In philosophy of mind, the hard problem of consciousness is to explain why and how humans and other organisms have qualia, phenomenal consciousness, or subjective experiences. It is contrasted with the "easy problems" of explaining why and how physical systems give a (healthy) human being the ability to discriminate, to integrate information, and to perform behavioral functions such as watching, listening, speaking (including generating an utterance that appears to refer to personal behaviour or belief), and so forth.
The easy problems are amenable to functional explanation: that is, explanations that are mechanistic or behavioral, as each physical system can be explained (at least in principle) purely by reference to the "structure and dynamics" that underpin the phenomenon.<ref
name="Chalmers" />

Proponents of the hard problem argue that it is categorically different from the easy problems since no mechanistic or behavioral explanation could explain the character of an experience, not even in principle.  Even after all the relevant functional facts are explicated, they argue, there will still remain a further question: "why is the performance of these functions accompanied by experience?" To bolster their case, proponents of the hard problem frequently turn to various philosophical thought experiments, involving philosophical zombies (which, they claim, are conceivable) or inverted qualia, or the claimed ineffability of colour experiences, or the claimed unknowability of foreign states of consciousness, such as the experience of being a bat.

The terms 'hard problem' and 'easy problems' were coined by the philosopher David Chalmers in a 1994 talk given at The Science of Consciousness conference held in Tucson, Arizona. The following year, the main talking points of Chalmers talk was then published in The Journal of Consciousness Studies. The publication gained significant attention from consciousness researchers, and became the subject of a special volume of the journal
which was later published into a book. In 1996, Chalmers published The Conscious Mind: a book length treatment of the hard problem, in which he elaborated on his core arguments and responded to their counterarguments. His use of the word easy is "tongue-in-cheek". As the cognitive psychologist Steven Pinker puts it, they are about as easy as going to Mars or curing cancer. "That is, scientists more or less know what to look for, and with enough brainpower and funding, they would probably crack it in this century."

The existence of the hard problem is disputed. It has been accepted by some philosophers of mind such as Joseph Levine, Colin McGinn, and Ned Block and cognitive neuroscientists such as Francisco Varela, Giulio Tononi, and Christof Koch. On the other hand, its existence is denied by other philosophers of mind, such as Daniel Dennett, Massimo Pigliucci, Thomas Metzinger, Patricia Churchland, and Keith Frankish, and by cognitive neuroscientists such as Stanislas Dehaene, Bernard Baars, Anil Seth, and Antonio Damasio. Clinical neurologist and skeptic Steven Novella has dismissed it as "the hard non-problem". According to a 2020 PhilPapers survey, a large majority (62.42%) of the philosophers surveyed said they believed that the hard problem is a genuine problem, while 29.72% said that it does not exist.

Overview
David Chalmers first formulated the hard problem in his paper "Facing up to the problem of consciousness" (1995) and expanded upon it in The Conscious Mind (1996). His works provoked comment. Some, such as David Lewis and Steven Pinker, have praised Chalmers for his argumentative rigour and "impeccable clarity". Pinker later said, in 2018, "In the end I still think that the hard problem is a meaningful conceptual problem, but agree with Dennett that it is not a meaningful scientific problem. No one will ever get a grant to study whether you are a zombie or whether the same Captain Kirk walks on the deck of the Enterprise and the surface of Zakdorn. And I agree with several other philosophers that it may be futile to hope for a solution at all, precisely because it is a conceptual problem, or, more accurately, a problem with our concepts." Daniel Dennett and Patricia Churchland, among others, believe that the hard problem is best seen as a collection of easy problems that will be solved through further analysis of the brain and behaviour.

Consciousness is an ambiguous term. It can be used to mean self consciousness, awareness, the state of being awake, and so on. Chalmers uses Thomas Nagel's definition of consciousness: the feeling of what it is like to be something. Consciousness, in this sense, is synonymous with experience.

Chalmers' formulation

The problem of consciousness, Chalmers argues, is two problems: the easy problems and the hard problem.

Easy problems
The easy problems are amenable to reductive inquiry. They are a logical consequence of lower level facts about the world, similar to how a clock's ability to tell time is a logical consequence of its clockwork and structure, or a hurricane is a logical consequence of the structures and functions of certain weather patterns. A clock, a hurricane, and the easy problems, are all the sum of their parts (as are most things).

The easy problems relevant to consciousness concern mechanistic analysis of the neural processes that accompany behaviour. Examples of these include how sensory systems work, how sensory data is processed in the brain, how that data influences behaviour or verbal reports, the neural basis of thought and emotion, and so on. They are problems that can be analyzed through "structures and functions".

Hard problem
The hard problem, in contrast, is the problem of why and how those processes are accompanied by experience. It may further include the question of why these processes are accompanied by this or that particular experience, rather than some other kind of experience. In other words, the hard problem is the problem of explaining why certain mechanisms are accompanied by conscious experience. For example, why should neural processing in the brain lead to the felt sensations of, say, feelings of hunger? And why should those neural firings lead to feelings of hunger rather than some other feeling (such as, for example, feelings of thirst)?

Chalmers argues that it is conceivable that the relevant behaviours associated with hunger, or any other feeling, could occur even in the absence of that feeling. This suggests that experience is irreducible to physical systems such as the brain. This is the topic of the next section.

How the easy and hard problems are related

Chalmers believes that the hard problem is irreducible to the easy problems: solving the easy problems will not lead to a solution to the hard problems. This is because the easy problems pertain to the causal structure of the world while the hard problem pertains to consciousness, and facts about consciousness include facts that go beyond mere causal or structural description.

For example, suppose someone were to stub their foot and yelp. In this scenario, the easy problems are mechanistic explanations that involve the activity of the nervous system and brain and its relation to the environment (such as the propagation of nerve signals from the toe to the brain, the processing of that information and how it leads to yelping, and so on). The hard problem is the question of why these mechanisms are accompanied by the feeling of pain, or why these feelings of pain feel the particular way that they do. Chalmers argues that facts about the neural mechanisms of pain, and pain behaviours, do not lead to facts about conscious experience. Facts about conscious experience are, instead, further facts, not derivable from facts about the brain. An explanation for all of the relevant physical facts about neural processing would leave unexplained facts about what it is like to feel pain. This is in part because functions and physical structures of any sort could conceivably exist in the absence of experience. Alternatively, they could exist alongside a different set of experiences. For example, it is logically possible for a perfect replica of Chalmers to have no experience at all, or for it to have a different set of experiences (such as an inverted visible spectrum, so that the blue-yellow red-green axes of its visual field are flipped).

The same cannot be said about clocks, hurricanes, or other physical things. In those cases, a structural or functional description is a complete description. A perfect replica of a clock is a clock, a perfect replica of a hurricane is a hurricane, and so on. The difference is that physical things are nothing more than their physical constituents. For example, water is nothing more than H2O molecules, and understanding everything about H2O molecules is to understand everything there is to know about water. But consciousness is not like this. Knowing everything there is to know about the brain, or any physical system, is not to know everything there is to know about consciousness. So consciousness, then, must not be purely physical.

Implications for physicalism

Chalmers's idea contradicts physicalism (sometimes labelled materialism). This is the view that everything that exists is a physical or material thing, so everything can be reduced to microphysical things (such as subatomic particles and the interactions between them). For example, a desk is a physical thing, because it is nothing more than a complex arrangement of a large number of subatomic particles interacting in a certain way. According to physicalism, everything can be explained by appeal to its microphysical constituents, including consciousness. Chalmers's hard problem presents a counterexample to this view, since it suggests that consciousness cannot be reductively explained by appealing to its microphysical constituents. So if the hard problem is a real problem then physicalism must be false, and if physicalism is true then the hard problem must not be a real problem.

Though Chalmers rejects physicalism, he is still a naturalist.

Historical precedents

The hard problem of consciousness has scholarly antecedents considerably earlier than Chalmers. Chalmers himself notes that "a number of thinkers in the recent and distant past" have "recognised the particular difficulties of explaining consciousness." He states that all his original 1996 paper contributed to the discussion was "a catchy name, a minor reformulation of philosophically familiar points".

Among others, thinkers who have made arguments similar to Chalmers' formulation of the hard problem include Isaac Newton, John Locke, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, John Stuart Mill, and Thomas Henry Huxley. Likewise, Asian philosophers like Dharmakirti and Guifeng Zongmi discussed the problem of how consciousness arises from unconscious matter.

The problem's explanatory targets
Philosopher Raamy Majeed argued in 2016 that the hard problem is associated with two "explanatory targets":
[PQ] Physical processing gives rise to experiences with a phenomenal character.
[Q] Our phenomenal qualities are thus-and-so.

The first fact concerns the relationship between the physical and the phenomenal (i.e., how and why are some physical states felt states), whereas the second concerns the very nature of the phenomenal itself (i.e., what does the felt state feel like?).

Wolfgang Fasching argues that the hard problem is not about qualia, but about the what-it-is-like-ness of experience in Nagel's sense—about the givenness of phenomenal contents:

Today there is a strong tendency to simply equate consciousness with the qualia. Yet there is clearly something not quite right about this. The "itchiness of itches" and the "hurtfulness of pain" are qualities we are conscious of. So philosophy of mind tends to treat consciousness as if it consisted simply of the contents of consciousness (the phenomenal qualities), while it really is precisely consciousness of contents, the very givenness of whatever is subjectively given. And therefore the problem of consciousness does not pertain so much to some alleged "mysterious, nonpublic objects", i.e. objects that seem to be only "visible" to the respective subject, but rather to the nature of "seeing" itself (and in today's philosophy of mind astonishingly little is said about the latter).

Related concepts

The mind–body problem

The mind–body problem is the problem of how the mind and the body relate. The mind body problem is more general than the hard problem of consciousness, since it is the problem of discovering how the mind and body relate in general, thereby implicating any theoretical framework that broaches the topic. The hard problem, in contrast, is often construed as a problem uniquely faced by physicialist or materialist theories of mind.

"What Is It Like to Be a Bat?"

The philosopher Thomas Nagel posited in his 1974 paper "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" that experiences are essentially subjective (accessible only to the individual undergoing them—i.e., felt only by the one feeling them), while physical states are essentially objective (accessible to multiple individuals). So he argued we have no idea what it could mean to claim that an essentially subjective state just is an essentially non-subjective state (i.e., that a felt state is nothing but a functional state). In other words, we have no idea of what reductivism amounts to. He believes "every subjective phenomenon is essentially connected with a single point of view, and it seems inevitable that an objective, physical theory will abandon that point of view."

Explanatory gap

In 1983, the philosopher Joseph Levine proposed that there is an explanatory gap between our understanding of the physical world and our understanding of consciousness.

Levine's disputes that conscious states are reducible to neuronal or brain states. He uses the example of pain (as an example of a conscious state) and its reduction to the firing of c-fibers (a kind of nerve cell). The difficulty is as follows: even if consciousness is physical, it is not clear which physical states correspond to which conscious states. The bridges between the two levels of description will be contingent, rather than necessary. This is significant because in most contexts, relating two scientific levels of descriptions (such as physics and chemistry) is done with the assurance of necessary connections between the two theories (for example, chemistry follows with necessity from physics).

Levine illustrates this with a thought experiment: Suppose that humanity were to encounter an alien species, and suppose it is known that the aliens do not have any c-fibers. Even if one knows this, it is not obvious that the aliens do not feel pain: that would remain an open question. This is because the fact that aliens do not have c-fibers does not entail that they do not feel pain (in other words, feelings of pain do not follow with logical necessity from the firing of c-fibers). Levine thinks such thought experiments demonstrate an explanatory gap between consciousness and the physical world: even if consciousness is reducible to physical things, consciousness cannot be explained in terms of physical things, because the link between physical things and consciousness is contingent link.

Levine does not think that the explanatory gap means that consciousness is not physical: he is open to the idea that the explanatory gap is only an epistemological problem for physicalism. In contrast, Chalmers thinks that the hard problem of consciousness does show that consciousness is not physical.

Philosophical zombies

Philosophical zombies are a thought experiment commonly used in discussions of the hard problem. They are hypothetical beings physically identical to humans but that lack conscious experience. Philosophers such as Chalmers, Joseph Levine, and Francis Kripke take zombies as impossible within the bounds of nature but possible within the bounds of logic. This would imply that facts about experience are not logically entailed by the "physical" facts. Therefore, consciousness is irreducible. In Chalmers' words, "after God (hypothetically) created the world, he had more work to do." Daniel Dennett, a philosopher of mind, criticised the field's use of "the zombie hunch" which he deems an "embarrassment" that ought to "be dropped like a hot potato".

Knowledge argument

The knowledge argument, also known as Mary's Room, is another common thought experiment: A hypothetical neuroscientist named Mary has lived her whole life in a black-and-white room and has never seen colour before. She also happens to know everything there is to know about the brain and colour perception. Chalmers believes that when Mary sees the colour red for the first time, she gains new knowledge — the knowledge of "what red looks like" — which is distinct from, and irreducible to, her prior physical knowledge of the brain or visual system. A stronger form of the knowledge argument claims not merely that Mary would lack subjective knowledge of "what red looks like," but that she would lack knowledge of an objective fact about the world: namely, "what red looks like," a non-physical fact that can be learned only through direct experience (qualia). Others, such as Thomas Nagel, take a "physicalist" position, disagree with the argument in its stronger and/or weaker forms. For example, Nagel put forward a "speculative proposal" of devising a language that could "explain to a person blind from birth what it is like to see." The knowledge argument implies that such a language could not exist.

Philosophical responses
David Chalmers' formulation of the hard problem of consciousness provoked considerable debate within philosophy of mind, as well as scientific research.

The hard problem is considered a problem primarily for physicalist views of the mind (the view that the mind is a physical object or process), since physical explanations tend to be functional, or structural. Because of this, some physicalists have responded to the hard problem by seeking to show that it dissolves upon analysis. Other researchers accept the problem as real and seek to develop a theory of consciousness' place in the world that can solve it, by either modifying physicalism or abandoning it in favour of an alternative ontology (such as panpsychism or dualism).
A third response has been to accept the hard problem as real but deny human cognitive faculties can solve it.

PhilPapers is an organization that archives academic philosophy papers and periodically surveys professional philosophers about their views. It can be used to gauge professional attitudes towards the hard problem. As of the 2020 survey results, it seems that the majority of philosophers (62.42%) agree that the hard problem is real, with a substantial minority that disagrees (29.76%).

Attitudes towards physicalism also differ among professionals. In the 2009 PhilPapers survey, 56.5% of philosophers surveyed subscribed to physicalism and 27.1% of philosophers surveyed rejected physicalism. 16.4% fell into the "other" category. In the 2020 PhilPapers survey, 51.93% of philosophers surveyed indicated that they "accept or lean towards" physicalism and 32.08% indicated that they reject physicalism. 6.23% were "agnostic" or "undecided".

Different solutions have been proposed to the hard problem of consciousness. The sections below taxonomizes the various responses to the hard problem. The shape of this taxonomy was first introduced by Chalmers in a 2003 literature review on the topic. The labelling convention of this taxonomy has been incorporated into the technical vocabulary of analytic philosophy, being used by philosophers such as Adrian Boutel, Raamy Majeed, Janet Levin, Pete Mandik & Josh Weisberg, Roberto Pereira, and Helen Yetter-Chappell.

Type-A Materialism

Type-A materialism (also known as reductive materialism or a priori physicalism) is view characterized by a commitment to physicalism and a full rejection of the hard problem. By this view, the hard problem either does not exist or is just another easy problem, because every fact about the mind is a fact about the performance of various functions or behaviours. So, once all the relevant functions and behaviours have been accounted for, there will not be any facts left over in need of explanation. Thinkers who subscribe to type-A materialism include Paul and Patricia Churchland, Daniel Dennett, Keith Frankish, and Thomas Metzinger.

Some type-A materialists believe in the reality of phenomenal consciousness but believe it is nothing extra in addition to certain functions or behaviours. This view is sometimes referred to as strong reductionism. Other type-A materialists may reject the existence of phenomenal consciousness entirely. This view is referred to as eliminative materialism or illusionism.

Strong reductionism
Many philosophers have disputed that there is a hard problem of consciousness distinct from what Chalmers calls the easy problems of consciousness. Some among them, who are sometimes termed strong reductionists, hold that phenomenal consciousness (i.e., conscious experience) does exist but that it can be fully understood as reducible to the brain.

Broadly, strong reductionists accept that conscious experience is real but argue it can be fully understood in functional terms as an emergent property of the material brain. In contrast to weak reductionists (see above), strong reductionists reject ideas used to support the existence of a hard problem (that the same functional organization could exist without consciousness, or that a blind person who understood vision through a textbook would not know everything about sight) as simply mistaken intuitions.

A notable family of strong reductionist accounts are the higher-order theories of consciousness. In 2005, the philosopher Peter Carruthers wrote about "recognitional concepts of experience", that is, "a capacity to recognize [a] type of experience when it occurs in one's own mental life," and suggested that such a capacity could explain phenomenal consciousness without positing qualia. On the higher-order view, since consciousness is a representation, and representation is fully functionally analyzable, there is no hard problem of consciousness.

The philosophers Glenn Carruthers and Elizabeth Schier said in 2012 that the main arguments for the existence of a hard problem—philosophical zombies, Mary's room, and Nagel's bats—are only persuasive if one already assumes that "consciousness must be independent of the structure and function of mental states, i.e. that there is a hard problem." Hence, the arguments beg the question. The authors suggest that "instead of letting our conclusions on the thought experiments guide our theories of consciousness, we should let our theories of consciousness guide our conclusions from the thought experiments."

The philosopher Massimo Pigliucci argued in 2013 that the hard problem is misguided, resulting from a "category mistake". He said: "Of course an explanation isn't the same as an experience, but that's because the two are completely independent categories, like colors and triangles. It is obvious that I cannot experience what it is like to be you, but I can potentially have a complete explanation of how and why it is possible to be you."

In 2017, the philosopher Marco Stango, in a paper on John Dewey's approach to the problem of consciousness (which preceded Chalmers' formulation of the hard problem by over half a century), noted that Dewey's approach would see the hard problem as the consequence of an unjustified assumption that feelings and functional behaviors are not the same physical process: "For the Deweyan philosopher, the 'hard problem' of consciousness is a 'conceptual fact' only in the sense that it is a : the mistake of failing to see that the physical can be had as an episode of immediate sentiency."

The philosopher Thomas Metzinger likens the hard problem of consciousness to vitalism, a formerly widespread view in biology which was not so much solved as abandoned. Brian Jonathan Garrett has also argued that the hard problem suffers from flaws analogous to those of vitalism.

The philosopher Peter Hacker argues that the hard problem is misguided in that it asks how consciousness can emerge from matter, whereas in fact sentience emerges from the evolution of living organisms. He states: "The hard problem isn't a hard problem at all. The really hard problems are the problems the scientists are dealing with. [...] The philosophical problem, like all philosophical problems, is a confusion in the conceptual scheme." Hacker's critique extends beyond Chalmers and the hard problem and is directed against contemporary philosophy of mind and neuroscience more broadly. Along with the neuroscientist Max Bennett, he has argued that most of contemporary neuroscience remains implicitly dualistic in its conceptualizations and is predicated on the mereological fallacy of ascribing psychological concepts to the brain that can properly be ascribed only to the person as a whole. Hacker further states that "consciousness studies", as it exists today, is "literally a total waste of time" and that "the conception of consciousness which they have is incoherent".

Eliminative materialism / Illusionism

Eliminative materialism or eliminativism is the view that many or all of the mental states used in folk psychology (i.e., common-sense ways of discussing the mind) do not, upon scientific examination, correspond to real brain mechanisms. According the 2020 PhilPapers survey, 4.51% of philosophers surveyed subscribe to eliminativism.

While Patricia Churchland and Paul Churchland have famously applied eliminative materialism to propositional attitudes, philosophers including Daniel Dennett, Georges Rey, and Keith Frankish have applied it to qualia or phenomenal consciousness (i.e., conscious experience). On their view, it is mistaken not only to believe there is a hard problem of consciousness, but to believe phenomenal consciousness exists at all.

This stance has recently taken on the name of illusionism: the view that phenomenal consciousness is an illusion. The term was popularized by the philosopher Keith Frankish. Frankish argues that "illusionism" is preferable to "eliminativism" for labelling the view that phenomenal consciousness is an illusion. More substantively, Frankish argues that illusionism about phenomenal consciousness is preferable to realism about phenomenal consciousness. He states: "Theories of consciousness typically address the hard problem. They accept that phenomenal consciousness is real and aim to explain how it comes to exist. There is, however, another approach, which holds that phenomenal consciousness is an illusion and aims to explain why it seems to exist." Frankish concludes that illusionism "replaces the hard problem with the illusion problem—the problem of explaining how the illusion of phenomenality arises and why it is so powerful."

The philosopher Daniel Dennett is another prominent figure associated with illusionism. After Frankish published a paper in the Journal of Consciousness Studies titled Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness, Dennett responded with his own paper with the spin-off title Illusionism as the Obvious Default Theory of Consciousness. Dennett has been arguing for the illusory status of consciousness since early on in his career. For example, in 1979 he published a paper titled On the Absence of Phenomenology (where he argues for the nonexistence of phenomenal consciousness). Similar ideas have been explicated in his 1991 book Consciousness Explained. Dennett argues that the so-called "hard problem" will be solved in the process of solving what Chalmers terms the "easy problems". He compares consciousness to stage magic and its capability to create extraordinary illusions out of ordinary things. To show how people might be commonly fooled into overstating the accuracy of their introspective abilities, he describes a phenomenon called change blindness, a visual process that involves failure to detect scenery changes in a series of alternating images. He accordingly argues that consciousness need not be what it seems to be based on introspection. To address the question of the hard problem, or how and why physical processes give rise to experience, Dennett states that the phenomenon of having experience is nothing more than the performance of functions or the production of behavior, which can also be referred to as the easy problems of consciousness. Thus, Dennett argues that the hard problem of experience is included among—not separate from—the easy problems, and therefore they can only be explained together as a cohesive unit.

Elimativists differ on the role they believe intuitive judgement plays in creating the apparent reality of consciousness. The philosopher Jacy Reese Anthis is of the position that this issue is born of an overreliance on intuition, calling philosophical discussions on the topic of consciousness a form of "intuition jousting".  But when the issue is tackled with "formal argumentation" and "precise semantics" then the hard problem will dissolve. The philosopher Elizabeth Irvine, in contrast, can be read as having the opposite view, since she argues that phenomenal properties (that is, properties of consciousness) do not exist in our common-sense view of the world. She states that "the hard problem of consciousness may not be a genuine problem for non-philosophers (despite its overwhelming obviousness to philosophers)."

A complete illusionist theory of consciousness must include the description of a mechanism by which the illusion of subjective experience is had and reported by people. Various philosophers and scientists have proposed possible theories. For example, in his book Consciousness and the Social Brain neuroscientist Michael Graziano advocates what he calls attention schema theory, in which our perception of being conscious is merely an error in perception, held by brains which evolved to hold erroneous and incomplete models of their own internal workings, just as they hold erroneous and incomplete models of their own bodies and of the external world.

Criticisms of Eliminative Materialism / Illusionism
The main criticisms of eliminative materialism and illusion hinge on the counterintuitive nature of the view. Arguments of this form are called Moorean Arguments. A Moorean argument seeks to undermine the conclusion of an argument by asserting that the negation of that conclusion is more certain than the premises of the argument.

The roots of the Moorean Argument against illusionism extend back to Augustine of Hippo who stated that he could not be deceived regarding his own existence, since the very act of being deceived secures the existence of a being there to be the recipient of that deception.

In the Early-Modern era, these arguments were repopularized by René Descartes, who coined the now famous phrase "Je pense, donc je suis" ("I think, therefore I am"). Descartes argued that even if he was maximally deceived (because, for example, an evil demon was manipulating all his senses) he would still know with certainty that his mind exists, because the state of being deceived requires a mind as a prerequisite.

This same general argumentative structure is still in use today. For example, in 2002 David Chalmers published an explicitly Moorean argument against illusionism. The argument goes like this: The reality of consciousness is more certain than any theoretical commitments (to, for example, physicalism) that may be motivating the illusionist to deny the existence of consciousness. The reason for this is because we have direct "acquaintance" with consciousness, but we do not have direct acquaintance with anything else (including anything that could inform our beliefs in consciousness being an illusion). In other words: consciousness can be known directly, so the reality of consciousness is more certain than any philosophical or scientific theory that says otherwise. Chalmers concludes that "there is little doubt that something like the Moorean argument is the reason that most people reject illusionism and many find it crazy."

Eliminative materialism and illusionism have been the subject of criticism within the popular press. One highly cited example comes from the philosopher Galen Strawson who wrote an article in the New York Review of Books titled The Consciousness Deniers. In it, Strawson describes illusionism as the "silliest claim ever made", next to which "every known religious belief is only a little less sensible than the belief that the grass is green." Another notable example comes from Christof Koch (a neuroscientist and one of the leading proponents of Integrated Information Theory) in his popular science book The Feeling of Life Itself. In the early pages of the book, Koch describes eliminativism as the "metaphysical counterpart to Cotard's syndrome, a psychiatric condition in which patients deny being alive." Koch takes the prevalence of eliminativism as evidence that "much of twentieth-century analytic philosophy has gone to the dogs".

Type-B Materialism

Type-B Materialism, also known as Weak Reductionism or A Posteriori Physicalism, is the view the hard problem stems from human psychology, and is therefore not indicative of a genuine ontological gap between consciousness and the physical world. Like Type-A Materialists, Type-B Materialists are committed to physicalism. Unlike Type-A Materialists, however, Type-B Materialists do accept inconceivability arguments often cited in support of the hard problem, but with a key caveat: that inconceivability arguments give us insight only into how the human mind tends to conceptualize the relationship between mind and matter, but not into what the true nature of this relationship actually is. According to this view, there is a gap between two ways of knowing (introspection and neuroscience) that will not be resolved by understanding all the underlying neurobiology, but still believe that consciousness and neurobiology are one and the same in reality.

While Type-B Materialists all agree that intuitions about the hard problem are psychological rather than ontological in origin, they differ as to whether our intuitions about the hard problem are innate or culturally conditioned. This has been dubbed the "hard-wired/soft-wired distinction." In relation to Type-B Materialism, those who believe that our intuitions about the hard problem are innate (and therefore common to all humans) subscribe to the "hard-wired view". Those that believe our intuitions are culturally conditioned subscribe to the "soft-wired view". Unless otherwise specified, the term 'Type-B Materialism' refers to the hard-wired view.

Notable philosophers who subscribe to Type-B Materialism include David Papineau, Joseph Levine and  Janet Levine.

The Hard-Wired View
Joseph Levine (who formulated the notion of the explanatory gap) states: "The explanatory gap argument doesn't demonstrate a gap in nature, but a gap in our understanding of nature." He nevertheless contends that full scientific understanding will not close the gap, and that analogous gaps do not exist for other identities in nature, such as that between water and H2O. The philosophers Ned Block and Robert Stalnaker agree that facts about what a conscious experience is like to the one experiencing it cannot be deduced from knowing all the facts about the underlying physiology, but by contrast argue that such gaps of knowledge are also present in many other cases in nature, such as the distinction between water and H2O.

To explain why these two ways of knowing (i.e. third-person scientific observation and first-person introspection) yield such different understandings of consciousness, weak reductionists often invoke the phenomenal concepts strategy, which argues the difference stems from our inaccurate phenomenal concepts (i.e., how we think about consciousness), not from the nature of consciousness itself. By this view, the hard problem of consciousness stems from a dualism of concepts, not from a dualism of properties or substances.

The Soft-Wired View
Some consciousness researchers have argued that the hard problem is a cultural artifact, unique to contemporary Western Culture. This is similar to Type-B Materialism, but it makes the further claim that the psychological facts that cause us to intuit the hard problem are not innate, but culturally conditioned. Notable researchers who hold this view include Anna Wierzbicka, Hakwan Lau and Matthias Michel.

Wierzbicka (who is a linguist) argues that the vocabulary used by consciousness researchers (including words like experience and consciousness) are not universally translatable, and are "parochially English." Weirzbicka calls David Chalmers out by name for using these words, arguing that if philosophers "were to use panhuman concepts expressed in crosstranslatable words" (such as know, think, or feel) then the hard problem would dissolve. David Chalmers has responded to these criticisms by saying that he will not "apologize for using technical terms in an academic article . . . they play a key role in efficient communication in every discipline, including Wierzbicka's".

Type-C Materialism

Type-D Dualism

Dualism views consciousness as either a non-physical substance separate from the brain or a non-physical property of the physical brain. Dualism is the view that the mind is irreducible to the physical body. There are multiple dualist accounts of the causal relationship between the mental and the physical, of which interactionism and epiphenomenalism are the most common today. Interactionism posits that the mental and physical causally impact one another, and is associated with the thought of René Descartes (1596–1650). Epiphenomalism holds the mental is causally dependent on the physical, but does not in turn causally impact it.

In contemporary philosophy, interactionism has been defended by philosophers including Martine Nida-Rümelin, while epiphenomenalism has been defended by philosophers including Frank Jackson (although Jackson later changed his stance to physicalism). Chalmers has also defended versions of both positions as plausible. Traditional dualists such as Descartes believed the mental and the physical to be two separate substances, or fundamental types of entities (hence "substance dualism"); some more recent dualists, however, accept only one substance, the physical, but state it has both mental and physical properties (hence "property dualism").

Type-E Dualism

Type-F Monism

Meanwhile, panpsychism and neutral monism, broadly speaking, view consciousness as intrinsic to matter. In its most basic form, panpsychism holds that all physical entities have minds (though its proponents take more qualified positions), while neutral monism, in at least some variations, holds that entities are composed of a substance with mental and physical aspects—and is thus sometimes described as a type of panpsychism.

Forms of panpsychism and neutral monism were defended in the early twentieth century by the psychologist William James, the philosopher Alfred North Whitehead, the physicist Arthur Eddington, and the philosopher Bertrand Russell, and interest in these views has been revived in recent decades by philosophers including Thomas Nagel, Galen Strawson, and David Chalmers. Chalmers describes his overall view as "naturalistic dualism", but he says panpsychism is in a sense a form of physicalism, as does Strawson. Proponents of panpsychism argue it solves the hard problem of consciousness parsimoniously by making consciousness a fundamental feature of reality.

Idealism and cosmopsychism

A traditional solution to the hard problem is idealism, according to which consciousness is fundamental and not simply an emergent property of matter. It is claimed that this avoids the hard problem entirely. Objective idealism and cosmopsychism consider mind or consciousness to be the fundamental substance of the universe. Proponents claim that this approach is immune to both the hard problem of consciousness and the combination problem that affects panpsychism.

From an idealist perspective, matter is a representation or image of mental processes. Supporters suggest that this avoids the problems associated with the materialist view of mind as an emergent property of a physical brain. Critics point out that you then have , in terms of explaining individual subjective experience. In response, Bernardo Kastrup claims that nature hints at a mechanism for this in the condition Dissociative identity disorder (previously known as Multiple Personality Disorder). Kastrup proposes dissociation as an example from nature showing that multiple minds with their own individual subjective experience could develop within a single universal mind.

Cognitive psychologist Donald D. Hoffman uses a mathematical model based around conscious agents, within a fundamentally conscious universe, to support conscious realism as a description of nature—one that falls within the objective idealism approaches to the hard problem: "The objective world, i.e., the world whose existence does not depend on the perceptions of a particular conscious agent, consists entirely of conscious agents."

David Chalmers calls this form of idealism one of "the handful of promising approaches to the mind–body problem."

New mysterianism

New mysterianism, most significantly associated with the philosopher Colin McGinn, proposes that the human mind, in its current form, will not be able to explain consciousness. McGinn draws on Noam Chomsky's distinction between problems, which are in principle solvable, and mysteries, which human cognitive faculties are unequipped to ever understand, and places the mind–body problem in the latter category. His position is that a naturalistic explanation does exist but that the human mind is cognitively closed to it due to its limited range of intellectual abilities. He cites Jerry Fodor's concept of the modularity of mind in support of cognitive closure.

While in McGinn's strong form, new mysterianism states that the relationship between consciousness and the material world can never be understood by the human mind, there are also weaker forms that argue it cannot be understood within existing paradigms but that advances in science or philosophy may open the way to other solutions (see above). The ideas of Thomas Nagel and Joseph Levine fall into the second category. Steven Pinker has also endorsed this weaker version of the view, summarizing it as follows:

And then there is the theory put forward by philosopher Colin McGinn that our vertigo when pondering the Hard Problem is itself a quirk of our brains. The brain is a product of evolution, and just as animal brains have their limitations, we have ours. Our brains can't hold a hundred numbers in memory, can't visualize seven-dimensional space and perhaps can't intuitively grasp why neural information processing observed from the outside should give rise to subjective experience on the inside. This is where I place my bet, though I admit that the theory could be demolished when an unborn genius—a Darwin or Einstein of consciousness—comes up with a flabbergasting new idea that suddenly makes it all clear to us.

Relationship to scientific frameworks
Most neuroscientists and cognitive scientists believe that Chalmers' alleged "hard problem" will be solved, or be shown to not be a real problem, in the course of the solution of the so-called "easy problems", although a significant minority disagrees.

Neural correlates of consciousness

Since 1990, researchers including the molecular biologist Francis Crick and the neuroscientist Christof Koch have made significant progress toward identifying which neurobiological events occur concurrently to the experience of subjective consciousness. These postulated events are referred to as neural correlates of consciousness or NCCs. However, this research arguably addresses the question of which neurobiological mechanisms are linked to consciousness but not the question of why they should give rise to consciousness at all, the latter being the hard problem of consciousness as Chalmers formulated it. In "On the Search for the Neural Correlate of Consciousness", Chalmers said he is confident that, granting the principle that something such as what he terms global availability can be used as an indicator of consciousness, the neural correlates will be discovered "in a century or two". Nevertheless, he stated regarding their relationship to the hard problem of consciousness:

One can always ask why these processes of availability should give rise to consciousness in the first place. As yet we cannot explain why they do so, and it may well be that full details about the processes of availability will still fail to answer this question. Certainly, nothing in the standard methodology I have outlined answers the question; that methodology assumes a relation between availability and consciousness, and therefore does nothing to explain it. [...] So the hard problem remains. But who knows: Somewhere along the line we may be led to the relevant insights that show why the link is there, and the hard problem may then be solved.

The neuroscientist and Nobel laureate Eric Kandel wrote that locating the NCCs would not solve the hard problem, but rather one of the so-called easy problems to which the hard problem is contrasted. Kandel went on to note Crick and Koch's suggestion that once the binding problem—understanding what accounts for the unity of experience—is solved, it will be possible to solve the hard problem empirically. However, neuroscientist Anil Seth argued that emphasis on the so-called hard problem is a distraction from what he calls the "real problem": understanding the neurobiology underlying consciousness, namely the neural correlates of various conscious processes. This more modest goal is the focus of most scientists working on consciousness. Psychologist Susan Blackmore believes, by contrast, that the search for the neural correlates of consciousness is futile and itself predicated on an erroneous belief in the hard problem of consciousness.

Integrated information theory

Integrated information theory (IIT), developed by the neuroscientist and psychiatrist Giulio Tononi in 2004 and more recently also advocated by Koch, is one of the most discussed models of consciousness in neuroscience and elsewhere. The theory proposes an identity between consciousness and integrated information, with the latter item (denoted as Φ) defined mathematically and thus in principle measurable. The hard problem of consciousness, write Tononi and Koch, may indeed be intractable when working from matter to consciousness. However, because IIT inverts this relationship and works from phenomenological axioms to matter, they say it could be able to solve the hard problem. In this vein, proponents have said the theory goes beyond identifying human neural correlates and can be extrapolated to all physical systems. Tononi wrote (along with two colleagues):

While identifying the "neural correlates of consciousness" is undoubtedly important, it is hard to see how it could ever lead to a satisfactory explanation of what consciousness is and how it comes about. As will be illustrated below, IIT offers a way to analyze systems of mechanisms to determine if they are properly structured to give rise to consciousness, how much of it, and of which kind.

As part of a broader critique of IIT, Michael Cerullo suggested that the theory's proposed explanation is in fact for what he dubs (following Scott Aaronson) the "Pretty Hard Problem" of methodically inferring which physical systems are conscious—but would not solve Chalmers' hard problem. "Even if IIT is correct," he argues, "it does not explain why integrated information generates (or is) consciousness." Chalmers agrees that IIT, if correct, would solve the "Pretty Hard Problem" rather than the hard problem.

Global workspace theory

Global workspace theory (GWT) is a cognitive architecture and theory of consciousness proposed by the cognitive psychologist Bernard Baars in 1988. Baars explains the theory with the metaphor of a theater, with conscious processes represented by an illuminated stage. This theater integrates inputs from a variety of unconscious and otherwise autonomous networks in the brain and then broadcasts them to unconscious networks (represented in the metaphor by a broad, unlit "audience"). The theory has since been expanded upon by other scientists including cognitive neuroscientist Stanislas Dehaene.

In his original paper outlining the hard problem of consciousness, Chalmers discussed GWT as a theory that only targets one of the "easy problems" of consciousness. In particular, he said GWT provided a promising account of how information in the brain could become globally accessible, but argued that "now the question arises in a different form: why should global accessibility give rise to conscious experience? As always, this bridging question is unanswered." J. W. Dalton similarly criticized GWT on the grounds that it provides, at best, an account of the cognitive function of consciousness, and fails to explain its experiential aspect. By contrast, A. C. Elitzur argued: "While [GWT] does not address the 'hard problem', namely, the very nature of consciousness, it constrains any theory that attempts to do so and provides important insights into the relation between consciousness and cognition."

For his part, Baars writes (along with two colleagues) that there is no hard problem of explaining qualia over and above the problem of explaining causal functions, because qualia are entailed by neural activity and themselves causal. Dehaene, in his 2014 book Consciousness and the Brain, rejected the concept of qualia and argued that Chalmers' "easy problems" of consciousness are actually the hard problems. He further stated that the "hard problem" is based only upon ill-defined intuitions that are continually shifting as understanding evolves:

Once our intuitions are educated by cognitive neuroscience and computer simulations, Chalmers' hard problem will evaporate. The hypothetical concept of qualia, pure mental experience, detached from any information-processing role, will be viewed as a peculiar idea of the prescientific era, much like vitalism... [Just as science dispatched vitalism] the science of consciousness will keep eating away at the hard problem of consciousness until it vanishes.

The meta-problem
In 2018, Chalmers highlighted what he calls the "meta-problem of consciousness", another problem related to the hard problem of consciousness:

The meta-problem of consciousness is (to a first approximation) the problem of explaining why we think that there is a [hard] problem of consciousness.

In his "second approximation", he says it is the problem of explaining the behavior of "phenomenal reports", and the behavior of expressing a belief that there is a hard problem of consciousness.

Explaining its significance, he says:
Although the meta-problem is strictly speaking an easy problem, it is deeply connected to the hard problem. We can reasonably hope that a solution to the meta-problem will shed significant light on the hard problem.  A particularly strong line holds that a solution to the meta-problem will solve or dissolve the hard problem. A weaker line holds that it will not remove the hard problem, but it will constrain the form of a solution.In other words, the 'strong line' holds that the solution to the meta-problem would provide an explanation of our beliefs about consciousness that is independent of consciousness. That would debunk our beliefs about consciousness, in the same way that explaining beliefs about god in evolutionary terms may provide arguments against theism itself.

In popular culture
British playwright Sir Tom Stoppard's play The Hard Problem, first produced in 2015, is named after the hard problem of consciousness, which Stoppard defines as having "subjective First Person experiences".

See also

 Animal consciousness
 Artificial consciousness
 Binding problem
 Blindsight
 Chinese room
 Cogito, ergo sum
 Cryonics
 Free will
 Ideasthesia
 Introspection
 Knowledge by acquaintance
 List of unsolved problems in biology
 Mind–body problem
 Phenomenalism
 Philosophy of self
 Primary–secondary quality distinction
 Problem of mental causation
 Problem of other minds
 Vertiginous question
 Von Neumann–Wigner interpretation

Notes

References

External links

Arguments in philosophy of mind
Consciousness
Mind–body problem
Open problems
Philosophical problems

Hard problem of consciousness


Marcus Lindblom is an American video game developer known for his English localization of the 1994 video game EarthBound. Lindblom spent his youth in the United States, and dropped out of college to move to Japan with his wife. After four years, he returned to college in the United States and began to work at Nintendo of America's call center. He eventually worked on Japanese-to-English game localization projects such as Wario's Woods and EarthBound. Lindblom worked with a translator and a writer to accurately translate the game for a Western audience. He sought to stay true to Shigesato Itoi's script, but was given latitude to make the script as weird as he wanted, and so added in American cultural allusions. Lindblom considers the localization his highest achievement.

He worked at Nintendo until 1996, when he left to work at other developers including Electronic Arts, Vivendi Games, Midway Games, and THQ. He established Partly Cloudy Games with friends around 2009, and , runs mobile games studio Carried Away Games. After following the fan community from afar, he came out to fans in mid 2012 and the press began to show greater interest in his work. He had planned to write a book about the game's development, release, and fandom as a Kickstarter project before a reply from Nintendo discouraged him from pursuing the idea.

Early life and career

Marcus Lindblom was raised in "a traditional, middle-class family". He dropped out of college, married, and moved with his spouse to Japan in the late 1980s. They planned to stay several months, but stayed four years before returning in 1990.

EarthBound

In the United States, Lindblom returned to college and, in 1990, began to work at Nintendo of America's customer service and game assistance call center in Redmond, Washington. He would wake up at four a.m. to work before class, a schedule he considered "energizing". Upon his graduation, Lindblom became a Software Analyst at Nintendo, where he worked on their games.

 Lindblom later transitioned to work as a localizer, where he translated Nintendo's Japanese games into English for Western audiences. As standard for the time, he worked without a department and in direct contact with the headquarters, which gave him wide decision-making latitude. Lindblom worked on Wario's Woods before coming to the EarthBound project around January 1995. He took over for Nintendo's Dan Owsen, who had localized a tenth of the game's script before moving to another project. The game was roughly translated from Japanese by a translator, and Lindblom received a paper script with the translation. Masayuki Miura, a Japanese writer, worked with Lindblom to contextualize the English script for the mood and message intended by the game's original development team.

Lindblom found his task of translating an "outsider's view of the U.S." for an American audience the hardest part of the localization. Nintendo did not want a direct translation, but a more American version of the script. He recalled that he was given latitude to make the script "as weird as [he] wanted" but also sought to stay true to the original text's translation, though he never communicated with Shigesato Itoi (the game's creator) directly. Lindblom's own humor and office in-jokes worked their way into the script alongside cultural allusions to Bugs Bunny, comedian Benny Hill, and This Is Spinal Tap. Outside the game's script, Lindblom's in-game text includes the item and weapon names as well as the combat prompts. His writing contains multiple Easter eggs, such as in some of the character's names. One character is named for his daughter, Nico, who was born during development. After taking the day off for her birthday, Lindblom recalled working for the next 30 days straight, without weekends off. He remembered the workload as large, and recalled "grinding-out" for about 14 hours a day. The localization process took four months.

Lindblom credited Miura and the game's affirming "tone" as what helped him manage the magnitude of the project. He remembers the game as "very [positive at its heart]" and wrote it to be "a glass half full kind of game". When asked of his favorite contribution to the final work, Lindblom remembered the character Pokey's mother, Lardna. He described the name choice as "just the most ridiculous thing to have picked". Nicholas Dean Des Barres of DieHard GameFan, an original reviewer, wrote that EarthBound was translated "impeccably" and praised the game's humor. In the period following its release, the game's English localization has found praise. Localization reviewer Clyde Mandelin described the Japanese-to-English conversion as "top-notch for its time". Kotaku found the localization "funny, clever, and evocative".

The American development team was devastated by the release's poor critical response and sales. Lindblom recalled that the game's reception was hurt by appearing "simplistic" in an age that revered graphics quality. He felt that the game's changes to the RPG formula—e.g., the rolling HP meter and fleeing enemies—were ignored in the following years. At the time of the game's Virtual Console rerelease, he felt the game had aged well.

After EarthBound

Lindblom worked on several other Nintendo games and left in 1996. He later worked at studios such as Electronic Arts, Vivendi Games, Midway Games, and THQ. Lindblom established Partly Cloudy Games with friends around 2009. The company has contracted with Microsoft and is also developing a real-time strategy Facebook game named The Robot Apocalypse. , Lindblom runs Carried Away Games, a mobile games studio. He described many of the games he worked on in his career as "forgettable" and the eventual popularity of EarthBound as "satisfying". He cited the example of a wedding proposal done through hacked text in EarthBound as something he appreciated. After following the fan community from afar, in mid-2012, Lindblom approached the Fangamer booth at the Penny Arcade Expo and explained his involvement in the game. When EarthBound was announced for the Wii U Virtual Console, the press began to show greater interest in Lindblom's work. Lindblom had planned a book about the game's development, release, and fandom as a Kickstarter project before a reply from Nintendo discouraged him from pursuing the idea. He did not plan to profit from the book, but felt he "owed" the fan community for its dedication. In response, he said he plans to continue his ongoing dialogue with the community. Lindblom told Kotaku that he thinks of EarthBound as his "finest accomplishment".

Credits

Notes

References

American translators
Mother (video game series)
Living people
Nintendo people
People from Kirkland, Washington
Video game developers
Video game localization
Japanese–English translators
Year of birth missing (living people)

Marcus Lindblom


The Native-speaking English Teacher (NET) Scheme came into operation in Hong Kong in 1998. It is a scheme which allows governmental and government subsidised primary and secondary schools in Hong Kong to employ English teachers from overseas. The aim of the scheme is to provide local students with exposure to authentic English language and to cultural enrichment. NET teachers are also expected to assist with teaching resources development and professional training for English teachers in their schools. At present, there are approximately 800 NET teachers in Hong Kong schools.

NET teachers are employed on a renewable two-year contract basis, they receive a gratuity at the end of each contract and also receive a special allowance which is intended to partially compensate for the additional costs of living overseas.

See also
Education in Hong Kong

External links
Native English-Speaking Teachers' Association (NESTA)
Education Bureau – Further details of NETs' terms of employment and of the rationale behind the scheme
Net Teacher Survival Guide

Education in Hong Kong
English-language education

Native-speaking English Teacher Scheme


Chaetodipus is a genus of pocket mouse. Like other members of their family such as pocket mice in the genus Perognathus, they are more closely related to pocket gophers than to true mice.

Characteristics
Members of this genus range in size from 80 to 125 mm (head and body) and weigh 15-47 grams (Nowak, 1999). Unlike the silky pocket mice (genus Perognathus), most species of the genus Chaetodipus have harsh pelage with some bordering on spiny hair. They tend to be found in arid habitats where they feed on seeds, vegetation, and insects (Nowak, 1999). Females give birth to a litter of 2-9 young after a gestation period of just under a month. The longest recorded lifespan is 8 years and 4 months (Nowak, 1999).

Sometimes members of the genus Chaetodipus are placed in the genus Perognathus.

References
 Nowak, Ronald M. 1999. Walker's Mammals of the World, 6th edition. Johns Hopkins University Press, 1936 pp.
 Patton, J. L. 2005. Family Heteromyidae. pp. 844–858 in Mammal Species of the World a Taxonomic and Geographic Reference. D. E. Wilson and D. M. Reeder eds. Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore.

Geomyoid rodents

Chaetodipus


Lahor is a town and tehsil of Swabi District in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan. The town is a settlement of 35,000 people and is west of Swabi, on the northern bank of the Indus River. Lahor is surrounded by Yar Hussain, Tordher, Ambar and the Indus River.

Tehsils of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
Swabi District

Lahor


Hada plebeja, the shears, is a moth of the family Noctuidae. It is found in Europe and across the Palearctic to Asia Minor, Armenia, Turkestan, Central Asia, Mongolia, Siberia. Also Kashmir.

Technical description and variation

The wingspan is 30–35 mm. The length of the forewings is 14–17 mm. Forewing lilac-grey, suffused with olive fuscous, deepest in median area; claviform stigma small, black-edged, followed by a broad bidentate pale patch at base of vein 2; orbicular and reniform pale grey with white edges; marginal area dark; submarginal line preceded by black dentate markings: veins more or less grey-scaled; hindwing fuscous, paler basewards; the fringe pale; - leucostigma Haw. has the ground colour whiter; hilaris Zett. is a form of this in which the whitish orbicular and the pale blotch on vein 2 are confluent and form one long streak; ochrea Tutt is a form, common in Britain, in which the forewing is varied with yellow scales: - latenai, Pierr. is a melanic mountain form from Switzerland and the Hebrides.

Biology
The moth flies from early June to early July.
Larva dark brown; dorsal and lateral lines pale; subdorsal lines formed of dark lunular blotches: spiracles black; head glossy black. The larvae feed on smooth hawksbeard, Hieracium pilosella, Taraxacum and alfalfa. preferring the roots.

References

External links

The Shears at UKmoths
Funet Taxonomy
Lepiforum.de
Vlindernet.nl

Hadenini
Moths described in 1761
Moths of Asia
Moths of Europe
Taxa named by Carl Linnaeus

Hada plebeja


Vanity Fair is a monthly magazine of popular culture, fashion, and current affairs published by Condé Nast in the United States.

The first version of Vanity Fair was published from 1913 to 1936. It was revived in 1983 and currently includes five international editions of the magazine. As of 2018, the Editor-in-Chief is Radhika Jones.

References

American monthly magazines

Vanity Fair (magazine)


The Prodigal Planet is a 1983 Christian end times film. It is the fourth and final film in the Thief in the Night series, based on an evangelical interpretation of Bible prophecy and the rise of the Antichrist. Unlike the previous three films in the series that were filmed entirely in Iowa, this one included filming locations in Omaha, Colorado, and New Mexico.

Plot
During the final years of the Antichrist's reign, a nuclear war has devastated the earth. The Antichrist and his world government find their grip on power slowly slipping away as Jesus Christ's return draws near. One of the lead characters from the previous film, David Michaels (played by William Wellman Jr.), is now part of a growing underground movement of Christian believers trying to stay out of the government's hands and thus escape execution. The government is using underground agents to infiltrate this movement. David's mission is to take an RV across a nuclear-devastated landscape to Albuquerque, where he will meet with other underground believers to await Jesus Christ's final return. The earth by this time is populated by doomsday people, mutants as a result of the nuclear exchanges. After rescuing one of them, Jimmy, David leads him to Jesus Christ. Jimmy later bravely dies to save the others from Jerry, and leaves Jerry their temporary captive.

Connie Wright (played by Terri Lynn Hall) is a government agent pretending to be a Christian. She rescues David from his internment at UNITE, then tries to get David to reveal the believers' secret hideout. Along the way, they rescue Linda and her daughter, Jody.  Linda is a scientific researcher, brilliant, but terrified. Jody is a spoiled brat who, after being told off by Jimmy, begins to change.  She even starts to slowly accept David's preaching. The same cannot be said of Linda, who is too rational a scientist to accept David's faith. But Linda is actually evidence of divine providence, because her scientific specialty is radiation. So as they travel through the war-ravaged nation, Linda's knowledge keeps them alive and provides crucial guidance. She feels guilty, though, because she was part of the team that helped create the mutant doomsday people.

David suspects Linda of being a spy, since it seems that government agents always know where they are. But Linda is the only trustworthy one: Jody is discovered to have been transmitting their position inadvertently, and Connie did so deliberately. Connie is later picked up by a senior UNITE officer (dubbed "General Goon" by David in Image of the Beast). They are soon killed as their van goes out of control and runs into a train. At the end of the movie, Jody accepts Jesus Christ as her Savior, while Linda still thinks about the matter, or at least she does not yet openly receive Jesus Christ on camera. Meanwhile, a badly wounded and sobbing Jerry is shown in the ruins of the UNITE military base, which is then destroyed by explosions, but not before he rips off his UNITE armband.

Cast
William Wellman Jr. as David Michaels
Lynda Beatie as Linda
Terri Lynn Hall as Connie Wright
Thom Rachford as Jerry Bradford
Robert Chestnut as Jimmy
Cathy Wellman as Jodi
Russell S. Doughten Jr. as Rev. Matthew Turner

Production

Filming
Unlike the previous three films in the series that were filmed entirely in Iowa, this one included filming locations in Omaha, Colorado, and New Mexico.

References

External links

1983 films
1980s science fiction films
American sequel films
Christian apocalyptic films
Films about evangelicalism
Films based on the New Testament
Films produced by Russell S. Doughten
Films shot in New Mexico
1980s English-language films
Films directed by Donald W. Thompson

The Prodigal Planet


In linear algebra, the outer product of two coordinate vectors is the matrix whose entries are all products of an element in the first vector with an element in the second vector. If the two coordinate vectors have dimensions n and m, then their outer product is an n × m matrix. More generally, given two tensors (multidimensional arrays of numbers), their outer product is a tensor. The outer product of tensors is also referred to as their tensor product, and can be used to define the tensor algebra.

The outer product contrasts with:
 The dot product (a special case of "inner product"), which takes a pair of coordinate vectors as input and produces a scalar
 The Kronecker product, which takes a pair of matrices as input and produces a block matrix
 Standard matrix multiplication

Definition
Given two vectors of size  and  respectively

their outer product, denoted  is defined as the  matrix  obtained by multiplying each element of  by each element of :

Or, in index notation:

Denoting the dot product by  if given an  vector  then  If given a  vector  then

If  and  are vectors of the same dimension bigger than 1, then .

The outer product  is equivalent to a matrix multiplication  provided that  is represented as a  column vector and  as a  column vector (which makes  a row vector). For instance, if  and  then

For complex vectors, it is often useful to take the conjugate transpose of  denoted  or :

Contrast with Euclidean inner product
If  then one can take the matrix product the other way, yielding a scalar (or  matrix):

which is the standard inner product for Euclidean vector spaces, better known as the dot product. The dot product is the trace of the outer product. Unlike the dot product, the outer product is not commutative.

Multiplication of a vector  by the matrix  can be written in terms of the inner product, using the relation .

The outer product of tensors
Given two tensors  with dimensions  and , their outer product  is a tensor with dimensions  and entries

For example, if  is of order 3 with dimensions  and  is of order 2 with dimensions  then their outer product  is of order 5 with dimensions  If  has a component  and  has a component , then the component of  formed by the outer product is .

Connection with the Kronecker product
The outer product and Kronecker product are closely related; in fact the same symbol is commonly used to denote both operations.

If  and , we have:

In the case of column vectors, the Kronecker product can be viewed as a form of vectorization (or flattening) of the outer product. In particular, for two column vectors  and , we can write:

(The order of the vectors is reversed on the right side of the equation.)

Another similar identity that further highlights the similarity between the operations is

where the order of vectors needs not be flipped. The middle expression uses matrix multiplication, where the vectors are considered as column/row matrices.

Connection with the matrix product
Given a pair of matrices  of size  and  of size , consider the matrix product  defined as usual as a matrix of size .

Now let  be the -th column vector of  and let  be the -th row vector of . Then  can be expressed as a sum of column-by-row outer products:

This expression has duality with the more common one as a matrix built with row-by-column inner product entries (or dot product):

This relation is relevant in the application of the Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) (and Spectral Decomposition as a special case). In particular, the decomposition can be interpreted as the sum of outer products of each left () and right () singular vectors, scaled by the corresponding nonzero singular value :

This result implies that  can be expressed as a sum of rank-1 matrices with spectral norm  in decreasing order. This explains the fact why, in general, the last terms contribute less, which motivates the use of the truncated SVD as an approximation. The first term is the least squares fit of a matrix to an outer product of vectors.

Properties
The outer product of vectors satisfies the following properties:

The outer product of tensors satisfies the additional associativity property:

Rank of an outer product
If u and v are both nonzero, then the outer product matrix uvT always has matrix rank 1. Indeed, the columns of the outer product are all proportional to the first column. Thus they are all linearly dependent on that one column, hence the matrix is of rank one.

("Matrix rank" should not be confused with "tensor order", or "tensor degree", which is sometimes referred to as "rank".)

Definition (abstract)
Let  and  be two vector spaces. The outer product of  and  is the element .

If  is an inner product space, then it is possible to define the outer product as a linear map . In this case, the linear map  is an element of the dual space of . The outer product  is then given by

This shows why a conjugate transpose of  is commonly taken in the complex case.

In programming languages

In some programming languages, given a two-argument function f (or a binary operator), the outer product, f, of two one-dimensional arrays, A and B, is a two-dimensional array C such that C[i, j] = f(A[i], B[j]). This is syntactically represented in various ways: in APL, as the infix binary operator ∘.f; in J, as the postfix adverb f/; in R, as the function outer(A, B, f) or the special %o%; in Mathematica, as Outer[f, A, B]. In MATLAB, the function kron(A, B) is used for this product. These often generalize to multi-dimensional arguments, and more than two arguments.

In the Python library NumPy, the outer product can be computed with function np.outer(). In contrast, np.kron results in a flat array. The outer product of multidimensional arrays can be computed using np.multiply.outer.

Applications
As the outer product is closely related to the Kronecker product, some of the applications of the Kronecker product use outer products. These applications are found in quantum theory, signal processing, and image compression.

Spinors
Suppose  so that  and  are in . Then the outer product of these complex 2-vectors is an element of , the 2 × 2 complex matrices:

The determinant of this matrix is  because of the commutative property of .

In the theory of spinors in three dimensions, these matrices are associated with isotropic vectors due to this null property. Élie Cartan described this construction in 1937, but it was introduced by Wolfgang Pauli in 1927 so that  has come to be called Pauli algebra.

Concepts
The block form of outer products is useful in classification. Concept analysis is a study that depends on certain outer products:

When a vector has only zeros and ones as entries, it is called a logical vector, a special case of a logical matrix. The logical operation and takes the place of multiplication. The outer product of two logical vectors  and  is given by the logical matrix . This type of matrix is used in the study of binary relations, and is called a rectangular relation or a cross-vector.

See also
 Dyadics
 Householder transformation
 Norm (mathematics)
 Ricci calculus
 Scatter matrix

Products
 Cartesian product
 Cross product
 Exterior product
 Hadamard product (matrices)

Duality
 Bra–ket notation for outer product
 Complex conjugate
 Conjugate transpose
 Transpose

References

Further reading

Bilinear maps
Higher-order functions
Operations on vectors
Articles with example Python (programming language) code

Outer product


Bismuthate is an ion. Its chemical formula is . It has bismuth in its +5 oxidation state.

It is a very strong oxidizing agent. It reacts with hot water to make bismuth(III) oxide and oxygen. It also reacts with acids. Sodium bismuthate is the most common bismuthate. It is one of the few sodium compounds that does not dissolve in water.

Related pages
Bismuth(III) chloride
Bismuth(V) fluoride, the other bismuth compound in its +5 oxidation state
Sodium bismuthate
 Sodium bismuth titanate

Bismuth compounds
Oxometallates

Bismuthate


In baseball statistics, an error is an act, in the judgment of the official scorer, of a fielder misplaying a ball in a manner that allows a batter or baserunner to advance one or more bases or allows an at bat to continue after the batter should have been put out. Shortstop, abbreviated SS, is a baseball or softball fielding position in the infield, commonly stationed between second and third base, which is considered to be among the most demanding defensive positions. The position is mostly filled by defensive specialists, so shortstops are generally relatively poor batters who typically hit lower in the batting order. In the numbering system used to record defensive plays, the shortstop is assigned the number 6.

The list of career leaders is dominated by players from the 19th century when fielding equipment was very rudimentary; baseball gloves only began to steadily gain acceptance in the 1880s, and were not uniformly worn until the mid-1890s, resulting in a much lower frequency of defensive miscues. 13 of the top 18 players in career errors began playing in the 19th century, six of whom played their entire careers before 1900; only one of the top 24 made their major league debut after 1915, and none of the top 38 were active after 1950. The top 12 single-season totals were all recorded before 1894, the top 61 were recorded before 1909, and the top 187 were recorded before 1919; none of the top 500 have been recorded since 1951. To a large extent, the leaders reflect longevity rather than lower skill. Luis Aparicio, whose 366 errors are the most by any American League (AL) shortstop since 1940, won nine Gold Glove Awards for defensive excellence, and retired with the second highest fielding percentage in AL history.

Herman Long, who retired in 1904 after setting major league records for games and putouts as a shortstop, is the all-time leader in errors committed as a shortstop with 1,070, nearly three times as many as any shortstop active since 1960, and the most by any player at a single position in major league history; he is the only shortstop to commit over 1,000 career errors. Bill Dahlen (975), Germany Smith (973), and Tommy Corcoran (961) are the only other shortstops to commit over 900 career errors. Elvis Andrus, who had 219 errors through the 2022 season to place him 120th all-time, is the leader among active players.

Key

List

Other Hall of Famers

References

Baseball-Reference.com

Major League Baseball statistics
Major League Baseball lists

List of Major League Baseball career fielding errors as a shortstop leaders


George Uglow Pope (24 April 1820 – 11 February 1908), or G. U. Pope, was an Anglican Christian missionary and Tamil scholar who spent 40 years in Tamil Nadu and translated many Tamil texts into English. His popular translations included those of the Tirukkural and Thiruvasagam.

He later took to teaching, running his own school in Ootacamund for while and then moving to head the Bishop Cotton Boys' School in Bangalore and after returning to England worked as a Lecturer at Balliol College, Oxford. A statue on the Chennai beach recognizes him for his contribution to the understanding and promotion of the Tamil language.

Biography

George Uglow Pope was born on 24 April 1820 in Bedeque, Prince Edward Island in Canada.  His father was John Pope (1791–1863), of Padstow, Cornwall, a merchant who became a missionary, who emigrated to Prince Edward Island in 1818, and Catherine Uglow (1797–1867), of Stratton, north Cornwall. The family moved to Nova Scotia, St. Vincent's before returning to Plymouth, England in 1826 where John Pope became a prosperous merchant and ship-owner. George Uglow Pope's and his younger brother William Burt Pope studied at the Wesleyan schools in Bury and Hoxton and at the age of fourteen George joined missionary service in southern India.

He left for South India in 1839 and arrived at Sawyerpuram near Tuticorin(now Thoothukudi) with the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel. Pope started studying Tamil as a teenager in England and during the voyage to India and Pope later turned into a scholar of Tamil, Sanskrit and Telugu. In 1841 he was ordained by the Church of England and he married Mary Carver, daughter of another Anglican priest. Pope worked in the Tirunelveli region where he also interacted with other missionaries like Christian Friedrich Schwartz. In 1845, Mary died at Tuticorin and Pope moved to Madras(now Chennai). He married Henrietta Page, daughter of G. van Someren and they left for England in 1849. During this period he worked with many figures in the Oxford Catholic movement including such as Cardinal Henry Edward Manning, Archbishop Trench, Bishop Samuel Wilberforce, Bishop John Lonsdale, E. B. Pusey, and John Keble.

Returning to Tanjore (now Thanjavur) in 1851, teaching at St Peter's School, he found himself in conflict with other missionaries. In 1855, a Tamil priest Vedanayakam Shastri who was a disciple of Schwartz and a poet in the court of Maharaja Serfoji was flogged publicly resulting in a separation of Tamil church free of the Anglican church leading to the resignation of Pope. He founded a seminary at Sawyerpuram for training Anglican Tamil clergy but this too ran into trouble and he decided to move to Ootacamund (Ooty) in 1859.  Here he founded a grammar school for European children (which ran from 1859 to 1870) which is now home to the Government Arts School and Stonehouse. The grammar school at Stonehouse cottage was opened by the Bishop of Madras on 2 July 1858 with Pope as Principal. The school moved elsewhere as the building was sold to the Trustees of the Lawrence Asylum in March 1859. Stonehouse cottage was then used to house the male asylum inmates and the Grammar school moved to new premises in Lovedale on 1 April 1869. He also founded Holy Trinity Church in Ooty. Pope was referred to with respect by the Tamilians as Pope Aiyar.

Pope became famous for his strictness and in 1870 he was made principal of Bishop Cotton Boys' School at Bangalore. He was also the first pastor of the All Saints Church at Bangalore. In 1881, Pope left India and settled in Oxford where he made a mark as a lecturer in Tamil and Telugu (1884). He received an honorary MA in 1886 and a Gold Medal of the Royal Asiatic Society in 1906.

He died on 11 February 1908. He delivered his last sermon on 26 May 1907. Pope was buried at St Sepulchre's Cemetery, located in Jericho, central Oxford, England. After his death, his second wife, Henrietta, and two daughters received pension. Henrietta died on 11 September 1911 and is buried beside Pope. Three of their sons continued to work in India. John Van Someren Pope worked on education in Burma, Arthur William Uglow Pope served as a railway engineer in India and China; while Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Henry served in the medical service as a professor of ophthalmology at the Madras Medical College.

Contributions to Tamil studies
Pope was along with Joseph Constantius Beschi, Francis Whyte Ellis, and Bishop Robert Caldwell one of the major scholars on Tamil. His first work was A Catechism of Tamil Grammar (1842). His most famous work is the translation of the Tirukkural which he completed on 1 September 1886. His Sacred Kural contains introduction, grammar, translation, notes, lexicon and concordance. It also includes the English translation of F. W. Ellis and the Latin Translation of Constanzo Beschi with 436 pages. He had, by February 1893, translated Naaladiyaar, a didactic work of moral sayings in quatrains, 400 in number in 40 chapters, each by a Jain ascetic, according to a Tamil tradition. His magnum opus, the translation of Tiruvachakam appeared in 1900. Of this he said: "I date this on my eightieth birthday. I find, by reference,  that my first Tamil lesson was in 1837.  This ends, as I suppose a long life of devotion to Tamil studies. It is not without deep emotion that I thus bring to a close my life's literary work". He dedication this last work to Benjamin Jowett who had been a friend while serving as chaplain at Balliol College (1888).

First lessons in Tamil: or a full introduction to the common dialect of that language, on the plan of Ollendorf and Arnold, Madras, 1856 (1st edition) - the next edition was published as:
A Tamil hand-book: or full introduction to the common dialect of that language on the plan of Ollendorf and Arnold, Madras, 1859 (2nd edition), 1867 (3rd edition)
A handbook of the ordinary dialect of the Tamil language, London, 1883 (4th edition, 3 volumes - Part 4-dictionary), Oxford 1904 (7th edition)
A larger grammar of the Tamil language in both its dialects], Madras, 1858
Pope's second catechism of Tamil grammar, 1858
A text-book of Indian history; with geographical notes, genealogical tables, examination questions, and chronological, biographical, geographical, and general indexes, London, 1871 (1st edition), 1880 (3rd edition)
திருவள்ளுவர் அருளிச்செய்த திருக்குறள் (Tiruvalluvar arulicceyta Tirrukkural). The 'Sacred' Kurral of Tiruvalluva-Nayanar, London, 1886
முனிவர் அருளிச்செய்த நாலடியார் (The Naladiyar, or, Four hundred quatrains in Tamil), Oxford, 1893
St. John in the Desert: an introduction and notes to Browning's 'a death in the desert', Oxford, 1897
The Tiruvacagam; or, 'Sacred utterances' of the Tamil poet, saint, and sage Manikka-Vacagar: the Tamil text of the fifty-one poems, with English translation, Oxford, 1900
A catalogue of the Tamil books in the library of the British Museum, London, 1909 (with L. D. Barnett)

Criticism
Pope has occasionally been criticised for over-emphasising certain texts from ancient Tamil literature while downplaying, or even dismissing, others, both ancient and more recent (which is something that many Tamil scholars tended to do in the late nineteenth century). Rajiv Malhotra has been highly critical of the work of Pope. In Malhotra's book Breaking India, he writes in detail of Pope's attempts to undermine Tamil spirituality. He writes of Pope's claims that all Tamil works are of Christian origin, and that Tamil culture has nothing to do with Indian culture, thereby forging a Dravidian identity that previously never existed.

See also

 Tirukkural
 Tirukkural translations
 Tirukkural translations into English
 List of translators into English
 Thiruvasagam
 Tamil Nadu / South India

References

External links
St Peter's School Thanjavur
Page on Pope's grave in St Sepulchre's Cemetery, Oxford, with biography
The Lutheran Aggression: A Letter to the Tranquebar Missionaries, by G.U. Pope (1853)
Resident Rendezvoyeur: A natural state of grace by Aliyeh Rizvi

1820 births
1908 deaths
Anglican missionaries in India
Dravidologists
Tamil scholars of non-Tamil background
Canadian Anglican missionaries
British Anglican missionaries
Tamil–English translators
Translators of the Tirukkural into English
Tirukkural translators
19th-century translators
Missionary linguists
Burials at St Sepulchre's Cemetery

George Uglow Pope


Robert Clay Prim III (September 25, 1921 – November 18, 2021) was an American mathematician and computer scientist.

Biography
Robert Clay Prim III was born in Sweetwater, Texas on September 25, 1921. In 1941, Prim received his B.S. in Electrical Engineering from The University of Texas at Austin, where he also met his wife Alice (Hutter) Prim (1921–2009), whom he married in 1942. Later in 1949, he received his Ph.D. in Mathematics from Princeton University, where he also worked as a research associate from 1948 until 1949.

During the climax of World War II (1941–1944), Prim worked as an engineer for General Electric. From 1944 until 1949, he was hired by the United States Naval Ordnance Lab as an engineer and later a mathematician. At Bell Laboratories, he served as director of mathematics research from 1958 to 1961. There, Prim developed Prim's algorithm. Also during his tenure at Bell Labs, Robert Prim assisted the Weapons Reliability Committee at Sandia National Laboratory chaired by Walter McNair in 1951. After Bell Laboratories, Prim became vice president of research at Sandia National Laboratories.

During his career at Bell Laboratories, Robert Prim along with coworker Joseph Kruskal developed two different algorithms (see greedy algorithm) for finding a minimum spanning tree in a weighted graph, a basic stumbling block in computer network design. His self-named algorithm, Prim's algorithm, was originally discovered in 1930 by mathematician Vojtěch Jarník and later independently by Prim in 1957. It was later rediscovered by Edsger Dijkstra in 1959. It is sometimes referred to as the DJP algorithm or the Jarník algorithm.

Robert C. Prim died in San Clemente, California on November 18, 2021, at the age of 100.

See also
Joseph Kruskal
Dijkstra's algorithm

References

External links
 A History of Fundamental Mathematics Research at Bell Labs
 Sweetwater, Texas Chamber of Commerce
 Dr. Robert Clay Prim - Bio/Description, IT History Society
 A History of Exceptional Service in the National Interest, Sandia National Laboratories

1921 births
2021 deaths
20th-century American mathematicians
20th-century American scientists
21st-century American mathematicians
American centenarians
American computer scientists
American electrical engineers
Men centenarians
University of Texas at Austin alumni
Princeton University alumni
Sandia National Laboratories people
Scientists at Bell Labs
People from Sweetwater, Texas

Robert C. Prim


Victor Alanson Elliott (July 23, 1839 – February 5, 1899) was an associate justice of the Colorado Supreme Court from 1888 to 1895.

Early life
Elliott was born in Richmond, Pennsylvania on July 23, 1839. He earned a law degree at the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor.

He fought in the Civil War, achieving the rank of major, and relocated to Colorado after the war ended.

Career in Colorado
Elliott had a law practice in Denver. Following Colorado's admission to the Union in 1876, he was elected to serve as the first judge of Colorado's Second Judicial District. He was re-elected to the office in 1882, serving for almost twelve years before being elected associate justice of the supreme court.

Elliott was elected to the Supreme Court in fall 1888 and served as an associate justice from December 4, 1888, to January 1895.

Death
Elliott died on February 5, 1899, aged 59, in Denver. He is buried in Denver's Riverside Cemetery.

References

Justices of the Colorado Supreme Court
1839 births
1899 deaths
University of Michigan Law School alumni
Lawyers from Denver
19th-century American judges
19th-century American lawyers

Victor A. Elliott


Passport to China (a.k.a. Visa to Canton) is a 1960 British adventure spy film released by Columbia Pictures; directed by Michael Carreras and starring Richard Basehart, Lisa Gastoni, Eric Pohlmann and Bernard Cribbins. The screenplay, which concerns a pilot who tries to rescue a girl from Communist-controlled China, was based on a story by Gordon Wellesley and made by Swallow Productions and Hammer Films.

Plot
Don Benton (Richard Basehart), a former World War II combat pilot, now running a travel agency in Hong Kong, refuses to take political sides and flatly rejects an offer to do espionage work for the United States.

When Mao Tai Tai (Athene Seyler), an old Chinese woman who more or less adopted Benton during the war years, asks him to try to find her missing grandson.

Knowing that the grandson was piloting a Formosan aircraft that disappeared over mainland China, Benton obtains a passport through a Russian friend, Ivano Kang (Eric Pohlmann). Flying to the mainland, he rescues the downed pilot.

To clear the young man's name, Benton goes to Canton to bring back one of the aircraft passengers, an independent agent, Lola Sanchez (Lisa Gastoni), who has memorized a vital scientific formula and is willing to sell it to the highest bidder.

Kang tries to get the formula from her, but she kills him. Benton hopes to get Lola out of the city, but as they work their way through holiday street crowds, she is fatally wounded by Kang's bodyguard and dies with her secret. Back in Hong Kong, Benton once more turns down an offer to do undercover work for the U.S. government.

Cast

 Richard Basehart as Don Benton
 Lisa Gastoni as Lola Sanchez
 Athene Seyler as Mao Tai Tai
 Eric Pohlmann as Ivano Kang
 Alan Gifford as Orme
 Bernard Cribbins as Pereira
Burt Kwouk as Jimmy
 Marne Maitland as Han Po

Production
Location scenes for Passport to China were filmed in Hong Kong. Released in Great Britain in Technicolor in December 1960 as Visa to Canton, the film was shown in the US in black-and-white. Although the male lead, Richard Basehart had starred in a number of prestigious feature films in the 1950s, by this point in his career, his prospects had faded.

Reception
Film reviewer Sandra Brennan, described the spy drama  as one of a "reluctant hero" who becomes involved in the Cold War tensions surrounding Communist China. Ultimately, "he refuses to do any more work for American intelligence."

References

Notes

Citations

Bibliography

 Aylesworth, Thomas and John S. Bowman. World Guide To Film Stars.  London: Brompton Books, 1991. .
 Quinlan, David. Quinlan's Film Stars. Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 1996. .

External links

1961 films
British adventure films
1960s adventure films
Columbia Pictures films
British aviation films
Cold War films
Films set in Hong Kong
Films shot at Bray Studios
Hammer Film Productions films
1960s English-language films
1960s British films

Passport to China


Sungri Motor Plant is a 600,000 m2 vehicle factory in the ceety o Tokchon (덕천), North Korea. It wis the maist capable plant o the North Korean automotive industry afore bein surpassed bi Pyeonghwa Motors. The plant produces urban an off-road passenger caurs, small, medium, an hivy cargo, as well as, haulage construction an off-road larries an buses.

Aw models are reportit tae be replicas or derivations o foreign cars. Vehicles are generally for civilian an commercial uise, as govrenment officials favour foreign imports an the armed forces hae thair ain facilities.

On Nov 20, 2017, Kim Jong-un wis reportit tae hae visited an providit site guidance at the Sungri Motor Plant.

History

The Sungri Motor Plant wis foondit in November 1950 as the Tokchon Motor Plant (덕천자동차공장). It produced its first vehicle, a Sungri-58 truck, in 1958. In 1975, the plant wis renamed Sungri Motor Plant (sungri meanin victory in Korean). In 1980, annual production wis reportit bi the govrenment tae be 20,000 units per year, houiver the rate wis mair likely atween 6,000 an 7,000 units per year. In 1996 production wis crippled due tae the kintra's economic difficulties, wi approximately 150 units produced.

Car models

 Achimkoy (아침의 꽃 - 'Flower o the morning') - 5 seat sedan, a copy o the GAZ-M20 Pobeda. Most likely a single prototype.
 Kunchook (건축 - 'Construction')
 Jaju (자주 - 'Independence' or 'Frequent') - A five-seat passenger car. Clone o the Volkswagen Passat.
 Kaengsaeng (갱생 - 'Rebirth') - A mair modified Sungri-4.10 (a Korean GAZ-69 an Jeep combination) o 1968, then moved for production on Pyongsang Auto Works.
 Paektusan (백두산 - 'Moont Paekdu'), Pyongyang 4.10 an Kaengsaeng 88  - Clones o a 1987 Mercedes-Benz W201 luxury passenger car.
 Shintaibaik (신태백 - 'New Taebaek')
 Sungri-4.10 - Korean GAZ-69 fower-wheel drive car modified wi new front end.
 Sungri-4.25 - Pick-up version o Korean GAZ-69.

Larrie models

 Kumsusan,Kyomsusang (금수산 - 'Moont Kumsu') - A 40-ton construction truck-dumper o 1979.
 Sonyon - Small urban delivery truck o the 1990s.
 Sungri-58 (승리 58호 - 'Victory 58') - A clone o the Soviet  GAZ-51 (ГАЗ-51) Truck, houiver wi weaker springs. The Sungri-58 an aa suffers frae unusually heich fuel consumption due tae its crudely copied GAZ-51 carburettor which haes been uised syne 1961. It wis first biggit in 1958. Later Sungri-58KA an Sungri-58NA (4x4) modifications wi new cabin are appeared in the 1970s.
 Sungri-60/10.10) - A lairge 6x6 truck o 1960, it haes a ten-ton payload an wis uised primarily for military purposes. It wis featurt on a North Korean stamp frae 1961.
 Sungri-61 - Based on the GAZ-63 (ГАЗ-63) truck. It is a 4x4 version o Sungri-58. The Sungri-61 wis first biggit in 1961. Later Sungri-61NA increased payload tae 2 tons an a new cabin.
 Sungri/Jaju-64 - Based on the KrAZ 256. A 6x4 dump truck, it haes a 10-ton payload an 15-litre V8-cylinder diesel ingine. It wis featurt on a North Korean stamp frae 1965. Built frae 1964 tae 1982.
 Sungri/Jaju-82 - A 4x2 multi-purpose truck o 1982, it haes a 10-ton payload an a 15-litre V8-cylinder diesel ingine. It wis featurt in a North Korean stamp frae 1988. Whiles referred tae as "Chaju".
 Sungrisan/Konsor-25 ('Moont Victory'/'Construction') - A 25-ton dumper o 1970. It is based on the BelAZ trucks. Later biggit bi the Mairch 30t Works.

References

Companies o North Korea

Sungri Motor Plant


General Heriberto Jara Corona (July 10, 1879 – April 17, 1968) was a Mexican revolutionary and politician who served as Governor of Veracruz.

Heriberto Jara was born in the town of Nogales, in the state of Veracruz, to Emilio Jara Andrade and María del Carmen Corona. He got enrolled in the Mexican Revolution while working at a factory in the municipality of Río Blanco in his native Veracruz.

The year Francisco I. Madero was elected President of Mexico he took over a seat in the Congress; then in 1916 he was elected again to serve in Congress and was one of the persons who drafted the 1917 Constitution. He served as Ambassador to Cuba and as Governor of Veracruz.
He was awarded the Stalin Peace Prize in 1950 and, in 1959, he received the Belisario Domínguez Medal of Honor. General Heriberto Jara International Airport in the port of Veracruz is named after him, as is the Stadium at Xalapa, built in 1925 on the grounds where William K. Boone had organized Olympic-style athletic games in 1922.

1879 births
1968 deaths
Governors of Veracruz
Governors of Tabasco
Members of the Chamber of Deputies (Mexico)
Ambassadors of Mexico to Cuba
Politicians from Veracruz
People of the Mexican Revolution
Recipients of the Belisario Domínguez Medal of Honor
Stalin Peace Prize recipients
Institutional Revolutionary Party politicians
20th-century Mexican politicians

Heriberto Jara Corona