Anthony Paul Scirrotto (born October 21, 1986) is a former American football safety. He was signed by the Carolina Panthers as an undrafted free agent in 2009. He played college football at Penn State.

Scirrotto has also been a member of the New York Giants and Philadelphia Eagles.

Early years
Scirotto is from West Deptford Township, New Jersey. During his senior season at West Deptford High School, Scirrotto was named a PrepStar All-American defensive back, First-team Associated Press All-State in both football and baseball, First-team The Philadelphia Inquirer and South Jersey Player of the Year, First-team All Colonial Conference, and Scholar Athlete of the Year.  He was a four-year starter at defensive back and led his team to three consecutive South Jersey Group II State Championships in 2002, 2003 and 2004, including undefeated 12-0 seasons in 2003 and 2004 as the team's quarterback and free safety. Scirrotto grabbed 26 interceptions during his high school campaign.

Scirrotto, also a prolific baseball pitcher and shortstop, was projected to be an early second round pick in the 2004 Major League Baseball Draft. Scirrotto reportedly declined interest in the MLB Draft in order to play football under Head Coach Joe Paterno and pursue a higher education.

College career
In 2005, Scirrotto received considerable playing time as a true freshman at Penn State as both a safety and punt returner, and he secured his first career interception.  In 2006, Scirrotto achieved prominence as a defensive playmaker when he led all players in the Big Ten Conference in interceptions with six.  He also led the conference in interception return yards with 122.  Additionally, he was second among all players in the Big Ten in passes defended with 14. Among all Division I-A players, Scirrotto was fifth in the nation in interception return yards and tied for 11th in total interceptions.

Scirrotto was the team's so-called "ironman" in 2006, participating in a team-leading 1,001 separate plays. In addition to his play from the safety position, Scirrotto garnered attention for making momentum shifting plays on Special Teams, returning an onside kick for a touchdown against the University of Illinois, blocking a  punt against Michigan State University, and as a punt returner.

As a result of his play, the sports media named Scirrotto 2006 First-team All-Big Ten Conference.  Scirrotto also earned a spot on the ESPN.com All-Bowl Team, a team composed of players with the best individual performances in postseason  Bowl games.  He was recognized for his efforts in the Nittany Lions' 20-10 victory over then-No. 17 University of Tennessee in the Outback Bowl on New Year's Day. Scirrotto recorded eight tackles (six solo), grabbed his sixth interception, and sparked the defense when he delivered arguably the Nittany Lions' biggest hit on then Tennessee wide receiver, Jayson Swain. He also caused two pass break-ups.

In 2007, Scirrotto extended his string of starts to 26 games.  For the second consecutive year, Scirrotto led the Nittany Lions in interceptions with 3 and number of plays with 1,029.  As a result of securing his 10th career interception, Scirrotto ended his junior season within 1 interception of entering the Top 10 in Penn State history.

The Sporting News named Scirrotto to the 2008 preseason first-team All-Big Ten Conference team. At season's end, he was named a first-team All-Big Ten selection.

In 2008, Scirrotto committed a crucial pass interference penalty late in the 4th quarter against the University of Iowa that cost Penn State a chance at an undefeated season and a possible birth in the National Championship Game.

Scirrotto was drafted in the 50th round at the number 1502 overall pick by the Kansas City Royals in the 2009 Major League Baseball Draft, despite not having played baseball since his senior year of high school in 2005.

2007 Off-campus incident
In a much publicized event, Scirrotto and his girlfriend were accosted, assaulted and battered by two Penn State students after a confrontation with them and a third man on a State College street on March 31, 2007.  As a result of the attack, the two assailants were charged with harassment and criminal mischief respectively. One of the assailants was accused of striking Scirrotto in the face and the other of destroying his personal property.  A Pennsylvania District Judge found both of Scirrotto's attackers guilty of those charges.  In the early morning of April 1, 2007, less than an hour after the attack on Scirrotto, police alleged that Scirrotto and several teammates were involved in a confrontation with the assailants and several others at an off-campus apartment party.  As a result of the alleged confrontation at the apartment party, Scirrotto was charged with felony burglary and criminal solicitation, as well as four related misdemeanors.

On August 20, 2007, Centre County, Pennsylvania, Presiding Judge Charles C. Brown Jr. granted, in part, a Motion for Habeas Corpus, dismissing four of the six charges brought against Scirrotto. Presiding Judge Brown ruled that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania failed to proffer the basic, prima facie evidence, necessary to submit Scirrotto to trial on charges of burglary, two counts of criminal solicitation, or assault.  Judge Brown held that the Commonwealth did not offer any evidence that Scirrotto entered the apartment party with the intent to commit a crime therein.  The Judge also ruled that there was no evidence that Scirrotto solicited any teammates to confront the men who had earlier attacked him.  Additionally, Judge Brown held that there was no evidence that Scirrotto assaulted anyone in connection with the earlier attack upon him, or during the alleged apartment party confrontation.

On February 14, 2008, the remaining charges against Scirrotto were dismissed in return for Scirrotto pleading guilty to a reduced misdemeanor count for trespass. Scirrotto was sentenced to a year probation, 25 days community service, and payment of a $500 fine as part of the plea agreement.

Professional career

Carolina Panthers
Scirrotto was signed as an undrafted free agent out of Penn State by the Carolina Panthers immediately following the 2009 NFL Draft but was released before the start of training camp.

New York Giants
Scirrotto was signed to the New York Giants' practice squad on November 24, 2009. He was released a week later on December 1.

Philadelphia Eagles
Scirrotto was signed by the Philadelphia Eagles on August 16, 2010, after FS Antoine Harris was placed on the season-ending injured reserve list. Scirrotto was waived on September 3.

References

External links
Philadelphia Eagles bio

1986 births
Living people
People from Paulsboro, New Jersey
People from West Deptford Township, New Jersey
Players of American football from New Jersey
Sportspeople from Gloucester County, New Jersey
American football safeties
Penn State Nittany Lions football players
Carolina Panthers players
New York Giants players
Philadelphia Eagles players

Anthony Scirrotto


Edwin Octavius Tregelles (19 October 1806 – 16 September 1886) was an English ironmaster, civil engineer and Quaker minister.

Family life
He was the youngest of the seventeen children of Samuel Tregelles (1766 –1831) and his wife, Rebecca Smith (1766–1811) of Falmouth, Cornwall, United Kingdom
He married Jenepher Fisher (1808–1844), a Quaker from County Cork, on 3 July 1832. There were three children. On 4 December 1850, he remarried, to Elizabeth Richardson (1813–1878): there were no children.

Business
Edwin Tregelles's father had formed an Iron Founding partnership with his Quaker relatives in Falmouth, the Foxes and in South Wales, the Prices. Edwin was apprenticed to Joseph Tregelles Price (1784–1854) the manager of the Welsh wing of the firm, at the Neath Abbey  Iron Works. He learnt a great deal of practical business and engineering.
He went into business as a civil engineer, superintended the introduction of gas lighting to towns in southern England. These included: Bridport, 1833; Dorchester, 1833; Bridgwater, 1843; Merthyr Tydvil, 1835; Exeter, 1836. In 1835 he was appointed engineer of the Southampton and Salisbury Railway, and later surveyed the West Cornwall Railway and in 1849 he  reported on the water supply and sewerage of Barnstaple and Bideford. By 1850 he had become a tinplate manufacturer at Shotley Bridge, Co. Durham.

Quaker and temperance activities
In 1853, he retired from business, in order to devote himself to religious and philanthropic work. He travelled in the Ministry to Ireland in 1839, with his cousin Robert Were Fox. He also travelled to the West Indies and Norway and many journeys in the Ministry in the United Kingdom.

He was on the Council of the United Kingdom Alliance, one of several Victorian bodies, promoting temperance.

He died in Banbury, Oxfordshire on 16 December 1886, and is buried in the Friends burial ground, Sibford Gower.

References

19th-century English businesspeople
English Quakers
People from Falmouth, Cornwall
1806 births
1886 deaths
British ironmasters

Edwin Octavius Tregelles


A packet-switching node is a node in a packet-switching network that contains data switches and equipment for controlling, formatting, transmitting, routing, and receiving data packets.

Note:  In the Defense Data Network (DDN), a packet-switching node is usually configured to support up to thirty-two X.25 56 kbit/s host connections, as many as six 56 kbit/s interswitch trunk (IST) lines to other packet-switching nodes, and at least one Terminal Access Controller (TAC).

Packets (information technology)

Packet-switching node


The Fritz Haber Institute of the Max Planck Society is a science research group in Dahlem, Berlin, Germany.

The original was called Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Physical Chemistry and Electrochemistry, and it was founded in 1911.  That became part of the Max Planck Society and took the name of the first director, Fritz Haber, in 1953.

The Institute has researched many kinds of physics including chemical kinetics and reaction dynamics, colloid chemistry, atomic physics, spectroscopy, surface chemistry and surface physics, chemical physics and molecular physics, theoretical chemistry, and materials science.

During World War I and World War II, the Institute did much war work for Germany's military.

Some of the most important members in the Institutes past are: Herbert Freundlich, Paul Friedlander, Rudolf Ladenburg, Michael Polanyi, Ladislaus Farkas, Hartmut Kallmann, Robert Havemann, Karl Friedrich Bonhoeffer, Rudolf Brill, Kurt Moliere, Jochen Block,  Heinz Gerischer, Rolf Hosemann, Kurt Überreiter, and Alex Bradshaw.

Nobel Prize winners involved with the Institute include Max von Laue (1914),  Fritz Haber (1918), James Franck (1925), Otto Hahn (1944), Eugene Wigner (1963), Ernst Ruska (1986), Gerhard Ertl (2007).

Other websites
The Fritz Haber Institute of the MPG website

Research organizations in Europe
Organizations based in Berlin
1911 establishments in Europe
1910s establishments in Germany


Anti-magnetic (non-magnetic) watches are those that are able to run with minimal deviation when exposed to a certain level of magnetic field. The International Organization for Standardization issued a standard for magnetic-resistant watches, which many countries have adopted.

ISO 764 magnetic-resistant watches standard
The international standard ISO 764 Horology—Magnetic resistant watches defines the resistance of watches to magnetic fields. According to ISO 764 or its equivalent DIN 8309 (Deutsches Institut für Normung - German Institute for Standardization) a watch must resist exposure to a direct current magnetic field of 4800 A/m. The watch must keep its accuracy to ±30 seconds/day as measured before the test in order to be acknowledged as a magnetic-resistant watch.
Annex A of ISO 764 deals with watches designated as magnetic resistant with an additional indication of intensity of a magnetic field exceeding 4800 A/m.

There are two ways of building an anti-magnetic watch:
 The first way consists of making the moving parts of alloys chosen to be insensitive to magnetic fields. These alloys include Invar (iron–nickel–carbon–chromium alloy), Glucydur (beryllium–bronze alloy), Nivarox (iron–nickel–chromium–titanium–beryllium alloy) and Elinvar (an alloy similar to Invar, though less resistant to magnetism and more resistant to thermal influence). These alloys are preferred by different watchmakers due to their differing properties. In the 1960s, almost all Swiss watches had Glucydur balance and Nivarox hairsprings. The anchors, escape wheels and other watch mechanisms were also made of non-magnetic metals or alloys.
 Another way of making a watch non-magnetic is to house the entire movement into a case made of a highly permeable (magnetically conductive) material. The movement is covered by an additional soft-iron clasp to prevent the forming of magnetic fields inside the watch itself.

History
The first recorded experiments in anti-magnetic watch-making are in 1846. Watchmakers from Vacheron Constantin were among the first to experiment with anti-magnetic features of a watch. However, they succeeded in assembling the first antimagnetic watch only several decades later. That watch was able to withstand magnetic fields because some of its parts were made of non-magnetic metals: the palladium-made balance wheel, balance spring and the lever shaft.

In 1896 Charles Édouard Guillaume discovered the nickel based alloy Invar. Afterwards, in 1920, when he received the Nobel Prize in Physics, he developed another alloy - Elinvar. These alloys assisted in the assembly of anti-magnetic watches. Invar and Elinvar are able to resist magnetic fields, allowing the watch to continue to keep accurate time.

The first anti-magnetic pocket watch was assembled by Vacheron Constantin in 1915.

In 1930, Tissot produced the first ever non-magnetic wristwatch.

Usage
Since their appearance, anti-magnetic watches have been favored by people who deal with high magnetic fields. They are widespread among electronic engineers and in other professions where strong magnetic fields are present.

Today, even divers' watches (according to ISO 6425) must be anti-magnetic as well as being water resistant, sufficiently luminous, shock resistant and have solid straps.

Contributions

After discovering the alloys for assembling anti-magnetic watches, many watch-making brands utilize such materials in production in order to improve the performance of such timepieces.

IWC
In 1989 IWC first manufactured the Ingenieur Reference 3508, which was able to withstand huge magnetic fields of up to 500000 A/m.

Omega
The Omega Anti-Magnetic Seamaster
was announced 17 January 2013 (e.g. Seamaster Aqua Terra > 15,000 Gauss).  According to the press release, the OMEGA movement does not rely on a protective container inside the watchcase but on the use of selected non-ferrous materials in the movement itself. The OMEGA prototype was subjected to 1.5 Tesla (15,000 Gauss) and continued to perform. Testing showed that the watch was as accurate after its magnetic exposure as it had been before.

Rolex
The Rolex Milgauss series of antimagnetic certified chronometers was first manufactured in 1954 with the model 6541 for those working in nuclear, aircraft, and medical settings associated with strong magnetic fields. The watch has an advertised magnetic flux density resistance of 1,000 Gauss within magnetic fields of 80,000 A/m. In 2007, after being out of production for nearly two decades a new Milgauss was introduced as the model number 116400.

Sinn

Certain diving watches produced by Sinn as mission timers (in German: "Einsatzzeitmesser") for professional users are also protected against magnetic fields up to 1,000 Gauss / 80,000 A/m, using a protective sheath consisting of a closed, magnetically soft inner case that includes the dial, the movement holding ring and the case back.

METAS N001 requirements
The Swiss Federal Institute of Metrology (METAS) has METAS N001 requirements for movements and mechanical watches resistant to magnetic fields of 1.5 Tesla (15,000 Gauss). The METAS N001 certification demands a series of tests were amongst other relevant requirements the watches are subjected to strong magnetic field exposures without resulting in the movement stopping or a 0 to ≤5 seconds daily rate deviation.

See also
 Watch
 Diving watch
 Shock-resistant watch
 Water-resistant watch
 Rolex Milgauss

References

External links
 Vacheron Constantin and Nonmagnetic Watches

Watches

Antimagnetic watch


The Battle of Midway was a major naval battle in the Pacific Theater of World War II that took place 4–7 June 1942, six months after the Empire of Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor and one month after the Battle of the Coral Sea. The U.S. Navy under Admirals Chester W. Nimitz, Frank J. Fletcher, and Raymond A. Spruance defeated an attacking fleet of the Imperial Japanese Navy under Admirals Isoroku Yamamoto, Chūichi Nagumo, and Nobutake Kondō north of Midway Atoll, inflicting devastating damage on the Japanese fleet. Military historian John Keegan called it "the most stunning and decisive blow in the history of naval warfare", while naval historian Craig Symonds called it "one of the most consequential naval engagements in world history, ranking alongside Salamis, Trafalgar, and Tsushima Strait, as both tactically decisive and strategically influential."

In response to the Doolittle air raid on Tokyo, the Japanese leadership planned a "barrier" strategy to extend Japan's defensive perimeter. They hoped to lure the American aircraft carriers into a trap, clearing the seas for Japanese attacks on Midway, Fiji, Samoa, and Hawaii. The plan was undermined by faulty Japanese anticipations of the American reaction and poor initial dispositions. Crucially, U.S. cryptographers were able to determine the date and location of the planned attack, enabling the forewarned United States Navy to prepare its own ambush.

Four Japanese and three American aircraft carriers participated in the battle. The Japanese fleet carriers—, , , and , part of the six-carrier force that had attacked Pearl Harbor six months earlier—were sunk, as was the heavy cruiser . The United States lost the carrier  and the destroyer , while the carriers  and  survived the battle fully intact.

After Midway and the exhausting attrition of the Solomon Islands campaign, Japan's capacity to replace its losses in materiel (particularly aircraft carriers) and men (especially well-trained pilots and maintenance crewmen) rapidly became insufficient to cope with mounting casualties, while the United States' massive industrial and training capabilities made losses far easier to replace. The Battle of Midway, along with the Guadalcanal campaign, is widely considered a turning point in the Pacific War.

Background

After expanding the war in the Pacific to include western outposts, the Japanese Empire had attained its initial strategic goals quickly, taking British Hong Kong, the Philippines, British Malaya, Singapore, and the Dutch East Indies (modern Indonesia). The Dutch East Indies, with its vital oil resources, was particularly important to Japan. Because of this, preliminary planning for the second phase of operations commenced as early as January 1942.

Because of strategic disagreements between the Imperial Army (IJA) and Imperial Navy (IJN), and infighting between the Navy's Imperial General Headquarters and Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto's Combined Fleet, a follow-up strategy was not formed until April 1942. Yamamoto finally won the bureaucratic struggle with a thinly veiled threat to resign, after which his plan for the Central Pacific was adopted.

Yamamoto's primary strategic goal was the elimination of America's carrier forces, which he regarded as the principal threat to the overall Pacific campaign. This concern was acutely heightened by the Doolittle Raid on 18 April 1942, in which 16 United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) B-25 Mitchell bombers launched from  bombed targets in Tokyo and several other Japanese cities. The raid, while militarily insignificant, was a shock to the Japanese and showed the existence of a gap in the defenses around the Japanese home islands as well as the vulnerability of Japanese territory to American bombers.

This, and other successful hit-and-run raids by American carriers in the South Pacific, showed that they were still a threat, although seemingly reluctant to be drawn into an all-out battle. Yamamoto reasoned that another air attack on Naval Station Pearl Harbor would induce all of the American fleet to sail out to fight, including the carriers. However, considering the increased strength of American land-based airpower on the Hawaiian Islands since the 7 December 1941 attack, he judged that it was too risky to attack Pearl Harbor directly.

Instead, Yamamoto selected Midway, a tiny atoll at the extreme northwest end of the Hawaiian Island chain, approximately  from Oahu. This meant that Midway was outside the effective range of almost all the American aircraft stationed on the main Hawaiian Islands. Midway was not especially important in the larger scheme of Japan's intentions, but the Japanese felt the Americans would consider Midway a vital outpost of Pearl Harbor and would therefore be compelled to defend it vigorously. The U.S. did consider Midway vital: after the battle, the establishment of a U.S. submarine base on Naval Air Facility Midway Island allowed submarines operating from Pearl Harbor to refuel and re-provision, extending their radius of operations by . In addition to serving as a seaplane base, Midway's airstrips also served as a forward staging point for bomber attacks on Wake Island.

Yamamoto's plan

Typical of Japanese naval planning during World War II, Yamamoto's battle plan for taking Midway (named Operation MI) was exceedingly complex. It required the careful and timely coordination of multiple battle groups over hundreds of miles of open sea. His design was also predicated on optimistic intelligence suggesting that  and USS Hornet, forming Task Force 16, were the only carriers available to the Pacific Fleet. During the Battle of the Coral Sea one month earlier,  had been sunk and  suffered so much damage that the Japanese believed she too had been lost. However, following hasty repairs at Pearl Harbor, Yorktown sortied and ultimately played a critical role in the discovery and eventual destruction of the Japanese fleet carriers at Midway. Finally, much of Yamamoto's planning, coinciding with the general feeling among the Japanese leadership at the time, was based on a gross misjudgment of American morale which was believed to be debilitated from the string of Japanese victories in the preceding months.

Yamamoto felt deception would be required to lure the U.S. fleet into a fatally compromised situation. To this end, he dispersed his forces so that their full extent (particularly his battleships) would be concealed from the Americans prior to battle. Critically, Yamamoto's supporting battleships and cruisers trailed Vice Admiral Chūichi Nagumo's carrier force by several hundred miles. They were intended to come up and destroy whatever elements of the U.S. fleet might come to Midway's defense once Nagumo's carriers had weakened them sufficiently for a daylight gun battle. This tactic was doctrine in most major navies of the time.

What Yamamoto did not know was that the U.S. had broken parts of the main Japanese naval code (dubbed JN-25 by the Americans), divulging many details of his plan to the enemy. His emphasis on dispersal also meant none of his formations was in a position to support the others. For instance, although  Nagumo's carriers were expected to carry out strikes against Midway and bear the brunt of American counterattacks, the only warships in his fleet larger than the screening force of twelve destroyers were two Kongō-class fast battleships, two heavy cruisers, and one light cruiser. By contrast, Yamamoto and Kondo had between them two light carriers, five battleships, four heavy cruisers, and two light cruisers, none of which saw action at Midway.

The light carriers of the trailing forces and Yamamoto's three battleships were unable to keep pace with the carriers of the Kidō Butai and so could not have sailed in company with them. The Kidō Butai would sail into range at best speed so as to increase the chance of surprise and would not have ships spread out across the ocean guiding the enemy toward it. If the other parts of the invasion force needed more defense, the Kidō Butai would make best speed to defend them. Hence the slower ships could not be with the Kidō Butai. The distance between Yamamoto and Kondo's forces and Nagumo's carriers had grave implications during the battle. The invaluable reconnaissance capability of the scout planes carried by the cruisers and carriers, as well as the additional anti-aircraft capability of the cruisers and the other two battleships of the Kongō-class in the trailing forces, were unavailable to Nagumo.

Aleutian invasion

In order to obtain support from the IJA for the Midway operation, the IJN agreed to support their invasion of the United States through the Aleutian Islands of Attu and Kiska, part of the organized incorporated Alaska Territory. The IJA occupied these islands to place the Japanese home islands out of range of U.S. land-based bombers in Alaska. Similarly, most Americans feared that the occupied islands would be used as bases for Japanese bombers to attack strategic targets and population centers along the West Coast of the United States.

The Japanese operations in the Aleutians (Operation AL) removed yet more ships that could otherwise have augmented the force striking Midway. Whereas many earlier historical accounts considered the Aleutians operation as a feint to draw American forces away, according to the original Japanese battle plan, AL was intended to be launched simultaneously with the attack on Midway. A one-day delay in the sailing of Nagumo's task force resulted in Operation AL beginning a day before the Midway attack.

Prelude

American reinforcements

To do battle with an enemy expected to muster four or five carriers, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas, needed every available flight deck. He already had Vice Admiral William Halsey's two-carrier (Enterprise and Hornet) task force at hand, though Halsey was stricken with shingles and had to be replaced by Rear Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, Halsey's escort commander. Nimitz also hurriedly recalled Rear Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher's task force, including the carrier Yorktown, from the South West Pacific Area.

Despite estimates that Yorktown, damaged in the Battle of the Coral Sea, would require several months of repairs at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, her elevators were intact and her flight deck largely so. The Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard worked around the clock, and in 72 hours she was restored to a battle-ready state, judged good enough for two or three weeks of operations, as Nimitz required. Her flight deck was patched, and whole sections of internal frames were cut out and replaced. Repairs continued even as she sortied, with work crews from the repair ship , herself damaged in the attack on Pearl Harbor six months earlier, still aboard.

Yorktowns partially depleted air group was rebuilt using whatever planes and pilots could be found. Scouting Five (VS-5) was replaced with Bombing Three (VB-3) from . Torpedo Five (VT-5) was also replaced by Torpedo Three (VT-3). Fighting Three (VF-3) was reconstituted to replace VF-42 with sixteen pilots from VF-42 and eleven pilots from VF-3, with Lieutenant Commander John S. "Jimmy" Thach in command. Some of the aircrew were inexperienced, which may have contributed to an accident in which Thach's executive officer Lieutenant Commander Donald Lovelace was killed. Despite efforts to get Saratoga (which had been undergoing repairs on the American West Coast) ready, the need to resupply and assemble sufficient escorts meant she was unable to reach Midway until after the battle.

On Midway, by 4 June the U.S. Navy had stationed four squadrons of PBYs—31 aircraft in total—for long-range reconnaissance duties, and six brand-new Grumman TBF Avengers from Hornets VT-8. The Marine Corps stationed 19 Douglas SBD Dauntless, seven F4F-3 Wildcats, 17 Vought SB2U Vindicators, and 21 Brewster F2A Buffalos. The USAAF contributed a squadron of 17 B-17 Flying Fortresses and four Martin B-26 Marauders equipped with torpedoes: in total 126 aircraft. Although the F2As and SB2Us were already obsolete, they were the only aircraft available to the Marine Corps at the time.

Japanese shortcomings

During the Battle of the Coral Sea one month earlier, the Japanese light carrier  had been sunk, while the fleet carrier  had been severely damaged by three bomb hits and was in drydock for months of repair. Although the fleet carrier  escaped the battle undamaged, she had lost almost half her air group and was in port at the Kure Naval District, Hiroshima, awaiting replacement planes and pilots. That there were none immediately available is attributable to the failure of the IJN crew training program which already showed signs of being unable to replace losses. In desperation, instructors from the Yokosuka Air Corps were relieved of their duties to serve as pilots.

Historians Jonathan Parshall and Anthony Tully believe that by combining the surviving aircraft and pilots from Shōkaku and Zuikaku, it is likely that Zuikaku could have been equipped with almost a full composite air group. They also note, however, that doing so would have violated Japanese carrier doctrine, which stressed that carriers and their air groups must train as a single unit. (In contrast, American air squadrons were considered interchangeable between carriers allowing for more flexibility.) In any case, the Japanese apparently made no serious attempt to get Zuikaku ready for the forthcoming battle.

Thus, Carrier Division 5, consisting of the two most advanced aircraft carriers of the Kido Butai, was not available which meant that Vice-Admiral Nagumo had only two-thirds of the fleet carriers at his disposal:  and  forming Carrier Division 1 and  and  making up Carrier Division 2. This was partly due to fatigue; Japanese carriers had been constantly on operations since 7 December 1941 including raids on Darwin and Colombo. Nonetheless, the First Carrier Strike Force sailed with 248 available aircraft on the four carriers (60 on Akagi, 74 on Kaga (B5N2 squadron oversized), 57 on Hiryū and 57 on Sōryū).

The main Japanese carrier-borne strike aircraft were the Aichi D3A1 "Val" dive bomber and the Nakajima B5N2 "Kate", which was used either as a torpedo bomber or as a level bomber. The main carrier fighter was the fast and highly maneuverable Mitsubishi A6M Zero. For a variety of reasons, production of the "Val" had been drastically reduced, while that of the "Kate" had been stopped completely and, as a consequence, there were none available to replace losses. In addition, many of the aircraft being used during the June 1942 operations had been operational since late November 1941 and, although they were well-maintained, many were almost worn out and had become increasingly unreliable. These factors meant all carriers of the Kidō Butai had fewer aircraft than their normal complement, with few spare aircraft or parts stored in the carriers' hangars.

In addition, Nagumo's carrier force suffered from several defensive deficiencies which gave it, in Mark Peattie's words, a glass jaw': it could throw a punch but couldn't take one." Japanese carrier anti-aircraft guns and associated fire control systems had several design and configuration changes deficiencies which limited their effectiveness. The IJN's fleet combat air patrol (CAP) consisted of too few fighter aircraft and was hampered by an inadequate early warning system, including a lack of radar. Poor radio communications with the fighter aircraft inhibited effective command and control of the CAP. The carriers' escorting warships were deployed as visual scouts in a ring at long range, not as close anti-aircraft escorts, as they lacked training, doctrine, and sufficient anti-aircraft guns.

Japanese strategic scouting arrangements prior to the battle were also in disarray. A picket line of Japanese submarines was late getting into position (partly because of Yamamoto's haste), which let the American carriers reach their assembly point northeast of Midway (known as "Point Luck") without being detected. A second attempt at reconnaissance, using four-engine H8K "Emily" flying boats to scout Pearl Harbor prior to the battle and detect whether the American carriers were present, part of Operation K, was thwarted when Japanese submarines assigned to refuel the search aircraft discovered that the intended refueling point—a hitherto deserted bay off French Frigate Shoals—was now occupied by American warships because the Japanese had carried out an identical mission in March. Thus, Japan was deprived of any knowledge concerning the movements of the American carriers immediately before the battle.

Japanese radio intercepts did notice an increase in both American submarine activity and message traffic. This information was in Yamamoto's hands prior to the battle. Japanese plans were not changed; Yamamoto, at sea in , assumed Nagumo had received the same signal from Tokyo and did not communicate with him by radio, so as not to reveal his position. These messages were, contrary to earlier historical accounts, also received by Nagumo before the battle began. For reasons that remain unclear, Nagumo did not alter his plans or take additional precautions.

U.S. code-breaking
Nimitz had one critical advantage: U.S. cryptanalysts had partially broken the Japanese Navy's JN-25b code. Since early 1942, the U.S. had been decoding messages stating that there would soon be an operation at objective "AF." It was initially not known where "AF" was, but Commander Joseph Rochefort and his team at Station HYPO were able to confirm that it was Midway: Captain Wilfred Holmes devised a ruse of telling the base at Midway (by secure undersea communications cable) to broadcast an uncoded radio message stating that Midway's water purification system had broken down. Within 24 hours, the code breakers picked up a Japanese message that "AF was short on water." No Japanese radio operators who intercepted the message seemed concerned that the Americans were broadcasting uncoded that a major naval installation close to the Japanese was having a water shortage, which Japanese intelligence might have suspected as deception. HYPO was also able to determine the date of the attack as either 4 or 5 June, and to provide Nimitz with a complete IJN order of battle.

Japan had a new codebook, but its introduction had been delayed, enabling HYPO to read messages for several crucial days; the new code, which took several days to be cracked, came into use on 24 May, but the important breaks had already been made. As a result, the Americans entered the battle with a good picture of where, when, and in what strength the Japanese would appear. Nimitz knew that the Japanese had negated their numerical advantage by dividing their ships into four separate task groups, so widely separated that they were essentially unable to support each other. This dispersal resulted in few fast ships being available to escort the Carrier Striking Force, thus reducing the number of anti-aircraft guns protecting the carriers. Nimitz calculated that the aircraft on his three carriers, plus those on Midway Island, gave the U.S. rough parity with Yamamoto's four carriers, mainly because American carrier air groups were larger than Japanese ones. The Japanese, by contrast, remained largely unaware of their opponent's true strength and dispositions even after the battle began.

Battle

Initial air attacks

At about 09:00 on 3 June, Ensign Jack Reid, piloting a PBY from U.S. Navy patrol squadron VP-44, spotted the Japanese Occupation Force  to the west-southwest of Midway. He mistakenly reported this group as the Main Force. Nine B-17s took off from Midway at 12:30 for the first air attack. Three hours later, they found Tanaka's transport group  to the west.

Harassed by heavy anti-aircraft fire, they dropped their bombs. Although their crews reported hitting four ships, none of the bombs actually hit anything and no significant damage was inflicted. Early the following morning, the Japanese oil tanker Akebono Maru sustained the first hit when a torpedo from an attacking PBY struck her around 01:00. This was the only successful air-launched torpedo attack by the U.S. during the entire battle.

At 04:30 on 4 June, Nagumo launched his initial attack on Midway, consisting of 36 D3As and 36 B5Ns, escorted by 36 Zero fighters. At the same time, he launched his seven search aircraft (2 B5Ns from Akagi and Kaga; 4 Aichi E13A "Jakes" from the heavy cruiser  and Chikuma; and 1 short range Nakajima E8N "Dave" from the battleship Haruna; an eighth aircraft from  launched 30 minutes late). Japanese reconnaissance arrangements were flimsy, with too few aircraft to adequately cover the assigned search areas, laboring under poor weather conditions to the northeast and east of the task force. As Nagumo's bombers and fighters were taking off, 11 PBYs were leaving Midway to run their search patterns. At 05:34, a PBY reported sighting two Japanese carriers and another spotted the inbound airstrike 10 minutes later.

Midway's radar picked up the enemy at a distance of several miles, and interceptors were scrambled. Unescorted bombers headed off to attack the Japanese carriers, their fighter escorts remaining behind to defend Midway. At 06:20, Japanese carrier aircraft bombed and heavily damaged the U.S. base. Midway-based Marine fighters led by Major Floyd B. Parks, which included six F4F Wildcats and 20 F2As, intercepted the Japanese and suffered heavy losses, though they managed to destroy four B5Ns and one Zero. Within the first few minutes, two F4Fs and 13 F2As were destroyed, while most of the surviving U.S. planes were damaged, with only two remaining airworthy. American anti-aircraft fire was intense and accurate, destroying three Japanese aircraft and damaging many more.

Of the 108 Japanese aircraft involved in this attack, 11 were destroyed (including three that ditched), 14 were heavily damaged, and 29 were damaged to some degree. The initial Japanese attack did not succeed in neutralizing Midway: American bombers could still use the airbase to refuel and attack the Japanese invasion force, and most of Midway's land-based defenses similarly remained intact. Japanese pilots reported to Nagumo that a second aerial attack on Midway's defenses would be necessary if troops were to go ashore by 7 June.

Having taken off prior to the Japanese attack, American bombers based on Midway made several attacks on the Japanese carrier force. These included six Grumman Avengers, detached to Midway from Hornets VT-8 (Midway was the combat debut of both VT-8 and the Avenger); Marine Scout-Bombing Squadron 241 (VMSB-241), consisting of 11 SB2U-3s and 16 SBDs, plus four USAAF B-26s of the 18th Reconnaissance and 69th Bomb Squadrons armed with torpedoes, and 15 B-17s of the 31st, 72nd, and 431st Bomb Squadrons. The Japanese repelled these attacks and the attacking force, losing only three Zero fighters while destroying five Avengers, two SB2Us, eight SBDs, and two B-26s. Among the dead was Major Lofton R. Henderson of VMSB-241, killed while leading his inexperienced SBD squadron into action. The main airfield at Guadalcanal was named after him in August 1942.

One B-26, piloted by Lieutenant James Muri, after dropping his torpedo and searching for a safer escape route, flew directly down the length of Akagi while being fired upon by fighters and anti-aircraft fire, which had to hold their fire to avoid hitting their own flagship. As it flew down the length of the ship, the B-26 strafed Akagi, killing two men. Another B-26, piloted by Lieutenant Herbert Mayes, did not pull out of its run after being seriously damaged by anti-aircraft fire, and instead headed directly for Akagis bridge. Either attempting a suicide ramming or out of control, the plane narrowly missed the bridge and crashed into the sea. This experience may well have contributed to Nagumo's determination to launch another attack on Midway in direct violation of Yamamoto's order to keep the reserve strike force armed for anti-ship operations.

While the air strikes from Midway were going on, the American submarine , commanded by Lieutenant Commander William Brockman, found herself near the Japanese fleet, attracting attention from the escorts. Around 08:20, she made an unsuccessful torpedo attack on a battleship and then had to dive to evade the escorts. At 09:10, she launched a torpedo at a cruiser and again had to dive to evade the escorts, with destroyer Arashi spending considerable time chasing Nautilus.

Nagumo's dilemma

In accordance with Yamamoto's orders for Operation MI, Nagumo had kept half of his aircraft in reserve. These comprised two squadrons each of dive bombers and torpedo bombers. The dive bombers were as yet unarmed (this was doctrinal: dive bombers were to be armed on the flight deck). The torpedo bombers were armed with torpedoes should any American warships be located.

At 07:15, Nagumo ordered his reserve planes to be re-armed with contact-fused general-purpose bombs for use against land targets. This was a result of the attacks from Midway, as well as the morning flight leader's recommendation of a second strike. Re-arming had been underway for about 30 minutes when, at 07:40, the delayed scout plane from Tone signaled that it had sighted a sizable American naval force to the east, but neglected to specify its composition. Later evidence suggests Nagumo did not receive the sighting report until 08:00.

Nagumo quickly reversed his order to re-arm the bombers with general-purpose bombs and demanded that the scout plane ascertain the composition of the American force. Another 20–40 minutes elapsed before Tones scout finally radioed the presence of a single carrier in the American force. This was one of the carriers from Task Force 16. The other carrier was not sighted.

Nagumo was now in a quandary. Rear Admiral Tamon Yamaguchi, leading Carrier Division 2 (Hiryū and Sōryū), recommended that Nagumo strike immediately with the forces at hand: 16 D3A1 dive bombers on Sōryū and 18 on Hiryū, and half the ready cover patrol aircraft. Nagumo's opportunity to hit the American ships was now limited by the imminent return of his Midway strike force. The returning strike force needed to land promptly or it would have to ditch into the sea. Because of the constant flight deck activity associated with combat air patrol operations during the preceding hour, the Japanese never had an opportunity to position ("spot") their reserve planes on the flight deck for launch.

The few aircraft on the Japanese flight decks at the time of the attack were either defensive fighters or, in the case of Sōryū, fighters being spotted to augment the combat air patrol. Spotting his flight decks and launching aircraft would have required at least 30 minutes. Furthermore, by spotting and launching immediately, Nagumo would be committing some of his reserves to battle without proper anti-ship armament, and likely without fighter escort; indeed, he had just witnessed how easily the unescorted American bombers had been shot down.

Japanese naval doctrine preferred the launching of fully constituted strikes rather than piecemeal attacks. Without confirmation of whether the American force included carriers (not received until 08:20), Nagumo's reaction was doctrinaire. In addition, the arrival of another land-based American air strike at 07:53 gave weight to the need to attack the island again. In the end, Nagumo decided to wait for his first strike force to land, and then launch the reserve, which would by then be properly armed with torpedoes.

Had Nagumo instead launched the available aircraft around 07:45 and risked the ditching of Tomonaga's aircraft, they would have formed a powerful and well-balanced force with the potential to sink two American carriers. Furthermore, fueled and armed aircraft inside the ships presented a significant additional hazard in terms of damage to the carriers in an event of attack, and keeping them on the decks was much more dangerous than getting them airborne. Whatever the case, at that point there was no way to stop the American strike against him, since Fletcher's carriers had launched their planes beginning at 07:00 (with Enterprise and Hornet having completed launching by 07:55, but Yorktown not until 09:08), so the aircraft that would deliver the crushing blow were already on their way. Even if Nagumo had not strictly followed carrier doctrine, he could not have prevented the launch of the American attack.

Attacks on the Japanese fleet

The Americans had already launched their carrier aircraft against the Japanese. Fletcher, in overall command aboard Yorktown, and benefiting from PBY sighting reports from the early morning, ordered Spruance to launch against the Japanese as soon as was practical, while initially holding Yorktown in reserve in case any other Japanese carriers were found.

Spruance judged that, though the range was extreme, a strike could succeed and gave the order to launch the attack. He then left Halsey's Chief of Staff, Captain Miles Browning, to work out the details and oversee the launch. The carriers had to launch into the wind, so the light southeasterly breeze would require them to steam away from the Japanese at high speed. Browning, therefore, suggested a launch time of 07:00, giving the carriers an hour to close on the Japanese at . This would place them at about  from the Japanese fleet, assuming it did not change course. The first plane took off from Spruance's carriers Enterprise and Hornet a few minutes after 07:00. Fletcher, upon completing his own scouting flights, followed suit at 08:00 from Yorktown.

Fletcher, along with Yorktowns commanding officer, Captain Elliott Buckmaster, and their staffs, had acquired the first-hand experience needed in organizing and launching a full strike against an enemy force in the Coral Sea, but there was no time to pass these lessons on to Enterprise, commanded by Captain George Murray, and Hornet, commanded by Captain Marc Mitscher, which were tasked with launching the first strike. Spruance ordered the striking aircraft to proceed to target immediately rather than waste time waiting for the strike force to assemble, since neutralizing enemy carriers was the key to the survival of his own task force.

While the Japanese were able to launch 108 aircraft in just seven minutes, it took Enterprise and Hornet over an hour to launch 117. Spruance judged that the need to throw something at the enemy as soon as possible was greater than the need to coordinate the attack by aircraft of different types and speeds (fighters, bombers, and torpedo bombers). Accordingly, American squadrons were launched piecemeal and proceeded to the target in several different groups. It was accepted that the lack of coordination would diminish the impact of the American attacks and increase their casualties, but Spruance calculated that this was worthwhile, since keeping the Japanese under aerial attack impaired their ability to launch a counterstrike (Japanese tactics preferred fully constituted attacks), and he gambled that he would find Nagumo with his flight decks at their most vulnerable.

American carrier aircraft had difficulty locating the target, despite the positions they had been given. The strike from Hornet, led by Commander Stanhope C. Ring, followed an incorrect heading of 265 degrees rather than the 240 degrees indicated by the contact report. As a result, Air Group Eight's dive bombers missed the Japanese carriers. Torpedo Squadron 8 (VT-8, from Hornet), led by Lieutenant Commander John C. Waldron, broke formation from Ring and followed the correct heading. The 10 F4Fs from Hornet ran out of fuel and had to ditch.

Waldron's squadron sighted the enemy carriers and began attacking at 09:20, followed at 09:40 by VF-6 from Enterprise, whose Wildcat fighter escorts lost contact, ran low on fuel, and had to turn back. Without fighter escort, all 15 TBD Devastators of VT-8 were shot down without being able to inflict any damage. Ensign George H. Gay, Jr. was the only survivor of the 30 aircrews of VT-8. He completed his torpedo attack on the carrier Sōryū before he was shot down, but Sōryū evaded his torpedo. Meanwhile, VT-6, led by Lieutenant Commander Eugene E. Lindsey lost 9 of its 14 Devastators (one ditched later), and 10 of 12 Devastators from Yorktowns VT-3 (who attacked at 10:10) were shot down with no hits to show for their effort, thanks in part to the abysmal performance of their unimproved Mark 13 torpedoes. Midway was the last time the TBD Devastator was used in combat.

The Japanese combat air patrol, flying Zeros, made short work of the unescorted, slow, under-armed TBDs. A few TBDs managed to get within a few ship-lengths range of their targets before dropping their torpedoes—close enough to be able to strafe the enemy ships and force the Japanese carriers to make sharp evasive maneuvers—but all of their torpedoes either missed or failed to explode. The performance of American torpedoes in the early months of the war was extremely poor, as shot after shot missed by running directly under the target (deeper than intended), prematurely exploded, or hit targets (sometimes with an audible clang) and failed to explode at all. Remarkably, senior Navy and Bureau of Ordnance officers never questioned why half a dozen torpedoes, released so close to the Japanese carriers, produced no results.

Despite their failure to score any hits, the American torpedo attacks achieved three important results. First, they kept the Japanese carriers off balance and unable to prepare and launch their own counterstrike. Second, the poor control of the Japanese CAP meant they were out of position for subsequent attacks. Third, many of the Zeros ran low on ammunition and fuel. The appearance of a third torpedo plane attack from the southeast by VT-3 from Yorktown, led by Lieutenant Commander Lance Edward Massey at 10:00 very quickly drew the majority of the Japanese CAP to the southeast quadrant of the fleet. Better discipline and the employment of a greater number of Zeros for the CAP might have enabled Nagumo to prevent (or at least mitigate) the damage caused by the coming American attacks.

By chance, at the same time VT-3 was sighted by the Japanese, three squadrons of SBDs from Enterprise and Yorktown were approaching from the southwest and northeast. The Yorktown squadron (VB-3) had flown just behind VT-3 but elected to attack from a different course. The two squadrons from Enterprise (VB-6 and VS-6) were running low on fuel because of the time spent looking for the enemy. Air Group Commander C. Wade McClusky, Jr. decided to continue the search and by good fortune spotted the wake of the Japanese destroyer , steaming at full speed to rejoin Nagumo's carriers after having unsuccessfully depth-charged U.S. submarine , which had unsuccessfully attacked the battleship . Some bombers were lost from fuel exhaustion before the attack commenced.

McClusky's decision to continue the search and his judgment, in the opinion of Admiral Chester Nimitz, "decided the fate of our carrier task force and our forces at Midway ..." All three American dive-bomber squadrons (VB-6, VS-6, and VB-3) arrived almost simultaneously at the perfect time, locations and altitudes to attack. Most of the Japanese CAP was directing its attention to the torpedo planes of VT-3 and was out of position; meanwhile, armed Japanese strike aircraft filled the hangar decks, fuel hoses snaked across the decks as refueling operations were hastily being completed, and the repeated change of ordnance meant that bombs and torpedoes were stacked around the hangars, rather than stowed safely in the magazines, making the Japanese carriers extraordinarily vulnerable.

Kaga
Beginning at 10:22, the two squadrons of Enterprises air group split up with the intention of sending one squadron each to attack Kaga and Akagi. A miscommunication caused both of the squadrons to dive at Kaga. Recognizing the error, Lieutenant Richard Halsey Best and his two wingmen were able to pull out of their dives and, after judging that Kaga was doomed, headed north to attack Akagi. Coming under an onslaught of bombs from almost two full squadrons, Kaga sustained three to five direct hits, which caused heavy damage and started multiple fires. One of the bombs landed on or right in front of the bridge, killing Captain Jisaku Okada and most of the ship's senior officers. Lieutenant Clarence E. Dickinson, part of McClusky's group, recalled:

Akagi
Several minutes later, Best and his two wingmen dove on Akagi. Mitsuo Fuchida, the Japanese aviator who had led the attack on Pearl Harbor, was on Akagi when it was hit, and described the attack:

Although Akagi sustained only one direct hit (almost certainly dropped by Lieutenant Best), it proved to be a fatal blow: the bomb struck the edge of the mid-ship deck elevator and penetrated to the upper hangar deck, where it exploded among the armed and fueled aircraft in the vicinity. Nagumo's chief of staff, Ryūnosuke Kusaka, recorded "a terrific fire ... bodies all over the place ... Planes stood tail up, belching livid flames and jet-black smoke, making it impossible to bring the fires under control." Another bomb exploded underwater very close astern; the resulting geyser bent the flight deck upward "in grotesque configurations" and caused crucial rudder damage.

Sōryū
Simultaneously, Yorktowns VB-3, commanded by Lieutenant Max Leslie, went for Sōryū, scoring at least three hits and causing extensive damage. Gasoline ignited, creating an inferno, while stacked bombs and ammunition detonated. VT-3 targeted Hiryū, which was hemmed in by Sōryū, Kaga, and Akagi, but achieved no hits.

Within six minutes, Sōryū and Kaga were ablaze from stem to stern, as fires spread through the ships. Akagi, having been struck by only one bomb, took longer to burn, but the resulting fires quickly expanded and proved impossible to extinguish; she too was eventually consumed by flames and had to be abandoned. The shell-shocked Nagumo was reluctant to leave the Akagi. Kusaka was able to persuade him. At 10:46, Nagumo transferred his flag to the light cruiser . All three carriers remained temporarily afloat, as none had suffered damage below the waterline, other than the rudder damage to Akagi caused by the near miss close astern. Despite initial hopes that Akagi could be saved or at least towed back to Japan, all three carriers were eventually abandoned and scuttled. While Kaga was burning, Nautilus showed up again and launched three torpedoes at her, scoring one dud hit. The Kaga was later sunk by the Japanese destroyer Hagikaze.

Japanese counterattacks
Hiryū, the sole surviving Japanese aircraft carrier, wasted little time in counterattacking. Hiryūs first attack wave, consisting of 18 D3As and 6 Zeros, followed the retreating American aircraft and attacked the first carrier they encountered, Yorktown, hitting her with three bombs, which blew a hole in the deck, snuffed out all but one of her boilers, and destroyed one anti-aircraft mount. The damage forced Fletcher to move his command staff to the heavy cruiser . Damage control parties were able to temporarily patch the flight deck and restore power to several boilers within an hour, giving her a speed of  and enabling her to resume air operations. Yorktown hoisted a flag signal to indicate a speed of 5 knots. Captain Buckmaster had his signalmen hoist a huge new (10 feet wide and 15 feet long) American flag from the foremast. Thirteen D3As and three Zeros were lost in this attack (two Zeros turned back early after they were damaged attacking some of Enterprises SBDs returning from their attack on the Japanese carriers).

Approximately one hour later, Hiryū's second attack wave, consisting of ten B5Ns and six escorting Zeros, arrived over Yorktown; the repair efforts had been so effective that the Japanese pilots assumed that Yorktown must be a different, undamaged carrier. They attacked, crippling Yorktown with two torpedoes; she lost all power and developed a 23-degree list to port. Five B5Ns and two Zeros were shot down in this attack.

News of the two strikes, with the mistaken reports that each had sunk an American carrier, greatly improved Japanese morale. The few surviving aircraft were all recovered aboard Hiryū. Despite the heavy losses, the Japanese believed that they could scrape together enough aircraft for one more strike against what they believed to be the only remaining American carrier.

American counterattack

Hiryū

Late in the afternoon, a Yorktown scout aircraft located Hiryū, prompting Enterprise to launch a final strike of 24 dive bombers (including six SBDs from VS-6, four SBDs from VB-6, and 14 SBDs from Yorktowns VB-3). Despite Hiryū being defended by a strong cover of more than a dozen Zero fighters, the attack by Enterprise and orphaned Yorktown aircraft launched from Enterprise was successful: four bombs (possibly five) hit Hiryū, leaving her ablaze and unable to operate aircraft. Hornets strike, launched late because of a communications error, concentrated on the remaining escort ships but failed to score any hits. Enterprise dive bomber Dusty Kleiss struck Hiryū on the bow, essentially crippling her.

After futile attempts at controlling the blaze, most of the crew remaining on Hiryū were evacuated, and the remainder of the fleet continued sailing northeast in an attempt to intercept the American carriers. Despite a scuttling attempt by a Japanese destroyer that hit her with a torpedo and then departed quickly, Hiryū stayed afloat for several more hours. She was discovered early the next morning by an aircraft from the escort carrier , prompting hopes she could be saved or towed back to Japan. Soon after being spotted, Hiryū sank. Yamaguchi, together with the ship's captain, , chose to go down with the ship, costing Japan perhaps its best carrier officer. One young sailor reportedly tried to go down with the ship with the officers but was denied.

As darkness fell, both sides took stock and made tentative plans for continuing the action. Fletcher, obliged to abandon the derelict Yorktown and feeling he could not adequately command from a cruiser, ceded operational command to Spruance. Spruance knew the United States had won a great victory, but he was still unsure of what Japanese forces remained and was determined to safeguard both Midway and his carriers. To aid his aviators, who had launched at extreme range, he had continued to close with Nagumo during the day and persisted as night fell.

Finally, fearing a possible night encounter with Japanese surface forces and believing Yamamoto still intended to invade (based in part on a misleading contact report from the submarine ) Spruance changed course and withdrew to the east, turning back west towards the enemy at midnight. For his part, Yamamoto initially decided to continue the engagement and sent his remaining surface forces searching eastward for the American carriers. Simultaneously, he detached a cruiser raiding force to bombard the island. The Japanese surface forces failed to make contact with the Americans because Spruance had decided to briefly withdraw eastward, and Yamamoto ordered a general withdrawal to the west. It was fortunate for the U.S. that Spruance did not pursue, for had he come in contact with Yamamoto's heavy ships, including , in the dark, considering the Japanese Navy's superiority in night-attack tactics at the time, there is a very high probability his cruisers would have been overwhelmed and his carriers sunk.

Spruance failed to regain contact with Yamamoto's forces on 5 June, despite extensive searches. Towards the end of the day, he launched a search-and-destroy mission to seek out any remnants of Nagumo's carrier force. This late afternoon strike narrowly missed detecting Yamamoto's main body and failed to score hits on a straggling Japanese destroyer. The strike planes returned to the carriers after nightfall, prompting Spruance to order Enterprise and Hornet to turn on their lights to aid the landings.

At 02:15 on 5 June Commander John Murphy's Tambor, lying  west of Midway, made the second of the submarine force's two major contributions to the battle's outcome, although its impact was heavily blunted by Murphy. Sighting several ships, neither Murphy nor his executive officer, Edward Spruance (son of Admiral Spruance), could identify them. Uncertain of whether they were friendly and unwilling to approach any closer to verify their heading or type, Murphy decided to send a vague report of "four large ships" to Admiral Robert English, Commander, Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet. This report was passed on by English to Nimitz, who then sent it to Spruance. Spruance, a former submarine commander, was "understandably furious" at the vagueness of Murphy's report, as it provided him with little more than suspicion and no concrete information on which to make his preparations. Unaware of the exact location of Yamamoto's "Main Body" (a persistent problem since the time PBYs had first sighted the Japanese), Spruance was forced to assume the "four large ships" reported by Tambor represented the main invasion force and so he moved to block it, while staying  northeast of Midway.

In reality, the ships sighted by Tambor were the detachment of four cruisers and two destroyers Yamamoto had sent to bombard Midway. At 02:55 these ships received Yamamoto's order to retire and changed course to comply. At about the same time as this change of course, Tambor was sighted and during maneuvers designed to avoid a submarine attack, the heavy cruisers  and  collided, inflicting serious damage on Mogamis bow. The less severely damaged Mikuma slowed to  to keep pace. Only at 04:12 did the sky brighten enough for Murphy to be certain the ships were Japanese, by which time staying surfaced was hazardous and he dived to approach for an attack. The attack was unsuccessful, and around 06:00 he finally reported two westbound s before diving again and playing no further role in the battle. Limping along on a straight course at 12 knots—roughly one-third their top speed—Mogami and Mikuma had been almost perfect targets for a submarine attack. As soon as Tambor returned to port, Spruance had Murphy relieved of duty and reassigned to a shore station, citing his confusing contact report, poor torpedo shooting during his attack run, and general lack of aggression, especially as compared to Nautilus, the oldest of the 12 boats at Midway and the only one which had successfully placed a torpedo on target (albeit a dud).

Over the next two days, several strikes were launched against the stragglers, first from Midway, then from Spruance's carriers. Mikuma was eventually sunk by Dauntlesses, while Mogami survived further severe damage to return home for repairs. The destroyers  and  were also bombed and strafed during the last of these attacks. Captain Richard E. Fleming, a U.S. Marine Corps aviator, was killed while executing a glide bomb run on Mikuma and was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor.

Meanwhile, salvage efforts on Yorktown were encouraging, and she was taken in tow by fleet tug . In the late afternoon of 6 June the , which had managed to slip through the cordon of destroyers (possibly because of the large amount of debris in the water), fired a salvo of torpedoes, two of which struck Yorktown. There were few casualties aboard since most of the crew had already been evacuated, but a third torpedo from this salvo struck the destroyer , which had been providing auxiliary power to Yorktown. Hammann broke in two and sank with the loss of 80 lives, mostly because her own depth charges exploded. With further salvage efforts deemed hopeless, the remaining repair crews were evacuated from Yorktown. Throughout the night of 6 June and into the morning of 7 June, Yorktown remained afloat; but by 05:30 on 7 June observers noted that her list was rapidly increasing to port. Shortly afterward, the ship turned onto her port side revealing the torpedo hole in her starboard bilge. At 07:01, the ship rolled upside-down and slowly sank, stern first.

Japanese and U.S. casualties
SBD pilot Norman "Dusty" Kleiss, who scored three hits on Japanese ships during the Battle of Midway (aircraft carriers Kaga and Hiryū and heavy cruiser Mikuma), wrote: "From the experience in the Marshalls, at Wake and at Marcus, I thought our fleet learned its lessons. We could not send TBDs into action unless they had adequate smoke protection and torpedoes that exploded more than 10 percent of the time."

By the time the battle ended, 3,057 Japanese had died. Casualties aboard the four carriers were: Akagi: 267; Kaga: 811; Hiryū: 392 (including Yamaguchi who chose to go down with his ship); Soryū: 711 (including Captain Yanagimoto, who chose to remain on board); a total of 2,181. The heavy cruisers Mikuma (sunk; 700 casualties) and Mogami (badly damaged; 92) accounted for another 792 deaths.

In addition, the destroyers Arashio (bombed; 35) and Asashio (strafed by aircraft; 21) were both damaged during the air attacks which sank Mikuma and caused further damage to Mogami. Floatplanes were lost from the cruisers Chikuma (3) and Tone (2). Dead aboard the destroyers Tanikaze (11), Arashi (1), Kazagumo (1) and the fleet oiler Akebono Maru (10) made up the remaining 23 casualties.

At the end of the battle, the U.S. lost the carrier Yorktown and the destroyer Hammann. 307 Americans had been killed, including Major General Clarence L. Tinker, Commander, 7th Air Force, who personally led a bomber strike from Hawaii against the retreating Japanese forces on 7 June. He was killed when his aircraft crashed near Midway Island.

Aftermath

After winning a clear victory, and as pursuit became too hazardous near Wake Island, American forces retired. Spruance once again withdrew to the east to refuel his destroyers and rendezvous with the carrier Saratoga, which was ferrying much-needed replacement aircraft. Fletcher transferred his flag to Saratoga on the afternoon of 8 June and resumed command of the carrier force. For the remainder of that day and then 9 June, Fletcher continued to launch search missions from the three carriers to ensure the Japanese were no longer advancing on Midway. Late on 10 June a decision was made to leave the area, and the American carriers eventually returned to Pearl Harbor.

Historian Samuel E. Morison noted in 1949 that Spruance was subjected to much criticism for not pursuing the retreating Japanese, thus allowing their surface fleet to escape. Clay Blair argued in 1975 that had Spruance pressed on, he would have been unable to launch his aircraft after nightfall, and his cruisers would have been overwhelmed by Yamamoto's powerful surface units, including Yamato. Furthermore, the American air groups had suffered considerable losses, including most of their torpedo bombers. This made it unlikely that they would be effective in an airstrike against the Japanese battleships, even if they had managed to catch them during the daytime. Also, Spruance's destroyers were critically low on fuel.

On 10 June the Imperial Japanese Navy conveyed to the military liaison conference an incomplete picture of the results of the battle. Nagumo's detailed battle report was submitted to the high command on 15 June. It was intended only for the highest echelons in the Japanese Navy and government and was guarded closely throughout the war. In it, one of the more striking revelations is the comment on Mobile Force Commander Nagumo's estimates: "The enemy is not aware of our plans (we were not discovered until early in the morning of the 5th at the earliest)." In reality, the whole operation had been compromised from the beginning by American code-breaking efforts.

The Japanese public and much of the military command structure were kept in the dark about the extent of the defeat: Japanese news announced a great victory. Only Emperor Hirohito and the highest Navy command staff were accurately informed of the carrier and personnel losses. Consequently, even the Imperial Japanese Army continued to believe, for at least a short time, that the fleet was in good condition.

On the return of the Japanese fleet to Hashirajima on 14 June the wounded were immediately transferred to naval hospitals; most were classified as "secret patients", placed in isolation wards and quarantined from other patients and their own families to keep this major defeat secret. The remaining officers and men were quickly dispersed to other units of the fleet and, without being allowed to see family or friends, were shipped to units in the South Pacific, where the majority died in battle. None of the flag officers or staff of the Combined Fleet were penalized, and Nagumo was later placed in command of the rebuilt carrier force. A possible reason Nagumo was not relieved of command was that he reported two American carriers had been sunk; not one actually sunk.

As a result of the defeat, new procedures were adopted whereby more Japanese aircraft were refueled and re-armed on the flight deck rather than in the hangars, and the practice of draining all unused fuel lines was adopted. The new carriers being built were redesigned to incorporate only two flight deck elevators and new firefighting equipment. More carrier crew members were trained in damage-control and firefighting techniques, although the losses of the Shōkaku, , and especially  later in the war suggest that there were still problems in this area.

Replacement pilots were pushed through an abbreviated training regimen in order to meet the short-term needs of the fleet. This led to a sharp decline in the quality of the aviators produced. These inexperienced pilots were fed into front-line units, while the veterans who remained after Midway and the Solomons campaign were forced to share an increased workload as conditions grew more desperate, with few being given a chance to rest in rear areas or in the home islands. As a result, Japanese naval air groups as a whole progressively deteriorated during the war while their American adversaries continued to improve.

American prisoners
Three U.S. airmen were captured during the battle: Ensign Wesley Osmus, a pilot from Yorktown; Ensign Frank O'Flaherty, a pilot from Enterprise; and Aviation Machinist's Mate Bruno Peter Gaido, O'Flaherty's radioman-gunner. Osmus was held on Arashi; O'Flaherty and Gaido on the cruiser Nagara (or destroyer Makigumo, sources vary); O'Flaherty and Gaido were interrogated and then killed by being tied to water-filled kerosene cans and thrown overboard to drown. Osmus was slated for the same fate; however, he resisted and was murdered on the Arashi with a fire axe, and his body was thrown overboard. The report filed by Nagumo tersely states that Osmus, "... died on 6 June and was buried at sea"; O'Flaherty and Gaido's fates were not mentioned in Nagumo's report. The execution of Osmus in this manner was apparently ordered by Arashis captain, Watanabe Yasumasa. Yasumasa died when the destroyer  sank in December 1943, but had he survived he would have likely been tried as a war criminal.

Japanese prisoners

Two enlisted men from Mikuma were rescued from a life raft on 9 June by  and taken to Pearl Harbor. After receiving medical care, at least one of these sailors cooperated during interrogation and provided intelligence. Another 35 crewmen from Hiryū were taken from a lifeboat by  on 19 June after being spotted by an American search plane. They were taken to Midway and then transferred to Pearl Harbor on .

Impact

The Battle of Midway has often been called "the turning point of the Pacific". It was the Allies' first major naval victory against the Japanese. Had Japan won the battle as thoroughly as the U.S. did, it might have been able to conquer Midway Island. Saratoga would have been the only American carrier in the Pacific, as no new ones were completed before the end of 1942. While the U.S. would probably not have sought peace with Japan as Yamamoto hoped, his country might have revived Operation FS to invade and occupy Fiji and Samoa; attacked Australia, Alaska, and Ceylon; or even attempted to occupy Hawaii.

Although the Japanese continued to try to secure more territory, and the U.S. did not move from a state of naval parity to one of supremacy until after several more months of hard combat, Midway allowed the Allies to switch to the strategic initiative, paving the way for the landings on Guadalcanal and the prolonged attrition of the Solomon Islands campaign. Midway allowed this to occur before the first of the new Essex-class fleet carriers became available at the end of 1942. The Guadalcanal campaign is also regarded by some as a turning point in the Pacific War.

Some authors have stated that heavy losses in carriers and veteran aircrews at Midway permanently weakened the Imperial Japanese Navy. Parshall and Tully have stated that the heavy losses in veteran aircrew (110, just under 25% of the aircrew embarked on the four carriers) were not crippling to the Japanese naval air corps as a whole; the Japanese navy had 2,000 carrier-qualified aircrews at the start of the Pacific War. The loss of four large fleet carriers and over 40% of the carriers' highly trained aircraft mechanics and technicians, plus the essential flight-deck crews and armorers, and the loss of organizational knowledge embodied in such highly trained crews, were still heavy blows to the Japanese carrier fleet. A few months after Midway, the Imperial Japanese Navy Air Service sustained similar casualty rates in the Battle of the Eastern Solomons and Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands, and it was these battles, combined with the constant attrition of veterans during the Solomons campaign, which were the catalyst for the sharp downward spiral in operational capability.

After the battle, Shōkaku and Zuikaku were the only large carriers of the original Pearl Harbor strike force still afloat. Of Japan's other carriers, Taihō, which was not commissioned until early 1944, would be the only fleet carrier worth teaming with Shōkaku and Zuikaku;  and  were light carriers, while  and , although technically classified as fleet carriers, were second-rate ships of comparatively limited effectiveness. In the time it took Japan to build three carriers, the U.S. Navy commissioned more than two dozen fleet and light fleet carriers, and numerous escort carriers. By 1942 the United States was already three years into a shipbuilding program mandated by the Second Vinson Act of 1938.

Both the United States and Japan accelerated the training of aircrew, but the United States had a more effective pilot rotation system, which meant that more veterans survived and went on to training or command billets, where they were able to pass on lessons they had learned in combat to trainees, instead of remaining in combat, where errors were more likely to be fatal. By the time of the Battle of the Philippine Sea in June 1944, the Japanese had nearly rebuilt their carrier forces in terms of numbers, but their planes, many of which were obsolete, were largely flown by inexperienced and poorly trained pilots.

Midway showed the worth of pre-war naval cryptanalysis and intelligence-gathering. These efforts continued and were expanded throughout the war in both the Pacific and Atlantic theaters. Successes were numerous and significant. For instance, cryptanalysis made possible the shooting down of Admiral Yamamoto's airplane in 1943.

The Battle of Midway also caused the plan of Japan and Nazi Germany to meet up in the Indian subcontinent to be abandoned.

The Battle of Midway redefined the central importance of air superiority for the remainder of the war when the Japanese suddenly lost their four main aircraft carriers and were forced to return home. Without any form of air superiority, the Japanese never again launched a major offensive in the Pacific.

Discovery of sunken vessels
Because of the extreme depth of the ocean in the area of the battle (more than ), researching the battlefield has presented extraordinary difficulties. On 19 May 1998, Robert Ballard and a team of scientists and Midway veterans from both sides located and photographed Yorktown, which was located  deep. The ship was remarkably intact for a vessel that had sunk in 1942; much of the original equipment and even the original paint scheme were still visible. Ballard's subsequent search for the Japanese carriers was unsuccessful.

In September 1999, a joint expedition between Nauticos Corp. and the U.S. Naval Oceanographic Office searched for the Japanese aircraft carriers. Using advanced renavigation techniques in conjunction with the ship's log of the submarine USS Nautilus, the expedition located a large piece of wreckage, subsequently identified as having come from the upper hangar deck of Kaga.

The crew of the research vessel RV Petrel, in conjunction with the U.S. Navy, announced on 18 October 2019 that it had found the Japanese carrier Kaga lying  beneath the waves. The crew of Petrel confirmed the discovery of another Japanese carrier, the Akagi, on 21 October 2019. The Akagi was found in the Papahānaumokuākea Marine National Monument resting in nearly  of water.

Remembrances

Chicago Municipal Airport, important to the war effort in World War II, was renamed Chicago Midway International Airport (or simply Midway Airport) in 1949 in honor of the battle. Henderson Field in Guadalcanal was named in honor of United States Marine Corps Major Lofton Henderson, who was the first Marine aviator to perish during the battle.

Escort carrier USS Midway (CVE-63) was commissioned on 17 August 1943. She was renamed St. Lo on 10 October 1944 to clear the name Midway for a large fleet aircraft carrier, , which was commissioned on 10 September 1945, eight days after the Japanese surrender, and is now docked in San Diego, California, as the USS Midway Museum.

On 13 September 2000 Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt designated the lands and waters of Midway Atoll National Wildlife Refuge as the Battle of Midway National Memorial. Tinker Air Force Base outside Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, is named in honor of Major General Clarence L. Tinker, Commander 7th Air Force, who personally led a bomber strike from Hawaii against the retreating Japanese forces on 7 June.

John Ford directed two films about the events: the 18-minute 1942 Movietone News documentary (released by the War Activities Committee) The Battle of Midway, which received the 1942 Academy Award for Best Documentary; and the eight-minute documentary Torpedo Squadron 8, which describes the heroism of Torpedo Squadron 8 of the . Ford, who was a Navy Reserve Commander at the time, was present at Midway Atoll's power plant on Sand Island during the Japanese attack and filmed it. He received combat wounds from enemy fire in his arm during the filming.

See also

First Bombardment of Midway, a 7 December 1941 attack on Midway by two Japanese destroyers
Imperial Japanese Navy in World War II
Pacific Theater aircraft carrier operations during World War II
 Midway (1976)
 Dauntless: The Battle of Midway (2019)
 Midway (2019)

Footnotes

Notes

References

Further reading

 A Japanese account; numerous assertions in this work have been challenged by more recent sources.

 First-hand account by Japanese captain, often inaccurate

 Significant section on Midway
 An account of blunders that led to the near-total destruction of the American torpedo squadrons, and of what the author calls a cover-up by naval officers after the battle

 Detailed study of battle, from planning to the effects on World War II

External links

Battle of Midway main topic page at the Naval History and Heritage Command
Battle of Midway (1942)U.S. Navy propaganda film directed by John Ford.
Victory At Sea: Midway Is East (1952)Episode 4 from a 26-episode series about naval combat during World War II
Destination Point Luck: Voices From Midway (2008)U.S. Navy Interviews of Battle of Midway Veterans

History of Midway Atoll
Pacific theatre of World War II
History of cryptography
Imperial Japanese Navy Air Service
Naval aviation operations and battles
World War II aerial operations and battles of the Pacific theatre
Naval battles of World War II involving Japan
Naval battles of World War II involving the United States
United States Marine Corps in World War II
United States naval aviation
1942 in the United States
1942 in Japan
June 1942 events
Japan–United States military relations

Battle of Midway


Sweet Sixteen is a 2002 coming-of-age crime drama film directed by Ken Loach. Set in Scotland, the film tells the story of Liam, a teenage boy from a troubled background who dreams of starting afresh with his mother as soon as she has completed her prison term. Liam's attempts to raise money for the two of them are set against the backdrop of the Inverclyde towns of Greenock, Port Glasgow and the coast at Gourock.

The film is an international co-production of the United Kingdom, Germany and Spain. It is often shown with subtitles because, as with many of Loach's films, the dialogue is extensively in a local dialect, in this case the Inverclyde variant of Scottish English and Scots, a similar dialect and accent to Glaswegian.

Plot
In the Scottish town of Greenock, teenager Liam and his friends exemplify the violent ned subculture: they no longer attend school, and instead wander aimlessly all day long. They earn money by illegally selling untaxed cigarettes in a pub. Liam's mother, Jean, is currently in prison for a crime actually committed by her boyfriend Stan, who works as a drug dealer with Liam's grandfather, Rab. Jean is due to be released in a few weeks, in time for Liam's 16th birthday.

Stan and Rab attempt to force Liam to smuggle drugs to Jean during a prison visit. Refusing to cooperate, Liam is beaten up by Stan and eventually thrown out of Rab's flat. Liam then moves in with his older sister Chantelle in nearby Port Glasgow. She urges Liam to do something constructive with his life.

When Liam takes Chantelle's young son Calum for a walk along the Greenock Esplanade, his friend Pinball arrives in a stolen car and insists on taking them joyriding along the coast. They drive up through the Cloch caravan park where Liam sees a caravan for sale. Liam dreams of starting afresh by purchasing a caravan to live in with his mother and sister, away from Stan and Rab. To afford it, he and Pinball steal a delivery of drugs from Stan's house and sell them. They soon raise several thousand pounds, which they pay as a deposit towards the caravan in Liam's mother's name.

Liam's efforts attract the attention of the local drug "godfather", Tony Douglas. Liam agrees to work with them after Tony tells him to "stay away from our shops". Pinball, meanwhile, is thrown into the health club showers due to his disrespectful behaviour towards the dealer, and vows revenge. Liam and Pinball continue selling drugs locally, with the help of Liam's other friends who deliver pizzas. Liam and Pinball meet again with members of Tony's gang, and Liam joins them in their car. Pinball is kicked out, angering him further; the gang members advise Liam to "dump" Pinball for good. They take Liam to a Glasgow nightclub and inform him that he has to kill someone to join the gang. Liam attempts to do so, but is stopped by the gang, who inform him it was a test—which he has passed.

Liam, Chantelle, Calum and Suzanne (Chantelle's friend) drive to the caravan for a picnic, only to discover that it has been burned down. Liam believes Stan did it. That evening, Pinball turns up in Tony's stolen car, telling Liam that he wants revenge. He proceeds to crash the car into the health club. Liam speaks to Tony in the morning and is ordered to kill Pinball. The next morning, Pinball—aware of Liam's intentions—tries to stab Liam, before proudly revealing that he burnt down the caravan. He then cuts his own face in rage. Liam reassures his injured friend after phoning for an ambulance, but he then notifies Tony that the deed has "been done", implying that he has indeed murdered Pinball.

Tony promises to buy Liam an upscale apartment, and on the day before his birthday, Liam's mother is released from prison and taken to this new house on the coast of Gourock where she is welcomed with a party. She appears uneasy, and the next morning is found to have escaped to Stan's house. Liam blames this on Chantelle, who is now fully aware that Liam is dealing drugs. She attempts to warn him about their mother probably not being so thankful for Liam's efforts because she is too devoted to Stan, but this only provokes Liam further. An enraged Liam goes to Stan's house, trying to convince his mother to return to their new home, only to be insulted by Stan. In a struggle, Liam stabs Stan.

Liam walks alone on the beach. He is phoned by Chantelle, who reminds him that it is his 16th birthday on that day, meaning he can be tried in court as an adult. She also tells him that the police have been looking for him, and that despite everything that he has done, Chantelle still loves him. He walks towards the sea.

Cast
 Martin Compston as Liam
 Annmarie Fulton as Chantelle
 William Ruane as Pinball
 Junior Walker as Nighttime
 Gary McCormack as Stan

Soundtrack

 "The Arrival of the Night Queen from The Magic Flute" by Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart – Performed by Failoni Kamerazenekar and Helen Kwon
 "I'll Stand by You" – Written by Tom Kelly, Billy Steinberg and Chrissie Hynde – Performed by the Pretenders
 "Burn in Hell" – Written by Otten/Skog/Tell/Torstensen – Performed by Clawfinger
 "Dogman" – Written by Tristan Hervo – Performed by Wide Open Cage
 "Bushes" – Written by Markus Nikolai, Theo Krieger, Clair Dietrich – Performed by Markus Nikolai
 "Ain't No Love (Ain't No Use)" – Written by Melanie Williams, Jimi Goodwin, Jez Williams, Andy Williams – Performed by Sub Sub featuring Melanie Williams
 "Let Me Entertain You" – Written by Robbie Williams and Guy Chambers – Performed by Robbie Williams
 "You Stole the Sun from My Heart" – Written by James Dean Bradfield, Nicky Wire, Sean Moore – Performed by Manic Street Preachers
 "I Go to Sleep" – Written and composed by Ray Davies – Performed by the Pretenders

Reception
Sweet Sixteen premiered at the UGC in central Glasgow on 1 October 2002. On the review aggregator website Rotten Tomatoes, the film holds an approval rating of 97% based on 88 reviews, with an average rating of 7.9/10. The website's critics consensus reads, "A bleak, but heartbreaking coming-of-age tale that resonates with truth." Sweet Sixteen was nominated for the Palme d'Or and won the Best Screenplay Award at the 2002 Cannes Film Festival. Sweet Sixteen inspired Italian singer-songwriter Lucio Dalla for the 2007 song "Liam".

Criticism of BBFC classification
Use of the words fuck (313 times) and cunt (about 20 times) led the British Board of Film Classification (BBFC) to forbid the film to viewers under the age of 18. Spain followed this decision, but other countries, like France and Germany (not under 12) had a different rating system. Loach and Paul Laverty protested against the British procedure in The Guardian.

Laverty asserted that this was "censorship" and "class prejudice" because he obtained plenty of information to write his screenplay from people around Scotland, many of whom were not 18, and were therefore denied the opportunity to see the film. The BBFC acknowledged that there is some variation across the United Kingdom in how offensive some words are perceived, but stood by the 18 certificate and argued that most of the publicity around the film was "mostly generated by the disgruntled film-maker".

Screenings in Inverclyde, Martin Compston's birthplace, where the film was shot, were shown under a 15 certificate.

References

External links

 Sweet Sixteen at the British Film Institute

 Review: 'Losing Liam' at Bright Lights Film Journal, 2005

2002 films
2002 crime drama films
2002 independent films
2000s British films
2000s coming-of-age drama films
2000s English-language films
2000s German films
2000s Spanish films
2000s teen drama films
BBC Film films
British coming-of-age drama films
British crime drama films
British independent films
British teen drama films
English-language crime drama films
English-language German films
English-language Scottish films
English-language Spanish films
European Film Awards winners (films)
Film controversies in the United Kingdom
Films about drugs
Films directed by Ken Loach
Films scored by George Fenton
Films set in Scotland
Films shot in Glasgow
German coming-of-age drama films
German crime drama films
German independent films
German teen drama films
Greenock
Icon Productions films
Rating controversies in film
Scots-language films
Scottish drama films
Spanish coming-of-age drama films
Spanish crime drama films
Spanish independent films
Spanish teen drama films
Teen crime films
Tornasol Films films

Sweet Sixteen (2002 film)


Brand Partners, formerly UKI Partnerships, is a partnership company and underwriters owned by the Direct Line Group.

It underwrites and administers policies for several different general insurance brands including RBS, Coutts, Lloyds TSB, Ulster Bank, Isle of Man Bank, Egg. It also administers products underwritten by other underwriters and has partnerships with many well known motor manufacturers such as BMW, Vauxhall, Peugeot.

In 2003, UKI was judged best in "customer service strategy" by Institute of Financial Services (IFS).

References

External links

Insurance companies of the United Kingdom

Brand Partners