Arab nationalism ( ) is a political ideology asserting that Arabs constitute a single nation. As a traditional nationalist ideology, it promotes Arab culture and civilization, celebrates Arab history, glorifies the Arabic language as well as Arabic literature, and calls for the rejuvenation of Arab society through total unification. It bases itself on the premise that the people of the Arab world — from the Atlantic Ocean to the Indian Ocean — constitute one nation bound together by a common identity: ethnicity, language, culture, history, geography, and politics.

One of the primary goals of modern Arab nationalism is ridding the Arab world of influence from the Western world (seen as a "nemesis" of Arab strength), and the removal of those Arab governments that are considered to be dependent upon Western hegemony. This form of the ideology is rooted in the undesirable outcome of the Arab Revolt; in successfully achieving their primary goal of dissolving the Ottoman Empire, the Arab rebels simultaneously enabled the partitioning of their would-be unified Arab state by Western powers. Anti-Western sentiment grew as Arab nationalists centralized themselves around the newfound Palestine cause, promoting the view that Zionism posed an existential threat to the territorial integrity and political  of the entire region, and that the resulting Arab–Israeli conflict was directly linked to Western imperialism due to the Balfour Declaration. Arab unity was considered a necessary instrument to "restoring this lost part" of the nation, which in turn meant eliminating the "relics" of foreign colonialism. Arab nationalism emerged in the 1920s, as the dominant ideological force in the eastern Arab world, commonly referred to as "the mashriq". Its influence steadily expanded over subsequent years. By the 1950s and 1960s, the charismatic Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser championed Arab nationalism, and political parties like the Ba'ath Party and the Movement of Arab Nationalists demonstrated remarkable capabilities for mobilization, organization, and clandestine activities. This ideology seemed to be on the rise across the independent Arab states.

Its influence began to wane in the following decades, with the rise of nation-state nationalism mostly promoted by each Arab state and the emergence of Islamic radicalism filling the perceived void.

However, the ideology as a whole began to decline across the Arab world following the decisive Israeli victory in the  June 1967 war.

Notable personalities and groups that are associated with Arab nationalism include Faisal I of Iraq, Gamal Abdel Nasser, the Arab Nationalist Movement, Michel Aflaq, Muammar Gaddafi, Saddam Hussein, the Palestine Liberation Organization, and the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party.

Ideology

Arab nationalists believe that the Arab nation existed as a historical entity prior to the rise of nationalism in the 19th–20th century. The Arab nation was formed through the gradual establishment of Arabic as the language of communication and with the advent of Islam as a religion and culture in the region. Both Arabic and Islam served as the pillars of the nation. According to writer Youssef M. Choueiri, Arab nationalism represents the "Arabs' consciousness of their specific characteristics as well as their endeavor to build a modern state capable of representing the common will of the nation and all its constituent parts."

Within the Arab nationalist movement are three main ideas: that of the Arab nation; Arab nationalism; and pan-Arab unity. The 1936–1939 Arab revolt in Palestine led to the foundation of the Arab nationalist Ba'ath Party, which asserts that the Arab nation is the group of people who speak Arabic, inhabit the Arab world, and who feel they belong to the same nation. Arab nationalism is the "sum total" of the characteristics and qualities exclusive to the Arab nation, whereas pan-Arab unity is the modern idea that stipulates that the separate Arab countries must unify to form a single state under one political system.

Local patriotism centered on individual Arab countries was incorporated into the framework of Arab nationalism starting in the 1920s. This was done by positioning the Arabian Peninsula as the homeland of the Semitic peoples (the Canaanites and Arameans of the Levant and the Assyrians and Babylonians of Mesopotamia) who migrated throughout the Near East in ancient times or by associating the other pre-Islamic cultures, such as those of Egypt and North Africa and Horn of Africa, into an evolving Arab identity.

The modern Arabic language actually has two distinct words which can be translated into English as "nationalism": qawmiyya قومية, derived from the word qawm (meaning "tribe, ethnic nationality"), and wataniyya وطنية, derived from the word watan (meaning "homeland, native country"). The term qawmiyya means attachment to the Arab nation, while wataniyya means loyalty to a single Arab state. Wataniyya is sometimes disparaged as "regionalism" by those who consider pan-Arabism the only legitimate variant of Arab nationalism.

In the post-World War years, the concept of qawmiyya "gradually assumed a leftist coloration, calling for ... the creation of revolutionary Arab unity." Groups who subscribed to this point of view advocated opposition, violent and non-violent, against Israel and against Arabs who did not subscribe to this point of view. The person most identified with qawmiyya was Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, who used both military and political power to spread his version of pan-Arab ideology throughout the Arab world. While qawmiyya still remains a potent political force today, the death of Nasser and the Arab defeat in the Six-Day War has weakened faith in this ideal. The current dominant ideology among Arab policy makers has shifted to wataniyya.

History

Origins

Throughout the late 19th century, beginning in the 1860s, a sense of loyalty to the "Fatherland" developed in intellectual circles based in the Levant and Egypt, but not necessarily an "Arab Fatherland". It developed from observance of the technological successes of Western Europe which they attributed to the prevailing of patriotism in those countries. During this period, a heavy influx of Christian missionaries and educators from Western countries provided what was termed the "Arab political revival", resulting in the establishment of secret societies within the empire.

The former was also possible with the influence of the intellectual movement produced by the expansion of journalism using a unifying language, with the creation of newspapers in Arabic, as well as the publication of an Arabic dictionary and an encyclopedia during the late 1860s and the early 1870s. This allowed the questioning (albeit limited), of Ottoman power. Accordingly, in the 1860s, literature produced in the Mashriq (the Levant and Mesopotamia) which was under Ottoman control at the time, contained emotional intensity and strongly condemned the Ottoman Turks for "betraying Islam" and the Fatherland to the Christian West. In the view of Arab patriots, Islam had not always been in a "sorry state" and attributed the military triumphs and cultural glories of the Arabs to the advent of the religion, insisting that European modernism itself was of Islamic origin. The Ottomans, on the other hand, had deviated from true Islam and thus suffered decline. The reforming Ottoman and Egyptian governments were blamed for the situation because they attempted to borrow Western practices from the Europeans that were seen as unnatural and corrupt. The Arab patriots' view was that the Islamic governments should revive true Islam that would in turn, pave way for the establishment of constitutional representative government and freedom which, though Islamic in origin, was manifested in the West at the time.

Arabism and regional patriotism (such as in Egypt or in the Levant) mixed and gained predominance over Ottomanism among some Arabs in Syria and Lebanon. Ibrahim al-Yaziji, a Lebanese Christian philosopher, called for the Arabs to "recover their lost ancient vitality and throw off the yoke of the Turks" in 1868. A secret society promoting this goal was formed in the late 1870s, with al-Yazigi as a member. The group placed placards in Beirut calling for a rebellion against the Ottomans. Meanwhile, other Lebanese and Damascus-based notables, mostly Muslims, formed similar secret movements, although they differed as Christian groups who disfavoured Arabism called for a completely independent Lebanon while the Muslim Arab societies generally promoted an autonomous Greater Syria still under Ottoman rule.

As early as 1870, Syrian Christian writer Francis Marrash distinguished the notion of fatherland from that of nation; when applying the latter to Greater Syria, he pointed to the role played by language, besides customs and belief in common interests, in defining national identity. This distinction between fatherland and nation was also made by Hasan al-Marsafi in 1881. By the beginning of the 20th century, groups of Muslim Arabs embraced an Arab nationalist "self-view" that would provide as the basis of the Arab nationalist ideology of the 20th century.

This new version of Arab patriotism was directly influenced by the Islamic modernism and revivalism of Muhammad Abduh, the Egyptian Muslim scholar, and Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Iranian political activist. They both shared their thoughts on reform for Islamic societies by publishing in the journal al-'Urwa al-Wuthqa. Abduh believed the Arabs' Muslim ancestors bestowed "rationality on mankind and created the essentials of modernity," borrowed by the West. Thus, while Europe advanced from adopting the modernist ideals of true Islam, the Muslims failed, corrupting and abandoning true Islam. Al-Afghani blamed a division between Muslims on Europe influence. He thus advocated for pan-Muslim unity as a project to revitalize Islam as a cohesive force against the Western hold, and argued that new interpretations of Islam were needed to confront questions posed by modernity. Their followers would create their own magazines and political parties to develop these ideas. Abduh influenced modern Arab nationalism in particular, because the revival of true Islam's ancestors (who were Arabs) would also become the revival of Arab culture and the restoration of the Arab position as the leaders of the Islamic world. One of Abduh's followers, Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi, openly declared that the Ottoman Empire should be both Turkish and Arab, with the latter exercising religious and cultural leadership.

Rise of modern Arab nationalism
In 1911, Arab intellectuals and politicians from throughout the Levant formed al-Fatat ("the Young Arab Society"), a small Arab nationalist club, in Paris. Its stated aim was "raising the level of the Arab nation to the level of modern nations." In the first few years of its existence, al-Fatat called for greater autonomy within a unified Ottoman state rather than Arab independence from the empire. Al-Fatat hosted the Arab Congress of 1913 in Paris, the purpose of which was to discuss desired reforms with other dissenting individuals from the Arab world. They also requested that Arab conscripts to the Ottoman army not be required to serve in non-Arab regions except in time of war. However, as the Ottoman authorities cracked down on the organization's activities and members, al-Fatat went underground and demanded the complete independence and unity of the Arab provinces.

Nationalist individuals became more prominent during the waning years of Ottoman authority, but the idea of Arab nationalism had virtually no impact on the majority of Arabs as they considered themselves loyal subjects of the Ottoman Empire. The British, for their part, incited the Sharif of Mecca to launch the Arab Revolt during the First World War. The Ottomans were defeated and the rebel forces, loyal to the Sharif's son Faysal ibn al-Husayn entered Damascus in 1918. By now, Faysal along with many Iraqi intellectuals and military officers had joined al-Fatat which would form the backbone of the newly created Arab state that consisted of much of the Levant and the Hejaz.

Damascus became the coordinating center of the Arab nationalist movement as it was seen as the birthplace of the ideology, the seat of Faysal—the first Arab "sovereign" after nearly 400 years of Turkish suzerainty—and because the nationalists of the entire Mashreq region were familiar with it. Nonetheless, Jerusalem, Beirut, and Baghdad remained significant bases of support. Following the creation of Faysal's state, a serious tension within the Arab nationalist movement became visible; the conflict between the ideology's highest ideal of forming a single independent unit comprising all countries that shared the Arabic language and heritage, and the tendency to give precedence to local ambitions.

To further tensions, a rift formed between the older nationalist members of various Syrian urban-class families and the generally younger nationalists who became close to Faysal—his Hejazi troops, Iraqi and Syrian military officers, and Palestinian and Syrian intellectuals. The older guard was mainly represented by Rida Pasha al-Rikabi, who served as Faysal's prime minister, while the younger guard did not have one particular leader. However, the youth within al-Fatat founded the Arab Independence Party ("al-Istiqlal") in February 1919. Its goal was to achieve unity and complete Arab independence. Prominent members included Izzat Darwaza and Shukri al-Quwatli. Centered in Damascus with branches in various cities throughout the Levant, al-Istiqlal received political and financial support from Faysal, but relied on the inner circle of al-Fatat to survive.

During the war, Britain had been a major sponsor of Arab nationalist thought and ideology, primarily as a weapon to use against the power of the Ottoman Empire. Although the Arab forces were promised a state that included much of the Arabian Peninsula and the Fertile Crescent the secret Sykes–Picot Agreement between Britain and France provided for the territorial division of much of that region between the two imperial powers. During the inter-war years and the British Mandate period, when Arab lands were under French and British control, Arab nationalism became an important anti-imperial opposition movement against European rule.

Growth of the movement

A number of Arab revolts against the European powers took place following the establishment of the British and French mandates. Resentment of British rule culminated in the Iraqi revolt of 1920. The uprising which was carried out by the urban population as well as the rural tribes of Iraq ended in 1921. The British drastically changed their policy in Iraq afterwards. Although the mandate was still in place officially, the British role was virtually reduced to an advisory one. In 1925, the Druze of southern Syria under the leadership of Sultan al-Atrash revolted against French rule. The revolt subsequently spread throughout Syria, particularly in Damascus where an uprising by the citizens took place. The French responded by systematically bombarding the city, resulting in thousands of deaths. The revolt was put down by the end of the year, but it is credited with forcing the French to take more steps to ensure Syrian independence. In Egypt, resentment of British hegemony led to wide-scale revolts across the country in 1919. As a result of three-year negotiations following the uprising, the British agreed to allow Egypt's official independence in 1922, but their military still held great influence in the country. The political leaders of the Egyptian revolution espoused Egyptian nationalism, rather than an Arab nationalist alternative.

The relative independence of Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and North Yemen encouraged Arab nationalists to put forward programs of action against colonial powers in the region. According to historian Youssef Choueiri, the "first public glimmerings" of a pan-Arab approach occurred in 1931, during the convention of a pan-Islamic conference in Jerusalem which highlighted Muslim fears of the increasing growth of Zionism in Palestine. Arab delegates held a separate conference and for the first time delegates from North Africa, Egypt, the Arabian Peninsula and the Fertile Crescent convened together to discuss Arab matters. A pan-Arabist covenant was proclaimed centering on three main articles:

The Arab countries form an integral and indivisible whole. Hence the Arab nation does not accept or recognize the divisions of whatever nature to which it has been subjected.
All efforts in every Arab country are to be directed towards the achievement of total independence within one single unity. Every endeavor which confines political activities to local or regional issues is to be fought against.
Since colonialism is, in all its forms and manifestations, incompatible with the dignity and paramount aims of the Arab nation, the Arab nation rejects it and will resist it with all the means at its disposal.
The Association of Algerian Muslim Ulama founded in 1931 was a major Islamist and Arab nationalist movement in French Algeria. Its motto was "Islam is our religion, Algeria is our homeland, Arabic is our language", and it emphasized on the Arab-Islamic national identity of Algeria, becoming the strongest defender of Arab and Muslim culture and a major provider of education in Arabic. Its founder Abdelhamid ibn Badis identified Islam, Arabism, and nationalism as the three main components of the Algerian national character distinct from France, while his fellow 'alim Ahmad Tawfiq al-Madani (1889–1983) wrote extensive historical writings in Arabic celebrating the Muslim and Arab ancestors of Algeria. The association also attracted Algerian public attention to what was happening in Mandatory Palestine, describing the events in Palestine in 1936 as an "insult to all Muslim countries and a degradation of Arabism" and events in 1947 as "test set up by God in order to examine the Muslims and the Arabs' faith". It also stressed the view that Palestine belongs to all Arabs and not only to Palestinians. In 1955, it joined the Arab nationalist National Liberation Front's insurgency against France in the Algerian War.

Plans for a near-future conference were made, but never came into play due to Faysal's death in 1933 (delegates chose Faysal of Iraq to be their patron and he agreed to provide moral and material support for the movement) and fierce British opposition. However, the Arab Independence Party was formed by Palestinian and Iraqi activists from al-Fatat as a direct result of the Jerusalem conference on 13 August 1932. Most of the AIP's activities were centered in the Palestinian political field, but the party also worked towards achieving Arab unity and solidarity as a means to strengthen Arab resistance against the British Mandate in Palestine and increased Jewish settlement occurring there. In August 1933, the League of Nationalist Action (LNA) was founded in Lebanon by Western-educated professional civil service groups with the aims of creating a common Arab market and industrial base as well as the abolishment of customs barriers between the Arab countries. By proposing agrarian reforms to limit the power of landowners, abolishing what they considered "feudalism" and promoting the growth of an industry, the LNA sought to undermine the absentee landlords in the Levant who tended to encourage local nationalism and were open to working with European authorities or Jewish land purchasers. The LNA enjoyed a level of popularity throughout the 1930s, but did not survive into the 1940s.

Following the killing of the Syrian Arab guerrilla leader Izz ad-Din al-Qassam by British forces in Ya'bad, Arab-Jewish tensions in Palestine reached a climax. Anti-Zionist sentiments reached a boiling point on 15 April 1936, when an armed group of Arabs killed a Jewish civilian after intercepting his car near the village of Bal'a. After Jews retaliated by killing two Arab farmers near Jaffa, this sparked an Arab revolt in Palestine. The AIP along with Palestinian notables selected popular leader and Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Amin al-Husseini to lead the uprising. The Arab Higher Committee (AHC), a national committee bringing together Arab factions in Palestine, was established to coordinate the uprising. To protest increased Jewish immigration, a general strike was declared and a political, economic, and social boycott of Jews soon ensued.

The events in Palestine followed similar anti-colonial activities in Egypt, Syria and Algeria which helped inspire the uprising. In Egypt, week-long anti-British demonstrations had eventually resulted in the restoration of the Egyptian constitution while in Syria, a general strike held in January–February 1936 led to major negotiations for an independence deal with the French government. The British took a firm stance against the nationalist revolt in Palestine, dissolving the AHC forcing al-Husayni into exile in Lebanon in 1937. In Algeria, hostility towards the Jewish community saw an attack in Constantine in the summer of 1934 in which a number of Jews were killed, in response to the events in Palestine. Al-Husayni, who leaned more towards Palestinian nationalism, was instrumental in organizing the pan-Arab Bloudan Conference on 9 September 1937 in Syria which gathered 524 delegates from across the Arab world, although al-Husayni himself was not in attendance. According to author Adeeb Dawisha, although the uprising had been quelled by 1939, it greatly "contributed to the growth of Arab nationalist sentiment" and began the development of "solidarity" between Arab governments.

Meanwhile, a clandestine Arab nationalist society was formed in Iraq in 1938 which came to be known as Arab Nationalist Party (ANP). The ANP typically confined itself to influencing events and leaders in Iraq rather than taking the lead of a mass nationalist movement. King Ghazi of Iraq was one such leader. Ghazi intended to build a strong Iraqi army and actively sought to annex Kuwait. Many Arab nationalist politicians from Kuwait, who favored independence particularly after the discovery of oil there in 1938, were provided safe haven in Iraq after being repressed by the quasi-rulers of the sheikhdom, the al-Sabah family (Kuwait was still a British territory at the time.) Ghazi died in a car accident in 1939, prompting a number of his army officers to allege the king was assassinated by British forces. That same year, al-Husayni arrived in Baghdad after escaping from Lebanon, giving a morale boost to the pan-Arab dimension in Iraqi politics. The prime minister at the time, Nuri al-Said and the regent king 'Abd al-Ilah, did not harbor the pan-Arabist sympathies Ghazi espoused.

Rashid Ali al-Gaylani succeeded al-Said as Prime Minister in March 1940 and took a neutral position regarding World War II, opening dialogue with the German government which was at war with Britain. Under great pressure from the latter, al-Gaylani resigned on 31 January 1941 and al-Said took his place. The perceived British interjection in Iraq's internal affairs angered Arab nationalist officers in the army, leading a group of them to overthrow the government in April and install al-Gaylani as Prime Minister. To counter a British military response to the coup, al-Gaylani enlisted the support of Germany, but the German military did not arrive to aid the Arab nationalist government. With pro-German Vichy France having taken control of neighboring Syria, Britain reoccupied Iraq in May to prevent it from joining the Axis powers. By 1 June, al-Gaylani and al-Husayni fled to the country for Germany, while the army officers who carried out the coup were captured and executed.

Al-Husayni became increasingly acquainted with Adolf Hitler, the Nazi leader of Germany, and other Nazi officials and attempted to coordinate Nazi and Arab policies to solve what he believed was the "Jewish problem" in Palestine. In one of the mufti's speeches he asked Arabs to unite and "kill the Jews wherever you find them." Throughout World War II, the Nazi government, seeking to take advantage of widespread anti-imperialist feelings in the Middle East, had broadcast anti-Semitic messages tailored to Arabic-speaking Muslims in the Middle East via radio.

The conflict in Iraq provoked anger and frustration throughout the Arab world and the British acknowledged the rapid growth of Arab nationalist feeling among the Arab population, large segments of which saw the events in Iraq as a valiant struggle against imperialism. British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, officially stated Britain's support of strong pan-Arab ties in a bid to ease anti-British sentiments in the region. The events of the region influenced the creation of the Arab Union Club in Egypt in 1942 which called for developing stronger ties between Egypt and the Arab world. Branches were subsequently opened in Baghdad, Beirut, Jaffa and Damascus, and Egyptian Prime Minister Mostafa El-Nahas adopted its platform, pledging to help protect "the interests and rights" of the "sister Arab nations" and explore the "question of Arab unity."

Establishment of the Arab League
Rivalry for the leadership of the Arab world developed mostly between the political establishments of Iraq and Egypt in the period following the failure of Rashid Ali coup. Eden's stated support for increased Arab ties encouraged Nuri al-Said of Iraq to propose his own plan for Arab unity in January 1943, dubbed the "Fertile Crescent Union." The plan recognized the linguistic, cultural and economic ties between the states of the Fertile Crescent region as well as the differences between their inhabitants. It sought to unify those states in a stage-based process whereby the initial stage would see Syria, Transjordan, Palestine and Lebanon unite with limited autonomy given to the Jews in Palestine and special rights for the Christians in Lebanon. Afterward the Levantine state and Iraq would form an "Arab League," to which other Arab states could join, that would oversee matters of defense, foreign policy, customs, currency and the safeguarding of minorities. The proposal reflected a combination of factors, namely the expansionist ambitions of the Hashemites, the attempt by Iraq's political establishment to secure the mantle of Arab leadership in their rivalry with Egypt and a genuine embrace of Arab identity by Iraq's leaders.

The Egyptian government of Nahas Pasha launched a rival initiative for establishing closer inter-Arab relations, and sent delegations to several Arab states. Influential Arab nationalist figures in the country sought to emphasize Egypt's Arab character, the most of prominent of them, Abdul Rahman al-Azzam, even writing "Egypt was an Arab country before Christ." The apparent Egyptian embrace of Arabism was met with general Arab excitement at the popular level and Pasha's efforts gained more traction among the various Arab governments than al-Said's Fertile Crescent proposal. Reasons for this ranged from the antipathy of the Saudi royal family and the Damascus political establishment to the leadership ambitions of the rival Hashemite family to the belief by Lebanon's Maronite Christian community that Egypt's plan would not require conceding future independence. Between 25 September-8 October 1944, the leaders of Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Transjordan, Yemen and the Palestinian Arab community convened in Alexandria, Egypt in a meeting hosted by the Egyptian government which ended with an agreement known as the "Alexandria Protocol."

Peak under Egyptian leadership

After the Second World War, Gamal Abdel Nasser, the leader of Egypt, was a significant player in the rise of Arab nationalism. Opposed to the British control of the Suez Canal Zone and concerned at Egypt becoming a Cold War battleground Nasser pushed for a collective Arab security pact within the framework of the Arab League. A key aspect of this was the need for economic aid that was not dependent on peace with Israel and the establishment of U.S. or British military bases within Arab countries. Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal and directly challenged the dominance of the Western powers in the region. At the same time he opened Egypt up as a Cold War zone by receiving aid and arms shipments from the Soviet bloc countries that were not dependent on treaties, bases and peace accords. However, because of the connotations for Cold War dominance of the region, Egypt also received aid from the US, who sought to promote the emerging Arab nationalism as a barrier to communism.

Gamal Abdel Nasser was a major supporter of the Algerian independence movement, whose mixture of Arab nationalism and revolution appealed to the Arabs in North Africa. He provided financial, diplomatic and military support to the National Liberation Front, and based the Algerian provisional government in Cairo. This played a major role in France's decision to wage war against him during the 1956 Suez Crisis. Albert Camus argued that Algerian nationalism was closely tied to Nasserism and Pan-Arabism in an essay titled 'Algeria 1958'. Algerian president Houari Boumédiène, who pursued Arab socialist and Pan-Arabist policies, drafted a new Algerian constitution in 1976 which declared "the unity of the Arab people is written in the community of the destinies of these people. When there will be the conditions for a unity based on the liberation of the popular masses, Algeria will engage itself in the promotion of the formulas of union, integration or fusion that may fully respond to the legitimate and deep aspirations of the Arab people". Like his predecessor Ahmed Ben Bella, he imposed Arab socialism as the state ideology and declared Islam the state religion, however he was more assertive than Ben Bella in carrying out Arabization to reverse French colonization, especially between 1970 and 1977.

The question of Palestine and opposition to Zionism became a rallying point for Arab nationalism from both a religious perspective and a military perspective. The fact that the Zionists were Jewish promoted a religious flavor to the xenophobic rhetoric and strengthened Islam as a defining feature of Arab nationalism. The humiliating defeat in the 1948 Arab–Israeli War strengthened the Arabs' resolve to unite in favor of a pan-Arab nationalist ideal. With the advent of Palestinian nationalism, a debate circled between those who believed that pan-Arab unity would bring about destruction of Israel (the view advocated by the Arab Nationalist Movement) or whether the destruction of Israel would bring about pan-Arab unity (the view advocated by Fatah).

Pan-Arabism was initially a secular movement. Arab nationalists generally rejected religion as a main element in political identity, and promoted the unity of Arabs regardless of sectarian identity. However, the fact that most Arabs were Muslims was used by some as an important building block in creating a new Arab national identity. An example of this was Michel Aflaq, founder along with Salah al-Din al-Bitar and Zaki al-Arsuzi of the Ba'ath Party in Syria in the 1940s. Aflaq, though himself a Christian, viewed Islam as a testament to the "Arab genius", and once said "Muhammed was the epitome of all the Arabs. So let all the Arabs today be Muhammed." Since the Arabs had reached their greatest glories through the expansion of Islam, Islam was seen as a universal message as well as an expression of secular genius on the part of the Arab peoples. Islam had given the Arabs a "glorious past", which was very different from the "shameful present". In effect, the troubles of the Arab presence were because the Arabs had diverged from their "eternal and perfect symbol", Islam. The Arabs needed to have a "resurrection" (ba'ath in Arabic). After the Ba'athist military coups in Iraq and Syria in the 1960s, the Ba'athists "contributed very little to the development of all-Arab nationalism, which was its original raison d'etre."

Another example of the occasional mingled of Arab nationalism and Islamic revivalist sentiment was from  Hasan al-Banna, the founder of the earliest and largest revivalist organization, the Muslim Brotherhood.  While in theory Islamic revivalists (for example Sayyid Qutb) were implacably opposed to nationalism as a European pollution intended to weaken Islamic unity, al-Banna "had regarded the transfer of power to non-Arabs after the first four 'Rightfully Guided' caliphs as the true reason for the decline of Islam."

Meanwhile, King Faisal of Saudi Arabia sought to counter the influences of Arab nationalism and communism in the region by promoting pan-Islamism as an alternative. He called for the establishment of the Muslim World League, visiting several Muslim countries to advocate the idea. He also engaged in a propaganda and media war with Nasser.

Women and nationalism
Women were active participants in the nationalist mobilizations. Arab nationalism became an opportunity for women to appear in public spaces –which were traditionally reserved for men, not only as protesters but also as founders of their own unions and organizations. One example is Hoda Sha'rawi, who marched with other women during the 1919 revolution against the British and would then create the Egyptian Feminist Union. (Male) Islamic modernists Muhammad Abduh and Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, along with Egyptian judge and intellectual Qasim Amine, are considered precursors of women's ideological discussion due to their reflections on the role of women in Islamic reforms. However, women themselves also contributed to the intellectual foundations of the ideology by publishing articles where they made demands, such as the expansion of education, in journals dedicated to Arab history and culture. Hind Nawfal established the first Arab women's magazine, Al-Fatat, in Egypt. This title became the foremother of a subsequent group of publications that came to be known as women's journals.

In this context, it has been argued that women's participation was used as an ideological instrument by Arab nationalism. They were considered "bearers of the nation", because they not only had the biological capability to give birth to future generations, but their own preparation signified a better education for their children. The former was a consequence of the creation of a "maternalist frame" for national and historical symbols, which women themselves adopted to construct their activism. Nermin Allam proposes the term "domestication of female public bravery" to refer to how women's participation has been reduced in the imaginary of the struggle to constrain their questioning of hierarchies.

Women were important to the movement in relation to the family unit. But women's presence in the nationalist pursuit was crucial considering that "building a nation-state required the mobilization of the entire population, both male and female". The former can also be seen in Palestine, where women partaken in a demonstration in opposition to the heavy flow of Zionist immigrants in 1921, or with their gradual participation in Algeria's War of Independence as nurses, cooks, and even carrying bombs. In July 1957, Djamila Bouhired was tried for allegedly bombing a cafe, which killed 11 civilians inside. Moreover, female political involvement has been considered by several authors as a necessary dimension of Arab nationalism, because it is, in essence, a "gendered discourse". The community that was imagined by nationalist groups was largely dependent on the status they assigned to women: modernist nationalists considered their inclusion in the public space as a necessary measure to achieve modernity, while conservative nationalists would vindicate their traditional roles as symbols of Islamic culture.

To modernists between the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth, the status of women in Arab society was seen as a symptom of backwardness. Consequently, the reinterpretation of Islamic texts proposed with the revival of Arab culture also included the women question. This was possible before nationalism became directly opposed to the European model. In this sense, the connection of the "ideal Arab woman" to the conceptions of modernity made women "markers of cultural borders". Consistent with this logic would be the discussion on the unveiling of women, which came to be used as a symbol of progress in the early twentieth century by Egypt. Additionally, Tunisian women protested its usage for the first time during the 1920s and the 1930s. However, this image "...was not much different from that of a tractor, an industrial complex, or a new railroad in symbolizing the modern, the development, the progress"; its value was not related to any notion of emancipation.

The women question became more complex to deal with once the requirement of women's political involvement needed to coexist with the continuity of tradition. When Arab nationalism directly challenged Western cultural influence, women's compliance with Arab values was key to distinguish themselves from Europe, or not to become Western-like. The former can be exemplified by how the use of the veil was reintroduced as a nationalist symbol during the Algerian War of Independence, in response to the strong French campaign against its use during the 1930s. Some authors argue there is a link between opposition to Westernization and the strengthening of domestic roles to protect Arab identity. Nadje Al-Ali and Beth Baron call this a process of gendering of nationalism, where the Arab nationalist discourse replicated the most conservative conceptions of womanhood. Following this logic, the laws that regulated the private sphere became stricter, or tightened. Conversely, this assertion has been nuanced by Deniz Kandiyoti, under the argument that the relationship between Islam and women's rights is "politically convergent" and should not be generalized nor simplified without a proper study of each case.

Because of this, the expansion of women's political and economic rights was achieved under nationalist regimes, but it was deficient when it came to questioning their domestic limitations, such as polygamy, divorce, and the minimum age for marriage. In Egypt, the 1956 Constitution granted women the right to vote for the first time in history, as well as their right to education and employment. Nasser also guaranteed economic rights to the working class and the peasantry regardless of gender. The Algerian constitution also acknowledged equal rights to all citizens, but until 1984 no changes were made in personal status codes, and social attitudes toward women receiving education beyond the primary level or going to work were restrictive. Associated is the phenomenon of state-feminism, which refers to the state's co-option of women's agenda to gain political legitimacy and constrict female mobilization. This was a strategy used by Nasser, who banned the creation of autonomous organizations and formulated women's demands as social welfare issues, leading to a recession of Egyptian feminist activism.

Decline
After the defeat of the Arab coalition by Israel during the 1967 Six-Day War—which the reigning Arab nationalist leader Nasser had dubbed al-Ma'raka al-Masiriya, (the battle of destiny)—the Arab nationalist movement is said to have suffered an "irreversible" slide towards "political marginality".

From the mid-1960s onward, the movement was further weakened by factional splits and ideological infighting. The formerly pro-Nasser Arab Nationalist Movement, publicly abandoned Nasserism in favor of Marxism–Leninism and fell apart soon after. In 1966, the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party split into rival factions based in Baghdad and Damascus, respectively.

The historian Adeed Dawisha observes the decline in popularity was, in part, due to the elimination of many of the political factors that stoked nationalist passion in the Arab world during the 1950s and early 1960s.

Other factors given for the decline include:
regional attachments such as Iraqi president Abd al-Karim Qasim's "Iraq first" policy;
attachments to tribes and "deeply-ingrained tribal values";
suspicion of Arab unity by minority groups such as Kurds in Iraq who were non-Arab, or Shia Arabs in Iraq who feared Arab nationalism was actually "a Sunni project" to establish "Sunni hegemony";
the Islamic revival, which grew as Arab nationalism declined, and whose Islamist adherents were very hostile towards nationalism in general, believing it had no place in Islam;
lack of interest by the movement in pluralism, separation of powers, freedom of political expression and other democratic concepts which might have "resuscitated" the ideology in its moment of weakness.

In the 21st century, following the Arab Spring, support for Arab and even most local nationalist movements declined further. Dawisha states the "irrelevance of secular nationalism to the concerns of the twenty-first century paved the way for increasingly violent competition between the state and political Islam for the loyalty, as well as for the hearts and minds of the Arab citizen", observing Arab nationalism has no role in this struggle.

Attempts at unity

In the 1940s, rulers such as Abdullah I of Jordan and Nuri al-Said of Iraq sought to create an expanded Arab empire constructed out of the smaller nation-states that had been created in the mandate period. Abdullah's dream was to be king of a Greater Syria while as-Said's dream was for a Fertile Crescent Federation. These aspirations, however, were unpopular and met with suspicion in the countries they sought to conquer. The creation of the Arab League and its insistence on the territorial integrity and respect for sovereignty of each member state, the assassination of Abdullah, and the 14 July Revolution weakened the political feasibility of these ideas.

During much of the 20th century, the rivalry between Syria and Nasser in Egypt for who would lead the union undermined the effort of forming a united Arab state. In 1958, Egypt and Syria temporarily joined to create the United Arab Republic. It was accompanied by attempts to include Iraq and North Yemen in the union. This very exercise, while fostering Egypt's position at the centre of Arab politics, led to the weakening of Syria.

With the 14 July Revolution taking place in Iraq the same year, Western powers feared the fallouts of a powerful Arab nationalism in the region. Foreign powers were not only concerned about the possible spread of such revolutionary movements in other Arab states, but also worried about losing the control and monopoly over the region's natural oil resources. However, due to discontent over the hegemony of Egypt and after a coup in Syria that introduced a more radical government to power, the United Arab Republic collapsed in 1961. The term United Arab Republic continued to be used in Egypt until 1971, after the death of Nasser.

Another unsuccessful attempt at union occurred in 1963. That year the Arab nationalist Ba'ath Party came to power in Syria and Iraq and talks were held on uniting the two countries with Egypt. On 17 April an agreement to unite the countries was signed, but Ba'ath leaders complained of what they considered Egyptian president Nasser's "patronizing, bullying tone" and his insistence on a single centralized party structure under his leadership. In Syria, pro-Nasserists were purged from the Syrian military and cabinet. In response, large pro-Nasser riots erupted in Damascus and Aleppo but were crushed with 50 rioters killed. A pro-Nasser coup attempt on 18 July 1963 in Syria also ended unsuccessfully. Hundreds of people killed or wounded in an attempt to take over the Damascus radio station and army headquarters, and 27 rebel officers were summarily executed. Nasser then formally withdrew from the union agreement, denouncing the Syrian Ba'athists as "fascists and murderers".

In 1964, Egypt, Iraq and North Yemen formed a Unified Political Command in order to prepare the gradual merger in a new United Arab Republic, however, both projects failed in 1966 and 1967. In 1971 and 1972 Muammar Gaddafi attempted to unite Libya, Egypt, Sudan and Syria to form the Federation of Arab Republics. This loose union lasted until 1977 when it split due to political and territorial disputes between the republics' leadership. In 1974, Muammar Gaddafi and Habib Bourguiba attempted their two nations of Libya and Tunisia to form the Arab Islamic Republic. The plan was rejected by Bourgiba due to his realization of unity of the Maghreb states. This would later become the Arab Maghreb Union.

In October 1978, Iraqi President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr began working closely with Syrian President Hafez al-Assad to foil the Camp David Accords. They signed a charter in Baghdad for Joint National Action which provided for the "closest form of unity ties" including "complete military unity" as well as "economic, political and cultural unification". An agreement to unify the two states was to come into effect in July 1979. However, Iraqi Vice President Saddam Hussein was fearful of losing his power to Assad (who was supposed to become the deputy leader in the new union) and forced al-Bakr into retirement under threat of violence. Although unity talks did continue between Assad and Saddam after July 1979, but Assad rejected Iraqi demands for a full merger between the two states and for the immediate deployment of Iraqi troops into Syria. Instead Assad, perhaps fearful of Iraqi domination and a new war with Israel, advocated a step-by-step approach. The unity talks were eventually suspended indefinitely after an alleged discovery of a Syrian plot to overthrow Saddam Hussein in November 1979.

Notable Arab nationalists

Michel Aflaq
Hussein bin Ali, King of Hejaz
George Antonius
Yasser Arafat
Abdul Rahman Arif
Abdul Salam Arif
Zaki al-Arsuzi
Hafez al-Assad
Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr
Ahmed Ben Bella
Salah al-Din al-Bitar
Izzat Darwaza
Faisal I of Iraq
Muammar Gaddafi
Rashid Ali al-Gaylani
Ghazi of Iraq
George Habash
Sati' al-Husri
Saddam Hussein
Amin al-Husseini
Salah Jadid
Kamal Jumblatt
Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi
Gamal Abdel Nasser
Jaafar Nimeiry
Adnan Pachachi
Samih al-Qasim
Shukri al-Quwatli
Ameen Rihani
Hamdeen Sabahi
Jurji Zaydan
Constantin Zureiq

See also

Arab socialism
Ba'athism
Iraqi nationalism
Jordanian nationalism
Lebanese nationalism
Libyan nationalism
Nasserism
Palestinian nationalism
Syrian nationalism
Tunisian nationalism

References

Bibliography
Abu-'Uksa, Wael (2016). Freedom in the Arab World: Concepts and Ideologies in Arabic Thought in the Nineteenth Century. Cambridge University Press.

Hiro, Dilip.  "Arab nationalism." Dictionary of the Middle East. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996. pp. 24–25.

Karsh, Efraim.  Arafat's War: The Man and His Battle for Israeli Conquest.  New York: Grove Press, 2003.
Karsh, Efraim. Islamic Imperialism: A History.  New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006.
Sela, Avraham.  "Arab Nationalism."  The Continuum Political Encyclopedia of the Middle East. Ed. Sela. New York: Continuum, 2002.  pp. 151–155

External links
"Islamic critique of Arab Nationalism" by Muhammad Yahya, Al-Tawhid, Vol III, No. 2, 1986.
"Arab Nationalism: Mistaken Identity" by Martin Kramer, Daedalus, Summer 1993, pp. 171–206.
"Requiem for Arab Nationalism" by Adeed Dawisha, Middle East Quarterly, Winter 2003, pp. 25–41.
"The Rise of Arab Nationalism in the Sudan" by Mohamed Hassan Fadlalla, Codex Online S.A.

Arab League

Arab nationalism


The Qods Mohajer (, "Immigrant"; loanword is Arabic for "holy migrant" or "sacred migrant") is an Iranian single-engine tactical unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) built by the Qods Aviation Industry Company in four main variants from the 1980s to the present day. The Mohajer family is primarily used for reconnaissance, and is among the most mature and well-known Iranian UAVs.

The Mohajer-1 was used during the Iran–Iraq War for battlefield surveillance. The Mohajer-2 was developed in the 1990s with improved avionics and range, and remains in service today. The Mohajer-4 is another evolutionary improvement with again improved range, endurance, and surveillance. The last major variant, the Mohajer-6 (UAV), is an unmanned combat aerial vehicle that carries two munitions.

The Mohajer is used by both the Iranian Army and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). It has been exported to Iranian allies in the Middle East and has been used in the Syrian and Iraqi civil wars. In addition, the Mohajer-2 is license-built in Venezuela as the Arpia.

Mohajer-1

The Mohajer was Iran's first drone to enter series production and was used during the Iran–Iraq War. The Mohajer-1 was known simply as "Mohajer" through the 80s and 90s, when it was re-designated "Mohajer-1" as other Mohajer variants had been developed.

Design

The Mohajer-1 had a narrow cylindrical fuselage, twin tailbooms, and straight wings mounted high and to the rear of the body. It had a single engine (unknown model) in a pusher configuration, and was guided by ailerons on the wings, an elevator on the horizontal stabilizer, and rudders on the tailbooms. The Mohajer-1 had three fixed landing gear for launch and recovery. It could also be recovered by parachute. The Mohajer-1 was about 8 feet long and had a wingspan of about 10 feet.

The Mohajer-1 carried a single still camera, probably carrying photographic film developed after the drone landed. It was controlled by hobby-class radio, which was easily jammed. In addition, Iran attempted to arm it with six RPG-7 rockets, three under each wing, though this was not very successful.

Performance
The Mohajer-1's range is not definitively known, but was severely limited by the hobbyist radio link and lack of an autopilot system, which meant that the aircraft could only surveil Iraqi positions when operated from the Iranian front lines. One source suggests the Mohajer-1 was only able to penetrate 3 km into Iraqi lines. On the other hand, another source says the Mohajer-1 had a range of 50 km, and still another source lists a range of 30 km; this may reflect a difference between the aircraft's theoretical range and its real-world performance. There are no details on the Mohajer-1's airspeed, endurance, or ceiling.

Operational history

Qods Aviation was formed in 1985 and four Mohajer-1s were built that year. The Mohajer-1 was operated by the IRGC's Raad Brigade and was used to correct artillery fire and photograph enemy positions. The Mohajer-1's first known use was in Operation Dawn 8 in 1986. It was also used Karbala 5 in 1987. Mohajer UAVs photographed Iraqi lines until the end of the war and completed 619 sorties by the war's end, taking 53,772 photographs in total. The Mohajer-1 is out of service today.

Though the Mohjajer-1 is primitive by today's standards and was essentially a hobbyist-class drone, the Iranians were satisfied with its performance, as it was one of only two Iranian surveillance assets in the war, along with RF-4s.

Mohajer-2
Following the successful use of the Mohajer-1, Iran wanted a version with more range and endurance. This version, which would later be named the Mohajer-2, also had an auto pilot system to fly beyond the line-of-control of its command center. The Mohajer-2 was developed in the 1990s and first seen in 1996. It was designed for surveillance use and  more than 200 Mohajer-2s had been built.

Design

The Mohajer-2 has a bullet-shaped fuselage, mid-mounted, untapered wings, twin tailbooms, twin rudders, belly skids, and a horizontal tail. The belly skids are non-retractable, but can compress on landing to reduce shock. Apart from the skids, it is essentially a refinement of the Mohajer-1 design. Its airframe is composed substantially of composite materials. The Mohajer-2 is 2.91m long and has a wingspan of 3.8 meters. It is powered by a 25 hp WAE-342 two-cylinder engine.

The Mohajer-2 has an autopilot system, which is able to maintain airspeed, altitude, and stability in flight. The autopilot system can control the aircraft's course via waypoints, or it can be controlled in real time from a ground control station. Like other Iranian drones, the Mohajer-2 lacks over-the-horizon guidance. The Mohajer-2 has a still or video (color or monochrome) camera, either fixed downwards for aerial surveying or mounted on a gimbal for surveillance. In addition, it has a fixed forwards-facing camera for navigation. There is no evidence the Mohajer-2 has been fitted with an infrared camera. It has an onboard digital processor and can downlink sensor imagery. The Mohajer-2 has two stub antenna in the under 10 GHz range, one on each wing, for real-time control. Prototype Mohajer-2s were fitted with two rocket pods for 12 RPG-7 rockets, similar to the Mohajer-1's, but this model did not enter production. The Mohajer-2 has a GPS guidance system.

The Mohajer-2 is launched from a PL3 pneumatic catapult, which can be truck-mounted, wheeled, or ship-mounted. It can also be launched from a JATO platform, though this is uncommon. It is recovered by skid landing or parachute.

Performance
Has an endurance of 1.5 hours and range of 50 km. The Mohajer-2 is about ten feet long and has a wingspan of about 12 feet. The tail wingspan is exactly 3 ft.

Operational history
During the 1990s Afghan civil war, Mohajer drones reportedly monitored the situation. A Mohajer (unknown variant) may have been shot down over Iraq on 19 April 2001. The Mohajer-2 is also known to be operated by Hezbollah. There are also inconclusive reports Mohajer-2s have been used over Syria.

In addition to its military use, the Mohajer-2 can also be used for weather reporting.

It is possible, but unconfirmed, that the Raad-85 is a variant of the Mohajer-2.

Arpia

In 2007, Venezuela signed an agreement with Iran to assemble 12 Mohajer-2 UAVs from knock-down kits supplied by Quds. Venezuelan state-owned defense contractor CAVIM began assembling the drones by 2009. US satellite imagery revealed the facility manufacturing the drones in 2010, and they were unveiled to the public as the CAVIM Arpia in 2012. Venezuela signed a $28 million contract to manufacture the UAVs, though it is unclear why, because this far exceeds the drones' value.

Mohajer-2N

In 2014, Iran introduced the Mohajer-2N, which shares the same design as the Mohajer-2 but has far improved performance. The Mohajer-2N replaces the electronics of the Mohajer-2 with more modern versions and has also has improved flight characteristics. The Mohajer-2N has a range of 150 km and flight endurance of 6 hours. It is believed this is accomplished through fuel tanks in the wings combined with weight savings elsewhere. Cruise speed is 180 km/h. Body material is composite. The Mohajer-2N is also capable of transmitting imagery in real time. Like most Mohajer-2s, the Mohajer-2N has two cameras; one under the nose for navigation, and a second on a gimbal under the body for surveillance.

Visually, the Mohajer-2N is nearly identical to the Mohajer-2. It is mainly "distinguished" by being 1 cm longer, having a wingspan 2 cm wider, and being five kg heavier. It can be fitted with the Mohajer-2's landing skids or with wheeled landing gear. The Mohajer-2N is recovered by skid landing or parachute.

Mohajer-3
The Mohajer-3, also known as the Dorna, was designed with a new airframe for better performance. It had a square body and featured a low-mounted horizontal stabilizer flush with the main wing, the only member of the Mohajer family configured this way. The Mohajer-3 could be fitted with fixed landing gear, for a runway takeoff, or with skids for a JATO launch. It was recovered by parachute or skid landing. It was powered by an unidentified 25 hp (18.6 kW) piston engine. The Mohajer-3 was announced in 1999.

The Mohajer-3 had a color/monochrome still or video camera, and was able to send images in real time. and  It had a range of 100 km, an endurance of 2–3 hours, and a cruise speed of 180 km/h. It did not have GPS guidance.

It was developed contemporaneously with the Mohajer-4 and did not enter service.

Mohajer-4

The Mohajer-4 was designed for both the Iranian Army and the IRGC and entered service in late 1997. It may have entered mass production in 1999. It was first documented in 2003. Sources differ slightly on how many have been built; one sources says that 40 have been built as of 2006, while another says that as of the mid-2000s, 34 had been built.

Design
The Mohajer-4 features a squarish body and low-mounted trapezoidal wings with upward-canted wingtips to lessen drag. It is powered by a two-bladed Limbach L550E four-cylinder, two-stroke 50 hp engine in a pusher configuration. The Mohajer-4 is constructed of composite material. It is 3.64 m long and has a wingspan of 5.3 m. The Mohajer-4 has a modular design, and components such as the body, wings, and tailbooms can be detached and recombined.

It has three landing skids. The Mohajer-4 can land via landing gear or a parachute.

The Mohajer-4 has a Hyarat 3 guidance and control system, which includes GPS navigation. It normally follows a preprogrammed flight path, but its mission profile can also be updated in flight via radio uplink. The Mohajer-4 has a fixed forward-facing camera for navigation and either a downward-facing camera for aerial surveying or a gimbal-mounted video camera for surveillance. Sources disagree on whether the Mojajer-4 can carry an infrared camera. Like the Mohajer-2, it has an onboard digital processor and can downlink sensor imagery. The Mohajer-4 is also reportedly capable of being fitted for communications relay and has an 'impressive' electronic warfare capability.

Performance

Operational range is increased to 150 km, altitude to 18000 feet and endurance to 7 hours. With a MTOW of 175 kg, the Mohajer-4 is almost double the weight of older versions.

The Mohajer-4 and 4B are operated by a crew of 5-7 men, including two operators. One operator controls the UAV's camera and the ground control station's directional antenna for real time video transfer. The other operator controls the UAV's flight using a software program called FliteMap, which is COTS American software.

In common with other Qods Aviation products, the Mohajer-4 can be ineffectively armed with unguided rockets, in this case a total of two Hydra 70 rockets under the wings.

Operational history

On November 7, 2004, Hezbollah flew a UAV over northern Israel for about 5 minutes.  The UAV entered Israeli airspace at more than 100 knots and an altitude of about 1,000 feet, flew briefly over the seaside city of Nahariya, and fell into the sea. Some sources have identified the UAV as a Mohajer-4. There are reports that Iran sold eight Mohajer-4s to Hezbollah.

Mohajer-4s have been used in the civil wars in Iraq and Syria. On 16 May 2015, the Turkish Air Force shot down a Mohajer-4 that violated its airspace. Mohajer-4s have also crashed, or been shot down, over Islamic State-held territories. A Mohajer-4 in Iraqi markings was downed over Iraq, but it is not clear if the UAV was actually being operated by the Iraqi Armed Forces.

Mohajer-4s are located at Iran's Konorak Air Base and at Bandar Jask. There is a designation of the Mohajer-4 called  "Shahin", which may be a sub-variant with unknown differences, or a designation for the Mohajer-4 in Iranian Army Ground service. There is also another sub-variant with unknown differences called the "Hodhod A/100".

In addition, Mohajer-4s are used by Iran's border guard to interdict drug smuggling.

Mohajer-4B
Also known as the Sadiq, the Mohajer-4B is a significant evolution of the Mohajer-4 platform with a square fuselage, twin tailbooms, a top-mounted horizontal stabilizer, uncanted wingtips, new landing skids, and straight wings mounted high and to the mid of the body. It was introduced in late 2014. All serial numbers begin "P062A–".

The Mohajer-4B was designed for reconnaissance and has a fixed, forward-facing camera for navigation. With an expanded payload bay, it can carry an IR/EO sensor mounted on a gimbal and a downward-facing surveying camera at the same time, unlike the Mohajer-2 and Mohajer-4, which could only carry one at a time. The Mohajer-4B has a flight ceiling of 15,000 feet, a (max) speed of 200 km/h, and an operational radius of 200 km. It weighs 242 kg and has an endurance of 6 hours. It may have a wingspan of approximately 7 meters.

An estimated 36 Mohajer-4Bs have been built as of 2015. Mohajer-4Bs have been used over Syria. A Mohajer-4B flew over, and was reportedly shot down by, the USS Boxer on 18 July 2019.

Sadegh-1

The Sadegh-1 ("Honest-1"), also known as the QOM-1, is simply a Mohajer-4B with two MANPADS mounted on pylons. It was tested in late 2014 and was used to harass a US Navy jet fighter in 2017. The integration work is believed to be performed by Shahid Shah Abhady Industrial Complex. Independent assessments of the Sadgh-1 range from "it probably doesn't work very well" to "fakery." Another source speculates it might be useful for air defense for Iranian-backed militia groups in Lebanon and Gaza.

Mohajer-6

The Mohajer-6 () retains the same form as prior Mohajer versions, but is significantly larger. It is capable of carrying guided bombs and more advanced surveillance equipment. It has been used in combat by Iran and exported to several Iranian allies. See the main article for more details.

Mohajer 10

Operators

 IRGC: Mohajer-1 (former) Mohajer-4,  Mohajer-6 and Sadegh-1.
 IRGC Ground Forces: Mohajer-2, Mohajer-4 and Mohajer-6.
 Islamic Republic of Iran Army Ground Forces: Mohajer-2 Mohajer-2N, Mohajer-4, Mohajer-4B and Mohajer-6
 Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force: Mohajer-4, Mohajer-6.
 Islamic Republic of Iran Border Guard Command: Mohajer-2, Mohajer-4
 :
 Popular Mobilisation Force: Mohajer-6
 : Mohajer-2, Mohajer-4, Mohajer-6
 : Mohajer-2
 : Licensed design of the Mohajer-2, known locally as Arpia. 12 were acquired.
 PDVSA
 Venezuelan Air Force, 83rd UAV Squadron
 : Mohajer-6 used by Ethiopia.

Non-state operators

  Hezbollah: Mohajer-2 and Mohajer-4
  Libyan National Army: Mohajer-2

Specifications (Mohajer-2)

See also

References

Notes

External references

External links

Mohajer
Twin-boom aircraft
Single-engined pusher aircraft
Unmanned military aircraft of Iran
Aircraft first flown in 1985

Qods Mohajer


The Wells Gray Provincial Park murders was the mass murder of a family of six, committed by David Shearing in August 1982 while the family was camping in the Clearwater Valley near Wells Gray Provincial Park, about  north of Kamloops in British Columbia. While media coined the term "Wells Gray Murders," because that is where the human remains were found, the actual murders occurred elsewhere, including Fage Creek,  north of Clearwater and  south of the Wells Gray Park entrance on Clearwater Valley Road. The story was featured as Episode 1 of the CBC television series The Detectives in 2018.

Disappearance
On August 2, 1982, three generations of a family set out on a camping trip. They were Bob and Jackie Johnson, their two daughters (Janet, 13 and Karen, 11), and Jackie's parents, George and Edith Bentley. The family last contacted relatives on August 6 when Edith called a second daughter, according to retired RCMP Sgt. Mike Eastham whose book about the investigation was published in 1999. On August 16, Bob Johnson failed to return to work at Gorman Brothers Lumber in Westbank which was considered very unusual for the 44-year-old employee. A week later, he was reported missing to the local police.

Search and murder investigation
The search centered on Wells Gray Park, where the family had planned to meet up. On September 13, a mushroom picker reported finding a burned-out car near Battle Mountain Road that was similar to the one the Johnsons were driving. When the RCMP officers searched the vehicle, they found the burned bodies of the four missing adults who had been shot in the head with a .22 caliber weapon. In the trunk were the remains of the two girls.

During spring 1983, several innovative methods were used to try to solve the baffling murders. In April, the presumed crime was re-enacted on-site for TV cameras and aired across Canada in hopes that some significant clue would be triggered. In May, police drove a replica of the Bentleys' 1981 Ford camper truck to Ontario and Quebec, as over 300 people had claimed they had seen such a vehicle heading east during the fall and winter. The reward for finding the truck was raised to $7,500 and 10,000 posters were sent out to police detachments and post offices across North America.

A year after the families disappeared, the murderer had still not been caught and the summer of 1983 became one of the worst for tourism in nearby Wells Gray Park. During the Canada Day holiday weekend, the weather was splendid and the media advised tourists not to head to British Columbia's parks because all campgrounds were full. The exception was Wells Gray Park where only 18 of 105 sites were occupied.

Capture
On October 18, 1983, the missing truck was found by two forestry workers on an abandoned logging road on Trophy Mountain not far from Wells Gray Provincial Park and, like the Johnsons' car, it had been burned. The police were criticized for embarking on a costly wild-goose chase across the country when, for that whole year, the truck was just a few kilometres from the murder site. It now seemed probable that the killer lived in the Clearwater area as few outsiders would be familiar with the maze of logging roads on Trophy Mountain. The truck was lifted out of the forest by a Sikorsky helicopter and flown down the mountain to a flat-bed truck, then taken to the RCMP crime lab in Vancouver. The media were told that the truck yielded no new clues. Police then conducted a second door-to-door questioning in Clearwater. By then, they had amassed a total of 13,000 tips about the case.

On November 19, 1983, local residents were shocked when David William Shearing (b. 1959), 24, was arrested in Dawson Creek, escorted to Kamloops under guard, and charged with the second-degree murders of the six members of the Johnson and Bentley families. The clue that ended the long search for the killer was gleaned during the Clearwater questioning after the truck was found; one person told police that, over a year earlier, Shearing had enquired about how to re-register a Ford pickup and repair a hole in its door. The police had never revealed that there was a bullet hole in the Bentleys' truck.

Sentencing
On April 16, 1984, David Shearing pleaded guilty to six counts of murder. In his ten-minute summation, Supreme Court Justice Harry McKay described the crime as "a cold-blooded and senseless execution of six defenceless and innocent people...a slaughter that devastated three generations in a single bound. What a tragedy. What a waste, and for what?" He sentenced Shearing to life in prison with no eligibility for parole for 25 years. This was the maximum possible penalty for second-degree murder and the first time in Canadian history that it had been handed out.

Crimes
It was only after his sentencing that the true nature of Shering's crimes was revealed. When questioned by Sgt. Eastham after the sentencing, he said that on August 10, he had stalked the victims at their campsite and shot the adults with a .22-caliber Remington Model 572 pump-action rifle. This allowed him to kidnap the girls who he kept alive for a week, raping Janet, and then killing them: on August 16, Shearing shot Karen in the back of the head; the next day on August 17, he killed Janet the same way.

Parole appeals
In September 2008, David Shearing was up for parole. The National Parole Board ruled that he still had violent sexual fantasies, had not completed sex offender treatment, and was not ready for freedom. His second application, in 2012, was also rejected. Shearing, now known as David Ennis, applied again in 2014, then withdrew the request a month before the hearing. In the meantime, online and paper petitions garnered 15,258 signatures urging the parole board not to release him. Family members of the Johnsons and Bentleys also appealed for relief from the agony of reliving the tragedy and campaigning against Shearing's release every few years. His 2021 appeal was again rejected.

References

Mass murder in Canada
Murder in British Columbia
Mass murder in 1982
1982 in British Columbia
August 1982 events in Canada
1982 murders in Canada
Family murders

Wells Gray Provincial Park murders


The Retiree Drug Subsidy Program is a program offered by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) to reimburse health plan sponsors (municipalities, unions and private employers) for a portion of their eligible expenses for retiree prescription drug benefits. This enables Plan Sponsors to continue providing drug coverage to their Medicare-eligible retirees at a lower cost.

Benefits of the RDS Program for participating Plan Sponsors include:
 A Federal subsidy equal to 28-percent Qualifying Covered Retiree's costs for prescription drugs otherwise covered by Medicare Part D that are attributable to such drug costs between the applicable Cost Threshold and Cost Limit
 Incurred costs (including dispensing fees) that the Health Plan Sponsor pays, and that the retiree pays, are eligible for subsidy. Rebates received are subtracted from the amount eligible for subsidy.
 Program flexibility that supports the Health Plan Sponsor's current prescription drug plan structure
 Extensive educational materials and support

To qualify for the subsidy, a Health Plan Sponsor must show that its coverage is "actuarially equivalent" to, or at least as generous as, the defined standard Medicare Part D coverage.

References

Medicare and Medicaid (United States)
Subsidies

Retiree Drug Subsidy


An Socach is a Scottish mountain situated some three miles (5 km) west of the A93 road from Perth to Braemar. It is located at grid ref. 080800 on Ordnance Survey sheet 43.  The summit altitude is 944 m (3,097 ft).  The name may derive from the Gaelic Soc, meaning the snout or beak, leading to the projecting place by analogy with the shape of a snout. Other sources state that it in fact means 'the sow'.

The hill has an elongated, round form, and the Munro bagger is advised that the highest top is in fact at its western end and is not the 938 m (3,077 ft) eastern summit as shown on certain OS maps. The hill may be climbed from Glen Ey to the north or from the top of the Glenshee Ski Centre to the east. The Glenshee route involves a descent into Baddoch Burn, and so more climbing is required than the Glen Ey route, which is longer.

External links
 An Socach entry at visitscotland.com

References
"The Munros" ed. Donald Bennett.

Mountains and hills of Perth and Kinross
Munros
Marilyns of Scotland
Mountains and hills of the Eastern Highlands

An Socach (Glen Ey)


Vincent Anselmo Gironda (November 9, 1917 – October 18, 1997) was an American professional bodybuilder, personal trainer, author, co-founder of the supplement company NSP Nutrition, and owner of the celebrity-frequented Vince's Gym. His nickname was the "Iron Guru".

Biography

Early life and career
Gironda was born in The Bronx, New York. While he was still a young child, the family moved out west to Los Angeles when his father, a stuntman, was offered work in the upcoming Ben Hur film. Vince tried his hand at being a stuntman as well but when he saw a photograph of John Grimek, he realized he needed more physical development and began lifting weights at the age of 22.

The first gym he trained at was the local YMCA. He was there for approximately eight months before moving to the Easton Brothers' gym. The Easton brothers taught him to be one of their instructors. He worked there and experimented with training protocols before opening his own gym in North Hollywood, California in 1948 called Vince's Gym.

Training philosophy

He had what many consider unorthodox training ideas. For example, unlike many other physique trainers, he did not prescribe regular barbell back squats (his gym had no squat racks), stating that they caused the over-development of the gluteal muscles and hips relative to the thighs. The exception would be female trainees who needed more gluteus and hip development. Typically, Gironda prescribed leg extensions, leg curls, sissy squats, hack squats and a special style of squat on a smith machine which he called the "thigh squat" for thigh development. In addition, he was one of the first few in the bodybuilding scene to comment that sit-ups do not contribute to the development of abdominal muscles.

Gironda also counseled against using the regular bench press for chest training, which he considered an inferior exercise because it involved too much front deltoid (shoulder); in its place he favored the "Neck press" in which the bar is lowered, with a wide grip and flared elbows, to the neck instead of the chest. He also favored chest pressing using dumbbells with the palms facing each other from flat & incline angles, stating that he thought to have the hands face the other with the thumbs facing each other also involved too much front deltoid. He considered his Gironda Dip the best overall pectoral developer. For Gironda, pectorals should be a wide slab, not two discrete masses. For the back, Gironda recommended using a full range of motion — such as touching the sternum to the bar when chinning — in order to fully contract the latissimus muscles. For shoulders, he stated that if you want to build maximum mass, shoulder raises (front raise, side lateral raise, and bent-over lateral raise) were the best. Although he normally recommended shoulder raises for deltoid development, he created a special form of shoulder press for Larry Scott to help develop his shoulders called the "Scott press". For triceps, he preferred the overhead cable extensions where the elbows rest on the cradle bench and triceps pressdowns while leaning against a post. For biceps, preacher curls (A.K.A. "Scott curls"), spider curls, and dumbbell curls were unbeatable. For training calves, he insisted that calf raises should be done barefoot & for high reps (usually sets of 20) with a full range of motion. His theory in bodybuilding was to build a body using isolation exercises, in order to achieve that mind-muscle connection.
He was also very famous for kicking people out of his gym for going against his techniques and performing the certain exercises he counseled against (i.e., sit-ups, bench press, squats, etc.), quoting, "We're not weightlifters, we're bodybuilders."

During the 1960s, Vince's reputation grew as a personal trainer due to his pupils winning all the important contests, the most well-known pupil being Larry Scott, winning the first 2 IFBB Mr. Olympias in 1965 & 1966. Bodybuilders who have trained at Vince's Gym over the years include "Body by" Jake Steinfeld, Lou Ferrigno ("The Incredible Hulk"), Frank Zane, Don Howorth and  Arnold Schwarzenegger. Gironda came to be known as "the Iron Guru", a name former magazine editor and photo/journalist Denie Walter gave him.

In 1972 Vince and Ray Raridon (personal trainer at Vince's Gym) became frustrated with quality and prices of the nutritional supplements that were in the market. Vince and Ray went on to create their own formulations with Signet Labs in Los Angeles. They came out with NSP Nutrition as their answer to the low quality and ineffective supplements. NSP Research Nutrition was born, which Vince lovingly called "Old Time Body Building Co." They used those terms because "We still make the staples of natural bodybuilding that Vince so strongly advocated.

Diet

Gironda promoted a low-carbohydrate high-fat diet and invented a diet known as the "Steak and Eggs Diet". He ate butter, cream, eggs, milk and red meat in high quantities and only a small amount of carbohydrates. His dietary views are mentioned in his book Unleashing the Wild Physique, published in 1984.

He recommended the use of numerous supplements, including desiccated liver tablets, free form amino acids, 225 mcg kelp tablets, Vitamin C tablets, digestive enzymes and raw glandular such as adrenal and orchic tablets. In certain circumstances, Gironda would recommend up to three dozen fertile hen-eggs a day, along with raw (unhomogenized, unpasteurized) cream or half-and-half milk. Large amounts of fertile eggs, he said, are equal to the anabolic steroid Dianabol in effectiveness. However, he was vehemently against the use of steroids for physique development, claiming that they contributed to a grotesque appearance.

Although Gironda was not a vegetarian, he endorsed a lacto-ovo vegetarian diet for his bodybuilding vegetarian readers.

Competitive history
1949 Pro Mr California - 4th

1950 Pro Mr USA - tied for 4th

1951 Pro Mr America - 2nd

1957 Pro Mr USA - 3rd

1962 Nabba Pro Mr. Universe - Class 2, 2nd

Trainer to the stars

By the early 1950s, he was a very well known trainer of both champion bodybuilders and movie and television actors. Gironda claimed to be able to get a person into shape faster than anyone else. He also claimed that the movie studios would send their actors and actresses to him for that reason.

A short list of stars who trained at Vince's Gym includes William Smith, Robert Blake, Cher, Clint Eastwood, Denzel Washington, James Garner, Brian Keith, Tommy Chong (of Cheech & Chong), Gordon Scott, Jeff Goldblum, Carl Weathers, Brad Davis, Michael Bowen, Clint Walker, Peter Lupus, Sean Penn and Erik Estrada.

Writer
In the 1970s Vince wrote countless articles for Iron Man, managed his mail-order business, started a nutrition supplement company (NSP Nutrition) and authored his own training and nutrition manuals, all the time still operating his gym.

In the 1980s, a book was published with the collaboration of MuscleMag International publisher Robert Kennedy titled "Unleashing the Wild Physique". It contained considerable knowledge Vince gathered and tested throughout his 30+ year career. The release of the book prompted a promotion tour where the Iron Guru gave sold-out seminars throughout the US and Canada.

Downfall of Vince's Gym
In the 1990s the growing popularity of very well-equipped gyms with considerable mass appeal and the emergence of numerous personal trainers to the stars made it difficult for simple gyms to operate, and so Vince's Gym closed in November 1995. A contributing factor to the gym closing was the severe health problems of Gironda's beloved son Guy. Caring for Guy sapped Gironda's energy, and his motivation to run his gym.

Death
Gironda died on October 18, 1997, in Ventura County, less than a month before his 80th birthday.

Further reading

Karl Coyne, Vince's Secret Locker Volume 3, 2021, Secret Locker Publications, ISBN   978-0-9985229-8-2
Robert Kennedy and Vince Gironda, Unleashing the Wild Physique, 1984, Sterling Pub. Co,
Alan Palmieri, Vince Gironda Legend And Myth, CD-ROM, 2004
Daryl Conant, "InVINCEable, 2009
Randy Roach, "Muscle, Smoke and Mirrors" Vol,1 (2008) Vol,2 (2011)

References

1917 births
1997 deaths
American bodybuilders
American male weightlifters
American people of Italian descent
Low-carbohydrate diet advocates
People associated with physical culture
People from the Bronx
Professional bodybuilders
Sportspeople from the Bronx
Strength training writers

Vince Gironda


Greater Danbury, also known as the Housatonic Valley Region, is a region in the state of Connecticut centered on the city of Danbury. It consists of the city of Danbury and adjacent towns in the areas around the Housatonic River and the Still River.

It consists on the towns of  Bethel, Bridgewater, Brookfield, New Fairfield, New Milford, Newtown, Ridgefield, Roxbury, and Sherman for a total of 9 municipalities.

Geography of Connecticut

Greater Danbury


Bixley medieval settlement is a deserted medieval village in Norfolk, England, about  south-east of Norwich. It is a Scheduled Monument.

History
The Domesday Book of 1086 recorded that there were 19 adult males in Bixley. The population, shown later from tax records, was small in the 14th and 15th centuries compared to other villages in the hundred. In 1524 there were five taxpayers.

Neighbouring settlements at Arminghall and Belhawe have also disappeared. It is thought that villages near Norwich became deserted at the end of the medieval period due to people migrating to the city.

The church of St Wandregeselius is on the western edge of the site. Its tower dates from the early 14th century; the rest of the church dates from 1868. It is a Grade II* listed building. The roof and interior were destroyed by a fire in 2004.

Earthworks
Historic England notes that the remains are "among the most extensive of their kind in this region of East Anglia." Most of the earthworks are east of a green lane, part of a former road from Norwich to Bungay, closed in 1800, that passes immediately west of the church. Remains can be discerned of several groups of two or three homesteads; the groups are  apart. Between the groups there is evidence of small fields and other enclosures, and of a system of lanes.

The adult male population of the village in 1086, recorded in the Domesday Book, included three bordars and thirteen sokemen: it is thought that this kind of population is shown by the arrangement of the settlement at Bixley.

See also
 List of lost settlements in Norfolk

References

Deserted medieval villages in Norfolk
Scheduled monuments in Norfolk

Bixley medieval settlement


A conference is a meeting, often lasting a few days, which is organized on a particular subject, or to bring together people who have a common interest. Conferences can be used as a form of group decision-making, although discussion, not always decisions, is the primary purpose of conferences. The term derives from the word confer.

History
The first known use of "conference" appears in 1527, meaning "a meeting of two or more persons for discussing matters of common concern". It came from the word confer, which means "to compare views or take counsel".
However the idea of a conference far predates the word. Arguably, as long as there have been people, there have been meetings and discussions between people. Evidence of ancient forms of conference can be seen in archaeological ruins of common areas where people would gather to discuss shared interests such as "hunting plans, wartime activities, negotiations for peace or the organisation of tribal celebrations".

Since the 1960s, conferences have become a lucrative sector of the tourism industry and have evolved into hundred billion Pound per year industry on a global scale. The growth around the world, including in Great Britain, Germany, Philippines, United States and Australia, has led to conferences themselves becoming an industry with buyers, suppliers, marketing, branding and conference facilities.

Modern conferences can be held to discuss a variety of topics, from politics, to science or sport. Many conferences are held on a regular periodic basis, such as annually, biannually (twice per year), or biennially (every other year).

With the development of communications technology, conference holders have the choice of replacing the physical meeting space with a telephonic or virtual form of meeting. This has resulted in terms such as a conference call or video conference.

Conference types
Conferences can have various formats, topics and intentions.

Conference formats
 Conference call, in telecommunications, a call with more than two participants at the same time
 Conference hall, room where conferences are held
 Video conference, with the reception and transmission of audio-video signals by users at different locations

Conferences topics
 Academic conference, in science and academic, a formal event where researchers present results, workshops, and other activities
 Annual conferences within Methodism, the governing structure of certain Methodist churches; despite the name, these are not individual events
 Athletic conference, a competitive grouping of teams, often geographical
 Authors' conference, or writers' conference, where writers gather to review their written works and suggest improvements
 Parent–teacher conference, a meeting with a child's teacher to discuss grades and school performance
 Peace conference, a diplomatic meeting to end conflict
 Press conference, an announcement to the press (print, radio, television) with the expectation of questions, about the announced matter
 Professional conference, a meeting of professionals in a given subject or profession dealing with related matters or developments
 Settlement conference, a meeting between the plaintiff and the respondent in a lawsuit, wherein they try to settle their dispute without proceeding to trial
 Trade fair, or trade conference
 Unconference or open space conference, a participant-driven meeting that tries to avoid one or more aspects of a conventional conference

See also
 Conference pear, a fruit, a cultivar of European pear
 Conference call, a telephonic meeting

 TED (Technology, Education and Design) Talks and TEDx conferences
 List of Allied World War II conferences
 Summit (meeting)
 Symposium (disambiguation)
 Convention (meeting)

References

Broad-concept articles

Meetings
Social events

Conference


Michel Tremblay (born March 28, 1933 in Cap-à-l'Aigle, Quebec) is a politician from Québec, Canada. A teacher by profession, he served in several education-related positions in the Bas-Saint-Laurent region before being elected to the National Assembly of Quebec as a Liberal in Rimouski in 1985.  After being re-elected in 1989, he was defeated in 1994.

He served as mayor of Rimouski from 1994 to 2005. He ran unsuccessfully as a Liberal in Rimouski-Neigette—Témiscouata—Les Basques in the 2006 federal election.

Since December 2006, he has been chairman of the board of CJEM-FM in Edmundston, New Brunswick.

External links

 Tremblay's biography on the Liberal Party's website

1933 births
Living people
Candidates in the 2006 Canadian federal election
Quebec Liberal Party MNAs
Mayors of Rimouski
Vice Presidents of the National Assembly of Quebec
Liberal Party of Canada candidates for the Canadian House of Commons

Michel Tremblay (politician)