Philosophy

Page 1 On the Individuation of Fregean Propositions João Branquinho ABSTRACT: My aim is to sketch a principle of individuation that is intended to serve the Fregean notion of a proposition, a notion I take for granted. A salient feature of Fregean propositions, i.e. complexes of modes of presentation of objects (individuals, properties), is that they are fine-grained items, so fine-grained that even synonymous sentences might express different Fregean propositions. My starting point is the principle labelled by Gareth Evans the Intuitive Criterion of Difference for Thoughts, which states that it is impossible coherently to take different mental attitudes to the same proposition. As a logical truth (a consequence of Leibniz's Law), this is a synchronic principle, the application of which is restricted to attitudes held at a single time. I argue that such a restriction might be reasonably lifted and, on the basis of an adequate notion of attitude-retention, I propose an admissible diachronic extension of the principle. Introduction Gareth Evans claims that the principle labelled by him the Intuitive Criterion of Difference for Thoughts, the principle that it is not possible coherently to take different propositional attitudes towards the same proposition, should be construed as having its application limited in two respects.1 On the one hand, the principle is not meant to settle questions about the identity of propositions entertained by different subjects; on the other, it is not meant to settle questions about the identity of propositions entertained at different times. My aim is to show that the latter restriction can be reasonably lifted and that there is a plausible diachronic extension of the Intuitive Criterion.2 The envisaged principle is meant to have the following features. First, it is grounded on the basic idea of cognitive dynamics, the idea that propositional attitudes may persist over time. Since it is natural to take the objects of retention as being mental particulars, as opposed to mental types, an account will be given of the notion of a token attitude; token attitudes will be concrete mental states in which subjects may be for certain periods of time, states that have particular propositions as their contents and belong to certain types. Second, the principle involves a pre-theoretical notion of antagonism as applied to types of attitudes; it rests heavily upon our intuitions about the correctness of attitude-ascriptions and the mutual compatibility of attitude-types (this is a feature it nevertheless shares with some of its synchronic counterparts). Third, there is a sense in which the principle relies upon a prior notion of content; and in which it is thus circular, though in an arguably enlightening way. On my view, the principle should not be seen as introducing factors that are constitutive of identity for propositions, in the way in which e.g. the axiom of extensionality introduces factors that are constitutive of identity for sets. In particular, the fact that given propositions do not satisfy the condition imposed by the principle roughly, diachronic sameness of cognitive significance should not be taken as grounding their distinctness, as being that which makes the propositions distinct. I think it is precisely the other Page 2 way around. It is rather the distinctness of the propositions in question established on the basis of independent considerations provided by some theory of content which explains that fact. Hence, the job of the principle is to ratify previous verdicts on the identity or distinctness of propositions, verdicts yielded by given accounts of propositional content. It is not supposed to tell us in an absolute manner whether given propositions are identical or distinct; it only tells us that relative to some already available theory of content. Moreover, the principle is mainly intended to serve the notion of a Fregean proposition, a notion I will just take for granted. The notion will be taken in a broad sense though, roughly the sense in which things of the following sort hold: the proposition that water is wet and the proposition that H20 is wet are distinct Fregean propositions; the proposition expressed by 'Today is fine' as uttered on a day d and the proposition expressed by 'Yesterday was fine' as uttered on d+1 may be one and the same Fregean proposition; and the proposition that Robbert is a native of Holland and the proposition that Robbert is a native of the Netherlands may be distinct Fregean propositions. Fregean propositions are thus fine-grained contents, typically involving conceptions of individuals and properties. 1. The Synchronic Intuitive Criterion Let us take as our starting-point the following standard formulation of the Intuitive Criterion: propositions are identical only if, necessarily, every attitude that a rational subject, who grasps them, takes at a given time to one is an attitude she takes at that time to the other. One could formalise it as follows: (S) p=q  (A)(x)(t)[A(x,p,t)  A(x,q,t)]. Here 'x' and 't' range over subjects and times, 'p','q' range over propositions, and 'A' ranges over types of attitude (e.g. Belief), so that A(x,p,t) reads 'x takes attitude A towards p at t'. It might be plausible to assume that a subject's taking an attitude towards a proposition at a time entails her grasping that proposition at the time, in which case one might drop the condition about grasping; if only for simplicity, I adopt this assumption. The first thing to notice about (S) is that it is a logical truth, a consequence of a theorem of the Logic of Identity.3 Furthermore, the status of (S) as a logical truth would be preserved even if we dropped the rationality requirement; thus, the principle would still hold with respect to subjects who are not necessarily rational. However, I am interested in a version of the Intuitive Criterion that is not captured by the logically valid formula (S). The version in question is incompatible inter alia with direct Page 3 reference theories, theories which postulate purely referential or coarse-grained contents (structures of individuals and properties), and is congenial to theories which postulate finegrained contents such as Fregean propositions. The new principle, which distinctively employs a notion of antagonism between attitudes, might receive the following formalisation:4 (S)* A)(B)(x)(t)[ [A(x,p,t)  B(x,q,t)]  A,B)]  p=q. Here 'A', 'B' range over attitude-types and the predicate '' stands for the Antagonisticrelation, a relation which holds between attitude-types A and B just in case A is antagonistic to B.5 Informally, (S)* states that it is impossible for a rational subject to take different attitudes, in the sense of antagonistic attitudes, towards the same proposition at the same time.6 Consider the case of Belief, i.e. x believes p at t. One could clearly take the following as types that are antagonistic to Belief in the intended sense: (i)Failure to Believe, i.e. x fails to believe p at t; (ii)Disbelief, i.e. x disbelieves p at t, which is usually construed as x believes not-p at t; and (iii)Suspension of Belief, i.e. x suspends belief about p at t, which is usually construed as It is not the case that either x believes p at t or x believes not-p at t. Of course, problematic cases are likely to appear. For instance, it seems somehow silly to say that a subject believes p at t but also suspects p at t; yet, we would not count suspicion as antagonistic to belief, at least in the sense which seems to be required by (S)*. However, I do not think that the existence of such cases would undermine the intended notion; for a significant number of conspicuous cases of antagonism, such as the pair belief/disbelief or the pair certainty/doubt, are surely available. There are three features of (S)* I want to emphasise. First, it is obviously not a straightforward logical truth; for one thing, dropping the rationality requirement would now make a difference. (S)* is stronger than (S): one could obtain the latter from the former by instantiating the Antagonistic-relation to the relation holding between an attitude-type A and its complement not A (assuming this to be a particular species of antagonism). Second, strictly Millian accounts of propositional attitudes are inconsistent with (S)*. Ascriptions like 'Hammurabi believes that Hesperus is Hesperus (at t)' and 'Hammurabi disbelieves that Hesperus is Hesperus (at t)' would both come out as true under such accounts; yet, if we were to apply (S)* then we would be led to the conclusion that the proposition that Hesperus is Hesperus is not the same as itself, a result which the Millian theorist could take as a reductio of (S)*. Third, applications of (S)* may be highly dependent upon our ground-floor judgements about antagonism between attitude-types (relative to fixed contents). Page 4 A further move I am willing to make consists in generalising (S)* to the diachronic case, lifting thus the restriction about synchronicity in attitude taking. To obtain the desired extension one needs to replace quantification over attitude-types, assumed both in (S) and (S)*, with quantification over token attitudes belonging to given types; this intermediate move is required because the diachronic principle we are aiming at is likely to rest on notions that apply to token attitudes, notably the notion of attitude-retention. Accordingly, I subsequently sketch what I take to be an adequate framework for token attitudes; the framework will be minimal in the sense that the principles employed are those which are strictly needed for getting a diachronic Intuitive Criterion off the ground. 2. A Minimal Account of Token Attitudes The relevant notion of a token attitude will be one that satisfies the set of assumptions 1-5 below. I intend such assumptions to be relatively uncontroversial, so that the account will presumably be compatible with a wide range of views on the nature of propositional attitudes.7 Assumption 1 There is a basic 5-place relation T(x,a,m,p,t) which holds between a subject x, a token attitude a, a type of attitude m, a content p, and a time t just in case x takes a, belonging to m, towards p at t. Assumption 2 (The Essentialist Principle) Token attitudes have their agents, types and contents essentially: T(x,a,m,p,t)  (t')[a exists at t'  T(x,a,m,p,t')]. Assumption 3 (Functionality of Subjects) The relation T is functional in its first relatum; there is a function which maps every token attitude a existing at a time t onto the subject x of a at t: [T(x,a,m,p,t)  T(y,a,n,q,t)]  x= y.8 Assumption 4 (Functionality of Contents)9 The relation T is functional in its fourth relatum; there is a function which maps every token attitude a existing at a time t onto the content p of a at t: [T(x,a,m,p,t)  T(x,a,m,q,t)]  p=q. Assumption 5 (Existence of Types) For every token attitude a existing at a time t there is a type m to which a belongs at t: a exists at t  (m)(x)(p)T(x,a,m,p,t). Assumption 1 introduces the most basic fact about token attitudes: subjects simply have token attitudes (e.g. specific beliefs or desires) on given occasions, such attitudes having certain Page 5 propositional contents and belonging to certain types. Token attitudes are formed in a particular mind, endure for a certain period of time, and eventually go out of existence; sometimes this only happens when their subjects, people who have a very rigid cognitive structure, go out of existence. Assumption 2 states that a token attitude's having (at a given time) the subject that it has, the content that it has, and a type of which it is a token, are all to be taken as essential properties of the token attitude in question; i.e., they are properties such that it would be impossible for such an attitude to lack them at any time at which it might exist.10 Assumption 3 expresses the Principle of Privacy of Ownership as applied to token attitudes. It conveys the idea that only the subject (or "owner") of a particular attitude can have that attitude (on the same or on a different occasion); no one else can have it (or share it with her). Assumption 4 states that every token attitude existing at a given time is to be assigned a unique content, at that time and with respect to a given psychological mode. Unlike its counterparts 3 and 4, Assumption 5 only assumes existence, and not uniqueness, of types; hence, the possibility is allowed that a given attitude with a particular content, had by an agent on a certain occasion, belongs to distinct attitude-types. 3. The Diachronic Intuitive Criterion We are now in a position to set up an admissible diachronic extension of the Intuitive Criterion. Let us go back to our formula (S)* and rewrite it in accordance with the account in Section 2. One obtains the following: (S)** x)(a)(b)(m)(n)(t)[[T(x,a,m,p,t) T(x,b,n,q,t)]  m,n)]  p=q. Here 'a', 'b' range over token attitudes, 'm', 'n' range over attitude-types, and 'T' stands for the 5-place Having-relation. (S)** could thus be assigned the following informal reading: a sufficient condition for propositions to be distinct is that it is possible for a rational subject to take token attitudes of antagonistic types towards them at the same time. With a view to obtaining the intended generalisation, one needs to take two steps. First, one needs to allow diachronicity in attitude taking, the possibility that the token attitudes our subject has towards the propositions p and q occur at different times. Secondly, one needs to assume that the attitude had by the subject at a certain time, say t, towards proposition p has been retained by her at the later time, say t', at which she holds her attitude towards proposition q. In other words, one must suppose that her original token attitude persists throughout the period which goes from the instant t at which that attitude was taken to the instant t' at which she takes a token attitude whose type is possibly in conflict with the type of Page 6 the first one. Therefore, some adequate notion of retention for token attitudes (and their contents) will be required. The rationale for introducing the supposition about retention is simply that if it were to be dropped then the resulting claim would be highly implausible. Dispensing with the assumption would be tantamount to allowing, for example, the possibility of our subject's changing her mind at some time between the time t at which she harbours her original attitude towards proposition p and the time t' at which she holds an attitude towards proposition q. If such a change of mind, which would surely be a change of mind concerning the content p of her former attitude, were allowed then the conclusion would be utterly unwarranted that the propositions entertained p and q are distinct on the basis that the attitudes our subject harbours towards them at t and t' belong to antagonistic types; for the simple reason that a change of mind would have the effect of cancelling the former token attitude, and then there would not be any attitude-types one could count as antagonistic to one another. If the foregoing reflection is along the right lines, one could try the following formulation of a diachronic principle of individuation for propositions: (D) x)(a)(b)(m)(n)(t0)(tn)(tnt0)[[T(x,a,m,p,t0)  T(x,b,n,q,tn)]  m,n)  Ret (x,a,m,p,t0,tn)]  p=q. 't0', 'tn' range over times and 'Ret' stands for the Retention-relation, a relation which holds between a subject x, a token attitude a, an attitude-type m, a content p, and times t0,tn (with tnt0) if and only if x retains a, of type m and with content p, from t0 to tn. Of course, if tn=t0 then the assumption about retention would be redundant and one would obtain the synchronic principle (S)** from (D). (D) could thus be given the following informal reading: a sufficient condition for propositions to be distinct is that it is possible for a rational subject to take, at (possibly) different times, conflicting attitudes towards them, provided that she retains at later times the attitudes previously held. Some remarks on the notion of attitude-retention are mandatory. A definition of the notion that suggests itself in a rather natural way is as follows: (R) (ti)(t0)(tn)(tntit0)[Ret(x,a,m,p,t0,tn) =df T(x,a,m,p,a, t0)  a exists at ti]. Yet, although (R) states the most basic fact about retention of token attitudes, it does not throw much light on the conditions under which retention is secured, i.e. on the conditions under which a given token attitude might be said to exist at every time in a given interval. So, what else could one say about attitude-retention? Page 7 On my view, there are at least two principles that the notion of attitude-retention should be seen as satisfying. The first plausibly states that an absence of change of mind is necessary for attitude-retention: in order to retain an attitude a, of type m and content p, from a time t0 to a time tn, a rational subject x must not change her mind about p at any time ti between t0 and tn. Indeed, the persistence of an attitude involves a continued relation to a content, and any change of mind concerning that content would have the effect of interrupting such a relation; thus, the token attitude (a mental particular) would cease to exist from the moment at which such a change of mind occurred. One could try the following, where 'c' and 'o' range over token attitudes and attitude-types: (C) (ti)(t0)(tn)(tntit0)[T(x,a,m,p,t0)  [Ret (x,a,m,p,t0,tn)  c)(o)[T(x,c,o,p,ti)  o,m)]]. The notion of a change of mind is cashed out in terms of the notion of antagonism between attitude-types; so, maybe (C) is not very enlightening (in the present context). Yet, the proposal has at least one important merit. According to it, when subjects change their minds they change their minds about previously entertained contents, not about previously taken attitudes (unless those contents are about previously taken attitudes, of course). Thus, changes of mind are not conceived as higher-order states, notably beliefs about beliefs beliefs to the effect that once one had certain beliefs and now one no longer has them. Although I cannot take up the issue here, I think that such "higher-order" accounts of the notion, and of attituderetention in general, are mistaken; for they seem to be committed to the wrong idea that a change of mind (or an absence of it) is something which is always epistemically transparent to the subject. The second principle has to do with memory; in particular, at least concerning a certain range of important cases, it has to do with propositional memory. Memory in this sense is or at least involves preservation of (already available) information, in contradistinction to acquisition of new information. Since attitude-retention requires in general preservation of attitude-content, the following claim could be reasonably advanced with respect to belief (and some other related attitude-types): a subject x retains a token attitude a, of type mb (where mb is the Belief-type) and content p, from a time t0 to a time tn provided that at any time ti in the interval she remembers p in the sense of propositional or factual memory.11 One could formalise this as follows: (M) (ti)(t0)(tn)(tntit0)[T(x,a,mb,p,t0)  [x remembers p at ti  Ret (x,a,mb,p,t0,tn)]]. Page 8 I take it that (M) is a rather plausible principle; although it is far from being uncontroversial and needs to be argued for.12 Naturally, there are cases in which one would say such things as "She perfectly remembers that so and so, but does not believe it". But those cases are not genuine counter-examples to the principle as they are likely to rest upon irrelevant notions of belief, such as the one on which one is said to fail to believe p when one wishes p were not the case. For those who find acceptable the claim that knowledge entails belief (necessarily, if x knows p at t then x believes p at t), (M) might be seen as a logical consequence of that claim taken in conjunction with the hardly disputable claim that propositional memory is a species of propositional knowledge (necessarily, if x remembers p at t then x knows p at t).13 (M) is a first-order principle, in the sense that it does not involve any iteration of propositional attitudes. What it requires the subject to remember is precisely that which she believed: the content of her memory is nothing over and above the content of her belief. In particular, the principle does not require the subject to have a memory about a belief, to remember that she had such a belief (or even to remember having such a belief). Therefore, (M) should not be conflated with the following claim also connecting memory and beliefretention:14 if a subject x retains a token attitude a, of type mb and content p, throughout an interval of time from t0 to tn, then at any time ti in the interval x remembers that x believes p. This is a higher-order claim, as it requires the subject to remember that she believed a certain thing. Anyway, I think such a claim is false even if one restricts its application to creatures that possess the concept of belief. I take it that it is perfectly possible for a (rational) subject who at a given time still holds a certain belief not to be aware then that she continues to have the belief. It follows on reasonable assumptions that the subject could not be in a position to remember that she still has the belief in question. Hence, I do not think that retaining a previous belief is a matter of remembering that one still has the belief in question (and the same would hold for the other attitudes). The consequent of principle (M) cannot be turned into a biconditional. For if propositional memory were also regarded as necessary for belief-retention then a subject could not be in a position to retain false beliefs; yet, this is clearly possible: the ancient astronomers certainly believed for a long time that the Earth is flat. Concerning the persistence of false beliefs, especially false beliefs about perceptually presented items, I think memory still plays an important explanatory role. Here the relevant form of memory is obviously not memory of facts or events, but perceptual memory of things, especially things that are no longer available to perception (e.g. a memory of a face of someone who died a long time ago). Moreover, I Page 9 believe this kind of memory is also very likely to play a major role in explaining cases of retention of token attitudes of other types (fears, desires, doubts, etc.). Two apparent difficulties for the diachronic principle should be considered. First, there is the charge of circularity. Attitude-retention requires preservation of attitude-content; so, as a principle of individuation for contents, (D) is bound to be circular. The reply is simply that the principle is meant from the outset to be circular, since it is meant from the outset to rely on a prior notion of identity of content (in the sense mentioned in the Introduction). As far as I can see, there is no harm in that; in particular, that does not prevent the principle from being informative (see below). The second problem is that there appears to be a sense in which, by means of certain additional suppositions, (D) could be derived from its synchronic counterpart (S)**. Yet, I do not think this is a genuine shortcoming. On the one hand, there could hardly be a derivation in the strict sense. On the other, there is no need to take that as a negative feature. Indeed, it could be seen as merely capturing the fact that (D) is an extension of (S)**, approximately in the same sense in which some mathematical results are said to be extensions of certain other results; it would only mean that some information about diachronic cases could already be extracted from (S)**, or would already be potentially contained in (S)**. Thus, it would encapsulate the idea that one could hardly make sense of synchronic cases without tacitly appealing to diachronicity. Let me finish by sketching how the diachronic principle might be applied in a nontrivial and informative way. Take as a paradigm the case of temporal indexical belief and the famous 'today'/'yesterday' example. Suppose that, pace Frege and Evans, one wants to endorse a Fregean view on which the proposition expressed by an utterance today of the sentence 'Today is fine' is distinct from the proposition expressed by an utterance tomorrow of the sentence 'Yesterday was fine'; one might prefer to hold on to such a view because one thinks that this is a clear case where intuitively different modes of presentation of a single object are involved. Now it turns out that this sort of verdict could be ratified by the diachronic principle taken in conjunction with an account of attitude-retention on which principle (M) holds (as well with certain additional assumptions). Indeed, it is at least arguable on such grounds that it would be possible for someone to hold a true belief towards the former proposition on a given occasion (say by asserting 'Today is fine' on a day d at 11:58 p.m.), to retain this belief all along on the basis of factual memory, and then, having momentarily lost track of the days, to disbelieve the latter proposition (say by asserting 'Yesterday was not fine' three minutes later); hence, these propositions would be ratified by the diachronic principle as Page 10 distinct from one another. Of course, it does not follow that the principle is in itself inconsistent with the rival Fregean position, for instance with Evans s account of temporal indexical belief; for on this account the notion of belief-retention is taken as governed by a principle which is much stricter than (M), viz. (roughly) the claim that the exercise of an ability to keep track of time as time passes is a pre-requisite for retaining temporal indexical beliefs (e.g. 'today'-beliefs). Anyway, although the issue lies beyond the scope of the present paper, I am inclined to think that Evans's claim, whose verificationist flavour should be apparent, is implausible and that some such claim as (M) is along the right lines. João Branquinho Department of Philosophy Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa Cidade Universitária 1699 Lisboa Codex Portugal firstname.lastname@example.com 1 See G. Evans, The Varieties of Reference, edited by John McDowell, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1982, 21-22. 2 As far as I can see, only very recently has the claim been explicitly advanced that there must be a diachronic notion of identity for propositions. See the following essays, both in Jérôme Dokic (ed.), Cognitive Dynamics, Vol. 2 of the European Review of Philosophy, Stanford, CSLI Publications, 1997: Michael Luntley, 'Dynamic Thoughts and Empty Minds', 77-104; and Christoph Hoerl, 'Cognitive Dynamics: An Attempt at Changing Your Mind', 141-158. 3 This is so provided that one takes for granted the claim, which is in any case implicit in the notation employed, that propositions are the appropriate bearers of cognitive significance (the sort of things that can be believed, desired, etc.). I shall not examine here the question whether or not the main arrow in (S) might be reversed, an affirmative answer to which would be tantamount to claiming that the notion of sameness of thought is exhausted by the notion of sameness of cognitive significance. I think the claim is wrong, though. 4 With a view to rendering the exposition more intuitive, I have used the proposition obtained from (S) by contraposition as a basis to formulate (S)*. 5 This relation is irreflexive, symmetric and non-transitive in the sense in which the relation of non-identity is non-transitive, i.e. from (A,B) and (B,A) one cannot infer (A,A)). 6 See Evans, op. cit., 18-19. 7 The account offered here is in some respects similar to the account proposed by John Perry and Mark Crimmins in their paper 'The Prince and Page 11 the Phone Booth: Reporting Puzzling Beliefs', The Journal of Philosophy 86 (1989), 685-711. However, unlike them who suppose that e.g. particular singular beliefs are themselves structured mental entities, consisting of so-called conceptions of objects and properties I do not make any specific assumptions about the metaphysical nature of token attitudes. 8 The absence of any quantifiers and modal operators in all these formulae is a convenience which may be explained as follows: their assertion can always be replaced by assertion of their closures, these being those formulae (containing no free variables) which are obtained by prefixing universal quantifiers and necessity signs, in any order, to them. 9 Uniqueness of content is here, and will be henceforth, taken as being always relative to a given type. 10 I am aware that the Essentialist Principle, taken as applied to contents, would be possibly rejected on those views which individuate contents by reference to a certain sort of mental acts (and not mental states), such as Evans's episodic thoughts; and the same could be said about Assumption 4 (Functionality of Contents). 11 This qualification is needed because there are other senses in which one might be said to remember a given proposition, senses for which (M) does not hold. For instance, we can say of someone who used to believe that God exists but no longer believes it that he remembers the proposition that God exists (in the sense of objectual memory). 12 Indeed, the principle has been challenged: see e.g. C.B. Martin and M. Deutscher, 'Remembering', Philosophical Review 75 (1966), 161-96 (166-9) and M. Steup, 'Memory' in J. Dancy and E. Sosa (eds.), A Companion to Epistemology, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1992, 276-8. However, I think that the cases presented as counter-examples to the principle might be dismissed in a way analogous to the way in which one can dismiss alleged counter-examples to the claim that memory is a form of knowledge. 13 For a defense of this claim, see Timothy Williamson's essay 'Is Knowing a State of Mind', Mind 104 (1995), 533-565 (see 555-556). 14 Unlike (M), this claim is given as a necessary condition; the reason is that the converse claim could not be what is intended since it is trivially true.


Unity in the Body

Philosophy

This article explores the attempts, possibilities, and future of ecumenical initiatives in Christianity.

Unity in the Body Domenic Marbaniang Published in the Contemporary Christian, 2011. In one of his sermons, the revivalist preacher Leonard Ravenhill mentions an incident in which an elderly lady was asked by someone which church she went to. She, perhaps reading the issue of denomination in the question, and not certain of the right terminology, answered abruptly, "Oh no, I go to a different abomination!" While the modern era has been able to pull down many of the denominational walls, there are still some lessons that must not be forgotten. We have learnt that many differences are not really essential, which means that unity can become essential. Yet, while we consider newer ways to bridge relationships, we must be cautious not to burn important bridges down. Questions of Authority The first instance of schismatic feelings in the Church is recorded in Acts 6, and it was, not very surprisingly, an issue of food and tables, a catering issue to be precise. The Hellenist Christians were the first protestants against the Hebrew Christians. The apostles solved it by appointing Spirit-filled deacons, democratically nominated to expressly serve tables. That is the only instance, by the way, where the KJV mentions the word "business" in the Book of Acts. The second instance of possible schism erupted in Acts 15, this time over a doctrinal issue. Some teachers, later known as Judaizers, were teaching that one could not be saved unless one was circumcised according to the Law of Moses. The apostles and elders at Jerusalem solved it by calling a Council at Jerusalem and commissioning Paul, Barnabas, Judas (Barsabbas), and Silas to inform Gentile Christians of the Jerusalem decision, namely that the Gentiles should not consider themselves forced to obey the Mosaic Law except abstaining from things offered to idols, from blood, from things strangled, and from sexual immorality. The schism, however, could not be prevented; for the Judaizers had their own reasons to differ from the Apostles, and the schismatic group came to be known as "false brethren" (pseudadelphos, 2Cor.11:26; Gal.2:4).[1] While the issue of tables could be administratively solved, the issue of doctrines inevitably ended in division. Gnostics, Docetists, Nicolaitans, and other schismatic groups followed later. The appointed deacons could serve tables; the commissioned apostles could only sever tables. From then on, all possibility of a dialogue between the parties was ruled out by the apostolic commission. Of course, an attempt was also not made, as the church at Antioch only wanted to know if the apostles at Jerusalem endorsed the new teaching. One couldn't expect the need for the apostles to consult or dialogue with the Judaizers to form a consensus. The report declared "It seemed good to the Holy Spirit, and to us...." (Acts 15:28). There was a theocratic framework to the theological framework of the Early Acts of Apostles Church. Later, apostolic authorship and authority played an important role in recognizing the Canon of the New Testament. Pseudographs claiming apostolic authorship abound, though discredited by the Church as uncanonical later on. Several other disputes, later in the history of the Church, could only be settled by reference to interpretations of the Canon. However, it was not until the Reformation that the concept of Sola Scriptura gained full acceptance. Yet, divisions and schisms continued to take place over questions of authority and doctrinal acceptance. The Post-Enlightenment period saw a new surge of scholarship that questioned the divine inspiration of the Scriptures. Much of the pronouncements that followed gave rise to a culture in which, according to the German philosopher Nietzsche, God was dead and the churches were nothing but "tombs and sepulchers of God."[2] Perhaps, the epigram "Seminaries are cemeteries" has its origins here. Despite its scholastic attractiveness and popularity, however, liberalism was as diversified as its term indicated, faithful to its Enlightenment zeitgeist, a spirit as catchy as a running nose and as elusive as a running goose. The American Presbyterian theologian J. Gresham Machen said about it: "the movement is so various in its manifestations that one may almost despair of finding any common name which will apply to all its forms."[3] Its opposition, however, decided to hit the rock. They became known as the Fundamentalists after the publication of a set of 12 books called The Fundamentals between 1910 and 1915. The five indisputable fundamentals of Christianity were identified as belief in the infallibility of the Bible, in the virgin birth and the divinity of Jesus Christ, in the sacrifice of Christ on the cross as atonement for the sins of all people, in the physical resurrection and second coming of Christ, and in the bodily resurrection of believers. The proceedings of both the Jerusalem Council of the 1st century and the conferences of the 20th century that gave rise to The Fundamentals[4] agree in the fact that they were both aimed at defending the unique identity of Christianity – the former, from the authority of Judaism, and the latter, from the authority of vague modernist liberalism. Past the modern era one enters the postmodern era to find the Church involved in another battle: the battle with ecumenism. The philosophical zeitgeist had undergone a little change, a critical change. The issue was no longer very much doctrine or authority: it was unity, tolerance, and cooperation. The United Christian Conference on Life and Work at Stockholm (1925) ran the slogan "service unites but doctrine divides" (quite true with reference to Acts 6 and Acts 15). With the missionary movement spreading across the nations, ecumenical concerns became inevitable, and ecumenism finally took momentum from the World Missionary Conference of Edinburgh (1910). The World Wars also played some role in building bridges of unity between Christians from various denominations.[5] The World Council of Churches (WCC) came into existence at Amsterdam in 1948. Even the Roman Catholic Church could not keep itself fully distanced from the movement. In 1961, Pope John XXIII permitted Roman Catholic observers officially to attend the third assembly of the WCC. But, as late as 2005, some observed that the ecumenical vision was not so seriously pursued by all, and research showed that there was more felt "a desire to preserve and enhance the identity of the confessional body rather than risk their own identity; of competition between confessional and ecumenical bodies."[6] In response to the mainline ecumenical movement, the era saw the resurgence of the Evangelical Movement,[7] the formation of the World Evangelical Fellowship (1951) and wide propagation of evangelicalism through the media of radio, television, and Christian literature. Evangelicalism, in essence, opposed the syncretistic tendencies of the ecumenical movement as represented by the WCC and called forth for emphasis on Biblical faith and world evangelization. In quite many ways, however, the era did see great attempts towards unity among the various groups; the Communion of Churches in India, the Pentecostal Charismatic Peace Fellowship, Churches Uniting in Christ, Christian Churches Together, and the Pentecostal World Fellowship may be quoted as few examples. Some of these stood with the WCC while others detached themselves from it. The WCC mourned the fact that the Roman Catholics, the Evangelicals, and the Pentecostals weren't in the fold. Hawkey quotes the General Secretary of Christian World Communions: "The tent isn't big enough. Until we find some way that Roman Catholics and Pentecostals belong, it is nonsense to talk of ecumenism."[8] Yet, the era also saw the rise of several trans-denominational or inter-denominational mission movements and a fruitful time of great exchange of ideas and spiritual fellowship through literature, music, television, etc between Christians, regardless of the denominations. Of course, "doctrines divide" still. In 1994, leading Evangelical and Roman Catholic scholars in the United States signed a document called "Evangelicals and Catholics Together" (ECT).[9] The significance of this document, subtitled "The Christian Mission in the Third Millennium", consists in the recognition of the need of unity despite several key differences in doctrine and practice, and in the agreement on points of affirmation, hope, enquiry, contention, and witness. "The difficulties must not be permitted to overshadow the truths on which we are, by the grace of God, in firm agreement," it said and expressed the hope that "our efforts to evangelize will not jeopardize but will reinforce our devotion to the common tasks to which we have pledged ourselves in this statement." Of course, there were a few more ECT meetings and statements to follow, being met by much criticism as well; however, it was also understood that the statements did not speak officially for any of the two communities.[10] The apostles[11] are no more, of course, and the Bible is out in the hand of even the boy who drives the plow,[12] amidst beliefs and cultures of various kinds. Yet, despite the diversity, and the absence of any visible central authority (like the apostolic authority of the 1st century Church),[13] there must be a recognizable essence of Christianity that identifies it as such, or else "Christianity" is up for grabs – it would evade definition. Many Introduction to Philosophy classes begin with the statement, "The question of what philosophy is, is itself a philosophical problem." Perhaps, that is also applicable to our subject: "The question of what Christianity is, is itself a Christian problem!" One usually hears the analogical argument, "Just because a child is born in a garage, doesn't make him a mechanic; similarly, just because one is born in a Christian home doesn't make one a Christian." We hear terms like "nominal Christians" and, of course, also of "anonymous Christians". So, the question boils into "Who should define Christianity or the Church?" or "What does absolutely define Christianity or the Church?" The search is not for a consensus but for the ultimate determinant. Questions of Approach With the Second Vatican Council (1962-65), the Catholic Church made an irrevocable commitment towards ecumenism. A key development was the recognition of Christians outside the visible structure of the Catholic Church. In the words of Cardinal Kasper: The decisive element of the Second Vatican Council's ecumenical approach is the fact that the Council no longer identifies the Church of Jesus Christ simply with the Roman Catholic Church, as had Pope Pius XII as lately as in the Encyclical "Mystici corporis" (1943). The Council replaced "est" (the Catholic Church "is" Jesus Christ's Church) with "subsisti": the Church of Jesus Christ subsists in the Catholic Church, which means that the Church of Jesus Christ is made concretely real in the Catholic Church; in her she is historically and concretely present and can be met. This does not exclude that also outside the visible structure of the Catholic Church there are not only individual Christians but also elements of the Church, and with them an "ecclesial reality". "It is not that beyond the boundaries of the Catholic community there is an ecclesial vacuum". The Council speaks of "elementa ecclesiae" outside the Catholic Church, which, as gifts belonging to the Church of Christ, are forces impelling towards Catholic unity. The concept "elementa" or "vestigia" comes from Calvin. Obviously, the Council – unlike Calvin – understands the elementa not as sad remains but as dynamic reality, and it says expressly that the Spirit of God uses these elementa as means of salvation for non-Catholic Christians. Consequently, there is no idea of an arrogant claim to a monopoly on salvation. On the contrary, both the Council and the ecumenical Encyclical acknowledge explicitly that the Holy Spirit is at work in the other Churches in which they even discover examples of holiness up to martyrdom.[14] Of course, there are differences, and the Catholic Church commits to respect "the other Churches in the otherness which they claim for themselves." Also, in the ecumenical effort, the goal is not a conversion of people to the Catholic fold (though mutual conversions must be respected with respect to freedom of conscience), but "the conversion of all to Jesus Christ". The idea is that "as we move nearer to Jesus Christ, in him we move nearer to one another." In this sense, the approach is not towards "union" or "compromises" of any kind – for differences undeniably exist – but towards greater "reciprocal spiritual exchange and a mutual enrichment." In its efforts to embrace the Orthodox brethren, the Church faced two offences: the Filioque and Roman primacy. The issue of Filioque concerns the inclusion of the statement that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son (implying a double procession) in the Nicene Creed. It served as the main bone of contention that led to the East-West Schism of 1054. The doctrine was rejected by the Eastern Church who believed that the Spirit proceeds from the Father alone. Following the 62nd meeting of the North American Orthodox-Catholic Theological Consultation (June 2002), the Consultation issued an agreed statement, The Filioque: A Church-Dividing Issue? in which it recommended refraining from labeling each other as heretical on this issue and not treat the doctrine as have already reached full and final ecumenical resolution. The Catholic Church also declared that the condemnation made at the Second Council of Lyons (1274) of those "who presume to deny that the Holy Spirit proceeds eternally from the Father and the Son" is no longer applicable.[15] The Filioque doesn't seem to be a major issue now; however, the issue of Roman primacy does. While many Eastern Orthodox Christians are willing to have the same respect for the Pope that they have for their own Pariarch, they desist according to the Roman Bishop the status of supremacy over all Christians. The doctrine of Papal primacy serves as the greatest obstacle in the Catholic efforts towards ecumenism. A Joint Working Group (JWG) between the World Council of Churches and the Catholic Church was set up in 1965 with the object of exploring means of cooperation between the two communities. After a period of some 40 years into the dialogues, the JWG reported in 2005 that there were deep differences even in the conception of ecumenism. There were "different understandings" and "different ways of doing" ecumenism.[16] Also, the Roman Catholic Church didn't seem to drop the concept of "return" to the "fullness" of truth and unity that subsists in the Roman Catholic Church. It continued to remind about the "incomplete" communion existing with other churches, though significantly having considered other churches as "churches and ecclesial communities."[17] Also seeing that there are differences of ecumenical perception within the WCC itself, and the fact that while the WCC is a fellowship of churches the RC is a church, an incompatibility was observed in the decision-making and implementation process – "Since the WCC has no authority over its member churches, the decisions are conveyed simply as recommendations." Other approaches are being tried. The Global Christian Forum (GCF) is one example through which it has been possible to also involve the Evangelicals and the Pentecostals in the ecumenical quest. It was founded in 1998 following the proposal of the then General Secretary of the WCC, Rev. Konrad Raiser, that a new, independent space should be created where participants could meet on an equal basis to foster mutual respect and to explore and address together common concerns.[18] A conference was held at Limuru, Kenya from November 6-9, 2007 which brought in some 250 church leaders from more than 70 countries with dozens of churches and organizations ranging from "African Instituted Churches and Pentecostals all the way through Protestant and Anglican to Roman Catholic and various groups of Orthodox."[19] Some 40% were reportedly from Evangelical and Pentecostal groups, many from the global south. Despite the fact that the WCC funded and supported it, the Forum was autonomous and independent of the WCC. The GCF brought in two advantages: historical freshness and postmodern approach. In its historical freshness, it differed in its autonomous nature and separation from the older ecumenism that had historically accrued suspicion among many groups. It did succeed in carving a new space. In its postmodern approach, it forwarded a transformed ecumenism that emphasized mutual cooperation and fellowship rather than structural unity and doctrinal agreement. The emphasis is on narratives (Christian life) and networking (Christian fellowship). The second global gathering of the Global Christian Forum is scheduled to be held on 4-7 October 2011 in Manado, Indonesia under the theme Life Together in Jesus Christ, Empowered by the Holy Spirit. It aims to assemble about 300 leaders and representatives of churches and organizations of all the main Christian traditions from all parts of the world.[20] The issue of Pentecostalism and Charismatic spiritual experience is obviously going to play an important role in this conference. With respect to the identity of Christian, the GCF has a minimal definition: the confession of "the triune God and Jesus Christ as perfect in his divinity and humanity," the focus, evidently, being above denominations on the fellowship with the Triune God and Jesus Christ. The next gathering in October will decide the nature of GCF's future, as well as much of global ecumenical endeavor.[21] Questions of Authenticity After the Nairobi Conference of the GCF, David Parker had commented: "The danger of GCF is that it will become simply another talkfest, but its advocates are determined to avoid that. The crucial test is whether it can lead to changes at the local level in the life and mission of the church, and provide a process that will assist in the ongoing resolutions of difficulties." The challenge is to help reflect the sense of unity in diversity at the grassroots level, or else the conferences are mere wastage of time and funds. The kids at school usually hang a note on their classroom walls, "Talk Less, Work More!" Work, ultimately, must be more expressive of intent than mere talk. Reconciliatory efforts by the Vatican have become expressly clear from not just efforts towards ecumenism, but also public grief and prayer for forgiveness over crimes during the Inquisition, Crusades, and throughout Catholic history. History is not open to oblivion; but, histories can be healed – and Christians have a ground for that in the Cross of Jesus Christ. This era has transdenominationally picked up several liberation themes, and the struggle for equality has played important role across nations, whether it be the Feminists, the Blacks, the Minjung, or the Dalits. Mutual acceptance has to become culturally embedded into the Christian life, or else mere resolutions and regulations only enforce hypocrisy. Discrimination is a serious issue. However, mutual acceptance cannot be an excuse for loss of spiritual identity. While it is true in a way that global secularization has in a great way helped to erect a platform in which freedom of conscience could be possible,[22] it has brought with it a danger that the Church becomes open to secularization instead of recognizing its identity difference from the secular. One example is when the problem of discrimination is wrongly stretched from sex-discrimination to sexualitydiscrimination. Just because the world legalizes homosexuality doesn't mean that the Church should follow pattern. If she does so, she violates not only the meaning of sexuality but also the essence of Biblical spirituality. In such event, her acts cannot be considered reconciliatory at all; they may be modern, but ultimately schismatic[23] – has she considered her relationship with the entire Christian community while making such controversial decisions? Is she being ecumenical only at conference tables and not when out in the world? Conclusion The prayer and effort towards unity is in agreement with the High-Priestly Prayer of our Lord in John 17:11, "That they may be one as We are." The Bible specifies reasons why one must separate from some, and why one must not separate from some. Christ brought down all walls of separation between male and female, Jew and Greek, rich and poor, slave and free, Roman and barbarian, masters and servants (Gal.3:28; Col.3:1). All enmities get cancelled on the Cross and those who were once historically enemies, no matter what the historical reasons are, are now united in His Body through the Cross (Eph.2:16). However, the Church also possesses a distinctive role as the light of God in the world. She is called to holiness and separation from immorality (1Thess.4:7; Col.1:22). She is expected to expose the works of darkness (Eph.5:11), making a distinction but saving others with fear, "pulling them out of the fire, hating even the garment defiled by the flesh" (Jude 22,23). Doctrinal integrity is integral, but the goal is that each, "speaking the truth in love, may grow up in all things into Him who is the head – Christ – from whom the whole body, joined and knit together by what every joint supplies, according to the effective working by which every part does its share, causes growth of the body for the edifying of itself in love" (Eph. 4:15-16). The 21st century has seen a rich growth in interdenominational ministry and the rise of many platforms through which Christians could globally and mutually benefit through study, sharing, witness, and worship from each other. The prospects are no longer bleak, for we have come a long way. However, as the sphere grows larger, our responsibility also grows to the larger. But, we believe that "as we move nearer to Jesus Christ, in him we move nearer to one another." Notes [1] The term "Judaizer" is never used in the New Testament; the verb ioudaizo used in Galatians 2:14 is translated as "to live as do the Jews" in the KJV. [2] Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science (1882, 1887) para. 125; Walter Kaufmann ed. (New York: Vintage, 1974), pp.181-82 [3] J. Gresham Machen, Christianity and Liberalism (1923), http://www.biblebelievers.com/machen [4] The term "fundamentalist" was first used by a Baptist journalist in 1920 as a badge of honor for those Christians who championed the cause of the Fundamentals. In later times, of course, it has received much negative connotations with the rise of militant fundamentalism. [5] Card. Walter Kasper, "Current Problems in Ecumenical Theology", www.vatican.va [6] Jill Hawkey, Mapping the Oikoumene (Geneva: World Council of Churches, 2005). Wcccoe.org [7] Modern Evangelicalism is generally considered to be a wider movement of which Fundamentalism was a subset. Many Evangelicals are moderate and are also found within the mainstream ecumenical denominations, though holding fast to the Protestant conservative faith (cf. "Evangelicalism", Encarta, Microsoft Corporation, 2008). [8] Mapping... (2005) [9] See full text at: http://www.leaderu.com/ftissues/ft9405/articles/mission.html, Accessed July 27, 2011. The names of the signatories included people like Bill Bright (Campus Crusade), Charles Colson (Prison Fellowship), Kent Hill (Eastern Nazarene College), John White (Geneva College), Robert Destro (Catholic University of America), J.I. Packer (Regent College) Francis George (OMI Diocese of Yakima), George Weigel (Ethics and Public Policy Center), Fr. Avery Dulles (Fordham University), Fr. Richard Neuhaus (Institute on Religion and Public Life), Brian O'Connell (World Evangelical Fellowship), and Pat Robertson (Regent University). [10] The Introduction of the 1994 statement mentions "This statement cannot speak officially for our communities." [11] Meaning the Founding Apostles. Many Pentecostal and Charismatic groups believe that the office of the apostle is still continuing. [12] William Tyndale (c.1492-1536) is said to have remarked to a "learned" but "blasphemous" clergyman, "I defy the Pope, and all his laws; and if God spares my life, ere many years, I will cause the boy that driveth the plow to know more of the Scriptures than thou dost!" [13] Namely, among the Protestants; the Roman Catholic Church embraces the doctrine of apostolic succession and papal infallibility. [14] Card. Walter Kasper, "Current Problems in Ecumenical Theology", www.vatican.va [15] "Filioque", Wikipedia, en.wikipedia.org, Accessed on July 29, 2011. [16] "From Reflection to Reception: Challenges facing the Roman Catholic Church-WCC collaboration", Aram I, Catholicos of Cilicia, Presentation at the event marking the 40th anniversary of the Joint Working Group between the Roman Catholic Church and the WCC. Document date: 18.11.2005. http://www.oikoumene.org [17] Ibid [18] http://www.globalchristianforum.org/aboutus/ & www.oikoumene.org/en/eventssections/global-christian-forum.html [19] David Parker, "Transforming Ecumenism? The Global Christian Forum", Christianity Today Australia, 26 Nov. 2007. au.christiantoday.com [20] Manado 2011, globalchristianforum.org [21] "It [the GCF] is for the moment the only instrument that provides space where all the main Christian traditions can assemble in mutual trust for this purpose." Op. cit. [22] Harvey Cox had argued as early as 1975 that secularization was Biblically inevitable. Harvey Cox, The Secular City, rev. edn. (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1975). [23] Cp. "The decision by the U.S. Episcopal Church to ordain Gene Robinson, an openly gay, non-celibate priest who advocates same-sex blessings, as bishop led the Russian Orthodox Church to suspend its cooperation with the Episcopal Church. Likewise, when the Church of Sweden decided to bless same-sex marriages, the Russian Patriarchate severed all relations with the Church, noting that "Approving the shameful practice of same-sex marriages is a serious blow to the entire system of European spiritual and moral values influenced by Christianity."" – "Ecumenism", Wikipedia, Accessed on July 29, 2011.


Holism, mental and semantic

Philosophy

(forthcoming in The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Holism, Mental and Semantic Ned Block Department of Philosophy New York University Abstract Mental (or semantic) holism is the doctrine that the identity of a belief content (or the meaning of a sentence that expresses it) is determined by its place in the web of beliefs or sentences comprising a whole theory or group of theories. It can be contrasted with two other views: atomism and molecularism. Molecularism characterizes meaning and content in terms of relatively small parts of the web in a way that allows many different theories to share those parts. For example, the meaning of 'chase' might be said by a molecularist to be try to catch. Atomism characterizes meaning and content in terms of none of the web; it says that sentences and beliefs have meaning or content independently of their relations to other sentences or beliefs. One major motivation for holism has come from reflections on the natures of confirmation and learning. As Quine (1953) observed, claims about the world are confirmed not individually, but only in conjunction with theories of which they are a part. And typically, one cannot come to understand scientific claims without understanding a significant chunk of the theory of which they are a part. For example, in learning the Newtonian concepts of 'force', 'mass', kinetic energy' and 'momentum', one doesn't learn any definitions of these terms in terms that are understood beforehand, for there are no such definitions. Rather, these theoretical terms were all learned together in conjunction with procedures for solving problems. The major problem with holism is that it threatens to make generalization in psychology virtually impossible. If the content of any state depends on all others, it would be extremely unlikely that any two believers would ever share a state with the same content. Moreover, holism would appear to conflict with our ordinary conception of reasoning. What sentences one accepts influence what one infers. if i accept a sentence and then later reject it, i thereby change the inferential role of that sentence, so the meaning of what i accept wouldn't be the same as what i later reject. but then it would be difficult to understand on this view how one could rationally --or even irrationally!-change one's mind. and agreement and translation are also problematic for much the same reason. holists have responded (1) by proposing that we should think not in terms of "same/different" meaning but in terms of a gradient of similarity of meaning, (2) by proposing "two factor" theories or (3) by simply accepting the consequence that there is no real difference between changing meanings and changing beliefs. Contents 1. The Doctrines 2. Motivations for Holism 3. Functionalism, Inference and Belief 4. Problems with the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction 5. The Problem of Disagreement and Translation 6. Psychological Laws 7. Narrow Content Holism 1. THE DOCTRINES Semantic holism is the view that the meaning of a sentence is determined by its place in the web of sentences comprising a whole theory. Mental holism is the corresponding view for belief content--that the identity of a belief content is determined by its place in the web of beliefs comprising a theory. Sometimes holists advocate a more sweeping view in which the identity of a belief is determined by its relations to a body of theories, or even the whole of a person's belief system. In what follows, I will treat mental and semantic holism as two aspects of a single view. Holism can be contrasted with two other views: molecularism and atomism. Molecularism characterizes meaning and content in terms of a relatively small part of the web that many different theories may share. For example, the meaning of 'bachelor' might be said by a molecularist to be man who has never married. And the meaning of 'and' might be given by a molecularist version of inferential role semantics (see SEMANTICS, CONCEPTUAL ROLE) via specifying that the inference from 'p and q' to p and from p, q to 'p and q' has a special status (e.g. it might be primitively compelling, in Peacocke's terms). Atomism characterizes meaning and content in terms of none of the web; it says that sentences and beliefs have meaning or content independently of their relations to any other sentences or beliefs and therefor independently of any theories in which they appear. Note the contrast between the semantic issues that are of concern here and those that concern particular phenomena in particular languages. Semantics in the present sense is concerned with the fundamental nature of meaning and what it is about a person that makes his words mean what they do. We might call the present sense the 'metaphysical sense'. Semantics in the other sense -what we might call the linguist's sense--concerns the issues of how meanings of words fit together to determine the semantic properties and internal structures of sentences. Semantics in the linguist's sense concerns such issues as how many types of pronouns there are (q.v. REFERENCE) and why it is that 'The temperature is rising' and 'The temperature is 60o doesn't entail that 60o is rising. There are interactions among the two enterprises, but semantics in the linguist's sense can proceed without taking much notice of the issue of semantic holism. 2. MOTIVATIONS FOR HOLISM The best known motivation for semantic/mental holism involves Quine's doctrine of confirmation holism, according to which "Our statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense experience not individually but only as a corporate body". (Quine 1953: 41) This view gains its plausibility from the logic of theory revision. An experimental datum confirms (i.e. verifies, gives us some reason to believe) a statement only in conjunction with a great number of theoretical ideas, background assumptions about the experiment, and assumptions from logic and mathematics, any one of which could be (and in the history of science often has been) challenged when problems arise. If we combine this confirmation holism with the Logical Positivist (q.v.) doctrine that the meaning of a sentence is its method of verification or confirmation, that is if we combine the doctrine that meaning is confirmation with the claim that confirmation is holistic, we get semantic holism. And this implies that talk of the meaning of a sentence in isolation from other sentences makes no more sense than talk of the meaning of 'of' apart from the contexts in which it occurs. Positivism and confirmation holism are not the only roads to semantic/mental holism. Another route proceeds from considering how people learn actual scientific theories. One doesn't learn definitions of 'force', 'mass', 'kinetic energy', or 'momentum' in terms that are understood beforehand, for there are no such definitions. Rather, these terms are learned together (in conjunction with procedures for solving problems. As Quine and Putnam argued, local "definitions" in a scientific theory tend to be mere passing expository devices of no lasting importance for the theory itself. And this is quite ubiquitous in theories--a circle of interdefined theoretical terms none of which are definable in terms outside the theory. This fact motivates Lewis' proposal that scientific terms can be defined functionally in terms of their roles in a whole theory (see FUNCTIONALISM; SEMANTICS, CONCEPTUAL ROLE). 3. FUNCTIONALISM, INFERENCE AND BELIEF Functionalism has become a popular approach in the philosophy of mind generally. For example, the difference between the belief that one will win the lottery and the desire that one will win the lottery is plausibly a functional difference (a difference in the roles of the states), since one but not the other leads to test-driving a Ferrari. But functionalists go further, claiming that the common content of these propositional attitudes can also be functionally defined (in terms of the cognitive roles of states which have these contents in the psychological economy, including links to inputs and outputs). It has often been supposed that the most important feature of the functional role of a belief in determining its content is its role in inference, and for that reason functionalism about content or meaning is sometimes called inferential role semantics. The functional role of a thought includes all sorts of causes and effects that are non-semantic, e.g. perhaps depressing thoughts can lower one's immunity, causing one to become ill. Conceptual roles are functional roles minus such non-semantic causes and effects. A functional theory of the whole mind must make reference to any difference in stimuli or responses that can be mentally significant. The difference between saying 'damn' and 'darn' can be mentally significant. (E.g. one can have a policy of saying one rather than the other.) Your pains lead to 'darn', mine to 'damn', so our pains are functionally different, and likewise our desires to avoid pain, our beliefs that interact with those desires, and so on. So if we functionally define 'pain' in terms of a theory of the whole mind, we are naturally led to the conclusion that two individuals who differ in this way share no mental states. This is why functionalism can lead to holism. Molecularists object that if you've got a fine-grained way of categorizing, you can just coarsen it. But how? Which causes and effects of pain are constitutive and which are not? The form of a solution could be: "pain = the state constituted by the following causal relations...." where the dots are replaced by a specification of a subset of the mentally significant causal relations into which pain enters. Putnam suggested we look for a normal form for a computational description of pain, and Lycan and Rey have suggested that we construct functional theories at different levels, one of which would be suitable to define 'pain' without distinguishing between 'damn' and 'darn'. But after years of discussion, there is no real solution, not even a proposal of something functional common to all and only pains. Lycan and Rey expect the issue to be settled only by an empirical psychology.(See Rey, 1996.) Moreover, even if one is optimistic about finding a functional definition of pain, one cannot assume that success will transfer to functionalist accounts of meaning. Success in the case of meaning would seem to require an analytic/synthetic distinction (see the next section) which many have found independently to be problematic. 4. PROBLEMS WITH THE ANALYTIC/SYNTHETIC DISTINCTION Another route to holism arises from considerations involving the analytic/synthetic distinction (q.v.), that is, the distinction between claims that are true solely in virtue of meaning and claims that depend also on the way the world is. Quineans often hold that the analytic/synthetic distinction is confused. Some philosophers have argued from the idea that there is something wrong with analyticity to holism. We can put the argument in terms of conceptual role semantics. Some inferences (e.g. from 'bachelor' to 'married') are part of meaning-constitutive inferential roles, but others (e.g. from 'bachelor' to 'dislikes commitment') are not. If some inferences are part of meaning-constitutive inferential roles, and if there is no analytic/synthetic distinction, then there is no principled way to draw a line between inferences that constitute meaning and those that do not. (SEE ANALYTIC/SYNTHETIC) So, the argument concludes, all inferences are part of meaning-constitutive inferential roles, and this is a form of holism. (Fodor and LePore, 1992; Devitt, 1995) But this argument is of course fallacious. A bald man can have some hairs and there is no principled way of drawing a line between the number or distribution of hairs on a bald man and on a non-bald man. But one would not conclude that everyone is bald. Failure to find a principled way of drawing a line needn't require one or the other extreme. Still, the argument is onto something. How would the molecularist choose among inferences to pick out the meaning-constitutive ones if what is meaning constitutive must be analytic rather than synthetic, yet there is no such distinction? But the problem is really more general, and far from being an argument for holism, it casts doubt on holism too. If meaning-constitutivity entails analyticity, any view--molecularist or holist--that postulates anything meaning-constitutive is in trouble if there is no such thing. One response to this argument has been to doubt the principle that a statement or inference that is meaning constitutive is thereby analytic (Block, 1993). There are two very different points of view which see a gap between meaning-constitutivity and analyticity. One approach to finding a gap between meaning-constitutivity and analyticity derives from the views of Quine and Davidson, on which there is no clear difference between a change of meaning and a change of belief. The other appeals to narrow contents (q.v.) Narrow contents are contents that are necessarily shared by "Twins", people who are internally as similar as you like, even though their environments differ. Thus consider the influential example of Putnam's "twin earth" which is a planet identical to earth in every respect except that wherever the earth has H2O, it has a superficially similar but chemically different substance, XYZ. Arguably, I and my twin on Putnam's Twin Earth share a narrow content for 'water' despite the different referents of our words. It is false that meaning-constitutive sentences or inferences are thereby analytic if meaning is narrow. Narrow meanings themselves are never true or false and hence cannot be true in virtue of meaning. For example, let us suppose that my Twin and I accept the propositions that we express with "Water contains hydrogen". My belief has a true wide content, my Twin's has a false wide content, but the narrow content has to be the same (since we are Twins). Further, we can even imagine a Twin Earth in which a putative meaningconstitutive inference is invalid. If there is any inference that is a good candidate for analytically defining 'water', it is the inference from 'water' to 'liquid'. But consider a Twin earth on which 'water' is used as here to refer to H2O, but where water is very rare; most of the substances referred to as 'liquids' being granular solids that look like liquids. So 'Water is a liquid' as said by them is false, even though it is true in our mouths. Perhaps it will be said that what is analytic is not "Water is a liquid' but 'Water has a liquidish look and feel'. But it is easy to imagine circumstances in which the look and feel of water changes. Perhaps what we should be looking for is not a narrow meaning that is true in virtue of meaning but one that is only assertible in virtue of meaning. But it is part of our commitment in the use of natural kind terms that the world plays a part in determining truth values, so we must regard any appearance of warrant solely in virtue of meaning as superficial. 5. THE PROBLEM OF DISAGREEMENT AND TRANSLATION Holism has some weird-sounding consequences. Suppose we say that all of a sentence's inferential links (within a theory or body of theories) are included in its set of meaning-constitutive inferential roles. But what sentences I accept influence what I infer, so how can I reason so as to change my own mind? If I accept a sentence, say 'Bernini stole the lead from the Pantheon,' and then later reject it, I thereby change the inferential role of that sentence, so the meaning of the sentence that I accept isn't the same as the one that I later reject. So how can I reason about which of my beliefs should be given up? Along similar lines, one can argue that no two people ever agree or disagree and that we can never translate anything perfectly from one language to another. The holist owes us a way to reconcile such conclusions with common sense. This section will explore three holistic responses. Harman (1973) and Block (1986) have argued that we can avoid the problem by replacing the dichotomy between agreement and disagreement with a gradient of similarity of meaning, perhaps multidimensional. If I first accept and then reject 'Bernini stole the lead from the Pantheon', it is not as if I have rejected something utterly unrelated to what I earlier accepted. This position profits from the analogy with the ordinary dichotomy between believing and disbelieving. Reasoning with this dichotomy can lead to trouble, trouble that is avoided if we substitute a graded notion for the dichotomy. For example, I can have a low degree of belief in a long conjunction even though I have a high degree in each of the conjuncts. But if we put this in terms of the dichotomy between believing and disbelieving, we say that I could believe each conjunct while disbelieving the conjunction, and that is a contradiction. The proposal, then, is that we substitute a graded notion of similarity of meaning for the ordinary notion of same/different meaning. It must be conceded, however, that there are no specific suggestions as to what the dimensions of similarity of meaning are or how they relate to one another. This approach can be combined with the aforementioned "two factor theory" according to which meaning consists of an internal holistic factor and a non-holistic purely referential factor. For purposes of translation and communication, the purely referential factor plays the main role in individuating contents. For purposes of psychological explanation, the internal factor plays the main role. (See Loar, 199?) There is another (compatible) holistic response to the problem of disagreement which is associated with the views of Quine, Davidson and Putnam, namely that there is something wrong with the terms in which the problem is posed. They explicitly reject the very distinction between disagreeing and changing the subject that is presupposed by the statement of the problem. Putnam (1988) and Stich (1983) have argued, along these lines, that translation is not an objective process; it depends on subjective value-laden decisions as to how to weigh considerations of similarity in reference and social and functional role. It is controversial whether this Quinean response avoids the problem of disagreement only by rendering meaning something unsuitable for science. Another holistic response is exemplified by Lewis' observation that there is no need to suppose that a satisfier of a functional description must fit it perfectly--fitting most of it is good enough (Lewis, 1995). Lewis proposes that in framing the functional roles, we replace the set of inferences that are the basis for a functionalized account of belief with the disjunction of all the conjunctions of most of them. E.g. if we think there are three inferences, A, B and C that are closely linked to the meaning of 'if', we might define 'if' as the relation that satisfies either A&B or A&C or B&C. (Of course, we thereby increase the danger that more than one relation will satisfy our definition.) Then disagreement will be possible between people who accept most of the inferences that define their subject matters. I have just been canvassing holistic responses to the problem, but of course atomism and molecularism are also responses. Fodor's (1987) version of atomism construes meanings as purely referential. Fodor goes so far as to insist that there could be punctate minds, minds that have only one belief. This view must, however, find some way of accommodating the insights that motivate holism. 6. PSYCHOLOGICAL LAWS Fodor and LePore (1992) object to holistic accounts of mental content on the ground that they would preclude psychological laws, for example: the belief that one is in immediate danger causes release of adrenalin. According to holism, there is no such thing as "the" belief that one is in immediate danger because the belief that you designate in this way is not quite the same as the belief that I designate in this way. Beliefs are too fine grained to be referred to in this way. One strategy for dealing with this issue is to observe that many candidate psychological laws can generalize about contents without actually specifying them.. Consider this candidate for a law: For any action a and any goal g, if one wants g and also believes that a is required for g, then one will try to do a. This is a universally quantified law (because of the role of 'any'), albeit a trivial one. Universally quantified laws are a good scientific bet, and these can involve holistic content. By quantifying over goals, one can state laws without committing oneself to two agents ever having exactly the same goal. The point just made says that the holist can allow one kind of psychological law (the quantified kind) but not another (the kind that mentions specific contents such as the belief that one is in danger). But the holist may go further, arguing that there is something wrong with the putative laws of specific contents. The point is that "The belief that one is in immediate danger causes release of adrenalin" stands to psychological law as "Large slippery rocks on mountain-tops can damage cars on roads below", stands to physical law. Laws should quantify over such specific items, not mention them explicitly. However, Fodor and LePore are right that any particular type of holistic state will exist only rarely and transiently. In this respect, holistic mental states are like the states of computers. A total computer configuration as specified by the contents of every register in the internal memory and every cell on the hard disk will occur only rarely and transiently. There are deterministic laws of the evolution of total computer states, but they deal with such transient states. So psychological explanation will have to be seen by holists as like explanation of what computers do, in part a matter of fine grained laws of the evolution of systems, in part coarse-grained accounts of how the systems work that do not have the status of laws. 7. NARROW CONTENT HOLISM There is a great deal of controversy about whether there is such a thing as narrow content or meaning, but if narrow content exists, there is good reason to think it is holistic. We already have seen one reason having to do with the fact that there is no analytic/synthetic distinction for narrow content. But there is another reason as well that focuses on change of narrow content with learning. Putnam (1983) and Block (1994) give an argument that uses some relatively uncontroversial premises about identity and difference in narrow content at a single time to squeeze out a conclusion to the effect that one's narrow contents can be expected to change whenever one receives substantial new information, however trivial. The argument depends on a variant of the famous "twin earth" example. Consider twins who grow up in different communities where 'grug' is used to denote different substances, beer in one and whiskey in the other, but the difference hasn't made any difference to the twins. At age 10, they are as similar as you like, and so the narrow contents of their 'grug's are the same. By age 12, they know as much about "grug" as teenagers normally know, including the (different) translations of 'grug' into English. One knows that "grug" in his language is beer, the other that "grug" is whiskey. The argument motivates the claim that their 'grug's differ in narrow content at 12 despite being the same at 10, so the information that they acquired (which is designed to be run-of-the-mill) changed the narrow contents. (But see Devitt, 1995, for a reply.) Issues about holism continue to be at the heart of debate in philosophy of language and mind. Thirty years ago, it was widely assumed that to be a holist was to be a skeptic about any science of meaning or content, but in recent years there has been a spirited debate about whether cognitive science can tolerate it. Bibliography Block, N. 1986, "Advertisement for a Semantics for Psychology" Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Volume X, edited by P.A. French, et. al., 615 678. (Discussion of inferential role semantics) Block, N. 1993 Holism, Hyper-analyticity and Hyper-compositionality," Mind and Language 8, 1, 1993: 1-27. (Defense of holism from a critique by Fodor and LePore.) Block, N. 1994: "An Argument for Holism", in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, Vol. XCIV, 1995, p.151-169. Devitt, M. 1995: Coming to Our Senses: A Naturalistic Program for Semantic Localism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Spirited defense of molecularism.) Fodor, J. 1987: Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge: MIT Press. (Defense of an atomistic view of content and meaning.) Fodor, J. & LePore, E.: 1992: Holism: A Shoppers' Guide. Oxford: Blackwell. (Critique of arguments for holism.) Harman, G. 1973: Thought, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Defense of a language of thought. Uses a functionalist point of view.) Lewis, D. 1995: "Lewis, David: Reduction of Mind", in S. Guttenplan, ed. A Companion to Philosophy of Mind, Blackwell: Oxford. (Summary and defense of Lewis' views on mind and meaning.) Loar, B., "Psychological and Social Content", in ...(Argument that narrow content is the only content) Putnam, H. 1983: Realism and Reason: Philosophical Papers, Vol. 3 Putnam, H. 1988: Representation and Reality Cambridge: MIT Press. (Critique of cognitive science views of mind and meaning.) Rey, G. 1996 ?? Stich, S. 1983: From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science. Cambridge: MIT Press. (Argument against appealing to content in psychological explanation. Quine, W. 1953: "Two Dogmas of Empiricism", in From a Logical Point of View. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. The classic argument against the analytic/synthetic distinction.