Tan Sağtürk (d. 14 Temmuz 1969, İzmir); Türk balet, dizi oyuncusu, Devlet Opera ve Balesi Genel Müdürü.

Hacettepe Üniversitesi Ankara Devlet Konservatuvarı Yüksek Bale Bölümü mezunudur. Fransız Genç Balesi Le Jeune Ballet De France, Fransız Devlet Balesi Ballet National De France başdansçısı, İstanbul Devlet Opera ve Balesi başdansçılığı, Diyarbakır, Mardin, Gaziantep, Kayseri, İstanbul, Ankara, İzmir, Kıbrıs bale ve dans okulları kurucusudur. Tan Sağtürk Bale ve Dans Eğitim Merkezi'ni açtı. Fransız Devlet Balesine yapılmış Soude-ve Je ne Regrette Rien (Edit Piaf) adlı yapıtı bulunmaktadır.

Antalya ve İzmir Devlet Opera ve Balesinde koreografisini yaptığı "Kalp Sesi Projesi" adlı yapıtı sahnelendirdi. FOX'ta yayımlanan Bez Bebek adlı dizide Hakan karakterini canlandırdı ve TV reklamlarında rol almıştır. Aynı zamanda Göztepe taraftarıdır.

15 Eylül 2023 tarihinde Resmi Gazete'de yayımlanan kararla Devlet Opera ve Balesi Genel Müdürü oldu. Tan Sağtürk kurumda genel müdürlüğe atanan ikinci bale kökenli sanatçı oldu. İlki Meriç Sümen'di.

Yer aldığı yarışmalar
 Türkiye'nin Yıldızları
 Biri Bizi Gözetliyor
 Benimle Dans Eder misin?
 Yok Böyle Dans

Filmografisi
 Çocuklar Duymasın (Selami) - 2017
 Alemin Kıralı (Kendisi) - 2011
 Şöhret Okulu
 Bez Bebek (Hakan Ertürk) - 2007-2009
 Selena (Konuk Sanatçı) - 2007
 Dolunay (Ahmet)
 İkinci Bahar (Timothy Perkins)
 Doktorlar
 Avrupa Yakası (Konuk Oyuncu)

Programlar
 İkon - 2022
 Aslı Şafak ile İşin Aslı - 2022
 Bayrama Özel - 2021
 Açelya Akkoyun ile Akla Takılanlanlar - 2020
 Hayat Sanat - 2019
 Burası Haftasonu - 2017

Kaynakça

Dış bağlantılar
 Resmî web sitesi

Türk balerin ve baletleri
İzmir doğumlu erkek oyuncular
1969 doğumlular
Türk erkek dizi oyuncuları
Yaşayan insanlar
Hacettepe Üniversitesi Ankara Devlet Konservatuvarında öğrenim görenler
Bale koreografları
Çerkes asıllı Türkler
Devlet Opera ve Balesi Genel Müdürleri

Tan Sağtürk


Salmonella enterica (formerly Salmonella choleraesuis) is a rod-shaped, flagellate, facultative anaerobic, Gram-negative bacterium and a species of the genus Salmonella. A number of its serovars are serious human pathogens; many of them are (more specifically) serovars of Salmonella enterica subsp. enterica.

Epidemiology

Most cases of salmonellosis are caused by food infected with S. enterica, which often infects cattle and poultry, though other animals such as domestic cats and hamsters have also been shown to be sources of infection in humans. Investigations of vacuum cleaner bags have shown that households can act as a reservoir of the bacterium; this is more likely if the household has contact with an infection source (i.e., members working with cattle or in a veterinary clinic).

Raw chicken eggs and goose eggs can harbor S. enterica, initially in the egg whites, although most eggs are not infected. As the egg ages at room temperature, the yolk membrane begins to break down and S. enterica can spread into the yolk. Refrigeration and freezing do not kill all the bacteria, but substantially slow or halt their growth. Pasteurizing and food irradiation are used to kill Salmonella for commercially produced foodstuffs containing raw eggs such as ice cream. Foods prepared in the home from raw eggs, such as mayonnaise, cakes, and cookies, can spread salmonellae if not properly cooked before consumption.

S. enterica genomes have been reconstructed from up 6,500 year old human remains across Western Eurasia, which provides evidence for geographic widespread infections with systemic S. enterica during prehistory, and a possible role of the Neolithization process in the evolution of host adaptation. Additional reconstructed genomes from colonial Mexico suggest S. enterica as the cause of cocoliztli, an epidemic in 16th-century New Spain.

Pathogenesis
Secreted proteins are of major importance for the pathogenesis of infectious diseases caused by S. enterica. A remarkably large number of fimbrial and nonfimbrial adhesins are present in Salmonella, and mediate biofilm formation and contact to host cells. Secreted proteins are also involved in host-cell invasion and intracellular proliferation, two hallmarks of Salmonella pathogenesis.

DNA repair capability

Exposure of S. enterica to bile salts, such as sodium deoxycholate, induces the SOS DNA damage response indicating that in this organism bile salts cause DNA damage.  Bile salt exposure is found to increase GC to AT transition mutations and also to induce genes of the OxyR and SoxRS regulons suggesting further that bile salts specifically cause oxidative DNA damage.  Mutants of S. enterica that are defective in enzymes required for the process of base excision repair are sensitive to bile salts.  This indicates that wild-type S. enterica uses base excision repair to remove DNA damages caused by the bile salts.  The RecBCD enzyme which functions in recombinational repair of DNA is also required for bile salt resistance.

Small noncoding RNA
Small nonprotein-coding RNAs (sRNA) are able to perform specific functions without being translated into proteins; 97 bacterial sRNAs from Salmonella Typhi were discovered.

AsdA (antisense RNA of dnaA) is a cis-encoded antisense RNA of dnaA described in S. enterica serovar Typhi. It was discovered by deep sequencing and its transcription was confirmed by Northern blot and RACE analysis. AsdA is estimated to be about 540 nucleotides long, and represents the complementary strand to that encoding DnaA, a protein that plays a central role in the initiation of DNA replication and hence cellular division. In rich media, it is highly expressed only after reaching the stationary growth phase, but under limiting iron or osmotic stress, it is already expressed during exponential growth. Overexpression of AsdA stabilizes dnaA mRNA, increasing its levels and thereby enhancing its rate of translation. This suggests that AsdA is a regulator of DNA replication.

Nomenclature
S. enterica has six subspecies, and each subspecies has associated serovars that differ by antigenic specificity.  S. enterica has over 2500 serovars.  Salmonella bongori was previously considered a subspecies of S. enterica, but it is now the other species in the genus Salmonella.  Most of the human pathogenic Salmonella serovars belong to the enterica subspecies.  These serogroups include S. Typhi, S. Enteritidis, S. Paratyphi, S. Typhimurium, and S. Choleraesuis.  The serovars can be designated as written in the previous sentence (capitalized and nonitalicized following the genus), or as follows: "S. enterica subsp. enterica, serovar Typhi".

S. e. subsp. arizonae, named after the state of Arizona, is most commonly found in cold-blooded animals (especially snakes), but can also infect turkey, sheep, and humans. It is endemic in southwestern United States. The similar S. e. subsp. diarizonae also infects snakes and occasionally humans.

See also
 1984 Rajneeshee bioterror attack
 AsrC small RNA
 Bacterial small RNA
 HilD 3'UTR
 IsrM small RNA
 PinT small RNA
 Typhoid Mary

References

External links

 Notes on Salmonella nomenclature

 Current research on Salmonella typhimurium  at the Norwich Research Park

 Type strain of Salmonella enterica at BacDive -  the Bacterial Diversity Metadatabase

Salmonella
Gram-negative bacteria
Typhoid fever

Salmonella enterica


A16 යනු ශ්‍රී ලංකාවේ තනා තිබෙන, A ශ්‍රේණියට අයත් මහා මාර්ගයකි. බෙරගල සහ හාලිඇල යන නගර සම්බන්ධ කරමින්, මෙම මාර්ගය ඉදි කොට ඇත.

මාර්ගය බණ්ඩාරවෙල සහ දෙමෝදර යන නගර හරහා ගමන් කරයි.

මාර්ග - ශ්‍රී ලංකාව

A16 මහා මාර්ගය (ශ්‍රී ලංකාව)


"This Side of Paradise" is the twenty-fourth episode of the first season of the American science fiction television series Star Trek. Written by D. C. Fontana and Jerry Sohl (using the pseudonym Nathan Butler) and directed by Ralph Senensky, it was first broadcast on March 2, 1967.

In the episode, the USS Enterprise visits a planet where the inhabitants are under the influence of strange plant life.

The title is taken from the poem "Tiare Tahiti" by Rupert Brooke and the 1920 novel This Side of Paradise by F. Scott Fitzgerald.

Plot
The USS Enterprise is ordered to a Federation colony on Omicron Ceti III. Captain Kirk, First Officer Spock, Chief Medical Officer Leonard McCoy, and others beam down to the colony, and discover the colonists all alive and well, a surprise since the planet is bathed in Berthold rays, a form of radiation which humans cannot survive for longer than a week. Their leader, Elias Sandoval, welcomes them and explains they only lost communications due to equipment failure. Also present is Leila Kalomi, a botanist Spock met on Earth six years before; she loved him, but he was unable to return her love. The landing party notices a lack of animal life, including livestock brought to the colony. During medical exams, McCoy finds no sign of disease or injury in any of them: even Sandoval, who has had an appendectomy, now has a healthy appendix. Kirk nonetheless insists that the colonists be evacuated due to the Berthold rays, over Sandoval's objections.

Kalomi offers to show Spock how the colonists have survived, and takes him to a field of strange flowers. The flowers expel spores that cover Spock, after which he professes his love for Kalomi, and blithely disregards orders to begin the evacuation of the colony. The rest of the landing party are also exposed to the spores and, with the exception of Kirk, exhibit the same sort of behavior. As part of a symbiotic relationship with their human hosts, the spores provide perfect health, including protection from Berthold rays.

Kirk returns to the ship while the rest of its crew, under the influence of spore plants that have been brought on board, beam down to the planet. Lt. Uhura has sabotaged the communication system to prevent contact with Starfleet. After exposure to the spores, Kirk too prepares to leave, but as he is about to beam down, he is seized by frustration at his own abandonment of the ship. The effect of the spores disappears, and Kirk surmises that violent emotions destroy them. Kirk lures Spock back aboard Enterprise and uses derogatory racial remarks to goad him into attacking. As Spock is about to bludgeon Kirk with a stool, he notices that the spores' influence on him is gone.

Kalomi beams aboard to find Spock no longer affected by the spores, and her heartbroken reaction frees her also. Kirk and Spock induce a similar effect on the planet below by broadcasting an irritating subsonic frequency to the crew's communicators, provoking fights among the colonists and crew. Once everyone is cleansed of the spores, Sandoval agrees to the evacuation.

As they leave orbit with the colonists aboard, Kirk asks Spock about his experiences on the planet. Spock replies, "I have little to say about it, Captain, except that for the first time in my life ... I was happy."

Themes

A Thorneloe University document, "Modern Interpretations of the Lotus-Eaters", notes the parallels between the episode and Homer's Odyssey episode of the Lotus-eaters: "These two stories share a particular theme: the diversion or halting of one's journey (either deliberately or accidentally) and how real life (i.e. the
journey itself) cannot be lived on the extremes. ... The original Star Trek series aired in the late 1960s. It reflects the vast social change that was occurring at that time. ... The idea of living in peace and limiting work activities to only the essentials was (and still is, in many respects) contrary to the religious and political ideologies and realities of that era. ... The strong Protestant work-ethic present in American society meant a constant strive for development and dominance over nature, no matter the cost. ... The colonists failed to do this, thus their attempt to live in peace and to develop only what was necessary was considered a failure (as noted towards the end of the show). ... It was also a time of psychoactive drugs. The spores of the flowers could also represent the dangers of these drugs and their potential to help users escape reality."

Production
 Writer Jerry Sohl had his name replaced by the pseudonym "Nathan Butler", after D. C. Fontana rewrote the original draft (entitled "The Way of the Spores").
 This was actor Frank Overton's last performance before his death on April 24, 1967, less than two months after the episode first aired.
 When Michael Barrier and Grant Woods were cast to play the characters Lieutenant Timothy Fletcher and Crewman Dimont, the names were changed to DeSalle and Kelowitz, whom the two actors played in previous episodes.
 The shot of the empty Enterprise bridge was reused in the Star Trek: The Next Generation episode "Relics", to depict Scotty's holodeck re-creation of his old ship.

Reception
Zack Handlen of The A.V. Club gave this episode an "A" rating, describing it as "an intriguingly ambiguous episode", and he praised its sense of humor.

In 2015, SyFy ranked this episode as one of the top ten essential Star Trek original series Spock episodes.

In 2016, SyFy ranked guest star Jill Ireland's performance as Leila, as the 15th best guest star on the original series.

In 2016, Empire ranked this the 24th best out of the top 50 episodes of all the 700 plus Star Trek television episodes.

In 2016, IGN ranked "This Side of Paradise" the 24th best episode of all Star Trek including later series. They note this episode for featuring a romance of sorts between Spock and an inhabitant of the planet Omicron Ceti III.

In 2018, PopMatters ranked this the 18th best episode of the original series.

A 2018 Star Trek binge-watching guide by Den of Geek recommended this episode for featuring the trio of characters Kirk, Spock, and Bones of the original series.

In 2019, Nerdist included this episode on their "Best of Spock" binge-watching guide.

References

External links

 "This Side of Paradise"—Screenshots before and after remastering at TrekMovie.com
 "This Side of Paradise"—Final draft with revisions December 28, 1966; report and analysis by Dave Eversole

1967 American television episodes
Star Trek: The Original Series (season 1) episodes
Television episodes written by D. C. Fontana
Television episodes directed by Ralph Senensky
Television episodes written by Jerry Sohl

This Side of Paradise (Star Trek: The Original Series)


في الهندسة الكهربائية، المطاوعة، ورمزها (B)، هي الجزء التخيلي من القبولية الكهربائية حيث القبولية هي مقلوب المعاوقة الكهربائية. وهي قيمة متغيرة تعتمد قيمتها على قيمة التردد ووحدة قياسه في نظام الوحدات الدولي (SI) هي سيمنز. بينما يسمى الجزء الحقيقي للقبولية المواصلة الكهربائية. ويعتبر أوليفر هيفسايد هو أول من قام بتعريفها في يونيو لعام 1887.

الصيغة العامة
طبقا للمعادلة العامة للقبولية الكهربائية والتي تنص على :

حيث :

Y هي القبولية الكهربائية وتقاس بالسيمنز .
Gهي المواصلة الكهربائية وتقاس بالسيمنز .
j هي الوحدة التخيلية .
B هي المطاوعة الكهربائية وتقاس بالسيمنز .

حيث القبولية (Y) هي مقلوب المعاوقة (Z) .

ويمكن كتابه المعادلة بالشكل التالي :

حيث

Z هي المعاوقة وتقاس بالأوم .
R هي المقاومة وتقاس بالأوم .
X هي المفاعلة وتقاس بالأوم .

ومعادلة القيمة المطلقة للقبولية الكهربائية هي :

انظر أيضا

 مسامحة كهربائية
 وحدة كهرومغناطيسية
 جاوس (وحدة)
 سيمنز (وحدة)

المصادر

كميات فيزيائية
كهرباء
هندسة الكهرباء

مطاوعة كهربائية


In social psychology, group polarization refers to the tendency for a group to make decisions that are more extreme than the initial inclination of its members. These more extreme decisions are towards greater risk if individuals' initial tendencies are to be risky and towards greater caution if individuals' initial tendencies are to be cautious. The phenomenon also holds that a group's attitude toward a situation may change in the sense that the individuals' initial attitudes have strengthened and intensified after group discussion, a phenomenon known as attitude polarization.

Overview
Group polarization is an important phenomenon in social psychology and is observable in many social contexts. For example, a group of women who hold moderately feminist views tend to demonstrate heightened pro-feminist beliefs following group discussion. Similarly, studies have shown that after deliberating together, mock jury members often decided on punitive damage awards that were either larger or smaller than the amount any individual juror had favored prior to deliberation. The studies indicated that when the jurors favored a relatively low award, discussion would lead to an even more lenient result, while if the jury was inclined to impose a stiff penalty, discussion would make it even harsher. Moreover, in recent years, the Internet and online social media have also presented opportunities to observe group polarization and compile new research. Psychologists have found that social media outlets such as Facebook and Twitter demonstrate that group polarization can occur even when a group is not physically together. As long as the group of individuals begins with the same fundamental opinion on the topic and a consistent dialogue is kept going, group polarization can occur.

Research has suggested that well-established groups suffer less from polarization, as do groups discussing problems that are well known to them. However, in situations where groups are somewhat newly formed and tasks are new, group polarization can demonstrate a more profound influence on decision-making.

Attitude polarization

Attitude polarization, also known as belief polarization and polarization effect, is a phenomenon in which a disagreement becomes more extreme as the different parties consider evidence on the issue. It is one of the effects of confirmation bias: the tendency of people to search for and interpret evidence selectively, to reinforce their current beliefs or attitudes. When people encounter ambiguous evidence, this bias can potentially result in each of them interpreting it as in support of their existing attitudes, widening rather than narrowing the disagreement between them.

The effect is observed with issues that activate emotions, such as political "hot-button" issues. For most issues, new evidence does not produce a polarization effect. For those issues where polarization is found, mere thinking about the issue, without contemplating new evidence, produces the effect. Social comparison processes have also been invoked as an explanation for the effect, which is increased by settings in which people repeat and validate each other's statements. This apparent tendency is of interest not only to psychologists, but also to sociologists, and philosophers.

Empirical findings
Since the late 1960s, psychologists have carried out a number of studies on various aspects of attitude polarization.

In 1979, Charles Lord, Lee Ross and Mark Lepper performed a study in which they selected two groups of people, one group strongly in favor of capital punishment, the other strongly opposed. The researchers initially measured the strength with which people held their position. Later, both the pro- and anti-capital punishment people were put into small groups and shown one of two cards, each containing a statement about the results of a research project written on it. For example:Kroner and Phillips (1977) compared murder rates for the year before and the year after adoption of capital punishment in 14 states. In 11 of the 14 states, murder rates were lower after adoption of the death penalty. This research supports the deterrent effect of the death penalty.or:Palmer and Crandall (1977) compared murder rates in 10 pairs of neighboring states with different capital punishment laws. In 8 of the 10 pairs, murder rates were higher in the state with capital punishment. This research opposes the deterrent effect of the death penalty.The researchers again asked people about the strength of their beliefs about the deterrence effect of the death penalty, and, this time, also asked them about the effect that the research had had on their attitudes.

In the next stage of the research, the participants were given more information about the study described on the card they received, including details of the research, critiques of the research, and the researchers' responses to those critiques. The participants' degree of commitment to their original positions were re-measured, and the participants were asked about the quality of the research and the effect the research had on their beliefs. Finally, the trial was rerun on all participants using a card that supported the opposite position to that they had initially seen.

The researchers found that people tended to believe that research that supported their original views had been better conducted and was more convincing than research that didn't. Whichever position they held initially, people tended to hold that position more strongly after reading research that supported it. Lord et al. point out that it is reasonable for people to be less critical of research that supports their current position, but it seems less rational for people to significantly increase the strength of their attitudes when they read supporting evidence. When people had read both the research that supported their views and the research that did not, they tended to hold their original attitudes more strongly than before they received that information. These results should be understood in the context of several problems in the implementation of the study, including the fact the researchers changed the scaling of the outcome of the variable, so measuring attitude change was impossible, and measured polarization using a subjective assessment of attitude change and not a direct measure of how much change had occurred.

Choice shifts
Group polarization and choice shifts are similar in many ways; however, they differ in one distinct way. Group polarization refers to attitude change on the individual level due to the influence of the group, and choice shift refers to the outcome of that attitude change; namely, the difference between the average group members' pre-group discussion attitudes and the outcome of the group decision.

Risky and cautious shifts are both a part of a more generalized idea known as group-induced attitude polarization. Though group polarization deals mainly with risk-involving decisions and/or opinions, discussion-induced shifts have been shown to occur on several non-risk-involving levels. This suggests that a general phenomenon of choice-shifts exists apart from only risk-related decisions. Stoner (1968) found that a decision is impacted by the values behind that circumstances of the decision. The study found that situations that normally favor the more risky alternative increased risky shifts. More so, situations that normally favor the cautious alternative increased cautious shifts. These findings also show the importance of previous group shifts. Choice shifts are mainly explained by largely differing human values and how highly these values are held by an individual. According to Moscovici et al. (1972) interaction within a group and differences of opinion are necessary for group polarization to take place. While an extremist in the group may sway opinion, the shift can only occur with sufficient and proper interaction within the group.  In other words, the extremist will have no impact without interaction. Also, Moscovici et al. found individual preferences to be irrelevant; it is differences of opinion which will cause the shift. This finding demonstrates how one opinion in the group will not sway the group; it is the combination of all the individual opinions that will make an impact.

History and origins
The study of group polarization can be traced back to an unpublished 1961 Master's thesis by MIT student James Stoner, who observed the so-called "risky shift". The concept of risky shift maintains that a group's decisions are riskier than the average of the individual decisions of members before the group met.

In early studies, the risky-shift phenomenon was measured using a scale known as the Choice-Dilemmas Questionnaire. This measure required participants to consider a hypothetical scenario in which an individual is faced with a dilemma and must make a choice to resolve the issue at hand. Participants were then asked to estimate the probability that a certain choice would be of benefit or risk to the individual being discussed. Consider the following example:"Mr. A, an electrical engineer, who is married and has one child, has been working for a large electronics corporation since graduating from college five years ago. He is assured of a lifetime job with a modest, though adequate, salary and liberal pension benefits upon retirement. On the other hand, it is very unlikely that his salary will increase much before he retires. While attending a convention, Mr. A is offered a job with a small, newly founded company which has a highly uncertain future. The new job would pay more to start and would offer the possibility of a share in the owner- ship if the company survived the competition of the larger firms."Participants were then asked to imagine that they were advising Mr. A. They would then be provided with a series of probabilities that indicate whether the new company that offered him a position is financially stable. It would read as following

"Please check the lowest probability that you would consider acceptable to make it worthwhile for Mr. A to take the new job."

The chances are 1 in 10 that the company will prove financially sound.

The chances are 3 in 10 that the company will prove financially sound.

The chances are 5 in 10 that the company will prove financially sound.

The chances are 7 in 10 that the company will prove financially sound.

The chances are 9 in 10 that the company will prove financially sound.

Place a check here if you think  Mr. A should not take the new job no matter what the probabilities.

Individuals completed the questionnaire and made their decisions independently of others. Later, they would be asked to join a group to reassess their choices. Indicated by shifts in the mean value, initial studies using this method revealed that group decisions tended to be relatively riskier than those that were made by individuals. This tendency also occurred when individual judgments were collected after the group discussion and even when the individual post-discussion measures were delayed two to six weeks.

The discovery of the risky shift was considered surprising and counter-intuitive, especially since earlier work in the 1920s and 1930s by Allport and other researchers suggested that individuals made more extreme decisions than did groups, leading to the expectation that groups would make decisions that would conform to the average risk level of its members. The seemingly counter-intuitive findings of Stoner led to a spurt of research around the risky shift, which was originally thought to be a special case exception to the standard decision-making practice.  Many people had concluded that people in a group setting would make decisions based on what they assumed to be the overall risk level of a group; because Stoner's work did not necessarily address this specific theme, and because it does seem to contrast Stoner's initial definition of risky shift, additional controversy arose leading researchers to further examine the topic. By the late 1960s, however, it had become clear that the risky shift was just one type of many attitudes that became more extreme in groups, leading Moscovici and Zavalloni to term the overall phenomenon "group polarization."

Subsequently, a decade-long period of examination of the applicability of group polarization to a number of fields in both lab and field settings began. There is a substantial amount of empirical evidence demonstrating the phenomenon of group polarization. Group polarization has been widely considered as a fundamental group decision-making process and was well established, but remained non-obvious and puzzling because its mechanisms were not fully understood.

Major theoretical approaches
Almost as soon as the phenomenon of group polarization was discovered, a number of theories were offered to help explain and account for it. These explanations were gradually narrowed down and grouped together until two primary mechanisms remained, social comparison and informational influence.

Social comparison theory
The social comparison theory, or normative influence theory, has been widely used to explain group polarization. According to the social comparison interpretation, group polarization occurs as a result of individuals' desire to gain acceptance and be perceived in a favorable way by their group. The theory holds that people first compare their own ideas with those held by the rest of the group; they observe and evaluate what the group values and prefers. In order to gain acceptance, people then take a position that is similar to everyone else's but slightly more extreme. In doing so, individuals support the group's beliefs while still presenting themselves as admirable group "leaders". The presence of a member with an extreme viewpoint or attitude does not further polarize the group. Studies regarding the theory have demonstrated that normative influence is more likely with judgmental issues, a group goal of harmony, person-oriented group members, and public responses.

Informational influence
Informational influence, or persuasive arguments theory, has also been used to explain group polarization, and is most recognized by psychologists today. The persuasive arguments interpretation holds that individuals become more convinced of their views when they hear novel arguments in support of their position. The theory posits that each group member enters the discussion aware of a set of items of information or arguments favoring both sides of the issue, but lean toward that side that boasts the greater amount of information. In other words, individuals base their individual choices by weighing remembered pro and con arguments. Some of these items or arguments are shared among the members while some items are unshared, in which all but one member has considered these arguments before. Assuming most or all group members lean in the same direction, during discussion, items of unshared information supporting that direction are expressed, which provides members previously unaware of them more reason to lean in that direction. Group discussion shifts the weight of evidence as each group member expresses their arguments, shedding light onto a number of different positions and ideas. Research has indicated that informational influence is more likely with intellective issues, a group goal of making correct decision, task-oriented group members, and private responses. Furthermore, research suggests that it is not simply the sharing of information that predicts group polarization. Rather, the amount of information and persuasiveness of the arguments mediate the level of polarization experienced.

In the 1970s, significant arguments occurred over whether persuasive argumentation alone accounted for group polarization. Daniel Isenberg's 1986 meta-analysis of the data gathered by both the persuasive argument and social comparison camps succeeded, in large part, in answering the questions about predominant mechanisms. Isenberg concluded that there was substantial evidence that both effects were operating simultaneously, and that persuasive arguments theory operated when social comparison did not, and vice versa.

Self-categorization and social identity
While these two theories are the most widely accepted as explanations for group polarization, alternative theories have been proposed. The most popular of these theories is self-categorization theory. Self-categorization theory stems from social identity theory, which holds that conformity stems from psychological processes; that is, being a member of a group is defined as the subjective perception of the self as a member of a specific category. Accordingly, proponents of the self-categorization model hold that group polarization occurs because individuals identify with a particular group and conform to a prototypical group position that is more extreme than the group mean. In contrast to social comparison theory and persuasive argumentation theory, the self-categorization model maintains that inter-group categorization processes are the cause of group polarization

Support for the self-categorization theory, which explains group polarization as conformity to a polarized norm, was found by Hogg, Turner, and Davidson in 1990. In their experiment, participants gave pre-test, post-test, and group consensus recommendations on three choice dilemma item-types (risky, neutral, or cautious). The researchers hypothesized that an ingroup confronted by a risky outgroup will polarize toward caution, an ingroup confronted by a caution outgroup will polarize toward risk, and an ingroup in the middle of the social frame of reference, confronted by both risky and cautious outgroups, will not polarize but will converge on its pre-test mean. The results of the study supported their hypothesis in that participants converged on a norm polarized toward risk on risky items and toward caution on cautious items. Another similar study found that in-group prototypes become more polarized as the group becomes more extreme in the social context. This further lends support to the self-categorization explanation of group polarization.

Applications

The Internet
The rising popularity and increased number of online social media platforms, such as Facebook, Twitter and Instagram, has enabled people to seek out and share ideas with others who have similar interests and common values, making group polarization effects increasingly  evident, particularly in generation Y and generation Z individuals. Similar to the social media platforms, video streaming platforms like YouTube are forming groups unconsciously through intelligent algorithm seeking for extreme contents. Owing to this technology, it is possible for individuals to curate their sources of information and the opinions to which they are exposed, thereby reinforcing and strengthening their own views while effectively avoiding information and perspectives with which they disagree.

One study analyzed over 30,000 tweets on Twitter regarding the shooting of George Tiller, a late term abortion doctor, where the tweets analyzed were conversations among supporters and opponents of abortion rights, post shooting. The study found that like-minded individuals strengthened group identity whereas replies between different-minded individuals reinforced a split in affiliation.

In a study conducted by Sia et al. (2002), group polarization was found to occur with online (computer-mediated) discussions. In particular, this study found that group discussions, conducted when discussants are in a distributed (cannot see one another) or anonymous (cannot identify one another) environment, can lead to even higher levels of group polarization compared to traditional meetings. This is attributed to the greater numbers of novel arguments generated (due to persuasive arguments theory) and higher incidence of one-upmanship behaviors (due to social comparison).

Some philosophers, such as Douglas Campbell, have argued that group polarization online might not always be a bad thing. In some cases, such as polarization against slavery and slave-owners, it might be desirable to inculcate strongly polarized attitudes in people, with the result that they do not even entertain these views as having any merit at all.

However, some research suggests that important differences arise in measuring group polarization in laboratory versus field experiments. A study conducted by Taylor & MacDonald (2002) featured a realistic setting of a computer-mediated discussion, but group polarization did not occur at the level expected. The study's results also showed that groupthink occurs less in computer-mediated discussions than when people are face to face. Moreover, computer-mediated discussions often fail to result in a group consensus, or lead to less satisfaction with the consensus that was reached, compared to groups operating in a natural environment. Furthermore, the experiment took place over a two-week period, leading the researchers to suggest that group polarization may occur only in the short-term.  Overall, the results suggest that not only may group polarization not be as prevalent as previous studies suggest, but group theories, in general, may not be simply transferable when seen in a computer-related discussion.

Politics and law
Group polarization has been widely discussed in terms of political behavior (see political polarization). Researchers have identified an increase in affective polarization among the United States electorate, and report that hostility and discrimination towards the opposing political party has increased dramatically over time.

Group polarization is similarly influential in legal contexts. A study that assessed whether Federal district court judges behaved differently when they sat alone, or in small groups, demonstrated that those judges who sat alone took extreme action 35% of the time, whereas judges who sat in a group of three took extreme action 65% of the time. These results are noteworthy because they indicate that even trained, professional decision-makers are subject to the influences of group polarization.

War and violent behavior
Group polarization has been reported to occur during wartime and other times of conflict and helps to account partially for violent behavior and conflict. Researchers have suggested, for instance, that ethnic conflict exacerbates group polarization by enhancing identification with the ingroup and hostility towards the outgroup. While polarization can occur in any type of conflict, it has its most damaging effects in large-scale inter-group, public policy, and international conflicts.

College life
On a smaller scale, group polarization can also be seen in the everyday lives of students in higher education. A study by Myers in 2005 reported that initial differences among American college students become more accentuated over time. For example, students who do not belong to fraternities and sororities tend to be more liberal politically, and this difference increases over the course of their college careers. Researchers theorize that this is at least partially explained by group polarization, as group members tend to reinforce one another's proclivities and opinions.

See also

 Confirmation bias
 Deindividuation
 Group-serving bias
 Groupthink
 Herd behavior and herd mentality
 Identity politics

References

Polarization
Social psychology
Motivation
Sectarianism

Group polarization


Giovanni Brass (d. 26 Mart 1933, Milano, İtalya), İtalyan yönetmen, film dünyasında ressam dedesi Italico tarafından verilen takma adı "Tintoretto"nun kısaltılmışı "Tinto Brass" olarak bilinir.

Erotik çalışmaları ile ünlü yönetmen özellikle CCosì fan tutte, Paprika ve Monella ve Kışkırtma olarak dilimize çevrilen Trasgredire filmleri ile tanınır.

Filmografi
 Monamour (2005)
 Fallo! (2003) "Do It"
 Senso '45 (2002)  "Black Angel"
 Trasgredire (2000)
 Monella (Lola) (1998)
 Fermo posta Tinto Brass (1995)
 L'Uomo che guarda (1994)
 Così fan tutte (1992/II)
 Paprika (1991)
 Snack Bar Budapest (1988)
 Capriccio (1987)
 Miranda (1985)
 La Chiave (1983) "The Key"
 Caligola (1979) (Esas fotoğrafları)
 Salon Kitty (1976)
 La Vacanza (1971)
 I Miss Sonia Henie (1971)
 Drop-out (1970)
 L'Urlo (1970) "The Howl"
 Nerosubianco (1969)
 Col cuore in gola (1967)
 Yankee (1966)
 Il disco volante (1964)
 La mia signora (1964) ("L'uccellino" ve "L'automobile" olarak iki bölüme ayrılmıştır)
 Ça ira (Il fiume della rivolta) (1964)
 Chi lavora è perduto (1963)

Dış bağlantılar
 resmi sayfası
 IMDB sayfası

Kaynakça

1933 doğumlular
İtalyan film yönetmenleri
Yaşayan insanlar
İtalyan ateistler
Milano doğumlular

Tinto Brass


Secvențierea Sanger este o metodă de  secvențiere ADN bazată pe incorporarea selectivă a di-deoxinucleotidelor de către enzima ADN polimerază în timpul  replicării ADN in vitro.

Metoda a fost dezvoltată de către Frederick Sanger și colegii săi în 1977 și a fost una dintre cele mai folosite metode de secvențiere ADN mai bine de 25 de ani. Mai nou, secvențierea Sanger a fost parțial înlocuită de secvențierea de nouă generație. Cu toate acestea, secvențierea Sanger este încă folosită, în contextul proiectelor mai mici, pentru validarea rezultatelor secvețierii de nouă generație, sau pentru citirea fragmentelor lungi și continue de ADN (mai mari de 500 de nucleotide).

Metoda

Metoda clasică de secvențiere Sanger ia un șablon simplu de ADN, un primer ADN, enzima ADN polimerază, deoxinucleozidetrifosfate normale (dNTP) și di-deoxinucleozidetrifosfate modificate (ddNTP), cele din urmă terminând prematur elongarea șirului ADN. ddNTP-urilor le lipsesc grupul hidroxil (OH) de la capătul 3', deci nu pot forma legătura necesară dintre două nucleotide, ceea ce împiedică polimeraza ADN să extindă ADN-ul.
ddNTP-urile sunt marcate radioactiv sau fluorescent pentru a putea fi detectate automat de către   mașinile de secvențiere.

Mostra ADN este împărțită în patru reacții separate, conținând fiecare toate cele patru deoxinucleotide (dATP, dGTP, dCTP și dTTP) și enzima ADN polimerază. În fiecare dintre reacții este adăugată doar una dintre cele patru di-deoxinucleotide (ddATP, ddGTP, ddCTP, sau ddTTP), în timp ce celelalte nucleotide sunt nemodificate.
Di-deoxinucleotidele modificate sunt adăugate în exces, în cantități de aproximativ 100 de ori mai mari decât deoxinucleotidele normale (ex. 0.005mM dATP : 0.5mM ddATP).
Pe scurt, este nevoie de patru reacții separate pentru a testa cele patru ddNTP.
După mai multe runde de extensie a șablonului ADN, fragmentele rezultate de ADN sunt denaturate prin expunere la căldură și sunt separate conform mărimii prin procedura de electroforeză pe gel.

În imaginea din dreapta un film X a fost expus gelului, iar benzile închise la culoare corespund fragmentelor ADN de diferite mărimi. O bandă de culoare închisă semnifică un fragment ADN scurtat la incorporarea unei di-deoxinucleotide (ddATP, ddGTP, ddCTP sau ddTTP). Pozițiile relative de pe cele patru benzi, de sus în jos, sunt folosite la citirea secvețelor ADN.

Referințe

ADN

Secvențierea Sanger


Bektaşoğlu, Çorum ilinin Merkez ilçesine bağlı bir köydür.

Tarihçe
Köyün adı, 1925 yılı kayıtlarında Belkaraağaç olarak geçmektedir. Daha önceleri Seydimçakallı köyüne bağlı bir mahalle iken, 13 Ocak 1956'da yine aynı köye bağlı Oluközü ve Borsunlu mahalleleri ile birleşerek köy statüsü kazandı.

Coğrafya
Köy, Çorum il merkezine 27 km uzaklıktadır.

Nüfus

Kaynakça

Dış bağlantılar

Çorum merkez belde ve köyleri

Bektaşoğlu, Çorum


බ්‍රිතාන්‍ය ලංකාවේ සිටි මහමුදලිවරයෙකු වූ එන්. ඩී. ආතර් ද සිල්වා විජේසිංහ සිරිවර්ධනගේ මාලිගය රිච්මන්ඩ් කාසල් නම් වේ. එය කළුතර පලාතොට අක්කර 42ක භූමිභාගයක ඉදිකොට තිබේ. වර්තමානයේ ශ්‍රී ලංකාවේ මහා බාරකරුගේ පාලනයේ පවතී.

ඉතිහාසය
ආතර් ද සිල්වා වරක් ඉන්දියාවේ සිදුකල සංචාරයකදී දුටු මහාරාජා මන්දිරයක් පිළිබඳව සිත් ඇතිවීම මෙම මන්දිරය ඉදිකිරීමට හේතු පාදක වී යැයි තොරතුරු සඳහන් වේ. ඒ අනූව ඉදිකරනු ලැබූ රිච්මන්ඩ් කාසල් මැදුරෙහි ගෙවැදීම, ආතර් ද සිල්වා විසින් 1910 වර්ෂයේ මැයි 10 වන දින පැවැත්වූ සිය විවාහ මංගල්‍යය සමගම සිදුකරන ලදී.

එතැන් පටන් වර්ෂ 31ක් දරුවන් නොමැතිව සිය මැතිණියද සමග රිච්මන්ඩ් කාසල් හී දිවි ගෙවූ ආතර් ද සිල්වා, කිසියම් හේතුවක් මත 1941 ජූලි මස 4 වැනි දිනදී නොතාරිස් එස්. ජේ. එස්. කදිරගාමර් ඉදිරිපිටදී අත්සන් කොට, රිච්මන්ඩ් කාසල් ඇතුළු තමා සතු සියළු වත්කම් ශ්‍රී ලංකාවේ මහා භාරකාර දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට පවරා දෙන ලදී. ඒ මෙම මන්දිරය ඔහුගේ ඇවෑමෙන් අනතුරුව අනාථ දරුවන් වෙනුවෙන් රැකවරණය සළසන ස්ථානයක් බවට සහ අනෙකුත් වතුපිටි වල ආදායම එම දරුවන්ගේ නඩත්තුව වෙනුවෙන් වෙන්විය යුතු බවට අවසන් කැමැත්ත ප්‍රකාශ වන පරිදිය.

ගෘහය
රිච්මන්ඩ් මැදුරෙහි ඉදිකිරීම් වෙනුවෙන් අමුද්‍රව්‍ය සමහරක් විදේශ රාජ්‍යයන්ගෙන් රැගෙන ආ බව පැවසෙයි. මැදුරට අවශ්‍ය ගඩොල් හා උළු ඉන්දියාවෙන්ද, තේක්ක හා ඕක් දැව බුරුමයෙන්ද, ජනෙල් වීදුරු ආදිය ඉතාලියෙන් හා නාන කාමර හා ගෙබිම මැටි පුවරු එංගලන්තයෙන්ද ගෙන්වා ගත් බව සඳහන් වේ. මෙම අමුද්‍රව්‍ය කොළඹ වරායේ සිට කළුතරට නැව් මගිනුත්, එතැන් සිට කළු ගඟ ඔස්සේ බත්තල් මඟිනුත් මන්දිරය ඉදි වන භූමිය වෙත ගෙන එනු ලැබ තිබේ.

ගෘහයෙහි වූ සම්පූර්ණ උළුවහු ප්‍රමාණය 99 ක් වේ. ජනෙල් ප්‍රමාණය 38 කි. පහත මාලයේ හා උඩු මහලේ වූ කාමර ප්‍රමාණය 14 කි. ඉන් බිම් මහලේ කාමර 5ක්ද, කන්තෝරු කාමර 2ක්ද, පින්තූර කාමරයක් හා නැටුම් ශාලාවක් වේ. මීට අමතරව පෝටිකෝවක්, බැල්කනියක්, මැද සාලයක් හා මැද මිදුලක් එහි දැකගත හැකි වේ. උඩුමහලේ කාමර 6ක්, නාන කාමර සහිත වැසිකිලි 4ක්, බැල්කනියක් හා තවත් එක් හිස් අවකාශයක් වේ.

උඩු මහලට නැගීම වෙනුවෙන් තරප්පු පේලි දෙකක් තිබෙන අතර ඉන් එකක් සේවකයින්ගේ භාවිතය පිණිස ඉදිකොට තිබේ. උඩුමහලට නගින තරප්පු පෙල මදක් ඉහලට වන්නට කොටසේදී, දෙපසට බෙදී යන අයුරින් තනා තිබේ. නිදන කාමරයන්හී බිත්ති, ශබ්ද පිටතට හා ඇතුලතට ගලා ඒම වැළකෙන පරිදි ඉදි කොට තිබේ. බිත්තියක් අඩියකට වඩා පළල් වන අතර එහි මධ්‍යයේ හිස් අවකාෂයක් රැඳෙන පරිදි ලෑලි කූඩුවක් සකස් කොට ඒ මත බදාම යොදා ඇත.

උද්‍යානය
රිච්මන්ඩ් කාසල් උද්‍යානයෙහි නිමවන ලද පොකුණක් දැක ගත හැකි වන අතර බිත්ති වලට සවිකොට ඇති සිංහ මුහුණු මගින් පොකුණට ජලය ගලා එන ආකාරයට එය නිමවා තිබේ. එසේම ග්‍රීක කැටයම් ශිල්පයට සමාන වූ කිරිගරුඩෙන් නෙලන ලද ප්‍රථිමා දොළහක් සහ, මුදලිගේ නිදන කාමරයට මුහුණලා කුඩා දරුවන් සත් දෙනෙකුගේ හා එය මධ්‍යයේ දරුවක නලවන මවකගේ ප්‍රථිමා මෙම උද්‍යානයෙහි දැකගත හැකිවේ.

වත්මන
වර්ථමානයේ මෙහි රිච්මන්ඞ් කාසල් පූර්ව ළමා විය සංවර්ධන මධ්‍යස්ථානයක් හා පිරිමි ළමයින් සඳහා රැක බලා ගැනීමේ මධ්‍යස්ථානයක් වේ.

ආශ්‍රිත

බාහිර සබැඳි
කළුතර - මනෝ ප්‍රනාන්දු - ISBN 955-8818-00-3
රිච්මන්ඩ් කාසල් මන්දිරය

රිච්මන්ඩ් කාසල්


التليلة بلدة لبنانية تقع في محافظة بعلبك الهرمل في قضاء بعلبك بالقرب من قرية طاريا.

جغرافيا
تقع بلدة التليلة على طريق وشارع طويل تلفه المنازل ومعروف بطريق التليلة يحدها من الشمال بلدة النبي رشادة ومن الجنوب والشرق بلدة طاريا ومن الغرب بلدة حدث بعلبك.

أهم معالمها
مفرق التليلة التجاري الذي يأتي إليه الناس من 8 قرى مجاورة.

المراجع

قضاء بعلبك

التليلة


An Octomeria sulfurea in uska species han Liliopsida nga ginhulagway ni Guy Robert Chiron ngan N.Sanson. An Octomeria sulfurea in nahilalakip ha genus nga Octomeria, ngan familia nga Orchidaceae. Waray hini subspecies nga nakalista.

Mga kasarigan

Octomeria

Octomeria sulfurea


Lepista (Elias Magnus Fries, 1849 ex Worthington George Smith, 1870) este un gen de ciuperci din încrengătura Basidiomycota în ordinul Agaricales și familia Tricholomataceae, al cărui nume generic este derivat din cuvântul latin (=blid de băut). Ciupercile acestui gen sunt saprofite și se dezvoltă în grupuri cu multe exemplare precum  în cercuri de vrăjitoare în păduri de foioase și de conifere, prin luminișuri ierboase, chiar și în grădini, livezi sau parcuri, de la câmpie până la munte. Timpul apariției depinde de specie. Se poate găsi din mai până în noiembrie (decembrie). Majoritatea acestor bureți este comestibilă cu excepția celor puțini cu miros neplăcut. Specii otrăvitoare nu sunt cunoscute. Conform Dictionary of the Fungi (ediția a 10-a, 2008), genul conține în jur de 50 specii. Tip de specie este Lepista nuda.

Descriere

 Pălăria: este de mărime medie pentru ciuperci plin dezvoltate cu un diametru de aproximativ 6-12 (15) cm, fiind foarte cărnoasă, inițial semisferică, apoi convexă cu marginea răsucită spre interior, devenind la maturitate, din ce în ce mai aplatizată și la bătrânețe adâncită în centru până în formă de pâlnie cu suprafața ondulată neregulat la unele specii (de exemplu Lepista irina, Lepista panaeolus) sau nu (de exemplu Lepista caespitosa, Lepista saeva). Cuticula este netedă, umedă, adesea cu marginea brumată în tinerețe și ușor de îndepărtat. Coloritul pălăriei variază între gri, gri-verzui peste brun-roșcat până la violaceu și brun-violet.
 Lamelele: stau dens, sunt subțiri, ori rotunjite la bureți care nu formează o pâlnie la bătrânețe, ori decurente la picior la cei cu pâlnie în vârstă. Culoarea se ține de cea a pălăriei. Sporii sunt elipsoidali, necolorați, parțial verucoși, hialini (translucizi) și neamilozi. Coloritul pulberii este crem-gălbui până rozaliu închis, rar albicios, dar niciodată violaceu sau albăstrui.
 Piciorul: are o înălțime de 6-10 (12) cm și o lățime de 1,5-2,5 (3,5) cm, este plin, fibros, ceva elastic fiind în regulă cilindric, la unele specii tare bombat spre baza deseori flocoasă. Coloritul corespunde cu cel al pălăriei.
 Carnea: este albicioasă, la unele specii de culoarea aspectului general, fragilă și fragedă în pălărie, dar aproape mereu ceva fibroasă în picior. Mirosul este caracteristic parfumat, dar câteodată și neplăcut de pământ, gustul mereu ceva dulcișor până dulce-amărui.

Specii
După Index Fungorum și NCBI din decembrie 2013, următoarele specii aparțin genului Lepista:

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Genul în imagini

Note

Lectură suplimentară
 G. Gulden: Studies in Lepista (Fr.) W.G. Smith section Lepista (Basidiomycotina, Agaricales), în: Sydowia, nr 36, 1983, p. 59-74
 G. Gulden: Lepista, în: L. Hansen & H. Knudsen, (ed.): Nordic macromycetes, vol. 2, Copenhaga 1992
 H. Harmaja: A revision of the generic limit between Clitocybe and Lepista, în: Karstenia, nr. 14, 1974, p. 82-92
 H. Harmaja: A further revision of the generic limit between Lepista and Clitocybe, în: Karstenia, nr. 15, 1976, p. 13-15
 H. Harmaja: Notes on Clitocybe s. lato (Agaricales), în: Annales Bot. Fennici, nr. 40, 2003, p. 213-218
 Jakob Emanuel Lange: Flora Agaricina Danica, vol. 1, Copenhaga 1935

 Meinhard Michael Moser: Röhrlinge und Blätterpilze - Kleine Kryptogamenflora Mitteleuropas, ediția a 5-ea, vol. 2, Editura Gustav Fischer, Stuttgart 1983
 J. H. Petersen: & J. Vesterholt 1990 (ed.): Danske storsvampe, Copenhaga 1990
  A. D. Reid: Coloured icones of rare and interesting fungi, partea a 3-a, în:  Nova Hedwiga (suplement), nr. 15, 1968, p. 13-14.

Legături externe

Lepista (ciuperci)
Ciuperci saprofite
1849 în știință

Lepista (ciuperci)


The French law on secularity and conspicuous religious symbols in schools bans wearing conspicuous religious symbols in French public (e.g., government-operated) primary and secondary schools. The law is an amendment to the French Code of Education that expands principles founded in existing French law, especially the constitutional requirement of laïcité: the separation of state and religious activities.

The bill passed France's national legislature and was signed into law by President Jacques Chirac on 15 March 2004 (thus the technical name is law 2004-228 of 15 March 2004) and came into effect on 2 September 2004. The full title of the law is "" (literally "Law #2004-228 of 15 March 2004, concerning, as an application of the principle of the separation of church and state, the wearing of symbols or garb which show religious affiliation in public primary and secondary schools").

The law does not mention any particular religious symbol, and thus bans Christian (veil, signs), Muslim (veil, signs), Sikh (turban, signs), Jewish and other religious signs. It is, however, considered by many to target the wearing of headscarves (a khimar, considered by many Muslims to be an obligatory article of faith as part of hijab) by Muslim schoolgirls. For this reason, it is occasionally referred to as the French headscarf ban in the foreign press. In addition, the law is seen by some as disproportionately affecting Muslims, arguing that Christians rarely wear oversized crosses, and Sikhs have successfully lobbied to be able to wear a simple under-turban, whereas  Jews have greater opportunities to enroll children in private Jewish religious schools owing to their long presence in the country.

Background

Islamic view of headscarves
In Islam, Hijab is a duty prescribed on all Muslim women, though in the matter discussed in this article it only applies to women. Hijab is often equated with the idea of modesty in all senses including personal, physical and social. While it prescribes restrictions and practices for both men (such as, for example, restraining one's thoughts from objectification of women and covering the aspects of oneself that attract others to them, incorporating the chest and between the navel and knee for many Muslims) and women, it is most known for its religious prescription for a woman to dress modestly and cover her hair.

While for most Muslims the concept of hijab is seen as balanced and consistent with ideas of gender equality, others see the religious prescription on female covering as chauvinistic, patriarchal, oppressive and an enforcement on women and against their rights. Most Muslims living in Western societies concede outright that the forcing of women to wear the headscarf is against Islamic precepts and cannot be accepted, but social pressure can in some cases be strong.

A number of Islamic feminists see the wearing of the headscarf, and particularly of the full-face veil such as the niqāb, as oppressive of women. French activist and politician Fadela Amara has thus stated: "The veil is the visible symbol of the subjugation of women, and therefore has no place in the mixed, secular spaces of France's public school system."

French education system

Education is compulsory in France up to the age of 16.  The French system of primary and secondary education consists of:
 government-operated schools (enseignement public);
 private schools receiving government subsidies (enseignement privé sous contrat), the vast majority of private schools; and
 private schools not receiving government subsidies (enseignement privé hors contrat).
Schools in the first two categories are required to apply the same national curricula as defined by the Ministry of Education. The curriculum for schools in the third category is free, provided that students receive at least some minimal skills in writing, mathematics, etc. The law discussed in this article only applies to government-operated schools, in the first category.

The French government highly subsidises private elementary and secondary schools, even those affiliated with religious organizations, as long as they apply the same curriculum as the public schools, with the same academic standards, and that they do not discriminate on grounds of religious affiliation nor make religious education compulsory. It is for instance common that children of agnostic or otherwise non-religious families, or children of families from other religions (including non-Catholic Christians), are put in Catholic schools, if their parents judge these schools to offer better conditions of education or to be more convenient. Consequently, families can use private schools at moderate costs. While there are no accessible official national statistics on the costs of private schools, typical prices per year for low-income families are in the range of a few hundred euros. The average costs are €500 a year per student;  however, this statistic includes very expensive, exclusive schools. In addition, according to the figures from the secretariat, more than half of schools have established a price schedule taking into account a family's income; as a result, costs to parents can be as little as €20 to €30 per school month per student.

In addition, the French government operates a distant learning agency, the CNED, which is another solution for families impacted by the normal rules or schedules of public schools.

History
Since 1905, France has had a law requiring separation of church and state, prohibiting the state from recognizing or funding any religion. Schools directly operated by the national or local governments must not endorse or promote any religious dogma (whether endorsing an existing religion or endorsing atheism or any other philosophy). Schools funded totally or in part by the national and local governments by law must not force students into religious education; they should remain equally accessible to children of any, or no, faith. For example, even though a majority of the population nominally professes Catholicism (although far fewer regularly practice Catholicism), government-operated French schools have no communal prayers, religious assemblies, or Christian crosses on the walls. The Constitution of France says that France is a laïque (roughly, secular) Republic.

In France, historically, differences between religions (or later between religious and non-religious people) have often resulted in deep divisions of society, from the 16th-century Wars of Religion to the late 19th-century Dreyfus Affair. The relations between the Church of France and the state were disputed under Louis XIV (see Gallicanism); they were severely strained under the Revolution of 1789, when the constitutional government of the National Assembly promulgated the Civil Constitution of the Clergy and the Church divided into the constitutional clergy, who accepted it, and the ultramontanes who did not.    Roman Catholicism was recognised as the faith of the majority of French citizens, but Napoleon also named Judaism and the Lutheran and Reformed Churches as officially recognised by the state. Although these four 'official' religions received state funding and protection (until the 1905 law as above), they were not given the status of a religion of the state. France had begun to view faith as a matter for each individual citizen rather than for a nation as a whole.

As a result of this history, religious manifestations are considered undesirable in government-operated schools; primary and secondary schools are supposed to be neutral spaces where children can learn away from political or religious pressures, controversies and quarrels. Because of this neutrality requirement, students are normally prohibited from conducting religious proselytising or political activism on the premises.

Civil servants are expected to stay neutral with respect to politics or religion when they discharge their duties. More generally, they are expected to keep a certain reserve and not make comments or demonstrations that may be interpreted as political, religious, or other bias in the course of their duties or as an endorsement of particular religious or partisan political views by the government. Teaching personnel in government-operated schools must not, by law, endorse any political or religious point of view; they may also face sanctions for wearing overt religious symbols.

1980s and 1990s

For many years school administrators have accepted, or tolerated, that schoolchildren wear symbols of their various religions, such as a Christian student wearing a cross, or a Jewish student wearing a kippah. However, there was some leeway and uncertainty in those matters, and occasionally some students faced disciplinary action for overly ostentatious attire.

Many people find crosses and yarmulkes acceptable, but not headscarves, for a variety of reasons. Some feminists do not consider them as religious symbols, but as symbols of female alienation, or dangerous signs of mounting communautarisme (ethnicisation of social relationships, which the French do not view favorably), rising Islamist movements, or attacks on the Republic, are sometimes deemed 'foreign' and 'un-French'. However, some people regard the wearing of headscarves as a feminist choice and do not view this as fundamentally different from other choices relating to clothing. The fact that most Muslims in France come from former French colonies has added a racist/antiracist tint to the debate. The issue has deeply divided France and debate has raged on ever since.

The issue of religion has wider implications than the mere wearing of headscarves, which contributed to the complexity of the debate. Occasionally, Muslim students have refused to attend certain classes when they or those influencing them deemed aspects of their faith to be contradicted (such as swimming classes or physical education); or insisted on attending them in Islamic garb, thus raising the question of whether this purported solution denatured the intended activity.

The wearing of the headscarf was also criticized as a means to enforce peer pressure on the girls not wearing it. One defense against this argument was that the ratio of Muslim girls to other girls was not always high in classrooms, and that scarf wearing did not necessarily reflect proselytizing intent; but a countervailing relevant issue was that the relevant group being pressured was Muslim girls not wearing the scarf, who could sometimes be endangered inside or outside school unless they submitted to wearing the scarf like their classmates.

Because of the absence of unambiguous law, action was taken on a case-by-case basis against students wearing ostensible religious garb, with differences of practice between establishments. School administrators, in such cases, were taken into legal, social and media quarrels far beyond their ordinary responsibilities. This was highlighted by the 1989 Affaire du Foulard ("the headscarf affair"), when three young girls were expelled from their school in Creil, near Paris, for refusing to take off their headscarves. This caused such an uproar that administrators realized something had to be done soon to regain control.

Because of these difficulties, public powers sought a more consistent approach. In 1989, the Minister of Education requested the legal analysis of the Conseil d'État on the issue of whether or not school administrators could, or should, expel students for wearing religious symbols, within the current framework of applicable regulations, laws, constitutional rights and international conventions. The general assembly of the Conseil gave a detailed analysis, containing the following opinion:
It results from the above that, in teaching establishments, the wearing by students of symbols by which they intend to manifest their religious affiliation is not by itself incompatible with the principle of laïcité, as it constitutes the free exercise of freedom of expression and of manifestation of religious creeds, but that this freedom should not allow students to sport signs of religious affiliation that, due to their nature, or the conditions in which they are worn individually or collectively, or due to their ostentatious and provocative character, would constitute an act of pressure, provocation, proselytism or propaganda, or would harm the dignity or the freedom of the student or other members of the educative community, or would compromise their health or safety, or would perturb the educational activities or the education role of the teaching personnel, or would trouble public order in the establishment or the normal functioning of the public service.

On 2 November 1992, the Conseil ruled that a school regulation prohibiting all philosophical or religious signs, including those that were worn, was excessively sweeping and against the principle of laïcité.

On 14 March 1994, the Conseil ruled that a school regulation prohibiting any headgear was excessive (the intent of this regulation was to prohibit the wearing of certain religious signs). The Conseil found that this regulation was excessively sweeping, without a clear need for it to be so.

On 10 March 1995, the Conseil upheld the expelling of three students from a highschool, on the basis that the three students gravely perturbed classes, infringing on school rules and the alleged prohibition of proselytism. One factor was the insistence of the students on wearing the scarf during sports classes, which was deemed inappropriate attire for such an activity. It also upheld some stipulations of the school regulations which restricted the wearing of signs of a religious, philosophical or political character, with the same legal analysis as the 1989 one cited above.

On 11 September 1995, three families appealed before the Conseil rulings of lower administrative courts, which had upheld decisions by high schools to exclude their daughters because they wore the veil; and the Minister of Education appealed rulings of lower courts that had declared illegal three exclusion decisions. The actual legal reasons differed slightly; however, in every case, on 27 November 1996, the Conseil ruled that the children had been inappropriately expelled, considering that the headscarf worn by the student, while it expressed the student's religious beliefs, did not have a protest or ostentatious character, nor did wearing it constitute in any case an act of pressure or proselytism.

The opinion and the decisions of the Conseil, which established some kind of case law, still left a considerable margin of appreciation to school administrators, which led to many tensions and embarrassments. It was thus argued that clear and consistent rules should be enacted.

Stasi commission's report

In July 2003, French President Jacques Chirac set up an investigative committee (commission Stasi) to examine how the principle of laïcité should apply in practice. It consisted of 20 people headed by Bernard Stasi, then ombudsman of France (médiateur de la République). While an obvious focus of the commission was wearing religious attire in public schools, the commission noted in its report that the issues went further.

The Stasi Commission published its report on 11 December 2003, considering that ostentatious displays of religion violated the secular rules of the French school system. The report recommended a law against pupils wearing "conspicuous" signs of belonging to a religion, meaning any visible symbol meant to be easily noticed by others. Prohibited items would include headscarves for Muslim girls, yarmulkes for Jewish boys, and turbans for Sikh boys. The Commission recommended allowing the wearing of discreet symbols of faith such as small crosses, Stars of David or Fatima's hands.

The Senate commission based its report on multiple sources: school representatives, headmasters, teachers; political associations, such as Ni Putes Ni Soumises or SOS Racisme; representatives of the main religions; or leaders of human-rights organizations.

The Commission's report emphasised that publicly funded schools in France should transmit knowledge, teach students critical awareness, assure autonomy and openness to cultural diversity, and encourage personal development. Schooling aims both to train students for a professional career, and to make them into good citizens of the French Republic. The report states that such a mission presupposes fixed common rules, like gender equality and respect for secularity.

Most of the debate has centered on hijab – the Islamic dress code, which may include a headscarf for women, but more generally, on the wearing of religious or political symbols  in schools. The wearing of headscarves in school started comparatively recently in mainland France (since the late 1980s), and has become the focus of the conflict. The increasing number of visible headscarves has been attributed by some to a rise in extremist activity in France, in particular in poor immigrant suburbs. However intellectuals such as Xavier Ternisien of Le Monde Diplomatique have maintained that the indubitable rise in religious observance is not linked with Islamic extremism, but with the frustration of children of immigrants no longer accepting to remain invisible as their parents often were. Further it is often associated with the idea of Muslim communities feeling settled and established in, and thus a part of, in French society such that they feel comfortable in expressing their identity.

The Commission identified the following positions with regard to wearing the Muslim headscarf:
 For those wearing it, the headscarf can have different meanings. The wearers may have exercised a free personal choice to wear the headscarf; or external pressure may have forced them to do so. Most French people find this idea of constraint or pressure particularly intolerable when it relates to young girls (some girls start wearing a headscarf before the age of 11).

The purpose of dressing according to hijab varies from person to person. Some women see the headscarf as a way to preserve their modesty and prevent any sexual attractions as in western countries. Some see it as a form of liberation above the sexualisation and consumerism of modern society. Others see it as a patriarchal article intended to keep women hidden and subservient.

The representatives of the main religions and leaders of human rights organisations have expressed several objections to a law banning the wearing of religious symbols. They believe it will lead to the stigmatisation of Muslims, exacerbate anti-religious sentiment, promote the image of a France that restricts personal freedom, and encourage Muslim girls to drop out of schools if they feel forced to choose between schooling and their faith.

The Commission said that the Republic must clarify this situation.

A section of the report which received less media attention recommended that the school system make Yom Kippur and Eid (festival) into vacation days each year: currently, only some Christian holidays are vacation days (see Holidays in France); students who want to celebrate other festivities have to take some work day off with the authorisation of their parents. However, for critics and Muslims this did not balance out affairs: the banning of Muslim girls from freely choosing to wear an article of faith, seen by them as a religious obligation, could not be balanced with the permission to celebrate a religious festival, which is not obligatory at all.

The report also recommended enacting a ban on conspicuous symbols of political affiliation. The French National Assembly has not taken up these proposals.

The Commission also noted that occasionally pupils refuse to attend school because of the presence of teachers of the opposite sex, or refuse to attend certain classes (such as gymnastics or swimming lessons). The Commission suggested that only schools or state-recognised doctors (not simply parents) should have the right to grant exemptions.

Law creation and interpretations
In December 2003, President Jacques Chirac decided to act on the part of the Stasi report which recommended banning conspicuous religious symbols from schools.  This meant that the legislature could adopt the recommendations, according to the emergency procedure, in January or February, ready for application at the start of the next school year in September 2004.

On 10 February 2004, the lower house voted by a large majority (494 for, 36 against, 31 abstentions) in support of the ban, which includes the caveat that the ban will be reviewed after it has operated for one year.

The initiators of the law are said to have particularly targeted two items of clothing: the headscarf and the veil (French: foulard and voile respectively); however the law mentions neither and just addresses "ostentatious" ("conspicuous") symbols. Because of its terse, broad, vague terms, the law will leave a lot of its interpretation to the administrative and judicial authorities.

The headscarf (sometimes referred to as the hijab in both French and English) covers the hair, ears, neck, and sometimes the shoulders, but not the face. Most Muslim girls who cover their heads in school wear such a headscarf.  More rarely, girls may also wear a complete dress covering their body (djelbab). The full or Afghan burka, which covers the entire body except for a slit or grille to see through, occurs more commonly as the dress of an adult woman than that of a schoolgirl.  A recent controversy occurred when a mother who wore a full burka became a representative of parents in a city school. Rather than encourage public participation of such women, her participation in school deliberations while entirely covered was highly criticised. It was finally tolerated.

In order to enforce the law, effective decisions whether certain items are "ostentatious" or not will have to be taken. In order to achieve that:
 the Minister of Education will issue circulaires, or instructions for its services; it seems that large crosses, full hijabs or yarmulkes would be banned, while small symbols such as small Stars of David or crosses in pendants would not be;
 headmasters will have to judge whether particular attire is or not acceptable with respect to the law;
 if necessary, families will go to administrative courts to challenge the school authorities' decision; a final decision may not be reached until the Conseil d'État at litigation (supreme administrative court), decides some points of jurisprudence.
The law itself may not be challenged before French courts (since this would have warranted action before the Constitutional Council before the signing of the law); however, the courts may significantly curtail its application — especially given the inherent margin of appreciation of what is ostentatious or not.

The law will apply in France and its overseas territories (which France administers as a part of its metropolitan territory), but it is likely that appropriate enforcement measures will depend on the local context, given the margin of appreciation offered by the law. Overseas Countries and Territories with a large Muslim community will receive some exemptions. For example, it was suggested that Mayotte girls may wear small bandanas and light veils (kishall).

Public reaction

France
The proposed ban was extremely controversial, with both sides of the political spectrum being split on the issue.

In 2004, French Cardinal Bernard Panafieu, the Archbishop of Marseilles called the ban "unenforceable". While agreeing that some Muslim immigrants have had trouble adjusting to a "lay, pluralistic society" he asserted that the ban was wrong as it prevented Muslims from "asserting their identity" and that it would be "better to act through persuasion than by compulsion" if the state wanted to limit the use of religious symbols.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.cathnews.com/news/402/67.php |title=Cardinal says French headscarf ban 'unenforceable''' |publisher=Cathnews.com |date=2004-02-12 |access-date=2009-01-31 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080522015601/http://www.cathnews.com/news/402/67.php |archive-date=May 22, 2008 }}</ref>

Population
On 14 February 2004, the Associated Press reported that "Thousands of people, many of them women wearing headscarves, marched in France ... to protest a law banning the Islamic coverings and other religious apparel in public schools."

Polls suggest that a large majority of the French favour the ban. A January 2004 survey for Agence France-Presse showed 78% of teachers in favour. A February 2004 survey by CSA for Le Parisien showed 69% of the population for the ban and 29% against. For Muslims in France, the February survey showed 42% for and 53% against. Among surveyed Muslim women, 49% approved the proposed law, and 43% opposed it.

Complex reasons may influence why an individual either supports or opposes this amendment.  They range from ensuring sex equality, preventing girls from being pressured into wearing the headscarf, boys into wearing turbans (for example), or a desire to see the Muslim community assimilated into French society on the one hand; to uphold freedoms of expression or conscience or religion, preventing the state from imposing restrictions on what a person can or cannot wear, preventing state victimisation of a minority group and opposing what may be seen as discrimination against Muslims on the other.

Political reactions
While all major political parties were somewhat divided on the issue, all major parties (the majority UMP and UDF, the opposition PS) supported the law.

However, André Victor, member of Workers' Struggle wrote in his article Islamic Hijab and the Subjugation of Women 25 April 2003 that "Sarkozy has spoken out against hijab on passport photos, and presumably earned the approval of millions of voters, which was probably the real purpose of this exercise in demagoguery[...] Therefore, this policy leads to increase the weight of the most reactionary religious authorities within the immigrant population."

Legal arguments
Some critics have raised a legal point: they see the law as incompatible with the European convention on fundamental human rights. The Stasi Commission responded: The European Court in Strasbourg protects laïcité when it is a fundamental value of the State. It allows limits to the freedom of expression in public services, especially when it is a matter of protecting minors against external pressures. The Commission considers that the expression of an individual's religion in the French state has to comply with the basic rules regarding the secular nature of the state and has to comply with the requirements of equality between the sexes and the safeguarding of the rights of minors. Similar debates on the education of girls in headscarves have long raged in secular-yet-Muslim Turkey; the European Court of Human Rights upheld the laws of Turkey, which are more restrictive than the French law; it therefore seems highly unlikely it would declare the French law contrary to the Convention.

Another piece of legal criticism is that a full-fledged law was not needed to enforce a measure that basically amounts to a new set of school regulations. Any binding document of lesser value (such as a décret or an arrêté ministeriel) would have had a similar effect. Since the writing of the Napoleonic Code, a principle of French law has been that it must be, in the words of the great legislator Portalis, "general and abstract."  Critics therefore argue that, by legislating on issues that could be solved with texts other than laws, the French legislature lowers the values of the law in general. Article 34 of the Constitution of France vests power in Parliament to legislate on the "fundamental principles of teaching", leaving the application of these principles to the executive branch. By legislating on such minutiae, the argument goes, Parliament may have overstepped the "domain of the law" (domaine de la loi) that is set out by the Constitution only for the sake of pleasing the media and some interest groups.
However, a counter-argument is that the Conseil d'État, ruling according to current statute law, considered that sweeping prohibitions of religious attire or headgear by administrative authorities was contrary to law.

Opposition
 Human rights NGOs
Some international human rights' organisations criticised the law. Human Rights Watch stated:
The proposed law is an unwarranted infringement on the right to religious practice. For many Muslims, wearing a headscarf is not only about religious expression, it is about religious obligation.

The United States Commission on International Religious Freedom said:
In February 2004, the Commission issued a public statement expressing concern over the proposed new law. The Commission expressed particular concern that the proposed restrictions may violate France's international human rights commitments. The Commission also stated that though increased immigration in France in recent years has created new challenges for the French government, including integration of these immigrants into French society as well as problems of public order, these challenges should be addressed directly, and not by inappropriately limiting the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion, and belief. The French government's promotion of its understanding of the principle of secularism should not result in violations of the internationally recognized individual right to freedom of religion or belief.

In 2012, the United Nations Human Rights Committee stated that the expulsion of a Sikh pupil from his school in 2008 because of his Sikh turban or keski was a violation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights signed by France.

 Jihadists
Several members of Al-Qaeda criticized the law: Ayman al-Zawahiri criticized the law in 2004 and considered it to be part of an ongoing campaign against Islam by "Crusaders", Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi criticized the law in 2005. In 2009 Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb called France the "mother of all evils" and urged revenge against France for its "fierce war on our daughters who wore Hijab".

International
Various commentators outside of France condemned the law based on what they saw as its racist implications. Susan Price, an Australian activist, argued that "the wedge-politics of racism has always been used to divide the working class, which in France pulled off spectacular rolling strikes against the government in 2003," adding that "the current attack must also be seen as part of a continuum of racist policies which go back to the mid-1990s and the 'Fortress Europe' policies of the major European capitalist governments" designed "to appeal to the support base of Jean-Marie Le Pen's right-wing National Front (FN)."

Similar arguments were made at the time by American anti-racist activist, Sharon Smith, who added the claim that Muslim women in France opposing the 2004 law were fighting against the same "state-imposed oppression" as women in Afghanistan were opposing by seeking freedom to choose to refrain from wearing burkas.

Enforcement
The law came into effect on 2 September 2004, with the new school year. In September 2005, the Ministry of Education reported that only 12 students showed up with distinctive religious signs in the first week of classes, compared to 639 in the preceding year. A number of students have elected to take state-provided distance-learning classes from CNED. There was one case of a Sikh student in the académie of Créteil, who refused to remove his turban.

The decision caused an outcry from many Muslims across the world, calling it a violation of freedom of practicing their religion. In addition to protests of a few thousand people in Paris, there were protests of up to a few hundred people in other countries, especially in the Muslim world.

As a consequence of the law, the years following the ban has seen an increasing number of Islamic secondary schools being established, some Muslim female students chose to study at home, and others left France with their families.

Interpretation

In some schools, the ban was also applied to long skirts and headbands, or anything else that the school thought suggested expression of a religious identity.  There are intentionally no specific rules, sometimes resulting in arbitrary interpretations by individual school employees.  According to Luc Ferry, the Minister of National Education when the law was passed, the schools were empowered to prohibit anything, even hairstyles or wearing clothing of a color that the school decided had a religious meaning.  Between January 2014 and April 2015, the Collective Against Islamophobia in France documented 130 cases of schools across France objecting to girls' clothing, mostly involving longer skirts, but also cases involving headbands that school officials said were too wide, or sweaters.

In April 2015, a 15-year-old schoolgirl in northeastern France was sent home for wearing a plain black maxi skirt, a white shirt, and a pale pink sweater to school, with no head scarf.  The school deemed wearing a long skirt to be a "provocation" and an "ostentatious sign" of her religion, especially since several other girls had worn maxi skirts recently, and sent her home to change clothes. This incident caused worldwide controversy and infuriated many of the country's Muslims, who saw the school system's punishment of the girl as racially and religiously discriminatory.

 Abaya ban
France banned Muslim girls in state schools from wearing abayas. In August 2023, French education minister, Gabriel Attal, said that the long, flowing dresses worn by some Muslim women, would be banned as they breached the "principle of secularism",  particularly by those pupils "wearing religious attire like abayas and long shirts."

On 4 September, first day of the new academic year, French schools sent  67 Muslim girls to home  for refusing to remove their abayas.

On 5 September, a 15-year-old girl living in the French City of Lyon reached school wearing jeans, T-shirt and an open Kimono - a common and popular traditional Japanese garment. The school however denied her the entry. On behalf of the girl student, Human rights lawyer Nabil Boudi on September 22, 2023 lodged a complaint in the United Nations alleging racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, over "discrimination the girl student faced on the grounds of her religious affiliation".

See also
 Alma and Lila Lévy
 Civil religion
 Feminism in France
 Islam in France
 Islamic dress in Europe
 Islamic scarf controversy in France
 Quebec Charter of Values, similar legislation proposed in Quebec in 2013
 R v Headteacher and Governors of Denbigh High School, ex p Begum, a similar controversy in England
 Religious pluralism
 Secular education
 Sikhism in France

Notes

External links
English
 The deep roots of French secularism, article by Henri Astier on BBC News online, Sept 1st, 2004
 France: Religious Freedom in the Land of Voltaire
 The war of the headscarves (The Economist, February 7, 2004)
 French MPs back headscarf ban (BBC, February 10, 2004)
 Eight different viewpoints on the headscarf from around Europe (BBC, February 10, 2004)
 Religious dress legal news and resources, JURIST

French
 About the bill from the Assemblée nationale

Support
English
 Analysis by the Brookings Institution

French
 The Law and the associated legislative process
 Law 2004-228 of March 15, 2004 (English translation)
 Parliamentary report on the law by Pascal Clément
 French Senate, Legislative file on the law
 French National Assembly, Legislative file on the law
 Litigation
 Conseil d'État, November 2, 1992,
 Conseil d'État, March 14, 1994,
 Conseil d'État, March 10, 1995,
 Conseil d'État, November 27, 1996: , , , , ,
 Conseil d'État, October 6, 2004: ,
 Conseil d'État, October 8, 2004:
 Cour administrative d'appel de Paris, July 19, 2005
 Legal analyses and applicable jurisprudence
 Legal analyses on the principle of laïcité (decisions and opinions of the Conseil d'État)
 French Code of Education, legislative part
 Conseil d'État. Rapport public 2004. Jurisprudence et avis de 2003. Un siècle de laïcité (Etudes et documents n.55), La Documentation française,  (online version, PDF, summary)
 Conseil d'État'', general assembly, section of the Interior,  advice #346.893 – November 27, 1989

Education policy in France
Secularity
Religion and education
Secularism in France
2004 in law
Law on secularity and conspicuous religious symbols in schools
Religion and society in France
Islam in France
Islamic clothing controversy in France
Religion and law
Religion and children
Religious symbols
2004 in education
2004 in religion
2004 establishments in France


Christopher Thomas Sununu (født d. 5. november 1974) er en amerikansk politiker fra det Republikanske Parti, som har været guvernør for delstaten New Hampshire siden 2017. Sununu er fra en politisk familie. Hans far, John H. Sununu, var også guvernør i staten (1983-1989), og hans bror, John E. Sununu, var medlem af Repræsentanternes Hus (1997-2003) og Senatet (2003-200) på det føderale niveau.

Baggrund
Chris Sununu blev født i Salem, New Hampshire som søn af politikeren John H. Sununu. Han er en ud af otte søskende.

Sununu har en bachelor i miljøteknik fra Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Politiske karriere

Guvernør
Sununu annoncerede i januar 2015, at han ville være kandidat til guvernørvalget i 2016. Sununu var en blandt flere republikanske kandidater, og vandt nomineringen med mindre en 1.000 stemmer flere end andenpladsen. I valget mødte han den demokratiske kandidat Colin Van Ostern, og vandt en meget tæt valgkamp med 48.8% af stemmerne til 46.6%. De sidste procentdeler gik til den libertarianske kandidat.

Sununu blev genvalgt i 2018 med 52,8% af stemmerne. Dette var på trods af, at andre republikanere ikke havde meget succes i staten på samme valgdag, da Demokraterne tog kontrol over statens to kamre.

Trods rygter om, at Sununu ville forsøge på at blive valgt til Senatet i 2020, annoncerede han, at han ville søge genvalg. Sununu blev her genvalgt i overbevisende stil med 65,2% af stemmerne.

Sununu annoncerede i november 2021, at han ville søge genvalg igen i 2022, og hermed igen afviste en mulighed for at være senatkandidat. Sununu vandt genvalg med 57,3% af stemmerne. Sununu blev hermed kun den anden guvernør i statens historie til at side i fire valgperioder.

Holdninger
Sununu anses som en moderat republikaner. Han støtter retten til abort, dog med restriktioner, og han har også støttet udvidelse af LGBT-rettigheder i forhold til beskyttelse imod diskrimination, og ved at forbyde omvendelsesterapi for mindreårige.

Sununu er liberal på økonomisk politik, og har i sin tid som guvernør gennemført flere store skattelettelser.

Referencer

Eksterne henvisninger

 Officiel profil for Guvernør Sununu  på New Hampshires officielle hjemmeside.
 Chris Sununus officielle kampagneside på www.chrissununu.com

Personer fra New Hampshire
Politikere fra USA
Guvernører i New Hampshire

Chris Sununu


SteelSeries er en dansk fabrikant af gaming periferiudstyr og tilbehør, heriblandt headsets, tastaturer, computermus, og gaming overflader.

Historie
SteelSeries blev i 2001 stiftet af Jacob Wolff-Petersen. Firmaets originale navn var Soft Trading, men det blev ændret til SteelSeries i 2007. Soft Trading lavede IceMat og SteelPad musemåtterne, hvilket eventuelt har påvirket firmaets navneændring. I 2008 købte SteelSeries Ideazon, en Nordamerikansk-baseret udvikler og fabrikant af gaming periferiudstyr.

I 2012 modtog SteelSeries investeringer fra amerikanske privatfond Catterton Partners, samt af den kinesiske privatfond ClearVue Partners, i ubestemte beløb.

Hold og spiller sponsoreringer
SteelSeries støtter en gruppe ESport spillere og hold gennem sponsorering og fællesskabsstøtte. Blandt de sponsorerede hold kan følgende hold findes: FaZe Clan, Evil Geniuses, Major League Gaming og Natus Vincere, m.v. Tidligere sponsoraftaler omfatter Manuel "Grubby" Schenkhuizen og Tom "Tsquared" Taylor i 2011.

Partnere
SteelSeries er partneret med Blizzard Entertainment, Electronic Arts, Gunnar Optiks, samt Valve Corporation.

Referencer

Eksterne links

Elektronikvirksomheder i Danmark

SteelSeries


Die Ulrichskapelle im Ulrichsbruch bei Östringen im Landkreis Karlsruhe im nördlichen Baden-Württemberg war eine mittelalterliche Kapelle, die dem heiligen Ulrich geweiht war. Die Kapelle ist spätestens seit dem 18. Jahrhundert verfallen.

Die Kapelle wurde 1337 von Eberhard von Ramberg für den halben Zehnten an Sinsheimer Bürger verkauft. 1414 verkauften Ulrich von Flehingen und Adelheid von Beimingen Zehntrechte an St. Ulrich dem Domstift Speyer. 1431 erwarb das Domstift auch die restlichen Zehntanteile. Das Domstift übertrug 1617 dem Bürger Baur die Verpflichtung zum baulichen Unterhalt der Kapelle. 1663 leistete das Domkapitel einen Kostenersatz für die Renovierung der Kapelle. 1738 lehnte das Domkapitel den Wiederaufbau der Kapelle ab.

Literatur
 Theodor Brauch: Östringen. Geschichte einer Stadt. Östringen 1982

Kirchengebäude im Landkreis Karlsruhe
Ostringen
Ostringen
Kirchengebäude in Europa
Bauwerk in Östringen
Ostringen

Ulrichskapelle (Östringen)


The Canadian Centre for Architecture (CCA; ) is a museum of architecture and research centre in Montreal, Quebec, Canada. It is located at 1920, rue Baile (1920, Baile Street), between rue Fort (Fort Street) and rue Saint-Marc (Saint-Marc Street) in what was once part of the Golden Square Mile. Today, it is considered to be located in the Shaughnessy Village neighbourhood of the borough of Ville-Marie.

Phyllis Lambert is the founding director emeritus, Bruce Kuwabara is chair of the board of trustees, Giovanna Borasi is the director.

The CCA contains a large library and archives, and is host to various exhibits throughout the year. It is also home to a study centre open to the general public. The CCA provides educational programs and cultural activities.

The CCA was designed and built by Peter Rose. It has an architectural garden located on the southern side of René Lévesque Boulevard. The sculpture garden was designed by architect Melvin Charney.

History
The CCA was founded in 1979 by Montreal architect Phyllis Lambert. The purpose of the centre was to promote public awareness of the role architecture plays in society, as well as to encourage scholarly architectural research and to foster innovative design practices.

The CCA was designed and constructed between 1985 and 1989 by Montreal architect Peter Rose. The design of the museum incorporates the Shaughnessy House mansion, built for Thomas Shaughnessy, a Second Empire-style mansion that Lambert purchased in 1974 to prevent its demolition.

The CCA received the Honor Award for Architecture from the American Institute of Architects and the Governor General's Medals in Architecture in 1992.

Building

The current building, which opened in 1989, surrounds Shaughnessy House and was designed by Peter Rose, in collaboration with Phyllis Lambert and Erol Argun. The historic Shaughnessy House, located at 1923 Dorchester Street West (today René Lévesque Boulevard), was built in 1874 according to plans by William Tutin Thomas. It is one of the few nineteenth-century mansions in Montreal that is accessible to the public.

The CCA building, with a surface area of roughly , is home to exhibit halls, the Paul Desmarais Theatre, a bookstore, the library, and a study centre in the Alcan Wing. It also contains restoration laboratories and conservation offices. The work of conservation and restoration of Shaughnessy House, with a floor area of over , was carried out under the direction of Denis Saint-Louis. Also inside is the Devencore Conservatory and reception rooms.

Due to its size, location and use of traditional and modern materials, combining structural aluminum with grey Montreal limestone, the CCA building's architecture blends past and present. Its landscapes, including the CCA sculpture garden facing the building on the south side of René Lévesque Boulevard, were designed according to the ecology of each location. Most of the rooms at Shaughnessy House have been restored to their original 1874 state.

The "Van Horne / Shaughnessy House" was listed as a National Historic Site of Canada in 1973, and as a Historical Monument of Quebec on 6 February 1974.

Collection and exhibits
The CCA has largest collections of books and artifacts touching on the built environment and certain aspects of industrial design.  Within the general collections it has special collections such as those pertaining to architectural games for children, universal exhibitions and their architecture, and significant architects including Ernest Cormier, Peter Eisenman, Arthur Erickson, John Hejduk, Cedric Price, Aldo Rossi, James Stirling, and the artist Gordon Matta-Clark.

The centre mounts regular shows made up of research on thematic subjects, different aspects of its collections, and hosts touring exhibits from other museums. The centre offers tours adapted to specific groups and educational programs for children. It also has a bookstore, a concert hall, and gardens. The sculpture garden which lies across René Lévesque Boulevard offers a full scale ghost-like lower shell of the bottom part of the Shaughnessy mansion, and assorted modernistic sculptures or constructs which are developed around the theme of architecture.

The centre's research library is open to the public by appointment. It celebrated its 20th anniversary in 2009.

Lectures series
Over the years, CCA has organized a variety of lectures and presentations, for example by Evgeny Morozov and Johannes Grenzfurthner.

Sculpture garden

The mansion faces a sculpture garden by Melvin Charney on the south side of René Lévesque Boulevard. Located in between René-Lévesque Boulevard and the Ville-Marie Expressway, it is a park, Esplanade Ernest Cormier, in an area of heavy traffic and is at the edge of a cliff. The park contains a set of sculptures that depict aspects of architecture, and include a reproduction of the base of the facade and size of Shaughnessy House. The vegetation is mixed with sections of open walls. Architectural fixtures and furniture items are placed on pedestals.

Affiliations
The Museum is affiliated with: CMA, CHIN, and Virtual Museum of Canada.

See also

 Architecture of Montreal
 Architecture of Canada
 Examination for Architects in Canada
 Rudolf Fränkel – his inheritance lies at the CCA
 Modern architecture
 Society for the Study of Architecture in Canada

References

External links

 CCA homepage in English and French

Museums in Montreal
Architecture museums
Sculpture gardens, trails and parks in Canada
Research institutes in Canada
Architecture organizations
Architecture in Canada
Postmodern architecture in Canada
Second Empire architecture in Canada
Buildings and structures completed in 1989
Art museums established in 1979
Downtown Montreal
Art museums and galleries in Quebec
1979 establishments in Quebec
Educational organizations based in Quebec
Library-related organizations
Museum organizations
Educational buildings in Montreal

Canadian Centre for Architecture


Port Leopold est un poste de traite abandonné situé dans la région de Qikiqtaaluk au Nunavut (Canada.

Géographie

Port Leopold, a l'extrémité nord-est de l'île Somerset fait face à l'île du Prince-Léopold.

Histoire

Le lieu est célèbre pour avoir été le camp d'hivernage, en 1848, de l' explorateur James Clark Ross lors de sa recherche de l' expédition Franklin.

Plus tard, Port Leopold devient le site d'un poste de traite de la Compagnie de la Baie d'Hudson.

Littérature

Dans Les Aventures du capitaine Hatteras de Jules Verne, John Hatteras essaye vainement d'atteindre l'île Beechey pour ensuite se frayer un chemin vers le nord. Il se résout à faire escale à Port Leopold avant de s'engager vers le sud dans le canal du Prince-Régent (chapitre XV).

Notes et références

Liens externes

Poste de traite de la Compagnie de la Baie d'Hudson

Port Leopold