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Disruptions: Owners of privately-held companies hate surprises, especially on the topic of cash. There are few things that wrench the gut of a business owner as much as discovering, with very little time to react, that their company is short on cash to make payments on important things like payroll, rent, debt service, vendors, etc.
Good news: There is a discipline that can help take surprises out of cash flow, named the Cash Flow Projection.
The future: Done properly, a Cash Flow Projection can give an owner the ability to look into the future to see the cash that will flow into and out of the company.
First step: The first step is to find an internal person you can trust to prepare and maintain the Cash Flow Projection. This person should have integrity, good work ethics and the ability to think through different scenarios while working weekly on the Cash Flow Projection document and process. Keeping cash flow matters confidential is paramount for this person.
Second step: Have this person either set up a Cash Flow Projection similar to the following one or have a skilled professional train this person to create and update this document.
WSJ: The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) and Random House, Inc. approached B2B CFO® in 2008 with an idea they had, which was to write a book to help business owners on this topic. They asked us to create a Cash Flow Projection that could be educational for the readers of their book. The following chart was published in their book, The Wall Street Journal, Complete Small Business Guidebook (pp. 90-91).
Shortfall: The WSJ book states, "… the chart on page 90 shows ABC Company's operating cash, beginning in January and outlines its estimated sales and expenses through July. You'll see the benefit of making such a chart when you look at the month of April, which shows a deficit. Assuming this business owner prepared the cash flow projections in January, he or she now has four months to come up with a plan for surviving the projected shortfall."
ABC Company, LLC
Internal Cash Flow Projections
January to July, 20X1


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subset: commoncrawl


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All The Catwalk Pictures From The Versace Runway Show At Milan Fashion Week
Versace Spring 2013
Versace Spring 2013
Donatella Versace is known for her sexy, body-con style, and her Spring '13 showing was just that, but perhaps with a more subtle touch than what we're used to seeing from the designer. The show opened with easy lace-appliqued mini-dresses paired with low-slung studded belts. The same technique was seen on a range of crop tops and hot shorts worn with sleek blazers and leather jackets. The most wearable, everyday pieces came from an assortment of skinny striped, dip-dyed, and lace-adorned pants paired with billowy crushed silk tops, emoting a decidedly '70s bohemian vibe. Catering to the red carpet, a brigade of colour — orange, teal, pink — entered the runway, highlighting seductive high-slit gowns (Jennifer Lopez, anyone?) and short embellished mini-dresses made for leg-baring starlets like Lea Michele and Selena Gomez.
- Trends: '70s, billowy sleeves, leather, lace.
- Colors: Black gold, orange, teal, blue, pink.
- Key Piece: We loved the lace-embellished pants.
- Accessories: Sandal boots, strappy metallic sandals, statement sunglasses, studded belts, exotic crossbody bags, leather clutches.
- Who Should Wear It: We can picture the sexy high-slit gowns on red-carpet stunners like Jennifer Lopez and Lea Michele, along with front-row attendees Milla Jovovich and Jessica Stam.


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Read all about it - Abolish War, the official MAW newsletter. See the latest issue here.
War is not inevitable.
The Movement for the Abolition of War aims to:
Conflict and Climate Change DVD and book "An extraordinarily good resource"
Christine Blower, NUT. Just £9 + p&p
Latest news... Latest news... Latest news... Latest news... Latest news... Latest
MAW's Remembrance Day Lecture, held at the Imperial War Museum, London on Sun 9 Nov, was given by Michael Morpurgo
'Who will sing the anthem? Who will tell the story?'
"a wonderful afternoon .... delightful and inspiring"
The link to the video of the talk is here
Songs for Choirs for 2014
One hundred years after the start of WW1, MAW is offering 14 peace songs free to choirs. See the words and music for each one here:
A climate for peace; Go down fighting;
The firing of the heart; The ones who said No;
The time; Turn our hands; We are for peace
Christmas in the trenches; Foolish notion;
Moonshine; Mothers, daughters, wives;
Music of healing; Scarecrow; Tyne Cot at night.
You can download the whole set here or go to the music part of the Downloads page.
Hear audio extracts on Soundcloud!
We Will We Remember Them: a resource for commemorating the death and suffering brought by war. The new edition has a forward by Michael Morpurgo, with services, reflections, prayers, songs & readings for Remembrance Sunday. As we commemorate the tragedy of the First World War, We Will Remember Them reminds us that to honour the dead, and care for the living, our most important task is to work for the prevention and elimination of war - what we say in remembrance should reflect this. The booklet is available from the MAW shop
End recruitment of 16 year olds into the UK armed forces!
MAW is one of the organisations sponsoring a petition calling for this to stop.
The UK is the only country in Europe to recruit 16 year olds.
Sign the petition online
New: Sally Reynolds represented MAW at the Round Table on the De-legitimisation of War, held in the Hague on 18/19 October 2014.
Read her notes here.
New: MAW Peace History Conference
Saturday October 11th, 2014
Read about it here.
New page on this site: Law


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Hilary Winfield creates high-end, original modern fine art and abstract paintings. Buy contemporary paintings online or contact the artist in Portland, OR.
Hilary Winfield is an award-winning, innovative, contemporary fine artist, creating abstract paintings from both intuition and from the energy and inspiration that she absorbs from the world around her. Originally from Washington, North Carolina, she relocated to Portland, Oregon approximately ten years ago, awed by the amazing beauty of the Pacific Northwest.
Winfield derives inspiration from the elements of the environment and from nature, including many unique aspects; weather, rusting metal, aging wood, water, dilapidated buildings, peeling paint, stones and rocks, the city lights at night. She notices magic everywhere, often in unanticipated places; from the surface of a body of water to the rustic, industrial warehouse floor of a manufacturing facility. The creative process for Winfield involves experimenting with various mediums and methods of infusing texture, iridescence and illumination into her work. Winfield's art is internationally collected and lends a refreshing and energizing vitality while simultaneously portraying great depth and balance.


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Russia Air Crash: Faulty Brakes Likely Cause
Faulty brakes may be to blame for a Russian airliner sliding off the runway and crashing into a motorway, an investigator has said, as the death toll rose to five.
"After landing the pilot uses all the available brake systems on the plane, but for some reason the machine did not stop," a member of the investigation team told Russia's Interfax news agency.
"Most likely it was faulty reverse engines or brakes."
Amateur footage captured the moment the Tu-204 plane smashed onto the road after it overshot a runway at Moscow's Vnukovo airport.
The footage, taken from a vehicle on the motorway, shows luggage and other debris flying from the aircraft and hitting other cars on the road.
Loud bangs can also be heard as the plane impacted with the ground and the cars were hit by the wreckage.
Five people - the pilot, co-pilot, flight engineer and two flight stewards - were killed in the crash and another three seriously injured
The Red Wing Airlines aircraft burst through a perimeter fence on to the motorway at Russia's third busiest airport.
Officials said the plane - travelling from the Czech Republic - was carrying eight crew members and no passengers. It broke into pieces and caught fire after crashing.
The cockpit of the aircraft was sheared off from the fuselage and a large chunk gashed out near the tail during the impact.
Investigators are examining flight recorders and other evidence to try to determine the cause of the accident.
Prior to Saturday's crash, there had been no fatal accidents reported for Tu-204s, which entered commercial service in 1995.
But the state news agency RIA Novosti cited an unidentified official at the Russian Aviation Agency as saying another Tu-204 had gone off the runway at the international airport in Novosibirsk, Siberia, on December 20.
The agency said that incident, in which no one was injured, was due to the failure of the plane's engines to go into reverse upon landing and that its brake system malfunctioned.
The Tu-204 plane is a twin-engine mid-range jet with room to carry about 210 passengers.
The billionaire owner of Red Wing Airlines, Alexander Lebedev, has said the pilot of the aircraft that crashed on Saturday was experienced, with 14,500 hours of flying time.
Witnesses told state channel Rossiya-24 they saw a man thrown from the plane as it rammed into the barrier of the motorway and described pulling other people from the wreckage.
The airport was closed after the crash and flights were routed to Moscow's other airports, Sheremetyevo and Domodedovo.
Russia and other former Soviet republics have some of the world's worst air traffic safety records - with a total accident rate three times the world average, according to the International Air Transport Association.
In April, 31 people were killed after a passenger jet crashed after takeoff in Siberia.
Another 44 people, including the Lokomotiv Yaroslavl ice hockey team, were killed when their aircraft smashed into a riverbank in September 2011.


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Its advertisements were pretty attractive in English and Chinese. Its target market is practically the whole world of people (yes, it has Halal certification to cater to the world's Muslim community) with "Symptoms of Cell Deterioration" – nocturia, lethargy, urinal disability, arthritis, incompetence, fatigue, skin aging, obesity, cold-averse). Its news coverage is all over the Internet. It had been sold through the Internet and possibly through multi-level-marketing (MLM).
Some of its online promotions have even stated that a certified laboratory in Singapore has tested that it is not adulterated with "Aphrodisiac Western Medicines or Illegal Drug Ingredients" and that it was "categorized as food and no MAL number is required" (MAL number is a approval number issued by the Ministry of Health of Malaysia). As listed on some promotional pages, it is stated that its main ingredient is the "Ginseng of The Desert" (Cynomorium Songaricum ) which "Helps invigorates the kidney and supplements essence for kidney YANG and insufficiency of blood manifested as impotence, nourishes the intestine and relaxes the bowels". Other ingredients include "Ginseng Extract, Hydrolysed Protein, Enzyme, Pomegranate, Polyphenol, Malt".
Why then would post-market analysis by the Health Science Authority (HSA) of Singapore proved otherwise for Mentalk, "The World First Energizing Candy" ? HSA's press release on their website stated they found the presence of "Aminotadalafil, which is chemically similar to tadalafil," It "can cause serious adverse reactions such as heart attacks and strokes in susceptible individuals. Heart patients who are on nitrate drugs may suffer severe hypotension which may be fatal. "
What is more worrying as HSA put it was that "As the product is marketed as a food-like item, there is potential danger to the wider population if the candy is unwittingly eaten by consumers, including teenagers and young children. . One of its advertisement stated "One world, One Candy".
As of this writing, follow-up actions by HSA and relevant authorities are underway.
Is it a case of trying to cheat passed the health authorities by submitting a truly safe sample for the lab test and then launching the adulterated version ? If so, it really took guts to have so many ads and one of them to state that "Mentalk does not contain any steroid, western or illegal drug ingredients".
Or is this a case of product that fell short of its effectiveness after launching and thus with the pressure to maintain the growth plan after pouring some much into the marketing of it, a decision was made to "refine" the product resulting in the adding of extra undeclared ingredients into the formula? If so, it is really foolish to do it in countries like Singapore where our HSA and AVA (Agri-Food and Veterinary Authority) are very proactive in conducting post-market survey and analysis of products, especially those that are too good to be true. HSA has been doing public education and awareness campaign.
Oh, I am surprised that Mentalk had included the actual Singapore ALS Laboratory report in their advertisement. Didn't the report has the same statement "This report cannot be used for advertising purposes." printed at the top of each of their test reports just like those from laboratories of HSA and SGH (Singapore General Hospital), etc.
Well, "Members of the public are strongly advised not to buy or eat 'Mentalk' candy. If they have already purchased the candy, they should throw it away immediately. If they feel unwell after eating this candy, they are urged to seek medical advice as soon as possible."
For more update on this candy issue, visit http://www.hsa.gov.sg


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!! History Commons Alert, Exciting News
This is a scalable context timeline. It contains events related to the event July 13, 2001: Bush Administration Again Denies CIA Expanded Authority to Assassinate Bin Laden. You can narrow or broaden the context of this timeline by adjusting the zoom level. The lower the scale, the more relevant the items on average will be, while the higher the scale, the less relevant the items, on average, will be.
Mary McCarthy. [Source: Associated Press]CIA Director George Tenet will claim in his 2007 book that he attempts to get new covert action authorities to fight bin Laden at this time. He says he wants to move from a defensive to offensive posture, but needs policy backing at a higher level to do it. He meets with Deputy National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley and gives him a list of expanded authorities the CIA is seeking to go after bin Laden. The authorities would permit the CIA or its partners to kill bin Laden without trying to capture him first. Tenet claims that he tells Hadley, "I'm giving you this draft now, but first, you guys need to figure out what your policy is." The next day, Mary McCarthy, a CIA officer serving as National Security Council (NSC) senior director, calls Tenet's chief of staff and asks the CIA to take the draft back. She says something to the effect, "If you formally transmit these to the NSC, the clock will be ticking (to take action), and we don't want the clock to tick just now." Tenet withdraws the draft. [Tenet, 2007, pp. 143-144] A deputy cabinet level meeting in July 2001 discusses the idea, but no action results (see July 13, 2001). The authorities will be granted a few days after 9/11. [Tenet, 2007, pp. 154]
Entity Tags: Mary McCarthy, Central Intelligence Agency, George J. Tenet, Stephen J. Hadley, Osama bin Laden
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak later claims that Egyptian intelligence discovers a "communiqué from bin Laden saying he wanted to assassinate President Bush and other G8 heads of state during their summit in Genoa, Italy" on this day. The communiqué specifically mentions this would be done via "an airplane stuffed with explosives." The US and Italy are sent urgent warnings of this. [New York Times, 9/26/2001] Mubarak will claim that Egyptian intelligence officials informed American intelligence officers between March and May 2001 that an Egyptian agent had penetrated al-Qaeda. Presumably, this explains how Egypt is able to give the US these warnings. [New York Times, 6/4/2002]
Entity Tags: Hosni Mubarak, Al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, George W. Bush
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline
Osama Bin Laden tells trainees in his Afghanistan training camps that there will be an attack in the near future. US intelligence learns of this comment and it is mentioned to top US leaders in an early July 2001 briefing (see July 10, 2001). More details, such as how the US learned this or how many people bin Laden told this to, have not been made public. [Tenet, 2007, pp. 152] But in the summer of 2001, bin Laden is overheard making a number of similar comments hinting at upcoming attacks (see Summer 2001).
Entity Tags: Osama bin Laden, US intelligence
The three authors of the book Germs, Judith Miller (left), Stephen Engelberg (top), and William Broad (bottom). This was the book Miller was working on before 9/11; it was published several weeks after 9/11. [Source: Publicity photo]New York Times reporter Judith Miller learns her government counterterrorism sources are worried that al-Qaeda is going to attack a US target on the Fourth of July holiday. There has been an increase in chatter about an impending attack. In 2005, Miller will recall, "Everyone in Washington was very spun-up in the counterterrorism world at that time. I think everybody knew that an attack was coming—everyone who followed this.… I got the sense that part of the reason that I was being told of what was going on was that the people in counterterrorism were trying to get the word to the president or the senior officials through the press, because they were not able to get listened to themselves." Conversation Overheard - She has a conversation with a still-anonymous top-level White House source who reveals there is some concern about a top-secret NSA intercept between two al-Qaeda operatives. She explains, "They had been talking to one another, supposedly expressing disappointment that the United States had not chosen to retaliate more seriously against what had happened to the [USS] Cole. And one al-Qaeda operative was overheard saying to the other, 'Don't worry; we're planning something so big now that the US will have to respond.' And I was obviously floored by that information. I thought it was a very good story: (1) the source was impeccable; (2) the information was specific, tying al-Qaeda operatives to, at least, knowledge of the attack on the Cole; and (3) they were warning that something big was coming, to which the United States would have to respond. This struck me as a major page one-potential story." Not Printed - Miller tells her editor Stephen Engelberg about the story the next day. But Engelberg says, "You have a great first and second paragraph. What's your third?" Miller finds only one other source to confirm these details. Yemen Connection - She later learns from her first source that the conversation occurred in Yemen. Though the telephone number is never disclosed, some circumstances suggest one of the parties taking part in the call may have been at the al-Qaeda communications hub in Sana'a, Yemen, that is monitored by US intelligence. One of the hijackers, Khalid Almihdhar, lives there with his wife and children (see Late August 1998), and communicates there will be forthcoming attacks to at least one family member (see Late October 2000-July 4, 2001). The hijackers in the US apparently call the Yemen hub around this time (see (August 2001)). On July 3, the CIA will request the arrest of Djamel Beghal (see July 3, 2001), an al-Qaeda operative whose calls to the hub are apparently being monitored at this time (see Before July 3, 2001). Regrets - Miller later regrets not following through more because she "had a book coming out" as well as other stories and that there wasn't a "sense of immediacy" about the information. In 2005, Engelberg will confirm Miller's story and agree that he wanted more specifics before running the story. Engelberg also later wonders "maybe I made the wrong call," asking, "More than once I've wondered what would have happened if we'd run the piece?" The New York Times has yet to mention the warning in all of their post-9/11 reporting and the 9/11 Commission has never mentioned anything about the warning either. In 2005, Miller will spend 85 days in jail for refusing to reveal a source and then leave the New York Times after widespread criticism about her reporting. [Columbia Journalism Review, 9/2005; AlterNet, 5/18/2006; Editor & Publisher, 5/18/2006]
Entity Tags: Stephen Engelberg, Al-Qaeda, Judith Miller
In 2002, Newsweek will report: "The White House acknowledged for the first time, [President] Bush was privately beginning to worry about the stream of terror warnings he was hearing that summer, most of them aimed at US targets abroad. On July 5, five days before the Phoenix memo (see July 10, 2001), Bush directed [Condoleezza] Rice to figure out what was going on domestically." [Newsweek, 5/27/2002] In 2004, President Bush will explain why he requested this: "[T]he reason I did is because there had been a lot of threat intelligence from overseas. And part of it had to do with the Genoa [Italy] G8 conference that I was going to attend." [US President, 4/19/2004] Though he does not mention it, the chief security concern at the late July 2001 conference he mentions is intelligence that al-Qaeda plans to fly an airplane into the conference. This threat is so widely reported before the conference (with some reports before July 5 (see June 13, 2001 and Mid-July 2001) that the attack is called off (see July 20-22, 2001). For instance, in late June, Time magazine mentioned a German intelligence report of an Osama bin Laden plot "to fly remote-controlled model aircraft packed with Semtex into the conference hall and blow the leaders of the industrialized world to smithereens"
(see June 20, 2001). Bush will later claim that this request is specifically for the later-famous August 6, 2001 briefing entitled, "Bin Laden Determined to Strike in US" (see August 6, 2001), although the CIA analysts who draft it will deny this (see July 13, 2004). [US President, 4/19/2004]
Entity Tags: Osama bin Laden, Condoleezza Rice, George W. Bush, Al-Qaeda
Chechen rebel leader Ibn Khattab promises some "very big news" to his fighters and this statement is communicated to the CIA. The CIA then forwards the warning to National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice together with several similar pieces of intelligence, saying it is evidence that an al-Qaeda attack is imminent (see July 10, 2001). [Tenet, 2007, pp. 151] The FBI is already aware that Ibn Khattab and Osama bin Laden, who have a long relationship (see 1986-March 19, 2002), may be planning a joint attack against US interests (see Before April 13, 2001). One of the operatives, Zacarias Moussaoui, will be arrested a month later (see August 16, 2001), but a search warrant for his belongings will not be granted (see August 16, 2001, August 22, 2001 and August 28, 2001).
Entity Tags: Ibn Khattab, Central Intelligence Agency
On this date, CIA Director George Tenet and CIA counterterrorism chief Cofer Black give the White House an urgent al-Qaeda briefing that, if heeded, Black later believes could have stopped bin Laden. Tenet and Black strongly suggest that both an overall strategy and immediate covert or military action against bin Laden are needed (see July 10, 2001). According to a 2006 book by journalist Bob Woodward that is likely paraphrasing Black, one of Woodward's sources for his book, "Black calculated that if [the White House] had given him $500 million of covert action funds right then and reasonable authorizations from the president to go kill bin Laden, he would have been able to make great strides if not do away with him.… Over the last two years—and as recently as March 2001—the CIA had deployed paramilitary teams five times into Afghanistan to work with the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance, a loose federation of militias and tribes in the north. The CIA had about 100 sources and subsources operating throughout Afghanistan. Just give him the money and the authority and he might be able to bring bin Laden's head back in a box." [Woodward, 2006, pp. 77-78; New York Daily News, 9/29/2006]
Entity Tags: Osama bin Laden, George J. Tenet, Central Intelligence Agency, Cofer Black
CIA counterterrorism chief Cofer Black and Richard Blee, a manager responsible for the CIA's bin Laden unit, meet with CIA Director George Tenet and review the latest intelligence about al-Qaeda. Black lays out a case based on communications intercepts and other intelligence suggesting a growing chance that al-Qaeda will attack the US soon. There is no smoking gun per se, but there is a huge volume of data indicating an attack is coming (see July 9-10, 2001). The case is so compelling—Tenet will later say it "literally made my hair stand on end"—that Tenet decides to brief the White House on it this same day (see July 10, 2001). [Washington Post, 10/1/2006; Tenet, 2007, pp. 151]
Entity Tags: White House, Richard Blee, George J. Tenet, Cofer Black, Al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, Central Intelligence Agency
Condoleezza Rice and George Tenet in the White House. This picture is actually taken on October 8, 2001, and President Bush is elsewhere in the room. [Source: Eric Draper / White House]CIA Director George Tenet finds the briefing that counterterrorism chief Cofer Black gave him earlier in the day (see July 10, 2001) so alarming that he calls National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice from his car as he heads to the White House and says he needs to see her right away, even though he has regular weekly meetings with her. [Washington Post, 10/1/2006] Tenet and Black let a third CIA official, Richard Blee, who is responsible for Alec Station, the CIA's bin Laden unit, brief Rice on the latest intelligence. Deputy National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley and counterterrorism "tsar" Richard Clarke are also present. [McClatchy Newspapers, 10/2/2006] 'Significant Attack' - Blee starts by saying, "There will be a significant terrorist attack in the coming weeks or months!" He argues that it is impossible to pick the specific day, saying Osama bin Laden "will attack when he believes the attack will be successful." He mentions a range of threat information including: A warning related to Chechen leader Ibn Khattab (see (July 9, 2001)) and seven pieces of intelligence the CIA recently received indicating there would soon be a terrorist attack (see July 9-10, 2001); A mid-June statement by bin Laden to trainees that there would be an attack in the near future (see Mid-June 2001); Information that talks about moving toward decisive acts; Late-June information saying a "big event" was forthcoming; Two separate bits of information collected "a few days before the meeting" in which people predicted a "stunning turn of events" in the weeks ahead. This may be a reference to intercepts of calls in Yemen, possibly involving the father-in-law of 9/11 hijacker Khalid Almihdhar (see June 30-July 1, 2001). Multiple, Simultaneous Attacks in US Possible - Blee says that the attacks will be "spectacular," they will be designed to inflict mass casualties against US facilities and interests, there may be multiple, simultaneous attacks, and they may be in the US itself. He outlines the CIA's efforts to disrupt al-Qaeda by spreading incorrect word that the attack plans have been compromised, in the hope that this will cause a delay in the attack. But he says this is not enough and that the CIA should go on the attack. Blee also discounts the possibility of disinformation, as bin Laden's threats are known to the public in the Middle East and there will be a loss of face, funds, and popularity if they are not carried out. Blee urges that the US take a "proactive approach" by using the Northern Alliance. [Tenet, 2007, pp. 151-4] Author Bob Woodward will later write: "Black emphasize[s] that this amount[s] to a strategic warning, meaning the problem [is] so serious that it require[s] an overall plan and strategy. Second, this [is] a major foreign policy problem that need[s] to be addressed immediately. They need […] to take action that moment—covert, military, whatever—to thwart bin Laden. The United States ha[s] human and technical sources, and all the intelligence [is] consistent." [Woodward, 2006, pp. 80; Washington Post, 10/1/2006] Richard Clarke expresses his agreement with the CIA about the threat's seriousness, and Black says, "This country needs to go on a war footing now." Rice's Response - There are conflicting accounts about the CIA's reading of Rice's response. According to Woodward: "Tenet and Black [feel] they [are] not getting through to Rice. She [is] polite, but they [feel] the brush-off." They leave the meeting frustrated, seeing little prospect for immediate action. Tenet and Black will both later recall the meeting as the starkest warning they gave the White House on al-Qaeda before 9/11 and one that could have potentially stopped the 9/11 attacks if Rice had acted on it (see July 10, 2001) and conveyed their urgency to President Bush. (Tenet is briefing Bush on a daily basis at this time, but he will later say that Rice has a much better rapport with the president.) Black will say, "The only thing we didn't do was pull the trigger to the gun we were holding to her head." [Woodward, 2006, pp. 80; Washington Post, 10/1/2006] Rice says that Bush will align his policy with the new realities and grant new authorities. Writing in 2007, Tenet will say that this response is "just the outcome I had expected and hoped for," and recall that as they leave the meeting, Blee and Black congratulate each other on having got the administration's attention. Nevertheless, Rice does not take the requested action until after 9/11. [Tenet, 2007, pp. 153-4] Rice Concerned about Genoa - Clarke will recall in 2006 that Rice focuses on the possible threat to Bush at an upcoming summit meeting in Genoa, Italy (see June 13, 2001 and July 20-22, 2001). Rice and Bush have already been briefed about the Genoa warning by this time (see July 5, 2001). Rice also promises to quickly schedule a high-level White House meeting on al-Qaeda. However, that meeting does not take place until September 4, 2001 (see September 4, 2001). [McClatchy Newspapers, 10/2/2006] Rice also directs that Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Attorney General John Ashcroft be given the same briefing, and they receive it a short time later (see July 11-17, 2001). Meeting Not Mentioned in 9/11 Commission Report - The meeting will not be mentioned in the 9/11 Commission Report (see August 4, 2002), and there will be controversy when it is fully revealed in 2006 (see September 29, 2006, September 30-October 3, 2006, and October 1-2, 2006).
Entity Tags: Richard Blee, Stephen J. Hadley, White House, Osama bin Laden, Richard A. Clarke, George J. Tenet, Al-Qaeda, Central Intelligence Agency, Cofer Black, Donald Rumsfeld, Condoleezza Rice, John Ashcroft
Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and Attorney General Ashcroft receive the same CIA briefing about a likely imminent, multiple, and simultaneous al-Qaeda strike that was given to the White House on July 10, 2001 (see July 10, 2001). In 2006, the State Department will reveal the two were briefed within a week of the White House briefing, at the request of National Security Adviser Rice. One official who helped prepare the briefing later describes it as a "ten on a scale of one to ten" that "connected the dots" to present a stark warning that al-Qaeda is ready to launch a new attack. A Pentagon spokesman says he has no information "about what may or may not have been briefed" to Rumsfeld, and Rumsfeld does not answer questions about it. Ashcroft says he was not given any briefing and calls it "disappointing" that he was not briefed. After it is confirmed that Ashcroft was briefed, apparently on July 17, Ashcroft will still claim not to remember the briefing, and will say he only recalls another CIA briefing earlier in the month (see July 5, 2001). Journalist Andrew Cockburn later reports that, "according to several intelligence sources," Rumsfeld's reaction to the briefing at the time "was one of vehement dismissal, complete with cutting observations about the CIA falling victim to 'vast doses of al-Qaeda disinformation' and 'mortal doses of gullibility.'" McClatchy Newspapers will comment that these briefings raise "new questions about what the Bush administration did in response, and about why so many officials have claimed they never received or don't remember the warning." [McClatchy Newspapers, 10/2/2006; Cockburn, 2007, pp. 9] On July 26, 2001, it will be reported that Ashcroft has stopped flying on commercial airlines within the US (see July 26, 2001).
Entity Tags: John Ashcroft, Donald Rumsfeld, Al-Qaeda, Condoleezza Rice, White House, Central Intelligence Agency
The Bush administration again denies the CIA expanded authorities to go on the offensive against bin Laden. These authorities would include permission to assassinate bin Laden without making an attempt to capture him alive first. In March 2001, the CIA wanted to give a draft request about this to the Bush administration, but officials weren't ready so the draft was withdrawn (see Early March 2001). On July 13, three days after a dramatic CIA presentation about a likely upcoming al-Qaeda attack (see July 10, 2001), a meeting of deputy cabinet officials is held to discuss the CIA's expanded authorities request. However, no decisions are made. Tenet will later comment, "the bureaucracy moved slowly." The Bush administration will grant these authorities a few days after 9/11. [Tenet, 2007, pp. 154]
Entity Tags: Bush administration (43), Osama bin Laden, George J. Tenet, Central Intelligence Agency
Shortly after a pivotal al-Qaeda warning given by the CIA to top officials (see July 10, 2001), Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence Steve Cambone expresses doubts. He speaks to CIA Director George Tenet, and, as Tenet will later recall, he "asked if I had considered the possibility that al-Qaeda threats were just a grand deception, a clever ploy to tie up our resources and expend our energies on a phantom enemy that lacked both the power and the will to carry the battle to us." Tenet claims he replied, "No, this is not a deception, and, no, I do not need a second opinion.… We are going to get hit. It's only a matter of time." After 9/11, Cambone will reportedly apologize to Tenet for being wrong. [Tenet, 2007, pp. 154] Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz raises similar doubts around the same time (see Mid-July 2001), and Tenet believes Defense Secretary Rumsfeld is blocking efforts to develop a strategy to fight bin Laden (see Summer 2001).
Entity Tags: George J. Tenet, Stephen A. Cambone
Anti-aircraft stationed around the G8 Summit in Genoa, Italy. [Source: BBC]The G8 summit is held in Genoa, Italy. Acting on previous warnings that al-Qaeda would attempt to kill President Bush and other leaders, Italian authorities surround the summit with anti-aircraft guns. They keep fighter jets in the air and close off local airspace to all planes. [Los Angeles Times, 9/27/2001] The warnings are taken so seriously that Bush stays overnight on an aircraft carrier offshore, and other world leaders stay on a luxury ship. [CNN, 7/18/2001] No attack occurs. US officials state that the warnings were "unsubstantiated," but after 9/11, they will claim success in preventing an attack. [Los Angeles Times, 9/27/2001] According to author Philip Shenon, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice is involved in discussions about the precautions, and this is the only time she focuses on al-Qaeda threats in the summer of 2001. Shenon will add: "There is no record to show that Rice made any special effort to discuss terrorist threats with Bush. The record suggested, instead, that it was not a matter of special interest to either of them that summer." [Shenon, 2008, pp. 154]
Entity Tags: Condoleezza Rice, Philip Shenon, George W. Bush
President Bush at his Crawford, Texas, ranch on August 6, 2001. Advisors wait with classified briefings. [Source: White House]President Bush receives a classified presidential daily briefing (PDB) at his Crawford, Texas ranch indicating that Osama bin Laden might be planning to hijack commercial airliners. The PDB provided to him is entitled, "Bin Laden Determined to Strike in US." The entire briefing focuses on the possibility of terrorist attacks inside the US. [New York Times, 5/15/2002; Newsweek, 5/27/2002] The analysts who drafted the briefing will say that they drafted it on the CIA's initiative (see July 13, 2004), whereas in 2004 Bush will state that he requested a briefing on the topic due to threats relating to a conference in Genoa, Italy, in July 2001, where Western intelligence agencies believed Osama bin Laden was involved in a plot to crash an airplane into a building to kill Bush and other leaders (see April 13, 2004). The analysts will later explain that they saw it as an opportunity to convey that the threat of an al-Qaeda attack in the US was both current and serious. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 260] The existence of this briefing is kept secret, until it is leaked in May 2002, causing a storm of controversy (see May 15, 2002). While National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice will claim the memo is only one and a half pages long, other accounts state it is 11 1/2 pages instead of the usual two or three. [New York Times, 5/15/2002; Newsweek, 5/27/2002; Die Zeit (Hamburg), 10/1/2002] A page and a half of the contents will be released on April 10, 2004; this reportedly is the full content of the briefing. [Washington Post, 4/10/2004] The briefing, as released, states as follows (note that the spelling of certain words are corrected and links have been added): Clandestine, foreign government, and media reports indicate bin Laden since 1997 has wanted to conduct terrorist attacks in the US (see December 1, 1998). Bin Laden implied in US television interviews in 1997 and 1998 that his followers would follow the example of World Trade Center bomber Ramzi Yousef and "bring the fighting to America" (see May 26, 1998). After US missile strikes on his base in Afghanistan in 1998, bin Laden told followers he wanted to retaliate in Washington, according to a -REDACTED-service (see December 21, 1998). An Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) operative told -REDACTED- service at the same time that bin Laden was planning to exploit the operative's access to the US to mount a terrorist strike. The millennium plotting in Canada in 1999 may have been part of bin Laden's first serious attempt to implement a terrorist strike in the US. Convicted plotter Ahmed Ressam has told the FBI that he conceived the idea to attack Los Angeles International Airport himself (see December 14, 1999), but that bin Laden lieutenant Abu Zubaida encouraged him and helped facilitate the operation. Ressam also said that in 1998 Abu Zubaida was planning his own US attack (see Late March-Early April 2001 and May 30, 2001). Ressam says bin Laden was aware of the Los Angeles operation. Although bin Laden has not succeeded, his attacks against the US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 (see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998) demonstrate that he prepares operations years in advance and is not deterred by setbacks. Bin Laden associates surveyed our embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam as early as 1993 (see Late 1993-Late 1994), and some members of the Nairobi cell planning the bombings were arrested and deported in 1997. Al-Qaeda members—including some who are US citizens—have resided in or traveled to the US for years, and the group apparently maintains a support structure that could aid attacks (see January 25, 2001). Two al-Qaeda members found guilty in the conspiracy to bomb our embassies in East Africa were US citizens (see September 15, 1998), and a senior EIJ member lived in California in the mid-1990s (see November 1989 and September 10, 1998). A clandestine source said in 1998 that a bin Laden cell in New York was recruiting Muslim-American youth for attacks (see October-November 1998). "We have not been able to corroborate some of the more sensational threat reporting, such as that from a [REDACTED] service in 1998 saying that bin Laden wanted to hijack a US aircraft to gain the release of 'Blind Sheikh' Omar Abdul-Rahman and other US-held extremists" (see 1998, December 4, 1998, and May 23, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 223] According to the Washington Post, this information came from a British service. [Washington Post, 5/18/2002] Nevertheless, FBI information since that time indicates patterns of suspicious activity in this country consistent with preparations for hijackings or other types of attacks, including recent surveillance of federal buildings in New York (see May 30, 2001). The FBI is conducting approximately 70 full-field investigations throughout the US that it considers bin Laden-related (see August 6, 2001). CIA and the FBI are investigating a call to our embassy in the UAE in May saying that a group or bin Laden supporters was in the US planning attacks with explosives (see May 16-17, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 223] In retrospect, the briefing is remarkable for the many warnings that apparently are not included (see for instance, from the summer of 2001 prior to August alone: May 2001, June 2001, June 12, 2001, June 19, 2001, Late Summer 2001, July 2001, July 16, 2001, Late July 2001, Late July 2001, Summer 2001, June 30-July 1, 2001, July 10, 2001, and Early August 2001). According to one account, after the PDB has been given to him, Bush tells the CIA briefer, "You've covered your ass now" (see August 6, 2001).
Incredibly, the New York Times later reports that after being given the briefing, Bush "[breaks] off from work early and [spends] most of the day fishing." [New York Times, 5/25/2002] In 2002 and again in 2004, National Security Adviser Rice will incorrectly claim under oath that the briefing only contained historical information from 1998 and before (see May 16, 2002 and April 8, 2004).
Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Islamic Jihad, Omar Abdul-Rahman, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Los Angeles International Airport, Condoleezza Rice, Abu Zubaida, Al-Qaeda, World Trade Center, Central Intelligence Agency, 9/11 Commission, Ahmed Ressam, Ramzi Yousef, Osama bin Laden
President Bush's cabinet-rank advisers discuss terrorism for the second of only two times before 9/11. [Washington Post, 5/17/2002] National Security Adviser Rice chairs the meeting; neither President Bush nor Vice President Cheney attends. Counterterrorism "tsar" Richard Clarke later says that in this meeting, he and CIA Director Tenet speak passionately about the al-Qaeda threat. No one disagrees that the threat is serious. Secretary of State Powell outlines a plan to put pressure on Pakistan to stop supporting al-Qaeda. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld appears to be more interested in Iraq. The only debate is over whether to fly the armed Predator drone over Afghanistan to attack al-Qaeda (see September 4, 2001). [Clarke, 2004, pp. 237-38] Clarke's earlier plans to "roll back" al-Qaeda first submitted on January 25, 2001 (see January 25, 2001) have been discussed and honed in many meetings and are now presented as a formal National Security Presidential Directive. The directive is "apparently" approved, though the process of turning it into official policy is still not done. [9/11 Commission, 3/24/2004] There is later disagreement over just how different the directive presented is from Clarke's earlier plans. For instance, some claim the directive aims not just to "roll back" al-Qaeda, but also to "eliminate" it altogether. [Time, 8/12/2002] However, Clarke notes that even though he wanted to use the word "eliminate," the approved directive merely aims to "significantly erode" al-Qaeda. The word "eliminate" is only added after 9/11. [Washington Post, 3/25/2004] Clarke will later say that the plan adopted "on Sept. 4 is basically… what I proposed on Jan. 25. And so the time in between was wasted." [ABC News, 4/8/2004] The Washington Post will similarly note that the directive approved on this day "did not differ substantially from Clinton's policy." [Washington Post, 3/27/2004] Time magazine later comments, "The fight against terrorism was one of the casualties of the transition, as Washington spent eight months going over and over a document whose outline had long been clear." [Time, 8/12/2002] The primary change from Clarke's original draft is that the approved plan calls for more direct financial and logistical support to the Northern Alliance and other anti-Taliban groups. The plan also calls for drafting plans for possible US military involvement, "but those differences were largely theoretical; administration officials told the [9/11 Commission's] investigators that the plan's overall timeline was at least three years, and it did not include firm deadlines, military plans, or significant funding at the time of the September 11, 2001, attacks." [Washington Post, 3/27/2004; Reuters, 4/2/2004]
Entity Tags: Taliban, Richard ("Dick") Cheney, Al-Qaeda, Northern Alliance, Donald Rumsfeld, George J. Tenet, Central Intelligence Agency, George W. Bush, Colin Powell, Richard A. Clarke, Condoleezza Rice
Amrullah Saleh. [Source: Associated Press' Kamran Jebreili]Northern Alliance leader Amrullah Saleh calls the CIA's Counterterrorist Center to inform it of the assassination of anti-Taliban commander Ahmed Shah Massoud (see September 9, 2001). His call is taken by Richard Blee, the manager responsible for Alec Station, the CIA's bin Laden unit. Although Congressman Dana Rohrabacher, an expert on Afghanistan, realizes the assassination means "something terrible [is] about to happen" (see September 9, 2001), Blee does not appear to connect the assassination to a spike in warnings about an al-Qaeda attack against US interests, even though he has been briefing senior officials about this all summer (see May 30, 2001, June 28, 2001, July 10, 2001, and Late July 2001). The Northern Alliance realizes that the Taliban will attack them immediately, because they are leaderless, and Saleh asks for support from the CIA. However, some at the CIA think that the Northern Alliance has no chance without Massoud, who held it together. Other officers "[call] frantically around Washington to find a way to aid the rump Northern Alliance before it [is] eliminated." The CIA informs the White House of the assassination, and the news soon leaks to CNN. This prompts the Northern Alliance to call again, this time complaining about the leak. [Coll, 2004, pp. 582-4]
Entity Tags: Richard Blee, Counterterrorist Center, Amrullah Saleh, Central Intelligence Agency, Alec Station, Ahmed Shah Massoud
An article in Time magazine briefly mentions a key meeting between the CIA and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, where top CIA officials warned Rice of an impending attack (see July 10, 2001). The meeting will be left out of the 9/11 Commission report, although CIA Director George Tenet will tell the Commission about it (see January 28, 2004). Time writes: "In mid-July, Tenet sat down for a special meeting with Rice and aides. 'George briefed Condi that there was going to be a major attack,' says an official; another, who was present at the meeting, says Tenet broke out a huge wall chart… with dozens of threats. Tenet couldn't rule out a domestic attack but thought it more likely that al-Qaeda would strike overseas." [Time, 8/4/2002] According to a transcript of Tenet's testimony to the 9/11 Commission, he told Rice there could be an al-Qaeda attack in weeks or perhaps months, that there would be multiple, simultaneous attacks causing major human casualties, and that the focus would be US targets, facilities, or interests. As Time reports, Tenet says the intelligence focuses on an overseas attack, but a domestic attack could not be ruled out. [Washington Post, 10/3/2006] News of the meeting will emerge in 2006 (see September 29, 2006), but the 9/11 Commission members will deny they were told about it. After the transcript is shared with reporters, they will reverse their denials (see September 30-October 3, 2006). Rice will also deny the meeting took place, only to reverse her position as well (see October 1-2, 2006).
Entity Tags: George J. Tenet, 9/11 Commission, Condoleezza Rice
Former CIA Director George Tenet privately testifies before the 9/11 Commission. He provides a detailed account of an urgent al-Qaeda warning he gave to the White House on July 10, 2001 (see July 10, 2001). According to three former senior intelligence officials, Tenet displays the slides from the PowerPoint presentation he gave the White House and even offers to testify about it in public. According to the three former officials, the hearing is attended by commissioner Richard Ben-Veniste, the commission's executive director Philip Zelikow, and some staff members. When Tenet testifies before the 9/11 Commission in public later in the year, he will not mention this meeting. The 9/11 Commission will neglect to include Tenet's warning to the White House in its July 2004 final report. [McClatchy Newspapers, 10/2/2006] Portions of a transcript of Tenet's private testimony will be leaked to reporters in 2006. According to the transcript, Tenet's testimony included a detailed summary of the briefing he had with CIA counterterrorism chief Cofer Black on July 10 (see July 10, 2001). The transcript also reveals that he told the commission that Black's briefing had prompted him to request an urgent meeting with Rice about it. This closely matches the account in Woodward's 2006 book that first widely publicized the July meeting (see September 29, 2006). [Washington Post, 10/3/2006] Shortly after Woodward's book is published, the 9/11 Commission staff will deny knowing that the July meeting took place. Zelikow and Ben-Veniste, who attended Tenet's testimony, will say they are unable to find any reference to it in their files. But after the transcript is leaked, Ben-Veniste will suddenly remember details of the testimony (see September 30-October 3, 2006) and will say that Tenet did not indicate that he left his meeting with Rice with the impression he had been ignored, as Tenet has alleged. [New York Times, 10/2/2006] Woodward's book will describe why Black, who also privately testified before the 9/11 Commission, felt the commission did not mention the July meeting in their final report: "Though the investigators had access to all the paperwork about the meeting, Black felt there were things the commissions wanted to know about and things they didn't want to know about. It was what happened in investigations. There were questions they wanted to ask, and questions they didn't want to ask." [Woodward, 2006, pp. 78]
Entity Tags: Richard Ben-Veniste, Philip Zelikow, White House, Cofer Black, Central Intelligence Agency, Condoleezza Rice, 9/11 Commission, Al-Qaeda, George J. Tenet
Original cover to Woodward's 'State of Denial.' [Source: Barnes and Noble]Journalist Bob Woodward's new book State of Denial is released. While the book focuses mainly on politics regarding the Iraq war, it also describes an urgent warning that then-CIA Director George Tenet gave to Condoleezza Rice, National Security Adviser at the time, and other White House officials on July 10, 2001 (see July 10, 2001). [New York Times, 9/29/2006; New York Daily News, 9/29/2006; Washington Post, 10/1/2006] This warning had been mentioned in passing in a 2002 Time magazine article, but it had escaped widespread attention until Woodward's book. [Time, 8/4/2002] The meeting is particularly controversial because neither the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry nor the 9/11 Commission mentioned in it in their final reports. The 9/11 Commission had learned about it from Tenet in early 2004 (see January 28, 2004). Rice and a number of 9/11 Commissioners deny knowing about the July meeting for several days, until documentation surfaces in the media detailing the meeting and Tenet's testimony to the commission (see October 1-2, 2006 and September 30-October 3, 2006). Details about the July meeting and surrounding controversies are reported on by the mainstream media for about a week, but there are no articles on it in any prominent newspaper after October 3, 2006. On October 5, Sen. John Kerry (D-MA) formally asks Sen. Richard Lugar (R-IN), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, for hearings about the revelations in Woodward's book, including controversies surrounding the July meeting. Kerry says in a letter to Lugar, "It is necessary to understand the mistakes of the past in order to ensure they are not repeated, and having testimony from the parties under oath will help to sharpen recollections and clarify the exact nature of this important meeting." However, no hearings take place. [Kerry, 10/5/2006]
Entity Tags: Bob Woodward, Condoleezza Rice, Bob Kerry, 9/11 Commission
In late September 2006, a new book by Bob Woodward reveals that CIA Director Tenet and CIA counterterrorism chief Cofer Black gave National Security Adviser Rice their most urgent warning about a likely upcoming al-Qaeda attack (see July 10, 2001 and September 29, 2006). Tenet detailed this meeting to the 9/11 Commission in early 2004 (see January 28, 2004), but it was not mentioned in the 9/11 Commission's final report later that year. According to the Washington Post, "Though the investigators had access to all the paperwork on the meeting, Black felt there were things the commissions wanted to know about and things they didn't want to know about." [Washington Post, 10/1/2006] The 9/11 Commissioners initially vigorously deny that they were not told about the meeting. For instance, 9/11 Commissioner Jamie Gorelick says she checked with commission staff who told her they were never told about a meeting on that date. She says, "We didn't know about the meeting itself. I can assure you it would have been in our report if we had known to ask about it." [Washington Post, 9/30/2006] Commissioner Tim Roemer says, "None of this was shared with us in hours of private interviews, including interviews under oath, nor do we have any paper on this. I'm deeply disturbed by this. I'm furious." Commissioner Richard Ben-Veniste says the meeting "was never mentioned to us." Philip Zelikow, the executive director of the 9/11 Commission, says the commissioners and their staff had heard nothing in their private interviews with Tenet and Black to suggest that they made such a dire presentation to Rice. "If we had heard something that drew our attention to this meeting, it would have been a huge thing." [New York Times, 10/2/2006] However, on October 3, 2006, a transcript of Tenet's private testimony to the 9/11 Commission is leaked to reporters and clearly shows that Tenet did warn Rice of an imminent al-Qaeda threat on July 10, 2001. Ben-Veniste, who attended the meeting along with Zelikow and other staff members, now confirms the meeting did take place and claims to recall details of it, even though he, Zelikow, and other 9/11 Commissioners had denied the existence of the meeting as recently as the day before. In the transcript, Tenet says "the system was blinking red" at the time. This statement becomes a chapter title in the 9/11 Commission's final report but the report, which normally has detailed footnotes, does not make it clear when Tenet said it. [Washington Post, 10/3/2006] Zelikow had close ties to Rice before joining the 9/11 Commission, having co-written a book with her (see March 21, 2004), and became one of her key aides after the commission disbanded (see February 28, 2005). Zelikow does not respond to requests for comments after Tenet's transcript surfaces. [McClatchy Newspapers, 10/2/2006; Washington Post, 10/3/2006]
Entity Tags: Richard Ben-Veniste, Tim Roemer, Jamie Gorelick, George J. Tenet, Condoleezza Rice, 9/11 Commission, Philip Zelikow, Cofer Black
Secretary of State Rice says that she does not recall the meeting on July 10, 2001, when CIA Director Tenet and other officials briefed her about the al-Qaeda threat (see July 10, 2001). "What I am quite certain of is that I would remember if I was told, as this account apparently says, that there was about to be an attack in the United States, and the idea that I would somehow have ignored that I find incomprehensible." [Associated Press, 10/2/2006] Rice says she has no recollection of what she variously calls "the supposed meeting" and "the emergency so-called meeting." [Editor & Publisher, 10/1/2006; McClatchy Newspapers, 10/2/2006] The Washington Post comments that "Rice added to the confusion… by strongly suggesting that the meeting may never have occurred at all—even though administration officials had conceded for several days that it had." Hours after Rice's latest denial, the State Department confirms that documents show Rice did attend such a meeting on that date. However, State Department spokesman Sean McCormack then says, "The briefing was a summary of the threat reporting from the previous weeks. There was nothing new." The Washington Post notes that when it was pointed out to McCormack that Rice asked for the briefing to be shown to Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and Attorney General Ashcroft (see July 11-17, 2001), "McCormack was unable to explain why Rice felt the briefing should be repeated if it did not include new material." [Washington Post, 10/3/2006]
Entity Tags: John Ashcroft, Sean McCormack, Condoleezza Rice, US Department of State, Al-Qaeda, George J. Tenet, Donald Rumsfeld
In an interview, former counterterrorism "tsar" Richard Clarke says that the CIA purposefully withheld information from him about two future 9/11 hijackers for over a year before September 11. The interview was taped in October 2009, but is released now by documentary makers Ray Nowosielski and John Duffy ahead of a forthcoming podcast entitled "Who Is Rich Blee?" about the intelligence failures before 9/11. Clarke indicates he found out the CIA failed to pass information on to him not long after 9/11, but assumed the information had been honestly missed by a single junior officer. However, when he later learned at at least 50 officers accessed the information, he began to question this theory. (Note: the news that the information was accessed by at least 50 officers broke in August 2007—see Mid-January-March 2000 and August 21, 2007). According to Clarke, information of the sort the CIA had on two of the hijackers, Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi, was automatically forwarded to him, but he never heard their names before 9/11. Clarke, who admits he cannot prove his allegation that the information was withheld deliberately, says the best explanation he can come up with is that the CIA was attempting to turn the two hijackers into double agents, which is why nobody was told outside the agency. Clarke points out that alleged Saudi intelligence operatives working in the US (see January 15-February 2000 and Spring 2000) who knew the hijackers could have helped with this. Clarke mentions four officials who would have been involved in a decision to withhold information: CIA Director George Tenet, who followed information about al-Qaeda in "microscopic detail," Counterterrorist Center chief Cofer Black, Alec Station chief Richard Blee, and his deputy Tom Wilshire. Clarke also expresses wonder that the information was not mentioned at a key meeting with National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice in July 2001 (see July 10, 2001) when Tenet, Black, and Blee were trying to get her to take strong action against al-Qaeda, because what they had on Almihdhar and Alhazmi was the "most persuasive piece of evidence" they had. He also does not understand why the CIA told the FBI in late August 2001 that the two hijackers had entered the country (see August 21-22, 2001). Clarke adds that the CIA presumably did not mention the fact that the two men were in the US at a meeting of high-level officials on September 4, 2001 (see September 4, 2001) because it would have angered Clarke and this would have led to an investigation in CIA "malfeasance and misfeasance" in concealing the information. However, he thinks the US authorities would have caught the hijackers with a "massive sweep" even if he had been told as late as September 4. Clarke also comments that he never asked Tenet and the other CIA officials about what had happened, as the facts became known to him over time. He also says that Tenet, Black, and Blee have got away with what they did, as they were not held to account by the Joint Congressional Inquiry or the 9/11 Commission. [John Duffy and Ray Nowosielski, 8/11/2011; Truthout (.org), 8/11/2011] Tenet, Black, and Blee received an advance copy of the interview and issued a statement in response (see August 3, 2011).
Entity Tags: George J. Tenet, Cofer Black, Tom Wilshire, Richard A. Clarke, Central Intelligence Agency, Ray Nowosielski, John Duffy, Richard Blee
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Where can I buy LeoVince products?
LeoVince doesn't sell directly to customers.
LeoVince products can be exclusively purchased through an authorized dealer.
Click here to view the list of our distributors.
All the answers to the most frequent questions on our exhaust systems, slip-ons and mufflers.
Where can I buy LeoVince products?
LeoVince doesn't sell directly to customers.
LeoVince products can be exclusively purchased through an authorized dealer.
Click here to view the list of our distributors.
How can I know a Leovince product price?
For pricing information, please contact your dealer.
Which LeoVince products are available for my bike?
To consult the list of the products available for your bike, go to "YOUR BIKE" area of our website (leovince.com), you can directly select the brand of your bike and then choose the model, or you can do a brand/model research.
Several LeoVince products are available for my bike. Which one do you recommend for me?
The choice between the various types of product is subjective and especially aesthetic.
In the LeoVince exhausts range you can find the best solution for all your needs, according to your bike specifications and the budget available.
Is it possible to buy spare parts?
Yes, spare parts can be purchased from authorized dealers.
How can I become a LeoVince dealer?
To become a LeoVince dealer we suggest you contact our distributors. Click here to view the list of our distributors.
Who should I contact in case of warranty request?
To get a LeoVince product guarantee you should contact your dealer.
Where can I find LeoVince product images?
High-definition images of LeoVince products can be downloaded by clicking on the "PICTURES" icon present in each product sheet on our website.
During a check by the law enforcement I've been criticized for failing transcription of the original exhaust replacement with a LeoVince approved exhaust on the registration certification. What can I do?
In the EU, the circular number 2438/4183 / (0) of 29th August 1996 of Motor Vehicles has determined that after the installation of an approved exhaust replacement on a vehicle is not necessary to updating the registration document.
Is it necessary to remap the control unit or make changes to the bike after the installation of a LeoVince exhaust?
Unless otherwise stated in the assembly instruction, remapping isn't necessary because our exhausts are developed to ensure optimum operation even with the bike in standard configuration. Remapping the bikes fuel injection system and/or the installation of an additional unit control may further improve the performance, however.
If I fit the LeoVince exhaust, should I eliminate the valve present on the original exhaust of my bike?
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My original exhaust is equipped with an oxygen sensor; what should I do if I mount a LeoVince exhaust?
If present on the original exhaust, also the LeoVince manifold provides the housing of the oxygen sensor.
Can LeoVince silencers be repacked?
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Does the LeoVince Homologation card replace the E-PASS certificate included in the user manual?
No, the LeoVince Homologation card does not replace the E-PASS certificate included in the booklet.


text:
I haven't done many Xs and Os articles recently, and this one isn't going to be explanatory in and of itself. Instead, its going to be a set of links pointing to Tampa 2 and Cover 2 resources. I'd like this to be a living document, at least over the short term, which means I reserve the right to rewrite, amend, and add to this list. If you are a coach or interested amateur, feel free to let me know more sources and resources that I can add.
What you'll see here in order is a link, perhaps a short summary of the scope of the link, and perhaps a short quote from the link. I might borrow a diagram or two from the link, if I think it will help the reader.
Obviously this is driven by the hire of Monte Kiffen and Rod Marinelli by the Dallas Cowboys. Rob Ryan was fired recently. The reasons are part of still heated discussions, but given subsequent hires, it's easy enough to suggest that the powers that be among the Cowboys want better execution all round. That the Cowboys offense was more prone to penalties and miscues than the defense is a position many Cowboys fans take, and that faction treats the firing of Ron Ryan as a kind of scapegoating.
Whether true or false, we're just trying to gather under one roof, resources on this defense, notes useful to fans and coaches alike.
Before beginning, we'll mention some things that should be any any defense aficionado's bag of tricks: the multipart articles on defense by Jene Bramel, a copy of the Jaworksi, Cosell and Plaut book, and of course, Tim Layden's quality introduction to modern football concepts. If you have never seen the Smart Football blog, you should, and if you're looking for information on stunts and modern zone blitzes, the Blitzology blog seldom disappoints.
A variety of other Xs and Os links are on the sidebar.
Scope: introductory. Diagrams may not be accurate, as they display an even front.
Inside the Playbook on the Tampa 2
Scope: Introductory. Matt Bowen was a NFL defensive back, and knows coverages well.
Scope: introductory. Article is self contradictory on the history of the defense.
The personnel used in the Tampa 2 are specific in position and required abilities. All positions in this defense place a premium on speed, and often the result is that they are all undersized by league standards. The defensive linemen in this scheme have to be quick and agile enough to create pressure on the quarterback without the aid of a blitz from either the linebackers or the secondary, with
the defensive tackle in the nose position having above-average tackling skills to help stop runs.
The Fifth Down Blog on the Cover 2 and Tampa 2
Scope: Introductory. Jene Bramel's coverage of the Monte Kiffin system.
Daily Norsemen on Minnesota's Tampa 2
Scope: nicely done introductory level discussion of the back 7 responsibilities in the Tampa 2
While they will generally all be tailored to one gap attacking from the 4-3 front … the back seven will have to display a wide variety of skills in order to execute the full defense.
This is distinct from some 3-4 systems (and other 4-3s), where the varied looks and confusing schemes imply a high degree of
flexibility from all players, but in fact does not require as much individual diversity at key positions.
ESPN News Article: fewer and fewer Cover 2 teams
Scope: news article, reporting teams moving away from Cover 2 because safeties can't hit as hard anymore.
The Core Positions in the Tampa 2
Scope: Introductory, newspaper blog. Bears-centric. Reporter repeating what a coach has told him.
Stampede Blue on the NT position in the Tampa 2
Scope: Introductory, with emphasis on the Colts and their history with 1 technique DTs in the Tampa 2.
Scope: Introduction. Some discussion of where current Cowboys fit into a Tampa 2 style scheme. Historically accurate.
In terms of the Tampa Bay personnel compared to this current Cowboys squad, think of DeMarcus Ware as Simeon Rice, Bruce Carter
as Derrick Brooks, Sean Lee as Shelton Quarles and Barry Church as John Lynch, with Jay Ratliff as Warren Sapp. I don't believe
the coverage part will be a problem for Carr and Claiborne, but how physical they can be trying to do those things I spoke of
in funneling runs inside or playing the run when he gets to the outside will be important.
How to coach the MLB drop in Tampa 2
Scope: coaching thread on message board.
That middle position isn't manned by the true MLB type that the Miami 4-3 was predicated on. Like these guys have said, he's 6 yards back and has different responsibilities too.
Scope: Coaching blog, and article. MLB, CB, and S responsibilities.
General coaching thread on the Tampa 2.
It is not a viable every-down coverage, due to the fact that you basically are giving up the entire 0-10 yd zone from hash-to-hash without resistance, so if a team just hits the TE & RB's over the middle, they can kill you with 8 yd gains every snap.
I was surprised when I found out that The Tampa 2 wasn't the same thing as the 4-3 Over Cover 2. Went to a COY clinic in Orlando a few years ago and Monte Kiffen was the speaker. It looked more like a version of the WT-6(*) than a version of the 4-3 Over. I'm still not real sure about that thing.
Not Tampa 2 specific, but interesting in contrast
On Pete Carroll's Seahawks 4-3
Scope: Introductory to intermediate.
Shakin' the Southland on the Miami 4-3 and descendents.
Scope: Intermediate.
Offensive Football, busting the Cover 2
Shakin' The Southland (Clemson football blog) on the Cover 2.
Scope: intermediate, with plenty of video.
Almost any article by Chris Brown of Smart Football has football coaches as its primary audience. Advanced fans can glean some insight as well.
Chris Brown on Peyton Manning's favorite play: Levels
* presumably, wide tackle 6.
We got the Split-60 from Coach "Erk Russell" in 1984. It was the WT-6 on the Strongside and the Split-4 on the Weakside. They called it the "Junk Yard Dog" defense. Coach Russell said that it took the best of the WT-6 and the Split-4.
We got it, squeezed down the Strongside into a 50 that we were more used to and I've used it every since as a Gap 5-2. Wish I'd put it in print, but I was just a coaching pup then and just thought it wasn't anything special.
Now they call it the 4-3 Under and say that Monte Kiffen is credited with it. Same defense that Coach Russell ran at Georgia with a few little wrinkles. I guess some things never change.


text:
"I don't believe in an afterlife, although I am bringing a change of underwear."
HIS deciduous, mud-red hair has been dried in a wind tunnel. His posture would be unsatisfactory for a question mark. His adenoidal diction suggests that he learned English from records played at the wrong speed. He has the kind of profile that should not be painted but wallpapered.
Peering dolefully at the world through weed-colored glasses, Woody Allen looks like a one-man illustration of the blind leading the halt. Nonetheless, at 36, he has become one of America's funniest...
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text:
Royals stay hot by topping nemesis Verlander
Moustakas belts decisive homer as KC wins second straight in set
KANSAS CITY -- It was Justin Verlander, the classic conqueror of Kansas City, on the mound. Tough hill to climb for the Royals.
So what happens on Saturday night?
Mike Moustakas nails Verlander for a game-deciding home run and the Royals beat him, 6-5. Baseball's premier hitter, Miguel Cabrera, is neutralized with the game on the line. Ned Yost secures his 700th managerial victory. And the Royals beat the first-place Detroit Tigers for the second straight night.
Most of the 30,116 fans left Kauffman Stadium in a happy frame of mind, perhaps sensing a turnaround for a hometown team that had gone into the All-Star break with five straight losses.
"This is a good team we've got here, man, we're resilient and we never say die," Moustakas said.
They had died many times over the years against Verlander's previous 25 starts against them.
"We're fully aware that we were 2-15 [now 3-15] against Verlander, so our focus today was to go out and give him a tough game and that's exactly what we did," Yost said.
The Royals, beating Verlander for the first time since Sept. 9, 2009, roughed him up for six runs (five earned) on eight hits in his 5 2/3 innings.
"Just overall, just wasn't in sync. Just gotta find it. Couldn't find it today," Verlander said.
Even so, he was in a 5-5 tie with pitching adversary Jeremy Guthrie after a frenetic four innings. Verlander was ahead, 3-1, but in the third, Salvador Perez clipped him for a game-tying two-run single. And, in the fourth, the Royals loaded the bases with none out and pushed in two runs for a 5-3 lead.
"He didn't have a very good game. Simple," Tigers manager Jim Leyland said. "And that's OK. That happens."
Then the Tigers caught a break in the fifth inning.
"We gave them the two runs there," Yost said.
Strange inning. Royals second baseman Chris Getz sustained a knee injury trying to grab a single by Prince Fielder. Guthrie had two outs with two on, when Andy Dirks hit a bouncer to first baseman Eric Hosmer, who promptly fell forward and failed to get the third out.
Hosmer intended to shovel the ball to Guthrie covering the bag.
"My first instinct was to flip it and I looked up and Guthrie had peeled off because he thought I was going to take it," Hosmer said. "That's where I've got to be telling him to get over right there. It was just a lack of communication on my part."
So Dirks got a single and Alex Avila followed with a two-run single on a sharply hit ball that a sprawling Elliot Johnson, who had replaced Getz, couldn't quite grab and it rolled away from him. So it was 5-5.
"We should have had zero runs allowed there and pick the team up after them scoring all those runs, but instead let them tie it up," Guthrie said. "When you've got to get six outs in an inning, you're going to give up some runs typically and I got bit by six outs."
Verlander got two quick outs in the Royals' half of the fifth. Up came Moustakas.
"It's Justin Verlander out there, you know, and when that guy's on, he's tough to hit," Moustakas said. "We were able to put up a couple runs against him and I was able to get a good pitch 2-0, and I just didn't miss it. He tried to run a sinker down-and-away and I was able to elevate it a little bit, and I was able to get it out of the park for us. Apparently, it was a huge run."
Apparently so, because his drive into the right-field bullpen turned out to be the winning run.
Not that there weren't some perilous moments for the Royals as the game wound down.
Royals reliever Aaron Crow gave up a single to Avila and walked pinch-hitter Don Kelly to start the eighth inning. They were bunted to second and third. Crow got Torii Hunter on a sharp grounder to Moustakas at third and the runners had to hold.
Up next: Cabrera, the right-handed blaster of Triple Crown fame. First base was open, but Yost decided against an intentional walk.
"We weren't going to let him beat us, but we also knew that he's like 0-for-6 off of Crow," Yost said.
So the deal was that Crow wasn't supposed to give Cabrera a pitch he could handle.
"Yeah, but you don't want to walk him and bring up Prince Fielder, so you go after him and see what happens," Crow said.
What happened was that Cabrera hit a sharp ground ball to Moustakas at third, not an easy play, but Hosmer picked up his throw on the bounce to end the threat.
But the drama wasn't over. Closer Greg Holland took over in the ninth and, after getting one out, Victor Martinez teed off on a shot to right field. Martinez paused and gazed as if expecting a game-tying home run.
"When you see a guy standing there in the box, obviously, I thought it was out because he stood there so long," Holland said.
However, the ball dipped into the right-field corner where David Lough came rather close to catching the ball.
"I think I might've got a piece of it. I thought I felt something when I went into the wall, but I just couldn't get to it in time," Lough said.
Martinez had a double, creating more tension until Holland retired the next two hitters for his 24th save.
Of all things, the Royals have now faced Verlander three times this season and not lost to him. In fact, they've won all three of those games. Verlander had no-decisions in the first two, both of which the Royals won in 10 innings. Now comes a loss for their old tormentor.
"It's obviously frustrating for me, but it's more frustrating for this team," Verlander said. "These guys look to me to win games, especially when they go out there and score five runs. That should be more than enough for me. Tonight it wasn't."
And the Royals now have a 5-2 record against the Tigers this season. But there are 12 games to go.


text:
Live from America
Yasiin, Yasiin, y'all seen
N.I.P, sing it
[Verse 1]
Poor so hard, my clean clothes look grimy, pretty women don't mind me
So what's fifty grand to a young nigga like me? More than my annual salary
Poor so hard, this shit crazy, walk outside the whole world hate me
Nervous stares at the thoroughfare, surveillance cameras, police tracing
Poor so hard, this shit weird, we be home and still be scared
There's grief here, there's peace here, easy and hard to be here
Psycho, liable to turn Michael, take your pick, Myers, Myers, Myers, same shit
Poor so hard, got holey socks, dope block on my stove top
Jumbotrons for astronauts, high in orbit off planet rock, say
Poor so hard, this chopper too, we starving Marvin, you hot food
There's birds of prey, no escape, open-air prison, local zoo
Poor so hard, who getting faded? Little Maurice in the sixth grade
No mama, no father, role model the dope game, say
Poor so hard, bitch behave, standing behind the deuce-deuce-trey
Ice-cold, heat blow, closed casket, cold case
Poor so hard, that shit cray
[Verse 2]
These young bloods is looking scary at the mall
They wearing pants, you can still see they drawers
They rob a nigga in the bathroom stall
They took his life cause he ain't want to take it off
Poor so hard, that shit cray, ain't it, Bey? Diabetics, fish filet
Poor so hard, your house so cold, nigga, it ain't spring
Every winter landlord fuckin' with my heat again
Bougie girl, grab your hand, show you how to do this ghetto dance
Fuck your French, we ain't in France, I'm just saying
Prince Williams ain't do it right, if you ask me
If I was him, I'd put some black up in my family
Fake Gucci, my nigga, fake Louis, my killa
Real drugs, my dealer, who the fuck is Margiela?
Doctors say I'm the illest, I ain't got no insurance
It's them niggas in poorest, be them rebel guerillas, huh
[Interlude: Malcolm X]
I don't worry, I tell you
I am a man who believed that I died 20 years ago
And I live like a man who is dead already
I have no fear whatsoever of anybody or anything
[Verse 3]
To the kings and queens and everyone in every place, yo
Don't get caught up in no throne, don't get caught up in no throne
Don't get caught up in no throne
Towers of Babylon rise up and so they shall fall
As it was written before, amen, so it goes on
Don't get caught up in no throne, don't get caught up in no throne
Don't get caught up in no throne
These devils out here lying, acting like the people ain't dying
We silver and they gold, ain't never saved a soul
Don't get caught up in no throne, don't get caught up in no throne
Don't get caught up in no throne
Signs through the earth and through the heavens, lunar, solar eclipses
We seeking for forgiveness and safety for our children
Don't get caught up in no throne, don't get caught up in no throne
Don't get caught up in no throne, Allah is in control
This remake/parody of "Niggas in Paris" is a part of Yasiin's "Top 40 Underdogs" series, where he remakes popular songs. You can download this track by following the link


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I must admit, my knowledge of Representative Keith Ellison continues to be somewhat limited at this point. In essence, I don't feel that I am competently educated about the man to create a cogent or informed opinion of who he is. However, since this is not the New York Times, but in fact a blog, I will endeavour to do my best.
I know about as much concerning Ellison as Ellison knew of the Symbionese Liberation Army when, back in 2000, he was passionately defending convicted terrorist and former SLA member, Kathleen Soliah, more mundanely known as Sarah Jane Olsen. From the proceeding article…
Before finishing his speech, Ellison admitted his knowledge of the SLA was deficient.
My point is that I remember the SLA. I was 12 years old when it hit the news in 1974. I remember the name, I remember the made-for-TV movie with Patty Hearst, who was 'taken away by the SLA' and by this black guy named Cinque, who strutted around and was real scary. And clearly these people were 'bad to the bone.' And as I began to read about the SLA, they were talking about rights for poor people. … I mean I'm not trying to say the SLA is – I don't even know enough about the SLA to tell you about the SLA, but I can tell you what they stated … they were in favor of: It had to do with fighting poverty and fighting racism and stuff like that. I'm not even here to tell you how they did it, because I don't know."
Is this what Minnesota can expect from its congressman–a man who conducts no research into the subjects with whom he is championing? If I didn't know better, I'd get the impression that Ellison supported what the SLA did; if I didn't know better. Of course, what's even more depressing is the fact that Ellison is simply more of the same in regards to America's politicians–uninformed and uninterested.
Muslim congressman called for terrorist's release in 2000
Ellison spoke at fund-raiser for woman from group that tried to kill Feinstein
Posted: January 21, 2007
7:00 p.m. Eastern
By Jay Baggett
© 2007 WorldNetDaily.com When House Speaker Nancy Pelosi joined Minnesota freshman Rep. Keith Ellison for his recent swearing-in ceremony, the controversy over his taking the oath of office on the Quran overshadowed his earlier role in supporting a terrorist whose group tried to kill policemen and allegedly twice tried to murder Pelosi's fellow San Francisco lawmaker Sen. Dianne Feinstein. On Feb.12, 2000, Ellison joined Bernadine Dohrn, one of the founders of the 1960s radical group the Weather Underground, and several other speakers at a fundraiser for recently arrested Kathleen Soliah, a.k.a. Sara Jane Olson.
Soliah – who along with a small band of Bay Area radicals took in Bill and Emily Harris and Patty Hearst, the last surviving members of the Symbionese Liberation Army following the May 17, 1974, shootout in Los Angeles – had been on the run since the three SLA "soldiers" were captured in September 1975.
Initially charged with planting pipe bombs under two police cars in Los Angeles in August 1975, Soliah was later charged in Sacramento for the murder of a bank customer killed in an April 1975 holdup after the victim's son exerted pressure through the media to reopen the case. Hearst, in her 1981 book, "Every Secret Thing," described the bungled robbery as an SLA operation in which she, Soliah, the Harrises and several others participated.
Soliah, arrested in St. Paul, Minn., in June 1999 and living under the name Sara Jane Olson, initially denied being Soliah or a member of the SLA. The upper-middle class doctor's wife was described by friends – several of whom were members of the state legislature – as an actress in community theater, a gourmet cook and a soccer mom who read books to the blind. People Magazine even did an article on her, featuring her well-appointed Highland Park home, and casting her as a Martha Stewart-type homemaker.
But as the long-forgotten story of the SLA was resurrected in the media and as the Los Angeles district attorney began to present the voluminous evidence, stored for over 25 years, Soliah-Olson shed the Martha Stewart image and presented herself as the victim of a politically motivated "witch hunt" and surrounded herself with SLA attorneys, '60s radicals and their sympathizers.
On Feb. 12, 2000, Soliah-Olson and her supporters held a forum and auction fundraiser for her defense in St. Paul. Among the speakers was Keith Ellison, a local criminal defense attorney, activist and radio talk-show host.
His speech is still preserved on an archived copy of the now-defunct Soliah-Olson defense website.
Ellison, who frequently defended black gang members in his practice, linked the prosecution of Soliah-Olson to notable radicals Geronimo Pratt and Mumia Abu Jamal.
"For the people who want to incarcerate Sara Jane Olson, ain't nothing changed," said Ellison. "As a matter of fact, they want to settle scores with Sara Jane Olson and others who were fighting for freedom in the '60s and '70s.
"… And like many of my clients, Sara Jane Olson has a public defender. Do you understand what I'm saying? Because she cannot afford to pay for her defense all by herself. Do you understand what I'm saying? I mean, the reality is, Sara Jane Olson, basically – is a black gang member – as far as I can see.
"… I think, just like the people who want to come together and lock up Sara, we need to come together and free Sara. And all the Saras, because she's not the only one."
Ellison, crediting the speech given by Dohrn earlier that evening, continued.
"This is not about justice," he said. "This is not about accountability, this is not about public safety. This is about symbolism. This is about making a point. This is about saying to you and to me that we are going to get you if you ever try to stand against what we're about. We're going to get you. And we're going to lock you up and we don't care how long it takes, we're going to get you."
Before finishing his speech, Ellison admitted his knowledge of the SLA was deficient:
"My point is that I remember the SLA. I was 12 years old when it hit the news in 1974. I remember the name, I remember the made-for-TV movie with Patty Hearst, who was 'taken away by the SLA' and by this black guy named Cinque, who strutted around and was real scary. And clearly these people were 'bad to the bone.' And as I began to read about the SLA, they were talking about rights for poor people. … I mean I'm not trying to say the SLA is – I don't even know enough about the SLA to tell you about the SLA, but I can tell you what they stated … they were in favor of: It had to do with fighting poverty and fighting racism and stuff like that. I'm not even here to tell you how they did it, because I don't know.
"… And so, I just want to welcome you for your contribution to the struggle and thank those of you who have been maintaining the struggle over the years, and say, "Hey, free Sara!"
Thirty-three months after Ellison's call for Soliah-Olson's release, she, the Harrises, and Michael Bortin, pleaded guilty to the shotgun murder of Myrna Opsahl, the bank customer killed in the SLA robbery. Soliah-Olson also pleaded guilty to placing pipe bombs under LAPD police cars. A fifth member, James Kilgore, was later captured in South Africa and sentenced for bomb possession and Opsahl's murder.
The focus on the SLA in Soliah-Olson's trial distracted attention from her own violent history before and after coming into contact with the group that kidnapped Patty Hearst. Over a year before the SLA came into existence, Soliah, her brother, Bortin and Kilgore were questioned in connection with a bomb factory discovered in a Berkeley garage. Bortin and a second man were arrested in connection with the bomb lab and convicted and sentenced for possessing an ammonium-nitrate bomb. Based on information developed by the Alameda County district attorney, the pair was suspected of 10 bombings in 1971 and one in 1972, the latter involving a tack-grenade bomb – housed in a beer can – tossed into a bar across the street from the San Francisco Hall of Justice frequented by police officers and court personnel.
During the latter half of 1974, when the Harrises and Hearst were hiding out on a Pennsylvania farm, Kathleen Soliah, her brother, Kilgore and Bortin were setting off bombs in the Bay Area under the banner of the New World Liberation Front, a name announced in the first SLA communique after the Harrises and Hearst came under the protection of Soliah in June 1974.
Vin McLellan and Paul Avery, in their 1977 book "The Voices of Guns," documented more than 10 Bay Area bombings by Soliah's NWLF in late 1974 and 1975:
- Aug. 6, 1974: Bomb failed to explode at Burlingame office of General Motors Acceptable Corporation;
- Sept. 3, 1974: Bomb exploded in the San Francisco office of Dean Witter and Company;
- Sept. 13, 1974: Bomb exploded at the Palo Alto office of Dean Witter and Company;
- Sept. 28, 1974: Bomb exploded in a warehouse of an ITT subsidiary in San Leandro;
- Oct. 2, 1974: Bomb exploded in a women's restroom of the ITT-owned Sheraton-Palace Hotel in San Francisco;
- Oct. 30, 1974: Bomb exploded at the Los Altos Hills home of retired ITT president Robert Halleck;
- Nov. 6, 1974: Seven meter maid three-wheeled motorcycles blown up in a Berkeley parking lot;
- Dec. 19, 1974: Bomb exploded in the San Francisco office of General Motors Corporation;
- Feb. 3, 1975: Bomb exploded at the San Jose office of General Motors Corporation;
- Feb. 4, 1975: Double bombing at Pillar Point Air Force Radar Station near Half Moon Bay and the Vulcan Foundry in Oakland;
- Feb. 6, 1975: Pipe bomb exploded at KRON-TV station in San Francisco;
- Aug. 4, 1975: Three NWLF fire bombs exploded in the carport of the Woodside home of Charles de Brettville, chairman of the Bank of California, a director of Pacific Gas and Electric, Shell Oil, Western Union and Safeway Stores, Inc;
- Aug. 14, 1975: The NWLF claimed credit for bombing of an Emeryville police cruiser.
By February 1975, the Bay Area was averaging one bombing every 16 days. The NWLF was linked to more than 70 bombings by authorities, mostly in Northern California.
McLellan and Avery wrote:
"The NWLF messages had a standing invitation to other groups to adopt the name, and there were apparently one or more independent 'NWLF' units that became active in bombings – but according to Hearst's FBI confessions, it was Bill Harris and the 'second team' who were behind most of the two dozen NWLF bombings over the following nine months. ('The Harrises were the g*****n NWLF!' said one Patty-briefed source, mixing admiration and exasperation.)"
After the FBI dragnet that caught Hearst and the Harrises failed to capture Soliah in September 1975, she and Kilgore continued setting off bombs under the name of the NWLF. On Feb 12, 1976, 24 years to the day before Ellison's plea to "free Sara," authorities say Soliah and Kilgore set off a bomb at the historic Hearst Castle on California's central coast, causing $1 million in damage. The pair were identified from photographs by tourists who escaped the blast. The NWLF communique that followed demanded the Hearst family contribute $250,000 to the defense of the Harrises.
The following night, a deputy sheriff patrolling near Woodside in the south Bay Area was shot by two gunmen as he investigated suspicious activity beneath an electric transmission tower adjacent to the freeway. The officer interrupted the pair's efforts before the bomb they were setting could be exploded. The NWLF took credit for shooting the officer.
One of the NWLF's better-known targets in 1976 was then-San Francisco Supervisor Dianne Feinstein.
In 1995, Feinstein, by now a U.S. senator, testified at Senate hearings on terrorism where she explained why she carried a concealed weapon:
"Because less than 20 years ago I was the target of a terrorist group. It was the New World Liberation Front. They blew up power stations and put a bomb at my home when my husband was dying of cancer. And the bomb didn't detonate. … I was very lucky. But, I thought of what might have happened. Later the same group shot out all the windows of my home. "And, I know the sense of helplessness that people feel. I know the urge to arm yourself, because that's what I did. I was trained in firearms. I'd walk to the hospital when my husband was sick. I carried a concealed weapon. I made the determination that if somebody was going to try to take me out, I was going to take them with me."
Last week, Ellison was named to the House Judiciary Committee, which has oversight over civil liberties, immigration and the courts. He said he would like to see a ban on racial profiling and will work to restore civil liberties he says have been rolled back by the Bush administration, Associated Press reported.
Jon Opsahl, son of the woman killed by the SLA, told WND: "It does seem to confirm that, unfortunately, intelligence and integrity are not prerequisites for political office in this country in general and in Minnesota in particular."


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Henry Stapp: Nondual Quantum Duality
Henry Stapp's consciousness theory sees a global collapse of superposed brain states as in the process of choosing between alternatives. Henry P Stapp points out that orthodox quantum theory reconciles two diverse aspects of scientific practice: the mathematical aspect represented by the deterministic evolution of mathematical properties in accordance with a deterministic equation Schrödinger's equation[dubious – discuss]; and the empirical aspect associated with our human actions upon the world about us, and the feedbacks that we experience. Another way that he puts it is that the mathematically determined evolution via Schrödinger's equation[dubious – discuss] is the 'rock like' aspect of matter, while the quantum collapse of the wave function is mind-like. His theory of how mind may interact with matter via quantum processes in the brain differs from that of Penrose and Hameroff. While the latter postulates quantum computing in the microtubules in brain neurons, Stapp postulates more global collapse via his 'mind like' wave-function collapse that exploits certain aspects of the quantum Zeno effect within the synapses to explain attention. His views are spelled out most clearly in his book, Mindful Universe: Quantum Mechanics and the Participating Observer
After receiving his PhD in particle physics at the University of California, Berkeley, under the supervision of Nobel Laureates Emilio Segrè and Owen Chamberlain, Henry Stapp moved to ETH Zurich to do post-doctoral work under Wolfgang Pauli. During this period he composed an article called 'Mind, Matter and Quantum Mechanics', which he never sent for publication, but would become the title of his 1993 book. When Pauli died in 1958, Stapp transferred to Munich, now in the company of Werner Heisenberg. While making important contributions to, inter alia, the analysis of proton-proton scattering and the development of analytic S-matrix theory, Stapp is perhaps most well known for his ongoing work in the foundations of quantum mechanics, with particular focus on explicating the role and nature of consciousness. He is also an expert on Bell's Theorem, having solved problems related to non-locality presented by John Bell and Albert Einstein.