Philosophy

A teleofunctional account of evolutionary mismatch Nathan Cofnas1 Received: 20 August 2015 / Accepted: 1 May 2016 / Published online: 6 May 2016  The Author(s) 2016. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com Abstract When the environment in which an organism lives deviates in some essential way from that to which it is adapted, this is described as ''evolutionary mismatch,'' or ''evolutionary novelty.'' The notion of mismatch plays an important role, explicitly or implicitly, in evolution-informed cognitive psychology, clinical psychology, and medicine. The evolutionary novelty of our contemporary environment is thought to have significant implications for our health and well-being. However, scientists have generally been working without a clear definition of mismatch. This paper defines mismatch as deviations in the environment that render biological traits unable, or impaired in their ability, to produce their selected effects (i.e., to perform their proper functions in Neander's sense). The machinery developed by Millikan in connection with her account of proper function, and with her related teleosemantic account of representation, is used to identify four major types, and several subtypes, of evolutionary mismatch. While the taxonomy offered here does not in itself resolve any scientific debates, the hope is that it can be used to better formulate empirical hypotheses concerning the effects of mismatch. To illustrate, it is used to show that the controversial hypothesis that general intelligence evolved as an adaptation to handle evolutionary novelty can, contra some critics, be formulated in a conceptually coherent way. Keywords Evolutionary mismatch  Evolutionary novelty  Environment of evolutionary adaptedness  Evolution of intelligence  Proper function  Teleosemantics & Nathan Cofnas firstname.lastname@example.com 1 Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Cambridge, Free School Lane, Cambridge CB2 3RH, UK 123 Biol Philos (2016) 31:507–525 DOI 10.1007/s10539-016-9527-1 Introduction When the environment in which an organism lives deviates in some essential-butnot-yet-defined way from that to which it is adapted, this is described as ''evolutionary mismatch,'' i.e., between the ancestral and the current environment (Confer et al. 2010; Lloyd et al. 2014). Elements of the current environment that deviate from the ancestral one are described as ''evolutionarily novel'' (Irons 1998; Sterelny 2010).1 Those that do not, as ''evolutionarily familiar'' (Kanazawa 2004a). The environment(s) to which an organism is adapted can be termed its ancestral environment (AE). The notion of mismatch plays an important role, explicitly or implicitly, in evolution-informed cognitive psychology (e.g., Confer et al. 2010; Tooby and Cosmides 1990), clinical psychology (e.g., Gilbert and Bailey 2000; Nesse 2004), and medicine (e.g., Eaton et al. 1988; Williams and Nesse 1991). However, scientists have generally been working without a clear definition of mismatch. This paper defines mismatch as deviations in the environment that render biological traits unable, or impaired in their ability, to produce their selected effects (i.e., to perform their proper functions in Neander's 1991a, b sense). The machinery developed by Millikan in connection with her account of proper function, and with her related teleosemantic account of representation, is used to identify four major types, and several subtypes, of evolutionary mismatch. Defining mismatch (or evolutionary novelty) in this way leaves it an open question whether different types of evolutionary novelty are good or bad for either the fitness or the general welfare of organisms. Many evolutionarily novel aspects of our contemporary environment are thought to have negative implications for our health and well-being (see Barrett 2007, 2010; Buss 2000; Lloyd et al. 2014: 4; Nesse 2004; Williams and Nesse 1991: 13–16). However, evolutionarily novel technology and systems of social organization have allowed our species to greatly increase its numbers (adaptedness) and have removed many evolutionarily familiar sources of suffering. Not all deviations from ancestral conditions are bad, and the neutral definition of mismatch defended in this paper captures that fact. A previous definition of mismatch In one of the few previous philosophical analyses of the concept, Lloyd et al. (2014: 4) define mismatch as ''a [detrimental] consequence that results from a trait that evolved in one environment being placed in another environment.'' '''Detrimental,''' they say, ''will usually be defined in terms of evolutionary fitness, but it can also refer to welfare in more general terms'' (6). This rules out by definition the possibility of mismatch being beneficial. As Lloyd et al. say: ''Traits that evolved in one environment need not be detrimental in a second environment; they can be neutral or fortuitously beneficial, but these cases are excluded by the term 'mismatch', which restricts our attention to the detrimental 1 In biology, the term ''evolutionary novelty'' usually refers to novel phenotypes. Scholars of mismatch use the term to refer to novel environments. 508 N. Cofnas 123 cases'' (5). We need to define mismatch in more neutral terms if we wish to investigate how deviations from the AE can be bad or good. Take an example of mismatch considered by Lloyd et al.: A person who is able to tan and ''who spends a lot of time indoors or covered with clothing will experience sunburn when their skin is suddenly exposed to the sun, a pattern of variation that seldom, if ever, occurred in their'' AE (14). Clearly, sunburns per se are bad from both a fitness (they increase the risk of cancer) and a general-welfare perspective. But the evolutionarily novel situation of spending a lot of time indoors and/or wearing clothing, though it may increase the risk of sunburn in some individuals, may on the whole be a good thing-both fitnessand welfare-wise. Deviations from AE conditions can have negative, positive, or mixed effects on fitness and welfare. Furthermore, in actual scientific debates in which the consequences of evolutionary novelty are at issue, it is not adequate to define evolutionary novelty as having only negative consequences. One of these debates will be discussed in the following section. The scientific use of an account of evolutionary mismatch/novelty: the evolution of general intelligence Some intelligence researchers hold that general intelligence (g) is an adaptation for dealing with evolutionary novelty (Chiappe and MacDonald 2005; Kanazawa 2004a). Byrne (1995: 38) argues that intelligence may evolve as an adaptation ''in generalist animals...to exploit continually changing environments, since they must daily cope with novelty in order to survive.'' Sterelny (2012: 3) sees the challenge posed by ''evolutionarily novel features of the environment'' as having been an important driver of hominin cognitive evolution. Critics raise two objections based on ambiguity in the concept of evolutionary novelty. First, they say that the proposition that something is an adaptation for ''evolutionary novelty'' is logically contradictory: Adaptations can only evolve in response to recurrent features of the environment. If evolutionary novelty is understood as nonrecurrent features of the environment, it is impossible to evolve an adaptation to deal with it (Penke et al. 2011). Second, they say that ''the division between 'evolutionarily familiar' and 'evolutionarily novel' is so vague that one could legitimately argue that the same phenomenon was both 'evolutionarily familiar' and 'evolutionarily novel''' (Dutton 2013: 612). Kanazawa (2010)-who advocates the hypothesis-claims that vegetarianism and liberalism are evolutionarily novel. From one perspective these things surely are evolutionarily novel: Until recently all our ancestors ate meat and did not go out of their way to help distant, unrelated people (what Kanazawa sees as the goal of liberalism). But with a little ingenuity we could think up reasons for regarding vegetarianism and liberalism as evolutionarily familiar. Dietary taboos are a human universal, and vegetarians can be regarded as members of a moral tribe; liberalism can be interpreted as an extension of the cooperative ideology that prevailed among hunter–gatherers. The general-intelligence-as-an-adaptation-toevolutionary-novelty hypothesis will not yield any testable predictions if it is unclear what features of the environment are novel or familiar. A teleofunctional account of evolutionary mismatch 509 123 Notice that Lloyd et al.'s (2014) definition of mismatch as harmful deviations from the AE cannot be used to resolve this debate. The contention is that general intelligence evolved to handle novelty, which includes taking advantage of new opportunities. Organized social codes might be evolutionarily novel, and we might have evolved greater intelligence in order to deal with them, but the development of social codes presumably was positive for our species. The definition of evolutionary novelty defended here could potentially be used to answer both of the above criticisms. First, it gives sense to the idea of recurrent evolutionary novelty (Byrne 1995; Kanazawa 2004a; Sterelny 2010). Sterelny (2010: 59) attributes our ability to ''negotiate evolutionarily novel problems'' in part to the fact that ''novelty is not new'' for our species. ''Our lineage has repeatedly experienced demanding environmental change.'' Byrne (1995: 38)-as quoted above-refers to ''continually changing environments'' that repeatedly confront animals with ''novelty.'' There is a conceptually coherent sense in which the environment can be recurrently novel over evolutionary time. The environment can remain evolutionarily novel indefinitely, as long as it continually changes so as to disrupt the performance of a species' proper functions. (This idea seems implicit in the aforecited works.) In regard to the second criticism, the definition of evolutionary novelty given here can, of course, resolve the tricky cases, such as those mentioned above or discussed in Dutton (2013). Analysis will likely reveal that in some cases a feature of the environment may be partly evolutionarily familiar and partly novel. The debate about the evolution of intelligence illustrates that ''mismatch'' may be more than a verbal category that is useful for scientists. It may potentially be something out there in the world that has actual consequences for evolution. Whether this is the case is an empirical, not a philosophical, question. But empirical hypotheses concerning the effects of mismatch require a coherent concept of mismatch in order to be formulated. The philosophical analysis given here attempts to clarify the concept. Groundwork for cataloging the types of evolutionary novelty Definition of evolutionary novelty Neander (1991a, b) defines the ''proper function(s)'' of a biological trait as the effect(s) of the trait that it was selected for-the effects that played a causal role in its selection. She terms these the selected effects. Evolutionary familiarity is defined here as the environmental conditions necessary for biological traits to perform their (Neanderian) proper functions, i.e., to produce the effects that are responsible for their recent (Godfrey-Smith 1994) evolution and proliferation and/or maintenance. Evolutionary novelty is defined as deviations in the environment that prevent biological traits from performing, or impair their ability to perform, such functions. Such impairment is not necessarily bad for organisms from the standpoint of either fitness or welfare. Mice may possess mechanisms the proper function of which is to escape from cats. These mechanisms do not perform these functions in cat-free 510 N. Cofnas 123 environments, but cat-free environments are good for mice. In humans, it is thought that depression is an adaptation for dealing with certain types of situations, causing the depressed person to withdraw from hopeless goals (Nesse 2000, 2004). Nevertheless, an environment that never triggered depression would be a good one (ceteris paribus; cf. Garson 2015: 177). Millikanian proper functions In Millikan's (1984) system, a direct proper function of x is F if the reason that x exists with character C is because, by virtue of C, x can perform F (26). For something to have a direct proper function, it must be a member of what she terms a ''reproductively established family.'' Different items belong to the same reproductively established family when they resemble each other due to later items being produced by copying, or reproduction of, earlier ones (or ''models''; 18–19). The properties by virtue of which one item is a reproduction of another are ''reproductively established properties'' (20). The proper function of a mechanism is relational when it is the function of the mechanism ''to do or to produce something that bears a specific relation to something else'' (39). For example, Smith's dwarf chameleon (Bradypodion taeniabronchum) camouflages itself by changing color. The ''pigment-rearranging device'' of chameleons has the relational proper function to bring the color of the chameleon in a certain relation-namely, ''same color as''-to the surface upon which it is sitting (39). When a mechanism with a relational proper function is faced with the type of entity toward which it is its function to bring about a certain relation, the mechanism acquires an adapted proper function: the function to produce the specific item or situation that bears the appropriate relation to the given entity in this particular instance (40). As noted, the chameleon's pigment-rearranging mechanism has as a relational proper function to make the chameleon's color the ''same color as'' the surface upon which the animal finds itself. If the color of the surface is specified as, say, brown, then the pigment-rearranging mechanism has as its adapted proper function to turn the chameleon brown. When a device performs its adapted proper function, it is termed an adapted device. The entity to which the device is adapted is its adaptor (40). The proper functions of adapted devices correspond to the proper functions of their producing devices that ''lie beyond the production of these adapted devices themselves'' (41). The proper functions of adapted devices are termed derived proper functions (41), and are of two types. Adapted derived proper functions are fixed by the device-producing mechanism and its particular adaptor. Invariant derived proper functions of an adapted device correspond to what can be described as the ultimate purpose of the producer. A particular bee dance-the adaptor of which is a source of nectar sighted by the dancing bee-has as its adapted derived proper function to induce the dancer's sisters to fly a certain distance in a specific direction (say, 100 meters north). Its invariant derived proper function is to guide them to nectar. A teleofunctional account of evolutionary mismatch 511 123 Proper functions and evolutionary mismatch Again, this paper defines evolutionary mismatch/novelty as deviations in the environment that prevent biological traits from producing, or impair their ability to produce, their selected effects (what Neander defines as ''proper function''). The taxonomy of evolutionary mismatch that will be given here is generated by the following observation: The property of being ''a (Neanderian) proper function'' is logically coextensive with that of being ''either a (Millikanian) direct or invariant derived proper function of a biological trait.'' If a trait x has been selected for having character C because, by virtue of C, x can perform F, F is the direct proper function of x, and also its selected effect-it has been selected because it does F. If a trait y has been selected because it produces adapted devices that bring about certain relationships to things in the world, the invariant derived proper function of the adapted device is the effect for the sake of which the mechanism that produced it was selected-invariant derived proper functions are selected effects. To elaborate on the last point, traits with relational proper functions-which produce adapted devices with derived proper functions-can be favored by natural selection when they tend to bring about certain invariant results in the AE: ''getting honey,'' ''escaping lions,'' ''catching mice,'' and the like. It is these final, invariant results which are the ultimate evolutionary purposes of such traits-their selected effects. Obtaining them is the invariant derived proper function of adapted devices. If environmental conditions change such that traits with relational proper functions tend to produce adapted devices with very different adapted derived proper functions (e.g., flying 100 meters south rather than north), while continuing to fulfill invariant derived proper functions (e.g., getting honey), this change is (ceteris paribus) irrelevant from an evolutionary perspective: The trait continues to produce the effects for which it was selected. That is why only environmental change that prevents an adapted device from fulfilling, or impairs its ability to fulfill, its invariant derived proper functions is ''evolutionarily novel'' according to the definition given here. Devices with relational proper functions must consume representations of states of the environment Devices with relational proper functions (which produce adapted devices with invariant derived proper functions) ''do or...produce something that bears a specific relation to something else'' (Millikan 1984: 39). The entity/world state toward which the mechanism has the function of bringing about a certain relation is called its adaptor. Any biological structure with a relational proper function performs its adapted proper function (in the normal way) in response to correct representations of the environment, specifically to the adaptor. To perform relational proper functions, organisms must evolve some way to track the relevant environmental conditions. For an organism to track some 512 N. Cofnas 123 environmental condition E, the instantiation of E must increase the probability of some type of state MP (p for ''producer'') occurring in the organism. When MP is tokened, the mechanism MC (c for ''consumer'') in the organism that uses MP as a sign that E is instantiated can exhibit a response appropriate for E. When MP is in fact caused by E, MC performs its proper function in exhibiting the response appropriate to E upon the registration of MP. According to Millikan (1989), MP tokens represent the conditions that are necessary for the mechanism that consumes MP-namely, some mechanism MC-to fulfill its proper function. To illustrate with camouflaging in Smith's dwarf chameleon, the chameleon has to have some way of tracking the color it is sitting on. To do this, it must use some sort of inner intentional icons to represent different colors. There is no consuming mechanism that uses the skin color as a sign of anything, so the skin itself has no representational content (Millikan 1984: 118; 1989: 283). But in order for the pigment-arranging mechanism to perform its relational proper function (in the normal way) on (e.g.) a brown surface, a chameleon must have some state-an inner intentional icon-that covaries with and represents ''brown surface.''2 Four types of evolutionary mismatch/novelty In Millikanian terms, evolutionary mismatch is defined as deviations in the environment that render biological traits unable, or impaired in their ability, to perform their direct proper functions or invariant derived proper functions. Biological traits perform their direct proper functions when the trait itself develops (unimpaired), and environmental conditions are such that the trait produces the effect for which it was selected. Environmental change that prevents traits with direct proper functions from developing, or that prevents fully developed traits with direct proper functions from producing their selected effects, constitutes two types of mismatch labeled Un(der)development-inducing and Ineffectiveness-inducing, respectively. Biological traits with relational proper functions perform their invariant derived proper functions when the organism correctly represents the environment (namely, the adaptor), and the adapted device it produces in response to that representation brings about the right adaptive relationship vis-à-vis the adaptor. Environmental change that causes the organism to misrepresent, or to fail to represent, the environment constitutes a third type of mismatch labeled Misrepresentation-inducing. If the environment changes so that the ways in which the organism uses representations fail to bring about the right invariant end results, this constitutes a fourth type of mismatch labeled Misresponse-inducing. The four types of evolutionary mismatch-the four ways in which traits can fail to produce their selected effects-are discussed in turn in the following four sections. 2 Such representations are ''pushmi-pullyu representations'': They are descriptive and directive at the same time (Millikan 1995). A teleofunctional account of evolutionary mismatch 513 123 Type 1-Un(der)development-inducing: failure of a trait with a direct proper function to develop The environment may change so that a biological trait that has a direct proper function simply fails to develop, or is impaired in its development. For example, human arms and hands have the direct proper function to be used for grasping (cf. Neander 1991a: 174). However, if a person develops in a womb that contains thalidomide, these structures may be greatly impaired in their development. Thalidomide in the womb is evolutionarily novel because it prevents biological traits (i.e., arms and hands) with direct proper functions from developing, or from developing well enough to perform their direct proper functions (i.e., grasping). A less dramatic example among humans is learning to read as a child, which leads to myopia among genetically susceptible individuals (Williams and Nesse 1991: 16). Type 2-Ineffectiveness-inducing: failure of a trait to perform its direct proper function despite unimpaired development If a biological trait has a direct proper function, the environment may change so that, although the trait physically develops unimpaired, it fails to perform its proper function. Prior to the industrial revolution, peppered moths (Biston betularia) in England were nearly all of the ''typica'' form-white with black spots. According to the well-known story of industrial melanism, this coloration camouflaged the moths against lichen-covered trees. In the mid-1800s, pollution from factories killed the lichens, exposing the dark tree bark. This environmental change rendered the moths' camouflaged structure unable to perform its direct proper function, although the moths continued to develop unimpaired (Cook et al. 2012). Learning Millikan (1984: 24–25) identifies two ways of learning: An organism may repeat behavior that was previously ''rewarded'' (or met some other set of criteria), or it may imitate behavior that it observed in another organism. In the former case, the direct proper function of the learned behavior is to obtain the reward. In the latter case, it is to perform the function that the learner associated-by observation-with the behavior in question (28). In either case, a learned behavior may be as bizarre or as novel as you wish, but it seems that the conditions that produced it cannot be evolutionarily novel, according to the definition given here, as long as the reward is obtained or the (observed) function is performed. For conditions to be evolutionarily novel, some trait has to fail to perform its direct (or invariant derived) proper function as a result of environmental change. How can successfully performed learned behaviors reflect evolutionary novelty? The answer is that the biological mechanisms that underlie learning perform their direct proper functions only when they produce (learned) behaviors with particular characteristics-namely, those characteristics by virtue of which the 514 N. Cofnas 123 behaviors performed certain functions in the AE, which caused the (past) proliferation of (tokens of) the underlying learning mechanism (cf. Millikan 1989: 292). Learning mechanisms fail to perform their direct proper functions when they do not produce learned behaviors with such characteristics. For example, in their natural environment, cats learn to hunt when they are hungry. A housecat in an evolutionarily novel environment might learn that, whenever it shakes its owner's hand, it gets a treat: It learns to shake hands when it is hungry. Being fed in response to performing this trick is evolutionarily novel vis-à-vis the cat's mechanism responsible for learning how to obtain food. The mechanism has as its direct proper function to establish (by learning) a connection between hunting and eating. Under novel conditions, the mechanism causes the cat to obtain food in some other way, but not by performing its direct proper function. Type 3-Misrepresentation-inducing: misrepresenting or failing to represent the environment In order to respond contingently to biologically important objects and situations, organisms may evolve traits with relational proper functions. In response to correct representations of their adaptors, these traits produce adapted devices which, under the right conditions, perform their invariant derived proper functions, thus accomplishing the ultimate goal for the sake of which the traits were selected. Environmental change that causes traits to fail to produce adapted devices that perform their invariant derived proper functions as a consequence of misrepresenting adaptors constitutes the third type of evolutionary mismatch. This section reviews the basic ways in which environmental change can cause organisms to misrepresent adaptors. Identifying objects Under evolutionarily familiar conditions, organisms tend to correctly represent the objects in their environment as being of a biologically important type (such as predator, prey, mother, sibling, potential mate), though sometimes with a bias for false positives or false negatives (Godfrey-Smith 1991). Objects of certain types stimulate the production of certain states in the organism, which traits with relational proper functions use as representations of such objects. The schema used to recognize object tokens of a particular type-i.e., to produce tokens of a state that the organism uses to track examples of that object type-can be acquired in either evolutionary or individual experience. Objects of different biologically important types have been-when encountered in evolutionary experience-more or less reliably associated with stimuli (or cues) of certain intensities in particular configurations (Eibl-Eibesfeldt 1989). The organism may evolve to use these cues in one of two ways. First, it may use them to pick out examples of an object type. The organism then learns to recognize tokens of the object type in question-forming a schema of it-through exposure to the examples. The cues used to recognize the original example(s) are not necessarily the same cues A teleofunctional account of evolutionary mismatch 515 123 used to recognize the object after the schema has been formed on the basis of the examples. Second, the organism may, through genetic adaptation, possess innate sensitivity to the key stimuli (or configurational key stimuli) associated with biologically important object types. The following two subsections deal, respectively, with these two ways of forming object schemas. Learning to recognize objects: imprinting Organisms that rely on learning to form a schema of a biologically important type of object must be adapted to use (historically reliable) cues to guide them to correct examples (i.e., tokens) of the object type in question. When a schema formed in this way is incorrigible, the process is termed imprinting (Lorenz 1970: 124–133). The time in the organism's life cycle in which imprinting occurs, or can occur, is termed the critical period. If, during the critical period, any of the cues used by an organism to guide it to biologically correct examples of the object type to imprint on are removed, or are attached to tokens of other object types, this constitutes evolutionary novelty (cf. Garson 2015: 180–183). The result will be that the organism fails to imprint on any object, or imprints on an incorrect object type. The particular object token(s) that an organism uses to form a schema of a biologically important type may, paradoxically, not themselves be of that type. Many birds and mammals use either their ''parents'' or their ''siblings'' to form schemas of ''potential mates,'' but parents and siblings themselves are (usually) not potential mates. A mallard drake (Anas platyrhynchos) raised by graylag goose (Anser anser) foster parents along with mallard siblings will flock with mallards but court graylags. Thus, it uses its siblings to form a schema of objects that elicit flocking behavior, and it uses its mother to form a schema of the objects that elicit courting behavior, although the mother herself will never be courted (Lorenz 1970: 280). A jackdaw (Corvus monedula) that has been reared by a human will, upon reaching sexual maturity, court Homo sapiens, but not the particular one who raised it (131). A Muscovy drake (Cairina moschata) raised by a human along with surrogate mallard siblings will, upon reaching sexual maturity, court mallards, indicating that it, unlike mallards and jackdaws, uses ''siblings'' as models to form the schema of ''potential mates'' (132). For ducks and jackdaws, being raised by humans, or by or with birds of another species, is evolutionarily novel: Cues that, under evolutionarily familiar conditions, guide them to imprint sexual responses on examples of correct object types are, in the novel situation, attached to biologically incorrect objects. This causes them to misrepresent members of other species as potential mates and to produce an adapted device with the adapted derived proper function of courting these incorrect objects. Of course, this adapted device fails to perform its invariant derived proper function of bringing about copulation with (non-relative) conspecifics. Under evolutionarily familiar conditions, humans imprint sexual disgust responses on close relatives. Recent research suggests that the sibling-inbreedingavoidance mechanism in humans relies on two cues to establish siblinghood: childhood coresidence and maternal perinatal association (Lieberman et al. 2007). 516 N. Cofnas 123 The latter cue refers to observing someone as an infant being cared for by one's own biological mother-this cue is potentially available only to older siblings. The former cue is potentially available to older, younger, and same-aged siblings. In humans, biological siblings who are not raised together often fail to imprint sexual disgust on each other. Contrary to thousands of years of popular belief- reflected most notably in the story of Oedipus-explicit knowledge by itself that someone is a relative appears to have little influence on one's attitude toward sexual relations with them. In fact, it is very common for relatives (whether siblings or parents and children) separated at birth to feel, upon reunion, strongly attracted to each other, and even to act on these feelings. This phenomenon is termed ''genetic sexual attraction'' (Greenberg and Littlewood 1995). People who experience genetic sexual attraction, however, are typically averse to sexual relations with their adoptive family members. The situation of being raised without, and reunited in adulthood with, an opposite-sex sibling is evolutionarily novel: It greatly increases the likelihood of failure to represent opposite-sex siblings as relatives and thus to produce an adapted device that fulfills its invariant derived proper function of preventing sexual attraction to, and relations with, siblings. Genetic adaptation to recognize objects Any natural, evolutionarily familiar type of object will (in the AE) more or less reliably emanate stimuli in particular intensities and in particular configurations. Organisms can evolve to use a subset of these stimuli to recognize tokens of the object type. Registration of the ''key'' stimuli or configurational stimuli produces a token of a state type used by the organism to represent the object (Eibl-Eibesfeldt 1989: 55; Tinbergen 1951: 25, 27). An object is evolutionarily novel when it emanates key stimuli associated with an evolutionarily familiar object but in different intensities or combinations, and/or it emanates key stimuli associated with an evolutionarily familiar type of object but is not of the same biologically important type. Visual pornography, for example, consists of images/video emanating key stimuli associated with ''sexually receptive mate,'' and these key stimuli may be arranged in evolutionarily novel combinations. More examples will be given in the subsection on supernormal stimuli (below). Consider also Dretske's (1986) example of marine bacteria that swim toward oxygen-low water by means of magnetotaxis. These bacteria contain tiny magnets called magnetosomes. The magnetosomes of species in the northern hemisphere draw bacteria toward geomagnetic north, which is downwards and away from highly oxygenated surface water. Species in the southern hemisphere have their magnetosomes reversed: They are drawn toward geomagnetic south, which is downwards and away from surface water in that hemisphere. The magnetic pull is the key stimulus that the bacteria are genetically adapted to use to produce a representation of the direction of oxygen-low water. The system that the bacterium uses to orient itself has a relational proper function. Its function is to bring about a certain relation between the organism and the oxygen-low water (namely, that the bacterium should swim toward and be in such water). ''Oxygen-low water'' is the adaptor-the thing toward which the A teleofunctional account of evolutionary mismatch 517 123 system has the function of bringing about a relation. The bacterium has to represent the adaptor in order to respond to it. ''Attraction-to-a-direction-at-a-time'' (cf. Millikan 1989: 290) does this-it represents the direction of oxygen-low water. The adapted device produced in response to this representation3 is a specific orientation with the flagellum propelling the bacterium forward. The adapted derived proper function of the adapted device is to swim in the direction of the magnetic pull at that particular time. The invariant derived proper function is to swim in the direction of oxygen-low water. Living in the southern hemisphere would be evolutionarily novel for a northern hemisphere bacterium and vice versa. In either case the orienting system in the bacterium would misrepresent its adaptor (low-oxygen water) as being upwards, because the key stimulus it uses to recognize oxygen-low water is associated with oxygen-high water. In response to the misrepresentation, the bacterium would produce an adapted device that fails to perform its invariant derived proper function. Identifying situations Under evolutionarily familiar conditions, organisms tend to correctly represent the situations in their environment as being of a biologically important type, and, just as with objects, sometimes with a bias for false positives or false negatives. Tokens of biologically significant situation types stimulate the production of certain states in the organism, which devices with relational proper functions use as representations. Environmental deviations that cause situations to remain unrepresented, or to be incorrectly represented, constitute a subtype of evolutionary novelty. Mismatch: misrepresenting situations Consider social exchange (in our species). Rational choice theory often fails to predict peoples' behavior in both artificial and natural social-exchange situations. About half of subjects cooperate in anonymous, one-shot prisoner's dilemma games (PDGs), while rational choice theory predicts that they will defect (Kanazawa 2004b: 41). Kanazawa (2004b) hypothesizes that the more a social-exchange situation corresponds to situations that existed in the AE, the more likely people will be to behave according to the predictions of rational choice theory. Why do so many people cooperate when playing anonymous, one-shot PDGs when doing so amounts to giving money to an anonymous stranger? The answer, Kanazawa proposes, is that, in the AE, there was no such thing as anonymous social exchange, nor of guaranteed one-time interactions. The only way to interact with someone in the AE was face-to-face. And, unless you killed them, there was no such thing as interacting with someone and knowing that you would never see them again. Situations of social exchange activate specialized cognitive mechanisms, which do not take cues of ''anonymity'' or ''one-time-ness'' as input. In modern postindustrial society, anonymous and non-iterated social exchange is common-in some contexts, even the norm. Our behavior (e.g., cooperating in anonymous, one-shot PDGs and 3 Pushmi-pullyu representation-see note 2 (above). 518 N. Cofnas 123 contributing to public goods) reflects a representation of our environment (namely, interactions are not anonymous or one shot) that is now often inaccurate. In anonymous, one-shot social exchange, our cognitive mechanisms produce an adapted device with the adapted derived proper function to be generous to our partner. The device fails to fulfill its invariant derived proper function of maximizing expected long-run payoff. In response to cues reflecting specific environmental conditions, organisms can develop an adaptive phenotype by means of developmental switches. For example, some species of water flea (crustaceans of the genus Daphnia) develop hard shells if exposed to chemicals emitted by their predators. The shells are ''metabolically costly,'' but worth it if the water flea is in an environment with many predators (Garson 2015: 178–179). Garson defines ''developmental mismatch'' as occurring when a cue triggers the development of a phenotype that turns out not to be appropriate-for example, if the chemical associated with predators was emitted in an environment without any predators. ''Developmental mismatches'' result from misrepresenting the environment. The developmental switch is part of a system with a relational proper function. The adaptor is the environmental situation (e.g., many predators), which must be correctly represented. The phenotype that develops is an adapted device with an invariant derived proper function to relate to the adaptor in the appropriate way. If the organism misrepresents the adaptor, it will develop a phenotype that fails to accomplish its invariant derived proper function. Supernormal stimuli The releasing effect of key stimuli (used to identify either objects or situations) can be increased by intensifying their presentation (Tinbergen 1951: 44–46). Configurational key stimuli can also be intensified by exaggerating the stimulus relations in question (e.g., dolls, teddy bears, and certain cartoon characters; Eibl-Eibesfeldt 1989: 59–63). An object in which several key stimuli with additive releasing effects are combined may have a releasing effect greater than any, or almost any, natural object. That is, objects can be represented as being clear examples of a certain biologically important type, although they may not be of that type at all. For practically all organisms, habitat selection is an important adaptive problem. Survival is closely tied to living in the right environment. Organisms evolve to be attracted to key stimuli associated with their biologically ideal environment, and to avoid environments that lack these stimuli. Humans seem to have evolved to prefer environmental conditions associated with the safest part of the Pleistocene African savannah: verdant, open spaces with scattered trees, especially in close proximity to clear water. When shown photographs of a variety of environments, children who have never been to a tropical savanna indicate that it would be the best environment to live in or to visit. Adults develop a comparable level of attraction to environments with which they are familiar, but continue to judge the savannah as appealing regardless of their individual experience (Balling and Falk 1982). The idyllic savannah environment is recreated in an exaggerated form, albeit on a smaller scale, in the suburban lawn. The grass of the suburban lawn is greener, A teleofunctional account of evolutionary mismatch 519 123 brighter, and more consistent than that which ever existed in the AE. Ironically, these lawns attain their supernormally stimulating effects due to the administration of health-threatening fertilizers and herbicides that sometimes reduce the fitness of those who come into contact with them (Barrett 2007: 67). The popular herbicide 2,4-dichlorophenoxyacetic acid, for example, threatens fitness in a dramatic way. Among men, exposure to this chemical is associated with reduced sperm quality; among pregnant women, with increased risk of miscarriage. Our attraction to key stimuli associated with the most fitness-promoting environment in the AE leads us to create an environment that needlessly threatens us, though we are compensated with a certain amount of aesthetic pleasure. Our representation of certain landscape features as indicating a vicinity of maximum safety is no longer accurate. Our habitat-selection mechanism produces an adapted device (namely, a desire to live in close proximity to supernormally stimulating lawns) that may fail to fulfill its invariant derived proper function (namely, leading us to an area that is more fitness promoting than the alternatives). Type 4-Misresponse-inducing: responding incorrectly to environmental conditions The previous section dealt with the principles by which organisms produce states to track environmental conditions. This section deals with how traits with relational proper functions use, or consume, these states in order to bring about adaptive relationships vis-à-vis their adaptors. Under evolutionarily familiar conditions, particular responses are elicited with certain frequencies, and are joined together to form behavioral chains to accomplish biologically important goals (i.e., invariant derived proper functions). When conditions change such that responses are elicited with different frequencies, or chains of behavior are not assembled correctly, or responses no longer achieve the biological purpose for which they evolved, the environment is evolutionarily novel. Behavioral chains Biological goals are often accomplished by the successive performance of relational proper functions, each of which is released by a separate stimulus situation/adaptor and is subject to its own appetence (cf. Millikan 1984: 41). In many cases, the completion of one relational proper function in a behavioral chain brings about the adaptor necessary to release the next relational proper function, and so on, until a biological goal is accomplished (through performance of the invariant derived proper function of the adapted device produced by the last relational proper function in the chain). This is particularly obvious in the case of reproductive behavior, which, in many animals, begins with courting (itself composed of a chain of behaviors), the performance of which brings about the stimulus situation/adaptor releasing copulation/insemination. This produces fertilized eggs or young, which in turn release parental behaviors. 520 N. Cofnas 123 Successful hunting behavior in cats (and many other predators) requires the integration of several separate motor patterns: stalking, pouncing, killing, and eating prey. Each of these behaviors can be released independently, and can be temporarily exhausted by repeated elicitation without reducing the appetence for the other behaviors that comprise the chain. Under natural conditions, successful stalking- released by the sight of a small animal, or signs of such an animal-brings about a situation that releases pouncing, which, when successful, leads to killing and finally to eating. Under natural conditions, cats learn to hunt when they are hungry. Under the evolutionarily novel conditions of apartment living, the elements of the hunting behavioral chain often become separated: The cat stalks shadows, pounces on balls of string, directs killing motions at random objects, and eats ''cat food'' from a dish. Frequency of elicitation of responses Objects and situations for which a particular response is adaptive are encountered, or must be sought or brought about, with a particular frequency in the AE. Organisms typically evolve so that, under evolutionarily familiar conditions, particular responses are elicited by the right stimulus situations with the frequency appropriate to the AE. The drive to perform a behavior (a relational proper function) is typically matched to the appropriate frequency (Tinbergen 1951: 168). An environment is evolutionarily novel vis-à-vis an evolved response if it presents the eliciting stimulus situation (which is represented as the adaptor) with a greater or lesser frequency than it occurred in the organism's evolutionary experience. In such environments, evolved responses may be elicited in biologically inappropriate situations (the organism produces an adapted device in response to the wrong adaptor) or fail to be elicited in appropriate situations (the organism fails to produce an adapted device in response to the right adaptor). As noted in the previous subsection, the elements comprising a behavioral chain are elicited by different stimulus situations, and are subject to their own appetence. Such elements will often, under evolutionarily familiar conditions, be elicited with different frequencies. This occurs when performance of one element of the chain often does not produce the adaptor for the relational proper function that comes next in the chain. As discussed, hunting in cats involves the successive performance of four separate behaviors, viz., stalking, pouncing, killing, and eating prey. Under evolutionarily familiar conditions, the earlier elements of this behavioral chain are performed more often than the later, since the prey may escape at any point before it is successfully killed.4 Thus, cats possess drives to perform the later elements of this behavioral chain with successively lesser frequency. If a cat is locked in a room with live mice introduced in succession-under conditions where the mice may put up a fight but never escape-the cat responds in the beginning by performing the whole sequence of hunting behavior to completion. After it has eaten several mice, it will kill a few more without eating them. Then the cat will stalk and catch mice for a while, before letting them go. Finally, pouncing behavior is exhausted, and the cat 4 Even killing movements are not always successful. A teleofunctional account of evolutionary mismatch 521 123 will simply stalk mice for a while until this last appetence is exhausted (Lorenz 1966: 92–93). Summary and application to a scientific debate This paper has delimited four types of evolutionary mismatch along with several subtypes (Table 1). This section seeks to illustrate the potential scientific use of this taxonomy by briefly considering its relevance for the hypothesis about the evolution of intelligence discussed earlier. Table 1 Four types of evolutionary mismatch/novelty Type Subtype Example Type 1-Un(der)developmentinducing: failure of a trait with a direct proper function to develop Thalidomide in the womb prevents limbs from developing; reading from a young age causes myopia Type 2-Ineffectivenessinducing: failure of a trait to perform its direct proper function despite unimpaired development Typica peppered moths in a polluted environment are not camouflaged Failure of a learning mechanism to produce the behavior for the sake of which it evolved Apartment-living cats fail to learn to hunt when they are hungry Type 3-Misrepresentationinducing: misrepresenting or failing to represent the environment Imprinting on the wrong type of object Jackdaws raised by humans court H. sapiens upon reaching sexual maturity Failing to imprint Siblings reared apart fail to imprint sexual disgust on each other (to avoid inbreeding) An object emanates key stimuli in different intensities or combinations from an evolutionarily familiar object Supernormal stimuli (e.g., food sweetened with refined sugar); some visual pornography Key stimuli associated with a biologically important type of object are attached to an object of a different type Visual pornography; teddy bears; artificially sweetened, sugarfree food; Facebook profiles Misrepresenting situations Many people cooperate in anonymous, one-shot prisoner's dilemma games; ''developmental mismatch'' Type 4-Misresponseinducing: responding incorrectly to environmental conditions Behavioral chains are not integrated The four main components of hunting behavior in apartmentliving cats are not integrated Responses are elicited with different frequencies from those that occurred in evolutionary experience Among most inhabitants of contemporary Western societies, genuine fear is elicited much less frequently than it was in the relatively violent and dangerous AE 522 N. Cofnas 123 As noted, some intelligence researchers argue that intelligence in humans, and potentially other animals, is an adaptation for dealing with evolutionary novelty (Byrne 1995: 38; Chiappe and MacDonald 2005; Kanazawa 2004a). These researchers have clearly been referring to Misrepresentation-inducing and Misresponse-inducing evolutionary novelty (Types 3 and 4). If the cues used by a species to recognize biologically important objects and situations are rendered unreliable by environmental change (Type 3), and if no substitute cues are available, natural selection may put a huge premium on general reasoning ability: Only those organisms capable of interpreting unpredictable, transient evidence concerning the classification of objects and situations will be able to navigate the environment successfully. Consider a problem faced by a wide range of animals: distinguishing ''friends'' and ''enemies.'' Most social animals use a straightforward procedure to solve this problem, relying on key stimuli (e.g., the individual is/is not a member of my group). When social organization becomes more complex-as with coalition-forming chimpanzees-relying on simple cues to represent conspecifics as friends and enemies will not work. Among humans, enemies may emit every possible sign of friendship until the moment of treachery. And real friends sometimes act in confusing ways. Seeing the conditions under which humans distinguish friends and enemies as evolutionarily novel helps to (partly) unify the social intelligence hypothesis and the hypothesis that intelligence evolved to deal with evolutionary novelty. Sterelny (2012: 6) argues that ''[h]ominin cognitive evolution cannot have been driven mostly by external environmental change, as then we would expect similar trajectories in other species, and that we do not see.'' But there may have been evolutionary novelty in early hominin's social domain. Changes in social organization rendered their evolved mechanisms for identifying friends and enemies unable to perform their proper functions. Since there are no reliable cues that could be used to determine whether a would-be ally will remain faithful to you over the course of a long-term political campaign (such as existed in the AE), general reasoning ability is the only faculty that could help one determine whom to trust and to what extent. Conclusion The method for cataloging evolutionary mismatch given here does not by itself resolve any scientific debates. But it may allow hypotheses concerning the effects of mismatch in Darwinian medicine (Williams and Nesse 1991), evolution-informed clinical psychology (Gilbert and Bailey 2000), and other fields to be formulated clearly. In regard to intelligence research, it could help make predictions about which species are likely to have undergone selection for general reasoning ability. What consequences the different types of mismatch have for species' evolution and well-being are empirical questions-which can be investigated in the light of a clear mismatch concept. A teleofunctional account of evolutionary mismatch 523 123 Acknowledgments I benefited from numerous conversations on this topic with Neven Sesardic, as well as feedback from him on several drafts of the paper. Thanks to Ruth Millikan, Elliott Sober, Jiji Zhang, and two reviewers for Biology & Philosophy for helpful comments on earlier drafts. Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made. References Balling JD, Falk JH (1982) Development of visual preference for natural environments. Environ Behav 14:5–28 Barrett D (2007) Waistland: the (r)evolutionary science behind our weight and fitness crisis. Norton, New York Barrett D (2010) Supernormal stimuli: how primal urges overran their evolutionary purpose. Norton, New York Buss DM (2000) The evolution of happiness. Am Psychol 55:15–23 Byrne RW (1995) The thinking ape: the evolutionary origins of intelligence. Oxford University Press, Oxford Chiappe D, MacDonald K (2005) The evolution of domain-general mechanisms in intelligence and learning. J Gen Psychol 132:5–40 Confer JC, Easton JA, Fleischman DS, Goetz CD, Lewis DMG, Perilloux C, Buss DM (2010) Evolutionary psychology: controversies, questions, prospects, and limitations. Am Psychol 65:110–126 Cook LM, Grant BS, Saccheri IJ, Mallet J (2012) Selective bird predation on the peppered moth: the last experiment of Michael Majerus. Biol Lett 8:609–612 Dretske F (1986) Misrepresentation. In: Bogdan RJ (ed) Belief: form, content, and function. Oxford University Press, New York, pp 17–36 Dutton E (2013) The savanna–IQ interaction hypothesis: a critical examination of the comprehensive case presented in Kanazawa's The Intelligence Paradox. Intelligence 41:607–614 Eaton SB, Konner M, Shostak M (1988) Stone agers in the fast lane: chronic degenerative diseases in evolutionary perspective. 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Soc Psychol Q 73:33–57 Lieberman D, Tooby J, Cosmides L (2007) The architecture of human kin detection. Nature 445:727–731 Lloyd E, Wilson DS, Sober E (2014) Evolutionary mismatch and what to do about it: a basic tutorial. Evolution Institute, Wesley Chapel Lorenz K (1966) On aggression. Harcourt, Orlando Lorenz K (1970) Studies in animal and human behaviour, vol 1. Harvard University Press, Cambridge Millikan RG (1984) Language, thought, and other biological categories: new foundations for realism. MIT Press, Cambridge 524 N. Cofnas 123 Millikan RG (1989) Biosemantics. J Philos 86:281–297 Millikan RG (1995) Pushmi-pullyu representations. Philos Perspect 9:185–200 Neander K (1991a) Functions as selected effects: the conceptual analyst's defense. Philos Sci 58:168–184 Neander K (1991b) The teleological notion of 'function'. Australas J Philos 69:454–468 Nesse RM (2000) Is depression an adaptation? Arch Gen Psychiatry 57:14–20 Nesse RM (2004) Natural selection and the elusiveness of happiness. Philos Trans R Soc B 359:1333–1347 Penke L, Borsboom D, Johnson W, Kievit RA, Ploeger A, Wicherts JM (2011) Evolutionary psychology and intelligence research cannot be integrated the way Kanazawa (2010) suggested. Am Psychol 66:916–917 Sterelny K (2010) Human natures. Biol Int 47:56–63 Sterelny K (2012) The evolved apprentice: how evolution made humans unique. MIT Press, Cambridge Tinbergen N (1951) The study of instinct. Oxford University Press, New York Tooby J, Cosmides L (1990) The past explains the present: emotional adaptations and the structure of ancestral environments. Ethol Sociobiol 11:375–424 Williams GC, Nesse RM (1991) The dawn of Darwinian medicine. Q Rev Biol 66:1–22 A teleofunctional account of evolutionary mismatch 525


Philosophy

Academics have increasingly used video and other electronic methods to collect data and capture reflections from participants. But, until recently, itâs been less common to use film as way of disseminating the results of research. Thatâs beginning to change. Film can be a powerful way to share research findings with a broad audience. This is particularly true when academics are combining) the traditions of ethnography, documentary filmmaking, and storytelling.

          Film and cinema are increasingly being used in environmental humanities to complement â or challenge â text-based research. The filmmakers in the arts, sciences and humanities see potential in using the moving images within political philosophy, environmental politics, postcolonial studies, human geography, urban ecology, postcolonial studies, design and literature. An example of this is the film One Table Two Elephants. It is a cinematic ethnography created by two Swedish researchers and filmmakers Jacob von Heland and Henrik Ernstson. Based on years of research in Cape Town, it was filmed in 2015 as part of a longer-term research and film-project . The documentary deals with race, nature and knowledge politics in Cape Town as part of the ways of knowing urban ecologies research project.

/22/2019 Film about Cape Town is being used to raise awareness, and to ask wider questions https://theconversation.com/film-about-cape-town-is-being-used-to-raise-awareness-and-to-ask-wider-questions-125398 1/7 Author Asma Mehan Postdoctoral research associate, Universidade do Porto Academic rigour, journalistic flair Academics have increasingly used video and other electronic methods to collect data and capture reflections from participants. But, until recently, it's been less common to use film as way of disseminating the results of research. That's beginning to change. Film can be a powerful way to share research findings with a broad audience. This is particularly true when academics are combining) the traditions of ethnography, documentary filmmaking, and storytelling. Film and cinema are increasingly being used in environmental humanities to complement – or challenge – text-based research. The filmmakers in the arts, sciences and humanities see potential in using the moving images within political philosophy, environmental politics, postcolonial studies, human geography, urban ecology, postcolonial studies, design and literature. An example of this is the film One Table Two Elephants. It is a cinematic ethnography created by two Swedish researchers and filmmakers Jacob von Heland and Henrik Ernstson. Based on years of research in Cape Town, it was filmed in 2015 as part of a longer-term research and film-project . The documentary deals with race, nature and knowledge politics in Cape Town as part of the ways of knowing urban ecologies research project. Shutterstock. Film about Cape Town is being used to raise awareness, and to ask wider questions October 22, 2019 5.01pm SAST One Table Two Elephants Trailer (2018, 84 min) f A il bl Li ht 10/22/2019 Film about Cape Town is being used to raise awareness, and to ask wider questions https://theconversation.com/film-about-cape-town-is-being-used-to-raise-awareness-and-to-ask-wider-questions-125398 2/7 Focusing on the global south, this project sought to critically examine the social, cultural and political dimensions of how resources are managed in rapidly growing urban spaces. It set out to answer and provoke debates about questions of sustainability and equality, including questions about identity and power in the context of a postcolonial city. The creators tried to develop and define visual humanities as a rich register to speak eloquently, forcefully and with texture into environmental questions. The film is part of a wider project to use film as research in challenging and complementing pen and paper. Following this perspective – and based on the explorative idea to treat film-asresearch/research-as-film – the filmmakers use cinematic and audio-visual registers to texture people's understanding of Cape Town. These range from intimate relations to structural issues. The aim is to move the audience beyond simplistic understandings while providing possibilities to translate what is happening to wider conversations about race, nature, and the city in other places of the world. The film has been nominated for several prizes and screened at film festivals in Copenhagen, Cape Town, Tirana, Nijmegen and Stockholm. It became an amazing learning space for the researchers and highly productive for especially the younger scholars and students that have been involved. The film Entering the city through its plants and wetlands, the many-layered, painful and liberating history of the city emerges as the film follows how biologists, hip hoppers, and wetland activists each search for ways to craft symbols of unity and cohesion. The film starts by following black, hip hop break dancers who are trying to bring in their own cultural roots into modern dancing techniques. It also follows conservation efforts being pursued by white residents of the city. The documentary is directed towards the general public as well as students and scholars. It brings texture to understanding a city like Cape Town. At the same time it provides possibilities to translate what it's recording into conversations about other cities and surroundings. Situated and grounded in lived experiences across a range of groups, this film follows different ways of knowing. It tries to be a vehicle toward difficult yet urgently needed conversations about how race, from AvailableLight 00:58 10/22/2019 Film about Cape Town is being used to raise awareness, and to ask wider questions https://theconversation.com/film-about-cape-town-is-being-used-to-raise-awareness-and-to-ask-wider-questions-125398 3/7 nature and the city are intertwined in South Africa's postcolonial world, where history is ever present in subtle and direct ways. The film is unusual in a number of ways. The material is rich and textured. It is edited without a voice over. This enables it to convey multiple interrelated histories across the city. The film provides possibilities for non-expert as well as experts to reflect on and deliberate over how a city and its environments can be known. 10/22/2019 Film about Cape Town is being used to raise awareness, and to ask wider questions https://theconversation.com/film-about-cape-town-is-being-used-to-raise-awareness-and-to-ask-wider-questions-125398 4/7 Lessons learnt The film doesn't attempt to formulate a coherent theory. Rather, it should be treated as an intellectual investigation that opens up the space to unknown territory – the inter-relationship between the creators of the movie and its subject matter. In this way, it can open the discussion and sketch possible lines of future research. By developing in-depth studies in Cape Town, South Africa, a rapidly growing city shaped by its colonial and apartheid past and highly unequal, culturally diverse and grappling with resource management challenges, the film aims to contrast the local knowledge with the dominant western one. In this way, it explores the politics of urban environmental knowledge in postcolonial cities. It tries to transmit the "knowledge" that is already produced towards a larger audience. A flyer to advertise a screening of the film. 10/22/2019 Film about Cape Town is being used to raise awareness, and to ask wider questions https://theconversation.com/film-about-cape-town-is-being-used-to-raise-awareness-and-to-ask-wider-questions-125398 5/7 Inequality Film Environment Hip hop Cape Town urban ecology Arts and culture postcolonialism One Table Two Elephants (Documentary film, 84 min, 2018), created by Jacob von Heland and Henrik Ernstson. You might also like  Q&A: A Plastic Ocean – can a movie help us see this invisible crisis? 10/22/2019 Film about Cape Town is being used to raise awareness, and to ask wider questions https://theconversation.com/film-about-cape-town-is-being-used-to-raise-awareness-and-to-ask-wider-questions-125398 6/7 How Cape Town found a creative solution to reusing a 90-year old grain elevator South Africa must start managing its retreat from the coast 10/22/2019 Film about Cape Town is being used to raise awareness, and to ask wider questions https://theconversation.com/film-about-cape-town-is-being-used-to-raise-awareness-and-to-ask-wider-questions-125398 7/7 Thought experiments: the films that turn us into philosophers


Philosophy of Emotional Intelligence

Philosophy

The critical reflection of the aspects of emotional intelligence can be put on account of the different epistemological perspectives, reflecting a maturity of the concept. There is a need to find consistent empirical evidence for the dimensionality of emotional intelligence and to develop appropriate methods for its correct and useful measurement. A concern of researchers is whether emotional intelligence is a theory of personality, a form of intelligence, or a combination of both. Many studies consider emotional intelligence to be a personal factor associated with competence. But most researchers consider emotional intelligence as an emotional awareness of oneself and others, in addition to professional efficiency and emotional management.
          DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.19339.11045

Philosophy of Emotional Intelligence Nicolae Sfetcu 01.02.2020 Sfetcu, Nicolae, " Philosophy of Emotional Intelligence ", SetThings (February 1, 2020), URL = https://www.setthings.com/en/philosophy-of-emotional-intelligence/ Email: email@example.com This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivatives 4.0 International. To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/bynd/4.0/. A partial translation of: Sfetcu, Nicolae, " Emoțiile și inteligența emoțională în organizații", SetThings (31 decembrie 2019), MultiMedia Publishing (ISBN 978-606-033-328-9), DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.32991.20640, URL = https://www.setthings.com/ro/e-books/emotiile-si-inteligenta-emotionala-in-organizatii/ A concept adjacent to emotional intelligence, apatheia, often incompletely translated by apathy and incorrectly by indifference, was considered by the Stoics as a state of mind not disturbed by passions, being seen as a quality that characterized the philosophical wisdom. Aristotle considers virtue to be the fair middle way between excess and deficiency of emotion (metropathia), implying the management of emotional or selfish reactions to external events that cannot be controlled. For the Stoics, apatheia was the optimal rational response to a reality caused by the will of others or by nature and which cannot be controlled. Only his own will can be controlled, through correct (virtuous) judgments and actions, experiencing contentment (eudaimonia) and good feelings (eupatheia). Seneca also affirms the importance of virtue in our own happiness, to "win the way to victory in all our struggles, – for the reward is... virtue, steadfastness of soul, and a peace that is won for all time." (Seneca 1917, chap. Lxxviii 13-16) Pironism states that through epoché (suspension of judgment) the mind is brought to ataraxia, a state of soul balance. As in Stoicism and Epicureanism, eudaimonia is the pyronistic goal of life and all three philosophies have placed it in ataxia or apatheia. Kant distinguished three types of "actions" (Müller-Merbach 2007) for which he develops three types of intelligence: 1. Technical intelligence (Kant: skill) is required for technical actions. Technical intelligence cannot be measured precisely by intelligence tests. It is an indicator of how well one understands objects. Technical intelligence must refer to specific areas of tasks. Technical intelligence is important for almost any position on the labor market. 2. Emotional intelligence (Kant: pragmatism) was largely ignored before 1995. The core of emotional intelligence is self-control. He was highlighted by the Chinese philosophers Confucius (Confucius 2013, bk. XIII) and Lao-Tzu in Daoism, (Tzu 1992, chap. 33) but also by the Greek and Roman philosophers Seneca (4 BC 65), (Seneca 1917) Epictetus (50-138), (Epictetus 1928) and Emperor Marcus Aurelius (120-181). (Marcus Aurelius et al. 1990) Epictetus states that: "No man is free who is not master of himself" (Epictetus 1928, 477) and that "Some things are under our control, while others are not under our control." (Epictetus 1928, 483) Goleman (Goleman 1996) and Steiner (Steiner and Perry 1997) argue the importance of self-control on the basis of current empirical experience. Emotional intelligence is based on humanism, human relationships, and social responsibility. Emotional intelligence involves the ability to understand other people, to cooperate and to influence them. 3. Ethical intelligence (Kant: wisdom) involves many ethical doctrines that offer partially opposite advice, such as teleological ethics versus deontological ethics, normative versus descriptive ethics or normative versus intuitive ethics. In addition, many objective ethical concepts are competing. For Kant, technical and pragmatic action are subordinate to ethical action, and the categorical imperative is superior to the two hypothetical imperatives of technical and pragmatic action. It follows that ethical intelligence will be considered superior to technical (skill) and emotional (pragmatic) intelligence. Ethics will provide the final judgment. But the wide variety of ethical concepts makes it difficult to accept the superiority of ethical intelligence over other intelligences. (Kant, Walker, and Meredith 2008) The critical reflection of the aspects of emotional intelligence (EI) can be put on account of the different epistemological perspectives, reflecting a maturity of the concept. (Meleis 1998) Chan and Latham stressed the need to find consistent empirical evidence for the dimensionality of EI and to develop appropriate methods for its correct and useful measurement. (Sue-Chan and Latham 2004) A concern of researchers is whether EI is a theory of personality, a form of intelligence, or a combination of both. Many studies consider EI to be a personal factor associated with competence. (Spence, Oades, and Caputi 2004) But most researchers consider EI as an emotional awareness of oneself and others, in addition to professional efficiency and emotional management. According to Dulewicz and Higgs, EI is considered a capacity at the ontological level including personal and social competence, (Dulewicz and Higgs 2000) which promotes a positive state of mind despite environmental demands, (Cummings, Hayduk, and Estabrooks 2005) and which helps to solve problems related to both emotional and cognitive abilities. (Ciarrochi, Dean, and Anderson 2002) It is also considered that EI has an inherent potential to be further developed and refined through reflection, thus promoting emotional and intellectual growth. (Caruso, Mayer, and Salovey 2002) Spence sees emotional intelligence from a public health perspective as an adaptive ability that promotes well-being. (Spence, Oades, and Caputi 2004) The EI critique addresses the limitations of empirical research and unsubstantiated generalizations, (Fineman 2004) considering that ontological and epistemological assumptions determine the research methodologies. (Monti and Tingen 1999) It is now considered that the only way that "emotions" can be identified is through measurements and quantifications related to the methods of descriptive and statistical analysis, using different methods of self-reporting and psychometric measurements. (Fineman 2004) Recommendations have been made regarding the application of qualitative approaches in future research within EI. (Sue-Chan and Latham 2004) Effective and creative manipulation of emotions is a gateway to a type of self-knowledge that leads to the freedom to be authentic in oneself at any given time. (Hammer and 常二 1999) In this context, an essential question is whether the EI phenomenon can more clearly articulate humanist existentialism in relation to the healthcare discipline. (Dulewicz and Higgs 2000) Emotional intelligence is considered an ability at the ontological level, important for promoting positive moods independent of the environment. (Cummings, Hayduk, and Estabrooks 2005) Cummings's work places perception and cognition in the context of adaptive human endeavors to effect change in oneself and in one's own environment. (Dai and Sternberg 2004) According to Dulewicz and Higgs, future epistemological studies of EI will approach EI conceptualization as a starting point for theoretical development, philosophical support structures for different conceptualizations of EI for methodological and theoretical purposes, and EI in the context of developing professional knowledge. (Dulewicz and Higgs 2000) EI is a human state that encompasses a priori potentialities, updated as emotional experiences. Wisdom is the ability to think and act using knowledge, experience, understanding, common sense and intuition. It is associated with attributes such as judgment, emotions (Grossmann 2017) and virtues. (Staudinger and Glück 2011) (Walsh 2015) In this regard, empirical scientists have begun to focus on the role of emotions in wisdom, (Kunzmann and Glück 2019) agreeing that emotions are essential for the efficient management of complex situations that demand. wisdom. An important finding relates to the positive relationship between the diversity of emotional experience and wise reasoning, independent of emotional intensity. (Grossmann, Oakes, and Santos 2019) Bibliography Caruso, David R., John D. Mayer, and Peter Salovey. 2002. "Relation of an Ability Measure of Emotional Intelligence to Personality." Journal of Personality Assessment 79 (2): 306– 20. https://doi.org/10.1207/S15327752JPA7902_12. Ciarrochi, Joseph, Frank P. Dean, and Stephen Anderson. 2002. "Emotional Intelligence Moderates the Relationship between Stress and Mental Health." Personality and Individual Differences 32 (2): 197–209. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0191-8869(01)00012-5. Confucius. 2013. Confucian Analects, The Great Learning & The Doctrine of the Mean. Courier Corporation. Cummings, Greta, Leslie Hayduk, and Carole Estabrooks. 2005. "Mitigating the Impact of Hospital Restructuring on Nurses: The Responsibility of Emotionally Intelligent Leadership." Nursing Research 54 (1): 2–12. https://doi.org/10.1097/00006199200501000-00002. Dai, David Yun, and Robert J. Sternberg. 2004. Motivation, Emotion, and Cognition. 1 edition. Mahwah, N.J: Routledge. Dulewicz, Victor, and Malcolm Higgs. 2000. "Emotional Intelligence: A Review and Evaluation Study." Journal of Managerial Psychology 15 (4): 341–72. https://doi.org/10.1108/02683940010330993. Epictetus. 1928. The Discourses as Reported by Arrian ; the Manual, and Fragments. William Heinemann. Fineman, Stephen. 2004. "Getting the Measure of Emotion--And the Cautionary Tale of Emotional Intelligence." Human Relations 57 (6): 719–40. https://doi.org/10.1177/0018726704044953. Goleman, Daniel. 1996. 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Oades, and Peter Caputi. 2004. "Trait Emotional Intelligence and Goal Self-Integration: Important Predictors of Emotional Well-Being?" Personality and Individual Differences 37 (3): 449–61. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2003.09.001. Staudinger, Ursula M., and Judith Glück. 2011. "Psychological Wisdom Research: Commonalities and Differences in a Growing Field." Annual Review of Psychology 62: 215–41. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.121208.131659. Steiner, Ph D. Claude, and Paul Perry. 1997. Achieving Emotional Literacy: A Personal Program to Increase Your Emotional Intelligence. Abridged edition. New York: Simon & Shuster Sound Ideas. Sue-Chan, Christina, and Gary P. Latham. 2004. "The Situational Interview as a Predictor of Academic and Team Performance: A Study of the Mediating Effects of Cognitive Ability and Emotional Intelligence | Request PDF." 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The Ontology of Reference: Studies in Logic and Phenomenology

Philosophy

Abstract: We propose a dichotomy between object-entities and meaning-entities. The former are entities such as molecules, cells, organisms, organizations, numbers, shapes, and so forth. The latter are entities such as concepts, propositions, and theories belonging to the realm of logic. Frege distinguished analogously between a ârealm of referenceâ and a ârealm of senseâ, which he presented in some passages as mutually exclusive. This however contradicts his assumption elsewhere that every entity is a referent (even Fregean senses can be referred to by means of suitably constructed expressions). We apply the meaning/object dichotomy to mathematical and fictional entities, and develop a view of mathematical and other abstract objects as the results of certain types of demarcation â as for example the North Sea is the result of demarcations built into naval charts. Such demarcations reflect demarcatory acts, which presuppose complex cognitive and social structures enabling the creation of maps, of theories (of mathematics, of natural science), and of novels.

Barry Smith THE ONTOLOGY OF REFERENCE: STUDIES IN LOGIC AND PHENOMENOLOGY Dissertat ion Univers i ty of Manchester , 1976 xv i + 477pp SUMMARY Ontology is sometimes conceived as having as its sole province the totality of object-entities, by which is meant entities such as molecules, cells, organisms, organizations, numbers, shapes, and so forth. When we attempt to extend ontology to the domain of meaning-entities (concepts, propositions, even whole theories), we find that the criteria for individuating and re-identifying objects cannot be carried over unproblematically to this area. We argue on this basis that there is an ontological dichotomy between meaning-entities on the one hand, and object-entities (individual objects, properties, relations, states of affairs, events and processes) on the other, and that it is illegitimate to impose standards appropriate to the latter in our investigations of the former. One principal means by which such imposition is effected is through the assumption that linguistic meanings are to be individuated through the expressions with which they are associated; the latter being conceived as belonging to the category of object-entities. We argue, however, that meanings, unlike expressions, are dependent on the contexts – both linguistic or extralinguistic – in which they are uttered and understood. Our first application of the meaning/object dichotomy as an instrument of philosophy is to the interpretation of Frege's ontology, and in particular Frege's conception of a 'realm of sense' and a 'realm of reference'. The most serious difficulty in this ontology of 'realms' turns on those passages in the Frege corpus in which it is suggested that we have to deal with two mutually exclusive categories, something which conflicts with one crucial implication of Fregean semantics, namely that every entity is a referent (can be referred to by means of some suitably constructed categorematic expression). However it is strictly speaking not referents with which senses or meaning are contrasted ontologically, but objects. This is because meanings themselves can serve as referents. Much of Frege's work in the field of logic seems to suggest that he conceived logic as a discipline which was concerned exclusively with relations between senses (more particularly between propositions or thoughts, the senses of complete assertoric sentences). Nevertheless, we find a series of isolated arguments in Frege's writings according to which 'logical laws are first laws in the realm of reference and only mediately relate to sense' ("Ausführungen über Sinn und Bedeutung", 1892-95, p. 134). The apparent contradiction can be resolved, we suggest, if account is taken of the fact that the crucial ontological dichotomy lies not between sense and referents but between sense and objects, and if it is recognized that those referents – principally truth-values and numbers – which constitute the immediate subject-matter of logic in Frege's eyes, ought themselves more properly to be conceived as meaning-entities. We take for granted the conception of logic as the science that has as its subject-matter the superstructural features of the realm of meanings, so that logic is concerned exclusively with relations between meanings. We advance at the same time a structuralist platonism as concerns the entities of mathematics, viewing the latter interrelationships amongst abstract structures in the realm of meanings. We then argue that the appeal of platonism as a philosophy of mathematics rests in part on the fact that a platonism of meaning-entities is, for deep-seated reasons, a less objectionable assumption than a platonism of objects. Mathematical rigour (like logical rigour) is possible because mathematics is exclusively a matter of relations between meanings. This thesis opens up the possibility of a view of mathematical objects as temporally determined entities, as entities whose ontological status depends – like that of, for example, the objects presented in works of literature – upon the existence of certain frameworks of conventions and upon the construction of certain linguistic structures (called 'formal theories') the understanding of which turns upon our regarding the propositions expressed as propositions about objects of a certain sort. Thus while objects are, from the point of view of mathematical rigour, strictly speaking superfluous, it is nevertheless a matter of 'practical necessity' (Lorenzen) that the mathematician (the set theorist, the number theorist) conceives himself as investigating a pre-established totality of objects, which he 'perceives' in a way which parallels both the 'perception' which the physicist has of the objects of his discipline and the quasi-perception of fictional objects achieved through readings of works of literature. However the status of mathematical objects as temporally determined must not be misunderstood by analogy with that of spatio-temporal objects, which have a simple structure of temporal properties. For mathematical objects, like all intentional objects, have a peculiar double structure of external properties and internal characteristics. Consider, for example, the case of objects of fiction: Here the properties with which we are concerned include, for example: the property of having been created by Shakespeare, of having been psychoanalyzed by Ernest Jones, of being non-existent, and of having such and such a stock of internal characteristics. The latter then include, for example: being a prince of Denmark, having suicidal impulses, having two arms and two legs, and so on. But the latter are not properties, since all objects which possess the property of being a prince of Denmark thereby exist, and Hamlet – we may assume – did not exist. When we read Shakespeare, for example as a literary critic, it is exclusively the stock of internal characteristics with which we are concerned. And in just the same way, when the set theorist is concerned with the sets projected by a particular set theory it is exclusively the internal characteristics of these sets which fall within the theory's purview. What distinguishes sets, and mathematical and abstract objects in general, from the purely intentional objects of fiction, is that the latter have temporal determinations not only among their external properties, but also among their internal characteristics (Hamlet, for example, is represented as existing as prince of Denmark at a determinate time). Mathematical objects, on the other hand, have no temporal characteristics. Hence, again, the appeal of platonism as a philosophy of mathematics. The abstract objects of mathematics and the non-existent objects of fiction form not merely a peripheral extension of the universe of existent objects (the latter regarded as somehow wellunderstood). Rather, following certain suggestions of Frege, we propose a view of objects – especially abstract objects – as the results of certain types of demarcation – as for example the North Sea exists because of certain intersubjectively accepted demarcations built into naval charts. Such demarcations reflect demarcatory acts, which exist because of complex cognitive and social structures (enabling the creation of novels, maps, mathematical theories and the theories of natural science). On this basis the universe of existent and non-existent objects begins to take on the character of a massively complex stratified structure, lower strata of microphysical particles combining together to constitute progressively higher strata of animate and inanimate material bodies, cities, nation states, civilizations, works of art, linguistic structures, mathematical configurations, and so on. The conception of this stratified ontology rests upon a notion of object developed by inspiration from, on the one hand the invention of existential quantification by Bolzano and Frege, and on the other hand from the ontology presented by Ingarden in his Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt. Ingarden, alone amongst all the major figures of the Austro-German tradition of Frege, Brentano, Meinong, Husserl and Twardowski, succeeded in developing an alternative to the idealist paradigm of creation of an object – according to which it is only autonomous objects, including the real world itself, which can be 'created' – and thereby succeeded also in pointing the way towards an adequate ontological theory of both non-existent and existent objects and of both the lower and the higher strata in the universe of objects as a whole. But even Ingarden was still too close to Husserl, Meinong and Brentano to derive as a consequence of his new paradigm of creation – which has much in common with the constructivist paradigm in the philosophy of mathematics advanced, for example by Kronecker, Weyl and Lorenzen – that the domain of objects as a whole is, while more inclusive than the domain of existent objects, still subject to a quite parallel system of rigid criteria for admission: not every thought about or belief in or assumption of an object is thereby such as to have a referent (that is: to have some target admissible as an object), just as not every thought about or belief in an existent entity is valid, from an external point of view, as a thought about or belief in that which it would claim to be directed towards. Hence perhaps the most important task attempted in this work is the provision of such criteria, that is the provision of necessary and sufficient conditions for objecthood. It is necessary, first of all, to delineate the category of object-entities (that is of objects in general, including not only individual objects but also properties, relations, states of affairs) from the category of meaning-entities. We have already seen that the status of the former as referents – whether for acts or for linguistic expressions – cannot serve to distinguish them from meaningentities. But it is still possible to distinguish among referents those entities whose 'proper' position is in the referent or 'target' position for an act and those – in particular meanings – who belong rather to the medium of articulation through which determinate reference is achieved. This implies a distinction, recognized by Husserl as the distinction between 'eigentliche und uneigentliche oder bloss symbolische Vorstellung' (between that which is properly intended and that which is improperly or merely symbolically intended) and by Russell as the distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description, between 'fulfilled' and 'empty' or generic reference. We can now state in summary form the first condition for objecthood: that entities are objects only if they are entities for which we can achieve fulfilled referential access. The second condition concerns the distinction between those entities – such as landmarks or public functionaries – which are objects in their own right, but which yet do not constitute an additional stratum of reality. This is because discourse about landmarks and public functionaries, like discourse about, say, punctuality, reciprocity, the platoon commander's lack of a nap, the identity of the murderer, is merely a stylistic variant of discourse concerning object-entities of a more mundane sort. The criterion which determines whether we have to deal with an additional stratum of entities in their own right, or with mere linguistic simulacra of such entities is, as recognized by Dummett, the existence of a field of predicates, a special vocabulary within which proper names for the entities in question are embedded. We possess such a vocabulary in the case of numbers ('larger than', 'is prime', 'is composite', 'is perfect', 'is the square of'...), and also in the case of colours ('darker than', 'primary', 'secondary', 'monochrome'...), which implies that both numbers and colours constitute additional strata of self-subsistent objects. The third condition – which embodies in its full force the recognition that objecthood is a purely 'external' matter for the attainment of which mere assumptions and beliefs are always insufficient – serves to exclude those acts, such as the acts of 19th-century astronomers who were convinced of the existence of an intramercurial 'plant Vulcan', for which we have a suitably rich field of predicates and apparent referential or 'target' access, yet for which we have no object since a simple ontological mistake has taken place. It is thus necessary to make a distinction among acts between those which are 'veridical', in the sense that they are protected from the possibility that, with future increases in knowledge, it should be discovered that the purported object of the act was merely the product of a private or institutional error or illusion, and 'non-veridical' acts, for which this is not the case. What is crucial is that there are non-existent objects, acts of reference to which are yet secure cases of veridicality: Hamlet, for example, is such an object, since works of literature constitute 'veridical contexts'. Thus the third and final condition may be formulated thus: entities, or purported entities, are objects only if they are embedded within a veridical context. The theory of objects (Gegenstandslehre) implied by these conditions is contrasted with the original theory of objects put forward by Meinong, here subjected to a thorough-going criticism. It is contrasted also with the 'Fregean' object-ontology, both as originally conceived by Frege, and as developed by Christian Thiel, whose interpretation of Frege is developed against the background of the constructivist theory of abstraction defended by Paul Lorenzen. We also exploit this more general ontological framework, with its dichotomy between meanings in general and objects in general, in order to provide an interpretation of Husserl's philosophical works, both of his early, pre-phenomenological period and of the period of the Ideen. In particular we attempt to show that Husserl's philosophy of logic and mathematics is not only much closer than has been generally supposed to the main (Frege-inspired) tradition, but also that it embodies certain crucial insights which have been lost to that tradition, insights which derive from the work of mathematicians and logicians such as Riemann, Schröder and Cantor who were influenced by the advances made by mathematical analysis in the 19th century, in contrast to thinkers such as Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein and Quine, for whom arithmetic was sometimes all too important. TABLE OF CONTENTS PART ONE: THE THEORY OF MEANINGS (BEDEUTUNGSLEHRE) 1. Variations on the Theory of Sense and Reference 2. Logic and Phenomenology: A Field of Problems 3. The Philosophy of Number 4. Essential Insight (at Arm's Length) 5. Meanings-in-General vs. Objects-in-General: An Ontological Dichotomy 6. Meanings as Noemata: Husserl's Generalisation of Linguistic Meaning to the Field of All Acts PART TWO: THE THEORY OF OBJECTS (GEGENSTANDSLEHRE) 7. Ontological Realism 8. Stratification of the Universe of Objects 9. Realism vs Abstraction Theory 10. Towards a Generalised Ontological Theory of Higher Strata I: Meinong's Attempt 11. Towards a Generalised Ontological Theory of the Objects of Higher Strata II: The Theory of Intentional Objects 12. Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Objecthood Notes and List of Abbreviations Bibliography For full text see: http://ontology.buffalo.edu/smith/Dissertation/