text:
Posted by: Sammi Ibrahem,Sr
Shia (/ˈʃiːə/; Arabic: شيعة Shīʿah), an abbreviation of Shīʻatu ʻAlī (شيعة علي, "followers of Ali"), is a branch of Islam which holds that the Islamic prophet Muhammad's proper successor as Caliph was his son-in-law and cousin Ali ibn Abi Talib. Shia Islam primarily contrasts with Sunni Islam, whose adherents believe that Muhammad's father-in-law Abu Bakr, not Ali ibn Abi Talib, was his proper successor.[1][2]
Adherents of Shia Islam are called Shias or the Shi'a as a collective or Shi'i individually.[3] Shia Islam is the second-largest branch of Islam: in 2009, Shia Muslims constituted 10–13% of the world's Muslim population.[4] Twelver Shia(Ithnā'ashariyyah) is the largest branch of Shia Islam.[5] In 2012 it was estimated that perhaps 85 percent of Shias were Twelvers.[6]
Shia Islam is based on the Quran and the message of the Islamic prophet Muhammad attested in hadith recorded by the Shia, and certain books deemed sacred to the Shia (Nahj al-Balagha).[7][8] Shia consider Ali to have been divinely appointed as the successor to Muhammad, and as the first Imam. The Shia also extend this "Imami" doctrine to Muhammad's family, theAhl al-Bayt ("the People of the House"), and certain individuals among his descendants, known as Imams, who they believe possess special spiritual and political authority over the community, infallibility, and other divinely-ordained traits.[9] Although there are myriad Shia subsects, modern Shia Islam has been divided into three main groupings: Twelvers, Ismailis and Zaidis, with Twelver Shia being the largest and most influential group among Shia.[10][11][12]
- Etymology
- Beliefs
- History
- Community
- BranchesTradition
- See also
- Notes
- References
- Further reading
- External links
The word Shia (Arabic: شيعة shīʻah /ˈʃiːʕa/) means follower[13] and is the short form of the historic phrase shīʻatu ʻAlī (شيعة علي /ˈʃiːʕatu ˈʕaliː/), meaning "followers of Ali", "faction of Ali", or "party of Ali".[14] Shi'a and Shiism are forms used in English, whileShi'ite or Shiite, as well as Shia, refer to its adherents.
The term for the first time was used at the time of Muhammad.[15] At present, the word refers to the Muslims who believe that the leadership of the community after Muhammad belongs to Ali and his successors. Nawbakhti states that the term Shia refers to a group of Muslims that at the time of the prophet and after him regarded Ali as the Imam and Caliph.[16] Al-Shahrastani expresses that the term Shia refers to those who believe that Ali is designated as the Heir, Imam and caliph by the prophet[17] and also Ali's authority never goes out of his descendants.[18] For the Shia, this conviction is implicit in the Quran and history of Islam. Shia scholars emphasize that the notion of authority is linked to the family of the prophets as the verses 3:33,34 shows: "Indeed, Allah chose Adam and Noah and the family of Abraham and the family of 'Imran over the worlds – (33) Descendants, some of them from others. And Allah is Hearing and Knowing. (34)"[19] Shia search for the true meaning of the revelation to get the purpose of the life blood and the human destiny.[20]
Succession of Ali
Shia Muslims believe that just as a prophet is appointed by God alone, only God has the prerogative to appoint the successor to his prophet. They believe God chose Ali to be Muhammad's successor, infallible, the first caliph (khalifa, head of state) of Islam. The Shias believe that Muhammad designated Ali as his successor by God's command.[21][22]
Ali was Muhammad's first cousin and closest living male relative as well as his son-in-law, having married Muhammad's daughter Fatimah.[23][24] Ali would eventually become the fourth Muslim (sunni) caliph.[25]
After the Farewell Pilgrimage, Muhammad ordered the gathering of Muslims at the pond of Khumm and it was there that Shia Muslims believe Muhammad nominated Ali to be his successor. The hadith of the pond of Khumm was narrated on 18th ofDhu al-Hijjah of 10 AH in the Islamic calendar (10 March 632 AD) at a place called Ghadir Khumm, located near the city of al-Juhfah, Saudi Arabia.[26] Muhammad there stated:
Oh people! Reflect on the Quran and comprehend its verses. Look into its clear verses and do not follow its ambiguous parts, for by Allah, none shall be able to explain to you its warnings and its mysteries, nor shall anyone clarify its interpretation, other than the one that I have grasped his hand, brought up beside myself, [and lifted his arm,] the one about whom I inform you that whomever I am his master (Mawla[a])), then Ali is his master (Mawla); and he is Ali Ibn Abi Talib, my brother, the executor of my will (Wasiyyi), whose appointment as your guardian and leader has been sent down to me from Allah, the mighty and the majestic.— Muhammad , from The Farewell Sermon[28]
- ^ The word mawla has many meanings as discussed in the book "Patronate And Patronage in Early And Classical Islam" By Monique Bernards, John Nawas on page 25:
"[M]awla may refer to a client, a patron, an agnate (brother, son, father's brother, father' brothers son), an affined kinsman, (brother-in-law, son-in-law), a friend, a supporter, a follower, a drinking companion, a partner, a newly-converted Muslim attached to a Muslim and last but not least an ally. Most of these categories have legal implications. In Islamic times, the term malawa mostly referred to Muslim freedmen and freed non-Arabs who attached themselves to Arabs upon their conversion to Islam. In these senses, Mawla is commonly translated as "a client". The association of malwa with non-arabs and a low status imparted an increasingly pejorative connotation to it.[27]
Shia Muslims believe this to be Muhammad's appointment of Ali as his successor.
Ali's caliphate
When Muhammad died in 632 CE, Ali and Muhammad's closest relatives made the funeral arrangements. While they were preparing his body, Abu Bakr, Umar, and Abu Ubaidah ibn al Jarrah met with the leaders of Medina and elected Abu Bakr as caliph. Ali and his family accepted the appointment for the sake of unity in the early Muslim community.[23] It was not until the murder of the third caliph, Uthman, in 657 CE that the Muslims in Medina in desperation invited Ali to become the fourth caliph as the last source,[23] and he established his capital in Kufah in present-day Iraq.[14]
Ali's rule over the early Muslim community was often contested, and wars were waged against him. As a result, he had to struggle to maintain his power against the groups who betrayed him after giving allegiance to his succession, or those who wished to take his position. This dispute eventually led to the First Fitna, which was the first major civil warwithin the Islamic Caliphate. The Fitna began as a series of revolts fought against the first imam, Ali ibn Abi Talib, caused by the assassination of his political predecessor, Uthman ibn Affan. While the rebels who accused Uthman of prejudice[clarification needed] affirmed Ali'skhilafa (caliph-hood), they later turned against him and fought him.[23] Ali ruled from 656 CE to 661 CE,[23] when he was assassinated[24] while prostrating in prayer (sujud). Ali's main rival Muawiyah then claimed the caliphate.[29]
Hasan ibn Ali
Upon the death of Ali, his elder son Hasan became leader of the Muslims of Kufa, and after a series of skirmishes between the Kufa Muslims and the army of Muawiyah, Hasan agreed to cede the caliphate to Muawiyah and maintain peace among Muslims upon certain conditions:[30][31]
- The enforced public cursing of Ali, e.g. during prayers, should be abandoned
- Muawiyah should not use tax money for his own private needs
- There should be peace, and followers of Hasan should be given security and their rights
- Muawiyah will never adopt the title of Amir ul momineen
- Muawiyah will not nominate any successor
Hasan then retired to Medina, where in 670 CE he was poisoned by his wife Ja'da bint al-Ash'ath ibn Qays, after being secretly contacted by Muawiyah who wished to pass the caliphate to his own son Yazid and saw Hasan as an obstacle.
Husayn, Ali's younger son and brother to Hasan, initially resisted calls to lead the Muslims against Muawiyah and reclaim the caliphate. In 680 CE, Muawiyah died and passed the caliphate to his son Yazid. Yazid asked Husayn to swear allegiance (bay'ah) to him. Ali's faction, having expected the caliphate to return to Ali's line upon Muawiyah's death, saw this as a betrayal of the peace treaty and so Husayn rejected this request for allegiance. There was a groundswell of support in Kufa for Husayn to return there and take his position as caliph and imam, so Husayn collected his family and followers in Medina and set off for Kufa. En route to Kufa, he was blocked by an army of Yazid's men (which included people from Kufa) near Karbala (modern Iraq), and Husayn and approximately 72 of his family and followers were killed in the Battle of Karbala.
The Shias regard Husayn as a martyr (shahid), and count him as an Imam from the Ahl al-Bayt. They view Husayn as the defender of Islam from annihilation at the hands of Yazid I. Husayn is the last imam following Ali whom all Shiah sub-branches mutually recognise.[32] The Battle of Karbala is often cited as the definitive break between the Shiah and Sunni sects of Islam, and is commemorated each year by Shiah Muslims on the Day of Ashura.
Imamate of the Ahl al-Bayt
Most of the early Shia differed only marginally from mainstream Sunnis in their views on political leadership, but it is possible in this sect to see a refinement of Shia doctrine. Early Sunnis traditionally held that the political leader must come from the tribe of Muhammad—namely, the Quraysh tribe. The Zaydis narrowed the political claims of Ali's supporters, claiming that not just any descendant of Ali would be eligible to lead the Muslim community (ummah) but only those males directly descended from Muhammad through the union of Ali and Fatimah. But during the Abbasid revolts, other Shia, who came to be known as Imamiyyah (followers of the Imams), followed the theological school of Imam Ja'far al-Sadiq, himself the great great grandson of the Prophet Muhammad's son-in-law Imam Ali . They asserted a more exalted religious role for Imams and insisted that, at any given time, whether in power or not, a single male descendant of Ali and Fatimah was the divinely appointed Imam and the sole authority, in his time, on all matters of faith and law. To those Shia, love of the imams and of their persecuted cause became as important as belief in God's oneness and the mission of Muhammad.[citation needed]
Later most of the Shia, including Twelver and Ismaili, became Imamis. Imami Shia believe that Imams are the spiritual and political successors to Muhammad.[citation needed] Imams are human individuals who not only rule over the community with justice, but also are able to keep and interpret the divine law and its esoteric meaning. The words and deeds of Muhammad and the imams are a guide and model for the community to follow; as a result, they must be free from error and sin, and must be chosen by divine decree, or nass, through Muhammad.[34][35]
According to this view, there is always an Imam of the Age, who is the divinely appointed authority on all matters of faith and law in the Muslim community. Ali was the first imam of this line, the rightful successor to Muhammad, followed by male descendants of Muhammad through his daughter Fatimah.[citation needed]
This difference between following either the Ahl al-Bayt (Muhammad's family and descendants) or Caliph Abu Bakr has shaped Shia and non-Shia views on some of the Quranic verses, the hadith (narrations from Muhammad) and other areas of Islam. For instance, the collection of hadith venerated by Shia Muslims is centered on narrations by members of the Ahl al-Bayt and their supporters, while some hadith by narrators not belonging to or supporting the Ahl al-Bayt are not included. Those of Abu Hurairah, for example, Ibn Asakir in his Ta'rikh Kabir and Muttaqi in his Kanzu'l-Umma report that Caliph Umar lashed him, rebuked him, and forbade him to narrate hadith from Muhammad. Umar said: "Because you narrate hadith in large numbers from the Holy Prophet, you are fit only for attributing lies to him. (That is, one expects a wicked man like you to utter only lies about the Holy Prophet.) So you must stop narrating hadith from the Prophet; otherwise, I will send you to the land of Dus." (A clan in Yemen, to which Abu Huraira belonged.) According to Sunnis, Ali was the fourth successor to Abu Bakr, while the Shia maintain that Ali was the first divinely sanctioned "Imam", or successor of Muhammad. The seminal event in Shia history is the martyrdom in 680 CE at the Battle of Karbala of Ali's son Hussein ibn Ali, who led a non-allegiance movement against the defiant caliph (71 of Hussein's followers were killed as well). Hussein came to symbolize resistance to tyranny.
It is believed in Twelver and Ismaili Shia Islam that 'aql, divine wisdom, was the source of the souls of the prophets and imams and gave them esoteric knowledge called ḥikmah and that their sufferings were a means of divine grace to their devotees.[36][37] Although the imam was not the recipient of a divine revelation, he had a close relationship with God, through which God guides him, and the imam in turn guides the people. Imamate, or belief in the divine guide, is a fundamental belief in the Twelver and Ismaili Shia branches and is based on the concept that God would not leave humanity without access to divine guidance.[38]
Imam of the time, last Imam of the Shia
The Mahdi is the prophesied redeemer of Islam who will rule for seven, nine or nineteen years (according to differing interpretations) before the Day of Judgment and will rid the world of evil. According to Islamic tradition, the Mahdi's tenure will coincide with the Second Coming of Jesus Christ (Isa), who is to assist the Mahdi against the Masih ad-Dajjal (literally, the "false Messiah" or Antichrist). Jesus, who is considered the Masih (Messiah) in Islam, will descend at the point of a white arcade, east of Damascus, dressed in yellow robes with his head anointed. He will then join the Mahdi in his war against the Dajjal, where Jesus will slay Dajjal and unite mankind.
The Shia Islamic faith is vast and inclusive of many different groups.[14] Shia theological beliefs and religious practises, such as prayers, slightly differ from the Sunnis'. While all Muslims pray five times daily, Shias have the option of always combiningDhuhr with Asr and Maghrib with Isha', as there are three distinct times mentioned in the Quran. The Sunnis tend to combine only under certain circumstances.[39][40] Shia Islam embodies a completely independent system of religious interpretation and political authority in the Muslim world.[41][42] The original Shia identity referred to the followers of Imam Ali,[43] and Shia theology was formulated in the 2nd century AH, or after Hijra (8th century CE).[44] The first Shia governments and societies were established by the end of the 3rd century AH/9th century CE. The 4th century AH /10th century CE has been referred to by Louis Massignon as "the Shiite Ismaili century in the history of Islam".[45]
The Shia believe that the status of Ali is supported by numerous hadith, including the Hadith of the pond of Khumm, Hadith of the two weighty things, Hadith of the pen and paper, Hadith of the invitation of the close families, and Hadith of the Twelve Successors. In particular, the Hadith of the Cloak is often quoted to illustrate Muhammad's feeling towards Ali and his family by both Sunni and Shia scholars. Shias prefer hadith attributed to the Ahl al-Bayt and close associates, and have their own separate collection of hadiths.[46][47]
Profession of faith
The Shia version of the Shahada, the Islamic profession of faith, differs from that of the Sunni. The Sunni Shahada states There is no god except Allah, Muhammad is the messenger of the Allah, but to this the Shia append Ali is the Wali (guidance) of God, علي ولي الله. This phrase embodies the Shia emphasis on the inheritance of authority through Muhammad's lineage. The three clauses of the Shia Shahada thus address tawhid (the unity of God), nubuwwah (the prophethood of Muhammad), and imamah (imamate, the leadership of the faith).
Ismah is the concept of infallibility or "divinely bestowed freedom from error and sin" in Islam.[48] Muslims believe that Muhammad and other prophets in Islam possessed ismah. Twelver and Ismaili Shia Muslims also attribute the quality to Imams as well as to Fatimah, daughter of Muhammad, in contrast to the Zaidi, who do not attribute 'ismah to the Imams.[49]Though initially beginning as a political movement, infallibility and sinlessness of the imams later evolved as a distinct belief of (non-Zaidi) Shiism.[citation needed]
According to Shia theologians, infallibility is considered a rational necessary precondition for spiritual and religious guidance. They argue that since God has commanded absolute obedience from these figures they must only order that which is right. The state of infallibility is based on the Shia interpretation of the verse of purification.[50][51] Thus, they are the most pure ones, the only immaculate ones preserved from, and immune to, all uncleanness.[52] It does not mean that supernatural powers prevent them from committing a sin, but due to the fact that they have absolute belief in God, they refrain from doing anything that is a sin.[53]
They also have a complete knowledge of God's will. They are in possession of all knowledge brought by the angels to the prophets (nabi) and the messengers (rasul). Their knowledge encompasses the totality of all times. They thus act without fault in religious matters.[54] Shias regard Ali as the successor of Muhammad not only ruling over the community in justice, but also interpreting Islamic practices and its esoteric meaning. Hence he was regarded as being free from error and sin (infallible), and appointed by God by divine decree (nass) to be the first Imam.[55] Ali is known as "perfect man" (al-insan al-kamil) similar to Muhammad, according to Shia viewpoint.[56]
The Occultation is a belief in some forms of Shia Islam that a messianic figure, a hidden imam known as the Mahdi, will one day return and fill the world with justice. According to the Twelver Shia, the main goal of the Mahdi will be to establish an Islamic state and to apply Islamic laws that were revealed to Muhammad.[57]
Some Shia, such as the Zaidi and Nizari Ismaili, do not believe in the idea of the Occultation. The groups which do believe in it differ as to which lineage of the Imamate is valid, and therefore which individual has gone into occultation. They believe there are many signs that will indicate the time of his return.
Twelver Shia Muslims believe that the Mahdi (the twelfth imam, Muhammad al-Mahdi) is already on Earth, is in occultation and will return at the end of time. Fatimid/ Bohra/ Dawoodi Bohra believe the same but for their 21st Tayyib, whereas Sunnis believe the future Mahdi has not yet arrived on Earth.[58]
History of Shia Islam
Historians dispute the origin of Shia Islam, with many Western scholars positing that Shiism began as a political faction rather than a truly religious movement.[59][60] Other scholars disagree, considering this concept of religious-political separation to be an anachronistic application of a Western concept.[61]
Following the Battle of Karbala, as various Shia-affiliated groups diffused in the emerging Islamic world, several nations arose based around a Shia leadership or population.
- Idrisids (788 to 985 CE): a Zaydi dynasty in what is now Morocco
- Uqaylids (990 to 1096 CE): a Shia Arab dynasty with several lines that ruled in various parts of Al-Jazira, northern Syria and Iraq.
- Buyids (934–1055 CE): at its peak consisted of large portions of modern Iraq and Iran.
- Ilkhanate (1256–1335): a Mongol khanate established in Persia in the 13th century, considered a part of the Mongol Empire. The Ilkhanate was based, originally, on Genghis Khan's campaigns in theKhwarezmid Empire in 1219–1224, and founded by Genghis's grandson, Hulagu, in territories which today comprise most of Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey, and Pakistan. The Ilkhanate initially embraced many religions, but was particularly sympathetic to Buddhism and Christianity. Later Ilkhanate rulers, beginning with Ghazanin 1295, embraced Islam his brother Öljaitü promoted Shia Islam.[clarification needed]
- Naubat Khan accepted Islam under the Guidance of Mughal General Bairam Khan's son Abdul Rahim Khan-I-Khana.
- Bahmanis (1347–1527 CE): a Shia Muslim state of the Deccan in southern India and one of the great medieval Indian kingdoms.[62] Bahmanid Sultanate was the first independent Islamic Kingdom in South India.[63]
Fatimid caliphate
- Fatimids (909–1171 CE): Controlled much of North Africa, the Levant, parts of Arabia and Mecca and Medina. The group takes its name from Fatima, Muhammad's daughter, from whom they claim descent.
- In 909 CE the Shiite military leader Abu Abdallah, overthrew the Sunni ruler in Northern Africa; which began the Fatimid regime.[64]
A major turning point in Shia history was the Safavid dynasty (1501–1736) in Persia. This caused a number of changes in the Muslim world:
- The ending of the relative mutual tolerance between Sunnis and Shias that existed from the time of the Mongol conquests onwards and the resurgence of antagonism between the two groups.
- Initial dependence of Shiite clerics on the state followed by the emergence of an independent body of ulama capable of taking a political stand different from official policies.[68]
- The growth in importance of Iranian centers of religious learning and change from Twelver Shiaism being a predominantly Arab phenomenon.[69]
- The growth of the Akhbari School which preached that only the Quran, hadith are to be bases for verdicts, rejecting the use of reasoning.
- Shah Ismail I also proclaimed himself the Mahdi and a reincarnation of Ali.[70]
With the fall of the Safavids, the state in Persia – including the state system of courts with government-appointed judges (qadis) – became much weaker. This gave the Sharia courts of mujtahids an opportunity to fill the legal vacuum and enabled the ulama to assert their judicial authority. The Usuli School also increased in strength at this time.[71]
The declaration of Shiism as the state religion of the Safavid dynasty in Persia.
Monument commemorating theBattle of Chaldiran, where more than 7000Muslims of Shia andSunni sects were killed in battle.
Battle of Chaldiran, was a major sectarian crisis in the Middle East.
One of the lingering problems in estimating the Shia population is that unless the Shia form a significant minority in a Muslim country, the entire population is often listed as Sunni. Shiites are estimated to be 21–35% of the Muslim population in South Asia, although the total number is difficult to estimate due to that reason.[72] It is variously estimated that 10–20%[73][74][75][76] of theworld's Muslims are Shia. They may number up to 200 million as of 2009.[75] The Shia majority countries are Iran, Iraq, Azerbaijan, and Bahrain.[77][78] They also form the plurality in Lebanon. Shias constitute 36.3% of entire local population and 38.6% of the local Muslim population of the Middle East.[79]
Shia Muslims constitute 27-35% of the population in Lebanon, and as per some estimates from 35%[77][80] to over 35-40% of the population in Yemen,[81] 30%-35% of the citizen population in Kuwait (no figures exist for the non-citizen population),[82][83] over 20% in Turkey,[75][84] 10–20% of the population in Pakistan,[75]and 10-19% of Afghanistan's population.[85][86]
Saudi Arabia hosts a number of distinct Shia communities, including the Twelver Baharna in the Eastern Province andNakhawila of Medina, and the Ismaili Sulaymani and Zaidiyyah of Najran. Estimations put the number of Shiite citizens at 2-4 million, accounting for roughly 15% of the local population.[87]
Significant Shia communities exist in the coastal regions of West Sumatra and Aceh in Indonesia (see Tabuik).[88] The Shia presence is negligible elsewhere in Southeast Asia, where Muslims are predominantly Shafi'i Sunnis. That is, except in Vietnam and Cambodia, where the totality of the small Muslim minority is made up of Shias of Imami persuasion.[citation needed]
A significant Shia minority is present in Nigeria, made up of modern-era converts to a Shia movement centered around Kanoand Sokoto states.[75][76][89] Several African countries like Kenya,[90] South Africa,[91] Somalia,[92] etc. hold small minority populations of various Shia denominations, primarily descendants of immigrants from South Asia during the colonial period, such as the Khoja.[93]
According to Shia Muslims, one of the lingering problems in estimating Shia population is that unless Shia form a significant minority in a Muslim country, the entire population is often listed as Sunni. The reverse, however, has not held true, which may contribute to imprecise estimates of the size of each sect. For example, the 1926 rise of the House of Saud in Arabia brought official discrimination against Shia.[94]
List of nations for which the Shia population may be estimated
Figures indicated in the first three columns below are based on the October 2009 demographic study by the Pew Research Center report, Mapping the Global Muslim Population.[75][76]
|Shia population[75][76]
|Percent of Muslim population that is Shia[75][76]
|Percent of global Shia population[75][76]
|Minimum estimate/claim
|Maximum estimate/claim
|66,000,000 – 70,000,000
|40,000,000 – 50,000,000
|40,000,000[95] – 50,000,000.[96]
|20,000,000 – 30,000,000
|43,250,000[97] – 57,666,666[98][99]
|22-25 million[100][not in citation given]
|19,000,000 – 22,000,000
|8,000,000 – 10,000,000
|7,000,000 – 11,000,000
|5,000,000 – 7,000,000
|85% of total population[101]
|3,000,000 – 4,000,000
|15–19% of total population[85]
|3,000,000 – 3,500,000
|Saudi Arabia
|3,000,000 – 4,000,000
|1,000,000 – 1,600,000[102]
|Estimated, no official census.[106]
|360,000 – 480,000
|30%-35% of 1.2m Muslims (citizen only)[82][83]
|400,000 – 600,000
|850,000 – 900,000
|100,000 (66%[107] of citizen population)
|200,000 (70%[108] of citizen population)
|United Arab Emirates
|300,000 – 400,000
|United States
|200,000 – 400,000
|100,000 – 300,000
|United Kingdom
|100,000 – 300,000
|Bosnia and Herzegovina
The history of Sunni-Shia relations has often involved violence, dating back to the earliest development of the two competing sects. At various times Shia groups have faced persecution.[110][111][112][113][114][115]
Militarily established and holding control over the Umayyad government, many Sunni rulers perceived the Shia as a threat – to both their political and their religious authority.[116] The Sunni rulers under the Umayyads sought to marginalize the Shia minority, and later the Abbasids turned on their Shia allies and imprisoned, persecuted, and killed them. The persecution of the Shia throughout history by Sunni co-religionists has often been characterized by brutal and genocidal acts. Comprising only about 10–15% of the entire Muslim population, the Shia remain a marginalized community to this day in many Sunni Arab dominant countries without the rights to practice their religion and organize.[117]
In 1514 the Ottoman sultan, Selim I, ordered the massacre of 40,000 Anatolian Shia.[118]According to Jalal Al-e-Ahmad, "Sultan Selim I carried things so far that he announced that the killing of one Shiite had as much otherworldly reward as killing 70 Christians."[119]
In 1801 the Al Saud-Wahhabi armies attacked and sacked Karbala, the Shia shrine in eastern Iraq that commemorates the death of Husayn.[120]
Under Saddam Hussein's regime, 1973 to 2003, in Iraq, Shia Muslims were heavily persecuted.[121]
In March 2011, the Malaysian government declared the Shia a "deviant" sect and banned them from promoting their faith to other Muslims, but left them free to practice it themselves privately.[122][123]
Shia, celebrate the following annual holidays:
- Eid ul-Fitr, which marks the end of fasting during the month of Ramadan
- Eid al-Adha, which marks the end of the Hajj or pilgrimage to Mecca
The following days are some of the most important holidays observed by Shia Muslims:
- Eid al-Ghadeer, which is the anniversary of the Ghadir Khum, the occasion when Muhammad announced Ali's Imamate before a multitude of Muslims.[124] Eid al-Ghadeer is held on the 18th of Dhu al-Hijjah.
- The Mourning of Muharram and the Day of Ashura for Shia commemorates Husayn ibn Ali's martyrdom. Husayn was a grandson of Muhammad who was killed by Yazid ibn Muawiyah. Ashurah is a day of deep mourning which occurs on the 10th of Muharram.
- Arba'een commemorates the suffering of the women and children of Husayn ibn Ali's household. After Husayn was killed, they were marched over the desert, from Karbala (central Iraq) to Shaam (Damascus, Syria). Many children (some of whom were direct descendants of Muhammad) died of thirst and exposure along the route. Arbaein occurs on the 20th of Safar, 40 days after Ashurah.
- Mawlid, Muhammad's birth date. Unlike Sunni Muslims, who celebrate the 12th of Rabi' al-awwal as Muhammad's birthday or deathday (because they assert that his birth and death both occur in this week), Shia Muslims celebrate Muhammad's birthday on the 17th of the month, which coincides with the birth date of the sixth imam, Ja'far al-Saadiq.[125] Wahhabis do not celebrate Muhammad's birthday, believing that such celebrations constitute a bid'ah.[126]
- Fatimah's birthday on 20th of Jumada al-Thani. This day is also considered as the 'women and mothers' day".[citation needed]
- Ali's birthday on 13th of Rajab.
- Mid-Sha'ban is the birth date of the 12th and final Twelver imam, Muhammad al-Mahdi. It is celebrated by Shia Muslims on the 15th of Sha'aban.
- Laylat al-Qadr, anniversary of the night of the revelation of the Quran.
- Eid al-Mubahila celebrates a meeting between the Ahl al-Bayt (household of Muhammad) and a Christian deputation from Najran. Al-Mubahila is held on the 24th of Dhu al-Hijjah.
Holy sites
The holiest sites common to all Muslims are Mecca, Medina and Jerusalem. For Shias, the Imam Husayn Shrine, Al Abbas Mosque in Karbala, and Imam Ali Mosque in Najaf are also highly revered.
Other venerated sites include Wadi-us-Salaam cemetery in Najaf, Al-Baqi' cemetery in Medina, Imam Reza shrine inMashhad, Kadhimiya Mosque in Kadhimiya, Al-Askari Mosque in Samarra, Sahla Mosque and Great Mosque of Kufa in Kufa and several other sites in the cities of Qom, Susa and Damascus.
Most of the Shia holy places in Saudi Arabia have been destroyed by the warriors of the Ikhwan, the most notable being the tombs of the Imams in the Al-Baqi' cemetery in 1925.[127] In 2006 a bomb destroyed the shrine of Al-Askari Mosque.[128]
The Shia belief throughout its history split over the issue of the Imamate. The largest branch are the Twelvers, followed by the Zaidi and Ismaili. All three groups follow a different line of Imamate.
Twelver Shia or the Ithnā'ashariyyah' is the largest branch of Shia Islam, and the term Shia Muslim often refers to the Twelvers by default. The term Twelver is derived from the doctrine of believing in twelve divinely ordained leaders, known asThe Twelve Imams. Twelver Shia are also known as Imami or Ja'fari, originated from the name of the 6th Imam, Ja'far al-Sadiq, who elaborated the twelver jurisprudence.[129]
Twelvers constitute the majority of the population in Iran (90%),[130] Azerbaijan (85%),[14][131] Bahrain (70%), Iraq (65%), Lebanon (65% of Muslims).[132][133][134]
Twelver doctrine is based on five principles.[135] These five principles known asUsul ad-Din are as follow:[136][137]
- Monotheism, God is one and unique.
- Justice, the concept of moral rightness based on ethics, fairness, and equity, along with the punishment of the breach of said ethics.
- Prophethood, the institution by which God sends emissaries, or prophets, to guide mankind.
- Leadership, a divine institution which succeeded the institution of Prophethood. Its appointees (imams) are divinely appointed.
- Last Judgment, God's final assessment of humanity.
More specifically, these principles are known as Usul al-Madhhab (principles of the Shia sect) according to Twelver Shias which differ from Daruriyat al-Din (Necessities of Religion) which are principles in order for one to be a Muslim. The Necessities of Religion do not include Leadership (Imamah) as it is not a requirement in order for one to be recognized as a Muslim. However, this category, according to Twelver scholars like Ayatollah al-Khoei, does include belief in God, Prophethood, the Day of Resurrection and other "necessities" (like belief in angels). In this regard, Twelver Shias draw a distinction in terms of believing in the main principles of Islam on the one hand, and specifically Shia doctrines like Imamah on the other.
Besides the Qurʾan which is common to all Muslims, the Shiʿah derive guidance from books of traditions ("ḥadīth") attributed to Muḥammad and the twelve imams. Below is a list of some of the most prominent of these books:
- Nahj al-Balagha by Ali ibn Abi Talib – the most famous collection of sermons, letters & narration by first Imam regarded by Shias
- al-Kafi by Muhammad ibn Ya'qub al-Kulayni[138]
- Wasa'il al-Shi'ah by al-Hurr al-Amili
The Twelve Imams
The Twelve Imams are the spiritual and political successors to Muhammad for the Twelvers.[citation needed] According to the theology of Twelvers, the successor of Muhammad is an infallible human individual who not only rules over the community with justice but also is able to keep and interpret the divine law and its esoteric meaning. The words and deeds of Muhammad and the imams are a guide and model for the community to follow; as a result, they must be free from error and sin, and Imams must be chosen by divine decree, or nass, through Muhammad.[34][35] Each imam was the son of the previous imam, with the exception of Hussein ibn Ali, who was the brother of Hasan ibn Ali.[citation needed] The twelfth and final imam is Muhammad al-Mahdi, who is believed by the Twelvers to be currently alive and in occultation.[38]
The Twelver jurisprudence is called Ja'fari jurisprudence. In this jurisprudence Sunnah is considered to be the oral traditions of Muhammad and their implementation and interpretation by the twelve Imams. There are three schools of Ja'fari jurisprudence: Usuli, Akhbari, and Shaykhi. The Usuli school is by far the largest of the three. Twelver groups that do not follow Ja'fari jurisprudence include Alevi, Bektashi, and Qizilbash.
In Ja'fari jurisprudence, there are ten ancillary pillars, known as Furu' ad-Din, which are as follows:[139]
- Prayer
- Fasting
- Pilgrimage
- Alms giving
- Struggle
- One Fifth (One Fifth) (20% tax on yearly earnings after deduction of household and commercial expenses.)
- Directing others towards good
- Directing others away from evil
- Love those who are in God's path
- Disassociation with those who oppose God
According to Twelvers, defining and interpretation of Islamic jurisprudence is the responsibility of Muhammad and the twelve Imams. As the 12th imam is in occultation, it is the duty of clerics to refer to the Islamic literature such as the Quran and hadith and identify legal decisions within the confines of Islamic law to provide means to deal with current issues from an Islamic perspective. In other words, Twelver clerics provide Guardianship of the Islamic Jurisprudence, which was defined by Muhammad and his twelve successors. This process is known as Ijtihad and the clerics are known as Marja', meaning reference. The labels Allamah and Ayatollah are in use for Twelver clerics.
Zaidi ("Fiver")
Zaidiyya, Zaidism or Zaydi is the second largest branch of Shia Islam.[citation needed] It is a Shia school named after Zayd ibn Ali. Followers of the Zaidi fiqh are called Zaidis (or occasionally Fivers). However, there is also a group called Zaidi Wasītīs who are Twelvers (see below). Zaidis constitute roughly 42–47% of the population of Yemen.[140][141]
The Zaydis, Twelvers, and Ismailis all recognize the same first four Imams; however, the Zaidis recognize Zayd ibn Ali as the fifth. After the time of Zayd ibn Ali, the Zaidis recognized that any descendant of Hasan ibn Ali or Hussein ibn Ali could be imam after fulfilling certain conditions.[142] Other well-known Zaidi Imams in history were Yahya ibn Zayd, Muhammad al-Nafs al-Zakiyya and Ibrahim ibn Abdullah. In matters of Islamic jurisprudence, the Zaydis follow Zayd ibn Ali's teachings which are documented in his book Majmu'l Fiqh (in Arabic: مجموع الفِقه). Al-Hadi ila'l-Haqq Yahya, founder of the Zaydi state in Yemen, instituted elements of the jurisprudential tradition of the Sunni Muslim jurist Abū Ḥanīfa, and as a result, Zaydi jurisprudence today continues somewhat parallel to that of the Hanafis.
The Zaidi doctrine of Imamah does not presuppose the infallibility of the imam nor that the Imams receive divine guidance. Zaidis also do not believe that the Imamate must pass from father to son but believe it can be held by any Sayyid descended from either Hasan ibn Ali or Hussein ibn Ali (as was the case after the death of Hasan ibn Ali). Historically, Zaidis held that Zayd was the rightful successor of the 4th imam since he led a rebellion against the Umayyads in protest of their tyranny and corruption. Muhammad al-Baqir did not engage in political action, and the followers of Zayd believed that a true imam must fight against corrupt rulers.
The Idrisids (Arabic: الأدارسة) were Arab[143] Zaydi Shia[144][145][146][147][148][149] dynasty in the western Maghreb ruling from 788 to 985 C.E., named after its first sultan, Idris I.
A Zaydi state was established in Gilan, Deylaman and Tabaristan (northern Iran) in 864 C.E. by the Alavids;[150] it lasted until the death of its leader at the hand of the Samanids in 928 C.E. Roughly forty years later the state was revived in Gilan and survived under Hasanid leaders until 1126 C.E. Afterwards, from the 12th to 13th centuries, the Zaydis of Deylaman, Gilan and Tabaristan then acknowledged the Zaydi Imams of Yemen or rival Zaydi Imams within Iran.[151]
The Buyids were initially Zaidi[152] as were the Banu Ukhaidhir rulers of al-Yamama in the 9th and 10th centuries.[153] The leader of the Zaydi community took the title of Caliph. As such, the ruler of Yemen was known as the Caliph, al-Hadi Yahya bin al-Hussain bin al-Qasim ar-Rassi Rassids (a descendant of Hasan ibn Ali the son of Ali) who, at Sa'dah, in 893-7 CE, founded the Zaydi Imamate, and this system continued until the middle of the 20th century, when the revolution of 1962 CE deposed the Zaydi Imam. The founding Zaidism of Yemen was of the Jarudiyya group; however, with increasing interaction with Hanafi and Shafi'i rites of Sunni Islam, there was a shift from the Jarudiyya group to the Sulaimaniyya, Tabiriyya, Butriyya or Salihiyya groups.[154] Zaidis form the second dominant religious group in Yemen. Currently, they constitute about 40–45% of the population in Yemen. Ja'faris and Isma'ilis are 2–5%.[155] In Saudi Arabia, it is estimated that there are over 1 million Zaydis (primarily in the western provinces).
Currently the most prominent Zaydi movement is Houthis movement, known by the name of Shabab Al Mu'mineen (Believing Youth). In 2014–2015 Houthis took over the government in Sana'a, which led to the fall of the Saudi Arabian-backed government of Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi.[156] Houthis and their allies gained control of a significant part of Yemen's territory and were resisting the Saudi Arabian-led intervention in Yemen seeking to restore Hadi in power. Both the Houthis and the Saudi Arabian-led coalition were being attacked by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.[157][158]
Ismaili ("Sevener")
Ismailis gain their name from their acceptance of Isma'il ibn Jafar as the divinely appointed spiritual successor (Imam) to Ja'far al-Sadiq, wherein they differ from the Twelvers, who accept Musa al-Kadhim, younger brother of Isma'il, as the true Imam.
After the death or Occultation of Muhammad ibn Ismaill in the 8th century, the teachings of Ismailism further transformed into the belief system as it is known today, with an explicit concentration on the deeper, esoteric meaning (bāṭin) of the faith. With the eventual development of Twelverism into the more literalistic (zahir) oriented Akhbari and later Usuli schools of thought, Shiaism developed in two separate directions: the metaphorical Ismailli group focusing on the mystical path and nature of God and the divine manifestation in the personage of the "Imam of the Time" as the "Face of God", with the more literalistic Twelver group focusing on divine law (sharī'ah) and the deeds and sayings (sunnah) of Muhammad and his successors (theAhlu l-Bayt), who as A'immah were guides and a light to God.[159]
Though there are several sub-groupings within the Ismailis, the term in today's vernacular generally refers to The Shia Imami Ismaili Muslim (Nizari community), generally known as the Ismailis, who are followers of the Aga Khan and the largest group among the Ismailiyyah. Another community which falls under the Isma'il's are the Dawoodi Bohras, led by a Da'i al-Mutlaq as representative of a hidden imam. While there are many other branches with extremely differing exterior practices, much of the spiritual theology has remained the same since the days of the faith's early Imams. In recent centuries Ismailis have largely been an Indo-Iranian community,[160] but they are found in India, Pakistan, Syria, Palestine, Saudi Arabia,[161] Yemen, China,[162] Jordan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, East Africa and South Africa, and have in recent years emigrated to Europe, Australia, New Zealand, and North America.[163]
Ismaili Imams
After the death of Isma'il ibn Jafar, many Ismailis believed that one day the messianic Mahdi, whom they believed to be Muhammad ibn Ismail, would return and establish an age of justice. One group included the violent Qarmatians, who had a stronghold in Bahrain. In contrast, some Ismailis believed the Imamate did continue, and that the Imams were in occultation and still communicated and taught their followers through a network of dawah "Missionaries".
In 909, Ubayd Allah al-Mahdi Billah, a claimant to the Ismaili Imamate, established the Fatimid Caliphate. During this period, three lineages of imams formed. The first branch, known today as the Druze, began with Al-Hakim bi-Amr Allah. Born in 386 AH (985), he ascended as ruler at the age of eleven. The typical religiously tolerant Fatimid Empire saw much persecution under his reign. When in 411 AH (1021) his mule returned without him, soaked in blood, a religious group that was forming in his lifetime broke off from mainstream Ismailism and did not acknowledge his successor. Later to be known as the Druze, they believe al-Hakim to be the incarnation of God and the prophesied Mahdi who would one day return and bring justice to the world.[164] The faith further split from Ismailism as it developed very unusual doctrines which often class it separately from both Ismailiyyah and Islam.
The second split occurred following the death of Ma'ad al-Mustansir Billah in 487 AH (1094). His rule was the longest of any caliph in any Islamic empire. Upon his passing away, his sons, Nizar the older, and Al-Musta'li, the younger, fought for political and spiritual control of the dynasty. Nizar was defeated and jailed, but according to Nizari tradition, his son escaped to Alamut, where the Iranian Ismaili had accepted his claim.[165] From here on, the Nizari Ismaili community has continued with a present, living Imam.
The Mustaali line split again between the Taiyabi (Dawoodi Bohra is its main branch) and the Hafizi. The former claim that At-Tayyib Abi l-Qasim (son of Al-Amir bi-Ahkami l-Lah) and the imams following him went into a period of anonymity (Dawr-e-Satr) and appointed a Da'i al-Mutlaq to guide the community, in a similar manner as the Ismaili had lived after the death of Muhammad ibn Ismail. The latter (Hafizi) claimed that the ruling Fatimid Caliph was the Imam, and they died out with the fall of the Fatimid Empire.
Ismailis have categorized their practices which are known as seven pillars:
The Shahada (profession of faith) of the Shia differs from that of Sunnis due to mention of Ali[166]
Contemporary leadership
The Nizaris place importance on a scholarly institution because of the existence of a present Imam. The Imam of the Age defines the jurisprudence, and his guidance may differ with Imams previous to him because of different times and circumstances. For Nizari Ismailis, the imam is Karim al-Husayni Aga Khan IV. The Nizari line of Imams has continued to this day as an unending line.
Divine leadership has continued in the Bohra branch through the institution of the "Unrestricted Missionary" Dai. According to Bohra tradition, before the last Imam, At-Tayyib Abi l-Qasim, went into seclusion, his father, the 20th Al-Amir bi-Ahkami l-Lah, had instructed Al-Hurra Al-Malika the Malika (Queen consort) in Yemen to appoint a vicegerent after the seclusion – theUnrestricted Missionary, who as the Imam's vicegerent has full authority to govern the community in all matters both spiritual and temporal while the lineage of Mustaali-Tayyibi Imams remains in seclusion (Dawr-e-Sitr). The three branches of the Mustaali, the Alavi Bohra, Sulaimani Bohra and Dawoodi Bohra, differ on who the current Unrestricted Missionary is.
A symbol from theMughal Empire; The amulet comprises magic squares,Quranic verses (including Al-Baqara 255 (Throne Verse)(2:255) running around the frame), divine names, besides a depiction of Zulfiqar at the center.
A procession of Shia Muslims of Bhopal in the Mughal Empire.
See also
- ^ Harney, John (January 3, 2016). "How Do Sunni and Shia Islam Differ?". New York Times. Retrieved January 4, 2016.
- ^ Almukhtar, Sarah; Peçanha, Sergio; Wallace, Tim (January 5, 2016). "Behind Stark Political Divisions, a More Complex Map of Sunnis and Shiites". New York Times. Retrieved January 6, 2016.
- ^ Shi'a is an alternative spelling of Shia, and Shi'ite of Shiite. In subsequent sections, the spellings Shia and Shiite are adopted for consistency, except where the alternative spelling is in the title of a reference.
- ^ "Mapping the Global Muslim Population". Retrieved 10 December 2014.
- ^ Newman, Andrew J. (2013). "Introduction". Twelver Shiism: Unity and Diversity in the Life of Islam, 632 to 1722. Edinburgh University Press. p. 2. ISBN 978-0-7486-7833-4.
- ^ Guidère, Mathieu (2012). Historical Dictionary of Islamic Fundamentalism. Scarecrow Press. p. 319. ISBN 978-0-8108-7965-2.
- ^ Esposito, John. "What Everyone Needs to Know about Islam." Oxford University Press, 2002 | ISBN 978-0-19-515713-0. p. 40
- ^ "From the article on Shii Islam in Oxford Islamic Studies Online". Oxfordislamicstudies.com. Retrieved 2011-05-04.
- ^ "Lesson 13: Imam's Traits". Al-Islam.org.
- ^ Tabataba'i (1979), p. 76
- ^ God's rule: the politics of world religions – Page 146, Jacob Neusner – 2003
- ^ Esposito, John. "What Everyone Needs to Know about Islam," Oxford University Press, 2002. ISBN 978-0-19-515713-0. p.40
- ^ Duncan S. Ferguson, (2010), Exploring the Spirituality of the World Religions, p.192
- ^ a b c d The New Encyclopædia Britannica, Jacob E. Safra, Chairman of the Board, 15th Edition, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., 1998, ISBN 0-85229-663-0, Vol 10, p. 738
- ^ Tabataba'i 1977, p. 34
- ^ Sobhani 2001, p. 97
- ^ Sobhani 2001, p. 98
- ^ Vaezi 2004, p. 54
- ^ Cornell 2007, p. 218
- ^ Cornell 2007, p. 236
- ^ Momen 1985, p. 15
- ^ "ʿALĪ B. ABĪ ṬĀLEB". Iranicaonline.org. Retrieved 2015-05-17.
- ^ a b c d e Merriam-Webster's Encyclopedia of World Religions, Wendy Doniger, Consulting Editor, Merriam-Webster, Incorporated, Springfield, MA 1999, ISBN 0-87779-044-2, LoC: BL31.M47 1999, p. 525
- ^ a b "Esposito, John. "What Everyone Needs to Know about Islam" Oxford University Press, 2002. ISBN 978-0-19-515713-0. p. 46
- ^ The New Encyclopædia Britannica, Jacob E. Safra, Chairman of the Board, 15th Edition, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., 1998, ISBN 0-85229-663-0, Vol 22, p. 17.
- ^ "Event of Ghadir Khumm". Al-islam.org. Retrieved 2011-05-04.
- ^ Bernards, Monique; Nawas, John (2005). Patronate And Patronage in Early And Classical Islam. BRILL. pp. 25.ISBN 978-90-04-14480-4.
- ^ The Last Sermon of Muhammad by Shia Accounts
- ^ The New Encyclopædia Britannica, Jacob E. Safra, Chairman of the Board, 15th Edition, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., 1998, ISBN 0-85229-663-0, Vol 10, p. tid738
- ^ ""Solhe Emam Hassan"-Imam Hassan Sets Peace".
- ^ تهذیب التهذیب. p. 271.
- ^ Discovering Islam: making sense of Muslim history and society (2002) Akbar S. Ahmed
- ^ Religious trends in pre-Islamic Arabic poetry, By Ghulam Mustafa (Hafiz.), Pg 11, Author writes: Similarly, swords were also placed on the Idols, as it is related that Harith b. Abi Shamir, the Ghassanid king, had presented his two swords, called Mikhdham and Rasub, to the image of the goddess, Manat….to note that the famous sword of Ali, the fourth caliph, called Dhu-al-Fiqar, was one of these two swords
- ^ a b Nasr (1979), p.10
- ^ a b Momen (1985), p. 174
- ^ Corbin 1993, pp. 45-51
- ^ Nasr (1979), p. 15
- ^ a b Gleave, Robert. "Imamate". Encyclopaedia of Islam and the Muslim world; vol.1. MacMillan. ISBN 0-02-865604-0.
- ^ "Learn to do Shia Prayer – Islamic Prayer – Shia Salat". Revertmuslims.com. Retrieved 2011-05-04.
- ^ "Joining Prayers and Other related Issues". Al-islam.org. Retrieved 2011-05-04.
- ^ "Druze and Islam". americandruze.com. Retrieved 2010-08-12.
- ^ "Ijtihad in Islam". AlQazwini.org. Retrieved 2010-08-12.
- ^ "Shi'ite Islam," by Allamah Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Tabataba'i, translated by Sayyid Husayn Nasr, State University of New York Press, 1975, p. 24
- ^ Dakake (2008), pp. 1 and 2
- ^ In his "Mutanabbi devant le siècle ismaëlien de l'Islam", in Mém. de l'Inst Français de Damas, 1935, p.
- ^ "The Complete Idiot's Guide to World Religions," Brandon Toropov, Father Luke Buckles, Alpha; 3rd edition, 2004, ISBN 978-1-59257-222-9, p. 135
- ^ "Shi'ite Islam" by Allamah Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Tabataba'i (1979), pp. 41–44
- ^ Dabashi, Theology of Discontent, p.463
- ^ Francis Robinson, Atlas of the Muslim World, pg. 47.
- ^ Quran 33:33
- ^ Momen (1985), p. 155
- ^ Corbin (1993), pp. 48 and 49
- ^ Dabashi (2006), p. 463
- ^ Corbin (1993), p. 48
- ^ "Part 1: The Perfect Man". Al-Islam.org.
- ^ How do Sunnis and Shias differ theologically? Last updated 2009-08-19, BBC religions
- ^ Nasr, Sayyed Hossein. "Expectation of the Millennium : Shiìsm in History,", State University of New York Press, 1989, p. 19, ISBN 978-0-88706-843-0
- ^ "Comparison of Shias and Sunnis". Religionfacts.com. Retrieved 2011-05-04.
- ^ See: Lapidus p. 47, Holt p. 72
- ^ Francis Robinson, Atlas of the Islamic World, pg. 23.
- ^ Jafri, S.H. Mohammad. "The Origin and Early Development of Shi'a Islam,", Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 6, ISBN 978-0-19-579387-1
- ^ "The Five Kingdoms of the Bahmani Sultanate". orbat.com. Retrieved 2007-01-05.
- ^ Ansari, N.H. "Bahmanid Dynasty" Encyclopædia Iranica
- ^ Pollard, Elizabeth (2015). Worlds Together Worlds Apart. 500 Fifth Ave, NY: W.W. Norton Company Inc. p. 313.ISBN 978-0-393-91847-2.
- ^ "A History of Islamic Societies". Retrieved 4 July 2015.
- ^ "Encyclopedia of the Ottoman Empire". google.ca.
- ^ History of the Ottoman Empire and modern Turkey
- ^ Francis Robinson, Atlas of the Muslim World, pg. 49.
- ^ Momen, Moojan, An Introduction to Shi'i Islam, Yale University Press, 1985, p.123
- ^ Time in Early Modern Islam: Calendar, Ceremony, and Chronology Page 23 By Stephen P. Blake [1]
- ^ Momen, Moojan, An Introduction to Shi'i Islam, Yale University Press, 1985, p.191, 130
- ^ Momen, Moojan, An Introduction to Shi'i Islam, Yale University Press, 1985, p.277
- ^ "Religions". CIA. The World Factbook. 2010. Retrieved 2010-08-25.
- ^ "Shīʿite". Encyclopædia Britannica Online. 2010. Retrieved 2010-08-25.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j "Mapping the Global Muslim Population: A Report on the Size and Distribution of the World's Muslim Population". Pew Research Center. 7 October 2009. Retrieved 2010-08-25.
- ^ a b c d e f g Miller, Tracy, ed. (October 2009). Mapping the Global Muslim Population: A Report on the Size and Distribution of the World's Muslim Population (PDF). Pew Research Center. Retrieved 2009-10-08.
- ^ a b "Foreign Affairs – When the Shiites Rise – Vali Nasr". Mafhoum.com. Retrieved 2014-01-27.
- ^ "Quick guide: Sunnis and Shias". BBC News. 2006-12-11.
- ^ Written at U.S.A. Atlas of the Middle East (Second ed.). Washington D.C.: National Geographic. 15 April 2008. pp. 80–81. ISBN 978-1-4262-0221-6.
- ^ "International Religious Freedom Report 2010". U.S. Government Department of State. Retrieved 2010-11-17.
- ^ "How many Shia?". Islamicweb.com. Retrieved 2011-05-04.
- ^ a b c "International Religious Freedom Report for 2012". US State Department. 2012.
- ^ a b c "The New Middle East, Turkey, and the Search for Regional Stability" (PDF). Strategic Studies Institute. April 2008. p. 87.
- ^ Shankland, David (2003). The Alevis in Turkey: The Emergence of a Secular Islamic Tradition. Routledge (UK).ISBN 0-7007-1606-8.
- ^ a b "Shia women too can initiate divorce" (PDF). Library of Congress Country Studies on Afghanistan. August 2008. Retrieved 2010-08-27.
Religion: Virtually the entire population is Muslim. Between 80 and 85 percent of Muslims are Sunni and 15 to 19 percent, Shia.
- ^ "Afghanistan". Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The World Factbook on Afghanistan. Retrieved 2010-08-27.
Religions: Sunni Muslim 80%, Shia Muslim 19%, other 1%
- ^ al-Qudaihi, Anees (2009-03-24). "Saudi Arabia's Shia press for rights". BBC Arabic Service. Retrieved 24 March 2009.
- ^ Leonard Leo. International Religious Freedom (2010): Annual Report to Congress. Diane Publishing. pp. 261–.ISBN 978-1-4379-4439-6. Retrieved 24 October 2012.
- ^ Paul Ohia (16 November 2010). "Nigeria: 'No Settlement With Iran Yet'". This Day.
- ^ Helene Charton-Bigot, Deyssi Rodriguez-Torres. Nairobi Today. the Paradox of a Fragmented City. African Books Collective, 2010. ISBN 9987-08-093-6, ISBN 978-9987-08-093-9. Pg 239
- ^ Heinrich Matthée (2008). Muslim Identities and Political Strategies: A Case Study of Muslims in the Greater Cape Town Area of South Africa, 1994-2000. kassel university press GmbH. pp. 136–. ISBN 978-3-89958-406-6. Retrieved 14 August2012.
- ^ Mohamed Diriye Abdullahi. Culture and customs of Somalia. Greenwood Publishing Group, 2001. ISBN 0-313-31333-4,ISBN 978-0-313-31333-2. Pg 55
- ^ Yasurō Hase; Hiroyuki Miyake; Fumiko Oshikawa (2002). South Asian migration in comparative perspective, movement, settlement and diaspora. Japan Center for Area Studies, National Museum of Ethnology. Retrieved 14 August 2012.
- ^ "Discrimination towards Shia in Saudi Arabia". Wsws.org. 2001-10-08. Retrieved 2011-05-04.
- ^ "Shia women too can initiate divorce". The Times of India. 6 November 2006. Retrieved 2010-06-21.
- ^ "30,000 Indian Shia Muslims Ready to Fight Isis 'Bare Handed' in Iraq". International Business Times UK.
- ^ "CIA – The World Factbook". Cia.gov. Retrieved 2011-05-04.
- ^ "Violence Against Pakistani Shias Continues Unnoticed | International News". Islamic Insights. Retrieved 2011-05-04.
- ^ Taliban kills Shia school children in Pakistan
- ^ "'No Settlement with Iran Yet'". This Day. 16 November 2010. Archived from the original on 2013-05-28.
- ^ "Religion" (PDF). Administrative Department of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan – Presidential Library. Retrieved 22 February 2015.
- ^ Hazran, Yusri. The Shiite Community in Lebanon: From Marginalization to Ascendancy, Brandeis University
- ^ Hassan, Farzana. Prophecy and the Fundamentalist Quest, page 158
- ^ Corstange, Daniel M. Institutions and Ethnic politics in Lebanon and Yemen, page 53
- ^ Dagher, Carole H. Bring Down the Walls: Lebanon's Post-War Challenge, page 70
- ^ Growth of the world's urban and rural population:n1920-2000, Page 81. United Nations. Dept. of Economic and Social Affairs
- ^ http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/travel-and-living-abroad/travel-advice-by-country/country-profile/middle-east-north-africa/bahrain/
- ^ "Why Bahrain blew up". New York Post. 2011-02-17. Retrieved 2011-02-22.
- ^ Top 15 Countries with Highest Proportion of Shiites in the Population, 7 July 1999
- ^ (Ya'qubi; vol. III, pp. 91–96, and Tarikh Abul Fida', vol. I, p. 212.)
- ^ The Psychologies in Religion, E. Thomas Dowd and Stevan Lars Nielsen, chapter 14. Books.google.com. 2006-02-22. ISBN 978-0-8261-2856-0. Retrieved 2011-05-04.
- ^ "Basra handover completed". Inthenews.co.uk. Retrieved 2011-05-04.
- ^ Maddox, Bronwen (2006-12-30). "Hanging will bring only more bloodshed". The Times (London). Retrieved2010-05-23.
- ^ "Al-Ahram Weekly | Region | Shi'ism or schism". Weekly.ahram.org.eg. 2004-03-17. Retrieved 2011-05-04.
- ^ The Shia, Ted Thornton, NMH, Northfield Mount Hermon Archived 13 August 2009 at the Wayback Machine
- ^ "The Origins of the Sunni/Shia split in Islam". Islamfortoday.com. Retrieved 2011-05-04.
- ^ Nasr, Vali (2006). The Shia Revival: How Conflicts Within Islam Will Shape the Future. W.W. Norton & Company Inc.ISBN 978-0-393-06211-3 p. 52-53
- ^ George C. Kohn (2007.) Dictionary of Wars. Infobase Publishing. p.385. ISBN 0-8160-6577-2
- ^ Al-e Ahmad, Jalal. Plagued by the West (Gharbzadegi), translated by Paul Sprachman. Delmor, NY: Center for Iranian Studies, Columbia University, 1982.
- ^ Saudi Arabia – The Saud Family and Wahhabi Islam Library of Congress Country Studies.
- ^ Gritten, David (25 February 2006). "Long path to Iraq's sectarian split". BBC News. Retrieved 19 April 2015.
- ^ "Malaysian government to Shia Muslims: Keep your beliefs to yourself". globalpost.com. Retrieved 17 March 2014.
- ^ "Malaysia" (PDF). state.gov. Retrieved 17 March 2014.
- ^ Paula Sanders (1994), Ritual, politics, and the city in Fatimid Cairo, p.121
- ^ Bernard Trawicky, Ruth Wilhelme Gregory, (2002), Anniversaries and holidays, p.233
- ^ "Mawlid al-Nabi (the Prophet's birthday)". Islamqa.info. Retrieved 6 December 2015.
- ^ Laurence Louėr (2008), Transnational Shia politics: religious and political networks in the Gulf, p.22
- ^ Karen Dabrowska, Geoff Hann, (2008), Iraq Then and Now: A Guide to the Country and Its People, p.239
- ^ Vincent J. Cornell (2007), Voices of Islam: Voices of tradition, p.237
- ^ "Esposito, John. "What Everyone Needs to Know about Islam" Oxford University Press, 2002. ISBN 978-0-19-515713-0. p. 45.
- ^ Administrative Department of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan – Presidential Library – Religion
- ^ Esposito, John. "What Everyone Needs to Know about Islam" Oxford University Press, 2002. ISBN 978-0-19-515713-0. p. 45
- ^ John Pike. "Bahrain – Religion". globalsecurity.org.
- ^ "Challenges For Saudi Arabia Amidst Protests In The Gulf – Analysis". Eurasia Review.
- ^ "Shiʿite Doctrine". iranicaonline.org.
- ^ Joanne Richter, (2006), Iran the Culture, p.7
- ^ Mulla Bashir Rahim, An Introduction to Islam, by Ahlul Bayt Digital Islamic Library Project
- ^ Islamic Texts Institute (2012). Al-Kafi Book I: Intellect and Foolishness. Taqwa Media. ISBN 9781939420008.
- ^ Iran the Culture Joanne Richter (2007), p.7
- ^ "About Yemen". Yemeni in Canada. Embassy of the Republic of Yemen in Canada. Archived from the original on 27 January 2007. Retrieved 9 April 2015.
- ^ "Yemen [Yamaniyyah]: general data of the country". Population Statistics. Retrieved 9 April 2015.
- ^ Sunni-Shi'a Schism: Less There Than Meets the Eye 1991 Page 24
- ^ Hodgson, Marshall (1961). "Venture of Islam". Chicago: University of Chicago Press: 262.
- ^ Ibn Abī Zarʻ al-Fāsī, ʻAlī ibn ʻAbd Allāh (1340). "Rawḍ al-Qirṭās: Anīs al-Muṭrib bi-Rawd al-Qirṭās fī Akhbār Mulūk al-Maghrib wa-Tārīkh Madīnat Fās". ar-Rabāṭ: Dār al-Manṣūr (published 1972): 38.
- ^ "حين يكتشف المغاربة أنهم كانوا شيعة وخوارج قبل أن يصبحوا مالكيين !". hespress.com.
- ^ "Introduction to Islamic Theology and Law". google.com.au. p. 218.
- ^ Hastings, James. "Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics Part 24". google.com.au. p. 844.
- ^ "The Institute of Ismaili Studies – The Initial Destination of the Fatimid caliphate: The Yemen or The Maghrib?".iis.ac.uk.
- ^ "Shi'ah tenets concerning the question of the imamate – New Page 1". muslimphilosophy.com.
- ^ Article by Sayyid 'Ali ibn 'Ali Al-Zaidi, A short History of the Yemenite Shi'ites (2005) Referencing: Iranian Influence on Moslem Literature
- ^ Article by Sayyid 'Ali ibn 'Ali Al-Zaidi, A short History of the Yemenite Shi'ites (2005) Referencing: Encyclopædia Iranica
- ^ Walker, Paul Ernest (1999). Hamid Al-Din Al-Kirmani: Ismaili Thought in the Age of Al-Hakim. Ismaili Heritage Series 3. London ; New York: I.B. Tauris in association with the Institute of Ismaili Studies. p. 13. ISBN 1-86064-321-3.
- ^ Madelung, W. "al-Uk̲h̲ayḍir." Encyclopaedia of Islam. Edited by: P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel and W.P. Heinrichs. Brill, 2007. Brill Online. 7 December 2007 (registration required)
- ^ Article by Sayyid 'Imam Ali ibn ' Ali Al-Zaidi, A short History of the Yemenite Shi'ites (2005)
- ^ "Universiteit Utrecht Universiteitsbibliotheek". Library.uu.nl. Retrieved 2011-05-04.
- ^ "Yemen's Houthis form own government in Sanaa". Al Jazeera. 6 February 2015. Retrieved 7 February 2015.
- ^ http://news.yahoo.com/yemen-govt-vows-stay-aden-despite-bombings-102423218.html
- ^ http://www.ndtv.com/world-news/arab-coalition-faces-new-islamic-state-foe-in-yemen-conflict-1229476
- ^ "Shaykh Ahmad al-Ahsa'i". Retrieved 2007-04-25.
- ^ Nasr, Vali, The Shia Revival, Norton, (2006), p. 76
- ^ "Congressional Human Rights Caucus Testimony – NAJRAN, The Untold Story". Retrieved 2007-01-08.
- ^ "News Summary: China; Latvia". Retrieved 2007-06-01.
- ^ Daftary, Farhad (1998). A Short History of the Ismailis. Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press. pp. 1–4. ISBN 0-7486-0687-4.
- ^ "al-Hakim bi Amr Allah: Fatimid Caliph of Egypt". Retrieved 2007-04-24.
- ^ Daftary, Farhad (1998). A Short History of the Ismailis. Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press. pp. 106–108.ISBN 0-7486-0687-4.
- ^ "Encyclopedia of the Middle East". Mideastweb.org. 2008-11-14. Retrieved 2011-05-04.
- Cornell, Vincent J. (2007). Voices of Islam. Westport, Conn.: Praeger Publishers. ISBN 978-0-275-98732-9.
- Encyclopædia Britannica Online. Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc.
- Encyclopædia Iranica. Center for Iranian Studies, Columbia University. ISBN 1-56859-050-4.
- Martin, Richard C. Encyclopaedia of Islam and the Muslim world; vol.1. MacMillan. ISBN 0-02-865604-0.
- Corbin, Henry (1993) [1964)]. History of Islamic Philosophy, Translated by Liadain Sherrard, Philip Sherrard. London; Kegan Paul International in association with Islamic Publications for The Institute of Ismaili Studies. ISBN 0-7103-0416-1.
- Dakake, Maria Massi (2008). The Charismatic Community: Shi'ite Identity in Early Islam. Suny Press. ISBN 0-7914-7033-4.
- Holt, P. M.; Lewis, Bernard (1977a). Cambridge History of Islam, Vol. 1. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-29136-4.
- Lapidus, Ira (2002). A History of Islamic Societies (2nd ed.). Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-77933-3.
- Momen, Moojan (1985). An Introduction to Shi'i Islam: The History and Doctrines of Twelve. Yale University Press. ISBN 0-300-03531-4.
- Sachedina, Abdulaziz Abdulhussein (1988). The Just Ruler (al-sultān Al-ʻādil) in Shīʻite Islam: The Comprehensive Authority of the Jurist in Imamite Jurisprudence. Oxford University Press US. ISBN 0-19-511915-0.
- Sobhani, Ja'afar; Shah-Kazemi, Reza (2001). Doctrines of Shiʻi Islam : a Compendium of Imami Beliefs and Practices([Online-Ausg.] ed.). London: I.B. Tauris [u.a.] ISBN 9781860647802.
- Tabatabaei, Sayyid Mohammad Hosayn; Seyyed Hossein Nasr (translator) (1979). Shi'ite Islam. Suny press. ISBN 0-87395-272-3. Cite uses deprecated parameter
- Ṭabataba'i, Allamah Sayyid Muḥammad Husayn (1977). Shiʻite Islam. Albany: State University of New York Press.ISBN 978-0-87395-390-0.
Further reading
- Peter J. Chelkowski (ed.), Eternal Performance: Taziyah and Other Shiite Rituals (Salt lake City (UT), Seagull Books, 2010) (Seagull Books – Enactments).
- Corbin, Henry (1993). History of Islamic Philosophy, translated by Liadain Sherrard and Philip Sherrard. Kegan Paul International in association with Islamic Publications for The Institute of Ismaili Studies. ISBN 0-7103-0416-1.
- Dabashi, Hamid (2011). Shi'ism: A Religion of Protest. Harvard University Press. ISBN 978-0674-06428-7. External link in
- Halm, Heinz (2004). Shi'ism. Edinburgh University Press. ISBN 0-7486-1888-0.
- Halm, Heinz (2007). The Shi'ites: A Short History. Markus Wiener Pub. ISBN 1-55876-437-2.
- Lalani, Arzina R. (2000). Early Shi'i Thought: The Teachings of Imam Muhammad Al-Baqir. I.B.Tauris. ISBN 1-86064-434-1.
- Momen, Moojan (1985). An Introduction to Shi'i Islam: The History and Doctrines of Twelver Shi'ism. Yale University Press.ISBN 0-300-03499-7.
- Shirazi, Sultanu'l-Wa'izin. Peshawar Nights, A Transcript of a Dialogue between Shia and Sunni scholars. Ansariyan Publications. ISBN 978-964-438-320-5.
- Nasr, Seyyed Hossein; Hamid Dabashi (1989). Expectation of the Millennium: Shiʻism in History. SUNY Press. ISBN 0-88706-843-X.
- Rogerson, Barnaby (2007). The Heirs of Muhammad: Islam's First Century and the Origins of the Sunni Shia split. Overlook Press. ISBN 1-58567-896-1.
- Wollaston, Arthur N. (2005). The Sunnis and Shias. Kessinger Publishing. ISBN 1-4254-7916-2.
- Moosa, Matti (1988). Extremist Shiites: The Ghulat Sects. Syracuse University Press. ISBN 0-8156-2411-5.
External links
- World Best & Biggest Shia Community Social Network
- Library of Shia Muslims Videos
- Shafaqna: International Shia News Agency
- English language website
- YaHusain.com, Shia Website with informative lectures in English & Urdu
- Islamic – Shia Website
- Al-Islam.org, A Digital Islamic Library
- The Shiapedia, an online Shia encyclopedia
- Murajaat – A Shi'i/Sunni debate
- Patheos Library – Shi'a Islam
- shiasource.com
- Imam Al-Khoei Foundation (Twelver)
- Official Website of Nizari Ismaili (Ismaili)
- Official Website of Alavi Bohra (Ismaili)
- Dawoodi Bohra (Ismaili)
- The Institute of Ismaili Studies (Ismaili)
- Shia at DMOZ
- al-shia.org Ahlulbayt Global Informations Center


text:
Gary Neville: No certainty in appointing Louis van Gaal or Ryan Giggs
Gary Neville would like Man Utd to appoint a British boss - and called for Ryan Giggs to get more of a chance.
By Gary Neville
Last Updated: 29/04/14 1:01pm
Netherlands coach Louis van Gaal has emerged as the favourite for the job and the club confirmed on Monday they have held positive talks with him, but are continuing to keep their options open.
However, Neville says that the appointment of a 62-year-old who has never worked in the Premier League carries an element of risk and backed former team-mate Giggs to be considered after he guided the team to a 4-0 win over Norwich on Saturday.
"He's an experienced hand. He's won trophies in different countries and managed the biggest clubs in Europe," he told Monday Night Football.
"He's the favourite at the moment and we know nowadays, just through the weight of media speculation, sometimes, where jobs are going to go. I think at the moment it's pushing towards him.
"I would have liked to have seen Ryan have two or three games. He started well on Saturday, so let him have two or three more games to see whether he settles into the position and whether he can bed in and be given that role.
"I don't think there's any certainty wherever you go. There's the idea that Ryan hasn't got experience but he knows the club and there's the idea that Van Gaal has massive experience, but doesn't know the Premier League.
"At the end of the day, the owners will do what they want to do. I suppose in some ways they want an experienced hand, but I personally would like to see a British manager be appointed because Manchester United have always appointed British managers.
"We'll wait and see."
Neville is concerned that Van Gaal might not be able to oversee an effective recruitment policy this summer because he will be taking charge of the Netherlands at the World Cup in Brazil.
And even though Giggs has no coaching experience, he highlighted managers such as Diego Simeone and Pep Guardiola who have stepped into the hot seat at big Spanish clubs and won titles.
Neville said: "There's no hard and fast rule in appointing managers nowadays. You see some managers go in who have little experience - Diego Simeone, Pep Guardiola or Kenny Dalglish all those years ago.
"Then there's the idea of managers who have one or two good seasons like Jose Mourinho. It worked for Chelsea and then Andre Villas-Boas didn't.
"You've seen different examples of how sometimes it works and sometimes it doesn't work. There is no hard and fast rule and until you appoint someone you haven't got a clue whether it's going to work or not.
"From that point of view, people say Ryan's got no experience but then is Van Gaal going to work? We don't know.
"It's a call for people at the club."

subset: commoncrawl


text:
The Road to KDE 4: KWin Composite Brings Bling to KDE
KWin, KDE's window manager, has been around since KDE 2.0 (replacing KWM in KDE 1.x) and has grown to be a mature and stable window manager over the years. For KDE 4, however, there were a few people rumbling about visual effects, and perhaps KWin was feeling a little envious of its younger cousins Compiz and Beryl. While these new effects have created a lot of buzz around Linux and UNIX, long-term KDE users have wished they can enjoy the effects of Compiz/Beryl while still having the tried and tested window manager that is KWin. As a result, for KDE 4, KWin has received a huge graphical upgrade, with composite and GL support. Read on for more details.
KWin has implemented effects in a way that allows a number of different rendering methods to be used, depending on your specific combination of hardware and drivers. These features have brought KWin rapidly into the era of dazzling eyecandy, along with some pleasant surprises on the usability front. This effort has been spearheaded by Lubos Lunak (a man known for his efficient code) and his team, with special mention to Rivo Laks and Philip Falkner for their contributions.
Effects are disabled by default at the moment, although that may change before KDE 4 ships, and distributions may decide to alter this setting anyway. When enabled, the effects are designed to degrade gracefully. If GL is not available, KWin disables GL effects but still allows Composite effects where possible via XRender. If XRender is not available, it falls back to plain X, running in the same fashion as the present KDE 3 version. To get the full array of effects, you need to have a video card (and driver) that supports AIGLX, XGL or use the proprietary Nvidia driver.
Once the effects are enabled, it's simply a matter of choosing which effects you'd like to activate. So far, Rivo Laks has been working on the effects plugin selection interface (see the screenshot below). The new plugin selection widget shown is making its way into various parts of KDE - it does automatic dependency checking, so once the dependency tree is known, it will intelligently enable or disable dependent plugins. This widget is also showing up in other parts of KDE 4.
(as you can see in the image, this dialog is quite new - less than a week old - and is missing all the icons...)
Lubos has been periodically blogging about the effects that KWin is now capable of, and has recorded a number of videos showing them off. Since video capture on my system is rather chunky, I will present his recordings instead. So, without further ado, I present some of the more popular of his flash videos, hosted by YouTube. If you are interested in more, please visit his YouTube User Page
The Present Windows Effect - a very useful effect that falls into both eye-candy and usability categories...
The Desktop Grid Effect - those familar with the Cube effect may note that this is not quite as flashy, but probably more useful. Doesn't mean there cannot be a Cube effect for KWin though.
This one shows the above two effects, as well as the Alt-Tab thumbnails, but it shows that the effects work great, even when the windows contain active videos.
Zoom Effect and Magnifier Effect: some accessibility related features that everyone may find useful, depending on your specific needs.
Effects like this one make people go "Wow". The first part of this video features the Fall Apart Effect, which basically has a window blow up. It's amazing how well this effect can be demonstrated in a low quality flash video...
Aside from Lubos, many of the new effects and underlying core components were programmed by Rivo Laks and Philip Falkner. They are responsible for many of the effects you see in the videos, including the Present Windows Effect, and the improved Alt-Tab dialog. There have been a number of contributions from others as well, and they are always looking for new and interesting ideas. In addition, KWin for KDE 4 builds on the already existing KWin version which has had dozens of people contribute to it over the years.
The window decoration shown above is called 'kwin3_crystal' and is still set as the default in SVN. It is simply a port of the existing KDE 3 Crystal window decorations, however, a new KWin window decoration is still in the works for KDE 4 - it hasn't been made the default yet, so I haven't been featuring it. When it does eventually become the default, you'll be sure to hear about it here (and likely in Danny's KDE Commit-Digest as well...).
KWin for KDE 3.x implemented a very simple composite manager, allowing simple effects such as window transparencies, fading menus, shadows, and so forth. The code was not too complex, but the infrastructure was not in place to seriously extend the effects to GL powered goodness. When the KDE 4 development series opened, it was seen as an excellent time to rewrite some of KWin's internal structures in order to support such effects. There were initial considerations of implementing support for the existing Compiz and/or Beryl system of effects via plugins, but there were technological hurdles that prevented this. I won't go into the technical details as to why this decision was made, however, it is important to note that KDE 4 will still work with Compiz/Beryl should the users choose to use that software instead of KWin.
Additionally, while KDE 4 will be supporting a number of platforms with libraries and applications, KWin is one of the applications that will not be making the switch as it is inextricably tied to X. This should be considered to be a Good Thing(tm), as it ensures that KDE will always be the best looking when used with Linux/UNIX, and hopefully it (and related KDE Workspace technologies, like Plasma) will remain a unique benefit of using a more open operating system.
KWin promises to ensure that KDE get the graphical boost it needs to keep the eye-candy folks happy, while providing new and usable features for the desktop environment that would not have otherwise been possible. Yet, it maintains the rock-solid foundation that a long history as an integral part of KDE has provided. It will still work (with reduced levels of effects) on any system that KDE 3 ran on, so no-one is left out in the cold. It is already the default for KDE 4 in SVN, and will be showing up in future beta releases.
On a personal note, I've found that KWin on my system was dropping down into XRender mode due to some X settings I need to fix, but it has been perfectly stable for me over the last two weeks. In fact, every week when I'm rebuilding KDE 4 to write these articles, I am more amazed at how quickly it is becoming stable and useful. If you are interested in testing it out for yourself, check to see if your distribution has packages available. I am aware of the existence of at least one live CD (where you don't have to risk messing with your system) that is available at the KDE Four Live website. They update the Live CD every few weeks, and currently has the KDE 4.0 Alpha 1 packages. Additionally, if you are brave enough to test the Composite features, and are having problems, have a quick look at the Composite HowTo.. If you have problems, please report bugs using the the KDE Bug Tracker by selecting the KWin program, and the "composite" component.
Until next time.
well you don't want kwin to be ported to windows so people will have more reason to use a more open platform, but require me to use non-free-software to be able to follow this article about free software?
come on guys, we really should be better than this. and dont tell me its a matter of bandwidth. if it is, go send me the files in ogg theora and i'll host 'em!
By hannes hauswedell at Thu, 2007/05/31 - 5:00am
Re: Youtube?
As a journalist writing about KDE, sometimes getting wider exposure is more important than purely utopian format choices - if more people use KDE (and *nix in general) because of what I write, then getting them over to open formats also becomes easier. Pretty much 100% of *nix media players play theora (and probably 95% play flash). But we only have ~5% of the market, and I doubt 2% of windows/mac play that format. In order to get them to view the videos, I have to hit them in their format. It's sad, but it's a critical mass thing.
Feel free to use free software decoders, like swfdec or even mplayer to play the files (as discussed above), and/or recode them into theora format.
And finally, a power user tip, for the amd64 users that are trying to use the official flash player, and don't want to have to do the whole 32bit jail and all that stuff... you can use konq64 with flash32. You just need to overwrite the programs 'nspluginscan' and 'nspluginviewer' with the 32-bit versions - and assuming you have enough of the 32bit libs installed, you can simply use the 32bit plugins within the 64bit konq. This doesn't work for firefox - in that case, you need to use the 32bit firefox.
By Troy Unrau at Thu, 2007/05/31 - 5:00am
Re: Youtube?
nspluginwrapper (http://gwenole.beauchesne.info/projects/nspluginwrapper/) does a notable job as well. It lets you use 32 bit plugins on 64 bit browsers. On kde 3.5.6 you need to apply a patch+recompile kdebase before konqueror uses it, but i believe the patch was included on 3.5.7, so it's just a matter of installing nspluginwrapper, and registering the flash plugin with it.
By Fede at Fri, 2007/06/01 - 5:00am
Re: Youtube?
thanks for your reply.
first of all i am kind of dissapointed that you think of the dot as a webpage primarily for convincing windows users and not as an information platform for current kde-users.
second: if you had had a look at the link i sent you (theorasea.org -> iTheora), you would have seen that the plugin used for displaying the theora videos works BOTH with a mediaplayer supporting theora AND with a builtin java-based theora player that works on all platforms that have java. and i am pretty-sure the masses of windows users with flash that regularly read the dot also have java or not?
and right now flash does not work properly with free software! yes i could read the sourcecode or use certain programs to find out the location of the flv and then fetch that and then look at that with mplayer, BUT i dont think it is right.
your flash videos might make some windows fanboy somewhere think wow, but if this person is not even willing to watch a video in another format (and i could similarly argue that most somewhat technical windows users use media palyers that support theora) than he will not install another operating system, nor will you be able to convince him of what "software freedom" means.
thanks for your work, this is not meant as flame, i am just seriously afraid of what is happening to the community...
By hannes hauswedell at Fri, 2007/06/01 - 5:00am
Re: Youtube?
As just a side note - I did not personally make those videos. They were made weeks (if not months) before I wrote this article. At the time while I was writing the article, I could not get the GL composite effects to work for my system to make new ones, so I simply reused them with permission. I've since been able to get it running (by updating the proprietary nvidia drivers to the latest version, which you are probably also opposed to using). Should future videos be made by myself, I will try my best to offer it in an open format.
However, there may be another moral quandary for you then, since I'd be showing off effects that you can get while using a closed driver, which detracts from the open source driver development.
Can't win them all I guess...
By Troy Unrau at Sun, 2007/06/03 - 5:00am
Re: Youtube?
Thanks for responding and caring, really :-)
I personally use intel graphics which actually do provide decent 3d-acceleration wit 100% free drivers. i don't even object to USING the nvidia driver if someone bought hardware some time ago and doesnt want to / cant afford to buy other hardware. BUT it is a difference whether you privately USE a piece of non-free-software or whether you release media in a non-free format, requiring everyone else to also use non-free software and thus actively promoting the use of non-free software, while discouraging those of us who try to establish alternatives (in contrast to the NVIDIA-blob there actually are alternatives to flash-video).
anyway thanks for listening and for your work in general.
p.s.: just found out that www.mux.am offers to convert youtube-videos to ogg theora. so if you are stuck with youtube videos again,drop me a note and i will convert them to theora and host them, so you can instead use iTheora ;)
By Hannes Hauswedell at Wed, 2007/06/13 - 5:00am
Re: Youtube?
While I do agree with you, I didn't really have much of a choice. When I bought this computer, the options were:
Intel onboard graphics:
Let's hope that AMD open-sources the ATI drivers and that puts enough pressure on nVidia to get them to do the same. Heck, let's hope that it improves the quality of ATI drivers in general. It's embarassing to be Canadian and shunning the Canadian graphics card company.
By Stephan Sokolow at Fri, 2007/08/31 - 5:00am
One large desktop
Is it possible to have just one desktop, larger than the physical screen, and zoom in and out?
Anyway, this finally made the multiple desktop function useful on a single display-computer...
By Axel at Thu, 2007/05/31 - 5:00am
Re: One large desktop
Great idea!!! i vote on this one!!
By higuita at Fri, 2007/06/01 - 5:00am
Re: One large desktop
Should be possible. X already allows desktops that are larger than the physical screen. Try hitting CTRL-ALT-+ or CTRL-ALT-- (last key is the minus sign) to zoom in and out already... Combined with KWin's zoom feature, this would likely be a lot easier...
By Troy Unrau at Sun, 2007/06/03 - 5:00am
Re: One large desktop
I've been thinking for a while now on something similar, that I call the 'toroidal desktop'.
By dafnis at Sun, 2007/06/03 - 5:00am
Re: One large desktop
This is not at all a terrible idea, and could probably even be implemented within the current kwin framework, however you might have trouble finding an interested developer :) You could always have a go at it yourself if your C++ is up to spec :)
By Troy Unrau at Mon, 2007/06/04 - 5:00am
Re: One large desktop
I was just thinking about something similar and decided to google for toroid desktop. I would like a large virtual desktop that can zoom in and out and pan and whose edges wrap. I would definitely want it to seamlessly add space. I might want to allow overlapping though because often I don't need to see the whole window.
I think I would also like to be easily expand one window or a group of windows while leaving the rest the same size. Think of pulling some of the windows closer to you while leaving the rest at a distance.
By cardiffgiant at Sat, 2007/06/30 - 5:00am
Re: One large desktop
Just the sort of thing I have always wanted too.
By Benny van maren at Mon, 2007/09/03 - 5:00am
real 3D please
Congratulations for nice 3D effects.
Another cool thing would be to support the now ever more upcoming "virtual reality" 3D goggles and have REAL 3D desktops.
What about that?
By sulla at Thu, 2007/05/31 - 5:00am
Re: real 3D please
Honestly, the "real" effects you describe sound more like a gimmick than, for example, an Exposé-like feature, which I've found indispensable ever since it appeared in Beryl. The fact that it will be in KWin is a huge relief, as I've never been able to keep Beryl stable.
By Till Eulenspiegel at Fri, 2007/06/01 - 5:00am
Claiming that technical lock-in is an advantage...
"Additionally, while KDE 4 will be supporting a number of platforms with libraries and applications, KWin is one of the applications that will not be making the switch as it is inextricably tied to X. This should be considered to be a Good Thing(tm), as it ensures that KDE will always be the best looking when used with Linux/UNIX, and hopefully it (and related KDE Workspace technologies, like Plasma) will remain a unique benefit of using a more open operating system."
This is a REALLY weird attitude. Actually it's bizarre. I know it is common among Linux people nowadays to say "hey, let's not port this and that app to Windows, so we can make Linux look cooler". This whole attitude smells of Bill Gates. Linux and open source projects can only be truly successful (and by successful, I mean more than just having most of the market share or whatever) if they show respect to ALL users.
Additionally, what if I actually need to use Windows or Mac OSX some time? Or what if I want to do it? Why shouldn't I be able to run KDE - my favourite environment then?
Now, I'm pretty confident that the KDE devs didn't mean to "lock" KWin to keep Windows and Mac users out in the cold, but it's still nothing to cheer about. And I hope that future versions of KDE will be even more portable.
Other than that paragraph, this was a great article, and I'm looking forward to KDE4 more than ever. I think the KDE devs made the right move to work on KWin instead of Compiz/Beryl, and it looks like it will be easy to add more functionality and usability along the way aswell. Great work!
By mirshafie at Thu, 2007/05/31 - 5:00am
Re: Claiming that technical lock-in is an advantage...
It seems to me that this technical lock-in is a side-effect of using technologies tied to X - if it could be easyly ported, somebody will port it because it is open source. By the way, how could a window manager be ported to Windows?
By Grósz Dániel at Thu, 2007/05/31 - 5:00am
Re: Claiming that technical lock-in is an advantag
That is exactly why it cannot really be ported - it is stuck with X. Where X goes, KWin may follow, assuming AIGLX/Xgl/etc. and XRender and ... and ... and... are all available on that platform.
So, for the time being, Plasma and KWin will stay on X. The applications can be ported, and they can even adopt a native theme on whatever system they are running on, should you like it that way - or use the regular KDE themes (but not window decorations...) Whatever makes you happy.
By Troy Unrau at Fri, 2007/06/01 - 5:00am
Re: Claiming that technical lock-in is an advantag
Yes, I understand that KWin is tied to X for technical reasons. But to claim that it is actually good that it is that way is a completely different matter.
By mirshafie at Sat, 2007/06/02 - 5:00am
Re: Claiming that technical lock-in is an advantag
-I thought you could run X inside Windows?
-Can't you change the WM in windows from the default explorer?
-Run a virtual machine maybe?
-How many Windows users know what a WM is?
-And it is a Good Thing(tm)
-AFAIK there are a lot of open source apps that have been ported to Windows, and a lot of them aren't as good on it (but hey, I haven't used Windows regularly in several years).
And this might just be bias speaking but, why shouldn't people make Linux look cooler? I don't know myself but wasn't there some concern about losing users to Windows with the port to QT 4, and KDE 4?
Sorry for the cynicism, but I feel that way right now. And most of my questions are questions, not necessarily rhetorical.
By Nobbe at Fri, 2007/06/01 - 5:00am
Re: Claiming that technical lock-in is an advantag
"-And it is a Good Thing(tm)
The reasoning behind this attitude, as I understand it, is that we shouldn't give people open source alternatives for Windows so that people completely make the switch to Linux. And that's fine for anyone who hates to play games without hours upon hours of tinkering with something, OR for people who are actually tied to Windows by some application. Look, there are HUNDREDS of reasons to use Windows instead of anything else simply because lots of completely irreplacable software is designed for Windows. Deal with it.
And what if people actually WANT to use Windows, but with as much open source software as possible? Who are we to judge them? I'm not saying KDE developers should use their limited time to port KWin or really any other app to Windows, but to say that it is GOOD (!) that it's hard or even impossible to port some of the stuff is WEIRD.
"And this might just be bias speaking but, why shouldn't people make Linux look cooler? I don't know myself but wasn't there some concern about losing users to Windows with the port to QT 4, and KDE 4?"
If "we" lose users to Windows, so what? The important thing is that people use computers the way they like. It's not a war people, and it's not a competition...
If some KDE users would actually be happier with KDE on Windows then LET THEM GO.
By mirshafie at Sat, 2007/06/02 - 5:00am
I beleive parts of the WM in Windows are built into the kernel.
Think about it...
By forrest at Sat, 2007/06/02 - 5:00am
Great work!
Impressing! I especially like the
By Sebastian Pipping at Fri, 2007/06/01 - 5:00am
Interesting, but
It's some good effects with potential, but I think some thought needs to be put into keyboard/mouse interaction. Switching between them involves some lag time, and when I see the mouse pointer move, and then typing for an expose-like extension, I think some refinement could help.
By Daniel Rollings at Fri, 2007/06/01 - 5:00am
all the changes in KDE4 really make me wonder what the future holds, I love KDE. and couldn't imagine useing any other Desktop, but more and more sillyness keeps getting added. and once something is added to kde its there forever, dolphin, kbfx, i swear any app written for kde will just be thrown in. and now were talking about composite window managers. which offer very little in useful functionality compared to how much recourses they suck up. It seems a usable effective desktop is not the goal, but how many cool tricks can we throw in. Its free and the developers do a great job, I dont mean to discount all their efforts. its much appreciated. but theres also a user base who has come to love kde. its only natural they might want to voice there opinions or concerns about KDE. just my thoughts for what its worth..
leave the silly, composite effects to someone else berl or whoever, and kbfx umm why kde already has a menu. same with dolphin. and how many mp3 players are we up too right now ?
I guess bash me all you want for having an opinion and caring about my favorite desktop
By bm at Fri, 2007/06/08 - 5:00am
Re: sighs
> and now were talking about composite window managers.
If you don't want the effects (and arguably not all them are useless eye-candy as you seem to be suggesting) then you can easily turn them off, just as you have been able to with other effects in previous versions of KWin.
> and how many mp3 players are we up too right now ?
How many mp3 players are being added to KDE 4? I count zero so far.
By Paul Eggleton at Fri, 2007/06/08 - 5:00am
Re: sighs
"and once something is added to kde its there forever"
Lots of things have been removed from the stock KDE install - Kedit being just one recent example.
What's wrong with Dolphin? It's shaping up to be an excellent file manager.
"swear any app written for kde will just be thrown in"
kde-apps.org lists 47858 contents. I don't know how much of this is actual apps, but it's clear that your comment is hyperbole designed only to irritate the developers.
"and now were talking about composite window managers. which offer very little in useful functionality compared to how much recourses they suck up."
I think kwin_composite is great, and the "Expose", live tabbing and grid effect are incredibly useful. And - guess what! - it's a plugin that's off by default.
I'm endlessly irritated by people who whinge about defaults that can be changed in 10 seconds - the "Dolphin" article here on KDE had some of the most spoiled, ungrateful and, frankly, downright stupid displays of belly-acheing I have ever seen, short of a tantrum my 3 year old nephew once threw. But to complain about something that won't even inconvenience you unless *you explicitly turn it on* - that's a whole new level of whininess. Well done!
"It seems a usable effective desktop is not the goal"
Yes it is, and I'm sure the overworked usability team who work tirelessly to try and design you a better desktop appreciate your thoroughly negative and wholly incorrect comments.
"leave the silly, composite effects to someone else berl or whoever"
"and kbfx umm why kde already has a menu"
Well, you'd better let Aaron Seigo know that Plasma has a menu already - he'll be thrilled to bits as it would be one less thing to do before October! What's the name of KDE4's menu?
"same with dolphin"
How many specialised File Managers with a focus on usability already exist in the stock KDE install? HINT: none.
"and how many mp3 players are we up too right now ?"
Paul has fielded this one with far more patience that I could muster.
"I guess bash me all you want for having an opinion and caring about my favorite desktop"
This, for me, was probably the most grating part of your post. I'll bash you, alright, but not for "having an opinion" or "caring about my favourite desktop" - I don't, after all, want to fuel that little martyr syndrome you've spent time nurturing. I'll bash you for your stream of pointless and thoroughly unconstructive nitpicking; your casual dismissal of the hard work of a team of volunteers that either benefits you directly or doesn't impact you at all; your statement about the usability goals of KDE which are just hilariously wrong; and your complete lack of research about what's actually going in to the default KDE install (a lot of effort is going in to trimming down the set of apps so that it is lean and lacking in redundancy, but still functional).
The number of people I've seen on these comments doing something like "Well, I can't be bothered to research this so I'll just assume the KDE developers are doing the stupidest possible thing and directly accuse them of it!" is mind-boggling, and they invariably put that clever little disclaimer on the end: you know, the one that means that anyone who disagrees with you can instantly be derided as trying to deprive you of a voice, or who just doesn't *care* about KDE as much as you do, regardless of the validity of their criticisms of your post.
So, if you *really* care about KDE as much as you claim to, I'd suggest the following:
a) Learn something about what you are criticising, rather than just assuming the KDE developers are doing something purely because it's the stupidest path possible/ to annoy their fanbase/ they were drunk and it seemed cool at the time. KDE does not just throw stuff in willy-nilly, it does not have however many MP3 players you think it has in the default install, and it is very focussed on usability.
b) If you have a legitimate complaint, don't whinge about it and berate the developers and then whine "Just my opinion! Just my opinion!". It's the equivalent of sidling up to a guy, kicking him in the nuts, and running away screaming.
Make sure the complaint is valid, and *give reasons* that have not been discussed and shot down ad nauseum. You have not given a single reason why you think, for example, that Dolphin is bad, so your slur against it is the exact opposite of the "constructive criticism" I'm sure you'd try to spin your post as!
When you've done this, *raise your objections like an adult*. Don't throw yourself on the dot.kde.org stage and cry, theatrically, "Oh, Lords of KDE - why have you turned upon humble and devoted servants such as I with your cruel caprice! Oh woe is me, that they shall not hear my pleas born of love; for their concerns are those of Bling, and Bloat, and the sowing of Confusion amongst their followers, and they strike the faces of any who dare speak against them, even though my words are intended to guide them down the True Path (i.e. the path I selfishly want them to take). PS don't criticise my misguided words because they're Just My Opinion(TM)!". This kind of approach is something you should grow out of when you're a teenager.
If you are concerned about some choice that the KDE devs might make in the future, then *give them the benefit of the doubt*. Don't simply assume that they have already made up their minds to commit to whatever nefarious decision you've conjured up in your head - raise the issue and say something like "Hi, I'm a little concerned about $X - have you made any decisions on what you are going to do about it? I think most KDE fans would prefer $Y". Don't say things like "I have absolutely no reason to assume this, but I just *know* that Plasma is going to have Goatse on every panel and will play loud high-pitched white noise continually and destroy all your work etc. Why have the KDE developers decided to do this? Don't they care about all their fans who have selflessly used the work they have produced for years [as if Free Software was a game of Populous and developers gained manna simply by having people passively consume their products and not lift a finger to help them]. I guess I'll have to go on back to GNOME :'(" followed by the theatrical *SIGH* intended to conjur up images of grubby-faced orphans collapsing in the gutter. Seriously, voice your opinions like an adult, and knock off the pitiful attempts at emotional blackmail - it's embarrassing.
By anon at Fri, 2007/06/08 - 5:00am
Re: sighs
just ignore this troll
By asdx at Sat, 2007/11/17 - 6:00am
how to enable effects module?
Great article -- one piece is missing though. How to get this extra module with effects? All I can find in google is how to set up the composite for Xorg (done) or how to click in the translucency checkbox.
But what to do in order to get extra tab/module with KWin effects? I didn't find the answer while googling and I didn't find anything in repos (opensuse).
Thanks in advance for your help.
By Maciej Pilichowski at Sun, 2007/12/23 - 6:00am
Re: how to enable effects module?
Mystery solved. I was misguided by the similarity in the videos (in comments) to KDE3 ;-) I thought it is available here too.
By Maciej Pilichowski at Sun, 2007/12/23 - 6:00am