See you online

Philosophy

Connecting with others online is not a new practice, of course. However, with lockdown measures in place across much of the globe, our social lives have been forced to migrate online to an even greater degree and intensity than ever before. While many decry the poverty of online social encounters, what underlies this debate is a philosophical question about how it is we encounter one another online. Perhaps somewhat counterintuitively, I explore how, in many cases, we directly perceive others and their experiences online, despite the fact that we are mediated by technology.

Forum Even when we are mediated by digital platforms we can directly perceive the experiences and emotions of others from home, happy hour on Zoom, family games on Steam, movie watch-alongs co-ordinated on WhatsApp, idly scrolling through Instagram – for many of us, these are now our dominant forms of social interaction. Having been forced to allow employees to work from home because of the Covid-19 pandemic, many employers are now implementing working-from-home schemes that extend beyond lockdown measures. Even as we slowly start to come out of lockdown, then, the percentage of our interpersonal encounters that happen online is on the up. While many decry the poverty of online social encounters, what underlies this debate is a philosophical question about how it is we encounter one another online. Perhaps somewhat counterintuitively, I explore how, in many cases, we directly perceive others and As I am writing this, as far as I know (due to the lack of clarity regarding the rules in the UK), I am still in lockdown thanks to the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic. I am not meant to meet with more than one other household; not meant to unnecessarily catch public transport to visit friends and relatives; not allowed in my office at the university. Opportunities for face-to-face social interaction have been seriously restricted in the last few months. Instead, I have been seeking social interaction with my friends, family, and colleagues on Zoom, Skype, HouseParty, WhatsApp, Messenger, Signal, Facebook, and Instagram. In the last decade, we have seen increased concern about taking more and more of our lives online. Sherry Turkle, for one, in her best-selling book Alone Together, has warned us of the dangers of replacing our face-toface interactions with virtual connections. She claims that while the quantity of social connections we can make has sky-rocketed with the birth of the internet and social media, the quality of those connections is leaving us lonely and isolated. Connecting with others online is not a new practice, of course. However, with lockdown measures in place across much of the globe, our social lives have been forced to migrate online to an even greater degree and intensity than ever before. Working See You Online Lucy Osler considers how we perceive others in a digitally-mediated world 77 Forum The key idea here is that, when I see you smile, I do not need to imagine or infer that you are happy. Rather, I can see your happiness directly in your smile, just as I can see your sadness directly in your tears or your pain directly in your wincing. Your happiness, sorrow, and pain are out there in the world for me to observe. This account rests on the claim that our expressive behaviour is not just a sign of some hidden inner experience but is instead a constitutive part of that experience itself – a part that I and others can directly perceive. Accordingly, there is no problem of other minds insofar as we can sometimes perceive parts of other minds directly, embodied in the expressive actions of the people we interact with. That our expressive gestures are part of our experience is supported by various empirical findings. For instance, there is evidence that those who suffer from both congenital or acquired facial paralysis (e.g., Moebius Syndrome, Bell's Palsy), or who have undergone Botox injections that intentionally diminish facial expressivity, report feeling their happiness less intensely as a result of their inability to smile. Without the expressive world-facing profile, it seems their experiences online, despite the fact that we are mediated by technology. When we go online we do not merely encounter pictures, symbols, or signs of other subjects; even when we are mediated by cameras, microphones, and digital platforms – or when we interact via text and chat apps – I suggest we can directly perceive some of the experiences and emotions of others. Considering how we encounter one another in the online sphere has important implications for how we assess both the quality and possibility of social interactions online more generally. Direct social perception In recent years, there has been revitalised interest in understanding humans not as minds concealed by flesh and skull but as embodied beings. This conceptualisation of humans as embodied subjects – beings whose capacities for thought and feeling are intimately bound up with the kinds of bodies we have and the things these bodies can do – has influenced how philosophers approach a perennial philosophical problem: the socalled "problem of other minds". Simply put, the problem is this: since I cannot see the thoughts and feelings of others – they are hidden behind layers of skin and skull – how do I know that other experiencing subjects exist at all? The recent "embodied turn" in philosophy offers a possible solution to this problem. It urges us to move away from talking about how the experiences of others are hidden away from us inside their heads and instead focus on the way that we often see minds in action – that is, the way we can have direct perceptual access to (at least part of) others' thoughts, feelings, and intentions in their embodied and expressive behaviour. In my pandemicenforced online social world, do I no longer have direct perceptual access to others and their experiences? 78 Forum that part of the emotion is somehow missing. People also seem to find it significantly harder to do "mental maths" or to give directions if they are prevented from using bodily gestures. All this points to the idea that our gestures are not simply a decorative flair but are a part of our experience; we think through embodied action, we feel through our expressive behaviour, and all of this is perceptually available to others. Given the emphasis on perceiving the expressive body of the other, these "direct social perception" views have typically been thought to apply only to face-to-face social interactions. "Face-to-face", though, is somewhat of a misnomer. I take it to capture both more and less than this phrase might suggest. When talking about a faceto-face interaction, this not only refers to my being able to see your face; it is not only smiles and tears that I perceive but also your bodily posture, your gestures, the way you manipulate the shared space between us, and so on. It might, then, be best to talk of a body-to-body interaction. Also, we are also not limited to seeing someone's expressivity but can also hear their tone of voice, their sobs, and laughs, feel their intention in the way that they hold our hand or caress our cheek. Thus "face-to-face" is used to imply a rich array of perceptual experiences that © Nika Mamedova 79 See You Online ic-enforced online social world, I no longer have direct perceptual access to others and their experiences? What is the implication of this conclusion? One might be forced to say that when we encounter others online, rather than directly perceiving others, I must infer or imagine what their experiences are like from the signs and symbols available to me. This might mean that we no longer can be properly speaking said to encounter the other and their experience, that they are rendered disembodied minds hidden behind a wall, not of flesh but of screens. Indeed, we might even be led to conclude that we only encounter constructs of others online, pieced together from our own inferences, imaginings, and projections. It is not a great leap from here to conclude that, at best, our online social interactions are seriously impaired in contrast to face-to-face interactions and, at worst, throw us into a world of imagined sociality. I want to present a rosier picture of our social encounters online and defend the idea that we can directly perceive others and their experience not only IRL but in the online sphere. Note, though, that while I undoubtedly present a more optimistic view of online sociality than is currently in vogue, I am not suggesting that our online interactions are identical to, as good as, or should replace our face-to-face encounters. I might have of the other's expressivity that may involve not only vision but other perceptual modalities, too. In fact, I do not even need to be strictly face-to-face or body-to-body with you at all to directly perceive some of your experiences. Imagine that you are yelling down to me with excitement from upstairs. Even though I cannot see your body, I can still hear the excitement in your voice. A crucial point often overlooked in these debates is the way that perceiving another's experience not only involves perceiving discrete embodied gestures such as clenched fists and smiles, etc. We can also perceive another's bodily style more generally. Merleau-Ponty describes how we perceive others as having a certain style of being-in-the-world. Think, for instance, of the difference between someone who is confidently chatting away, interacting with their environment, using large gestures, taking up a lot of space, versus someone who is timid, making small movements, using a quiet voice and so on. We can directly perceive distinct bodily styles in the way that someone acts, perceiving not just what they are doing but how they are doing it. Going online What, though, does direct social perception have to do with our online social encounters? On the face of it, not very much. If we wanted to craft a paradigm form of disembodied social interaction, online encounters seem a perfect example. Our online interactions, rather than taking place in the flesh, are mediated by our screens. I can sit in my home in Exeter and use technology to indirectly encounter others. Does this mean that in my pandemWe can directly perceive others and their experience not only IRL but in the online sphere sented on a pixelated screen that now I see your smile as a sign of your happiness rather than a part of it. I still experience your mediated smiles, your mediated laughs, as an expressive part of your happiness. When we are talking about direct social perception, what is direct is our experience of the other's expressivity, of the other's experience, i.e. that it does not involve inference or imagination. As such, it is perfectly possible for me to directly perceive your happiness in your smile, the excitement in your voice, even when your smile and voice are mediated by our screens and speakers. WhatsApp What, though, about other forms of online communication? While video chats are becoming increasingly common, particularly for those in lockdown, much of our online sociality is conducted via text, often on instant messaging platforms like WhatsApp, Messenger, and Signal. This seems like a far cry from a face-to-face interaction. Here, what I perceive might be described as mere signs and symbols, in the form of typed words and emoticons. There are two arguments I want to present in defence of the idea that even when restricted to instant messaging, we can directly perceive aspects of the other's experience. First, remember that what makes our expressive bodily behaviour available for direct social perception is that it is an intersubjectively available part of the other's experience. I think a similar claim can be made in relation to the words that we express ourselves with. Merleau-Ponty famously states that spoken words are not merely a sign of our inner experience but are an expressive part of our Forum 80 I do not make a claim about the quality of our online social encounters but consider the structure of these interactions. I explore this potentially contentious claim by assessing two forms of online social encounter: first, video chat on Zoom, and second, instant messaging on WhatsApp. Zoom When I enter a Zoom meeting, there is your face on my screen. My face is also on your screen. Video technology has made it possible for me to see and hear you online even though we are not physically together. Although I am not face-to-face with your physical body, I am able to perceive your body, mediated as it is by screens and microphones. Your smiles, your laughter, your excited tone of voice, all of these are there on Zoom for me to perceive. Aren't I just seeing a picture of you, a representation of your face, a reconstruction of your voice? Technically, yes. I certainly am not seeing your physical body in quite the same way that I do when we are face-to-face. But is seeing your physical body what is necessary for me to see your happiness in your smile? I think not. It seems odd to say that just because your smile is repreWhen I read your messages, I am not simply seeing signs of your experience but rather an expressive part of it 81 See You Online experience. We do not simply have a wealth of experience swirling around in our skulls which we then externalise through words. Rather, it is through speaking, through words, that our experience arises. This is supported by the common experience of needing to talk out our thoughts and feelings. Sometimes it is through speaking that we come to know our own emotions. When talking to my friend about my new love interest, my excitable chatter does not simply convey my crush but can help me realise my own infatuation; it is part of the experience of developing and enriching my infatuation. Tellingly, Merleau-Ponty makes a direct analogy between speech and gesture. If our bodily expressions can be part of my experience, so, I think, can my words. While Merleau-Ponty focuses predominantly upon spoken words, it seems reasonable to suppose that this can also apply to written words. Imagine that to help you cope with the stress of lockdown, you start keeping a journal. Through writing this journal you might discover how anxious you are feeling. Moreover, it might be through writing that you can come to regulate and shape your emotional well-being, allowing you to exorcise some of your pent-up frustration through the act of writing. Just as my smile is part of my happiness, then, so too might my writing be an expressive action that is part of other emotions. For this discussion, the important point is that when I read your messages, I am not simply seeing (indirect) signs of your experience but rather an expressive part of it. I do not need to infer your anger from the text you send me in all caps. I directly perceive it in your expressive act of typing in all caps. Remember that what is direct here is how I experience you, that I experience your anger without needing to infer or imagine that you are angry. However, this is only half of the story. Not only are the words you send an expressive part of your experience, but the style of your texting is also directly perceivable by me. Instant messaging platforms do not © Nika Mamedova 82 Forum simply deliver messages between people; they are not merely channels for transferring information. They also allow us to show a range of other expressive features that help to develop our own experiences. For instance, on WhatsApp, I not only see the message that you have sent, I can see if you are online, when you were last online, whether my message has delivered, whether my message has been read, and that you are typing. Why are these features important for our consideration of direct social perception online? Because these features are all expressive of the other's "style". If we are in the middle of an argument over WhatsApp and I can see that you have read my message, that you start typing, stop, start typing again, I perceive your frustration in the dynamic rhythm of your messaging. Thus, not only do we have directly perceivable bodily styles (gestures, facial expressions, etc.) but texting styles too. Again, I do not need to infer or imagine your frustrated state. Your expressivity is there for me to see on my screen. In other words, the way in which you text is also an expressive part of your experience and is directly available to me, even when we are sitting in different houses, different cities, or even different countries. Final thoughts All of this to say that, despite fears that technology will destroy our social lives, we can (sometimes at least) still be said to directly perceive others and their experiences even when we are in a mediated, online world. Perhaps, then, it should be no surprise that many of us have found a certain amount of solace in our online socialising in these days of social distancing – online platforms have allowed us to see one another without flouting lockdown rules. While there are many valid concerns about online interactions replacing all our face-to-face interactions, this is not necessarily because we do not, properly speaking, encounter others and their experiences online. A healthy diet requires that we eat a variety of foods and a healthy social diet might be thought to require the same thing. For many of us, if we were only allowed to have social interactions in the form of one-to-one face-to-face conversations, that might be experienced as overwhelming and exhausting. Too much of one style of social interaction may well be a bad thing; for many of us, having most of our social interactions take place online is too much. I, for one, am looking forward to being with more of my people IRL. But that does not mean that online interactions themselves must be bad or inferior, or that they do not really put us in direct contact with one another. They might, on my account, not even be as different to our face-to-face interactions as many suppose. Lucy Osler is a philosophy PhD candidate at the University of Exeter. She works on the phenomenology of online social encounters and has recently published in Phenomenology and Cognitive Sciences, Inquiry, and Philosophical Topics on this subject.


Technology's in-betweenness

Philosophy

One of the most obvious features that characterises any technology is its in-betweenessâcomprising technologies that stand in-between human users and natural affordances (natural objects, processes, or phenomena). This paper analyses technologies on the basis of their first- second- or third-order nature, and discusses how Information Communication Technologies (ICTs) are creating a new externality.

EDITOR LETTER Technology's In-Betweeness Luciano Floridi Received: 29 April 2013 /Accepted: 29 April 2013 /Published online: 11 May 2013 # Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013 One of the most obvious features that characterises any technology is its inbetweeness. Suppose you live in Rio de Janeiro, not in Oxford. A hat is a technology between you and the sunshine. A pair of sandals is a technology between you and the beach on which you are walking. And a pair of sunglasses is between you and the bright light that surrounds you. The point may be phrased slightly differently, in terms of what exactly a specific technology relates. Perhaps a pair of sandals relates not you, but just your feet, and not to the beach, but just to some of its sandy surface. Yet this is hair-splitting and, in its essence, the idea of such an in-betweeness seems clear and uncontroversial. However, it soon gets complicated. Because of our anthropocentric concerns, we have a standard term to describe one of the sides of technology's in-betweeness: it is the interacting user. However, we seem to lack a term for the other side of the relation, what invites a particular usage or enables some interaction. I suggest we call it affordance, even though this is a term that may have other technical connotations in other specific contexts. Here, it means that the sunshine is an affordance for the hat, the beach is an affordance for the sandals, and the bright light is an affordance for the sunglasses. An inventor is someone able to devise an artefact that may satisfy a user's need by taking advantage of some available affordance. As you can see, I am slightly stretching the word 'affordance', hopefully without breaking it. When technologies are in-between human users and natural affordances (natural objects, processes, or phenomena), we may qualify them as first-order. Listing firstorder technologies is simple. The ones mentioned above qualify. More can easily be added, such as the plough or the wheel. The axe is probably the first and oldest kind of first-order technology. Nowadays, a wood-splitting axe is still a first-order technology between you, the user, and the wood, the affordance. An hourglass is between you and the regular flow of sand. A saddle is between you and a horse. Nail clippers and hunting bows are other instances of such first-order kind of technology, which Philos. Technol. (2013) 26:111–115 DOI 10.1007/s13347-013-0106-y L. Floridi (*) School of Humanities, University of Hertfordshire, de Havilland Campus, Hatfield, Hertfordshire AL10 9AB, UK e-mail: firstname.lastname@example.com need not be simple, and can be technology-dependent and technically very sophisticated, like an assault rifle, which is sadly a first-order technology between two human sides, as both users and affordances. At this point, the word 'tool' may come to mind as appropriate, but it would be misrepresentative, because tools do not have to be first-order technologies, as I shall explain presently. Many non-human animals are able to make and use simple, first-order technologies, like modified sticks or shells, to perform tasks such as foraging, grooming, fighting, and even playing. This discovery determined in the past the end of a naïve interpretation of homo faber as homo technologicus. True, we are the species that builds, but the point to be made is slightly more subtle, because many other species also create and use artefacts to interact with their environments. Like in the case of our use of natural languages and other symbolic forms of communication, or the creation of artificial languages, e.g. to programme machines, the difference between us and other species is incommensurable not because it is a matter of binary presence or absence of some basic abilities, but because of the immensely more sophisticated degree in which such abilities are present in us. It is the difference between a colouring book with which a child has played using some crayons and the Sistine Chapel. Insisting on continuity is not mistaken, it is misleading. In the case of technologies, it is preferable to talk about homo faber as homo technologicus inventor and user of secondand third-order technologies, in the following sense. Second-order technologies are those relating users no longer to nature but to other technologies, that is, they are technologies whose affordances are other technologies. This is a good reason not to consider the concept of tool as being coextensive with that of first-order technology. Consider the homely example of a humble screwdriver. Of course, it is a tool, but it is between you and, you guessed it, a screw, which is actually another piece of technology, which in its turn (pun irresistible) is between the screwdriver and, for example, two pieces of wood. Other examples of such secondorder technologies include keys, whose affordances are obviously lockers, and vehicles, such as motorbikes and automobiles, whose users are (still) human and whose affordances are paved roads, another piece of technology. Some first-order technologies (recall: these are the ones that satisfy the scheme humanity-technology-nature) are useless without the corresponding second-order technologies (humanity–technology–technology) to which they are coupled. Roads do not require cars to be useful, but screws call for screwdrivers. And second-order technologies imply a level of mutual dependency with first-order technologies (the drill is there because of the drill bits) that is the hallmark of some degree of specialisation, and hence of organisation. You either have nuts and bolts or neither. Such interdependencies, and hence the appearance of second-order technologies, are usually associated with the emergence of more complex forms of human socialisation, and hence some kind of civilization. Whereas some non-human animals are able to build their own artefacts to some extent, e.g. by sharpening a stick, they do not seem to be able to build second-order technologies in any significant way. The engine, understood as any technology that provides energy to other technologies, is probably the most important, second-order technology. Watermills and windmills converted energy into useful motion for centuries, but it is only when the engine becomes a 'portable' energy-provider, which can be placed between users and 112 L. Floridi other technologies wherever it is needed, that the industrial revolution becomes a widespread reality. Much of modernity-prompted by science's increasing knowledge about, and control over, materials and energy-gets its mechanical aftertaste from the preponderance of this second-order in-betweeness. It is a world of gears, clocks, and powered mechanisms, characterised not just by the humanity–technology–nature relation but, more significantly, by the humanity–technology–technology relation. Modernity soon became a world of networked dependencies as well as lockin connections: no trains without railroads and coal, no automobiles without petrol stations and oil, and so forth, in a mutually reinforcing cycle that is both robust and constraining. As the history of the floppy disc shows, at some stage it is easier to replace the whole system-change paradigm, to put it more dramatically-than to keep improving one part of it. There is no point in having super-powerful floppy discs if the millions of drives already in place are not up to the task of reading them. This explains one of the advantages of any technological leapfrogging: a later adopter does not have to deal with the legacy of any incumbent technological package (coupled firstand second-order technology), and is free to take advantage of the most recent and innovative solution. Yet, this is less simple than it looks, precisely because of the coupled nature of second-order technologies. Of course, it would be easier to introduce electric or hybrid vehicles (assuming that this is what we want to do) if there were only roads but no internal combustion engine vehicles, the trouble is that roads are there because of the latter in the first place. Thus, the task of legislation that deals with technological innovation is also that of easing the transition from old to new technologies by decoupling, sometimes through incentives and disincentives, what needs to be kept (e.g. roads) from what needs to be changed (e.g. internal combustion engine vehicles). Most of the comfortable appliances we enjoy in our houses today are modern, in terms of conception: the refrigerator, the dishwasher, the washing machine, the clothes dryer, the TV with its remote control, the telephone, the vacuum cleaner, the electric iron, the sound system ... these are all either firstor second-order technologies, working between human users and the relevant affordances. They represent a world that is ripe for a third-order, revolutionary leap. For technology starts developing exponentially once its in-betweeness relates technologies-as-users to other technologies-as-affordances, in a technology–technology–technology scheme, and we, who were the users, are no longer in the loop, but at most on the loop, or not significantly present at all, that is, out of the loop, and enjoy or simply rely on such technologies as (possibly unaware) beneficiaries or consumers. Technologies as users interacting with other technologies as affordances, through other in-between technologies: this is another way of describing 'hyperhistory' as the stage of human development when third-order technological relations become the necessary condition for development, innovation and welfare. It is also a way of providing further evidence that we have entered into such hyperhistorical stage of our development. The very expression 'machine-readable data' betrays the presence of such a generation of third-order technologies. To put it simply, barcodes are not for our eyes and, in high-frequency trading (three quarters of all equity trading volume in the US is HFT), the buying and selling of stocks happens at such an extremely high speed that only fast computers and algorithms can cope with it, scanning many Technology's In-Betweeness 113 marketplaces simultaneously, executing millions of orders a second, and adapting strategies in milliseconds. The same holds true in any time-sensitive application, whether civilian or military. Further examples include autonomous vehicles, like driverless cars, or 'domotic appliances', the technologies that are transforming the house in a smart environment, for instance by monitoring, regulating, and adapting to our habits the central heating and the supply of hot water. The ultimate third-order technology is provided by ICTs (information and communication technologies). The very use of 'engine' in computational contexts (as in 'search engine') reminds us of the equation second-order technology: engine = thirdorder technology: computer. ICTs can process data autonomously, and hence be in charge of their own behaviours. Once this feature is fully exploited, the human user may be considered as redundant. You could not imagine a modern world of mechanical engines that keeps working once the last human has left earth. History, and in particular mechanical modernity, is still human-dependent. However, we can already conceive a fully automated, computational system that may not need human interactions at all in order to exist and grow. Projects to build self-assembling 3D printers that could exploit lunar resources to build an artificial colony on the Moon may still sound futuristic, but they illustrate well what the future looks like. Hyperhistory can in principle be human-independent. Autonomous agents no longer need to be human. To summarise, technologies can be analysed depending on their firstsecondor third-order nature. Once again, the point could be refined, but without much conceptual gain. Is a clock a first- (between you and your time), a second- (between you and your pressure cooker), or a third-order technology (between your computer and some scheduled task)? Is a pair of scissors a first- (between you and the stem of a rose), a second- (between you and a piece of paper), or a third- (between a robot and a piece of cloth in a factory) order technology? Is a computer a first- (between you and the level of water in a reservoir), a second- (between you and another computer) or a third-order (between two other computers) technology? Evidently each answer depends on the context and how we understand it, but then again, the lack of a decontextualized answer does not make the distinction any less cogent, it only proves that we need to be careful when using it. What is important to stress here is that the distinction is both sound and complete: there is no fourth-order technology. Not because the chain of technologies interacting with other technologies cannot be extended as much as one wishes, which of course is trivially possible, but because such a chain can always be reduced to a series of triples, each of which will be either of first-, of second-, or of third-order. The evolution of technologies, from firstto secondand finally to third-order, poses many questions. One seems worth exploring in this context. If technology is always in-between, then what are the new relata when ICTs work as third-order technologies? To be more precise, for the first time in our life on this planet, we have technologies that can regularly and normally act as autonomous users of other technologies, yet what is ICTs' in-between relationship to us, not as users but as potential beneficiaries who are out of the loop? Precisely because ICTs finally close the loop, and let technology interact with technology through itself, one may object that the very question becomes pointless: with the appearance of third-order technologies all the in-betweeness becomes internal, no longer ours but technologies' 114 L. Floridi business. Such a process of 'internalisation' is a source of concern about ICTs ending up controlling human life. Hyperhistory may be the time when we are depending on our technologies and our technologies are independent of us. At the same time, one may still argue that ICTs, as third-order technologies that close the loop, internalise the technological in-betweeness but generate a new externality, for they create a new space outside the loop (think for example of cyberspace), a space made possible by the loop, that relies on the loop to continue to exist and to flourish, but that is not to be confused with the space inside the loop. Occurrences of such spaces are not socially unprecedented: at different times and in different places, buildings' areas have been designed to be used and inhabited only by slaves or servants for the proper, invisible functioning of the whole house-system, from the kitchen and the canteen to separate stairs and corridors. What is unprecedented is the immense scale and pace at which the whole of human society is now migrating to such an out-of-the loop space, whenever possible. We are increasingly living onlife, on Google earth. We should be thinking more carefully about what we are doing. Technology's In-Betweeness


Philosophical Foundations Of Habermasâ Critique Of Particularistic Liberalism

Philosophy

JÃ¼rgen Habermas has emerged as a sharp, and occasionally harsh, critic of the Bush administrationâs policies since the Iraq war. Habermas has developed this critique in several of his short pieces and interviews, some of which are available in fine collections in both English and other languages. However, the occasional and journalistic character of Habermasâ political interventions often hide the theoretical basis of his critique. In this paper, I argue that Habermasâ critique of the Bush administrationâs foreign policy emanates from, and is founded upon, his conception of modernity, and specifically his views about the relationship between âparticularityâ and âgenerality.â The purpose of this essay is to demonstrate how Habermasâ critique can actually be read as a critique of particularism, which Habermas sees operating behind American (and British) foreign policy, and which, in his view, compromises the key achievements of modernity (especially in its Kantian version.)

ISSN 1393-614X Minerva An Internet Journal of Philosophy 14 (2010): 12-35 ____________________________________________________ Ali M. Rizvi 12 Philosophical Foundations of Habermas' Critique of Particularistic Liberalism Ali M. Rizvi Abstract Jürgen Habermas has emerged as a sharp, and occasionally harsh, critic of the Bush administration's policies since the Iraq war. Habermas has developed this critique in several of his short pieces and interviews, some of which are available in fine collections in both English and other languages. However, the occasional and journalistic character of Habermas' political interventions often hides the theoretical basis of his critique. In this paper, I argue that Habermas' critique of the Bush administration's foreign policy emanates from, and is founded upon, his conception of modernity, and specifically his views about the relationship between "particularity" and "generality." The purpose of this essay is to demonstrate how Habermas' critique can actually be read as a critique of particularism, which Habermas sees operating behind American (and British) foreign policy, and which, in his view, compromises the key achievements of modernity (especially in its Kantian version.) The Bush administration has laid the 220-year-old Kantian project of juridifying international relations ad acta with empty moralistic phrases.1 Introduction I shall begin this paper by briefly outlining Jürgen Habermas' conception of modernity in terms of his conception of particularity and generality and the internal relationship between them. I shall then go on to briefly discuss the dialectic between universalism and particularism in Habermas' work. I will apply this framework to my reading of Habermas' critique of the Bush Administration' policy in Iraq, as well as to his critique of Kant's proposals for a world republic. I shall present Habermas' own counter proposal ISSN 1393-614X Minerva An Internet Journal of Philosophy 14 (2010): 12-35 ____________________________________________________ Ali M. Rizvi 13 as an attempt to go beyond both one-sided particularism and one-sided universalism. In the conclusion, I will highlight certain possible blind spots in Habermas' analysis, and raise several questions for further exploration. Throughout the paper, however, my main concern remains to systematically highlight how a specific conception of particularity and generality, and the internal relationship between them, lies behind Habermas' critique of what he calls the "ethnocentric liberalism" of the Bush administration, and also to show how this conception informs his critique of the Kantian notion of a world republic. It will also be my aim throughout the paper to show how Habermas' theoretical concerns inform his political analysis, as well as to demonstrate how a theoretically informed reading of his political analysis can, in turn, enrich our understanding of his theoretical position itself. The Philosophical Background of the Critique Habermas' conception of generality and its relation to particularity is part and parcel of his conception of modernity. The modern outlook came into being through a historical process that involved societies, traditions and individual consciousnesses going through what Habermas calls "decentration."2 Stephen White offers an effective definition of the meaning of decentration as a conceptual separation between the cognitive-technical, the moral, and the aesthetic dimensions, as well as a reflective attitude toward these dimensions. The evolutionary importance of this change (in the sense of an advance in rationality) is that it allows for self-critique and an awareness of alternative interpretations of the world in all three dimensions.3 The process of decentration involves differentiations that create new conceptual distinctions and facilitate the emergence of new concepts. This results in an increased ability of traditions, cultures and individuals to detach themselves from their particular contexts. Habermas describes the process of modernization as a process of decentration ISSN 1393-614X Minerva An Internet Journal of Philosophy 14 (2010): 12-35 ____________________________________________________ Ali M. Rizvi 14 which results in the creation of new concepts, institutions and expressions of consciousness that are not bogged down (unlike in traditional and medieval societies) within their own particularistic contexts.4 This has resulted in the ability of modern societies to transcend particularities and organize their institutions in general (i.e. allinclusive) terms. For these reasons, Habermas understands the process of modernization to be one of increased generalization, and he regards this as representing an advance in rationality. Moreover, Habermas does not only equate rationality with generality, he also connects an advance in rationality to an increase in generality: for example, he differentiates between ethical and moral perspectives solely on the basis of their range of generality. 5 Both ethical and moral claims are context-transcending and unconditional; but moral claims are differentiated from ethical claims in that they are not only unconditional but also absolute, 6 where the difference between unconditionality and absoluteness is determined by the respective range of their generality. So, for instance, ethical claims are tied to a particular understanding of "our" own community and lifeworld, and although, compared to egoistic claims, ethical claims are still general claims, their generality is circumscribed by the limits of "our" own community. As Habermas puts it: "Ethical questions by no means call for a complete break with the egocentric perspective" 7 (it should be noted that by "egocentric perspective" Habermas means "particularistic perspective.") A complete break with particularity is achieved only at the level of moral claims, because they refer to everyone, everywhere; and they demand allegiance of everyone, everywhere 8 (the so called "double sense" of universality.)9 Only a "will that is guided by moral insight, and hence is completely rational, can be called autonomous," 10 because it completely breaks with particularity. Rationality depends on a break with the particular and the concrete. Moral claims are completely rational claims because they reach the highest stage of generalization, and in this they match the structure of communicative action and argumentation.11 ISSN 1393-614X Minerva An Internet Journal of Philosophy 14 (2010): 12-35 ____________________________________________________ Ali M. Rizvi 15 Habermas here retains the idealist vision that rationality is not to be found in the particular, but requires the complete transcendence of particularity. However, where Habermas differs from his idealist predecessors is that he rejects the idea that this conception of generality needs to be tied to a notion of a transcendent ontological realm (such as Plato's world of forms or Kant's pure intelligible realm.) 12 Habermas insists that generality must emerge from within this world, but he does so without positing the existence of any ontological realm beyond this world. The theoretical move he makes here is to marry the philosophy of language to the philosophy of action through Austin's notion of the speech act. In performing speech acts we do not merely say something, we also perform an action at the same time. These actions are known as "speech actions." Language, as well as being related to particularity, is also tied to generality: Habermas refers to this as "half transcendence." 13 Action, on the other hand, is tied to particularity. Both language and action are things of this world, and thus they are related to each other from within to start with. And in speech actions, language and action – and hence generality and particularity – are intertwined. A dialectical relationship between particularity and generality is thus established, but without presupposing the Hegelian absolute. Language points beyond particularities, while action-imperatives pull it back to the earth. 14 Generally speaking, there are two types of particularities: a) closed particularities that do not allow for the emergence of generality, and hence are exclusive (e.g. Al-Qaeda and the Islamic Republic of Iran); 15 and b) open particularities, which admit generality (i.e. they are inclusive.) 16 Different particularities are hierarchically situated according to their ability to create a space for the emergence of generality. All cultures and societies have potential for such generality, but to what extent they actualize this potential is a historical and empirical question. All cultures and societies are potentially equal, but the West has ISSN 1393-614X Minerva An Internet Journal of Philosophy 14 (2010): 12-35 ____________________________________________________ Ali M. Rizvi 16 established superiority over others simply because it has been more successful in actualizing this potential. 17 In Habermasian jargon, the West has "decentred" itself more than any other society; this decentration is expressed in the West's commitment to human rights, constitutionalism and democracy. 18 Clearly, here, Habermas gives a privileged position to America and her allies, and this partisanship is evident throughout his political writings. The morally privileged status of America and her allies also dictates Habermas' judgment of her and her enemies. 19 Thus Habermas, despite his criticism of America, claims that America can only be criticized internally, a claim which can only be justified if one grants America a privileged moral position vis-à-vis her enemies. 20 Particularities open to generality have a unique moral status; however, as particularities they remain under suspicion (more on this below.) Habermas and the Dialectic Between Universalism and Particularism Habermas believes that Western civilization has a universal core, which Habermas describes in his pragmatic theory of communication, and traces its development in the history of the West in his theory of social evolution. 21 In one of his recent rebuttals to his critics, he reminds them that: I would never have tackled a formal pragmatic reconstruction of the rational potential of speech if I had not harboured the expectation that I would in this way be able to obtain a concept of communicative rationality from the normative content of the universal and unavoidable presuppositions of the noncircumventable practice of the everyday process of reaching understanding. It is not a matter of this or that preference, of "our" or "their" notions of rational life; rather, what is at issue here is the reconstruction of a voice of reason, a voice that we have no choice but to allow to speak in everyday communicative practices – whether we want to or not. Perhaps I have deviously obtained through definitions what I claim to have found through reconstructions – this, at any rate, is the claim on which criticism should focus. 22 ISSN 1393-614X Minerva An Internet Journal of Philosophy 14 (2010): 12-35 ____________________________________________________ Ali M. Rizvi 17 The universal core that Habermas attributes to the West is not based on the particular experiences that Western societies have gone through, but on the linguistic character of our being in the world. As beings bound by the use of language23 we are all equal heirs to the potential inherent in language use. This potential is described by Habermas in terms of his theory of communicative action. Habermas takes "the type of action aimed at reaching understanding to be fundamental," 24 and he understands this fundamental type of action in linguistic terms: language is the only means through which we reach understanding with each other. 25 Language is thus the primary mode of action coordination among humans and is also the primary mode of their socialization. Since we are all linguistic beings, the history of different human societies must therefore reflect this shared potential of language use, and all human societies are necessarily able to realize this potential to a certain extent. Habermas then provides a quasi-Marxist account of why different human societies have failed to realize the potential inherent in language use. His theory is a sort of a revised version of the false consciousness thesis; 26 as he explains in an interview: Marx established in what sense the category of labour is a universal concept applicable to all societies. He shows that only to the extent that the capitalist mode of production has become established are the objective conditions fulfilled that allow him, Marx, access to an understanding of the universal character of this category 'labour'. With regard to ... a theory of communication, one must use the same method to clarify how the development of late capitalism has objectively fulfilled conditions that allow us to recognize universals in the structures of linguistic communication, providing criteria for a critique which can no longer be based on the philosophy of history.27 The potential for rationality inherent in linguistic communication is unleashed only when certain objective conditions are fulfilled, and Habermas believes that capitalism fulfils those conditions through the process of decentration and rationalization. 28 The rationalization and decentration of a lifeworld result in the uncoupling of facticity and ISSN 1393-614X Minerva An Internet Journal of Philosophy 14 (2010): 12-35 ____________________________________________________ Ali M. Rizvi 18 validity. 29 According to Habermas, in traditional societies, facticity and validity are so intertwined that the latter collapses into the former. It is for this reason that traditional societies are stuck to the particular; no distance from the particular is possible, since validity is what makes transcendence from the particular and the imagining of alternatives possible. 30 In modern societies, the loosening of the grip of the authorities that hold sway in traditional societies (e.g. religion, family, community etc) establishes a clear distinction, and permanent tension, 31 between facticity and validity, in such a manner that no facticity is deemed to be beyond criticism and transcendence. In a modern society, the process of decentration initially results in establishing a clear distinction between facticity and validity, and then in further differentiation within the notion of validity itself. 32 These distinctions provide a space for self-reflection and the generation of alternatives that is lacking in traditional societies. Thus, while the rationality potential inherent in language use is universal and is to be found in all societies to an equal degree (and must be defended as such,) the realization of the objective conditions necessary for the release of this universal rationality potential is specific to the society concerned. The release of the rationality potential requires that particular lifeworlds are transformed in a specific way (i.e. they become rationalized, in the Habermasian sense.) Without this specific transformation, the rationality potential inherent in language use cannot be unleashed. Thus, according to Habermas, lifeworlds throughout the globe need to be transformed in the specific manner described in his theory of social evolution (briefly summarized above.) This has exposed Habermas to the charge of Eurocentrism, a charge levelled on two points. First, Habermas' claim that his formal pragmatics is universal is viewed with suspicion. In fact, his formal pragmatics is seen as an underhanded attempt to import peculiarly European ideas (i.e. European ideologies of the Enlightenment and of modernity) into the analysis of linguistic communication. Second, Habermas' theory of social evolution, and particularly his view that particular lifeworlds need to be transformed in such a manner that they are ISSN 1393-614X Minerva An Internet Journal of Philosophy 14 (2010): 12-35 ____________________________________________________ Ali M. Rizvi 19 rationalized and decentred, is also seen by some as Eurocentric. 33 Habermas has responded to these objections by pointing out that the lifeworld transformation that he advocates is not specific to European societies (even though it first occurred in European societies), because it is a necessary precondition for unleashing what he sees as a universal and a shared heritage of human beings – as such, the required elements of lifeworld transformation must be considered universal. At this point, Habermas is careful to separate the universal need for transformation in a particular lifeworld, in the specific sense he advocates, from the particular details of how that transformation actually occurs. According to Habermas, the transformation that must occur is universal in the sense that it consists of establishing general patterns that are necessary to unleash the universality potential inherent in language use. However, both the materials for, and the mode of, this transformation must be provided by each particular lifeworld, as determined by its own history, and cannot be imported from any other lifeworld, including American and European lifeworlds. Habermas is thus able to criticize the American policy on Iraq on both these counts. First, he accuses America of violating the principle of equality that emanates from the belief in the universality of the rationality potential that is equally inherent in all human societies. And second, he criticizes America for its efforts to impose on others its own particular and specific experiences through which it realized the objective conditions necessary for unleashing the universality potential inherent in linguistic communication. Thus, on the one hand he criticizes her for violating the rights of universality, whilst on the other hand he blames her for denying the rights of particularity. I now wish to examine Habermas' view of American policy in more depth. Habermas' Critique of America As pointed out earlier, Habermas believes that generality emerges from within ISSN 1393-614X Minerva An Internet Journal of Philosophy 14 (2010): 12-35 ____________________________________________________ Ali M. Rizvi 20 particularity, and so he rejects abstractionist notions of generality that are totally detached from particularity. At the same time, he gives preference to those particularities that are most suitable for facilitating the emergence of generality. However, Habermas' distrust of particularism in itself also includes a distrust of even those particularities that have given rise to generalities. America is one such important particularity. Habermas' critique of America is based on his belief that America systematically confuses its own particular status with its general status (i.e. its status as a bearer of general claims.) The confusion is complex, and needs careful conceptual articulation. To begin with, America, as a particularity, is a morally privileged particularity because it has gone through the process of decentration. However, this does not give America any right to try to impose its own particular experiences on others. America should try to promote its universal claims, but without confusing them with claims derived from her own particularity. American generality is manifested in its constitution, as well as its commitment to democracy and human rights. America's particularity is manifested in its norms and values, and in the historical process (and route) by which it has reached its current stage of development. 34 The issue is not that American norms and values are particularistic; indeed, they are general norms and values. However, they are norms and values derived from a particularity. 35 Thus, Habermas doesn't accuse America of simple particularism (of the type of which he accuses America's enemies, like Al-Qaeda or the Islamic Republic of Iran), but of a particularity centred universalism, or what he calls "universalized ethnocentrism." 36 In this context, Habermas has two specific criticisms of the Bush administration's foreign policy: I) He rejects the American project to impose democracy on Iraq (and the Middle East), because he believes that a generality (in this case, constitutional democracy) must emerge ISSN 1393-614X Minerva An Internet Journal of Philosophy 14 (2010): 12-35 ____________________________________________________ Ali M. Rizvi 21 from within a particularity (in this case, Iraq), i.e. from within Iraqi culture; from within its own history: When thousands of Shiites in Nasiriya demonstrate against both Saddam and the American occupation, they express the fact that non-Western cultures must appropriate the universalistic content of human rights with their own resources and in their own interpretations, one that establishes a convincing connection to local experiences and interests. 37 The toppling of the monument to Saddam Hussein represented the urge in Iraqis for freedom, democracy, and human rights. On the other hand, the fierce resistance to Americans in their country represents Iraqi resistance to what Habermas calls "liberal nationalism," which tries to impose its own particularity on others. Resistance is thus not directed against the universal as such; it is directed against a particularity, which is at most only one representative of the universal. II) Habermas rejects America's claim to be able to determine the true interests of Iraq and the Middle East. This second criticism of America is itself twofold: a) America gives priority to her own particularistic (national) interests over the interests of the system as a whole (i.e. to general interests);38 and b) even if America were intent on giving priority to general interests over her own particular interests, it would not be possible for her to know what the true interests of all might be (Let's call this an "epistemological impossibility.") 39 For Habermas, no particularity – not even a particularity open to generality, and embodying general norms and values – can decide what is the general interest or the interests of all (i.e. of everyone, everywhere.) The actors themselves must decide what the general interest is, and this must be done within communicative action or discourse, being the only medium in which particularity is suspended from within, and ISSN 1393-614X Minerva An Internet Journal of Philosophy 14 (2010): 12-35 ____________________________________________________ Ali M. Rizvi 22 generality is attained without compromising the interests of anyone. General interest is to be decided by the actors themselves, within the dialogical mode, where everyone is compelled to take into account the interests of others and relativize his or her own interests accordingly. At the institutional level, the same can be achieved by adhering to the procedures that ensure that powerful particularities do not impose their own agendas on less powerful particularities. Hence Habermas' persistent insistence on the central role of the UN and other international institutions in managing the relations between states and people, even though he concedes that these institutions are in dire need of reform. 40 Habermas' Critique of Kant When Habermas turns to outlining his Kantian alternative to American liberal nationalism, the philosophical basis of his evaluation remains the same as in his critique of America. Although he allies himself with Kant, he also criticizes him for his residual particularistic biases. Thus, he criticizes Kant's idea of a world republic on the grounds that Kant did not develop the notion of a world republic "in sufficiently abstract terms" (i.e. general terms.) 41 In other words, Kant does not sufficiently differentiate the conception of cosmopolitan conditions from the concretistic notion of a world republic. 42 Kant ignores the fact that a world republic would require a concrete lifeworld in order to function properly, and that such a lifeworld does not exist; moreover, it would seem to be a conceptual "impossibility." 43 Lifeworlds, no matter how much decentration they might have gone through, are inherently particular,44 and so a global lifeworld would never be substantial enough to support and sustain the workings of a universal state. The production and reproduction of legitimacy requires a very thick conception of a lifeworld based on shared values, history, memories, language etc. 45 Habermas' critique of the Kantian notion of a world republic shows his appreciation of the role of particularities in sustaining and organizing human life. True to his conception of universalism, he claims that all human beings are brothers and sisters; 46 however, he also knows that there cannot ISSN 1393-614X Minerva An Internet Journal of Philosophy 14 (2010): 12-35 ____________________________________________________ Ali M. Rizvi 23 ever be a universal lifeworld shared by everyone, i.e. a lifeworld thick enough to sustain a world republic. 47 Habermas thus considers a middle way, a compromise between the ethnocentric universalism of the Bush administration and the concretistic universalism of Kant. Habermas proposes something that he calls a "postnational constellation;" 48 a form of social organization whereby the nation state does not lose its relevance, but through which it nonetheless opens up towards the other. Habermas is not in favour of the withering away of the nation state entirely, because he recognizes the supreme significance of particularities in organizing and sustaining human life. 49 However, as mentioned above, Habermas is also against closed particularities. The notions of closedness and openness are of course relative, and are to be understood historically, 50 but having acknowledged this proviso, openness is important for two reasons. First, it is the basis of autonomy, a key notion which underpins modernity. Second, it supports the development of the state: with the evolution of capitalism and the advent of globalization, the state risks lapsing into irrelevance if it does not open itself up to the other. However, this opening up (or generalization) must be based on a respect for particularities, i.e. it should emerge from within – as always, Habermas stresses the need for a dialectic between generality and particularity. In this respect, Habermas proposes a two-tiered system that again shows his sensitivity to the fact that generality must emerge from within, and to the fact that it should always be supported by corresponding particularities. Instead of Kant's idea of a world republic, then, Habermas proposes a two-tiered system: a) the emergence of regional regimes, akin to the European Union; and b) the constitutionalization of the UN and international law in general. I will briefly elaborate on these two tiers below, although only to the extent that they are relevant to my argument in this paper. ISSN 1393-614X Minerva An Internet Journal of Philosophy 14 (2010): 12-35 ____________________________________________________ Ali M. Rizvi 24 a) The first tier of Habermas' proposed system involves the formation of new regional regimes. His argument is that globalization is the phenomenon which makes reliance on the old state-centric system untenable.51 Thus, there is a need to expand beyond the statecentric system. This going beyond, however, cannot be accomplished on the level of a world republic, as there are insufficient grounds for its creation and sustenance. A more realistic scenario is the emergence of various regional bodies, in the style of the European Union, which would be able to perform various functions that the old-style state has increasingly been unable to perform adequately.52 The idea of the creation of various regional regimes 53 is realistic, because at the regional level it is possible to develop lifeworlds which are thick enough to sustain such regimes. For example, Habermas has consistently argued for the creation of a more federal Europe, and for a European constitution. A federal Europe is a possibility because a thick enough conception of a European lifeworld is a possibility. In this regard, Habermas calls for the people of Europe to build "a new European dimension onto their national identities." 54 Without the development of such a shared European identity, the dream of a federal Europe, armed with a constitution and able to conduct a common foreign and defence policy, would be a chimera without any solid basis in reality. 55 Europe requires not just a functional but also a normative integration of citizens 56 that could make the pursuit of common goals possible in the first place. 57 Habermas also anticipates a specific objection: that a Federal European Union without a shared culture and a shared identity seems like wishful thinking. Habermas' reply here is twofold. First, national identities are themselves constructs, and so a Federal Europe would not be unique in this – it would in fact be only slightly more abstract than the abstraction which is national identity. Second, we do need a common European consciousness in order to build a Federal Europe. A European constitution would be one of the vehicles for creating such a consciousness; political movements and political campaigns would be another. ISSN 1393-614X Minerva An Internet Journal of Philosophy 14 (2010): 12-35 ____________________________________________________ Ali M. Rizvi 25 However, the ingredients of such a construction must be based on the reality of a shared European history, and a shared ethos developed during that history, which would differentiate member states from non-members. In other words, the construction of a European identity (or any other identity for that matter) cannot be a construction ex nihilo: the basis for its construction must be already there in reality. As Habermas puts it: "increasing trust is not only a result but also a presupposition of a shared process of political opinion and will formation."58 Moreover, the process of generalization and abstraction can only take place in a concrete context. Thus, an "egalitarian commitment to universalistic principles of constitutional democracy also developed" on the basis of "ethnically extended particularism," 59 and "Citizens do not internalize constitutional norms in an abstract form, but concretely, in the context of their respective national histories."60 This is another way of saying that generality must emerge from within particularities, which also implies that particularities themselves must have the potential to be the breeding ground for generalities. Habermas thinks that a European federation can emerge from within the historical reality of Europe, because European people share enough (both positively and negatively) 61 in terms of history, culture, and experience that can provide the grounds for a new European identity formation. b) The second tier of Habermas' alternative to Kant's idea of a world republic is the constitutionalization of the UN charter and of international law. However, Habermas contends that the role of the UN must be limited to two central key areas: protecting human rights and peacekeeping.62 Habermas sees these roles as "reactive" in character, in that they are based on the "feeling of indignation over the violation of human rights, i.e. over repression and injuries to human rights committed by states." 63 Habermas thinks that there is enough existing "negative consensus" 64 among the world public to provide sufficient legitimating support for these functions. Habermas envisages global social movements as vehicles for the promotion and dissemination of such solidarity on a ISSN 1393-614X Minerva An Internet Journal of Philosophy 14 (2010): 12-35 ____________________________________________________ Ali M. Rizvi 26 permanent basis. Again, Habermas rejects the idea of a world republic on the grounds that there is insufficient basis for this in the lifeworld. 65 However, he also rejects the claim that one should stick to the old paradigm of internationalism, whereby the UN is seen entirely in terms of the state-centric paradigm. Here again, Habermas' argument is that there are in existence sufficient grounds for developing a role for the UN which goes beyond the state-centric paradigm. However, despite Habermas' strong advocacy for more robust regional bodies, as well as a more robust UN role in managing world politics, Habermas does not envisage the end of the state and its function in a global world. The state will continue to play a central role in our life, especially in the area of the monopoly of violence, as well as providing robust justification for, and defence of, the modern way of life. Such a role cannot be delegated to other institutions, simply because no other institution possesses the background consensus that informs the life and reality of the state.66 Conclusion In this paper, I have sought to make explicit the philosophical basis of Habermas' critique of the Bush administration's foreign policy in terms of his views on Modernity, and specifically in terms of his views on the relation between generality and particularity. I agree with Max Pensky that there is no straightforward relationship between Habermas' theoretical writings and his political writings, but I also agree with him that there is a dialectical relation between these writings. 67 I hope that this exercise, in making explicit the theoretical basis of Habermas' critique of the current American administration and its conduct of the Iraq war, will have been fruitful in providing a deeper understanding of Habermas' deeper political analysis of the situation, as well as shedding light upon his theoretical position. I will illustrate this latter point briefly, by way of a conclusion. By making explicit the theoretical basis of Habermas' critique, we are now able to examine some of the issues in Habermas' thought in greater depth, and in a new light. ISSN 1393-614X Minerva An Internet Journal of Philosophy 14 (2010): 12-35 ____________________________________________________ Ali M. Rizvi 27 One such issue is the abstractionist bias of Habermas' thinking. Concentrating on the theme of the relation between particularity and generality can help us to see the complexity and nuances of Habermas' position, with the result that we recognize that Habermas can neither be simply dubbed either as a particularist or an abstractionist. His position is based on realizing the importance of both, and the dialectical relation between them. Thus, those critics who accuse Habermas of Eurocentrism miss the point: as we have seen, Habermas emphasizes the idea that generality must emerge from within. In the case of Iraq, he stresses the importance of providing a justification for the democratic process from within Iraqi history, rather than by imposing it from without, and he criticizes the United States for ignoring this fundamental idea. However, the relation between particularity and generality in Habermas' works also reveals, at a deeper level, certain basic blind spots in his position. To continue with the example of Iraq, Habermas criticizes the position that, in his view, ignores the particular, but he also criticizes the position that he thinks is particularistic, i.e. which lacks any room for the emergence of generality. He thinks that generality should emerge from within the particular – in this case, from within Iraqi history. However, one thing that Habermas does not consider is the possibility that Iraqi history might not have resources for the emergence of the type of generality that Habermas has in mind. This is, at the very least, a possibility, and the fact that Habermas does not consider it diminishes the critical dimension of his thinking to a certain extent. Furthermore, by concentrating on the issue of particularity and generality, we can also highlight essential gaps in Habermas' position on the emergence of modernity. If modernity is seen as merely a space to facilitate the emergence of generality and the consequent opportunity for self-reflection, we can legitimately raise the question about the kinds of generalities that Habermas envisages. In Habermas' thinking, is it not possible that different types of particularities might lead to different kinds of generalities? ISSN 1393-614X Minerva An Internet Journal of Philosophy 14 (2010): 12-35 ____________________________________________________ Ali M. Rizvi 28 Why is it necessary for every generality to be modelled on a vision of modernity? Why should self-reflection and critical analysis necessarily be of the type advocated by modern thinkers, from Kant to Habermas? Concentrating on the issue of particularity and generality opens up space for these sorts of questions and issues, which are not only important for our understanding of Habermas but also for interpreting our present and future. REFERENCES Abdel-Nour, F. "Farewell to Justification: Habermas, Human Rights, and Universalist Morality." Philosophy & Social Criticism, 30 (1) [2004]: 73-96. Cooke, M. Language and Reason: A Study of Habermas's Pragmatics (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1994). Dews, P. (ed). Autonomy and Solidarity, 2 nd rev. edn. (London: Verso, 1992). Ferraro, A. Justice and Judgment (London: Sage, 1999). Gray, J. "F. A. Hayek and the Rebirth of Classical Liberalism." Literature of Liberty, 5 (4) [Winter 1982]: 19-101 Habermas, J. The Theory of Communicative Action, vols. I & II, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984). Habermas, J. Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics; trans. Ciaran Cronin (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993). Habermas, J. On the Pragmatics of Communication, ed. Maeve Cooke (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998). Habermas, J. The Postnational Constellation, ed. & trans. Max Pensky (Oxford: Polity, 2000). Habermas, J. Truth and Justification, ed. & trans. Barbara Fultner (Cambridge, Mass.: ISSN 1393-614X Minerva An Internet Journal of Philosophy 14 (2010): 12-35 ____________________________________________________ Ali M. Rizvi 29 MIT Press, 2003). Habermas, J. The Divided West, ed. & trans. Ciaran Cronin (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006). Johnson, P. "Globalizing Democracy: Reflections on Habermas's Radicalism." European Journal of Social Theory, 11 (1) [2008]: 71-86. Owen, D. S. "Habermas's Developmental Logic Thesis: Universal or Eurocentric?" Philosophy Today, 24, Supplement (1998): 104-111. Prychitko, David L. and Virgil Henry Storr, "Communicative Action and the Radical Constitution: The Habermasian Challenge to Hayek, Mises and their Descendents." Cambridge Journal of Economics, 31 (2) [2007]: 255-274. Rawls, J. The Law of Peoples: With "The Idea of Public Reason Revisited" (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999). Rizvi, A M. Habermas' Conception of "Transcendence from Within": An Interpretation (unpublished PhD Dissertation: La Trobe University, 2007). White, S.K. "Habermas' Communicative Ethics and the development of moral consciousness." Philosophy and Social Criticism, 10 (1984): 25-48. NOTES 1 Habermas, J. The Divided West, ed. & trans. Ciaran Cronin (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006), 103; italics in the original (hereafter TDW). 2 See Habermas, J. The Theory of Communicative Action, vols. I & II, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984), 48ff, and chapter 1 of vol. 1, passim (hereafter TCA I & TCA II respectively). 3 White, S.K. "Habermas' Communicative Ethics and the development of moral consciousness." Philosophy and Social Criticism, 10 (1984): 25-48; 31. 4 "What irritates us members of a modern lifeworld is that in a mythical interpreted world we cannot, or cannot with sufficient precision, make certain differentiations that are fundamental to our understanding of the world. From Durkheim to Lévi Strauss, anthropologists have repeatedly ISSN 1393-614X Minerva An Internet Journal of Philosophy 14 (2010): 12-35 ____________________________________________________ Ali M. Rizvi 30 pointed out the peculiar confusion between nature and culture. We can understand this phenomenon to begin with as a mixing of two object domains, physical nature and the sociocultural environment. Myths do not permit a clear, basic, conceptual differentiation between things and person, between objects that can be manipulated and agents – subjects capable of speaking and acting to whom we attribute linguistic utterances" (TCA I: 48; italics in the original). 5 Habermas, J. Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics; trans. Ciaran Cronin (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993): 1-17 (hereafter JA). 6 JA: 5. 7 JA: 6. 8 Habermas, J. The Postnational Constellation, ed. & trans. Max Pensky (Oxford: Polity, 2000): 108 (hereafter TPNC). 9 Cooke, M. Language and Reason: A Study of Habermas's Pragmatics (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1994): 64. 10 JA: 10; emphasis added. Only "the autonomous will is completely internal to reason" (JA: 13). 11 TPNC: 108. 12 Of course, some would object to this interpretation of Kant. However, adjudicating among different readings of Kant is not my task here. It suffices for my purpose that my reading corresponds to Habermas'. On conflicting readings of Kant on this point, see the works of Henry E. Allison and Paul Guyer, among others. For Habermas' take on Kant, see Jürgen Habermas, Truth and Justification, ed. & trans. Barbara Fultner (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2003). 13 TCA II: 125. 14 For details, see Ali M Rizvi, Habermas' Conception of "Transcendence from Within": An Interpretation (unpublished PhD Dissertation: La Trobe University, 2007). 15 TDW: 11. 16 Habermas differentiates between a majority culture and a generality culture. A majority culture is one that makes its decisions according to the will of the majority, but is not necessarily a general culture because a majority culture can lack openness to the other. This difference goes back to Rousseau's distinction between the majority will and the general will. For details on this point, see Alessandro Ferraro, Justice and Judgment (London: Sage, 1999): 156-163. 17 In the context of the UN, Habermas explains this duality between equality in principle and inequality in practice well: "there exists a gradation in legitimacy between liberal, semiISSN 1393-614X Minerva An Internet Journal of Philosophy 14 (2010): 12-35 ____________________________________________________ Ali M. Rizvi 31 authoritarian, and even despotic member states, in spite of the formal equality enjoyed by all members" (TDW: 107). 18 As Pauline Johnson writes, Habermas "points out that the figure of the citizen, the bearer of republican liberty rights, allowed the nation-state to forge a more universal mode of integration that transcended particularistic regional ties to village, family, locality and dynasty" (Pauline Johnson, "Globalizing Democracy: Reflections on Habermas's Radicalism," European Journal of Social Theory, 11 (1) [2008]: 71-86; 73. 19 Thus the key distinction between the Kosovo war (which Habermas supported) and the Iraq war (which he opposed) seems to be that in the former, America and her allies were united, whereas in the latter they were divided. What made the former morally acceptable was (in part) the "undisputed democratic and rule of law character of all members of the acting military coalition." However, "today normative dissent has divided the West against itself" (TDW: 29). It is also his belief in the moral superiority of the West that leads Habermas to assert that criticism of the West must be derived from its own history and its own standards, and not from outside, thus practically rejecting the legitimacy of any external criticism of the West: "justified criticism of the West derives its standards from the West's own 200-year-old discourse of self-criticism" (TDW: 111). 20 TDW: 185, 111 and passim. Habermas' assertion is that America can only be criticized internally, and it follows from this that America shouldn't be criticized externally (any such criticism of America would be attributed either to unthinking fundamentalism or to the kinds of unacceptable anti-Americanism characteristic of certain left-wing circles in the West.) If this is Habermas' position then I think it can only be sustained through the corresponding belief in the moral superiority of America. 21 Habermas defines universality in terms of generality. Universality is the highest range of generality, and every universal is general, but not vice versa. 22 Habermas, J. On the Pragmatics of Communication, ed. Maeve Cooke (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998): 207 (hereafter OPC). 23 Habermas differentiates between language and language use in this context (OPC: 26). 24 OPC: 21. 25 This point is sharply borne out in Habermas' critique of intentionalist theories in general, and Searle's intentionalism in particular (OPC: 257-275). 26 TCA II: 332-373. 27 Dews, P. (ed). Autonomy and Solidarity, 2 nd rev. edn. (London: Verso, 1992): 100; emphasis added. ISSN 1393-614X Minerva An Internet Journal of Philosophy 14 (2010): 12-35 ____________________________________________________ Ali M. Rizvi 32 28 However, as a true disciple of Hegel, Habermas considers the realization of these objective conditions in dialectical terms. This allows him to concede an ambiguity inherent in any such realization. Habermas explains this ambiguity through his conception of the colonization of lifeworld. Thus, Habermas realizes the ambivalent character of late capitalism in terms of the release of the rationality potential inherent in linguistic use (see TCA II: 153-197). 29 Habermas claims that in traditional societies, facticity and validity are fused in such a manner that it is not possible to transcend the facticity. The rationalisation of the lifeworld essentially means an uncoupling of facticity and validity in such a way that facticity becomes, in principle, transcendable. 30 A clear differentiation between facticity and validity is indispensable in order for particularism to be transcended. The notion of validity itself depends on idealization and generalization (see JA: 55ff; BFN: 1-41). 31 The "tension" within a lifeworld between facticity and validity or "ideality" is one of Habermas' favourite expressions. It means that, after the rationalisation of a lifeworld, facticity and "ideality" are neither fused into each other completely, nor separated from each other completely (BFN: 20, 35 and passim). 32 Through the emergence of the distinction between theoretical and practical validity claims, for example. 33 See Owen, D. S. "Habermas's Developmental Logic Thesis: Universal or Eurocentric?" Philosophy Today, 24, Supplement (1998): 104-111. 34 Habermas is not very clear about what particular values America tries to impose on others. Did America try to impose its own type of presidential system in Iraq, for example? 35 In other words, the generality of norms and values does not transcend American particularity. 36 TDW: 103. 37 TDW: 35, also see 53. Habermas doesn't elaborate anywhere (as far as I know) on how Iraqis (for example) "would appropriate the universal content of human rights with their own resources." Habermas' natural instinct is to bet on social movements to do the "dirty" work (see Farid Abdel-Nour, "Farewell to Justification: Habermas, Human Rights, and Universalist Morality." Philosophy & Social Criticism, 30 (1) (2004): 73-96). However, what Habermas might have in mind here can be gleaned from Rawls' concrete proposal on how to "civilize" Islam. Drawing upon the work of Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, Rawls argues that Muslims can today appropriate the "universal content of human rights" in the context of their own tradition if they reject the Medina period of the prophetic teachings and concentrate solely on the Mecca period (implying that the former are not compatible with human rights discourse, whereas the latter are). See John Rawls, The Law of Peoples: With "The Idea of Public Reason Revisited" (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999): 151, n46. ISSN 1393-614X Minerva An Internet Journal of Philosophy 14 (2010): 12-35 ____________________________________________________ Ali M. Rizvi 33 38 If we were to focus on the economy, we might say that America cares about its own accumulation at the expense of accumulation in general. 39 "From its self-imposed isolation, even the good hegemon, having appointed itself as the trustee of general interests, cannot know whether what it claims to do in the interest of others is, in fact, equally good for all" (TDW: 35; emphasis in the original. See also 184-185). Compare this with the Hayekian notion of the epistemological impossibility of socialism and his related notion of the impossibility of knowing markets and their mechanism (see John Gray, "F. A. Hayek and the Rebirth of Classical Liberalism." Literature of Liberty, 5 (4) (Winter 1982): 19-101). For a recent comparison of Habermas and Hayek, see David L. Prychitko and Virgil Henry Storr, "Communicative Action and the Radical Constitution: The Habermasian Challenge to Hayek, Mises and their Descendents." Cambridge Journal of Economics, 31 (2) (2007): 255-274. 40 TDW: 173-175. 41 TDW: 127. Habermas talks of "an overhasty concretization of the general idea of a "cosmopolitan condition" or a constitution for the international community" (123) on Kant's part; see also TDW: 118. 42 TDW: 129. 43 A world republic is a conceptual impossibility, because the concept of world republic must be based on the principle of "complete inclusion" such that no one can be excluded from it. Democracy on the other hand, despite all its openness, cannot be established without some sort of exclusion: "Any political community that wants to understand itself as a democracy must at least distinguish between members and non-members" (TPNC: 107). 44 "The spatial and temporal horizons of a lifeworld . . . no matter how broadly they extend, always form a whole that is both intuitively present but always withdrawn to an unproblematic background; a whole which is closed in the sense that it contains every possible interaction from the perspective of lifeworld participants" (TPNC: 82). 45 TPNC: 107-109. 46 Dews, Autonomy and Solidarity: 270. 47 "With the framework of a common culture, negotiation partners also have recourse to common value orientations and a shared conception of justice, which makes an understanding beyond instrumental-rational agreements possible. But on the international level the "thick" communicative embeddedness is missing" (TPNC: 109). 48 TPNC, passim. 49 In the context of the European Union, Habermas writes, "It is neither possible nor desirable to level out the national identities of member nations, nor melt them down in a "Nation of Europe."" (TPCN: 99). ISSN 1393-614X Minerva An Internet Journal of Philosophy 14 (2010): 12-35 ____________________________________________________ Ali M. Rizvi 34 50 Habermas conceives of the relationship between openness and closedness, inclusivity and exclusivity, as a dialectical relationship. He seems to concede the possibility of pure particularity, as in the case of traditional societies and modern regressive movements like Al-Qaeda; however, he doesn't entertain the possibility of pure inclusivity. At the moral level one can achieve pure inclusivity, but such a level is that of pure abstraction and needs to be married to particularity of the ethical to gain any concrete status. Every openness, to be concrete, requires an ultimate (even if temporary) closure. Thus the real difference between "particularistic" particularities and non particularistic particularities is that in the former the closure is absolute and permanent, while in the latter it is temporary and always moving, although there is no situation in which the need for closure can be permanently transcended (see PNC: 107-11). 51 TPNC: 69-80. 52 Habermas sees these regional bodies as performing the functions of a world domestic policy without a world government (TPNC: 104). These functions would include "political coordination in the areas of the economy, the environment, transportation, health, etc . . . ." (TDW: 108). These regional bodies would also serve as "an international negotiating system that could place limits on the "race to the bottom" – cost-cutting deregulatory race that reduces the capacities for socialpolitical action and damages social standards – would need to enact and enforce redistributive regulations." (TDW: 109); also see TDW: 136ff. 53 TPNC: 70. Elsewhere, Habermas speaks of "continental regimes on the model of the European Union" (TDW: 109). 54 TDW: 42. 55 TDW: 44, TPNC: 99-100. 56 Habermas also contrasts functional integration with social integration (see TPNC: 82). 57 TDW: 68. 58 TDW: 81. 59 TDW: 77. 60 TDW: 78. "From a normative point of view, the fact that the democratic process must always be embedded in a common political culture doesn't imply the exclusivist project of realizing national particularity, but rather has the inclusive meaning of a practice of self-legislation that includes all citizens equally" (TPNC: 73). 61 See TDW: 43-48. 62 "... maintaining peace and enforcing human rights globally . . ." (TDW: 108). ISSN 1393-614X Minerva An Internet Journal of Philosophy 14 (2010): 12-35 ____________________________________________________ Ali M. Rizvi 35 63 TPNC: 108. 64 TDW: 109-110. 65 TPNC: 109. 66 TPNC: 99. 67 Pensky, M. Introduction to TPNC: ix-x. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at La Trobe University, Melbourne and at the XXII World Congress of Philosophy, held in Seoul, Korea. Copyright © 2010 Minerva All rights are reserved, but fair and good faith use with full attribution may be made of this work for educational or scholarly purposes. Ali M. Rizvi teaches Philosophy and Critical Thinking at Universiti Brunei Darussalam, Brunei. Email: email@example.com