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No. 2015 IL App (1st) 130530 People
v. Walker Filed 6-17-15 (TJJ)
Almost 30 years ago, James Walker was convicted of first-degree murder in the shooting deaths of three people. Walker claimed he was in Momence, Illinois, at the time of the shooting, but three eyewitnesses identified him as the shooter. On direct appeal, the appellate court affirmed Walker's conviction. People v. Walker, No. 1-86-856 (1988) (unpublished order under Supreme Rule 23). Walker filed two postconviction petitions, which were summarily dismissed by the circuit court and affirmed by the appellate court. People v. Walker, No. 1-02-0959 (2003) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23); People v. Walker, No. 1-03-0333 (2004) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). On December 4, 2012, Walker filed a third pro se petition for postconviction relief asserting actual innocence and reasonable doubt. The circuit court of Cook County denied the petition as without merit. We affirm, finding Walker's petition for postconviction relief presents neither newly discovered, noncumulative exculpatory evidence nor material evidence of a conclusive character that would likely change the outcome on retrial.
No. 2015 IL App (2d) 141229 Fleckles
v. Diamond Filed 6-23-15 (TJJ)
In this permissive interlocutory appeal pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 306(a)(5) (appeals from interlocutory orders "affecting the care and custody of unemancipated minors"), plaintiff, James S. Fleckles, petitioned pursuant to the Illinois Parentage Act of 1984 to establish paternity and obtain joint custody and visitation with his yet-unborn child. Defendant, Danielle J. Diamond, moved to strike and dismiss the petition, arguing that the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Uniform Child-Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, because, under that statute, Colorado, where the child was ultimately born and where defendant lived with the child, was his "home state." The trial court denied Danielle's motion, and we granted her petition for leave to appeal. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand the cause with directions for the trial court to dismiss the custody portion of James's petition.
No. 2015 IL App (3d) 130278 Ruhl
v. The Department of Corrections Filed 6-23-15
Plaintiffs, Ronald Ruhl, Robert Hernandez and Douglas Oaks, inmates incarcerated in the Illinois Department of Corrections (DOC), filed a petition for writ of mandamus against the DOC in the Will County circuit court. The complaint alleged that the DOC had been overcharging plaintiffs for goods sold at the prison commissary in violation of section 3-7-2a of the Unified Code of Corrections. The DOC filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619(a)(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure, arguing that the inmates lacked standing to enforce section 3-7-2a of the Unified Code against it. The trial court granted the DOC's motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs appeal, arguing that this court's recent decision in Jackson v. Randle, 2011 IL App (4th) 100790, is flawed and they do, in fact, have standing to enforce the relevant statutory provision. We affirm.
No. 2015 IL App (3d) 140553 HSBC
Bank USA v. Rowe Filed 6-23-15 (TJJ)
Plaintiff, HSBC Bank USA, filed a complaint to foreclose mortgage against defendants, Scott and Nanci Rowe. Pursuant to plaintiff's motion, the trial court struck defendants' affirmative defense of lack of standing. The court also denied defendants' motion to deem their requests for admissions admitted. After granting summary judgment on the complaint, the court entered a judgment for foreclosure and sale. Defendants appeal, arguing that the court: (1) erred in granting summary judgment; and (2) abused its discretion in denying defendants' motion to deem requests admitted. We affirm.
No. 2015 IL App (1st) 132355 People
v. Saterfield Filed 6-12-15 (TJJ)
Defendant Lloyd Saterfield appeals from the circuit court's dismissal of his pro se petition for postjudgment relief filed pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure. On appeal, defendant contends, relying on People v. Laugharn, 233 Ill. 2d 318 (2009), that the court's sua sponte dismissal of the petition was premature because the court entered it before the 30-day period for the State to respond had expired. We affirm.
No. 2015 IL App (1st) 134049 People
v. Brown Filed 6-22-15 (TJJ)
This appeal arises from the denial of defendant Cordelrow Brown's posttrial motion to vacate his 2010 conviction on seven counts of first degree murder, including two counts of knowing murder and five counts of felony murder. Those murder charges arose from the 2010 death of Mycal Hunter, which resulted from injuries Hunter sustained during a 2007 gunfight involving the defendant and other individuals. In a prior trial in 2008-09 arising from the same gunfight, the defendant was convicted of five felonies for shooting at individuals other than Hunter: one count of aggravated battery with a firearm, one count of aggravated battery, and three counts of aggravated discharge of a firearm. However, at the 2008-09 trial, the defendant was also found not guilty by directed verdict of other charges with respect to Hunter, including attempted murder, aggravated battery with a firearm, aggravated battery, and aggravated discharge of a firearm. The defendant argues that, in light of his acquittal by directed verdict in the 2008-09 trial on those charges pertaining to Hunter, his 2010 murder prosecution for Hunter's subsequent death was barred by double jeopardy and collateral estoppel. Affirmed in part, vacated in part and remanded.
No. 2015 IL App (5th) 140184 Tipton
v. Madison County, Illinois Filed 6-22-15 (TJJ)
The plaintiff, Dennis Tipton, built a 60-by-128-foot pole barn on his property. The property was zoned for agricultural use, but the plaintiff intended to use the building to store equipment for use in his off-site concrete construction business. A series of discussions ensued between the plaintiff and Madison County planning and development officials regarding whether this intended use was consistent with the county's zoning ordinance. The officials took the position that the plaintiff's proposed use was not permitted. The plaintiff filed an application for a change in the zoning of his property, which was denied. He then filed a complaint under the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3-101 et seq. (West 2012)). The plaintiff argued that (1) the county's interpretation of the ordinance was not correct, and (2) the denial of his application was against the manifest weight of the evidence. The circuit court affirmed the denial by the Madison County Board (County Board) of the plaintiff's rezoning request. The court found that the question of the county's interpretation of the ordinance was not properly before it, but noted that if it were to consider the question, it would uphold the county's interpretation. The plaintiff appeals, arguing that (1) the court properly considered whether his intended use was permitted under the zoning ordinance, but erroneously concluded that it was not; and (2) the denial of his rezoning application was against the manifest weight of the evidence. We affirm.
No. 2015 IL App (1st)
131290 People
v. Taylor Filed 6-19-15 (RJC)
Following a bench trial, defendant Courtney
Taylor was found guilty of aggravated assault based on mere
words and then sentenced to six months' supervision. On
appeal, defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient
to prove her guilty of aggravated assault beyond a reasonable
doubt. We reverse.
No. 2015 IL App (1st)
Design Ltd. v. Speedway Crane, LLC Filed
Plaintiff, CE Design, Ltd., was an engineering
consulting firm that provided engineering, architectural, and
surveying services prior to ceasing operations in 2010.
Plaintiff purchased an advertising program for the 2005 and
2006 editions of the Blue Book of Building and Construction
(Blue Book) and was a Blue Book customer in 2005. Defendant,
Speedway Crane, is an Illinois limited liability company in
the crane rental business. On June 20, 2008, plaintiff brought
a class action to obtain relief and recover damages against
defendant allegedly caused by the sending of the faxed
advertisement. Count I of plaintiff's complaint alleged violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA). 47 U.S.C. § 227 (Supp. III 2004).1 The TCPA prohibits the sending of an unsolicited facsimile advertisement and provides that monetary damages may be recovered for each violation in the amount of a party's actual pecuniary loss or $500, whichever is greater. Counts II and III alleged that the fax constituted conversion and that it violated section 2 of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (815 ILCS 505/2 (West 2008)). The trial court rejected defendant's claim of mootness but entered summary judgment in favor of defendant, finding that plaintiff had given prior express permission to receive faxed advertisements when it invited contact from businesses in the commercial construction industry by voluntarily advertising its fax number in the Blue Book.
No. 2015 IL App (1st)
133247 Estate
of Howell v. Howell Filed 6-19-15 (RJC)
Two appeals have been consolidated. In the
first one, No. 1-13-3247, the Northern Trust Company and
LaTanya Turks, as coguardians of the estate of Turks' adult
son, Donald Howell, appeal from an order granting their
petition to engage in estate planning but rejecting a proposed
plan that would benefit his mother without distributing funds
to his father and 10 half siblings who were born to other
mothers. The second appeal, No. 1-14-0180, concerns attorney
fees and asks us to determine whether the estate should
compensate the coguardians' attorneys for pursuing this
No. 2015 IL App (1st)
133775 People's
Bank of Arlington Heights v. Atlas Filed
This is a mortgage foreclosure case in which the principal defenses raised by the homeowner arise under the federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA) (15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq. (2006)). In this appeal, we must decide whether plaintiff, People's Bank of Arlington Heights (People's Bank), was required to comply with certain disclosure provisions of TILA before foreclosing on a home owned by defendants Marshall Atlas and Arlene Atlas. The trial court found TILA inapplicable, and thus granted summary judgment in favor of People's Bank, because the loan secured by the mortgage on defendants' home was a commercial loan, not a consumer loan, and was thus exempt from TILA's disclosure requirements.
No. 2015 IL 117876 In
re Marriage of Mueller Filed 6-18-15 (RJC)
In this Sangamon County case, a wife filed for
divorce in 2012 after 20 years of marriage. This dispute
concerns the division of property. Both parties are still
working. The respondent husband works for the Springfield
Police Department and is part of its pension system in lieu of
Social Security. The wife has a job in the private sector and
participates in Social Security. Under federal law, Social
Security benefits are exempt from the equitable distribution
of property and may not be used as an offset. Also, although
the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act
specifically provides that pension benefits tied to
contributions made during a marriage are marital property,
judicial precedent in Illinois holds that future Social
Security benefits are bare expectancies that may never in fact
be received and, thus, are not marital property subject to
The husband made an offer of proof proposing to reduce the wife's share of the husband's pension by taking consideration of her anticipated Social Security benefits. This was successfully objected to by the other side. Ultimately, the circuit court awarded the wife slightly more than 35% of the husband's pension, or $350,000. The appellate court affirmed, as did the Illinois Supreme Court in this decision, stating that this result is consistent with state law and with Congressional intent to keep Social Security benefits out of divorce cases.
No. 2015 IL 117934 People
v. Downs Filed 6-18-15 (RJC)
In 2009, a Kane County jury found this defendant guilty of first degree murder in connection with a 2007 offense, and a 70-year sentence was imposed. The defendant sought review in the appellate court and there, for the first time, alleged that the trial court had committed plain error by erroneously defining reasonable doubt in response to an inquiry from the jury. The appellate court ordered a new trial, but the Illinois Supreme Court did not agree with what the appellate court had done.
The supreme court said that the late timing of
this defendant's claim constituted a procedural default which
could bar further consideration of it. However, there is an
exception to this rule where there is plain error affecting a
substantial right. In this decision, the court found that
Downs had failed to show that a clear or obvious error had
occurred and, therefore, the supreme court declined to apply
the plain error doctrine, which might have preserved his
After the jury had begun its deliberations, it sent the judge a note asking for a definition of reasonable doubt and inquiring whether the definition of reasonable doubt was 80%, 70%, or 60%. The response given was "we cannot give you a definition" and "it is your duty to define."
Although some jurisdictions hold otherwise, it is the established law in Illinois that reasonable doubt should not be further defined for the jury. The Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, are consistent with this, as are the Committee Notes thereto. There was no error in the response of the trial court to the jury. An instruction that the meaning of reasonable doubt is for the jury to determine is a correct statement of the law.
The defendant also complained that the jury's framing of its question in terms of percentages indicated that it was prepared to apply a lesser standard of proof.
The appellate court, in ruling as it did, did not address the defendant's additional claim that, when a Krankel hearing had been held earlier on his pro se assertion that his counsel at trial had been ineffective, the new counsel at that hearing was ineffective also. A remand was ordered so that the appellate court could consider that contention.
No. 2015 IL 118000 Hadley
v. Subscriber Doe Filed 6-18-15 (RJC)
No. 2015 IL App (1st) 132162 People
v. Harris Filed 6-17-15 (RJC)
Following a jury trial, defendant Aaron Harris
was convicted of possession of cannabis and sentenced to 24
months of probation. On appeal, Harris argues that the trial
court erred in denying his pretrial motion to quash his arrest
and suppress evidence obtained pursuant to an anticipatory
search warrant. Specifically, Harris contends that the police
improperly executed the search by arresting him before he
opened a package containing narcotics that had been fitted by
law enforcement with an electronic monitoring and breakaway
filament device. Additionally, Harris claims that the State
did not prove his knowing possession beyond a reasonable doubt
and that the trial court improperly assessed fees with respect
to credits accrued during incarceration. Reversed and
No. 2015 IL App (1st) 133414 McKenna
v. AlliedBarton Security Services, LLC Filed
On December 8, 2006, four tenants of the Citigroup
Center/Ogilvie Transportation Center were shot (three
fatally) by an interloper who was initially denied access to
the office tower portion of the building by security
personnel. This individual persisted in his effort to get up
to a private office in the building and was taken there by a
security guard after telling him he was holding a gun inside
a large, manila envelope in his hand. Thus, despite various
security measures that were in place to protect the tenants
of this office building, an armed killer was brought to an
office on the thirty-eighth floor where he went on a
shooting rampage that claimed three lives while injuring
another person. After exhaustive discovery and extensive
motion practice, defendants AlliedBarton Security Services,
LLC (AB) and NACA Madison, LLC (NACA) successfully obtained
summary judgment in the trial court, after convincing the
motion judge that they owed no duty to protect these
plaintiffs and that their conduct could not, as a matter of
law, be considered a proximate cause of the injuries and
deaths. We disagree on both bases and reverse and remand to
the trial court for further proceedings.
No. 2015 IL App (3d)
130581 People
v. Moreno Filed 6-17-15 (RJC)
Defendant, Michael Moreno, was convicted of aggravated
driving under the influence (DUI) resulting in a death,
aggravated failure to report an accident resulting in a
death, and disorderly conduct. His appeal challenges his
conviction of aggravated failure to report an accident
resulting in a death, a Class 1 felony, based on his
failure to report the accident within 30 minutes after
leaving the scene. He contends that the evidence was
insufficient to prove the offense, because he was
"physically unable" to report the accident at a police
station within 30 minutes. Defendant notes that, following
the accident, he was arrested for disorderly conduct,
briefly taken to a hospital, and then interviewed by the
police. In the alternative, he contends that he
acknowledged having been involved and that the police had
all of the statutorily required information. We affirm.
No. 2015 IL App (2d)
140706 In
re Estate of Brewer Filed 6-17-15 (RJC)
This is an appeal from an order of the circuit court of
Winnebago County granting a motion to dismiss a petition
to contest the validity of a will. We affirm.
In this administrative review action, plaintiff,
Marvin Gruby, contends that defendant the Illinois
Department of Public Health (Department) violated
provisions of the Illinois Nursing Home Care Act (Act
or Nursing Home Care Act) (210 ILCS 45/1-101 et seq.
(West 2012)) and the federal Nursing Home Reform
Amendments (Pub. L. No. 100-203, §§ 4201-4218, 101
Stat. 1330 (1987) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.)). He maintains that the
violation occurred when the Department declined to
complete a hearing on his involuntary 2015 IL App (2d)
140790 transfer or discharge from a nursing facility
owned by defendant Manorcare Health and Rehabilitation
Services, d/b/a Manorcare Highland Park (Manorcare).
According to plaintiff, he had a right to a hearing
even though Manorcare had withdrawn its notice of
involuntary transfer
or discharge, because Manorcare simultaneously refused to readmit him to the facility following a brief hospitalization. Affirmed.
No. 2015 IL App (3d)
140516 People
v. Pulling Filed 6-17-15 (RJC)
The State appeals the trial court's order that granted defendant Frank E. Pulling's motion to suppress evidence. On appeal, the State argues that the trial court erred in finding that the traffic stop was unreasonably prolonged prior to the canine alert, and therefore, the motion to suppress should not have been granted. Affirmed.
Over three years after his mother Kathryn Moon's death, plaintiff, Randall Moon, as executor, filed a wrongful death and survival action against defendants, Dr. Clarissa Rhode and Central Illinois Radiological Associates, Ltd. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint, alleging that the complaint was untimely. The trial court granted defendants' motion. Plaintiff appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in granting defendants' motion. Specifically, plaintiff contends that the discovery rule applied and that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until the date on which he knew or reasonably should have known of defendants' negligent conduct.
No. 2015 IL App (1st) 133035 Schacht
v. Brown Filed 6-16-15 (RJC)
This case involve allegations that Dorothy Brown, as the clerk of the circuit court of Cook County, is engaged in a practice of holding and remitting certain court fees in a manner not authorized by law. Plaintiffs, Mark J. Schacht and several John Does, appeal an order of the circuit court dismissing their third amended complaint with prejudice pursuant to section 2-619(a)(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 2012)). On appeal, plaintiffs contend that the court erred in determining that they did not have standing to challenge the method in which the clerk of the circuit court of Cook County holds and remits certain court fees. Affirmed.
No. 2015 IL App (1st)
142288 NorthBrook
Bank and Trust Company v. 300 Level, Inc.
Filed 6-15-15 (RJC)
On June 28, 2011, First Chicago filed a routine motion
requesting that the court appoint Cadillac Investigations,
Inc. (Cadillac), as a special process server. The court
order granting the motion states, in relevant part: "A
special process server, of lawful age, employed or retained
by Cadillac Investigations, Inc., *** License No.
115-000924, an Illinois corporation, is appointed as special
process server for all Defendants in this matter." On May
14, 2014, 300 Level appeared back on the scene for the first
time in two years. Through its new law firm, Leading Legal,
LLC, it filed a motion to quash service.
No. 2015 IL App (5th)
140062 In
re Marriage of Brown Filed 6-15-15 (RJC)
On January 25, 2010, Jeffrey Brown filed a petition for dissolution of marriage from Kerri Brown. The case proceeded to a one-day trial on April 5, 2012. Eleven months later, on March 8, 2013, the court issued its ruling in an order titled "Supplemental Judgment on All Remaining Issues." On April 5, 2013, Kerri filed a timely posttrial motion asking the court to reconsider various issues. On May 13, 2013, the court heard the motion. On January 8, 2014, the court entered its order on posttrial motions. Jeffrey filed a timely notice of appeal. We reverse.
No. 2015 IL App (1st) 122975 Szafranski
v. Dunston Filed 6-12-15 (TJJ)
In 2010, plaintiff, Jacob Szafranski, and defendant, Karla Dunston, entered into an agreement to undergo in vitro fertilization (IVF) together for the purpose of creating preembryos. Karla had been diagnosed with lymphoma and was expected to suffer ovarian failure and infertility as a result of her chemotherapy treatment. During the IVF procedure, Jacob and Karla agreed to fertilize all of the eggs that were retrieved. Jacob deposited his sperm for the IVF and three viable pre-embryos were created and frozen. After their relationship ended, the parties disagreed over whether Karla could use the pre-embryos. Jacob sued to enjoin Karla from using them, and Karla filed a counterclaim seeking sole custody and control over the pre-embryos. Following a hearing on the parties' motions for summary judgment, the circuit court awarded Karla sole custody and control of the pre-embryos and the right to use them to have children. On remand, the circuit court held a two-day trial, after which it entered judgment in favor of Karla. The court found that Jacob and Karla had an oral contract allowing Karla to use the embryos without Jacob's consent. We affirm the circuit court's judgment. The evidence at trial supported the circuit court's finding that the parties formed an oral contract on March 24, wherein they agreed to create preembryos that Karla could use to have a biological child. We also agree that the parties did not modify this contract when they signed the medical informed consent document on March 25. Finally, we cannot say that the court erred in finding that Karla's interests prevail over Jacob's interests in this dispute, based on evidence in the record that the pre-embryos represent Karla's last and only opportunity to have a biological child with her own eggs.
No. 2015 IL App (1st) 131863 Burkhamer
v. Krumske Filed 6-12-15 (TJJ)
Pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 306(a)(1) (eff. July 1, 2014), the plaintiff, Kevin Burkhamer, filed a petition for leave to appeal from an order of the circuit court of Cook County granting a new trial to the defendant, Mel Richard Krumske. We allowed the petition. On appeal, the plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in ordering a new trial and that the trial court abused its discretion when it granted the defendant a mistrial.
No. 2015 IL App (1st) 133969 Arient
v. Shaik Filed 6-12-15 (TJJ)
In the case at bar, defendant Nazeer Shaik purchased plaintiff Scott Arient's pet shop, and plaintiff remained as an employee. There were three agreements: an employee agreement whereby plaintiff continued to work at the shop; and a purchase agreement, as well as an asset purchase agreement, whereby defendant purchased the shop. In 2011, defendant closed the pet shop and plaintiff sued alleging breach of contract. On November 21, 2013, a jury rendered a verdict against plaintiff on his claims and against defendant on his counterclaims. As a result, the trial court issued an order stating that no monetary award was entered against either party. On this appeal, plaintiff seeks a new trial and raises one issue. He claims that the trial court abused its discretion when it barred him from admitting certain evidence. In response, defendant claims, among other things, that plaintiff forfeited this issue by failing to file a posttrial motion. The jury verdict and the trial court's order were both entered on November 21, 2013. Less than a month later, plaintiff filed a notice of appeal on December 19, 2013, without first filing a posttrial motion. For the following reasons, we agree that this issue is forfeited for our consideration.
No. 2015 IL App (1st) 142619 In
re Former Marriage of Donnelly Filed 6-12-15 (TJJ)
This permissive interlocutory appeal pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 308 (eff.Feb. 26, 2010) by petitioner Joseph Dixon Donnelly (Joseph) requests this court to consider a question certified by the circuit court of Cook County regarding the application of the holding in In re Marriage of Petersen, 2011 IL 110984. Joseph's former wife, respondent Renee Elizabeth Donnelly (Renee), filed a series of petitions seeking that Joseph pay a proportionate share of college expenses for the parties' four children after the children graduated from college. The circuit court denied Joseph's motion to dismiss the most recent of these petitions, but certified the following question for our review: "Does the holding in Petersen, 2011 IL 110984, preclude the court from ordering a parent to reimburse the other parent for college expenses allegedly paid prior to the date the petition is filed, whenever the parties' Judgment for Dissolution of Marriage does not order a specific dollar amount or percentage to be paid but leaves the amount to be determined at a later date?" We granted Joseph's petition for leave to appeal and answer the certified question in the negative.
No. 2015 IL App (1st) 143860 In
re Curtis W. Filed 6-12-15 (TJJ)
Pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 311(a) (eff. Feb. 26, 2010) and Rule 306(a)(5) (eff. Feb. 16, 2011), the respondent-minor, Curtis W., Jr. (Curtis Jr.), brings this expedited appeal from an order of the circuit court of Cook County denying the State's petition to terminate the parental rights of the respondent-father, Curtis W., Sr. (the respondent). On appeal, Curtis Jr. contends that the trial court's determination that termination of the respondent's parental rights was not in the best interest of Curtis Jr. was against the manifest weight of the evidence. He further contends that the trial court erred when it determined that the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent was unfit under section 1(D)(b) and (i) of the Adoption Act (the Adoption Act) (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b), (i) (West 2014)). We do not need to address Curtis Jr.'s second contention. The respondent does not challenge the trial court's finding that he was unfit under section 1(D)(m) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m) (West 2014)). The finding of unfitness on one ground is sufficient. See In re M.J., 314 Ill. App. 3d 649, 655 (2000) (if there is sufficient evidence to satisfy any one ground of unfitness, the reviewing court need not consider the other findings of parental unfitness).
No. 2015 IL App (3d) 150038 In
re Estate of B.R.S. Filed 6-12-15 (TJJ)
Respondents, Conaley and Jessica Aaron (the Aarons), appeal the trial court's denial of their petition to vacate the order granting Jamie Lawson plenary guardianship of the minor, B.R.S. Their arguments focus primarily on Lawson's failure to (1) list them as the minor's nearest kin and her custodians in the petition for guardianship and (2) provide them notice of the hearing. They assert that these failures were part of a fraud perpetrated by Lawson upon the court in pursuit of custody of the minor. They contend that the omissions render the order voidable and require the court to conduct a more in-depth review to ascertain whose appointment as guardian would serve the best interest of the minor. Additionally, the Aarons take issue with section 11-8 of the Probate Act of 1975 (755 ILCS 5/11-8 (West 2014)) and challenge its constitutionality. They argue that on its face this section thwarts their fundamental right to due process as it confers an interest in the proceeding but retracts the need for notice allowing them to participate in the disposition of the case. Lastly, they claim that Lawson should be estopped from guardianship as a matter of law as her parental rights were relinquished in the adoption of the minor by the newly deceased parent. We agree that the trial court erred in denying the Aarons' motion to vacate. We remand the case for proceedings in accord with this opinion.
No. 2015 IL App (2d) 131319 People
v. Valle Filed 6-11-15 (TJJ)
After a bench trial, defendant, Jaime L. Valle, was convicted of unlawful possession of cocaine with the intent to deliver (720 ILCS 570/401(a)(2)(A) (West 2010)) and sentenced to six years' imprisonment. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to quash his arrest and suppress evidence. Defendant argues that the police exceeded the scope of the warrant that authorized the search leading to the evidence of his offense. We affirm.
No. 2015 IL App (3d) 140073 In
re Estate of O'Hare Filed 6-11-15 (TJJ)
Virginia Johnson appeals from a judgment for $421,621.73 in favor of the public guardian of Du Page County, as guardian of the estate of Virginia's adult daughter, Sarah O'Hare. Virginia had served as guardian of Sarah's estate from November 9, 2007, until June 24, 2010. The trial court found that Virginia failed to properly account for the use of estate funds and had spent substantial sums for her own benefit and the benefit of members of her family other than Sarah. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment.
No. 2015 IL App (1st) 133451 Magnini
v. Centegra Health Systems Filed 6-10-15 (TJJ)
Plaintiff Julie Magnini brought a medical malpractice suit against Centegra Health Systems, Dr. Amir Heydari, Dr. Aaron Schwaab, Dr. Richard Lind (collectively, the doctors), and various other defendants not relevant to this appeal. She alleged that she was injured as a result of gastric bypass surgery performed at Centegra Hospital in 2007, as well as later surgeries to treat complications arising out of the original surgery. Additionally, Julie's husband, Martin Magnini, sought damages for loss of consortium. The Magninis sought recovery against Centegra on a theory of vicarious liability, alleging that the doctors were "agents and employees" of Centegra. The trial court granted summary judgment for Centegra, finding that the doctors were independent contractors, not agents, since Centegra did not control the manner in which they rendered care to patients. The Magninis appeal, arguing that there is an issue of material fact as to whether Centegra retained sufficient control over the doctors to negate their status as independent contractors. Finding no error, we affirm.
No. 2015 IL App (1st) 133926 In
re Marriage of Pasquesi Filed 6-10-15 (TJJ)
The circuit court ordered John to replenish the trust (set up my a prior marital settlement agreement) at a rate of $12,000 per year, determined John's current and retroactive child support obligation, as well as his past-due childrelated expenses obligation, and granted Roberta the tax exemptions for the parties' dependent children. John asserts the trial court abused its discretion in: (i) ordering him to replenish the trust, because Roberta, an interested party, is the trustee and there was no evidence to support replenishment; (ii) calculating his retroactive child support obligation from February 1, 2012 to August 12, 2012, because he had no income at that time; (iii) allocating the dependency exemptions to Roberta because he could have benefitted from them; and (iv) ordering him to pay $12,464 in past-due child-related expenses. We affirm. The circuit court acted within its discretion in ordering John to replenish the trust because the parties' MSA named Roberta as trustee and John willfully refused to pay nonmedical expenses that were not in dispute. The circuit court also did not abuse its discretion in calculating John's retroactive child support for February 1, 2012 to August 12, 2012, where the record did not show a change in circumstances, in permitting Roberta to claim all four children as dependents on her taxes as provided in the MSA, or in relying on Roberta's calculation in ordering John to pay $12,464 in past-due childrelated expenses.
No. 2015 IL App (1st) 140184 LSREF2
Nova Investments III, LLC v. Coleman Filed 6-5-15
Plaintiff, LSREF2 Nova Investments III, LLC, appeals the circuit court's order granting a motion to reconsider in favor of defendant, Michelle Coleman, and dismissing plaintiff's complaint seeking relief under a promissory note based on the doctrine of res judicata. On appeal, plaintiff contends the circuit court erred in dismissing its complaint where res judicata did not bar it from pursuing a distinct remedy other than the remedy pursued in the prior mortgage foreclosure action. Based on the following, we affirm.
No. 2015 IL App (1st) 130991 People
v. Evans Filed 6-8-15 (TJJ)
The circuit court found defendant, James Evans, guilty after a bench trial of possession of cannabis and sentenced him to 12 months' probation. 720 ILCS 550/4(d) (West 2010). Defendant raises three issues for our review: (1) whether the State presented sufficient evidence to sustain his conviction for possession of cannabis; (2) whether defendant received the effective assistance of trial counsel where his counsel did not file a motion to suppress the cannabis recovered during his arrest; and (3) whether the circuit court failed to apply a credit for the time he served in presentence custody against the various fines imposed on him. We hold the State presented sufficient evidence to sustain his conviction for possession of cannabis. We decline to review defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on the record before us, but note that defendant may still pursue his claim under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 to 122-7 (West 2010)). The State concedes, and we agree, that defendant is entitled to a $5 credit per day for the time he spent in presentence custody. 725 ILCS 5/110-14 (West 2010). Accordingly, we reduce the total monetary judgment against defendant by $10 based on the two days defendant spent in presentence custody.
No. 2015 IL App (1st) 143507 In
re Isaiah D. Filed 6-8-15 (TJJ)
This appeal arises from the trial court's November 25, 2014 order adjudicating respondent-appellant Isaiah D. (respondent) to be an habitual juvenile offender (HJO) and a violent juvenile offender (VJO) and sentencing him to the Department of Juvenile Justice (DOJJ) until the age of 21, pursuant to the mandatory sentencing provisions of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act or Act). See 705 ILCS 405/5-815, 5-820 (West 2012).
No. 2015 IL App (1st) 132245 Perik
v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. Filed 6-5-15 (TJJ)
Plaintiff Sharon Perik appeals from an order of the circuit court denying her motion to vacate the decision of the American Arbitration Association (AAA) dismissing her arbitration claim against defendant JPMorgan Chase, N.A. (Chase), as successor in interest to Washington Mutual Bank (WaMu). Plaintiff had sought arbitration of her claim that Chase, as the successor in interest to Washington Mutual Bank (WaMu), was liable for WaMu's libel per se. The arbitrator dismissed plaintiff's claim pursuant to the administrative exhaustion requirement set forth in the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA) (12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(13)(D) (2012)), finding it lacked jurisdiction to consider the claim as plaintiff had not first filed her claim with the Federal Deposit Insurance Company (FDIC), which had been named as the receiver for WaMu after the federal government closed the bank. Plaintiff argues on appeal that the court erred in denying her motion to vacate as (1) the AAA exceeded its authority in its appointment of the arbitrator and (2) the arbitrator had no authority to dismiss the arbitration based on FIRREA. We remand and direct the court to vacate its decision and dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.
No. 2015 IL App (2d) 140267 People
v. Olsen Filed 6-5-15 (TJJ)
The State appeals from an order of the circuit court of De Kalb County granting the motion of defendant, Corey E. Olsen, to suppress evidence as a discovery sanction. For the reasons that follow, we reverse and remand.
No. 2015 IL App (4th) 130881 People
v. Sanders Filed 6-5-15 (TJJ)
In May 2013, a jury found defendant, Derry "Jay" Sanders, guilty of two counts of criminal sexual assault. On appeal, defendant asserts the trial court (1) improperly denied his Batson challenge (Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986)), and (2) erred when it prohibited defense counsel from introducing the content of text messages the complaining witness, B.J., sent another man the night of the offense. We affirm.
No. 2015 IL App (1st) 130993 People
v. Risper Filed 6-4-15 (TJJ)
Following a jury trial, defendant Roderic Risper was convicted of attempted robbery and sentenced to the Cook County department of corrections boot camp. On appeal, defendant contends that he was denied his right to a fair trial due to three references made at trial to the identification of defendant as a perpetrator of the crime by a witness who ultimately did not testify—the first by the State in its opening statement, and twice later by police officers during their testimony. Defendant argues that these references violated his right to confront the witnesses against him and denied him a fair trial. We affirm. We agree that each of these references to a nontestifying witness's identification of defendant as a culprit was error, but we find the errors harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
No. 2015 IL App (4th) 140613 Richter
v. Prairie Farms Dairy, Inc. Filed 6-4-15 (TJJ)
In October 2006, plaintiffs, Michael and Denise Richter, doing business as Rich- Lane Farms, filed suit against defendant, Prairie Farms Dairy, Inc., in Madison County case No. 06-L-892 (Richter I). Count I of plaintiffs' complaint alleged shareholder remedies under section 12.56 of the Business Corporation Act of 1983 (805 ILCS 5/12.56 (West 2006)), count II alleged violations under section 10a of the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (Consumer Fraud Act) (815 ILCS 505/10a (West 2004)), and count III alleged common-law fraud. In September 2007, the circuit court granted defendant's motion to dismiss counts II and III for failure to state a claim. Plaintiffs appeal, arguing their refiled complaint is not barred by res judicata or
the statute of limitations. We agree, and we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
No. 2015 IL App (1st) 130672 The
Board of Library Trustees of the Village of Midlothian v.
The Board of Library Trustees of the Posen Public Library
District Filed 6-3-15 (TJJ)
Plaintiff-appellee Board of Library Trustees of the Village of Midlothian (Midlothian) filed a breach of contract suit against defendant-appellant Board of Library Trustees of the Posen Public Library District (Posen). The trial court granted Midlothian's motion for summary judgment on liability and amounts due under the contracts and, after a hearing on prejudgment interest, entered a judgment against Posen for a total of $173,297 in damages, $121,294.33 in prejudgment interest from August 2007 through December 2012, and $14,996.49 in unpaid late fees. On appeal, Posen contends the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because (1) the performance of the parties modified the terms of the written contracts; (2) the trial court incorrectly rejected Posen's affirmative defenses of equitable estoppel, laches, and accord and satisfaction; (3) the damages evidence was insufficient to sustain a judgment; and (4) Midlothian is not entitled to prejudgment interest. On cross-appeal, Midlothian contends that the trial court erred in awarding prejudgment interest only from 2007 rather than from 2001. Finding that summary judgment for Midlothian was improperly granted, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County and remand with directions.
No. 2015 IL App (2d) 140944 Eakins
v. Hanna Cylinders Filed 6-2-15 (TJJ)
Plaintiff, David Eakins, filed a two-count complaint against defendant, Hanna Cylinders, LLC, for wages due and owing pursuant to the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act (Wage Act) (820 ILCS 115/1 et seq. (West 2012)) and for breach of the parties' employment contract. Plaintiff appeals the trial court's grant of defendant's summary judgment motion and denial of his motion for summary judgment. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand the cause with directions.
No. 2015 IL App (3d) 130523 People
v. Ringland Filed 6-3-15 (TJJ)
In these five consolidated cases defendants were each charged separately of felony drug offenses as a result of evidence obtained following traffic stops conducted by the State's Attorney's special investigator Jeff Gaither in La Salle County. Each defendant filed a motion to quash his or her arrest and suppress evidence. The separate hearings on defendants' motions focused on the traffic stops and Gaither's authority as a member of the State's Attorney's Felony Enforcement (SAFE) unit to execute said stops. Each hearing was premised on substantially the same stipulated testimony; following argument, the trial court granted defendants' motions. The court found that while the State's Attorney had authority to appoint a special investigator pursuant to section 3-9005(b) of Counties Code (55 ILCS 5/3-9005(b) (West 2012)), the failure to comply with the fingerprint requirements of the statute meant that Gaither was not authorized to act as a peace officer on the date of the incidents. The State appeals, claiming the trial court erred in finding that special investigator Gaither was not authorized to act as a peace officer at the time of the traffic stops where the State's Attorney substantially complied with the necessary fingerprint requirements of the statute. We affirm.
No. 2015 IL App (4th) 1420628 The
County of McLean v. States Self-Insurers Risk Retention
Group, Inc Filed
Alan Beaman was convicted of
murdering Jennifer Lockmiller.
The supreme court subsequently reversed Beaman's
conviction, concluding that the State unlawfully withheld
exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83 (1963). Beaman
then filed suit in federal court against McLean County, its
State's Attorney and others (County) asserting (1) civil
rights violations pursuant to section 1983, and (2) several
state-law tort claims, including malicious prosecution. The County then
filed this action seeking a declaratory judgment that States
Self-Insurers Risk Retention Group, Inc., was obligated to
pay the costs of plaintiffs' legal defense against Beaman's
federal lawsuit pursuant to an insurance policy that was in
place when Beaman was exonerated. The trial court
ruled for the County, finding, for purposes of Beaman's
malicious prosecution claim, that the dismissal of the
charges against him in January 2009—not his arrest or
prosecution in the 1990s—constituted the date of the
"occurrence" that resulted in his "personal injury" within
the meaning of the insurance policy. Because the court
concluded that Beaman's malicious-prosecution claim ripened
during the policy period, it ordered defendant to pay the
cost of plaintiffs' defense against Beaman's federal
lawsuit. States
Self-Insurers appealed, arguing that the "occurrence" of
Beaman's "personal injury" within the meaning of the
insurance policy was his arrest and prosecution, not his
exoneration. The
appellate court agreed and reversed.
No. 2015 IL App (4th) 140173 Ameren
Illinois Company v. The Illinois Commerce Commission
Filed 6-2-15 (JMC)
In tariffs it filed with the Illinois Commerce Commission, Ameren proposed increasing its rates for natural gas. The Commission suspended the tariffs and held an evidentiary hearing on them. Ameren appealed from one aspect of the Commission's decision: the rate of return the Commission allowed Ameren on its equity. Held: in setting the rate of return, the Commission's decision was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. In a second consolidated case involving different tariffs, Ameren filed "rider" tariffs proposing the establishment of a small volume transportation program, a program that would allow retail gas suppliers to use Ameren's infrastructure to deliver natural gas to customers who chose to enter into contracts with
the retail gas suppliers. The
Commission approved the small volume transportation program
but required retail gas suppliers to abide by three consumer
protections, over and above those that statutory law already
provided. Two
interveners, Dominion Retail, Inc., and Interstate Gas
Supply of Illinois, Inc., challenged the three consumer
protections. They
contended the Commission lacked statutory authority to
require these protections, and they also contended there was
no evidence that the protections were even necessary. Held: the
Commission had statutory authority to require the inclusion
of the new consumer protections in the small volume
transportation tariffs.
No. 2015 IL App (4th) 140167 Bentley
v. Hefti Filed
Bentley filed a complaint
against the Heftis seeking money damages for allegedly
uncompensated construction services. Later, Bentley
sought to add two additional counts. Attached to that
motion was a document entitled "Supplement to the Complaint
to Add Count[s] IV and V," in which Bentley alleged that
almost a year earlier Marion Hefti published defamatory
statements against him. The
trial court allowed the amendment. Marion moved to
dismiss the purported supplemental complaint, arguing that
it was time barred by the one-year statute of limitations
for defamation, which had expired. The trial court
denied the motion to dismiss.
Marion the filed this interlocutory appeal pursuant
to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 308, which called on the
court to answer the following certified question: "If a
motion for leave to file a supplemental complaint pursuant
to section 2-609 of the Code of Civil Procedure is filed
with the proposed supplemental complaint attached before the
expiration of the statute of limitations, but leave of court
is not obtained to file such supplemental complaint until
after the statute of limitations has expired, is the new
cause of action stated in the supplemental complaint time
barred?" Held:
No. 2015 IL App (4th) 130707 People v.
Reeves Filed
Reeves moved to amend the
written sentencing judgment for his consecutive sentences in
two consolidated cases to reflect a specific number of days
of credit for simultaneous presentence custody on separate
charges. The
trial court summarily dismissed the motion. The trial court
appointed the State Appellate Defender to represent Reeves. On appeal the
Appellate Defender moved to withdraw its representation,
contending any request for review would be without merit.
The appellate court agreed that the motion was meritless and
allowed the motion to withdraw.
No. 2015 IL App (4th) 130695 People v.
Shotts Filed
Shotts was convicted of (1)
one count of aggravated criminal sexual assault; (2) four
counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse; and (3) four
counts of criminal sexual assault. The trial court
imposed consecutive sentences of 25 years for aggravated
criminal sexual assault and 13 years each for three of
defendant's criminal sexual assault convictions. (The court
did not enter judgment on the remaining convictions, finding
that they arose out of the same conduct as the four
convictions for which the court sentenced defendant.) After he
filed numerous unsuccessful post-trial claims, Shotts filed
a motion for leave to file a successive petition for relief
under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, which was denied. Shotts then filed
a notice of appeal. Later,
Shotts sent a letter to the trial court, requesting
reconsideration of the court's denial of his motion to file
a successive petition for post-conviction relief. The trial court
denied the motion. Shotts
then filed an amended notice of appeal. The State
Appellate Defender moved
to withdraw as Shotts' counsel on the ground that no
meritorious issues were
raised on appeal.
The appellate court granted that motion and affirmed
the trial court.
No. 2015 IL App (1st) 142925 Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Simpson Filed 6-1-15
No. 2015 IL App (4th) 130323 In
re Maurice D. Filed 5-29-15
Following a February 2013
bench trial, the trial court adjudicated respondent
delinquent, finding the evidence supported a conviction for
criminal sexual abuse (720 ILCS 5/11-1.50(c) (West 2010))
beyond a reasonable doubt. In April 2013, the court
sentenced respondent to 12 months' conditional discharge and
ordered him to serve 30 days in the McLean County jail, with
credit for 7 days served. As a result of his conviction,
respondent must register as a sex offender. Respondent
appeals, asserting that the prosecution of a minor who
engages in "consensual" sexual activity with another
close-in-age minor for an imprisonable misdemeanor offense
violates (1) the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the
eighth amendment to the United States Constitution and the
proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution
and (2) substantive due process. We affirm.
No. 2015 IL App (4th)
130652 People
v. Chatha Filed 5-29-15 (RJC)
In February 2012, a police
confidential source purchased a commercially packaged
product from a convenience store owned by defendant, Kuldeep
Chatha. Forensic testing revealed that the product contained
a lab-manufactured chemical compound—referred to as
AM-2201—which mimics the effects of cannabis. The State
later charged defendant with possession of a controlled
substance with the intent to deliver (50 grams or more of a
substance containing AM-2201 (synthetic cannabis)
(1-(5-fluoropentyl)-3-(1-naphthoyl)indole) (720 ILCS
570/401(c)(11) (West 2010)). Following a March 2013 bench
trial, the trial court found defendant guilty. In July 2013,
the court sentenced defendant to (1) jail for 180 days,
which the court stayed; and (2) probation for 3 years.
Defendant appeals, arguing that the State failed to prove
his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. We agree and reverse.
No. 2015 IL App (4th)
140546 Essig
v. Advocate Bromenn Medical Center
Filed 5-29-15 (RJC)
In March 2009, 24-year-old
Kathryn Essig died of a pulmonary thromboembolism due to
deep vein thrombosis, which occurred when a piece of a blood
clot from her deep veins traveled into her lungs and caused
a blockage, leading to her asphyxiation. In October 2009,
Kathryn's parents, plaintiffs Michael and Kay Essig, sued
Dr. Daniel Lange and Carle Clinic Association, P.C. (Carle),
alleging that Lange's negligent attempt to remove a kidney
stone from Kathryn in April 2008 was the proximate cause of
her death. In June 2010, plaintiffs filed an amended
complaint, which added claims of institutional negligence
against defendant, Advocate BroMenn Medical Center
(BroMenn). In February 2014, the trial court granted
BroMenn's motion for summary judgment. In June 2014, the
court dismissed the case with prejudice after plaintiffs
reached a settlement agreement with Lange and Carle.
Plaintiffs appeal, arguing that the trial court erred by
granting summary judgment in favor of BroMenn as to
plaintiffs' claims of institutional negligence. We disagree
and affirm.
No. 2015 IL App (1st)
131307 People
v. Smith Filed 5-29-15 (RJC)
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of
aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW) (720 ILCS
5/24-1.6 (West 2010)) and unlawful use of a weapon by a
felon (UUWF) (720 ILCS 5/24-1.1 (West 2010)). The trial
court subsequently sentenced defendant to concurrent terms
of nine years in the Illinois Department of Corrections.
Defendant appeals, arguing that: (1) the trial court erred
in denying his motion to quash his arrest and suppress
evidence because defendant's "furtive movements" did not
support a reasonable inference that he was armed and
dangerous; (2) defendant's convictions for AUUW and UUWF
violate the one-act, one-crime rule; (3) defendant's
conviction for UUWF violates the second amendment (U.S.
Const., amend. II); (4) defendant's sentence for AUUW
violates the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois
Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §11); and (5) the
mittimus should be corrected to reflect 450 days of
presentence credit and that defendant was found guilty of
counts I and V.
No. 2015 IL App (1st) 131529 Motorola
Solutions, Inc. v. Zurich Insurance Co.
Filed 5-29-15 (RJC)
The instant consolidated appeals arise from the
interpretation of two nearly identical settlement
agreements entered into by plaintiff Motorola Solutions,
Inc. (Motorola), one with defendant Zurich Insurance
Company (Zurich) and one with defendant Associated
Indemnity Corporation (Associated).1 The parties disagree
about whether the settlement agreements contained
provisions that operated to release defendants from
providing insurance coverage for certain claims against
Motorola. Each party filed a motion for summary judgment
on the issue, all of which were denied after the trial
court found that the releases were ambiguous. The parties
conducted discovery and a bench trial was held on the
issue of the scope of the releases' language. The trial
court concluded that the parties had not released
Motorola's claims, and defendants now appeal. On appeal,
defendants claim that the trial court erred in not
granting summary judgment in their favor and erred in
finding that the claims had not been released after the
bench trial. Additionally, defendants claim that the trial
court erred in denying their joint motion to compel
discovery of certain Motorola documents. Affirmed.
No. 2015 IL App (1st) 131873
v. Brown Filed 5-29-15
Following a bench trial, the defendant, Stanley Brown,
was convicted of attempted first-degree murder (720 ILCS
5/8-4(a) (West 2010); 720 ILCS 5/9-1 (West 2010)) and
sentenced to 17 years' imprisonment. On appeal from that
conviction, the defendant argues that the State failed
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he had the
specific intent to kill. We reverse the defendant's
conviction and sentence for attempted first-degree
murder, affirm his conviction on all other charges, and
remand this cause back to the circuit court
for resentencing.
No. 2015 IL App (1st)
141321 Silverberg
v. Haji Filed 5-29-15 (RJC)
Plaintiff, Joe Silverberg, filed suit against defendant,
Mohamed J. Haji, for damages arising from a July 6, 2008,
car accident. Plaintiff filed his complaint against
defendant on July 6, 2010, and, after various attempts to
locate and serve defendant spanning a 41-month period,
service was ultimately accomplished on December 11, 2013.
Defendant then filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 103(b) (eff. July 1, 2007),
claiming that plaintiff had failed to exercise reasonable
diligence in obtaining service over him. The trial court
granted that motion, dismissing the complaint as to
defendant with prejudice. Plaintiff now appeals, arguing
first, that the court erred as a matter of law by
considering improper factors and by failing to consider
the totality of the circumstances in rendering judgment;
and second, that the court abused its discretion when it
granted defendant's motion. We reverse the trial court's
judgment and remand for further proceedings.
No. 2015 IL App (3d) 140263
re Marriage of Roberts
Filed 5-29-15 (RJC)
After 37 years of marriage, petitioner, a teacher, filed a petition for dissolution of marriage against respondent, a disabled pharmacist. The trial court divided the property of the parties, and awarded each party a one-half interest in petitioner's pension from the Teachers'Retirement System (TRS). Petitioner appeals, arguing that the trial court should have awarded her pension solely to her, or, alternatively, should have granted her maintenance in an amount equal to the payments respondent would receive from her pension. We reverse and remand, finding that the trial court erred in awarding half of petitioner's TRS pension to respondent.
No. 2015 IL App (2d) 140822 Segobiano-Morris
v. Grayslake Community Consolidated School District No. 46
Filed 5-28-15 (JMC)
Segobiano-Morris was employed as a teacher by in Grayslake. In 2013, she received an "unsatisfactory" rating on her performance evaluation and, due to a reduction in force (RIF), the District dismissed her. She then brought a complaint for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, alleging that her dismissal violated the teacher employment provisions of the School Code and seeking her reinstatement. The District moved to dismiss, arguing that plaintiff was honorably dismissed at the end of the school term and not recalled, in accordance with section 24-12(b) of the School Code. The trial court dismissed the action. On appeal, plaintiff argued that the District failed to honorably dismiss her and, further, that she should have been recalled. She also asserted that the trial court's interpretation of section 24-12(b) cannot be reconciled with the School Code as a whole.
No. 2015 IL App (1st) 131308 People v.
Deleon Filed 5-28-15 (JMC)
Deleon was convicted of unlawful sale or delivery of a firearm (prohibiting delivery of "any firearm of a size which may be concealed upon the person, incidental to a sale, without withholding delivery of such firearm for at least 72 hours after application for its purchase has been made"). The State's evidence showed that defendant had acted as the straw purchaser of a .40-caliber handgun for his friend at a store in Indiana. Defendant, at his friend's request, picked out the gun and paid for it with his friend's money. Four days later, defendant and his friend returned to Indiana, defendant picked up the gun, and defendant gave it to his friend after they returned to Illinois. Defendant raised two issues on appeal: (1) he claimed that the State lacked jurisdiction to prosecute him because he purchased the firearm in Indiana and delivered it to his friend in Indiana; and (2) he claimed that the State failed to prove that he did not let the necessary 72-hour waiting period elapse before he delivered the gun to his friend.
No. 2015 IL App (2d) 140530 In re Marriage of Miller Filed 5-28-15 (JMC)
Jeffrey petitioned the
trial court pursuant to section 510(c) of the Illinois
Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act for the
termination of maintenance payments to petitioner, Lorena.
The trial court granted the petition, finding petitioner
was cohabiting with Michael Meyers on a resident,
continuing, and conjugal basis. In reaching this
determination, the court considered Facebook pictures and
posts written by Lorena and Michael, but it did not
consider posts written by third parties. The court stated
that the posts were relevant to its consideration of how
Lorena and Michael presented their relationship to others.
The court also allowed Jeffrey to submit several financial
documents over Lorena's hearsay objection. The court did
not reach the question of modification of maintenance,
which each party had raised as an alternative. Lorena
appeals. Held:
(1) it was not improper for the court to consider the
Facebook posts; (2) Lorena's argument concerning the
financial documents was rejected; but (3) the trial
court's overall finding that Lorena cohabited with Michael
so as to have a de facto marriage, as opposed to
an intimate dating relationship, was against the manifest
weight of the evidence.
No. 2015 IL App (1st) 122451 People v.
Gipson Filed 5-27-15 (JMC)
Gipson was tried and
sentenced as an adult for offenses he committed as a
juvenile. After defendant was automatically transferred from
juvenile court to adult court, the court found him unfit to
stand trial but later determined he had been restored to
fitness. The
trial court found defendant guilty of the attempted
first-degree murder of Clifton Smith and Anthony Milton,
aggravated battery with a firearm and aggravated discharge
of a firearm. The court also found that he personally
discharged a firearm. Acknowledging its limited sentencing
discretion, the trial court imposed the minimum sentence for
two counts of attempted murder, a cumulative sentence of 52
years in prison. On appeal, defendant challenged the fitness
restoration proceedings, the imposition of two firearm
enhancements and the constitutionality of the statutory
transfer and sentencing scheme.
No. 2015 IL App (1st) 120807 People
v. Torres Filed 5-27-15 (JMC)
Torres was charged with attempted murder, four counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault, and aggravated kidnapping. He was acquitted of attempted murder but convicted on a charge of of aggravated battery as a lesser-included offense as well as the other charges. The trial court merged the four counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault and sentenced Torres to concurrent terms of 21 years for aggravated criminal sexual assault and 6 years for aggravated kidnapping, with a consecutive 6-year term for aggravated battery. Torres argued three grounds for reversing his convictions and remanding for a new trial: (1) the trial court improperly allowed testimony regarding two prior acts of domestic violence; (2) the State inadequately summarized a prior act of domestic violence; and (3) the trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury as to the State's burden of proving lack of consent beyond a reasonable doubt.
No. 2015 IL App (3d) 140981 In re
S.W. Filed 5-26-15 (JMC)
After finding minors Sh.W. and Sp.W. neglected, the court conducted an unfitness hearing and a best interests hearing. In the course of proceedings, the respondent fired four court-appointed attorneys. On the day of the hearing, the respondent requested a 90-day continuance to hire private counsel. The court conducted the hearing and found respondent to be unfit. The court scheduled the best interests hearing for one month later. One week prior to the best interests hearing, respondent, again, requested a continuance, which the court denied. Respondent's parental rights were terminated. Issues: whether the court erred in (1) denying the requests for continuances; and (2) denied her right to due process.
No. 2015 IL App (4th) 140971 People v.
Grant Filed 5-26-15 (JMC)
Grant pled guilty
to possession of cocaine, with an agreed-upon sentence of 2
years with credit for 384 days served. In a post-conviction
petition, Grant alleged he did not receive the benefit of
the bargain because he received a different, more onerous
sentence than the one to which he agreed. On October 20, 2014,
the trial court summarily dismissed the petition as
frivolous and patently without merit. On appeal, grant
argued the trial court erred in dismissing his
post-conviction petition
No. 2015 IL App (1st) 141272 In re Marriage of Benson Filed 5-26-15 (JMC)
Nancy petitioned to enforce the terms of a 1999 judgment of dissolution required David to pay a portion of his disability benefits to her. The court found David's disability benefits
were in the nature of a
disability pension and, as a result, Nancy was entitled to a
fractional interest in those benefits. David appealed,
arguing, inter alia, the trial court erred in ruling
Nancy was entitled to a portion of his disability benefits
where the original dissolution judgment only awarded Nancy a
portion of his retirement benefits. We affirm.
No. 2015 IL App (1st)
130267 Grey
v. Hasbrouck Filed 5-22-15 (RJC)
The defendant, La Marr, Hasbrouck, M.D., State Registrar
of Vital Records, appeals an order of the circuit court of
Cook County awarding attorney fees and costs to the
plaintiffs, Lauren Gray, Victor Williams and Nicholas
Guarino, in conjunction with the entry of a consent decree.
No. 2015 IL App (1st) 132182 Majid
v. The Retirement Board of the Policemen's Annuity and
Benefit Fund of the City of Chicago
Filed 5-22-15 (RJC)
The plaintiff, Nail Majid, appeals from an order of the
circuit court of Cook County affirming the decision of the
defendant, the Retirement Board of the Policemen's Annuity
and Benefit Fund of the City of Chicago (the Board),
terminating the plaintiff's disability benefit. On appeal,
the plaintiff contends that: (1) the Board erred when it
failed to consider whether the plaintiff's felony
conviction arose out of or in connection with his service
as a police officer; (2) the hearing in which his
disability benefit was terminated violated his right to
procedural due process under the fourteenth amendment to
the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. XIV),
and article I, section 2, of the 1970 Illinois
Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 2); and (3)
section 5-227 of the Illinois Pension Code (the Code) (40
ILCS 5/5—227 (West 2010)) violated his right to equal
protection under the fourteenth amendment to the United
States Constitution and article I, section 2, of the 1970
Illinois Constitution.
No. 2015 IL App (1st) 141272
Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Sanders Filed
Defendant Phillip Sanders appeals from the circuit court
of Cook County's order dismissing his petition brought
pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure
(Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2012)). On appeal,
defendant contends that: (1) his petition was not ripe for
adjudication under People v. Laugharn, 233 Ill. 2d 318
(2009); (2) the court lacked personal jurisdiction to
enter the judgment of foreclosure; and (3) the circuit
court erred in dismissing his petition on the merits.
No. 2015 IL App (1st)
150508 Zurek
v. Petersen Filed 5-22-15 (RJC)
Petitioner Ken Zurek and Vicki Vanderhei and Chris Litwin filed nomination papers with the Village of Franklin Park, Cook County, Illinois, in order to appear as candidates for the office of village trustee on ballots printed for the consolidated election occurring on April 7, 2015. Respondent Randall K. Petersen filed an objector's petition contending that none of the voter petition sheets filed in support of the three candidates met the requirement in section 10-4 of the Election Code that each sheet include a sworn statement from the circulator of the petition specifying the date or dates on which the sheet was circulated. 10 ILCS 5/10-4 (West 2012). The candidates then tried to persuade the Franklin Park Municipal Officers Electoral Board (electoral board or board) that it was sufficient for each circulator to have sworn "that all of the signatures on this sheet were signed within the statutory time period for petition circulation." The electoral board rejected this argument and ruled unanimously that the nomination papers were invalid. The candidates sought review in the circuit court of Cook County, which affirmed the board, and then candidate Zurek sought further review by this court.
No. 2015 IL App (1st)
123496 People
v. Wright Filed 5-21-15 (RJC)
Defendant Eugene Wright was convicted of four counts of
armed robbery while armed with a firearm pursuant to section
18-2(a)(2) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (the Code) (720 ILCS
5/18-2(a)(2) (West 2010)), and sentenced to 50 years in
prison. On appeal, defendant asserts: (1) his due process
rights were violated when the State secured his indictment
for armed robbery with misleading testimony; (2) the trial
court failed to properly admonish him pursuant to Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 401(a) (eff. July 1, 1984); (3) the trial
court improperly excluded codefendant's statement that
codefendant committed the crime with a BB gun; (4) the State
failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of
armed robbery while armed with a firearm; and (5) the trial
court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the
definition of a firearm. Reversed and remanded.
No. 2015 IL App (1st) 141952 Heredia
v. O'Brien Filed 5-21-15 (RJC)
This is an appeal from the circuit court's order
dismissing a medical malpractice action filed by the
plaintiff, Gabriella Heredia, against the defendants, two
hematologists, Dr. Virginia Caroll O'Brien (hereinafter
Dr. O'Brien) and Dr. Hande Tuncer (hereinafter Dr.
Tuncer), and their employer, Rush University Medical
Center (hereinafter Rush), arising from the plaintiff's
hospitalization and treatment at Rush in the spring of
2009. The cause of action was dismissed on the basis that
it was not commenced within the two-year statutory
limitations period set forth in section 13-212(a) of the
Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS
5/13-212(a) (West 2010)). On appeal, the plaintiff argues
that the trial court erred in dismissing her action as
untimely because her complaint was filed within two years
of the date on which she first learned or should have
learned through the exercise of reasonable diligence that
her injuries were sustained as a result of the negligence
of the hematologists involved in her treatment.
No. 2015 IL App (2d) 140847
re Marriage of Edelman Filed 5-21-15
In 2010, the circuit court of Lake County entered an agreed order enrolling a foreign judgment—the Connecticut judgment for dissolution of marriage between the petitioner, Melissa Edelman, and the respondent, John Preston—in Lake County, pursuant to Illinois's version of the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (Family Support Act) (750 ILCS 22/101 et seq. (West 2012)). In 2013, Melissa filed petitions under Illinois law for contribution to college expenses, to increase child support, and to establish adult child support. The trial court dismissed the petitions on the basis that, under the federal Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act (Full Faith and Credit Act) (28 U.S.C. § 1738B (2006)), Connecticut law governed any proceedings related to the judgment, and the petitions sought relief that was not available under Connecticut law. Melissa appealed, arguing that the Full Faith and Credit Act did not bar her from seeking relief under Illinois law. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
No. 2015 IL 113135 People
v. Allen Filed 5-21-15 (RJC)
A Cook County jury convicted this defendant of the March, 1999 aggravated criminal sexual assault of a woman which took place on the south side of Chicago. More than three years after the crime, he was arrested and charged, and his trial began in 2006. He received a life sentence, and the appellate court affirmed. A sexual assault kit had been prepared at the time of the offense, but the victim was a reluctant witness and investigators did not succeed in contacting her again until May of 2002. Meanwhile, in connection with the investigation of an unrelated homicide, police had obtained the defendant's blood sample. He was later eliminated as a suspect in that other matter, but his blood sample was in the system. In July of 2002, Barner was arrested and charged. The victim identified the defendant from a photo array, a lineup, and at trial.
In subsequent proceedings on appeal, the defendant claimed
that his constitutional fifth amendment right to confront
witnesses had been violated when the prosecution was allowed
to present the testimony of three state experts concerning
the DNA laboratory work and conclusions of nontestifying
scientists, who were not subject to cross-examination by
him. The defendant claimed that this entitled him to a new
trial. In this decision, the Illinois Supreme Court
No. 2015 IL
116223 People
v. Gaytan Filed 5-21-15
In this McLean County case, the Illinois Supreme Court upheld a conviction for unlawful possession of cannabis with intent to deliver imposed on a defendant who was a passenger in a vehicle which was stopped because of what police claimed was an obstructed license plate. He was sentenced to 120 days in jail and 30 months of probation. In September of 2010, two Chenoa policemen in a patrol car on Interstate 55 observed a car whose license plate numbers, one of them testified, could not be completely read because of a ball-type trailer hitch on the back of the vehicle. An officer testified that they were unable to run the license plate number so as to identify the owner but that, after the vehicle was stopped, he walked around to the back of it, and, from that vantage point, the numbers could be fully read. However, in conjunction with the stop, the driver rolled down a window and the odor of cannabis was detected. A search of the car revealed cannabis, which this defendant indicated was his, and he was arrested. A grand jury later indicted him and, after his unsuccessful motion to suppress, he was convicted in a stipulated bench trial. The appellate court reversed, and the State appealed. The defendant had challenged the denial of his motion to suppress by claiming that the police had no "reasonable, articulable suspicion that a crime was being committed" when they initiated the traffic stop, and he submitted a photograph which was taken from a point directly behind the vehicle, from which angle the numbers could be read. (A copy of that photograph is attached to this opinion.) However, neither this nor a grainy squad car video had impressed the trial judge to rule other than he did here. The appellate court held that the trial court had erred in denying the motion to suppress and, on that basis, reversed the conviction. At the time of the events in question, the Vehicle Code stated that every "registration plate shall at all times be *** in a place and position to be clearly visible and shall be maintained in a condition to be clearly legible, free from any materials that would obstruct the visibility of the plate, including, but not limited to, glass covers and plastic covers." The defendant relied on the specific examples cited in the last part of this language, claiming that what was forbidden could include only items attached to the license plate itself. This was the view taken by the appellate court. The State, however, took the contrary position that obstructing items could be attached to a vehicle itself, such as the trailer hitch at issue here, and that any obstruction, however minor, is prohibited.
No. 2015 IL 116226
v. Vanderventer Filed 5-21-15
This class action challenges the constitutionality of a
section of the Counties Code which calls for the state's
Rental Housing Support Program to be funded by a surcharge
collected by county recorders of deeds when they record real
estate-related documents. The legislature has stated its
purposes for the Rental Housing Support Program. Recognizing
the problems created by a lack of affordable housing, the
program subsidizes a portion of the rent that many tenants
have to pay. It was the intent of this statute to help
provide affordable housing to low-income families throughout
Illinois. The Illinois Constitution of 1970 prohibits
"fee offices." The article on Local Government states as
follows: "Compensation of officers and employees of units of
local government shall not be paid from fees collected. Fees
may be collected as provided by law and by ordinance and
shall be deposited upon receipt with the treasurer of the
unit." This provision has been held to prevent a local
governmental unit from retaining or "skimming off" a portion
of taxes collected for another taxing body as a fee for the
service of collecting those taxes. The circuit court held
the Counties Code section question to be invalid under this
constitutional provision. It also ruled that the due process
and uniformity clauses of the Illinois Constitution had been
violated. Because of these holdings of statutory
unconstitutionality, a direct appeal lay to the Illinois
Supreme Court. A class of defendants has been certified
consisting of the recorders of deeds in each of the counties
in the state. The circuit court's judgments were
No. 2015 IL
116799 People
v. LeFlore Filed 5-21-15
A Kane County jury convicted this defendant of the April
2009 hold-up of a gas station in Aurora, and the circuit
court imposed a 20-year prison term for aggravated robbery.
He had not been represented by an attorney at trial.
The appellate court reversed his conviction and remanded for
a new trial based on the circuit court's failure to properly
admonish him, as required by the Rules of the Illinois
Supreme Court, concerning his waiver of counsel. The State
now concedes that the defendant must be tried again because
of this defect. The instant appeal concerns the circuit
court's denial of his pretrial motion to suppress
evidence. The defendant's pretrial motion had
complained of the use by police of a GPS device which they
had secretly installed on the vehicle that he drove and
which was used to track his route when he drove it to the
scene of the crime. The trial court was of the view that no
search had occurred, but, while LeFlore's appeal was pending
in the appellate court, the Supreme Court of the United
States held in 2012, in United States v. Jones, that
government installation of a GPS device on a vehicle, and
its use of that device to monitor the vehicle's movements,
constituted a search under the fourth amendment. The State
would later theorize in this appeal that application of the
exclusionary rule was precluded here because, in 2009,
police had reasonably relied in good faith on existing legal
precedent which did not go as far as Jones. That
theory was agreed with by the Illinois Supreme Court in this
opinion. Police had received an anonymous tip that
LeFlore was committing burglaries and bringing the fruits
thereof back to the apartment complex where he lived with
his girlfriend, who was the registered owner of a red Kia.
He had recently been arrested for fleeing police in that
car, on which the GPS device was later secretly placed. He
was on mandatory supervised release from prison at the time.
Shortly after the offense, a parole search was conducted at
the defendant's residence, during the course of which he
arrived in the red Kia. He was taken into custody for
driving on a revoked license and confessed to the robbery.
The store cashier later picked him out of a photo lineup.
The defendant would later claim that all the evidence
against him should be suppressed because the GPS placement,
done without a warrant, was illegal. The appellate court
accepted this argument, ordering a new suppression hearing
as well as a new trial.
No. 2015 IL
117341 In
re D.L.H. Filed 5-21-15
In 2012, in Cahokia, a 14-month-old infant died of head
injuries after being left in the company of other children,
including this juvenile respondent, who was nine years old
at the time. All of the other children were three years old
or younger, except for one who was 11. After the death, the
State filed a petition against the respondent for
adjudication of wardship in the circuit court of St. Clair
County. First degree murder was alleged, but the court found
the respondent unfit to stand trial based on expert
testimony as to his limited intellectual abilities for his
age. Ultimately, the State sought and was granted a
"discharge" hearing, a nonjury proceeding which allows one
who is unfit for trial to, nevertheless, be acquitted if
there is not sufficient evidence to find him guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. Should this not be the case, however, and
there is sufficient evidence of guilt, the unfit individual
is not found guilty, but is determined to be "not not
guilty" and remanded for further treatment. This would
contemplate, upon fitness restoration, a trial for
murder. Before the discharge hearing, counsel for the
juvenile moved to suppress statements he had made to a
police detective in two interviews in the kitchen of his
home with his father present. Video recordings had been made
of the statements, they were played for the court, and the
police detective testified and was cross-examined. Those
statements were challenged as involuntary, but the
prehearing suppression motion was denied. That denial is
disputed here. The discharge hearing did not result in an
acquittal, but in a finding of "not not guilty," with a
maximum treatment period specified as five years. The
juvenile respondent appealed. The appellate court did not
reach all the issues presented, but did reverse and remand,
stating that the circuit court's finding that the statements
were voluntary was against the manifest weight of the
evidence. It did not reach questions of harmless error or
the sufficiency of the evidence to support the "not not
guilty" finding. The State appealed.
No. 2015 IL
117695 People
v. Kuehner Filed 5-21-15
In 2005, this 17-year-old defendant entered an open guilty
plea to attempted first degree murder and home invasion. His
2007 motion to withdraw his plea as not knowing and
voluntary because of counsel's allegedly deficient advice
and representation was denied. The circuit court of Sangamon
County imposed two consecutive terms of 17½ years in prison,
and the appellate court affirmed. In 2009, Kuehner acted pro
se and filed a postconviction petition, claiming that
he had been denied effective assistance of counsel both in
the trial court and in his direct appeal (in which, he
alleged, his counsel had failed to challenge his trial
attorney's effectiveness). At the first stage of the
postconviction proceeding, the circuit court found that the
petition was neither frivolous nor patently without merit
and it docketed the matter for second stage proceedings. As
provided for by statute, counsel was appointed to represent
Kuehner at this second stage. Almost three years later, in
2012, appointed counsel filed a motion to withdraw and a
brief in support of that motion. The court allowed the
motion to withdraw and also a motion to dismiss filed by the
State. Petitioner sought appellate review, but the appellate
court affirmed. Postconviction petitioner had several
issues, some of which were dealt with in the brief submitted
by the attorney in seeking to withdraw. However, other
issues were not reached. Family members of the then-17 year
old accused (his mother and his aunt) were alleged to have
been lied to so as to manipulate them to put pressure on the
accused to plead guilty. In connection with that plea, trial
counsel was also claimed in the postconviction petition to
have lied in connection with the potential sentence.
Postconviction counsel, in seeking to withdraw, did not
address, analyze, or even mention any of those claims,
asserting, with neither explanation nor support, that the
petitioner's postconviction issues were "without merit and
unsupportable as a matter of law" and that "no errors
committed by *** counsel ***rose to the level of
ineffectiveness." The trial court granted counsel's motion
to withdraw and the State's motion to dismiss.
No. 2015 IL
117783 Warren
County Soil and Water Conservation District v. Walters
Filed 5-21-15 (RJC)
This dispute arises from the logging of timberland in
Warren County. The plaintiff is the Warren County Soil and
Water Conservation District. Among the defendants are Steve
Walters, an Iowa timber buyer and Robert O'Dell, an Iowa
logger. The latter hauled a load of trees from Warren County
property owned by a woman who resides in the State of
Washington and who contracted with Walters for the logging.
The Conservation District later came to believe that it
owned the property and filed a suit in 2009 seeking damages.
An Illinois attorney for Walters and O'Dell filed a written
appearance, but essentially performed no substantive work,
and a default judgment for $68,920 was entered against the
defendants in June of 2011. In 2012, the circuit court
entered an order removing this attorney from the case.
Meanwhile, because all notices had been sent to this
attorney's address, the defendants did not learn of his
neglect until the circuit court notified them of the default
and the attorney's removal.
Statute permits a final judgment to be vacated within two
years of entry if certain procedures are followed and
certain criteria are met. This is a modern codification of
relief which was once granted in equity. The defendants
filed a petition for such relief, expressing the equitable
merits of their case, but the circuit and appellate courts
ruled that a 2007 decision of the Illinois Supreme Court
eliminated a circuit court's discretion to consider equity
in this type of petition. The supreme court held in this
decision that such was not the case.
No. 2015 IL
117962 Turcios
v. The DeBruler Company Filed 5-21-15
The defendant in this
Lake County wrongful death suit is DeBruler Company, the
agent for a Park City development known as Colonial Park
Apartments. The plaintiff is Maria Turcios, the special
administrator of the estate of her late husband Nelsyn
Caceras, who died June 15, 2011. The complaint alleged that
the Spanish-speaking couple had entered into a written
apartment lease (in Spanish) with the defendant for May 1,
2011, to April 30, 2012. The family, with two children,
moved in on May 1. Just 10 days into the lease, a purported
30-day eviction notice was received, with advice that
"construction begins June 10." Subsequent letters offered
free rent from June 1 to June 9, and transfer to another
unit with free rent for the month of June. $2000 was offered
to make the move. Demolition began in early June, with
surrounding parts of the building being torn out while the
family was still in their apartment. Nelsyn was found dead
in the apartment on June 15, with a suicide note. Plaintiff
filed suit in the circuit court of Lake County, seeking
damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress,
wrongful eviction, breach of contract, and wrongful death. A
claim under the survival statute was also alleged. Only the
latter two claims are at issue here. The wrongful death
claim was predicated on suicide, allegedly brought about by
the defendant's infliction of emotional distress. The
circuit court dismissed the wrongful death and survival
claims with prejudice, finding that "wrongful death via
suicide" is not cognizable in Illinois. The defense was not
successful on its motion to dismiss the claims for
intentional infliction of emotional distress, wrongful
eviction, and breach of contract. The appellate court
vacated the dismissal and remanded for the circuit court to
reconsider whether the emotional distress was a substantial
factor in causing the suicide.
No. 2015 IL
118143 McVey
v. M.L.K. Enterprises, LLC Filed 5-21-15
Health care liens are regulated by statute. In this Jackson
County case, the supreme court held that, where an injury
victim who had settled her circuit court claim filed a
petition to adjudicate liens and the only health care lien
at issue was that of the treating hospital, the Health Care
Services Lien Act did not permit the deduction of attorney
fees and costs of litigation prior to calculating the amount
to be paid to the health care lienholder. In 2010, plaintiff
Alma McVey sustained a foot injury at a restaurant owned by
defendant M.L.K. Enterprises. After she filed suit, the
matter was settled for $7,500. In the subsequent proceedings
on her lien-adjudication petition, it was stipulated that
Memorial Hospital of Carbondale's lien was $2,891.61. There
also were attorney fees, and plaintiff would later assert
that she had also incurred $846.66 in litigation costs. The
trial court refused to deduct attorney fees and costs prior
to calculating the amount available to the hospital. That
result was affirmed here. The appellate court had reached a
different result, following one of its own prior decisions
which held that the computation of the amount available to
health care providers should not begin until costs
associated with bringing the case to trial and securing
payment of the judgment had been deducted from the original
award. The appellate court was reversed and the
circuit court was affirmed.
No. 2015 IL
118255 People
v. Richardson Filed 5-21-15
The sole issue on appeal
is whether the saving clause in the exclusive jurisdiction
provision of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court
Act) (705 ILCS 405/5-120 (West 2012)) violates the equal
protection rights of defendant Jermaine Richardson. The
circuit court of Du Page County found the clause violated
defendant's equal protection rights and declared it
unconstitutional as applied to him. Pursuant to Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 603 (eff. Feb. 6, 2013), the State's
appeal comes directly to this court. We reverse the judgment
of the circuit court and remand the cause for further
No. 2015 IL App (1st) 142439 Mular
v. Ingram Filed 5-20-15 (RJC)
Plaintiff-appellant Geraldine Mular appeals the
dismissal of her personal injury complaint against
defendant-appellee Dawn Ingram arising out of injuries Mular
sustained while she was a guest at Ingram's home. The trial
court dismissed the complaint based on its finding that Mular
failed to exercise reasonable diligence in effecting service
on Ingram after the complaint was filed. Because the statute
of limitations applicable to Mular's personal injury claim had
expired, the complaint was dismissed with prejudice. The trial
court further denied Mular leave to amend her complaint to
assert a claim for construction negligence to which a longer
statute of limitations applies. Finding no abuse of discretion
in either ruling, we affirm.
No. 2015 IL App (5th)
130354 People
v. Braddy Filed 5-20-15 (RJC)
The defendant seeks a new trial on the basis that the trial court improperly granted the State's motion allowing evidence of uncharged sexual assaults allegedly committed by the defendant on his sister 20 years prior to the crimes alleged in this case. He alleges that the State's notice of its intent to introduce this evidence was inadequate because it did not comply with the relevant statute. Alternatively, he argues that the evidence unduly prejudiced him and should not have been allowed because it was too remote in time and too dissimilar from the charged offenses. We affirm.
No. 2015 IL App (1st)
Council 31 v. The State of Illinois Filed 5-19-15
This case deals with a statute aimed at
increasing efficiency in the state government by reducing
collective bargaining unit membership among management-level
state employees. Under the authority of that statute, the
Governor filed petitions identifying the positions occupied by
the individual objectors in these cases (individuals) for
exclusion from their collective bargaining units. The
Governor's designations were approved by the Illinois Labor
Relations Board, thereby excluding the individuals from their
collective bargaining units. AFSCME, on behalf of the
designated employees, filed this appeal arguing that the
statute is unconstitutional. We affirm the decisions of the
Illinois Labor Relations Board.
No. 2015 IL App (2d)
140441 West
Bend Mutual Insurance Company v. DJW-Ridgeway Building
Consultants, Inc. Filed 5-19-15 (RJC)
Plaintiff, West Bend Mutual Insurance Company
(West Bend), appeals the grant of summary judgment in favor of
defendant, DJW-Ridgeway Building Consultants, Inc. (Ridgeway),
on West Bend's complaint for a declaratory judgment that it
does not owe Ridgeway a duty to undertake its defense in a
construction negligence suit.
No. 2015 IL App (3d)
120892 People
v. Valdez Filed 5-19-15 (RJC)
Defendant, Josue Valdez, was a noncitizen who pled guilty to burglary predicated upon theft (720 ILCS 5/19-1(a) (West 2012)). He filed a timely motion to withdraw his guilty plea, claiming his counsel provided him ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to advise him that he would be deported as a result of his plea, in violation of the holding in Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010). The trial court denied the motion, finding that counsel's advice was deficient but that defendant was not prejudiced because the court admonished defendant that his plea may have adverse immigration consequences. Defendant appeals. We vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings.
No. 2015 IL App (1st) 132551 Bank
of America v. WS Management, Inc. Filed
Plaintiff, Bank of America, appeals from orders of the circuit court that declined to find that spouses William Spatz (William) and Wendy Spatz (Wendy) were alter egos of Spatz Centers, Inc. (SCI), and WS Management, Inc. (WSM). Defendants, William, Wendy, SCI, WSM, and Anderson Associates, L.P. (Anderson), cross-appeal, contending: (1) the trial court should have found that certain facts and issues were precluded by collateral estoppel; (2) the trial court erred in finding that defendants violated the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (Fraudulent Transfer Act) (740 ILCS 160/1 et seq. (West 2006)); and (3) the trial court improperly awarded attorney fees to plaintiff. We affirm the court's judgment on the collateral estoppel, Fraudulent Transfer Act, and alter ego claims, and vacate and remand on the issue of plaintiff's attorney fees.
No. 2015 IL App (1st)
140679 Fennerty
v. City of Chicago Filed 5-18-15 (RJC)
Plaintiff, Janet Y. Fennerty, appeals the order
of the circuit court granting summary judgment in favor of
defendant, City of Chicago, on plaintiff's personal injury
complaint. On appeal, plaintiff contends the trial court erred
in granting summary judgment where (1) the property on which
she sustained her injury is not "recreational property" within
the meaning of section 3-106 of the Local Governmental and
Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Tort Immunity Act)
(745 ILCS 10/3-106 (West 2010)); and (2) her allegations raise
a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the city
engaged in willful and wanton misconduct. Reversed and
remanded for further proceedings.
No. 2015 IL App (1st)
141457 Baker
v. The Forest of Preserve District of Cook County
Filed 5-18-15 (RJC)
This appeal, filed by taxpayers of Cook County,
concerns the statutory authority of the Forest Preserve
District of Cook County (FPD) to acquire property in
foreclosure by purchasing the mortgage note and subsequently
bidding on the property at the foreclosure sale.
No. 2015 IL App (2d)
140139 People
v. Lutter Filed 5-18-15 (RJC)
Following a bench trial, defendant, Scott
Lutter, was found guilty of reckless driving (625 ILCS
5/11-503(a)(1) (West 2012)). He appeals, contending that the
information charging him with this offense was filed outside
the statute of limitations and that the State failed to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that an exception to the statute of
limitations applied. We reverse.
No. 2015 IL App (3d)
120376 People
v. Brzowski Filed 5-18-15 (RJC)
Defendant Walter Brzowski was charged with two counts of unlawful violations of an order of protection for sending mail to his two sons. Three months later, he was charged with an additional two counts of unlawful violations of an order of protection for sending mail to his exwife.
Two separate trials were held. Defendant represented
himself at both trials. Defendant was convicted of all four
charges. He was sentenced to one year in prison on the first
two charges of unlawful violations of an order of protection
and two concurrent three-year terms of imprisonment on
the latter two charges. Defendant appeals, arguing that (1)
he was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, (2) he
was not adequately informed of the contents of the order of
protection, (3) the order of protection was invalid, (4) he
was not properly instructed regarding his waiver of counsel,
(5) he was improperly denied his right to counsel, and (6)
the court allowed improper arguments and inadmissible
evidence at his trials. We reverse and remand.
No. 2015 IL App (4th)
140696 People
v. Harris Filed 5-18-15 (RJC)
Following an April 2014 stipulated bench trial, defendant, Jackie V. Harris, was convicted of one count of aggravated driving under the influence (DUI) of alcohol and one count of aggravated driving with a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of greater than 0.08 in violation of statute. The trial court sentenced defendant to 13 years' imprisonment. Defendant appeals, arguing (1) the trial court erred in finding defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) the court erred in refusing to suppress evidence illegally seized; and (3) the court abused its discretion in sentencing defendant to 13 years' imprisonment. Affirmed.
No. 2015 IL App (2d)
140908 Stearns
v. Ridge Ambulance Service, Inc. Filed
Plaintiff, Scott Stearns, as executor of the estate of Marjorie Stearns, deceased (Marjorie), filed a multi-count complaint under the Wrongful Death Act against Ridge Ambulance Service, Inc. (Ridge), Jerry Brooks, and Countryside Care Centre, Inc. (Countryside). Marjorie, who resided in a nursing home operated by Countryside, died as a result of injuries sustained while Ridge transported her back to the nursing home following treatment at an offsite dialysis center. Brooks, who was an employee of Ridge, was driving the medical transport vehicle (medi-van) in which Marjorie's injuries occurred. Countryside's successful motion for summary judgment on the claims against it gives rise to this appeal under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (eff. Feb. 26, 2010). We reverse and remand.
No. 2015 IL App (3d) 130379 Republic
Bank of Chicago v. Village of Manhattan
Filed 5-15-15 (RJC)
Plaintiff Republic Bank of Chicago filed two separate complaints against multiple defendants to foreclose on roads and outlots contained in two failed subdivisions located in the Village of Manhattan (Village). The Village filed motions to dismiss the complaints, arguing that the roads and common areas had been dedicated to the Village. The trial court granted the Village's motions to dismiss. On appeal, Republic Bank argues that (1) the roads and common areas were not properly dedicated to the Village, and (2) even if they were properly dedicated, Republic Bank is still entitled to foreclose on them. We affirm.
No. 2015 IL App (1st) 132345 In
re Marriage of Robinson Filed 5-14-15 (RJC)
In this appeal, we are called upon to address the applicability of the Federal Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act (FUSFSPA) (10 U.S.C. § 1408 (2006)) to the modification of an out-of-state divorce judgment dividing a former military member's pension. Petitioner Maleta Robinson (Maleta) and respondent DeAngelo M. Willis (DeAngelo), a former member of the United States Marine Corps, divorced in Michigan in 2009. As part of the consent judgment entered by the Michigan court, Maleta received 25% of DeAngelo's military pension. Maleta then moved to Illinois and sought to register the Michigan judgment in Cook County. After DeAngelo did not appear in Cook County, the circuit court registered the Michigan order and entered an order dividing DeAngelo's military retirement pay. DeAngelo filed a motion to vacate that order, alleging that the Illinois circuit court lacked personal jurisdiction over him. The circuit court denied DeAngelo's motion and entered another order dividing DeAngelo's pension. DeAngelo appeals, asserting that the Illinois circuit court lacked personal jurisdiction to divide his pension under FUSFSPA, which empowers state courts to divide military retirement pay in divorce proceedings. We vacate the trial court's order dividing DeAngelo's military pension and remand for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether DeAngelo was a resident or domiciliary of Illinois under FUSFSPA.
No. 2015 IL App (2d) 141201 Makindu
v. Illinois High School Association Filed
The instant controversy arose after the defendant, the Illinois High School Association (IHSA), amended one of its bylaws, which had the effect of preventing the plaintiff, Rodrigue Ceda Makindu, from participating on his high school's basketball team. The plaintiff filed a complaint and sought a preliminary injunction in the circuit court of Kane County, asserting that the IHSA's amended bylaw violated his right to equal protection. The trial court granted the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction, and the IHSA appeals from that order. Affirmed.
No. 2015 IL App (4th) 140176 People
v. Pettis Filed 5-14-15 (RJC)
The instant controversy arose after the defendant, the Illinois High School Association (IHSA), amended one of its bylaws, which had the effect of preventing the plaintiff, Rodrigue Ceda Makindu, from participating on his high school's basketball team. The plaintiff filed a complaint and sought a preliminary injunction in the circuit court of Kane County, asserting that the IHSA's amended bylaw violated his right to equal protection. The trial court granted the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction, and the IHSA appeals from that order. Affirmed.
No. 2015 IL App (1st) 133693 In
re Application of the County Treasurer Filed
The circuit court of Cook County granted Community Partners, LLC, a tax deed to property owned and occupied by Jose and Minerva Negron. (FNA Cardinal 09, LLC, had obtained a certificate of purchase and assigned it to Community Partners.) Despite FNA's attempts at service, the Negrons never received notice of the tax deed proceeding, and they, along with TCF National Bank, which held a mortgage on the property and was served with notice, filed a petition to vacate the order under section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The petition alleged the tax deed was procured through fraud under section 22-45 of the Property Tax Code, constituted a taking in violation of their constitutional rights to due process under article IX, section 8 of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IX, § 8), and was an illegal eviction under the forcible entry and detainer provisions of the Code. We affirm. The trial court did not err in dismissing the section 2-1401 petition, because no grounds existed for a fraud finding as nothing in the record suggests Community Partners acted with the intent to deceive the appellants. Moreover, the trial judge stated that when he entered the order granting the tax deed, he knew the Negrons were living in the house and had not been personally served with notice of the tax sale. FNA also did not violate the Negrons' due process rights because, although they were not personally served, the notice was reasonably calculated, under the circumstances, to apprise them of the tax deed proceeding and afforded them an opportunity to present their objections.
No. 2015 IL App (1st) 141690 Centro
Medico Panamericano, Ltd v. Laborers' Welfare Fund of the
Health and Welfare Department of the Construction and
General Laborers' District Council of Chicago and Vicinity
Filed 5-13-15 (TJJ)
This interlocutory appeal arises from the trial
court's order granting summary judgment in an insurance
coverage lawsuit to defendant Laborers' Welfare Fund of the
Health and Welfare Department of the Construction and
General Laborers' District Council of Chicago and
Vicinity. On appeal, plaintiff Centro Medico Panamericano,
Ltd., an out-patient surgical center, contends that the trial
court erroneously granted defendant's motion for summary
judgment because defendant's service representatives
made plaintiff an oral unambiguous promise about the extent of
insurance coverage. Plaintiff also contends that the trial
court erred in concluding that the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C. § 18 (2000)
(ERISA)), preempted plaintiff's claim for promissory estoppel.
In addition, plaintiff contends that the trial court erred by
considering inadmissible hearsay and failing to grant
plaintiff's Illinois Supreme Court Rule 191(a). We
No. 2015 IL App (1st) 150568 Williams
v. Cook County Officers Electoral Board Filed
This appeal arises from the trial court's order denying petitioner Kenneth Williams' petition for judicial review. On appeal, petitioner first contends that he is statutorily qualified to seek and hold public office under the Election Code and School Code. Petitioner also contends that respondent, the Cook County Officers Electoral Board (Electoral Board), prematurely removed petitioner's name from the ballot because he still had time to be pardoned before the election. Petitioner next contends that the hearing officer and Electoral Board exceeded their authority by amending and expanding the three objections, comingling arguments, going beyond the scope of the legal question at issue, and failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing. In addition, petitioner contends that the Electoral Board failed to undergo a choice of law analysis and properly apply Indiana law governing the expungement of Indiana convictions. Finally, petitioner contends his due process rights were violated by Anita Alvarez's participation in the Electoral Board process. We affirm.
No. 2015 IL App (2d) 121276-B G.M.
Sign, Inc. v. Pennswood Partners, Inc. Filed
G.M. Sign, a recipient of unsolicited faxed advertisements, with its principal place of business in Round Lake, Illinois, filed a class action complaint against Pennswood Partners (Pennswood), a Pennsylvania corporation with its principal and only place of business in Pennsylvania. Pennswood's insurers, Maryland Casualty Company (Maryland Casualty) and Assurance Company of America (Assurance) (collectively, Zurich) denied Pennswood's tender of its defense. Maryland Casualty, a Maryland corporation with its principal place of business in Illinois, and Assurance, a New York corporation with its principal place of business also in Illinois, are underwriting insurance companies used by the Zurich Insurance Group's small business unit to issue insurance policies. Subsequently, G.M. Sign and Pennswood settled their lawsuit for $8 million. Zurich filed a declaratory judgment action against Pennswood and G.M. Sign, seeking a declaration that their insurance policies did not provide coverage to Pennswood for the underlying lawsuit. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Applying Illinois law, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Pennswood and G.M. Sign and against Zurich, determining that Zurich had a duty to defend and indemnify Pennswood and that the settlement was reasonable. The trial court entered judgment in favor of G.M. Sign in the amount of $8 million and denied Pennswood and G.M. Sign's request for accrued postsettlement interest. On appeal Zurich argues: (1) Zurich had no duty to defend or indemnify Pennswood in the underlying action under Pennsylvania law; (2) Illinois courts are vested with the discretion to consider federal courts' predictions in their conflict-of-law analysis; and (3) in an insurance coverage case, a single state's law should be applied to the interpretation of an insurance policy. Pennswood and G.M. Sign argue that the trial court erred by denying their request for accrued postsettlement interest. We vacate our original opinion and determine that our reconsideration in light of Bridgeview does not change the result. We reverse in part and affirm in part.
No. 2015 IL App (3d) 130426 People v. Scarbrough Filed 5-13-15 (TJJ)
The defendant, Jamar Scarbrough, entered a blind plea of guilty to driving while his license was revoked (625 ILCS 5/6-303(a) (West 2012)) and to obstructing identification (720 ILCS 5/31-4.5(a)(2) (West 2012)). The circuit court sentenced him to 12 months of conditional discharge and to 30 days in the Will County jail, with credit for 25 days served. On appeal, the defendant argues that he is entitled to a new sentencing hearing because the court erred when it found that: (1) he was ineligible for court supervision; and (2) he was required to serve a minimum of 30 days in jail. Alternatively, the defendant argues that he is entitled to a remand or new postplea proceedings because defense counsel failed to comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2006). We affirm.
No. 2015 IL App (1st) 130171 People
v. Lewis Filed 5-12-15 (TJJ)
Following a jury trial, defendant Samuel Lewis was convicted of armed robbery and unlawful vehicular invasion and was sentenced to concurrent terms of 35 years' and 9 years' imprisonment. On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress identification because his sixth amendment right to counsel had attached when he was arrested in Nevada on a Cook County arrest warrant and brought before a Nevada court for extradition proceedings. Defendant also argues that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel when trial counsel: (1) failed to object to evidence of other crimes; (2) introduced a photograph of defendant from an unrelated arrest; (3) failed to object to the State's emphasis on defendant's refusal to participate in a lineup; and (4) made an analogy in closing argument that compared reasonable doubt to a football game. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
No. 2015 IL App (1st) 131872 People
v. Booker Filed 5-12-15 (TJJ)
Following a bench trial, defendant, James Booker, was convicted of home invasion while armed with a dangerous weapon, robbery, attempted robbery, and unlawful restraint. At sentencing, the court merged defendant's unlawful restraint convictions into the home invasion counts and sentenced defendant to concurrent prison terms totaling 15 years. On appeal, defendant contends that: (1) the State failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the offenses because only two of the four witnesses identified him as the perpetrator; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to quash and suppress because the police lacked reasonable suspicion when they detained him; (3) he was denied due process when he was convicted of an uncharged offense which was not a lesser-included offense of any of the crimes with which he was charged; (4) the 15-year sentence imposed for his four home invasion convictions is excessive; (5) three of his home invasion convictions must be vacated under the one-act, one-crime doctrine; and (6) the mittimus must be corrected to reflect the proper sentence of three years for his attempted robbery conviction. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
No. 2015 IL App (1st)
120089 People
v. Ross Filed 5-11-15 (RJC)
No. 2015 IL App (1st) 130500 People
v. Walker Filed 5-11-15 (RJC)
No. 2015 IL App (1st) 140490
v. The Department of Employment Security
Filed 5-11-15 (RJC)
No. 2015 IL App (3d)
130429 People
v. Irby Filed 5-11-15 (RJC)
No. 2015 IL 118585 In
re Pension Reform Litigation Filed 5-08-15
In the fall of 2013, the General Assembly enacted a statute amending the Illinois Pension Code to reduce the retirement annuity benefits of individuals who first became members of four of the State of Illinois' pension systems prior to January 1, 2011. That enactment became effective on June 1, 2014. It was challenged in five separate actions which were consolidated in the circuit court of Sangamon County. That court declared the statute to be unconstitutional in its entirety as a violation of the pension protection clause of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, and enforcement of the statute was permanently enjoined. The circuit court stated that "the State of Illinois made a constitutionally protected promise to its employees concerning their pension benefits. Under established and uncontroverted Illinois law, the State of Illinois cannot break that promise." Appeal of this statutory invalidation lay directly to the Illinois Supreme Court.
No. 2015 IL App (1st)
130272 Gernaga
v. City of Chicago Filed 5-08-15 (RJC)
This appeal arises from
administrative review of a decision by the City of
Chicago's department of administrative hearings (DOAH).
Plaintiff, Mr. Bohdan Gernaga, sought administrative
review of a decision issued by the DOAH finding him liable
for violating section 9-102-020(a) of the Chicago
Municipal Code (Municipal Code) (Chicago Municipal Code §
9-102-020(a) (added July 9, 2003)), for entering an
intersection against a red traffic light.
No. 2015 IL App (1st) 131465 CE
Design Ltd. v. C&T Pizza, Inc. Filed
In this interlocutory
appeal, defendant C&T Pizza, Inc., appeals a circuit
court order granting plaintiff CE Design Ltd., class
certification in an action alleging, inter alia,
violation of the federal Telephone Consumer Protection
Act (TCPA) (47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C) (2006)), which
makes it unlawful to "use any telephone facsimile
machine, computer, or other device to send, to a
telephone facsimile machine, an unsolicited
advertisement." Defendant raises several arguments as to
why it believes the circuit court abused its discretion
in certifying the class.
No. 2015 IL App (1st)
142508 Erie
Insurance Exchange v. Compeve Corporation
Filed 5-08-15 (RJC)
Defendants, Compeve
Corporation (Compeve) and Slava Packovskis, appeal
from the trial court's entry of summary judgment in
favor of plaintiff Erie Insurance Exchange (Erie). The
trial court found that Erie had no duty to defend
defendants in a lawsuit filed against them by
Microsoft Corporation (Microsoft), which alleged that
defendants violated Microsoft's intellectual property
rights by selling computers loaded with unauthorized
copies of Microsoft's software. Affirmed.
No. 2015 IL App (1st)
142897 In
re Marianna F.-M. Filed 5-08-15 (RJC)
Respondent Oscar F.
is the natural father of the minor Marianna F.-M. In
May 2014, Marianna was placed in the custody of the
Illinois Department of Children and Family Services
(DCFS). After a September 2014 adjudicatory hearing,
the circuit court found that Marianna was abused and
neglected and that Oscar was the perpetrator of the
abuse and neglect. The court held a dispositional
hearing the same day. At the conclusion of the
hearing, the court found Oscar fit, willing, and
able to parent Marianna and returned Marianna home
to Oscar under an order of protective supervision.
The Cook County public guardian, Marianna's
court-appointed attorney and guardian ad litem,
filed a timely notice of appeal from the court's
dispositional orders. For the following reasons, we
reverse the court's order returning Marianna home,
vacate the order of protection, and remand for
further proceedings.
No. 2015 IL App (1st)
McMahon Building Maintenance, Inc. Filed
Plaintiff L.A. McMahon
Window Washing (McMahon) sought administrative review in
the circuit court of Cook County of a decision by
defendants Illinois Department of Employment Security
(IDES) and its director, Jay Rowell (the Director)
(together, the Department), which affirmed the decision of
IDES that window washers who performed services for
McMahon were employees for purposes of the Illinois
Unemployment Insurance Act (the Act) (820 ILCS 405/212
(West 2010)). Pursuant to an audit and a fact-finding
hearing, the Department determined that McMahon failed to
establish that the exemptions from "employment" in section
212 of the Act apply to the workers in question. The
circuit court upheld the Director's decision. McMahon
appeals, contending the Director and the circuit court
erred in their determination that the McMahon workers were
"employees" and not "independent contractors" under
section 212 of the Act. Affirmed.
No. 2015 IL App (5th)
130402 Bemis
v. Employers Mutual Casualty Company Filed 5-06-15
The case involves
decertification of a class in a class action suit filed by
Bemis & Associates, Chiropractors, against Employers
Mutual and EMC Property & Casualty. The appellate
court decertified the class in light of its decision in Coy
Chiropractic Health Center, Inc. v. Travelers Casualty
& Surety Co., 409 Ill. App. 3d 1114 (2011). The class action
was based on allegations the Bemis had contracted to
accept discounted reimbursements from payor insurance
companies, health care plans, or claims administrators
with whom two of its insurers had contracted. Bemis alleged that
its bills were discounted without steering patients to him
because the insurers did not offer financial incentives to
its insureds for utilizing Bemis as their provider.
No. 2015 IL App (3rd) 130525
People v. Hollahan Filed
Hollahan appealed his
convictions of two counts of domestic battery, arguing
that the trial court held a bench trial without obtaining
a proper jury waiver.
No. 2015 IL App (3rd) 130190 People
v. Edwards Filed 5-06-15 (JMC)
Following a stipulated bench trial, Edwards was convicted of first-degree murder and attempted murder. Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress, claiming his confession to police was involuntary based on the fact that he was 17 years old at the time, had a fifth grade reading level, suffered from various mental disorders, and that the investigating officers did not allow him to speak to his mother or another concerned adult despite his request to do so. The trial court denied the motion. Issues: (1) did the trial court err in denying Edward's motion to suppress where defendant was 17 years old at the time of the arrest, had a limited education, and did not have contact with a parent or concerned adult; (2) did the trial court err when it failed to hold the statutorily required fitness hearing after it found a bona fide doubt of fitness to stand trial; (3) was the 90-year sentence is unconstitutional under Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. ____, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), prohibiting offenders under the age of 18 from mandatory life sentences; and (4) was Edwards entitled to an additional day of presentence incarceration credit. Held: no.
No. 2015 IL App (2nd) 120471
People v. Reyes Filed 5-06-15
Reyes, a minor, was convicted of one count of first-degree murder and two counts of attempted murder with a firearm and sentenced to 97 years' imprisonment. Issues: (1) is the automatic transfer statute of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (also known as the excluded jurisdiction statute), which requires that certain juveniles be tried and sentenced as adults, is unconstitutional; and (2) given Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), is the Illinois statutory sentencing scheme is unconstitutional as applied to him. Held: no.
No. 2015 IL App (1st) 141521 State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Benedetto
Filed 5-06-15 (JMC)
Issue: was wind shear physical contact under State Farm's motor vehicle insurance policy's uninsured motorist provision and Illinois law. Held: no. Summary judgment for insured therefore vacated.
No. 2015 IL App (1st) 133382 Cavitt
v. Repel Filed 5-04-15 (JMC)
The trial judge granted
Repel's motion to dismiss a "petition to void" filed by
Cavitt to vacate a 1997 judgment for child support, pursuant
to section 2-1401 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure
and imposed on Cavitt attorney fees and costs. Issues: (1) did the
court err in dismissing the section 2-1401 petition without
conducting an evidentiary hearing; and (2) did the court err
in imposing a total of $31,977.83 in attorney fees and
costs. Held:
No. 2015 IL App (5th) 130544 Carter
v. The City of Alton Filed 5-04-15
The case involved municipal ordinances in four Illinois communities which allowed local police departments to charge vehicle owners an "administrative fee" when their vehicles are towed and impounded. Issue: do the fees comport with the requirements of substantive due process? Plaintiffs appealed from dismissal of their complaints. The appellate court noted that all four cases turn, in part, on the distinction between a fee and a fine. Defendants argued that the fees are rationally related to their interest in recouping the costs associated with DUI arrests and the towing and impoundment of vehicles as a result of such arrests. The appellate court noted that it was not reaching that ultimate question. It simply determined that the complaints survived the motion to dismiss.
No. 2015 IL App (1st) 131362 People
v. McLaurin Filed 5-04-15 (JMC)
McLaurin was convicted of
first-degree murder. Issues:
(1) was McLaurin's trial lawyer ineffective because he
failed to secure the testimony of an eyewitness under the
Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from
Within or Without a State in Criminal Proceedings; (2) was
his lawyer ineffective for failing to object to the
admission of, and failing to request the redaction of,
inadmissible statements in a State's witness prior written
statement and grand jury testimony; (3) did the trial
court abuse its discretion when it allowed the jury to
receive and review a portion of that witness' prior
written statement that contained other-crimes evidence
disclosing that the defendant "carries different types of
guns"; and (4) did the trial court fail to comply with
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431(b) because it did not
"provide each juror an opportunity to respond" to specific
questions regarding the Zehr principles. Held: no.
No. 2015 IL App (1st)
111925-B People
v. Flemming Filed 5-01-15 (RC)
No. 2015 IL App (1st) 131735 Wortham
v. The City of Chicago Department of Administrative
Hearings Filed 5-01-15 (RC)
No. 2015 IL App (1st)
140171 Fattah
v. Bim Filed 5-01-15 (RC)
No. 2015 IL App (1st)
130984WC Loyola
University of Chicago v. Illinois Workers Compensation
Commisssion Filed 5-01-15 (RC)
Claimant, Anne Mikesh, appeals from the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County finding that the Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission (Commission) did not have jurisdiction to construe the settlement contract entered into by her and respondent, Loyola University of Chicago. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court in part, reverse in part, and reinstate the decision of the Commission as modified.
No. 2015 IL App (1st)
133985WC Steel
& Machinery Transportation, Inc. v. Illinois
Workers Compensation Commisssion Filed
Respondent, Steel & Machinery Transportation, Inc., appeals from the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County confirming a decision of the Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission (Commission) awarding benefits to claimant, Radomir Cvetkovski, pursuant to the Workers' Compensation Act (Act) (820 ILCS 305/1 et seq. (West 2004)). On appeal, respondent argues that the Commission erred in finding that an employer-employee relationship existed between it and claimant. We affirm.
No. 2015 IL App (4th)
140028WC Bell
v. Illinois Workers Compensation Commisssion
Filed 5-01-15 (RC)
Mary J. Nash filed an application for adjustment of claim under the Workers' Compensation Act (Act) (820 ILCS 305/1 et seq. (West 2008)), seeking benefits for injuries she sustained while she was working for Dan Pilson Auto Center (employer). Prior to the arbitration hearing, Ms. Nash died of causes unrelated to her work accident. Janet K. Bell, Ms. Nash's sister and the administrator of her estate (claimant), filed an amended application for adjustment of claim substituting herself as the claimant. After conducting a hearing, an arbitrator awarded temporary total disability (TTD) benefits and medical expenses and found that the claimant had sustained a permanent partial disability from her work injury. However, the arbitrator ruled that any permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits that had accrued prior to Ms. Nash's death abated with her death, and declined to award any such benefits to her estate. The claimant appealed the arbitrator's decision to the Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission (the Commission). The Commission unanimously affirmed and adopted the arbitrator's decision. The claimant then sought judicial review of the Commission's decision in the circuit court of Coles County, which confirmed the Commission's ruling. This appeal followed.