The Russian apartment bombings were a series of explosions that hit four apartment blocks in the Russian cities of Buynaksk, Moscow, and Volgodonsk in September 1999, killing more than 300, injuring more than 1,000, and spreading a wave of fear across the country. The bombings, together with the Invasion of Dagestan, triggered the Second Chechen War. The handling of the crisis by Vladimir Putin, who was prime minister at the time, boosted his popularity greatly and helped him attain the presidency within a few months.

The blasts hit Buynaksk on 4 September and Moscow on 9 and 13 September. On 13 September, Russian Duma speaker Gennadiy Seleznyov made an announcement in the Duma about receiving a report that another bombing had just happened in the city of Volgodonsk. A bombing did happen in Volgodonsk—but only three days later—on 16 September. Chechen militants were blamed for the bombings, but denied responsibility, along with Chechen president Aslan Maskhadov.

A suspicious device resembling those used in the bombings was found and defused in an apartment block in the Russian city of Ryazan on 22 September. On 23 September, Vladimir Putin praised the vigilance of the inhabitants of Ryazan and ordered the air bombing of Grozny, which marked the beginning of the Second Chechen War. Three FSB agents who had planted the devices at Ryazan were arrested by the local police. The next day, FSB director Nikolay Patrushev announced that the incident in Ryazan had been an anti-terror drill and the device found there contained only sugar, and freed the FSB agents involved.

The official Russian investigation of the Buynaksk bombing was completed in 2001, while the investigation of the Moscow and Volgodonsk bombings were completed in 2002. In 2000, seven people were convicted of perpetrating the Buynaksk attack. According to the court ruling on the Moscow and Volgodonsk bombings, which was announced in 2004, the attacks were organized and led by Achemez Gochiyaev, who remains at large. All bombings, the court ruled, were ordered by Islamist warlords Ibn Al-Khattab and Abu Omar al-Saif, who have been killed. Five other suspects have been killed and six have been convicted by Russian courts on terrorism-related charges.

Attempts at an independent investigation have faced obstruction. State Duma deputy Yuri Shchekochikhin filed two motions for a parliamentary investigation of the events, but the motions were rejected by the State Duma in March 2000. An independent public commission to investigate the bombings was chaired by Duma deputy Sergei Kovalev. The commission was rendered ineffective because of government refusal to respond to its inquiries. Two key members of the Kovalev Commission, Sergei Yushenkov and Yuri Shchekochikhin, have since died in apparent assassinations. The Commission's lawyer and investigator Mikhail Trepashkin was arrested and served four years in prison for revealing state secrets. Former FSB agent Alexander Litvinenko, who defected and blamed the FSB for the bombings, was poisoned and killed in London in 2006. A British inquiry later determined that Litvinenko's murder was "probably" carried out with the approval of Putin and Patrushev.

The attacks were widely attributed to Chechen terrorists, although their guilt has never been conclusively proven. Some historians and journalists claim the bombings were coordinated by Russian state security services to help bring Putin into the presidency. Others disagree with such theories or argue that there is insufficient evidence to assign responsibility for the attacks.

Bombings

Overview
Five apartment bombings took place and at least three attempted bombings were prevented. All bombings had the same "signature", based on the nature and the volume of the destruction. In each case a powerful explosive was used, and the timers were set to go off at night and inflict the maximum number of civilian casualties. The explosives were placed to destroy the weakest, most critical elements of the buildings and force them to "collapse like a house of cards". The individuals behind the bombings were able to obtain or manufacture several tons of powerful explosives and deliver them to numerous destinations across Russia.

Manezhnaya Square, Moscow
On 31 August 1999, at 20:00 local time, a bomb exploded in the amusement arcade of the Manezh Square shopping complex of Moscow. At least 29 people were injured. According to the FSB, the explosion had been caused by a bomb of about 300 grams of explosives.

On 2 September 1999, an unknown person called and claimed that the bombing was committed by the militant organization the "Liberation Army of Dagestan".

Buynaksk, Dagestan
On 4 September 1999, at 22:00, a car bomb detonated outside a five-story apartment building in the city of Buynaksk in Dagestan, near the border of Chechnya. The building was housing Russian border guard soldiers and their families. Sixty-four people were killed and 133 were injured in the explosion.

On 4 September 1999, another bomb was discovered shortly after the explosion in the city of Buynaksk in Dagestan. The defused bomb was in a car containing  of explosive material. It was discovered by local residents in a parking lot surrounded by an army hospital and residential buildings.

Moscow, Pechatniki
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}On 9 September 1999, shortly after midnight at 20:00 GMT, a bomb detonated on the ground floor of an apartment building in southeast Moscow (19 Guryanova Street). The explosive power was equivalent to  of TNT. The nine-story building was destroyed, killing 106 people inside (with early reports giving 93 dead) and injuring 249 others, and damaging 19 nearby buildings. A total of 108 apartments were destroyed during the bombing. An FSB spokesman announced that traces of RDX and TNT were found on items removed from the site of the explosion. Residents said a few minutes before the blast four men were seen speeding away from the building in a car.

Boris Yeltsin ordered the search of 30,000 residential buildings in Moscow for explosives. He took personal control of the investigation of the blast. Putin declared 13 September a day of mourning for the victims of the attacks.

Moscow, Kashirskoye highway

On 13 September 1999, at 05:00, a large bomb exploded in a basement of an apartment block on Kashirskoye Highway in southern Moscow, about  from the place of the last attack. This was the deadliest blast in the chain of bombings (because the apartment was built with brick), with 119 people killed and 200 injured. The eight-story building was flattened, littering the street with debris and throwing some concrete pieces hundreds of meters away.

Moscow, prevented bombings

On September 13, 1999, the police found and defused bombs in an apartment block on Borisovskiye Prudy street and Kapotnya in Moscow.

According to Litvinenko, Felshtinsky and Goldfarb, on 13 September 1999, Achemez Gochiyaev called and reported about bombs planted in several locations. Gochiyaev claimed that he was framed by his old acquaintance, an FSB officer who asked him to rent basements "as storage facilities" at four locations where bombs were later found. After the second explosion on Kashirskoye highway Gochiyaev recognized he was set up, called the police and told them about the basements of two other buildings at Borisovskie Prudy and Kapotnya, where the explosives were actually found and explosions averted. In 2002 Felshtinsky and Litvinenko obtained a written testimony from Achemez Gochiyaev as well as a video recording and several photographs about it. The same statement was received by Prima News agency.

According to Russian newspaper Kommersant and the public relations centre of the FSB, further bombings in Moscow were prevented with the help of a real estate agent who called the police after the second bombing in Moscow and told about his client, who rented basements in the two buildings which were blown up in Moscow. The client was identified as Achemez Gochiyaev.

Volgodonsk, Rostov Oblast

A truck bomb exploded on 16 September 1999, outside a nine-story apartment complex in the southern Russian city of Volgodonsk, killing 17 people and injuring 69. The bombing took place at 5:57 am. Surrounding buildings were also damaged. The blast also happened  from a nuclear power plant. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin signed a decree calling on law enforcement and other agencies to develop plans within three days to protect industry, transportation, communications, food processing centres and nuclear complexes.

Ryazan incident (FSB exercises "Ryazan sugar")
At 20:30 on 22 September 1999, Alexei Kartofelnikov, a resident of an apartment building in the city of Ryazan noticed two suspicious men who carried sacks into the basement from a car. While the license plate indicated that the car was registered in Moscow, a sheet of paper was taped over the last two digits, and the number written on it implied that the car was local.

Kartofelnikov alerted the police, but by the time they arrived the car and the men were gone. The policemen found three sacks of white powder in the basement, each weighing . A detonator and a timing device were attached to the sacks. The detonator was reported by a Russian newspaper to be a 12-gauge shotgun shell filled with powder. The timer was set to 5:30 AM. Yuri Tkachenko, the head of the local bomb squad, disconnected the detonator and the timer.  Reportedly, Tkachenko tested the three sacks of white substance with a "MO-2" gas analyser, which detected RDX vapors.

Inhabitants of the apartment building were evacuated. According to David Satter, residents of neighboring buildings fled their homes in terror, to the effect that nearly 30,000 residents spent the night on the street. Police and rescue vehicles converged from different parts of the city. As many as 1,200 local police officers were put on alert, the railroad stations and the airport were surrounded, and roadblocks were set up on highways leaving the city.

At 01:30 on  23 September 1999, explosive engineers of the Ryazan UFSB took a sample of substance from the suspicious-looking sacks to a firing ground located about  away from Ryazan for testing. During the substance tests at that area they tried to explode it by means of a detonator, which was also made from a shotgun shell, but the substance failed to detonate. At 05:00, Radio Rossiya reported about the attempted bombing, noting that the bomb was set up to go off at 05:30. In the morning, Ryazan resembled a city under siege. Composite sketches of three suspected terrorists, two men and a woman, were posted everywhere in the city and shown on TV. At 08:00 Russian television reported the attempt to blow out the building in Ryazan and identified the explosive used in the bomb as RDX. Vladimir Rushailo announced later that police prevented a terrorist act. A news report at 16:00 reported that the explosives failed to detonate during their testing outside the city.

At 19:00, Vladimir Putin praised the vigilance of the inhabitants of Ryazan, and called for the air bombing of the Chechen capital Grozny in response to the terrorism acts. He said:

On 23 September Natalia Yukhnova, a telephone service employee in Ryazan, tapped into a suspicious phone call to Moscow and overheard the following instruction: "Leave one at a time, there are patrols everywhere". The called number was traced to a telephone exchange unit serving FSB offices.

When arrested, the detainees produced FSB identification cards. They were soon released on orders from Moscow.

The position of Russian authorities on the Ryazan incident changed significantly over time. Initially, it was declared by the FSB and federal government to be a real threat. However, after the people who planted the bomb were identified, the official version changed to "security training".

On 24 September, FSB director Nikolai Patrushev announced that it was an exercise that was being carried out to test responses after the earlier blasts.

The Ryazan FSB "reacted with fury" and issued a statement saying:

FSB also issued a public apology about the incident. In a show Independent Investigation on NTV, Evgeniy Savostyanov, former director of Moscow and Moscow Oblast regional FSB branch, has criticized the FSB for performing such exercise on residential buildings with inhabitants inside and without notifying local authorities.

In excerpts from the planned Ryazan operation, first published in 2002, it was stated that the exercise was overseen by the head of the FSB's Center of Special Operations (CSO), Major General Alexander Tikhonov.

Detonator and explosives detection equipment controversy
In February 2000, Novaya Gazeta journalist Pavel Voloshin published an essay entitled What happened in Ryazan: Sugar or Hexogen?, that was partly based on his two-hour long interview with Yuri Tkachenko, the police explosives expert who defused the Ryazan bomb. The essay noted that it's well known that a gas analyser that tested the vapours coming from the sacks indicated the presence of RDX. Tkachenko said that he was completely certain that the instrument was in correct working order. The gas analyser was of world-class quality, cost $20,000, and was maintained by a specialist who worked according to a strict schedule, making frequent prophylactic checks, because the device contained a radioactive source. Meticulous care in the handling of the gas analyser was a necessity because the lives of the bomb squad experts depended on the reliability of their equipment. Speaking of the detonator, Voloshin noted that people who disarmed the device (Tkachenko and his bomb squad) claimed that the detonator attached to the sacks was not a dummy and had been prepared on a professional level. The police warrant officer who answered the original call and discovered the bomb insisted that there were no doubts it was a combat situation.

In March 2000, the newspaper Ryazanskiye Vedomosti published an interview with Lieutenant Colonel Yuri Maximov, the head of the investigative section of the Ryazan UFSB. Maximov said that the Ryazan bomb squad was equipped with explosive vapour detector "М-02", but bomb-disposal experts didn't like it and used analytical kit "Exprei", which was more accurate. Also in March 2000, the head of the Ryazan UFSB General Sergeyev appeared on TV show "Independent Investigation" commenting on the device used to detect the RDX. According to Sergeyev, it was packed in a briefcase and acted like a litmus test from school. The substance to be investigated was wiped by a collection paper, which was subsequently sprayed from an aerosol can. A change of the paper color indicated the presence of explosives. Sergeyev explained the false positive result by prior contamination of the lid of the briefcase, on which Tkachenko poured some sugar from the sacks to perform the test.

At a press conference on the occasion of the Security Agency Worker's Day in December 2001, Tkachenko said that a gas analyser had not been used and the detonator was a shotgun shell that couldn't detonate any known explosives.

In February 2003, Kommersant journalist  studied the criminal investigation file on the Ryazan incident, obtained by Russian State Duma member Sergei Kovalev. According to the proceedings, a bomb disposal expert who arrived to the scene had twice performed a test which didn't show the presence of explosive particles. The head of the bomb squad Tkachenko, who arrived soon after that, made a test himself and found the RDX. The investigator who questioned Yuri Tkachenko concluded that the detection of RDX was made possible by contamination of Yuri Tkachenko's hands, since the latter worked with explosives containing RDX on the day before the incident without wearing sterile gloves. Another detail concerned the type of a device used to detect the explosives. The report submitted by the Ryazan UFSB claimed that gas analyser "M-02" was used. However, during Tkachenko's questioning it was revealed that he had used the device "Exprel" for the analysis. The investigation has resolved the contradiction in the following way. The bomb squad in Ryazan is equipped with the gas analyser "М-02", but the latter has certain limitations. The device has a high degree of imprecision, and the analysis takes a long time. So, the bomb squad used the device "Exprel", which is more robust, accurate and easy to use. But since they were not supposed to possess that device, the bomb squad has submitted the paperwork which showed that the gas analyser "M-02" had been used.

The case of Private Alexei Pinyaev
In March 2000, Novaya Gazeta journalist Pavel Voloshin reported the account of Private Alexei P. (later identified as Pinyaev) of the 137th Regiment. Pinyaev guarded a storehouse with weapons and ammunition near the city of Ryazan. Together with a friend, he entered the storehouse to see the weapons. The friends were surprised to see that the storehouse contained sacks with the word "sugar" on them. Pinyaev and his friend were discouraged, but didn't want to leave the storehouse empty-handed. The two paratroopers cut a hole in one of the bags and put some sugar in a plastic bag. They made tea with the sugar, but the taste of the tea was terrible. They became frightened because the substance might turn out to be saltpeter, and brought the plastic bag to a platoon commander. He consulted a sapper, who identified the substance as hexogen.

According to Felshtinsky and Pribylovsky, after the newspaper report FSB officers descended on Pinyayev's unit, accused them of divulging a state secret and told them, "You guys can't even imagine what serious business you've got yourselves tangled up in." The regiment later sued publishers of Novaya Gazeta for insulting the honour of the Russian Army, since there was no Private Alexei Pinyayev in the regiment, according to their statement.

A report aired by ORT in March 2000 and created by journalist Leonid Grozin and operator Dmitry Vishnevoy accused Novaya Gazeta of lying. According to Grozin and Vishnevoy, there is no storehouse at the test range of the 137th Regiment. Alexei Pinyaev has admitted meeting with Pavel Voloshin, but claimed that he was merely asked to confirm a pre-conceived story.

At an FSB press conference in 2001, Private Pinyayev stated that there was no hexogen in the 137th Airborne Regiment and that he was hospitalised in December 1999 and no longer visited the test range.

Explosives in the apartment bombings
After the bombing at Guryanova Street on September 9, the Moscow FSB reported that items removed from the scene showed traces of TNT and RDX (or "hexogen").

Later FSB declared that the explosive used in the bombings was a mixture of aluminium powder, ammonium nitrate, TNT and sugar prepared by the perpetrators in a concrete mixer at a fertiliser factory in Urus-Martan, Chechnya. Also, each bomb contained some plastic explosive used as an explosive booster.

RDX is produced in only one factory in Russia, in the city of Perm. According to David Satter, the FSB changed the story about the type of explosive, since it was difficult to explain how huge amounts of RDX disappeared from the closely guarded Perm facility. According to Lieutenant General of the FSB Ivan Mironov, the precise composition of the explosive mixture was hard to determine, because no visible traces remain after the aluminium powder is consumed in a blast.

Related events

War of Dagestan

On 7 August 1999, an Islamist group, led by Shamil Basayev and Ibn al-Khattab, invaded the Russian republic of Dagestan.

According to historian René De La Pedraja, the war in Chechnya was planned in advance by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, soon after the kidnapping of Gennady Shpigun. The ministry developed a plan for a limited military campaign to occupy the northern third of Chechnya up to the Terek River valley. Putin strongly supported the initial plan to occupy only the northern third of Chechnya. The invasion of militants in Dagestan accelerated the schedule for such a campaign. However, after the apartment bombings, "the usually cool and cautious Putin was swept away in the popular outrage" and decided to approve a much more ambitious campaign to subdue all of Chechnya. The Russian Army was not ready to pursue the extended campaign, which resulted in a prolonged conflict.

Advance warnings about the impending bombings
In July 1999, Russian journalist Aleksandr Zhilin, writing in the Moskovskaya Pravda, warned that there would be terrorist attacks in Moscow organised by the government. Using a leaked Kremlin document as evidence, he added that the motive would be to undermine the opponents of the Russian President Boris Yeltsin. These included Moscow mayor Yury Luzhkov and former prime minister Yevgeny Primakov. However, this warning was ignored.

According to Amy Knight, "even more significant is the fact that a respected and influential Duma deputy, Konstantin Borovoi, was told on September 9, the day of the first Moscow apartment bombing, that there was to be a terrorist attack in the city. His source was an officer of the Russian military intelligence (GRU). Borovoy transmitted this information to FSB officials serving on Yeltsin's Security Council, but he was ignored."

Announcement of impending Volgodonsk bombings in the Russian Duma
On 13 September, just hours after the second explosion in Moscow, Russian Duma speaker Gennadiy Seleznyov of the Communist Party made an announcement, "I have just received a report. According to information from Rostov-on-Don, an apartment building in the city of Volgodonsk was blown up last night." When the Volgodonsk bombing happened on 16 September, Vladimir Zhirinovsky demanded an explanation in the Duma the following day, but Seleznyov turned his microphone off. Vladimir Zhirinovsky said in the Russian Duma: "Remember, Gennadiy Nikolaevich, how you told us that an apartment block has been blown up in Volgodonsk, three days prior to the blast? How should we interpret this? The State Duma knows that the apartment block was destroyed on Monday, and it has indeed been blown up on Thursday [same week]..."

Alexander Litvinenko believed that someone had mixed up the order of the blasts, "the usual Kontora mess up". According to Litvinenko, "Moscow-2 was on the 13th and Volgodonsk on 16th, but they got it to the speaker the other way around". Investigator Mikhail Trepashkin confirmed that the man who gave Seleznyov the note was indeed an FSB officer.

Later Seleznyov told a Russian newspaper that he actually referred to an explosion organized by criminal gangs, which took place in Volgodonsk and claimed no fatalities.

In an August 2017 interview with Yuri Dud, Vladimir Zhirinovsky was asked about the incident in State Duma and claimed there was a misunderstanding.

Sealing of all materials by the Russian Duma
The Russian Duma rejected two motions for a parliamentary investigation of the Ryazan incident. In the Duma a pro-Kremlin party Unity, voted to seal all materials related to the Ryazan incident for the next 75 years and forbade an investigation into what happened.

Claims and denials of responsibility for the blasts
On 9 September, an anonymous person, speaking with a Caucasian accent, phoned the Interfax news agency, saying that the blasts in Moscow and Buynaksk were "our response to the bombings of civilians in the villages in Chechnya and Dagestan."

On 13 September 1999, Novaya Gazeta published a report by retired army major Vyacheslav Izmailov, which said that the editorial board of Novaya Gazeta had received information about the planned terrorist attacks from its sources in Chechnya. In a follow-up article published on 20 September 1999, Izmailov revealed that Novaya Gazeta had received the information on 8 September, twelve hours before the bombing on Guryanova street in Moscow, and immediately relayed it to the Chief Directorate Combating Organized Crime (GUBOP) of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The article has also identified the source as Alexander Kapanadze, a non-commissioned officer in the Russian Army who was taken captive by Chechens in 1995. According to Izmailov, as many as 10 terrorist attacks have been planned. In a documentary by Alexey Pivovarov, editor-in-chief of Novaya Gazeta Dmitry Muratov commented that Kapanadze has disappeared soon after he had met with GUBOP; none of his whereabouts are known.

On 15 September, an unidentified man, again speaking with a Caucasian accent, called the ITAR-TASS news agency, claiming to represent a group called the Liberation Army of Dagestan. He said that the explosions in Buynaksk and Moscow were carried out by his organisation. According to him, the attacks were a retaliation to the deaths of Muslim women and children during Russian air raids in Dagestan. "We will answer death with death," the caller said. Russian officials from both the Interior Ministry and FSB, at the time, expressed scepticism over the claims and said there is no such organization. On 15 September 1999, a Dagestani official also denied the existence of a "Dagestan Liberation Army".

In an interview published in Lidove Noviny on September 9, Shamil Basayev denied responsibility for the bombings and said that it had been the work of Dagestanis. According to Basayev, the bombings were a retribution for the military operation of the Russian Army against "three small villages" in Dagestan. In subsequent interviews, Basayev said he did not know who perpetrated the bombings.

In a 12 September interview with Associated Press, Ibn al-Khattab said that "From now on they will get our bombs everywhere! Let Russia await our explosions blasting through their cities! I swear we will do it!" However, in a subsequent interview on 14 September to the Interfax agency in Grozny, Khattab denied responsibility for the bombings.

Chechen Foreign Ministry issued an official statement on 14 September condemning Moscow blasts, and affirming that "Ichkeria stands firmly against terrorism in any manifestation".

Domestic investigations

Criminal investigation and court ruling
In 2000, investigation of the Buynaksk attack was complete and seven people were convicted of the bombing.

Russia's pre-trial investigation of the Moscow and Volgodonsk bombings was finished in 2002. According to the Russian State Prosecutor office, all apartment bombings were executed under command of ethnic Karachay Achemez Gochiyayev and planned by Ibn al-Khattab and Abu Omar al-Saif, Arab militants fighting in Chechnya on the side of Chechen insurgents. Al-Khattab and al-Saif were killed during the Second Chechen War. According to investigators, the explosives were prepared at a fertiliser factory in Urus-Martan Chechnya, by "mixing aluminium powder, nitre and sugar in a concrete mixer", or by also putting there RDX and TNT. From there they were sent to a food storage facility in Kislovodsk, which was managed by an uncle of one of the terrorists, Yusuf Krymshakhalov. Another conspirator, Ruslan Magayayev, leased a KamAZ truck in which the sacks were stored for two months. After everything was planned, the participants were organised into several groups which then transported the explosives to different cities.

According to investigators, the explosion in Moscow mall on 31 August was committed by another man, Magomed-Zagir Garzhikaev on the orders from Shamil Basayev, according to the FSB.

Court hearings on the Moscow and Volgodonsk attacks were held behind closed doors, and were completed in 2004. The process has produced 90 volumes of proceedings, 5 of which were classified.

Court rulings

According to the court ruling, Al-Khattab paid Gochiyayev $500,000 to carry out the attacks at Guryanova Street, Kashirskoye Highway, and Borisovskiye Prudy, and then helped to hide Gochiyayev and his accomplices in Chechnya. In early September 1999, Magayayev, Krymshamkhalov, Batchayev and Dekkushev reloaded the cargo into a Mercedes-Benz 2236 trailer and delivered it to Moscow. En route, they were protected from possible complications by an accomplice, Khakim Abayev, who accompanied the trailer in another car. In Moscow they were met by Achemez Gochiyayev, who registered in Hotel Altai under the fake name "Laipanov", and Denis Saitakov. The explosives were left in a warehouse in Ulitsa Krasnodonskaya, which was leased by pseudo-Laipanov (Gochiyayev). The next day, the explosives were delivered in "" vans to three addresses—Ulitsa Guryanova, Kashirskoye Shosse and Ulitsa Borisovskiye Prudy, where pseudo-Laipanov leased cellars. Gochiyayev supervised the placement of the bombs in the rented cellars. Next followed the explosions at the former two addresses. The explosion at 16 Borisovskiye Prudy was prevented.

According to the court, 4 September Buinaksk bombing was ordered by Al-Khattab. Reportedly, since the perpetrators have managed to explode only one truck bomb instead of the two, Khattab called it a "botched job" and paid $300,000 for it, which was a part of the sum he originally promised. One of the suspects confessed having loaded the trucks with sacks in Buynaksk, but claimed he did not know what they were intended for.

The explosion in the mall on Manezhnaya Square was the subject of a separate court process held in Moscow in 2009. The court accused Khalid Khuguyev () and Magumadzir Gadzhikayev () of organisation and execution of the 1999 explosions in the Manezhnaya Square mall and in hotel Intourist and sentenced them to 25 years and 15 years of imprisonment, correspondingly.

Sentences
 and  have both been sentenced to life terms in a special regime colony. Both defendants have pleaded guilty only to some of the charges. For instance, Dekkushev acknowledged that he knew the explosives he transported were to be used for an act of terror. Dekkushev also confirmed Gochiyaev's role in the attacks. Dekkushev was extradited to Russia on 14 April 2002 to stand trial. Krymshakhalov was apprehended and extradicted to Moscow. Achemez Gochiyaev, the head of the group that carried out the attacks and allegedly the main organiser, remains a fugitive, and is under an international search warrant.

In a statement released in January 2004, the FSB said, "until we arrest Gochiyayev, the case [of the apartment block bombings of 1999] will not be closed." In an interview with Dmitry Gordon published on May 18, 2020, former GRU officer Igor Strelkov said that during the initial stage of the Second Chechen war, he was a part of a group which attempted to capture Achemez Gochiyaev.

Suspects and accused
In September 1999, hundreds of Chechen nationals (out of the more than 100,000 permanently living in Moscow) were briefly detained and interrogated in Moscow, as a wave of anti-Chechen sentiments swept the city. However, no Chechens were tried for the Buinaksk, Moscow or Volgodonsk attacks. Rather, it were Dagestani Wahhabis in the case of the Buinaksk bombing, and Karachay Wahhabis in the case of Moscow and Volgodonsk attacks.

According to the official investigation, the following people either delivered explosives, stored them, or harboured other suspects:

Moscow bombings
 Ibn al-Khattab (a Saudi-born Mujahid), who was poisoned by the FSB in 2002.
 Achemez Gochiyayev (an ethnic Karachai, has not been arrested; he is still at large)
 Denis Saitakov (an ethnic Tatar from Uzbekistan), killed in Georgia in 1999–2000
 Khakim Abayev (an ethnic Karachai), killed by FSB special forces in May 2004 in Ingushetia
 Ravil Akhmyarov (a Russian citizen), Surname indicates an ethnic Tatar, killed in Chechnya in 1999–2000
 Yusuf Krymshamkhalov (an ethnic Karachai and resident of Kislovodsk), arrested in Georgia in December 2002, extradited to Russia and sentenced to life imprisonment in January 2004, after a two-month secret trial held without a jury
 Stanislav Lyubichev (a traffic police inspector, resident of Kislovodsk, Stavropol Krai), who helped the truck with explosives pass the checkpoint after getting a sack of sugar as a bribe, sentenced to four years in May 2003

Volgodonsk bombing
 Timur Batchayev (an ethnic Karachai), killed in Georgia in the clash with police during which Krymshakhalov was arrested
 Zaur Batchayev (an ethnic Karachai) killed in Chechnya in 1999–2000
 Adam Dekkushev (an ethnic Karachai), arrested in Georgia, threw a grenade at police during the arrest, extradited to Russia and sentenced to life imprisonment in January 2004, after a two-month secret trial held without a jury

Buinaksk bombing
 Isa Zainutdinov (an ethnic Avar) and native of Dagestan, sentenced to life imprisonment in March 2001
 Alisultan Salikhov (an ethnic Avar) and native of Dagestan, sentenced to life imprisonment in March 2001
 Magomed Salikhov (an ethnic Avar) and native of Dagestan, arrested in Azerbaijan in November 2004, extradited to Russia, found not guilty on the charge of terrorism by the jury on 24 January 2006; found guilty of participating in an armed force and illegal crossing of the national border, he was retried again on the same charges on 13 November 2006 and again found not guilty, this time on all charges, including the ones he was found guilty of in the first trial. According to Kommersant Salikhov admitted that he made a delivery of paint to Dagestan for Ibn al-Khattab, although he was not sure what was really delivered.
 Ziyavudin Ziyavudinov (a native of Dagestan), arrested in Kazakhstan, extradited to Russia, sentenced to 24 years in April 2002
 Abdulkadyr Abdulkadyrov (an ethnic Avar) and native of Dagestan, sentenced to 9 years in March 2001
 Magomed Magomedov (Sentenced to 9 years in March 2001)
 Zainutdin Zainutdinov (an ethnic Avar) and native of Dagestan, sentenced to 3 years in March 2001 and immediately released under amnesty
 Makhach Abdulsamedov (a native of Dagestan, sentenced to 3 years in March 2001 and immediately released under amnesty).

Attempts at an independent investigation
The Russian Duma rejected two motions for a parliamentary investigation of the Ryazan incident.

An independent public commission to investigate the bombings was chaired by Duma deputy Sergei Kovalyov. The commission started its work in February 2002. On 5 March Sergei Yushenkov and Duma member Yuli Rybakov flew to London where they met Alexander Litvinenko and Mikhail Trepashkin. After this meeting, Trepashkin began working with the commission.

However, the public commission was rendered ineffective because of government refusal to respond to its inquiries. Two key members of the Commission, Sergei Yushenkov and Yuri Shchekochikhin, both Duma members, have died in apparent assassinations in April 2003 and July 2003, respectively. Another member of the commission, Otto Lacis, was assaulted in November 2003 and two years later, on 3 November 2005, he died in a hospital after a car accident.

The commission asked lawyer Mikhail Trepashkin to investigate the case. Trepashkin said he found that the basement of one of the bombed buildings was rented by FSB officer Vladimir Romanovich and that the latter was witnessed by several people. Trepashkin also investigated a letter attributed to Achemez Gochiyayev and found that the alleged assistant of Gochiyayev who arranged the delivery of sacks might have been Kapstroi-2000 vice president Alexander Karmishin, a resident of Vyazma.

Trepashkin was unable to bring the alleged evidence to the court because he was arrested in October 2003 (on charges of illegal arms possession) and imprisoned in Nizhny Tagil, just a few days before he was to make his findings public. He was sentenced by a Moscow military closed court to four years imprisonment on a charge of revealing state secrets. Amnesty International issued a statement that "there are serious grounds to believe that Mikhail Trepashkin was arrested and convicted under falsified criminal charges which may be politically motivated, in order to prevent him continuing his investigative and legal work related to the 1999 apartment bombings in Moscow and other cities".

In a letter to Olga Konskaya, Trepashkin wrote that some time before the bombings, Moscow's Regional Directorate against Organized Crimes (RUOP GUVD) arrested several people for selling the explosive RDX. Following that, Nikolai Patrushev's Directorate of FSB officers came to the GUVD headquarters, captured evidence and ordered the investigators fired. Trepashkin wrote that he learned about the story at a meeting with several RUOP officers in the year 2000. They claimed that their colleagues could present eyewitness accounts in a court. They offered a video tape with evidence against the RDX dealers. Mr Trepashkin did not publicise the meeting fearing for lives of the witnesses and their families.

According to Trepashkin, his supervisors and the people from the FSB promised not to arrest him if he left the Kovalev commission and started working together with the FSB "against Alexander Litvinenko".

On 24 March 2000, two days before the presidential elections, NTV Russia featured the Ryazan events of Fall 1999 in the talk show Independent Investigation. The talk with the residents of the Ryazan apartment building along with FSB public relations director Alexander Zdanovich and Ryazan branch head Alexander Sergeyev was filmed few days earlier. On 26 March, Boris Nemtsov voiced his concern over the possible shut-down of NTV for airing the talk. Seven months later, NTV general manager  said at the JFK School of Government that Information Minister Mikhail Lesin warned him on several occasions.  Malashenko's recollection of Lesin's warning was that by airing the talk show NTV "crossed the line" and that the NTV managers were "outlaws" in the eyes of the Kremlin. According to Alexander Goldfarb, Mr. Malashenko told him that Valentin Yumashev brought a warning from the Kremlin, one day before airing the show, promising in no uncertain terms that the NTV managers "should consider themselves finished" if they went ahead with the broadcast.

Artyom Borovik was among the people who investigated the bombings. He received numerous death threats and died in a suspicious plane crash in March 2000 that was regarded by Felshtinsky and Pribylovsky as a probable assassination.

Journalist Anna Politkovskaya and former security service member Alexander Litvinenko, who investigated the bombings, were killed in 2006.

Surviving victims of the Guryanova street bombing asked President Dmitry Medvedev to resume the official investigation in 2008, but it was not resumed.

In a 2017 discussion at the RFE/RL Sergei Kovalyov said: "I think that the Chechen trace was skilfully fabricated. No one from the people who organized the bombings was found, and no one actually was looking for them". He then was asked by Vladimir Kara-Murza if he believes that several key members of his commission, and even Boris Berezovskiy and Boris Nemtsov who "knew quite a few things about the bombings" were killed to prevent the independent investigation. Kovalev responded: "I cannot state with full confidence that the explosions were organized by the authorities. Although it's clear that the explosions were useful for them, useful for future President Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, because he had just promised to "waste in the outhouse" (as he said) everyone who had any relation to terrorism. It was politically beneficial for him to scare people with terrorism. That is not proven. But what can be stated with full confidence is this: the investigation of both the Moscow explosions and the so-called "exercises" in Ryazan is trumped up. There can be various possibilities. It seems to me, that Ryazan should have been the next explosion, but I cannot prove that."

Alleged Russian government involvement
According to David Satter, Yuri Felshtinsky, Alexander Litvinenko, Vladimir Pribylovsky and Boris Kagarlitsky, the bombings were a successful false flag operation coordinated by the Russian state security services to win public support for a new full-scale war in Chechnya and to bring Putin to power. Some of them described the bombings as typical "active measures" practised by the KGB in the past. The war in Chechnya boosted Prime Minister and former FSB Director Vladimir Putin's popularity, and brought the pro-war Unity Party to the State Duma and Putin to the presidency within a few months.

In February 2000, the US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright stated they have not seen any evidence that ties the bombings to Chechnya.

During the testimony of David Satter in the United States House of Representatives, he stated that:
With Yeltsin and his family facing possible criminal prosecution, however, a plan was put into motion to put in place a successor who would guarantee that Yeltsin and his family would be safe from prosecution and the criminal division of property in the country would not be subject to reexamination. For "Operation Successor" to succeed, however, it was necessary to have a massive provocation. In my view, this provocation was the bombing in September 1999 of the apartment building bombings in Moscow, Buinaksk, and Volgodonsk. In the aftermath of these attacks, which claimed 300 lives, a new war was launched against Chechnya. Putin, the newly appointed prime minister who was put in charge of that war, achieved overnight popularity. Yeltsin resigned early. Putin was elected president and his first act was to guarantee Yeltsin immunity from prosecution.

According to a reconstruction of the events by Felshtinsky and Pribylovsky:
 The bombings in Buynaksk were carried out by a team of twelve GRU officers who were sent to Dagestan and supervised by the head of GRU's 14th Directorate General Nikolai Kostechko. That version was partly based on a testimony by Aleksey Galkin. The bombing in Buynaksk was conducted by the GRU to avoid an "interagency conflict between the FSB and the Ministry of Defense".
 In Moscow, Volgodonsk and Ryazan, the attacks were organized by the FSB through a chain of command that included director of the counter-terrorism department General German Ugryumov, FSB operatives Maxim Lazovsky, Vladimir Romanovich, Ramazan Dyshekov and others. Achemez Gochiyayev, Tatyana Korolyeva, and Alexander Karmishin rented warehouses that received shipments of hexogen disguised as sugar and did not know that the explosives were delivered.
 Adam Dekkushev, Krymshamkhalov, and Timur Batchayev were recruited by FSB agents who presented themselves as "Chechen separatists" to deliver explosives to Volgodonsk and Moscow.
 Names and the fate of FSB agents who planted the bomb in the city of Ryazan remain unknown.

Support

Historians, journalists and politicians
The view about the bombings being organized and perpetrated by Russian state security services was originally put forward by journalist David Satter and historians Yuri Felshtinsky and Vladimir Pribylovsky, in co-authorship with Alexander Litvinenko. It was later supported by a number of historians. Amy Knight, a historian of the KGB, wrote that it was "abundantly clear" that the FSB was responsible for carrying out the attacks and that Vladimir Putin's "guilt seems clear," since it was inconceivable that the FSB would have done so without the sanction of Putin, the agency's former director and by then Prime Minister of Russia. In her book Putin's Kleptocracy, historian Karen Dawisha summarized evidence related to the bombings and concluded that "to blow up your own innocent and sleeping people in your capital city is an action almost unthinkable. Yet the evidence that the FSB was at least involved in planting a bomb in Ryazan is incontrovertible." According to Timothy Snyder, "it seemed possible" that the perpetrators of the apartment bombings were FSB officers. David Satter considered the bombings as a political provocation by the Russian secret services that was similar to the burning of the Reichstag.

This view has been also supported by investigative journalists. In 2008, British journalist Edward Lucas concluded in his book The New Cold War: Putin's Russia and the Threat to the West that "The weight of evidence so far supports the grimmest interpretation: that the attacks were a ruthlessly planned stunt to create a climate of panic and fear in which Putin would quickly become the country's indisputable leader, as indeed he did." In the September 2009 issue of GQ, veteran war correspondent Scott Anderson wrote about on Putin's role in the Russian apartment bombings, based in part on his interviews with Mikhail Trepashkin The journal owner, Condé Nast, then took extreme measures to prevent an article by Anderson from appearing in the Russian media, both physically and in translation.

Former Russian State Security Council chief Alexandr Lebed in his 29 September 1999 interview with Le Figaro said he was almost convinced that the government organised the terrorist acts. Andrei Illarionov, a former key economic adviser to the Russian president, said that FSB involvement "is not a theory, it is a fact. There is no other element that could have organized the bombings except for the FSB." Later Lebed's public relations staff claimed that he was quoted out of the context.

Russian military analyst Pavel Felgenhauer noted that "The FSB accused Khattab and Gochiyaev, but oddly they did not point the finger at Chechen president Aslan Maskhadov's regime, which is what the war was launched against."

Some US politicians have commented that they consider credible the allegations about Russian state security services as the actual organizers of the bombings. In 2003, U.S. senator John McCain said that "It was during Mr. Putin's tenure as Prime Minister in 1999 that he launched the Second Chechen War following the Moscow apartment bombings. There remain credible allegations that Russia's FSB had a hand in carrying out these attacks. Mr. Putin ascended to the presidency in 2000 by pointing a finger at the Chechens for committing these crimes, launching a new military campaign in Chechnya, and riding a frenzy of public anger into office."

On 11 January 2017, senator Marco Rubio raised the issue of the 1999 bombings during the confirmation hearings for Rex Tillerson. According to senator Rubio, "there's [an] incredible  body of reporting, open source and other, that this was all—all those bombings were part of a black flag operation on the part of the FSB." On 10 January 2018, senator Ben Cardin of the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee released a report entitled "Putin's Asymmetric Assault on Democracy in Russia and Europe: Implications for U.S. National Security". According to the report, "no credible evidence has been presented by the Russian authorities linking Chechen terrorists, or anyone else, to the Moscow bombings."

According to Satter, all four bombings that occurred had a similar "signature" which indicated that the explosives had been carefully prepared, a mark of skilled specialists. There is also no explanation as to how the terrorists were able to obtain tons of hexogen explosive and transport it to various locations in Russia; hexogen is produced in one plant in Perm Oblast for whose security the central FSB is responsible. The culprits would also have needed to organise nine explosions (the four that occurred and the five attempted bombings reported by the authorities) in different cities in a two-week period. Satter's estimate for the time required for target plan development, site visits, explosives preparation, renting space at the sites and transporting explosives to the sites was four to four and a half months.

In a speech to the Oxford Union on 12th March 2022, former MI6 officer Christopher Steele voiced support for the idea that the bombings were a false flag operation conducted by Russian security services in order to justify the war in Chechnya.

Books and films
The theory of Russian government involvement has been supported in a number of books and movies on the subject.

David Satter, a senior fellow of the Hudson Institute, authored two books Darkness at Dawn: The Rise of the Russian Criminal State and The Less You Know, The Better You Sleep: Russia's Road to Terror and Dictatorship under Yeltsin and Putin (published by Yale University Press in 2003 and 2016) where he scrutinized the events and came to the conclusion that the bombings were organized by Russian state security services.

In 2002, former FSB officer Alexander Litvinenko and historian Yuri Felshtinsky published a book Blowing up Russia: Terror from within. According to authors the bombings and other terrorist acts have been committed by Russian security services to justify the Second Chechen War and to bring Vladimir Putin to power.

In another book, Lubyanka Criminal Group, Litvinenko and Alexander Goldfarb described the transformation of the FSB into a criminal and terrorist organization, including conducting the bombings.  Former GRU analyst and historian Viktor Suvorov said that the book describes "a leading criminal group that provides "protection" for all other organized crime in the country and which continues the criminal war against their own people", like their predecessors NKVD and KGB. He added: "The book proves: Lubyanka [the KGB headquarters] was taken over by enemies of the people. ... If Putin's team can not disprove the facts provided by Litvinenko, Putin must shoot himself. Patrushev and all other leadership of Lubyanka Criminal Group must follow his example."

Alexander Goldfarb and Marina Litvinenko published a book Death of a Dissident. They asserted that the murder of Mr. Litvinenko was "the most compelling proof" of the FSB involvement theory.  According to the book, the murder of Litvinenko "gave credence to all his previous theories, delivering justice for the tenants of the bombed apartment blocks, the Moscow theater-goers, Sergei Yushenkov, Yuri Shchekochikhin, and Anna Politkovskaya, and the half-exterminated nation of Chechnya, exposing their killers for the whole world to see."

A PBS Frontline documentary on Vladimir Putin also mentioned the theory and FSB involvement, citing the quick removal of rubble and bodies from the bombing scenes before any investigation could take place, the discovery of the Ryazan bomb, the deaths of several people who had attempted to investigate the bombings, as well as the defused Ryazan bomb being made of Russian military explosives and detonators.

A documentary film Assassination of Russia was made in 2000 by two French producers who had previously worked on NTV's Sugar of Ryazan program.

A documentary Nedoverie ("Disbelief") about the bombing controversy made by Russian director Andrei Nekrasov was premiered at the 2004 Sundance Film Festival. The film chronicles the story of Tatyana and Alyona Morozova, the two Russian-American sisters, who had lost their mother in the attack, and decided to find out who did it. His next film on the subject was Rebellion: the Litvinenko Case. The film doesn't intend to investigate the Litvinenko murder, rather than that, its goal is to put the case into a wider context of the events unfolding in post-Soviet Russia.

Yuli Dubov, author of The Big Slice, wrote a novel The Lesser Evil, based on the bombings. The main characters of the story are Platon (Boris Berezovsky) and Larry (Badri Patarkatsishvili). They struggle against an evil KGB officer, Old man (apparently inspired by the legendary Philipp Bobkov), who brings another KGB officer, Fedor Fedorovich (Vladimir Putin) to power by staging a series of apartment bombings.

Criticism
In March 2000, Putin dismissed the allegations of FSB involvement in the bombings as "delirious nonsense." "There are no people in the Russian secret services who would be capable of such crime against their own people. The very allegation is immoral," he said. An FSB spokesman said that "Litvinenko's evidence cannot be taken seriously by those who are investigating the bombings". According to Strobe Talbott who was a United States Deputy Secretary of State during the events, "there was no evidence to support" the "conspiracy theory, although Russian public opinion did indeed solidify behind Putin in his determination to carry out a swift, decisive counteroffensive."

According to Russian investigative journalist Andrei Soldatov, "From the start, it seemed that the Kremlin was determined to suppress all discussion ... When Alexander Podrabinek, a Russian human rights activist, tried to import copies of Litvinenko's and Felshtinsky's Blowing up Russia in 2003, they were confiscated by the FSB. Trepashkin himself, acting as a lawyer for two relatives of the victims of the blast, was unable to obtain information he requested and was entitled to see by law". However, Soldatov believed that the obstruction might reflect "'paranoia' rather than guilt on the part of the authorities". Consequently, Soldatov argued, that paranoia has produced the very conspiracy theories that the Russian Government intended to eradicate. In their book The New Nobility, Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan believe that the Ryazan incident had actually been a training exercise. According to the authors, such exercises are typical for Vympel, a unit of the FSB whose mission is to verify the efficacy of counterterrorism measures at sites such as nuclear plants. In authors' opinion, the book Blowing Up Russia by Felshtinsky and Litvinenko contained no new evidence against the FSB, and claims by Trepashkin were highly dubious. Soldatov and Borogan noted that the main point of allegations against the FSB was that Achemez Gochiyaev was an innocent businessman, who was made a scapegoat by the FSB and falsely accused of perpetrating the bombings. However, according to Soldatov and Borogan, Gochiyaev was a leader of a local Islamist group since the mid-1990s, and Dekkushev and Krymshamkhalov were members of the same group called "Muslim Society No. 3". According to Russian state security services, the group was founded in 1995, counted more than 500 members by 2001, and was responsible for a series of terrorist attacks in the 2000s. Soldatov and Borogan have also noted a partial admission of guilt by Dekkushev and Krymshamkhalov during a trial in 2003.

According to Robert Bruce Ware, the simplest explanation for the apartment block blasts is that they were perpetrated by Islamist extremists from North Caucasus who sought retribution for the attacks of the Federal forces against the Islamist enclave in the central Dagestan, known as the Islamic Djamaat. Ware points out that that would explain the timing of the attacks, and why there were no attacks after the date on which the insurgents were driven from Dagestan. It would also explain why no Chechen claimed responsibility. Also it would explain Basayev's reference to responsibility of Dagestanis and it would be consistent with the initial vow of Khattab to set off the bombs blasting through Russian cities. Ware also criticizes an argument that David Satter and Rajan Menon use to support the view of Russian security services responsibility for the bombings—that the apartment block explosions involved hexogen, which is a highly controlled substance in Russia and is extraordinarily difficult to obtain. According to Ware, that's not the case, as sizable amounts of hexogen (as well as other weaponry) were readily available in Dagestan. As a proof, Ware cites the police reports of the program for voluntary surrender of arms in Dagestan which ran for a couple of months in 2003 and revealed large quantities of hexogen and ammonite.

Max Abrahms, a researcher who is critical of the efficacy of terrorism in general, argued that the bombings were detrimental for the self-determination of Chechnya. He noted that the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria has achieved a de facto independence from Russia after the Khasavyurt Accord, with two thirds of Russian citizens favoring the separation of the breakaway republic. However, the public opinion in Russia has changed dramatically after the bombings. Most Russians started "baying for blood" and strongly supporting the war with Chechnya that became inevitable and led to the loss of the independence as a result of the bombings. According to Abrahms, this supports his theory that attacks by terrorist organizations have been always counterproductive for the perpetrators and therefore gave rise to conspiracy theories about alternative perpetrators who actually benefited from the events.

Political scientist Ronald R. Pope in his review of David Satter's book Darkness at Dawn cited Kirill Pankratov's criticism, published as a contribution to Johnson's Russia List. Regarding the apartment bombings, Pankratov argued that the Russian authorities did not need an additional justification to wage a war against Chechnya, in view of high-profile kidnappings and the invasion of Dagestan. One of his other arguments was that the theory of FSB responsibility for the bombings implied that it had been able to keep the lid on the operation much more effectively than the FSB had been able to execute it.

Political scientist Brian Taylor believes that there is too little evidence to decide which version of the events is correct, as the available evidence is fragmentary and controversial. Taylor identifies several reasons to doubt the conspiracy version. First, while the bombings did propel Putin to power, that alone is not proof that this was the goal of the attacks. Second, there was a casus belli even without the bombings—namely, the invasion of Dagestan and multiple kidnappings in the region in the preceding years. Third, if the goal of the bombings was to justify a new war, one or two bombings in Moscow would be more than adequate; any subsequent bombings would be potentially dangerous, because they would increase the risk to expose the conspiracy. Fourth, a complex plot involving multiple players and a large number of FSB operatives could not be kept secret. According to Taylor, it is plausible that the FSB "simulated" an attack in Ryazan in order to claim credit for "uncovering" it; however, the plot was foiled by vigilant local denizens and law enforcement personnel, and the "training exercise" justification was improvised after the plot failed.

Yuri Luzhkov, Mayor of Moscow at the time of the bombings, believed that the bombings in Moscow were facilitated by new legislation that established freedom of movement within the country, which was restricted prior to 1993. According to Luzhkov, the law made it possible for Chechen terrorists to bring weapons to Moscow and store them there, as well as purchase vehicles and provide housing for their personnel who had arrived in Moscow. According to Luzhkov, "for three months, after having arrived in Moscow, a terrorist could live wherever he wanted and stay with anyone, without notifying the police", which allowed the terrorists to prepare the bombings.

Sealing information by the US government
On 14 July 2016, David Satter filed Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests with the State Department, the CIA and the FBI, inquiring about documents pertaining to the apartment bombings, the Ryazan incident and persons who tried to investigate the bombings and were killed. The agencies acknowledged receipt of the requests, but Satter received no other response within the statutory time limit. On 29 August 2016, Satter filed suit against the Department of Justice and other agencies involved. However, the CIA refused even to acknowledge the existence of any relevant records because doing so would reveal "very specific aspects of the Agency's intelligence interest, or lack thereof, in the Russian bombings."

The State Department responded with a redacted copy of a cable from the U.S. embassy in Moscow. According to the cable, on 24 March 2000, a former member of Russian intelligence services told a U.S. diplomat that the real story about the Ryazan incident could never be known because it "would destroy the country." The informant said the FSB had "a specially trained team of men" whose mission was "to carry out this type of urban warfare". The informant has also said that Viktor Cherkesov, the FSB's first deputy director and an interrogator of Soviet dissidents was "exactly the right person to order and carry out such actions."

David Satter made a renewed FOIA request, and on 22 March 2017, State Department responded that documents concerning the U.S. assessment of the bombings would remain secret. A draft Vaughn index, a document used by agencies to justify withholdings in FOIA cases, said that the release of that information had "the potential to inject friction into or cause serious damage" to relationships with the Russian government that were "vital to U.S. national security".

On 16 March 2018, the case Satter v. Department of Justice was closed.

Impact on survivors
Multiple survivors of the bombings have developed disabilities, with many of them diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder. In 2006 Irina Khalai, a survivor of the Volgodonsk bombing, founded the NGO "Volga-Don", which promotes legislation for the legal recognition of victims of terrorist attacks.

Chronology of events
 5 August 1999: Shamil Basayev enters western Dagestan from Chechnya, starting the War of Dagestan
 9 August 1999: Stepashin is dismissed and Putin becomes prime minister
 22 August 1999: The forces of Shamil Basayev withdraw back into Chechnya
 25 August 1999: Russian jets make bombing runs against 16 sites in Chechnya
 31 August 1999: Bombing in Moscow, Manezhnaya Square, 29 people are injured
 4 September 1999: Bombing in Buynaksk, 64 people killed, 133 are injured
 9 September 1999: Bombing in Moscow, Pechatniki, 94 people are killed, 249 are injured
 13 September 1999: Bombing in Moscow, Kashirskoye highway, 118 are killed
 13 September 1999: A bomb is defused and a warehouse containing several tons of explosives and six timing devices is found in Moscow
 13 September 1999: Russian Duma speaker Gennadiy Seleznyov makes an announcement about the bombing of an apartment building in the city of Volgodonsk that only takes place three days later
 16 September 1999: Bombing in Volgodonsk, 18 are killed, 288 injured
 23 September 1999: An apartment bomb is found in the city of Ryazan. Vladimir Rushailo announces that police prevented a terrorist act. Vladimir Putin praises the vigilance of the citizens and calls for the air bombing of Grozny
 23–24 September 1999: According to David Satter, FSB agents who planted the bomb in Ryazan are arrested by local police
 24 September 1999: Nikolai Patrushev declares that the incident was a training exercise and frees the FSB agents
 24 September 1999: Second Chechen War begins

See also
 List of people allegedly involved in Russian apartment bombings
 List of deaths related to Russian apartment bombings

References

Bibliography

External links

Islamic terrorism in Russia
Explosions in 1999
Censorship in Russia
False flag operations
Vladimir Putin
Building and structure collapses in Russia
Chechen–Russian conflict
Events in Moscow
Terrorist incidents in Russia in 1999
Mass murder in 1999
20th-century mass murder in Russia
Conflicts in 1999
Massacres in Russia
Murder in Moscow
Federal Security Service
Second Chechen War
Terrorist incidents in Moscow
1999 in Moscow
September 1999 events in Russia
Building bombings in Russia
Building and structure collapses caused by fire
1999 murders in Russia

1999 Russian apartment bombings


An Bulbine latifolia in uska species han Liliopsida nga syahan ginhulagway ni Carl von Linné d.y., ngan ginhatag han pagkayana nga asya nga ngaran ni Spreng.. An Bulbine latifolia in nahilalakip ha genus nga Bulbine, ngan familia nga Xanthorrhoeaceae.

Subspecies

Ini nga species ginbahin ha masunod nga subspecies:

 B. l. curvata
 B. l. latifolia

Mga kasarigan

Mga sumpay ha gawas

Bulbine

Bulbine latifolia


Das Haus in der Wetzlarer Straße 14 im Stadtteil Hermannstein in Wetzlar ist ein denkmalgeschütztes Wohngebäude, das Mitte des 18. Jahrhunderts errichtet wurde.

Das giebelständig zur Straße ausgerichtete Gebäude wurde zweigeschossig in Fachwerk ausgeführt. Es ist Teil einer L-förmigen Hofanlage, die auf einem schmalen Grundstück erbaut wurde, 1951 wurde hofseitig ein Anbau angefügt. Während das Fachwerk des Erdgeschosses ausschließlich der Konstruktion des Hauses dient, finden sich an den Eck- und Bundständern des Obergeschosses Mannfiguren, die mit geraden Fußstreben, gegenläufigen Fußbändern und kleinen Winkelhölzern ausgeführt wurden.

Weblinks

Hermannstein
Wohngebäude im Lahn-Dill-Kreis
Kulturdenkmal in Wetzlar
Fachwerkhaus in Wetzlar

Wetzlarer Straße 14 (Hermannstein)


Um assento de avião é um assento em um avião comercial em que os passageiros são acomodados durante a viagem. Esses assentos são geralmente dispostos em fileiras que atravessam a fuselagem do avião. Um diagrama de tais assentos em uma aeronave é chamado de mapa de assentos de aeronave.

Características e comodidades
Os assentos são presos a trilhos embaixo do piso que correm ao longo da fuselagem da aeronave. Se a companhia aérea quiser reconfigurar os assentos, esta é uma operação menor. Para segurança dos passageiros, todos os assentos das companhias aéreas são equipados com cintos de segurança.

Comodidades básicas

Os assentos são frequentemente equipados com outras comodidades. Assentos de avião podem ser equipados com um mecanismo de reclinação para maior conforto dos passageiros, reclinando mecanicamente, geralmente na classe econômica e na primeira classe e classe executiva de curta distância, ou eletricamente (geralmente na primeira classe e classe executiva de longa distância). A maioria das aeronaves também possui bandejas para comer e ler, seja no encosto que se dobra para formar uma pequena mesa na maioria dos assentos da classe econômica, ou dentro do apoio de braço que se dobra na maioria dos assentos da primeira classe, classe executiva, anteparo e fila de saída. A maioria dos assentos das companhias aéreas também possui um bolso que pode conter uma revista de bordo e instruções de segurança.

Em aeronaves de pequeno e curto curso, ou em transportadoras de baixo custo, algumas dessas comodidades podem não estar instaladas. Por exemplo, em várias aeronaves, a Ryanair instalou assentos não reclináveis sem bolsos de assento com os manuais de segurança costurados no encosto do assento. Mesmo em aviões com assentos reclináveis, alguns assentos podem ter uma reclinação restrita ou nenhuma reclinação. Normalmente, esta será a fileira traseira da cabine, onde uma antepara traseira bloqueia a reclinação, ou assentos imediatamente à frente da saída de emergência, onde um assento reclinado pode restringir o acesso à saída de emergência, criando um risco potencial de segurança. Sites independentes de avaliação de assentos, como o SeatGuru muitas vezes advertem os passageiros contra esses assentos. Durante a decolagem e o pouso, a tripulação pede aos passageiros que coloquem seus assentos em uma posição "vertical", não reclinada, e que levantem e guardem suas mesas de bandeja.

Comodidades avançadas

Eletrônicos
Os assentos podem ser equipados com portas de alimentação (soquetes EmPower, AC, DC ou USB) para pequenos aparelhos elétricos e portas para fones de ouvido para entretenimento de áudio. A maioria das companhias aéreas de serviço completo também inclui telas de vídeo pessoais como parte do sistema de entretenimento a bordo em aeronaves de longo curso; mas algumas aeronaves usam um sistema de traga seu próprio dispositivo, onde os passageiros usam seus próprios dispositivos. As telas são geralmente touchscreens ou podem ser controladas por monofones remotos. Na economia e na economia premium, a tela normalmente fica no encosto, mas em um assento na primeira fila ou na cabine premium, eles podem precisar ser retirados de um compartimento especial após a decolagem e, em seguida, devolvidos para o pouso.

Apoios de cabeça ajustáveis
A maioria das aeronaves de longa distância, e aeronaves de curta distância em algumas companhias aéreas, possui assentos com apoios de cabeça ajustáveis em todas as classes, permitindo que o passageiro ajuste o apoio de cabeça para maior conforto.

Apoio lombar ajustável
O suporte lombar eletricamente ajustável é encontrado na maioria dos assentos da primeira classe e da classe executiva de longa distância. Raramente, a classe econômica também pode incluir um suporte lombar mecanicamente ajustável em algumas aeronaves de longo curso. No entanto, com a tendência de assentos finos na classe econômica, essa comodidade praticamente desapareceu da maioria das novas instalações de assentos da classe econômica.

Massagem
Alguns assentos da classe executiva, como o Recaro CL 4420, possuem um recurso de massagem integrado.

Assento deitado de cama plana
Algumas cabines da classe executiva apresentam assentos que se reclinam em uma posição plana inclinada. Estes assentos "deitados em ângulo" permitem maior conforto do que os assentos reclináveis tradicionais, mas são menos confortáveis do que os assentos de cama totalmente horizontais.

A maioria das cabines internacionais de primeira classe e um número crescente de cabines internacionais de classe executiva apresentam assentos que se reclinam em uma posição horizontal completa, formando uma cama.

Assentos econômicos "slimline"
Algumas companhias aéreas estão introduzindo novos assentos "slimline" na classe econômica. Embora "slimline" não seja um termo definido, os assentos finos têm menos estofamento nas costas. O espaçamento e a largura dos assentos na classe econômica também diminuíram. Em 1985, nenhuma das quatro principais operadoras dos EUA oferecia um assento com menos de 19 polegadas de largura. Desde o início do século 21 até 2018, a largura média do assento diminuiu de 18,5 para 17 polegadas, e às vezes tão baixa quanto 16,1 polegadas.

Assentos estreitos pesam menos do que os assentos de tamanho normal e supostamente permitem que as companhias aéreas aumentem a capacidade sem afetar significativamente o conforto dos passageiros. Muitos passageiros, no entanto, expressaram descontentamento com esses assentos. Além disso, o Departamento de Transportes dos EUA (DOT) começou a explorar as questões de segurança associadas ao aumento da capacidade da aeronave e à redução da distância entre os assentos resultante da instalação de assentos "slimline". Em uma audiência de 14 de abril de 2015 do Comitê Consultivo do DOT para Proteção ao Consumidor de Aviação, Cynthia Corbett, investigadora do Instituto Médico Aeroespacial Civil da Administração Federal de Aviação (FAA), discutiu preocupações sobre a evacuação de emergência de aeronaves de maior capacidade. O grupo de cidadãos "Flyers Rights" abriu um processo contra a FAA em 2017, argumentando que a agência tinha a responsabilidade de evitar que os assentos ficassem tão apertados que se tornassem um problema de segurança em caso de emergência.

Este tipo de assento foi lançado pela Recaro, mas vários outros fabricantes, como Weber Aircraft LLC e B/E Aerospace, também introduziram seus próprios assentos finos. Esses assentos podem ou não apresentar apoios de cabeça móveis e, geralmente, não possuem apoio lombar ajustável.

Uma inovação mais recente da Zodiac Seats U.S. (anteriormente Weber Aircraft LLC) é um assento articulado, onde o assento se move para frente, além do encosto do assento inclinado para trás. Tais assentos foram instalados em algumas aeronaves da Aer Lingus, Delta Air Lines, Emirates, American Airlines, Avianca, entre outras. Este assento acabou sendo adotado por concorrentes como B/E Aerospace e Recaro.

Layout

As cabines de companhias aéreas são frequentemente classificadas como de corpo estreito se houver um único corredor com assentos de cada lado, ou de corpo largo se houver dois corredores com um bloco de assentos entre eles, além dos assentos laterais.

O número de assentos lado a lado é afetado pela largura da aeronave. Em aeronaves muito pequenas, como o Beechcraft 1900, existem apenas assentos individuais em cada lado do corredor (1 + 1 assentos). As aeronaves de fuselagem estreita mais largas, como a família Airbus A320 e a aeronave Boeing 737, têm seis assentos lado a lado em um layout 3+3. Também existem layouts assimétricos, exemplos incluindo o Embraer Regional Jet que tem 1+2 assentos, enquanto as aeronaves Douglas DC-9, Sukhoi Superjet 100 e Airbus A220 normalmente possuem 2+3 assentos.

Em aeronaves de fuselagem larga, o bloco central de assentos entre os corredores pode ter até 5 assentos em aviões como o layout da maioria das aeronaves McDonnell Douglas DC-10 e algumas aeronaves Boeing 777, embora a Boeing recomenda o 3+3+3 sobre o esquema 2+5+2. Aviões muito largos, como o Boeing 747 ou o Airbus A380, têm dez assentos lado a lado, normalmente em um layout 3+4+3, embora esse layout também seja usado às vezes como um layout de alta densidade em aeronaves normalmente com nove assentos lado a lado, como como o 777 ou DC-10. Recentemente, as companhias aéreas adotaram dez assentos lado a lado nas aeronaves Boeing 777-300.

Embora existam algumas exceções, a maioria dos assentos de aeronaves comerciais são voltados para a frente e os assentos de aeronaves militares são frequentemente voltados para trás. A Southwest Airlines oferecia anteriormente alguns assentos voltados para trás em algumas aeronaves, mas esse esquema acabou. Assentos voltados para trás também são comuns em jatos executivos, para fornecer um layout do tipo conferência. British Airways, United Airlines e American Airlines também têm assentos voltados para trás em seu Club World (exceto no A350), United First no doméstico 777-200 (selecionado) e Business Class Cabins, respectivamente. Tem sido argumentado que os assentos voltados para trás são mais seguros porque, em caso de colisão, a desaceleração repentina impulsionará o passageiro para um assento voltado para trás em vez de sair dele, o que significa que a força é distribuída por todo o encosto do assento, em vez de das tiras do cinto de segurança. O argumento contra esses assentos foi baseado no conforto, segurança e custo dos passageiros. Pode-se argumentar que os passageiros que desejam o layout natural dos assentos voltados para a frente podem se sentir desconfortáveis com um layout para trás. No aspecto de segurança, o argumento tem sido que durante um acidente de avião, detritos, como bagagens, voarão para frente na cabine, possivelmente nos passageiros em assentos voltados para trás.

Muitas companhias aéreas fornecem mapas de suas configurações de assentos nas várias aeronaves que voam. Para companhias aéreas que não possuem mapas de assentos, sites como o SeatGuru mostram mapas de assentos para as companhias aéreas mencionadas.

Arranjo
Assentos de janela estão localizados nas laterais da aeronave e geralmente ao lado de uma janela, embora algumas aeronaves tenham fileiras de assentos onde falta uma janela. Os assentos de janela são preferidos pelos passageiros que desejam ter uma vista ou uma parede na qual possam se apoiar. Os passageiros em assentos adjacentes ao corredor têm a vantagem de poder sair do assento sem ter que passar por cima dos outros passageiros e ter um corredor no qual podem esticar as pernas. Se um bloco de assentos tiver três ou mais assentos, também haverá assentos do meio que são impopulares porque o passageiro fica entre dois outros passageiros sem vantagens de assentos na janela ou no corredor. Os assentos do meio geralmente são reservados por último.

Tamanho
Ao avaliar o tamanho, e conforto, de um assento, os principais termos usados são pitch e largura.

Foi relatado em 2016 que a distância média entre as fileiras de assentos (pitch) havia diminuído para 79 centímetros (31 pol), de mais de 89 centímetros (35 pol), enquanto a largura média do assento havia diminuído para 43 centímetros (17 pol) de 46 centímetros (18 polegadas) nas duas décadas anteriores.

Inclinação do assento
A distância entre os assentos é definida como o espaço entre um ponto em um assento e o mesmo ponto no assento à sua frente. Em quase todos os casos, a distância entre os assentos aumenta com a classe de viagem (econômica, executiva, primeira etc.). Para muitas operadoras, a distância entre os assentos na classe econômica é de 74 a 81 cm (29 a 32 polegadas). O espaço para as pernas depende da inclinação do assento e da espessura do encosto. As companhias aéreas alegaram que uma redução do espaçamento dos assentos pode ser compensada por um design mais fino do encosto.

Os assentos da classe executiva da American Airlines em seus antigos Boeing 767-200 eram de 62 polegadas (160 cm), o maior em qualquer classe executiva de curta distância. A US Airways, agora fundida com a American Airlines, tem assentos flatbed de primeira classe em seus Airbus A330-300 com uma distância entre assentos de 94 polegadas (2 polegadas a menos de 8 pés) ou 240 cm (2,4 metros).

Em 2010, a distância entre assentos em companhias aéreas de baixo custo poderia ser tão baixa quanto 28 polegadas (71 cm) no caso da Spirit Airlines, mas normalmente era de 29 polegadas (74 cm) ou 30 polegadas (76 cm).

Largura do assento

Há alguma ambiguidade sobre o significado de "largura do assento". Pode ser considerada como a largura delimitada pelos apoios de braço de cada lado, ou seja, a largura disponível para sentar, ou como a distância do ponto médio de um apoio de braço ao ponto médio do próximo, um número maior pela largura de um apoio de braço, e a largura disponível para os ombros, é também um terço da largura de um bloco de três assentos idênticos. Pensa-se que a maioria das companhias aéreas utiliza o primeiro destes números. Na classe econômica, essa largura era tipicamente de 43 a 46 centímetros (17 a 18 polegadas) em 2003.

Em 2013, a Airbus disse que, para voos de longa distância, deveria haver um padrão da indústria para uma largura mínima de assento de 18 polegadas em cabines econômicas, mas sua rival Boeing argumentou que cabia às companhias aéreas decidir. As pessoas estão ficando mais largas: o peso do homem americano médio na casa dos 40 anos aumentou 10% nos 30 anos desde a introdução do Boeing 747 em 1970. O assento mais estreito de 17 polegadas de largura preferido por A Boeing é um legado da década de 1950, quando os jatos de passageiros foram introduzidos pela primeira vez. Nas décadas de 1970 e 1980 com a introdução do Boeing 747 e dos primeiros jatos Airbus, 18 polegadas se tornaram padrão para voos de longa distância. Os assentos foram ampliados para 18,5 polegadas com o Boeing 777 na década de 1990 e o A380 superjumbo na década de 2000. Muitas companhias aéreas estão adotando assentos mais leves de 17 polegadas em seus Boeing 777 e 787 e assentos de 18 polegadas para A350s. Embora por quase 20 anos, a configuração padrão na parte traseira de um Boeing 777 fosse de nove assentos por fileira, em 2012 quase 70% da maior versão desse avião foi entregue com 10 assentos lado a lado. Quando a Airbus apresentou seu A380, ele oferecia 10 assentos lado a lado, dando a cada passageiro até 19 polegadas de espaço no quadril. Em 2013, dez companhias aéreas voaram Airbus A330 com nove assentos de 16,7 polegadas em cada fileira, em vez dos oito para os quais foi projetado. Um relatório de pesquisa encomendado pela Airbus concluiu que uma polegada extra na largura do assento melhora a qualidade do sono em 53%.

Houve uma tendência decidida para aumentar a densidade de assentos econômicos no século XXI. Em 1985, nenhuma das quatro principais operadoras americanas oferecia um assento com menos de 19 polegadas de largura. Desde o início do século XXI até 2018, a largura média do assento diminuiu de 18,5 para 17 polegadas e, às vezes, tão baixa quanto 16,1 polegadas.

Cadeira de corredor

Uma "cadeira de corredor" de avião é um assento móvel fornecido pelas companhias aéreas para passageiros que necessitam do uso de uma cadeira de rodas. Enquanto a maioria dos trens, ônibus e outras formas de transporte público têm espaço para a cadeira de rodas do passageiro e uma rampa ou elevador auxiliar para embarque, os corredores dos aviões são muito estreitos para cadeiras de rodas convencionais. A cadeira de corredor oferece ao passageiro cadeirante mobilidade assistida no embarque e desembarque, e movimentação em voo dentro da cabine, como até o banheiro.

Material

Os assentos das companhias aéreas são projetados para serem leves, mas ao mesmo tempo fortes e resistentes ao fogo, além de levar em consideração o conforto dos passageiros. Um projeto típico é uma estrutura de alumínio com blocos de espuma de poliuretano presos a ela. Em alguns casos, uma camada de tecido resistente ao fogo, por exemplo Kevlar ou Nomex, passa por cima disso, e no topo há uma camada de tecido ou couro.

Os assentos de couro são mais caros do que os assentos de tecido tradicionais. Mesmo assim, várias companhias aéreas, incluindo transportadoras de baixo custo , escolhem o couro não apenas para apresentar um produto mais "luxuoso", mas também porque esses assentos são mais fáceis de limpar e evitam que líquidos derramados penetrem no estofamento para reduzir os problemas de retorno.

Cor
Nos primórdios da aviação, os assentos das companhias aéreas eram tipicamente de cores suaves e terrosas, como marrom claro e cinza, destinadas a acalmar os passageiros. Durante a década de 1970, cores mais brilhantes, como vermelho e laranja, tornaram-se mais comuns. Depois disso, tons de azul e cinza, com um tom mais empresarial, tornaram-se a escolha mais comum. No entanto, algumas companhias aéreas como a Austrian Airlines, Emirates e Singapore Airlines ainda usam cores suaves nos assentos.

Auxiliar

Geralmente, cada posição individual do banco, exceto os últimos na parte traseira da cabine, tem um pequeno conjunto de controles auxiliares embutidos no encosto do banco para o passageiro diretamente atrás do banco. O assento em si normalmente contém uma pequena mesa extensível dobrável, que deve ser dobrada durante a decolagem e o pouso, e, na maioria das aeronaves internacionais de fuselagem larga, uma tela de vídeo LCD diretamente acima da mesa da bandeja (as aeronaves anteriores tinham uma única grande tela de projeção na frente de cada cabine). Diretamente acima do assento; no teto da cabine, está um console para a unidade de atendimento ao passageiro. Os controles no console PSU podem incluir:

 Um bocal de ar condicionado cujo fluxo de ar e orientação podem ser ajustados pelo passageiro. Esse recurso é encontrado na maioria das aeronaves narrowbody, mas muitas companhias aéreas o omitem em muitas aeronaves widebody mais novas, como o Boeing 777.
 Uma luz de leitura (muitas vezes muito semelhante em aparência ao bocal) que pode ser ligada pelo passageiro para obter luz extra, especialmente quando as luzes principais da cabine estão desligadas. Os botões para acender e apagar as luzes geralmente estão localizados diretamente no console superior na maioria das aeronaves de fuselagem estreita, enquanto na maioria das aeronaves de fuselagem larga, os botões geralmente são encontrados junto com os controles de entretenimento a bordo (IFE), que podem estar no braços, os encostos dos bancos ou uma interface de tela sensível ao toque.
 Um botão de chamada, que, quando pressionado, alerta um comissário de bordo para atender os passageiros da fila com o botão pressionado, um sinal de áudio silencioso na cozinha e várias luzes alertam os comissários de bordo. Assim como os botões de luz de leitura, o botão de chamada geralmente está localizado diretamente no console superior na maioria das aeronaves de fuselagem estreita, enquanto eles são encontrados junto com os controles IFE na maioria das aeronaves de fuselagem larga.

 O sinal "aperte o cinto de segurança" que é iluminado durante a decolagem e aterrissagem e durante a turbulência. Aeronaves mais antigas que precedem a proibição de fumar ainda podem ter um sinal de "proibido fumar"; aeronaves mais novas podem ter um sinal de "desligar dispositivos eletrônicos".

Nos assentos da janela há persianas para proteção da luz solar. Os regulamentos exigem que eles estejam abertos durante os pousos e decolagens, para fornecer visibilidade dentro e fora da aeronave em emergências. Algumas companhias aéreas solicitam aos passageiros que mantenham as cortinas das janelas abaixadas, além de silenciar a iluminação da cabine, durante os horários em que a maioria dos passageiros deseja dormir. O Boeing 787 Dreamliner usa janelas eletrocrômicas em vez de tampas de janela. Muitos apoios de braço fornecem dispositivos para reclinar a cadeira, controles de controle para sistemas de entretenimento a bordo. Os cinzeiros, fornecidos universalmente quando era permitido fumar, às vezes ainda são fornecidos para pequenos detritos.

Assentos de avião
Componentes da cabine de avião

Assento de avião


John Hancock (* 24. Oktober 1824 in Bellefonte, Jackson County, Alabama; † 19. Juli 1893 in Austin, Texas) war ein US-amerikanischer Politiker. Zwischen 1871 und 1885 vertrat er zweimal den Bundesstaat Texas im US-Repräsentantenhaus.

Werdegang
John Hancock besuchte die öffentlichen Schulen seiner Heimat und studierte danach an der University of Tennessee in Knoxville. Nach einem anschließenden Jurastudium und seiner 1846 erfolgten Zulassung als Rechtsanwalt begann er in Austin in diesem Beruf zu arbeiten. Zwischen 1851 und 1855 war er Richter im zweiten Gerichtsbezirk von Texas. Danach praktizierte er wieder als privater Rechtsanwalt. Außerdem wurde er Pflanzer und Viehzüchter. Gleichzeitig schlug er als Mitglied der Demokratischen Partei eine politische Laufbahn ein. In den Jahren 1860 und 1861 saß er als Abgeordneter im Repräsentantenhaus von Texas.

Hancock war ein Gegner der Sezession und weigerte sich nach dem Beitritt des Staates Texas zur Konföderation, den Treueeid auf diesen neuen Staat zu leisten. Daraufhin wurde er aus dem Parlament ausgeschlossen. Danach arbeitete er zunächst als Anwalt. Da er sich weiterhin weigerte, in irgendeiner Form der Konföderation zu dienen, wurde der Druck auf ihn so stark, dass er Texas verlassen musste. Erst nach dem Ende des Bürgerkrieges kehrte er dorthin zurück.

Politisch war Hancock Mitglied der Demokratischen Partei. Im Jahr 1866 war er Delegierter auf einer Versammlung zur Überarbeitung der Verfassung von Texas. Bei den Kongresswahlen des Jahres 1870 wurde er im vierten Wahlbezirk seines Staates in das US-Repräsentantenhaus in Washington, D.C. gewählt, wo er am 4. März 1871 die Nachfolge von Eduard Degener antrat. Nach zwei Wiederwahlen konnte er bis zum 3. März 1877 drei Legislaturperioden im Kongress absolvieren. Seit 1875 vertrat er den fünften Distrikt von Texas. Im Jahr 1876 wurde er von seiner Partei nicht mehr zur Wiederwahl nominiert. 1882 wurde Hancock im neu eingerichteten zehnten Bezirk seines Staates erneut in den Kongress gewählt, wo er zwischen dem 4. März 1883 und dem 3. März 1885 eine weitere Legislaturperiode absolvieren konnte. Im Jahr 1884 kandidierte er nicht mehr.

Nach dem Ende seiner Zeit im US-Repräsentantenhaus praktizierte John Hancock wieder als Anwalt. Er starb am 19. Juli 1893 in Austin.

Weblinks

Mitglied des Repräsentantenhauses der Vereinigten Staaten für Texas
Mitglied des Repräsentantenhauses von Texas
Mitglied der Demokratischen Partei (Vereinigte Staaten)
Richter (Texas)
Rechtsanwalt (Vereinigte Staaten)
US-Amerikaner
Geboren 1824
Gestorben 1893
Mann

John Hancock (Politiker, 1824)


LaSalle/Van Buren es una estación en las líneas Rosa, Naranja, Marrón y Púrpura del Metro de Chicago. La estación se encuentra localizada en 121 West Van Buren Street en Chicago, Illinois. La estación LaSalle/Van Buren fue inaugurada el 3 de octubre de 1897.  La Autoridad de Tránsito de Chicago es la encargada por el mantenimiento y administración de la estación.

Descripción
La estación LaSalle/Van Buren cuenta con dos plataformas laterales y dos vías.

Conexiones
La estación es abastecida por las siguientes conexiones de autobuses:
 Rutas del CTA Buses:
  #1 Indiana/Hyde Park
  #7 Harrison
  #22 Clark
  #24 Wentworth
  #36 Broadway
  #126 Jackson
  #129 West Loop/South Loop
  #130 Museum Campus (en verano solamente)
  #132 Goose Island Express
  #145 Wilson/Michigan Express
  #151 Sheridan

Referencias

Enlaces externos

 Estación LaSalle/Van Buren
 Líneas y estaciones del Metro de Chicago

Estaciones de ferrocarril de Estados Unidos inauguradas en 1897
Estaciones de la línea Rosa (Metro de Chicago)
Estaciones de la línea Púrpura (Metro de Chicago)
Estaciones de la línea Naranja (Metro de Chicago)
Estaciones de la línea Marrón (Metro de Chicago)

LaSalle/Van Buren (Metro de Chicago)


Christina «Tina» Weirather  (Gamprin, Liechtenstein; 24 de mayo de 1989) es una esquiadora liechtensteiniana retirada. Ha ganado 1 Medalla en el Campeonato del Mundo (1 de plata), 2 Copas del Mundo en disciplina de Super Gigante y tiene 9 victorias en la Copa del Mundo de Esquí Alpino (con un total de 41 pódiums).

Es hija de los esquiadores retirados Harti Weirather (de Austria) y Hanni Wenzel (de Liechtenstein), que ambos fueron varias veces Campeones Olímpicos y/o Campeones del Mundo, y que ganaron también varias veces la General y Disciplinas de la Copa del Mundo, con numerosas victorias y pódiums.

El 25 de marzo de 2020 anunció su retirada del esquí profesional a través de la red social Instagram, dado que las medidas de confinamiento impuestas por la pandemia de COVID-19 impidieron realizar una rueda de prensa.

Resultados

Juegos Olímpicos de Invierno
 2006 en Turín, Italia
 Super Gigante: 33.ª

Campeonatos Mundiales
 2005 en Bormio, Italia
 Super Gigante: 31.ª
 2013 en Schladming, Austria
 Descenso: 13.ª
 Eslalon Gigante: 27.ª
 2015 en Vail/Beaver Creek, Estados Unidos
 Eslalon Gigante: 4.ª
 Super Gigante: 6.ª
 Descenso: 11.ª
 2017 en St. Moritz, Suiza
 Super Gigante: 2.ª
 Descenso: 10.ª
 Eslalon Gigante: 19.ª

Copa del Mundo

Clasificación Copa del Mundo

Victorias en la Copa del Mundo (7)
 7 victorias – (1 de Descenso, 5 de Super Gigante y 1 de Eslalon Gigante)
 31 podios – (11 de Descenso, 14 de Super Gigante y 6 de Eslalon Gigante)

Referencias

Enlaces externos

 Perfil de Tina Weirather en la página oficial de la FIS – (en inglés)
 www.tina-weirather.com – página web oficial – (en inglés)

Personas de Vaduz
Esquiadores alpinos
Esquiadores alpinos de Liechtenstein
Personas vivas
Medallistas olímpicos de bronce de Pyeongchang 2018
Medallistas olímpicos de bronce de Liechtenstein
Medallistas olímpicos de bronce de esquí alpino
Esquiadores en los Juegos Olímpicos de Pyeongchang 2018
Liechtensteinianas del siglo XXI
Deportistas femeninas de Liechtenstein
Esquiadoras
Nacidos en Liechtenstein

Tina Weirather


Strekov este o comună slovacă, aflată în districtul Nové Zámky din regiunea Nitra. Localitatea se află la , se întinde pe o suprafață de  și în 2017 număra 1.979 de locuitori.

Istoric
Localitatea Strekov este atestată documentar din 1075.

Note

Legături externe

Localități din Slovacia

Strekov


O Wet'suwet'en     ) é um povo das Primeiras Nações que vive no rio Bulkley e ao redor do Lago Burns, Lago Broman e Lago François no noroeste do Interior Central da Colúmbia Britânica. O endônimo Wet'suwet'en significa "Povo do rio Wa Dzun Kwuh (rio Bulkley)".
Os Wet'suwet'en são um ramo do povo Dakelh ou Carrier e, em combinação com o povo Babine, são chamados de Carrier ocidental.Eles falam Witsuwit'en, um dialeto da Babine-Witsuwit'en, linguagem que, junto com seu idioma irmão Carrier, é um membro da família Athabaskan.

Sua história oral, chamada kungax, narra que sua aldeia ancestral, Dizkle ou Dzilke, ficava rio acima do Bulkley Canyon. Este aglomerado de casas de cedro em ambos os lados do rio foi abandonado, segundo a história oral, devido a um presságio de um desastre iminente. A localização exata da vila foi perdida. O povo gitxsan vizinho da área de Hazelton tem uma história semelhante, embora a aldeia em sua versão se chame Dimlahamid (Temlahan).

Clãs
No sistema de governança tradicional do Wet'suwet'en, existem cinco clãs, que são subdivididos em treze grupos de casas. Cada grupo de casas é liderado por um único chefe da casa e também inclui vários subchefes (também chamados de "chefes de ala"). Os nomes dos chefes hereditários (tanto chefes quanto subchefes) geralmente são passados para um sucessor escolhido pelo titular do nome em exercício, na maioria das vezes por meio de linhagens familiares. A participação no clã é transmitida matrilinearmente, da mãe para os filhos. Em Witsuwit'en, os chefes hereditários do sexo masculino são referidos como dinï ze', e os chefes hereditários do sexo feminino são referidos como ts'akë ze'.

Os grupos e chefes das casas de cada um dos cinco clãs, bem como os nomes em inglês dos chefes das casas atuais, podem ser encontrados no gráfico abaixo. Unist'ot'en Camp - O group é afiliado ao Yex T'sa Wilk'us (Casa negra) sob o Clã Gilseyhu (Sapo grande)

Ver também
Protestos indígenas contra gasoduto e ferrovia no Canadá

Nota

Referências

Bibliografia

Ligações externas
 The office of the Wet'suwet'en

Povos nativos do Canadá
Primeiras Nações
História do Canadá
Grupos étnicos do Canadá
Povos indígenas da América do Norte
!Mais Teoria da História na Wiki (Povos originários)

Wetʼsuwetʼen


A Marinha dos Estados Unidos teve quatro navios chamados USS New Hampshire:

 : um navio depósito que serviu de 1864 a 1921; renomeado Granite State em 1904.
 : um couraçado pré-dreadnought da Classe Connecticut que serviu de 1908 a 1921.
 : um couraçado da Classe Montana cancelado em 1943.
 : um submarino de ataque da Classe Virginia em serviço desde 2008.

USS New Hampshire


La  du Circuit Het Nieuwsblad féminin a eu lieu le . La course fait partie du calendrier international féminin UCI 2022 en catégorie 1.Pro. C'est également la première épreuve internationale disputée en Europe pour les féminines et est considérée comme le début de la saison des classiques. Elle est remportée par la Néerlandaise Annemiek van Vleuten.

Présentation

Équipes

Parcours
Le départ fictif est donné depuis Gand et celui officiel à Merelbeke. L'arrivée se trouve à Ninove.

Le Molenberg est notablement évité, tandis que la Marlboroughstraat et la Biesestraat sont référencées. Neuf monts sont au programme de cette édition, dont certains recouverts de pavés :

En plus des traditionnels monts, il y a cinq secteurs pavés :

Favorites
La vainqueur sortante Anna van der Breggen a pris sa retraite. Annemiek van Vleuten vainqueur 2020 et qui vient de remporter une course en Espagne fait figure de favorite. Dans le même registre, Grace Brown est candidate à la victoire. Les sprinteuses à l'aise dans les classiques du Nord Marta Bastianelli, Lotte Kopecky, Elisa Balsamo ou Sarah Roy peuvent également l'emporter, tout comme la pure sprinteuse Lorena Wiebes si elle passe les obstacles.

Récit de la course
Une échappée se forme en début de course. Elle contient : Emily Newsom, Kylie Waterreus, Svenja Betz, Fien Delbaere, Anastasia Carbonari et Laura Tomasi. Elle compte jusqu'à quatre minutes d'avance mais est reprise à quarante kilomètres de l'arrivée. Dans le Leberg, Marlen Reusser attaque. Elle est suivie par Ellen van Dijk, Anna Henderson et Liane Lippert. Elles obtiennent une minute d'avance. Sofia Bertizzolo part en poursuite, mais sans succès. L'approche du mur de Grammont réduit l'écart. Dans celui-ci, Anna Henderson est distancée. Les favorites, dont Annemiek van Vleuten et Demi Vollering, se détachent du peloton et reviennent sur la tête. Lotte Kopecky revient également seule de sorte que le Bosberg est abordé par un groupe d'une dizaine de coureuses. Dans celui-ci, Annemiek van Vleuten produit une attaque longue. Demi Vollering est la seule à pouvoir suivre, tant bien que mal. Avec Lotte Kopecky et Marlen Reusser dans le groupe de poursuite, Demi Vollering décide de ne pas prendre de relais à Annemiek van Vleuten qui parvient néanmoins à agrandir l'écart. Elles se disputent la victoire au sprint. Annemiek van Vleuten lance des  avant une succession de courbes. Demi Vollering semble remonter sur la fin mais coince. Derrière, le peloton s'est reformé. Lorena Wiebes règle le sprint devant Elisa Balsamo.

Classements

Classement final

Points UCI

Liste des participants

Source.

Organisation
Flanders Classics organise la course.

Prix

Notes et références

Liens externes

2022
Cyclisme en Belgique en 2022
Cyclisme sur route en 2022
Cyclisme en février 2022
Sport en Belgique en février 2022

Circuit Het Nieuwsblad féminin 2022


O Comitê para a Defesa dos Interesses Nacionais (nome original ; abreviado CDIN) foi um partido político direitista e anticomunista fundado no Reino do Laos em 17 de junho de 1958. Consternado pela eleição dos comunistas laosianos para a Assembleia Nacional nas eleições de maio de 1958, políticos e militares mais jovens fundaram o CDIN como uma alternativa aos políticos e oficiais superiores laosianos que estavam no poder. O CDIN se pronunciava como um impulsor para os esforços anticorrupção no governo real do Laos. Foi apoiado pela embaixada dos Estados Unidos; a assistência se manifestou em aconselhamento político e ações cívicas, como a Operação Booster Shot. Nas eleições de 24 de abril de 1960, claramente fraudadas, o CDIN conquistou 32 dos 59 assentos. A liderança do Pathet Lao havia sido detida durante a eleição; em 23 de maio de 1960, eles fugiram para se juntar à insurreição nas montanhas. Isso encerrou a coalizão governante e iniciou os combates na Guerra Civil do Laos.

Notas

Referências
 Ahern, Thomas L. Jr. (2006), Undercover Armies: CIA and Surrogate Warfare in Laos. Center for the Study of Intelligence. Classified control no. C05303949.
 Anthony, Victor B. and Richard R. Sexton (1993). The War in Northern Laos. Command for Air Force History. OCLC 232549943.
 Castle, Timothy N. (1993). At War in the Shadow of Vietnam: U.S. Military Aid to the Royal Lao Government 1955–1975. .
 Conboy, Kenneth and James Morrison (1995). Shadow War: The CIA's Secret War in Laos. Paladin Press. .
 Fall, Bernard (1969). Anatomy of a Crisis: The Laotian Crisis of 1960-1961. Doubleday & Co. ASIN: B00JKPAJI4.
 Warner, Roger (1995). Back Fire: The CIA's Secret War in Laos and Its Link to the War in Vietnam. Simon & Schuster. ISBNs 0-68480-292-9, 978-06848-0292-3.

Partidos políticos do Laos
Guerra Civil do Laos