The Qatar diplomatic crisis was a high-profile incident involving the deterioration of ties between Qatar and the Arab League between 2017 and 2021. It began when Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Egypt severed their bilateral relations with Qatar and subsequently banned Qatar-registered aircraft and Qatari ships from utilizing their sovereign territory by air, land, and sea; this involved the Saudis' closure of Qatar's only land crossing, initiating a de facto blockade of the country. Tensions between the two sides came to a close in January 2021, following a resolution between the Saudis and the Qataris.

The Saudi-led coalition cited Qatar's alleged support for terrorism as the main reason for their actions, alleging that Qatar had violated a 2014 agreement with the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), of which Qatar is a member. Saudi Arabia and other countries have criticized Al Jazeera and Qatar's relations with Iran. Qatar explained that it had provided assistance to some opposition groups, including Islamist groups (such as the Muslim Brotherhood), but consistently negated aiding militant groups linked to al-Qaeda or the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Qatar also emphasized that it has long assisted the United States in the War on Terror, especially via the Qatar-based Aludaid US military base, and the ongoing military intervention against ISIL.

One day into the crisis, the Saudi-led coalition was joined by Jordan, and were further supported thereafter by the Maldives, Mauritania, Senegal, Djibouti, the Comoros, and the Tobruk-based government in Libya in severing relations with Qatar and closing the country's land routes for its food imports. The demands against Qatar included reducing diplomatic relations with Iran, stopping military coordination with Turkey, and closing Al Jazeera; Qatar refused to agree to any of the Saudi-led coalition's demands. Initial supply disruptions were minimised by additional imports from Iran, with which Qatar restored full diplomatic relations in August 2017, and Turkey.

On 4 January 2021, Qatar and Saudi Arabia agreed to a resolution of the crisis, brokered by Kuwait and the United States, which stated that Saudi Arabia will reopen its border with Qatar and begin the process for reconciliation. An agreement and final communiqué signed on 5 January 2021 following a GCC summit at Al-'Ula marks the resolution of the crisis. According to Foreign Policy, the publication views the crisis as a failure for Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt, because Qatar generated closer ties to Iran and Turkey, and became economically and militarily stronger and more autonomous.

Background

Since he took power in 1995 as Emir of Qatar, Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani believed Qatar could find security by transforming itself from a Saudi appendage to a fully sovereign state, equal  to Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia withdrew its ambassador to Doha from 2002 to 2008 to try to pressure Qatar to curb its individualistic tendencies. This approach broadly failed. The Arab Spring left a power vacuum which both Saudi Arabia and Qatar sought to fill, with Qatar being supportive of the revolutionary wave and Saudi Arabia opposing it; since both states are allies of the United States, they avoid direct conflict with one another. Qatar has had differences with other Arab governments on a number of issues: it broadcasts Al Jazeera; it is accused of maintaining good relations with Iran; and it has supported the Muslim Brotherhood in the past. Qatar has been accused of sponsoring terrorism. Some countries have faulted Qatar for funding rebel groups in Syria, including al-Qaeda's affiliate in Syria, the al-Nusra Front, although Saudi Arabia has done the same. In December 2021, The Economist stated that Qatar had changed its anti-Islamist policies and asked Brotherhood members to leave the country.

Qatar has allowed the Afghan Taliban to set up a political office inside the country. Qatar is a close ally of the United States, hosting the largest American base in the Middle East, Al Udeid Air Base.

In March 2014, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt withdrew their ambassadors from Qatar. This severing of relations was the first of its kind since the establishment of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The crisis affected the GCC negatively at first – raising questions among member states, revealing shifts in their political agendas, and changing the balance of power in the region to some extent.

The exact reasons for the break in diplomatic relations in 2017 are unclear, but contemporary news coverage primarily attributed it to several events in April and May 2017:

April 2017 hostage negotiations

In April 2017, Qatar was involved in a deal with both Sunni and Shi'ite militants in Iraq and Syria. The deal had two goals. The immediate goal was to secure the return of 26 Qatari hostages (including Qatari royals) who had been kidnapped by Shi'ite militants while falcon hunting in southern Iraq and kept in captivity for more than 16 months. The second goal was to get both Sunni and Shi'ite militants in Syria to allow humanitarian aid to pass through and allow the safe evacuation of civilians. According to the New York Times, this deal allowed the evacuation of at least 2,000 civilians from the Syrian village of Madaya alone. What outraged Saudi Arabia and the UAE was the amount of money Qatar paid to secure the deal. According to the Financial Times, Qatar paid $700 million to multiple Iranian-backed Shi'a militias in Iraq, $120–140 million to Tahrir al-Sham, and $80 million to Ahrar al-Sham.

Riyadh Summit 2017

As part of the Riyadh Summit in late May 2017, many world leaders, including US President Donald Trump visited the region. Trump gave strong support for Saudi Arabia's efforts in fighting against states and groups allied with Iran and the Muslim Brotherhood, leading to an arms deal between the countries. The Business Insider reported that "Elliott Broidy a top fundraiser for President Donald Trump; and George Nader, Broidy's business partner ... pushed for anti-Qatar policies at the highest levels of government, and expected large consulting contracts from Saudi Arabia and the UAE." Trump's support may have induced other Sunni states to fall in line with Saudi Arabia to take a stance against Qatar. Trump's public support for Saudi Arabia, according to The New York Times, emboldened the kingdom and sent a chill through other Gulf states, including Oman and Kuwait, for fear that any country that defies the Saudis or the United Arab Emirates could face ostracism as Qatar had. The Saudi-led move was at once an opportunity for the GCC partners and Egypt to punish their adversaries in Doha, please their allies in Washington, and remove attention from their own shortcomings and challenges.

Hacking operations against Qatar
According to Qatar-based Al Jazeera and the American FBI, the Qatar News Agency website and other government media platforms were hacked in May 2017 resulting in postings on the official Qatar News Agency website of faked remarks attributed to the Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, expressing support for Iran, Hamas, Hezbollah, and Israel. The emir was quoted as saying: "Iran represents a regional and Islamic power that cannot be ignored and it is unwise to face up against it. It is a big power in the stabilization of the region." Qatar reported that the statements were false and did not know their origin. Despite this, the remarks were widely publicized in the various non-Qatari Arab news media, including UAE-based Sky News Arabia and Saudi-owned Al Arabiya. On 3 June 2017, the Twitter account of Bahraini foreign minister Khalid bin Ahmed Al Khalifa was hacked.

Initially, alleged intelligence gathered by US security agencies indicated that Russian hackers were behind the intrusion first reported by the Qataris. However, a US official briefed on the inquiry told the New York Times that it "was unclear whether the hackers were state-sponsored" and The Guardian diplomatic editor Patrick Wintour reported that "it is believed that the Russian government was not involved in the hacks; instead, freelance hackers were paid to undertake the work on behalf of some other state or individual." A US diplomat said that Russia and its ally Iran stood to benefit from sowing discord among US allies in the region, "particularly if they made it more difficult for the United States to use Qatar as a major base." The FBI sent a team of investigators to Doha to help the Qatari government investigate the hacking incident. Later, the New York Times reported that the hacking incidents may be part of a long-running cyberwar between Qatar and other Gulf countries that was only revealed to the public during the recent incidents, and they noted how Saudi and UAE media picked up the statement made by the hacked media in less than 20 minutes and began interviewing many well-prepared commentators against Qatar.

US intelligence agencies believe that the hacking was done by the United Arab Emirates, according to a Washington Post report published on 16 July. The intelligence officials stated that the hacking was discussed among Emirati officials on 23 May, one day before the operation took place. The UAE denied any involvement in the hacking. It was announced on 26 August 2017, that five individuals allegedly involved in the hacking were arrested in Turkey.

A former employee of the US National Security Agency (NSA), David Evenden, was hired by the UAE to work at the cyberespionage firm CyberPoint. The Emirates signaled a green flag to Evenden and his team to run hacking operations against Qatar, in order to scavenge substance that Qatar has been involved in funding the Muslim Brotherhood at some point in time. In its major stratagem against Qatar, the UAE allowed Evenden and the network of other former NSA employees to neglect rationalizations and fetch confidential data. This team at CyberPoint carried out several global hacking attempts, including against the Qatari royals, the officials at FIFA, and even the Internet critics of the UAE. In 2015, the Emirates, using these NSA employees, hacked the emails of Michelle Obama, before her scheduled visit to an event in Qatar. Mrs. Obama was invited by Qatar's Sheikha Moza bint Nasser. The email hack provided the UAE with every piece of information exchanged between the two women and their staff.

Hacking of UAE ambassador's email

In May 2017, the email account of the UAE ambassador to the US, Yousef Al-Otaiba, was hacked. The emails were seen by the Huffington Post as an attempt "to embarrass" Al Otaiba because they showed links between the UAE and the US-based pro-Israel Foundation for Defense of Democracies. The hack was seen as a move to benefit Qatar, which deepened the rift even more between the two sides. According to The Intercept, Yousef al-Otaiba has been reportedly linked to buying influence for UAE-led campaigns in the White House.

Severance of diplomatic and economic ties
Between 5 and 6 June 2017, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Yemen, Egypt, the Maldives, and Bahrain all separately announced that they were cutting diplomatic ties with Qatar; among these Bahrain was the first to announce the severing of ties at 02:50 GMT in the early morning of 5 June.

A variety of diplomatic actions were taken. Saudi Arabia and the UAE notified ports and shipping agents not to receive Qatari vessels or ships owned by Qatari companies or individuals. Saudi Arabia closed the border with Qatar. Saudi Arabia closed its airspace to Qatar Airways. Instead, Qatar was forced to reroute flights to Africa and Europe through Iranian airspace. Saudi Arabia's central bank advised banks not to trade with Qatari banks in Qatari riyals. Additionally, Qatari citizens in those countries were required to return home to Qatar within two weeks.

Qatar verbally criticized the ban. The Foreign Ministry of Qatar criticized the ban, arguing that it undermined Qatar's sovereignty. The foreign minister of Qatar, Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al-Thani, said that Saudi statements regarding Qatar were contradictory: on the one hand, Saudi Arabia claimed Qatar was supporting Iran, on the other hand, it claimed Qatar was funding Sunni extremists fighting against Iran.

Saudi Arabia's move was welcomed by United States president Donald Trump despite a large US presence at the Al Udeid Air Base, the primary base of US air operations against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. However, Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson and Defense Secretary James Mattis worked on de-escalating the situation. Tillerson, as the CEO of ExxonMobil, was acquainted with the current and previous emirs of Qatar. A number of countries in the region, including Turkey, Russia and Iran, called for the crisis to be resolved through peaceful negotiations.

All GCC countries involved in the announcement ordered their citizens out of Qatar. Three Gulf states (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain) gave Qatari visitors and residents two weeks to leave their countries. The foreign ministries of Bahrain and Egypt gave Qatari diplomats 48 hours to leave their countries. Qatar was expelled from the Saudi Arabian-led intervention in Yemen and Yemen's government itself cut ties. Kuwait and Oman remained neutral.

The Tobruk-based government of Libya claimed to have cut diplomatic ties with Qatar despite having had no actual diplomatic relations with that country.

The semi-autonomous Somali regions of Puntland, Hirshabelle, and Galmudug each issued statements cutting ties with Qatar, in opposition to the neutral stance of the federal government of Somalia.

Other countries made statements condemning Qatar, including Gabon and Eritrea.

Demands on Qatar and responses
On 22 June 2017, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Egypt, and Bahrain issued Qatar a list of 13 demands through Kuwaiti mediation, requiring Qatar to agree within 10 days (2 July 2017). According to reports on 23 June, the demands included:

Closing Al Jazeera and its affiliate stations.
Closing other news outlets that Qatar funds, directly and indirectly, including Arabi21, Rassd, Al-Araby Al-Jadeed and Middle East Eye.
Closing the Turkish military base in Qatar, and terminating the Turkish military presence and any joint military cooperation with Turkey inside Qatar.
Reducing diplomatic relations with Iran. Only trade and commerce with Iran that complies with US and international sanctions were to be permitted.
Expelling any members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and cutting off military and intelligence cooperation with Iran.
"Severing ties with terrorist, ideological and sectarian organizations including the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), Al-Qaeda, Hezbollah, and Jabhat Fateh al Sham, formerly al Qaeda's branch in Syria", according to one Arab official, who insisted Qatar must announce its compliance.
Surrendering all designated terrorists in Qatar, and stopping all means of funding for individuals, groups or organisations that have been designated as terrorists.
Ending interference in the four countries' domestic and foreign affairs and having contact with their political oppositions.
Stopping granting citizenship to wanted nationals from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Bahrain.
Revoking Qatari citizenship for existing nationals where such citizenship violates those countries' laws.
Paying reparations for years of alleged wrongs.
Submitting to monitoring for 10 years.
Aligning itself with the other Gulf and Arab countries militarily, politically, socially and economically, as well as on economic matters, in line with an agreement reached with Saudi Arabia in 2014.

According to a report by the Qatar-endowed Al Jazeera, "Qatari officials immediately dismissed the document as neither reasonable [nor] actionable." Iran denounced the blockade. US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson said that some of the demands would be very hard to meet but encouraged further dialogue.

On 3 July, Saudi Arabia accepted a Kuwaiti request for the deadline to be extended by 48 hours.

On 5 July, foreign ministers from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Bahrain met in Cairo after receiving a response from Qatar to their list of demands. The meeting, intended to resolve the dispute, ended in a stalemate when Saudi foreign minister Adel al-Jubeir said that the political and economic boycott of Qatar would remain until it changed its policies. Also on the same day, the Saudi-led bloc withdrew its insistence on compliance with the 13 specific demands of the previous month, instead asking Qatar to accept six broad principles, which included commitments to combat terrorism and extremism and to end acts of provocation and incitement.

However, by 30 July 2017, the 13 demands had been reinstated. In the meantime, a joint statement was made in Cairo in order to restart the negotiation process with Qatar, which included six principles:

 Commitment to combat extremism and terrorism in all its forms and to prevent their financing or the provision of safe havens.
 Prohibiting all acts of incitement and all forms of expression which spread, incite, promote or justify hatred and violence.
 Full commitment to the Riyadh Agreement 2013 and the supplementary agreement and its executive mechanism for 2014 within the framework of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) for Arab States.
 Commitment to all the outcomes of the Arab-Islamic-US Summit held in Riyadh in May 2017.
 To refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of States and from supporting illegal entities.
 The responsibility of all States of the international community to confront all forms of extremism and terrorism as a threat to international peace and security.

Global reactions

United States

United States President Donald Trump claimed credit for engineering the diplomatic crisis in a series of tweets. On 6 June, Trump began by tweeting: "During my recent trip to the Middle East I stated that there can no longer be funding of Radical Ideology. Leaders pointed to Qatar – look!" An hour and a half later, he remarked on Twitter that it was "good to see the Saudi Arabia visit with the King and 50 countries already paying off. They said they would take a hard line on funding extremism, and all reference was pointing to Qatar. Perhaps this will be the beginning of the end to the horror of terrorism!" This was in contrast to attempts by the Pentagon and the Department of State to remain neutral. The Pentagon praised Qatar for hosting the Al Udeid Air Base and for its "enduring commitment to regional security." US Ambassador to Qatar, Dana Shell Smith, sent a similar message. Earlier, the US Secretary of State had taken a neutral stance and called for dialogue. On the same day, Trump also had a phone call with Saudi King Salman and rejected a Saudi proposal to invade Qatar. Instead, the United States requested Kuwaiti mediation with the goal of resolving the conflict.

On 8 June, President Donald Trump, during a phone call with the Emir of Qatar Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, offered to act as a mediator in the conflict with a White House meeting between the parties if necessary. The offer was declined, and a Qatari official stated, "The emir has no plans to leave Qatar while the country is under a blockade." On 9 June, Trump once again put the blame on Qatar, calling the blockade "hard but necessary" while claiming that Qatar had been funding terrorism at a "very high level" and described the country as having an "extremist ideology in terms of funding." This statement was in conflict with Secretary of State Tillerson's comments on the same day, which called on Gulf states to ease the blockade. In 13 June 2017 after meeting with Tillerson in Washington, Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir stated that there was "no blockade" and "what we have done is we have denied them use of our airspace, and this is our sovereign right," and that the King Salman Centre for Humanitarian Aid and Relief would send food or medical aid to Qatar if needed. The following day, Trump authorized the sale of $12 billion of U.S. weapons to Qatar. According to The Intercept, Saudi Arabia and the UAE lobbied Trump to fire Rex Tillerson because he "intervened to stop a secret Saudi-led, UAE-backed plan to invade and essentially conquer Qatar."

On 21 June 2017, Trump told a crowd in Iowa that "We cannot let these incredibly rich nations fund radical Islamic terror or terrorism of any kind", noting that after his visit to Riyadh in May 2017 to meet with Saudi King Salman and urge an end to terror funding, "He has taken it to heart. And now they're fighting with other countries that have been funding terrorism. And I think we had a huge impact."

Other countries

Multiple countries, the European Union and the United Nations called for resolution of the diplomatic crisis through dialogue:

Israel's former defense minister, Avigdor Lieberman, described the situation as an "opportunity" for Israel, stating, "Some [Arab countries'] interests overlap with Israeli interests, including the issue with al-Jazeera." He went on to describe Al Jazeera Media Network as an "incitement machine" and "pure propaganda." Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has demanded AJMN shut down its offices in Israel.

Reports that Mauritius had cut ties with Qatar were refuted by the Mauritian government. A report in the Saudi Gazette incorrectly stated that Mauritius had broken off ties with Qatar and that Mauritius' Vice Prime-Minister had issued a communiqué pledging his country's support for Saudi Arabia. This prompted further erroneous reports by other outlets. However, Mauritian Vice Prime Minister Showkutally Soodhun in an interview with Le Défi Media Group of Mauritius refuted claims that he had issued any such communiqué, and Mauritius' Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement that Mauritius continued to maintain diplomatic relations with Qatar.

Pakistan stated that it had no plans to cut diplomatic relations with Qatar. The National Assembly passed a resolution urging all countries to "show restraint and resolve their differences through dialogue." The Pakistani Federal minister for Petroleum and Natural Resources said that "Pakistan will continue to import liquefied natural gas (LNG) from Qatar." A six-member Qatari delegation headed by a special envoy of the Qatari Emir visited Pakistan and asked Pakistan to play a positive role in resolving the diplomatic crisis, and the former Prime Minister of Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif, was quoted as saying that "Pakistan would do 'all it can' to help resolve the crisis," as well as calling on the Muslim world to play a role in ending hostilities. A TRT report stated that Pakistan would deploy 20,000 troops in Qatar, which the Pakistani foreign ministry denied.

The Philippines suspended the deployment of migrant workers to Qatar on 6 June 2017. However, the next day, they allowed the deployment of returning workers and those with an Overseas Employment Certificate, but still maintained the suspension of the deployment of new workers. The suspension was later fully lifted on 15 June.

On 8 June 2017, Egypt's deputy UN Ambassador Ihab Moustafa called for the United Nations Security Council to launch an investigation into accusations that Qatar "paid up to $1 billion to a terrorist group active in Iraq" to free 26 Qatari hostages, including members of its royal family, which payment would violate UN resolutions. The Qataris were kidnapped on 16 December 2015 from a desert camp for falcon hunters in southern Iraq. The hostages were released eighteen months later in April 2017. Qatari diplomats responded to the Egyptian calls for an investigation by reaffirming their commitment to the UN resolutions towards eliminating the financing of terrorism.

In June 2017, the government of Qatar hired American attorney and politician John Ashcroft to lobby on its behalf and help the state deny international allegations of supporting terror.

On 24 November 2017, deputy chief of Dubai Police Lieutenant General Dhahi Khalfan, blamed the 2017 Sinai attack on Al-Jazeera's reporting and called for the bombing of Al-Jazeera's headquarters by the Saudi-led coalition.

Israel has not shared a direct diplomatic relation with Qatar since 2012, yet over the past few years, the country has emerged as an unlikely peacemaker in the Middle East by extending a helping hand to Doha and strengthening its ties with its nemesis, UAE. Israel offered Doha to work along with it on Gaza's reconstruction in June 2020, changing Washington's narrative towards Qatar concerning its relation with Hamas as one focused on getting all parties to cooperate in support of the peace plan initiated by the Trump administration. In 2017, Israel condemned the legislation introduced in the US Congress, designating Qatar as a state sponsor of terrorism for having ties with Hamas. The legislation was filed by Ed Royce, a Republican, and the then-Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. In the meantime, Israel also strengthened its partnership with the UAE by holding a meeting in Washington of the ambassadors of UAE and Bahrain with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Israel maintained a balance between strengthening its relations with Abu Dhabi and simultaneously extending a helping hand to Doha.

In the Country Reports on Terrorism released by US Department of state on March 2022, CT cooperation signed in 2017 by Qatar included the participation of the United States and Qatar on terrorist screening and aviation security. In 2019, the Qatari government drafted new AML/CFT legislation, which was finalized and passed into law on September 11, 2019 which stated that Qatar maintains an inter-agency National Anti-Terrorism Committee (NATC) composed of representatives from more than 10 government agencies. The NATC is tasked with formulating Qatar's CT policy, ensuring inter-agency coordination, fulfilling Qatar's obligations to counter terrorism under international conventions, and participating in multilateral conferences on terrorism. U.S. officials met regularly with the chairman of the NATC to discuss implementation of the CT MOU and overall CT cooperation. The Qatar State Security Bureau (SSB) maintained an aggressive posture toward monitoring internal terrorism-related activities. Qatar is a member of MENAFATF. FIU, known as the Qatar Financial Information Unit, is a member of the Egmont Group. Qatar is also a member of the Defeat-ISIS Coalition's CIFG and the TFTC. In collaboration with other TFTC member states, Qatar in 2019 imposed one round of sanctions against individuals and entities affiliated with the Iranian regime's terror-support networks in the region. Qatar continued to maintain restrictions, imposed in 2017, on the overseas activities of Qatari charities, requiring all such activity to be conducted through one of two approved charities in an effort to better monitor charitable giving for terrorist financing abuse.

The Syrian Coalition of Revolutionary and Opposition Forces said "Syria is awaiting a more active Arab role that will contribute to putting an end to the nearly 10-year suffering of the Syrian people; help the Syrian people achieve their aspirations for freedom and independence; getting rid of the murderous Assad regime and Iranian sectarian militias; and putting an end the Iranian subversive project in Syria and the region."

The UK Financial Conduct Authority issued a notice against Banque Havilland for its manipulative trading strategies, and imposed a fine of £10 million. The Luxembourg-based bank and its ex-employees were found involved in a 2017 plan to devalue the currency of Qatar. A former analyst with the bank, Vladimir Bolelyy created a document that involved the plot to target Qatar's financial system in 2017. Bolelyy and the former London CEO, Edmund Rowland, were responsible for disseminating the document. A copy of the document was also sent to a representative of the Abu Dhabi sovereign wealth fund.   The Emirates was closely connected to the owner of Banque Havilland, David Rowland. He was deeply involved with the UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed, who was referred to as "The Boss" by the bank employees. In January 2023, the FCA also banned and fined Edmund Rowland, Vladimir Bolelyy and a former senior manager David Weller.

United Nations
In November 2020, United Nations special rapporteur Alena Douhan published a preliminary report condemning the Saudi-led blockade of the State of Qatar and urged lifting the ban immediately due to human rights violations against the people of Qatar. The UAE, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Egypt-led blockade of Qatar was concluded to be illegal by the special rapporteur. Douhan has stated a final report would be presented to the United Nations Human Rights Council in September 2021.

Reportedly, it is prohibited under the UN Charter to impose any unilateral coercive measures against its member states unless authorized by the organization's relevant organs or found consistent with the principles composing the charter.

Impact

Logistical implications

On 6 June 2017, Emirates Post of UAE halted postal services to Qatar.

At the start of the blockade, nearly 80 percent of Qatar's food requirements came from Persian Gulf Arab neighbors, with only 1 percent being produced domestically. Imports from outside the Gulf states usually came by land from Saudi Arabia. Immediately after the cutting of relations, local reports indicated residents swarmed grocery stores in hopes of stockpiling food. Many food delivery trucks were idled along the Saudi-Qatari border. On 8 June 2017, Qatari Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al-Thani said, "We're not worried about a food shortage, we're fine. We can live forever like this, we are well prepared." Qatar had talks with both Turkey and Iran to secure the supply of food. On 11 June 2017, Iran sent four cargo planes with fruit and vegetables and promised to continue the supply. Turkey pledged food and water supplies to go along with their troop deployment at their Turkish military base in Qatar.

As part of the Qatari government's response to lost food imports, it provided support to domestic agricultural company Baladna, which built a new dairy farm with imported cattle that was planned to produce enough milk to fulfill domestic demand for dairy products by June 2018.

Air travel
All airlines based in the blockading countries, including Emirates, suspended flights to and from Qatar. Gulf Air, EgyptAir, flydubai, Air Arabia, Saudi Arabian Airlines and Etihad Airways suspended their flights to and from Qatar. Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates also banned overflights by aircraft registered in Qatar. Qatar rerouted flights to Africa and Europe via Iran, paying a "hefty" overflight fee for each such flight.

Qatar Airways in response suspended its flight operations to Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, and Bahrain.

Due to the closing of Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt airspace to Qatar Airways, Oman Air took up a significant role transporting travelers from and to Doha, mostly through Iranian airspace, while still allowing Qatari passport holders to book flights. The travel embargo had a significant impact on foreign nationals living and working in Qatar, with about 100,000 Egyptians and citizens from other countries stranded there, unable to book direct flights or obtain travel documents for their return. Per request from Qatar, the blockade was under review by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), a UN-agency seeking a "consensus-based solution" for the resolution of the crisis.

On 31 July 2017, the agency asserted its neutrality in the conflict and announced that Qatar Airways will have access to three contingency routes over international waters in early August based on a preliminary agreement reached with the Saudi aviation authority (GACA) early that month. The ICAO, based in Montreal, also reminded all member countries to comply with the 1944 Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation and its agenda.

In December 2020, Qatar's ambassador to the United Nations sent a letter to the UN Secretary-General António Guterres and the Security Council members, reporting the airspace offenses by four Bahraini fighter jets. He said that Bahrain's military aircraft violated Qatar's airspace on 9 December by flying over the country's territorial waters.

Shipping
The United Arab Emirates banned Qatar-flagged ships from calling at Fujairah. It also banned vessels from Qatar from the port and vessels at the port from sailing directly to Qatar. Similar restrictions were put in place at Jebel Ali, which prior to the blockade handled over 85% of shipborne cargo for Qatar. Bahrain, Egypt and Saudi Arabia also banned Qatar-flagged ships from their ports.

On 8 June 2017 shipping giant Maersk was unable to transport in or out of Qatar entirely. Due to Qatar's shallow ports, large cargo ships are required to dock at Jebel Ali or other nearby ports where a feeder service transports the goods into Qatar. In response, Maersk and Swiss-based MSC vessels for Qatar were rerouted to Salalah and Sohar in Oman. Particularly smaller shipments of perishable and frozen foods have taken that route.

On 12 June 2017, Chinese shipping company COSCO announced suspension of services to and from Qatar. Taiwan's Evergreen Marine and Hong Kong's Orient Overseas Container Line had already suspended services.

Media ban
Hamad Saif al-Shamsi, the Attorney-General of the United Arab Emirates announced on 7 June that publishing expressions of sympathy towards Qatar through social media, or any type of written, visual or verbal form is considered illegal under UAE's Federal Penal Code and the Federal law on Combating Information Technology Crimes. Violators of this offense face between 3 and 15 years imprisonment, a fine of up to 500,000 emirati dirhams ($136,000) or both. Bahrain also issued a similar statement with a penalty up to 5 years imprisonment and a fine.

Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Bahrain, and the UAE all blocked access to Qatari news agencies, including the controversial Qatar-based Al Jazeera. Saudi Arabia shut down the local office of Al Jazeera Media Network. The BBC speculated that changes to Al Jazeera would be a necessary part of any peaceful resolution. In June, Qatar-based beIN Sports (a spin-off from Al Jazeera) was also blocked by Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The UAE lifted this ban the following month, but the channels remained banned in Saudi Arabia. BeIN programming was illegally rebranded and redistributed by a large-scale pirate television operation known as beoutQ. beoutQ operated out of Saudi Arabia using the Arabsat satellites, and was promoted by Saudi politicians.

In 2018, the Saudi government also began to target beIN Sports for allegedly holding monopoly in sports broadcasting, including revoking its broadcast licenses based on accusations of anti-competitive behaviour, and pulling its rights to the Asian Football Confederation in the Kingdom in 2019. beIN Sports considered the moves to be politically motivated, while it was feared that the service was normalising the practice of piracy.

Finances

At the start of the crisis, Standard & Poor's downgraded Qatar's debt by one notch from AA to AA-. Qatar's stock market dropped 7.3% on the first day of the crisis, and reached a 9.7% drop by 8 June 2017. Additionally, in the first months following the crisis the government of Qatar injected $38.5 billion, which was equivalent to 23% of the country's GDP, to support the country's economy and its banking sector.

As per S&P Global Ratings, banks in Qatar are strong enough to survive a withdrawal of all Gulf country deposits.

Despite the ongoing diplomatic blockade led by Saudi Arabia, international banks like HSBC, Goldman Sachs and others sought to repair their ties with Qatar by building stronger financial and business relations. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates informally warned the bankers not to have close relations with Doha or else there would be consequences.

On 20 January 2019, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani attended the opening session of the Arab Economic Summit in Beirut, Lebanon. This helped Qatar increase its influence and soft power in the region. Sheikh Tamim Bin Hamad Al Thani and Mauritanian President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz were the only two Arab leaders to attend the summit. Since Sheikh Tamim was the only GCC leader to attend, he received praise from the President of Lebanon himself, Michel Aoun. Hilal Khashan, a professor of political science at the American University of Beirut, said "He became the star of the summit."

Overall, Qatar's annual GDP declined by 1.5% in 2017, though it increased by 1.2% in 2018 and 0.8% in 2019 despite the diplomatic crisis, though it would decline 3.6% in 2020 following the Covid-19 pandemic. In the year the crisis ended in 2021 Qatar's annual GDP increased 1.6%.

Energy
Qatar is a global leader in liquefied natural gas production. Despite the severing of ties, Qatari natural gas continued to flow to the UAE and Oman through Abu Dhabi based Dolphin Energy's pipeline. The pipeline meets about 30–40 percent of UAE's energy needs. Shipping constraints from the crisis rerouted multiple shipments of oil and gas to and from the Gulf, which caused reverberations in many local energy markets. On 8 June 2017, gas futures spiked nearly 4 percent in the United Kingdom, which had nearly a third of all its imported gas arriving from Qatar. There was a secondary effect of the dispute on worldwide supplies of helium, which is often extracted from natural gas. Qatar is the world's second largest supplier of helium (the US ranks first).

In March 2019, Qatar lodged a complaint to International Atomic Energy Agency regarding the United Arab Emirates Barakah nuclear power plant, stating that it poses a serious threat to regional stability and the environment. The UAE denied that there are safety issues with the plant, which is being built by Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO) with operation by French utility Électricité de France, and stated "The United Arab Emirates ... adheres to its commitment to the highest standards of nuclear safety, security and non-proliferation."

23rd and 24th Gulf Cup
The 23rd Arabian Gulf Cup was scheduled to be hosted in Qatar. In November 2017, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain pulled out of the Gulf Cup due to the Qatar boycott. On 7 December 2017, it was announced that Kuwait would host the football tournament after Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain all withdrew because of the diplomatic crisis.

Qatar hosted the 24th Arabian Gulf Cup in 2019. Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates announced their participation in the tournament on 12 November (two weeks before the event kicked off), reversing an attempted second boycott of the event.

Qatari military relations

On 7 June 2017, the Turkish parliament passed, with 240 votes in favour and 98 against, a legislative act first drafted in May allowing Turkish troops to be deployed to a Turkish military base in Qatar.  During a speech on 13 June 2017, the President of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, condemned the boycott of Qatar as "inhumane and against Islamic values" and stated that "victimising Qatar through smear campaigns serves no purpose". On 23 June 2017, Turkey rejected demands to shut down its military base in Qatar.

Qatar hosts about 10,000 US troops at Al Udeid Air Base, which houses the forward operating base of United States Central Command that is strategically located for US airstrikes in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan. A Pentagon spokesperson claimed the diplomatic crisis would not affect the US military missions in Qatar.

On 30 January 2018 an inaugural United States-Qatar Strategic Dialogue meeting was held, co-chaired by U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, U.S. Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis, Qatari Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of State for Defence Affairs Khalid al-Attiyah and Qatari Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani. The meeting expressed the need for an immediate resolution of the crisis which respects Qatar's sovereignty. In a Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation, the United States expressed its readiness to deter and quell any external threat to Qatar's territorial integrity. Qatar offered to help fund the expansion of facilities at US bases in Qatar.

On 25 March 2018, the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) officially quashed rumours that the Incirlik Air Base in Turkey and the Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar will be closed despite the ongoing regional conflict.

In January 2018, Qatar's ambassador communicated with Russia with the intent to purchase S-400 surface-to-air missiles. Both countries signed an agreement on military and technical cooperation in 2017. In May 2018, the French daily newspaper Le Monde reported that King Salman of Saudi Arabia would take military action if Qatar installed the Russian air defence system. However, a senior Russian official remarked the system would still be delivered even against the will of Saudi Arabia. The Saudis were themselves approaching Russia to improve economic and military ties in 2017, but bargaining relating to the arms deal was hindered by concerns the United States and Saudi Arabia had with regard to the Russian position towards Iran's military and strategic involvement in the Middle East.

In June 2018, Qatar expressed its wish to join NATO. However, NATO declined Qatar's membership proposal, stating that only additional European countries could join according to Article 10 of NATO's founding treaty. Qatar and NATO have previously signed a security agreement together in January 2018.

Arab League Council 2017
During the 148th Session of the Arab League Council at the level of Foreign Ministers which was held in Cairo, Qatar's State Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sultan Al Muraikhi, got into a heated argument with Saudi delegate Ahmad Al Qattan. The argument was caused after Al Muraikhi gave a short speech about how Qatar had to go back to supporting Iran after it recalled the Qatari ambassador to Iran to support Saudi Arabia in 2016.

2019 Asian Cup
During the semi-final match between the Qatar national football team and the tournament hosts the United Arab Emirates, the UAE supporters threw shoes and bottles onto the pitch. This conduct was preceded by booing the Qatari national anthem. Qatar won 4–0, paving the way to their first Asian Cup final and eventual title.

A British-Sudanese football fan was allegedly beaten by fans for wearing a Qatar football shirt to a match in which Qatar was playing and then, after investigation by the UAE police, arrested for wasting police time and making false statements of being assaulted. According to The Guardian, the fan was arrested for wearing a Qatar football shirt. The claim was denied by UAE authorities who stated the fan was arrested for wasting police time and making false assault claims to the police. The UAE police said that the fan had admitted to making false statements. A UAE official in London stated "He was categorically not arrested for wearing a Qatar football shirt. This is instead an instance of a person seeking media attention and wasting police time." According to photos shown by The National, fans were seen waving the Qatari flag and wearing Qatari football shirts without any instances of arrests in the final. According to The New York Times, the UAE accused Qatar of fielding ineligible players due to them being not originally Qatari. The players accused were the competitions' top scorer Almoez Ali, a Sudan born striker, as well as Bassam Al-Rawi, an Iraq born defender.

2022 FIFA World Cup
Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Mauritania, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt in a letter asked FIFA to replace Qatar as 2022 FIFA World Cup host, calling the country as a "base of terrorism". In reaction to the Qatar diplomatic crisis over the alleged support of terrorism by the Qatari Government, the president of the German Football Association, Reinhard Grindel stated in June 2017, that "the football associations of the world should conclude that major tournaments cannot be held in countries which actively support terrorism", and that the German Football Association will talk with UEFA and the German Government in order to evaluate whether to boycott the tournament in Qatar in 2022. Hassan Al Thawadi, general secretary of Qatar's FIFA World Cup organizing committee, stated that "Qatar does not support terrorism. Qatar is at the forefront of the fight against terrorism on the ground. It's one of the main partners in the coalition fighting ISIS (the Islamic State group)." Thawadi said: "Our projects are going ahead as scheduled. This (blockade) is no risk in relation to the hosting of the World Cup."

In October 2017, Lieutenant General Dhahi Khalfan Tamim, deputy chief of Dubai Police, wrote about the Qatar diplomatic crisis on Twitter in Arabic; "If the World Cup leaves Qatar, Qatar's crisis will be over … because the crisis is created to get away from it". According to observers, the message appeared to imply that the blockade was enacted due to Qatar hosting the world's biggest football event. In reaction to media coverage of his tweet, Dhahi Khalfan tweeted; "I said Qatar is faking a crisis and claims it's besieged so it could get away from the burdens of building expensive sports facilities for the World Cup". UAE Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Anwar Gargash said the official, Dhahi Khalfan, had been misunderstood in media coverage. Gargash stated that Qatar's hosting of World Cup 2022 "should include a repudiation of policies supporting extremism & terrorism."

Hassan al-Thawadi, secretary general of the Qatar World Cup supreme committee, stated that projects were progressing as scheduled for the 2022 FIFA World Cup. Qatar's only land border and air and sea routes have been cut off by Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). As the blockade came into play, World Cup organizers were asked to investigate a "Plan B", FIFA however has confidence in not exploring a "Plan B" for an alternate 2022 host. According to Thawadi, all these logistical obstacles are being overcome and building progress is continuing with only minimal cost increases, in preparation for the first World Cup in the Middle East.

Resolution
An article published by the Financial Times stated that, according to people briefed on the matter, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia moved towards ending the 2017 blockade against the State of Qatar after the victory of President-elect Joe Biden in 2020. An advisor to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, was quoted as calling the shift in the Kingdom's policy towards Qatar "a gift for Biden" signaling that Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman had shown willingness "to take steps" towards resolving differences with Qatar. The prince is said to have been intimidated by the incoming administration, as the former administration had reportedly supported the Riyadh government in times of crisis such as casualties in the Yemen war, detention of activists, the murder of Jamal Khashoggi, etc. On the other hand, UAE's ambassador to the US, Yousef al-Otaiba, was quoted as stating that ending the dispute was not a priority, referring to the ongoing differences with the blockaded nation.

On 4 January 2021, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia's neighbour and a fellow GCC member, along with the United States, jointly brokered a deal in which Saudi Arabia would end its blockade of Qatar and reopen their shared land border.

On 5 January 2021, Qatar's Emir, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, arrived in Al-'Ula, Saudi Arabia, for a GCC summit. Later, the leaders signed the Al-'Ula statement. Before the signing, Bin Salman said that the support of Kuwait and the United States had resulted in "the Al-'Ula declaration agreement that will be signed at this blessed summit, in which the Gulf, Arab and Islamic solidarity and stability were emphasized." In addition to the statement, a final communique was signed. Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan al-Saud said Saudi Arabia and its allies agreed to restore full ties with Doha, including resumption of flights. Qatar did not fulfill any of the original 13 demands, analysts saying that the Gulf states agreed instead to a joint security declaration.

The United Nations Secretary-General, António Guterres, welcomed the end of the crisis and the opening of the airspace, land, and sea borders between Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Egypt, and Qatar. In a statement issued on 5 January 2021, he expressed hope that the countries concerned will continue to be positive, to strengthen their relations. He also recognized the contributions of the late Emir of Kuwait and late Sultan of Oman, who worked tirelessly towards resolving the Gulf rift. One Middle East policy analyst believed that the secret pact among the Gulf leaders is likely to have been multi-level, which includes several bilateral agreements between individual states rather than a unitary document.

As of July 2023, Bahrain, Chad, Egypt, Maldives, Mauritania, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, and the UAE had restored diplomatic ties with Qatar.

See also
 2017 Lebanon–Saudi Arabia dispute
 Arab Cold War
 Axis of Resistance
 International Maritime Security Construct
 International propagation of Salafism and Wahhabism
 Iran–Israel proxy conflict
 Iran–Saudi Arabia proxy conflict
 Middle Eastern Cold War (disambiguation)
 OPEC
 Qatar–Saudi Arabia diplomatic conflict
 Russia–Syria–Iran–Iraq coalition
 Shia–Sunni relations

References

2010s conflicts
2020s conflicts
Conflicts in 2017
Conflicts in 2018
Conflicts in 2019
Conflicts in 2020
Conflicts in 2021
2010s in Qatar
2020s in Qatar
2017 in Qatar
2018 in Qatar
2019 in Qatar
2020 in Qatar
2021 in Qatar
June 2017 events in Asia
2017 in international relations
2018 in international relations
2019 in international relations
2020 in international relations
2021 in international relations
Iran–Saudi Arabia proxy conflict
Arab Winter
Shia–Sunni sectarian violence
Geopolitical rivalry
Gulf Cooperation Council
Politics of Qatar
Politics of the Arab world
Politics of the Middle East
Bahrain–Iran relations
Bahrain–Qatar relations
Bahrain–Turkey relations
Chad–Iran relations
Chad–Qatar relations
Chad–Turkey relations
Comoros–Iran relations
Comoros–Qatar relations
Comoros–Turkey relations
Djibouti–Iran relations
Djibouti–Qatar relations
Djibouti–Turkey relations
Egypt–Iran relations
Egypt–Qatar relations
Egypt–Turkey relations
Iran–Jordan relations
Iran–Maldives relations
Iran–Mauritania relations
Iran–Niger relations
Iran–United Arab Emirates relations
Iran–Saudi Arabia relations
Iran–Senegal relations
Iran–Qatar relations
Iran–Turkey relations
Iran–Yemen relations
Gabon–Iran relations
Gabon–Qatar relations
Gabon–Turkey relations
Jordan–Qatar relations
Jordan–Turkey relations
Maldives–Qatar relations
Maldives–Turkey relations
Mauritania–Qatar relations
Mauritania–Turkey relations
Niger–Qatar relations
Niger–Turkey relations
Qatar–Saudi Arabia relations
Qatar–Senegal relations
Qatar–United Arab Emirates relations
Qatar–Turkey relations
Qatar–Yemen relations
Saudi Arabia–Turkey relations
Senegal–Turkey relations
Turkey–United Arab Emirates relations
Turkey–Yemen relations
Censorship in the United Arab Emirates
Censorship in Saudi Arabia
Censorship in Bahrain
Censorship in Egypt

Qatar diplomatic crisis


Մոնդավիո (), կոմունա Իտալիայում, գտնվում է Մարկե շրջանում՝ Պեզարո է Ուրբինո պրովինցիայում։ Բնակչությունը կազմում է 4013 մարդ (2008 թվականի տվյալներով), բնակչության խտությունը՝ 136 մարդ/կմ²։ Տարածքը կազմում է 29 կմ²։ Փոստային ինդեքս՝ 61040: Հեռախոսային կոդ՝ 0722։

Ժողովրդագրություն
Բնակչության գրաֆիկը.

Համայնքի վարչակազմ
Հեռախոս։ 0721 97101
Էլ-փոստ։ firstname.lastname@example.com
Պաշտոնական կայք։ http://www.comune.mondavio.pu.it

Պատկերասրահ

Արտաքին հղումներ
 Պաշտոնական էջ
 Վիճակագրության ազգային ինստիտուտ
 http://www.istat.it/english/

Իտալիայի քաղաքներ

Մոնդավիո


In Österreich wurde 2006 die OeMAG Abwicklungsstelle für Ökostrom AG (auch Ökostromabwicklungsstelle) eingerichtet.

Hintergrund
Die Übertragung der Abwicklungsverantwortung erfolgte mit 1. Oktober 2006. Die OeMAG ist auch Bilanzgruppenverantwortlicher (BGV) für die Öko-Bilanzgruppe. Als BGV ist die OeMAG für die Prognose und das Fahrplanmanagement sowie auch das Ausgleichsenergiemanagement zuständig. Die OeMAG hat die Verpflichtung, die von anerkannten Ökostromanlagen in das öffentliche Netz eingespeisten Ökostrommengen gem. der §§ 12ff Ökostromgesetz 2012 (ÖSG 2012) und den geltenden Marktregeln abzunehmen und zu vergüten. Die gelieferten Strommengen werden an die auf österreichischem Bundesgebiet tätigen Stromhändler weitergeliefert. Die Weiterlieferung und Verrechnung erfolgt nach Maßgabe der an Endkunden abgegebenen Mengen an elektrischer Energie (Quotenregelung). Für die Abnahme des Ökostroms gelten die durch Verordnung festgesetzten Preise. Die Weitergabe an die Stromhändler erfolgt zum Day-ahead-Börsepreis. Die gelieferten Herkunftsnachweise werden gemäß der in der Verordnung festgesetzten Preise verrechnet.

Vorstandsvorsitzender von 2007 bis 2020 war Magnus Brunner.

Geschäftsfelder
Zu den Geschäftsfeldern gehört die

 Ökostromabwicklung
 Investitionsförderung für KWK, Ablauge-KWK und MWK
 Investitionsförderung für Kleinwasserkraftwerke
 Abwicklung der Landesförderungen für Biomasseanlagen

Die gesamte in die Ökobilanzgruppe eingespeiste Ökostrommenge im Jahr 2019 betrug 10.406 GWh, wobei 1.333 GWh auf Kleinwasserkraft und 9.073 GWh auf sonstige Ökostromanlagen entfielen. Im Jahr 2018 wurden zum Vergleich 9784 GWh eingespeist, wobei 1.505 GWh auf die Erzeugung durch Kleinwasserkraftwerke und 8.279 GWh auf jene von sonstigen Ökostromanlagen zurückzuführen waren. Zum Ende des Jahres 2019 speisten 28.885 Photovoltaikanlagen in die Ökobilanzgruppe ein. Die gesamte installierte Leistung in der Öko-Bilanzgruppe beträgt zum Ende des Jahres 2019 4.175 MW.

Weblinks
 Offizielle Website

Einzelnachweise

Unternehmen (Wien)
Energieunternehmen (Österreich)
Stromhandel
Unternehmen (Erneuerbare Energien)
Gegründet 2006
Erneuerbare Energien (Österreich)

OeMAG Abwicklungsstelle für Ökostrom


Amanda (titre original : Carefree) est un film musical américain réalisé par Mark Sandrich, sorti sur les écrans en 1938.

Synopsis

Une jeune femme, Amanda Cooper (Ginger Rogers), tombe amoureuse de son psychiatre, Tony Flagg (Fred Astaire). Son fiancé, Stephen Arden (Ralph Bellamy), commence à trouver que son ami Tony ne change pas grand-chose à la pensée de mariage entre Amanda et lui. Après avoir hypnotisé Amanda, Tony se rend compte qu'il est amoureux d'elle et tente en vain de se réconcilier avec elle qui, après sa séance, ne l'aime plus. À cause (ou grâce) à Stephen, Amanda a un choc et comme elle n'est plus sous hypnose, elle recommence à beaucoup aimer Tony, qu'elle finit par épouser.

Fiche technique
 Titre : Amanda
 Titre original : Carefree
 Réalisation : Mark Sandrich, assisté de Leslie Goodwins (non crédité)
 Scénario : Allan Scott, Ernest Pagano d'après une histoire de Marian Ainslee, Guy Endore, Dudley Nichols et Hagar Wilde
 Production: Pandro S. Berman
 Société de production : RKO
 Musique : Irving Berlin et (non crédité) Robert Russell Bennett
 Directeur musical : Victor Baravalle
 Chorégraphie : Hermes Pan et Fred Astaire
 Directeur de la photographie : Robert de Grasse
 Montage : William Hamilton
 Direction artistique : Van Nest Polglase et Carroll Clark (associé)
 Décors de plateau : Darrell Silvera
 Costumes : Howard Greer pour Ginger Rogers et Edward Stevenson
 Pays d'origine :
 Format : noir et blanc - Son : Mono (RCA Victor System)
 Langue : anglais - français
 Genre : film musical et comédie romantique
 Durée : 83 minutes
 Dates de sortie :
  :
  :

Distribution
 Fred Astaire : . Tony Flagg
 Ginger Rogers : Amanda Cooper
 Ralph Bellamy : Stephen "Steve" Arden
 Luella Gear : Tante Cora
 Jack Carson : Thomas Connors
 Clarence Kolb : Le juge Joe Travers
 Franklin Pangborn : Roland Hunter
 Walter Kingsford : . Powers
 Kay Sutton : Miss Adams
 Charles Coleman : Le portier (non crédité)
 Hattie McDaniel : Hattie (non créditée)
 James Finlayson : un homme sur le cours de golfe (non crédité)
 Edward Gargan : le policier (non crédité)
 Paul Guilfoyle : le chef liftier (non crédité)
 Donald Kerr : le réparateur sur l'échelle (non crédité)
 Richard Lane : Henry, le maître d'hôtel du country club (non crédité)
 Frank Moran : un chauffeur de taxi  (non crédité)

À noter
 Amanda est le huitième des dix films tournés ensemble par Fred Astaire et Ginger Rogers, dont neuf pour la RKO.
 Le film présente deux particularités dans la série : c'est le plus court, avec seulement quatre numéros musicaux, (plusieurs séquences ont été abandonnées ou coupées au montage), et c'est le seul où ils partagent un long baiser, à la fin de « I Used to be Color Blind », un numéro onirique dont une partie était projetée au ralenti.
 Un tournage en couleur d'Amanda, ou du moins de « I Used to be Color Blind », était prévu, le titre de la chanson faisant d'ailleurs directement référence à l'utilisation du Technicolor. L'idée fut abandonnée en raison du coût ou des difficultés de production, suivant les sources.
 Le tandem s'était dans la pratique séparé après L'Entreprenant Monsieur Petrov, Fred Astaire, un peu las de suivre la même formule, tournant Une demoiselle en détresse avec Joan Fontaine, et Ginger Rogers jouant de son côté dans Pension d'artistes face à Katharine Hepburn, Vacances payées avec Douglas Fairbanks Jr. et Mariage incognito en compagnie James Stewart. La RKO, qui était alors au bord de la faillite, reforma le duo et mit très vite en chantier Amanda et, dans la foulée, La Grande Farandole en espérant qu'ils auraient un succès aussi net que leurs premiers longs métrages. En raison de coûts de production qui avaient fortement augmenté au cours des années 30, les deux films furent cependant déficitaires.
 C'est le dernier film de Mark Sandrich où apparaît Ginger Rogers. Rogers s'était plainte de son traitement par le studio, ses cachets étant moins élevés que ceux de Fred Astaire ou des seconds rôles masculins de leurs films, et du traitement dont Sandrich la gratifiait. Elle eut gain de cause contre Sandrich auprès du producteur Pedro Berman, reproduisant même la lettre de ce dernier dans ses mémoires.

Liens externes

Film américain sorti en 1938
Comédie romantique américaine
Film musical américain de comédie
Film musical romantique américain
Film musical américain des années 1930
Film avec une musique composée par Irving Berlin
Film de danse
Film en anglais américain
Film américain en noir et blanc
Film de RKO Pictures

Amanda (film, 1938)


Pi ədədi () — çevrənin uzunluğunun onun diametri ilə nisbətinə bərabər olan riyazi sabit. -nin adı, Yunan dilində (περίμετρον) yəni "Dairənin uzunluğu" sözünün ilk hərfi olan π hərfindən alınmışdır. Bu hərf latın əlifbasında  olaraq simvollaşdırılır.  həm də Arximed sabiti və Lüdolf ədədi olaraq da bilinir.

Riyaziyyat kitablarında  olaraq ifadə edilməsinə baxmayaraq həqiqi cavabını əldə etmək üçün vaxtaşırı təkrar olunmayan sonsuz sayda pilləyə ehtiyac var.

65 pilləli = 3, 14159 26535 89793 23846 26433 83279 50288 41971 69399 37510 58209 74944 5923

Fabrice Bellard 2010-cu ildə Çudnovski alqoritmi ilə  ədədinin 2.699.999.990.000 pilləlisini tapmışdır. Arximed 3.1/7 ilə 3.10/71 arasında bir ədəd olaraq hesablamışdır. Misirlilər 3.1605, babillilər 3.1/8, Ptolemey 3.14166 olaraq, İtalyan Lazzarini 3.1415929, Fibonaççi isə 3.141818 ilə hesablamışdırlar.

XVIII əsr də  140 pilləyə qədər,XIX əsrdə isə 500 pilləyə qədər hesablandı.Dünyanın ilk kompüterində cəmi 2035 pilləlisi hesablanmış, müasir dövrün kompüterlərində isə milyonlarla pilləlisi hesablana bilir.

Dəqiq qiyməti

Onu tam dəqiq hesablamaq mümkün olmadığı elmə aydındır.

Ən son texnologiyalar vasitəsilə -nin dəqiq qiyməti belə göstərilir:  =3,14159265358979323846264338327950288419716939937510582097494459230781640
628620899862803482534211706798214808651328230664709384460955058223172535940 81284811174502841027.....
pi  ədədinin  sonu  yoxdur.O  sonsuz  ədəddir

ilə əlaqəli olaraq, işlədilən bir neçə düstur

 Pi ədədinin təqribi hesablanması üçün Eyler düsturu:

Pi günü

Həvəskarlar hər il 14 mart saat 1:59-da Pi gününü qeyd edirlər.
Bu qeyri-rəsmi bayramı 1987-ci ildə San-Fransiskolu Fizik Larry Shaw təklif etmişdir.

Həmçinin bax
Digits of Pi - Up to 1 Million Digits
Riyaziyyat
Ədədlər
Riyazi sabitlər

Pi (ədəd)


Hagop Agopjan (; * 1951 als Harutiun Tokaschian in Mosul, Königreich Irak; † 28. April 1988 in Athen, Griechenland) war ein armenisch-irakischer politischer Aktivist und Untergrundkämpfer. Er war eines der Gründungsmitglieder der armenischen Organisation Asala und bis zu seinem Tod 1988 der Anführer.

Leben
Er wurde unter dem Namen Harutiun Tokaschian in der irakischen Stadt Mosul geboren. Nachdem er sein Pseudonym Hagop Agopjan annahm, zog er in den Libanon um, wo er der Volksfront zur Befreiung Palästinas beitrat. 1975 gründete er in Beirut zusammen mit James Karnusian und Kevork Ajemian mit Unterstützung von palästinensischen Gruppen die Asala.

Nach dem israelischen Einmarsch in den Libanon 1982 floh Hagop und baute neue Basen in Syrien (Damaskus) und unter dem Namen Henri Titizian auch in Athen auf. Er brach mit der Palästinensischen Befreiungsorganisation (PLO), welche Asala-Mitglieder ausbildete und unterstützte, und verbündete sich mit dem PLO-Gegner Abu Nidal.

Als Asala-Anführer verwendete Hagop Agopjan die Pseudonyme Mihran Mihranian, Vahram Vahramian und Iran Irmian. Die französische Polizei gab später an, dass sein echter Name Bedros Havanassjan sei.

Ermordung
Agopjan wurde am 28. April 1988 um 4:30 Ortszeit vor seinem Haus im Athener Vorort Paleo Faliro erschossen, als er auf ein Taxi wartete, das ihn zu einem Flug nach Belgrad fahren sollte. Er wurde von seiner Schwägerin begleitet, die nicht verletzt wurde. Er hatte einen südjemenitischen Diplomatenpass mit dem Namen Abdul Mohammed Kasim bei sich. Sein Grab befindet sich in der Stadt Mossul. Auch seine Eltern Macardich und Siranoush Takoshian lebten noch in Mossul. Die Gründe für seine Ermordung sind unbekannt.

Einzelnachweise

Revolutionär
Mordopfer
Person (Mossul)
Iraker
Armenier
Geboren 1951
Gestorben 1988
Mann

Hagop Agopjan


Tenk je obec v Maďarsku v Hevešskej župe v obvode Heves.

Má rozlohu 1234 ha a žije tu 1221 obyvateľov (2007).

Obce v Maďarsku

Tenk


Le Cartel (Kingpin) est une mini-série américaine en six épisodes de 42 minutes, créée par David Mills TV et diffusée entre le 2 février et le  sur le réseau NBC.

En France, la télésuite a été diffusée du 4 au  sur Canal+. Rediffusion en 2009 sur Paris Première, et à partir du  sur AB1 .

Synopsis
Cette mini-série met en scène l'histoire de la vie d'un trafiquant de drogue mexicain, Miguel Cadena, et de sa famille.

Distribution
 Yancey Arias (V. F. : Damien Boisseau) : Miguel Cadena
 Sheryl Lee (V. F. : Dorothée Jemma) : Marlene McDillon Cadena
 Rubén Carbajal (V. F. : Kevin Sommier) : Joey Cadena
 Bobby Cannavale (V. F. : Gilles Morvan) : Chato Cadena
 Angela Alvarado Rosa (V. F. : Isabelle Ganz) : Delia Flores
 Brian Benben (V. F. : Bruno Dubernat) : Dr Heywood Klein
 Shay Roundtree (V. F. : Lucien Jean-Baptiste) : Junie Gatling
 Neko Parham : Shawn Williams
 Elpidia Carrillo : Lupita
 Sean Young : Lorelei Klein

Épisodes
 La Succession [1/2] (Pilot [1/2])
 La Succession [2/2] (El Velorio [2/2])
 Magie noire (Black Magic Woman)
 Docteur French (French Connection)
 Représailles (The Odd Couple)
 Une nouvelle donne (Gimme Shelter)

Commentaires

Le Cartel est considéré comme une sorte de réponse de NBC à HBO et sa série Les Soprano. À l'origine, il avait été prévu de prolonger cette mini-série, mais le taux d'audience décevant annula ce projet.

Références

Article annexe

 Psychotrope au cinéma et à la télévision

Liens externes

Série télévisée créée en 2003
Série télévisée américaine des années 2000
Série télévisée de NBC
Série télévisée de Paramount Television
Mini-série américaine

Le Cartel


Անոթազարկ (պուլս), արյունատար անոթների պատերի հրոցանման պարբերական տատանումներ, որոնք պայմանավորված են սրտի կծկումներով՝ արյունը սրտից անոթների մեջ արտամղմամբ։

Տարբերում են զարկերակային, երակային և մազանոթային անոթազարկներ։ Առավել գործնական նշանակություն ունի զարկերակային անոթազարկը, որը սովորաբար շոշափվում է ճաճանչային զարկերակի շրջանում։

Դրա համար ձեռքով բռնում են հետազոտվողի դաստակը՝ ճաճանչադաստակային հոդի շրջանը այնպես, որպեսզի բութ մատը տեղադրվի նախաբազկի թիկնային կողմում, իսկ մյուս մատերով սեղմում են առաջային մակերևույթի մաշկը, որտեղ շոշափվում է բաբախող ճաճանչային զարկերակը։

Անոթազարկի հաճախություն

Առողջ մարդու անոթազարկի հաճախությունը համապատասխանում է սրտի կծկումներին և կազմում է րոպեում 60-80 զարկ։ Սրտի կծկումների հաճախացումը (րոպեում 90 զարկից ավելի) կոչվում է հաճախասրտություն, դանդաղեցումը (60 զարկից պակաս)՝ դանդաղասրտություն։ Սրտի որոշ հիվանդությունների դեպքում անոթազարկի հաճախությունը կարող է ավելի սակավ լինել սրտի կծկումների թվից (անոթազարկի պակաս)։ Երեխաների անոթազարկն ավելի հաճախ է, քան չափահասներինը, աղջիկներինը մի փոքր ավելի հաճախ, քան տղաներինը։ Գիշերն անոթազարկն ավելի դանդաղ է, քան ցերեկը։

Բնականոն պայմաններում անոթազարկը հաճախանում է ֆիզիկական լարվածության, նյարդահուզական հակազդեցությունների դեպքերում։ Հաճախասրտությունն արյան շրջանառության համակարգի հարմարվող, հակազդեցությունն է թթվածնի նկատմամբ՝ օրգանիզմի աճող պահանջի դեպքում, որը նպաստում է օրգանների և հյուսվածքների լավ արյունամատակարարմանը։ Սակայն մարզված սրտի (օրինակ՝ մարզիկների) փոխհատուցող, հակազդեցությունն արտահայտվում է ոչ այնքան հաճախասրտության առաջացմամբ, որքան սրտի կծկումների ուժեղացմամբ, որն օրգանիզմի համար գերադասելի է։ Սրտի, ներզատիչ գեղձերի, նյարդային և հոգեկան շատ հիվանդությունների, ջերմաստիճանի բարձրացման, որոշ թունավորումների ժամանակ նույնպես առաջանում է հաճախասրտություն։

Դանդաղասրտությունը դիտվում է սրտի մի շարք հիվանդությունների, թունավորումների և որոշ դեղանյութերի ազդեցության դեպքերում։

Բնականոն վիճակում անոթազարկը ռիթմիկ է, անոթազարկային ալիքները հաջորդում են միմյանց հավասար ժամանակահատվածներում։ Սրտի ռիթմի խանգարումը կոչվում է անռիթմություն, երբ անոթազարկային ալիքները միմյանց հաջորդում են ոչ հավասար ժամանակահատվածներում։ Անոթազարկի հատկանիշներից է լեցունությունը, որը հիմնականում կախված է սրտի մղող կարողությունից՝ նրա կծկման (սիստոլայի) ընթացքում։ Անոթազարկի լարվածությունը որոշվում է այն ուժով, որն անհրաժեշտ է զարկերակների նեղացման համար և կապված է զարկերակային ճնշման հետ։ Անոթազարկի առանձնահատկությունների ուսումնասիրությունը բժշկին արժեքավոր տեղեկություն է տալիս հիվանդի առողջական վիճակի մասին։

Գրականություն
 Кузовлев Ф. Н. Анализ состояний радиальных пульсов как метод диагностики . — 2007
 История физикальных методов диагностики. под редакцией д.м.н. Бутова М. А. (посвящается 190-летию открытия Рене Теофиля Гиацинта Лаэннека), Рязань 2007

Արտաքին հղումներ
 Անոթազարկ
 Զարկերակային անոթազարկ

Արյունատար անոթներ

Անոթազարկ


Vladimir yew sûka Rusyaya. Na sûke 1108 de saz biya. Moğolan tiya 1237 de istila kerdo, heme ca vêşno, si sero si nêverda.

Namdarê Vladimiri
Valentin Afonin - Futbolber
Nikolai Andrianov - Cımnastıkber
Vladimir Artemov - Cımnastıkber
Aleksey Batalov - Sinemaber
Mikhail Petrovich Lazarev - Admiral
Yuri Levitan - Radyober
Alexey Prokurorov - Xızxızokber
Yuri Ryazanov - Cımnastıkber
Vasily Shulgin - Siyasetber
Mikhail Speransky - Siyasetber
Aleksandr Stoletov - Fizikber
Nikolai Stoletov - General, brother of Aleksandr
Sergei Taneyev - Composer
Dmitri Vyazmikin - Futbolber
Denis Yevsikov - Futbolber
Nikolai Zhukovsky - Zanışber

Sûkê wayiye

Teber de

Çımey
 Offizielle Webseite der Stadt  (russisch, englisch)
 Wladimir und die Städte des Goldenen Rings
 Sehenswürdigkeiten, Bilder & Informationen über Wladimir & den Goldenen Ring in Russland  (deutsch)
 Vladimir-Suzdal Museum-Reserve  (englisch, russisch)
 allvladimir.ru (russisch)
 Wladimir auf mojgorod.ru (russisch)
 25 Jahre Städtepartnerschaft Erlangen - Wladimir

Rusya

Vladimir


Վիլկիցկու նեղուց, Թայմիր թերակղզու և Հս․ Երկիր կղզեխմբի միջև, միացնում է Կարայի և Լապտևների ծովերը։ Երկարությունը մոտ 130 կմ է, նվազագույն լայնությունը՝ 56 կմ, խորությունը՝ մինչև 210 մ։ Վիլկիցկու նեղուցում ամբողջ տարին հանդիպում են լողացող սառույցներ։ Հայտնաբերվել է 1914 թվականին։ Անվանվել է ռուս հիդրոգրաֆ Բ. Վիլկիցկու պատվին։

Ռուսաստանի նեղուցներ
Լապտևների ծով
Կարայի ծով

Վիլկիցկու նեղուց


The 2010 All Thailand Golf Tour was the 12th season of the All Thailand Golf Tour, the main professional golf tour in Thailand since it was established in 1999.

Schedule
The following tables list official events during the 2010 season.

Men's events

Women's events

Notes

References

All Thailand Golf Tour
All Thailand Golf Tour

2010 All Thailand Golf Tour


コットン・クラブ()とは、1920年代の禁酒法時代、ニューヨークハーレム地区にあった名高い高級ナイトクラブ。

顧客は全て白人で、スタッフと演奏者は全て黒人(アフリカ系アメリカ人)であった。また、経営者はアイルランド系のギャングスターとして名の知れたオウニー・マドゥンである。
クラブの出し物であるジャズライブが著名。コットン・クラブを中心に活動したバンドで最も有名なものは、デューク・エリントン楽団である。

概要
コットン・クラブでは、ジャズレビューにデューク・エリントン、キャブ・キャロウェイ、ルイ・アームストロングなど一流の黒人ミュージシャンを多数出演させていたが、客はすべて白人であった。コットン・クラブの最盛期に客となった名士の中には、ジミー・デュランテ、ジョージ・ガーシュウィン、アル・ジョルソン、メイ・ウェスト、アーヴィング・バーリン、モス・ハート、チャールズ・チャップリン、ジミー・ウォーカーニューヨーク市長などもいる。

同じ時代にイリノイ州シセロでもコットン・クラブというナイトクラブが存在した。こちらはラルフ・カポネが経営しており、実力のあるジャズ・ミュージシャンならこぞって出演したがったという。また、汚職政治家とギャングスターのたまり場でもあった。

歴史
1920年、ヘビー級チャンピオンのジャック・ジョンソンが「クラブ・デラックス」を142番街レノックスアベニューに開く。ギャングとして名高いオウニー・マドゥンがシンシン刑務所入所中の1923年に経営権を握り、店の名を「コットン・クラブ」に改名。1925年には酒類販売のかどでしばし閉鎖したがほどなく営業再開。1933年にマドゥンがシンシン刑務所に舞い戻ると、店の踊り子やストリッパーは塀の中のマドゥンのためにしばしば刑務所を慰問公演した。

クラブの出し物は当時の黒人への偏見を反映して、黒人をしばしばジャングルの土人や南部農園の黒人("darkies")として描いた。また露出度の高い衣装で出演するコーラス・ガールに対してはもっと微妙な選別を行った。彼女らには"tall, tan, and terrific"(すらっと高く、浅黒く、イカシテる)、つまり背の高さは5フィート6インチ以上、黒人としては明るめの肌、20歳以下であることを求めたのである。エリントンは白人の客のために「ジャングル・ミュージック」を書くよう期待されていた。

とはいえ、クラブは多くの黒人ミュージシャンを世に出した。1923年、フレッチャー・ヘンダーソンは彼の最初の楽団を率いてクラブに出演している。

デューク・エリントン楽団は1927年から1931年までクラブの専属バンドであった。おかげで彼は一か所にじっくりと腰を据えてダンス音楽などの作曲でレパートリを増やしながら、さまざまな音楽効果を自在に試すことができたが、これはツアーで各地を演奏してまわる楽団を率いていればなかなか望めないことであった。またクラブの演奏がラジオ放送されたおかげでエリントンの名は全米に知れ渡った。エリントンはこの期間に100曲以上もの自作曲をレコード化し、その後50年近く率いることとなるグループを築き上げた。クラブが黒人客締め出しの厳しい規則を(多少なりとも)緩めたのは、エリントンの求めによるものであった。

1930年、キャブ・キャロウェイのオーケストラが「ブラウン・シュガー・レビュー」でクラブに登場し、1931年にはエリントンの後を受けてクラブ専属となった。1934年からはジミー・ランスフォードの楽団が専属となる。後年にはエリントン、アームストロング、キャロウェイがクラブで演奏するため戻ってくることもあった。

レナ・ホーンは16歳の時コーラスガールとしてこのクラブでデビューした。ドロシー・ダンドリッジもクラブで歌っている。コールマン・ホーキンス、ドン・レッドマンはヘンダーソンの楽団員であった。タップ・ダンサーのビル・ボジャングル・ロビンソンとニコラス兄弟もクラブショーに出演していた。

クラブは当時の白人ポップカルチャーの力も引き出した。名義上のオーナーであったウォルター・ブルックスは、ブロードウェイで成功したショー「シャッフル・アロング」を手がけた人物である。ドロシー・フィールズ&ジミー・マクヒュー(当時非常に有名だった作詞チーム)やハロルド・アーレンがレビューに歌を提供した。その中には、ルー・レスリーがブロードウェイで手がけたレビュー「1928年のブラックバード」も含まれ、劇中では "I Can't Give You Anything But Love" や "Diga Diga Doo"が歌われる。

1935年のハーレム人種暴動のあと1936年にしばらく営業を中断したが、年内にブロードウェイの48番街で営業を再開。1940年にとうとう閉鎖。賃貸料の高騰と客の嗜好変化、およびマンハッタンのナイトクラブ所有者に対する連邦当局の脱税調査が閉鎖の原因であった。

1920年代終わりから1930年代初めにかけてカリフォルニアのカルバーシティにはコットン・クラブの西海岸支店があり、本店からアームストロングやキャロウェイ、エリントンなどが来演した。

エピソード
経営者でギャングスターのオウニー・マドゥンは、友人のユダヤ系ギャングスターブー・ブー・ホフに頼み、デューク・エリントンをフィラデルフィアからニューヨークに呼び寄せて契約を結ばせた。

コットン・クラブを舞台にした作品
 コットンクラブ - フランシス・フォード・コッポラ監督の映画

ジャズ・クラブ
ナイトクラブ
アフリカ系アメリカ人の文化
マンハッタンの文化
こつとんくらふ
ニューヨーク市のコンサート会場
ハーレム (マンハッタン)
こつとんくらふ

コットン・クラブ


Frankie Boyle's New World Order is a British comedy television programme created, written and presented by Frankie Boyle. Premiering in 2017 on BBC Two, it followed his BBC iPlayer-exclusive "Autopsy" shows. After a few minutes of stand-up, he makes two statements and discusses them with his guests. Boyle summarises each debate in a short monologue to camera. The programme finishes with Boyle sitting against the desk delivering a final longer monologue to camera.

Throughout its six series, regular guests included Sara Pascoe, Katherine Ryan, Mona Chalabi, Miles Jupp, Sophie Duker and Kiri Pritchard-McLean. The show also had annual specials that review news of the year. The show was cancelled in 2023.

Production
Following on from his BBC iPlayer-exclusive "Autopsy" shows, New World Order airs as prime time TV on BBC Two. It follows a very similar structure to Boyle's "Autopsy"; instead of the studio audience voting in agreement or disagreement with the thesis, however, Boyle summarises the debate in a short monologue to camera. The show premiered on 8 June 2017.

The show returned for a review of the year on 29 December 2017 as Frankie Boyle's 2017 New World Order. The second series of seven episodes started on 18 May 2018. The data journalist Mona Chalabi became a regular in this series. Another end-of-year review show, Frankie Boyle's 2018 New World Order, was broadcast on 27 December 2018. A third series began on 29 March 2019. Ryan was not in this series, having left the show. An end-of-year review show, Frankie Boyle's 2019 New World Order, was broadcast on 30 December 2019. A fourth series that debuted on 3 September 2020 was followed by a 2020 review show on 1 January 2021. In September 2021, Boyle announced that the show would return for a fifth series the following month, recorded in Glasgow.

Boyle spoke about the writing and filming process for series six in July 2022. He said that he would workshop material for the series in the Glee Club, Glasgow from July to the recording—this includes the closing monologues, co-authored by Charlie Skelton. He planned around 40 "warm-up shows" to practice jokes. Boyle said: "there's often a bit at the start where there's three big jokes that lead you in", to "try and get [the audience] on board and create some confidence with them".

Boyle announced in March 2023 that the BBC had cancelled the series, saying that this was "not surprising in the current climate, I suppose". A writer for Chortle commented that the BBC was potentially shifting prioritisation away from panel shows and towards scripted comedy, and that New World Orders viewership had declined over time. However, the writer and The Independents Louis Chilton connected it to criticisms that the BBC was avoiding content that was critical of the current government.

Episode list

Series 1 (2017)
As with the Autopsy shows, Sara Pascoe and Katherine Ryan were regulars for the first series.

Special (2017)

Series 2 (2018)
The series returned with Boyle, Pascoe and Ryan joined by the data journalist Mona Chalabi for the first half of the series. For the second half, Miles Jupp took over as a regular in place of Ryan. Chalabi was absent from the second half of the series.

Special (2018)

Series 3 (2019)

Special (2019)

Series 4 (2020)
This series was filmed without a studio audience, with a revised socially-distanced set due to COVID-19.

Special (2020/2021)

Series 5 (2021)
Filmed in front of a live studio audience in Glasgow.

Special (2021)

Series 6 (2022)
Filmed in front of a live studio audience in Glasgow.

Special (2022)

Most appearances
Up to and including 27 December 2022 (excludes the 5 "Unseen & Best Bits" episodes).

24 appearances
 Miles Jupp

22 appearances
 Sara Pascoe

15 appearances
 Sophie Duker
 Kiri Pritchard-McLean

11 appearances
 Jamali Maddix

8 appearances
 Katherine Ryan

6 appearances
 Desiree Burch
 Mona Chalabi
 Rob Delaney
 Susie McCabe

4 appearances
 Ahir Shah

3 appearances
 Sara Barron
 Rosie Jones
 Richard Osman
 Lucy Prebble
 Romesh Ranganathan

Reception
The show was nominated for the best Entertainment Performance BAFTA in 2020.

The Independents Louis Chilton commented on the show's legacy upon its cancellation, which he deemed "a profound disappointment". Chilton said that it was "one of the few shows on TV that was sincerely and unapologetically left-wing", with criticisms of Keir Starmer and tacit agreement for revolution, though centrist guests could also air their views. Chilton praised the show's "diverse roster of rotating guests", which included guest lineups that were entirely female or non-white, and gave opportunities to lesser-known comedians.

Footnotes

References

External links

2017 British television series debuts
2022 British television series endings
2010s British satirical television series
2010s British television talk shows
2020s British satirical television series
2020s British television talk shows
BBC satirical television shows
BBC television talk shows
English-language television shows
Improvisational television series
Television series by Zeppotron
Television series by Banijay

Frankie Boyle's New World Order


Julij Born, nemški baron in bančnik, * 1840, Berlin, † 5. februar 1897, Brighton, Združeno kraljestvo.

Ko se je v 19. stoletju pričela KID modernizirati, je za obnovo in posodobitev jeseniških železarskih obratov potrebovala veliko denarja, ki ga pa družba ni imela.

Bolj ali manj uspešno so iskali kredite. Pri pridobitvi potrebnih finančnih sredstev je imel veliko vlogo berlinski finančnik Julij Born, ki je s svojim kapitalom omogočil posodobitev železarne z gradnjo Siemens-Martinovih peči.

Born je že od leta 1888 prihajal na Gorenjsko, kjer je na povabilo direktorja jeseniške železarne Hugona Noota hodil na lov v tržiške gozdove, ki so bili v lasti KID-a. Born, ki je bil prevzet nad lepotami teh gozdov, je že po nekaj letih vzel v zakup lovno pravico. Po nekaj letih se je odločil, da od KID-a odkupi tržiške gozdove. Pogajanja o nakupu so bila končana 1891.

S prihodom Julija Borna se začenja v zgodovini tržiških gozdov obdobje sistematičnega urejanja gozdnega gospodarstva, graditve gozdnih prometnic, gospodarskih poslopij in naprav za predelavo lesa.

V Puterhofu, kot se je do leta 1955 imenoval današnji Jelendol, si je dal novi lastnik gozdov zgraditi dvorec z imenom Sveta Katarina. Leta 1895 je od Čadovlje pri Tržiču do Jelendola zgradil cesto in na potoku Dovžanka zgradil malo hidrocentralo z dvema generatorjema, ki sta pri 720 vrtljajih na minuto proizvajala elektriko vsak po 15 KW, pri napetosti 120 V. Elektriko iz domače hidroelektrarne so uporabljali za razsvetljavo in pogon žage, ki so jo 1895 postavili blizu dvorca.

Okoli leta 1890 je Born od francoske družbe Illyrische Quecksilger Gewerkschaft odkupil skupaj z zemljišči okoli njega Šentanski rudnik živega srebra.

Nenadna smrt Julija Borna je razvoj Jelendola za nekaj let ustavila. Njegovi trije otroci so bili še mladoletni. Z zapuščino so upravljali varuhi, ki pa za nadaljnje naložbe niso imeli posluha in so odlašali z odločitvami. Kraj je dobil nov zagon šele ob polnoletnosti dedičev.

Glej tudi
 družina Born

Rojeni leta 1840
Umrli leta 1897
Nemški Judje
Nemški plemiči
Nemški bančniki

Julij Born


NGC 2541 yew cısımê asmênio. Katalogo Neweyo Pêroyi de ca gêno.

Gıreyê teberi
 2541 SEDS

Cısımê NGC

NGC 2541


Hadisələr
 8 dekabr — Vaşinqtonda SSRİ ilə ABŞ arasında tarixdə ilk dəfə olaraq qısa mənzilli raketlərin məhv edilməsi haqqında saziş imzalanması.
 15 may — Azərbaycan müəllimlərinin X qurultayının keçirilməsi.
 Laçın rayonu ərazisində Qaragöl Dövlət Təbiət Qoruğunun yaradılması.
 Qax rayonu ərazisində İlisu Dövlət Təbiət Qoruğunun yaradılması.

Doğumlar
 30 yanvar — Arda Turan, Türk futbolçu.
 2 fevral — Jerar Pike, İspaniyalı futbolçu.
5 fevral—Özgə Gürəl, türk aktrisa
Poli Genova—Bolqarıstanlı müğənni
 11 mart — Kseniya Sokolyanskaya — Rusiya telejurnalisti, aparıcı.
 19 aprel — Mariya Şarapova, rus tennisçi.
 21 aprel — Anastasiya Prixodko, Ukraynalı müğənni.
 4 may — Sesk Fabreqas, İspaniyalı futbolçu.
 10 may — İvan Rakitiç
 16 may — Can Bonomo, Türk müğənni.
 24 iyun — Lionel Messi, Argentinalı futbolçu.

Vəfatlar
 12 oktyabr — Fəxri Qorutürk, Türkiyə Respublikasının 6-cı prezidenti.

1987


Սարիսու, գետ Ղազախստանում՝ Ջեզկազգանի և Կզըլ Օրդայի մարզերում։ Երկարությունը 671 կիլոմետր է, ավազանը՝ 81600 քառակուսի կիլոմետր։ Առաջանում է Ժաման Սարիսու և Ժաքսի Սարրսու գետերի միախառնումից, հոսում Ղազախական մանրաբլուրների սահմաններով հարավ արևմուտք և կորչում Բետպակ Դալա անապատում։ Սնումը ձնային է։ Ջրերն օգտագործվում են արդյունաբերության, ջրամատակարարման և ոռոգման համար։

Ծանոթագրություններ

Ղազախստանի գետեր

Սարիսու (գետ)


An Ophiurodon permixta in uska species han Ophiuroidea nga ginhulagway ni Jean Baptiste François René Koehler hadton 1905. An Ophiurodon permixta in nahilalakip ha genus nga Ophiurodon, ngan familia nga Ophiolepididae. Waray hini subspecies nga nakalista.

Mga kasarigan

Ophiurodon

Ophiurodon permixta


Lefevre Jean Claude est le « nom d'artiste » de l'artiste contemporain Jean-Claude Lefevre, né à Coutances en 1946.

Expositions

 Vincent Dupont-Rougier / Lefevre Jean Claude, Granville Gallery, Paris, 2012.
 Tracts ! Cabinet du livre d'artiste, université Rennes 2 ; 2012
 Les murs d'une maison, l'acte en peinture, Maison Cantoisel, Joigny ; 2012.
 Boîtes noires, correspondances, Café Le Flore, Paris, , 2011
 Pour information 1 [passe à ton voisin] Le Centre des livres d'artistes, Saint-Yrieix-la-Perche ; 2011.
 La photocopie, Cabinet du livre d'artiste, université Rennes 2 ;  au .
 lefevre jean claude rutault, Interface, Dijon, 2011
 Very Nice Lefevre Jean-Claude, Garage 103, Nice, 1978

Bibliographie

 Martine Le Gac, lefevre jean claude rutault, édition Interface, Dijon, 2011, 8p.
 Blandine Chavanne, Alice Fleury, [ljc notations] le travail de l'art au travail…, Musée des Beaux-Arts, Nantes, 2009
 Jean-Charles Agboton-Jumeau, ljc notations : essai d'autobiographie du travail de l'art au travail, Granville Gallery, 2008

Liens externes

 INHA : Le travail de l'art au travail. Autour de Lefevre Jean Claude et de l'archive
 Lefevre Jean Claude, Tableaux parisiens, 1998

Plasticien français contemporain
Naissance à Coutances
Naissance en janvier 1946
Pseudonyme

Lefevre Jean-Claude


Hermetismus est traditio religiosa et philosophica praecipue in scripturis pseudepigraphicis Hermeti Trismegisto tributis condita et in Tabula Smaragdina reperta. Doctrina secreta est, quae in Aegypto saeculo tertio a.C.n. natam esse a nonnullis putatur.

De doctrina
Haec doctrina clam, praeter Christianismum, trans antiquitatem ac tempora mediaevalia et hodierna doceri et exerceri perrexit.

Saeculo sexto decimo multi principes, inter quos Rudolphus II, Imperator Romanorum, ad hanc doctrinam inclinabant et ei favebant.

Multi libri hermetici magni et alchemiae pretii, quos solum magnates emendi facultatem habebant, tunc temporis edebantur.

Bibliographia
 Jean DORESSE, "L'hermétisme égyptianisant", in Histoire des religions, Gallimard, "Pléiade", t. II, 1972, p. 430-497.
 Mircea Eliade, Histoire des croyances et des idées religieuses, t. 2, Payot, 1978, § 209-210.
 André-Jean FESTUGIÈRE, La Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste, surtout le t. I, 1944, 441 p. : L'astrologie et les sciences occultes (sur l'hermétisme gréco-égyptien populaire), et le t. II, 610 p. : Le Dieu cosmique (sur l'hermétisme gréco-égyptien savant), 1944-1954. Rééd. en 1 vol. des 4 vol. : Lutetiae, Les Belles Lettres, 2006, 1700 p.
 André-Jean FESTUGIÈRE, Hermétisme et mystique païenne, Aubier-Montaigne, 1967, 333 p., p. 28-88, 230-248.
 Garth FOWDEN, Hermès l'Égyptien (1986), trad., Les Belles Lettres, 2000, 380 p.
 Jean-Pierre Mahé, "Hermetica philosophica", apud Encyclopédie Philosophique Universelle, vol. III : Les œuvres philosophiques, t. I : La philosophie occidentale, PUF, 1992, p. 164-169.
 Giuliano Kremmerz - La scienza dei magi, 3 volumi, Ed. Mediterranee, 1975
 U. D. Cisaria (a cura di), Dizionario dei Termini Ermetici dell'Opera Omnia di Giuliano Kremmerz, in La scienza dei Magi - 4° volume, Edizioni Mediterranee, Romae, 1975
 Giuliano Kremmerz - La Porta Ermetica, Ed. Mediterranee, 2000
 Giuliano Kremmerz - Introduzione alla Scienza Ermetica, Ed. Mediterranee, 2000
 Festugière, André-Jean, Ermetismo e mistica pagana, Genuae 1991
 Moreschini, Claudio, Dall'Asclepius al Crater Hermetis. Studi sull'ermetismo latino tardo-antico e rinascimentale, Pisis 1985
 Vinci Verginelli, Bibliotheca Hermetica - Catalogo alquanto ragionato della raccolta Verginelli-Rota di antichi testi ermetici (secoli XV-XVIII), Florentiae 1986.
 Brian P. Copenhaver: Hermetica: The Greek Corpus Hermeticum and the Latin Asclepius in a New English Translation. Cantabrigiae: Cambridge University Press 1992.
 Ralf Liedtke (Hrsg.): Hermes in Nuce. Hermetische Schriften des 18. Jahrhunderts. Archiv für Altes Gedankengut und Wissen, Sinzheim 2005, ISBN 3-937592-12-1
 Emmanuel d'Hooghvorst, 1951 : "Essai sur l'art d'alchymie", in Inconnues vol. 5, Lausannae, 1951.

Corpus Hermeticum
Ioannes Picus Mirandula
Ordo Hermeticus Aurorae Aureae
Mystica
Neoplatonismus
Rosicrucianismus
Symbolismus
Tabula smaragdina
Thelema

Hermetismus
Philosophia

Hermetismus


Oleq Protasov (; ) – Ukrayna futbolçusu və məşqçisi.

Klub karyerası
Oleq Protasov futbolçu karyerası dövründü Dnepr (1981-1987, 147 oyun, 95 qol), Dinamo Kiyev, (1988-1990, 71 oyun, 30 qol), Olimpiakos (1990-1994, 83 oyun, 48 qol), Qamba 1994-1995, 55 oyun, 24 qol), Veriya (Yunanıstan, 1996-1998, 62 oyun, 11 qol), Prodeftiki (Yunanıstan, 1998-1999, 28 oyun, 5 qol), Panelefsiniakos (Yunanıstan, 1999-2000) klublarının şərəfinii qoruyub. 1984-1991-ci illərdə 68 dəfə SSRİ yığmasına dəvət alıb 29 qol vurub. 1994-cü ildə isə bir dəfə Ukrayna millisinə çağırılıb.

Məşqçi karyerası

Məşqçi karyerasına 2002-ci ildə başlayıb və 2004-ci ilə qədər Yunanıstanın Olimpiakos klubunda çalışıb. 2004-2005-ci mövsümündə bu ölkənin AEL klubunu çalışdırıb. 2005-2006 mövsündə Rumıniyanın Styaua Buxarest klubuna başçılıq edib. 2006-2008-ci illərdə vətəninə dönərək, Dnepr Dnepropetrovsk klubunun baş məşqçisi olub 2008-ci ildə Kubana, 2009-cu ildə isə Yunanıstanın İraklis klubuna başçılıq edib. 2009-cu ilin sonunda Rostov klubunun baş məşqçisi təyin olunub.

İstinadlar

Ukrayna futbolçuları
Yaponiyada legioner futbolçular

Oleq Protasov


Catherine de Rambouilletová, markíza de Rambouillet, franc. Catherine de Rambouillet,  narodená Catherine de Vivonne, (* 1588, Rím, Taliansko -  † 2. december 1665, Paríž, Francúzsko) bola zakladateľka prvého spoločenského salónu v Paríži v 17. storočí. Salón si otvorila vo svojom paláci "hôtel de Rambouillet", ktorý sa nachádzal na mieste dnešného Palais-Royal.

Životopis
Narodila sa v Ríme v rodine markíza de Vivonne, pána de Pisany, neskoršieho amabasadora v Španielsku, a matke Giulii Savelli, rímskej šľachtičnej, neteri pápeža. Bola vychovaná v konverzačnej kultúre, zúčastňovala sa stretnutí jej otca s literárnymi priateľmi.

Vydala sa v 12 rokoch (27. január 1600) za Charlesa d´Angennes, vidame du Mans a budúceho markíza de Rambouillet. Pár opustil hôtel de Rambouillet aby sa ubytoval v hôtel de Pisani, v ulici Saint-Thomas-du-Louvre v Paríži. Tento palác si vyzdobili a zariadili spolu, čím inšpirovali Máriu Medicejskú pri zariaďovaní jej Luxemburského paláca. Catherine mala sedem detí. Dvaja synovia zomreli mladí. Dcéra Julie jej sekundovala v salóne, Angélique bola prvou manželkou grófa de Grignan a tretia dcéra vstúpila do kláštora, neskôr sa stala opátkou z Yères. Vnučka po línii Julie, Marie-Julie de Sainte-Maure, sa stala vojvodkyňou d'Uzès.

Salón
Z dôvodu zhoršeného zdravia a tiež mravov na dvore sa rozhodla prijímať vysokú spoločnosť u seba. Zaujímala sa o umenie, literatúru, mala rada históriu a hovorila viacerými jazykmi.
Držala si skvelý salón aj s pomocou dcéry Julie (1607-1671), na počesť ktorej bola skomponovaná séria madrigalov "La guirlande de Julie", až do jej sobáša (1645) s vojvodom de Montausier a smrti Vincenta Voiture v 1648. Salón neprerušene trval od roku 1618 do 1648. Vydobil si veľký vplyv na francúzsky jazyk a literatúru tej doby, jeho návštevníčky preciózky mali dôležitú úlohu v obnovovaní francúzskeho slovníka. Molière spodobnil a zosmiešnil svoj zážitok v tomto salóne v divadelnej hre "Les Précieuses ridicules" (Smiešne preciózky).

Salón madame de Rambouillet bola priekopnícka inštitúcia, ktorá položila základy Francúzskej akadémie. Práve tu bol prijímaný kardinál de Richelieu a vďaka hosťom, ktorí sa zaoberali čistotou gramatiky francúzskeho jazyka, oficiálne založil za účelom jeho udržiavania akadémiu. Zakladajúci akademici boli vyberaní z radov mužov, ktorých hodnotila a prijímala vo svojom salóne Catherine de Vivonne, markíza de Rambouillet.

Salón madame de Rambouillet si vedel uctiť ženy, na rozdiel od ostatných salónov, ktoré navštevovali masívne len muži. Preto madame de Rambouillet navštevovali aj zástupy mladých žien z najlepších rodín. Prezývaná Arthénice, anagram zložený z mena Malherbe, sa objavila ako Cléomire v diele "Artamène ou le Grand Cyrus" od Georgesa a Madeleine de Scudéry. Cyrus mal byť Enghien - Condé. Medzi návštevníkmi hôtel de Rambouillet sa najčastejšie vyskytovali: François de Malherbe, Honoré d'Urfé, vojvodkyňa de Longueville, M. de Chaudebonne, Antoine Godeau, Honorat de Bueil de Racan, Marc-Antoine Girard de Saint-Amant, Georges de Scudéry, Jean Desmarets de Saint-Sorlin, Roger de Bussy-Rabutin, Claude Malleville, François Maynard, Jean Ogier de Gombauld, Pierre Corneille, Angélique Paulet, Madame de La Fayette, Madame de Sévigné, Guillaume Colletet, Claude Favre de Vaugelas, Gédéon Tallemant des Réaux, Vincent Voiture a Richelieu. Salón bol zrušený medzi rokmi 1645 a 1650 z dôvodu úmrtia v rodine a aktuálneho stavu politiky - Frondy.

Potomkovia
 syn, vidame de Mans, zomrel v 7. roku života na mor
 syn, markíz de Pisani, bol zabitý pri meste Nordlingen.
 Marie-Julie, dcéra, vydatá za vojvodu de Montausier
 Angélique, bola prvou manželkou grófa de Grignan
 tri ďalšie dcéry vstúpili do kláštorov, jedna z nich sa stala opátkou v Yères.
 vnučka, Marie-Julie de Sainte-Maure sa stala vojvodkyňou d'Uzès, jej matkou bola Marie-Julie.

Iné projekty

Zdroje

 Životopis Mme. de Rambouillet
 článok o vývoji salónov

Narodenia v 1588
Úmrtia 2. decembra
Úmrtia v 1665
Francúzske osobnosti
Saloniérky
Osobnosti z Ríma

Catherine de Rambouilletová


Ryan A. Taylor, known professionally as Trinity "The Tuck" Taylor or just Trinity the Tuck (born December 10, 1984), is an American drag queen and recording artist best known for competing on the ninth season of RuPaul's Drag Race and for winning the fourth season of RuPaul's Drag Race All Stars, shared with Monét X Change. She went by Trinity "the Tuck" Taylor on her original season, but on the first episode of All Stars, she indicated that she would henceforth go simply by Trinity the Tuck.

Trinity additionally competed on the seventh season of RuPaul's Drag Race All Stars: (also known as Rupaul's Drag Race All Stars  7- All Winners), the first all winners edition of the franchise.

Early life
Taylor was born to April Renee Dunaway in Birmingham, Alabama, and grew up in Trussville and Springville, Alabama, attending Springville High School. From the age of 8, Taylor was raised by her grandparents due to her mother contracting HIV and subsequently dying. Her drag mother is Jordan Kennedy.

Career
Trinity was named Miss Pulse by Pulse nightclub in 2011. She has won several national pageants, including National Entertainer of the year (against Alyssa Edwards) in 2014 and Miss National Renaissance 2016. She has also performed worldwide as a backup dancer for Andy Bell from Erasure.

RuPaul's Drag Race

In February 2017, Trinity was announced being among fourteen contestants for the ninth season of RuPaul's Drag Race. She won three challenges during the course of the competition, in episodes three, seven and ten. Trinity placed in the top four overall, after losing a lip sync to "Stronger" by Britney Spears against Peppermint. She was referenced in a skit on Saturday Night Live in May 2017.

Trinity was announced to compete on the fourth season of RuPaul's Drag Race All Stars on November 9, 2018. She was referred to as Trinity the Tuck instead of Trinity Taylor. Following her appearance on All Stars, Trinity was interviewed by Vogue for paying homage to a famous Prada dress worn by Sarah Paulson. Paulson publicly thanked Trinity for the special honor through several of her social media platforms. Trinity later won the season in a tie with Monét X Change, having placed in the top two four times throughout the competition (in episodes one, three, seven, and nine) as well as winning two lipsyncs which gave her the power to eliminate Jasmine Masters in episode one and Latrice Royale in episode nine.

She was cast to be one of ten Drag Race alumni to be on RuPaul's Celebrity Drag Race, where she served as a mentor for Loni Love.

In April 2022, it was announced that Trinity would be competing on the seventh season of RuPaul's Drag Race All Stars, the first all winners edition of the franchise.

Other ventures
In 2019, Trinity was featured on Botched for lip correction surgery.

On November 3, 2019, Trinity launched her podcast Werk with Trinity the Tuck, which features recurring and special guests. She has also continued to release new episodes of her YouTube series Talking with the Tuck.

Trinity appeared in the music video for the song "You Need to Calm Down" by Taylor Swift as Lady Gaga.

In 2020, Trinity appeared in the Netflix original AJ and the Queen as a well-known pageant drag queen.

Trinity was featured on Out Magazine, Gay Times, PinkNews and various other press publications for her tribute project where she recreated iconic runway looks from previous RuPaul's Drag Race winners. The project, a collaboration with her boyfriend Leo Llanos, has garnered her high praise from fans, Drag Race alumni and press outlets for its captivating imagery and reinvented fashion styles. Trinity, along with her All Stars 4 co-winner Monét X Change, collaborated with Llanos to recreate looks from To Wong Foo to celebrate the end of their reign. In June 2019, a panel of judges from New York magazine placed her 15th on their list of "the most powerful drag queens in America", a ranking of 100 former Drag Race contestants.

In June 2020, Trinity interviewed Cyndi Lauper, as part of the YouTube series We Stan, to talk about the Stonewall Riots and the importance of activism.

In 2020, Trinity launched her all inclusive digital drag competition, Love for the Arts on Twitch, where contestants from all over the world compete to find out which contestant is the best drag artist of them all.

In 2021, Trinity appeared on Celebrity Karaoke Club Drag Edition as a contestant. Trinity ultimately won the competition, beating out fellow Drag Race alumni, Manila Luzon and The Vivienne.

In 2022, Trinity, in partnership with Producer Entertainment Group, launched their own brand of flavored vodka, courtesy of Serv Vodka.

Music
During the first episode of All Stars 4, she premiered an original comedy song titled "The Perfect Tuck" during the episode's variety show and won the challenge. The song was released for digital download on the same day. Her second solo single, a dance track called "The Face, the Body", was released on January 25, 2019. A music video for her third single, "I Call Shade", was released on February 14, 2019, and features Peppermint. The music video has over a million views. Her debut album Plastic premiered at number 9 on the Billboard Comedy Albums chart.

She appeared in the music videos for Latrice Royale's "Excuse the Beauty" and Aja's "I Don't Wanna Brag". On November 29, 2019, Trinity released a promotional holiday single called Trinity Ruins Christmas.

In 2021, Trinity released Mood Swing, an EP including the singles "Witch" and "Call Me Mommy Daddy" featuring Jozea Flores.

In 2022, Trinity released "Walk. Slay. Serv. Repeat."

Personal life
As of at least mid-2017, Taylor lives in Orlando, Florida. She has had plastic surgery, including having her ears pinned and a rhinoplasty by Dr. Miami Michael Salzhauer. On March 31, 2022, she came out as non-binary and transgender. She uses she/they pronouns.

Filmography

Television

Music videos

Web series

Discography

Studio albums

Extended plays

Singles

As lead artist

As featured artist

Tours
 Werk the World
 War on the Catwalk
 A Drag Queen Christmas
Haters Roast
 Plastic World Tour

Awards and nominations

References

External links

1985 births
Living people
American drag queens
American LGBT singers
American podcasters
LGBT people from Alabama
LGBT people from Florida
Non-binary drag performers
American non-binary musicians
People from Birmingham, Alabama
People from Orlando, Florida
Trinity Taylor
Trinity Taylor
Transgender non-binary people
National Entertainer of the Year winners

Trinity the Tuck


NGC 100 — Yeni Baş Kataloqda qeydə alınmış qalaktika. Göy üzündə Balıqlar bürcü istiqamətində yerləşir. Sc tipli .   tərəfindən  ildə 40.64 sm (16 inç) ölçülü  vasitəsilə ildə kəşf edilmişdir.

İstinadlar

Xarici keçidlər
 SEDS

100
NGC 100
Balıqlar bürcü

NGC 100


Անդրեա Ալեքսի (, ), ալբանացի ճարտարապետ, նկարիչ և քանդակագործ։

Համարվում է Դալմաթյան վերածննդի ժամանակաշրջանի ամենահեղինակավոր նկարիչներից մեկը։

Կենսագրություն
Անդրեա Ալեքսին ծնվել է Լեժայում և կարող է ավելի շուտ տեղական ալբանական ծագում ունենալ, քան իտալական։ Այլ աղբյուրներ փաստում են, որ նա ծագումով իտալացի է։ Այնուհետև տեղափոխվել է Դալմաթիայի Սփլիթ քաղաք, որտեղ ուսանել է քանդակագործ Մարկ Տրոյային։ Կյանքի մեծ մասն ապրել և ստեղծագործել է Դալմաթիայում։ Եղել է Ջորջո դա Սեբենցոյի աշակերտը։ Նրա նշանավոր գործերից է 1466 թվականին Նիկոլո դի Ջիովանի Ֆիորենտինոյի հետ Տրոգիրի Սուրբ Հովհաննես տաճարի աշխատանքները։

Սուրբ Հակոբ տաճարի նմանությամբ այն կառուցված է ծայրահեղ ճշգրտությամբ ստեղծված մեծ քարե բլոկներից։ Համաձայն անտիկ իդեալների՝ այն ճարտարապետության և քանդակագործության եզակի ներդաշնակություն է ապահովում։ Ներսի կողմից պատերը ողորկ չեն։ Տաճարի մեջտեղում՝ խորանին, Տրոգիրի սուրբ Հովհաննեսի սարկոֆագն է՝ շրջապատված լուսամփոփները ձեռքներին պուտտեներով, որոնք կարծես լույս են տալիս դժոխքի դռներից։ Նրանց վերևում Քրիստոսի և առաքյալների քանդակներով որմնախորշերն են (հիմնականում Ալեքսի աշխատանքն է)։ Կեսոնային առաստաղի մեջտեղում Աստծո պատկերն է և հրեշտակների 96 գլուխներ։ Մանկական ժպտացող դեմքերով լի տաճարը տարբերվում է այդ ժամանակաշրջանի եվրոպական արվեստից։

Անդրեան հայտնի է նաև Իտալիայում գտնվող իր առևտրականների արձաններով, 1454 թվականին Դալմաթիայի Արաբե կղզու եկեղեցու «Տրոգիրի մկրտարան» որմնանկարներով, որը նա ստորագրել է 1467 թվականին՝ ANDREAS ALEXIUS DURRACHINUS OPIFEX MCCCCXII (Անդրեա Ալեքսի, արվեստագետ Դուրրեսից, 1462)։

Մահացել է 1505 թվականին, Դուրրասում։

Ծանոթագրություններ

Արտաքին հղումներ
 Biography  at the Croatian Post stamp collection web site

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