WOI-DT (channel 5) is a television station licensed to Ames, Iowa, United States, serving the Des Moines area as an affiliate of ABC. It is owned by Tegna Inc. alongside CW affiliate KCWI-TV (channel 23), also licensed to Ames. Both stations share studios on Westown Parkway in West Des Moines, while WOI-DT's transmitter is located in Alleman, Iowa.

In addition to its own digital signal, WOI-DT is simulcast in high definition on KCWI-TV's fifth digital subchannel, using virtual channel 5.5.

History

Early history
WOI-TV signed on the air on February 21, 1950. It was Iowa's second television station (following WOC-TV, now KWQC-TV, in Davenport), and the first in the Des Moines area. Originally on channel 4, it moved to channel 5 in 1952 because of interference with WHBF-TV in the Quad Cities. Programming came from ABC, CBS, NBC, and the DuMont network during the station's early years, but it was a primary CBS affiliate. NBC disappeared from the schedule when WHO-TV (channel 13) signed on in 1954, and CBS disappeared when KRNT-TV (channel 8, now KCCI) signed on in 1955 owing to KRNT radio's long affiliation with CBS radio, leaving channel 5 an exclusive ABC affiliate. During the late 1950s, the station was also briefly affiliated with the NTA Film Network.

WOI-TV was originally owned by Iowa State University in Ames along with its noncommercial WOI radio stations (AM 640 and FM 90.1), making it the first commercial television station in the United States to be owned by a major college (today, only two commercial TV stations are owned by public universities: KOMU-TV in Columbia, Missouri, and WVUA-CD/WVUA in Tuscaloosa, Alabama). As such, it carried some educational programming from sign-on until the Des Moines Public Schools signed on KDPS-TV (channel 11, now KDIN-TV) in 1959. The startup costs for WOI-TV were paid by the remaining monies from a federal grant awarded to the university for work on the Manhattan Project. WOI's facilities were used by the university to deliver lectures by satellite.

Sale to Citadel Communications
On June 17, 1992, the Iowa Board of Regents voted to sell WOI-TV to Capital Communications Company, a joint venture between Citadel Communications (unrelated to radio station owner Citadel Broadcasting) and Connecticut's Lynch Corporation, for $14 million. The Board of Regents immediately faced a lawsuit filed by "Iowans for WOI-TV, Inc." opposing the sale and arguing that the station was a benefit to the university. On March 1, 1994, WOI-TV was finally sold, while the university kept the WOI radio stations. Capital moved WOI-TV's studios to a temporary location in Des Moines later that year. In 1998 WOI-TV moved to its current studios.

WOI-TV was home to America's longest running local children's program, The Magic Window. The show ran continuously from 1951 through 1994. The original host (1951–1953) was Joy (Ringham) Munn. Producer Dick Hartzell (Ford Foundation Experimental Programming Development) had two small children and was concerned about the lack of good programs for children. Hartzell asked Joy to assist him in planning a handicraft section for a new program, and soon cast her as host of The Magic Window. Later, it was hosted by Betty Lou Varnum for the last 40 of those years.

In August 2011, comedian Stephen Colbert produced a series of political television ads through his "Colbert Super PAC" to run in Iowa, encouraging Iowans to vote for Texas governor Rick Perry at the 2011 Ames Straw Poll for Republican candidates in the 2012 Presidential election. The ads called for voters to submit the vote for a write-in candidate by spelling Perry's last name "Parry", "with an 'A' for IowA and America." Thus "Rick Parry", would be a fictional candidate. Both KCCI and WHO approved to run the ads while WOI did not, stating that they considered the ads "confusing to viewers." Colbert responded by calling the station out on national television on the August 11 episode of his Comedy Central show The Colbert Report, claiming that station executives "sit in their ivory corn silos and play puppet master with national politics." On the August 15 episode, Colbert issued an apology to WOI general manager/Citadel president Ray Cole for the rant. He went on to challenge the station, which he sarcastically called "Des Moines' News Leader" throughout the saga, to find out the exact number of write-in votes for "Rick Parry" at the Straw Poll and called on the entire weeknight anchor team and intrepid cub reporter Katie Eastman to do so. GOP officials have not released that information and do not intend to. According to filings with the Federal Elections Commission, WOI-DT later donated $1170 to the Colbert Super PAC.

Sale to Nexstar Media Group

On September 16, 2013, Citadel announced that it would sell WOI-DT, along with KCAU-TV in Sioux City and WHBF-TV in Rock Island, Illinois, to the Nexstar Broadcasting Group for $88 million. Nexstar immediately took over the station's operations through a time brokerage agreement. The deal followed Citadel founder and CEO Phil Lombardo's decision to "slow down," as well as a desire by Lynch Entertainment to divest its investments in WOI and WHBF. The sale was completed on March 13, 2014. WOI-DT thus became the first Nexstar-owned station, the only one before its subsequent acquisition of Tribune Media, and one of a handful in the United States, to utilize a historic three-letter call sign. Nexstar then announced on November 4, 2014, that it would also buy CW affiliate KCWI from Pappas Telecasting for $3.5 million. The sale was finalized on March 14, 2016, with Nexstar announcing shortly after that KCWI would leave its downtown Des Moines studios and consolidate operations with WOI on Westown Parkway.

On January 5, 2015, WOI re-launched as the Graham Media Group "Local" Mandate-inspired Local 5. The change came as part of investments into the station by Nexstar, which saw upgrades to the station's studio equipment and the introduction of a new news studio featuring a touchscreen display. The station also re-launched its morning news as Good Morning Iowa, and places a larger emphasis on political coverage and how stories "matter" to viewers as part of its overall coverage. A week later, the station took their second subchannel, which carried the moribund Live Well Network, dark, with no replacement programming until August 2016, when Laff launched in the slot.

Sale to Tegna Inc.
On December 3, 2018, Nexstar announced it would acquire the assets of Chicago-based Tribune Media—which had owned NBC affiliate WHO-DT since December 2013—for $6.4 billion in cash and debt. FCC regulations prohibit common ownership of more than two stations in the same media market, or two or more of the four highest-rated stations in the market.

On March 20, 2019, Nexstar announced that it would keep the higher-rated WHO-DT and sell WOI and KCWI to McLean, Virginia-based Tegna Inc.. This was part of a deal to sell nineteen Nexstar- and Tribune-operated stations to Tegna and the E. W. Scripps Company in separate deals worth $1.32 billion; the WOI/KCWI duopoly, along with Moline, Illinois, sister station WQAD-TV (which had been owned by Tribune), would mark Tegna's first television properties in Iowa. The sale was completed on September 19, 2019. On February 20, 2020, David Loving was named the new general manager; he assumed his duties on March 2, 2020.

Programming
Until September 27, 2011, WOI-DT did not carry ABC World News Now, instead joining its fellow Citadel stations in signing off each night, one of the few remaining stations in the country to do so.

In November 2004, all three Citadel ABC-affiliated stations, including WOI, had preempted their Veterans' Day showing of the movie Saving Private Ryan.

On December 1, 2008, WOI-TV launched an affiliation with Retro Television Network on its DT2 subchannel, which was later replaced by the Live Well Network on January 16, 2012. It ended at 5 a.m. on January 17, 2015, with Live Well's upcoming end, and like sister stations WHBF and KCAU, which also pulled their DT2 subchannels, WOI took the channel dark with no replacement programming. On August 24, 2016, WOI-TV began broadcasting Laff on its DT2 subchannel.

News operation

Despite its status as Des Moines' oldest TV station, WOI channel 5 has spent the better part of the last half-century as a distant third in the market, in part because ABC wasn't on par with CBS or NBC until the 1970s. Another factor was the reluctance of the Iowa Legislature to allow the publicly-owned station to compete with privately-owned KCCI and WHO-TV. When long-dominant KCCI saw its ratings slip in the mid-2000s, WOI-TV reaped little benefit. In the May 2011 ratings period, WOI-DT failed to achieve even a 1.0 rating among 18- to 49-year-olds while its share rating remained a 3 or lower. Its morning newscasts barely registered a blip in the ratings. It has consistently been one of ABC's weakest affiliates in the top-100 markets.

On September 11, 2006, WOI dropped the Eyewitness News brand (which the station had used for five years) and rebranded itself as "ABC5", using a variation of the circle 7 logo shared by Citadel's other major network affiliates. Since 2007, the ABC5 Weather team, led by Chief Meteorologist Brad Edwards, has been certified by WeatheRate, an independent weather rating service, as providing "Central Iowa's Most Accurate Forecast". The designation has no scientific basis, but is simply licensed to any station willing to pay for it on a market-exclusive basis. Edwards was previously an on-air meteorologist for the Weather Channel.

On October 8, 2010, WOI-DT became the second commercial station in Des Moines (behind WHO-DT) to launch local news into high definition.

Notable former on-air staff
 Brynn Carman – weekend anchor and reporter; now with KRDO-TV in Colorado Springs
 Chris Flanagan – anchor and reporter (2004–2009); now with WFXT in Boston
 Rick Mitchell – meteorologist (now with KXAS-TV in Dallas)

Technical information

Subchannels
The station's digital signal is multiplexed:

Translator
 33 Des Moines

Analog-to-digital conversion
WOI-TV shut down its analog signal, over VHF channel 5, on June 12, 2009, the official date on which full-power television stations in the United States transitioned from analog to digital broadcasts under federal mandate. The station's digital signal relocated from its pre-transition UHF channel 59, which was among the high band UHF channels (52-69) that were removed from broadcasting use as a result of the transition, to its analog-era VHF channel 5.

Also, the "WOI-DT" callsign was legally transferred from the pre-transition digital television channel 59 to the post-transition digital channel 5 and the "WOI-TV" callsign from the now-defunct analog channel 5 was permanently discontinued, rare among stations which usually transferred their analog-era calls to their digital counterparts (although WHO-DT also took the same action).

Transmission aerials

References

Further reading
 Jeff Stein, Making Waves: The People and Places of Iowa Broadcasting. Cedar Rapids, Iowa: WDG Communications, 2004.
 "'Intrepid Cub Reporter' Living With A 'Colbert Bump.'" All Things Considered, National Public Radio, www.npr.org/, August 20, 2011.

External links
WeAreIowa.com - Official website
WOI-TV historical artifacts from DesMoinesBroadcasting.com
Coverage map from TVFool.com

ABC network affiliates
True Crime Network affiliates
Grit (TV network) affiliates
Cozi TV affiliates
Twist (TV network) affiliates
TheGrio affiliates
Dabl affiliates
Television channels and stations established in 1950
Television stations in Des Moines, Iowa
Tegna Inc.
1950 establishments in Iowa

WOI-DT


The International Association for Vegetation Science (IAVS) promotes contact between scientists and others interested in the study of vegetation ecology, promotes research and publication of research results. In 1939 the International Phytosociological Society (IPS) was founded, with its headquarters in Montpellier, France. After the Second World War it was reconstituted as the Internationale Vereinigung für Vegetationskunde (IVV), which adopted a constitution at the International Botanical Congress of 1954. The current name was adopted in 1981–82.

Publications
The society publishes:
 IAVS Bulletin
 Journal of Vegetation Science
 Applied Vegetation Science
 Resolutions

Awards
The Alexander von Humboldt Medal is a prize awarded biennially from 2011 onwards by the association. The award is intended to honor scientists who have contributed greatly to the intellectual development and advancement of vegetation science and plant community ecology. Honorary membership is also bestowed by the society.

Medal recipients
2011 J. Philip Grime
2013 David Tilman
2015 Sandra Lavorel
2017 F. Stuart Chapin III
2019 Pierre Legendre

References

Further reading
 published by IAVS

External links

Botanical societies
International scientific organizations


A metal umlaut (aka röck döts) is a diacritic that is sometimes used gratuitously or decoratively over letters in the names of mainly hard rock or heavy metal bands—for example, those of Blue Öyster Cult, Queensrÿche, Motörhead, the Accüsed, Mötley Crüe and the parody bands Spın̈al Tap and Green Jellÿ.

Usage
Among English speakers, the use of umlaut marks and other diacritics with a blackletter typeface is a form of foreign branding which has been attributed to a desire for a "gothic horror" feel. The metal umlaut is not generally intended to affect the pronunciation of the band's name, unlike the umlaut in German (where the letters u and ü, a and ä, as well as o and ö, represent distinct vowels) and the Scandinavian languages (where å, ä and a, ö/ø and o are distinct letters).

History
German rock band Amon Düül, who released their first album Psychedelic Underground in 1969, have two umlauts in their name.

The first gratuitous use of the umlaut in the name of a hard rock or metal band appears to have been by Blue Öyster Cult in 1970. Blue Öyster Cult's website states it was added by guitarist and keyboardist Allen Lanier, but rock critic Richard Meltzer claims to have suggested it to their producer and manager Sandy Pearlman just after Pearlman came up with the name: "I said, 'How about an umlaut over the O?' Metal had a Wagnerian aspect anyway."

Reactions

Speakers of languages which use an umlaut to designate a pronunciation change may understand the intended effect, but perceive the result differently. When Mötley Crüe visited Germany, singer Vince Neil said the band couldn't figure out why "the crowds were chanting, 'Mutley Cruh! Mutley Cruh!

These decorative umlauts have been parodied in film and fiction; in an interview about the mockumentary film This Is Spın̈al Tap, fictional rocker David St. Hubbins (Michael McKean) says, "It's like a pair of eyes. You're looking at the umlaut, and it's looking at you." The heavy metal parody band Gwar parodied the use of metal umlauts in a lyric insert included with its first record, stylizing the song names with gratuitous diacritics. In 1997, the satirical newspaper The Onion published an article titled "Ünited Stätes Toughens Image With Umlauts."

Band or album name examples

English-speaking countries

 The Accüsed – American сrossover thrash band.
 Assück – American grindcore band.
 Barbariön – Australian metal band.
 Beowülf – California thrash metal band.
 Blue Öyster Cult – American hard rock band.
 The Crüxshadows – American alternative rock band.
 Dälek – American hip-hop band.
 Daniel Amos – American Christian alternative rock band released their ninth album in 1991 titled Kalhöun with band's name contracted to dä.
 Death in June – British dark folk/experimental band used umlauts and accented "e"s in their name and titles on the original releases of their albums The Wörld Thät Sümmer (1985) and Thé Wäll Öf Säcrificé (1989), spelling their name, Deäth In Jüne and Déäth In Jüné, respectively on each.
 Deströyer 666 – thrash metal/black metal band.
 Dethklok – fictional metal band from the cartoon Metalocalypse, sometimes spelled as "Dëthkløk" in the band's logo.
 Green Jellÿ – comedy metal band, originally spelled (and still pronounced) Green Jellö.
 G̈r̈oẗus̈ – Experimental band, their logo design has umlaut marks over only the consonants.
 Hüsker Dü – American punk band (the game "Hūsker Dū?" was published with macrons instead of umlauts).
 Infernäl Mäjesty – Canadian thrash metal band.
 Jack Ü – American EDM DJ duo, side group and collaborative project, consisting of Mad Decent founder Diplo and Owsla founder Skrillex.
 Kïll Cheerleadër – Canadian punk metal band.
 King Creosote – Scottish band sometimes used a three-dot "umlaut" in some of their artwork, over the "i."
 Lȧȧz Rockit – American thrash band. German pronunciation would roughly be "Let's rock it."
 Läther – album of Frank Zappa, used an umlaut in its title.
 Leftöver Crack – American anarcho punk band.
 Living Colour's stylized logo has an umlaut over the u.
 Løvë – Aaron Carter EP
 Maxïmo Park – British indie rock band.
 Mïngle Härde – British hardcore punk/noise rock band.
 Mötley Crüe – American glam metal band.
 Motörhead – English rock band.
 Moxy Früvous – Canadian political satire band.
 Night on Bröcken – debut album by American progressive metal band Fates Warning. Apparently a reference to the German mountain Brocken, which is not spelled with an umlaut.
 Queensrÿche – American progressive metal band.
 Rrröööaaarrr and Dimension Hatröss – albums by Canadian thrash metal band Voivod. They also used it for their songs "Korgüll the Exterminator" and "Chaosmöngers", which appear on Rrröööaaarrr and Dimension Hatröss respectively. The band's name is also occasionally spelled "Voïvod" such as on the cover of the album Phobos.
 Ruste⃛d Root – American jam band uses a three-dot umlaut over the "e" in its logo, as seen on its album covers.
 Spın̈al Tap – British semi-fictional band, with a dotless letter i and a metal umlaut over the n.
 Stöner – American stoner rock band.
 Toilet Böys – American laser punk band from New York City.
 Ünloco – American nu metal band.
 Up 2 Më – album of Yeat, used an umlaut in its title.
  Yächtley Crëw – Yacht-rock band from Los Angeles
 Znöwhite – American thrash band.
 2 Alivë – album of Yeat, used an umlaut in its title.

Other countries

 Аквариум – Russian rock band, whose name is stylized as "Åквариум" on their logo, and they use "Å" as their symbol.
 Crashdïet – Swedish glam metal band.
 Die Ärzte – German punk band, have used three dots over the "Ä" since their 2003 album Geräusch. The normal two-dot umlaut, Die Ärzte, is simply correct German for The Doctors.
 Girugämesh – Japanese rock band often stylise their name with an umlaut over the a.
 Infernal – Danish electronic band, was stylized as Infërnal on their album Waiting for Daylight.
 Insidiöus Törment – Liechtenstein-based old school heavy metal band who use gratuitous umlauts, but pronounce them nonetheless.
 Kobaïan – French progressive rock band Magma sings in this constructed language, which has many diacritic symbols in its written form.
 Közi – Japanese rock musician.
 Mägo de Oz – Spanish folk metal band.
 Moottörin Jyrinä – Finnish heavy metal band, the umlaut in Moottörin is gratuitous, but the one in Jyrinä is not.
 Motör Militia – Bahraini thrash metal band.
 Mütiilation – French black metal band.
 Püdelsi – Polish rock band.
 Törr – Czech black metal band.

Other examples

Video games
 Brütal Legend – action-adventure video game
 Dynamite Düx – a beat 'em up video game
 Lars Ümlaüt – a character in the Guitar Hero series
 DieselStörmers – a crowdfunded in 2014 pre-released steampunk multiplayer platformer
 Crüe Ball – a Pinball game featuring the music of Mötley Crüe

Other
 Häagen-Dazs – an ice cream brand (introduced 1961)
 Stüssy - the skateboard / punk / streetware brand started by Shawn Stussy (introduced 1984)
 Cröonchy Stars – a discontinued breakfast cereal (introduced 1988)
 Tonfön – the Tongan telephone company (introduced 2002)
 Brüno – film by Sacha Baron Cohen (2009)
 Jason Derulo stylised his stage name as "Jason Derülo" on his 2010 debut album and its promotion
 Löded Diper – name of the fictional band that Rodrick Heffley plays in the Diary of a Wimpy Kid book series
 Deathtöngue – the original name of a metal band in the comic Bloom County (changed, after media publicity, to "Billy and the Boingers")
 Krêfel - Belgian chain of consumer electronics.  In this case the intention is however not to project a 'gothic' quality but rather 'quality'.

See also
 Devil horns, heavy metal hand signal
 Disemvoweling in band names
 Faux Cyrillic (Faцx Cyяillic)
 Foreign branding (Häagen-Dazs, Fahrvergnügen)
 Nu metal, also stylized as nü-metal
 Sensational spelling
 Über
 Word play

References

External links

 My Life in Heavy Metal by Steve Almond (excerpt)
 The Döts (Dave Krinsky)
 Would you like umlauts with that? (PDF) by Bruce Campbell
 The Metal Umlaut in the Liff Dictionary
 Early history of this page (screencast) by Jon Udell

Umlaut
Latin-script diacritics
Nonstandard spelling

Metal umlaut


In commutative algebra, the norm of an ideal is a generalization of a norm of an element in the field extension. It is particularly important in number theory since it measures the size of an ideal of a complicated number ring in terms of an ideal in a less complicated ring. When the less complicated number ring is taken to be the ring of integers, Z, then the norm of a nonzero ideal I of a number ring R is simply the size of the finite quotient ring R/I.

Relative norm
Let A be a Dedekind domain with field of fractions K and integral closure of B in a finite separable extension L of K.  (this implies that B is also a Dedekind domain.) Let  and  be the ideal groups of A and B, respectively (i.e., the sets of nonzero fractional ideals.) Following the technique developed by Jean-Pierre Serre, the norm map

is the unique group homomorphism that satisfies

for all nonzero prime ideals  of B, where  is the prime ideal of A lying below .

Alternatively, for any  one can equivalently define  to be the fractional ideal of A generated by the set  of field norms of elements of B.

For , one has , where .

The ideal norm of a principal ideal is thus compatible with the field norm of an element:

Let  be a Galois extension of number fields with rings of integers  .

Then the preceding applies with , and for any  we have

which is an element of .

The notation  is sometimes shortened to , an abuse of notation that is compatible with also writing  for the field norm, as noted above.

In the case , it is reasonable to use positive rational numbers as the range for  since  has trivial ideal class group and unit group , thus each nonzero fractional ideal of  is generated by a uniquely determined positive rational number.
Under this convention the relative norm from  down to  coincides with the absolute norm defined below.

Absolute norm

Let  be a number field with ring of integers , and  a nonzero (integral) ideal of .

The absolute norm of  is

By convention, the norm of the zero ideal is taken to be zero.

If  is a principal ideal, then
.

The norm is completely multiplicative: if  and  are ideals of , then

.

Thus the absolute norm extends uniquely to a group homomorphism

defined for all nonzero fractional ideals of .

The norm of an ideal  can be used to give an upper bound on the field norm of the smallest nonzero element it contains:

there always exists a nonzero  for which

where

  is the discriminant of  and
  is the number of pairs of (non-real) complex embeddings of  into  (the number of complex places of ).

See also
Field norm
Dedekind zeta function

References

Algebraic number theory
Commutative algebra
Ideals (ring theory)

Ideal norm


Vice-Admiral John Hughes-Hallett CB DSO (1 December 1901 – 5 April 1972) was a British naval commander and politician. He was the Naval Commander during the Dieppe Raid of 1942.

Early life and career

Hughes-Hallett was born in December 1901, to a distinguished armed services family. His father was Colonel Wyndham Hughes-Hallett, his mother Clementina Mary Loch (25 Mar 1869 – 8 Dec 1948). They were relatively old at 56 and 31 years old, respectively, at the time of his birth.

Educated at Bedford School, Hughes-Hallett had a distinguished career in the Royal Navy, beginning as a Midshipman on HMS Lion, May 1918. He was promoted to staff rank and during the Second World War served in a variety of roles. During the Norwegian campaign of 1940 he saw active service on HMS Devonshire and was mentioned in despatches.

Later naval career
In 1940 to 1941 Hughes-Hallett played a key role in cross-Channel raids. He assisted in planning raids under Mountbatten and was the Naval Commander during the misconceived Dieppe Raid of 1942. Although the raid itself was not successful and cost many lives, it did lead to new strategies for cross-Channel operations. The actual proposer of the idea of the Mulberry Harbour is disputed, but it is believed by some to have been Hughes-Hallett. At a meeting following the Dieppe raid, he declared that if a port could not be captured, then one should be taken across the Channel. Although this was met with derision at the time, the concept of Mulberry Harbours began to take shape when Hughes-Hallett moved to be Naval Chief of Staff to the Operation Overlord planners.

Hughes-Hallett became Commodore commanding the Channel Assault Force and Naval Chief of Staff (X) from 1942 to 1943. Of the five Assault Forces, Hughes-Hallett's Force "J" started its training with a decided advantage over the other four; its nucleus having been formed as far back as October 1942, with headquarters at Cowes. On 1 May 1943, Commodore Hughes-Hallett succeeded Rear Admiral Philip Vian as the head of the Naval Branch at Supreme Allied Command. He served as Captain of HMS Jamaica from December 1943.  After the war, he was in command of HMS Vernon, (1946-8).  Vernon in Portsmouth was the navy's Torpedo training centre and he had to cope with the problems arising from the recent creation of the Electrical branch. Until this a ship's electrics had been looked after by torpedomen but they had become so complex a new separate branch was deemed necessary. He then commanded HMS Illustrious'(1948–1949) and after that was Vice-Controller of the Navy in Bath, 1950–1952, and then Flag Officer, Heavy Squadron, Home Fleet, 1952–3.  A strict disciplinarian, he was sometimes known as 'Hughes-Hitler'.

Political career
Hughes-Hallett retired from the Royal Navy in 1954 as Vice-Admiral on his adoption as a Conservative Parliamentary candidate.  A problem arose when he enquired of the Secretary of the Admiralty what pension he could expect, at that time MPs got no pension, and the Secretary erroneously gave him a figure that was far too high. When he discovered this he threatened legal proceedings and as he was now an MP this was very embarrassing to the Government; it was discussed at Cabinet level on at least two occasions. (Cabinet Minutes in National Archives).  First elected in September 1954, he served as the Member of Parliament for Croydon East, later Croydon North East, until the 1964 election, defeating Labour's Walter Wolfgang at the 1959 general election. He was a British Representative at the Council of Europe between 1958 and 1960 and Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Transport for Shipping and Shipbuilding, 1961 to 1964. In the 1958–59 parliament, he successfully piloted his private members bill through parliament, although only tenth in the ballot. It became the Road Traffic (Driving of Motor Cycles) Act. He was very popular among the Young Conservatives and always interested in their activities.

Later years
In the late 1960s he suffered a serious stroke which hampered further activities. In his last years he lived in Slindon, near Arundel, Sussex, England and died in 1972. He never married. His brother, Charles Hughes-Hallett was a Rear Admiral. He had drafted memoirs, but they have not as yet been published.

Film portrayals
Captain Hughes-Hallett was a major character in the Canadian CBC miniseries Dieppe, in which he was played by actor Robert Joy.

Homage
Around 1990, a street in Caen (France) was named after Commodore Hughes-Hallett, linking avenue Amiral Mountbatten to avenue Maréchal Montgomery and rue Colonel Rémy, in a district close to the Mémorial pour la Paix museum, where a majority of streets commemorate personalities linked with the Second World War, the Résistance, and the subsequent making of the European Community. Unfortunately, the surname is misspelt: rue Commodore J.H. Hallet.

Notes

External links

The Papers of Vice-Admiral John Hughes-Hallett held at Churchill Archives Centre

1901 births
1972 deaths
Royal Navy vice admirals
Conservative Party (UK) MPs for English constituencies
Politics of the London Borough of Croydon
UK MPs 1951–1955
UK MPs 1955–1959
UK MPs 1959–1964
People educated at Bedford School
Royal Navy officers of World War II
Companions of the Order of the Bath
Companions of the Distinguished Service Order
Ministers in the Macmillan and Douglas-Home governments, 1957–1964

John Hughes-Hallett


Cecilia Cenci (3 August 1942 – 21 September 2014)  was an Argentinian film, stage and television actress. She was born in La Plata.

Career
Cecilia Cenci studied dramatic art at the School of Theatre in La Plata, participating in the mid-1960s in the old Channel 7 in the show Guide for Parents. On the big screen, she made her debut with the film The Pig War (1975) with José Slavin, and Marta González. However, it was in the 1980s when Cenci reached her career climax. She worked on several films until 1993 when she played the character of Eva Peron in the film Gatica, el Mono, directed by Leonardo Favio.
On the small screen she was showcased in various comedian and melodramatic roles.  In 1980 she won a starring role opposite Germán Kraus in the telenovelas Rosas para su enamorada and Donde pueda quererte. In Chile she starred as the wife in Andrea, Justicia de Mujer (1984).  She appeared in several soap operas with international projection in antagonistic roles as in María de nadie, with Grecia Colmenares and Jorge Martinez and the telenovela Mujer comprada, with Mayra Alejandra and Arturo Puig. One of her most notable roles was that of Felicia del Molino López de Espada in the telenovela Nano (1994), with Araceli González . Her last television appearance was playing another villainous character, but this time with a humorous touch, in the soap opera Por Amor a Vos starring Miguel Angel Rodriguez and Claribel Medina.

She also did a notable union work and served as president of the Argentina Actors Association during 2008-2011.  She was also president of the Social Work Actors from December 2006 until March 2014.

She died at dawn on 21 September 2014, at age 72 of brain cancer. She died at the Favaloro Foundation in Buenos Aires and was buried in the cemetery of the Argentina Actors Association of the Chacarita Cemetery.

Filmography
1975: The Pig War
1976: The Fat Man of America
1976: Free Stone
1977: The show producer
1979: Backlash
1979: Dolls that make boom!
1981: While life lasts me
1982: The house of the seven tombs
1988: Thanks for the services
1993: Gatica, the "Monkey", playing Evita

Television
1980: Where I can love you
1980: An angel in the city as Sandra
1980: Roses for your love
1980: Barracas to the south
1981: The cycle of Guillermo Bredeston and Nora Cárpena
1981: El Rafa
1981/1982: Learning to Live
1982: The East
1982/1983: Every day the same story
1984: Andrea, Women's Justice like Andrea
1985: Mary of nobody as Ivana
1986: Purchased Woman as Laura Simonal
1987: Estrellita mine as Cristina
1988/1989: We're made of meat
1989: So are the mine ones
1989: The plays of Dario Vittori (episode "The babe is going")
1991: Buenos Aires, tell me about love as Mercedes
1991: Unforgettable as Dr. Gutiérrez
1994: Nano as Felicia del Molino López de Espada
1997: Sacred Love as Mercedes
1997: Mine, only mine as Angelina Zamorano
2008: For loving you as Elvira Batani Molinari

Theatre
1979: Coexistence, directed by Roberto Duran in Regina Theatre
The Navel
Arsenic and Old Lace
Trees die standing
1993: What a night of marriage by Ivo Pelay
Affectionately Evita
The force of nature
Love the outdoors
Des-displaced
Storms' Tamer
Tute Cabrero
2009: González
2013: To bribe the oblivion

References

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Cecilia Cenci


Manuel D'Ornellas (1937–1999) was a Peruvian lawyer and distinguished journalist. He was known as "Manu", was born in San Sebastian, Spain, the son of Peruvian and Spanish parents on April 29, 1937. However, he always held Peruvian nationality, but not Spanish, as his father enrolled him at birth at the Peruvian Consulate. He died in Montevideo in 1999.

D'Ornellas was born in San Sebastian, Spain, to Baron Manuel d'Ornellas y Pardo and Pilar Suárez de Salazar. D'Ornellas lived in Buenos Aires, where he was educated at Colegio Santa Maria, Colegio Cardenal Newman and the University of Buenos Aires.

In 1960, he married Princess Monika Radziwiłł Czartoryska, granddaughter of the Polish princes Franciszek Pius Radziwiłł and Adam Ludwik Czartoryski.

He was Commercial Attaché at the Peruvian Embassy in Buenos Aires between 1960 and 1962.

People from Lima
1937 births
1999 deaths
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Manuel D'Ornellas


The Gettysburg campaign was a military invasion of Pennsylvania by the main Confederate army under General Robert E. Lee in summer 1863.  It was the first time during the war the Confederate Army attempted a full-scale invasion of a free state.  The Union won a decisive victory at Gettysburg, July 1–3, with heavy casualties on both sides. Lee managed to escape back to Virginia with most of his army.  It was a turning point in the American Civil War, with Lee increasingly pushed back toward Richmond until his surrender in April 1865. The Union Army of the Potomac was commanded by Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker and then (from June 28) by Maj. Gen. George G. Meade.

After his victory in the Battle of Chancellorsville, Lee's Army of Northern Virginia moved north for a massive raid designed to obtain desperately needed supplies, to undermine civilian morale in the North, and to encourage anti-war elements. Lee's army slipped away from Federal contact at Fredericksburg, Virginia, on June 3, 1863. The largest predominantly cavalry battle of the war was fought at Brandy Station on June 9. The Confederates crossed the Blue Ridge Mountains and moved north through the Shenandoah Valley, capturing the Union garrison at Winchester, in the Second Battle of Winchester, June 13–15. Crossing the Potomac River, Lee's Second Corps advanced through Maryland and Pennsylvania, reaching the Susquehanna River and threatening the state capital of Harrisburg. However, the Army of the Potomac was in pursuit and had reached Frederick, Maryland, before Lee realized his opponent had crossed the Potomac. Lee moved swiftly to concentrate his army around the crossroads town of Gettysburg.

The Battle of Gettysburg was the deadliest of the war. Starting as a chance meeting engagement on July 1, the Confederates were initially successful in driving Union cavalry and two infantry corps from their defensive positions, through the town, and onto Cemetery Hill. On July 2, with most of both armies now present, Lee launched fierce assaults on both flanks of the Union defensive line, which were repulsed with heavy losses on both sides. On July 3, Lee focused his attention on the Union center. The defeat of his massive infantry assault, Pickett's Charge, caused Lee to order a retreat that began the evening of July 4.

The Confederate retreat to Virginia was plagued by bad weather, difficult roads, and numerous skirmishes with Union cavalry. However, Meade's army did not maneuver aggressively enough to prevent Lee from crossing the Potomac to safety on the night of July 13–14.

Background

Lee's plans

Shortly after Lee's Army of Northern Virginia defeated Hooker's Army of the Potomac during the Chancellorsville Campaign (April 30 – May 6, 1863), Lee decided upon a second invasion of the North. Such a move would upset Union plans for the summer campaigning season, give Lee the ability to maneuver his army away from its defensive positions behind the Rappahannock River, and allow the Confederates to live off the bounty of the rich northern farms while giving war-ravaged Virginia a much needed break. Lee's army could also threaten Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Washington, and encourage the growing peace movement in the North.

Lee had numerous misunderstandings that shaped his strategy. Lee misread Northern opinion by his reliance on anti-war Copperhead newspapers for northern public opinion. Reading them, he assumed the Yankees must be just as war weary as southerners, and did not appreciate the determination of the Lincoln Administration. Lee did know he was seriously short of supplies for his own army, so he planned the campaign primarily as a full-scale raid that would seize supplies. He wrote:

Lee was overconfident of the morale and equipment of his "invincible" veterans as a result of their performance at Chancellorsville; he fantasized about a definitive war-winning triumph:

The Confederate government had a different strategy. It wanted Lee to reduce Union pressure threatening their garrison at Vicksburg, Mississippi, but he rejected its suggestions to send troops to provide direct aid, arguing for the value of a concentrated blow in the Northeast.

In essence, Lee's strategy was identical to the one he employed in the Maryland campaign of 1862. Furthermore, after Chancellorsville he had supreme confidence in the men of his army, assuming they could handle any challenge he gave them.

Opposing forces

Confederate forces
Lee's movement started on the first of June and within a short time was well on its way through Maryland, with Union forces moving north along parallel lines. Lee's cavalry, under General Jeb Stuart had the primary mission of gathering intelligence on where the enemy position was, but Stuart failed and instead raided some supply trains. He did not rejoin Lee until the battle was underway. Stuart had taken all Lee's best cavalry, leaving the main army with two third-rate, ill-equipped, poorly led brigades that could not handle the reconnaissance challenge in hostile country.

Stuart had taken the bulk of the cavalry on a counter-clockwise sweep near the coast behind the Union army and was out of contact with Lee for a week, depriving Lee of knowledge of the federal army.  Trying to find Lee, he solved his intelligence problem by reading a Philadelphia newspaper that accurately reported Lee's location. The news was a day old, however, and Stuart, slowed down by a wagon train of booty, did not arrive at Gettysburg until July 2. The Confederates were often aided by uncensored newspaper reports of the movements of Union forces. Hooker tried to censor the newspapers, but reporters and editors evaded his restrictions and the South often had accurate reports of Union strength.

Lee's armies threatened Harrisburg, Washington, Baltimore and even Philadelphia. Local militia units hurriedly formed to oppose Lee, but they were inconsequential in the face of a large, battle-hardened attack force.  When Lee finally got news of the approaching Federal army, he ordered his scattered forces to concentrate at Gettysburg, a crossroads junction in heavily wooded areas. Over three days, July 1–3,  both armies arrived piecemeal; the Confederate forces from the north and northwest, while Union forces from the south and east. By July 1, Meade was to the south of Lee, cutting off his retreat and forcing him to fight.

Union forces
Joseph Hooker, commanding the Army of the Potomac, was, as Lee had calculated, indeed tardy and afraid to fight Lee. He wanted to attack Richmond, but Lincoln vetoed that idea because Hooker's goal should have been fighting and defeating the Confederacy's most important army in the field, Lee's Army of Northern Virginia. When Hooker demanded control of the garrison at Harper's Ferry or he would resign, Lincoln called his bluff and replaced Hooker with George Meade on June 28, just 3 days before the battle started. The new commander brooked no delay in chasing the rebels north.

Meade's advance was sluggish but was further advanced than Lee knew.  Lee underestimated his new foe, expecting him to be easy to anticipate and slow to respond, much like Hooker. Meade wanted to defend further south, but when battle was joined at Gettysburg he hastened all corps there.

Taking advantage of interior lines, Meade was close behind Lee, and had cut off the line of retreat back to Virginia. Lee had to fight, but first he had to rush to reassemble his scattered forces at the crossroads town of Gettysburg before Meade defeated them piecemeal. Lee had 60,000 infantry and 10,200 cavalry (Meade's staff estimated Lee had 140,000). This time it was Lee's turn to be fooled; he gullibly accepted misinformation that suggested Meade had twice as many soldiers, when in fact he had 86,000.

Though the main Confederate army was marching through Pennsylvania, Lincoln was unable to give Meade more firepower. The vast majority of the 700,000 Federal soldiers (except for Grant's 70,000 near Vicksburg) were noncombatants that held static defensive posts that Lincoln feared to uncover, or like Rosecrans at Nashville, they were afraid to move. Urgently the President called for 100,000 civilian militiamen to turn out for the emergency; being unorganized, untrained, unequipped and poorly led, they were more trouble than they were worth. When the battle began they broke and ran away.

Campaign timeline
The battles of the Gettysburg Campaign were fought in the following sequence; they are described in the context of logical, sometimes overlapping divisions of the campaign.

Lee's advance to Gettysburg

On June 3, 1863, Lee's army began to slip away northwesterly from Fredericksburg, leaving A.P. Hill's Corps in fortifications above Fredericksburg to cover the departure of the army, protect Richmond from any Union incursion across the Rappahannock, and pursue the enemy if Hill thought it advantageous. By the following morning, Hooker's chief of staff, General Daniel Butterfield, had received various reports that at least a portion of the Confederate Army was moving. The next day, June 5, Hooker canceled all leave and army furloughs and instructed that all troops be prepared to march if necessary. In the meantime, Longstreet's and Ewell's corps were camped in and around Culpeper. With more Union reports intimating that Lee had moved a large portion of his army, Hooker ordered Sedgwick to conduct a reconnaissance in force across the Rappahannock River.

A small skirmish began shortly after 5:00 p.m. as Vermont and New Jersey troops, supported by a heavy Federal artillery bombardment, paddled across the river and overran Confederate positions on the southern bank. As a precaution, Lee temporarily halted Ewell's Corps, but when he saw that Hooker would not press the Fredericksburg line to bring on a battle, he ordered Ewell to continue. The same day as Federal troops crossed the river, General Buford wrote that he had received credible information that "all of the available cavalry of the Confederacy" was in Culpeper County. On June 7, George H. Sharpe, head of the Bureau of Military Information, erroneously reported to Hooker that, while J. E. B. Stuart was preparing a large cavalry raid, Lee's infantry would be withdrawing to Richmond. Hooker decided to preemptively attack the Confederate cavalry force in Culpeper and ordered Cavalry Corps commander Alfred Pleasonton to command the assault.

Lee rejoined the leading elements of his army in Culpeper on June 7 and ordered Albert G. Jenkins' cavalry to advance northward through the Shenandoah Valley. He also wrote to John D. Imboden and ordered him to attract Union forces in Hampshire County and to disrupt their communications and logistics as well as acquire cattle for use by the Confederate Army. To support these movements, Lee wrote to General Samuel Jones and asked him to spare any troops that he could. The following day, he wrote to James Seddon, Confederate Secretary of War, and attempted to persuade him to send troops currently in North Carolina to reinforce either his army or Confederate forces in the west. On June 9, Lee ordered Stuart to cross the Rappahannock and raid Union forward positions, screening the Confederate Army from observation or interference as it moved north. Anticipating this imminent offensive action, Stuart ordered his troopers into bivouac around Brandy Station.

Brandy Station

Alfred Pleasonton's combined arms force consisted of 8,000 cavalrymen and 3,000 infantry, while Stuart commanded about 9,500 Confederates. Pleasonton's attack plan called for a double envelopment of the enemy. The wing under Brigadier General John Buford would cross the river at Beverly's Ford,  northeast of Brandy Station. At the same time, David McMurtrie Gregg's wing would cross at Kelly's Ford,  downstream to the southeast. However, Pleasonton was unaware of the precise disposition of the enemy and he incorrectly assumed that his force was substantially larger than the Confederates he faced.

About 4:30 a.m. on June 9, Buford's column crossed the Rappahannock River and almost immediately encountered Confederate forces. After overcoming their shock at Buford's surprise attack, Confederate forces rallied and managed to check the Union force near St. James Church. Gregg's force, delayed in getting the leading force into position, finally attacked across Kelly's Ford at 9:00 a.m. Gregg's force divided once across the Rappahannock with one section attacking west toward Stevensburg and the second force pushing north to Brandy Station. Between Gregg and the St. James action was a prominent ridge called Fleetwood Hill, which had been Stuart's headquarters the previous night. Stuart, surprised a second time by Gregg's forces threatening his rear, sent regiments from St. James to check the Union advance in the south. When Gregg's men charged up the western slope and neared the crest, the lead elements of Grumble Jones' brigade rode over the crown.

For several hours there was desperate fighting on the slopes of the hill as many confusing charges and counter-charges swept back and forth. The section of Union troops sent to Stevensburg were bluffed into withdrawing and turned eastward to reinforce Gregg on Fleetwood Hill. Generals Lee and Ewell rode out to Brandy Station to observe the battle and Lee ordered infantry reinforcements under Robert E. Rodes moved within a mile of the battle, still concealed, in case the Union broke through Stuart's lines. Meanwhile, as Buford's forces at St. James began to make headway, Pleasonton ordered a withdrawal of all Union forces across the Rappahannock. As the threat to Confederate positions at Brandy Station lifted, Rodes withdrew his infantry back to their camp at Pony Mountain. By 9:00 p.m. all Union troops were across the river.

Brandy Station was the largest predominantly cavalry fight of the war, and the largest to take place on American soil. It was a tactical draw, although Pleasonton withdrew before finding the location of Lee's infantry nearby and Stuart claimed a victory, attempting to disguise the embarrassment of a cavalry force being surprised as it was by Pleasonton. The battle established the emerging reputation of the Union cavalry as a peer of the Confederate mounted arm.

Winchester

After Brandy Station, a variety of Union sources reported the presence of Confederate infantry at Culpeper and Brandy Station. Hooker did not immediately act on this information. The day after the battle, Ewell's Corps began marching toward the Shenandoah Valley. Lee intended Ewell to clear the valley of Federal forces while Longstreet's Corps marched east of the Blue Ridge Mountains. A.P. Hill would then march his corps through the valley as well. On June 12, the leading elements of Lee's army were passing through the Chester Gap.

At the same time, Hooker still believed that Lee's army was positioned on the west bank of the Rappahannock, between Fredericksburg and Culpeper and that it outnumbered his own. Hooker had proposed to march on Richmond after the battle at Brandy Station, but Lincoln had replied that "Lee's army, not Richmond, is your true objective." Meanwhile, Ewell's Corps was passing Front Royal and approaching Winchester.

The Union garrison was commanded by Major General Robert H. Milroy and consisted of 6,900 troops posted in Winchester itself and a detachment of 1,800 men  east in Berryville, Virginia. The Union defenses consisted of three forts on high ground just outside the town. Milroy's tenure at Winchester had been marked by incivility toward the civilian population, who resented his oppressive rule, and the Confederate troops were eager to destroy his force. General-in-chief Henry Halleck did not want any Union force stationed in Winchester beyond what was necessary as an outpost to monitor Confederate movement and repeatedly ordered Milroy's superior, Maj. Gen. Robert C. Schenck of the Middle Department, to withdraw the surplus force to Harpers Ferry. Schenck, however, did not comply and, unaware that Lee's infantry were approaching, did not issue any orders for Milroy to withdraw immediately from Winchester before June 13. By then, Milroy's position was in extreme danger from a superior Confederate force.

Ewell planned to defeat the Union garrison by sending Allegheny Johnson and Jubal Early's divisions directly to Winchester while Rodes' division maneuvered east to defeat the Union detachment at Berryville and wheel north toward Martinsburg. These movements effectively surrounded the Federal garrison by 23,000 Confederate troops. On the 13th, Milroy's telegraph connection with Harpers Ferry and Washington was cut by Ewell's troops. The Berryville detachment escaped Rodes' division and fell back on Winchester while Rodes' men continued north to Martinsburg. Though Ewell was initially hesitant about assaulting the defenses at Winchester, Early discovered that there was an unguarded hill west of the fortifications that dominated the battlefield.

By 11 a.m. on June 14, Early began moving his forces covertly to take that position. To distract the Union, Ewell ordered demonstrations by John B. Gordon's brigade and the Maryland Line. At 6 p.m., Confederate artillery opened fire on the Union's West Fort and the brigade of Brig. Gen. Harry T. Hays led the charge that captured the fort and a Union battery. As darkness fell, Milroy belatedly decided to retreat from his two remaining forts.

Anticipating the movement, Ewell ordered Johnson to march northwest and block the Union escape route. At 3:30 a.m. on June 15, Johnson's column intercepted Milroy's on the Charles Town Road. Although Milroy ordered his men to fight their way out of the situation, when the Stonewall Brigade arrived just after dawn to cut the turnpike to the north, Milroy's men began to surrender in large numbers. Milroy escaped personally but the Second Battle of Winchester cost the Union about 4,450 casualties (4,000 captured) out of 7,000 engaged, while the Confederates lost only 250 of 12,500 engaged.

Hooker's pursuit

"Fighting Joe" Hooker did not know Lee's intentions, and Stuart's cavalry masked the Confederate army's movements behind the Blue Ridge effectively. He initially conceived the idea of reacting to Lee's absence by seizing unprotected Richmond, Virginia, the Confederate capital. But President Abraham Lincoln sternly reminded him that Lee's army was the true objective. His orders were to pursue and defeat Lee but to stay between Lee and Washington and Baltimore. On June 14, the Army of the Potomac departed Fredericksburg and reached Manassas Junction on June 16. Hooker dispatched Pleasonton's cavalry again to punch through the Confederate cavalry screen to find the main Confederate army, which led to three minor cavalry battles from June 17 through June 21 in the Loudoun Valley.

Pleasonton ordered David McM. Gregg's division from Manassas Junction westward down the Little River Turnpike to Aldie. Aldie was tactically important in that near the village the Little River Turnpike intersected both of the turnpikes leading through Ashby's Gap and Snickers Gap into the Valley. The Confederate cavalry brigade of Col. Thomas T. Munford was entering Aldie from the west, preparing to bivouac, when three brigades of Gregg's division entered from the east at about 4 p.m. on June 17, surprising both sides. The resulting Battle of Aldie was a fierce mounted fight of four hours with about 250 total casualties. Munford withdrew toward Middleburg.

While the fighting occurred at Aldie, the Union cavalry brigade of Col. Alfred N. Duffié arrived south of Middleburg in the late afternoon and drove in the Confederate pickets. Stuart was in the town at the time and managed to escape before his brigades under Munford and Beverly Robertson routed Duffié in an early morning assault on June 18. The primary action of the Battle of Middleburg occurred on the morning of June 19 when Col. J. Irvin Gregg's brigade advanced west from Aldie and attacked Stuart's line on a ridge west of Middleburg. Stuart repulsed Gregg's charge, counterattacked, then fell back to defensive positions  to the west.

On June 21, Pleasonton again attempted to break Stuart's screen by advancing on Upperville,  to the west of Middleburg. The cavalry brigades of Irvin Gregg and Judson Kilpatrick were accompanied by infantry from Col. Strong Vincent's brigade on the Ashby's Gap Turnpike. Buford's cavalry division moved northwest against Stuart's left flank, but made little progress against Grumble Jones's and John R. Chambliss's brigades. The Battle of Upperville ended as Stuart conducted a fierce fighting withdrawal and took up a strong defensive position in Ashby's Gap.

After successfully defending his screen for almost a week, Stuart found himself motivated to begin the most controversial adventure of his career, Stuart's raid around the eastern flank of the Union Army.

Hooker's significant pursuit with the bulk of his army began on June 25, after he learned that the Army of Northern Virginia had crossed the Potomac River. He ordered the Army of the Potomac to cross into Maryland and concentrate at Middletown (Slocum's XII Corps) and Frederick (the rest of the army, led by Reynolds's advance wing—the I, III, and XI Corps).

The invasion of Pennsylvania

Lincoln issued a proclamation calling for 100,000 volunteers from four states to serve a term of six months "to repel the threatened and imminent invasion of Pennsylvania." Pennsylvania Governor Andrew Curtin called for 50,000 volunteers to take arms as volunteer militia; only 8,000 initially responded, and Curtin asked for help from the New York State Militia. Gov. Joel Parker of New Jersey also responded by sending troops to Pennsylvania. The War Department created two new departments, the Department of the Monongahela, commanded by MGEN William T. H. Brooks, and the Department of the Susquehanna, commanded by MGEN Darius N. Couch, to coordinate defensive efforts in Pennsylvania.}

Pittsburgh, Harrisburg, and Philadelphia were considered potential targets and defensive preparations were made. In Harrisburg, the state government removed its archives from the town for safekeeping. In much of southern Pennsylvania, the Gettysburg campaign became widely known as the "emergency of 1863". The military campaign resulted in the displacement of thousands of refugees from Maryland and Pennsylvania who fled northward and eastward to avoid the oncoming Confederates, and resulted in a shift in demographics in several southern Pennsylvania boroughs and counties.

Although a primary purpose of the campaign was for the Army of Northern Virginia to accumulate food and supplies outside of Virginia, Lee gave strict orders (General Order 72) to his army to minimize any negative impacts on the civilian population. Food, horses, and other supplies were generally not seized outright, although quartermasters reimbursing Northern farmers and merchants using Confederate money were not well received. Various towns, most notably York, Pennsylvania, were required to pay indemnities in lieu of supplies, under threat of destruction. During their invasion of Pennsylvania, Confederate troops abducted up to 1,000 African Americans (most of them free people of color with a few being fugitive slaves), all of whom were forcibly sent southwards and sold into slavery. Many of the abductions were carried out by Albert G. Jenkins' cavalry brigade.

Ewell's corps continued to push deeper into Pennsylvania, with two divisions heading through the Cumberland Valley to threaten Harrisburg, while Jubal Early's division of Ewell's Corps marched eastward over the South Mountain range, occupying Gettysburg on June 26 after a brief series of skirmishes with state emergency militia and two companies of cavalry. Early laid the borough under tribute but did not collect any significant quantities of supplies. Soldiers burned several railroad cars and a covered bridge, and they destroyed nearby rails and telegraph lines. The following morning, Early departed for adjacent York County.

The brigade of Brig. Gen. John B. Gordon of Early's division reached the Susquehanna on June 28, where militia guarded the  covered bridge at Wrightsville. Gordon's artillery fire caused the well-fortified militiamen to retreat and burn the bridge. Confederate cavalry under the command of Brig. Gen. Albert G. Jenkins raided nearby Mechanicsburg on June 28 and skirmished with militia at Sporting Hill on the west side of Camp Hill on June 29. The Confederates then pressed on to the outer defenses of Fort Couch, where they skirmished with the outer picket line for over an hour, the northernmost engagement of the Gettysburg campaign. They later withdrew in the direction of Carlisle.

Stuart's raid

Jeb Stuart enjoyed the glory of circumnavigating an enemy army, which he had done on two previous occasions in 1862, during the Peninsula Campaign and at the end of the Maryland Campaign. It is possible that he had the same intention when he spoke to Robert E. Lee following the Battle of Upperville. He certainly needed to erase the stain on his reputation represented by his surprise and near defeat at the Battle of Brandy Station. The exact nature of Lee's order to Stuart on June 22 has been argued by the participants and historians ever since, but the essence was that he was instructed to guard the mountain passes with part of his force while the Army of Northern Virginia was still south of the Potomac and that he was to cross the river with the remainder of the army and screen the right flank of Ewell's Second Corps. Instead of taking a direct route north near the Blue Ridge Mountains, Stuart chose to reach Ewell's flank by taking his three best brigades (those of Wade Hampton, Fitzhugh Lee, and John R. Chambliss, the latter replacing the wounded W.H.F. "Rooney" Lee) between the Union army and Washington, moving north through Rockville to Westminster and on into Pennsylvania, hoping to capture supplies along the way and cause havoc near the enemy capital. Stuart and his three brigades departed Salem Depot at 1 a.m. on June 25.

Unfortunately for Stuart's plan, the Union army's movement was underway and his proposed route was blocked by columns of Federal infantry from Hancock's II Corps, forcing him to veer farther to the east than either he or General Lee had anticipated. This prevented Stuart from linking up with Ewell as ordered and deprived Lee of the use of his prime cavalry force, the "eyes and ears" of the army, while advancing into unfamiliar enemy territory.

Stuart's command reached Fairfax Court House, where they were delayed for half a day by the small but spirited Battle of Fairfax Court House (June 1863) on June 27, and crossed the Potomac River at Rowser's Ford at 3 a.m. on June 28. Upon entering Maryland, the cavalrymen attacked the C & O Canal, one of the major supply lines for the Army of the Potomac, capturing canal boats and cargo. They entered Rockville on June 28, also a key wagon supply road between the Union Army and Washington, tearing down miles of telegraph wire and capturing a wagon train of 140 brand new, fully loaded wagons and mule teams. This wagon train would prove to be a logistical hindrance to Stuart's advance, but he interpreted Lee's orders as placing importance on gathering supplies. The proximity of the Confederate raiders provoked some consternation in the national capital and Meade dispatched two cavalry brigades and an artillery battery to pursue the Confederates. Stuart supposedly told one of his prisoners from the wagon train that were it not for his fatigued horses "he would have marched down the 7th Street Road [and] took Abe & Cabinet prisoners."

Stuart had planned to reach Hanover, Pennsylvania, by the morning of June 28, but rode into Westminster, Maryland, instead late on the afternoon of June 29. Here his men clashed briefly with and overwhelmed two companies of the 1st Delaware Cavalry under Maj. Napoleon B. Knight, chasing them a long distance on the Baltimore road, which Stuart claimed caused a "great panic" in the city of Baltimore.

Meanwhile, Union cavalry commander Alfred Pleasonton ordered his divisions to spread out in their movement north with the army, looking for Confederates. Judson Kilpatrick's division was on the right flank of the advance and passed through Hanover on the morning of June 30. The head of Stuart's column encountered Kilpatrick's rear as it passed through town and scattered it. The Battle of Hanover ended after Kilpatrick's men regrouped and drove the Confederates out of town. Stuart's brigades had been better positioned to guard their captured wagon train than to take advantage of the encounter with Kilpatrick. To protect his wagons and prisoners, he delayed until nightfall and then detoured around Hanover by way of Jefferson to the east, increasing his march by . After a  trek in the dark, his exhausted men reached Dover on the morning of July 1, the same time that his Confederate infantry colleagues began to fight Union cavalrymen under John Buford at Gettysburg.

Leaving Hampton's Brigade and the wagon train at Dillsburg, Stuart headed for Carlisle, hoping to find Ewell. Instead, he found nearly 3,000 Pennsylvania and New York militia occupying the borough. After lobbing a few shells into town during the early evening of July 1 and burning the Carlisle Barracks, Stuart concluded the so-called Battle of Carlisle and withdrew after midnight to the south towards Gettysburg. The fighting at Hanover, the long march through York County with the captured wagons, and the brief encounter at Carlisle slowed Stuart considerably in his attempt to rejoin the main army.

Stuart and the bulk of his command reached Lee at Gettysburg the afternoon of July 2. He ordered Wade Hampton to take a position to cover the left rear of the Confederate battle lines. Hampton moved into position astride the Hunterstown Road  northeast of town, blocking access for any Union forces that might try to swing around behind Lee's lines. Two brigades of Union cavalry from Judson Kilpatrick's division under Brig. Gens. George Armstrong Custer and Elon J. Farnsworth were probing for the end of the Confederate left flank. Custer attacked Hampton in the Battle of Hunterstown on the road between Hunterstown and Gettysburg, and Hampton counterattacked. When Farnsworth arrived with his brigade, Hampton did not press his attack, and an artillery duel ensued until dark. Hampton then withdrew towards Gettysburg to rejoin Stuart.

Dix's advance against Richmond
As Lee's offensive strategy became clear, Union general-in-chief Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck planned a countermove that could take advantage of the now lightly defended Confederate capital of Richmond. He ordered the Union Department of Virginia, two corps under Maj. Gen. John A. Dix, to move on Richmond from its locations on the Virginia Peninsula (around Yorktown and Williamsburg) and near Suffolk. However, Halleck made the mistake of not explicitly ordering Dix to attack Richmond. The orders were to "threaten Richmond, by seizing and destroying their railroad bridges over the South and North Anna Rivers, and do them all the damage possible." Dix, a well-respected politician, was not an aggressive general, but he eventually contemplated attacking Richmond despite the vagueness of Halleck's instructions.

On June 27, his men conducted a successful cavalry raid on Hanover Junction, led by Col. Samuel P. Spear, which defeated the Confederate regiment guarding the railroad junction, destroyed the bridge over the South Anna River and the quartermaster's depot, capturing supplies, wagons, and 100 prisoners including General Lee's son, Brig. Gen. W. H. F. "Rooney" Lee. On June 29, at a council of war, Dix and his lieutenants expressed concerns about their limited strength (about 32,000 men) and decided to limit themselves to threatening gestures. Confederate Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill wrote that the Union advance on Richmond was "not a feint but a faint." The net effect of the operation was primarily psychological, causing the Confederates to hold back some troops from Lee's offensive to guard the capital.

Meade assumes command
On the evening of June 27, Lincoln sent orders relieving Hooker. Hooker had argued with Halleck about defending the garrison at Harpers Ferry and petulantly offered to resign, which Halleck and Lincoln promptly accepted. George Meade, a Pennsylvanian who was commanding the V Corps, was ordered to assume command of the Army of the Potomac early on the morning of June 28 in Frederick, Maryland. Meade was surprised by the change of command order, having previously expressed his lack of interest in the army command. In fact, when an officer from Washington woke him with the order, he assumed he was being arrested for some transgression. Despite having little knowledge of what Hooker's plans had been or the exact locations of the three columns moving quickly to the northwest, Meade kept up the pace. He telegraphed to Halleck, in accepting his new command, that he would "Move toward the Susquehanna, keeping Washington and Baltimore well covered, and if the enemy is checked in his attempt to cross the Susquehanna or if he turns toward Baltimore, to give him battle."

On June 30, Meade's headquarters advanced to Taneytown, Maryland, and he issued two important orders. The first directed that a general advance in the direction of Gettysburg begin on July 1, a destination that was from  away from each of his seven infantry corps. The second order, known as the Pipe Creek Circular, established a prospective line on Big Pipe Creek, which had been surveyed by his engineers as a strong defensive position. Meade had the option of occupying this position and hoping that Lee would attack him there; alternatively, it would represent a fall back position if the army got into trouble at Gettysburg.

Lee concentrates his army
The lack of Stuart's cavalry intelligence kept Lee unaware that his army's normally sluggish foe had moved as far north as it had. It was only after a spy hired by Longstreet, Henry Thomas Harrison, reported it that Lee found out his opponent had crossed the Potomac and was following him nearby. By June 29, Lee's army was strung out in an arc from Chambersburg ( northwest of Gettysburg) to Carlisle ( north of Gettysburg) to near Harrisburg and Wrightsville on the Susquehanna River. Ewell's Corps had almost reached the Susquehanna River and was prepared to menace Harrisburg, the Pennsylvania state capital. Early's Division occupied York, which was the largest Northern town to fall to the Confederates during the war. Longstreet and Hill were near Chambersburg.

Lee ordered a concentration of his forces around Cashtown, located at the eastern base of South Mountain and  west of Gettysburg. On June 30, while part of Hill's Corps was in Cashtown, one of Hill's brigades, North Carolinians under Brig. Gen. J. Johnston Pettigrew, ventured toward Gettysburg. The memoirs of Maj. Gen. Henry Heth, Pettigrew's division commander, claimed that he sent Pettigrew to search for supplies in town—especially shoes.

When Pettigrew's troops approached Gettysburg on June 30, they noticed Union cavalry under Brig. Gen. John Buford arriving south of town, and Pettigrew returned to Cashtown without engaging them. When Pettigrew told Hill and Heth about what he had seen, neither general believed that there was a substantial Federal force in or near the town, suspecting that it had been only Pennsylvania militia. Despite Lee's order to avoid a general engagement until his entire army was concentrated, Hill decided to mount a significant reconnaissance in force the following morning to determine the size and strength of the enemy force in his front. Around 5 a.m. on Wednesday, July 1, two brigades of Heth's division advanced to Gettysburg.

Battle of Gettysburg

The two armies began to collide at Gettysburg on July 1, 1863. The first day proceeded in three phases as combatants continued to arrive at the battlefield. In the morning, two brigades of Confederate Maj. Gen. Henry Heth's division (of Hill's Third Corps) were delayed by dismounted Union cavalrymen under Brig. Gen. John Buford. As infantry reinforcements arrived under Maj. Gen. John F. Reynolds from the I Corps, the Confederate assaults down the Chambersburg Pike were repulsed, although Gen. Reynolds was killed.

By early afternoon, the Union XI Corps had arrived, and the Union position was in a semicircle from west to north of the town. Ewell's Second Corps began a massive assault from the north, with Maj. Gen. Robert E. Rodes's division attacking from Oak Hill and Maj. Gen. Jubal A. Early's division attacking across the open fields north of town. The Union lines generally held under extremely heavy pressure, although the salient at Barlow's Knoll was overrun. The third phase of the battle came as Rodes renewed his assault from the north and Heth returned with his entire division from the west, accompanied by the division of Maj. Gen. W. Dorsey Pender.

Heavy fighting in Herbst's Woods (near the Lutheran Theological Seminary) and on Oak Ridge finally caused the Union line to collapse. Some of the Federals conducted a fighting withdrawal through the town, suffering heavy casualties and losing many prisoners; others simply retreated. They took up good defensive positions on Cemetery Hill and waited for additional attacks. Despite discretionary orders from Robert E. Lee to take the heights "if practicable," Richard Ewell chose not to attack. Historians have debated ever since how the battle might have ended differently if he had found it practicable to do so.

On the second day, Lee attempted to capitalize on his first day's success by launching multiple attacks against the Union flanks. After a lengthy delay to assemble his forces and avoid detection in his approach march, Longstreet attacked with his First Corps against the Union left flank. His division under Maj. Gen. John Bell Hood attacked Little Round Top and Devil's Den. To Hood's left, Maj. Gen. Lafayette McLaws attacked the Wheatfield and the Peach Orchard. Although neither prevailed, the Union III Corps was effectively destroyed as a combat organization as it attempted to defend a salient over too wide a front. Gen. Meade rushed as many as 20,000 reinforcements from elsewhere in his line to resist these fierce assaults. The attacks in this sector concluded with an unsuccessful assault by the Third Corps division of Maj. Gen. Richard H. Anderson against the Union center on Cemetery Ridge. That evening, Ewell's Second Corps turned demonstrations against the Union right flank into full-scale assaults on Culp's Hill and East Cemetery Hill, but both were repulsed. The Union army had occupied strong defensive positions, and Meade handled his forces well, resulting in heavy losses for both sides but leaving the disposition of forces on both sides essentially unchanged.

After attacks on both Union flanks had failed the day and night before, Lee was determined to strike the Union center on the third day. He decided to support this attack with a renewed thrust on the Union right that was supposed to start in concert with his assault on the center. However, the fighting on Culp's Hill resumed early in the morning with a Union counterattack, hours before Longstreet could begin his attack on the center. The Union troops on fortified Culp's Hill had been reinforced and the Confederates made no progress after multiple, futile assaults that lasted until noon. The infantry assault on Cemetery Ridge known as Pickett's Charge was preceded by a massive artillery bombardment at 1 p.m. that was meant to soften up the Union defense and silence its artillery, but it was largely ineffective. Approximately 12,500 men in nine infantry brigades advanced over open fields for  under heavy Union artillery and rifle fire. Although some Confederates were able to breach the low stone wall that shielded many of the Union defenders, they could not maintain their hold and were repulsed with over 50% casualties.

During and after Pickett's Charge on the third day, two significant cavalry battles also occurred: one approximately  to the east, in the area known today as East Cavalry Field, the other southwest of the [Big] Round Top mountain (sometimes called South Cavalry Field). The East Cavalry Field fighting was an attempt by Maj. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart's Confederate cavalry to get into the Federal rear and exploit any success that Pickett's Charge may have generated. Union cavalry under Brig. Gens. David McM. Gregg and George Armstrong Custer repulsed the Confederate advances. In South Cavalry Field, after Pickett's Charge had been defeated, reckless cavalry charges against the right flank of the Confederate Army, ordered by Brig. Gen. Judson Kilpatrick, were easily repulsed.

The three-day battle in and around Gettysburg resulted in the largest number of casualties in the American Civil War—between 46,000 and 51,000. In conjunction with the Union victory at Vicksburg on July 4, Gettysburg is frequently cited as the war's turning point.

Lee's retreat to Virginia

Lee managed to escape back to Virginia after a harrowing forced march in the face of flooded rivers. Meade took the blame for the failure to capture Lee's highly vulnerable and outnumbered army.

Following Pickett's Charge, the Confederates returned to their positions on Seminary Ridge and prepared fortifications to receive a counterattack. When the Union attack had not occurred by the evening of July 4, Lee realized that he could accomplish nothing more in his campaign and that he had to return his battered army to Virginia. Lee started his Army of Northern Virginia in motion late the evening of July 4 towards Fairfield and Chambersburg. Cavalry under Brig. Gen. John D. Imboden was entrusted to escort the miles-long wagon train of supplies and wounded men that Lee wanted to take back to Virginia with him, using the route through Cashtown and Hagerstown to Williamsport, Maryland. Thousands of more seriously wounded soldiers were left behind in the Gettysburg area, along with medical personnel. However, despite casualties of over 20,000 men, including a number of senior officers, the morale of Lee's army remained high and their respect for the commanding general was not diminished by their reverses.

Unfortunately for the Confederate Army, however, once they reached the Potomac they found it difficult to cross. Torrential rains that started on July 4 flooded the river at Williamsport, making fording impossible.  downstream at Falling Waters, Union cavalry destroyed Lee's lightly guarded pontoon bridge on July 4. The only way to cross the river was a small ferry at Williamsport. The Confederates could potentially have been trapped, forced to defend themselves against Meade with their backs to the river.

The route of the bulk of Lee's army was through Fairfield and over Monterey Pass to Hagerstown. A small but important action that occurred while Pickett's Charge was still underway, the Battle of Fairfield, prevented the Union from blocking this route. Brig. Gen. Wesley Merritt's brigade departed from Emmitsburg with orders to strike the Confederate left and rear along Seminary Ridge. Merritt dispatched about 400 men from the 6th U.S. Cavalry to seize foraging wagons that had been reported in the area. Before they were able to reach the wagons, the 7th Virginia Cavalry, leading a column under Confederate Brig. Gen. William E. "Grumble" Jones, intercepted the regulars, but the U.S. cavalrymen repulsed the Virginians. Jones sent in the 6th Virginia Cavalry, which successfully charged and swarmed over the Union troopers. There were 242 Union casualties, primarily prisoners, and 44 casualties among the Confederates.

Imboden's journey was one of extreme misery, conducted during the torrential rains that began on July 4, in which the 8,000 wounded men had to endure the weather and the rough roads in wagons without suspensions. The train was harassed throughout its march. At dawn on July 5, civilians in Greencastle ambushed the train with axes, attacking the wheels of the wagons, until they were driven off. That afternoon at Cunningham's Cross Roads, Union cavalry attacked the column, capturing 134 wagons, 600 horses and mules, and 645 prisoners, about half of whom were wounded. These losses so angered Stuart that he demanded a court of inquiry to investigate.

Early on July 4 Meade sent his cavalry to strike the enemy's rear and lines of communication so as to "harass and annoy him as much as possible in his retreat." Eight of nine cavalry brigades (except Col. John B. McIntosh's of Brig. Gen. David McM. Gregg's division) took to the field. Col. J. Irvin Gregg's brigade (of his cousin David Gregg's division) moved toward Cashtown via Hunterstown and the Mummasburg Road, but all of the others moved south of Gettysburg. Brig. Gen. John Buford's division went directly from Westminster to Frederick, where they were joined by Merritt's division on the night of July 5.

Late on July 4, Meade held a council of war in which his corps commanders agreed that the army should remain at Gettysburg until Lee acted, and that the cavalry should pursue Lee in any retreat. Meade decided to have Brig. Gen. Gouverneur K. Warren take a division from Sedgwick's VI Corps to probe the Confederate line and determine Lee's intentions. By the morning of July 5, Meade learned of Lee's departure, but he hesitated to order a general pursuit until he had received the results of Warren's reconnaissance.

The Battle of Monterey Pass began as Brig. Gen. Judson Kilpatrick's cavalry division easily brushed aside Brig. Gen. Beverly Robertson's pickets and encountered a detachment of 20 men from the Confederate 1st Maryland Cavalry Battalion, under Capt. G. M. Emack, that was guarding the road to Monterey Pass. Aided by a detachment of the 4th North Carolina Cavalry and a single cannon, the Marylanders delayed the advance of 4,500 Union cavalrymen until well after midnight. Kilpatrick ordered Brig. Gen. George A. Custer to charge the Confederates with the 6th Michigan Cavalry, which broke the deadlock and allowed Kilpatrick's men to reach and attack the wagon train. They captured or destroyed numerous wagons and captured 1,360 prisoners – primarily wounded men in ambulances – and a large number of horses and mules.

As Meade's infantry began to march in pursuit of Lee on the morning of July 7, Buford's division departed from Frederick to destroy Imboden's train before it could cross the Potomac. At 5 p.m. on July 7 his men reached within  of the parked trains, but Imboden's command repulsed their advance. Buford heard Kilpatrick's artillery in the vicinity and requested support on his right. Kilpatrick's men had moved toward Hagerstown and pushed out the two small brigades of Chambliss and Robertson. However, infantry commanded by Brig. Gen. Alfred Iverson drove Kilpatrick's men through the streets of town. Stuart's remaining brigades came up and were reinforced by two brigades of Hood's Division and Hagerstown was recaptured by the Confederates. Kilpatrick chose to respond to Buford's request for assistance and join the attack on Imboden at Williamsport. Stuart's men pressured Kilpatrick's rear and right flank from their position at Hagerstown and Kilpatrick's men gave way and exposed Buford's rear to the attack. Buford gave up his effort when darkness fell.

Lee's rearguard cavalry clashed with Federal cavalry in the South Mountain passes in the Battle of Boonsboro on July 8, delaying Union pursuit. In the Battle of Funkstown on July 10, Stuart's cavalry continued its efforts to delay Federal pursuit in an encounter near Funkstown, Maryland, which resulted in nearly 500 casualties on both sides. The fight also marked the first time since the Battle of Gettysburg that Union infantry engaged Confederate infantry in the same engagement. Stuart was successful in delaying Pleasonton's cavalry for another day.

By July 9 most of the Army of the Potomac was concentrated in a  line from Rohrersville to Boonsboro. Other Union forces were in position to protect the outer flanks at Maryland Heights and at Waynesboro. By July 11 the Confederates occupied a , highly fortified line on high ground with their right resting on the Potomac River near Downsville and the left about  southwest of Hagerstown, covering the only road from there to Williamsport.

Meade telegraphed to general-in-chief Henry W. Halleck on July 12 that he intended to attack the next day, "unless something intervenes to prevent it." He once again called a council of war with his subordinates on the night of July 12, which resulted in a postponement of an attack until reconnaissance of the Confederate position could be performed, which Meade conducted the next morning. By that time, Lee became frustrated waiting for Meade to attack him and was dismayed to see that the Federal troops were digging entrenchments of their own in front of his works. Confederate engineers had completed a new pontoon bridge over the Potomac, which had also subsided enough to be forded. Lee ordered a retreat to start after dark, with Longstreet's and Hill's corps and the artillery to use the pontoon bridge at Falling Waters and Ewell's corps to ford the river at Williamsport.

On the morning of July 14, advancing Union skirmishers found that the entrenchments were empty. Cavalry under Buford and Kilpatrick attacked the rearguard of Lee's army, Maj. Gen. Henry Heth's division, which was still on a ridge about  from Falling Waters. The initial attack caught the Confederates by surprise after a long night with little sleep, and hand-to-hand fighting ensued. Kilpatrick attacked again and Buford struck them in their right and rear. Heth's and Pender's divisions lost numerous prisoners. Brig. Gen. J. Johnston Pettigrew, who had survived Pickett's Charge with a minor hand wound, was mortally wounded at Falling Waters. This minor success against Heth did not make up for the extreme frustration in the Lincoln administration about allowing Lee to escape. The president was quoted as saying, "We had them within our grasp. We had only to stretch forth our hands and they were ours. And nothing I could say or do could make the Army move."

The two armies did not take up positions across from each other on the Rappahannock River for almost two weeks. On July 16 the cavalry brigades of Fitzhugh Lee and Chambliss held the fords on the Potomac at Shepherdstown to prevent crossing by the Federal infantry. The cavalry division under David Gregg approached the fords and the Confederates attacked them, but the Union cavalrymen held their position until dark before withdrawing.

The Army of the Potomac crossed the Potomac River at Harpers Ferry and Berlin (now named Brunswick) on July 17–18. They advanced along the east side of the Blue Ridge Mountains, trying to interpose themselves between Lee's army and Richmond. On July 23, in the Battle of Manassas Gap, Meade ordered French's III Corps to cut off the retreating Confederate columns at Front Royal, by forcing passage through Manassas Gap. At first light, French began slowly pushing the Stonewall Brigade back into the gap. About 4:30 p.m., a strong Union attack drove the Confederates until they were reinforced by Maj. Gen. Robert E. Rodes's division and artillery. By dusk, the poorly coordinated Union attacks were abandoned. During the night, Confederate forces withdrew into the Luray Valley. On July 24, the Union army occupied Front Royal, but Lee's army was safely beyond pursuit.

Aftermath
The Gettysburg campaign represented the final major offensive by Robert E. Lee in the Civil War. Afterward, all combat operations of the Army of Northern Virginia were in reaction to Union initiatives. Lee suffered over 27,000 casualties during the campaign, a price very difficult for the Confederacy to pay. The campaign met only some of its major objectives: it had disrupted Union plans for a summer campaign in Virginia, temporarily protecting the citizens and economy of that state, and it had allowed Lee's men to live off the bountiful Maryland and Pennsylvania countryside and plunder vast amounts of food and supplies that they carried back with them and that would allow them to continue the war. However, the myth of Lee's invincibility had been shattered and not a single Union soldier was removed from the Vicksburg Campaign to react to Lee's invasion of the North. (Vicksburg surrendered on July 4, the day Lee ordered his retreat.) Union campaign casualties were approximately 30,100.

Meade was severely criticized for allowing Lee to escape, just as Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan had been after the Battle of Antietam. Under pressure from Lincoln, he launched two campaigns in the fall of 1863—Bristoe and Mine Run—that attempted to defeat Lee. Both were failures. He also suffered humiliation at the hands of his political enemies in front of the Joint Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War, questioning his actions at Gettysburg and his failure to defeat Lee during the retreat to the Potomac. Nevertheless, Meade would remain in command of the Army of the Potomac for the rest of the war, although he would effectively lose strategic control of it after Ulysses S. Grant was appointed general-in-chief of the Union armies and set his headquarters with Meade's army, directly supervising him.

On November 19, 1863, Abraham Lincoln spoke at the dedication ceremonies for the national cemetery created at the Gettysburg battlefield. His Gettysburg Address redefined the war, calling for a "new birth of freedom" in the nation, which established the destruction of slavery as an implied goal.

See also

 Troop engagements of the American Civil War, 1863
 List of costliest American Civil War land battles
 List of Medal of Honor recipients for the Gettysburg Campaign
 Gettysburg Cyclorama, a painting by the French artist Paul Philippoteaux depicting Pickett's Charge
 Gettysburg Address

Notes

Citations

References

 Brown, Kent Masterson. Retreat from Gettysburg: Lee, Logistics, & the Pennsylvania Campaign. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005. .
 Busey, John W., and David G. Martin. Regimental Strengths and Losses at Gettysburg. 4th ed. Hightstown, NJ: Longstreet House, 2005. .
 Clark, Champ, and the Editors of Time-Life Books. Gettysburg: The Confederate High Tide. Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1985. .

 Gottfried, Bradley M. The Maps of Gettysburg: An Atlas of the Gettysburg Campaign, June 3 – June 13, 1863. New York: Savas Beatie, 2007. .
 Huntington, Tom. Pennsylvania Civil War Trails: The Guide to Battle Sites, Monuments, Museums and Towns. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2007. .

 Martin, David G. Gettysburg July 1. rev. ed. Conshohocken, PA: Combined Publishing, 1996. .

 Nye, Wilbur S. Here Come the Rebels! Dayton, OH: Morningside House, 1984. . First published in 1965 by Louisiana State University Press.

 Sauers, Richard A. "Battle of Gettysburg." In Encyclopedia of the American Civil War: A Political, Social, and Military History, edited by David S. Heidler and Jeanne T. Heidler. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2000. .

 Symonds, Craig L. American Heritage History of the Battle of Gettysburg. New York: HarperCollins, 2001. .
 Wittenberg, Eric J., and J. David Petruzzi. Plenty of Blame to Go Around: Jeb Stuart's Controversial Ride to Gettysburg. New York: Savas Beatie, 2006. .
 Wittenberg, Eric J., J. David Petruzzi, and Michael F. Nugent. One Continuous Fight: The Retreat from Gettysburg and the Pursuit of Lee's Army of Northern Virginia, July 4–14, 1863. New York: Savas Beatie, 2008. .
 Woodworth, Steven E. Beneath a Northern Sky: A Short History of the Gettysburg Campaign. Wilmington, DE: SR Books (scholarly Resources, Inc.), 2003. .
 National Park Service battle descriptions

Further reading
 Bearss, Edwin C. Receding Tide: Vicksburg and Gettysburg: The Campaigns That Changed the Civil War. Washington DC: National Geographic Society, 2010. .
 Boritt, Gabor S., ed. The Gettysburg Nobody Knows. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997. .
 Brown, Kent Masterson. Retreat from Gettysburg: Lee, Logistics, and the Pennsylvania Campaign (U of North Carolina Press; 2011).
 Desjardins, Thomas A. These Honored Dead: How the Story of Gettysburg Shaped American Memory. New York: Da Capo Press, 2003. .
 Frassanito, William A. Early Photography at Gettysburg. Gettysburg, PA: Thomas Publications, 1995. .
 Foote, Shelby. The Civil War: A Narrative. Vol. 2, Fredericksburg to Meridian. New York: Random House, 1958. .
 Fremantle, Arthur J. L. The Fremantle Diary: A Journal of the Confederacy. Edited by Walter Lord. Short Hills, NJ: Burford Books, 2002. . First published 1954 by Capricorn Books.
 Freeman, Douglas S. R. E. Lee, A Biography. 4 vols. New York: Scribner, 1934.
 Gallagher, Gary W., ed. The Third Day at Gettysburg and Beyond. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998. .
 Gallagher, Gary W., ed. Three Days at Gettysburg: Essays on Confederate and Union Leadership. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1999. .
 Gottfried, Bradley M. Brigades of Gettysburg. New York: Da Capo Press, 2002. .
 Gottfried, Bradley M. The Artillery of Gettysburg. Nashville, TN: Cumberland House Publishing, 2008. .
 Hall, Jeffrey C. The Stand of the U.S. Army at Gettysburg. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003. .
 Harman, Troy D. Lee's Real Plan at Gettysburg. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2003. .
 Laino, Philip, Gettysburg Campaign Atlas. 2nd ed. Dayton, OH: Gatehouse Press 2009. .
 Longstreet, James. From Manassas to Appomattox: Memoirs of the Civil War in America. New York: Da Capo Press, 1992. . First published in 1896 by J. B. Lippincott and Co.
 Orrison, Robert, and Dan Welch. The Last Road North: A Guide to the Gettysburg Campaign, 1863. Emerging Civil War Series. El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beatie, 2016. .
 Petruzzi, J. David, and Steven Stanley. The Complete Gettysburg Guide. New York: Savas Beatie, 2009. .
 Pfanz, Harry W. Gettysburg – The First Day. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001. .
 Pfanz, Harry W. Gettysburg – The Second Day. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1987. .
 Pfanz, Harry W. Gettysburg: Culp's Hill and Cemetery Hill. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993. .
 Sears, Stephen W. Gettysburg (2004).
 Tagg, Larry. The Generals of Gettysburg. Campbell, CA: Savas Publishing, 1998. .
 Trudeau, Noah Andre. Gettysburg: A Testing of Courage. New York: HarperCollins, 2002. .
 Tucker, Glenn. High Tide at Gettysburg. Dayton, OH: Morningside House, 1983. . First published 1958 by Bobbs-Merrill Co.
 Wert, Jeffry D. Gettysburg: Day Three. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001. .

External links

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