Definitional dictionary of logic

Philosophy

DEFINITIONAL DICTIONARY OF LOGIC 2009 Complied by Dr Desh Raj Sirswal http://drsirswal.webs.com A Accident, Fallacy of: A fallacy committed when a general rule is applied to a specific case, but because of extenuating circumstances, the case is an exception to the general rule and the general rule should not be applied to the case. Amphiboly, Fallacy of: A fallacy containing a statement that is ambiguous because of its grammatical construction. One interpretation makes the statement true, the other makes it false. If the ambiguous statement is interpreted one way, the premise is true but the conclusion is false; but if the ambiguous statement is interpreted the other way, the premise is false. The meaning must shift if the argument is going to go from a true premise to a true conclusion. If the meaning is not allowed to shift during the argument, either the argument has false a premise or it is invalid. Appeal to Questionable Authority Fallacy (argumentum ad verecundiam):When someone attempts to support a claim by appealing to an authority that is untrustworthy, or when the authority is unqualified, or prejudiced, or has a motive to lie. Argument: An argument is a connected series of statements or propositions, some of which are intended to provide support, justification or evidence for the truth of another statement or proposition. Arguments consist of one or more premises and a conclusion. Argument Against the Person (argumentum ad hominem): This fallacy is committed when you attack a person s character or personal circumstances in order to oppose or discredit their argument or viewpoint. Argument form: In logic, the argument form or test form of an argument results from replacing the different words, or sentences that make up the argument with letters, along the lines of algebra; the letters represent logical variables. The sentence forms which classify argument forms of common important arguments are studied in logic.Thus, form is the manner in which all the constituents of the reasoning (premise as well as conclusion) are used. 2 Appeal to Force (argumentum ad baculum, literally argument from the stick ): A fallacy committed when an arguer appeals to force or to the threat of force to make someone accept a conclusion. Appeal to Ignorance (argumentum ad ignorantium): In this fallacy, someone argues that a proposition is true simply on the grounds that it has not been proven false (or that a proposition must be false because it has not been proven true). Appeal to Pity (argumentum ad misericordiam): A fallacy committed when the arguer attempts to evoke pity from the audience and tries to use that pity to make the audience accept a conclusion. Appeal to the People (argumentum ad populum): A fallacy committed when an arguer attempts to arouse and use the emotions of a group to win acceptance for a conclusion. Aristotle: Aristotle was the founder of logic as the science. He was one of the first scholars to carry out a systematic study of the propositions and arguments. Modern logic extends far beyond the work of traditional Aristotelian logic. Modern logicians, unlike the traditional logicians, have used mathematical methods and techniques to test the validity of arguments. Aristotelian Four-fold Classification of Categorical Propositions: Aristotle classified categorical proposition in four, based on Quality and Quantity distribution: Universal Affirmative – All S is P. – A Type Proposition Universal Negative – No S is P. – E Type Proposition Particular Affirmative– Some S is P. – I Type Proposition Particular Negative – Some S in not P. -O Type Proposition B Begging the Question Fallacy (petitio principii, meaning postulation of the beginning): This is committed when someone employs the conclusion (usually in some disguised form) as a premise in support of that same conclusion. Boolean analysis of Categorical Propositions: Boolean interpretation of categorical propositions depends on the empty classes. A class is either empty or has members. Universal propositions are equated to empty class (Zero) and particular propositions are not equate to empty class. C 3 Categorical Proposition: A categorical proposition is simply a statement about the relationship between categories. It states whether one category or categorical term is fully contained with another, is partially contained within another or is completely separate. Categorical Syllogism: A categorical syllogism is an argument consisting of exactly three categorical propositions (two premises and a conclusion) in which there appear a total of exactly three categorical terms, each of which is used exactly twice. Composition, Fallacy of :A fallacy in which someone uncritically assumes that what is true of a part of a whole is also true of the whole. Complex Question: This fallacy is committed when a question is asked in such a manner that a particular belief or assumption has been accepted as the basis for answering the question. Conclusion: In any argument, the proposition to which the other propositions in the argument are claimed to give support, or for which they are given as reasons. Conjunction: A truth-functional connective meaning ―and‖, symbolized by the dot. A statement of the form p.q is true if and only if p is true and q is true. Contingent: Most statement forms are neither tautologous nor self-contradictory; their truth-tables contain both Ts and Fs and called as contingent. Contradiction: A statement form whose column contains nothing but Fs, on the other hand, is said to be self-contradictory. Contradictory: Propositions are contradictory when the truth of one implies the falsity of the other, and conversely. Here we see that the truth of a proposition of the form All S are P implies the falsity of the corresponding proposition of the form Some S are not P. A and O or E and I are contradictories. Contrary: Propositions are contrary when they cannot both be true; if one is true, then other must be false. They can both be false. Note that corresponding A and E propositions, while contrary, are not contradictory. While they cannot both be true, they can both be false. Conditional or Hypothetical Proposition: A type of compound proposition, it is false only when the antecedent is true and the consequent is false. Connotation refers to the set of characteristics essentially possessed by every object denoted by the term. For example, man, Gita, Mohan, Kamal etc. Man means that possess morality and rationality. Morality and rationality = Connotation. Contraposition: An inference formed by replacing the subject term of a proposition with the complement of its predicate term, and replacing the predicate term by the complement 4 of its subject term. Not all contrapositions are valid. Contraposition is a reliable immediate inference for both A and O propositions; that is, the contrapositive of any A or O proposition is true if and only if the original proposition was true. Thus, in each of the pairs, both propositions have exactly the same truth-value. Conversion: An inference formed by interchanging the subject and predicate terms of a categorical proposition. Not all conversions are valid. Conversion grounds an immediate inference for both E and I propositions That is, the converse of any E or I proposition is true if and only if the original proposition was true. Thus, in each of the pairs noted as examples either both propositions are true or both are false. D Deductive Argument: A deductive argument is an argument in which it is thought that the premises provide a guarantee of the truth of the conclusion. In a deductive argument, the premises are intended to provide support for the conclusion that is so strong that, if the premises are true, it would be impossible for the conclusion to be false. Deductively valid: An argument is deductively valid if, whenever all premises are true, the conclusion is also necessarily true. An argument that is not valid is said to be  'invalid''. Deductive Reasoning eductive reasoning works from the more general to the more specific. Sometimes this is informally called a ―top-down‖ approach. We might begin with thinking up a theory about our topic of interest. We then narrow that down into more specific hypotheses that we can test. We narrow down even further when we collect observations to address the hypotheses. This ultimately leads us to be able to test the hypotheses with specific data - a confirmation (or not) of our original theories. Division, Fallacy of: A fallacy in which someone uncritically assumes that what is true of the whole must be true of the parts. Disjunction: Truth-functional connectives meaning ―or‖, so connected are called ―disjuncts.‖ Disjunctive Syllogism: This syllogism presents two alternatives in an ―either . . . or‖ form; one of the alternatives is for formal reasons assumed to be necessarily true, so that to deny one leaves the other as the only possibility. The two possibilities, called disjuncts, are stated in the major premise; one is and must be denied in the minor premise; and the other is affirmed in the conclusion. Dilemma: A dilemma means double proposition, it is a problem offering at least two solutions or possibilities, of which none are practically acceptable; one in this position 5 has been traditionally described as being impaled on the horns of a dilemma, neither horn being comfortable. Denotation denotes the objects, connotation connotes the characteristics. Denotation of a term refers to the objects or things which possess the quality. Man= Denotation. Distribution of Terms: A categorical term is said to be distributed if it contains all members of a categorical term. It is undistributed if the categorical proposition that contains it says does not something about all members of that categorical term. Disjunctive Proposition: A type of compound proposition; if true, at least one of the component of propositions must be true. Double Negation: An expression of logical equilalance; a rule of inference that permits the validity mutual replacement of any symbol by the negation of the negation of that symbol. Symbolized as ~~p. E Eduction: Eduction is of three types –Conversion , Obversion and Contraposition. These are not part of the square of opposition. They involve certain changes in their subject and predicate terms. The main concern is to converse logical equivalence. Enthymeme: An enthymeme, in its modern sense, is an informally stated syllogism (a three-part deductive argument) with an unstated assumption that must be true for the premises to lead to the conclusion. In an enthymeme, part of the argument is missing because it is assumed. In a broader usage, the term ―enthymeme‖ is sometimes used to describe an incomplete argument of forms other than the syllogism. Equivocation, Fallacy of:In this fallacy, a particular word or phrase is used with one meaning in one place, that word or phrase is used with another meaning in another place, and what has been established on the basis of the one meaning is regarded as established with respect to the other meaning. As a result, the conclusion depends on a word (or phrase) being used in two different senses in the argument. The premises are true on one interpretation of the word, but the conclusion follows only from a different interpretation. Euler diagrams: Euler diagrams or Euler circles are a diagrammatic means of representing sets and their relationships. They are the modern incarnation of Euler circles, which were invented by Leonhard Euler in the 18th century. Euler diagrams usually consist of simple closed curves in the plane which are used to depict sets. The spatial relationships between the curves (overlap, containment or neither) corresponds to settheoretic relationships (intersection, subset and disjointness). 6 Excluded middle, Principle of: This principle asserts that every statement is either true or false. Using our notation we may rephrase it by saying that the principle pÚ ~p must be true, that every such statement is a tautology. Exclusive premises, Fallacy of: A formal mistake in which both premises of a syllogism are negative. Existential fallacy: As a formal fallacy, the mistake of inferring a particular conclusion from two universal premises. Existential Import: Existential import means the commitment to the existence of certain object or thing, which is implied by the subject of a given proposition. If the class designated by the subject of the proposition has members, then the proposition is said to have existential import otherwise not. According to George Boole, a prominent modern logician, the universal propositions A and E do not have existential import while the particular proposition I and O have it. F Fallacy: Fallacy is an error of reasoning, it is mistake in judgment. It is a type of mistake in argumentation that might appear to be correct, but which proves upon examination not to be so. An argument is governed by certain rules, and violation of any one of them makes an argument invalid and fallacious. False Cause Fallacy: A fallacy involving faulty reasoning about causality. Fallacy of Drawing an affirmative conclusion from a negative premise, or drawing a negative conclusion from an affirmative premise. A formal mistake in which one premise of a syllogism is negative but the conclusion is affirmative. False Dilemma, Fallacy of: A fallacy committed when someone assumes there are only two alternatives, eliminates one of these two, and concludes in favor of the second, when more than the two stated alternatives exist, but have not been considered. Figures of Syllogism: The position of middle term in the premises decides the figure of a syllogism. The middle term can occur in four different ways in a standard form categorical syllogism. Form: The form or logical form of an argument is the representation of its sentences using the formal grammar and symbolism of a logical system to display its similarity with all other arguments of the same type.It consists of stripping out all spurious grammatical features from the sentence (such as gender, and passive forms), and replacing all the expressions specific to the subject matter of the argument by schematic variables. Thus, for example, the expression  all A's are B's' shows the logical form which is common to 7 the sentences  all men are mortals',  all cats are carnivores',  all Greeks are philosophers' and so on. Formal Fallacy: those outside the content of language–i.e., a fallacy that arises from an error in the form of an argument; it is (usually) independent of content. Formally valid: An argument is formally valid if its form is one such that for each interpretation under which the premises are all true also the conclusion is true. Four terms, Fallacy of: A formal mistake in which a categorical syllogism contains more than three terms. G Genetic Fallacy: A fallacy committed when someone attacks a view by disparaging the view s origin or the manner in which the view was acquired. George Boole (1815-1864): Boole was a well known British mathematician and logician. He in 1840 established the technique of using mathematical symbols and operations to solve problems in logic. He devised a method of expressing logical relationships in terms of algebra, now known as ―Boolean Algebra.‖ Guilt by association Fallacy :A type of abusive ad hominem in which one person attacks a second person s associates in order to discredit the person and thereby his view or argument. H Hasty Generalization, Fallacy of: A fallacy committed when someone draws a generalization about a group on the basis of observing an unrepresentative sample of the group. Hypothetical Syllogisms In a hypothetical syllogism the first premise (or major proposition) presents an uncertain condition (―if A, then B‖) or a problem (―either A or B‖; ―S and T cannot both be true‖) which must then be properly resolved by the second premise so that a valid conclusion can follow. The resolution of the problem is always in the form of affirmation or denial. I 8 Identity, Principle of: This principle asserts that if any statement is true, then it is true. Using our notation we may rephrase it by saying that the principle of identity asserts that every statement of the from pÉp must be true, that every such statement is tautology. Illicit major, Fallacy of : A formal mistake in which the major term of a syllogism is undistributed in the major premise, but is distributed in the conclusion. Illicit minor, Fallacy of: A formal mistake in which the minor term of a syllogism is undistributed in the minor premise, but is distributed in the conclusion. Immediate inference: In immediate inference there is one and only one premise and from this sole premise conclusion is drawn. Various kinds of immediate inferences may be distinguished traditionally including conversion, Obversion and contraposition. Induction: Induction like deduction is a form of reasoning; it is a type of inference in which from some observed instances a conclusion is drawn about the unobserved instances of the same kind. Though the premises do not necessarily imply the conclusion in induction, yet the premises are good reason for drawing the conclusion. No empirical science, natural or social science, which aims to describe nature, world, or society, can do without induction. Infact all sciences, except pure mathematics and formal logic, are making extensive use of inductive inferences. Inductive Arguments: An inductive argument is an argument in which it is thought that the premises provide reasons supporting the probable truth of the conclusion. In an inductive argument, the premises are intended only to be so strong that, if they are true, then it is unlikely that the conclusion is false. Inductive Reasoning: Inductive reasoning works the other way, moving from specific observations to broader generalizations and theories. Informally, we sometimes call this a ―bottom up‖ approach (please note that it's ―bottom up‖ and not ―bottoms up‖ which is the kind of thing the bartender says to customers when he's trying to close for the night!). In inductive reasoning, we begin with specific observations and measures, begin to detect patterns and regularities, formulate some tentative hypotheses that we can explore, and finally end up developing some general conclusions or theories. Inference: Inference is the act or process of deriving a conclusion based solely on what one already knows. Inference has two types. They are deductive, when we move from the general to the particular and inductive where the conclusion is wider in extent than the premises. In intelligence testing, mostly deductive inference ability is judged. Informal Fallacy: those dependent upon language– i.e., a fallacy that arises from the content of an argument (the what is said, not the how it is said). Irrelevant Conclusion, Fallacy of (ignoratio elenchi, meaning ignorance of the proof ):A fallacy in which someone puts forward premises in support of a stated conclusion, but the premises actually support a different conclusion. 9 Inversion: Inversion is yet another form of immediate inference which is not independent; it makes use of conversion and Obversion. In inversion the subject of the conclusion is contradictory of the subject of the premise, and predicate of the conclusion is contradictory of the predicate of the premise. Inversion of all categorical propositions is valid. L Laws of Thought: Three tautologies-the principle of identity, the principle of contradiction, and the principle of excluded middlethat have sometimes been held to be the fundamental principles of all reasoning. Logic: Logic is the study of the methods and principles used to distinguish correct reasoning from incorrect reasoning. Knowledge of logic helps one to face a problem in a more orderly and systematic way and in many cases makes the solution less difficult and more certain. Like any other active field of study, it too has grown in many directions. Today, logic is both a branch of philosophy and a branch of mathematics. It is applications as well known in the area of artificial intelligence. Logical Deduction: Another important factor in logical reasoning is logical deduction. Deriving an inference from units of arguments which are called proposition in logic or deducing an inference from statements is called logical deduction. For example: All men are mortal. Raveesh is a man. Therefore, Raveesh is mortal. From statement (a) and (b) we derive a logical conclusion that Raveesh is mortal. Logical Reasoning: Reasoning is an art as well as a science; it is something we do as well as understand. The mental recognition of cause –and –effect relationship is called  reasoning'. It may be prediction of an event from an observed cause or the inference of a cause from an observed event. Logical Reasoning is a process of passing from the known to the unknown. It is the process of deriving a logical inference from a hypothesis through reasoning. M 10 Major Premise: Since one of the premises of the syllogism must be a categorical proposition that affirms some relation between its middle and major terms, we call that the major premise of the syllogism. Major Term: The major term of the syllogism is whatever is employed as the predicate term of its conclusion. Material Equivalence: A truth-functional relation (symbolized by the three bars sign, @) that may connect two statements. Two statements are materially equivalent when they are both true, or when they are both false, that is, when they have the same truth value. Material Implication: A truth-functional relation (symbolized by the horseshoe, É ) that may connect two statements. The statement ―p materially implies q‖ is true when either p is false, or q is true. It is a weak relation: it does not refer to the meaning of the statements connected, but mere asserts that it is not the case both that p is true and q is false. Mediate Inference: In mediate inference conclusion draw from more than two premises. We also call it syllogism. It has many types. For example, Categorical, Disjunctive, Hypothetical etc. Middle Term: In a standard form syllogism the middle term doesn't occur in the conclusion at all, but must be employed in somewhere in each of its premises; hence, we call it the middle term. Minor Term: One of those terms must be used as the subject term of the conclusion of the syllogism, and we call it the minor term of the syllogism as a whole. Minor Premise: The other premise, which links the middle and minor terms, we call the minor premise. Moods of Syllogism: Mood of a syllogism means arrangement of premises and conclusion. For instance AAA in the first figure is expressed as: All M is P All S is M./ Therefore all S is P. N Negation: Denial; symbolized by the tilde or curl, ~p simply means ―it is not the case that p‖ and may be read as ―not-p.‖ Non Causa Pro Causa fallacy :In a Non Causa Pro Causa fallacy ( not the cause for the cause ) someone claims that A is the cause of B, when in fact (1) A is not the cause of B, but (2) the mistake is not based merely on one thing coming after another thing. One 11 version of this fallacy is the fallacy of accidental correlation: the arguer concludes that one thing is the cause of another thing from the mere fact that the two phenomena are correlated. Noncontradiction ,Principle of: This principle asserts that no statement can be both true and false. Using our notation we may rephrase it by saying that the principle of noncontradiction asserts that every statement of the form p *~p must be false, that every such statement is self-contradictory. O Obversion: An inference formed by changing the quality of a proposition and replacing the predicate term by its complement. Obversion is valid for any standard form Categorical proposition. Obversion is the only immediate inference that is valid for categorical propositions of every form. In each of the instances, the original proposition and its obverse must have exactly the same truth-value, whether it turns out to be true or false. Opposition: Any logical relation, including Subalternation, among the kinds of categorical proposition (A,E, I and O) exhibited on the square of opposition. P Particular Proposition: A proposition that refers to some but not to all the members of a class. The particular affirmative proposition (I) say that ―Some S is P.‖ The particular negative proposition (O) says that ―Some S is not P.‖ In both traditional and modern logic, particular propositions are understood to have existential import Poisoning the Well: The use of emotionally charged language to discredit an argument or position before arguing against it. Post Hoc Ergo Propter Hoc fallacy: In a Post Hoc Ergo Propter Hoc fallacy ( after this, therefore, because of this ) someone concludes that A is the cause of B simply on the grounds that A preceded B in time. Premise: The premises are those statements that are taken to provide the support or evidence; the conclusion is that which the premises allegedly support. Proposition: A proposition is a judgment expressed in a language and a judgment is a mental act in which two or more than two ideas are combined together. A proposition links nouns, pronouns and phrases to other words in a sentence. The word or phrase that the proposition introduces is called the object of the proposition. Propositional Function: In quantification theory, an expression from which a proposition may result either by instantiation or by generalization. 12 Q Quality: An attribute of every categorical proposition determined by whether the proposition affirms or denies some form of class inclusion. Every categorical proposition is either affirmative or negative in quality. Quantity: An attribute of every categorical proposition, determined by whether the proposition refers to all members or only to some members of the class designated by its subject term. Thus, every categorical proposition is either universal or particular in quantity. R Red Herring Fallacy: A fallacy committed when the arguer tries to divert attention from his opponent s argument by changing the subject and drawing a conclusion about the new subject. S Sentence: A unit of language that express a complete thought; sentence may express a proposition, but is distinct from a proposition it may be used to express. Slippery Slope Fallacy (or domino argument ): In this fallacy, someone objects to a position P on the grounds that P will set off a chain reaction leading to trouble; but no reason is given for supposing the chain will actually occur. Metaphorically, if we adopt a certain position, we will start sliding down a slippery slope and we won t be able to stop until we slide all the way to the bottom (where some bad result lies in wait). Snob Appeal Fallacy: This is committed when the arguer claims that if you will adopt a particular conclusion, this will place you in a special, elite group or will make you better than everyone else. Sorites: An argument in which a conclusion is inferred from any number of premises through a chain of syllogistic inferences. Special Pleading, Fallacy of: In this fallacy, the arguer applies a principle to someone else s case but makes a special exception to the principle in his own case. Square of Opposition: Any logical relation among the kinds of categorical propositions (A, E,I and O) exhibited on the Square of Opposition. There are four ways in which 13 propositions may be ―observed‖ –as Contradictories, Contraries, Sub-contraries and subalternation. These are represent with an important and widely used diagram called the Square of Opposition. Statement: A proposition; what is typically asserted by a declarative sentence, but not the sentence itself. Every statement must be either true or false, although the truth or falsity of a given statement may be unknown. Statement Forms: Any sequence of symbols containing statement variables but no statements, such that when statements are consistently substituted for the statement variables, the result is a statement. Straw Man Fallacy: A fallacy committed when an arguer (a) summarizes his opponent's argument but the summary is an exaggerated, ridiculous, or oversimplified representation of the opponent s argument that makes the opposing argument appear illogical or weak; (b) the arguer refutes the weakened, summarized argument; and (c) the arguer concludes that the opponent s actual argument has been refuted. Subject and Predicate: The first term in the proposition is the subject. The second term is the predicate. For example: Some dogs (subject) are friendly (predicate). Suppressed Evidence, Fallacy of: In this fallacy, evidence that would count heavily against the conclusion is left out of the argument or is covered up. Subalternation: Two propositions are said to stand in the relation of Subalternation when the truth of the first (―the superaltern‖) implies the truth of the second (―the subaltern‖), but not conversely. In traditional logic, the truth of an A or E proposition implies the truth of the corresponding I or O proposition, respectively. Consequently, the falsity of an I or O proposition implies the falsity of the corresponding A or E proposition, respectively. However, the truth of a particular proposition does not imply the truth of the corresponding universal proposition, nor does the falsity of an universal proposition carry downwards to the respective particular propositions. Subcontrary: Propositions are subcontrary when it is impossible for both to be false; it one is false the other must be true. They can both be true. I and O propositions are subcontrary, but not contrary or contradictory. Syllogism: Any deductive argument in which a conclusion is inferred from. Two statements which are assumed to be true (or premises) that lead to a conclusion. Syllogistic Moods: Logicians also speak of syllogistic moods. Moods are defined as the arrangement of the premises according to quantity (universal or particular) and quality (affirmative or negative). T 14 Tautology: A statement form all of whose substitution instances must be true. The truthtable contains nothing but Ts is said to tautologious. Truth and Validity: The term validity (also called logical truth, analytic truth, or necessary truth) as it occurs in logic refers generally to a property of particular statements and deductive arguments. Although validity and logical truth are synonymous concepts, the terms are used variously in different contexts. Whether or not logical truth is analytic truth is a matter of clarification. Truth table: An array on which all possible truth values of compound statements are displayed, through the display of all possible combinations of the truth values of their simple components. A truth table may be used to define truth-functional connectives; it may also be used to test the validity of many deductive arguments. Truth Value: The status of any statement as true, or false (T or F). Truth-Functional Compound Statement: A compound statement whose truth function is wholly determined by the truth values of its components. They also known as truth functional connectives. Truth-Functional Component: Any component of a compound statement whose replacement by another statement having the same truth value would not change the truth value of the compound statement. Truth-Functional Connective: Any logical connective (including conjunction, disjunction, material implication, and material equivalence) between the components of a truth –functional compound statement. Tu Quoque Fallacy (you re one, too):A type of abusive ad hominem that attempts to discredit a person s viewpoint or position by charging the person with hypocrisy or inconsistency. Essentially, the charge is, We don t need to take his argument seriously because he doesn't practice what he preaches. U Undistributed middle, Fallacy of: A formal mistake in which a categorical syllogism contains a middle term that is not distribute in either premise. Uniform translation: Techniques (often requiring the use of auxiliary symbols making possible the reformation of a syllogistic argument into standard form, so that it may be accurately tested. V 15 Validity: To say that an argument is valid is to say that the conclusion really does follow from the premises. That is, an argument is valid precisely when it cannot possibly lead from true premises to a false conclusion. Venn diagrams: Venn diagrams or set diagrams are diagrams that show all hypothetically possible logical relations between a finite collections of sets(groups of things). Venn diagrams were conceived around 1880 by John Venn. They are used in many fields, including set theory, probability, logic, statistics, and computer science. Venn and Boolean Expression of Categorical Proposition: The modern interpretation of categorical logic also permits a more convenient way of assessing the truth-conditions of categorical propositions, by drawing Venn diagrams, topological representations of the logical relationships among the classes designated by categorical terms. W Weak Analogy, Fallacy of : A fallacy committed when an analogical argument is presented but the analogy is too weak to support the conclusion. Cited from: A Class-Room Introduction to Logic Link: http://niyamaklogic.wordpress.com/definitional-dictionary-of-logic/ 30-08-2011 © Desh Raj Sirswal 2007-


Philosophy

We are in a state of impending crisis.  And the fault lies in part with academia.  For two centuries or so, academia has been devoted to the pursuit of knowledge and technological know-how.  This has enormously increased our power to act which has, in turn, brought us both all the great benefits of the modern world and the crises we now face.  Modern science and technology have made possible modern industry and agriculture, the explosive growth of the worldâs population, global warming, modern armaments and the lethal character of modern warfare, destruction of natural habitats and rapid extinction of species, immense inequalities of wealth and power across the globe, pollution of earth, sea and air, even the AIDS epidemic (AIDS being spread by modern travel).  All these global problems, involving preventable deaths of millions, have arisen because some of us have acquired unprecedented powers to act without acquiring the capacity to act wisely.  We urgently need to bring about a revolution in universities so that the basic intellectual aim becomes, not knowledge merely, but rather to help humanity acquire the capacity to resolve conflicts and problems of living in more cooperatively rational ways.  The revolution we need would affect every branch and aspect of academic inquiry.  The basic intellectual task of academia would be to articulate our problems of living (personal, social and global) and propose and critically assess possible solutions, possible actions. This would be the task of social inquiry and the humanities. Tackling problems of knowledge would be secondary. Social inquiry would be at the heart of the academic enterprise, intellectually more fundamental than natural science. On a rather more long-term basis, social inquiry would be concerned to help humanity build cooperatively rational methods of problem-solving into the fabric of social and political life, so that we may gradually acquire the capacity to resolve our conflicts and problems of living in more cooperatively rational ways.  Natural science would change to include three domains of discussion: evidence, theory, and aims â the latter including discussion of metaphysics, values and politics.  Academia would actively seek to educate the public by means of discussion and debate.  These changes all come from demanding that academia cure its current damaging structural irrationality, so that reason â the authentic article â may be devoted to promoting human welfare.

CHAPTER SEVEN The Urgent Need for an Academic Revolution: The Rational Pursuit of Wisdom Nicholas Maxwell Introduction We are in a state of impending crisis. And the fault lies in part with academia. For two centuries or so, academia has been devoted to the pursuit of knowledge and technological know-how. This has enormously increased our power to act which has, in turn, brought us both all the great benefits of the modern world and the crises we now face. Modern science and technology have made possible modern industry and agriculture, the explosive growth of the world's population, global warming, modern armaments and the lethal character of modern warfare, destruction of natural habitats and rapid extinction of species, immense inequalities of wealth and power across the globe, pollution of earth, sea and air, even the AIDS epidemic (AIDS being spread by modern travel). All these global problems, involving preventable deaths of millions, have arisen because some of us have acquired unprecedented powers to act without acquiring the capacity to act wisely. We urgently need to bring about a revolution in universities so that the basic intellectual aim becomes, not knowledge merely, but rather to help humanity acquire the capacity to resolve conflicts and problems of living in more cooperatively rational ways. The revolution we need would affect every branch and aspect of academic inquiry. The basic intellectual task of academia would be to articulate our problems of living (personal, social and global) and propose and critically assess possible solutions, possible actions. This would be the task of social inquiry and the humanities. Tackling problems of knowledge would be secondary. Social inquiry would be at the heart of 2 the academic enterprise, intellectually more fundamental than natural science. On a rather more long-term basis, social inquiry would be concerned to help humanity build cooperatively rational methods of problem-solving into the fabric of social and political life, so that we may gradually acquire the capacity to resolve our conflicts and problems of living in more cooperatively rational ways. Natural science would change to include three domains of discussion: evidence, theory, and aims – the latter including discussion of metaphysics, values and politics. Academia would actively seek to educate the public by means of discussion and debate. These changes all come from demanding that academia cure its current damaging structural irrationality, so that reason – the authentic article – may be devoted to promoting human welfare. That, in outline, is my thesis and argument. In order to develop my case in a little more detail, let me begin with a slightly more detailed discussion of our current global problems. Our Grave Global Problems There is, to begin with, the problem of the sustained and profound injustice of immense differences of wealth across the globe, the industrially advanced first world of North America, Europe and elsewhere experiencing unprecedented wealth while something like a third of all people alive today, in Africa, south America, Asia and elsewhere, live in conditions of poverty in the developing world, hungry, unemployed, without proper housing, health care, education, or even access to safe water. UNICEF estimates that over 9 million children die every year from preventable causes – some 25,000 every day. There is the problem of the lethal character of modern warfare. Whereas something like 12 million people were killed in wars in the 19th century, over 100 million died in wars in the 20th century – and we have not done very well in the 21st century so far. There is the 3 arms trade, the massive stockpiling of armaments, even by poor countries, and the ever-present threat of their use by terrorists or in war, whether the arms be conventional, chemical, biological or nuclear. And not only is there the threat of terrorism: even more serious, perhaps, there are the dire consequences of our appalling responses to terrorism.1 There is the problem of the progressive destruction of tropical rain forests and other natural habitats, with its concomitant devastating extinction of species. There is the long-standing problem of the rapid growth of the world's population, especially pronounced in the poorest parts of the world, and adversely affecting efforts at development. If current trends continue there will be over nine and a half billion people in the world by the middle of the century. There is the horror of the AIDS epidemic, again far more terrible in the poorest parts of the world, devastating millions of lives, destroying families, and crippling economies. And over all this hangs the menace of global warming. We have known about global warming for a very long time. John Tyndall discovered that carbon dioxide is a greenhouse gas as long ago as 1859, and Svante Arrhenius realised in 1896 that we would cause global warming. The first person really to discover that we are causing global warming was Guy Callendar, who gave a lecture to the Meteorological Society in London on the subject in 1938. He was not believed – and of course, 1938 was not the best time to make the announcement! Any lingering doubts should have been removed, however when, in the late 1950s, Charles Keeling, in Hawaii, began to make extremely accurate measurements of the increase in carbon dioxide in the atmosphere.2 Nearly half a century later, we are just beginning to realise how serious the problem is. We have hardly begun to do anything about it. Some experts think it is already too late. If we carry on as we are, vast tracts of the earth's surface will become uninhabitable. Even if we cut back dramatically on our CO2 emissions globally overnight, global warming 4 will still occur. And there are dreadful dangers. Ice at the poles and in glaciers is melting at an alarming rate. As the polar ice melts, less sunlight is reflected back into space, which further contributes to global warming. And there are a number of other such 'tipping points'. Vast quantities of methane are trapped in permanently frozen ground in Canada and Russia, and under the sea. If global warming melts this ground, and the methane is released from the earth and sea, as is already happening to some extent, this will further accelerate warming, as methane is a very much stronger greenhouse gas than carbon dioxide. Global warming might turn tropical rain forests, already under threat, into deserts: the destruction of trees and other vegetation that this would involve would further contribute to carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, and to global warming. Even if we avoid the worst, nevertheless millions of people may die as a result of drought, hurricanes, floods, and rising tides. The Urgent Need for an Academic Revolution. What can we do to tackle these immense global problems more effectively and humanely than we are doing at present? There are endlessly many different things that need to be done, some of which are being done. But I want to concentrate on just one crucial institution, rarely mentioned in the present context, which nevertheless has a crucial role to play – namely academia. Academia – universities and schools – ought to be playing a vital role in helping us discover what we need to do to tackle our global problems, and how we can motivate ourselves to do what we need to do. Sustained exploration of what our global problems are, and what we need to do in order to help resolve them, ought to be at the heart of the academic enterprise. But this is not the case. Instead, academia has, by and large, concentrated on the pursuit of knowledge and technological know-how. And in some respects this has just made matters worse. Modern science 5 and technological know-how have made possible all our current global problems, so characteristic of our age. Indeed, in a perfectly respectable sense of "cause", science and technology have caused our global problems (Maxwell, 2000). Natural science has been extraordinarily successful in improving knowledge. This has had all sorts immensely beneficial results, for medicine, agriculture, industry, transport, communications, etc., etc. – as well as having the intrinsic value of enormously enhancing our knowledge and understanding of the universe around us. The modern world is inconceivable without modern science. But knowledge and technological know-how increase our capacity to act which, in addition to having beneficial consequences, can also have harmful ones, whether intended, as in war or terrorism, or unintended as – at least initially – in the case of environmental degradation. Scientific knowledge and technological know-how make modern industry, agriculture, medicine and hygiene possible, which in turn lead to population growth, destruction of natural habitats and extinction of species, pollution of the earth, sea and air, global warming, and even the AIDS crisis – AIDS being spread by modern travel. And modern technology has massively increased the lethal character of modern war, and terrorism. Martin Rees, the current President of the Royal Society, thinks the dangers are so great this may even be "our final century" – the title of a book of his (Rees, 2003). What has gone wrong? Some blame science for our troubles – but that rather misses the point. As I shall argue in a moment, we need to learn from the immense success of science, rather than just blame it for our troubles. What has gone wrong is that academic inquiry as a whole has concentrated on acquiring knowledge dissociated from a more fundamental concern with helping us learn how to tackle our problems of living in cooperatively rational ways. 6 Instead of giving priority to problems of living, academia has concentrated on solving problems of knowledge and this, entirely predictably, has resulted in our current global problems. Judged from the really quite orthodox standpoint of helping to promote human welfare, academic inquiry devoted to acquiring knowledge is grossly and damagingly irrational – and this is, in the long term, the source of our troubles. The crisis of our times – the crisis behind all the others – is science without wisdom. Far from trying to ameliorate this crisis, modern science and academia in important respects have the effect of intensifying it. Here, then, in outline, is the nub of my thesis and argument. We need to distinguish two conceptions and kinds of inquiry which I shall call knowledge-inquiry and wisdom-inquiry. Knowledge-inquiry is, by and large, what we have at present. It is, however, damagingly and profoundly irrational, in a wholesale, structural way. Wisdom-inquiry results when knowledge-inquiry is modified just sufficiently to become a kind of inquiry rationally devoted to helping promote human welfare by intellectual and educational means. Two arguments establish that knowledge-inquiry is irrational, one that appeals to problemsolving rationality, and a second that appeals to aim-oriented rationality. The outcome of these arguments is that we urgently need to bring about a revolution in academia so that the basic task becomes to help humanity learn how to create a better world. The argument, as just stated, simplifies matters somewhat, as I shall indicate as we proceed. Academia today does not, in every respect, conform to the edicts of knowledge-inquiry. Many universities are probably, in academic practice, an admixture of the two conceptions of inquiry. Furthermore, as I shall indicate, there are hints that, in recent years, the influence of wisdom-inquiry is on the increase. The revolution may already be underway! Nevertheless, at the 7 time of writing, knowledge-inquiry is still the dominant view in academic practice.3 Knowledge-Inquiry: Exposition Knowledge-inquiry demands that a sharp split be made between the social or humanitarian aims of inquiry and the intellectual aim. The intellectual aim is to acquire knowledge of truth, nothing being presupposed about the truth. Only those considerations may enter into the intellectual domain of inquiry relevant to the determination of truth – claims to knowledge, results of observation and experiment, arguments designed to establish truth or falsity. Feelings and desires, values, ideals, political and religious views, expressions of hopes and fears, cries of pain, articulation of problems of living: all these must be ruthlessly excluded from the intellectual domain of inquiry as having no relevance to the pursuit of knowledge – although of course inquiry can seek to develop factual knowledge about these things, within psychology, sociology or anthropology. Within natural science, an even more severe censorship system operates: an idea, in order to enter into the intellectual domain of science, must be an empirically testable claim to factual knowledge. The basic idea of knowledge-inquiry, then, is this. First, knowledge is to be acquired; then it can be applied to help solve social problems. For this to work, authentic objective knowledge must be acquired. Almost paradoxically, human values and aspirations must be excluded from the intellectual domain of inquiry so that genuine factual knowledge is acquired and inquiry can be of genuine human value, and can be capable of helping us realise our human aspirations. At the core of knowledge-inquiry there is a conception of science which may be called standard empiricism: the basic intellectual aim of science is truth, and the basic method is to assess claims to knowledge with respect to evidence, nothing 8 being assumed permanently about the universe independent of evidence.4 Knowledge-inquiry exercises a profound influence over the whole character and structure of academia – in influencing such things as what is to count as a contribution to thought, criteria for publication, factors influencing promotions, prizes and academic status, content of thought and education.5 Not everything in academia conforms to knowledge-inquiry. It is qualified by the influence of the Romantic movement, by what Isaiah Berlin (1980, pp. 1-24) called the counter-Enlightenment, and by recent fads such as postmodernism, relativism and social constructivism, all of which, in various ways, cast doubt on the feasibility or value of science, knowledge and rationality.6 And, as I have mentioned, a few recent, scattered hints of movement toward wisdom-inquiry can perhaps be discerned. Knowledgeinquiry is, however, the only widely understood current ideal of rational inquiry, and its influence, by and large, still prevails. It is vital to appreciate that the problem with knowledgeinquiry is not that it gives too much emphasis to rationality but, quite the contrary, that it is a characteristic form of irrationality masquerading as rationality. Knowledgeinquiry violates three of the four most elementary rules of reason one can think of. From Knowledge-Inquiry to Wisdom-Inquiry: First Argument I now spell out my first argument in support of my contention that knowledge-inquiry, despite being the predominant influence over academia today, is nevertheless profoundly and damagingly irrational in a wholesale, structural way, there being, for both intellectual and humanitarian reasons, an urgent need to put wisdom-inquiry into academic practice instead. 9 But first, what do I mean by "rationality"? As I use the term, rationality appeals to the idea that there is some no doubt rather ill-defined set of rules, methods or strategies which, if implemented, give us, other things being equal, our best chances of solving our problems, achieving our aims. The rules of reason don't guarantee success, don't prescribe in detail what we must do or think, and cannot be mechanically implemented. They require us, when relevant, to attend to our feelings, desires, intuition and imagination. They are meta-rules, in that they presuppose that we can already put many specific rules into practice in acting successfully in the world, and tell us how to marshal what we can already do to give ourselves the best chances of solving new problems, realizing new aims. Four basic rules of rational problem-solving are: (1) Articulate, and try to improve the articulation of, the problem to be solved. (2) Propose and critically assess possible solutions. (3) If the problem to be solved is especially difficult, specialize. That is, break the problem up into subordinate problems, and formulate preliminary, easier-to-solve versions of the problem, in an attempt to work gradually to the solution to the basic problem to be solved. (4) If (3) is implemented, ensure that basic and specialized problem-solving interact with one another, so that each influences the other. There are now two crucial preliminary points that I must make. (a) Granted we seek to realise what is of value in life, the problems we need to solve are, fundamentally, problems of living, of action, not problems of knowledge. It is what we do, or refrain from doing, and not what we know, that enables us to realise what is of value (except when what we 10 seek of value is knowledge and understanding themselves). Even when new knowledge is needed, in medicine say, or agriculture, it is always what this knowledge enables us to do that enables us to realise what is of value, not the knowledge or technological know-how as such. (b) Furthermore, in order to realise what is of value in life more successfully than we do at present, we need to discover how to tackle our problems of living in more cooperative ways than we do at present. It follows from (1) to (4) and (a) and (b) that, if academic inquiry is to help promote human welfare rationally, then it needs to give absolute intellectual priority to the tasks of (1) articulating, and improving the articulation of, our problems of living, individual, social and global, and (2) proposing and critically assessing possible (increasingly cooperative) solutions – possible actions, policies, political programmes, philosophies of life. This would be the task of social inquiry and the humanities. Social inquiry would be intellectually more fundamental than natural science, but would not itself be science, or concerned, in the first instance, to acquire knowledge. Academia would also need to tackle a vast array of specialized problems of knowledge and technological know-how, in accordance with rule (3), but would at the same time have to interconnect fundamental and specialized problem-solving, in accordance with rule (4). Knowledge-inquiry puts rule (3) splendidly into effect in tackling a maze specialized problems, of all kinds. Disastrously, it violates rules (1), (2) and (4). What most needs to be done, from the standpoint of helping to promote human welfare, namely (1) articulate problems of living and (2) propose and critically assess possible solutions, possible actions, is excluded from knowledge-inquiry altogether. The failure to implement rules (1) and (2) means rule (4) cannot be implemented either. 11 In short, knowledge-inquiry violates three of the four most elementary rules of rational problem solving that one can think of. It is this massive structural irrationality of knowledgeinquiry which sabotages its capacity to help humanity learn how to create a better world. What inquiry most needs to do, namely (1) articulate problems of living and (2) propose and critically assess possible solutions, cannot be done at all, if the edicts of knowledge-inquiry are observed. In addition, this means the pursuit of knowledge is dissociated from such discussion, so that scientific research fails to respond adequately to human need and values. It is worth noting that something like 30% of research and development funds in the UK is devoted to the military – 50 % in the USA (Langley, 2005; Smith, 2003). Wisdom-inquiry, first version, is what emerges when knowledge-inquiry is modified just sufficiently to ensure that the four rules of reason are put into academic practice in a wholesale, structural fashion. The primary change that needs to be made is to ensure that academic inquiry implements rules (1) and (2). It becomes the fundamental task of social inquiry and the humanities (1) to articulate, and seek to improve the articulation of, our problems of living, and (2) to propose and critically assess possible solutions, from the standpoint of their practicality and desirability. In particular, social inquiry has the task of discovering how conflicts may be resolved in less violent, more cooperatively rational ways. It also has the task of promoting such tackling of problems of living in the social world beyond academe. Social inquiry is, thus, not primarily social science nor, primarily, concerned to acquire knowledge of the social world; its primary task is to promote more cooperatively rational tackling of problems of living in the social world. Pursued in this way, social inquiry is intellectually more fundamental than the natural and technological sciences, which tackle subordinate 12 Diagram 1: Wisdom-Inquiry Implementing Problem-Solving Rationality problems of knowledge, understanding and technology, in accordance with rule (3). In diagram 1, implementation of rule (3) is represented by the specialized problem solving of the natural, technological and formal sciences, and more specialized aspects of social inquiry and the humanities. Rule (4) is represented by the two-way arrows linking 13 fundamental and specialized problem solving, each influencing the other. One can go further. According to this view, the thinking that we engage in as we live, in seeking to realise what is of value to us, is intellectually more fundamental than the whole of academic inquiry (which has, as its basic purpose, to help cooperatively rational thinking and problem solving in life to flourish). Academic thought emerges as a kind of specialization of personal and social thinking in life, the result of implementing rule (3); this means there needs to be a two-way interplay of ideas, arguments and experiences between the social world and academia, in accordance with rule (4). This is represented, in diagram 1, by the two-way arrows linking academic inquiry and the social world. The natural and technological sciences need to recognize three domains of discussion: evidence, theory, and aims. Discussion of aims seeks to identify that highly problematic region of overlap between that which is discoverable, and that which it is of value to discover. Discussion of what it is of value to discover interacts with social inquiry, in accordance with rule (4): see diagram 1. Wisdom-inquiry as depicted in diagram 1, the outcome of putting rules (1) to (4) into practice, differs profoundly from academia as it exists at present, the product of knowledgeinquiry plus some policy studies and anti-rationalist trends on the fringes of academic work. (For further details see Maxwell, 1976; 1984 or, better, 2007a.) From Knowledge-Inquiry to Wisdom-Inquiry: Second Argument Why has this profound and damaging structural irrationality of academic inquiry not been noticed? When and how did it come about? 14 It all goes back to the Enlightenment of the 18th century – especially the French Enlightenment. The philosophes had the wonderful idea that it might be possible to learn from scientific progress how to make social progress towards an enlightened world. This is a profoundly important idea. The philosophes of the Enlightenment – Voltaire, Diderot, Condorcet and others – did what they could to put this profoundly important idea into practice in their lives. They fought dictatorial power, dogma and superstition with weapons no more lethal than argument and wit (Gay, 1973). But in developing the idea intellectually, the philosophes blundered. They botched the job. They thought that what needed to be done was to develop the social sciences alongside the natural sciences. Three steps need to be got right to put the basic Enlightenment idea properly into practice. The 18th century Enlightenment got all three steps wrong! This traditional, bungled version of the Enlightenment was then developed throughout the 19th century by SaintSimon, Comte, Marx, Mill and others, and institutionalised in universities all over the world in the first part of the 20th century with the creation of departments of social science: economics, anthropology, sociology, psychology, political science.7 The outcome is knowledge-inquiry – by and large what we have at present: seriously defective and irrational from the standpoint of helping us create a better world. But what, it may be asked, is wrong with the traditional Enlightenment programme? 15 In order to implement the Enlightenment programme properly of learning from scientific progress how to achieve social progress towards an enlightened world, the three crucial steps that need to be got right are: (i) The progress-achieving methods of science need to be correctly identified. (ii) These methods need to be correctly generalized so that they become fruitfully applicable to any human endeavour, whatever the aims may be, and not just applicable to the endeavour of improving knowledge. (iii) The correctly generalized progress-achieving methods then need to be exploited correctly in the great human endeavour of trying to make social progress towards an enlightened, wise, civilized world. Unfortunately, the philosophes of the Enlightenment got all three points wrong. And as a result these blunders, undetected and uncorrected, are built into the intellectualinstitutional structure of academia as it exists today. First, the philosophes failed to capture correctly the progress-achieving methods of natural science. From D'Alembert in the 18th century to Popper in the 20th (Popper, 1963), the widely held view, amongst both scientists and philosophers, has been (and continues to be) that science proceeds by assessing theories impartially in the light of evidence, no permanent assumption being accepted by science about the universe independently of evidence. But this standard empiricist view is untenable. If taken literally, it would instantly bring science to a standstill. For, given any accepted Theory of physics (T), Newtonian theory say, or quantum theory, endlessly many empirically more successful rivals can be concocted which agree with T about observed phenomena but disagree arbitrarily about 16 some unobserved phenomena. Physics would be drowned in an ocean of such empirically more successful rival theories. In practice, these rivals are excluded because they are disastrously disunified. Two considerations govern acceptance of theories in physics: empirical success and unity. But in persistently accepting unified theories, to the extent of rejecting disunified rivals that are just as, or even more, empirically successful, physics makes a big persistent assumption about the universe. The universe is such that all disunified theories are false. It has some kind of unified dynamic structure. It is physically comprehensible in the sense that explanations for phenomena exist to be discovered. But this untestable (and thus metaphysical) assumption that the universe is comprehensible is profoundly problematic. Science is obliged to assume, but does not know, that the universe is comprehensible. Much less does it know that the universe is comprehensible in this or that way. A glance at the history of physics reveals that ideas have changed dramatically over time. In the 17th century there was the idea that the universe consists of corpuscles, minute billiard balls, which interact only by contact. This gave way to the idea that the universe consists of point-particles surrounded by rigid, spherically symmetrical fields of force, which in turn gave way to the idea that there is one unified self-interacting field, varying smoothly throughout space and time. Nowadays we have the idea that everything is made up of minute quantum strings embedded in ten or eleven dimensions of space-time. Some kind of assumption along these lines must be made but, given the historical record, and given that any such assumption concerns the ultimate nature of the universe, that of which we are most ignorant, it is only reasonable to conclude that it is almost bound to be false. 17 The way to overcome this fundamental dilemma inherent in the scientific enterprise is to construe physics as making a hierarchy of metaphysical assumptions concerning the comprehensibility and knowability of the universe, these assumptions asserting less and less as one goes up the hierarchy, and thus becoming more and more likely to be true: see diagram 2. In this way a framework of relatively insubstantial, unproblematic, fixed assumptions and associated methods is created within which much more substantial and problematic assumptions and associated methods can be changed, and indeed improved, as scientific knowledge improves. Put another way, a framework of relatively unspecific, unproblematic, fixed aims and methods is created within which much more specific and problematic aims and methods evolve as scientific knowledge evolves. (A basic aim of science is to discover in what precise way the universe is comprehensible, this aim evolving as assumptions about comprehensibility evolve.) There is positive feedback between improving knowledge, and improving aims-and-methods, improving knowledge-abouthow-to-improve-knowledge. This is the nub of scientific rationality, the methodological key to the unprecedented success of science. Science adapts its nature to what it discovers about the nature of the universe. (For further details of this argument see Maxwell, 1976, 1984, 1998, 2004, 2007a, especially chapter 14.) So much for the first blunder of the traditional Enlightenment, and how to put it right. Second, having failed to identify the methods of science correctly, the philosophes naturally failed to generalize these methods properly. They failed to appreciate that the idea of representing the problematic aims (and associated methods) of science in the form of a hierarchy can be generalized and applied fruitfully to other worthwhile enterprises besides science. Many other enterprises have problematic aims – 18 Diagram 2: Hierarchical Conception of Science problematic because aims conflict, and because what we seek may be unrealisable, undesirable, or both. Such enterprises, with problematic aims, would benefit from employing a hierarchical methodology, generalized from that of science, thus making it possible to improve aims and methods as the enterprise proceeds. There is the hope that, as a result of exploiting in life methods generalized from those employed with such success in science, some of the astonishing success of science might be exported into other 19 worthwhile human endeavours, with problematic aims quite different from those of science. Third, and most disastrously of all, the philosophes failed completely to try to apply such generalized, hierarchical progress-achieving methods to the immense, and profoundly problematic enterprise of making social progress towards an enlightened, wise world. The aim of such an enterprise is notoriously problematic. For all sorts of reasons, what constitutes a good world, an enlightened, wise or civilized world, attainable and genuinely desirable, must be inherently and permanently problematic.8 Here, above all, it is essential to employ the generalized version of the hierarchical, progress-achieving methods of science, designed specifically to facilitate progress when basic aims are problematic: see diagram 3. It is just this that the philosophes failed to do. Instead of applying the hierarchical methodology to social life, the philosophes sought to apply a seriously defective conception of scientific method to social science, to the task of making progress towards, not a better world, but to better knowledge of social phenomena. And this ancient blunder is still built into the institutional and intellectual structure of academia today, inherent in the current character of social science (Maxwell, 1984 or 2007a, chapters 3, 6 and 7). Properly implemented, in short, the Enlightenment idea of learning from scientific progress how to achieve social progress towards an enlightened world would involve developing social inquiry, not as social science, but as social methodology, or social philosophy. A basic task would be to get into personal and social life, and into other institutions besides that of science – into government, industry, agriculture, commerce, the media, law, education, international relations – hierarchical, progress-achieving methods (designed to improve problematic aims) arrived at by generalizing the methods of science. A basic task for academic inquiry as a whole would be to help humanity 20 Diagram 3: Hierarchical Social Methodology Generalized from Science learn how to resolve its conflicts and problems of living in more just, cooperatively rational ways than at present. This task would be intellectually more fundamental than the scientific task of acquiring knowledge. Social inquiry would be intellectually more fundamental than physics. Academia would be a kind of people's civil service, doing openly for the public what actual civil services are supposed to do in secret for governments. Academia would have just sufficient 21 power (but no more) to retain its independence from government, industry, the press, public opinion, and other centres of power and influence in the social world. It would seek to learn from, educate, and argue with the great social world beyond, but would not dictate. Academic thought would be pursued as a specialized, subordinate part of what is really important and fundamental: the thinking that goes on, individually, socially and institutionally, in the social world, guiding individual, social and institutional actions and life. The fundamental intellectual and humanitarian aim of inquiry would be to help humanity acquire wisdom – wisdom being the capacity to realise (apprehend and create) what is of value in life, for oneself and others, wisdom thus including knowledge and technological know-how but much else besides (Maxwell, 1984, p. 86; 2007a, p. 79). One outcome of getting into social and institutional life the kind of aim-evolving, hierarchical methodology indicated above, generalized from science, is that it becomes possible for us to develop and assess rival philosophies of life as a part of social life, somewhat as theories are developed and assessed within science. Such a hierarchical methodology provides a framework within which competing views about what our aims and methods in life should be – competing religious, political and moral views – may be cooperatively assessed and tested against broadly agreed, unspecific aims (high up in the hierarchy of aims) and the experience of personal and social life. There is the possibility of cooperatively and progressively improving such philosophies of life (views about what is of value in life and how it is to be achieved) much as theories are cooperatively and progressively improved in science. In science, ideally, theories are critically assessed with respect to each other, with respect to metaphysical ideas concerning the comprehensibility of the universe, and with respect to experience (observational and experimental results). In a somewhat analogous way, diverse philosophies of life may be critically assessed with respect to each other, with 22 respect to relatively uncontroversial, agreed ideas about aims and what is of value, and with respect to experience – what we do, achieve, fail to achieve, enjoy and suffer – the aim being to improve philosophies of life (and more specific philosophies of more specific enterprises within life such as government, education or art) so that they offer greater help with the realization of what is of value in life. This hierarchical methodology is especially relevant to the task of resolving conflicts about aims and ideals, as it helps disentangle agreement (high up in the hierarchy) and disagreement (more likely to be low down in the hierarchy). Wisdom-inquiry, because of its greater rigour, has intellectual standards that are, in important respects, different from those of knowledge-inquiry. Whereas knowledgeinquiry demands that emotions and desires, values, human ideals and aspirations, philosophies of life be excluded from the intellectual domain of inquiry, wisdom-inquiry requires that they be included. In order to discover what is of value in life it is essential that we attend to our feelings and desires. But not everything we desire is desirable, and not everything that feels good is good. Feelings, desires and values need to be subjected to critical scrutiny. And of course feelings, desires and values must not be permitted to influence judgements of factual truth and falsity. Wisdominquiry embodies a synthesis of traditional rationalism and romanticism. It includes elements from both, and it improves on both. It incorporates romantic ideals of integrity, having to do with motivational and emotional honesty, honesty about desires and aims; and at the same time it incorporates traditional rationalist ideals of integrity, having to do with respect for objective fact, knowledge, and valid argument. Traditional rationalism takes its inspiration from science and method; romanticism takes its inspiration from art, from imagination, and from passion. Wisdominquiry holds art to have a fundamental rational role in inquiry, in revealing what is of value, and in unmasking false 23 values; but science, too, is of fundamental importance. What we need, for wisdom, is an interplay of sceptical rationality and emotion, an interplay of mind and heart, so that we may develop mindful hearts and heartfelt minds (Maxwell, 1976, p. 5). It is time we healed the great rift in our culture, so graphically depicted by Snow (1986). All in all, if the Enlightenment revolution had been carried through properly, the three steps indicated above being correctly implemented, the outcome would have been a kind of academic inquiry very different from what we have at present, inquiry devoted primarily to the intellectual aim of acquiring knowledge. Conclusion Humanity is in deep trouble. We urgently need to learn how to make progress towards a wiser, more civilized world. This in turn requires that we possess traditions and institutions of learning rationally designed – well designed – to help us achieve this end. It is just this that we do not have at present. What we have instead is natural science and, more broadly, inquiry devoted to acquiring knowledge. Judged from the standpoint of helping us create a better world, knowledge-inquiry of this type is dangerously and damagingly irrational. We need to bring about a major intellectual and institutional revolution in the aims and methods of inquiry, from knowledge-inquiry to wisdominquiry. Almost every branch and aspect of academic inquiry needs to change. A basic intellectual task of academic inquiry would be to articulate our problems of living (personal, social and global) and propose and critically assess possible solutions, possible actions. This would be the task of social inquiry and the humanities. Tackling problems of knowledge would be secondary. Social inquiry would be at the heart of the academic enterprise, intellectually more fundamental than 24 natural science. On a rather more long-term basis, social inquiry would be concerned to help humanity build hierarchical methods of problem-solving into the fabric of social and political life so that we may gradually acquire the capacity to resolve our conflicts and problems of living in more cooperatively rational ways than at present. Natural science would change to include three domains of discussion: evidence, theory, and aims – the latter including discussion of metaphysics, values and politics. Academia would actively seek to educate the public by means of discussion and debate, and would not just study the public. This revolution – intellectual, institutional and cultural – if it ever comes about, would be comparable in its long-term impact to that of the Renaissance, the scientific revolution, or the Enlightenment. The outcome would be traditions and institutions of learning rationally designed to help us acquire wisdom. There are a few scattered signs that this intellectual revolution, from knowledge to wisdom, is already under way provoked in the main by growing awareness of the menace that global warming represents.9 It will need, however, much wider cooperative support – from scientists, scholars, students, research councils, university administrators, vice chancellors, teachers, the media and the general public – if it is to become anything more than what it is at present, a fragmentary and often impotent movement of protest and opposition, often at odds with itself, exercising little influence on the main body of academic work. I can hardly imagine any more important work for anyone associated with academia than, in teaching, learning and research, to help promote this revolution. 25 Bibliography Berlin, I. (1980) Against the Current. London: Hogarth Press. Farganis, J. (ed.) (2003) Readings in Social Theory: The Classic Tradition to Post-Modernism. New York: McGraw-Hill. Gay, P. (1973) The Enlightenment: An Interpretation. London: Wildwood House Hayek, F. A. (1979) The Counter-Revolution of Science. Indianapolis: Liberty Press. Langley, C. (2005) Soldiers in the Laboratory. Folkstone: Scientists for Global Responsibility Maxwell, N. (1976) What's Wrong With Science?. Hayes: Bran's Head Books (2nd edition, 2009, London: Pentire Press). _______ (1984) From Knowledge to Wisdom: A Revolution in the Aims and Methods of Science. Oxford: Blackwell. _______ (1998) The Comprehensibility of the Universe: A New Conception of Science Oxford: Oxford University Press _______ (2000) Can Humanity Learn to become Civilized? The Crisis of Science without Civilization, Journal of Applied Philosophy 17, pp. 29-44. _______ (2001) The Human World in the Physical Universe: Consciousness, Free Will and Evolution. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield. _______ (2004) Is Science Neurotic?. London: Imperial College Press. _______ (2007a) From Knowledge to Wisdom: A Revolution for Science and the Humanities. London: Pentire Press; 2nd edition of Maxwell (1984), revised throughout with a new introduction and three new chapters. _______ (2007b) The Disastrous War against Terrorism: Violence versus Enlightenment, in A.W. Merkidze (ed.) Terrorism Issues: Threat Assessment , Consequences and Prevention. New York: Nova Science Publishers, ch. 3, 26 pp. 111-133 (available at www.nick-maxwell.demon.co.uk /Terrorism.htm). _______ (2009) Are Universities Undergoing an Intellectual Revolution?, Oxford Magazine, No. 290, June, pp. 13-16 (available at www.nick-maxwell.demon.co.uk/Essays.htm #essayiiia). Popper, K. (1963) Conjectures and Refutations. London: Routledge. Rees, M. (2003) Our Final Century. London: Arrow Books. Sokal, A, (2008) Beyond the Hoax: Science, Philosophy and Culture. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Smith, D. (2003) The Atlas of War and Peace. London: Earthscan. Snow, C. P. (1986) The Two Cultures: And a Second Look. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Weart, S. (2003) The Discovery of Global Warming. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 27 Endnotes 1. See Maxwell (2007b). 2. For an excellent history of the discovery of global warming see Weart (2003). 3. For a detailed presentation of the case that knowledgeinquiry is dominant in academic practice, see Maxwell (2007a, ch. 6). 4. For a more detailed exposition of standard empiricism and knowledge-inquiry see Maxwell (1984, ch. 2) or (2007a, ch. 2). 5. See note 3. 6. For devastating criticisms of postmodernism, relativism and social constructivism see Sokal (2008). 7. For an excellent brief account of the origins of social science along these lines, see Farganis (2003). See also Hayek (1979). 8. There are a number of ways of highlighting the inherently problematic character of the aim of creating civilization. People have very different ideas as to what does constitute civilization. Most views about what constitutes Utopia, an ideally civilized society, have been unrealizable and profoundly undesirable. People's interests, values and ideals clash. Even values that, one may hold, ought to be a part of civilization may clash. Thus freedom and equality, even though inter-related, may nevertheless clash. It would be an odd notion of individual freedom which held that freedom was for some, and not for others; and yet if equality is pursued too singlemindedly this will undermine individual freedom, and will even undermine equality, in that a privileged class will be required to enforce equality on the rest, as in the old Soviet Union. A basic aim of legislation for civilization, we may well hold, ought to be to increase freedom by restricting it: this brings out the inherently problematic, paradoxical character of the aim of achieving civilization. One thinker who has stressed the inherently problematic, contradictory character of the idea of 28 civilization is Isaiah Berlin; see, for example, Berlin (1980, pp. 74-79). Berlin thought the problem could not be solved; I, on the contrary, hold that the hierarchical methodology indicated here provides us with the means to learn how to improve our solution to it in real life. 9. See chapter 12 of the second edition of Maxwell (1984), and Maxwell (2009).