The invention is a method and system in which an authentication chip having secret information stored within it, including secret data stored in multi-level flash memory, is protected from unauthorised modification of values stored in the flash memory. The secret information is stored using an internal command and can only be accessed by one or more further commands. Secret data in the information is stored in intermediate states of the multi-level flash memory between the minimum and maximum voltage level states. A validity check is performed on secret data items before allowing them to be read out by a command accessing them. The validity check involves calculation of a checksum and comparison of the result with a checksum stored using the internal command as part of the secret information.

This invention concerns a method and system in which an authentication chip having secret information stored within it, including secret data stored in multi-level flash memory, is protected from unauthorised modification of values stored in the flash memory.
1 Introduction
Manufacturers of systems that require consumables, such as a laser printer that requires toner cartridges, have struggled with the problem of authenticating consumables, to varying levels of success. Most have resorted to specialized packaging. However this does not stop home refill operations or clone manufacture. The prevention of copying is important for two reasons:
To protect revenues
To prevent poorly manufactured substitute consumables from damaging the base system. For example, poorly filtered ink may clog print nozzles in an ink jet printer.
2 Scope
Authentication is an extremely large and constantly growing field. This invention is concerned with authenticating consumables. In most cases, there is no reason to prohibit the use of consumables in a third party product.
The invention concerns an authentication chip that contains an authentication code and circuit specially designed to prevent copying. The chip is manufactured using the standard Flash memory manufacturing process, and is low cost enough to be included in consumables such as ink and toner cartridges.
Once programmed, the authentication chips are compliant with the NSA export guidelines since they do not constitute an encryption device. They can therefore be practically manufactured in the USA (and exported) or anywhere else in the world.
3 Concepts and Terms
This part discusses terms and concepts that are referred to throughout the remainder of the document.
3.1 Symbolic Nomenclature
The following symbolic nomenclature is used throughout this document:
3.2 Basic Terms
A message, denoted by M, is plaintext. The process of transforming M into ciphertext C, where the substance of M is hidden, is called encryption. The process of transforming C back into M is called decryption. Referring to the encryption function as E, and the decryption function as D, we have the following identities:
E[M]=C
D[C]=M
Therefore the following identity is true: D[E[M]]=M
3.3 Symmetric Cryptography
A symmetric encryption algorithm is one where:
the encryption function E relies on key K1,
the decryption function D relies on key K2,
K2 can be derived from K1, and
K1 can be derived from K2.
In most symmetric algorithms, K1 equals K2. However, even if K1 does not equal K2, given that one key can be derived from the other, a single key K can suffice for the mathematical definition. Thus:
EK[M]=C
DK[C]=M
The security of these algorithms rests very much in the key K. Knowledge of K allows anyone to encrypt or decrypt. Consequently K must remain a secret for the duration of the value of M. For example, M may be a wartime message xe2x80x9cMy current position is grid position 123-456xe2x80x9d. Once the war is over the value of M is greatly reduced, and if K is made public, the knowledge of the combat unit""s position may be of no relevance whatsoever. Of course if it is politically sensitive for the combat unit""s position to be known even after the war, K may have to remain secret for a very long time.
An enormous variety of symmetric algorithms exist, from the textbooks of ancient history through to sophisticated modem algorithms. Many of these are insecure, in that modern cryptanalysis techniques (see Section 3.8) can successfully attack the algorithm to the extent that K can be derived.
The security of the particular symmetric algorithm is a function of two things: the strength of the algorithm and the length of the key [78].
The strength of an algorithm is difficult to quantify, relying on its resistance to cryptographic attacks (see Section 3.8). In addition, the longer that an algorithm has remained in the public eye, and yet remained unbroken in the midst of intense scrutiny, the more secure the algorithm is likely to be. By contrast, a secret algorithm that has not been scrutinized by cryptographic experts is unlikely to be secure.
Even if the algorithm is xe2x80x9cperfectlyxe2x80x9d strong (the only way to break it is to try every keyxe2x80x94see Section 188.8.131.52), eventually the right key will be found. However, the more keys there are, the more keys have to be tried. If there are N keys, it will take a maximum of N tries. If the key is N bits long, it will take a maximum of 2N tries, with a 50% chance of finding the key after only half the attempts (2Nxe2x88x921). The longer N becomes, the longer it will take to find the key, and hence the more secure it is. What makes a good key length depends on the value of the secret and the time for which the secret must remain secret as well as available computing resources.
In 1996, an ad hoc group of world-renowned cryptographers and computer scientists released a report [9] describing minimal key lengths for symmetric ciphers to provide adequate commercial security. They suggest an absolute minimum key length of 90 bits in order to protect data for 20 years, and stress that increasingly, as cryptosystems succumb to smarter attacks than brute-force key search, even more bits may be required to account for future surprises in cryptanalysis techniques.
We will ignore most historical symmetric algorithms on the grounds that they are insecure, especially given modern computing technology. Instead, we will discuss the following algorithms:
DES
Blowfish
RC5
IDEA
3.3.1 DES
DES (Data Encryption Standard) [26] is a US and international standard, where the same key is used to encrypt and decrypt. The key length is 56 bits. It has been implemented in hardware and software, although the original design was for hardware only. The original algorithm used in DES was patented in 1976 (U.S. Pat. No. 3,962,539) and has since expired.
During the design of DES, the NSA (National Security Agency) provided secret S-boxes to perform the key-dependent nonlinear transformations of the data block. After differential cryptanalysis was discovered outside the NSA, it was revealed that the DES S-boxes were specifically designed to be resistant to differential cryptanalysis. As described in [92], using 1993 technology, a 56-bit DES key can be recovered by a custom-designed $1 million machine performing a brute force attack in only 35 minutes. For $10 million, the key can be recovered in only 3.5 minutes. DES is clearly not secure now, and will become less so in the future.
A variant of DES, called triple-DES is more secure, but requires 3 keys: K1, K2, and K3. The keys are used in the following manner:
EK3[DK2[EK1[M]]]=C
DK3[EK2[DK1[C]]]=M
The main advantage of triple-DES is that existing DES implementations can be used to give more security than single key DES. Specifically, triple-DES gives protection of equivalent key length of 112 bits [78]. Triple-DES does not give the equivalent protection of a 168-bit key (3xc3x9756) as one might naively expect.
Equipment that performs triple-DES decoding and/or encoding cannot be exported from the United States.
3.3.2 Blowfish
Blowfish is a symmetric block cipher first presented by Schneier in 1994 [76]. It takes a variable length key, from 32 bits to 448 bits, is unpatented, and is both license and royalty free. In addition, it is much faster than DES.
The Blowfish algorithm consists of two parts: a key-expansion part and a data-encryption part. Key expansion converts a key of at most 448 bits into several subkey arrays totaling 4168 bytes. Data encryption occurs via a 16-round Feistel network. All operations are XORs and additions on 32-bit words, with four index array lookups per round.
It should be noted that decryption is the same as encryption except that the subkey arrays are used in the reverse order. Complexity of implementation is therefore reduced compared to other algorithms that do not have such symmetry.
[77] describes the published attacks which have been mounted on Blowfish, although the algorithm remains secure as of February 1998 [79]. The major finding with these attacks has been the discovery of certain weak keys. These weak keys can be tested for during key generation. For more information, refer to [77] and [79].
3.3.3 RC5
Designed by Ron Rivest in 1995, RC5 [74] has a variable block size, key size, and number of rounds. Typically, however, it uses a 64-bit block size and a 128-bit key.
The RC5 algorithm consists of two parts: a key-expansion part and a data-encryption part. Key expansion converts a key into 2r+2 subkeys (where r=the number of rounds), each subkey being w bits. For a 64-bit blocksize with 16 rounds (w=32, r=16), the subkey arrays total 136 bytes. Data encryption uses addition mod 2w, XOR and bitwise rotation.
An initial examination by Kaliski and Yin [43] suggested that standard linear and differential cryptanalysis appeared impractical for the 64-bit blocksize version of the algorithm. Their differential attacks on 9 and 12 round RC5 require 245 and 262 chosen plaintexts respectively, while the linear attacks on 4, 5, and 6 round RC5 requires 237, 247 and 257 known plaintexts). These two attacks are independent of key size.
More recently however, Knudsen and Meier [47] described a new type of differential attack on RC5 that improved the earlier results by a factor of 128, showing that RC5 has certain weak keys.
RC5 is protected by multiple patents owned by RSA Laboratories. A license must be obtained to use it.
3.3.4 IDEA
Developed in 1990 by Lai and Massey [53], the first incarnation of the IDEA cipher was called PES. After differential cryptanalysis was discovered by Biham and Shamir in 1991, the algorithm was strengthened, with the result being published in 1992 as IDEA [52].
IDEA uses 128-bit keys to operate on 64-bit plaintext blocks. The same algorithm is used for encryption and decryption. It is generally regarded as the most secure block algorithm available today [78][56].
The biggest drawback of IDEA is the fact that it is patented (U.S. Pat. No. 5,214,703, issued in 1993), and a license must be obtained from Ascom Tech AG (Bern) to use it.
3.4 Asymmetric Cryptography
An asymmetric encryption algorithm is one where:
the encryption function E relies on key K1,
the decryption function D relies on key K2,
K2 cannot be derived from K1 in a reasonable amount of time, and
K1 cannot be derived from K2 in a reasonable amount of time.
Thus: EK1[M]=C
DK2[C]=M
These algorithms are also called public-key because one key K1 can be made public. Thus anyone can encrypt a message (using K1) but only the person with the corresponding decryption key (K2) can decrypt and thus read the message.
In most cases, the following identity also holds: EK2[M]=C
DK1[C]=M
This identity is very important because it implies that anyone with the public key K1 can see M and know that it came from the owner of K2. No-one else could have generated C because to do so would imply knowledge of K2. This gives rise to a different application, unrelated to encryptionxe2x80x94digital signatures.
The property of not being able to derive K1 from K2 and vice versa in a reasonable time is of course clouded by the concept of reasonable time. What has been demonstrated time after time, is that a calculation that was thought to require a long time has been made possible by the introduction of faster computers, new algorithms etc. The security of asymmetric algorithms is based on the difficulty of one of two problems: factoring large numbers (more specifically large numbers that are the product of two large primes), and the difficulty of calculating discrete logarithms in a finite field. Factoring large numbers is conjectured to be a hard problem given today""s understanding of mathematics. The problem however, is that factoring is getting easier much faster than anticipated. Ron Rivest in 1977 said that factoring a 125-digit number would take 40 quadrillion years [30]. In 1994 a 129-digit number was factored [3]. According to Schneier, you need a 1024-bit number to get the level of security today that you got from a 512-bit number in the 1980s [78]. If the key is to last for some years then 1024 bits may not even be enough. Rivest revised his key length estimates in 1990: he suggests 1628 bits for high security lasting until 2005, and 1884 bits for high security lasting until 2015 [69]. Schneier suggests 2048 bits are required in order to protect against corporations and governments until 2015 [80].
Public key cryptography was invented in 1976 by Diffie and Hellman [15][16], and independently by Merkle [57]. Although Diffie; Hellman and Merkle patented the concepts (U.S. Pat. No. 4,200,770 and 4,218,582), these patents expired in 1997.
A number of public key cryptographic algorithms exist. Most are impractical to implement, and many generate a very large C for a given M or require enormous keys. Still others, while secure, are far too slow to be practical for several years. Because of this, many public key systems are hybridxe2x80x94a public key mechanism is used to transmit a symmetric session key, and then the session key is used for the actual messages.
All of the algorithms have a problem in terms of key selection. A random number is simply not secure enough. The two large primes p and q must be chosen carefullyxe2x80x94there are certain weak combinations that can be factored more easily (some of the weak keys can be tested for). But nonetheless, key selection is not a simple matter of randomly selecting 1024 bits for example. Consequently the key selection process must also be secure.
Of the practical algorithms in use under public scrutiny, the following are discussed:
RSA
DSA
ElGamal
3.4.1 RSA
The RSA cryptosystem [75], named after Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman, is the most widely used public key cryptosystem, and is a de facto standard in much of the world [78].
The security of RSA depends on the conjectured difficulty of factoring large numbers that are the product of two primes (p and q). There are a number of restrictions on the generation of p and q. They should both be large, with a similar number of bits, yet not be close to one another (otherwise p=q=pq). In addition, many authors have suggested that p and q should be strong primes [56]. The Hellman-Bach patent (U.S. Pat. No. 4,633,036) covers a method for generating strong RSA primes p and q such that n=pq and factoring n is believed to be computationally infeasible.
The RSA algorithm patent was issued in 1983 (U.S. Pat. No. 4,405,829). The patent expires on Sep. 20, 2000.
3.4.2 DSA
DSA (Digital Signature Algorithm) is an algorithm designed as part of the Digital Signature Standard (DSS) [29]. As defined, it cannot be used for generalized encryption. In addition, compared to RSA, DSA is 10 to 40 times slower for signature verification [40]. DSA explicitly uses the SHA-1 hashing algorithm (see Section 220.127.116.11).
DSA key generation relies on finding two primes p and q such that q divides pxe2x88x921. According to Schneier [78], a 1024-bit p value is required for long term DSA security. However the DSA standard [29] does not permit values of p larger than 1024 bits (p must also be a multiple of 64 bits).
The US Government owns the DSA algorithm and has at least one relevant patent (U.S. Pat. No. 5,231,688 granted in 1993). However, according to NIST [61]:
xe2x80x9cThe DSA patent and any foreign counterparts that may issue are available for use without any written permission from or any payment of royalties to the U.S. government. xe2x80x9d
In a much stronger declaration, NIST states in the same document [61] that DSA does not infringe third party""s rights:
xe2x80x9cNIST reviewed all of the asserted patents and concluded that none of them would be infringed by DSS. Extra protection will be written into the PK1 pilot project that will prevent an organization or individual from suing anyone except the government for patent infringement during the course of the project.xe2x80x9d
It must however, be noted that the Schnorr authentication algorithm [81] (U.S. Pat. No. 4,995,082) patent holder claims that DSA infringes his patent. The Schnorr patent is not due to expire until 2008.
3.43 ElGamal
The ElGamal scheme [22][23] is used for both encryption and digital signatures. The security is based on the conjectured difficulty of calculating discrete logarithms in a finite field.
Key selection involves the selection of a prime p, and two random numbers g and x such that both g and x are less than p. Then calculate y=gx mod p. The public key is y, g, and p. The private key is x.
ElGamal is unpatented. Although it uses the patented Diffie-Hellman public key algorithm [15][16], those patents expired in 1997. ElGamal public key encryption and digital signatures can now be safely used without infringing third party patents.
3.5 Cryptographic Challenge-Response Protocols and Zero Knowledge Proofs
The general principle of a challenge-response protocol is to provide identity authentication. The simplest form of challenge-response takes the form of a secret password. A asks B for the secret password, and if B responds with the correct password, A declares B authentic.
There are three main problems with this kind of simplistic protocol. Firstly, once B has responded with the password, any observer C will know what the password is. Secondly, A must know the password in order to verify it. Thirdly, if C impersonates A, then B will give the password to C (thinking C was A), thus compromising the password.
Using a copyright text (such as a haiku) as the password is not sufficient, because we are assuming that anyone is able to copy the password (for example in a country where intellectual property is not respected).
The idea of cryptographic challenge-response protocols is that one entity (the claimant) proves its identity to another (the verifier) by demonstrating knowledge of a secret known to be associated with that entity, without revealing the secret itself to the verifier during the protocol [56]. In the generalized case of cryptographic challenge-response protocols, with some schemes the verifier knows the secret, while in others the secret is not even known by the verifier. A good overview of these protocols can be found in [25], [78], and [56].
Since this document specifically concerns Authentication, the actual cryptographic challenge-response protocols used for authentication are detailed in the appropriate sections. However the concept of Zero Knowledge Proofs bears mentioning here.
The Zero Knowledge Proof protocol, first described by Feige, Fiat and Shamir in [24] is extensively used in Smart Cards for the purpose of authentication [34][36][67]. The protocol""s effectiveness is based on the assumption that it is computationally infeasible to compute square roots modulo a large composite integer with unknown factorization. This is provably equivalent to the assumption that factoring large integers is difficult.
It should be noted that there is no need for the claimant to have significant computing power. Smart cards implement this kind of authentication using only a few modulo multiplications [34][36].
Finally, it should be noted that the Zero Knowledge Proof protocol is patented [82] (U.S. Pat. No. 4,748,668, issued May 31, 1988).
3.6 One-Way Functions
A one-way function F operates on an input X, and returns F[X] such that X cannot be determined from F[X]. When there is no restriction on the format of X, and F[X] contains fewer bits than X, then collisions must exist. A collision is defined as two different X input values producing the same F[X] valuexe2x80x94i.e. X1 and X2 exist such that X1xe2x89xa0X2 yet F[X1]=F[X2].
When X contains more bits than F[X], the input must be compressed in some way to create the output. In many cases, X is broken into blocks of a particular size, and compressed over a number of rounds, with the output of one round being the input to the next. The output of the hash function is the last output once X has been consumed. A pseudo-collision of the compression function CF is defined as two different initial values V1 and V2 and two inputs X1 and X2 (possibly identical) are given such that CF(V1, X1)=CF(V2, X2). Note that the existence of a pseudo-collision does not mean that it is easy to compute an X2 for a given X1.
We are only interested in one-way functions that are fast to compute. In addition, we are only interested in deterministic one-way functions that are repeatable in different implementations. Consider an example F where F[X] is the time between calls to F. For a given F[X] X cannot be determined because X is not even used by F. However the output from F will be different for different implementations. This kind of F is therefore not of interest.
In the scope of this document, we are interested in the following forms of one-way functions:
Encryption using an unknown key
Random number sequences
Hash Functions
Message Authentication Codes
3.6.1 Encryption Using an Unknown Key
When a message is encrypted using an unknown key K, the encryption function E is effectively one-way. Without the key K, it is computationally infeasible to obtain M from EK[M]. An encryption function is only one-way for as long as the key remains hidden.
An encryption algorithm does not create collisions, since E creates EK[M] such that it is possible to reconstruct M using function D. Consequently F[X] contains at least as many bits as X (no information is lost) if the one-way function F is E.
Symmetric encryption algorithms (see Section 3.3) have the advantage over asymmetric algorithms (see Section 3.4) for producing one-way functions based on encryption for the following reasons:
The key for a given strength encryption algorithm is shorter for a symmetric algorithm than an asymmetric algorithm
Symmetric algorithms are faster to compute and require less software or silicon
Note however, that the selection of a good key depends on the encryption algorithm chosen. Certain keys are not strong for particular encryption algorithms, so any key needs to be tested for strength. The more tests that need to be performed for key selection, the less likely the key will remain hidden.
3.6.2 Random Number Sequences
Consider a random number sequence R0, R1, . . . , Ri, Ri+1. We define the one-way function F such that F[X] returns the Xth random number in the random sequence. However we must ensure that F[X] is repeatable for a given X on different implementations. The random number sequence therefore cannot be truly random. Instead, it must be pseudo-random, with the generator making use of a specific seed.
There are a large number of issues concerned with defining good random number generators. Knuth, in [48] describes what makes a generator xe2x80x9cgoodxe2x80x9d (including statistical tests), and the general problems associated with constructing them. Moreau gives a high level survey of the current state of the field in [60].
The majority of random number generators produce the ith random number from the ixe2x88x92lth statexe2x80x94the only way to determine the ith number is to iterate from the 0th number to the ith. If i is large, it may not be practical to wait for i iterations.
However there is a type of random number generator that does allow random access. In [10], Blum, Blum and Shub define the ideal generator as follows: xe2x80x9c. . . we would like a pseudo-random sequence generator to quickly produce, from short seeds, long sequences (of bits) that appear in every way to be generated by successive flips of a fair coinxe2x80x9d. They defined the x2 mod n generator [10], more commonly referred to as the BBS generator. They showed that given certain assumptions upon which modern cryptography relies, a BBS generator passes extremely stringent statistical tests.
The BBS generator relies on selecting n which is a Blum integer (n=pq where p and q are large prime numbers, pxe2x89xa0q, p mod 4=3, and q mod 4=3). The initial state of the generator is given by x0 where x0=X2 mod n, and x is a random integer relatively prime to n. The ith pseudo-random bit is the least significant bit of xi where:
xi=x2ixe2x88x921 mod n
As an extra property, knowledge of p and q allows a direct calculation of the ith number in the sequence as follows:
xi=x0y mod n where y=2i mod ((pxe2x88x921)(qxe2x88x921))
Without knowledge of p and q, the generator must iterate (the security of calculation relies on the conjectured difficulty of factoring large numbers).
When first defined, the primary problem with the BBS generator was the amount of work required for a single output bit. The algorithm was considered too slow for most applications. However the advent of Montgomery reduction arithmetic [58] has given rise to more practical implementations, such as [59]. In addition, Vazirani and Vazirani have shown in [90] that depending on the size of n, more bits can safely be taken from xi without compromising the security of the generator.
Assuming we only take 1 bit per xi, N bits (and hence N iterations of the bit generator function) are needed in order to generate an N-bit random number. To the outside observer, given a particular set of bits, there is no way to determine the next bit other than a 50/50 probability. If the x, p and q are hidden, they act as a key, and it is computationally infeasible to take an output bit stream and compute x, p, and q. It is also computationally infeasible to determine the value of i used to generate a given set of pseudo-random bits. This last feature makes the generator one-way. Different values of i can produce identical bit sequences of a given length (e.g. 32 bits of random bits). Even if x, p and q are known, for a given F[i], i can only be derived as a set of possibilities, not as a certain value (of course if the domain of i is known, then the set of possibilities is reduced further).
However, there are problems in selecting a good p and q, and a good seed x. In particular, Ritter in [68] describes a problem in selecting x. The nature of the problem is that a BBS generator does not create a single cycle of known length. Instead, it creates cycles of various lengths, including degenerate (zero-length) cycles. Thus a BBS generator cannot be initialized with a random statexe2x80x94it might be on a short cycle. Specific algorithms exist in section 9 of [10] to determine the length of the period for a given seed given certain strenuous conditions for n.
3.6.3 Hash Functions
Special one-way functions, known as Hash functions, map arbitrary length messages to fixed-length hash values. Hash functions are referred to as H[M]. Since the input is of arbitrary length, a hash function has a compression component in order to produce a fixed length output. Hash functions also have an obfuscation component in order to make it difficult to find collisions and to determine information about M from H[M].
Because collisions do exist, most applications require that the hash algorithm is preimage resistant, in that for a given X1 it is difficult to find X2 such that H[X1]=H[X2]. In addition, most applications also require the hash algorithm to be collision resistant (i.e. it should be hard to find two messages X1 and X2 such that H[X1]=H[X2]). However, as described in [20], it is an open problem whether a collision-resistant hash function, in the ideal sense, can exist at all.
The primary application for hash functions is in the reduction of an input message into a digital xe2x80x9cfingerprintxe2x80x9d before the application of a digital signature algorithm. One problem of collisions with digital signatures can be seen in the following example.
A has a long message M1 that says xe2x80x9cI owe B $10xe2x80x9d. A signs H[M1] using his private key. B, being greedy, then searches for a collision message M2 where H[M2]=H[M1] but where M2 is favorable to B, for example xe2x80x9cI owe B $1 millionxe2x80x9d. Clearly it is in A""s interest to ensure that it is difficult to find such an M2.
Examples of collision resistant one-way hash functions are SHA-1 [28], MD5 [73] and RIPEMD-160 [66], all derived from MD4 [70][72].
220.127.116.11 MD4
Ron Rivest introduced MD4 [70][72] in 1990. It is only mentioned here because all other one-way hash functions are derived in some way from MD4.
MD4 is now considered completely broken [18][19] in that collisions can be calculated instead of searched for. In the example above, B could trivially generate a substitute message M2 with the same hash value as the original message M1.
184.108.40.206 MD5
Ron Rivest introduced MD5 [73] in 1991 as a more secure MD4. Like MD4, MD5 produces a 128-bit hash value. MD5 is not patented [80].
Dobbertin describes the status of MD5 after recent attacks [20]. He describes how pseudo-collisions have been found in MD5, indicating a weakness in the compression function, and more recently, collisions have been found. This means that MD5 should not be used for compression in digital signature schemes where the existence of collisions may have dire consequences. However MD5 can still be used as a one-way function. In addition, the HMAC-MD5 construct (see Section 184.108.40.206) is not affected by these recent attacks.
188.8.131.52 SHA-1
SHA-1 [28] is very similar to MD5, but has a 160-bit hash value (MD5 only has 128 bits of hash value). SHA-1 was designed and introduced by the NIST and NSA for use in the Digital Signature Standard (DSS). The original published description was called SHA [27], but very soon afterwards, was revised to become SHA-1 [28], supposedly to correct a security flaw in SHA (although the NSA has not released the mathematical reasoning behind the change).
There are no known cryptographic attacks against SHA-1 [78]. It is also more resistant to brute force attacks than MD4 or MD5 simply because of the longer hash result.
The US Government owns the SHA-1 and DSA algorithms (a digital signature authentication algorithm defined as part of DSS [29]) and has at least one relevant patent (U.S. Pat. No. 5,231,688 granted in 1993). However, according to NIST [61]:
xe2x80x9cThe DSA patent and any foreign counterparts that may issue are available for use without any written permission from or any payment of royalties to the U.S. government.xe2x80x9d
In a much stronger declaration, NIST states in the same document [61] that DSA and SHA-1 do not infringe third party""s rights:
xe2x80x9cNIST reviewed all of the asserted patents and concluded that none of them would be infringed by DSS. Extra protection will be written into the PK1 pilot project that will prevent an organization or individual from suing anyone except the government for patent infringement during the course of the project.xe2x80x9d
It must however, be noted that the Schnorr authentication algorithm [81] (U.S. Pat. No. 4,995,082) patent holder claims that DSA infringes his patent. The Schnorr patent is not due to expire until 2008. Fortunately this does not affect SHA-1.
22.214.171.124 RIPEMD-160
RIPEMD-160 [66] is a hash function derived from its predecessor RIPEMD [11] (developed for the European Community""s RIPE project in 1992). As its name suggests, RIPEMD-160 produces a 160-bit hash result. Tuned for software implementations on 32-bit architectures, RIPEMD-160 is intended to provide a high level of security for 10 years or more.
Although there have been no successful attacks on RIPEMD-160, it is comparatively new and has not been extensively cryptanalyzed. The original RIPEMD algorithm [11] was specifically designed to resist known cryptographic attacks on MD4. The recent attacks on MD5 (detailed in [20]) showed similar weaknesses in the RIPEMD 128-bit hash function. Although the attacks showed only theoretical weaknesses, Dobbertin, Preneel and Bosselaers further strengthened RIPEMD into a new algorithm RIPEMD-160.
RIPEMD-160 is in the public domain, and requires no licensing or royalty payments.
3.6.4 Message Authentication Codes
The problem of message authentication can be summed up as follows:
How can A be sure that a message supposedly from B is in fact from B?
Message authentication is different from entity authentication (described in the section on cryptographic challenge-response protocols). With entity authentication, one entity (the claimant) proves its identity to another (the verifier). With message authentication, we are concerned with making sure that a given message is from who we think it is from i.e. it has not been tampered with en route from the source to its destination. While this section has a brief overview of message authentication, a more detailed survey can be found in [86].
A one-way hash function is not sufficient protection for a message. Hash functions such as MD5 rely on generating a hash value that is representative of the original input, and the original input cannot be derived from the hash value. A simple attack by E, who is in-between A and B, is to intercept the message from B, and substitute his own. Even if A also sends a hash of the original message, E can simply substitute the hash of his new message. Using a one-way hash function alone, A has no way of knowing that B""s message has been changed.
One solution to the problem of message authentication is the Message Authentication Code, or MAC.
When B sends message M, it also sends MAC[M] so that the receiver will know that M is actually from B. For this to be possible, only B must be able to produce a MAC of M, and in addition, A should be able to verify M against MAC[M]. Notice that this is different from encryption of Mxe2x80x94MACs are useful when M does not have to be secret.
The simplest method of constructing a MAC from a hash function is to encrypt the hash value with a symmetric algorithm:
1. Hash the input message H[M]
2. Encrypt the hash EK[H[M]]
This is more secure than first encrypting the message and then hashing the encrypted message. Any symmetric or asymmetric cryptographic function can be used, with the appropriate advantages and disadvantage of each type described in Section 3.3 and Section 3.4.
However, there are advantages to using a key-dependent one-way hash function instead of techniques that use encryption (such as that shown above):
Speed, because one-way hash functions in general work much faster than encryption;
Message size, because EK[M] is at least the same size as M, while H[M] is a fixed size (usually considerably smaller than M);
Hardware/software requirementsxe2x80x94keyed one-way hash functions are typically far less complex than their encryption-based counterparts; and
One-way hash function implementations are not considered to be encryption or decryption devices and therefore are not subject to US export controls.
It should be noted that hash functions were never originally designed to contain a key or to support message authentication. As a result, some ad hoc methods of using hash functions to perform message authentication, including various functions that concatenate messages with secret prefixes, suffixes, or both have been proposed [56][78]. Most of these ad hoc methods have been successfully attacked by sophisticated means [42][64][65]. Additional MACs have been suggested based on XOR schemes [8] and Toeplitz matrices [49] (including the special case of LFSR-based (Linear Feed Shift Register) constructions).
126.96.36.199 HMAC
The HMAC construction [6][7] in particular is gaining acceptance as a solution for Internet message authentication security protocols. The HMAC construction acts as a wrapper, using the underlying hash function in a black-box way. Replacement of the hash function is straightforward if desired due to security or performance reasons. However, the major advantage of the HMAC construct is that it can be proven secure provided the underlying hash function has some reasonable cryptographic strengthsxe2x80x94that is, HMAC""s strengths are directly connected to the strength of the hash function [6].
Since the HMAC construct is a wrapper, any iterative hash function can be used in an HMAC. Examples include HMAC-MD5, HMAC-SHA 1, HMAC-RIPEMD160 etc.
Given the following definitions:
H=the hash function (e.g. MD5 or SHA-1)
n=number of bits output from H (e.g. 160 for SHA-1, 128 bits for MD5)
M=the data to which the MAC function is to be applied
K=the secret key shared by the two parties
ipad=0x36 repeated 64 times
opad=0x5C repeated 64 times
The HMAC algorithm is as follows:
1. Extend K to 64 bytes by appending 0x00 bytes to the end of K
2. XOR the 64 byte string created in (1) with ipad
3. append data stream M to the 64 byte string created in (2)
4. Apply H to the stream generated in (3)
5. XOR the 64 byte string created in (1) with opad
6. Append the H result from (4) to the 64 byte string resulting from (5)
7. Apply H to the output of (6) and output the result
Thus:
HMAC[M]=H[(K⊕opad)|H[(K⊕ipad)|M]]
The recommended key length is at least n bits, although it should not be longer than 64 bytes (the length of the hashing block). A key longer than n bits does not add to the security of the function.
HMAC optionally allows truncation of the final output e.g. truncation to 128 bits from 160 bits.
The HMAC designers"" Request for Comments [51] was issued in 1997, one year after the algorithm was first introduced. The designers claimed that the strongest known attack against HMAC is based on the frequency of collisions for the hash function H (see Section 5.5.10), and is totally impractical for minimally reasonable hash functions:
As an example, if we consider a hash function like MD5 where the output length is 128 bits, the attacker needs to acquire the correct message authentication tags computed (with the same secret key K) on about 264 known plaintexis. This would require the processing of at least 264 blocks under H, an impossible task in any realistic scenario (for a block length of 64 bytes this would take 250, 000 years in a continuous 1 Gbps link, and without changing the secret key K all this time). This attack could become realistic only if serious flaws in the collision behavior of the function Hare discovered (e.g. Collisions found after 230 messages). Such a discovery would determine the immediate replacement of function H (the effects of such a failure would be far more severe for the traditional uses of H in the context of digital signatures, public key certificates etc).
Of course, if a 160-bit hash function is used, then 264 should be replaced with 280.
This should be contrasted with a regular collision attack on cryptographic hash functions where no secret key is involved and 264 off-line parallelizable operations suffice to find collisions.
More recently, HMAC protocols with replay prevention components [62] have been defined in order to prevent the capture and replay of any M, HMAC[M] combination within a given time period.
Finally, it should be noted that HMAC is in the public domain [50], and incurs no licensing fees. There are no known patents infringed by HMAC.
3.7 Random Numbers and Time Varying Messages
The use of a random number generator as a one-way function has already been examined. However, random number generator theory is very much intertwined with cryptography, security, and authentication.
There are a large number of issues concerned with defining good random number generators. Knuth, in [48] describes what makes a generator good (including statistical tests), and the general problems associated with constructing them. Moreau gives a high level survey of the current state of the field in [60].
One of the uses for random numbers is to ensure that messages vary over time. Consider a system where A encrypts commands and sends them to B. If the encryption algorithm produces the same output for a given input, an attacker could simply record the messages and play them back to fool B. There is no need for the attacker to crack the encryption mechanism other than to know which message to play to B (while pretending to be A). Consequently messages often include a random number and a time stamp to ensure that the message (and hence its encrypted counterpart) varies each time.
Random number generators are also often used to generate keys. Although Klapper has recently shown [45] that a family of secure feedback registers for the purposes of building key-streams does exist, he does not give any practical construction. It is therefore best to say at the moment that all generators are insecure for this purpose. For example, the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm [54], is a classic attack on an LFSR random number generator. If the LFSR is of length n, then only 2n bits of the sequence suffice to determine the LFSR, compromising the key generator.
If, however, the only role of the random number generator is to make sure that messages vary over time, the security of the generator and seed is not as important as it is for session key generation. If however, the random number seed generator is compromised, and an attacker is able to calculate future xe2x80x9crandomxe2x80x9d numbers, it can leave some protocols open to attack. Any new protocol should be examined with respect to this situation.
The actual type of random number generator required will depend upon the implementation and the purposes for which the generator is used. Generators include Blum, Blum, and Shub [10], stream ciphers such as RC4 by Ron Rivest [71], hash functions such as SHA-1 [28] and RIPEMD-160 [66], and traditional generators such LFSRs (Linear Feedback Shift Registers) [48] and their more recent counterpart FCSRs (Feedback with Carry Shift Registers) [44].
3.8 Attacks
This section describes the various types of attacks that can be undertaken to break an authentication cryptosystem. The attacks are grouped into physical and logical attacks.
Logical attacks work on the protocols or algorithms rather than their physical implementation, and attempt to do one of three things:
Bypass the authentication process altogether
Obtain the secret key by force or deduction, so that any question can be answered
Find enough about the nature of the authenticating questions and answers in order to, without the key, give the right answer to each question.
The attack styles and the forms they take are detailed below.
Regardless of the algorithms and protocol used by a security chip, the circuitry of the authentication part of the chip can come under physical attack. Physical attacks come in four main ways, although the form of the attack can vary:
Bypassing the security chip altogether
Physical examination of the chip while in operation (destructive and non-destructive)
Physical decomposition of chip
Physical alteration of chip
The attack styles and the forms they take are detailed below.
This section does not suggest solutions to these attacks. It merely describes each attack type. The examination is restricted to the context of an authentication chip (as opposed to some other kind of system, such as Internet authentication) attached to some System.
3.8.1 Logical Attacks
These attacks are those which do not depend on the physical implementation of the cryptosystem. They work against the protocols and the security of the algorithms and random number generators.
188.8.131.52 Ciphertext Only Attack
This is where an attacker has one or more encrypted messages, all encrypted using the same algorithm. The aim of the attacker is to obtain the plaintext messages from the encrypted messages. Ideally, the key can be recovered so that all messages in the future can also be recovered.
188.8.131.52 Known Plaintext Attack
This is where an attacker has both the plaintext and the encrypted form of the plaintext. In the case of an authentication chip, a known-plaintext attack is one where the attacker can see the data flow between the system and the authentication chip. The inputs and outputs are observed (not chosen by the attacker), and can be analyzed for weaknesses (such as birthday attacks or by a search for differentially interesting input/output pairs).
A known plaintext attack can be carried out by connecting a logic analyzer to the connection between the system and the authentication chip.
22.214.171.124 Chosen Plaintext Attacks
A chosen plaintext attack describes one where a cryptanalyst has the ability to send any chosen message to the cryptosystem, and observe the response. If the cryptanalyst knows the algorithm, there may be a relationship between inputs and outputs that can be exploited by feeding a specific output to the input of another function.
The chosen plaintext attack is much stronger than the known plaintext attack since the attacker can choose the messages rather than simply observe the data flow.
On a system using an embedded authentication chip, it is generally very difficult to prevent chosen plaintext attacks since the cryptanalyst can logically pretend he/she is the system, and thus send any chosen bit-pattern streams to the authentication chip.
18.104.22.168 Adaptive Chosen Plaintext Attacks
This type of attack is similar to the chosen plaintext attacks except that the attacker has the added ability to modify subsequent chosen plaintexts based upon the results of previous experiments. This is certainly the case with any system / authentication chip scenario described for consumables such as photocopiers and toner cartridges, especially since both systems and consumables are made available to the public.
220.127.116.11 Brute Force Attack
A guaranteed way to break any key-based cryptosystem algorithm is simply to try every key. Eventually the right one will be found. This is known as a brute force attack. However, the more key possibilities there are, the more keys must be tried, and hence the longer it takes (on average) to find the right one. If there are N keys, it will take a maximum of N tries. If the key is N bits long, it will take a maximum of 2N tries, with a 50% chance of finding the key after only half the attempts (2Nxe2x88x921). The longer N becomes, the longer it will take to find the key, and hence the more secure the key is. Of course, an attack may guess the key on the first try, but this is more unlikely the longer the key is.
Consider a key length of 56 bits. In the worst case, all 256 tests (7.2xc3x971016 tests) must be made to find the key. In 1977, Diffie and Hellman described a specialized machine for cracking DES, consisting of one million processors, each capable of running one million tests per second [17]. Such a machine would take 20 hours to break any DES code.
Consider a key length of 128 bits. In the worst case, all 2128 tests (3.4xc3x971038 tests) must be made to find the key. This would take ten billion years on an array of a trillion processors each running 1 billion tests per second.
With a long enough key length, a brute force attack takes too long to be worth the attacker""s efforts.
18.104.22.168 Guessing Attack
This type of attack is where an attacker attempts to simply xe2x80x9cguessxe2x80x9d the key. As an attack it is identical to the brute force attack (see Section 184.108.40.206) where the odds of success depend on the length of the key.
22.214.171.124 Quantum Computer Attack
To break an n-bit key, a quantum computer [83] (NMR, Optical, or Caged Atom) containing n qubits embedded in an appropriate algorithm must be built. The quantum computer effectively exists in 2n simultaneous coherent states. The trick is to extract the right coherent state without causing any decoherence. To date this has been achieved with a 2 qubit system (which exists in 4 coherent states). It is thought possible to extend this to 6 qubits (with 64 simultaneous coherent states) within a few years.
Unfortunately, every additional qubit halves the relative strength of the signal representing the key. This rapidly becomes a serious impediment to key retrieval, especially with the long keys used in cryptographically secure systems.
As a result, attacks on a cryptographically secure key (e.g. 160 bits) using a Quantum Computer are likely not to be feasible and it is extremely unlikely that quantum computers will have achieved more than 50 or so qubits within the commercial lifetime of the authentication chips. Even using a 50 qubit quantum computer, 2110 tests are required to crack a 160 bit key.
22.214.171.124 Purposeful Error Attack
With certain algorithms, attackers can gather valuable information from the results of a bad input. This can range from the error message text to the time taken for the error to be generated.
A simple example is that of a userid/password scheme. If the error message usually says xe2x80x9cBad useridxe2x80x9d, then when an attacker gets a message saying xe2x80x9cBad passwordxe2x80x9d instead, then they know that the userid is correct. If the message always says xe2x80x9cBad userid/passwordxe2x80x9d then much less information is given to the attacker. A more complex example is that of the recent published method of cracking encryption codes from secure web sites [41]. The attack involves sending particular messages to a server and observing the error message responses. The responses give enough information to learn the keysxe2x80x94even the lack of a response gives some information.
An example of algorithmic time can be seen with an algorithm that returns an error as soon as an erroneous bit is detected in the input message. Depending on hardware implementation, it may be a simple method for the attacker to time the response and alter each bit one by one depending on the time taken for the error response, and thus obtain the key. Certainly in a chip implementation the time taken can be observed with far greater accuracy than over the Internet.
22.214.171.124 Birthday Attack
This attack is named after the famous xe2x80x9cbirthday paradoxxe2x80x9d (which is not actually a paradox at all). The odds of one person sharing a birthday with another, is 1 in 365 (not counting leap years). Therefore there must be 183 people in a room for the odds to be more than 50% that one of them shares your birthday. However, there only needs to be 23 people in a room for there to be more than a 50% chance that any two share a birthday, as shown in the following relation:
Prob=1xe2x88x92nPr/nr=1xe2x88x92365P23/36523≈0.507
Birthday attacks are common attacks against hashing algorithms, especially those algorithms that combine hashing with digital signatures.
If a message has been generated and already signed, an attacker must search for a collision message that hashes to the same value (analogous to finding one person who shares your birthday). However, if the attacker can generate the message, the birthday attack comes into play. The attacker searches for two messages that share the same hash value (analogous to any two people sharing a birthday), only one message is acceptable to the person signing it, and the other is beneficial for the attacker. Once the person has signed the original message the attacker simply claims now that the person signed the alternative messagexe2x80x94mathematically there is no way to tell which message was the original, since they both hash to the same value.
Assuming a brute force attack is the only way to determine a match, the weakening of an n-bit key by the birthday attack is 2n/2. A key length of 128 bits that is susceptible to the birthday attack has an effective length of only 64 bits.
18.104.22.168 Chaining Attack
These are attacks made against the chaining nature of hash functions. They focus on the compression function of a hash function. The idea is based on the fact that a hash function generally takes arbitrary length input and produces a constant length output by processing the input n bits at a time. The output from one block is used as the chaining variable set into the next block. Rather than finding a collision against an entire input, the idea is that given an input chaining variable set, to find a substitute block that will result in the same output chaining variables as the proper message.
The number of choices for a particular block is based on the length of the block. If the chaining variable is c bits, the hashing function behaves like a random mapping, and the block length is b bits, the number of such b-bit blocks is approximately 2b/2c. The challenge for finding a substitution block is that such blocks are a sparse subset of all possible blocks.
For SHA-1, the number of 512 bit blocks is approximately 2512/2160, or 2352. The chance of finding a block by brute force search is about 1 in 2160.
188.8.131.52 Substitution with a Complete Lookup Table
If the number of potential messages sent to the chip is small, then there is no need for a clone manufacturer to crack the key. Instead, the clone manufacturer could incorporate a ROM in their chip that had a record of all of the responses from a genuine chip to the codes sent by the system. The larger the key, and the larger the response, the more space is required for such a lookup table.
220.127.116.11 Substitution with a Sparse Lookup Table
If the messages sent to the chip are somehow predictable, rather than effectively random, then the clone manufacturer need not provide a complete lookup table. For example:
If the message is simply a serial number, the clone manufacturer need simply provide a lookup table that contains values for past and predicted future serial numbers. There are unlikely to be more than 109 of these.
If the test code is simply the date, then the clone manufacturer can produce a lookup table using the date as the address.
If the test code is a pseudo-random number using either the serial number or the date as a seed, then the clone manufacturer just needs to crack the pseudo-random number generator in the system. This is probably not difficult, as they have access to the object code of the system. The clone manufacturer would then produce a content addressable memory (or other sparse array lookup) using these codes to access stored authentication codes.
184.108.40.206 Differential Cryptanalysis
Differential cryptanalysis describes an attack where pairs of input streams are generated with known differences, and the differences in the encoded streams are analyzed.
Existing differential attacks are heavily dependent on the structure of S boxes, as used in DES and other similar algorithms. Although other algorithms such as HMAC-SHA1 have no S boxes, an attacker can undertake a differential-like attack by undertaking statistical analysis of:
Minimal-difference inputs, and their corresponding outputs
Minimal-difference outputs, and their corresponding inputs
Most algorithms were strengthened against differential cryptanalysis once the process was described. This is covered in the specific sections devoted to each cryptographic algorithm. However some recent algorithms developed in secret have been broken because the developers had not considered certain styles of differential attacks [91] and did not subject their algorithms to public scrutiny.
18.104.22.168 Message Substitution Attacks
In certain protocols, a man-in-the-middle can substitute part or all of a message. This is where a real authentication chip is plugged into a reusable clone chip within the consumable. The clone chip intercepts all messages between the system and the authentication chip, and can perform a number of substitution attacks.
Consider a message containing a header followed by content. An attacker may not be able to generate a valid header, but may be able to substitute their own content, especially if the valid response is something along the lines of xe2x80x9cYes, I received your messagexe2x80x9d. Even if the return message is xe2x80x9cYes, I received the following message . . . xe2x80x9d, the attacker may be able to substitute the original message before sending the acknowledgment back to the original sender.
Message Authentication Codes were developed to combat message substitution attacks.
22.214.171.124 Reverse Engineering the Key Generator
If a pseudo-random number generator is used to generate keys, there is the potential for a clone manufacture to obtain the generator program or to deduce the random seed used. This was the way in which the security layer of the Netscape browser program was initially broken [33].
18.104.22.168 Bypassing the Authentication Process
It may be that there are problems in the authentication protocols that can allow a bypass of the authentication process altogether. With these kinds of attacks the key is completely irrelevant, and the attacker has no need to recover it or deduce it.
Consider an example of a system that authenticates at power-up, but does not authenticate at any other time. A reusable consumable with a clone authentication chip may make use of a real authentication chip. The clone authentication chip uses the real chip for the authentication call, and then simulates the real authentication chip""s state data after that.
Another example of bypassing authentication is if the system authenticates only after the consumable has been used. A clone authentication chip can accomplish a simple authentication bypass by simulating a loss of connection after the use of the consumable but before the authentication protocol has completed (or even started).
One infamous attack known as the xe2x80x9cKentucky Fried Chipxe2x80x9d hack [2] involved replacing a microcontroller chip for a satellite TV system. When a subscriber stopped paying the subscription fee, the system would send out a xe2x80x9cdisablexe2x80x9d message. However the new micro-controller would simply detect this message and not pass it on to the consumer""s satellite TV system.
220.127.116.11 Garrote/Bribe Attack
If people know the key, there is the possibility that they could tell someone else. The telling may be due to coercion (bribe, garrote etc.), revenge (e.g. a disgruntled employee), or simply for principle. These attacks are usually cheaper and easier than other efforts at deducing the key. As an example, a number of people claiming to be involved with the development of the Divx standard have recently (May/June 1998) been making noises on a variety of DVD newsgroups to the effect they would like to help develop Divx specific cracking devicesxe2x80x94out of principle.
3.8.2 Physical Attacks
The following attacks assume implementation of an authentication mechanism in a silicon chip that the attacker has physical access to. The first attack, Reading ROM, describes an attack when keys are stored in ROM, while the remaining attacks assume that a secret key is stored in Flash memory.
22.214.171.124 Reading ROM
If a key is stored in ROM it can be read directly. A ROM can thus be safely used to hold a public key (for use in asymmetric cryptography), but not to hold a private key. In symmetric cryptography, a ROM is completely insecure. Using a copyright text (such as a haiku) as the key is not sufficient, because we are assuming that the cloning of the chip is occurring in a country where intellectual property is not respected.
22.214.171.124 Reverse Engineering of Chip
Reverse engineering of the chip is where an attacker opens the chip and analyzes the circuitry. Once the circuitry has been analyzed the inner workings of the chip""s algorithm can be recovered.
Lucent Technologies have developed an active method [4] known as TOBIC (Two photon OBIC, where OBIC stands for Optical Beam Induced Current), to image circuits. Developed primarily for static RAM analysis, the process involves removing any back materials, polishing the back surface to a mirror finish, and then focusing light on the surface. The excitation wavelength is specifically chosen not to induce a current in the IC.
A Kerckhoffs in the nineteenth century made a fundamental assumption about cryptanalysis: if the algorithm""s inner workings are the sole secret of the scheme, the scheme is as good as broken [39]. He stipulated that the secrecy must reside entirely in the key. As a result, the best way to protect against reverse engineering of the chip is to make the inner workings irrelevant.
220.127.116.11 Usurping the Authentication Process
It must be assumed that any clone manufacturer has access to both the system and consumable designs.
If the same channel is used for communication between the system and a trusted system authentication chip, and a non-trusted consumable authentication chip, it may be possible for the non-trusted chip to interrogate a trusted authentication chip in order to obtain the xe2x80x9ccorrect answerxe2x80x9d. If this is so, a clone manufacturer would not have to determine the key. They would only have to trick the system into using the responses from the system authentication chip.
The alternative method of usurping the authentication process follows the same method as the logical attack described in Section 22.214.171.124, involving simulated loss of contact with the system whenever authentication processes take place, simulating power-down etc.
184.108.40.206 Modification of System
This kind of attack is where the system itself is modified to accept clone consumables. The attack may be a change of system ROM, a rewiring of the consumable, or, taken to the extreme case, a completely clone system.
Note that this kind of attack requires each individual system to be modified, and would most likely require the owner""s consent. There would usually have to be a clear advantage for the consumer to undertake such a modification, since it would typically void warranty and would most likely be costly. An example of such a modification with a clear advantage to the consumer is a software patch to change fixed-region DVD players into region-free DVD players (although it should be noted that this is not to use clone consumables, but rather originals from the same companies simply targeted for sale in other countries).
188.8.131.52 Direct Viewing of Chip Operation by Conventional Probing
If chip operation could be directly viewed using an STM (Scanning Tunnelling Microscope) or an electron beam, the keys could be recorded as they are read from the internal non-volatile memory and loaded into work registers.
These forms of conventional probing require direct access to the top or front sides of the IC while it is powered.
184.108.40.206 Direct Viewing of the Non-volatile Memory
If the chip were sliced so that the floating gates of the Flash memory were exposed, without discharging them, then the key could probably be viewed directly using an STM or SKM (Scanning Kelvin Microscope).
However, slicing the chip to this level without discharging the gates is probably impossible. Using wet etching, plasma etching, ion milling (focused ion beam etching), or chemical mechanical polishing will almost certainly discharge the small charges present on the floating gates.
126.96.36.199 Viewing the Light Bursts Caused by State Changes
Whenever a gate changes state, a small amount of infrared energy is emitted. Since silicon is transparent to infrared, these changes can be observed by looking at the circuitry from the underside of a chip. While the emission process is weak, it is bright enough to be detected by highly sensitive equipment developed for use in astronomy. The technique [89], developed by IBM, is called PICA (Picosecond Imaging Circuit Analyzer). If the state of a register is known at time t, then watching that register change over time will reveal the exact value at time t+n, and if the data is part of the key, then that part is compromised.
184.108.40.206 Viewing the Keys Using an SEPM
A non-invasive testing device, known as a Scanning Electric Potential Microscope (SEPM), allows the direct viewing of charges within a chip [37]. The SEPM has a tungsten probe that is placed a few micrometers above the chip, with the probe and circuit forming a capacitor. Any AC signal flowing beneath the probe causes displacement current to flow through this capacitor. Since the value of the current change depends on the amplitude and phase of the AC signal, the signal can be imaged. If the signal is part of the key, then that part is compromised.
188.8.131.52 Monitoring EMI
Whenever electronic circuitry operates, faint electromagnetic signals are given off. Relatively inexpensive equipment can monitor these signals and could give enough information to allow an attacker to deduce the keys.
220.127.116.11 Viewing Idd Fluctuations
Even if keys cannot be viewed, there is a fluctuation in current whenever registers change state. If there is a high enough signal to noise ratio, an attacker can monitor the difference in Idd that may occur when programming over either a high or a low bit. The change in Idd can reveal information about the key. Attacks such as these have already been used to break smart cards [46].
22.214.171.124 Differential Fault Analysis
This attack assumes introduction of a bit error by ionization, microwave radiation, or environmental stress. In most cases such an error is more likely to adversely affect the chip (e.g. cause the program code to crash) rather than cause beneficial changes which would reveal the key. Targeted faults such as ROM overwrite, gate destruction etc. are far more likely to produce useful results.
22.214.171.124 Clock Glitch Attacks
Chips are typically designed to properly operate within a certain clock speed range. Some attackers attempt to introduce faults in logic by running the chip at extremely high clock speeds or introduce a clock glitch at a particular time for a particular duration [1]. The idea is to create race conditions where the circuitry does not function properly. An example could be an AND gate that (because of race conditions) gates through Input 1 all the time instead of the AND of Input1 and Input2.
If an attacker knows the internal structure of the chip, they can attempt to introduce race conditions at the correct moment in the algorithm execution, thereby revealing information about the key (or in the worst case, the key itself).
184.108.40.206 Power Supply Attacks
Instead of creating a glitch in the clock signal, attackers can also produce glitches in the power supply where the power is increased or decreased to be outside the working operating voltage range. The net effect is the same as a clock glitchxe2x80x94introduction of error in the execution of a particular instruction. The idea is to stop the CPU from XORing the key, or from shifting the data one bit-position etc. Specific instructions are targeted so that information about the key is revealed.
188.8.131.52 Overwriting ROM
Single bits in a ROM can be overwritten using a laser cutter microscope [1], to either 1 or 0 depending on the sense of the logic. If the ROM contains instructions, it may be a simple matter for an attacker to change a conditional jump to a non-conditional jump, or perhaps change the destination of a register transfer. If the target instruction is chosen carefully, it may result in the key being revealed.
220.127.116.11 Modifying EEPROM/Flash
These attacks fall into two categories:
those similar to the ROM attacks except that the laser cutter microscope technique can be used to both set and reset individual bits. This gives much greater scope in terms of modification of algorithms.
Electron beam programming of floating gates. As described in [87] and [32], a focused electron beam can change a gate by depositing electrons onto it. Damage to the rest of the circuit can be avoided, as described in [3 1]. This attack is potentially able to work against multi-level flash memory.
22.214.171.124 Gate Destruction
Anderson and Kuhn described the rump session of the 1997 workshop on Fast Software Encryption [1], where Biham and Shamir presented an attack on DES. The attack was to use a laser cutter to destroy an individual gate in the hardware implementation of a known block cipher (DES). The net effect of the attack was to force a particular bit of a register to be xe2x80x9cstuckxe2x80x9d. Biham and Shamir described the effect of forcing a particular register to be affected in this wayxe2x80x94the least significant bit of the output from the round function is set to 0. Comparing the 6 least significant bits of the left half and the right half can recover several bits of the key. Damaging a number of chips in this way can reveal enough information about the key to make complete key recovery easy.
An encryption chip modified in this way will have the property that encryption and decryption will no longer be inverses.
126.96.36.199 Overwrite Attacks
Instead of trying to read the Flash memory, an attacker may simply set a single bit by use of a laser cutter microscope. Although the attacker doesn""t know the previous value, they know the new value. If the chip still works, the bit""s original state must be the same as the new state. If the chip doesn""t work any longer, the bit""s original state must be the logical NOT of the current state. An attacker can perform this attack on each bit of the key and obtain the n-bit key using at most n chips (if the new bit matched the old bit, a new chip is not required for determining the next bit).
18.104.22.168 Test Circuitry Attack
Most chips contain test circuitry specifically designed to check for manufacturing defects. This includes BIST (Built In Self Test) and scan paths. Quite often the scan paths and test circuitry includes access and readout mechanisms for all the embedded latches. In some cases the test circuitry could potentially be used to give information about the contents of particular registers.
Test circuitry is often disabled once the chip has passed all manufacturing tests, in some cases by blowing a specific connection within the chip. A determined attacker, however, can reconnect the test circuitry and hence enable it.
126.96.36.199 Memory Remanence
Values remain in RAM long after the power has been removed [35], although they do not remain long enough to be considered non-volatile. An attacker can remove power once sensitive information has been moved into RAM (for example working registers), and then attempt to read the value from RAM. This attack is most useful against security systems that have regular RAM chips. A classic example is cited by [1], where a security system was designed with an automatic power-shut-off that is triggered when the computer case is opened. The attacker was able to simply open the case, remove the RAM chips, and retrieve the key because the values persisted.
184.108.40.206 Chip Theft Attack
If there are a number of stages in the lifetime of an authentication chip, each of these stages must be examined in terms of ramifications for security should chips be stolen. For example, if information is programmed into the chip in stages, theft of a chip between stages may allow an attacker to have access to key information or reduced efforts for attack. Similarly, if a chip is stolen directly after manufacture but before programming, does it give an attacker any logical or physical advantage?
184.108.40.206 Trojan Horse Attack
At some stage the authentication chips must be programmed with a secret key. Suppose an attacker builds a clone authentication chip and adds it to the pile of chips to be programmed. The attacker has especially built the clone chip so that it looks and behaves just like a real authentication chip, but will give the key out to the attacker when a special attacker-known command is issued to the chip. Of course the attacker must have access to the chip after the programming has taken place, as well as physical access to add the Trojan horse authentication chip to the genuine chips.
The invention is in an authentication chip having secret information stored within it, including secret data and non sensitive data stored in multi-level flash memory, the multi-level flash memory having invalid and valid (intermediate) voltage stages, a method of protecting the authentication chip from unauthorised modification of values stored in the flash memory, the method including the steps of:
using an internal command to store the secret information, including the secret data and a checksum for the data, where the secret information can only be accessed by one or more further commands;
storing the secret data in intermediate states of the multi-level flash memory between the minimum and maximum voltage level states;
performing a data validity check on non-sensitive data only by detecting invalid states in the multi-level memory;
performing a data validity check on secret data items before allowing the data items to be read out by a command accessing them, the validity check involving calculation of a checksum and comparison of the result with the checksum stored using the internal command.
In the event of the comparison indicating invalidity of the secret data, then clearing the secret information.
The internal command may be the only command that is able to store non-zero values for the secret information, and to set flags for use by the further commands, it may make no other changes and have no outputs.
The secret data may include one or more keys for encryption and decryption functions, and a seed value for a random number. These may have 160 bits each.
A CLR command may be the only command able to clear the secret information to zero values.
The multi-level flash memory may be a single floating gate holding more that one bit. For example a four-state transistor having a minimum voltage representing 00, a maximum voltage representing 11 and two middle voltages representing 01 and 10. The two middle voltages may be used to represent a single bit and the two extremes may be invalid states. In this case an attack that changes the voltage such that the value of a bit changes from one valid state to another will cause the checksum to fail.
The flash memory may be covered by tamper prevention lines, tamper detection lines, or both.
The checksum may be a signature calculated from the secret data. For instance where the secret data includes two keys for encryption or decryption functions the checksum may be calculated as a signature combining them both. The checksum may have the same length as one of the keys, or the length of both combined. The checksum may be calculated by running the SHA-1 algorithm over the two keys.
In another aspect the invention is an authentication system including a chip having secret information stored within it using an internal command, the secret information including secret data stored in multi-level flash memory, and a checksum for the data, the multi-level flash memory also storing non-sensitive data where the secret information can only be accessed by one or more further commands, the secret data is stored in intermediate (valid) states of the multi-level flash memory between the minimum and maximum voltage level states which are invalid states, and a data validity check is performed on secret data items before allowing the data items to be read out by a command accessing them, the validity check involving calculation of a checksum and comparison of the result with the checksum stored using the internal command and wherein data validity checks are performed on non-sensitive information to detect invalid states in the multi-level flash memory.

Unauthorized modification of values in flash memory


A system and method for matching one or more source schemas with one or more target schemas is provided. The matching between source and target schemas is performed by gathering inputs pertaining to the source and target schemas, wherein the inputs comprises a set of details in a predefined format. Thereafter, the gathered inputs are processed by comparing the source schemas with the target schemas. The processing is performed to identify a set of matches between the source and target schemas based on the linguistic similarity, structural similarity and functional similarity and relationship between the source and target schemas. Subsequently, the identified matches are stored.

Database application domains such as, but not limited to, data integration, E-business, data warehousing and semantic query processing involve schema matching. Schema matching is performed to identify similarity between schemas in source and target databases. The matches are typically of two types i.e. simple and complex schema matches, wherein the simple matches represent a 1:1 mapping between schema elements of the source and target schemas and the complex matches represent a 1:N, M:1 or M:N mapping between the corresponding schema elements.
Schema matching is generally performed manually, wherein a user such as a Subject Matter Expert (SME) identifies the similarity between schemas through a Graphical User Interface (GUI). Schema matching is also performed by automating steps of schema matching. Automation includes collection of exhaustive explicit information such as, but not limited to, domain knowledge and constraint rules. The collected information is used to narrow down the search for matches between schemas. The collected information is then used to identify complex schema matches. Schema matching also includes instance data comparison based on predefined inference rules. Instance data comparison is effective in identification of simple schema matches. In addition, contextual information is used for schema matching, wherein a set of logical conditions are used to identify complex schema matches.
With recurrent growth in database application domains considerable increase in size and complexity of schemas has been observed. The increase in size and complexity makes manual identification error prone, effort intensive and time consuming. Further, there is lack of exhaustive explicit information in case of heterogeneous and distributed systems such as, but not limited to, e-commerce systems, Business-to-Business (B2B) exchanges and online cataloguing systems, which limits application of schema matching via automation. Furthermore, instance data comparison based on predefined inference rules becomes ineffective in identifying complex schema matches. Although, complex schema matches can be identified using contextual information and instance data, the number of matches identified is limited due to the set of logical conditions and the predefined inference rules, thereby limiting the scope of schema matching.
Consequently, there is need for a system and a method for efficiently matching source and target schemas. Also, the method should enable the identification of complex schema matches without manual intervention.


The invention provides a catheter set for plexus anesthesia wherein the catheter can be displaced under electric stimulation and the position of the catheter can be checked also afterwards. The catheter set is provided with a puncture cannula, a capillary plugged onto said puncture cannula, and a catheter which can be inserted through said capillary and has an open patient-side end. Into the catheter, a guide wire can be inserted, being provided with an electric contact means at its end distant from the patient and having its patient-side end exposed. The position of the guide wire and the catheter end, respectively, in the fascia can be checked by electric pulses. When the catheter remains set for a longer time period, subsequent insertion of the guide wire makes it possible to monitor and, if need be, correct the position of the catheter at all times.

1. Field of the Invention
The invention is directed to a catheter set for plexus anesthesia.
2. Description of Related Art
In a catheter set as known from German Utility Model 82 22 222, a plastic capillary is plugged onto a puncture cannula having its front end provided with a suitable bevel. After puncture of the nerve vessel, the puncture cannula is drawn out of the capillary, and a catheter is inserted into the capillary, through which catheter an anesthetic can be administered to the patient.
Disadvantageously, the known plexus catheter requires much experience and skill and makes it very difficult to locate the nerve undergoing treatment. Besides, the capillary and/or the catheter may kink, which hinders advance of the catheter.
There is also known a catheter set for plexus anesthesia wherein there is used a mandrel coated with plastic material in order to increase stiffness when setting the catheter. This stiffness of the mandrel, in particular, can cause injuries to fine nerve branches. Moreover, precise control of the catheter position is not possible using this catheter set.
It is an object of the present invention to provide a catheter set wherein the catheter can be introduced under electric stimulation and the catheter position can also be checked afterwards.


A camshaft assembly is disclosed which comprises an inner shaft (12), an outer tube (14) surrounding and rotatable relative to the inner shaft (12), and two groups of cam lobes mounted on the outer tube, the first group of cam lobes being fast in rotation with the outer tube, and each cam (10) lobe (18) of the second group being rotatably mounted on the outer surface of the tube (14) and connected for rotation with the inner shaft (12) by means of one or more drive members (50) passing through circumferentially elongated slots in the outer tube. In the invention, each drive member comprises a (15) drive component (50d) engaged with fixed alignment in the cam lobe (18) and a separate fastener (50b) that is rotatable to clamp the drive component against a flat surface on the inner shaft (12), each drive member (50) being constructed such that during the tightening of the fastener (50b) no relative (20) sliding movement is required at the interface between the drive component (50d) and the inner shaft (12).

The Applicants' earlier PCT patent application WO2006/097767, describes an SCP camshaft in which the positions of the drive members are adjustable in order to compensate for significant manufacturing inaccuracies between the inner shaft and its associated group of cam lobes. FIGS. 1A to 1E in the accompanying drawings correspond to FIGS. 2A to 2E respectively of the latter publication, which is incorporated herein by reference. In these drawings:
FIG. 1A is a side view of an SCP camshaft,
FIG. 1B is a section along the line I-I in FIG. 1A,
FIG. 1C is a section along the line II-II in FIG. 1A,
FIG. 1D is a partially exploded perspective view of the camshaft of Figure A, and
FIG. 1E is a partially cut-away perspective view of the camshaft of FIG. 1A.
The SCP camshaft 10 is made up of an inner shaft 12 and an outer tube 14, the latter being supported in bearings 20. A first group of cams 16 is secured, for example by heat shrinking, for rotation with the outer tube 14 and a second group of cams 18 is secured for rotation with the inner shaft 12 by drive members 50 having the form of compound fastener each consisting of a nut 50a and a bolt 50b.
The shank of the bolt 50b passes with clearance through a hole in the drive shaft 12, and the head of the bolt and the nut act as drive members and are a tight clearance or an interference fit in the cam lobe 18.
In order to transmit torque between the cam lobe 18 and the inner drive shaft 12, the bolt and the nut are clamped against flat surfaces 12a, 12b on opposite sides of the drive shaft 12. The timing of each cam lobe 18 is therefore dictated by the position of the flat surfaces on the drive shaft 12 and the angle of the connecting pin bore in the cam lobe 18. The arrangement is shown clearly in FIGS. 1C and 1E.
An important aspect of this design is that once the two parts 50a, 50b of the fastener have been clamped on to the drive shaft 12, there must be no movement of the parts when the camshaft is in operation, as this will result in the camshaft becoming tight to turn. It is clearly an advantage therefore to maximise the coefficient of friction between the flat surfaces 12a and 12b of the drive shaft 12 and the parts of the fastener serving as a drive member, as this will increase the torque that can be applied to the cam lobe before any relative movement will take place.


Provided is a touch control system of an electronic product in underwater environment. The touch control system includes a sealing device which is configured to accommodate the electronic product. The sealing device includes a sealed chamber interlayer and a sealed shell. Herein the sealed chamber interlayer is opposite to the touch screen of the electronic product and is capable of being pressed and rebounded and is transparent, and the sealed shell is connected with the sealed chamber interlayer in a sealing manner. The sealed chamber interlayer covers a surface of the touch screen completely. The sealed shell covers other surfaces of the electronic product, and implements touch control to the touch screen by applying an external force to the sealed chamber interlayer. Underwater high-accuracy maneuverability of the touch screen of the electronic product may be implemented when an external force is applied to the sealed chamber interlayer by a finger.

Electronic products have entered into all fields and all places of people's lives, including underwater environment. For example, when diving and swimming, people also hope to keep communication with the outside world. However, in terms of selection of a touch control screen in the field of the electronic products, a capacitive touch screen is most commonly used at present, and an operating principle is as follows: when a conductive object (such as a finger of a human body) is close to a surface of a touch screen within a certain distance, a local coupling capacitance may be formed between the finger and the touch screen, thereby changing a charge distribution amount of a corresponding location in the touch screen. In this way, the location that the finger touches may be perceived, and accordingly an instruction may be formed. Water in nature is a conductive material. Therefore, when the surface of the touch screen has a certain amount of water drops and even is completely covered with the water, operation of the finger to the touch screen may be influenced and even trapped in failure completely.
Thus, how to prevent the touch screen from influence (such as in the rain, under the water and other environments) has become a practical need. Taking operations and underwater waterproofing of the touch screen of a smart cell phone for instance, the related art includes the following ways.
The way of a waterproof shell: (1) an overall rigid waterproof shell has good sealing reliability and pressure resistance, however the touch screen may not be operated. (2) A local soft waterproof shell has the soft waterproof shell on an opposite side of the touch screen, with common tightness. Depending on tension of a material of a soft side, the soft waterproof shell resists a pressure of water, therefore the pressure resistance is poor, and it is applicable to a water depth less than 5 m generally. The soft waterproof shell has extremely poor touch effect and may not implement normal touch operation fully. (3) An inflatable and local soft waterproof shell may be applicable to the water depth of 10-30 m generally. However, the touch screen has the extremely poor operability because a soft part may swell as a result of a great positive pressure formed in the shell due to air inflation in advance before placed in water. Furthermore, along the change of the water depth, air in the shell may be compressed and degree of swelling may be changed. In this way, hand feel when operating the touch screen will be changed greatly, and an error operation may occur easily. The soft side may have short service life due to easy deformation, and accordingly a device may have poor pressure resistance.
The way of a waterproof bag: although certain operation of the touch screen may be implemented, the waterproof bag has extremely poor operability, poor sealing reliability and short service life, is applicable to shallow water depth, and would basically not resist the pressure.
Without any other waterproof devices, waterproofing of the smart cell phone and underwater operation of the bare touch screen have high requirements to development difficulty, cycle and cost of the technology itself. Moreover, the applicable water depth and reliability of this kind of latest products on the market at present should be verified and subjected to tests of the market.

Touch control system of electronic product in underwater environment

Divevolk (Zhuhai) Intelligence Tech Co., Ltd


A circuit arrangement comprising a high-side semiconductor switch with a first load terminal connected to a first supply terminal receiving an input voltage, a second load terminal connected to an output terminal providing an output signal, and a control terminal, a floating driver circuit connected to the control terminal for driving the semiconductor switch, a level shifter receiving an input signal and providing a floating input signal dependent on the input signal, a floating control logic receiving the output signal and the floating input signal and providing at least one control signal to the floating driver circuit, wherein the floating control logic comprises means for detecting an edge in the output signal and means for generating the control signal dependent on the result of the edge detection.

In high-side semiconductor switches information about the switching state of the high-side switch is often needed to take opportune actions. This information is usually given by a zero-crossing detector which usually is a comparator comparing the potential of a switching node, the source of a MOS transistor, for example, to a reference potential, thus detecting a rising or a falling edge of the switching node.
To give an example, the information when the switching node has actually changed its potential from a low level to a high level may be used for controlling the gate-voltage of a MOS high-side switch in order to reduce conducted electromagnetic emission thus improving electromagnetic compatibility (EMC).
The high-side switch is usually controlled by a floating logic and driver circuit which is supplied by a floating power supply, whereas the zero-crossing detector is usually supplied by a ground related supply voltage. Since the voltages to be switched by the high-side switch can be rather high for an ordinary (CMOS) comparator, the inputs of the comparator have to be especially designed for high voltages. Furthermore, the output of the zero-crossing detector also provides a ground related signal as its output signal which has to be level shifted by an extra level shifter, before it can be further processed by the floating logic controlling the actual switching state of the high-side switch. The additional level shifter has adverse effects on the processing speed of the output signal of the zero-crossing detector, i.e., the output signal is delayed by the level shifter before it can be further processed by the high-side logic.
For an optimal switching operation it is necessary, to detect zero-crossings (i.e., a rising edge) of the signal provided by the switching node as fast as possible.
There is a general need to provide a circuit arrangement comprising a high-side semiconductor switch, a floating driver circuit, and a floating control logic which is able to detect zero-crossings in the signal provided by the switching node very fast and which allows to eliminate the need for a high voltage comparator.

High-side switch with a zero-crossing detector


An embodiment of a micro-electro-mechanical system of the MEMS type comprising at least one micro-electro-mechanical device of the MEMS type and one junction with a duct suitable to being associated with an external apparatus. Said junction being a printed circuit board PCB comprising at least two layers with juxtaposed faces, a channel being present in at least one face of at least one of said at least two layers suitable for realizing the duct with the juxtaposition of the other face of at least another one of at least two layers.

As it is known, MEMS is the acronym of Micro-Electro-Mechanical Systems and identifies a technology for the integration on a same substrate, in particular a die of silicon, of glass or of organic material, of devices of various nature, mechanical and/or electronic/electric, integrated in a highly miniaturized form.
In particular, the MEMS technology combines the opto-mechanical properties of micro mechanical devices with the electric properties of integrated electronic circuits.
As it can be easily guessed, some realizations such as, for example, pressure sensors, gas analyzers, drug micropumps and dispensers for liquids may require a connection to the MEMS devices, and in particular sensitive elements made therein, with external apparatuses, such as tanks, comprising liquids or gases.
Therefore, one may connect the sensitive element of the MEMS device, which has typical sizes of some microns, with an inlet of the external apparatus, whose sizes may be on the order of millimeters.
To this purpose, the use is known, as shown in FIGS. 1-5, as junction, of a cap-like element 6 with a countershaped body suitably coupled to a package 5 of a MEMS device 3. The cap-like element 6 comprises one or more connection conduits 7 projecting from the body for the connection between the sensitive element of the MEMS device 3 and the external apparatus, this latter being nor shown in these figures.
In particular, the external apparatus may be a micro-tank or, for a microfluidic system, fluidic connection pipes.
The conduits 7 of the cap-like element 6 have such external sizes as to be associated with an inlet of the external apparatus, while they have an internal cavity which is adapted to the sizes of the sensitive element of the MEMS device 3, as shown in particular in FIG. 3.
This solution known for the realization of MEMS systems has some drawbacks.
Generally, the package 5, as shown in FIGS. 4 and 5, comprises the MEMS device 3 which is in turn associated with a suitable substrate 2 of polysilicon or of organic or ceramic material. However, before being associated with the substrate 2, the MEMS device 3 is sandwich-wise interposed between two silicon dies assembled by using a glass-based material and by using a particularly difficult and critical process. The process used also employs a material with a lead oxide content of about 80%.
Moreover, as shown in FIG. 5, the wire micro-junctions among the MEMS device 3 and the electronic circuit 4 associated therewith are made by using gold wires having diameter of some tens of microns, with a process which requires an extreme cleanliness of the surfaces whereon the junction is made and an accurate control of the process parameters.
The cap-like element 6, which defines the junction, may require in turn a rather complicated and critical manufacturing process especially for the realization of the ducts 7, which have extremely small sizes. Moreover, during the assembly, the cap-like element 6 may require an additional step specific for the assembly onto the MEMS system 1 and moreover, due to the particularly small sizes, the ducts 7, projecting from the cap body 6 may be easily deformed.
Thus, the MEMS systems with these junctions may be complex and particularly expensive.

Micro-electro-mechanical systems (MEMS) and corresponding manufacturing process


A control method is provided, including: obtaining input information, where the input information includes a capacitance signal and report point coordinates generated when a user performs an operation on a terminal screen; using report point coordinates in a previous frame as report point coordinates in a current frame if it is determined that a capacitance signal in the current frame and a capacitance signal in the previous frame that are in the input information meet a preset condition; or using report point coordinates in a previous frame as report point coordinates in a current frame if it is determined that the report point coordinates in the current frame and report point coordinates in a first frame that are in the input information meet a preset condition.

In recent years, a touchscreen panel (TP) is widely used due to advantages such as high sensitivity and a high response speed, and in particular, brings good user experience to a user in a field of intelligent terminals, such as a mobile phone. However, when the user unintentionally taps a screen with a finger, because of a change of a contact area between the finger and the screen, a terminal may perform a calculation and determine the unintentional tapping as a flick operation of the user. Consequently, user experience is affected.