The United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) was the second phase of the United Nations intervention in Somalia and took place from March 1993 until March 1995, following the outbreak of the Somali Civil War in 1991. UNOSOM II carried on from the transitory United States-controlled (UN-sanctioned) Unified Task Force (UNITAF), which had been preceded by UNOSOM I. Notably, UNOSOM II embarked on a nation-building mission, diverging from its predecessors. As delineated in UNSCR 814, the operation's objectives were to aid in relief provision and economic rehabilitation, foster political reconciliation, and re-establish political and civil administrations across Somalia.

UNOSOM II was a substantial multinational initiative, uniting over 22,000 troops from 27 nations. This operation marked the largest multilateral force ever assembled for peacekeeping, and at that time, it was the costliest UN operation.

Four months into its mandate in June 1993, the operation transformed into a military campaign as it found itself entangled in armed conflict with Somali factions, predominantly against the Somali National Alliance (SNA) led by Gen. Mohammed Farah Aidid. As the intervention progressed, military operations against the SNA took focus, relegating the task of political reconciliation, institution-building and humanitarian aid to a peripheral role. Three months into the conflict, the US military would implement Operation Gothic Serpent to assist UNOSOM II against the SNA with special forces. Soon after, the infamous Battle of Mogadishu took place, signifying the end of the hunt for Aidid and military operations in Somalia. The United States withdrew six months after the battle, and the remaining UN forces departed from Somalia in early 1995, concluding the operation.

UNOSOM II faced heavy criticism for alleged human rights abuses, violations of international law, and the use of excessive force, attracting scrutiny from a wide range of humanitarian organizations, academics and journalists. Furthermore, the operation was widely criticized for an overemphasis on military operations, diverging from its original humanitarian intent. The humanitarian impact and number of lives saved is disputed.

Background

Following the failure of the monitoring mission created as UNOSOM by the United Nations, the United States offered to lead a substantial intervention force, made up chiefly of American personnel.  This was accepted by the UN and made possible through United Nations Security Council Resolution 794, authorizing the use of "all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia". The Security Council urged the Secretary-General and member states to make arrangements for the unified command and control of the military forces that would be involved.

On the evening of 4 December 1992, U.S. President George H. W. Bush addressed the nation, informing them that U.S. troops would be sent to Somalia. The U.S. contribution would be known as Operation Restore Hope, which joined a multinational force and became known as the United Task Force (UNITAF). The operations of UNOSOM I were suspended. UNITAF was authorized under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. The United States designed the UNITAF mission to be a transitional action under U.S. control, structured into four phases. Initially, troops were deployed to secure key harbor and airport sites in Mogadishu and Baledogle, forming the operation's base. The security zone was then extended to encompass the surrounding regions of southern Somalia, a step completed ahead of schedule due to favorable conditions and support from Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs). The third phase involved further southern expansion of the security zone into Kismayo and Bardera while ensuring secure routes for humanitarian operations. Finally, in the last phase the U.S. transferred operations to the United Nations and withdrew most UNITAF forces.

Expansion of mandate
On 3 March 1993, the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council his recommendations for effecting the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II. He noted that despite the size of the UNITAF mission, a secure environment was not yet established. There was still no effective functioning government or local security/police force. The Secretary-General concluded that, should the Security Council determine that the time had come for the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II, the latter should be endowed with enforcement powers under Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter to establish a secure environment throughout Somalia. UNOSOM II would therefore seek to complete the task begun by UNITAF. The new mandate would also empower UNOSOM II to assist in rebuilding their economic, political and social life, so as to recreate a Somali State. Most notably it would also mandate the disarmament of Somali militias.

While Somalia was not reincorporated into a UN trusteeship as it had been in the 1950s, UNOSOM II was entrusted with the power to make decisions on behalf of the Somali people. This significant shift in mandate incited numerous allegations of UN colonialism. The United Nations, by invoking Chapter VII, essentially transformed the scope of its operations in Somalia, a move that would become a major point of contention in the near future. According to UNOSOM II advisor John Drysdale the majority of Somali political leaders rejected the notion of UN administering any aspect of Somalia, though some prominent figures such as Gen. Mohamed Abshir called for the return of trusteeship. The shift raised suspicions among a wide spectrum of Somalis, inciting concerns about the UN's possible attempts to reestablish a trusteeship. Aidid's faction was particularly vocal about these apprehensions, but was not alone. A variety of other Somali factions, including that of Aidid's main adversary, Ali Mahdi, also expressed similar concerns.

Addis Ababa Reconciliation Conference and creation of UNOSOM II

During March 1993, several weeks before UNOSOM II was created, the first UN sponsored Somali peace conference was being held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The Conference on National Reconciliation consisted of the majority of Somalis factions and leaders. UN Special Representative Lansana Kouyate of Guinea warned the delegates of the national reconciliation conference that the UN was going to invoke it's Chapter VI powers across the entirety of Somalia unless they came to an agreement by 25 March 1993. The conference finalized an agreement 24 hours past the deadline.

On 26 March 1993 UNOSOM II, was established by the Security Council in Resolution 814, though did not formally take over operations in Somalia until UNITAF was dissolved just over a month later on 4 May 1993. John Drysdale notes that by invoking Chapter VI, the UNOSOM II Force Commander could operate with near impunity depending on their interpretation of Article 42 of Chapter VI. Article 42 offered no rules of engagement, in effect gave UNOSOM II forces the power to make arbitrary detentions and offer no right to habeas corpus for Somalis. In Drysdale's view UNITAF had avoided armed conflict with Somali factions due to the careful rules of engagement created by the head of the operation, US Marine Lt. Gen. Robert B. Johnston. Johnston's approach, which focused above all on winning the Somali's public confidence, was lost during the transfer to the far more aggressive UNOSOM II mandate.

Structure
UNOSOM II would be composed of four main divisions. They would be officially led and coordinated in Somalia by the representative of the UN Secretary-General, retired US Admiral Jonathan Howe. The four divisions were tasked with:

 Force Command: Maintaining overall security in Somalia and protecting UN operations. The Force Commander was a Turkish General named Cevik Bir, although his second in command, Major General Thomas M. Montgomery, a US military officer was noted to wield more power and influence, as the command structure was dominated by US officers. Montgomery headed the US Quick Reaction Force and reported directly to the US Pentagon.
 Division for Humanitarian Relief and Rehabilitation: Planning and coordination of all humanitarian activities.
 Division for Political Affairs: Promoting political reconciliation and building of transitional governmental and administrative structures.
 Justice Division: Formation of civil police and rehabilitation of the judiciary. Also tasked with monitoring violations of international law.

UNOSOM II had a strength of 30,000 personnel, including 22,000 troops and 8,000 logistic and civilian staff from Algeria, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Botswana, Canada, Denmark, Egypt, Fiji, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Kuwait, Jordan, Malaysia, Morocco, Nepal, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Spain, South Korea, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the United States and Zimbabwe. The United States military provided 1,167 troops and numerous helicopter gunships for a Quick Reaction Force, which would remain completely under US operational control.Despite UNOSOM II being composed of a coalition of twenty-seven countries, most of the decision makers and many of the staff were Americans, giving the United States significant control over much of the operation. It was observed that very few nations involved had any representation in the UN military command structure. Due to this, many states providing troops to the operation insisted on maintaining command structures with their own respective governments, which would result in numerous future inter-UNOSOM II disputes between contingents. UNOSOM II Force Commander Cevik Bir openly admitted that the critical posts in his headquarters were manned by Americans by May 1993. In addition to this the representative of the UN Secretary-General in Somalia, retired US Admiral Jonathan Howe, staffed the UNOSOM II headquarters with twenty-eight US officers in key positions. Months into the operation, following the 5 June 1993 killings of the Pakistanis and the passing of UNSCR 837, the US would effectively take complete lead of the mission. In the months following US officers would operate with minimal consultations with UN headquarters in New York. Marine Lt. Gen. Robert B. Johnston, head of UNITAF, would state that although in his view UNITAF had been success US efforts and losses would be in vain if UNOSOM II was also not successful.

UNOSOM II would divide Somalia into five distinct zones. Northwest, Northeast, Central, South and Mogadishu.

In operation
A federalist government based on 18 autonomous regions was agreed upon by the leaders of Somalia's various armed factions. It was the objective of UNOSOM II to support this new system and initiate nation-building in Somalia. This included disarming the various factions,  helping the people to set up a representative government, and restoring infrastructure.

Growing hostilities between UNOSOM and the SNA
Major disagreements between the UN and the Somali National Alliance began soon after the establishment of UNOSOM II, centering on the perceived true nature of the operations political mandate. In May 1993, relations between the SNA and UNOSOM would rapidly deteriorate following two significant events.

Kismayo Incident
During the March Addis Ababa conference, the Somali National Front (SNF), a pro-Barre faction opposing Aidid, smuggled weapons into strategic port city of Kismayo. Although the city was nominally controlled by the SNA and UNITAF forces, Gen. Hersi Morgan of the SNF ousted the Somali National Alliance forces led by Col. Omar Jess.On 7 May 1993, three days after UNOSOM II took control of Kismayo from UNITAF, the SNA made an attempt to retake the city. During the assault the Belgian peacekeepers stationed in the town intervened, considering the assault to take Kismayo an attack on their positions and consequently repelled the SNA forces. The fall of Kismayo to Gen. Morgan infuriated the Somali National Alliance. To the SNA the incident was viewed as blatant U.N. partiality, as UNITAF had failed to prevent Morgan from seizing the city and UNOSOM had then fought SNA forces who had tried to retake it. Following the loss of Kismayo, Aidid began to deeply mistrust the United States and the UN mission.

Galkayo peace accord
In early May, Gen. Aidid and Col. Abdullahi Yusuf of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) agreed to convene a peace conference for central Somalia. In light of recent conflict between the two, the initiative was seen a major step towards halting the Somali Civil War. Gen. Aidid, having initiated the talks with Col. Yusuf, considered himself the conference chair, setting the agenda. Beginning 9 May, elder delegations from their respective clans, Habr Gidr and Majerteen, met. While Aidid and Yusuf aimed for a central Somalia-focused conference, they clashed with UNOSOM, which aimed to include other regions and replace Aidid's chairmanship with ex-President Abdullah Osman, a staunch critic of Aidid. As the conference began, Aidid sought assistance from UNOSOM ambassador Lansana Kouyate, who proposed air transport for delegates and a 14-day accommodation. However, he was called back to New York and replaced by April Glaspie, following which UNOSOM retracted its offer. Aidid resorted to private aircraft to transport delegates. Following the aircraft incident, Aidid would publicly rebuke the United Nations on Radio Mogadishu for interference in Somali internal affairs.

Aidid invited Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia, Adm. Johnathan Howe to open the conference, which was refused. The differences between Aidid and the UN proved to be to great, and the conference proceeded without the United Nations participation. On the 2 June 1993 the conference between Gen. Aidid and Col. Abdullahi Yusuf successfully concluded. Admiral Howe would be invited to witness the peace agreement, but again declined. The Galkacyo peace accord successfully ended large scale conflict in the Galgadud and Mudug regions of Somalia.

The contention between the Somali National Alliance and UNOSOM from this point forward would begin to manifest in anti-UNOSOM propaganda broadcast from SNA controlled Radio Mogadishu.

Somaliland
UNOSOM II would have a highly contentious relationship with Somaliland, eventually resulting in the United Nations being expelled from the region. Most notably during a visit to Hargeisa, Leonard Kamungo, the head of the Political Affairs division for UNOSOM II, engaged in discussions with the President of Somaliland, Muhammad Haji Ibrahim Egal. Kamungo warned Egal that he held the authority to deploy UNOSOM military forces in Somaliland without requiring local consent, if he deemed it necessary. This remark incensed Egal who retorted by threatening that Hargeisa "would become the United Nations' Dien Bien Phu." In response, Egal gave Kamungo a 24-hour ultimatum to depart from Somaliland. UNOSOM would later be entirely expelled from the territory on Egals orders.

UNOSOM II - SNA conflict

Radio Mogadishu and 5 June 1993 inspection

Radio Mogadishu was a highly popular broadcast station with the residents of the city, and was a vital piece of SNA infrastructure that had been captured following a vicious battle with Ali Mahdi's forces. Following the Kismayo and Galkayo incidents that station began to air anti-UNOSOM propaganda, incensing high ranking UN personnel. It was feared that the broadcasts would shift the attitudes of the Somali public towards the United Nations operation, leading UNOSOM officials to resolve to close the station. In mid-May, the Pakistani contingent was asked to draw up a plan to shut down the station. The Pakistanis did not possess the technical expertise required for such an operation and requested that the US supply experts.

Importantly, Radio Mogadishu had also been an Authorized Weapons Store Site (AWSS), subject to UNOSOM inspection. It was decided the American special forces technicians would accompany a Pakistani weapons inspection team to the site in order to determine how to disable the station. Gen. Aidid and the upper echelons of the Somali National Alliance, had been made aware of the discussions to seize or destroy the station.

According to the 1994 United Nations Inquiry:Opinions differ, even among UNOSOM officials, on whether the weapons inspections of 5 June 1993 was genuine or was merely a cover-up for reconnaissance and subsequent seizure of Radio Mogadishu.On the morning of Saturday June 5th 1993 an element of the Pakistani force in Somalia had been tasked with the inspection of site AWSS 5, which happened to be located at Aidid controlled Radio Mogadishu. The station was popular across the city, even among those who did not like Aidid or the Habr Gidr clan and concern that UNOSOM was coming to shut it down infuriated many citizens of Mogadishu. The fighting would results in 24 Pakistanis and dozens of Somalis killed. UNOSOM believed forces associated with Aidid were behind the attack. The 1994 UN Inquiry would conclude that in absence of a "...more convincing explanation," it believed the Somali National Alliance was most likely behind the attack. Despite this, the commission noted that no evidence existed to back previous UNOSOM assertions that the attack had been pre-planned or pre-meditated by the SNA, and further noted that the incident had likely been a spontaneous reaction.

UNSCR 837 and UNOSOM - SNA war

The next day, the UN responded with Resolution 837, reaffirming that the secretary-general had the authorization to "take all necessary measures against those responsible for the armed attacks and to establish the effective authority of UNOSOM II throughout Somalia." This was essentially a declaration of war on Aidid and the Somali National Alliance, leading to numerous armed confrontations between the two parties. Although UNOSOM II had fewer war-fighting resources than UNITAF, it adopted a more ambitious and aggressive stance. Nevertheless, several UNOSOM contingents expressed opposition to the aggressive military posture. They viewed an offensive as politically misguided and militarily untenable. As the conflict dragged on, these contingents began advocating for a diplomatic resolution. International observers notably criticized the UN's decision to initiate a military offensive as 'incomprehensible', given the dynamics of Somali society. Professor Ioan M. Lewis asserted that the UN made an unwise choice to resort to military force, which led to substantial Somali casualties, rather than attempting to politically isolate Aidid and launch an independent legal inquiry. Political science Professor Béatrice Pouligny noted  that it is widely agreed that the UN offensive that followed UNSCR 837 had significant negative repercussions for UNOSOM II as it incited hostility from across a wide spectrum of Somali society, extending to those Somali who had been most favourable of the intervention.

June 1993 UNOSOM offensive
On 12 June 1993 US troops began a military offensive around Mogadishu. On 17 June, a warrant with a $25,000 reward was issued by Admiral Jonathan Howe for information leading to the arrest of Aidid, but he was never captured. That same day, Aidid's compound and Radio Mogadishu were directly targeted by US AC-130 gunships. Over the following weeks, strikes were carried out all over Mogadishu with AC-130s and attack helicopters. UNOSOM began to greatly increase its firepower in Mogadishu and started making deliberate shows of force with Italian and American helicopters over the city. The US Quick Reaction Force, which had been split up into several different hot spots in Somalia, was entirely recalled to Mogadishu. BBC East Africa correspondent Mark Doyle described the war between the Somali National Alliance and UNOSOM forces as seen by journalists in Mogadishu:Typical daylight hours in south Mogadishu thunder to the sound of American helicopter gunships criss-crossing the skies at low level; militia with small arms or rocket-propelled grenade launchers (RPGs) take aim at what they see as an offensive provocation. It's not unusual, from the main hotel in south Mogadishu, to view open battles, with U.S. helicopters firing 20-millimeter cannons at apparent militia ground positions. From other vantage points, full-scale battles have been observed pitting Turkish tanks, Pakistani APCs, and American Humvees against the militia. All this has taken place in a heavily built-up urban environment, with the inevitable heavy casualties. By night, the macabre events continue. Loud explosions are common as militia mortars are aimed at the UN compound or the fortified, UN-controlled airport. UN forces' flares light up the sky in an often futile attempt to pinpoint their enemy. Slow dull tracer fire streaks across the blackness from the militias' weapons. The crack-crack-crack and flash-flash-flash of cannons fired from U.S. helicopter gunships can be seen spitting at apparent militia emplacements.
In the week after the offensive, US officers and intelligence experts contended that Aidid's command and control capability over his SNA fighters had been significantly weakened, and the organization's morale had taken a substantial hit. They also believed that the intensive American aerial bombardment had decimated most of the Somali National Alliance's arsenal. American officials involved in the war estimated that the SNA had no more than 300 loyal fighters, motivated merely by cash or Khat handouts. However, interviews conducted by Washington Post reporter Keith Richburg with Somali insurgents painted a contrasting picture: a highly motivated and committed military force whose morale seemed to strengthen as the conflict intensified. Months into the conflict, US and UN officials would concede that they had, "...greatly underestimated their enemy,"

Following the passing of UNSCR 837, the hunt for Aidid characterized much of the UNOSOM II intervention. The increasing tempo of military operations being carried out in Mogadishu caused civilian casualties and began to seriously affect the relationship between UN troops and the Somali people. UNOSOM forces began to be increasingly perceived as foreign interlopers and imperialists, particularly after incidents such as the 13 June mass shooting, when UN troops fired upon a demonstration with a machine gun killing 20 Somalis, many women and children, and a US helicopter attack on Digfer Hospital on 17 June. The Times reported that in the month following the offensive at least 200 civilians had been directly killed by foreign troops. Many Mogadishu residents were deeply disturbed by the effects of heavy weaponry utilized by UN forces in Mogadishu, such as AC-130s, helicopter gunships, wire-guided TOW missiles and rockets. Airstrikes in particular heavily affected Somali civilians and sparked hostility. Each major armed confrontation with UN forces was noted to have the deleterious effect of increasing Aidid's stature with the Somali public. In the view of Professor Mats Berdal of the Department of War Studies at King's College, the conduct of US armed forces during the conflict demonstrated that the US military was not attuned to the requirements of low-level military operations that Somalia required at the time. He would argue that, "[There is] a distinctive mindset and approach to low-intensity operations which had been shaped by the American experience during and after Vietnam, and by a deeply entrenched belief in the efficacy of technology and firepower as a means of minimizing one's own casualties. It is an approach that was inappropriate to the particular circumstances of Somalia."The UNOSOM offensive had significant negative political consequences for the intervention as it alienated the Somali people, strengthened political support for Aidid, and led to growing criticism of the operation internationally. As a result numerous UNOSOM II contingents began to increasingly push for a more conciliatory and diplomatic approach with the SNA. Relief agencies and humanitarian organizations publicly distanced themselves from the UN offensive. The backlash from Somali political and military factions against the offensive was so profound that even groups previously ambivalent or antagonistic towards Aidid began to perceive the UN and US forces as foreign oppressors. According to Professor Pouligny, the escalating UNOSOM offensive resulted in the operation forfeiting any potential support from other Somali factions. Former Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations, Ramesh Thakur, stated that, "The scale, intensity, and frequency of the use of force by UNOSOM after June 1993 bore little resemblance to the rhetoric and expectations of when it was established, nor any recognizable relationship by then to a peacekeeping operation as defined in the UN lexicon."

According to British academic Alex de Waal, UNOSOM's war against the Somali National Alliance set an important legal precedent as UN forces declared immunity to the laws of war. Following a US helicopter attack on Digfer Hospital, de Waal confronted UN commanders in Mogadishu asking if the operation considered itself bound by the Geneva Conventions. According to de Waal a UN official had responded in regard to the attack that, "The normal rules of engagement do not apply in this nation." During this time, UNOSOM forces tried to disarm residents in parts of Mogadishu. Dutch journalist Linda Polman reported that US troops shelled the homes of Somalis who resisted surrendering their weapons, resulting in significant civilian casualties.

Bloody Monday raid

On 12 July 1993, a house where a meeting of clan elders was taking place was attacked by US AH-1 Cobra helicopters in what became known to the Somalis as Bloody Monday. UNOSOM claimed that they had launched a successful raid on a Somali National Alliance command and control center where hardliners had been gathered, an account that is widely disputed by Somalis, foreign journalists and human rights organizations. Johnathan Howe would assert that evidence to back UN claims could not be provided because the cameras recording the raid had jammed. The Red Cross claimed that 54 Somalis had been killed, including several notable religious elders. According to Dr. Sebastian Kaempf, the Abdi House raid represented the single most important event during UNOSOM II, as the consequences of the attack proved disastrous for UNOSOM interests in Somalia. Black Hawk Down author Mark Bowden noted 12 July had been a serious mistake and had the effect of firmly uniting a large portion of Mogadishu behind Aidid. Notable groups and organizations such as the Vatican, the Organisation of African Unity, World Vision, Doctors Without Borders, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International called for UNOSOM to review it policies and course.

The raid exposed deep rifts and created dissension amongst the UNOSOM II coalition, which consequently began fraying the cohesion and unity of the operation. The head of the UNOSOM II Justice Division would criticize the raid in a memo to head of UNOSOM, US Admiral Johnathan Howe. Further criticism of the raid came from numerous contributing states such as Ireland, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Zimbabwe, but most notably the Italian contingent, who threatened to pull out of the whole operation a few days later citing concerns that the escalation was indicative that relief role of UNOSOM II had been overtaken by an American-led campaign against Mohammed Farah Aidid. The Italians, who had ruled Somalia as a colonial territory for half a century, believed that the unprecedented attack threatened to widen the civil war and turn the Somalis against the entire UN peacekeeping force. A Pakistani officer in Mogadishu noted that the clash between the Americans and Italians was destroying the cohesion of UNOSOM II, and that a review of strategy was desperately needed. American envoy to Somalia, Robert B. Oakley, stated that after the raid countries such as Italy, France, and Zimbabwe, as well as other UNOSOM contingents, ceased their participation in operations against Aidid upon receiving orders from their respective governments. This decision weakened the United Nations' already fragile command authority. Additionally, many humanitarian efforts came to a halt, and numerous non-governmental organizations expressed their disapproval of both the United Nations and the United States. Intense diplomatic efforts were consequently made in order to avert a major split in UNOSOM II.

The strike also caused an outcry among UN civilian staffers and disenchantment over the direction of UNOSOM II for employees of the humanitarian section. At least nine UN civilian employees in Mogadishu working for the humanitarian sector either resigned or walked away from their posts in protest, including the top UNOSOM Justice Division official in Somalia, Ann Wright. Many of those who stayed would comment to reporters that the United Nations had relinquished its moral authority in its war against Aidid.

The dissension in the U.N. ranks with the Italians and others over what had occurred on July 12, 1993, led to a significant lull in UNOSOM operations in Mogadishu until the August 8, 1993 killings of American soldiers. The raid would lead to a significant increase in attacks on UNOSOM II troops and American forces in Mogadishu being deliberately targeted by Somali factions for the first times. That month night patrols in Mogadishu were halted entirely due to the city becoming to dangerous for foreign troops.

Escalation of insurgency and deployment of Task Force Ranger

Somali militias and volunteers increasingly began targeting UNOSOM II and US forces, causing further casualties. Following the 12 July 1993 raid, firefights between the SNA and UNOSOM began occurring almost daily. By September 1993, the Pan-Arab newspaper Al-Hayat reported that several Somali Islamic factions, which had previously remained neutral in the war, had now tacitly allied with the SNA. When the conflict had begun in June 1993 Islamic factions had divided over whether not to fight foreign troops because Aidid had previously been a major threat to them. As civilian casualties began mounting in July and August numerous Islamic factions began to launch attacks on UNOSOM forces in Mogadishu after sunset. Independent sources in Mogadishu, corroborated by Al-Hayat, indicated that the majority of night military operations throughout 1993 were coordinated by a variety of Somali Islamic groups within the city. Notably, Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya, a prominent Somali Islamist militant organization that had previously been in conflict with Aidid's forces in 1992, also began engaging in the insurgency against the American and UN forces. While Aidid did not overtly claim responsibility for these night operations, Al-Hayat noted that he sought to project the appearance of being the orchestrator for propaganda purposes.

As American casualties started to mount in Somalia, domestic backlash in the United States grew. Bipartisan support from the US senate began to build for a withdrawal. By August 1993, it was evident to the Clinton administration that a strategy shift was necessary to retain domestic support for US involvement in Somalia. This shift was signalled by Defense Secretary Les Aspin in his 27 August speech, advocating for a decreased military focus in UNOSOM II and urging the UN and the OAU to resume negotiations with all parties. Both the US Secretary of State and the National Security Advisor pushed for a shift towards diplomacy. Certain US officials advocated for a more aggressive response, among them was Ambassador Robert R. Gosende from the State Department. Gosende had written a cable recommending the deployment of thousands of additional troops and urged the abandonment of all diplomatic engagements with the SNA. Contrarily, General Joseph P. Hoar, who was at the helm of CENTCOM, expressed sharp disagreement with Gosende's approach. In a confidential memo, General Hoar articulated his belief that if more American troops were needed, then control of Mogadishu was already lost.

On 8 August, SNA forces detonated a remote controlled bomb against a U.S. military vehicle and killed American soldiers for the first time. Two weeks later, another bomb injured seven. In response, President Bill Clinton approved the proposal to deploy a special task force composed of 400 US Army Rangers and Delta-force Commandos. Despite growing reservations about the effectiveness of UNOSOM military operations against the Somali National Alliance, the immediate concern of protecting US forces led to the decision to deploy elite forces. In August elite unit, named Task Force Ranger, consisting of 441 elite US troops was flown into Mogadishu and began a manhunt for Aidid in what became known as Operation Gothic Serpent.

On 15 September 1993, US Major Gen. David C. Meade conveyed in a confidential memo to his superiors that the campaign against the insurgency was faltering, both tactically and potentially operationally. He cautioned that persisting in the conflict risked catastrophe. On October 3, 1993, Task Force Ranger raided a hotel in Mogadishu to capture high ranking SNA personnel. What ensued was the longest, bloodiest and deadliest battle for US and UNOSOM II troops in Somalia. In what later became known as the Battle of Mogadishu, eighteen US soldiers were killed. Images of their dead bodies being dragged through the streets were broadcast on internationally, infuriating the American public.

Fallout of the Battle of Mogadishu and the end of UNOSOM II

On 6 October 1993, U.S. President Bill Clinton would personally order General Joseph P. Hoar to cease all combat operations against Somali National Alliance, except in self defence. General Hoar would proceed to relay the stand down order to Generals William F. Garrison of Task Force Ranger and Thomas M. Montgomery of the American Quick Reaction Force. The following day on 7 October, Clinton publicly announced a major change in course in the mission. Substantial U.S. forces would be sent to Somalia as short term reinforcements, but all American forces would be withdrawn from the country by the end of March 1994. He would firmly defend American policy in Somalia but admitted that it had been a mistake for American forces to be drawn into the decision "to personalize the conflict" to Aidid. He would go on to reappoint the former U.S. Special Envoy for Somalia Robert B. Oakley to signal the administrations return to focusing on political reconciliation.

The Somali National Alliance perceived the cessation of the military operation as a decisive victory. The stand down order given to U.S. forces in Somalia led other UNOSOM II contingents to effectively avoid any confrontation with the SNA. This led to the majority of patrols in Mogadishu to cease and numerous checkpoints in SNA controlled territory to be abandoned. For the remainder of the operation UNOSOM troops withdrew into entrenched positions and practically disappeared from Mogadishu streets. The Somali National Alliance and other factions would retake full position of territory in the city that they had previously conceded.The next month on 16 November 1993, the United Nations Security Council instructed Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali to suspend arrest actions and declared the release of all Somali National Alliance prisoners of war. The following day Mohamed Farah Aidid announced that the decision had proved that the SNA had achieved a victory over the UN. After the cessation of hostilities between the SNA and UNOSOM, Acting Special Representative Lansana Kouyate (replacing Adm. Johnathan Howe) successfully launched an initiative to normalize relations in March 1994. Numerous points of contention between the respective organizations were discussed at length and understandings were reached, facilitating the normalization of the relationship between the UN and the SNA. That same year the UNOSOM II began withdrawing. The withdrawal of UNOSOM forces weakened Aidids prominence within the SNA, as the war had served to unify the alliance around a common foreign enemy.

Withdrawal and end of UNOSOM II
All US forces in Somalia completely withdrew on March 3, 1994. All European contingents also decided to withdraw at this time, leaving behind almost exclusively Third World forces to man UNOSOM II. Though it was widely feared the less equipped contingents would come under attack from Somali militia following the Western withdrawal, the period was mostly uneventful. Local hostility forced the remaining UNOSOM staff in Somalia to travel by helicopter, even for distances as short as a kilometre. This was in stark contrast to the intervention's onset when the UN personnel could travel via bus shuttle system.

On November 4, 1994, after peacemaking efforts by the remaining 1,900 UNOSOM II troops failed, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) voted unanimously to withdraw all forces in Resolution 954. Subsequently, on November 16, the UNSC authorized Resolution 955, placing new emphasis on peacemaking and reconstruction and returning to a less reactive role. The withdrawal of the remaining UN military and police troops from Somalia was completed on March 28, 1995, thereby ending UNOSOM II's mandate.

Casualties
UNOSOM II forces would suffer at total of 385 casualties, including over 130 deaths. US forces would suffer a total of 196 casualties during the operation, including 26 deaths. 7 Nigerian soldiers would be killed during a skirmish with the SNA in September 1993. Estimates of total UNOSOM II personnel killed vary from 134 to 154 killed across the entire operation. 110 are attributed to combat related fatalities. The vast majority, approximately 80, would be killed during 1993.

Although the operation's casualties have been surpassed by the more recent MINUSMA operation in Mali, UNOSOM II was among the deadliest missions in UN history for peacekeepers. It stands out for having the highest number of deaths resulting from hostile actions compared to both earlier and subsequent operations.

6,000 to 10,000 Somalis had been estimated to have been widely estimated to have been killed or wounded during the operation, many as a result of fire from helicopter gunships. According to American foreign correspondent Scott Peterson, Aidid personally told him a total of 13,000 Somalis had been killed by UNOSOM forces. In the view of Peterson, it was unlikely Somali deaths during the UNOSOM II surpassed 2,000. Peterson asserts that nearly two-thirds of the Somali casualties were women and children. According to SNA personnel, an estimated 900 fighters died in the war with UNOSOM, the most significant loss being during the Battle of Mogadishu.

Results of 1994 UN Inquiry
The month following the Battle of Mogadishu, the United States urged the United Nations to establish the commission to determine who was responsible for the clashes between UNOSOM II peacekeepers and Aidid's SNA forces. A three-man UN inquiry commission headed by Matthew Nglube, former chief justice of Zambia, Gen. Emmanuel Erskine of Ghana and Gen. Gustav Hagglund of Finland was set up by the Security Council. On 30 November 1993 the commission landed in Mogadishu.

The report charged the Gen. Aidid with launching the 5 June 1993, attack which initiated the conflict between the SNA and UNOSOM. Notably, it also heavily criticized U.N. peacekeeping officials for embarking on a campaign of forceful disarmament of Somali factions, an effort that antagonized the Aidid's forces and sharpened tensions. The commission questioned the merit of the aggressive UNOSOM peacekeeping strategy and argued that the U.N. should not have abandoned its neutral role in Somalia. The inquiry criticized the United States for operating under a separate military command and leading raids against Aidid that were not coordinated with UNOSOM officers. The commission condemned the use of American combat helicopters over the heavily populated neighborhoods of Mogadishu and criticized tactics as "incompatible with basic tenets of peacekeeping". The report recommended financial reparations for Somali civilians who became victims of the fighting.

Criticism of UNOSOM II

Over emphasis on military operations
UNOSOM II was widely criticized for placing too much emphasis on military operations. Over 90% of the operations $1.6 billion budget was used for military or security purposes. In July 1993, UN relief head Jan Eliasson publicly admonished UNOSOM II for spending 10 times as much on military operations in Somalia than it did on aid. At the time he would caution that the original objective of sending troops to Somalia was being forgotten. Due to the war with the Somali National Alliance and the insurgency, UNOSOM II would end up spending far more than the allocated $1.6 billion.

Ramesh Thakur, a former Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations, pointed out that the extent, intensity, and frequency of military force used by UNOSOM II after 5 June 1993, did not align with the principles and definition of a peacekeeping operation as defined by the United Nations. The day after the Battle of Mogadishu, after being asked by journalists on national news if Malaysia disagreed with any UNOSOM policies, Defence Minister Najib Razak would comment: "We find there is too much emphasis on military action, like it was an obsession." This would lead to accusations from some Somalia observers that UNOSOM was helping build up the myth of Aidid by depicting him as the only Somali capable of defying a foreign military presence.

Excessive force and human rights abuses
UNOSOM II forces were criticized for various instances of human rights abuses, violations of international law and excessive force by a wide range of academics, foreign correspondents and humanitarian organizations. Doctors Without Borders, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International would all criticize UNOSOM II on these grounds. Africa Rights Watch and Doctors Without Borders would both publish detailed reports of abuses by UN forces during the summer of 1993. While conceding UN troops were in a difficult position, the Africa Rights Watch report would conclude that abuses and atrocities carried out by UNOSOM II force stemmed from the highest echelons of the command structure and were not cases of undisciplined actions by individual soldiers. According to de Waal, on several occasions UNOSOM forces in Mogadishu violated the Geneva Conventions. Among the forces responsible for human rights abuses were the United States, Italy, France, Nigeria and numerous other UNOSOM contingents.

Some of the most widely criticized events that occurred from 5 June to 3–4 October 1993 include:

 US forces fired missiles at Digfer Hospital in Mogadishu on the belief that Aidids forces were hiding in the buildings, resulting in the deaths of nine patients. Africa Rights Watch would assert that the incident represented a prima-facie case that UN command in Mogadishu had violated the Geneva Convention.
 Pakistani forces fired on two large public demonstrations killing over 20 Somalis, many of whom were women and children.
 US Quick Reaction Force launched the Abdi House raid during a meeting of Somali elders, resulting in the deaths of at least 60 civilians according to Amnesty International.
 Rony Brauman, who was then serving as the president of Doctors Without Borders, detailed an incident in which the premises of Action Against Hunger in Mogadishu, also housing the Doctors Without Borders team, came under attack by UNOSOM forces. Two U.S. AH-1 Cobra helicopters, disregarding the clearly visible Red Cross flags and emblems of both humanitarian organizations on the building, fired two missiles at the compound before strafing it with machine-gun fire, resulting in the death of one aid worker and injuries to several others. According to Brauman the incident was triggered by the presence of a vehicle nearby which the attack helicopters had deemed suspicious, but belonged to journalists from the France 2 television channel.
 In mid-September US AH-1 Cobra helicopters killed nearly 100 Somalis who were in the vicinity of a clash between the SNA and the 10th Mountain Division using TOW missiles and cannon fire. Children living in the surrounding neighborhood had also been killed by stray helicopter fire.
The UN's response to these events were characterized by a marked lack of transparency and accountability. Despite possessing internal advice from its own legal and political staff in Somalia, UNOSOM would reportedly disregard their input and criticism. Amnesty International would describe the UN's internal investigatory mechanisms for dealing with human rights violations by its troops in Somalia as highly inadequate and inconsistent with the UN's own standards. In the vast majority of incidents, no UN forces were ever reprimanded or punished.

Misleading claims and relationship with journalists
Former Under-Secretary-General Ramesh Thakur would further point out that UNOSOM II consistently undermined its authority by deceiving and misleading journalists. He noted that The Times correspondents in Mogadishu could recall numerous occasions where UNOSOM officials had lied to reporters. BBC journalist Mark Doyle would note that reporters in Mogadishu often treated the versions of events purported by UNOSOM with as much skepticism as the version of events purported by Aidid. Doyle would claim that information given out by UN officials was sometimes deliberately misleading; and often UNOSOM would only give details of military operations if the reporters already possessed their own leads. Reuters Mogadishu correspondent Aidan Hartley would later claim that UN officials, "...toed a line of propaganda that was palpably absurd to reporters who went around and saw what was happening."

In one incident noted by both Aidan Hartley and Ramesh Thakur, an American AH-1 Cobra helicopter launched a missile strike into Mogadishu in front of a large crowd of Somalis and foreign correspondents. Witnesses watched and filmed the TOW missile leave the helicopter and spiral into a tea shop, killing a Somali woman. A press conference was held after, during which the UNOSOM spokesman flatly denied the eyewitness accounts and claimed that no helicopters had launched any attack. Following the denial, a TV cameraman got up and played the tape he had filmed of the helicopter firing the missile. UNOSOM would only admit responsibility after footage of the attack was later broadcast globally. In another significant incident, Pakistani UNOSOM troops opened fire with a machine gun onto a crowd of protesters. Thousands of Somalis citizens and dozens foreign journalists had witnessed the troops open fire, unprovoked, from a rooftop emplacement resulting in the deaths of dozens of civilians, including women and children. UNOSOM would claim that Somali National Alliance militia had used the crowd as human shields to fire on the Pakistanis, who then shot back in self defence. According to The Washington Post, the UNOSOM account of the shooting was disputed by virtually all witnesses.

According to American war correspondent Scott Peterson, US forces had censored images of mortars firing from UN bases directly into the city of Mogadishu by confiscating the pictures and arresting the photojournalist who had taken the image. In another incident, Associated Press photographer Peter Northall was photographing an American UH-60 Black Hawk purposely "rotor washing" a market in the city, only to then be directly targeted and assaulted with six percussion grenades from the helicopter. UNOSOM II press spokesman, US Maj. David Stockwell, would defend the incident stating that Northall posed "a threat to himself".

Aftermath and Legacy
UNOSOM II is widely regarded as unsuccessful in achieving its main objectives and having ended in failure, largely due to the decision to withdraw without completing its goals following the Battle of Mogadishu in October 1993. According to Alex de Waal, the failure of the operation can only be understood, "...in the context of the routine brutality and impunity of the many of the military contingents, which antagonized Somalis who would have otherwise been supportive." A 1995 Amnesty International report would conclude that the operation had demonstrated a poor record of promoting and protecting human rights, which would consequently severely impede its ability to function.

UNOSOM II's complete departure in early 1995 did not result in the eruption of violence that was widely predicted, though the civil war continued to simmer with occasional clashes between factions. The withdrawal led to the formation of local administrations gaining momentum throughout Somalia, such as localized Islamic Courts and regional administrations like Puntland, resulting in period of relative stability and economic growth until the early 2000's. Somali political science professor Hussein Adam notes, "With the collapse of UNOSOM-sponsored institutions, more authentic entities, including authoritative local leaders, have emerged. With the distorting effect of UNOSOM no longer present, the process of both political and economic transformation has been facilitated. In certain places, including northern Mogadishu, alternative institutions have emerged without any external support."

In the view of Walter Clarke, a high ranking US official involved in Operation Restore Hope, and Jeffrey Herbst, Associate Professor at Princeton University, "The intervention in Somalia was not an abject failure; an estimated 100,000 lives were saved. But its mismanagement should be an object lesson for peacekeepers...on other such missions." The figure of Somalis saved following the large scale military intervention in December 1992 is disputed by various other academics and organizations. According to an assessment by the Washington based independent NGO Refugee Policy Group, only 10,000 to 25,000 lives of the approximately 100,000 rescued by international assistance had been saved by the UNITAF and UNOSOM II interventions, though de Waal argues the true figure of lives saved may have been even lower.

Charles W. Maynes, an American diplomat and editor of Foreign Policy, reported that according to private estimates by CIA officials, U.S. troops alone may have been responsible for between 7,000 and 10,000 Somali casualties. Mohamed Sahnoun, former Special Representative of the Secretary General to Somalia claimed 6,000 to 10,000 Somalis had been killed in the war with UNOSOM forces. This has led to debates about the net impact of UNOSOM II.

In Somali culture, the era has become the subject of numerous plays and poetry. As noted by Dr. Ana Ljubinkovic, these works often take the form of sophisticated dramas, showcasing a critical perspective of UNOSOM's perceived arrogance and misjudgments.

Notes

Bibliography

External links
 United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) (2003-2005) at the United Nations Archives Archived
 UN page of UNOSOM I Archived
 UN page of UNOSOM II Archived
 Overview of the US intervention in Somalia Archived

Operations involving American special forces
United Nations operations in Somalia
Somalia–United States relations
Battle of Mogadishu (1993)
Military operations involving India
Military operations involving New Zealand
Conflicts in 1993
Conflicts in 1994
Conflicts in 1995
Somali Civil War
1993 in Somalia
1994 in Somalia
1995 in Somalia
Military operations involving Saudi Arabia

United Nations Operation in Somalia II


In geometry, a centre (British English) or center (American English) () of an object is a point in some sense in the middle of the object. According to the specific definition of centre taken into consideration, an object might have no centre. If geometry is regarded as the study of isometry groups, then a centre is a fixed point of all the isometries that move the object onto itself.

Circles, spheres, and segments
The centre of a circle is the point equidistant from the points on the edge. Similarly the centre of a sphere is the point equidistant from the points on the surface, and the centre of a line segment is the midpoint of the two ends.

Symmetric objects
For objects with several symmetries, the centre of symmetry is the point left unchanged by the symmetric actions. So the centre of a square, rectangle, rhombus or parallelogram is where the diagonals intersect, this is (among other properties) the fixed point of rotational symmetries. Similarly the centre of an ellipse or a hyperbola is where the axes intersect.

Triangles

Several special points of a triangle are often described as triangle centres:

the circumcentre, which is the centre of the circle that passes through all three vertices;
the centroid or centre of mass, the point on which the triangle would balance if it had uniform density;
the incentre, the centre of the circle that is internally tangent to all three sides of the triangle;
the orthocentre, the intersection of the triangle's three altitudes; and
the nine-point centre, the centre of the circle that passes through nine key points of the triangle.

For an equilateral triangle, these are the same point, which lies at the intersection of the three axes of symmetry of the triangle, one third of the distance from its base to its apex.

A strict definition of a triangle centre is a point whose trilinear coordinates are f(a,b,c) : f(b,c,a) : f(c,a,b) where f is a function of the lengths of the three sides of the triangle, a, b, c such that:

 f is homogeneous in a, b, c; i.e., f(ta,tb,tc)=thf(a,b,c) for some real power h; thus the position of a centre is independent of scale.
 f is symmetric in its last two arguments; i.e., f(a,b,c)= f(a,c,b); thus position of a centre in a mirror-image triangle is the mirror-image of its position in the original triangle.

This strict definition excludes pairs of bicentric points such as the Brocard points (which are interchanged by a mirror-image reflection). As of 2020, the Encyclopedia of Triangle Centers lists over 39,000 different triangle centres.

Tangential polygons and cyclic polygons

A tangential polygon has each of its sides tangent to a particular circle, called the incircle or inscribed circle. The centre of the incircle, called the incentre, can be considered a centre of the polygon.

A cyclic polygon has each of its vertices on a particular circle, called the circumcircle or circumscribed circle. The centre of the circumcircle, called the circumcentre, can be considered a centre of the polygon.

If a polygon is both tangential and cyclic, it is called bicentric. (All triangles are bicentric, for example.) The incentre and circumcentre of a bicentric polygon are not in general the same point.

General polygons

The centre of a general polygon can be defined in several different ways. The "vertex centroid" comes from considering the polygon as being empty but having equal masses at its vertices. The "side centroid" comes from considering the sides to have constant mass per unit length. The usual centre, called just the centroid (centre of area) comes from considering the surface of the polygon as having constant density. These three points are in general not all the same point.

Projective conics
In projective geometry every line has a point at infinity or "figurative point" where it crosses all the lines that are parallel to it. The ellipse, parabola, and hyperbola of Euclidean geometry are called conics in projective geometry and may be constructed as Steiner conics from a projectivity that is not a perspectivity. A symmetry of the projective plane with a given conic relates every point or pole to a line called its polar. The concept of centre in projective geometry uses this relation. The following assertions are from G. B. Halsted.
 The harmonic conjugate of a point at infinity with respect to the end points of a finite sect is the 'centre' of that sect.

 The pole of the straight at infinity with respect to a certain conic is the 'centre' of the conic.

 The polar of any figurative point is on the centre of the conic and is called a 'diameter'.

 The centre of any ellipse is within it, for its polar does not meet the curve, and so there are no tangents from it to the curve. The centre of a parabola is the contact point of the figurative straight.

 The centre of a hyperbola lies without the curve, since the figurative straight crosses the curve. The tangents from the centre to the hyperbola are called 'asymptotes'. Their contact points are the two points at infinity on the curve.

See also
 Centrepoint
 Chebyshev centre
 Fixed points of isometry groups in Euclidean space
 Instantaneous centre of rotation

References

Elementary geometry

Centre (geometry)


A Pigovian tax is a type of tax that takes into account negative effects of things produced.

This concepts tries to reconcile both the interests of the producer and the social interests of the consumer.

For example, a producer of plastic bottles only cares about their profits, not on the negative effect that the bottles in the trash may have on nature. Other example may be unintended consequences from buildings, or the increase of a need for police in areas where there is more consumption of alcohol.

The concept was studied by economist Arthur Cecil Pigou in his book The Economics of Welfare.

Taxation

Pigovian tax


Rudolf Wojtowicz (born 9 June 1956 in Bytom) is a retired Polish football player, who in different periods of his career was a defender or a midfielder. Wojtowicz initially represented Szombierki Bytom, winning Polish championships in 1980. In the early 1980s he left Poland and settled in Germany. Wojtowicz played for Bayer Leverkusen (1982–1986) as well as Fortuna Düsseldorf (1986–1992). Also, between 1996 and 1998, he was head coach of Fortuna. Currently, he works as one of coaches of Hertha Berlin.

Wojtowicz capped once for Poland, on 12 April 1978, in a game vs. Ireland.

References

Living people
1956 births
Polish men's footballers
Poland men's international footballers
Bundesliga players
Bayer 04 Leverkusen players
Fortuna Düsseldorf players
Expatriate men's footballers in Germany
Footballers from Bytom
Polish expatriate men's footballers
Polish football managers
Fortuna Düsseldorf managers
Szombierki Bytom players
German footballers needing infoboxes
Men's association football defenders
Men's association football midfielders

Rudolf Wojtowicz


Louis Bourdages (July 6, 1764 – January 20, 1835) was a businessman and political figure in Lower Canada.

He was born Louis-Marie Bourdages in Jeune-Lorette, Quebec in 1764, the son of Raymond Bourdages, an Acadian doctor and merchant. Bourdages studied at the Petit Séminaire de Québec, where he met Pierre-Stanislas Bédard. After he left school, he became a sailor and travelled to Europe and the West Indies. He returned to Quebec City in 1787, where he was unsuccessful in establishing himself as a merchant, and moved to Saint-Denis on the Richelieu River in 1790 where he became a farmer. He later articled as a notary and qualified to practice in 1805. Bourdages also became an important land-owner in the region.

In 1804, he was elected to the Legislative Assembly of Lower Canada for Richelieu; he represented this region until 1814. In 1806, he helped found Le Canadien. Bourdages was generally opposed to measures intended to put an end to seigneurial tenure. During the War of 1812, he served in the local militia, reaching the rank of lieutenant-colonel. He was elected in Buckinghamshire in an 1815 by-election and then represented it from 1820 to 1830, when Buckinghamshire was reorganized. He then represented Nicolet in the assembly from 1830 until his death at Saint-Denis in 1835. Bourdages helped prepare the Ninety-Two Resolutions submitted to the British government in 1834. In January 1835, he suffered an attack of apoplexy and died several days later.

His son Rémi-Séraphin, who represented Rouville in the legislative assembly, died before his father in 1832.

External links

1764 births
1835 deaths
Members of the Legislative Assembly of Lower Canada

Louis Bourdages


Jean-Nicolas Démeunier (sometimes Desmeuniers) (15 March 1751 – 2 February 1814) was a French author and politician.

Biography

Démeunier was born in Nozeroy in the department of Jura. He is the author of several historical essays, political and moral, and many translations of English travel books.

He attended his studies in his home province before his literary abilities earned him the attention of the royal court. Démeunier was appointed Royal Censor and secretary to "Monsieur", the Louis XVIII, who was the brother of King Louis XVI, and the King of France after the Restoration, an event that occurred only months after Démeunier's death.

French Revolution

Supporter of the French Revolution, he was elected (16 May 1789) by the Third Estate of the city of Paris to the Estates General with 133 votes. When the conservative members of the Constitutional Committee resigned mid-September 1789, he was one of the deputies selected to replace them. He served a turn as President (22 December 1789 – 3 January 1790) of the National Assembly.

It was as a member of the Constitutional Committee that Démeunier had the biggest impact. He presented to the Assembly on behalf of the Committee a report (7 March 1791) on the need for the ministerial responsibility, and later declared support (26 August 1791) for the eligibility of the members of the royal family to hold elective office. He would also promote the organization of the jury and the Court of Cassation.

After the session, Demeunier was elected administrator of the city of Paris (7 November 1791), but he resigned immediately in protest of the election of Jerome Pétion as mayor.

He fled to the United States during the Reign of Terror.

Directory, Consulate, and Empire

Démeunier returned to France in 1796, and was candidate to the French Directory.

The first Consul appointed Démeunier (4 Nivose VIII/25 December 1799) member of the Tribunat at its inception; he became president of this assembly 2 January 1800. He was further elevated to the Sénat conservateur 28 Nivose X (18 January 1802).

He received further awards under Napoleon, named to the Legion of Honor, first as Member 9 Vendémiaire XII (2 October 1803), then as commander 25 Prairial XII (14 June 1804), and finally as Grand Officer (30 June 1811). Démeunier was established comte de l'Empire (26 April 1808).

Démeunier died months before the fall of Napoleon. He is interred in the Panthéon in Paris.

Lycée

Démeunier was particularly active in the management of the newly created Lycée of which "Monsieur", the Comte de Provence, was the principal Maecenas. This Lycée was created by combining the Musée de Paris with the Musée Scientifique—both had been created by the Société Appolonienne. The aim of these institutions was to provide good-quality education to the general public. After the return of Louis XVIII to Paris, the Lycée remained active under the name "Athénée Royal", until 1848.

Jean-Nicolas Démeunier may also be considered one of the key figures in the organisation of support for the American cause. For example, his L'Amérique indépendante, ou les différents constitutions de treize provinces (1790) was to be of great influence on the democratic experiments in Belgium in the few years preceding the French Revolution. (For a detailed discussion of events and relevant sources see Gorman 1925, reference below.)

The real significance of "L'Amérique indépendante" lay in the fact that it was published as a separate volume of Démeunier's contributions to Charles Joseph Panckoucke's "Encyclopédie méthodique", which had been corrected and debated in correspondence with Thomas Jefferson.

Writings

 L'Esprit des usages et des coutumes des différens peuples, ou observations tirées des voyageurs et des historiens (3 volumes, 1776). Réédition : J.-M. Place, Paris, 1988.
 Encyclopédie méthodique. Économie politique et diplomatique, partie dédiée et présentée à monseigneur le baron de Breteuil, ministre et secrétaire d'État, &c. Par M. Démeunier, avocat, & censeur royal (4 volumes, 1784–1788)
 Essai sur les États-Unis (1786).
 Des Conditions nécessaires à la légalité des États-Généraux (1788).
 Avis aux députés qui doivent représenter la Nation dans l'Assemblée des États-Généraux (1789).
 L'Amérique indépendante, ou Les différentes constitutions des treize provinces qui se sont érigées en républiques sous le nom d'États-Unis de l'Amérique. Avec un précis de l'histoire de chaque province, & des remarques sur les constitutions, la population, les finances & l'état dans lequel les provinces se trouvent actuellement (1790).

References
 Daniel Ligou ed., Dictionnaire de la franc-maçonnerie (Paris : Presses universitaires de France, 1987).
 Roger Hahn, The anatomy of a scientific institution: The Paris Academy of Sciences, 1666–1803 (Berkeley : University of California Press, 1971).
 Howard C. Rice Jr., Thomas Jefferson's Paris (Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1976).
 Thomas Kiely Gorman, America and Belgium: a study of the influence of the United States upon the Belgian Revolution of 1789–1790 (London : T. F. Unwin, [1925]).

External links

 Jefferson to Démeunier
 Démeunier: L'Esprit des Usages et Coutumes des differents peuples (French text)

1751 births
1814 deaths
18th-century French writers
18th-century French male writers
18th-century French politicians
Members of the Sénat conservateur
Les Neuf Sœurs
Burials at the Panthéon, Paris
French encyclopedists

Jean-Nicolas Démeunier


is the deputy director of Mainichi Broadcasting System's Tokyo office. Since beginning the network's 6:00pm Saturday timeblock, he has been involved in the planning and production of numerous anime, including various series from the Gundam universe, Code Geass, Blood+, Fullmetal Alchemist, Eureka Seven, Terra e... and Darker than Black: Kuro no Keiyakusha.

Biography
After graduating from the University of Tokyo's school of literature, Takeda joined Mainichi Broadcasting System in 1984, first working at the network's news bureau and later transferring to the network's Tokyo television department. Among the affairs he had covered during his time in the network's news department was the infamous Glico Morinaga case.

After transferring to MBS' television department, Takeda became involved in the production and planning of numerous anime television series, chiefly starting off the network's Saturday 6:00pm timeblock and being involved in its major popularity and success. Beginning with the timeblock's first major series, Mobile Suit Gundam SEED and followed by its successors such as Fullmetal Alchemist, Blood+ and Mobile Suit Gundam 00, the slot has enjoyed high ratings since its inception, with Takeda being involved in the planning and production of each of its shows and having been largely credited for its success. He guest appeared as King T@KED@ in Mobile Suit Gundam SEED DESTINY.

Takeda has also been involved in collaborations with the satellite anime television network Animax, with Animax having aired numerous of Mainichi Broadcasting System's anime, as well as jump starting several promotional campaigns in magazines and other media which have helped further promote each of the anime programs aired by the network.

Produced anime television series

Current programs
Star Driver: Kagayaki no Takuto (Planning)
Puella Magi Madoka Magica (Planning)

Previous programs
Mobile Suit Gundam SEED (Producer)
Fullmetal Alchemist (Planning)
Mobile Suit Gundam SEED DESTINY (Executive Producer)
Blood+ (Planning)
Eureka Seven (Planning)
Tenpō Ibun Ayakashi Ayashi (Planning)
Code Geass: Lelouch of the Rebellion (first season) (Planning)
Terra e... (Planning)
Darker than Black: Kuro no Keiyakusha (Planning)
Mobile Suit Gundam 00 (Executive Producer)
Shakugan no Shana II (Planning)
Macross Frontier (Executive Producer)
Mobile Suit Gundam 00 (season 2) (Executive Producer)
Black Butler (Planning)
Fullmetal Alchemist: Brotherhood (Planning)
Basquash! (Executive Producer)
Sengoku Basara Two (Planning)

References

External links

Japanese production designers
People from Nara Prefecture
Living people
Japanese anime producers
Japanese television producers
1960 births

Seiji Takeda