Hiddenness of God

Philosophy

This is a 5,000 word article on divine hiddeness, with special attention to John Schellenberg's work on the topic

HIDDENNESS OF GOD Daniel Howard-Snyder Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd edition, MacMillan 2006 Many people are perplexed that God (if such there be) does not make His existence more evident. For many of them, the hiddenness of God puts their faith in God to the test. Others, however, claim that God's hiddeness is the basis of an argument against God's existence. While this claim is no newcomer to religious reflection, it has been the focus of renewed debate since the 1990's. Two preliminary observations are in order. First, the God in question is the God of traditional theism, a personal God who is unsurpassably good. Second, the "hiddenness of God" is an inapt term to use in an argument for the conclusion that there is no God since God is hidden only if there is a God; the term "inculpable nonbelief" is better. At a first approximation, the argument is that there are people who, through no fault of their own, lack belief that God exists; thus, since there is a God only if there is no inculpable nonbelief, there is no God. 1. RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE ARGUMENT FROM EVIL The argument from inculpable nonbelief is related in several ways to the more familiar argument from evil and suffering against the existence of God. First, inculpable nonbelief is supposed to be evidence against the existence of God independent of evil and suffering. To see how this can be, imagine a society in a world much like our own but in which there is no evil or suffering. While no argument from evil could arise in such a society, some of its citizens might maintain that there is a God while others maintain that there is not since there are inculpable nonbelievers. Second, evil and suffering are much more powerful evidence than inculpable nonbelief. It is difficult to view inculpable nonbelief as nearly as bad as the horrors of Auschwitz or the suffering caused by the tsunami of December 26, 2004. Perhaps this is due, in part, to the fact that, unlike evil and suffering, inculpable nonbelief is not bad in itself; indeed, it is bad only if there is a God. Third, although inculpable nonbelief is weaker, independent evidence for atheism, it is arguably stronger precisely because of the suffering in the world. That is because suffering constitutes a context in which one's expectation increases that God would make Himself and His love sufficiently clear. For one is more in need of the assurance and comfort that God's manifest love would bring when one suffers. Thus, its absence in the suffering of many people, especially horrific and intense suffering, is more striking. Fourth, formulations of the argument from inculpable nonbelief parallel those of the more familiar argument from evil. For example, one commonly distinguishes 2 "logical" ("deductive") arguments from evil from "evidential" ("inductive," or "probabilistic") arguments from evil. A logical argument from evil affirms of some known fact about evil that it is incompatible with theism, while an evidential argument does not, either because it affirms that the fact in question is not known but only reasonably believed, or because it affirms that the fact in question is only improbable given theism, not incompatible with it. One can distinguish arguments from inculpable nonbelief along the same lines. 2. SCHELLENBERG'S VERSION OF THE ARGUMENT More than anyone else, John L. Schellenberg is responsible for renewing the contemporary debate with his Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason (1993). The main argument is this: (1) There are people who are capable of relating personally to God but who, through no fault of their own, fail to believe. (2) If there is a personal God who is unsurpassably great, then there are no such people. (3) So, there is no such God. (from 1 and 2) According to Schellenberg, (1) is a generalization from two facts. First, there are honest seekers of the truth who are atheists and agnostics. Second, there are individuals who belong to cultures that lack the idea of a personal God altogether, e.g. the Chinese race in the period from the beginning of their history until the Christian Middle Ages. In defense of (2), Schellenberg offers the following subargument: (2a) If there is a personal God who is unsurpassably great, then there is a personal God who is unsurpassably loving. (2b) If there is a personal God who is unsurpassably loving, then for any human person H and any time t, if H is at t capable of relating personally to God, H has it within H's power at t do so (i.e., will do so, just by choosing), unless H is culpably in a contrary position at t. (2c) For any human person H and any time t, H has it within H's power at t to relate personally to God only if H at t believes that God exists. (2d) So, if there is a personal God who is unsurpassably great, then for any human person H and any time t, if H is at t capable of relating personally to God, H at t believes that God exists, unless H is culpably in a contrary position at t. (from 2a through 2c). In effect, (2d) is (2) of the main argument. Schellenberg regards (2) as a necessary truth, reflecting part of the meaning of "there is a personal God who is unsurpassably great." (An evidential or probabilistic version of the argument would say that (2) is only likely to be true.) So Schellenberg regards each of (2a) through (2c) as necessary truths. He thinks (2a) is just obviously necessary. (2b), however, is not obvious. Indeed, what does it mean? In particular, what 3 does Schellenberg mean by "relating personally to God" and being "capable" of such a relationship? He means this. To relate personally to God is to interact with God in the various ways that theistic religious traditions describe: on the divine side, God's guiding, supporting, and forgiving one, for example, and on the human side, one trusting Him, showing gratitude, and worshipping Him, among other things. Crucially, such a relationship would involve an explicit consciousness of God's presence and interaction with one. This relationship is to be conceived of developmentally, not as something that comes complete and mature. To be capable of a personal relationship with God is to have the cognitive and affective equipment required to be conscious of God's presence and interaction with one and to hold the attitudes and to perform the behavior involved in such a relationship; it also requires possession of the concept of God, or at least the materials from which it can be constructed. So why should one suppose that (2b) is true? Schellenberg argues that it follows from the nature of unsurpassable love, and can be supported by analogy with the best sorts of human love as well. An unsurpassable lover would seek a kind of close, explicit participation in the life of his or her beloved for its own sake, as well as for the beloved's sake, so that the beloved could draw from it what he or she needed to flourish. This would be especially true in the divine-human case. A close, explicit interaction with God would bestow moral benefits. For example, it would enable one to more easily overcome character flaws and it would provide one with a model for other relationships. Moreover, it would bestow experiential benefits, such as peace and joy, security and support in suffering, and the pleasure of companionship. Of course, God would not force Himself on one, as that would make the relationship a sham. He would leave it up to one to enter into and maintain it. Thus, one's own resistance, as well as the consequences of one's prior free choices, would be the only thing God would allow to prevent one from relating personally with Him. Otherwise, He would always be available just for the asking. As for (2c), Schellenberg argues that it is absolutely impossible for one to have a personal relationship with another unless one believes that the other exists. Thus, as a matter of logical necessity, one has it within one's power to relate personally to another only ifone believes that the other exists. The same goes for us and God. Schellenberg's argument has enjoyed much critical scrutiny. To this scrutiny we now direct our attention. 3. NON-THEODICAL CRITICISMS OF THE ARGUMENT Some critics say that the argument does not show that there is no God since it leaves open the possibility of an impersonal God, or a personal God that is not unsurpassably great. Others say that since God is so absolutely different, even incomprehensible, nothing could count as evidence against God's existence, including inculpable nonbelief. These responses are irrelevant, however, since Schellenberg's target is a God that is at least somewhat comprehensible insofar as He is said to be personal and unsurpassably great. 4 Another criticism holds that the argument is an occasion for observing that unsurpassable greatness does not imply unsurpassable love. In this connection, think of the Stoic view of eudaemonia (happiness), according to which the sage, the person who has achieved moral and intellectual perfection, would possess benevolence but lack upsetting emotions like empathy, ecstasy, fear, and grief since these passions would upset the life of bliss characteristic of the sage. On such a view, (2a) is false. A personal God who was unsurpassably great would be a divine sage and, as such, would not possess the sort of attachment and passion characteristic of the love exhibited by parents for their children. Some critics deny (2b). They note that one's view of the implications of unsurpassable love depends on what human analogies one takes to be most salient. They suggest that an emphasis on maternal love of children supports (2b), whereas an emphasis on familiar adult love or the love of a benevolent reconstructive surgeon is more apt and supports the denial of (2b). One might worry about this since, first, benevolence is not love, second, maternal love is offered as an apt analogy in lived theistic religions, and, third, a perfectly loving God would empathize with the plight of those who seek Him but who through no fault of their own come up empty-handed. Many critics say that there are no inculpable nonbelievers who are capable of relating personally to God; as such, (1) is false. Chief among them are those who argue, first, that there is sufficient evidence to believe, in creation and history, or through the witness of one's conscience or sensus divinitatis. Next, they argue that nonbelief is best explained by the willful sinfulness of nonbelievers, in which case it is not inculpable. For example, Jonathan Edwards (1970) argues that God has endowed human beings with the faculties to discern, appreciate, and weigh the evidence for God's existence, but those faculties work properly only if they function in accordance with "true benevolence," which consists mainly in an intense desire for truth about God and for true holiness. So while there is plenty of evidence, some lack it because they lack true benevolence. In Original Sin, Edwards denies that there are nonbelievers who possess true benevolence; after all, he says, the scriptures say (cp. Romans 1:19-22) that there is "sufficient light for the knowledge of God," hence, nonbelievers must fail to believe "divine things" owing to "a dreadful stupidity of mind, occasioning a sottish insensibility of their truth and importance" (1970, 149, 157). This insensibility consists in a "proneness to idolatry" and a "disregard of eternal things"-dispositions to ignore familiar and obvious considerations, to be swayed by ridicule and deference to people in authority, to prejudice against religion, and so on-which impair the God-given ability to reason properly about God. People bring such impairments on themselves. One worry about this criticism is that, even though some nonbelievers lack true benevolence, the empirical evidence strongly suggests that others possess it since they really do earnestly seek the truth about God, love the Good, assess evidence judiciously, and, if anything, display a prejudice for God, not against Him. 5 Some critics appeal to implicit belief. The idea is that since God is the Good (or, God's moral goodness is His most salient feature), pursuit of the Good is, in fact, pursuit of God, even if one does not recognize it as such. This thought can be taken in different directions. On the one hand, one might infer that, since belief in the Good just is (or is one way to have) belief that God exists, one is a nonbeliever only if one fails to pursue the Good, a failure for which one would be culpable; so, there are no inculpable nonbelievers, and (1) is false. On the other hand, one might deny that belief in the Good is belief that God exists but still infer that one can relate personally with God (just by choosing) even if one does not believe that God exists since, after all, belief in the Good (moral goodness) is sufficient for the early stages of a developing personal relationship with God; as such, (2c) is false. Another possibility is that one can begin to develop a personal relationship with God without belief that God exists. One option here is a kind of faith that God exists that has as its cognitive component acceptance rather than belief. Belief differs from acceptance in that, first, acceptance is a mental act, rather than a dispositional mental state (which is not to say that acceptance does not engender a complex behavioral disposition), and second, acceptance is under voluntary control while belief is not. Regarding the first point, although accepting a proposition is like believing it in that accepting it involves a positive stance toward it, accepting a proposition is unlike believing it in that accepting it involves one adopting it or taking it on for the purposes of theoretical and practical reasoning as well as behavior, even though one is not disposed to think "yes, that's how things are" on considering it, which is essential to belief. As for the second point, belief is a state one finds in oneself, the causal consequence of one's reasons, evidence, or grounds. However, when one's grounds for a proposition seem ambiguous, one can choose to accept it or choose to withhold acceptance. Now, if one's faith that God exists involves acceptance but not belief, one will nevertheless be disposed to act and feel in ways appropriate to God's existence (e.g., worshipping and feeling gratitude), and one will accept various experiences and sacraments as God's interacting with one (e.g., forgiving, guiding, and supporting one). In that case, one might argue that (2c) is false: one can have it within one's power to begin to relate personally to God even if one does not believe that God exists; faith is enough. 4. A SOUL-MAKING THEODICY Many critics concur with (2c) but argue that (2b) is false. Toward that end, they offer theodicies, reasons why God might lovingly permit inculpable nonbelief. Several general themes have emerged in the literature. First, God may well prefer temporary nonbelief to belief accompanied by a negative response. Second, God might have different reasons for different individuals depending on what attitudes and dispositions they possess; likewise, He might have different reasons for the same individual at different times. Third, God might have a combination of reasons, no one of which is enough but which, taken 6 together, explain His permission of inculpable nonbelief. Fourth, on some versions of theism, everyone will eventually have evidence sufficient for belief, if not in this life then in the next; so theodicies involve reasons for God to permit inculpable nonbelief for a time, not forever. Finally, evidence sufficient for belief that God exists need not involve arguments or spectacular "signs and wonders"; experiential awareness of God is enough. What follows are some representative theodicies. According to one version of the soul-making theodicy, many people, at the dawn of their capacity to relate personally to God, are already ill-disposed toward Him. Through no fault of their own, they have become inculpably ill-disposed nonbelievers. These include many of those who were raised to be hostile or indifferent toward religion, who were abused by excessively strict religious parents, or who had instilled in them an extreme self-centeredness or disrespect for proper authority. Perhaps God refrains from giving such people evidence sufficient for belief because they would not respond appropriately if they had it. Moreover, there's a grave risk in bringing inculpable illdisposed nonbelievers to belief since there is a good chance they will confirm their defective disposition by an unfitting response; indeed, it might even be useless to give them evidence since they might be so ill-disposed that they are more inclined to think they are institutionalizable ("hearing voices") than that God is communicating with them. Consequently, God waits, giving them the opportunity to become more receptive and apt to reciprocate His love, and influences them in subtle but respectful and loving ways toward this end. As for inculpable nonbelievers who are well-disposed toward God, this version of the soul-making theodicy considers separately those who were responsible for becoming well-disposed and those who were not. Examples of the first group include those who have been virtually determined-say, by parental training-to become well-disposed but who do not yet believe. In that case, as they become capable of relating personally to God, they are disposed to love God but they had little if any say in becoming so disposed. This is unfortunate because, all else being equal, a state of affairs in which one reciprocates God's love but had little if any say in being so disposed is not nearly as good as a state of affairs in which one reciprocates God's love and had a significant say about being so disposed. God prefers the better state of affairs, and so He does not bring to belief the well-disposed inculpable nonbeliever who is not responsible for being so disposed because He prefers them to confirm their disposition, on their own, in the face of contrary desires and competing allegiances, before them to belief. In that way, God allows them to make their involuntarily acquired good disposition toward Him genuinely theirs. Now consider well-disposed inculpable nonbelievers who were responsible for becoming so disposed. Given the influences that shape childhood character, these will most likely be adults who have either reshaped their bad dispositions toward God for the good or confirmed their good dispositions over time. They constitute the most difficult case for the soul-making theodicy; nevertheless, it has some resources. For, as is well 7 known, one can be disposed to love another for the wrong reasons. For example, sometimes one's love springs from a desire to extend one's power or influence, increase one's pleasure, or satisfy one's curiosity. Other times its source is insecurity or fear, for example, fear of being alone or unprotected. And there are other sources. Likewise with God. One may well be disposed to love God on coming to belief, but one might be so disposed for reasons that are not as fitting as they might be. For example, it is most fitting to love God mainly for His moral beauty, His holiness; relatedly, perhaps no disposition to love God is suitably motivated unless it is grounded in a strong desire to surrender wholly to His will. In that case, the possibility arises that if God were to bring such people to belief, they would love Him, but their love would not be appropriately motivated. So He woos them, before bringing them to belief, influencing them behind the scenes in respectful and loving ways to change the source of their disposition to love Him and to confirm that change over time. 5. OTHER THEODICIES A variety of other theodicies have been articulated. The presumption theodicy states that God does not bring some individuals to belief because if He did, they would relate to God in presumptuous and arrogant ways, not with due contrition and humility, which are essential to a proper relationship with God. According to the stimulus theodicy, God does not produce belief in some individuals because if He did, they would be less apt to recognize the wretchedness of living life on their own, without God. Divine hiddenness stimulates such people to recognize this fact about the human condition, which is essential for entering into a proper relationship with God. A variation on the stimulus theodicy states that God does not provide evidence sufficient for belief in some individuals because if He did, the perceived risk required for an intense and passionate faith would be objectionably reduced, and without such a faith one cannot wholly enter into a proper relationship with God. The deception theodicy asserts that some people are disposed in such a way that, if God brought them to belief, they would be deceived into thinking that they had arrived at a proper understanding of religious matters, and would become complacent or relate to God at a superficial level. Proponents of the intellectual virtue theodicy say that God does not provide evidence sufficient for belief in some individuals because if He did, certain intellectual temptations would not be available to them, and they would not have the opportunity to respond to those temptations virtuously. For example, if the evidence were too clear, sustained investigation and reflection, and wrestling with doubt, would be inhibited. According to the diversity theodicy, God does not produce belief in some people because if He did, diverse expression of religious imagination, creativity, and devotion would be greatly reduced, and religious variety of this sort is a great good. Finally, advocates of the investigation theodicy hold that it is a great good to pursue knowledge with others, all the more so when the knowledge is as important as knowledge of God. But people can pursue 8 knowledge together only if some of them are ignorant. So God permits inculpable nonbelief so that human beings might help each other to learn about Him and to assist nonbelievers in starting personal relationships with Him. Naturally enough, these theodicies have been criticized. Some critics claim that they provide no good reason for God to permit inculpable nonbelief at all, or at least not for every sort of inculpable nonbeliever. Others insist that if they are good reasons, then the problem of too much belief arises. Most importantly, it is claimed that the benefits of temporary inculpable nonbelief articulated in the theodicies can be accommodated within a developing, explicit personal relationship with God that involves evidence sufficient for belief that He exists. One final critique of Schellenberg's argument should be mentioned. His argument invites one to affirm, at least tacitly, that there is no reason for God to permit inculpable nonbelief. Two themes have emerged on this score. First, one should accept the invitation only if the theodicies fail, individually but especially collectively, to account for why God might lovingly permit inculpable nonbelief. The worry here is that human beings are enormously complicated, and it is no easy task to tell whether any particular candidate for inculpable nonbelief possesses or fails to possess those motivations, attitudes, and dispositions that figure in the theodicies above. Second, even if there are inculpable nonbelievers whose nonbelief cannot be fully explained by any theodicy one knows of, the live possibility remains that there is some theodicy one does not know of. Indeed, would it really be all that surprising if God had some purpose for permitting inculpable nonbelief, as well as other bad things that happen, that one cannot understand? BIBLIOGRAPHY Alston, William P. "Belief, Acceptance, and Religious Faith." In Faith, Freedom, and Rationality: Philosophy of Religion Today, edited by Jeff Jordan and Daniel HowardSnyder. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996. Drange, TheodoreM. Nonbelief and Evil: Two Argument for the Nonexistence of God. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Press, 1998. Edwards, Jonathan. Original Sin. Edited by Clyde A. Holbrook. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1970. Henry, Douglas V. "Does Reasonable Nonbelief Exist?" Faith and Philosophy 18 (1) (2001): 75-92. Hick, John. Faith and Knowledge. 2nd edition. NY: Cornell University Press, 1966. 9 Howard-Snyder, Daniel. "The Argument from Divine Hiddenness." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26 (3) (1996): 433-453. Howard-Snyder, Daniel, and Paul K. Moser, eds. Divine Hiddenness: New Essays. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Lehe, Robert T. "A Response to the Argument from the Reasonableness of Nonbelief." Faith and Philosophy 21 (2) (2004): 159-174. McKim, Robert. "The Hiddenness of God." Religious Studies 26 (1) (1990): 141-161. McKim, Robert. Religious Ambiguity and Religious Diversity. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. Morris, Thomas V. "The Hidden God." Philosophical Topics 16 (2) (1988): 5-21. Moser, Paul K. "Divine Hiddenness Does Not Justify Atheism," and "Reply to Schellenberg." In Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion, edited by Michael L. Peterson and Raymond J. VanArragon. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004. Murray, Michael J. "Coercion and the Hiddenness of God." American Philosophical Quarterly 30 (1993): 27-38. Pascal, Blaise. Pensees. Translated by A.J. Krailsheimer. Harmondsworth, U.K.: Penguin, 1966. Penelhum, Terence. Reason and Religious Faith. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995. Schellenberg, John L. Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993. Schellenberg, John L. "Divine Hiddenness Justifies Atheism" and "Reply to Moser." In Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion, edited by Michael L. Peterson and Raymond J. VanArragon. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004. Schellenberg, John L. "The Hiddenness Argument Revisited (I)" and "The Hiddenness Argument Revisited (II)." Religious Studies 41 (2005). Schellenberg, John L. Prolegomena to a Philosophy of Religion. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005. 10 Swinburne, Richard. Providence and the Problem of Evil. Oxford, U.K.: Clarendon Press, 1998. Wainwright, William J. Reason and the Heart: A Prolegomenon to a Critique of Passional Reason. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995.


Philosophy

Viewpoint Attentional Harms and Digital Inequalities Anna Hartford1, PhD; Dan J Stein2, PhD, DPhil 1Brain-Behaviour Unit, University of Cape Town, Cape Town, South Africa 2South African Medical Research Council Unit on Risk & Resilience in Mental Disorders, Department of Psychiatry & Neuroscience Institute, University of Cape Town, Cape Town, South Africa Corresponding Author: Anna Hartford, PhD Brain-Behaviour Unit University of Cape Town J-Block, Groote Schuur Hospital Cape Town, 7935 South Africa Phone: 27 214042174 Email: firstname.lastname@example.com Abstract Recent years have seen growing public concern about the effects of persuasive digital technologies on public mental health and well-being. As the draws on our attention reach such staggering scales and as our ability to focus our attention on our own considered ends erodes ever further, the need to understand and articulate what is at stake has become pressing. In this ethical viewpoint, we explore the concept of attentional harms and emphasize their potential seriousness. We further argue that the acknowledgment of these harms has relevance for evolving debates on digital inequalities. An underdiscussed aspect of web-based inequality concerns the persuasions, and even the manipulations, that help to generate sustained attentional loss. These inequalities are poised to grow, and as they do, so will concerns about justice with regard to the psychological and self-regulatory burdens of web-based participation for different internet users. In line with calls for multidimensional approaches to digital inequalities, it is important to recognize these potential harms as well as to empower internet users against them even while expanding high-quality access. (JMIR Ment Health 2022;9(2):e30838) doi: 10.2196/30838 KEYWORDS digital inequalities; attentional harms; excessive internet use; persuasive technologies; internet ethics; attention economies Introduction Over the past 3 decades, as the internet has become an increasingly indispensable tool for economic, social, and political inclusion, there has been extensive and warranted concern about the sorts of social inequalities, or stratifications, that are generated or exacerbated by digital exclusion. Initially, first-level research on these digital divides focused predominantly on the issue of access or nonaccess to the internet. However, as access has widened and as the field has developed, it has become clear that more complex and multidimensional analyses of digital inequalities are necessary. In turn, focus has shifted from access alone to include the quality of access; questions regarding digital literacy and proficiency (referred to as second-level digital divides) [1]; and, more recently, the ability to generate concrete social and economic benefits via the internet (referred to as third-level digital divides) [2,3]. Increasingly, there has been growing concern about the prejudicial nature of the harms, and not only the benefits, that can accompany web-based participation, particularly with regard to surveillance, algorithmic bias, and predatory marketing [4-14]. Among the potential harms associated with digital access, which can be exacerbated by socioeconomic forces and factors, are what we will be calling attentional harms. The present nature of the internet has made it an extraordinary draw on human attention, which has been amplified by the internet's design and commodification. The growing awareness of design features that encourage excessive use has necessitated an ethical reckoning regarding what is at stake when we introduce powerful forces of distraction into our lives at such an enormous scale or when human attention is treated as a commodity by the world's most powerful corporations. The acknowledgment of these factors has serious implications within multidimensional analyses of digital divides, especially insofar as our goal ought to be to provide digital access that JMIR Ment Health 2022 | vol. 9 | iss. 2 | e30838 | p. 1https://mental.jmir.org/2022/2/e30838 (page number not for citation purposes) Hartford & SteinJMIR MENTAL HEALTH XSL•FO RenderX empowers individuals and enriches their lives. In countries that have addressed earlier digital divides, the issue of attentional harms has become more pressing, and in some tech-heavy societies, being empowered to disconnect or having the option of "tech-lite" environments is increasingly seen as a privilege [15]. In many other countries, particularly those in the Global South, the issue of digital divides is understudied and underresearched, with the focus remaining predominantly on enduring first-level divides [16]. However, countries that are still addressing earlier digital divides now have the opportunity to do so in a more complex and multidimensional way, including by recognizing the potential harms and agential costs that can be generated by internet use, particularly when we are not adequately informed about and empowered against them. Attention Economies Broadly speaking, persuasive design is the process of creating technologies in order to generate behavioral change. One can distinguish between the intended and unintended effects of persuasive design [17] and between persuasive design and outright manipulative, deceptive, or coercive design [18,19], though in some cases these distinctions will be vague. Fogg [20] famously founded the Stanford Persuasive Technology Lab (now the Behavior Design Lab) and developed a behavior model for persuasive design. Concern about the ethics of persuasive design has accompanied the field from the outset. Fogg [21] himself has been careful to say that these techniques should not be used for ignoble purposes and has proposed that education is key to empowering individuals against nefarious forms of persuasive design. Recent ethical debates concerning design principles have emphasized the roles of participatory design and design justice as ways of overcoming marginalization and oppression [6,22-25] as well as advancing design that is aligned with, rather than opposed to, human well-being and flourishing (a point to which we will soon return) [26]. The so-called attention economy has come to dominate the provision of many web-based services. As such, success and profitability often relies on maximizing user engagement; the more often and the longer users engage with products, the more data manufacturers are able to collect on them and the longer manufacturers have them as an audience for advertisers. In turn, the goal of many software developers has been to design products that generate habitual engagement and maximize use, drawing on techniques from applied psychology, neuroscience, and behavioral economics in their efforts. Certain pervasive design features, such as "like" buttons (or their equivalents), push notifications, streaks, auto-play, and infinite scroll, have been especially successful in this regard and have proliferated across platforms. The success of some of these features in terms of maximizing use have often been attributed to intermittent variable rewards, which have long been linked to addictive behavior and are also associated with the addictive quality of slot machines [27,28]. At the level of our neural reward system, an uncertain reward generates a more significant dopamine response than those generated by a reliable reward. On prominent internet platforms, sophisticated machine learning technologies now endeavor to randomize rewards for each user. Insofar as these content "rewards" involve high arousal and extreme or divisive material, there are related concerns about social harms [29,30]. The effect of these design features on our behavior, and their draw on our attention, is patent. The habitual checking of certain internet platforms and incessant engagement with smartphones have become facts of life in many parts of the world. One report indicates that the average smartphone user checks their device over 70 times per day and swipes and interacts with it thousands of times [31]. Efforts to limit or reduce the time spent on devices, even among "ordinary" users, can require significant self-control and often results in failure [32]. The difficulty of focusing one's attention while having ready access to the internet has also become renowned, with many people investing in internet and site-blocking software in order to aid concentration. The mere presence of a smartphone has been reported to adversely affect working memory and functional fluid intelligence [33]. Persuasive design focused on maximizing use has come under increased scrutiny in recent years. Public interest about the effects of persuasive technologies on our behavior, mental health, and well-being has grown significantly, informed by a public conversation featuring tech insiders (notably the former Google design ethicist Tristan Harris), policy makers, health specialists, and educators, among others [34]. Some have argued that the increasing sophistication of persuasive digital technologies and their personalized nature makes them a far deeper and more considerable threat to autonomy than more long-standing and familiar forms of persuasive design [35]. Attentional Harms The value of our attention, that is, our ability to direct our attention in meaningful ways and our capacity for sustained attention, is as yet underexplored and undertheorized territory [15,35]. However, as the draws on our attention and the power of digital distractions reach such staggering scales and as our ability to focus our attention on our own considered ends erodes ever further, the need to understand and articulate what is at stake has become pressing. Yet, the necessary ethical frameworks (and even vocabularies) for understanding the significance of these forces are presently underdeveloped. Williams [35] writes: To date, the problems of "distraction" have been minimized as minor annoyances. Yet the competition for attention and the "persuasion" of users ultimately amounts to a project of the manipulation of the will. We currently lack a language for talking about, and thereby recognizing, the full depth of these problems. At individual levels, these problems threaten to frustrate one's authorship of one's own life. Amplifying this sentiment, Dennett [36] has said that "this is perhaps the greatest risk to human political freedom that we've ever seen," and that "an agent who controls your attention controls you." JMIR Ment Health 2022 | vol. 9 | iss. 2 | e30838 | p. 2https://mental.jmir.org/2022/2/e30838 (page number not for citation purposes) Hartford & SteinJMIR MENTAL HEALTH XSL•FO RenderX It is clear that what we pay attention to is closely related to our conscious awareness and, therefore, to deep aspects of our individual identity and what constitutes our experience of life. How we direct our attention has both voluntary and involuntary aspects, and our attention can be drawn and held in ways that are by no means indicative of our assessments of worth, including via persuasion, manipulation, and coercion. Insofar as we are compelled to direct ever more significant amounts of our attention in ways that we do not relate to on a deeper level or in ways that we would not reflectively endorse, there are elements of our very selfhoods that are at stake. An emerging philosophical conversation has sought to situate attentional harms within existing paradigms for understanding what is necessary for human well-being. For the purposes of this viewpoint, we only summarize some of the approaches that have been taken and gesture to other moral frameworks that might be applicable to the issue of attentional harms. As seen above, in exploring the harms implicit in pervasive attentional loss, some philosophers have focused on personal autonomy [35,36]. Other philosophers, drawing on Wolf [37], have emphasized the importance of the construction of worth and meaning to human well-being and have argued that persistent distraction undermines the pursuit of this goal [38]. Still others have drawn on Nussbaum's [39] capabilities approach, which asserts the moral importance of the freedom to achieve well-being and understands well-being in terms of an individual's capabilities, to argue that the harms of excessive time spent on the internet can undermine the capabilities central to human dignity [40]. An enduring difficulty within this debate concerns how to distinguish between beneficial and harmful co-options of our attention. After all, sometimes our attention is drawn precisely because we are highly invested in something and consider it enduringly worthwhile and meaningful. This can also be true of the time we spend on the internet; there is no end to what can be pursued on the internet, including essential and otherwise worthwhile undertakings, and therefore no straightforward relationship between the time spent on the internet and the sorts of attentional harms with which we are concerned. Further, within certain parameters, escapism itself can be stress relieving and curative. Given this: how can we recognize the harmless aspects, and even the beneficial aspects, of attentional loss while simultaneously recognizing where our attention is being co-opted in harmful ways and where we are giving over large swathes of our lives and receiving little in return but angst, regret, and alienation from our web-based pursuits? A deontological framework is potentially useful here; we can distinguish between cases where our attention is being used as a mere means to the ends of others and cases where it is being treated as an end in itself. Per this framework, in cases where our attention is used as a mere means, the sustained co-option of our attention can be construed as harmful. In cases where our attention is also treated as an end in itself-cases where our engagement is ultimately something we would reflectively endorse-the sustained co-option of our attention need not be harmful and may even be beneficial. Another important consideration in appraising these attentional harms is what has been called the indispensability thesis [15]. The all-purpose nature of digital devices, which include a range of essential and work-related functions, has resulted in the use of such devices increasingly becoming a requirement in both our personal and professional lives (and never more so than during the COVID-19 pandemic). This increasing indispensability has long motivated concern about digital inequalities in terms of the quality of access. However, the fact of indispensability also raises different ethical questions, and there is a sense in which the indispensability of (near-constant) internet access undermines full-fledged consent to the risks and deleterious effects associated with such access and engagement, given that there is increasingly no realistic alternative [15]. The current nature of the internet exacerbates this difficulty. In most cases, people cannot keep only the "essential" internet on them (ie, the parts they need to function or pursue their goals); people must always have access to the whole thing, including parts that might be sources of compulsion and regret. As Hanin [15] puts it: Whereas no sane adult must smoke, use drugs, consume sugary foods, or gamble as a precondition to leading a fulfilling life or excelling in a profession, many sane adults have no practical way of avoiding often prolonged entanglement with digital ecosystems in the workplace and their personal lives. This entanglement poses formidable psychological challenges for self-regulation. We agree with scholars who argue that widespread and systemic attentional harms should not be downplayed or dismissed and that they can potentially be deeply undermining to human agency and well-being. Respect for individuals ought to include respect for their attention, and any aspirational notion of the value of human life and the conditions for human flourishing ought to recognize the importance of our engaged presence and the ideal of achieving a sense of meaning and worth within our lives [26,41]. Insofar as digital distractions stymie these pursuits-often intentionally and on an utterly unprecedented scale-we are warranted in resisting or seeking to alter the forms these technologies take within our lives. Attentional Inequalities As research into digital inequalities has emphasized, in expanding access to web-based services, it is crucial to acknowledge that not all internet access is equal. This inequality also pertains to attentional harms. The potential burdens of internet access, including the psychological and self-regulatory burdens that we have been describing, are very differently felt by different users depending on their device, their digital literacy, their awareness of these potential harms, and their recourse to strategies for avoiding them. In societies where inequalities related to internet access have largely been overcome, socioeconomic vulnerability sometimes correlates with more time, rather than less time, on certain platforms, including social media and digital games [8,42]. In some places, "tech-lite" environments are becoming the ultimate JMIR Ment Health 2022 | vol. 9 | iss. 2 | e30838 | p. 3https://mental.jmir.org/2022/2/e30838 (page number not for citation purposes) Hartford & SteinJMIR MENTAL HEALTH XSL•FO RenderX privilege. For example, it is a much-reported fact that many Silicon Valley insiders send their children to the deliberately "tech-lite" Waldorf School [43]. Advocating for government-provided "tech-lite" environments, Hanin (writing from the United States of America) emphasizes that "poor and rich alike should have access to such settings, which may otherwise risk becoming a luxury for the few" [15]. Societies that are addressing earlier digital divides, including those in the Global South, should do so with cognizance of the emerging complexities and new stratifications regarding the potential attentional costs and burdens of access. In other words, the most empowering forms of connectivity are those that also empower us with strategies and effective methods for disengaging and disconnecting when we recognize, and are enabled to recognize [44], that time spent on the internet is impeding our own considered ends rather than serving them. Research has also suggested that socioeconomic vulnerability is a risk factor for developing clinically significant internet addiction [45]. Our earlier points about indispensability are relevant here too. One important consideration is determining how feasible it is for individuals to control their access, especially among those who are vulnerable to internet addiction or problematic use. As Christakis [46] writes: Cultural influences both mandate and facilitate that we spend time "online," meaning that teetotalism is not an option. Given our current understanding that there is a genetic predisposition to behavioral addictions, we may be going a long way toward ensuring that the entire susceptible population develops them. There are a range of straightforward socioeconomic factors that potentially contribute to attentional harms. Low-income internet users are much more likely to go on the internet by using their phone rather than a computer [8,47], which increases data vulnerability and, in many cases, limits control. Moreover, the ability to afford a more expensive smartphone provides a far higher degree of data privacy and greater control over which apps and services can be removed from a device or controlled within it, including those that someone might find to be compulsive or habit forming. A person who can afford to buy an iPhone (Apple Inc) or a parent who can afford to buy one for their child therefore has a far greater range of control over the time spent on their device and other use limits compared to that of someone who cannot afford to buy one [34]. Android phones (which cost one-third of the price of iPhones) have also been reported to collect significantly more personal data [48]. Data vulnerability has primarily been assessed through the lens of privacy and security [8,11]. However, another aspect of this vulnerability relates to attentional harms and the efficacy of targeted content. Increased data collection can generate a vicious cycle in which data can be deployed to better maximize use (through artificial intelligence–driven personalized recommendations and randomized rewards), which in turn allows more data to be gathered [8,15]. Relatedly, these factors increase vulnerability to predatory marketing tactics [13,49]. Socioeconomic inequalities in the burdens of attentional harms are liable to increase in coming years as divisions concerning who is aware of these harms emerge and as wealthier internet users buy their way out of some of the more noxious aspects of the web-based attention economy [44]. In considering ways to move away from the attention economy model, the most obvious suggestion is to require users to pay for services. In recommending regulations on persuasive technologies, Williams [35] suggests that "companies could be expected (or compelled, if necessary) to give users a choice about how to 'pay' for content online – that is, with their money or with their attention." Aspects of this choice are already prevalent on the internet, with the distinction between free and premium services. As Roose writes [50]: Today's internet is full of premium subscriptions, walled gardens and virtual VIP rooms, all of which promise a cleaner, more pleasant experience than their free counterparts. At present, available methods for mitigating attentional harms require significant digital literacy. In the first place, one must recognize such forces and the designs that exacerbate them, and one must further recognize the available means for resisting them. One study, which used education as a proxy for socioeconomic status, found that while internet users with both low and high education levels recognize the attentional burdens of being on the internet, especially with regard to wasted time, highly educated users were much more likely to intervene or to consider that time spent on the internet is potentially detrimental to their self-actualization [51]. Provided that one is aware of these options and, in many cases, is also able to pay for them, one can partially mitigate digital distraction by investing in site-blocking software, ad-blocking software, apps that generate screen time alerts, or devices that disable one's internet connection for certain hours. People can also hide more of their personal information, encrypt their browsing history, and invest in apps and plug-ins that overwrite certain persuasive design features and shift default settings to those that reduce use rather than amplify use [52]. If the goal of overcoming digital inequalities is to empower individuals and enhance their well-being and their access to opportunities, we have to be cognizant of aspects of digital access that are deliberately disempowering, undermine our pursuit of meaning and worth within our lives, and ultimately serve powerful corporate interests that might well conflict with the interests of individual users. The fact that these burdens can be compounded by socioeconomic factors generates further moral reasons to support decent minimum standards for design regulation and user controls (regardless of the cost of a device and regardless of whether services are free or paid for), since these burdens raise issues of justice with regard to the distribution of these essential controls and, in turn, raise issues of justice with regard to who will be empowered to better safeguard their attention as an end in itself and whose attention will be treated as a mere means to the ends of others. JMIR Ment Health 2022 | vol. 9 | iss. 2 | e30838 | p. 4https://mental.jmir.org/2022/2/e30838 (page number not for citation purposes) Hartford & SteinJMIR MENTAL HEALTH XSL•FO RenderX Acknowledgments A portion of the material within this viewpoint overlaps with a chapter that we have written for Mental Health in a Digital World [53], which overviewed some of the ethical implications of the addictive qualities of the internet. Conflicts of Interest None declared. References 1. Attewell P. The first and second digital divides. Sociol Educ 2001 Jul;74(3):252-259. [doi: 10.2307/2673277] 2. van Deursen AJAM, Helsper EJ. The third-level digital divide: Who benefits most from being online? Communication and Information Technologies Annual (Studies in Media and Communications) 2015;10:29-52. [doi: 10.1108/S2050-206020150000010002] 3. Ragnedda M. The Third Digital Divide: A Weberian Approach to Digital Inequalities. England, UK: Routledge; 2017. 4. Lutz C. 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JMIR Ment Health 2022 | vol. 9 | iss. 2 | e30838 | p. 6https://mental.jmir.org/2022/2/e30838 (page number not for citation purposes) Hartford & SteinJMIR MENTAL HEALTH XSL•FO RenderX Edited by J Torous; submitted 31.05.21; peer-reviewed by W LaMendola; comments to author 01.08.21; revised version received 15.10.21; accepted 15.10.21; published 11.02.22 Please cite as: Hartford A, Stein DJ Attentional Harms and Digital Inequalities JMIR Ment Health 2022;9(2):e30838 URL: https://mental.jmir.org/2022/2/e30838 doi: 10.2196/30838 PMID: ©Anna Hartford, Dan J Stein. Originally published in JMIR Mental Health (https://mental.jmir.org), 11.02.2022. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work, first published in JMIR Mental Health, is properly cited. The complete bibliographic information, a link to the original publication on https://mental.jmir.org/, as well as this copyright and license information must be included. JMIR Ment Health 2022 | vol. 9 | iss. 2 | e30838 | p. 7https://mental.jmir.org/2022/2/e30838 (page number not for citation purposes) Hartford & SteinJMIR MENTAL HEALTH XSL•FO RenderX


New Hope for Non-Reductive Physicalism

Philosophy

Non-reductive physicalism is committed to two theses:  first, that mental properties are ontologically autonomous, and second, that physicalism is true.  Jaegwon Kim has argued that this view is unstable â to honor one thesis, one must abandon the other.  In this paper, I present an account of property realization that addresses Kimâs criticism and that explains how the two theses are indeed comfortably compatible.

Page 1 of 11 NEW HOPE FOR NON-REDUCTIVE PHYSICALISM JULIE YOO Abstract: Non-reductive physicalism is committed to two theses: first, that mental properties are ontologically autonomous, and second, that physicalism is true. Jaegwon Kim has argued that this view is unstable – to honor one thesis, one must abandon the other. In this paper, I present an account of property realization that addresses Kim's criticism and that explains how the two theses are indeed comfortably compatible. The Problem Non-reductive physicalists want to hold on to the idea that higher-level properties – mental properties, especially – have an autonomous ontological standing, and hence, their own distinctive causal powers. But their equal commitment to physicalism threatens to undermine this commitment to the autonomy of higher-level properties. This is, in effect, Kim's dilemma for non-reductive physicalism: it is inherently unstable because the physicalism denies the irreducibility thesis, while the irreducibility thesis denies physicalism (Kim 1989, 1993, 1998, 2005). In this paper, I shall to propose a novel way of solving this dilemma. The Way Out of the Bind: Reducing Higher-Level Properties While Retaining their Powers My argument, in a nutshell, is this. A property exists if and only it can confer causal powers upon its bearers. Properties are individuated in terms of the distinctive range of causal powers each of them are capable of conferring. Now, mental properties confer causal powers completely in virtue of the physical properties on which they logically supervene, but no mental property is identical with a physical property. The concept of property realization renders possible the consistent conjunction of these two strands – irreducibility and physicalism. Page 2 of 11 Let us get started with a picture of multiple realizability to get us oriented with respect to its sister notion of property realization. On standard accounts of multiple realizability, it is believed that different physical properties – different physical types of kinds – P1, P2, ... Pn, can each necessitate one and the same type of mental M (or higher-level) property: Fig. 1 M R1 R2 ... Rn While this picture isn't wrong, the schematic nature of the diagram engenders an oversimplified way of thinking about realization that is misleading. It is misleading in that it gives the impression that a given realization R is a single physical property. But this convenient simplification obscures an important detail, much attended to by the emergentists, to their credit, and it is that a mental property is a property of a system made up of concrete aggregates and whose micro-physical properties and relations make the operations of the whole system or mechanism possible. To say that a property is multiply realizable is to say that a number of different kinds of systems or mechanisms – ones that are not only made up of different kinds of materials, but that also have different kinds of architectural configurations – can execute one and the same function. Think of the indispensible corkscrew: there is the rack and pinion model, the waiter's corkscrew, and the rigid coiled wire with a convenient handle. Each of these different kinds of mechanisms counts as a distinct type of realization; that is, the rack and pinion model is R1, the waiter's corkscrew is R2, and so on. A more careful look at what's going on suggests that a concrete instance of a given realization is best represented as being made up of inter-related micro-physical aggregates a1, a2, ..., an, having micro-physical properties P1, P2, ..., Pn, whose causal powers "constitute" the causal powers of M: Page 3 of 11 Fig. 2 M R1 R2 . . . Rn a1 a2 an b1 b2 bn P1 P2 Pn Q1 Q2 Qn The realizing base of M is the micro-physical properties P1, P2, ..., Pn of the constituent aggregates a1, a2, ..., an, which they instantiate in virtue of being the type of material or substance they are.1 Now, if physicalism is true, then each of these properties have causal powers that fully determine the causal powers of M. M, to use an emergentist term, is a resultant of each of the micro-physical properties P1, P2, ... Pn. The question, then, is how M is capable of having its own distinctive causal powers, given that M's powers are fully derived from its realizing base. The answer lies in drawing a connection between two things: a causal power conception of the nature of properties (Shoemaker 1984), now often called the "Eleatic theory of properties,"2 and the phenomenon of universalizability, as described by Robert Batterman (2000, 2001). I begin with universality. To the extent that each mental property, by all appearances, has a unique array of causal powers (the total facts about which a complete empirical functionalist analysis of mental properties would deliver) it satisfies a necessary condition for being a distinctive genuine property. Now, one of the remarkable things about nature is that there are higher-level regularities that are realized by very heterogeneous mechanisms. That is, wildly different kinds 1 Actually, Fig. 2 may also be too schematic. Depending on how we want to individuate the a's, it is possible for a given a to have many properties P, not just a single property in the way Fig. 2 represents. Take a particular corkscrew x and say that x is the rack and pinion kind. The individual x has the macro-property M of being a corkscrew in virtue of x's being composed of two handle bars, a flange, spindle, metal spiral, etc.. These are the a's that have the P's whose collective instantiation makes it possible for the a's to constitute x and enable it to do its thing. Now, the handle bars alone would have the properties of being handle-bar shaped, being rigid, being made of metal, and so on, so a given a is most likely to have properties P. I won't be too fussy about this detail, as Fig. 2 is sufficient as a working model.) 2 The Eleatic theory of properties is so called because the conception goes back to Plato's Eleatic stranger in the Sophist, who suggests that the mark of being is power. This idea is also codified in what Kim calls "Alexander's principle," named after the emergentist, Samuel Alexander, who argued that a property must have causal powers to exist. Page 4 of 11 of systems manage to accomplish the same kinds of tasks. This phenomenon is what Jerry Fodor 1997 has called a "metaphysical mystery" – how, in essence, things that are so different can still give rise to things that are the same: The very existence of the special sciences testifies to reliable macro-level regularities that are realized by mechanisms whose physical substance is quite typically heterogeneous. - Damn near everything we know about the world suggests that unimaginably complicated to-ings and fro-ings of bits and pieces at the extreme micro-level manage somehow to converge on stable macro-level properties. On the other hand, the 'somehow' really is entirely mysterious, ... [for we don't] see why there should be (how there could be) [macro-level regularities] unless, at a minimum, macro-level kinds are homogeneous in respect of their micro-level constitution. Which, however, functionalists in psychology, biology, geology, and elsewhere, keep claiming that they typically aren't. (Fodor 1997, pp. 160 – 61) We see the mystery across the special sciences: an animal's fitness, for example, can be realized by its reproductive success, lack of predators, abundance of food, and the good fortune of not suffering odd accidents; pain, to use everyone's favorite example, can be realized by C-fiber stimulation, silicon chips, or hydraulic mechanisms – all at least in principle. With all the heterogeneity at this lower level, it is indeed mysterious how they manage to give rise to stable, recurring, patterns and regularities that appear to hold with nomological force. (The converse is equally mysterious, namely, how such few types of fundamental particles, laws, and forces, give rise to the complexity and heterogeneity of our world, but this is a slightly different matter that will not be addressed here.) In his "Multiple Realizability and Universality," Batterman explains how the mysterious phenomenon, called "universality," is explained in physics. Multiple realizability is an instance of universal behavior. Universal behavior is where vastly different systems – systems with different microstructures, different architectures, different properties – exhibit identical behavior when characterized at some level of description: To begin to get an idea about the concept of universality as well as its ubiquity, consider the following homely example. One wants to explain the observed common behavior of pendulums – one wants, for example, to understand why pendulums with bobs of different colors, rods of different lengths, different Page 5 of 11 masses composed of diverse materials, etc., all have periods (for small oscillations) that are directly proportional to the square root of the length of the rod from which the bob is hanging. At one level the explanation is quite straightforward: one solves the very simple equation of motion for such a system. - But there is another why-question which is far from simple. Why, one might ask, are factors such as the color and (to a large degree) the constitution or microstructural makeup of the bobs irrelevant for answering our why-question about the period of the pendulums? Why is this equation, rather than one in which, say, a color parameter plays a prominent role, explanatory? In other words, what allows us to bracket, or set aside as 'noise' these other features of the individual pendulums as inessential or irrelevant for the explanation of the behavior of interest? These latter questions concern the explanation of universal behavior. (Batterman 2000, pp. 120 – 121) As Batterman explains, physics has managed to identify universal behavior in all kinds of systems – systems of thermodynamics near their critical points, certain limit theorems of probability – and construct very detailed explanations of those variables that are relevant for the behavior of a system's macro-level behavior (the length of the bob of the pendulum) and those that are mere negligible to the salient macro-level properties of the system (the color of a pendulum). The lesson to take away from this, according to Batterman, is that there are "physical reasons why the details of the makeup of the individual realizers may be largely irrelevant for the upper level behavior of the system" (Batterman's emphasis, 2000, p. 124). Now, while it is interesting that some of explanatory methods are sophisticated enough to handle universal behavior, our question is how our world is constructed so that it can display universal behavior while being composed of such a diverse heterogeneity of more basic physical (micro-physical) constituents. The question is decidedly about the metaphysics of the phenomenon, the "truth-makers" in the world that make our explanations of universality true. On my view, we need to look to the Eleatic theory of properties to lay out that metaphysics. On the Eleatic theory, properties are those things in virtue of which the objects having them can enter into causal relations. Thus, a property X is not the thing that has causal power K. Many people speak this way, but what they really mean is that a property confers causal powers. The things that have causal powers are individuals, like physical objects or events or other kinds of concrete particulars. A property, then, is individuated in terms of the unique array of causal powers it confers upon the individuals that have it. Its unique array is what I call its causal profile (see also Gillett 2002). The notion is drawn from two observations. First, that a property Page 6 of 11 in isolation from other properties is not enough to confer its bearer with a causal power, as many other contributing properties must also be instantiated. A property, then, is one among many others that contribute to the causal power of an object: (α) A property X contributes to a causal power K in a given circumstance just in case i. X is necessary for K, and ii. X, together with a set of properties Γ , is minimally sufficient to confer K. Thus, the relationship between a property and a causal power is not one-to-one. And this is the second observation: it is, in fact, many-many. For any property X, its instantiation in different circumstances can confer different causal powers, and for each type of causal power, different individuals can have that type of causal power though it instantiates different properties. (β) Possibly, for any property X, Xi contributes to Ki and Xj contributes to Kj and Xi = Xj, but Ki ≠ Kj. (χ) Possibly, for any causal power K, Xi contributes to Ki and Xj contributes to Ki and Ki = Kj but Xi ≠ Xj. The individuation conditions for a property can be stated thus: (δ) X and Y are the same property just in case they have exactly the same causal profile: for all actual and possible Ki and Kj, X contributes to Ki and Y contributes to Kj and Ki = Kj. The basic idea of (δ) is that X and Y are the same property if under all possible circumstances – all possible sets of properties Γ with which they can be conjoined – they contribute to all and only the same causal powers. For instance, if the property of having heat contributes to various causal powers in various circumstances – melt wax, boil water, bake brownies, ... – and the property of having a mean kinetic energy contributes to exactly the same causal powers in those same circumstances, then heat and mean kinetic energy are the same property. But given that mean kinetic energy is only one realization of heat among other realizers, this means that there is Page 7 of 11 a circumstance where heat and mean kinetic energy contribute to different causal powers and thus count as different properties. This theory about the nature of properties and their conditions for individuation gives us a very intuitive way of explaining the phenomenon of universality. On my view, the capacity to behave in universal ways is built into the profile of each physical property. That is, the things that make up the profile of a higher-level property are the profiles of many lower-level properties acting in concert. This is not emergentism. Let us return to the theological story about our cosmology to see why. A physicalist says that to create our world, God created physical particles, physical properties, and their governing laws, and nothing more. I would add that God also created ways for those physical properties to combine with each other in universal-behaving ways, ways that the special sciences are so adept at describing. These higher-level properties are genuine because higher-level predicates refer to entities that have unique causal profiles. The comparison with fractals may be instructive here: larger patterns, which are made up of smaller patterns, have properties that are unique to them. But those properties are entirely derived from or are "resultants" out of the properties of the smaller constituent patterns; it just so happens that the smaller patterns are constructed in such a way that they generate the larger patterns with their distinctive properties. So we get the higher-level properties and regularities because of the complex ways that physical systems can behave, and solely due to their physical nature. Perhaps another example will be helpful here. A wall will have certain properties that its individual component bricks do not have. An obvious property will be its mass m. For the purposes of illustration, let's say that all bricks have somewhat different masses. Now supposed that the wall were to engage in universal behavior with respect to its mass. Then bricks of different masses would regularly combine to create a wall with mass m, in a variety of different contexts (inside, outside, during the day, during the night, ... ), and in a number of different ways (the left side gets done first, then the right, or the layers get added one level at a time, or diagonally, ... ). They all lead to instances of wall-of-mass-m. This is quite remarkable, but there is nothing but physical ingredients and physical laws at work here. There need be no irreducible wall-of-mass-m property that imposes its causal powers from above. All the causal powers for the wall with its mass come strictly from the causal powers of the individual bricks and their mode of combination. Emergence doesn't come into the picture. It is a part of the nature of these bricks to form an object with the property of being a wall-of-mass-m. But this is Page 8 of 11 no more mysterious than the fact that it is a part of the nature of an electron to attract protons. Insofar as the property of being wall-of-mass-m makes a causal difference, and makes it in its uniquely distinctive ways, then by the theory of properties I have laid out, this is a genuine property, as genuine as the properties at the fundamental level. The Eleatic theory is purely democratic when it comes to determining which properties exist. The level doesn't matter. What matters is its profile. If my approach to the metaphysics of universality is right, then a whirl of many properties P1, P2, ... Pn and their corresponding profiles can give rise to a "larger" stable property M and with its corresponding profile, all thanks to nothing but the nature of the properties P1, P2, ... Pn. Non-Reductive Physicalism and Downward Causation One would be right to wonder whether my view preserves the original non-reductive physicalist conception of the world as having different "layers" or "levels" that are hierarchically arranged. On one way of looking at it, my view places everything in one grand level, so that there is no hierarchy of different levels that exist in a metaphysically robust way. Instead, all the entities and properties postulated by the sciences, special and micro-physical, are equally fundamental and mutually irreducible, living side by side, and running in and out of each other's lives. This picture is consistent with my view. As long as it does not violate the supervenience relations between properties that belong to traditionally different levels – the biological supervening upon the chemical, and mental supervening upon the biological, and so on – it certainly does not force us to alter our ways of how the sciences are related to each other. The important part of this proposal is that the supervening properties do indeed have their own causal powers, and hence, ultimately brings about physical changes when the supervening properties are instantiated. But it does so, not by exercising downward causation as on the classical emergentists view, but by constraining how the physical changes come about. The view, then, that I present, may better be described as an account of downward determination. Page 9 of 11 References Alexander, S. (1920). Space, Time, and Deity, 2 vols. London: Macmillan. Batterman, R. 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