In legal discourse, an author is the creator of an original work, whether that work is in written, graphic, or recorded medium. Thus, a sculptor, painter, or composer, is an author of their respective sculptures, paintings, or compositions, even though in common parlance, an author is often thought of as the writer of a book, article, play, or other written work. In the case of a work for hire, "the employer or commissioning party is considered the author of the work", even if they did not write or otherwise create the work, but merely instructed another individual to do so.

Typically, the first owner of a copyright is the person who created the work, i.e. the author. If more than one person created the work, then a case of joint authorship takes place. Copyright laws differ around the world. The United States Copyright Office, for example, defines copyright as "a form of protection provided by the laws of the United States (title 17, U.S. Code) to authors of 'original works of authorship.'"

Some works are considered to be authorless. For example, the monkey selfie copyright dispute in the 2010s involved photographs taken by Celebes crested macaques using equipment belonging to a nature photographer. The photographer asserted authorship of the photographs, which the United States Copyright Office denied, stating: "To qualify as a work of 'authorship' a work must be created by a human being". More recently, questions have arisen as to whether images or text created by a generative artificial intelligence have an author.

Legal significance of authorship
Holding the title of "author" over any "literary, dramatic, musical, artistic, [or] certain other intellectual works" gives rights to this person, the owner of the copyright, especially the exclusive right to engage in or authorize any production or distribution of their work. Any person or entity wishing to use intellectual property held under copyright must receive permission from the copyright holder to use this work, and often will be asked to pay for the use of copyrighted material.

The copyrights on intellectual work expire after a certain time. It enters the public domain, where it can be used without limit. Copyright laws in many jurisdictions – mostly following the lead of the United States, in which the entertainment and publishing industries have very strong lobbying power – have been amended repeatedly since their inception, to extend the length of this fixed period where the work is exclusively controlled by the copyright holder. Technically, someone owns their work from the time it's created. A notable aspect of authorship emerges with copyright in that, in many jurisdictions, it can be passed down to another upon one's death. The person who inherits the copyright is not the author, but has access to the same legal benefits.

Intellectual property laws are complex. Fiction work involves trademark law, likeness rights, fair use rights held by the public (including the right to parody or satirize), and many other interacting complications.

Authors may portion out different rights they hold to different parties, at different times, and for different purposes or uses, such as the right to adapt a plot into a film, but only with different character names, because the characters have already been optioned by another company for a television series or a video game. An author may also not have rights when working under contract that they would otherwise have, such as when creating a work for hire (e.g., hired to write a city tour guide by a municipal government that totally owns the copyright to the finished work), or when writing material using intellectual property owned by others (such as when writing a novel or screenplay that is a new installment in an already established media franchise).

Philosophical views of the nature of authorship

In literary theory, critics find complications in the term author beyond what constitutes authorship in a legal setting. In the wake of postmodern literature, critics such as Roland Barthes and Michel Foucault have examined the role and relevance of authorship to the meaning or interpretation of a literary text.

Barthes challenges the idea that a text can be attributed to any single author. He writes, in his essay "Death of the Author" (1968), that "it is language which speaks, not the author." The words and language of a text itself determine and expose meaning for Barthes, and not someone possessing legal responsibility for the process of its production. Every line of written text is a mere reflection of references from any of a multitude of traditions, or, as Barthes puts it, "the text is a tissue of quotations drawn from the innumerable centers of culture"; it is never original. With this, the perspective of the author is removed from the text, and the limits formerly imposed by the idea of one authorial voice, one ultimate and universal meaning, are destroyed. The explanation and meaning of a work does not have to be sought in the one who produced it, "as if it were always in the end, through the more or less transparent allegory of the fiction, the voice of a single person, the author 'confiding' in us." The psyche, culture, fanaticism of an author can be disregarded when interpreting a text, because the words are rich enough themselves with all of the traditions of language. To expose meanings in a written work without appealing to the celebrity of an author, their tastes, passions, vices, is, to Barthes, to allow language to speak, rather than author.

Michel Foucault argues in his essay "What is an author?" (1969) that all authors are writers, but not all writers are authors. He states that "a private letter may have a signatory—it does not have an author." For a reader to assign the title of author upon any written work is to attribute certain standards upon the text which, for Foucault, are working in conjunction with the idea of "the author function." Foucault's author function is the idea that an author exists only as a function of a written work, a part of its structure, but not necessarily part of the interpretive process. The author's name "indicates the status of the discourse within a society and culture," and at one time was used as an anchor for interpreting a text, a practice which Barthes would argue is not a particularly relevant or valid endeavour.

Expanding upon Foucault's position, Alexander Nehamas writes that Foucault suggests "an author [...] is whoever can be understood to have produced a particular text as we interpret it," not necessarily who penned the text. It is this distinction between producing a written work and producing the interpretation or meaning in a written work that both Barthes and Foucault are interested in. Foucault warns of the risks of keeping the author's name in mind during interpretation, because it could affect the value and meaning with which one handles an interpretation.

Literary critics Barthes and Foucault suggest that readers should not rely on or look for the notion of one overarching voice when interpreting a written work, because of the complications inherent with a writer's title of "author." They warn of the dangers interpretations could suffer from when associating the subject of inherently meaningful words and language with the personality of one authorial voice. Instead, readers should allow a text to be interpreted in terms of the language as "author."

Relationship with publisher

Self-publishing

Self-publishing is a model where the author takes full responsibility and control of arranging financing, editing, printing, and distribution of their own work. In other words, the author also acts as the publisher of their work.

Traditional publishing
With commissioned publishing, the publisher makes all the publication arrangements and the author covers all expenses.

The author of a work may receive a percentage calculated on a wholesale or a specific price or a fixed amount on each book sold. Publishers, at times, reduced the risk of this type of arrangement, by agreeing only to pay this after a certain number of copies had sold. In Canada, this practice occurred during the 1890s, but was not commonplace until the 1920s. Established and successful authors may receive advance payments, set against future royalties, but this is no longer common practice. Most independent publishers pay royalties as a percentage of net receipts – how net receipts are calculated varies from publisher to publisher. Under this arrangement, the author does not pay anything towards the expense of publication. The costs and financial risk are all carried by the publisher, who will then take the greatest percentage of the receipts. See Compensation for more.

Vanity publishing

Vanity publishers normally charge a flat fee for arranging publication, offer a platform for selling, and then take a percentage of the sale of every copy of a book. The author receives the rest of the money made. Most materials published this way are for niche groups and not for large audiences.

Vanity publishing, or subsidy publishing, is stigmatized in the professional world. In 1983, Bill Henderson defined vanity publishers as people who would "publish anything for which an author will pay, usually at a loss for the author and a nice profit for the publisher." In subsidy publishing, the book sales are not the publishers' main source of income, but instead the fees that the authors are charged to initially produce the book are. Because of this, the vanity publishers need not invest in making books marketable as much as other publishers need to. This leads to low quality books being introduced to the market.

Relationship with editor
The relationship between the author and the editor, often the author's only liaison to the publishing company, is typically characterized as the site of tension. For the author to reach their audience, often through publication, the work usually must attract the attention of the editor. The idea of the author as the sole meaning-maker of necessity changes to include the influences of the editor and the publisher to engage the audience in writing as a social act.

There are three principal kinds of editing:
 Proofing (checking the grammar and spelling, looking for typographical errors),
 Story (potentially an area of deep angst for both author and publisher), and
 Layout (the typesetting needed to ready a work for publishing often requires minor text changes, so a layout editor is employed to ensure that these do not alter the sense of the text).

Pierre Bourdieu's essay "The Field of Cultural Production" depicts the publishing industry as a "space of literary or artistic position-takings," also called the "field of struggles," which is defined by the tension and movement inherent among the various positions in the field. Bourdieu claims that the "field of position-takings [...] is not the product of coherence-seeking intention or objective consensus," meaning that an industry characterized by position-takings is not one of harmony and neutrality. In particular for the writer, their authorship in their work makes their work part of their identity, and there is much at stake personally over the negotiation of authority over that identity. However, it is the editor who has "the power to impose the dominant definition of the writer and therefore to delimit the population of those entitled to take part in the struggle to define the writer". As "cultural investors," publishers rely on the editor position to identify a good investment in "cultural capital" which may grow to yield economic capital across all positions.

According to the studies of James Curran, the system of shared values among editors in Britain has generated a pressure among authors to write to fit the editors' expectations, removing the focus from the reader-audience and putting a strain on the relationship between authors and editors and on writing as a social act. Even the book review by the editors has more significance than the readership's reception.

Compensation
Authors rely on advance fees, royalty payments, adaptation of work to a screenplay, and fees collected from giving speeches.

A standard contract for an author will usually include provision for payment in the form of an advance and royalties.

 Advance: a lump sum paid before publication. An advance must be earned out before royalties are payable. It may be paid in two lump sums: the first payment on contract signing, and the second on delivery of the completed manuscript or on publication.

 Royalty payment: the sum paid to authors for each copy of a book sold and is traditionally around 10–12%, but self-published authors can earn about 40% – 60% royalties per each book sale. An author's contract may specify, for example, that they will earn 10% of the retail price of each book sold. Some contracts specify a scale of royalties payable (for example, where royalties start at 10% for the first 10,000 sales, but then increase to a higher percentage rate at higher sale thresholds).

Usually, an author's book must earn the advance before any further royalties are paid. For example, if an author is paid a modest advance of $2000, and their royalty rate is 10% of a book priced at $20 – that is, $2 per book – the book will need to sell 1000 copies before any further payment will be made. Publishers typically withhold payment of a percentage of royalties earned against returns.

In some countries, authors also earn income from a government scheme such as the ELR (educational lending right) and PLR (public lending right) schemes in Australia. Under these schemes, authors are paid a fee for the number of copies of their books in educational and/or public libraries.

These days, many authors supplement their income from book sales with public speaking engagements, school visits, residencies, grants, and teaching positions.

Ghostwriters, technical writers, and textbooks writers are typically paid in a different way: usually a set fee or a per word rate rather than on a percentage of sales.

In the year 2016, according to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, nearly 130,000 people worked in the country as authors, making an average of $61,240 per year.

See also
 Lead author
 Academic authorship
 Authors' editor
 Writing
 Distributive writing
 Professional writing
 Composition (language)
 Auteur
 Writer
 Poet
 Novelist
 Lists of writers
 Lists of poets
 List of novelists
Lesser-known authors

References

Writing occupations
Literary criticism

Author


Fair use is a doctrine in the law of the United States that permits limited use of copyrighted material without having to first acquire permission from the copyright holder. Fair use is one of the limitations to copyright intended to balance the interests of copyright holders with the public interest in the wider distribution and use of creative works by allowing as a defense to copyright infringement claims certain limited uses that might otherwise be considered infringement. Like "fair dealing" rights that exist in most countries with a British legal history, the fair use right is a general exception that applies to all different kinds of uses with all types of works and turns on a flexible proportionality test that examines the purpose of the use, the amount used, and the impact on the market of the original work.

The doctrine of "fair use" originated in the Anglo-American common law during the 18th and 19th centuries as a way of preventing copyright law from being too rigidly applied and "stifling the very creativity which [copyright] law is designed to foster." Though originally a common law doctrine, it was enshrined in statutory law when the U.S. Congress passed the Copyright Act of 1976. The U.S. Supreme Court has issued several major decisions clarifying and reaffirming the fair use doctrine since the 1980s, most recently in the 1994 decision Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.

History
The 1710 Statute of Anne, an act of the Parliament of Great Britain, created copyright law to replace a system of private ordering enforced by the Stationers' Company. The Statute of Anne did not provide for legal unauthorized use of material protected by copyright. In Gyles v Wilcox, the Court of Chancery established the doctrine of "fair abridgement", which permitted unauthorized abridgement of copyrighted works under certain circumstances. Over time, this doctrine evolved into the modern concepts of fair use and fair dealing. Fair use was a common-law doctrine in the U.S. until it was incorporated into the Copyright Act of 1976, .

The term "fair use" originated in the United States. Although related, the limitations and exceptions to copyright for teaching and library archiving in the U.S. are located in a different section of the statute. A similar-sounding principle, fair dealing, exists in some other common law jurisdictions but in fact it is more similar in principle to the enumerated exceptions found under civil law systems. Civil law jurisdictions have other limitations and exceptions to copyright.

In response to perceived over-expansion of copyrights, several electronic civil liberties and free expression organizations began in the 1990s to add fair use cases to their dockets and concerns. These include the Electronic Frontier Foundation ("EFF"), the American Civil Liberties Union, the National Coalition Against Censorship, the American Library Association, numerous clinical programs at law schools, and others. The "Chilling Effects" archive was established in 2002 as a coalition of several law school clinics and the EFF to document the use of cease and desist letters. In 2006 Stanford University began an initiative called "The Fair Use Project" (FUP) to help artists, particularly filmmakers, fight lawsuits brought against them by large corporations.

U.S. fair use factors
Examples of fair use in United States copyright law include commentary, search engines, criticism, parody, news reporting, research, and scholarship. Fair use provides for the legal, unlicensed citation or incorporation of copyrighted material in another author's work under a four-factor test.

The U.S. Supreme Court has traditionally characterized fair use as an affirmative defense, but in Lenz v. Universal Music Corp. (2015) (the "dancing baby" case), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that fair use was not merely a defense to an infringement claim, but was an expressly authorized right, and an exception to the exclusive rights granted to the author of a creative work by copyright law: "Fair use is therefore distinct from affirmative defenses where a use infringes a copyright, but there is no liability due to a valid excuse, e.g., misuse of a copyright."

The four factors of analysis for fair use set forth above derive from the opinion of Joseph Story in Folsom v. Marsh, in which the defendant had copied 353 pages from the plaintiff's 12-volume biography of George Washington in order to produce a separate two-volume work of his own. The court rejected the defendant's fair use defense with the following explanation:

The statutory fair use factors quoted above come from the Copyright Act of 1976, which is codified at . They were intended by Congress to restate, but not replace, the prior judge-made law. As Judge Pierre N. Leval has written, the statute does not "define or explain [fair use's] contours or objectives." While it "leav[es] open the possibility that other factors may bear on the question, the statute identifies none." That is, courts are entitled to consider other factors in addition to the four statutory factors.

1. Purpose and character of the use
The first factor is "the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes." To justify the use as fair, one must demonstrate how it either advances knowledge or the progress of the arts through the addition of something new.

In the 1841 copyright case Folsom v. Marsh, Justice Joseph Story wrote:

A key consideration in later fair use cases is the extent to which the use is transformative. In the 1994 decision Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music Inc, the U.S. Supreme Court held that when the purpose of the use is transformative, this makes the first factor more likely to favor fair use. Before the Campbell decision, federal Judge Pierre Leval argued that transformativeness is central to the fair use analysis in his 1990 article, Toward a Fair Use Standard. Blanch v. Koons is another example of a fair use case that focused on transformativeness. In 2006, Jeff Koons used a photograph taken by commercial photographer Andrea Blanch in a collage painting. Koons appropriated a central portion of an advertisement she had been commissioned to shoot for a magazine. Koons prevailed in part because his use was found transformative under the first fair use factor.

The Campbell case also addressed the subfactor mentioned in the quotation above, "whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes." In an earlier case, Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., the Supreme Court had stated that "every commercial use of copyrighted material is presumptively . . . unfair." In Campbell, the court clarified that this is not a "hard evidentiary presumption" and that even the tendency that commercial purpose will "weigh against a finding of fair use . . . will vary with the context." The Campbell court held that hip-hop group 2 Live Crew's parody of the song "Oh, Pretty Woman" was fair use, even though the parody was sold for profit. Thus, having a commercial purpose does not preclude a use from being found fair, even though it makes it less likely.

Likewise, the noncommercial purpose of a use makes it more likely to be found a fair use, but it does not make it a fair use automatically. For instance, in L.A. Times v. Free Republic, the court found that the noncommercial use of Los Angeles Times content by the Free Republic website was not fair use, since it allowed the public to obtain material at no cost that they would otherwise pay for. Richard Story similarly ruled in Code Revision Commission and State of Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc. that despite the fact that it is a non-profit and didn't sell the work, the service profited from its unauthorized publication of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated because of "the attention, recognition, and contributions" it received in association with the work.

Another factor is whether the use fulfills any of the preamble purposes, also mentioned in the legislation above, as these have been interpreted as "illustrative" of transformative use.

It is arguable, given the dominance of a rhetoric of the "transformative" in recent fair use determinations, that the first factor and transformativeness in general have become the most important parts of fair use.

2. Nature of the copyrighted work

Although the Supreme Court has ruled that the availability of copyright protection should not depend on the artistic quality or merit of a work, fair use analyses consider certain aspects of the work to be relevant, such as whether it is fictional or non-fictional.

To prevent the private ownership of work that rightfully belongs in the public domain, facts and ideas are not protected by copyright—only their particular expression or fixation merits such protection. On the other hand, the social usefulness of freely available information can weigh against the appropriateness of copyright for certain fixations. The Zapruder film of the assassination of President Kennedy, for example, was purchased and copyrighted by Time magazine. Yet its copyright was not upheld, in the name of the public interest, when Time tried to enjoin the reproduction of stills from the film in a history book on the subject in Time Inc v. Bernard Geis Associates.

In the decisions of the Second Circuit in Salinger v. Random House and in New Era Publications Int'l v. Henry Holt & Co, the aspect of whether the copied work has been previously published was considered crucial, assuming the right of the original author to control the circumstances of the publication of his work or preference not to publish at all. However, Judge Pierre N. Leval views this importation of certain aspects of France's droit moral d'artiste (moral rights of the artist) into American copyright law as "bizarre and contradictory" because it sometimes grants greater protection to works that were created for private purposes that have little to do with the public goals of copyright law, than to those works that copyright was initially conceived to protect. This is not to claim that unpublished works, or, more specifically, works not intended for publication, do not deserve legal protection, but that any such protection should come from laws about privacy, rather than laws about copyright. The statutory fair use provision was amended in response to these concerns by adding a final sentence: "The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors."

3. Amount and substantiality

The third factor assesses the amount and substantiality of the copyrighted work that has been used. In general, the less that is used in relation to the whole, the more likely the use will be considered fair.

Using most or all of a work does not bar a finding of fair use. It simply makes the third factor less favorable to the defendant. For instance, in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. copying entire television programs for private viewing was upheld as fair use, at least when the copying is done for the purposes of time-shifting. In Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corporation, the Ninth Circuit held that copying an entire photo to use as a thumbnail in online search results did not even weigh against fair use, "if the secondary user only copies as much as is necessary for his or her intended use".

However, even the use of a small percentage of a work can make the third factor unfavorable to the defendant, because the "substantiality" of the portion used is considered in addition to the amount used. For instance, in Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a news article's quotation of fewer than 400 words from President Ford's 200,000-word memoir was sufficient to make the third fair use factor weigh against the defendants, because the portion taken was the "heart of the work". This use was ultimately found not to be fair.

4. Effect upon work's value
The fourth factor measures the effect that the allegedly infringing use has had on the copyright owner's ability to exploit his original work. The court not only investigates whether the defendant's specific use of the work has significantly harmed the copyright owner's market, but also whether such uses in general, if widespread, would harm the potential market of the original. The burden of proof here rests on the copyright owner, who must demonstrate the impact of the infringement on commercial use of the work.

For example, in Sony Corp v. Universal City Studios, the copyright owner, Universal, failed to provide any empirical evidence that the use of Betamax had either reduced their viewership or negatively impacted their business. In Harper & Row, the case regarding President Ford's memoirs, the Supreme Court labeled the fourth factor "the single most important element of fair use" and it has enjoyed some level of primacy in fair use analyses ever since. Yet the Supreme Court's more recent announcement in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music Inc that "all [four factors] are to be explored, and the results weighed together, in light of the purposes of copyright" has helped modulate this emphasis in interpretation.

In evaluating the fourth factor, courts often consider two kinds of harm to the potential market for the original work.
 First, courts consider whether the use in question acts as a direct market substitute for the original work. In Campbell, the Supreme Court stated that "when a commercial use amounts to mere duplication of the entirety of the original, it clearly supersedes the object of the original and serves as a market replacement for it, making it likely that cognizable market harm to the original will occur". In one instance, a court ruled that this factor weighed against a defendant who had made unauthorized movie trailers for video retailers, since his trailers acted as direct substitutes for the copyright owner's official trailers.
 Second, courts also consider whether potential market harm might exist beyond that of direct substitution, such as in the potential existence of a licensing market. This consideration has weighed against commercial copy shops that make copies of articles in course-packs for college students, when a market already existed for the licensing of course-pack copies.<ref name=PrincetonUP></ref>

Courts recognize that certain kinds of market harm do not negate fair use, such as when a parody or negative review impairs the market of the original work. Copyright considerations may not shield a work against adverse criticism.

 Additional factors
As explained by Judge Leval, courts are permitted to include additional factors in their analysis.

One such factor is acknowledgement of the copyrighted source. Giving the name of the photographer or author may help, but it does not automatically make a use fair. While plagiarism and copyright infringement are related matters, they are not identical. Plagiarism (using someone's words, ideas, images, etc. without acknowledgment) is a matter of professional ethics, while copyright is a matter of law, and protects exact expression, not ideas. One can plagiarize even a work that is not protected by copyright, for example by passing off a line from Shakespeare as one's own. Conversely, attribution prevents accusations of plagiarism, but it does not prevent infringement of copyright. For example, reprinting a copyrighted book without permission, while citing the original author, would be copyright infringement but not plagiarism.

 U.S. fair use procedure and practice
The U.S. Supreme Court described fair use as an affirmative defense in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. This means that in litigation on copyright infringement, the defendant bears the burden of raising and proving that the use was fair and not an infringement. Thus, fair use need not even be raised as a defense unless the plaintiff first shows (or the defendant concedes) a "prima facie" case of copyright infringement. If the work was not copyrightable, the term had expired, or the defendant's work borrowed only a small amount, for instance, then the plaintiff cannot make out a prima facie case of infringement, and the defendant need not even raise the fair use defense. In addition, fair use is only one of many limitations, exceptions, and defenses to copyright infringement. Thus, a prima facie case can be defeated without relying on fair use. For instance, the Audio Home Recording Act establishes that it is legal, using certain technologies, to make copies of audio recordings for non-commercial personal use.

Some copyright owners claim infringement even in circumstances where the fair use defense would likely succeed, in hopes that the user will refrain from the use rather than spending resources in their defense. Strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP) cases that allege copyright infringement, patent infringement, defamation, or libel may come into conflict with the defendant's right to freedom of speech, and that possibility has prompted some jurisdictions to pass anti-SLAPP legislation that raises the plaintiff's burdens and risk.

Although fair use ostensibly permits certain uses without liability, many content creators and publishers try to avoid a potential court battle by seeking a legally unnecessary license from copyright owners for any use of non-public domain material, even in situations where a fair use defense would likely succeed. The simple reason is that the license terms negotiated with the copyright owner may be much less expensive than defending against a copyright suit, or having the mere possibility of a lawsuit threaten the publication of a work in which a publisher has invested significant resources.

Fair use rights take precedence over the author's interest. Thus the copyright holder cannot use a non-binding disclaimer, or notification, to revoke the right of fair use on works. However, binding agreements such as contracts or licence agreements may take precedence over fair use rights.

The practical effect of the fair use doctrine is that a number of conventional uses of copyrighted works are not considered infringing. For instance, quoting from a copyrighted work in order to criticize or comment upon it or teach students about it, is considered a fair use. Certain well-established uses cause few problems. A teacher who prints a few copies of a poem to illustrate a technique will have no problem on all four of the above factors (except possibly on amount and substantiality), but some cases are not so clear. All the factors are considered and balanced in each case: a book reviewer who quotes a paragraph as an example of the author's style will probably fall under fair use even though they may sell their review commercially; but a non-profit educational website that reproduces whole articles from technical magazines will probably be found to infringe if the publisher can demonstrate that the website affects the market for the magazine, even though the website itself is non-commercial.

Fair use is decided on a case by case basis, on the entirety of circumstances. The same act done by different means or for a different purpose can gain or lose fair use status. Even repeating an identical act at a different time can make a difference due to changing social, technological, or other surrounding circumstances.

 Fair use in particular areas
 Computer code
The Oracle America, Inc. v. Google, Inc. case revolves around the use of application programming interfaces (APIs) used to define functionality of the Java programming language, created by Sun Microsystems and now owned by Oracle Corporation. Google used the APIs' definition and their structure, sequence and organization (SSO) in creating the Android operating system to support the mobile device market. Oracle had sued Google in 2010 over both patent and copyright violations, but after two cycles, the case matter was narrowed down to whether Google's use of the definition and SSO of Oracle's Java APIs (determined to be copyrightable) was within fair use. The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled against Google, stating that while Google could defend its use in the nature of the copyrighted work, its use was not transformative, and more significantly, it commercially harmed Oracle as they were also seeking entry to the mobile market. The case, should this ruling hold, could have a significant impact on developing products for interoperability using APIs, such as with many open source projects.

 Documentary films
In April 2006, the filmmakers of the Loose Change series were served with a lawsuit by Jules and Gédéon Naudet over the film's use of their footage, specifically footage of the firefighters discussing the collapse of the World Trade Center.
With the help of an intellectual property lawyer, the creators of Loose Change successfully argued that a majority of the footage used was for historical purposes and was significantly transformed in the context of the film. They agreed to remove a few shots that were used as B-roll and served no purpose to the greater discussion. The case was settled and a potential multimillion-dollar lawsuit was avoided.This Film Is Not Yet Rated also relied on fair use to feature several clips from copyrighted Hollywood productions. The director had originally planned to license these clips from their studio owners but discovered that studio licensing agreements would have prohibited him from using this material to criticize the entertainment industry. This prompted him to invoke the fair use doctrine, which permits limited use of copyrighted material to provide analysis and criticism of published works.

 File sharing
In 2009, fair use appeared as a defense in lawsuits against filesharing. Charles Nesson argued that file-sharing qualifies as fair use in his defense of alleged filesharer Joel Tenenbaum. Kiwi Camara, defending alleged filesharer Jammie Thomas, announced a similar defense.
However, the Court in the case at bar rejected the idea that file-sharing is fair use.

 Internet publication
A U.S. court case from 2003, Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., provides and develops the relationship between thumbnails, inline linking and fair use. In the lower District Court case on a motion for summary judgment, Arriba Soft's use of thumbnail pictures and inline linking from Kelly's website in Arriba Soft's image search engine was found not to be fair use. That decision was appealed and contested by Internet rights activists such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation, who argued that it was fair use.

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found in favor of the defendant, Arriba Soft. In reaching its decision, the court utilized the statutory four-factor analysis. First, it found the purpose of creating the thumbnail images as previews to be sufficiently transformative, noting that they were not meant to be viewed at high resolution as the original artwork was. Second, the photographs had already been published, diminishing the significance of their nature as creative works. Third, although normally making a "full" replication of a copyrighted work may appear to violate copyright, here it was found to be reasonable and necessary in light of the intended use. Lastly, the court found that the market for the original photographs would not be substantially diminished by the creation of the thumbnails. To the contrary, the thumbnail searches could increase the exposure of the originals. In looking at all these factors as a whole, the court found that the thumbnails were fair use and remanded the case to the lower court for trial after issuing a revised opinion on July 7, 2003. The remaining issues were resolved with a default judgment after Arriba Soft had experienced significant financial problems and failed to reach a negotiated settlement.

In August 2008, Judge Jeremy Fogel of the Northern District of California ruled in Lenz v. Universal Music Corp. that copyright holders cannot order a deletion of an online file without determining whether that posting reflected "fair use" of the copyrighted material. The case involved Stephanie Lenz, a writer and editor from Gallitzin, Pennsylvania, who made a home video of her thirteen-month-old son dancing to Prince's song Let's Go Crazy and posted the video on YouTube. Four months later, Universal Music, the owner of the copyright to the song, ordered YouTube to remove the video under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. Lenz notified YouTube immediately that her video was within the scope of fair use, and she demanded that it be restored. YouTube complied after six weeks, rather than the two weeks required by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. Lenz then sued Universal Music in California for her legal costs, claiming the music company had acted in bad faith by ordering removal of a video that represented fair use of the song. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that a copyright owner must affirmatively consider whether the complained of conduct constituted fair use before sending a takedown notice under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, rather than waiting for the alleged infringer to assert fair use. 801 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2015). "Even if, as Universal urges, fair use is classified as an 'affirmative defense,' we hold—for the purposes of the DMCA—fair use is uniquely situated in copyright law so as to be treated differently than traditional affirmative defenses. We conclude that because 17 U.S.C. § 107 created a type of non-infringing use, fair use is "authorized by the law" and a copyright holder must consider the existence of fair use before sending a takedown notification under § 512(c)."

In June 2011, Judge Philip Pro of the District of Nevada ruled in Righthaven v. Hoehn that the posting of an entire editorial article from the Las Vegas Review Journal in a comment as part of an online discussion was unarguably fair use. Judge Pro noted that "Noncommercial, nonprofit use is presumptively fair. ... Hoehn posted the Work as part of an online discussion. ... This purpose is consistent with comment, for which 17 U.S.C. § 107 provides fair use protection. ... It is undisputed that Hoehn posted the entire work in his comment on the Website. ... wholesale copying does not preclude a finding of fair use. ... there is no genuine issue of material fact that Hoehn's use of the Work was fair and summary judgment is appropriate." On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that Righthaven did not even have the standing needed to sue Hoehn for copyright infringement in the first place.

 Professional communities
In addition to considering the four fair use factors, courts deciding fair use cases also look to the standards and practices of the professional community where the case comes from. Among the communities are documentarians, librarians, makers of Open Courseware, visual art educators, and communications professors.

Such codes of best practices have permitted communities of practice to make more informed risk assessments in employing fair use in their daily practice. For instance, broadcasters, cablecasters, and distributors typically require filmmakers to obtain errors and omissions insurance before the distributor will take on the film. Such insurance protects against errors and omissions made during the copyright clearance of material in the film. Before the Documentary Filmmakers' Statement of Best Practices in Fair Use was created in 2005, it was nearly impossible to obtain errors and omissions insurance for copyright clearance work that relied in part on fair use. This meant documentarians had either to obtain a license for the material or to cut it from their films. In many cases, it was impossible to license the material because the filmmaker sought to use it in a critical way. Soon after the best practices statement was released, all errors and omissions insurers in the U.S. shifted to begin offering routine fair use coverage.

 Music sampling

Before 1991, sampling in certain genres of music was accepted practice and the copyright considerations were viewed as largely irrelevant. The strict decision against rapper Biz Markie's appropriation of a Gilbert O'Sullivan song in the case Grand Upright Music, Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records Inc. changed practices and opinions overnight. Samples now had to be licensed, as long as they rose "to a level of legally cognizable appropriation." This left the door open for the de minimis doctrine, for short or unrecognizable samples; such uses would not rise to the level of copyright infringement, because under the de minimis doctrine, "the law does not care about trifles." However, 3 years later, the Sixth Circuit effectively eliminated the de minimis doctrine in the Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films case, holding that artists must "get a license or do not sample". The Court later clarified that its opinion did not apply to fair use, but between Grand Upright and Bridgeport, practice had effectively shifted to eliminate unlicensed sampling.

 Parody
Producers or creators of parodies of a copyrighted work have been sued for infringement by the targets of their ridicule, even though such use may be protected as fair use. These fair use cases distinguish between parodies, which use a work in order to poke fun at or comment on the work itself and satire, or comment on something else. Courts have been more willing to grant fair use protections to parodies than to satires, but the ultimate outcome in either circumstance will turn on the application of the four fair use factors.

For example, when Tom Forsythe appropriated Barbie dolls for his photography project "Food Chain Barbie" (depicting several copies of the doll naked and disheveled and about to be baked in an oven, blended in a food mixer, and the like), Mattel lost its copyright infringement lawsuit against him because his work effectively parodies Barbie and the values she represents. In Rogers v. Koons, Jeff Koons tried to justify his appropriation of Art Rogers' photograph "Puppies" in his sculpture "String of Puppies" with the same parody defense. Koons lost because his work was not presented as a parody of Rogers' photograph in particular, but as a satire of society at large. This was insufficient to render the use fair.

In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music Inc the U.S. Supreme Court recognized parody as a potential fair use, even when done for profit. Roy Orbison's publisher, Acuff-Rose Music, had sued 2 Live Crew in 1989 for their use of Orbison's "Oh, Pretty Woman" in a mocking rap version with altered lyrics. The Supreme Court viewed 2 Live Crew's version as a ridiculing commentary on the earlier work, and ruled that when the parody was itself the product rather than mere advertising, commercial nature did not bar the defense. The Campbell court also distinguished parodies from satire, which they described as a broader social critique not intrinsically tied to ridicule of a specific work and so not deserving of the same use exceptions as parody because the satirist's ideas are capable of expression without the use of the other particular work.

A number of appellate decisions have recognized that a parody may be a protected fair use, including the Second (Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp.); the Ninth (Mattel v. Walking Mountain Productions); and the Eleventh Circuits (Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co.). In the 2001 Suntrust Bank case, Suntrust Bank and the Margaret Mitchell estate unsuccessfully brought suit to halt the publication of The Wind Done Gone, which reused many of the characters and situations from Gone with the Wind but told the events from the point of view of the enslaved people rather than the slaveholders. The Eleventh Circuit, applying Campbell, found that The Wind Done Gone was fair use and vacated the district court's injunction against its publication.

Cases in which a satirical use was found to be fair include Blanch v. Koons and Williams v. Columbia Broadcasting Systems.

 Text and data mining
The transformative nature of computer based analytical processes such as text mining, web mining and data mining has led many to form the view that such uses would be protected under fair use. This view was substantiated by the rulings of Judge Denny Chin in Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., a case involving mass digitisation of millions of books from research library collections. As part of the ruling that found the book digitisation project was fair use, the judge stated "Google Books is also transformative in the sense that it has transformed book text into data for purposes of substantive research, including data mining and text mining in new areas".

Text and data mining was subject to further review in Authors Guild v. HathiTrust, a case derived from the same digitization project mentioned above. Judge Harold Baer, in finding that the defendant's uses were transformative, stated that 'the search capabilities of the [HathiTrust Digital Library] have already given rise to new methods of academic inquiry such as text mining."

 Reverse engineering

There is a substantial body of fair use law regarding reverse engineering of computer software, hardware, network protocols, encryption and access control systems.

 Social media
In May 2015, artist Richard Prince released an exhibit of photographs at the Gagosian Gallery in New York, entitled "New Portraits". His exhibit consisted of screenshots of Instagram users' pictures, which were largely unaltered, with Prince's commentary added beneath. Although no Instagram users authorized Prince to use their pictures, Prince argued that the addition of his own commentary the pictures constituted fair use, such that he did not need permission to use the pictures or to pay royalties for his use. One of the pieces sold for $90,000. With regard to the works presented by Painter, the gallery where the pictures were showcased posted notices that "All images are subject to copyright." Several lawsuits were filed against Painter over the New Portraits exhibit.

 Influence internationally
While U.S. fair use law has been influential in some countries, some countries have fair use criteria drastically different from those in the U.S., and some countries do not have a fair use framework at all. Some countries have the concept of fair dealing instead of fair use, while others use different systems of limitations and exceptions to copyright. Many countries have some reference to an exemption for educational use, though the extent of this exemption varies widely.

Sources differ on whether fair use is fully recognized by countries other than the United States. American University's infojustice.org published a compilation of portions of over 40 nations' laws that explicitly mention fair use or fair dealing, and asserts that some of the fair dealing laws, such as Canada's, have evolved (such as through judicial precedents) to be quite close to those of the United States. This compilation includes fair use provisions from Bangladesh, Israel, South Korea, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Uganda, and the United States. However, Paul Geller's 2009 International Copyright Law and Practice says that while some other countries recognize similar exceptions to copyright, only the United States and Israel fully recognize the concept of fair use.

The International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA), a lobby group of U.S. copyright industry bodies, has objected to international adoption of U.S.-style fair use exceptions, alleging that such laws have a dependency on common law and long-term legal precedent that may not exist outside the United States.

 Israel
In November 2007, the Israeli Knesset passed a new copyright law that included a U.S.-style fair use exception. The law, which took effect in May 2008, permits the fair use of copyrighted works for purposes such as private study, research, criticism, review, news reporting, quotation, or instruction or testing by an educational institution. The law sets up four factors, similar to the U.S. fair use factors (see above), for determining whether a use is fair.

On September 2, 2009, the Tel Aviv District court ruled in The Football Association Premier League Ltd. v. Ploni that fair use is a user right. The court also ruled that streaming of live soccer games on the Internet is fair use. In doing so, the court analyzed the four fair use factors adopted in 2007 and cited U.S. case law, including Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp. and Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc..

 Malaysia
An amendment in 2012 to the section 13(2)(a) of the Copyright Act 1987 created an exception called 'fair dealing' which is not restricted in its purpose. The four factors for fair use as specified in US law are included.

 Poland
Fair use exists in Polish law and is covered by the Polish copyright law articles 23 to 35.

Compared to the United States, Polish fair use distinguishes between private and public use. In Poland, when the use is public, its use risks fines. The defendant must also prove that his use was private when accused that it was not, or that other mitigating circumstances apply. Finally, Polish law treats all cases in which private material was made public as a potential copyright infringement, where fair use can apply, but has to be proven by reasonable circumstances.

 Singapore
Section 35 of the Singaporean Copyright Act 1987 has been amended in 2004 to allow a 'fair dealing' exception for any purpose. The four fair use factors similar to US law are included in the new section 35.

 South Korea
The Korean Copyright Act was amended to include a fair use provision, Article 35-3, in 2012. The law outlines a four-factor test similar to that used under U.S. law:

 Fair dealing

Fair dealing allows specific exceptions to copyright protections. The open-ended concept of fair use is generally not observed in jurisdictions where fair dealing is in place, although this does vary. Fair dealing is established in legislation in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Singapore, India, South Africa and the United Kingdom, among others.

 Australia

While Australian copyright exceptions are based on the Fair Dealing system, since 1998 a series of Australian government inquiries have examined, and in most cases recommended, the introduction of a "flexible and open" Fair Use system into Australian copyright law. From 1998 to 2017 there have been eight Australian government inquiries which have considered the question of whether fair use should be adopted in Australia. Six reviews have recommended Australia adopt a "Fair Use" model of copyright exceptions: two enquiries specifically into the Copyright Act (1998, 2014); and four broader reviews (both 2004, 2013, 2016). One review (2000) recommended against the introduction of fair use and another (2005) issued no final report. Two of the recommendations were specifically in response to the stricter copyright rules introduced as part of the Australia–United States Free Trade Agreement (AUSFTA), while the most recent two, by the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) and the Productivity Commission (PC) were with reference to strengthening Australia's "digital economy".

 Canada

The Copyright Act of Canada establishes fair dealing in Canada, which allows specific exceptions to copyright protection. In 1985, the Sub-Committee on the Revision of Copyright rejected replacing fair dealing with an open-ended system, and in 1986 the Canadian government agreed that "the present fair dealing provisions should not be replaced by the substantially wider 'fair use' concept". Since then, the Canadian fair dealing exception has broadened. It is now similar in effect to U.S. fair use, even though the frameworks are different.

CCH Canadian Ltd v. Law Society of Upper Canada [2004] 1 S.C.R. 339, is a landmark Supreme Court of Canada case that establishes the bounds of fair dealing in Canadian copyright law. The Law Society of Upper Canada was sued for copyright infringement for providing photocopy services to researchers. The Court unanimously held that the Law Society's practice fell within the bounds of fair dealing.

 United Kingdom

Within the United Kingdom, fair dealing is a legal doctrine that provides an exception to the nation's copyright law in cases where the copyright infringement is for the purposes of non-commercial research or study, criticism or review, or for the reporting of current events.

 Policy arguments about fair use
A balanced copyright law provides an economic benefit to many high-tech businesses such as search engines and software developers. Fair use is also crucial to non-technology industries such as insurance, legal services, and newspaper publishers.

On September 12, 2007, the Computer and Communications Industry Association (CCIA), a group representing companies including Google Inc., Microsoft Inc., Oracle Corporation, Sun Microsystems, Yahoo! and other high-tech companies, released a study that found that fair use exceptions to US copyright laws were responsible for more than $4.5 trillion in annual revenue for the United States economy representing one-sixth of the total US GDP. The study was conducted using a methodology developed by the World Intellectual Property Organization.

The study found that fair use dependent industries are directly responsible for more than eighteen percent of US economic growth and nearly eleven million American jobs. "As the United States economy becomes increasingly knowledge-based, the concept of fair use can no longer be discussed and legislated in the abstract. It is the very foundation of the digital age and a cornerstone of our economy," said Ed Black, President and CEO of CCIA. "Much of the unprecedented economic growth of the past ten years can actually be credited to the doctrine of fair use, as the Internet itself depends on the ability to use content in a limited and unlicensed manner."

 Fair Use Week
Fair Use Week is an international event that celebrates fair use and fair dealing. Fair Use Week was first proposed on a Fair Use Allies listserv, which was an outgrowth of the Library Code of Best Practices Capstone Event, celebrating the development and promulgation of ARL's Code of Best Practices in Fair Use for Academic and Research Libraries''. While the idea was not taken up nationally,  Copyright Advisor at Harvard University, launched the first ever Fair Use Week at Harvard University in February 2014, with a full week of activities celebrating fair use. The first Fair Use Week included blog posts from national and international fair use experts, live fair use panels, fair use workshops, and a Fair Use Stories Tumblr blog, where people from the world of art, music, film, and academia shared stories about the importance of fair use to their community. The first Fair Use Week was so successful that in 2015 ARL teamed up with Courtney and helped organize the Second Annual Fair Use Week, with participation from many more institutions. ARL also launched an official Fair Use Week website, which was transferred from Pia Hunter, who attended the Library Code of Best Practices Capstone Event and had originally purchased the domain name fairuseweek.org.

See also

References

Further reading

 United States. Congress. House of Representatives (2014). The Scope of Fair Use: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, One Hundred Thirteenth Congress, Second Session, January 28, 2014.

External links

 U.S. Copyright Office Fair Use Index, a searchable database of notable fair use cases in U.S. federal courts
 The Fair Use/Fair Dealing Handbook, a compilation of national statutes that explicitly refer to fair use or fair dealing
 CHEER, a repository of copyright educational resources for higher education

Copyright law
Digital rights
Equitable defenses
Legal doctrines and principles
United States copyright law
United States intellectual property law

සාධාරණ භාවිතය


Hugh (died 1054) was the Count of Rouergue and Gévaudan from 1008 to his death. He was the son and successor of Raymond II and he inherited suzerainty over neighbouring counties (Agde, Béziers, Uzès) and over Narbonne.

In 1016, Hugh sold his rights over the Archdiocese of Narbonne.  In 1035, he sold certain allodial lands to his viscount, Berengar.  In January 1051, Hugh donated the church of Tribons to the abbey of Conques for the sake of his father's soul. He married Fides (also Fe or Foy), daughter of Wilfred II of Cerdanya, to whom he had sold the archdiocese in 1016. They had two daughters, the elder of which, Bertha, inherited Rouergue and Gévaudan, but lost suzerainty over the other territories to William IV of Toulouse.  She married Robert II of Auvergne while her younger sister, Fides, married Bernard, Viscount of Narbonne.

Notes

Sources
 Foixstory: Les Comtes de Toulouse.
 Lewis, Archibald R. The Development of Southern French and Catalan Society, 718-1050.

1054 deaths
Counts of Rouergue
Year of birth unknown
House of Rouergue

Hugh of Rouergue


Carl Ferdinand Ritter von Arlt (18 April 1812 – 7 March 1887) was an Austrian ophthalmologist born in Ober-Graupen, a village near Teplitz (Teplice) in Bohemia.

He earned his doctorate in Prague in 1839, and later became a professor of ophthalmology in Prague (1849–1856) and Vienna (1856–1883). His son Ferdinand Ritter von Arlt (1842–1917) was also an ophthalmologist.

Arlt published a prodigious number of books and articles concerning diseases of the eye, and collaborated with Albrecht von Graefe and Franciscus Donders on the journal Archiv für Ophthalmologie. He was the first physician to provide proof that myopia (short-sightedness) is generally a consequence of excessive length of the sagittal axis of the eye (bulbus).

Annually. he returned to his home town in order to treat people in its vicinity who were afflicted with eye diseases. Arlt died in Vienna on 7 March 1887.

The following eponyms are named after Arlt:
 "Arlt's line": Linear scar present in sulcus subtarsalis during Chlamydia trachomatis infection.
 "Arlt's operation": Transplantation of eyelashes back from the edge of the eyelid for treatment of distichiasis.
 "Arlt's syndrome": A contagious eye infection caused by Chlamydia trachomatis.
 "Arlt's triangle": keratic precipitates distributed in a wedge-shaped area on the inferior corneal endothelium.

Selected publications
 Die Krankheiten des Auges  (Diseases of the eye) three volumes, (1851, 1853 & 1856).
 Operationslehre (Surgical Lessons) In Saemisch/Graefe Handbuch der gesamten Augenheilkunde, Volume 3, (1874).
 Meine Erlebnisse. (Autobiography), Wiesbaden 1887, Otto Becker, pupil of Arlt, completed his autobiography.

References
 Who Named It?; Carl Ferdinand von Arlt
 KHURANA, AK. "Comprehensive ophthalmology"

1812 births
1887 deaths
People from Krupka
Austrian ophthalmologists
Charles University alumni
Academic staff of Charles University
Academic staff of the University of Vienna
German Bohemian people
Austrian people of German Bohemian descent
Habsburg Bohemian nobility

Carl Ferdinand von Arlt


Australian insurance law is based on commercial contract law, but is subject to regulations that affect the insurance industry and insurance contracts within Australia. Commonwealth Parliament has power to make laws with respect to insurance and insurance companies under section 51(xiv) (insurance other than state insurance) and (xx) (the corporations power) of the Australian Constitution. Generally, the Insurance Act 1973 and Insurance Contracts Act 1984 are the main acts that apply, however there are a number of other pieces of legislation enacted by the states, private codes and voluminous case law all of which forms the body of insurance law.

Legislation
The Insurance Act 1973 (Cth) sets minimum capital and solvency requirements for companies wanting to enter or operate in the insurance market.

Chapter 7 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) regulates the way in which insurers and insurance agents and brokers carry on business and how they deal with the people they do business with and intend to do business with.

The Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (ICA) applies to most insurance contracts with an Australian connection and is intended to ensure that a fair balance is struck between the interests of the insurer and the insured.

The primary federal laws affecting the industry include:
 Life Insurance Act 1995 (Life Insurance prudential regulation)
 Insurance Act 1973 (General Insurance prudential regulation)
 Health Insurance Act 2007 (Health insurance prudential regulation and consumer protection)
 Corporations Act 2001 (especially Ch 7, consumer protection in respect of insurance policies)
 Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (consumer protection in respect of insurance policies)
Other legislation which affects the industry includes:
 A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999 (Taxation rules in respect to insurance e.g. Division 78)
 Privacy Act 1988 (The National Privacy Principles)
Further regulations include:
 The General Insurance Code of Practice which all general insurer signatories agree to self-regulate under.
 Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS)

Regulators
The prudential aspects of general, life and health insurance (solvency etc.) are regulated by the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA), which has the power under the Insurance Act 1973 to investigate a general insurer, freeze its assets or direct it to take specific action (for example, stop writing new business).

The Australian Securities & Investments Commission (ASIC) is responsible for the general administration of the Insurance Contracts Act 1984. Matters relating to advice or disclosure of insurance products sold are regulated by ASIC. The Australian Competition & Consumer Commission (ACCC) also has a regulatory role with respect to competition law.

In certain states, various bodies also have powers in regulating certain types of statutory insurance. For example, in New South Wales the Motor Accidents Authority regulates Compulsory Third Party motor liability insurance. In many cases these bodies have powers regarding premium rating and reinsurance rules.

Insurance contract
The formation of an insurance contract is governed by ordinary contractual principles however, as a commercial contract, a policy of insurance should be given a businesslike interpretation "having regard to the language used by the parties, the commercial circumstances the document addresses, and the objects which it is intended to secure."

Code of Practice
The General Insurance Code of Practice is a self-regulatory code that binds all general insurers who are signatories to it. It has been approved by ASIC pursuant to s 1101A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).

Australian Financial Complaints Authority

If a person doesn't agree with the outcome of the insurer's Internal Dispute Resolution (IDR) process, they can contact the Australian Financial Complaints Authority (AFCA) with a request that the Service resolve the dispute.

See also
 Insurance in Australia
 Utmost good faith

References

External links
 Insurance Contracts Act 1984
 Insurance (Agents & Brokers) Act 1984
 Financial Services Reform Act 2001
 Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority
 Australian Securities and Investment Commission
 Australian Insurance Law Association
 Insurance Council of Australia
 Insurance Ombudsman Service (IOS)

Further reading
Greg Pynt, Australian Insurance Law: A First Reference (Chatswood: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2008).
Peter Mann and Candace Lewis, Annotated Insurance Contracts Act, 4th edition (Pyrmont: Lawbook Co., 2003).

Law of Australia
Insurance law
Insurance in Australia

Australian insurance law


Kempston North is an electoral ward and area within the town of Kempston, Bedfordshire, England.

The boundaries of Kempston North are approximately the River Great Ouse to the north west, with Kempston High Street and Bedford Road to the south east.

The Hillgrounds neighbourhood is within Kempston North.

The area used to be a hamlet called Kempston Up End, but was absorbed into the Kempston Urban District in 1896. Today, Addison Howard Park and Kempston Pool are located within the boundaries of Kempston North.

Kempston
Wards of Bedfordshire

Kempston North


Lofton v. Secretary of the Department of Children & Family Services, is a 2004 decision from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit upholding Florida's ban of adoption of children by homosexual persons as enforced by the Florida Department of Children and Families.

Federal District Court
The plaintiffs applied for adoptions and their applications were rejected because they were homosexuals. Four of the plaintiffs were legal guardians or foster parents of the children, who were also plaintiffs. They filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, asking it to enjoin enforcement of the law. They also sought class certification for all persons similarly situated.

The court considered five questions on whether the law violated:
 the right to familial privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment
 the right to intimate association
 the right to family integrity
 the right to sexual privacy
 equal protection on the basis of sexual orientation

On August 21, 2001 District court judge James Lawrence King rejected class certification and granted summary judgment in favor of defendants.

Court of Appeals
The Court noted that "adoption is not a right; it is a statutory privilege" and that adoption is wholly a creature of the state. It then noted that in "formulating its adoption policies and procedures, the State of Florida acts in the protective and provisional role of in loco parentis for those children who, because of various circumstances, have become wards of the state. Thus, adoption law is unlike criminal law, for example, where the paramount substantive concern is not intruding on individuals' liberty interests" and that it is "also distinct from such contexts as government-benefit eligibility schemes or access to a public forum, where equality of treatment is the primary concern." The Court held that "the state's overriding interest is the best interests of the children whom it is seeking to place with adoptive families", and "the state can make classifications for adoption purposes that would be constitutionally suspect in many other arenas".

Because adoption is a public act, the plaintiffs-appellants were "asking the state to confer official recognition — and, consequently, the highest level of constitutional insulation from subsequent state interference". The Court noted that "appellants have not cited to us, nor have we found, a single precedent in which the Supreme Court or one of our sister circuits has sustained a constitutional challenge to an adoption scheme or practice by any individual other than a natural parent, and even many challenges by natural parents have failed".

The court rejected the family integrity claim. It said that in arguing that there is a fundamental right to family integrity, "appellants argue[d] that parental and familial rights should be extended to individuals such as foster parents and legal guardians and that the touchstone of this liberty interest is not biological ties or official legal recognition, but the emotional bond that develops between and among individuals as a result of shared daily life". The Court concluded that plaintiffs "could [not have had] justifiable expectation of permanency in their relationships and that even if an expectation of permanency was created, "[t]he resulting liberty interest at most would provide procedural due process protection in the event the state were to attempt to remove [the children] Doe or Roe" and that "[s]uch a procedural right does not translate, however, into a substantive right to be free from state inference. Nor does it create an affirmative right to be accorded official recognition as "parent" and "child."

In dealing with sexual privacy claim, the Court first asked if sexual privacy was a fundamental right. Plaintiffs-appellants argued that "the Supreme Court's recent decision in Lawrence v. Texas, which struck down Texas's sodomy statute, identified a hitherto unarticulated fundamental right to private sexual intimacy. They contend that the Florida statute, by disallowing adoption to any individual who chooses to engage in homosexual conduct, impermissibly burdens the exercise of this right." The Court noted that nowhere in Lawrence was it announced that homosexual sodomy was a fundamental right and that Lawrence did not "locate this right directly in the Constitution, but instead treated it as the by-product of several different constitutional principles and liberty interests." It noted that the Supreme Court had "exercise the utmost care whenever [it is] asked to break new ground" in the field of fundamental rights" It also noted that Lawrence did not use "strict scrutiny, the proper standard when fundamental rights are implicated, but instead invalidated the Texas statute on rational-basis grounds" and that "the asserted liberty interest is not the negative right to engage in private conduct without facing criminal sanctions, but the affirmative right to receive official and public recognition". The Court concluded that "the Lawrence decision cannot be extrapolated to create a right to adopt for homosexual persons".

In addressing the equal protection challenge, the Court used the rational basis standard, declining to hold that homosexuals are a suspect class. It noted that "[r]ational-basis review, a paradigm of judicial restraint, does not provide a license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices." The defendants-appellees had argued that the law "is rationally related to Florida's interest in furthering the best interests of adopted children by placing them in families with married mothers and fathers" and that "disallowing adoption into homosexual households, which are necessarily motherless or fatherless and lack the stability that comes with marriage, is a rational means of furthering Florida's interest in promoting adoption by marital families."  Plaintiffs-appellants had argued that "the statute is not rationally related to this interest", being "overinclusive and underinclusive." The Court rejected appellants' arguments, holding that "The Florida legislature could rationally conclude that homosexuals and heterosexual singles are not "similarly situated in relevant respects." It is not irrational to think that heterosexual singles have a markedly greater probability of eventually establishing a married household and, thus, providing their adopted children with a stable, dual-gender parenting environment. Moreover, as the state noted, the legislature could rationally act on the theory that heterosexual singles, even if they never marry, are better positioned than homosexual individuals to provide adopted children with education and guidance relative to their sexual development throughout pubescence and adolescence."  The Court rejected a comparison with Romer v. Evans noting that "Florida's statute is not so "[s]weeping and comprehensive" as to render Florida's rationales for the statute "inexplicable by anything but animus" toward its homosexual residents. Amendment 2 deprived homosexual persons of "protections against exclusion from an almost limitless number of transactions and endeavors that constitute ordinary civic life in a free society." In contrast to this "broad and undifferentiated disability," the Florida classification is limited to the narrow and discrete context of access to the statutory privilege of adoption27 and, more importantly, has a plausible connection with the state's asserted interest. Moreover, not only is the effect of Florida's classification dramatically smaller, but the classification itself is narrower. Whereas Amendment 2's classification encompassed both conduct and status, Florida's adoption prohibition is limited to conduct. Thus, we conclude that Romer's unique factual situation and narrow holding are inapposite to this case." thus, the Court rejected the equal protection claim.

Plaintiffs petitioned for en banc rehearing, which was denied. Judge Rosemary Barkett dissented from the denial of rehearing, noting that "[w]hile Florida claims that it has singled out homosexuals because it wishes to limit adoptions to married couples, the statute in this case says absolutely nothing about married couples. In fact, Florida's adoption statute expressly provides for single persons to adopt".

The plaintiffs petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. It was denied.

Subsequent Developments
Florida's ban on homosexuals adopting children was later challenged in the Florida state courts.  In In re Gill and was found unconstitutional under the state Constitution of Florida on September 22, 2010 by a Florida state court of appeals.  The state did not appeal the decisions further thereby ending Florida's ban.

Comparison with Cook v. Gates
In contrast, the First Circuit held in Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2008), that heightened scrutiny applied to substantive due process sexual privacy challenges, as opposed to the rational basis review used by the 11th Circuit in Lofton.

References

2004 in United States case law
United States substantive due process case law
United States LGBT rights case law
2004 in LGBT history
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit cases
Adoption law in the United States
United States family case law
LGBT adoption


Anson Henry (born March 9, 1979) is a retired Canadian sprinter of Jamaican descent who specialized in the 100 metres. He was born in Toronto, Ontario, Canada. His personal best time is 10.12 seconds, achieved in May 2006 in Doha. He also has 20.52 seconds in the 200 metres and 6.59 seconds in the 60 metres.

He blasted onto the track scene when he was the bronze medalist at the 2002 NCAA Indoor Track and Field Championships while representing Washington State University .  Henry finished only behind silver medalist Leonard Scott and gold medalist Justin Gatlin who later tested positive for amphetamines.  Talk of moving Henry up to the silver medal position went unconcluded.  He would later be a favorite at the NCAA Outdoor Track and Field Championships, but due to a muscle cramp in the 100m final Henry hobbled across the line in an unexpected 8th-place finish.  Henry still remains the Washington State University record holder in the 60m (6.65), 100m (10.04w, 10.17) and 200m (20.52).

At the 2003 Pan American Games he won the bronze medal in the 100 metres, as the original winner Mickey Grimes was stripped of the gold medal after testing positive for ephedrine. At the 2006 Commonwealth Games he finished sixth in the 100 metres and won a bronze medal in the 4 x 100 metres relay. He won a relay silver medal at the 2007 Pan American Games and also finished 7th in the 100m.

Later on in 2007 Henry would have an impressive 10th-place finish overall in the 100m dash at the 2007 World Championships in Osaka, Japan.  This was the best finish by a Canadian sprinter at any major championships in the 100m since Bruny Surin won bronze at the 1999 World Championships in Seville, Spain.

He also competed at the 2008 Olympic Games without reaching the final. In Beijing he competed at the 100 metres sprint and placed 4th in his heat behind Francis Obikwelu, Obinna Metu and Walter Dix.  He improved his time to 10.33 in the quarter-finals, but failed to qualify to the semi-finals as he finished only in seventh place. Together with Hank Palmer, Pierre Browne and Jared Connaughton he also competed at the 4x100 metres relay. In their qualification heat they placed second behind Jamaica, but in front of Germany and China. Their time of 38.77 was the fourth out of sixteen participating nations in the first round and they qualified for the final. There they sprinted to a time of 38.66 seconds, which was the sixth time.

Henry is now a commentator for CBC Sports.

Early years

Anson Henry attended Dunbarton High School.  Mainly a basketball player through the majority of his high school years, Henry gave track and field a try in his senior year.  He was successful in becoming an OFSAA 100m Bronze Medalist, and later became the Canadian National Junior Champion in the 100m dash.  He had a personal best in high school of 10.40s.  Later he was 1 of 9 junior athletes selected from Canada to compete at the IAAF World Junior Championships in Athletics in Annecy, France.  He finished in 9th place.

College career

Anson Henry received a full athletic scholarship to attend Washington State University.  While struggling with injury throughout his early years, which delayed his flourish as a collegiate athlete until his senior year.  In that year he set a new WSU 60m record of 6.65 seconds at the NCAA Indoor Track and Field Championships and had a 3rd-place finish.  He would later set the 100m school record of 10.17 as he won the 2002 Mt. SAC Relays 100m dash.  With the Pac-10 Conference Championships being held at WSU, Henry pulled off the double as he won both the 100m dash (10.29s, -1.4w) and set a new school record in the 200m Dash of 20.52s (-0.9w).  He entered the NCAA Outdoor Track and Field Championships as a heavy favorite, and looked great through the qualifying rounds but pulled up mid race with a hamstring cramp, leaving him crossing the line lame in an 8th-place finish.  Henry's accomplishments in the year of 2002 awarded him Pac-10 Track and Field Athlete of the Year, and also NCAA Western Region Track and Field Athlete of the Year.  Henry still remains the only sprinter at WSU to be both an Indoor and Outdoor All-American.

References

1979 births
Living people
Canadian male sprinters
Athletes (track and field) at the 2003 Pan American Games
Athletes (track and field) at the 2007 Pan American Games
Athletes (track and field) at the 2004 Summer Olympics
Athletes (track and field) at the 2008 Summer Olympics
Olympic track and field athletes for Canada
Athletes (track and field) at the 2006 Commonwealth Games
Black Canadian track and field athletes
Athletes from Toronto
Pan American Games track and field athletes for Canada
Pan American Games silver medalists for Canada
Pan American Games bronze medalists for Canada
Commonwealth Games bronze medallists for Canada
Commonwealth Games medallists in athletics
Pan American Games medalists in athletics (track and field)
Medalists at the 2003 Pan American Games
Medalists at the 2007 Pan American Games
Medallists at the 2006 Commonwealth Games

Anson Henry


Aldric or Audric del Vilar was the twelfth-century lord of Auvillar and a troubadour. According to the vida of Marcabru, he raised the young Marcabru. This may in fact be derived by Marcabru's biographer from an exchange of satiric songs between the two, beginning with Audric's "Tot a estru" (16b.1), to which Marcabru responded with "Seigner n'Audric" (293.43). Audric may have been originally writing in response to Marcabru's gap "D'aisso lau Dieu". The whole exchange revolves around Marcabru's claim that he will accept bread from a fool so long as it lasts. On the other hand, both of Marcabru's pieces, which share Audric's metrical form, may be responses to Audric. Audric introduced the nickname Pan-Perdut (Breadless) for Marcabru.

References

Chambers, Frank M. (1985). An Introduction to Old Provençal Versification. Diane Publishing. .
Gaunt, Simon, and Kay, Sarah, edd. (1999). The Troubadours: An Introduction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. .
Gaunt, Simon; Harvey, Ruth; Marshall, John; and Paterson, Linda M. (2000). Marcabru: A Critical Edition. Boydell and Brewer. .
Seigner n'Audric, edited with English notes

Notes

External links
 Audric's sirventes

12th-century French troubadours
Year of death unknown
Year of birth unknown
People from Tarn-et-Garonne

Audric del Vilar


August Tyler (1911-2011) was an American socialist activist of the 1930s, a labor union official, author, and newspaper columnist. Tyler is best remembered as a leading American labor intellectual of the post-World War II era and as the author of a history of the International Ladies Garment Workers Union.

Biography

Early years

August Tyler was born Augustus Tilove to Jewish immigrants in Brooklyn, New York, on October 18, 1911. He later changed his surname in honor of Wat Tyler, the leader of the English Peasants' Revolt in 1381.

Tyler was the product of a radical upbringing, as he later recalled in a 1988 interview with New York Newsday:

As far as my mother was concerned, socialism was what God ordained. You didn't learn it from Marx or anybody; it was just the natural thing. People are people and they shouldn't be rich and they shouldn't be poor. I just thought this was the way you live. You're supposed to be a socialist and ultimately the whole world goes socialist.

Tyler attended New York University on a scholarship in the early 1930s, where he became involved in left-wing political activities, including public speaking on street corners on behalf of the Young People's Socialist League (YPSL), the youth section of the Socialist Party. Upon graduating in 1932, Tyler briefly worked as a writer for the Yiddish-language socialist newspaper The Jewish Daily Forward. He also served as editor of Free Youth, one of the YPSL's short-lived publications of the early 1930s.

Tyler rose through the ranks of the YPSL, rising to the top leadership position in the group. This post gave Tyler a seat with top leaders of the adult party, making him a key leader in the bitter factional war that occupied the Socialist Party in that period. Tyler was a supporter of the so-called "Militant faction" of the Socialist Party against the older generation of party regulars known as the Old Guard and was later active in the far-left "Clarity caucus" after the Militants themselves fragmented.

Along with many on the American left, Tyler was a vigorous opponent of rearmament for a new World War, authoring a resolution which declared the Socialist Party would support no war except a war for socialism. In making this pronouncement Tyler reasoned that the distinction between democratic-capitalist and fascist countries would be essentially meaningless in the event of war since the militarization of society inherent in the act of going to war would reduce the democratic nations themselves to reactionary dictatorships.

Tyler declared that the only course for the Socialist Party was to organize the dissident forces created by a new war in order to "smash the capitalist system." He condemned the ongoing agitation for collective security against fascism being preached by the Communist Party and many liberals, as "asking the working class to sign a blanket check even before a war, endorsing support in the event of war."

The Socialist Party imploded in a frenzy of factional warfare during the second half of the 1930s, with the party's Old Guard right wing leaving to form the Social Democratic Federation (established in 1936) and the Trotskyist left wing expelled en masse to form the Socialist Workers Party (established in 1938). With its membership and funds depleted, many activists in the Socialist Party were forced to turn their efforts elsewhere.

Union career

Tyler's intelligence and commitment seems to have caught the attention of International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union (ILGWU) president David Dubinsky. Despite the fact that Dubinsky was himself a stalwart of the Socialist Party's Old Guard, Tyler was offered a staff job with the ILGWU in its education department. Tyler held a succession of positions in the union rising in 1945 to the post of Assistant President, a position he held until his retirement in 1989.

In an autobiographic essay, Tyler once noted that his career in the ILGWU was interrupted by the war. "When I returned from my stint as an aerial gunner, I suggested to Dubinsky that the union create a full-time political department. He argued that no union had such a department. I told him he had a reputation as an innovator. He was flattered. I got the job."

Tyler later worked with the ILGWU's successor union, UNITE, as an assistant to the president, and for many years hosted his own radio program on station WEVD (a radio station owned by The Forward Association and named after Eugene Victor Debs) in New York.

When the English-language version of the Forward launched in 1990, Tyler began writing for the publication, penning a weekly column in the paper until 2006.

Tyler authored several works of historical scholarship, including a 1995 history of the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union published by the noted academic publisher M. E. Sharpe. As a leading public intellectual, Tyler wrote prolifically. He continued to write a periodic column for The Jewish Daily Forward entitled "Tyler Too" well into his 90s.

Death and legacy

Gus Tyler died on June 3, 2011, in Sarasota, Florida, at the age of 99. He was survived by two children and three grandchildren.

Tyler, it was recalled in The New York Times at the time of his death, "tumbled through life like a Saul Bellow character, full of analytic thought and urban vitality. He wore multifarious hats: pamphleteer, professor and poet, but insisted on defining himself with a single word: agitator. ...   His most powerful weapons were words, in books, newspaper columns, radio commentaries and speeches he wrote for labor chieftains."

Tyler's papers are included in several collections at the Kheel Center for Labor-Management Documentation and Archives at Cornell University in Ithaca, New York.

Works
 The United Front. New York: Rand School Press, 1933.
 Life of Karl Marx. Chicago: Young People's Socialist League, Educational Dept., n.d. [c. 1934].
 An Outline of Socialist Economics. Chicago: Young People's Socialist League, Educational Dept., n.d. [1930s].
 The Elements of Revolutionary Socialism. Chicago: Educational Dept., Young People's Socialist League of America, n.d. [c. 1936].
 Youth Fights War! Chicago: Young Peoples Socialist League, n.d. [c. 1936].
 A New Philosophy for Labor. New York, Fund for the Republic, 1959.
 A Legislative Campaign for a Federal Minimum Wage, 1935. New York: Henry Holt, 1959.
 Organized Crime in America: A Book of Readings. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1962.
 Combating Organized Crime. Philadelphia: American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1963.
 The Labor Revolution: Trade Unions in a New America. New York: Viking Press, 1967.
 The Political Imperative: The Corporate Character of Unions. New York: Macmillan, 1968.
 The Jewish Labor Movement: A Living Legacy. New York: Nathan Chanin Cultural Foundation, n.d. [1960s].
 Labor in the Metropolis. Columbus, OH: C.E. Merrill Publishing Co., 1972.
 Mexican-Americans Tomorrow: Educational and Economic Perspectives. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1975.
 Scarcity: A Critique of the American Economy. New York: Quadrangle/New York Times Book Co., 1976.
 George Meany: The Making of a Freedom Fighter. New York: 85th Birthday Tribute to George Meany Committee, 1979.
 The Threat of Conservatism. With Peter Steinfels and Irving Howe. New York: Foundation for the Study of Independent Social Ideas, 1980.
 The Power of Money in American Politics. With Fred Wertheimer and David Cohen. New York: Aspen Institute for Humanisitc Studies, 1982.
 The Work Ethic: A Critical Analysis. With Jack Barbash, Robert J. Lampman, and Sar A. Levitan. Madison, WI: Industrial Relations Research Association, 1983.
 Look for the Union Label: A History of the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1995.
 A Vital Voice: 100 Years of the Jewish Forward. New York: Forward Association, 1997

References

Further reading

 Sam G. Riley, "Gus Tyler," in Biographical Dictionary of American Newspaper Columnists. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1995; pp. 331–332.

External links
 Douglas Martin, "Gus Tyler, Firebrand of Labor Movement, Dies at 99," New York Times, June 12, 2011, pg. A32.
 Robert E. Lazar, "Guide to the International Ladies Garment Workers Union. Gus Tyler. Assistant President's records, 1952-1980", Kheel Center for Labor-Management Documentation and Archives, Cornell University Library, 1981.

1911 births
2011 deaths
Activists from New York City
20th-century American Jews
Members of the Socialist Party of America
American socialists
American Marxists
American trade unionists
International Ladies Garment Workers Union leaders
21st-century American Jews

Gus Tyler