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This is a scalable context timeline. It contains events related to the event November 24, 2001: Later-Famous Detainee Captured in Afghanistan, FBI Does Not Read Him His Rights. You can narrow or broaden the context of this timeline by adjusting the zoom level. The lower the scale, the more relevant the items on average will be, while the higher the scale, the less relevant the items, on average, will be.
White House lawyers have become impatient with the interagency group's (see Shortly Before September 23, 2001) less than full endorsement of the use of military commissions to try suspected terrorists. By late October, Timothy E. Flanigan takes the task of designing a strategy for prosecuting terrorists away from the group and proceeds to focus on military commissions as the only preferable option. The White House lawyers now work more in secret, excluding many agencies and most of the government's experts in military and international law, but together with the lawyers of the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), with the intention of drafting a presidential military order. (Golden 10/24/2004) There is a remarkable secrecy surrounding the drafting process (see November 11-13, 2001). Both Attorney General John D. Ashcroft and his deputy, Larry D. Thompson, are closely consulted. But the head of the Justice Department's Criminal Division, Michael Chertoff is kept out of the loop. Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld is informed through his general counsel, William J. Haynes. Other Pentagon experts, however, are excluded. (Golden 10/24/2004) When the order is signed (see November 13, 2001), many express surprise. "That came like a bolt from the blue," a former Pentagon official says. "Neither I nor anyone I knew had any insight, any advance knowledge, or any opportunity to comment on the president's military order." (Goldenberg 6/9/2004) "I can't tell you how compartmented things were," retired Rear Adm. Donald J. Guter, the Navy's Judge Advocate General, later recalls. "This was a closed administration." (Golden 10/24/2004)
President Bush issues a three-page executive order authorizing the creation of military commissions to try non-citizens alleged to be involved in international terrorism (see November 10, 2001). The president will decide which defendants will be tried by military commissions. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld will appoint each panel and set its rules and procedures, including the level of proof needed for a conviction. A two-thirds vote is needed to convict a defendant and impose a sentence, including life imprisonment or death. Only the president or the secretary of defense has the authority to overturn a decision. There is no provision for an appeal to US civil courts, foreign courts, or international tribunals. Nor does the order specify how many judges are to preside on a tribunal or what qualifications they must have. (US Department of Defense 11/13/2001; Lardner and Slevin 11/14/2001; Golden 10/24/2004)
Questionable Rule of Evidence Adopted - The order also adopts a rule of evidence stemming from the 1942 Supreme Court case of United States v. Quirin that says evidence shall be admitted "as would… have probative value to a reasonable person." This rule, according to Judge Evan J. Wallach, "was repeatedly used [in World War II and in the post-war tribunals] to admit evidence of a quality or obtained in a manner which would make it inadmissible under the rules of evidence in both courts of the United States or courts-martial conducted by the armed forces of the United States." (Wallach 9/29/2004) Evidence derived from torture, for example, could theoretically be admitted. It should be noted that the order is unprecedented among presidential directives in that it takes away some individuals' most basic rights, while claiming to have the power of law, with the US Congress not having been so much as consulted.
Specifics Left to Rumsfeld - Bush's executive order contains few specifics about how the commissions will actually function. Bush will delegate that task to Rumsfeld, although, as with the order itself, White House lawyers will actually make the decision to put Rumsfeld in charge, and Bush will merely sign off on the decision (see March 21, 2002). (Savage 2007, pp. 138)
Dispute over Trial Procedures - During the next few years, lawyers will battle over the exact proceedings of the trials before military commissions, with many of the military lawyers arguing for more rights for the defendants and with Defense Department chief counsel William J. Haynes, and Justice Department and White House lawyers (including White House counsel Alberto Gonzales, vice presidential counsel David Addington, and Gonzales' deputy Timothy Flanigan) taking a more restrictive line. (Golden 10/24/2004)
Out of the Loop - Both National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice and Secretary of State Colin Powell were left outside of the circle during the drafting of this directive (see November 6, 2001 and November 9, 2001). Rice is reportedly angry about not being informed. (Golden 10/24/2004)
Serious 'Process Failure' - National Security Council legal adviser John Bellinger will later call the authorization a "process failure" with serious long-term consequences (see February 2009).
Salim Hamdan is captured in Afghanistan. (Guantanamo Military Commissions 11/20/2007 ) Hamdan is an Arab who has lived in Afghanistan for some time and has some knowledge about al-Qaeda and its operations there. He will later become well known after he is transferred to Guantanamo and engages in a series of legal battles to gain his freedom (see November 8, 2004 and June 30, 2006). (Gomez 7/24/2008; Mikkelsen 7/24/2008) At some point, he is handed over to the FBI. However, agents for the bureau do not read him his Miranda rights. "Our policy at the time was not to read Miranda rights," FBI special agent Robert Fuller will say in testimony at a US military commission hearing for Hamdan. Reuters will later write, "Similar warnings must be given to suspects in US military custody, and suspects overseas who may face US charges commonly receive warnings." FBI special agent Stewart Kelley will say, "If they are a suspect, and they are detained, a Miranda is usually given." (Mikkelsen 7/24/2008)
Salim Hamdan, a detainee with some knowledge about al-Qaeda who was captured in late November, takes FBI agents on two tours of facilities associated with al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. Hamdan and the agents twice drive around Kandahar in the months after his capture and he points out compounds owned by Osama bin Laden, including Tarnak Farms, and guest houses where al-Qaeda members could safely stay, which the agents take pictures of. Robert Fuller, one of the agents who accompanies Hamdan, will later say: "The first compound, when we arrived to it, it was destroyed. No roof was left." The second compound is intact, and "in great shape," according to Fuller. Hamdan also tells the FBI of his time at a training camp, but says he only stayed for a month and then returned to a guest house to be with his family. In addition, he identifies several high-ranking al-Qaeda officials and describes visits by bin Laden and other al-Qaeda figures to the camp. They gave speeches and "offered words of encouragement," according to FBI agent Craig Donnachie. (Gomez 7/24/2008; Mikkelsen 7/24/2008) Despite this co-operation, Hamdan will be transferred to Guantanamo, held there for years, and prosecuted in a military commission (see June 30, 2006).
The White House declares that the United States will apply the Geneva Conventions to the conflict in Afghanistan, but will not grant prisoner-of-war status to captured Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters. Though Afghanistan was party to the 1949 treaty, Taliban fighters are not protected by the Conventions, the directive states, because the Taliban is not recognized by the US as Afghanistan's legitimate government. Likewise, al-Qaeda fighters are not eligible to be protected under the treaty's provisions because they do not represent a state that is party to the Conventions either.
Administration Will Treat Detainees Humanely 'Consistent' with Geneva - In the memo, President Bush writes that even though al-Qaeda detainees do not qualify as prisoners of war under Geneva, "as a matter of policy, the United States Armed Forces shall continue to treat detainees humanely and to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of Geneva." The presidential directive is apparently based on Alberto Gonzales's January 25 memo (see January 25, 2002) and a memo from Vice President Cheney's chief of staff, David Addington (see January 25, 2002).
Bush Chooses Not to Suspend Geneva between US and Afghanistan - The directive also concludes that Bush, as commander in chief of the United States, has the authority to suspend the Geneva Conventions regarding the conflict in Afghanistan, should he feel necessary: Bush writes, "I have the authority under the Constitution to suspend Geneva as between the United States and Afghanistan, but I decline to exercise that authority at this time." Though not scheduled for declassification until 2012, the directive will be released by the White House in June 2004 to demonstrate that the president never authorized torture against detainees from the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. (George W. Bush 2/7/2002 ; CNN 2/7/2002; Barry, Hirsh, and Isikoff 5/24/2004; Cohn 1/19/2005; Dubose and Bernstein 2006, pp. 191)
Overriding State Department Objections - Bush apparently ignores or overrides objections from the State Department, including Secretary of State Colin Powell (see January 25, 2002) and the department's chief legal counsel, William Howard Taft IV (see January 25, 2002). Both Powell and Taft strenuously objected to the new policy. (Savage 2007, pp. 147)
Ignoring Promises of Humane Treatment - The reality will be somewhat different. Gonzales laid out the arguments for and against complying with Geneva in an earlier memo (see January 18-25, 2002), and argued that if the administration dispensed with Geneva, no one could later be charged with war crimes. Yet, according to Colin Powell's chief of staff, Lawrence Wilkerson, sometime after the Bush memo is issued, Vice President Cheney and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld decide to ignore the portions promising humane treatment for prisoners. "In going back and looking at the deliberations," Wilkerson later recalls, "it was clear to me that what the president had decided was one thing and what was implemented was quite another thing." (Dubose and Bernstein 2006, pp. 190-191)
Jack Goldsmith, the embattled head of the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) (see October 6, 2003), finds himself again mired in a conflict with Vice President Dick Cheney's hardline chief aide, David Addington. Goldsmith has already fought with Addington over Goldsmith's decision to withdraw the OLC's support for the administration's memos justifying torture (see December 2003-June 2004). Now Goldsmith and Addington are at odds over the policies governing the detention and trial of suspected terrorists. The spark for this conflict is the January 2004 Supreme Court decision to review the detention of US citizen and suspected "enemy combatant" Yaser Esam Hamdi (see January 9, 2004). Goldsmith suggests going to Congress to have that body pass legislation declaring such detention legal, reasoning that the Supreme Court would be less likely to rule against the administration if Congress had authorized such detention policies. Addington, who like his boss does not accept the idea that Congress has any business interfering in such policy decisions, refuses to countenance the idea, and Goldsmith's proposal goes nowhere. In June 2004, the Supreme Court approves the detention policies but put modest legal restrictions on the administration's ability to detain citizens without trial. Goldsmith, this time with deputy solicitor general Paul Clement, again suggests going to Congress; once again, Addington refuses. The White House, Goldsmith later says, continues to operate as if it could avoid any adverse decisions from the Supreme Court. When the Court issues its decision in the Hamdan case (see November 8, 2004), rejecting the administration's policy of trying terror suspects in military tribunals without Congressional approval, and upholding the preeminence of the Third Geneva Convention in protecting the rights of accused terror detainees—including al-Qaeda suspects—the decision has a shattering effect on the Bush administration's legal arguments towards detaining and trying those suspects. Goldsmith believes the Court's decision is "legally erroneous" but has huge political consequences. Now detainees at Guantanamo Bay have more legal rights than ever before, and for the first time, the specter of war-crimes charges against Bush officials becomes a real possibility. Goldsmith later says that it is in these arguments, more than in the battles over domestic wiretapping or interrogation techniques, that Addington's attempts to expand presidential power actually backfires. Goldsmith is later vindicated when, in September 2006, one of the last acts of the Republican-led Congress will give the administration every power the administration had asked for, authorizing the military commissions that the Court had rejected. The Bush administration could have avoided a damaging Court decision by working with Congress beforehand. "I'm not a civil libertarian, and what I did wasn't driven by concerns about civil liberties per se," he says in a 2007 interview. "It was a disagreement about means, not ends, driven by a desire to make sure that the administration's counterterrorism policies had a firm legal foundation." (Rosen 9/9/2007)
In the case of Rasul v. Bush, involving Guantanamo detainees Shafiq Rasul, Mamdouh Habib, David Hicks, and Asif Iqbal, the Supreme Court holds in a 6-3 ruling that the US exercises "complete jurisdiction and control" over Guantanamo Bay, and thus, that the Guantanamo prisoners have the right to challenge their detentions before a judge. Under the habeas corpus statute, Justice John Paul Stevens writes for the majority that "aliens held at the base, no less than American citizens, are entitled to invoke the federal courts' authority." (Supreme Court opinion on writ of certiorari. Shafiq Rasul, et al. v. George W. Bush, et al. 6/28/2004) It is unclear whether the court's ruling is intended to extend to detainees held in other parts of the world, but given the court's reasoning, it appears that decision applies to detainees both in Guantanamo and elsewhere. (New York Times 6/29/2004)
Conservative Dissent - The three dissenting justices are conservatives William Rehnquist, Antonin Scalia, and Clarence Thomas. Scalia says the decision is "an irresponsible overturning of settled law in a matter of extreme importance to our forces currently in the field." He acknowledges that the location of Guantanamo has in fact been intended to keep detainees outside of the reach of the judiciary. "Today, the court springs a trap on the executive, subjecting Guantanamo Bay to the oversight of federal courts even though it has never before been thought to be within their jurisdiction, and thus making it a foolish place to have housed alien wartime detainees," Scalia writes. Stevens writes that it does not matter what status the Guantanamo inmates have regarding the question of whether they should have access to a US court. "What is presently at stake is only whether the federal courts have jurisdiction to determine the legality of the executive's potentially indefinite detention of individuals who claim to be wholly innocent of wrongdoing." And this, he writes, they do. The case is subsequently sent back to a lower court to consider the prisoners' claims. (Guardian 6/28/2004)
Side-Stepping the Ruling - The media characterizes the decision as a rebuke for the Bush administration, which had argued that the courts have no right to interfere in the commander in chief's decisions involving wartime policies. However, the decision says nothing about what rights the detainees might have once they get inside a courtroom, and therefore actually places little real restraint on the government. White House officials will decide that the detainees have no rights in the courtroom whatsoever—although the Court has ruled that they can file lawsuits, those lawsuits must be dismissed out of hand because the detainees have no right to actually present a case. The Republican-led Congress will later pass a law stripping courts of jurisdiction over Guantanamo lawsuits. (Savage 2007, pp. 192)
US District Judge James Robertson rules that the Combatant Status Review Tribunal being held at the Guantanamo base in Cuba to determine the status of detainee Salim Ahmed Hamdan is unlawful and cannot continue. At the time of the decision, Hamdan is before the Guantanamo military commission. (Leonnig and Mintz 11/9/2004; Locy 11/9/2004) The commission system, as set up by White House lawyers David Addington and Timothy Flanigan three years before (see Late October 2001), gives accused terrorists such as Hamdan virtually no rights; in author and reporter Charlie Savage's words, "the [Bush] administration had crafted rules that would make it easy for prosecutors to win cases." (Savage 2007, pp. 195-196)
Violation of Geneva Conventions - Robertson, in his 45-page opinion, says the government should have conducted special hearings to determine whether detainees qualified for prisoner-of-war protections under the Geneva Conventions at the time of capture. (Locy 11/9/2004) He says that the Bush administration violated the Geneva Conventions when it designated prisoners as enemy combatants, denied them POW protections, and sent them to Guantanamo. (Savage 11/9/2004) The Combatant Status Review Tribunals that are currently being held in response to a recent Supreme Court decision (see June 28, 2004) are inadequate, Robertson says, because their purpose is to determine whether detainees are enemy combatants, not POWs, as required by the Third Geneva Convention. (Locy 11/9/2004)
Rejects Claims of Presidential Power - Robertson also rejects the administration's claim that the courts must defer to the president in a time of war. "The president is not a 'tribunal,'" the judge says. (Locy 11/9/2004) Robertson, a Clinton appointee, thus squarely opposes both the president's military order of November 13, 2001 (see November 13, 2001) establishing the possibility of trial by military tribunal, and his executive order of February 7, 2002 (see February 7, 2002) declaring that the Geneva Conventions do not to apply to Taliban and al-Qaeda prisoners. "The government has asserted a position starkly different from the positions and behavior of the United States in previous conflicts," Robertson writes, "one that can only weaken the United States' own ability to demand application of the Geneva Conventions to Americans captured during armed conflicts abroad." (Locy 11/9/2004; Leonnig and Mintz 11/9/2004; Savage 11/9/2004)
Orders Military Courts-Martial - Robertson orders that until the government conducts a hearing for Hamdan before a competent tribunal in accordance with the Third Geneva Conventions, he can only be tried in courts-martial, according to the same long-established military rules that apply to trials for US soldiers. (Leonnig and Mintz 11/9/2004; Savage 11/9/2004) Robertson's ruling is the first by a federal judge to assert that the commissions are illegal. (Leonnig and Mintz 11/9/2004)
Hearings Immediately Recessed - When word of Robertson's ruling comes to Guantanamo, Colonel Peter Brownback, presiding over a pretrial hearing for Hamdan, immediately gavels the hearing closed, declaring an "indefinite recess" for the tribunal. (Savage 2007, pp. 195-196)
Ruling Applauded by Civil Libertarians, Rejected by Bush Lawyers - Anthony Romero, director of the American Civil Liberties Union; Eugene Fidell, president of the National Institute of Military Justice; and Michael Ratner, president of the Center for Constitutional Rights, all applaud Robertson's ruling. (Savage 11/9/2004) The Bush administration rejects the court's ruling and announces its intention to submit a request to a higher court for an emergency stay and reversal of the decision. "We vigorously disagree.… The judge has put terrorism on the same legal footing as legitimate methods of waging war," Justice Department spokesman Mark Corallo says. "The Constitution entrusts to the president the responsibility to safeguard the nation's security. The Department of Justice will continue to defend the president's ability and authority under the Constitution to fulfill that duty." (Leonnig and Mintz 11/9/2004; Savage 11/9/2004) He also says that the commission rules were "carefully crafted to protect America from terrorists while affording those charged with violations of the laws of war with fair process." (Savage 11/9/2004)
Ruling May Affect Other Detainees - Though the ruling technically only applies to Hamdan, his civilian attorney, Neal Katyal, says it could affect other detainees. "The judge's order is designed only to deal with Mr. Hamdan's case," Katyal says. "But the spirit of it… extends more broadly to potentially everything that is going on here at Guantanamo." (Locy 11/9/2004)
John Roberts is approved by the Senate to become the new chief justice of the US Supreme Court, replacing the recently deceased William Rehnquist (see September 5, 2005). Roberts, who once clerked for Rehnquist while Rehnquist was an associate justice, also served in the Reagan Justice Department and as an associate counsel to then-President Reagan. He was deputy solicitor general in the first Bush administration. George W. Bush appointed him to the DC Circuit Court in 2001. (White House 9/29/2005) Roberts was originally nominated to succeed the retiring Sandra Day O'Connor, but when Rehnquist died, Bush quickly withdrew the nomination for associate justice and refiled Roberts's name for chief justice.
Characteristics and History - Roberts appeals to conservatives for a number of reasons; he has a powerful legal intellect, is soft-spoken, personable, and telegenic, and has not been outspoken about his views on issues like abortion and the right to privacy. Law professor Stephen Wermiel, who knows Roberts well, said in July that Roberts is not "somebody who… comes off as gruff or overbearing, which some people will recall was a factor in the [Robert] Bork hearings in 1987" (see July 1-October 23, 1987). Wermiel called Roberts's nomination "a stroke of brilliance on the White House's part." One area of controversy surrounds Roberts's work with Governor Jeb Bush of Florida during the bitterly contested 2000 presidential election, where Roberts helped construct the strategies used in the Bush v. Gore case that awarded George W. Bush the presidency. Another is Roberts's membership in the Federalist Society, an organization of conservative activist judges, lawyers, and legal thinkers. A third is his advocacy, during his time with the first Bush administration, for scrapping decades of law providing for the separation of church and state in order to allow prayer in public schools. (Neary 7/20/2005) Four days before President Bush nominated him to the Court, Roberts voted in favor of upholding the Bush administration's assertions about its wartime powers in the case of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (see June 30, 2006), ruling that Bush need not consult Congress before setting up military commissions, and ruling that Bush is not bound by the strictures of the Geneva Convention. Liberals are unhappy with his stance against abortion, his representation as a private attorney of corporate mining interests seeking to dodge environmental regulations and of businesses trying to evade affirmative action requirements, as well as his attempts to curb environmentalists' efforts to save endangered species. In 2007, reporter Charlie Savage will write that while progressives and liberals busily attacked Roberts for his positions on various "hot-button" issues, "[a]lmost lost amid the hubbub was" Roberts's "unwavering commitment to the [expansion of] presidential power," dating back to his 1980-81 clerkship under Rehnquist and his tenure as a White House lawyer under Ronald Reagan (see June-July 1983, October 1983, February 13, 1984, and May 16, 1984). (Savage 2007, pp. 251-255)
Quick Confirmation - The Senate agreed to expedite Roberts's confirmation process in order to allow him to preside over the next session of the Supreme Court in October, and so gave its members little time to peruse his record. Roberts sailed through the Senate Judiciary Committee hearings, and is confirmed by a 78-22 vote. Roberts hit a brief snag when he divulged that he had met with Attorney General Alberto Gonzales just six days before hearing oral arguments in the Hamdan case, had met with Vice President Cheney and a select coterie of top White House officials while considering his verdict, and had met with Bush for the president's final approval on the Court nomination the same day that he handed down his favorable ruling. Though 22 Democrats vote against his confirmation, because Roberts's ascension to the Court does not change the ideological balance among the nine justices (Roberts is replacing the equally conservative Rehnquist), Senate Democrats decided not to filibuster his nomination. (Dean 2007, pp. 154-155; Savage 2007, pp. 252)
US District Judge James Robertson resigns from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), a special, secret court set up to oversee government surveillance operations. Robertson refuses to comment on his resignation from FISC, but two of Robertson's associates say that Robertson's resignation stems from his deep concerns that the NSA's warrantless domestic wiretapping program (see Early 2002) is not legal, and has tainted the work of the court. Robertson, formerly one of ten "revolving" members of FISC who periodically rotate in and out of duty on the court, continues to serve as a Washington, DC district judge. Colleagues of Robertson say that he is concerned that information gained from the warrantless surveillance under Bush's program subsequently could have been used to obtain warrants under the FISA program, a practice specifically prohibited by the court. Robertson, a Clinton appointee selected for FISC by Chief Justice William Rehnquist, has also been critical of the Bush administration's treatment of detainees at the Guantanamo Bay prison camp, and recently issued a decision that sidetracked Bush's use of military tribunals for some Guantanamo detainees (see November 8, 2004). Even though Robertson was hand-picked for FISC by the deeply conservative Rehnquist, who expressly selected judges who took an expansive view of wiretapping and other surveillance programs, (Holland 12/21/2005) some conservative critics such as Jim Kouri, a vice-president of the National Association of Chiefs of Police, call Robertson a "left-leaning, liberal" "Clintonista" jurist with ties to "ultra-liberal" civil rights associations and a desire for media attention (though Robertson has refused to speak to the press about his resignation). Critics also demand that less attention be directed at the NSA wiretapping program and more on finding out who leaked the information that led to the New York Times's recent revelatory articles on the program (see Early 2002). GOP strategist Mike Baker says in response to Robertson's resignation, "Only the Democrats make confirmations and appointments of people by Republican President [sic] a question of ideology. The news media try to portray [Robertson] as non-partisan. He's as liberal as they come and as partisan as they come." (Kouri 12/23/2005) Presiding judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly is arranging for a classified briefing of all the remaining FISC judges on the wiretapping program, partly in order to bring any doubts harbored by other justices into the open. Sources say Kollar-Kotelly expects top NSA and Justice Department officials to outline the program for the judges. No one on FISC except for Kollar-Kotelly and her predecessor, Judge Royce Lambeth, have ever been briefed on the program. If the judges are not satisfied with the information provided in this briefing, they could take action, which could include anything from demanding proof from the Justice Department that previous wiretaps were not tainted, could refuse to issue warrants based on secretly-obtained evidence, or, conceivably, could disband the entire court, especially in light of Bush's recent suggestions that he has the power to bypass the court if he so desires. (Leonnig and Linzer 12/22/2005)
Senators Lindsey Graham (R-SC) and Jon Kyl (R-AZ) file an amicus curiae brief with the Supreme Court in the case of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (see June 30, 2006) saying that because of the passage of the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA—see December 15, 2005), the Court no longer has jurisdiction over the case. Graham and Kyl argue their point by citing the "legislative history" of the DTA, in particular the official statements Graham and Kyl made during debate over the bill, and specifically an "extensive colloquy" between the two that appears in the Congressional Record for December 21, 2005. Graham and Kyl argue that this "colloquy," which argues that Guantanamo prisoners have no rights under the standard of habeas corpus, stands as evidence that "Congress was aware" that the DTA would strip the Court of jurisdiction over cases that involve Guantanamo detainees. (The Senate included an amendment written by Graham, Kyl, and Carl Levin (D-MI) to the DTA that would reject habeas claims in future court cases, but does not apply retroactively to cases already filed, such as Hamdan.) However, Graham and Kyl never engaged in such a discussion on the floor of the Senate. Instead, they had the text inserted in the Record just before the law passed (see December 30, 2005), meaning that no one in Congress heard their discussion. The brief indicates that the discussion happened during the debate over the bill when it did not. The Record indicates that the discussion that did take place concerning the Hamdan case comes from Democrats, and explicitly state that the DTA has no bearing on the case. C-SPAN video coverage of the debate proves that Graham and Kyl never made those statements, and Senate officials confirm that the discussion was inserted later into the Record. But in their brief, Graham and Kyl state that "the Congressional Record is presumed to reflect live debate except when the statements therein are followed by a bullet… or are underlined." The Record shows no such formatting, therefore, says the brief, it must have been live. The debate between Graham and Kyl is even written to make it appear as if it had taken place live, with Graham and Kyl answering each other's questions, Kyl noting that he is nearing the end of his allotted time, and another senator, Sam Brownback (R-KS) apparently attempting to interject a question. Lawyers for the prosecution will strenuously object to the brief, and Justice Department defense lawyers will use the brief as a centerpiece for their argument that the Supreme Court should throw the case out. (US Supreme Court 2/2006 ; Bazelon 3/27/2006; Dean 7/5/2006) Former Nixon White House counsel John Dean will call the brief "a blatant scam," and will accuse Graham and Kyl of "misle[ading] their Senate colleagues, but also sham[ing] their high offices by trying to deliberately mislead the US Supreme Court.… I have not seen so blatant a ploy, or abuse of power, since Nixon's reign.… [Graham and Kyl] brazenly attempted to hoodwink the Court regarding the actions of Congress in adopting the DTA." (Dean 7/5/2006) Their efforts will not be successful, as the Supreme Court will ultimately rule against the Republican position in Hamdan vs. Rumsfeld (see June 30, 2006).
In the Hamdan v. Rumsfeld case, the Supreme Court rules 5-3 to strike down the Bush administration's plans to try Guantanamo detainees before military commissions. Ruling in favor of detainee Salim Ahmed Hamdan (see November 8, 2004), the Court rules that the commissions are unauthorized by federal statutes and violate international law. Writing for the majority, Justice John Paul Stevens says, "The executive is bound to comply with the rule of law that prevails in this jurisdiction." The opinion throws out each of the administration's arguments in favor of the commissions, including its assertion that Congress had stripped the Supreme Court of the jurisdiction to decide the case. One of the major flaws in the commissions, the Court rules, is that President Bush unilaterally established them without the authorization of Congress. (Greenhouse 6/30/2006) During the oral arguments three months before, Hamdan's lawyer, Neal Katyal, told the Court: "The whole point of this [proceeding] is to say we're challenging the lawfulness of the tribunal [the military commissions] itself. This isn't a challenge to some decision that a court makes. This is a challenge to the court itself, and that's why it's different than the ordinary criminal context that you're positing." (Savage 2007, pp. 274-275)
Major Defeat for Bush Administration - Civil libertarian and human rights organizations consider the ruling a shattering defeat for the administration, particularly in its assertions of expansive, unfettered presidential authority. Bush says in light of the decision, he will work with Congress to "find a way forward" to implement the commissions. "The ruling destroys one of the key pillars of the Guantanamo system," says Gerald Staberock, a director of the International Commission of Jurists. "Guantanamo was built on the idea that prisoners there have limited rights. There is no longer that legal black hole." The ruling also says that prisoners held as "enemy combatants" must be afforded rights under the Geneva Conventions, specifically those requiring humane treatment for detainees and the right to free and open trials in the US legal system. While some form of military trials may be permissible, the ruling states that defendants must be given basic rights such as the ability to attend the trial and the right to see and challenge evidence submitted by the prosecution. Stevens writes that the historical origin of military commissions was in their use as a "tribunal of necessity" under wartime conditions. "Exigency lent the commission its legitimacy, but did not further justify the wholesale jettisoning of procedural protections." (Greenhouse 6/30/2006) In 2007, author and reporter Charlie Savage will write, "Five justices on the Supreme Court said Bush had broken the law." (Savage 2007, pp. 275)
Hardline Conservative Justices Dissent - Stevens is joined by Justices David Souter, Stephen Breyer, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg. Justice Anthony Kennedy issues a concurring opinion. Dissenting are Justices Samuel Alito, Antonin Scalia, and Clarence Thomas. Thomas, in a dissent signed by Scalia and Alito, calls the decision "untenable" and "dangerous." Chief Justice John Roberts recused himself from the case because of his participation in a federal appeals court that ruled in favor of the administration (see November 8, 2004).
Not Charged for Three Years - Hamdan is a Guantanamo detainee from Yemen, captured in Afghanistan in November 2001 and taken to Guantanamo in June 2002. He is accused of being a member of al-Qaeda, in his function as driver and bodyguard for Osama bin Laden. He was not charged with a crime—conspiracy—until mid-2004. (Greenhouse 6/30/2006)
Former Justice Department official Marty Lederman, now a Georgetown law professor, writes of the Hamdan v. Rumsfeld case (see June 30, 2006): "Focusing just on the [military] commissions aspect of this misses the forest for the trees. This ruling means that what the CIA and the Pentagon have been doing [detaining prisoners without due process] is, as of now, a war crime, which means that it should stop immediately." (Savage 2007, pp. 276)
Civil liberties lawyer and columnist Glenn Greenwald states that the recent Supreme Court ruling in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (see June 30, 2006), finding that the Bush administration's Guantanamo Bay military commissions violate both federal law and the Geneva Conventions, also proves that the NSA's warrantless wiretapping program is illegal (see December 15, 2005). "To arrive at its decision," Greenwald writes, "the Court emphatically rejected the administration's radical theories of executive power, and in doing so, rendered entirely discredited the administration's only defenses for eavesdropping on Americans without the warrants required by law. Actual compliance with the Court's ruling, then, compels the administration to immediately cease eavesdropping on Americans in violation of FISA," the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (see 1978). "If the administration continues these programs now, then they are openly defying the Court and the law with a brazeness and contempt for the rule of law that would be unprecedented even for them." Greenwald notes that FISA prohibits any surveillance of American citizens without judicial approval and oversight. The Bush administration has already admitted to conducting just such surveillance (see December 17, 2005 and December 21, 2005), and President Bush has even stated his intention to expand the program (see December 19, 2005). The Justice Department and a number of administration officials have attempted to claim the NSA surveillance program is both legal and necessary (see December 19, 2005, December 19, 2005, December 21-22, 2005, and Early 2006); Greenwald writes that the Hamdan decision "decimated" those claims, a conclusion shared by a number of legal experts (see January 9, 2006). Moreover, he writes, there is no remaining excuse for Democratic senators not to endorse Senator Russ Feingold's resolution to censure Bush for violating FISA (see March 12, 2006 and After). The argument advanced by, among others, Senator Barack Obama (D-IL), that Bush believed he was complying with the law because his lawyers told him he was in compliance, is no longer relevant in light of Hamdan, Greenwald argues. "[T]here is no longer any good faith basis left for violating FISA. Ongoing warrantless eavesdropping can only be ordered by the president with a deliberate intent to break the law. After Hamdan, there are no more excuses left for the president to violate FISA, and there is therefore no more excuse left for Democratic senators to refuse to take a stand with Sen. Feingold against the administration's lawbreaking." Bush has two clear choices, Greenwald writes: either to comply with FISA or openly defy the Supreme Court. "If we are a country that continues to operate under the rule of law, compliance with the Supreme Court's ruling compels the immediate cessation of the president's warrantless eavesdropping program, as well as what are undoubtedly the other, still-secret programs prohibited by law but which have been justified by these same now-rejected theories of unlimited executive power. Put simply, after Hamdan, there are no more excuses left for the president's refusal to comply with the law." (Greenwald 7/8/2006)
Shortly after the Supreme Court rules that the Geneva Conventions apply to detainees suspected of terrorist affiliations (see June 30, 2006), the Bush administration publicly agrees to apply the Conventions to all terrorism suspects in US custody, and the Pentagon announces that it is now requiring all military officials to adhere to the Conventions in dealing with al-Qaeda detainees. The administration says that from now on, all prisoners in US custody will be treated humanely in accordance with the Conventions, a stipulation that would preclude torture and "harsh interrogation methods." Until the ruling, the administration has held that prisoners suspected of terrorist affiliations did not have the right to be granted Geneva protections (see February 7, 2002). Lawyer David Remes, who represents 17 Guantanamo detainees, says, "At a symbolic level, it is a huge moral triumph that the administration has acknowledged that it must, under the Supreme Court ruling, adhere to the Geneva Conventions. The legal architecture of the war on terror was built on a foundation of unlimited and unaccountable presidential power, including the power to decide unilaterally whether, when and to whom to apply the Geneva Conventions." But in the wake of the ruling the administration is pressuring Congress to introduce legislation that would strip detainees of some of the rights afforded them under the Conventions, including the right to free and open trials, even in a military setting. "The court-martial procedures are wholly inappropriate for the current circumstances and would be infeasible for the trial of these alien enemy combatants," says Steven Bradbury, the acting chief of the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel. Bradbury and Daniel Dell'Orto, the Defense Department's principal deputy attorney general, have repeatedly urged lawmakers to limit the rights of detainees captured in what the administration terms its war on terrorism. Dell'Orto says Congress should not require that enemy combatants be provided lawyers to challenge their imprisonment. Congressional Democrats have a different view. Senate Judiciary Chairman Patrick Leahy (D-VT) says, "I find it hard to fathom that this administration is so incompetent that it needs kangaroo-court procedures to convince a tribunal of United States military officers that the 'worst of the worst' imprisoned at Guantanamo Bay should be held accountable" for crimes. "We need to know why we're being asked to deviate from rules for courts-martial." (Babington and Abramowitz 7/12/2006)
Following up on the Supreme Court's recent Hamdan ruling that the Bush administration's military commissions trial system is illegal (see June 30, 2006), a dozen members of the Judge Advocate General (JAG) corps meets with a team of White House lawyers. The JAG officers are experts in military law; much of their training centers on how to best conduct their legal proceedings in line with the Geneva Conventions. Most JAG officers had opposed the Bush administration's decision to ignore Geneva (see June 8, 2004) in its treatment of detainees; in return, the White House's civilian lawyers had dismissed the JAG officers as, in author and reporter Charlie Savage's words, "closed minded, parochial, and simplistic." The JAGs view the Hamdan ruling as vindication of their objections; for its part, the Justice Department is eager to be able to say that it incorporated the JAGs' views in its proposed legislation for a new system of detainee trials. The JAGs' overriding concern is to ensure that no secret evidence can be used against detainees in future trials. Defendants must be able to see and respond to all evidence used against them, the JAGs believe, otherwise the trials are not in compliance with Geneva. The original military commissions required that defendants and their lawyers be removed from the courtroom when classified evidence was introduced, a practice that the military lawyers believe was a basic violation of defendant rights. Unfortunately for the JAGs, they quickly learn that the White House lawyers are uninterested in their views. When they take their seats in a Justice Department conference room, the White House lawyers inform them that there is no reason to discuss the secret evidence question, because more senior officials will ultimately make that decision. Instead, the JAGs are limited to discussing minor technical issues and typographical changes. The meeting does allow Attorney General Alberto Gonzales to testify to Congress in early August that "our deliberations have included detailed discussions with members of the JAG corps," whose "multiple rounds of comments… will be reflected in the legislative package." Unlike the White House lawyers, Congress will listen to the JAG officers, and will outlaw the use of secret evidence in detainee trials. (Savage 2007, pp. 279-281)
Former Nixon White House counsel John Dean is troubled by the Military Commissions Act (MCA) (see October 17, 2006) currently under consideration in Congress. The MCA authorizes military tribunals instead of criminal court trials for suspected terrorists. Dean supported the idea of tribunals when they were first suggested in 2001, but, he writes: "[T]he devil… arrived later with the details. It never occurred to me (and most people) that Bush & Co. would design a system more befitting a totalitarian state than a democratic nation that once led the world by its good example." After a previous tribunal procedure was struck down by the Supreme Court (see June 30, 2006), Bush sent another proposal to Congress in early September. Where the bill did not actively rewrite the Court's findings, it ignored them altogether, Dean writes. Dean finds the law a stunning reversal of decades—centuries, in some instances—of US jurisprudence and international law, including its dismissal of Geneva protections, its retroactive protection for US officials who may have tortured detainees, and its dismissal of habeas corpus rights for detainees. Dean calls the proposed legislation "shameful," and writes: "This proposal… is going to tell us a great deal about where we are as a nation, for as General [Colin] Powell said, 'The world is beginning to doubt the moral basis of our fight against terrorism. To redefine [the Geneva Conventions] would add to those doubts.' As will amending the war crimes law to absolve prior wrongs, denying detainees 'a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples,' and enacting a law that insults the Supreme Court." (Dean 9/22/2006)
Senator Barack Obama (D-IL) speaks out against the Military Commissions Act (MCA), which gives the federal government wide latitude to incarcerate and interrogate "terror suspects" without charge or due process of the law (see October 17, 2006). Obama says that "political considerations" for the upcoming midterm elections played a significant role in the timing of the bill, but "what we're doing here today—a debate over the fundamental human rights of the accused—should be bigger than politics. This is serious. If this was a debate with obvious ideological differences—heartfelt convictions that couldn't be settled by compromise—I would understand. But it's not." Obama notes that in five years of the Bush administration's system of military tribunals, "not one terrorist has been tried. Not one has been convicted. And in the end, the Supreme Court of the United States found the whole thing unconstitutional (see June 30, 2006), which is why we're here today. We could have fixed all of this in a way that allows us to detain and interrogate and try suspected terrorists while still protecting the accidentally accused from spending their lives locked away in Guantanamo Bay. Easily. This was not an either-or question." Congress could have written and passed legislation that would have established "a real military system of justice that would sort out the suspected terrorists from the accidentally accused," one that would be in line with domestic law and the Geneva Conventions. Instead, "politics won today.… The administration got its vote, and now it will have its victory lap, and now they will be able to go out on the campaign trail and tell the American people that they were the ones who were tough on the terrorists." Meanwhile, Obama says, questions about the efficacy and legality of the Bush system of justice persist, al-Qaeda and the Taliban are regrouping "while we look the other way," and the administration is bent on fighting a war in Iraq "that our own government's intelligence says is serving as al-Qaeda's best recruitment tool.… This is not how a serious administration would approach the problem of terrorism." (Obama 9/28/2006)
The newly passed Military Commissions Act (MCA—see October 17, 2006) gives the executive branch sweeping new powers sought by President Bush and Vice President Cheney since the 9/11 attacks, according to a New York Times analysis. Reporters Scott Shane and Adam Liptak write, "Rather than reining in the formidable presidential powers Mr. Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney have asserted since Sept. 11, 2001, the law gives some of those powers a solid statutory foundation. In effect it allows the president to identify enemies, imprison them indefinitely, and interrogate them—albeit with a ban on the harshest treatment—beyond the reach of the full court reviews traditionally afforded criminal defendants and ordinary prisoners. Taken as a whole, the law will give the president more power over terrorism suspects than he had before the Supreme Court decision this summer in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld that undercut more than four years of White House policy" (see June 30, 2006). The MCA "does not just allow the president to determine the meaning and application of the Geneva Conventions; it also strips the courts of jurisdiction to hear challenges to his interpretation." Additionally, it gives Bush and his designees the absolute, unchallenged power to define anyone they choose as an "enemy combatant," thereby stripping them of any traditional US legal protections and placing them under the far harsher and restrictive rubric of the MCA. "Over all, the legislation reallocates power among the three branches of government, taking authority away from the judiciary and handing it to the president." Law professor Bruce Ackerman notes, "The president walked away with a lot more than most people thought. [The MCA] further entrenches presidential power" and allows the administration to declare even an American citizen an unlawful combatant subject to indefinite detention. "And it's not only about these prisoners," says Ackerman. "If Congress can strip courts of jurisdiction over cases because it fears their outcome, judicial independence is threatened." (Shane and Liptak 9/30/2006)
President Bush signs the Military Commissions Act (MCA) into law. (White House 10/17/2006) The MCA is designed to give the president the authority to order "enemy detainees" tried by military commissions largely outside the scope of US civil and criminal procedures. The bill was requested by the Bush administration after the Supreme Court's ruling in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (see June 28, 2004) that the US could not hold prisoners indefinitely without access to the US judicial system, and that the administration's proposal that they be tried by military tribunals was unconstitutional (see June 28, 2004). (Mariner 10/9/2006) It is widely reported that the MCA does not directly apply to US citizens, but to only non-citizens defined as "enemy combatants. (Cohen 10/19/2006) However, six months later, a Bush administration lawyer will confirm that the administration believes the law does indeed apply to US citizens (see February 1, 2007).
Sweeping New Executive Powers - The MCA virtually eliminates the possibility that the Supreme Court can ever again act as a check on a president's power in the war on terrorism. Similarly, the law gives Congressional approval to many of the executive powers previously, and unilaterally, seized by the Bush administration. Former Justice Department official John Yoo celebrates the MCA, writing, "Congress… told the courts, in effect, to get out of the war on terror" (see October 19, 2006). (Savage 2007, pp. 319, 322)
'Abandoning' Core 'Principles' - The bill passed the Senate on a 65-34 vote, and the House by a 250-170 vote. The floor debate was often impassioned and highly partisan; House Majority Leader John Boehner (R-OH) called Democrats who opposed the bill "dangerous," and Senate Judiciary Committee member Patrick Leahy (D-VT) said this bill showed that the US is losing its "moral compass." Leahy asked during the debate, "Why would we allow the terrorists to win by doing to ourselves what they could never do, and abandon the principles for which so many Americans today and through our history have fought and sacrificed?" Senate Judiciary Committee chairman Arlen Specter (R-PA) had said he would vote against it because it is "patently unconstitutional on its face," but then voted for it, saying he believes the courts will eventually "clean it up." Specter's attempt to amend the bill to provide habeas corpus rights for enemy combatants was defeated, as were four Democratic amendments. Republicans have openly used the debate over the MCA as election-year fodder, with House Speaker Dennis Hastert (R-IL) saying after the vote that "House Democrats have voted to protect the rights of terrorists," and Boehner decrying "the Democrats' irrational opposition to strong national security policies." Democrats such as Senator Barack Obama (D-IL) say they will not fight back at such a level. "There will be 30-second attack ads and negative mail pieces, and we will be called everything from cut-and-run quitters to Defeatocrats, to people who care more about the rights of terrorists than the protection of Americans," Obama says. "While I know all of this, I'm still disappointed, and I'm still ashamed, because what we're doing here today—a debate over the fundamental human rights of the accused—should be bigger than politics." (Babington and Weisman 10/19/2006) After winning the vote, Hastert accused Democrats who opposed the bill of "putting their liberal agenda ahead of the security of America." Hastert said the Democrats "would gingerly pamper the terrorists who plan to destroy innocent Americans' lives" and create "new rights for terrorists." (New York Times 10/19/2006)
Enemy Combatants - The MCA applies only to "enemy combatants." Specifically, the law defines an "unlawful enemy combatant" as a person "who has engaged in hostilities or who has purposefully and materially supported hostilities against the United States or its co-belligerents," and who is not a lawful combatant. Joanne Mariner of Human Rights Watch says the definition far exceeds the traditionally accepted definition of combatant as someone who directly participates in hostilities. But under the MCA, someone who provides "material support" for terrorists—whether that be in the form of financial contributions or sweeping the floors at a terrorist camp—can be so defined. Worse, the label can be applied without recourse by either Bush or the secretary of defense, after a "competent tribunal" makes the determination. The MCA provides no guidelines as to what criteria these tribunals should use. Taken literally, the MCA gives virtually unrestricted power to the tribunals to apply the label as requested by the president or the secretary. Mariner believes the definition is both "blatantly unconstitutional" and a direct contradiction of centuries of Supreme Court decisions that define basic judicial rights. (Mariner 10/9/2006) Under this definition, the president can imprison, without charge or trial, any US citizen accused of donating money to a Middle East charity that the government believes is linked to terrorist activity. Citizens associated with "fringe" groups such as the left-wing Black Panthers or right-wing militias can be incarcerated without trial or charge. Citizens accused of helping domestic terrorists can be so imprisoned. Law professor Bruce Ackerman calls the MCA "a massive Congressional expansion of the class of enemy combatants," and warns that the law may "haunt all of us on the morning after the next terrorist attack" by enabling a round of mass detentions similar to the roundup of Japanese-American citizens during World War II. (Savage 2007, pp. 322)
Military Commissions - The MCA mandates that enemy combatants are to be tried by military commissions, labeled "regularly constituted courts that afford all the necessary 'judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples' for purposes of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions." The commissions must have a minimum of five commissioned military officers and a military judge; if death is a possible penalty, the commissions must have at least 12 officers. The defendant's guilt must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt; convictions require a two-thirds vote. Sentences of beyond 10 years require a three-quarters vote, and death penalties must be unanimously voted for. Defendants may either represent themselves or by military or civilian counsel. The court procedures themselves, although based on standard courts-martial proceedings, are fluid, and can be set or changed as the secretary of defense sees fit. Statements obtained through methods defined as torture are inadmissible, but statements take by coercion and "cruel treatment" can be admitted. The MCA sets the passage of the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA—see December 15, 2005) as a benchmark—statements obtained before the December 30, 2005 enactment of that law can be used, even if the defendant was "coerced," if a judge finds the statement "reasonable and possessing sufficient probative value." Statements after that date must have been taken during interrogations that fall under the DTA guidelines. Defendants have the right to examine and respond to evidence seen by the commission, a provision originally opposed by the administration. However, if the evidence is classified, an unclassified summary of that material is acceptable, and classified exculpatory evidence can be denied in lieu of what the MCA calls "acceptable substitutes." Hearsay evidence is admissible, as is evidence obtained without search warrants. Generally, defendants will not be allowed to inquire into the classified "sources, methods, or activities" surrounding evidence against them. Some human rights activists worry that evidence obtained through torture can be admitted, and the fact that it was obtained by torture, if that detail is classified, will not be presented to the court or preclude the evidence from being used. Public access to the commissions will be quite limited. Many experts claim these commissions are illegal both by US constitutional law and international law. (Mariner 10/9/2006)
Secret Courts - The military tribunals can be partially or completely closed to public scrutiny if the presiding judge deems such an action necessary to national security. The government can convey such concerns to the judge without the knowledge of the defense. The judge can exclude the accused from the trial if he deems it necessary for safety or if he decides the defendant is "disruptive." Evidence can be presented in secret, without the knowledge of the defense and without giving the defense a chance to examine that evidence, if the judge finds that evidence "reliable." And during the trial, the prosecution can at any time assert a "national security privilege" that would stop "the examination of any witness" if that witness shows signs of discussing sensitive security matters. This provision can easily be used to exclude any potential defense witness who might "breach national security" with their testimony. Author and investigative reporter Robert Parry writes, "In effect, what the new law appears to do is to create a parallel 'star chamber' system for the prosecution, imprisonment, and elimination of enemies of the state, whether those enemies are foreign or domestic." (Parry 10/19/2006)
Appeals - Guilty verdicts are automatically appealed to a Court of Military Commission Review, consisting of three appellate military justices. The DC Circuit Court of Appeals has extremely limited authority of review of the commissions; even its authority to judge whether a decision is consistent with the Constitution is limited "to the extent [that the Constitution is] applicable."
Types of Crimes - Twenty-eight specific crimes fall under the rubric of the military commissions, including conspiracy (not a traditional war crime), murder of protected persons, murder in violation of the bill of war, hostage-taking, torture, cruel or inhuman treatment, mutilation or maiming, rape, sexual abuse or assault, hijacking, terrorism, providing material support for terrorism, and spying. (Mariner 10/9/2006)
CIA Abuses - The MCA, responding to the recent Supreme Court decision of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (see June 30, 2006) that found the CIA's secret detention program and abusive interrogation practices illegal, redefines and amends the law to make all but the most pernicious interrogation practices, even those defined as torture by the War Crimes Act and the Geneva Conventions, legal. The MCA actually rules that the Geneva Conventions are all but unenforceable in US courts. It also provides retroactive protection under the law to all actions as far back as November 1997. Under the MCA, practices such as waterboarding, stress positioning, and sleep deprivation cannot be construed as torture. (Mariner 10/9/2006) The MCA even states that rape as part of interrogations cannot be construed as torture unless the intent of the rapist to torture his victim can be proven, a standard rejected by international law. The MCA provides such a narrow definition of coercion and sexual abuse that most of the crimes perpetrated at Abu Ghraib are now legal. (Goodman 10/4/2006) Although the MCA seems to cover detainee abuse for all US agencies, including the CIA, Bush says during the signing of the bill, "This bill will allow the Central Intelligence Agency to continue its program for questioning key terrorist leaders and operatives." International law expert Scott Horton will note, "The administration wanted these prohibitions on the military and not on the CIA, but it did not work out that way." Apparently Bush intends to construe the law to exempt the CIA from its restrictions, such as they are, on torture and abuse of prisoners. (Benjamin 5/22/2007)
No Habeas Corpus Rights - Under the MCA, enemy combatants no longer have the right to file suit under the habeas corpus provision of US law. This means that they cannot challenge the legality of their detention, or raise claims of torture and mistreatment. Even detainees who have been released can never file suit to seek redress for their treatment while in US captivity. (Mariner 10/25/2006)
Retroactive Immunity - The administration added a provision to the MCA that rewrote the War Crimes Act retroactively to November 26, 1997, making any offenses considered war crimes before the MCA is adopted no longer punishable under US law. Former Nixon White House counsel John Dean will write in 2007 that the only reason he can fathom for the change is to protect administration officials—perhaps including President Bush himself—from any future prosecutions as war criminals. Dean will note that if the administration actually believes in the inherent and indisputable powers of the presidency, as it has long averred, then it would not worry about any such criminal liability. (Dean 2007, pp. 239-240)
John Yoo, a former Justice Department official, celebrates the passage of the Military Commissions Act (see October 17, 2006). Yoo writes that Congress has ordered "the courts, in effect, to get out of the war on terror." The bill is not so much a victory for the presidency, Yoo writes, as it is a loss for the judiciary, a "stinging rebuke to the Supreme Court. It strips the courts of jurisdiction to hear any habeas corpus claim filed by any alien enemy combatant anywhere in the world." It supersedes the Court's ruling in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (see June 30, 2006), which Yoo calls "an unprecedented attempt by the court to rewrite the law of war and intrude into war policy… [a] stunning power grab." Now, he writes: "Congress and the president did not take the court's power grab lying down. They told the courts, in effect, to get out of the war on terror, stripped them of habeas jurisdiction over alien enemy combatants, and said there was nothing wrong with the military commissions. It is the first time since the New Deal that Congress had so completely divested the courts of power over a category of cases. It is also the first time since the Civil War that Congress saw fit to narrow the court's habeas powers in wartime because it disagreed with its decisions. The law goes farther. It restores to the president command over the management of the war on terror. It directly reverses Hamdan by making clear that the courts cannot take up the Geneva Conventions. Except for some clearly defined war crimes, whose prosecution would also be up to executive discretion, it leaves interpretation and enforcement of the treaties up to the president. It even forbids courts from relying on foreign or international legal decisions in any decisions involving military commissions." Yoo had previously authored numerous torture memos (see October 4, 2001, November 6-10, 2001, November 20, 2001, December 21, 2001, December 28, 2001, January 9, 2002, January 11, 2002, January 14, 2002, January 22, 2002, January 24-26, 2002, March 13, 2002, July 22, 2002, August 1, 2002, August 1, 2002, and March 14, 2003) and opinions expanding the power of the president (see September 21, 2001, September 25, 2001, September 25, 2001, October 23, 2001, October 23, 2001, and June 27, 2002). (Yoo 10/19/2006)
Exercising its new authority under the just-signed Military Commissions Act (MCA—see October 17, 2006), the Bush administration notifies the US District Court in Washington that it no longer has jurisdiction to consider 196 habeas corpus petitions filed by Guantanamo detainees. Many of these petitions cover multiple detainees. According to the MCA, "no court, justice, or judge" can consider those petitions or other actions related to treatment or imprisonment filed by anyone designated as an enemy combatant, now or in the future. The MCA is already being challenged as unconstitutional by several lawyers representing Guantanamo detainees. The MCA goes directly against two recent Supreme Court cases, Rasul v. Bush (see June 28, 2004) and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (see June 30, 2006), which provide detainees with habeas corpus and other fundamental legal rights. Many Congressional members and legal experts say that the anti-habeas provisions of the MCA are unconstitutional. For instance, Senator Arlen Specter (R-PA) notes that the Constitution says the right of any prisoner to challenge detention "shall not be suspended" except in cases of "rebellion or invasion." (DeYoung 10/20/2006) Law professor Joseph Margulies, who is involved in the detainee cases, says the administration's persistence on the issue "demonstrates how difficult it is for the courts to enforce [the clause] in the face of a resolute executive branch that is bound and determined to resist it." Vincent Warren of the Center for Constitutional Rights, which represents many of the detainees, expects the legal challenges to the law will eventually wind up before the Supreme Court. (DeYoung 10/20/2006)
Steven Bradbury, the chief of the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), issues a classified memo on what a new interpretation of the Geneva Conventions' Common Article 3 means for the CIA's "enhanced interrogation program." The Bradbury memo, released after months of debate among Bush officials regarding the ramifications of the recent Supreme Court decision extending Geneva protections to enemy combatants in US custody (see June 30, 2006), new legislation following the Court's decision (see October 17, 2006), and an executive order on interrogations (see July 20, 2007), spells out what interrogation practices the CIA can use. The memo's existence will not become known until after the 2009 release of four Justice Department torture memos (see April 16, 2009). Michael Ratner of the Center for Constitutional Rights will say upon learning of the memo, "The CIA still seems to want to get authority to interrogate people outside of what would be found to be a violation of the Geneva Conventions and the law." Ratner will add that the memo raises questions about why the CIA felt it needed expanded authorities for interrogations. "What we don't know is whether, after Hamdan, that 2007 memo modifies what the CIA is able to do in interrogation techniques," he will say. "But what's more interesting is why the CIA thinks it needs to use those interrogation techniques. Who are they interrogating in 2007? Who are they torturing in 2007? Is that they're nervous about going beyond what OLC has said? These are secret-site people. Who are they? What happened to them?" (Ackerman 4/21/2009)
Aziz Huq, an author and the director of the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University, writes that the Protect America Act (PAA-see August 5, 2007) came about as a result of what he calls "the most recent example of the national security waltz, a three-step administration maneuver for taking defeat and turning it into victory." Step one is a court defeat for the administration, for example regarding detainees at Guantanamo (see June 28, 2004), or the overruling of military commissions in 2006 (see June 30, 2006). The second step, which comes weeks or months later, is an announcement that the ruling has created a security crisis and must be "remedied" through immediate legislation. The third and final step is the administration pushing legislation through Congress, such as the Detainee Treatment Act (see December 15, 2005) or the Military Commissions Act, that, Huq writes, "not only undoes the good court decision but also inflicts substantial damage to the infrastructure of accountability."
Step One: FISC Refuses to Approve NSA's Surveillance Program - In January 2007, the administration announced that it was submitting the NSA's domestic surveillance program to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), the secret court that issues FISA warrants for surveillance (see May 1, 2007). This was due to pending court cases threatening to rule the program in violation of FISA and the Fourth Amendment; the administration wanted to forestall, or at least sidestep, those upcoming rulings. In June, FISC refused to approve parts of the NSA program that involved monitoring overseas communications that passed through US telecom switches. Since a tremendous amount of overseas communications are routed through US networks, this ruling jeopardized the NSA's previous ability to wiretap such communications virtually at will without a warrant. The administration objected to the NSA having to secure such warrants.
Step Two: The Drumbeat Begins - Months later, the drumbeat for new legislation to give the NSA untrammeled rights to monitor "overseas" communications, which not only traveled through US networks, but often began or ended with US citizens, began with appearances in the right-wing media by administration supporters, where they insisted that the FISC ruling was seriously hampering the NSA's ability to garner much-needed intelligence on terrorist plots against the US. The White House and Congressional Republicans drafted legislation giving the NSA what it wanted, and presented it during the last week of the Congressional session, minimizing the time needed for scrutiny of the legislation as well as reducing the time available for meaningful debate.
Step Three: Passing a Law With Hidden Teeth - The legislation that would become the Protect America Act was carefully written by Bush officials, and would go much farther than giving the NSA the leeway it needed to wiretap US citizens. Instead, as Huq writes, "the Protect America Act is a dramatic, across-the-board expansion of government authority to collect information without judicial oversight." Democrats believed they had negotiated a deal with the administration's Director of National Intelligence, Mike McConnell, to limit the law to addressing foreign surveillance wiretaps, but, Huq writes, "the White House torpedoed that deal and won a far broader law." The law removes any real accountability over domestic surveillance by either Congress or the judiciary. Former CIA officer Philip Giraldi says that the PAA provides "unlimited access to currently protected personal information that is already accessible through an oversight procedure." The law is part of the administration's continual attempts to "eviscerat[e]" the checks and balances that form the foundation of US democracy.
Ramifications - The law includes the provision that warrantless surveillance can be "directed at a person reasonably believed to be located outside of the United States." Huq writes that this is a tremendously broad and vague standard that allows "freewheeling surveillance of Americans' international calls and e-mails." He adds: "The problem lies in the words 'directed at.' Under this language, the NSA could decide to 'direct' its surveillance at Peshawar, Pakistan—and seize all US calls going to and from there.… Simply put, the law is an open-ended invitation to collect Americans' international calls and e-mails." The law does not impose any restrictions on the reason for surveillance. National security concerns are no longer the standard for implementing surveillance of communications. And the phrase "reasonably believe" is uncertain. The provisions for oversight are, Huq writes, "risibly weak." Surveillance need only be explained by presentations by the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General to FISC, which has little room to invalidate any surveillance, and furthermore will not be informed of any specific cases of surveillance. As for Congress, the Attorney General only need inform that body of "incidents of noncompliance" as reported by the administration. Congress must rely on the administration to police itself; it cannot demand particulars or examine documentation for itself. The law expires in six months, but, Huq notes, that deadline comes up in the middle of the 2008 presidential campaign, with all the pressures that entails. And the law allows "the NSA to continue wielding its new surveillance powers for up to a year afterward." The law, Huq writes, "does not enhance security-related surveillance powers. Rather, it allows the government to spy when there is no security justification. And it abandons all but the pretense of oversight." (Huq 8/7/2007)
The former lead prosecutor for terrorism tribunals at Guantanamo, Colonel Morris Davis, tells reporters that senior officials at the Pentagon pushed for convictions of high-profile detainees before the November 2008 presidential elections, placing politics ahead of duty. Davis says that the pressure from the Pentagon played a part in his decision to resign (see October 4, 2007). Davis says senior Defense Department officials discussed the "strategic political value" of putting some prominent detainees on trial in a September 2006 meeting (see September 29, 2006). Davis also says he objected to newly appointed senior officials' insistence on using classified evidence in closed sessions of court, and to the military commissions being put under Pentagon general counsel William J. Haynes (see October 4, 2007).
'Less than Full, Fair and Open' - Davis had serious concerns about the use of classified evidence, due to worries it could be seen to be tainting trials. Davis says that since Brigadier General Thomas Hartmann's arrival as legal adviser to the convening authority in the summer of 2007, Hartmann has attempted to speed up trials that will engage media attention and show the public that the process works (see July 2007). "He said, the way we were going to validate the system was by getting convictions and good sentences," Davis says. "I felt I was being pressured to do something less than full, fair and open." (White 10/20/2007) Pentagon regulations require the legal adviser to be an impartial administration and not an arm of the prosecution.
'Political Commission' - Law professor Marc Falkoff, who represents some of the Guantanamo detainees, will observe that the interference Davis cites "is a patent violation of Rule 104 of the Manual for Military Commissions and Section 949b of the Military Commissions Act, both of which make it unlawful to 'attempt to coerce or, by any unauthorized means, influence… the exercise of professional judgment by trial counsel or defense counsel.'" Falkoff notes that in the Supreme Court's Hamdan verdict (see June 30, 2006), Justice Anthony Kennedy specifically disapproved of the first military commissions because they lacked "the safeguards that are important to the fairness of the proceedings and the independence of the court." Davis says, "[A]s things stand right now, I think it's a disgrace to call it a military commission—it's a political commission." (Falkoff 11/2/2007)
Navy Lieutenant Commander Brian Mizer, the lawyer for Guantanamo detainee Salim Hamdan, says that senior Pentagon officials are orchestrating war crimes prosecutions for the 2008 presidential campaign. In a court brief filed on this day, Mizer describes a September 29, 2006 meeting at the Pentagon where Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon England asked lawyers to consider 9/11-related prosecutions in light of the upcoming presidential campaign. "We need to think about charging some of the high-value detainees because there could be strategic political value to charging some of these detainees before the election," England is quoted as saying (see September 29, 2006). Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman refuses to discuss specifics of the case, but says that the Pentagon "has always been extraordinarily careful to guard against any unlawful command influence" in upcoming military commissions trials. Mizer says that because of England's instructions, and other examples of alleged political interference, his client cannot get a fair trial. Three weeks before England's observation about the "strategic political value" of the trials, President Bush disclosed that he had ordered the CIA to transfer "high-value detainees" from years of secret custody to Guantanamo for trial.
Issues 'Scrambled' - Attorney Eugene Fidell, president of the National Institute of Military Justice, says the Hamdan motion exposes the problem of Pentagon appointees' supervisory relationship to the war court. "It scrambles relationships that ought to be kept clear," he says. England's statement, says Fidell, is "enough that you'd want to hold an evidentiary hearing about it, with live witnesses. It does strike me as disturbing for there to be even a whiff of political considerations in what should be a quasi-judicial determination." Susan Crawford is the White House-appointed supervisor for the court proceedings; England is a two-term White House appointee who has supervised the prison camps' administrative processes. Crawford, England, and other White House officials have crossed the legal barriers that separate various functions of a military court, Mizer argues. Mizer plans to call the former chief prosecutor for the Guantanamo trials, Morris Davis (see October 4, 2007), who first brought the England remark to light. Davis resigned his position after contending that political influence was interfering with the proper legal procedures surrounding the prosecution of accused war criminals.
Motion for Dismissal - Mizer's motion asks the judge, Navy Captain Keith Allred, to dismiss the case against Hamdan as an alleged 9/11 co-conspirator on the grounds that Bush administration officials have exerted "unlawful command influence." Hamdan is a former driver for Osama bin Laden whose lawyers successfully challenged an earlier war court format (see June 30, 2006). Hamdan's case is on track to be the first full-scale US war crimes tribunal since World War II. (Rosenberg 3/28/2008)
The Supreme Court rules 5-4 that foreign terror suspects held without charge at Guantanamo Bay have the Constitutional right to challenge their detention in US civilian courts. The Court splits along ideological lines, with the more liberal and moderate members supporting the finding, and the more conservative members opposing it. Justice Anthony Kennedy, considered a centrist, writes the ruling. He writes, "The laws and Constitution are designed to survive, and remain in force, in extraordinary times." The ruling specifically strikes down the portion of the Military Commissions Act (see October 17, 2006) that denies detainees their habeas corpus rights to file petitions. (Sherman 6/12/2008; Associated Press 6/12/2008) The case is Boumediene v. Bush, and was filed in the Supreme Court in March 2007 on behalf of Lakhdar Boumediene, a Bosnian citizen held in the Guantanamo camp since 2002 (see January 18, 2002). It was combined with a similar case, Al Odah v United States (see October 20, 2004). (Oyez (.org) 6/2007; Shawl 6/29/2007)
'Stinging Rebuke' for Bush Administration - The ruling is considered a serious setback for the Bush administration (a "stinging rebuke," in the words of the Associated Press), which insists that terror suspects detained at Guantanamo and elsewhere have no rights in the US judicial system. It is unclear whether the ruling will lead to prompt hearings for detainees (Associated Press 6/12/2008; Sherman 6/12/2008) ; law professor James Cohen, who represents two detainees, says, "Nothing is going to happen between June 12 and January 20," when the next president takes office. Justice Department spokesman Peter Carr says the decision will not affact war crimes trials already in the works: "Military commission trials will therefore continue to go forward."
Scalia: Ruling Will 'Cause More Americans to Be Killed' - President Bush says he disagrees with the ruling, and says he may seek new legislation to keep detainees under lock and key. Justice Antonin Scalia, the leader of the Court's ideological right wing, agrees; in a "blistering" dissent, he writes that the decision "will make the war harder on us. It will almost certainly cause more Americans to be killed." In his own dissent, Chief Justice John Roberts argues that the ruling strikes down "the most generous set of procedural protections ever afforded aliens detained by this country as enemy combatants." Joining Scalia and Roberts in the minority are Justices Samuel Alito and Clarence Thomas. Voting in the majority are Kennedy and Justices Stephen Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, David Souter, and John Paul Stevens.
Military Tribunals 'Doomed,' Says Navy Lawyer - Former Navy lawyer Charles Swift, who argued a similar case before the Supreme Court in Hamdan v Rumsfeld (see June 30, 2006), says he believes the ruling removes any legal basis for keeping Guantanamo open, and says that military tribunals are "doomed." The entire rationale for Guantanamo and the tribunals, Swift says, is the idea that "constitutional protections wouldn't apply." But now, "The court said the Constitution applies. They're in big trouble." Democrats and many human rights organizations hail the ruling as affirming the US's commitment to the rule of law; some Republican lawmakers say the ruling puts foreign terrorists' rights over the safety of the American people. Vincent Warren, the head of the Center for Constitutional Rights, says: "The Supreme Court has finally brought an end to one of our nation's most egregious injustices. By granting the writ of habeas corpus, the Supreme Court recognizes a rule of law established hundreds of years ago and essential to American jurisprudence since our nation's founding." (Associated Press 6/12/2008)
Six FBI agents and one Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) agent testify at a military commission hearing for detainee Salim Ahmed Hamdan. Although at least one witness is anonymous, the FBI agents testifying include Robert Fuller and Craig Donnachie. Fuller admits that the bureau failed to read Hamdan his Miranda rights following his capture in 2001 (see November 24, 2001), and describes a tour of al-Qaeda facilities Hamdan took them on (see Shortly after November 24, 2001). Although Hamdan only provided what they thought was incomplete information, the agents all deny coercing or threatening him. (Gomez 7/24/2008; Mikkelsen 7/24/2008)
The senior Bush administration official in charge of bringing Guantanamo Bay detainees to trial rules that the US military tortured a detainee, and therefore the US cannot try him. Susan Crawford, the convening authority of military commissions, says that the US tortured Mohamed al-Khatani, a Saudi national accused of planning to participate in the September 11 attacks (see August 4, 2001). Crawford says al-Khatani was interrogated with techniques that included sustained isolation, sleep deprivation, nudity and prolonged exposure to cold, and which cumulatively left him in a "life-threatening condition." Crawford says: "We tortured [al-]Khatani. His treatment met the legal definition of torture. And that's why I did not refer the case" for prosecution. Crawford is a retired judge who served as the Army's general counsel during the Reagan administration and the Pentagon's inspector general during the first Bush administration. She is the first senior official of the current Bush administration to publicly state that a detainee was tortured while in US custody.
Cumulative Effect Equals Torture - None of the individual techniques used against al-Khatani were torturous in and of themselves, Crawford says, but the cumulative effect—particularly their duration and the deleterious effect on al-Khatani's health—combined to constitute torture. "The techniques they used were all authorized, but the manner in which they applied them was overly aggressive and too persistent," she says. "You think of torture, you think of some horrendous physical act done to an individual. This was not any one particular act; this was just a combination of things that had a medical impact on him, that hurt his health. It was abusive and uncalled for. And coercive. Clearly coercive. It was that medical impact that pushed me over the edge" to call it torture. Al-Khatani has been in US custody since December 2001 (see December 2001), and was interrogated from November 2002 through January 2003 (reports of the exact dates vary—see August 8, 2002-January 15, 2003 and October 11, 2002). He was held in isolation until April 2003. "For 160 days his only contact was with the interrogators," Crawford says. "Forty-eight of 54 consecutive days of 18-to-20-hour interrogations. Standing naked in front of a female agent. Subject to strip searches. And insults to his mother and sister." He was threatened with a military dog named Zeus. He "was forced to wear a woman's bra and had a thong placed on his head during the course of his interrogation," Crawford says, and "was told that his mother and sister were whores." With a leash tied to his chains, he was led around the room "and forced to perform a series of dog tricks," according to reports from his interrogations. He was twice hospitalized with bradycardia, a potentially lethal condition where the heartbeat drops to abnormally low levels.
Ruling Halts Future Prosecution against al-Khatani - Crawford dismissed war crimes charges against al-Khatani in May 2008 (see May 13, 2008). In November, military prosecutors said they would refile charges against al-Khatani, based on subsequent interrogations that did not employ harsh techniques (see November 18, 2008). But Crawford says that she would not let any such prosecutions go forward. However, Crawford is not unaware of the potential danger posed by letting him go free. "There's no doubt in my mind he would've been on one of those planes had he gained access to the country in August 2001," Crawford says. "He's a muscle hijacker.… He's a very dangerous man. What do you do with him now if you don't charge him and try him? I would be hesitant to say, 'Let him go.'" Al-Khatani's civilian lawyer, Gitanjali Gutierrez, says, "There is no doubt he was tortured." Gutierrez says: "He has loss of concentration and memory loss, and he suffers from paranoia.… He wants just to get back to Saudi Arabia, get married and have a family." Al-Khatani "adamantly denies he planned to join the 9/11 attack," she adds. "He has no connections to extremists." Gutierrez says she thinks Saudi Arabia has an effective rehabilitation program and Khatani ought to be returned there. (Woodward 1/14/2009; Glaberson 1/14/2009) His lawyers at the Center for Constitutional Rights describe him as a broken, suicidal man who can never be prosecuted because of his treatment at the hands of his captors. (Glaberson 1/14/2009)
Sympathetic but Unbending - Crawford, a lifelong Republican, says she sympathizes with the situation faced by the Bush administration and the CIA after the 9/11 attacks. "I sympathize with the intelligence gatherers in those days after 9/11, not knowing what was coming next and trying to gain information to keep us safe," she acknowledges. "But there still has to be a line that we should not cross. And unfortunately what this has done, I think, has tainted everything going forward." Noting that the 2006 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld case (see June 30, 2006) disallowed torture but allowed for "coercive interrogation techniques," Crawford says even those techniques should not be allowed: "You don't allow it in a regular court." Crawford says she is not yet sure if any of the other five detainees accused of participating in the 9/11 plot, including their leader, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, were tortured, but she believes they may have been. "I assume torture," she says, and notes that CIA Director Michael Hayden has publicly confirmed that Mohammed was one of three detainees subjected to waterboarding, a technique classified by law as torture. Crawford has not blocked prosecution of the other five detainees. Ultimately, she says, the responsibility for the farrago of illegal detentions and torture rests with President Bush. He was right to create a system to try suspected terrorists, she says, but the implementation was fatally flawed. "I think he hurt his own effort.… I think someone should acknowledge that mistakes were made and that they hurt the effort and take responsibility for it.… We learn as children it's easier to ask for forgiveness than it is for permission. I think the buck stops in the Oval Office." (Woodward 1/14/2009)
Rules Change - Pentagon spokesman Geoff Morrell says that the Hamdan case changed the rules, and thus retroactively classified al-Khatani's treatment as torture. "The [Defense] Department has always taken allegations of abuse seriously," he says. "We have conducted more than a dozen investigations and reviews of our detention operations, including specifically the interrogation of Mohamed al-Khatani, the alleged 20th hijacker. They concluded the interrogation methods used at [Guantanamo], including the special techniques used on Khatani in 2002, were lawful. However, subsequent to those reviews, the Department adopted new and more restrictive policies and procedures for interrogation and detention operations. Some of the aggressive questioning techniques used on al-Khatani, although permissible at the time, are no longer allowed in the updated Army field manual." (Woodward 1/14/2009)
Prosecutors Unprepared - When Crawford came to Guantanamo as convening authority in 2007, she says "the prosecution was unprepared" to bring cases to trial. Even after four years of working possible cases, "they were lacking in experience and judgment and leadership." She continues: "A prosecutor has an ethical obligation to review all the evidence before making a charging decision. And they didn't have access to all the evidence, including medical records, interrogation logs, and they were making charging decisions without looking at everything." It took over a year, and the intervention of Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon England, for prosecutors to turn over possibly exculpatory evidence to defense lawyers, even though the law requires that such evidence be turned over immediately. The entire system at Guantanamo is a blot on the reputation of the US and its military judicial system, she says: "There's an assumption out there that everybody was tortured. And everybody wasn't tortured. But unfortunately perception is reality." The system she oversees cannot function now, she believes. "Certainly in the public's mind, or politically speaking, and certainly in the international community" it may be forever tainted. "It may be too late." (Woodward 1/14/2009)
Georgetown law professor Neal Katyal is to be named the Justice Department's deputy solicitor general. Katyal successfully argued for the defense in the landmark Hamdan v. Rumsfeld trial before the Supreme Court (see June 30, 2006). Legal Times reporter Joe Palazzolo writes, "Katyal's appointment is another strong signal of President-elect Barack Obama's intentions to depart sharply from the terrorist detention and interrogation policies of the Bush administration." The Hamdan case, "which marked Katyal's first appearance before the high court, was a stinging rebuke to [President Bush's] broad assertion of wartime power." Katyal's boss, Harvard Law School dean Elena Kagan, was named earlier in the month. Katyal was incoming Attorney General Eric Holder's national security adviser in the Justice Department from 1998 to 1999, when Holder was deputy attorney general for the Clinton administration. Katyal also served as one of the co-counsels for Vice President Gore in the Supreme Court election dispute of December 2000. He once clerked for Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer. (Palazzolo 1/17/2009)
Officials for the incoming Obama administration are dismayed to find that the task of closing Guantanamo Bay, one of President Obama's first orders as president (see January 22, 2009), is going to be much harder than anticipated, because the records and details of the approximately 245 prisoners in custody are in terrific disarray. Obama officials, barred from examining classified records on the detainees until the inauguration, also find that many of the prisoners have no comprehensive case files at all. What information that does exist on the detainees is, according to a senior Obama official, "scattered throughout the executive branch." Most detainees have little more than a dossier containing brief summaries of information, and lack any sort of background or investigative information that would be required for federal prosecutions. Obama named a Cabinet-level panel to review each case individually before the base is to be closed in a year, and those panel members will now have to spend weeks and perhaps months hunting down and correlating relevant material.
'Food Fights' among Bush Agencies - Officials from the former Bush administration admit that the files are incomplete, and that no single government office was tasked with keeping the information on Guantanamo detainees together. They blame the CIA and other intelligence agencies for not adequately sharing information, and add that the Bush administration's focus was more on detention and interrogation, and much less on putting together information for future prosecutions. A former Pentagon official says that "regular food fights" between competing government agencies over the sharing of information contributed to the lack of coherent and consistent files. (A CIA official denies that the agency ever balked at sharing information with other governmental agencies, and says the Defense Department was more likely to be responsible for laspes in information.)
Former Bush Officials Say Obama Officials 'Look[ing] for Excuses' - However, other former Bush officials say the Obama team is trying to "look for excuses" instead of dealing with the complexities of the issues involved. Obama officials, after promising quick solutions, are now "backpedaling and trying to buy time" by blaming its predecessor, according to a former senior Bush official. He says that "all but about 60… are either high-level al-Qaeda people responsible for 9/11 or bombings, or were high-level Taliban or al-Qaeda facilitators or money people," and the Obama administration will come to the same conclusion as Bush officials: that they need to stay in detention without trial or charges.
Files 'Not Comprehensive,' Problem Noted in Previous Judicial Proceedings - But Obama officials say they want to make their own judgments. A senior Obama official says: "The consensus among almost everyone is that the current system is not in our national interest and not sustainable. [But] it's clear that we can't clear up this issue overnight" in part because the files "are not comprehensive." Justice Department lawyers claim that after the Supreme Court ruled detainees have habeas corpus rights (see June 30, 2006), Bush officials were "overwhelmed" by the sudden need to gather and correlate information and material. In one federal filing, the Justice Department told a court that the record for a particular detainee "is not simply a collection of papers sitting in a box at the Defense Department. It is a massive undertaking just to produce the record in this one case." In another filing, Justice Department officials told a court that "defending these cases requires an intense, inter-agency coordination of efforts. None of the relevant agencies, however, was prepared to handle this volume of habeas cases on an expedited basis." Some former military officials say that evidence gathered for military commissions trials was scattered and incomplete. One former Guantanamo prosecutor, Darrel Vandeveld, says evidence was "strewn throughout the prosecution offices in desk drawers, bookcases packed with vaguely-labeled plastic containers, or even simply piled on the tops of desks." He says he once accidentally found "crucial physical evidence" that "had been tossed in a locker located at Guantanamo and promptly forgotten." (DeYoung and Finn 1/25/2009) Vandeveld says that evidence at Guantanamo was often so disorganized "it was like a stash of documents found in a village in a raid and just put on a plane to the US." (United Press International 1/14/2009)
Prosecutors Lacked Evidence Necessary for Prosecutions, Says Senior Official - "A prosecutor has an ethical obligation to review all the evidence before making a charging decision," says Susan Crawford, the convening authority for the military commissions. "And they didn't have access to all the evidence, including medical records, interrogation logs, and they were making charging decisions without looking at everything." Crawford has stated that another detainee was tortured while at Guantanamo (see January 14, 2009). (Weiss 1/14/2009)
Defense Department: Information There, but Scattered - Pentagon spokesman Geoff Morrell says the files are in good order: "Fundamentally, we believe that the individual files on each detainee are comprehensive and sufficiently organized," however, "in many cases, there will be thousands of pages of documents… which makes a comprehensive assessment a time-consuming endeavor.… Not all the documents are physically located in one place," but most are available through a database. "The main point here is that there are lots of records, and we are prepared to make them available to anybody who needs to see them as part of this review." (DeYoung and Finn 1/25/2009)
John Yoo, the former Bush administration legal adviser who authored numerous opinions on the legality of torture, detentions without legal representation, and warrantless wiretapping (see November 6-10, 2001, December 28, 2001, January 9, 2002, August 1, 2002, and August 1, 2002, among others), writes an op-ed for the Wall Street Journal opposing the Obama administration's intent to close the Guantanamo Bay detention facility (see January 20, 2009 and January 22, 2009)) and restrict the CIA's ability to torture detainees (see January 22, 2009). Yoo, now a law professor and a member of the neoconservative American Enterprise Institute, writes that while President Obama's decision "will please his base" and ease the objections to the Bush "imperial presidency," it will "also seriously handicap our intelligence agencies from preventing future terrorist attacks." Yoo writes that the Obama decisions mark a return "to the failed law enforcement approach to fighting terrorism that prevailed before Sept. 11, 2001." Yoo recommends that Obama stay with what he calls "the Bush system" of handling terror suspects. Yoo fails to note that the US law enforcement system prevented, among others, the "millennium bombing" plot (see December 14, 1999), the plot to bomb New York City's Lincoln and Holland Tunnels (see June 24, 1993), and Operation Bojinka (see January 6, 1995).
Obama Needs to be Able to Torture Prisoners Just as Bush Did, Yoo Declares - And by eschewing torture, Obama is giving up any chance on forcing information from "the most valuable sources of intelligence on al-Qaeda" currently in American custody. The Bush administration policies prevented subsequent terrorist attacks on the US, Yoo contends, and Obama will need the same widespread latitude to interrogate and torture prisoners that Bush employed: "What is needed are the tools to gain vital intelligence, which is why, under President George W. Bush, the CIA could hold and interrogate high-value al-Qaeda leaders. On the advice of his intelligence advisers, the president could have authorized coercive interrogation methods like those used by Israel and Great Britain in their antiterrorism campaigns. (He could even authorize waterboarding, which he did three times in the years after 9/11.)" It is noteworthy that Yoo refused to confirm that Bush ordered waterboarding of suspects during his previous Congressional hearings (see June 26, 2008).
Interrogations Must be 'Polite' - According to Yoo, in forcing the CIA and other US interrogators to follow the procedures outlined in the Army Field Manual, they can no longer use "coercive techniques, threats and promises, and the good-cop bad-cop routines used in police stations throughout America.… His new order amounts to requiring—on penalty of prosecution—that CIA interrogators be polite. Coercive measures are unwisely banned with no exceptions, regardless of the danger confronting the country." (Yoo 1/29/2009) Yoo is incorrect in this assertion. The Army Field Manual explicitly countenances many of the "coercive techniques, threats and promises, and the good-cop bad-cop routines" Yoo says it bans. Further, the Field Manual says nothing about requiring interrogators to be "polite." (Army 9/2006) And actual field interrogators such as the Army's Matthew Alexander have repeatedly said that torturing prisoners is ineffective and counterproductive, while building relationships and treating prisoners with dignity during interrogations produces usable, reliable intelligence (see November 30, 2008).
Shutting Down Military Commissions - Obama's order to stay all military commission trials and to review the case of "enemy combatant" Ali Saleh al-Marri (see June 23, 2003) is also mistaken, Yoo writes. Yoo fears that Obama will shut down the military commissions in their entirety and instead transfer detainees charged with terrorist acts into the US civilian court system. He also objects to Obama's apparent intent to declare terrorists to be prisoners of war under the Geneva Conventions, instead of following the Bush precedent of classifying terrorists "like pirates, illegal combatants who do not fight on behalf of a nation and refuse to obey the laws of war." To allow terror suspects to have rights under Geneva and the US legal system, Yoo asserts, will stop any possibility of obtaining information from those suspects. Instead, those suspects will begin using the legal system to their own advantage—refusing to talk, insisting on legal representation and speedy trials instead of cooperating with their interrogators. "Our soldiers and agents in the field will have to run more risks as they must secure physical evidence at the point of capture and maintain a chain of custody that will stand up to the standards of a civilian court," Yoo writes. (Yoo 1/29/2009) In reality, the Supreme Court's ruling in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (see June 30, 2006), as well as the Detainee Treatment Act (see December 15, 2005) and the Military Commissions Act (see October 17, 2006), all mandate that detainees must be handled according to the Geneva Conventions.
Risk to Americans - Another effect of transferring detainees into the civilian justice system, Yoo claims, is to allow "our enemies to obtain intelligence on us." Defense lawyers will insist on revealing US intelligence—information and methods—in open court, and will no doubt force prosecutors to accept plea bargains "rather than risk disclosure of intelligence secrets."
Obama 'Open[ed] the Door to Further Terrorist Acts on US Soil' - Obama said in his inaugural speech that the US must "reject as false the choice between our safety and our ideals." Yoo calls that statement "naive," and writes, "That high-flying rhetoric means that we must give al-Qaeda—a hardened enemy committed to our destruction—the same rights as garden-variety criminals at the cost of losing critical intelligence about real, future threats." By making his choices, Yoo writes, "Mr. Obama may have opened the door to further terrorist acts on US soil by shattering some of the nation's most critical defenses." (Yoo 1/29/2009)
Reflecting on the Bush administration's decision to create "military commissions" to try terror suspects (see November 13, 2001), John Bellinger, the former legal adviser to the National Security Council during much of the Bush administration, says: "A small group of administration lawyers drafted the president's military order establishing the military commissions, but without the knowledge of the rest of the government, including the national security adviser, me, the secretary of state, or even the CIA director. And even though many of the substantive problems with the military commissions as created by the original order have been resolved by Congress in response to the Supreme Court's decision in the Hamdan case (see June 30, 2006), we have been suffering from this original process failure ever since." (Murphy and Purdum 2/2009)
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