Philosophy

A Role for Conscious Accessibility in Skilled Action Chiara Brozzo1 Accepted: 5 November 2020/ # The Author(s) 2020 Abstract Skilled sportsmen or musicians-more generally, skilled agents-often fill us with awe with the way they perform their actions. One question we may ask ourselves is whether they intended to perform some awe-inspiring aspects of their actions. This question becomes all the more pressing as it often turns out that these agents were not conscious of some of those aspects at the time of performance. As I shall argue, there are reasons for suspecting lack of conscious access to an aspect of one's action to be incompatible with intending to perform that aspect of one's action. Subsequently, though, I will also argue that, in some cases, the incompatibility is only prima facie, and can be dispelled by drawing the following distinction: that between aspects of one's action that are merely temporarily not consciously accessed, versus aspects of one's action that are permanently inaccessible to consciousness. I will thus remove an obstacle towards saying that skilled agents intended to perform certain aspects of their actions, despite lack of conscious access to those aspects at the time of performance. 1 Introduction Suppose I am a really skilled golfer and that, while standing on the green, I swing the club so that the ball is hit and lands in the hole. This is a good swing. Suppose, further, that you, while observing me, say: "Good shot! The way you oriented your right hand during the swing was really clever!" However, as it turns out, during the performance of this skilled action I was not conscious of the way I was orienting my right hand, although this was crucial for my swing turning out to be as good as it did. Something close to this fictional example is not uncommon in the realm of skilled action. Indeed, many skilled agents are not conscious of many fundamental aspects1 of their own skilfully performed bodily actions.2 Review of Philosophy and Psychology https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-020-00516-3 1My talk of aspects of an action is comparable to Wu's (2016) talk of features of an action. 2The focus of this article will be on skilled bodily actions, such as playing golf or playing the piano. See Christensen (2019) for other kinds of skilled action that are not necessarily tied to bodily movements. * Chiara Brozzo firstname.lastname@example.com 1 Philosophy Department, Durham University, 50/51 Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HN, UK Here is some experimental evidence for this phenomenon. Skilled typists, the kind that type an average of 68 words per minute, were asked to type a number of four-letter words in different conditions. In some conditions, they were required to type the whole word. In other conditions, they were asked to type only the letters normally typed by-say-their right hand. Their performance was significantly slower and gave rise to significantly many more mistakes in the latter than in the former condition (Logan and Crump 2010, reported in Shepherd 2019). In Logan andCrump's words, skilled typists do not know "which hand types which letters" (Logan and Crump 2011, p. 13). Skilled typists in this experiment are a concrete example of agents who do not consciously access some aspects of their skilfully performed action: they are not conscious of which hand types which letters. When I say that skilled typists do not consciously access which hand types which letters, what I mean is the following: which hand types which letters is not part of the typists' phenomenology at the time of performance. In the rest of this article, I shall use consciously accessing and being conscious of interchangeably.3 What is the significance of lack of conscious access to some aspect of one's skilled action? One reasonwhy this is significant is that it may seem as though lack of conscious access to an aspect of one's action is incompatible with having an intention representing that aspect of one's action (as I shall explain in Sections 2 and 3). The following challenge thus arises: The Challenge: if an agent is not conscious of some aspect of their skilled action, can we say that this agent intended to perform that aspect of their action?4 A number of authors who have tackled this challenge have answered negatively, maintaining that lack of conscious access to some aspects of one's action may be necessitated by the fast timing with which the action is executed (see, e.g., Pacherie 2008; Papineau 2013), and that this is incompatible with the idea that the skilled agent intended to perform those aspects of their action. Those aspects of the skilled agent's action are therefore accounted for in a different way-for instance, Papineau (2013) suggests that they might be part of a raft of dispositions (in response to circumstance C, produce behaviour B) activated by an overall intention to, say, play defensively as opposed to aggressively. While I think that this is right in some cases, I shall argue that other cases allow for aspects of one's skilled action to be accounted for in terms of an intention representing them. In particular, in the opening example, did I intend to orient my right hand in the impressive way that you noticed during my brilliant swing? My aim is to defend the idea that, if certain conditions were in place, an obstacle is removed towards saying that I did. 3 My usage of conscious access is somewhat unorthodox in the light of Block's distinction between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness (Block 1995). In effect, when I say that someone does not consciously access a certain aspect of their action, what I mean from the point of view of Block's distinction is that they are not phenomenally conscious of that aspect. 4 An anonymous reviewer raises an important point: this challenge could be undercut if one characterised the skilled agent's situation in the following way. Rather than intending to perform certain aspects of their skilled action, the agent may be merely performing certain aspects of their skilled action intentionally. If Bratman (1984, 1987) is right, the latter does not imply the former. So, what becomes of the challenge if a certain aspect of an action is performed intentionally, but is not intended? I contend that a version of the challenge still stands, because it can be argued that doing something intentionally, just like intending to do something, is seemingly incompatible with certain kinds of lack of conscious access to an aspect of one's action. More on this in footnote 12. Brozzo C. In outline, this is what I shall do in the rest of this article. First, I will argue that the possibility for conscious access to what an intention represents-say, a certain aspect of an action-is a prerequisite on having a genuine intention (as opposed to some other kind of attitude or representation) to perform that aspect of the action (Sections 2 and 3). I will then explain how this prerequisite makes lack of conscious access to a certain aspect of one's action seemingly incompatible with having an intention representing that aspect of one's action, thus giving rise to a challenge for certain skilled actions (Section 4). I will then present a distinction between kinds of lack of conscious access (Section 5). Having done this, I will apply one of the terms of this distinction to some cases of skilled action, in order to rescue them from the challenge (Section 6). I will clarify that the skilled actions that may thus be rescued by no means exhaust the set of skilled actions. Still, they are an important subset of it (Section 7). 2 The Role of Conscious Access in Intention In the opening example, I described orienting my right hand in the way I did as an aspect of my skilled action.What is required forme to have an intention representing this aspect ofmy action? To answer this question, something about what an intention is has to be mentioned. An intention is a representation of a certain state of affairs where this state of affairs is represented with a so-called world-to-mind direction of fit (Searle 1983; see also Anscombe 1957; Mele 1992; Pacherie 2008). This means that, for an intention to be fulfilled, the world needs to conform towhat the intention represents.5 To this extent, intentions are analogous to desires, which also represent states of affairswith aworld-to-mind direction of fit: for a desire to be fulfilled, the world needs to conform to what the desire represents. Setting aside those who think that intentions reduce to combinations of beliefs and desires (see Sinhababu 2013 for a recent account of this kind), if there is any reason to think of intentions as distinctive attitudes, it is that intending to do something implies being committed to doing it, whereas desiring to do something does not (I can desire to win the lottery without being committed to it-I can't even be sensibly committed to it). This has been theorised by Michael Bratman (1987), in terms of the idea that intentions are subject to a normative requirement for strong consistency that I shall call the strong consistency requirement. According to it, we should not intend any course of action that conflicts with any of our other intentions or beliefs. For example, I shouldn't intend to orient my right hand in a certain way if I also believe it will be detrimental to the success of my swing, and I also intendmy swing to be successful. If one's intentions do not meet this requirement, as they sometimes do (how many times have you intended to do something that you know to be in conflict with something else you intend or believe?), then, according to Bratman, one is guilty of a criticisable form of irrationality. If my intention is to be evaluated from the point of view of rationality, a precondition on this seems to be that I should have conscious access to what my intention (and other attitudes supposed to not conflict with it) represents: I can only be held irrational for having attitudes that I know to be inconsistent. By contrast, if I am not conscious of having a certain attitude, I will not be aware of any conflict between it and other attitudes of mine. 5 The direction of fit of intentions is to be contrasted with that of beliefs. Beliefs have the reverse direction of fit, namely mind-to-world: for a belief to be true, what the belief represents needs to conform to how things actually are-namely, to the world. A Role for Conscious Accessibility in Skilled Action It can therefore be argued that, in order for the strong consistency requirement to even be applicable to intentions, one should be conscious of what one intends to do. Thus, conscious access to what a certain attitude or representation represents seems to be a precondition on that attitude or representation being an intention. 3 Too Demanding a Notion of Intention? The following doubt may now arise: is the notion of intention that I have just presented too demanding? For example, aren't there notions of intention that do not require conscious access to what they represent? Conscious access to what intentions represent is a requirement that can be justified independently of Bratman's proposal. Even if one disagrees that intentions are subject to the strong consistency requirement, one can still endorse the idea that intentions have a role in getting things done. As such, they should enter relationships of motivation and constraint with other attitudes that an agent has: e.g., the desire to win a match, the belief that a certain strategy is better than another for achieving this end, and so on.One should therefore be able to form intentions in the light of, i.e. constrained andmotivated by, other attitudes. For this to happen, all of these attitudes, including the intentions that the agent means to form, should be available to the agent's consciousness. This is why conscious access to an aspect of one's action is a reasonable requirement on having an intention representing that aspect. A very noteworthy exception to this widespread requirement was provided by Pacherie (2008). At the time, Pacherie defended a threefold distinction between intentions, which included a notion of intention, namely motor intention (abbreviated in M-intention), that allowed for what motor intentions represent to be consciously inaccessible. Indeed, this notion of intention was motivated precisely, among other things, by invoking the case of skilled action: many skilled actions, Pacherie correctly pointed out, are executed at too fast a pace for the agent to consciously access the representations guiding these actions at the time of performance. Even in the context of this proposal, Pacherie acknowledged that her notion of Mintention was somewhat unorthodox, something that has been re-emphasised more recently by Mylopoulos and Pacherie (2019). Thanks to her unorthodox proposal, however, Pacherie should be credited with insightfully bringing to the attention of philosophers representations involved in the production of actions executed at a very quick pace and often spontaneously, raising the question as to whether these representations should be considered intentions. This question had been previously answered negatively by Bach (1978). In more recent years, there has been a gradual move towards acknowledging these representations, now generally referred to as motor representations, as philosophically interesting, but, at the same time, importantly different from intentions (e.g., Butterfill and Sinigaglia 2014; cf. Shepherd 2019).6 6 An interesting complication is that this is not to do exclusively, or even mainly, with the idea that what motor representations represent is not consciously accessible. Against this idea, there is evidence suggesting that what some motor representations represent is consciously accessible (Jeannerod 1994, 2006; further evidence is reported in Ferretti 2016). Butterfill and Sinigaglia (2014) argue that motor representations differ from intentions because motor representations have a different format from intentions. This has given rise to a rich debate (e.g., Levy 2017; Mylopoulos and Pacherie 2017; Ferretti and Zipoli Caiani 2019; Pavese 2019; Shepherd 2019). Brozzo C. Therefore, if what motor representations (or at least some of them) represent is not consciously accessible, this does not constitute a counterexample to the idea that having an intention requires conscious access to what the intention represents. At this point, though, another objection may arise. It is possible for some representations of aspects of one's action to actually be constrained by the content of other attitudes that the agent has, even though what these representations represent is not consciously accessed by the subject. For example, suppose that I adopt a certain hand configuration to grasp the golf club handle that is represented by a motor representation,7 and that I cannot consciously access what this representation represents. Yet, what the motor representation represents, i.e. this hand configuration, is constrained by my intention-say, to swing the club in a certain way. So, in effect, consistency between the content of my intention and what the motor representation represents- namely, my hand configuration-is ensured (a point along these lines has recently been made both by Fridland 2017b and by Mylopoulos and Pacherie 2019).8 In answer to this objection, the following may be said. If we think of the strong consistency requirement as a plausible requirement on intentions, then we'll expect the subject as a whole, rather than one of its subsystems (e.g., the motor system), to be responsible for consistency among their attitudes and representations. This is so that the subject as a whole may be assessed for rationality or irrationality in holding certain attitudes. If so, then, we'll expect the subject to be able to consciously adopt their attitudes, and, as a consequence, be able to access what these attitudes represent, in order for the subject as a whole to be responsible for consistency among their attitudes. On the other hand, if we drop the strong consistency requirement, while the notion of constraint across attitudes and representations may be made sense of regardless of whether the subject has conscious access to what these attitudes and representations represent, the notion ofmotivation to form certain attitudes on the basis of others is hard to make sense of in the absence of the subject having conscious access to the content of their attitudes, and consciously forming additional attitudes in the light of those they already possess. Therefore, it seems that conscious access to what a certain attitude represents is a precondition on that attitude being an intention, independently of Bratman's proposal. 4 The Role of Conscious Access between Action and Intention How does being conscious of what one's intention represents bear on consciously accessing (aspects of) the action that fulfils the intention in question? This may not be obvious at first sight, since being conscious of what one's intention represents and consciously accessing (aspects of) the action that fulfils the intention in question are conceptually distinct.9 Still, relations of implication hold between them, as follows. The main idea is that, while executing an aspect of an action represented by an intention, the subject will, at the same time, also have the intention representing that aspect of the 7 Most likely, a set of motor representations. Let's talk about a hypothetical single motor representation for the sake of simplicity. 8 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for inviting me to address this point. 9 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for inviting me to clarify this connection. A Role for Conscious Accessibility in Skilled Action action, since intentions to do A are generally held to be retained during A-ing (see, e.g., Searle 1983; Mele 1992; Pacherie 2008). Since one is executing that aspect of the action precisely because one is attempting to fulfil one's intention representing that aspect, lacking conscious access to that aspect of the action may seem to indicate that one also lacks conscious access towhat the attitude representing this aspect of the action represents.10 In the previous two sections, conscious access to what an attitude or representation represents has been shown to be a precondition on that attitude or representation being an intention. Because of this, if one does not consciously access an aspect of one's action at the time of performance, it may seem as though one did not intend to do anything of the kind (although it would still be possible that this aspect of one's action was under the control of a motor representation).11 Thus, lack of conscious access to a certain aspect of one's action seems to be incompatible with having an intention representing that aspect. Applied to cases of skilled action, you may therefore think that, if I was not conscious of orienting my right hand in a certain way (as in my opening example), this is incompatible with the idea that I intended to orient my right hand in that way. This, as anticipated, gives rise to a challenge: The Challenge: if an agent is not conscious of some aspect of their skilled action, can we say that this agent intended to perform that aspect of their action?12 I shall now draw a distinction between kinds of lack of conscious access, in order to then argue that cases of skilled action falling into some of them may be rescued from the challenge. 5 A Distinction: Temporary Vs. Permanent Lack of Conscious Access I propose to distinguish two ways in which we may lack conscious access to something. The first is what I shall call temporary lack of conscious access. I have temporary lack of conscious access to something at time t1 if I lack conscious access to it (i.e., it is not part of my phenomenology) at t1, but there exists a time tx (where tx is different from t1), 13 at which I could consciously access it. Suppose, for example, that I form a certain 10 One reason to think so is that, as part of the rationality requirements to which intentions are subject, one should also be able to know that one has fulfilled their intention. This is so as to be able to update their other intentions and beliefs accordingly and, e.g., to be capable of being held irrational if they are still attempting to fulfil an intention that has already been fulfilled. In order to know that one has fulfilled their intention, however, one should have conscious access to aspects of the corresponding action, so as to be able to know whether it has been executed. 11 I emphasise seem, because the conditions of incompatibility will be refined in due course. 12 Recall from footnote 4 that a potential way to undercut this challenge is to characterise skilled agents as merely intentionally doing something, rather than as intending to do something. Even so, lack of conscious access to what the skilled agent is doing seems to be incompatible with the skilled agent's intentionally doing something. Here is one reason why. Setiya (2018) points out that "when it is not the execution of a directly corresponding intention, doing A intentionally is a foreseen or desired consequence of an action that is" (my emphasis), and adds that this is a necessary condition on intentional action. That an action is either foreseen or desired by the subject implies that the subject can consciously access both its representation and the action itself-again, if we hold onto the idea that the subject is in charge of choosing their attitudes discussed in Section 3. 13 Note that, for all I have said so far, tx might be before or after t1. Brozzo C. plan. Suppose, further, that, while I haven't forgotten the plan, I am also not thinking about it at a certain time t1, and I would be able to recall it at a different time tx. Then, at time t1, I have temporary lack of conscious access to my plan. Mele and Moser have in a way anticipated the notion of temporary lack of conscious access, insofar as they observe that "[a] state of having a plan [...] can exist [...] even while absent from awareness or consciousness" (Mele and Moser 1994, p. 42). Think, for example, of the distinction between occurrent and standing mental states. A mental state that is standing, rather than occurrent, is one to which one has temporary lack of conscious access. Indeed, Mele applies the distinction between standing and occurrent mental states to intentions, noting that one can have a standing intention to fly to Corsica even while sleeping-therefore, while not currently consciously accessing this intention (Mele 2007, 2009). The contrast case for temporary lack of conscious access is what I shall call permanent lack of conscious access. I have permanent lack of conscious access to an aspect of my action when this aspect of my action can never be part of my phenomenology. The distinction between permanent and temporary lack of conscious access may be reminiscent of Searle's distinction between shallow and deep unconscious (Searle 1990). Searle draws this distinction in order to differentiate among unconscious neurophysiological states. Specifically, he wants to distinguish those that correspond to mental states from those that do not. In order to do so, he differentiates between "states that are in principle accessible to consciousness", which he calls shallow unconscious, and states that are "inaccessible even in principle", which he calls deep unconscious (Searle 1990, p. 588). Searle's distinction and mine, though connected, are, however, interestingly different, and do not map onto each other neatly. States that are only temporarily inaccessible to consciousness are shallow unconscious: they are the sort of states that could in principle be consciously accessed. But it is not always the case that states that are permanently consciously inaccessible are in principle consciously inaccessible, i.e. deep unconscious. Here is why. Suppose that I have an unconscious desire to wind up a certain colleague of mine. For whichever reason, I cannot consciously access this desire of mine, and, despite all the therapy I undergo in order to bring repressed desires to light, I will never be able to consciously access it. My desire to wind up my colleague is therefore permanently consciously inaccessible. This does not mean, however, that my desire is in principle inaccessible by Searle's lights. On the contrary: qua desire, i.e. a mental state, it is the sort of state that is in principle accessible to consciousness (that is, shallow unconscious). So, temporarily inaccessible states are in principle accessible, but permanently inaccessible states are not always in principle inaccessible. They might be in principle accessible. What is the relevance of the distinction between temporary and permanent lack of conscious access for present purposes? I will show that' when an aspect of someone's skilled action is merely temporarily not accessed, then this is potentially compatible with the agent's having an intention to perform that aspect of the action. Here is why. An agent might temporarily lack conscious access to an aspect of their skilled action insofar as they are capable of regaining conscious access to that aspect of their action (a concrete example of how this could happen in the context of skilled action will be given in Section 6). For the moment, suffice it to note the following. Suppose I form an intention to go to Copenhagen at the end of the month. There will be A Role for Conscious Accessibility in Skilled Action a time-for example, just after forming the intention-in which I consciously access what this intention represents, insofar as the intention is an occurrent state of my mind. Suppose that, soon afterwards, the question as to what I shall have for dinner tonight becomes occurrent. As I am pondering over recipes and the actual contents of my fridge, my intention to go to Copenhagen switches from occurrent to standing. Assuming that I do not forget about my intention to go to Copenhagen, at any point before my trip I shall be capable of making my intention to go to Copenhagen occurrent, and therefore I will regain conscious access to what this intention represents. These switches between occurrent and standing do not threaten the status of my attitude towards going to Copenhagen as an intention: all the while, I can still be held irrational if I also believe that I should be in Stockholm in the same days in which I'm supposed to be in Copenhagen. Aspects of an agent's skilled action might be subject to similar switches between occurrent and standing as my plan to go to Copenhagen, as will be illustrated in the next section. In cases like this, lack of conscious access to these aspects may be restored at any point. Call this kind of temporary lack of conscious access recoverable. Temporary lack of conscious access of the recoverable kind can be elucidated by drawing a distinction between the notions of conscious access on the one hand and conscious accessibility on the other hand. A subject has conscious access to a certain aspect of their action at t1 when they are currently (i.e., at t1) accessing that aspect of their action-for example, because their attention has just been drawn to this aspect. By contrast, saying that a certain aspect of an action is consciously accessible to the subject at time t1 leaves it open whether the subject is consciously accessing that aspect at t1. That a certain aspect of an action is consciously accessible to a subject at t1means that there exist a time tx (where it should be possible for tx to occur after t1) at which the subject may consciously access that aspect of their action (cf. Block 1995). Saying that a subject has temporary lack of conscious access to an aspect of their action at time t1 implies merely that the subject lacks conscious access to that aspect of the action at t1, but leaves it open whether that aspect of the action is consciously accessible to the subject-namely, whether the subject could access it at some other time. Saying that a subject has recoverable temporary lack of conscious access to an aspect of their action at t1means, more specifically, that aspect of the action is consciously accessible to the subject. In particular, that aspect of the action could be accessed at a time tx which is after t1-only, it is not accessed at t1. 14 Temporary lack of conscious access of the recoverable kind is to be contrasted with a second kind of temporary lack of conscious access, which does not work on the assumption that conscious access may be restored. On the contrary, the assumption is the following. A certain aspect of one's action is consciously accessed upon the first few performances of that action, and then, following sufficient practice, the subject loses the ability to consciously access that aspect of their action, without any possibility of recovery. Call this kind of temporary lack of conscious access non-recoverable. Non-recoverable temporary lack of conscious access to a certain aspect of one's action still qualifies as temporary on the grounds that, on previous performances of that action, the agent did consciously access that aspect. 14 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for inviting me to clarify the relationship between the notions of temporary lack of conscious access on the one hand and those of conscious access vs. conscious accessibility on the other hand. Brozzo C. How do all these different kinds of lack of conscious access to an aspect of an action relate to the possibility of having intentions representing that aspect of the action? In particular, which kinds of lack of conscious access to an aspect of an action are compatible with having an intention representing that aspect of the action? In the next section, I will show that recoverable temporary lack of conscious access to a certain aspect of an action is compatible with this aspect being represented by an intention, thus rescuing some skilled actions from the challenge. It is worth noting that, if one accepts Bratman's proposal, conscious access to aspects of an action that one is representing as to be brought about is not sufficient to establish that an agent has an intention representing that aspect of the action. Further conditions need to be in place-e.g., the state representing this action should be subject to the strong consistency requirement. From the point of view of Bratman's proposal, rescuing some skilled actions from the challenge will achieve the removal of an obstacle towards saying that the agent intended to perform a certain aspect of their skilled action. 6 Conscious Accessibility: A Way out of the Challenge for some Skilled Actions I shall rescue some skilled actions from the challenge by arguing that agents are only temporarily not conscious of aspects of their skilled actions in a way that is recoverable, in the sense illustrated in the previous section. I will show this for cases in which an individual is not conscious of certain aspects of their skilled action at the time of performance because: (i) the individual is not focusing their attention on those aspects at the time of performance, and/or (ii) those aspects are automatised. I will show that cases in which the individual is not focussing their attention on those aspects at the time of performance are ones where the individual lacks conscious access to those aspects at the time of performance, but conscious access is recoverable-in other words, those aspects are still consciously accessible to the subject. I will also show that cases in which an agent is not conscious of an aspect of their action at the time of performance because that aspect is automatised are at least compatible with temporary lack of conscious access of the recoverable kind. 6.1 Attention Skilled musicians' performance is a good example of cases where an individual is not conscious of aspects of their skilled action during its execution because they are not focussing their attention on those aspects. A study by Chaffin and Logan (2006) shows exactly this. In the course of learning how to play a piano piece with a view to performing it in public, in the first stages of this process a skilled pianist will attend to so-called basic cues, concerned with low-level aspects of her bodily action, such as the way in which two consecutive keys should be pressed (e.g., legato vs. staccato). At subsequent stages of learning, the pianist will attend to cues that concern more abstract aspects of performance. Among these, Chaffin and Logan distinguish interpretive cues A Role for Conscious Accessibility in Skilled Action from expressive cues. Interpretive cues are supposed to bring attention to aspects such as timing and timbre, e.g. "start crescendo". Expressive cues invite the performer to attempt to convey certain feelings to the audience, e.g. "start building tension". When the pianist attends to either interpretive or expressive cues, she does not attend to basic ones, and vice versa.15 As a consequence, it may come about that some aspects of her performance, such as the posture of some of her fingers or of one of her hands, are not consciously accessed while she attends to starting building tension, and vice versa. Suppose that this is actually the case. Now, attention being shifted across different aspects of one's action of piano playing seems to imply lack of conscious access to the aspects of the action that are not being attended to. That lack of conscious access, however, is merely temporary, because-Chaffin and Logan note-at later stages of learning, attention can be shifted back and forth between different kinds of cues. As a result, it is reasonable to infer that aspects of the pianist's action that are involved in attending to basic cues (e.g., the posture of some of the pianist's fingers or of one of her hands) are still consciously accessible, i.e. may be consciously accessed by the pianist,16 and likewise for aspects involved in attending to interpretive or expressive cues, such as "start crescendo" or "start building tension". Therefore, when lack of conscious access to an aspect of a certain action is the consequence of an attention shift, this accessmay be recovered. As in the case of my plan to go to Copenhagen, the pianist simply happened not to consciously access certain aspects of her action at a certain time, and these may just as well have been accessed. This is perfectly compatible with these aspects of the agent's action being represented by an intention. Thus, cases of skilled action where lack of conscious access to some of their aspects is due to attention shifts may be rescued from the challenge. Recall that the challenge ran as follows: The Challenge: if an agent is not conscious of some aspect of their skilled action, can we say that this agent intended to perform that aspect of their action? The challenge may initially look pressing because it generically considers the possibility that an agent is not conscious of some aspects of their skilled action, without 15 An anonymous reviewer raises doubts about the truth of this phenomenon, by mentioning the possibility that a pianist could attend to expressive cues (e.g., start building tension) by means of attending to some basic cues (e.g., playing more and more staccato). If that were the case, it would not be true that attending to expressive cues prevents one from attending to basic cues. While this indeed sounds like a possibility in principle, it is not what Chaffin and Logan (2006) report. Their study looks at a pianist's reports in the course of learning a given piano piece for the purposes of performance. They note that, for example, at the end of session 17' the focus of the pianist's reports was (seemingly exclusively) on basic cues-often, specific fingerings at given points in the score. On the other hand, at the end of Session 24, namely one day in advance of the first public performance of the piece, the focus of the pianist's reports was (again, seemingly exclusively) on interpretation (e.g., crescendo at a certain point, pianissimo at another). Chaffin and Logan partially address the point raised by the reviewer by pointing out (about expressive rather than basic cues) that, at the end of the last session before the first public performance, the pianist's report also did not mention expression at all, and yet the following performance was expressive. However, they say that expression was "built into the automatic actions of the performance. But the pianist was not [...] focusing on expression as she played" (Chaffin and Logan 2006, p. 118). It is possible that the same might be the case for basic cues. 16 It is possible that attending to low-level aspects of one's bodily action might make performance worse-a phenomenon that Papineau (2013) calls the yips (more on this in Section 7). This, however, is not necessarily the case, and, even when it is, it does not make it any less true that attending to those aspects of the action is possible for the pianist. Brozzo C. specifying whether this is because these aspects are merely temporarily not accessed at the time of performance or, rather, because the subject has permanent lack of conscious access to these aspects. However, it is only the latter case that is incompatible with a subject having an intention representing those aspects, because the rationality of the subject in performing that action cannot be assessed. The reason why aspects of an action to which an agent is not paying attention can be rescued from the challenge is because, in these cases, an agent is merely not consciously accessing those aspects at a certain time, but these aspects are still consciously accessible, so that the subject can still be assessed for rationality in choosing to execute them. That being the case, we can still say that the agent intended to perform those aspects of the action. 6.2 Automaticity According to Bargh (1992), the central feature of an automatic process is autonomy, in the following sense: an automatic process is "one that, once started (and irrespective of whether it was started intentionally or unintentionally), runs to completion with no need for conscious guidance or monitoring" (Moors and De Houwer 2006, p. 301, reported in Fridland 2017a).17 Performing an action skilfully often results in some aspects of that action being automatised. Here is an example. The Buccaneers, an American football team, for many years had the reputation of not being very good. This changed once Tony Dungy became their coach in 1996. What Dungy did, in effect, was to get his players to automatise a number of formations. Success for a team in American football usually relies on the team players knowing a high number of formations. By contrast, Tony Dungy taught his players to memorise much fewer formations than average, but to practice them over and over until what each team player had to do in the context of a single formation became automatic (Duhigg 2013).18 The automaticity of the players' behaviour makes it very likely that many aspects of their bodily actions-e.g., their orienting their limbs in a specific way-would not be consciously accessed as the game unfolds.19 Does this mean that those aspects of the players' actions are permanently consciously inaccessible? It does not. The reasons for this fall into two different cases: either conscious access to these aspects may be recovered, or it may not. In order to discuss these two possibilities, let me go back to the example of the skilled typists discussed by Logan and Crump (2011). Logan and Crump's results show that skilled typists do not know which hand types which letters. Logan and Crump interpret these results in terms of the idea that, in the 17 Defining automaticity is much more complicated than this, as noted by Fridland (2017a). While acknowledging the complexity of the topic, I adopt the reported definition because it is sufficient for the purposes of the present discussion. 18 This may be well explained by a model proposed by Papineau (2013), according to which all the players had to do was to select the intention to play according to a certain formation, and what they did from then onwards unfolded automatically. According to Papineau (2013), this is due to the way their basic action control system works once it has been re-set by a given intention (see Fridland (2017b) for reservations about Papineau's model). 19 Wayne Wu's distinction between aspects of one's action that are automatic as opposed to others being controlled is also relevant here: the idea is that the feature of the players' actions consisting in playing according to a certain formation is controlled, whereas the feature of orienting one's leg in a certain way is automatic (Wu 2016). A Role for Conscious Accessibility in Skilled Action control of the typists' actions, two independent loops (as they call them) develop. One is responsible for word choice' and another for how the typing of the word is subdivided between the two hands. According to Logan and Crump, the first loop is under conscious control, but the second is not. This interpretation may be further elaborated in two different ways, and I will show that at least one of them is compatible with merely temporary lack of conscious access of the recoverable kind. The first way to elaborate Logan and Crump's interpretation is that which hand types which letters is recoverable for conscious access.20 Evidence for this would be that, upon request, typists could go back to consciously selecting which hand types which letters, even though this would be effortful. If so, it would appear that this aspect of their action is merely temporarily not accessed in a recoverable way-that is, it's still consciously accessible. In this case, as with that of attention shifts tackled in the previous subsection, their lack of conscious access to that aspect of their action would bemerely contingent, and thus perfectly compatible with this aspect being represented by an intention. The second way to elaborate Logan and Crump's interpretation, by contrast, is that the aspects of the typists' actions controlled by the second loop are no longer consciously accessible: skilled typists can no longer consciously select which hand types which letters. This option cannot be treated in the same way as the previous one. As in the case of the Buccaneers trained by Dungy, we may assume that skilled typists started their training by consciously selecting, and therefore consciously accessing, which hand types which letters. However, by the end of their training' according to this second way of elaborating Logan and Crump's interpretation, typists lost access to this aspect of their action. Admittedly, when lack of conscious access is temporary but nonrecoverable, it is at best not clear that it could be compatible with representation by an intention. Therefore, right now I can only conclude that aspects of skilled action that are not consciously accessed because they have been automatised may be rescued from the challenge when they are temporarily not accessed in a recoverable way. 7 How Much Skilled Action Is Consciously Accessible? Here is an issue for my proposal. Many current philosophical accounts of skilled action work on the assumption that certain aspects of one's skilled action are permanently consciously inaccessible, for precisely some of the reasons that Pacherie (2008) originally pointed out: many skilled actions are executed at a very quick pace-for example, in order to be able to respond appropriately to a certain stimulus in an effective way given time constraints. Many skilled actions are therefore not only quickly executed, but also spontaneous. Bratman (1987) even doubts that aspects of these actions should be classified as intentional. Working on the assumption that some aspects of an agent's skilled action are permanently consciously inaccessible, many current philosophical proposals aim to account for these aspects of the action not as represented by intentions, but still as part of the agent's strategy in some way-e.g., because they are part of a raft of dispositions 20 This is in line with what Fridland (2017a, p. 4343) reports: "Sheets-Johnstone (2012) and Tzelgov et al. (1997) have both pointed out the implausibility of agents remaining necessarily unaware of their skilled, habitual, automatic behaviors." Brozzo C. that are activated by an overarching intention (Papineau 2013), or because they are in some sense intelligent-for example, they are sensitive to an overarching intention (Fridland 2017b). In the light of this, is the idea that an important class of aspects of skilled action is temporarily consciously inaccessible in a recoverable way just off the mark? In the light of this question, my proposal requires qualification. I acknowledge that, indeed, many aspects of skilled action won't be represented by intentions precisely because they are permanently consciously inaccessible. My aim in this article has not been to deny this, but rather to point out that this should not obscure the fact that some aspects of skilled action are only temporarily consciously inaccessible, and in a recoverable way. This is especially likely with those aspects of one's skilled action that the agent can afford to reflect on as they unfold without damaging performance. Piano playing is a good example: as pointed out by Chaffin and Logan (2006), this is the sort of skilled action where agents can afford to change the focus of their attention multiple times, therefore consciously accessing different aspects of their action at different times, without any detriment to performance. More generally, that there are indeed aspects of skilled action that are only temporarily consciously inaccessible is evidenced by the phenomenon that David Papineau refers to as the yips, namely starting to overthink aspects of one's skilled action in advance of performance. About the yips, Papineau notes: It is striking that the yips arise only in connection with those sporting movements that are triggered by the players themselves, as opposed to those that are responses to their competitors' actions. It is specifically when you need to initiate some movement yourself that you are in danger of thinking about the movements you must perform. When somebody else is in control of the timing and direction of an approaching ball or other trigger to your movement, you have no time to think about what you must do – you just do it. (2013, p. 181) In short, while my proposal is not suited to the entire realm of skilled action, it might be useful for bringing back into focus aspects of skilled action where conscious access, though missing some of the time, may nevertheless be restored. 8 Conclusion Recall the opening example, in which I execute a fantastic golf swing partly thanks to the clever way in which I oriented my right hand. I pointed out that the idea that this aspect of my action is represented by an intention is challenged by the fact that, at the time of action performance, I was not conscious of orienting my hand in this clever way-i.e., I did not consciously access this aspect of my action. I have shown two cases in which this aspect of my action may be rescued from the challenge. Both cases work on the assumption that this aspect of my action was merely temporarily not accessed, rather than permanently inaccessible, and in a way that is recoverable. In other words, this aspect of my action, while not consciously accessed at the time of performance, was still consciously accessible. A Role for Conscious Accessibility in Skilled Action Thus, I have shown how some aspects of our skilled actions may be represented by an intention, even when we do not consciously access those aspects at the time of performance. This by no means rescues all cases of skilled action from the challenge, but the cases that may be rescued through my proposal still range far and wide in the realm of skilled action. Acknowledgements I would like to thank Denis Buehler, Wayne Christensen, Elvira Di Bona, Naomi Eilan, Ellen Fridland, Thor Grünbaum, Al Mele, Myrto Mylopoulos, Krisztina Orbán, Elisabeth Pacherie, David Papineau, Sarah Robins, Johannes Roessler, Joshua Shepherd, Susanna Siegel, Hong Yu Wong, four anonymous reviewers, and the audiences of the conference of the European Society for Philosophy and Psychology in Athens (2019) and of the Philosophy of Neuroscience Research Forum at the University of Tübingen (2019) for inspiration and feedback. My research was supported by the John Templeton Foundation (ACT Fellowship awarded to Hong Yu Wong). Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article's Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article's Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/. References Anscombe. 1957. G.E.M., Intention (Second Edition). Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Bach, K. 1978. A representational theory of action. Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition 34 (4): 361–379. Bargh, J.A. 1992. The ecology of automaticity: toward establishing the conditions needed to produce automatic processing effects. The American Journal of Psychology 105 (2): 181–199. https://doi. org/10.2307/1423027. Block, N. 1995. On a confusion about a function of consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2): 227–247. Bratman, M. 1987. Intention, plans, and practical reason. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Butterfill, S.A., and C. Sinigaglia. 2014. Intention and motor representation in purposive action. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1): 119–145. Chaffin, R., and T. Logan. 2006. Practicing perfection: How concert soloists prepare for performance. Advances in Cognitive Psychology 2 (2–3): 113–130. Christensen, W. 2019. Skilled action. Philosophy Compass 14 (11): e12631. Duhigg, C. 2013. The power of habit: Why we do what we do and how to change. 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Logan, G.D., and M.J. Crump. 2011. Hierarchical control of cognitive processes: The case for skilled typewriting. Psychology of Learning and Motivation-Advances in Research and Theory 54: 1–19. Mele, A.R. 1992. Springs of action: Understanding intentional behavior. New York: Oxford University Press. Mele, A.R. 2007. Persisting intentions. Noûs 41 (4): 735–757. Mele, A.R. 2009. Effective intentions: The power of conscious will. New York: Oxford University Press. Mele, A.R., and P.K. Moser. 1994. Intentional action. Nous 28 (1): 39–68. Moors, A., and J. De Houwer. 2006. Automaticity: A theoretical and conceptual analysis. Psychological Bulletin 132 (2): 297–326. Mylopoulos, M., and E. Pacherie. 2017. Intentions and motor representations: The interface challenge. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (2): 317–336. Mylopoulos, M., and E. Pacherie. 2019. Intentions: The dynamic hierarchical model revisited. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science 10 (2): e1481. Pacherie, E. 2008. The phenomenology of action: A conceptual framework. Cognition 107 (1): 179–217. Papineau, D. 2013. In the zone. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements 73: 175–196. Pavese, C. 2019. The psychological reality of practical representation. Philosophical Psychology 32 (5): 784– 821. Searle, J.R. 1983. Intentionality: An essay in the philosophy of mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Searle, J.R. 1990. Consciousness, explanatory inversion, and cognitive science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4): 585–596.ì. Setiya, K. 2018. Intention. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intention/. Accessed 7 Dec 2020. Sheets-Johnstone, M. 2012. Kinesthetic memory: Further critical reflections and constructive analyses. In Body, metaphor, memory and movement, ed. S.C. Koch, T. Fuchs, M. Summa, and C. Müller, 43–72. Amsterdam: John Benhamins Publishing. Shepherd, J. 2019. Skilled action and the double life of intention. 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Philosophy

January 12, 2016 [Journal of Metaphysics and Connected Consciousness 2016 (In Press)] Pereira, C. Understanding memories of a near-death experience from the perspective of quantum entanglement and in the presence of the supernatural Published by The Ministry of Connected Consciousness Page 1 Understanding memories of a near-death experience from the perspective of quantum entanglement and in the presence of the supernatural Contzen Pereira* and Janice Harter@ Abstract Near-death experiences are a big challenge to the fields of science and philosophy; termed as hallucinatory by neurologists and "stuff of which fantasies are made off" by sceptics, there are some unique near-death experiences which defy these claims. Memories generated during these experiences are of specific interest as they are created without a body and can be recalled post the experience. Call it the mind, soul, psyche or consciousness, if deliberated as a form of quantum generated energy, a strong correlation under a reductionist based perspective can be obtained. Life at a macroscopic level may not be similar to life at a quantum level, and has been proved in quantum physics through its spooky properties like quantum entanglement. Self-sustaining quantum generated energy through entanglement is the answer to all mystical realties and the answer lies in believing in its existence in and around us. It is this energy that brings in the awareness of one's existence and which performs tasks beyond the imagination of the current self; an energy created at the creation of all that exists; a true supernatural force. This paper reviews a unique void near-death experience and hypothesizes quantum entanglement to be involved in the conception and storage of these energy-based memories in a quantum subatomic cloud which can be restated if returned back to the body or lost to the environment upon death. Key Words Near-Death Experience, Quantum entanglement, Memories, Supernatural, Sub-atomic cloud Correspondence: * Contzen Pereira, Ph.D. Independent Scholar, Mumbai, India. Email Address: email@example.com, email@example.com @Rev. J.L. Harter, Ph.D. Email Address: firstname.lastname@example.com. January 12, 2016 [Journal of Metaphysics and Connected Consciousness 2016 (In Press)] Pereira, C. Understanding memories of a near-death experience from the perspective of quantum entanglement and in the presence of the supernatural Published by The Ministry of Connected Consciousness Page 2 Introduction Be it the soul in philosophy and religion; the psyche in psychology or the mind or consciousness in science, there seems to be a resilient correlation or similarity with each of these concepts, especially in relation to its preposterousness and absurdity. From a scientific reductionist based perspective, if we reduce these notions to pure energy generated at the level of subatomic particles that exists all around us, it may seem unswerving. The problematical part is to prove the ability of these entangled subatomic particles to create and store reminiscences outside the body. Quantum studies are now revealing aspects in relations to subatomic particle energy and its ability to perform beyond the imagination of what one can except and visualize. Quantum entanglement is a unique property in quantum physics that best describes the mysterious behaviours that take place at a quantum level with its effects observed at a macroscopic level (Peres 1993). Near-death experiences may be termed absurd by some and hallucinatory by many (Mobbs and Watt 2011) but there sure is some depth of existence if we look at it from the perspective of quantum generated energy; a pure subatomic energy that exists in the unruly microscopic quantum world; an energy that supports the existence of what we have been addressing as the soul, psyche, mind and consciousness; the oldest form of energy created and present all through the cosmos. With consciousness alone, multiple disciplines have attempted to pinpoint what consciousness is precisely and the best academia has to offer at this point in time is the hard and easy problems of consciousness. Perhaps our lack of understanding of consciousness has inadvertently ruled out the possibility that consciousness does, in fact exist in part outside the brain-body. If it does exist etherically as a field of energy, this may be a game-changer in terms of how we view this phenomenon of the near death experience. This paper evaluates an experience different from the mainstream and more typical accounts of the near death experience in that this one was a positive void–based near-death experience and attempts to hypothesize this experience to be a result of quantum entanglement with the interference of the supernatural force that exists beyond the dimensions of space and time. A void-based near death experience A near-death experience occurs at the moment of anticipated death just before biological death during which a patient is quite often clinically dead or very near death (SchroterKunhardt 1993). Most of the near-death experiences studied and evaluated are broadly categorized as positive and negative. Positive near-death experiences involve a feeling of peace and tranquillity, a sensation of floating through a tunnel towards a bright light with a complete life review, while a negative near-death experience is more horrific, which is usually accompanied by unpleasant feelings of fear and panic which may or may not be associated with a life review (Blanke and Dieguez 2009). In both forms the most common January 12, 2016 [Journal of Metaphysics and Connected Consciousness 2016 (In Press)] Pereira, C. Understanding memories of a near-death experience from the perspective of quantum entanglement and in the presence of the supernatural Published by The Ministry of Connected Consciousness Page 3 and important aspect of the experience is the ability to remember the experience as a reminiscence post the experience. Janice, whose experience I would be sharing in this paper experienced a void near-death experience, which was surprisingly a positive one along with a past and future life review. This experience is definitely unique in comparison to other near-death experiences and can bring in a correlation of her thoughts, memories and experience with the mysterious quantum world that yet needs to be fully explored. Since most near-death cases of the void are negative and associated with a feeling of fear and darkness, her positive experience along with a future life review is a unique experience which retained as a memory that changed her life post the experience. Her experience – She was 36 weeks and 9 days pregnant and was completely healthy when she went into labor in hospital. Upon admission she was given a medication called Breathine (Turbutaine) and within seconds of administering the drug intravenously, she felt her body temperature rise and she passed out. Breathine is a bronchodilator, which dilates the bronchial openings of the lungs by relaxing them for much better flow of air in and out of the lungs. It was surprising that this drug was administered despite of it not being recommended for treating prolonged (more than 48 to 72 hours) premature labor. Fatal side effects, that includes fast or irregular heartbeats, high blood sugar and low potassium levels, fluid accumulation in lungs and heart attack have been reported after use in pregnant women. While passing out she felt her heart beat stop and felt as if she had moved from one reality to another while retaining conscious awareness. For her, the time elapsed in the void seemed around 30 – 45 minutes which was actually 3 – 4 minutes hospital time, wherein the doctors considered the case as code blue and administered a medication to counter act the first one, to revive her. The reality that she experienced was a pure black form of nothingness; a void space which somehow didn't seem frightening to her. She was curious to know whether she could feel her hands and legs but there was none; she was aware that she was in a place of pure transparency. In this state of transparency, she was consciously aware and was convinced that she was out of her body as she felt lighter than what she would have felt in her heavy physical body. The time spent in the dark void seemed eternal as she watched the most important sequences of her life through a life review, which stopped at a point where she had children and she could not perceive the review further. In the void there was a presence of an entity with her; she could not see it but could feel it as an inner voice, which she described as a tone. When her life review was complete, this entity sent her a thought, "Are you ready to go?" At that point of time, she was unaware of the reason why she was in the hospital and therefore within the void she confided in the thought that was sent to her by the entity and was ready to go at that moment, for in the void she considered that she had done the best of everything in life. January 12, 2016 [Journal of Metaphysics and Connected Consciousness 2016 (In Press)] Pereira, C. Understanding memories of a near-death experience from the perspective of quantum entanglement and in the presence of the supernatural Published by The Ministry of Connected Consciousness Page 4 The tone asked her whether she was sure to go and then it showed her the moments that she had spent with her older children which ended with her the baby that was not yet born and what she would look like when she was 2 years old. Post the experience Janice gave birth to a girl and the daughter resembled the same baby she was shown during the future life review, the only thing odd was that during the review the two year old girl had shoulder length blond curly hair which was turned out to be the case with her daughter when she was two years old. This life review changed her thought; she felt love; felt a sense of incompleteness which was not until the entity showed her the future life review which was subdued within the void which seemed more self-oriented. A longing for completeness of her life review lead the entity to grant her wish and within a single spin of her heart beat she was back into her body and she heard the voices of the hospital staff as they spoke of not disclosing her state to her friends who were present during the event for fear of upsetting her in her delicate condition. Quantum entanglement as a reason for memory retention post the near-death experience and the interference of the supernatural force depicting the future According to reductive science, matter is nothing but a form of energy; an energy created by the bizarre. In quantum physics when two particles are entangled they behave as one and not as two separate particles, so what happens in the quantum world is completely different from what we perceive in the macroscopic world, which also holds true for the world of quantum biology. In an entangled state of sub atomic particles there will be a constant exchange of energy between these particles which somehow interacts with one another resulting in information gathering. Hameroff and Chopra suggest that quantum entanglement of low-energy particles could interact even outside the body suggesting a near-death experience; therefore the existence of a quantum soul (Hameroff and Chopra 2012). In order to justify this theory, we need to hypothesize that the flow of energy within the body occurs through quantum interactions for which the microtubular network is the ideal support framework that is known to quantum compute information. Based on this hypothesis, it can be suggested that the information gathering may occur as a result of quantum entanglement of the sub atomic particles within the microtubules resulting in the formation of a subatomic cloud that acts as a holographic image processor. The subatomic cloud of energy is therefore in a constant state of exchanging energy with the cosmos with an ability to retain memory through holographic processing to commute consciousness. During a near death experience, a shutdown of the body may result in a change in the state of this quantum entangled subatomic cloud of energy wherein post shutdown the microtubules cease to compute consciousness but the holographed memories, identity and cognition with emotion and function remains intact within the sub atomic cloud, until the body can be revived or resuscitated. January 12, 2016 [Journal of Metaphysics and Connected Consciousness 2016 (In Press)] Pereira, C. Understanding memories of a near-death experience from the perspective of quantum entanglement and in the presence of the supernatural Published by The Ministry of Connected Consciousness Page 5 The experience in the void for Janice was reportedly beautiful as well as peaceful and these memories changed her life thereafter. Based on the above hypothesis, her subatomic particle cloud, with her past memories remained intact outside her body as she experienced her past a life review. The most important memory to be noted in her experience was the awareness of her being outside her body. Her curiosity to feel the presence of her hands and legs assured her that she was in a state of pure transparency which confirms her awareness within the void, where she could differentiate between her physical and nonphysical body; she could feel the presence of her own subatomic energy cloud. Based on her experience it can be assumed that this awareness was computed within the quantum entangled subatomic cloud outside the body creating a holographic image within this cloud to be retained as a memory which was reiterated when she was rescusitated. The ability to see her life review of the future was unique to her near death experience. Life reviews of the past has been observed in many near death experiences and is surely a link to the recalling of memories that may be stored as holographic images within the quantum entangled particles within the microtubular network of the brain and body. But a future life review is rare, especially when it comes true, which was obvious in her experience. The image of her daughter before she was born during the experience is more inclined to the presence of a supernatural form; a form which creates experiences within and beyond the domains of space and time; a form who resides over all possible dimensions; the symmetric form of light that created all of what exists. The beauty of such a memory lies in the image created of something that does not exist; in this case the image of her daughter was created and was holographed within her subatomic cloud to be stored and to be observed in the future. A supernatural force may sometimes seem irrational during such a scientific discussion but science sometimes does not have an answer to every question and impetuses one to be more open to the consideration of the possibility of a supernatural. This does not mean that there is no science behind the supernatural; rather it is the supernatural that utilizes science to make us appreciate our existence. Experiencing the creation of the supernatural is the true appreciation of the subjective experience of one's consciousness, for like the supernatural, it will always remain a beautiful mystery (Pereira 2015). Conclusion Self-sustaining energy is the answer to all mystical realties and the answer lies in believing in its existence in and around all living beings; that which brings in the awareness of one's existence and which performs tasks beyond the imagination of the current self awareness; an energy created at the creation of all that exists; a supernatural force beyond our imagination. Near death experiences cannot wholly be definitively referred to as hallucinations as they do not correspond with such objective reality. For during a near-death January 12, 2016 [Journal of Metaphysics and Connected Consciousness 2016 (In Press)] Pereira, C. Understanding memories of a near-death experience from the perspective of quantum entanglement and in the presence of the supernatural Published by The Ministry of Connected Consciousness Page 6 experience the brain is inactive and as of now there is no study that has detected activity in the vision centre of the brain during a near-death experience. A biophysical visual representational model has been developed to show the involvement of low-energy quantum entanglements during near-death experiences (Bokkon et al 2013). The quantum world is mysterious; the entanglement of particles at a subatomic level within a biological network of the microtubules is where memories and awareness gets computed. The subatomic energy cloud has the ability to perform within the system as well as outside the system, which is clearly demonstrated during a near-death experience. Awareness and memories is therefore fundamental; a form of energy that exists all around us, created by the supernatural and computed by particles in the quantum world and our bodies are like quantum processors that are an emerging creation meant to increase its intelligence and build its identity. Memories can therefore be created with and without the presence of a body; for it is computed within the realms of the quantum world that lies beyond the imagination of oneself evident during a near-death experience. References Blanke O and Dieguez S. 2009. Leaving the body and life behind: Out-of-body and NearDeath experience. S. Laureys & G. Tononi (Eds.) The Neurology of Consciousness. Elsevier Ltd. Bokkon I, Mallick BN, Tuszynski J. 2013. Near death experiences: A multi-disciplinary hypothesis. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience. 7(533): 1 – 11. Hameroff S and Chopra D. 2012. The "Quantum Soul": A Scientific Hypothesis. A. MoreiraAlmeida and F.S. Santos (eds.), Exploring Frontiers of the Mind-Brain 79 Relationship, Mindfulness in Behavioral Health, DOl 1O.1007/978-1-4614-0647-L5, Springer Science+Business Media, LLC. Harter J. 2014. Awakening from the Dream. Ministry of Connected Consciousness; ISBN 9781-312-77625-8 p. 1-2 Mobbs D and Watt C. 2011. There is nothing paranormal about near-death experiences: how neuroscience can explain seeing bright lights, meeting the dead, or being convinced you are one of them. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15 (10):447-449. Pereira C. 2015. Understanding the subjective experience of consciousness in "GOD". Journal of Metaphysics and Connected Consciousness 2 (In Press). Peres A. 1993. Quantum Theory, Concepts and Methods, Kluwer, 1993; ISBN 0-7923-2549-4 p. 115. January 12, 2016 [Journal of Metaphysics and Connected Consciousness 2016 (In Press)] Pereira, C. Understanding memories of a near-death experience from the perspective of quantum entanglement and in the presence of the supernatural Published by The Ministry of Connected Consciousness Page 7 Schroter-Kunhardt M. 1993. A review of Near-Death experiences. Journal of Scientific Exploration 7 (3): 219 – 239.


Philosophy

Michael Morris' Knowledge and Ideology is an original and valuable contribution to the philosophical debate concerning the meaning and validity of the concept of ideology critique. While the concept of ideology has occupied a pivotal role within the tradition of critical social theory, as Terry Eagleton had already pointed out in his 1994 study, the term nevertheless has "a whole range of useful meanings, not all of which are compatible with one another." Morris takes Eagleton's analysis as his point of departure, distinguishing between "epistemic" and "functional" varieties of ideology critique. Unlike Eagleton's earlier study, however, which focused on the historical development of these two dominant ways of conceiving ideology, Morris' work attempts to show how the cognitive and non-cognitive dimensions of belief can be productively reconciled in a "Neo-Hegelian variation of epistemic ideology critique." Morris' work makes a compelling case that critical social theory can be sensitive to the social dimensions of belief without abandoning the legitimate goals of the traditional epistemological project. I have some questions, however, regarding how he proposes to reconcile these two competing visions of ideology critique.

Comments on Knowledge and Ideology: The Epistemology of Social and Political Critique Miles Hentrup, Florida Gulf Coast University Michael Morris' Knowledge and Ideology is an original and valuable contribution to the philosophical debate concerning the meaning and validity of the concept of ideology critique. While the concept of ideology has occupied a pivotal role within the tradition of critical social theory, as Terry Eagleton had already pointed out in his 1994 study, the term nevertheless has "a whole range of useful meanings, not all of which are compatible with one another."1 Morris takes Eagleton's analysis as his point of departure, distinguishing between "epistemic" and "functional" varieties of ideology critique. Unlike Eagleton's earlier study, however, which focused on the historical development of these two dominant ways of conceiving ideology, Morris' work attempts to show how the cognitive and noncognitive dimensions of belief can be productively reconciled in a "Neo-Hegelian variation of epistemic ideology critique."2 Morris' work makes a compelling case that critical social theory can be sensitive to the social dimensions of belief without abandoning the legitimate goals of the traditional epistemological project. I have some questions, however, regarding how he proposes to reconcile these two competing visions of ideology critique. First, Morris considers authors like Stirner, Nietzsche, Marcuse and Foucault, who look to the "social origins and functions of belief "3 in order to unmask the hidden interests which every theory wittingly or unwittingly serves. These figures represent what Morris calls the tradition of "functional critique of ideology." What unites the figures within this tradition, for Morris, is their "guiding concern with the functional role that beliefs play in the perpetuation of social oppression."4 While these thinkers do well to consider beliefs as entities in the world tied to systems of oppression, Morris rightly notes that these same thinkers often fail to consider the specifically cognitive dimensions of belief. That is to say, functional critics of ideology often fail to adequately treat beliefs as claims about the world. Morris devotes Parts One and Two of Knowledge and Ideology to an examination of the problems he identifies in this majority tradition of ideology critique. In Part One, Morris joins Jürgen Habermas5 among others in voicing his concern that functional critics of ideology often become ensnared within a performative contradiction Florida Philosophical Review 68 that threatens to undermine their criticisms. In taking recourse to the very same "rationality" which their analyses condemn as a function of power, these functional critics open themselves to the charge of self-refutation. While I share Morris' concern here and appreciate his articulation of this important point, I wonder whether these critics, in reducing all rational criteria to their functional role in the expression of power, would be moved by such logical scruples. After all, Nietzsche for his part affirms that "the nihilist does believe that one needs to be logical."6 In Part Two of Knowledge and Ideology, Morris elaborates a second important point of criticism of functional ideology critique: "If every belief and custom expresses and serves multiform power, then our general orientation toward the world becomes little more than a personal and quasi-aesthetic preference."7 If, that is, functional ideology critique leads us to regard all beliefs, all norms, and all forms of social organization as equally arbitrary incursions upon an otherwise radically individual and unmediated subject, then it effectively eliminates its own normative basis. Once the functional critic throws the proverbial baby out with the bathwater, the decision between violence and non-violence becomes one of mere personal preference. Further, Morris suggests that it is because the tradition of functional ideology critique views all norms as fundamentally oppressive that it often ends up promoting and even glorifying their violent disruption as "liberation." Now, I share the author's concern about the way that functional ideology critique can promote violent and antisocial behavior when it becomes severed from its normative core. I wonder whether the chief problem with such authors as Nietzsche, Foucault, Stirner, etc., however, is not that they end up actually glorifying violence, but that they can't offer any satisfactory justification for why, for instance, we should be concerned to reduce violence in the first place. Accordingly, I would ask the author to clarify whether he thinks that functional ideology critique becomes problematic only when it is put in the service of violent and ignoble ends, or when it comes to serve ends that cannot be satisfactorily justified. If, as I suspect, it is the latter, then I wonder whether a metacritique of the tradition of functional ideology critique wouldn't be better suited to turn to such questions of justification. Here's another way of putting the same question: Morris suggests a certain family resemblance between the bohemian, the irrationalist, the postmodern, the skeptic, the fideist, and the fascist. What is the basic problem that links each of these figures together? To my mind, it is their suspicion toward all rational criteria – a suspicion which slides, all too easily, into dogmatism and, ultimately, chauvinism. But if my diagnosis is correct, then doesn't this suggest that functional ideology critique must come to terms with Hentrup 69 its epistemic deficit? Isn't this the chief problem that the critique of ideology must come to grips with? It is because Morris finds that the minority tradition of ideology critique – what he calls the "epistemic critique of ideology" – promises to address such concerns that he considers it to be a necessary corrective to the more dominant tradition of functional ideology critique. Morris finds representatives of the tradition of epistemic ideology critique in Karl Marx – the author, of course, of The German Ideology – Jürgen Habermas, Karl Mannheim, György Lukács, and more recently, in Jon Elster and Tommie Shelby. The strong variation of this paradigm construes the critique of ideology – here understood as the scientific unmasking of cognitively distorted belief – as a necessary and radical outgrowth of the traditional epistemological project. Because, as Morris points out, traditional epistemology insists upon a "sharp distinction between (a) properly epistemic accounts of truth and justification and (b) all psychological, sociological, historical, and rhetorical studies that examine the causes and associative patterns of belief,"8 it fails to recognize the inherently social dimension of cognition. Epistemic critics of ideology, therefore, are those figures like Marx, Mannheim, and Lukács who, in acknowledging the "constitutive and legitimate role of social roots and functions in the formation of most types of knowledge, without thereby undermining the difference between knowledge and error,"9 insist upon the "ideological" character of the traditional epistemological project. Thus, in quasi-Hegelian fashion, Morris positions the tradition of epistemic ideology critique as the "truth" which reconciles the important insights of the functional critique of ideology with the legitimate aspirations of the traditional epistemological project. Part Three of Knowledge and Ideology is devoted to Morris' attempts to synthesize the cognitive and noncognitive dimensions of belief within the context of a "Marxist Theory of Knowledge." Now, I find Morris' argument regarding the need to reconcile the aspirations of traditional epistemology with those of social theory to be quite clear and compelling. I agree with his basic thesis that a metacritique of ideology ought to integrate the social and cognitive dimensions of belief and to reject the traditional opposition between theoretical and practical reason upon which the former opposition rests. Nevertheless, I cannot follow Morris to his eventual conclusion that such a metacritique of ideology ought to be grounded in a Neo-Hegelian social ontology because I fail to see how it satisfies the traditional concerns of epistemology. I understand that Morris finds in the Neo-Hegelian framework an account which affirms that beliefs are determined by particular practical aims embedded within social practices. But what, in turn, does Morris suppose it is that determines those particular practical aims which he considers so decisive in the formation of beliefs? Indeed, Florida Philosophical Review 70 why should we believe that social practices and the particular aims which guide them are the most salient features in belief-formation in the first place? Even if beliefs are largely determined by such aims, what is it that makes some beliefs justified and others not? Following from this, what is it that legitimates Morris' own social-epistemic position as Neo-Hegelian metacritic of ideology? Why ought we to accept Morris' metacritique of ideology over the competing visions of ideology critique he engages throughout the study other than the fact that it aims to integrate the social and cognitive dimensions of belief? If there are "no sufficiently robust and determinate standards of 'truth,' 'reality' and 'knowledge' that exist above and prior to all cognitive practices,"10 as Morris argues, because these categories are always already rooted in specific cognitive practices which are themselves rooted in social practices, then what sort of justification can he provide for why we should prefer his account of ideology over any other? Hegel's philosophy provides an astonishing, if not overwhelming, attempt to answer each of the questions I have tried to raise here. Though Hegel does not have a critique of ideology per se, I wonder whether Morris thinks that Hegel – rather than, say, Lukács or Mannheim – can ultimately provide the theoretical resources for the same sort of metacritique of ideology that Morris advocates. I find this question particularly urgent in view of Morris' frequent appeal to Hegel's concept of "concrete universality." It is my impression that Morris is hesitant to pursue those questions of justification which, for Hegel, lead to the "standpoint of philosophical science."11 Indeed, Morris explicitly concedes at one point that "without the metaphysical and theological guarantees provided by Hegel, the existence of some such universal remains uncertain, perhaps something that can only be approached or approximated."12 But if Morris wishes to avoid these justificatory questions, then I am left wondering why we ultimately ought to accept his Neo-Hegelian metacritique of ideology over some competing account other than, say, mere personal preference? Moreover, if Morris does not think that we are in the position to appeal to traditional conceptions of "truth," "reality," or "knowledge" because they emerge from social practices which are themselves guided by particular interests, then I fail to see what ultimately distinguishes Morris' own metacritique of ideology from the functionalist variant he criticizes for eschewing traditional epistemological concerns. If the functional critic of ideology can only treat skepticism as an entity in the world, as part of the social reality she hopes to explain, surely this cannot mean that she can avoid its specific epistemological challenges. In view of such concerns, I would request further clarification as to which traditional epistemological standards the author Hentrup 71 thinks the metacritique of ideology must satisfy and, further, how he proposes to incorporate these requirements in his own Neo-Hegelian vision of the critique of ideology. Finally, if, as I have suggested above, functional critiques of ideology are problematic not only because they often encourage the violent disruption of norms, but because their suspicion toward all norms compels them to observe the disruption of every norm with the same stolid indifference, I wonder what means Morris' metacritique can offer to mitigate this last concern. Morris explains at one point that he has called attention to the links between functional ideology critique and the glorification of violence in order to "undermine the more sanguine attitudes of postmodern radicalism, with its conviction that endless debunking, unmasking, and deconstructing must naturally promote tolerance and militate against aggression."13 Morris' treatment of Rousseau, Stirner, Nietzsche and other figures he associates with the tradition of functional ideology critique makes it quite clear that he considers the glorification of violence to be distasteful, even abhorrent, but it remains ambiguous whether Morris' own metacritique of ideology can offer anything other than aesthetic criteria in support of its denunciation. Florida Philosophical Review 72 Endnotes 1 Terry Eagleton, Ideology: An Introduction (London: Verso Books, 2007), 1. 2 Michael Morris, Knowledge and Ideology: The Epistemology of Social and Political Critique (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 248. 3 Morris, Knowledge and Ideology, 10. 4 Morris, Knowledge and Ideology, 5-6. 5 See Jürgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures, trans. Frederick G. Lawrence (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998), 106-130. and Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), 18. 6 Morris, Knowledge and Ideology, 117. 7 Morris, Knowledge and Ideology, 50. 8 Morris, Knowledge and Ideology, 14-15. 9 Morris, Knowledge and Ideology, 241. 10 G.W.F. Hegel, Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Basic Outline: Part I: Science of Logic, trans. Klaus Brinkmann & Daniel O. Dahlstrom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 66. 11 Morris, Knowledge and Ideology, 22. 12 Morris, Knowledge and Ideology, 179.