger" or "Fred ate a big lamb" but could never be "Mary had a little lamb" at any one point in time. This concept of just-in-time correction of values followed by just-in-time "re-corruption" of them can be applied to data at any granularity (bits, bytes, blocks of bytes of arbitrary size, entire pages of memory, multiple pages of memory) to thwart memory lifting or dumping.
Following is a description of an example embodiment of a self-correcting overwrite process as expressed in
The first step is to retrieve the enumerated function number (for example this concept of enumeration refers to an indexed location within a program, the 4th function entry point for example which defines the start location of the area of concern), the exact start address within that location, the exact end address of the area of concern, and the encryption key, for each location of memory to be just-in-time corrected and just-in-time corrupted after such correction. All of the correct data that will be needed to overwrite these pre-processed, pre-corrupted locations is placed in an archive location, optionally encrypted, in a relatively safe place like a driver, vxd, or sysfile as part of a post-processing step. Using the "Lamb" example above, the content "Mary had a little lamb" would be copied during a pre-processing step as the protected product was being prepared for distribution, and each word encrypted and placed in such an archive for later use. The location formerly occupied by that sentence would be filled with "Fred ate a big cheeseburger". Where and as needed, any file-specific checksum is recomputed to make it a valid file despite this pre-processing substitution. As the just-in-time substitutions occur, the appropriate (usually Microsoft required) checksums as needed are again re-modified to avoid any errors during execution. As each modification occurs, or once prior to any such modification, code such as the example below is executed to ensure the writing/modifying process has appropriate error-free access to the area of memory where the write is intended to occur:
As shown below, the stored correct code ("Mary had a little lamb") is removed from storage, un-encrypted, and then the pre-process-corrupted location ("Fred ate a big cheeseburger") is overwritten with the correct information. Note: all storage buffers are preferably destroyed after the overwrite occurs so that the correct data isn't lingering, waiting to be stolen by other means.
In this example embodiment, when the process has completed, the content can be re-corrupted back to an invalid state using the driver-level "Corrupt" process illustrated below. This process is used to fill the code space with garbage (e.g. "Fred ate a big cheeseburger" from the example above) just after the corrected data is read by the operating system. In this example the space is filled in with zeros, but any incorrect/corrupted/irrelevant value may be overwritten at this point.
Below is an embodiment of the invention as described in
The various examples below illustrate invention mechanisms that search the system for a signature in a particular process. There are two different types in this example; namely, an all-at-once mechanism that scans all system processes in one call by using process SearchProcMemory repeatedly. There is also a less intrusive example, which scans a certain number of bytes before returning, and continues where it left off on the next call.
The data structures used to store the signatures of threats and tools that are later looked for during the scan of memory for such intrusive tools can be represented as follows:
In an illustrative embodiment of this aspect of the present invention, the process scans memory for threats but does so not by a system-wide scan of all memory, but rather by examining the operational items in the operating system's Taskbar. As the taskbar usually represents applications launched by the user, such tools as debuggers and logging tools will certainly be among them if launched. Even more subtle tools such as ICE tools may have processes that have display windows and these windows can be found and then the eventual creation or ownership of these windows traced back to the original threat-source. In another embodiment, the process of this aspect of the present invention further controls user access to any launched applications on the system during this time, minimizes any and all open windows it finds, and disables any ability of the user to restore them from a minimized state until desired by the process. No hacker tool, the signature of which is known, will survive this process, nor will any such program already run be useful before it is killed because it is, for example, minimized and locked from user keyboard and mouse access. Note that the order of the tasks is not critical; they may be done in any of a number of orders, or in parallel.
Top level windows currently being displayed are enumerated. Their position and current state (size, etc) are recorded for later use when they are restored to that state. The windows are all minimized, and the minimize/maximize box is removed from all windows enumerated so that even if the user is able to click on them, they cannot be re-maximized. All sizing and scrolling controls are removed from all windows. It is then determined if each such enumerated window should be added to the list of processes to later be scanned in more detail (for example is it a VISIBLE window or an invisible dummy window with no user utility as some applications use merely to have a hook to the desktop window for other purposes). The system process tree is evaluated to determine the name and memory location of any and all processes that may own any of these enumerated windows or that may have any relationship to any of these windows (for example by inheritance, or by having a common handle context, or by any other means discernable). All memory associated with the windows or related discerned system tasks are examined to search for memory patterns or signatures of known threats. The operating system window caption is searched for a match to known threat window captions. If any threat is detected, action is taken (as with many of the processes specified herein, no particular action is mandated; however it is likely that the actions will include but not be limited to some or all of: exiting the protected entity, killing the threat window, and or notifying the system or user of the threat presence. When this detection is complete, the system remains in the locked down state until the protection task is deemed to be finished and it is deemed safe to allow access to all such windows. The same protective operations are performed on any new window that is spawned, and the protection operations are re-executed optionally at intervals against all enumerable windows and related system tasks to ensure that no subversion processes evade the detection system. Then, when the need to protect the system is no longer relevant, all windows are restored to their prior settings, and all window controls are restored.
With reference to
As shown in
As shown in
In one example, the system and method of this aspect focus on synonymous replacement of comparison operations where equality, greater than, or lesser than, qualities are tested, and each are broken out as functional unit of "equality testing". Appropriate substitution sequences of logical equivalence are selected 125, for example an equivalence test of "If A=B" could be converted to the logical equivalent "C=A−B" combined with "If(NOT(C))" where the Boolean value 0 for false, 1 for true is assumed implicitly. One such sequence is selected and the substitution 126 is performed. This function can optionally be performed in assembly language, or as a compiler plug-in, or as a higher-level language substitution or macro-substitution. The chosen substitution is logged 127 against future conversions of the same logical construct so that if repetition is not desired, and if variability within releases and between releases is desired, it can be attained by establishing substitution rules that prohibit the same substitution occurring on the next similar construct. The next such set of instructions are parsed 124 and the process continues until all of the input has been processed.
In an approach exemplified below, modifications are made to the assembly language of a program so that it is more difficult to disassemble. A number of variations of this approach are possible 128. For example, "jmp" or Jump commands that are not used by the normal logical flow of the code can be added. Alternatively, the jump call can be replaced by a sequence with a synonymous outcome, such as a push followed by a return.
This line of assembly language is auto disassembly prone (weak):
Preliminary device data is collected, comprising a complete enumeration and list of all real devices on the system 149 and an individual entity, for example, one per device, is spawned for each device 150. Each such entity 152, 156, 159, 161 is an identical embodiment of the present process and system that utilize the attributes of the target hardware device 152 such as firmware version, memory capacity, configuration strings, cpu clock speed, bus speed, and any all other device-related values that can vary by and between devices, to generate a whole or partial value to be later used by the system 153. That value is encrypted for transmission 154 and then transmitted (for example via a messaging system as depicted in
The following example illustrates the principles of this aspect of the invention in an embodiment that matches the components interfacing with the system's PCI bus to the content in such a way that the content is bound to the aggregate values resulting from the detailed examination of these devices. In this example, the hardware examination process in intended to yield a numeric value of 64 bits (any number of bits may be used in the actual implementation, depending on the application) by examining multiple devices on the PCI bus. Note that any system bus service may be examined (SCSI, USB, 1394 FireWire, and others); however, PCI is a suitable example since most readers are familiar with the PCI bus found in their own computers and the cards typically found on that bus. In the case of this example, the 64 bit value will be arrived at by finding a number of cards or devices on the bus and having the examination of these cards or devices yield separate values of some number of bits each. The number of bits per component in this example is dependent upon how many devices are discovered on the bus and how many total bits the desired aggregate multi-device result is desired to be. The devices on the PCI bus in this example are enumerated and four are found, so the total number of desired aggregate bits is divided by the number of devices. A value of 16 bits is therefore derived from each of the four devices. Each device is examined in detail, in turn, either by the same "marriage" entity or by a device-specific "marriage" entity dispatched per device. In the case where a specific entity is dispatched per device, each such entity may be armed with a unique encryption key known only to the dispatching entity and the individual marriage entity which may serve afterwards as an aggregator of the arrived at values per device. Each such PCI device in turn is examined in detail, the examination, for example, taking the form of several levels of data gathering. Much of the data is gathered from the device's configuration read only memory, which may be shadowed or stored in structures associated with the PCI bus. At the first level of data gathering, the device's class, subclass, type (for example sound card) and vendor (for example "Creative Labs") are recorded. At a deeper level of data gathering, numeric details such as the device's bus latency, total memory, memory speed, device processor family and speed (if any), and other factual information about the device are gathered. During this process, bus device validity analysis as per the embodiments described above with respect to
Such manipulation can take the form of converting the individual values reported back to 16-bit segments and performing logical operations on them, for example AND-ing and or OR-ing them together to create an aggregate 16-bit value that uniquely represents the analyzed discovered PCI bus device/card. Any set of operations may be performed as desired to create this value, so long as the process produces repeatable values when provided with the same inputs. Even a simple conversion to ASCII and then addition of all the values as their numeric ASCII table equivalents, modulo the largest possible 16-bit number would be a viable approach in this regard. Each such PCI card in turn is analyzed and the related attributes are rendered down into a 16-bit value in this fashion.
The resulting four 16-bit values are then concatenated, either by the monolithic marriage entity in the case of a monolithic approach, or by the dispatching entity after being decrypted by the dispatching entity on a per marriage-entity-key basis. Alternatively the final 64-bit value represented in this example may be arrived at by having each such examined device produce an output value of 64 bits, and all four of these values may be aggregated into an aggregate 64-bit value by means of, for example, logical operations such as AND and OR. This 64 bit value may be deemed to be the "marriage value" for the system and may be considered reasonably unique. It may then be used as an encryption/decryption key for any content which is desired to be encrypted in a fashion specific to this target marriage system, based on the principal that the decrypting entity may use the same algorithm to arrive at a decryption key on the fly and successfully decrypt the information. This approach is rendered even more secure by means of the detection of virtual machines and emulations as discussed above and elsewhere in this document, because such emulated or virtual machines may otherwise be used to spoof such a marriage concept and cause nearly any system (including emulators) to appear to be the specified marriage system. Further, as discussed below, there may be ties to network authentication routines that may themselves provide some of the necessary bits to create the final value, adding an extra layer of security and some ability to account for content usage on a per-system basis, as desired.
Paging, or "Page Faulting" is a term used when discussing the behavior of operating systems that use virtual memory, for example Vax/VMS, BSD and System V Unix, Linux, and other operating systems. In the present specification, when page faulting is discussed, the mechanisms referred to in some detail are those of the various Windows operating systems. The concept of a page fault itself is straightforward, even though the mechanics of implementation may be detailed. The operating system creates the external appearance of unlimited memory available to the application, and this "virtually unlimited", or virtual memory, is managed by the operating system in a manner such that the application, when running, thinks it is entirely present in memory. In fact it may not be, but as parts of it are needed in memory the operating system seamlessly provides them just before they're needed. Usually this is done on a page-by-page basis where a page represents an arbitrarily sized allotment of memory. Thus if the available memory was 4 pages and an application consumes 8 pages, only 4 of the pages would fit in memory at any one time. In that case, if pages 1, 2, 3, and 4 are present in memory, and the system requires page 5, and attempts to use page 5, the system at that time experiences a "page fault".
One way in which the page can be known to be not present and therefore worthy of such page fault handling is that each page may have a data structure associated with it, which indicates whether the page's content is present in memory or whether it needs to be paged in by the operating system. This may be referred to as the "page-not-present" bit in some contexts. If page-not-present is true, a request of the page when results in a page fault. In any event, the requesting entity is never made aware the page desired is not present, since a powerful low-level subsystem of the operating system "handles" the fault and provides the page immediately in a manner that makes it appear as though the page had always been present. The system entity that commonly deals with page faults may be referred to as a "page fault handler", and it is well-known how to usurp the role of the page fault handler and replace it temporarily with a custom page fault handler.
In the present invention of
If it is not the first time 177 this page has been faulted upon 176, it is next determined whether the accessing process is an authorized entity or not 172. In this context, the executing program itself is referred to as the authorized entity; for example, if the protected is "foo.exe" and the 345th page of foo.exe had been corrupted as a defensive countermeasure to memory lifting by a subversion device, the only entity for which the custom page fault handler would perform a corruption-removal or correction is the authorized "foo.exe". If the entity is not authorized 171, then the system may optionally initiate a defensive or exit response process 168, may optionally invoke a direct response 169, or may do nothing 170. In all such unauthorized-entity cases the page is not touched and the incorrect, irrelevant, corrupted or garbage content is not corrected 170 (the not-present mark is allowed to persist 170). As explained above, the "not-present" bit or marker or flag indicates that the page is not in memory and any subsequent access to the page will require a successful page fault and in-memory page placement in order to proceed.
If it is determined 172 that the entity is authorized 173 and the requested page is 174 determined to be one which was not pre-processed to be corrupted in content, or not "land mined" (the term "land mined" is used within this document interchangeably with "corrupted", in that a corrupted page will "blow up", or cause a crash, if execution is attempted without the corruption being corrected), then it is not modified, but is marked as present 179 and allowed to pass through to the requesting process. In addition, any previously corrected, and "present"-marked, pages may be made corrupted at this time, and may be marked "not-present" as well at this time. In this manner, the next time the page is requested for access, it will be necessary to invoke a page fault and re-load the page through the mechanism of the custom defensive page fault handler. Following this, the handler complesets its process and returns.
If, however, it is determined that the requesting entity is authorized 173 and that the page was indeed one which was pre-processed to be corrupted in content 175, then the page is corrected 182 by overwriting it (for example as in
Following is an example illustrating the invention of
If the requesting entity is authorized, then the customized page fault handler does nothing and returns from the fault 192, allowing the standard paging handlers to access the page for the requesting entity as needed. If it is not an authorized entity and is not a targeted "land mined" page for monitoring 200, then the system does nothing and returns from the fault allowing the standard paging handlers to access the page for the requesting entity as needed.
If the requesting entity is not authorized, and if the page is in fact a targeted page for monitoring 195, then a defensive and or exit response may be invoked 196, a direct response may be invoked 197, or pages as yet untouched by the unauthorized process may be rendered incorrect, irrelevant, corrupted or garbage in content in advance of any future contact so as to make any unauthorized access (such as a memory dump or lift in progress), when detected, actively trigger destruction of critical data before lifting can occur to all pages.
In other words, given the example from the previous section of this document of an 8-page executable foo.exe, of which some pages are in memory, when an unauthorized entity touches any of the in-memory pages, or causes a page fault on any not present pages, a defensive response occurs. Assume, for example, that pages 1, 2, and 4 are in memory, and a memory lifting tool begins to lift the executable code. It may successfully copy page 1 and 2 because they are present in memory and are not corrupted. However, when the memory lifter tries to touch page 3, page 3 is not present, a page fault occurs, and the defensive page fault handler of FIG. 17, upon page fault invocation, determines the entity is a) not the executing foo.exe; or b) a known threat tool (such as by examining the in-memory signature or other attribute as discussed elsewhere in this invention document with respect to defensive mechanisms). Page 3 is permitted to be paged in; however, it is corrupted in the process 198. The defensive handler may also choose to corrupt page 4 in memory and may choose to corrupt and subsequent pages as they are paged into memory. In this manner, the memory lift captures 6 of the 8 pages in a corrupt/broken/land-mined state, in which any attempt to execute is guaranteed to produce results (such as crashing the foo.exe or even the operating system) that are not desired.
Following is a code example illustrating the invention of
An example of a high-level abstraction employed by this aspect of the invention is the ability to express complex device commands as a simple series of text parameters. These parameters allow control over device features not normally accessible to users and tightly controlled by drivers. The example parameters which may be set by any user and consumed by the device to produce "device driver expert" results or effects are as follows:
Embodied in many of the above concepts and associated figures are references to exit processes invoked in response to an intrusion. The responses are typically invoked by the entity itself, and are variable and may be tailored to the needs of the entity packaging the protective system. Instances include but are not limited to: a) immediate exit by killing all associated processes using system calls and then killing self using system exit calls; b) deferred exit by passing a self-destruct message through a message passing system as shown in
Also embodied in many of the above inventions and associated diagrams are references to defensive processes invoked in response to an intrusion. The responses are invoked by the protected entity to act upon the intruding process or tool, or the system itself, to destabilize the attack. These responses are variable and may be tailored to the needs of the entity packaging the protective system. Instances include but are not limited to: a) manipulation of displays to make fonts illegible, font and screen colors inappropriate or unintelligible. In this example invention embodiment, under circumstances where undesired inputs cannot be suppressed it may be necessary to alter or limit or prohibit the ability of the threat or tool to display information to the user. In other words, the user can type but cannot see the typing and the tool's output. For instance, as illustrated in the code below, by making the display black fonts on a black background. This is done only under circumstances where a threat has been identified unequivocally (for instance as a running In Circuit Emulator or ICE):
In another instance, b) the ability of a threat or opponent tool to process input is crippled, not by filtering or intercepting keystrokes and mouse clicks but instead by destroying the parts of the tool that understand how to process certain inputs in a very specific fashion. For instance if a certain tool had a powerful command keystroke that invoked a significant threat function of the tool, and the tool's ability to recognize that stroke is corrupted or destroyed by intrusive changes made to the running tool itself in memory, the tool is rendered much less effective.
In an example of this type, undesired inputs are suppressed not by intercepting keystrokes on the way through or to the input device driver, but rather by crippling the recipient application's ability to process them, by targeting a specific area of memory where the threat application is running and knocking out specific areas of threat functionality with surgical accuracy so that whether or not any keyboard or mouse filtering is done at the system level, certain keystrokes will not be seen by the threat application and cannot be acted upon.
Other instances include: c) overt process killing of intruding process; d) overt immediate or deferred kill or reboot of the system; e) subtle destabilization of the system by memory corruption; f) provision of false information to the intruding process or tool; and g) introduction of spoof and saturation data (as in
While this invention has been particularly shown and described with references to preferred embodiments thereof, it will be understood by those skilled in the art that various changes in form and details may be made herein without departing from the spirit and scope of the invention as defined by the appended claims.
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It was the 50th anniversary of the day his hiring as Georgia football coach was announced.
"I was the freshman coach and a former player at a rival school, Auburn," Dooley remembered in talking about the anniversary of his hiring. "Georgia was in a down period. They were in a stretch where they had seven losing seasons in 10 years."
Georgia had hired Joel Eaves, Dooley's former basketball coach at Auburn, to be athletic director to try to resurrect the program.
"Coach Eaves announced he was going to conduct a nationwide search for a new football coach and bring in someone to make Georgia a winner again," Dooley recalled. "When they said the new coach was named Vince, everyone thought Lombardi and was ecstatic, but then they said Dooley, and everyone thought, who? Looking back, the only three people at the time who thought it was a good hire was coach Eaves, me and my wife, Barbara. But we worked hard, got the players to believe, and we started winning. And nothing gives a coach credibility more than winning."
For the full story, pick up a copy of this week's newspaper or subscribe to our e-Edition at http://ee.jcnews.com.


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These are the bookings recorded for the Doris C. Gravat Detention Center for May 7, 2014. Some of the people listed may not have actually spent time in jail if they posted bond and were released. Although those listed have been arrested and charged, that does not mean they have been found guilty. All bookings may be viewed online by visiting www.aikenstandard.com and clicking on the Crime tab.
William Edward Parker Jr., 32 criminal domestic violence second offense within 10 years or prior conviction
Thomas Alvin Busbee Jr., 51 driving under suspension third offense, open container of beer, driving under the influence
Frank L. Gentile, 56 driving under the influence
Terrance Burton Johnson, 41 assault, beat or wound officer serving process or while resisting arrest, disorderly conduct, threatening a public official, assault and battery third degree
Edward Levi James, 26 speeding bench warrant, possession of a stolen auto
Ericka Denise Hampton, 40 disorderly conduct/gross intoxication
Joseph Michel, 45 possession of cocaine first offense, simple possession of marijuana, possession of prescription drug without a prescription three counts
Virgil Garnette Hickson, 41 assault and battery third degree
Keith Foster Lyonnais, 42 public drunk
Kerwin Jamal Johnson, 27 disorderly conduct sentence
Gabrielle Simone Priester, 22 shoplifting value $2,000 or less
Leann Elizabeth Barziloski, 32 criminal domestic violence
Johnny Edward Skipper Jr., 50 failure to pay family court
Thomas Morris Robbins III, 53 Violation of conditions of probation supervision
Tramaine Deon Wright, 25 trespassing
Akeem Rashad Jean, 24 littering less than 15 pounds or 27 cubic feet first offense, failure to comply with order of a public safety officer, driving under suspension third offense or subsequent
Christopher Wade Frix, 32 failure to pay family court
Brandon Lamont Newsome, 24 family court/failure to appear commitment
Terrell Demond Echols, 20 assault and battery third degree
Jose Manuel Serrano, 25 criminal domestic violence bench warrant
Sue LouAnn Williams, 45 driving under suspension first offense
William Bernard Greene, 35 possession of a weapon during a violent crime if not also sentenced to life, robbery while armed or allegedly armed with a deadly weapon, grand larceny value $10,000 of more, assault and battery of a high an aggravated nature
James Edward Rickerson, 49 operating an uninsured vehicle, driving under suspension, failure to register a motor vehicle
Michael Lamont Rouse, 35 failure to pay child support
Christopher Gerald Ready, 50 possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine near school, manufacture distribution methamphetamine first offense, simple possession of marijuana, failure to stop for law enforcement, uninsured vehicle operator, driving reckless
Dillon Rayce Allen, 21 shoplifting $1,000 or less three count
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