Philosophy

Prestige	Bias:	An	Obstacle	to	a	Just	Academic	Philosophy Forthcoming	in	Ergo Helen	De	Cruz Oxford	Brookes	University email@example.com Abstract This	paper	examines	the	role	of	prestige	bias	in	shaping	academic	philosophy,	with	a focus on its demographics. I argue that prestige bias exacerbates the structural underrepresentation	of	minorities	in	philosophy.	It	works	as	a	filter	against	(among others)	philosophers	of	color,	women	philosophers,	and	philosophers	of low	socioeconomic	status.	As	a	consequence	of	prestige	bias	our judgments	of	philosophical quality	become	distorted. I	outline	ways	in	which	prestige	bias	in	philosophy	can	be mitigated. 1.	Introduction In	spite	of	a	growing	realization	that	academic	philosophy	has	consistently	exhibited a lack of diversity, the profession remains largely white, middle-class, male, and Anglophone. Attempts to diversify philosophy, for instance, by introducing more minority	authors	in	syllabi,	have	met	with	mixed	success.	Thompson,	Adleberg,	Sims, and	Nahmias	(2016)	found	that	including	more	women	in	introductory	syllabi	did	not, on	its	own,	entice	more	women	to	major	in	philosophy.	Philosophy	students	already come to university with preconceived notions about what sort of person a philosopher	is:	University	of	Sydney	female	undergraduates,	for	example,	were	both less interested in	philosophy	and less self-confident	about their	philosophical skills compared	to	their	male	peers	(Baron,	Dougherty,	&	Miller	2015). 2 Several psychological factors might contribute to this lack of diversity, including implicit bias and stereotype threat (see Brownstein & Saul 2016 for a review).	One	underexplored	factor	is	prestige	bias,	which	is	widespread	in	academia. In	this	paper	"prestige	bias"	denotes	a	preference,	all	other	things	being	equal, for job candidates who have their PhD degree from prestigious institutions. It also denotes	a	preference	for	papers	in	journals	that	are	seen	as	prestigious. The	aim	of this	paper is to investigate	how	prestige	bias	contributes	to	and exacerbates the structural underrepresentation of minorities1	in philosophy, and how it amplifies inequalities in access to social and economic resources. Philosophers affected by prestige bias include, but are not limited to, women, African	American,	Hispanic,	and	other	philosophers	of	color	and	people	of	low	socioeconomic	status,	especially	first-generation	college	graduates.2 Section 2 will examine how prestige bias is at present unchallenged compared	to	other	forms	of	bias	in	philosophy.	Section	3	looks	at	the	forms	prestige bias takes in academia, and in philosophy specifically. In Section 4 I consider a common defense of relying on prestige: it may be a useful heuristic of quality. However,	as	I	will	argue	in	Section	5,	using	prestige	as	a	proxy	for	quality	effectively screens	out	philosophers	from	underrepresented	groups.	Because	of	these	patterns of exclusion, it is unlikely that prestige	would be a reliable	measure of quality. In Section	6,	I	outline	concrete	ways	in	which	we	can	mitigate	prestige	bias. 1 By minorities, I mean people who are underrepresented in philosophy, especially in comparison to their prevalence in the general population. For example,	women comprise 50.8% of the US population, but only between 21 and 26% of US philosophy faculty members are women (Schwitzgebel & Jennings 2017). To give another example, Latinx/Hispanics	make up 17.6% of the US population, but only 7.8% of APA	members in 2016 self-identified as such: http://c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.apaonline.org/resource/resmgr/data_on_profession/Memb er_Demo_Chart_FY2016_rev.pdf 2	I	will	assume	that	diversity	in	philosophy	is	a	good	thing,	but	I	will	not	argue	for	this	claim. 3 2.	Prestige	Bias:	An	Unchallenged	Phenomenon	in	Philosophy Philosophers	are	increasing	their	efforts	to	counter	sexism,	racism,	homophobia,	and other forms of bias that	marginalize and exclude	members of the profession. For example,	the	Gendered	Conference	Campaign3	was	launched	by	bloggers	at	Feminist Philosophers	to	highlight	male-only	conferences	in	philosophy.	The	anonymous	blog What is it Like to be a Woman in Philosophy4	provides testimonies of women in philosophy, including many accounts of gender and sexual harassment. The Job Candidate	Mentoring Program for	Women in Philosophy5	pairs up female	mentors and	mentees	as	a	way to	mitigate the	advantage in informal	mentoring that	many male	academic job	seekers	have.	The	Cocoon Job-Market	Mentoring	Project6	helps mentees	with	other special job	market challenges, such as first-generation college graduates and ethnic minorities. Dialogues on Disability 7 presents a series of interviews that recounts the lived experience of disabled philosophers, and draws attention to the systematic underrepresentation and exclusion of disabled philosophers in professional philosophy. The Directory of Philosophers from Underrepresented Groups in Philosophy (UP Directory)8	provides a database of philosophers	who	self-identity	with	a	number	of	demographics	(including	Black,	with a	disability,	woman,	other	gender,	and	Lesbian,	Gay,	Bisexual,	Transgender	or	Queer). The	purpose	of	this	website,	according	to	its	organizers,	is	"to	provide	an	easy-to-use resource	for	anyone	who	wants	to	learn	more	about	the	work	of	philosophers	who belong	to	underrepresented	groups	within	the	discipline."	There	are	committees	of 3	https://feministphilosophers.wordpress.com/gendered-conference-campaign/ 4	https://beingawomaninphilosophy.wordpress.com/ 5	https://jobmentoringforwomen.wordpress.com/ 6	https://sites.google.com/site/cocoonmentoringproject/ 7	See	e.g.,	this	interview	,	with	Brian	Montgomery. http://philosophycommons.typepad.com/disability_and_disadvanta/2017/10/dialogues-ondisability-shelley-tremain-interviews-brian-montgomery.html See	also https://www.academia.edu/5812065/Introducing_Feminist_Philosophy_of_Disability 8	http://www.theupdirectory.com 4 the	American	Philosophical	Association (APA) for	women,	Asian,	African-American, Hispanic, LGBTQ, and indigenous philosophers. This selection of efforts	within the profession is not meant to be exhaustive but to highlight the fact that some philosophers	care	about	inclusiveness	in	the	discipline. In	all	these	efforts	to	increase	the	discipline's	diversity,	prestige	bias	is	rarely discussed	or	directly	challenged.	This is	perhaps	due to the large	attention implicit bias has received, or active resistance against people who call out bias (see Kidd 2017 for an overview). Some authors, such as Bruya (2015), have offered methodological	criticisms	of	rankings	of	philosophical	programs,	in	particular	of	the Philosophical	Gourmet	Report	(PGR),	but	do	not	dispute	the	idea	of	ranking	per	se. Their	focus	is	on	how	the	rankings	could	be	improved,	but	they	do	not	seem	to	think there	is	anything	intrinsically	wrong	with	a	ranking	system.	However,	as	I	will	argue in the next sections, rankings reflect a bias for prestige, and prestige bias can exacerbate	inequalities	in	philosophy. 3.	Prestige	Bias	Is	Pervasive Academics in the	US tend to	be	politically left-leaning: the	majority	are in favor	of lessening	economic	and social inequalities (Gross	&	Simmons	2014).	However, this concern for equality of opportunity does not translate itself in faculty hiring decisions.	Social	inequality	in	academia	is	glaring.	A	main	criterion	for	hiring	appears to be the prestige of the department	where candidates complete their doctorate. (There	are	other	ways	in	which	prestige	bias	manifests	itself,	such	as	a	bias	in	favor of	prestigious	journals	or	for	what	are	perceived	as	"core	topics",	which	I	will	briefly discuss in Section 5.2.) In particular, there is a structural lack of upward social mobility in hiring practices: someone from a prestigious school may end up in a lower-ranked institution, but the reverse is unusual. In philosophy, as in other disciplines, comparably few high-prestige schools generate a disproportionate number	of	tenure-track	hires.	This	advantage	of	prestigious	institutions	also	appears in	graduate school	admissions, citations,	and research	assessments.	The	data I	will present in this section are correlational and do not, by themselves, establish that prestige is driving the hiring decisions. It might be that a common factor (e.g., 5 candidate quality) underlies the pattern. In Section 4 I will present evidence to suggest	that	prestige-independent	of	other	measures-is	driving	hiring	decisions. A systematic review of placement data of 19,000 academics in three disciplines, computer science, business, and history (Clauset, Arbesman, & Larremore	2015)	shows	that	candidates	graduating	from	prestigious	schools	have	a substantial	advantage	on	the	job	market:	only	25%	of	doctoral	schools	produced	71– 86%	of	all	tenure-track	faculty	in	these	fields.	Upward	social	mobility	was	especially rare: only 9–14% of faculty found jobs in institutions that were more prestigious than the one that awarded their doctorate. Herlihy-Mera (2015) observes similar hiring patterns in English departments in the	US from 1955 to 2012. High-ranking universities	supplied	lower-ranking	ones	with	plenty	of	candidates,	but	they	did	not reciprocally	hire	from	these	schools:	72%	of	all	hires	came	from	top-10	departments, but only 1% of hires in top-10 departments are PhD holders from lower-ranked schools. Moreover, the top-10 departments mostly hire candidates from similarly prestigious	universities.	Overall,	50%	of	appointments	in	this	field	came	from	just	3% of	institutions. Do	we	observe	similar	dynamics in	philosophy?	I	examined	hiring	data	from the past 5 years (2012–2017), obtained by Carolyn Dicey Jennings and colleagues through their Academic Placement	Data and Analysis project9	to find out	whether prestige	of	the	department	that	awarded	the	PhD	influences	hiring.	I	use	the	PGR	as a measure of prestige. In the PGR, a select number of judges (mostly from elite institutions in the US and the UK) rank philosophy departments with graduate programs in the English-speaking world "on the basis of the quality of faculty."10 Note that by its focus on Anglophone departments, the PGR does not include institutions	in	many	parts	of	the	world,	including	continental	Europe,	Latin	America, Asia,	and	Africa. In this	way, it	may further	exacerbate	discrimination	against	nonnative	speakers	of	English,	for	instance	caused	by	implicit	and	explicit	biases	against people	who	speak	with	a foreign	accent (see	Ayala	2015	for	discussion).	Also,	with the	exception	of	the	National	University	of	Singapore,	African	and	Asian	universities 9	http://placementdata.com/about/ 10	http://www.philosophicalgourmet.com/reportdesc.asp 6 in	English-speaking	countries	are	not	featured	in	the	PGR,	even	though	a	number	of them offer PhDs in Philosophy with English as the language of instruction, which further	strengthens	biases	against	people	of	color	in	philosophy. The PGR provides a good indicator of the relative prestige of philosophy faculties.	Its	top-ranked	schools	mostly	correspond	to	departments	that	also	do	well in	other	rankings	(e.g.,	Oxford,	Princeton,	Yale,	and	Harvard);	however,	there	are	a few schools, such as Rutgers and	Michigan,	which rank highly in the PGR but not globally. 11 To investigate placements in philosophy, Jennings et al. requested placement data from department chairs and placement officers.12	Their dataset contains a diverse set of unranked and ranked doctoral programs. Examples of unranked	participating	schools include	Baylor	University,	the	University	of	Reading, Boston	University,	Duquesne	University,	Emory	University,	and	Fordham	University. Examples of ranked participating schools include the University of Oxford, the Graduate Center of the City University of New York, Princeton University, the University	of	Toronto,	and	New	York	University.	If	philosophy	is	like	other	disciplines, we should observe the following patterns. First, one would expect that the topranked departments supply a very large number of tenure-track hires. Second, graduates from the most prestigious departments would be hired at all levels, whereas graduates from unranked schools tend to cluster at unranked or lowly ranked	institutions.	I	focused	on	tenure-track	hires	and	permanent	lectureships	(the equivalent junior faculty position in the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand) in the	dataset.	As I	wanted to examine the	effects	of doctoral prestige, I only	looked	at	doctoral	departments	in	countries	that	are	listed	in	the	PGR	(the	US, UK,	Canada,	New	Zealand,	and	Australia).	The	resulting	dataset	of	hires	from	the	last five years13	(2012–2017) contains 1260 tenure-track and	permanent lecturer hires, 1254 of which have information on both hiring department and origin of the 11	For	the	most	recent	overall	PGR	rankings,	see http://www.philosophicalgourmet.com/overall.asp 12	The	most	recent	hiring	data,	for	2012–2017,	are	available	upon	request	through	the	e-mail address	provided	on	the	website	http://placementdata.com/about/	or	can	be	consulted online. 13 At the time the list was provided to me, June 2017. The total number of tenure track/permanent	lectureship	hires	for	2017	was	not	known	then. 7 candidate's	doctorate. I first	examined	whether there is	a	correlation	between the mean PGR scores of the hiring and PhD granting department. This correlation is statistically	significant,	r(1258)	=	0.383,	p	<.001,	but	only	has	a	medium	effect	size, probably	owing	to	the	fact	that	highly-ranked	candidates	get	hired	at	departments	of different	ranks,	including	unranked	departments,	as	we	will	see	shortly.14 I then categorized both the placement and doctoral departments in the following	three	types:	(1)	not	PGR-ranked,	(2)	ranked	by	the	PGR,	outside	the	top	20, and	(3)	PGR-ranked	in	the	top	20. As	can	be	seen	in	Table	1,	most	hires	reported	in the Academic Placement Data and Analysis project are in unranked schools: 976 hires	out	of	a	total	of	1254,	i.e.,	77.8%.	This	is	unsurprising,	given	that	most	schools are unranked. In this time period, top-20 programs made a total of 97 tenure track/permanent lecturer hires, 7.7%	of the total number of hires. The data show that	people	from	unranked	schools	do	get	hired:	390	candidates	(31.1%	of	all	hires) were people	without PGR	pedigree.	However, candidates from the top-20 schools supplied	a	large	number	of	all	hires,	36.8%.	Among	the	97	tenure	track/permanent lecturer	hires	in	the	top-20	schools,	there	was	only	one	candidate	from	an	unranked school:	this	candidate	had	a	degree	from	the	Catholic	University	of	America	(not	PGR ranked), and was hired at the University of Notre Dame (PGR rank 17). The overwhelming	majority of hired candidates (90.7%, N=88) at the PGR top 20 had their	PhD	degree	from	another	PGR	top-20	school.	Figure	1	visualizes	this	dynamic: job	seekers	who	have	their	degrees	from	top-PGR	departments	get	jobs	at	all	ranks, including	at	unranked	departments,	but	the	PGR	top-20	institutions	mostly	hire	from similarly ranked departments. This is very much in line with findings from other disciplines: lower-ranked departments hire candidates from higher-ranked institutions, but highly-ranked departments do not regularly recruit among lowerranked	doctoral	schools.	The	situation	in	philosophy	appears	to	be	less	elitist	than	in English,	but is	still in line	with	a	preference	for	candidates	from	prestigious	schools (prestige	bias). 14	A	linear	regression	could	not	be	calculated	because	the	residuals	did	not	follow	a	normal distribution. 8 Placements in institutions outside	PGR Placements in institutions in the PGR outside top20 Placements in institutions in the PGR	top	20 Totals Candidates from unranked	schools 375 14 1 390 Candidates from PGR ranked schools outside top	20 328 67 8 403 Candidates from PGR top 20 ranked	schools 273 100 88 461 Totals 976 181 97 1254 Table	1.	Placement	of	candidates	from	doctoral	departments	outside	of	the PGR,	in	the	PGR	outside	the	top-20,	and	in	the	PGR	top-20	as	reported	in	the Academic	Placement	Data	and	Analysis	project. 9 Figure	1.	Streams	of	placements	from	three	different	kinds	of	PhD	granting institutions:	PGR	top	20	(purple),	PGR	top	21–50	(orange),	and	unranked	(green). This	lack	of	social	mobility	may	manifest	itself	before	students	enter	graduate school. Schwitzgebel (2011) found that philosophy graduate students enrolled at Berkeley and Princeton, two PGR top-20 institutions that published the undergraduate pedigree of their graduate students, mainly hail from other PGRranked	universities.	Of the	121	graduate	student	profiles	he	examined,	nearly	30% came from just eight universities.	Only three of the universities from	which these graduate	students	got	their	undergraduate	degree	were	absent	from	the	top	100	of the	US	News	and	World	Report	rankings,	but	they	were	ranked	well	for	philosophy (e.g.,	Rutgers).	I	looked	at	a	more	recent	sample,	namely	the	42	PhD	students	listed at the New York University philosophy department who were enrolled in 2017,15 which is currently ranked 1 in the PGR. Of these, 40 had their undergraduate or master's	listed	on	the	website	or	their	personal	homepage.	The	majority	of	current NYU	PhD students in philosophy (75%)	have their earlier degree from	PGR-ranked departments. These schools include Oxford (32.5%, PGR rank 2), Princeton (7.5%, PGR	rank	3),	and	Berkeley	(7.5%,	PGR	rank	11).	The	unranked	departments	included foreign schools such	as	Humboldt	University	of	Berlin,	Monash	University, and the University of Cape Town. More systematic research would need to be done to confirm the role of undergraduate departmental prestige to graduate admissions, but	these	findings	indicate	an	influence. Prestige bias also plays a role in later career development, such as the evaluation of grant applications and REF (Research Excellence Framework) assessments.	The	REF	is	intended	to	measure	the	quality	of	research	outputs	(papers, monographs, etc.) by British faculty members, in order to produce rankings of departments	by	discipline,	and	to	allocate	future	funding	for	research.	Publications are	awarded	between	one	and	four	stars,	from	unclassified	to	world-leading.	There 15	http://philosophy.fas.nyu.edu/page/students 10 are no hard criteria or metrics for the number of stars to award. Because the researchers	whose	work	is	reviewed	are	not	anonymous	and	evaluations	of	research are	to	some	extent	subjective,	evaluations	can	become	biased.	Using	data	that	are available	in	the	public	domain,	Dix	(2016)	found	significant	bias	in	evaluations	for	the REF:	prestigious,	research-focused	institutions,	mostly	from	the	Russell	Group	(which are	regarded	as	the	most	prestigious	universities),	benefit	from	prestige	bias	at	the expense of more teaching-focused, newer universities (the so-called post-92 universities).	As	Dix	writes, outputs	that	would	appear	equivalent	based	on	external	citations	are	scored far more highly if it comes from a known 'good' institution. In terms of money, it suggests that new	universities	may	be awarded	up to two thirds less	research	funding	than	might	have	received	under	a	blind	system.	(2016) 4.	Prestige	as	a	Measure	of	Quality One reason for the correlational data presented in the previous section	might be that	prestige	tracks	quality:	candidates	who	attend	prestigious	schools	could	be	on average	of	higher	quality,	and	job	hires	track	this	quality,	rather	than	prestige	per	se. Perhaps because there would be a correlation between prestige and quality, departments	could	justifiably	use	the	former	as	an	indicator	for	the	latter. In	order for	prestige	to	be	a	useful	indicator	of	quality,	two	conditions	need	to	be	met:	first,	it needs	to	be	the	case	that	prestige	is	a	reliable	indicator	of	philosophical	talent,	and second,	everyone	of	equal	merit	should	have	equal	access	to	prestige	(otherwise	we might be overlooking meritorious candidates who might not have had access to prestigious schools). In this section, I argue that the first condition is not	met, by showing that it is sometimes the case that there are equally good candidates (on measures	other than	quality),	where the	prestigious	candidate is	more likely to	be preferred. In Section 5, I will argue against the second condition: prestige bias disadvantages	some	groups	of	philosophers	more	than	others. To	examine	how,	if	at	all,	prestige	might	measure	quality,	it	is	useful	to	clarify what	quality	might	mean.	At	least	at	the	stage	of	hiring	junior	candidates,	quality	is not expertise or a proven track record of excellence. If it were, we	would expect more seasoned candidates with a larger number of publications to have greater 11 success	on the job	market. But in philosophy	departments in the	US, like in other disciplines,	there is	a	preference	for	hiring	relatively inexperienced	candidates	who have just received their PhD or are still in the All But Dissertation (ABD) stage. Among philosophers who obtained their PhDs between 2012 and 2014 and who managed	to	obtain	tenure-track	positions,	42%	received	their	offer	in	the	year	they graduated (Jennings et al. 2015). More recent placement data (Jennings, Cobb, Kallens,	&	Kyrilov	2017)	reveal	that	the	probability	of	obtaining	a	permanent	position decreases	over	time.	There	is	a	1	in	5	chance	to	be	hired	while	ABD	to	first	year	of graduation,	1	in	8	in	the	second	and	third	year	after	graduation,	dropping	steadily	to 1 in	23	seven	years	after	graduation.	While these figures	do	not take into	account baseline	probability	rates	(people	who	did	not	get	a	job	right	away	might	have	been weaker candidates), it indicates that measures of established teaching excellence and	publication	record	only	play	a	modest	role	(at	best)	in	hiring	decisions. Given that students increasingly publish during their graduate studies, one might	argue	that	a	successful	track	record	of	papers	has	already	been	established	by the time candidates go on the	market. Unfortunately, the	most recent placement data (Jennings et al. 2017) do not list the number of publications per candidate. Earlier	calculations for	hiring in	2012 indicate	that	candidates	hired in tenure	track positions	have	a	median	of	2	publications:	people	from	unranked	departments	have more publications than people from ranked departments.16	The correlation was negative,	but	small	(r	=	-.17):	the	lower	the	rank	of	the	PhD	granting	institution,	the more	papers	in	peer-reviewed	journals	a	candidate	was	likely	to	have	(the	effect	size here	is	very	modest	so	we	cannot	draw	any	firm	conclusions	at	this	point). At the stage	of being	hired in a tenure track position, quality	might reflect promise or potential. A search committee member might reason as follows "a candidate	with	a	PhD	from	a	prestigious	university	is	more	likely	to	develop	a	quality track record", that is, is a	more promising candidate. This quest for potential and promise might be explained by a widespread belief in innate ability among professional philosophers. Leslie, Cimpian, Meyer, and Freeland (2015) surveyed academics	from	30	disciplines	in	the	US	to	examine	whether	belief	in	a	field-specific 16	http://philosophysmoker.blogspot.co.uk/2012/04/to-get-job-in-philosophy.html 12 aptitude or talent could explain the underrepresentation of women and AfricanAmericans.	Of the	examined	disciplines in the	social sciences	and	humanities (e.g., social	sciences,	anthropology,	and	linguistics),	philosophy	showed	the	highest	belief in	field-specific	ability,	measured	by	agreement	to	the	following	statement:	"Being	a top scholar in [philosophy] requires a special aptitude that just can't be taught." Participating	philosophers	also	tended	to	believe	that	this	attitude	was	prevalent	in their discipline. Such beliefs may play a role in hiring decisions, by looking for potential	that	indicates	a	special	aptitude	for	philosophy,	even	if	that	aptitude	is	not yet	realized	in	the	form	of	an	established	publication	record. However, it is hard to	measure potential, or to test	whether	measures for quality in terms of potential are reliable (see also Bright, 2017). A large body of literature	from	a	variety	of	job	sectors,	including	academic	and	non-academic	fields (see Kuncel, Klieger, Connelly, & Ones 2013 for a meta-analysis), suggests that holistically	measuring	quality from job	application	materials and interviews (rather than more quantitative measures) tends to produce poor hiring decisions. Once search	committees	have	made	a	first	cut	based	on	minimum	requirements	(e.g.,	PhD in	philosophy,	right	area	of	specialization),	predicting	how	well	someone	will	fare	in their	future	job	based	on	application	materials	is	notably	difficult.	For	instance,	70– 80% of the variation in job performance of people hired at senior levels in management	is	unpredictable	at	the	hiring	stage	(Highhouse	2008). In retrospect, it is also hard to ascertain whether the hiring decision was correct.	For instance,	when	potential is	not	realized,	we	do	not	know	whether it is because	a	candidate's	quality	has	changed	over	time,	or	whether	we	were	mistaken about them. It is also difficult to rely on quality evaluations in terms of potential, because	they	can	become	a	self-fulfilling	prophecy.	Several	years	after	hiring,	once	a candidate has built up a significant publication record and national or even international	reputation,	it	is	possible	to	get	some	sense	of	whether	the	candidate's job	performance	is	good	(reflecting	some	form	of	quality).	But	it	is	unsurprising	that job applicants hired at research-intensive universities	would do	well several years down	the line.	Take	Chris	and	Daryl,	who	both	apply	for	a	position	at	a	prestigious research-intensive	university.	Chris	is	hired;	Daryl	fails	to	land	a	tenure-track	position in	the	same	year.	Chris	obtains	a	2-2	position	that	allows	for	pre-tenure	sabbaticals 13 and research leave.	Chris	has research support (e.g., funding for conference travel and books). The university regularly hosts major events, including lecture series, colloquia,	and	conferences,	featuring	renowned	and	up-and-coming	visiting	speakers. This	helps	Chris	get	a	good	sense	of the latest topics	of interest in their	discipline, and helps them to build out an international network. Daryl obtains a one-year Visiting	Assistant	Professor	position	at	a teaching-intensive school,	having to teach eight	courses	per	year,	followed	by	a	string	of	other	short-term	positions,	including adjunctships.	Daryl lacks funding for conferences or books, office space, and even reliable library access.	Daryl attempts to improve their publication record, but the stresses	of	successive	job	applications	and	relocations	eat	away	at	their	productivity. Five years further, Chris is on course to achieve tenure with an impressive publication	record,	while	Daryl	is	struggling,	a	clear	instance	of	the	Matthew	effect. The	Matthew	effect	describes	any	form	of	cumulative	advantage	(whether	economic or cultural) that accrues over time, whereby those rich in resources tend to accumulate advantages more easily, and those poor in resources face increasing difficulties, thus amplifying disparities between resource-rich and resource-poor individuals. The related concept of Matthew mechanism (Bask & Bask 2015) describes the	processes through	which this	widening	gap	occurs.	Researchers	who obtain	a	tenure-track	position	while	ABD	or	freshly	minted	PhD	have	more	resources (e.g., in terms of academic support) and fewer stressors (e.g., low pay, frequent moves),	compared	to	academics	who	do	not	land	such	positions	immediately. Moreover, the few studies that have compared doctoral prestige to other measures	(e.g.,	how	well	the	candidate	published	during	graduate	school,	how	much their	work	was	cited,	and	how	quickly	they	submitted	their	PhD	dissertation)	found that prestige had only a small effect on future productivity, but a large effect on placement	(see,	for	example,	Baldi	1995	for	a	study	among	sociologists).	Given	that US academic institutions often have ballpark figures for research productivity that are required for tenure, future productivity is an important consideration for whether	or	not	someone	would	be	a	successful	hire	at	a	tenure	track	job.17 17	For example, at Florida State University, a philosopher who comes up for tenure and promotion to Associate Professor would need something in the order of five refereed articles	plus	two	further	units,	or	a	published	book	and	two	articles,	all	of	sufficient	quality 14 Taken	together,	this	suggests	that	it	is	hard	to	assess	future	academic	success at	the	stage	of	hiring,	that	it	is	difficult	to	check	whether	assessments	on	the	basis	of candidate	quality	are	correct	or	a	self-fulfilling	prophecy	due	to	the	Matthew	effect and	mechanism, and that prestige is only a modest predictor of future academic productivity.	In	the	light	of	this,	it	would	seem	prudent	not	to	rely	unreflectively	on prestige as a measure of quality. Yet, as we have seen, philosophers do rely on prestige in	hiring	decisions.	They	do	so	because it	provides	an	easy	way to	whittle down	a large	pile	of	applications to	a	more	manageable	one.	Typical job	applicant dossiers in the US contain a cover letter, research statement (sometimes also a dissertation abstract), CV, teaching statement, and other evidence of teaching competence	(such	as	evaluations	and	syllabi),	a	writing	sample,	and	three	letters	of reference. In the	UK, the file tends to be thinner, consisting of a cover letter, CV, writing	sample,	and	contact	details	of	reference	writers	(whose	letters	are	typically only solicited at the shortlisting stage). Substantial dossiers	made sense	when the number	of	applicants	for	any	tenure	track	job	was	modest	by	today's	standards.	At present,	with	hundreds	of	applications	for	most	openings,	it	is	impossible	for	search committee members to read all this on top of regular teaching, research, and administrative duties (Herlihy-Mera 2015: 88). Using the prestige of the doctoral granting	department	has	become	a	practical	shortcut.	As	Marinoff	explains	the	hiring procedure	at	City	College,	New	York	(an	unranked	department): How did we prune our field from 637 to 27? An important selection criterion	was holding a Ph.D. from	a good	university.	Members of our department earned their Ph.D.s at Columbia, Harvard, Oxford, and University	of	London.	Additionally,	City	College	is	known	as	the	"Harvard of the Proletariat," with distinguished alumni that include nine Nobel and beyond the candidate's PhD dissertation. See here: http://philosophy.fsu.edu/sites/g/files/imported/storage/original/application/75dc0cd3f638 61dc03c87575de5c7945.pdf.	Many	other	institutions	have	quantitative	norms,	in	addition	to qualitative	norms	(i.e.,	the	papers	or	books	need	to	be	of	sufficient	quality,	and	there	need to	be	at	least	n	of	them,	with	n	varying	per	institution). 15 Laureates,	more	than	any	other	public	institution	in	America.	Our	faculty members	are	expected	to	live	up	to	this	legacy.	(2009) Quantitative evidence suggests that the prestige of the PhD granting department plays a role in hiring decisions independent of other qualities a candidate	might	have.	Bedeian,	Cavazos,	Hunt, and Jauch (2010) looked	at a large sample	of	graduate	placements in	management	and	found	that	the	prestige	of	the doctoral	department interacted	with	perceived	quality	of	publications.	Early	career graduates from top departments tended to get more prestigious initial appointments compared to graduates from lower-ranked institutions with equally strong	publication	records	who	entered	the	job	market.	This	does	not	indicate	that there	is	no	correlation	between	prestige	and	quality,	but	it	does	show	that	in	some cases, equally good candidates were treated unequally due to prestige factors.18 Headworth and Freese (2016) looked at candidate placement in sociology, taking into	account	both	the	prestige	of	the journals	the job	candidates	published in,	and the	awards	they	won.	After	controlling	for	these	two	factors,	Headworth	and	Freese still	found an	enormous	association	between	PhD institution	and	placement in the	set of jobs	we	consider.	The	over	40%	of	doctorates	who	receive their	degrees from schools in the lowest-prestige tier are entirely absent from the	most prestigious sociology research jobs and virtually absent even from our broader	set	of	all	rated	jobs.	(2016:	1275–1276) The first	claim is in line	with	what	we	have	seen for	philosophy,	where	candidates from the lowest-prestige universities are absent in the top departments. But the second	claim	does	not	hold true for	philosophy:	people from	unranked	schools	do land	tenure-track	jobs.	Headworth	and	Freese	(2016)	think	that	prestige	of	the	PhD granting university is used as a proxy for quality, trumping factors such as publications	in	prestigious	journals	and	winning	prestigious	awards. Prestige	is	an	indicator	of	social	and	cultural	capital,	and	might	be	valued	for indicating these. By hiring a candidate from a prestigious institution, the hiring 18	Thank	you	to	an	anonymous	referee	for	raising	this	point. 16 committee	and	faculty	might	hope	to	get	the	prestige	to	rub	off	on	them.	Building upon	conceptual	analysis	by	Bourdieu	(1986),19	Burris	(2004)	investigated	prestige	in academia as a form of social capital, focusing on sociology, history, and political science.	Bourdieu	(1986;	1988)	drew	a	distinction	between	economic,	cultural,	and social capital. Economic capital represents one's economic resources (such as property	rights	and	money).	Cultural	capital	consists	of	one's	cultural	resources,	such as dispositions (etiquette, tastes that are deemed appropriate), books and other sources of knowledge, and formal educational qualifications. Social capital represents	one's	social	network	and	relationships,	often	in	the	form	of	membership of a particular social circle-the	more exclusive and	desirable the circle, the	more valuable	one's	social	capital.	The	latter	form	of	capital	is	concretely	expressed	in	the form	of	interpersonal	relationships,	such	as	friendships,	marriages,	and	networks.	In the	case	of	academia,	this	can	be	a	PhD	from	a	prestigious	university,	being	hired	at a prestigious university, or being part of a network of people at prestigious institutions.	People	may	try	to	convert	one	form	of	capital	into	another.	For	example, someone	can	try	to	put	their	education	(cultural	capital)	to	acquire	a	well-paying	job (resulting	in	economic	capital),	or	someone	with	money	but	no	social	standing	might want to	marry into a	more established family	with high social but little economic capital (e.g., impoverished	nobility). In spite	of	being	perhaps the least tangible	of these capitals, social capital is the most resistant to change. It is protected by exclusive	club	memberships.	People	who	try	to	get into	exclusive	social	groups	are derisively referred to	as	upstarts	or social climbers.	The fact that social	mobility in academia	is	mainly	downward,	not	upward	can	be	explained	in	terms	of	Bourdieu's (1986) distinction between the types of capital. Lesser-ranked departments are "eager to exchange their economic capital (faculty positions and salaries) for the increment in prestige they hope to gain by hiring the graduate of a highly ranked department" (Burris 2004: 245). The net result is that prestige hierarchies are maintained,	as	highly-ranked	department	graduates	quasi-monopolize	employment. It	can	explain	why	rankings	remain	remarkably	stable	even	as	faculty	members	move department	or	retire.	If	a	department	were	to	lose	a	large	number	of	its	prominent 19	See	also	Bourdieu's	Homo	Academicus	(1988),	a	study	of	the	forms	of	social	and	cultural capital	in	French	academia. 17 faculty	members	in	a	short	period	of	time,	this	might	result	in	a	shift	in	social	capital and thus affect the ranking. Since faculty moves are limited, rankings will be maintained because institutional networks (e.g., who hires from whom) tend to transcend individual faculty	members.	Prestige	may	also	be	an indicator	of	cultural capital,	as	faculty	at	top	departments	tend	to	have	a	better	feel	for	the	"rules	of	the game",	for	instance,	by	submitting	more	to	top	journals	and	working	more	on	"core topics" (see Section 5.2 for preliminary empirical evidence to support this claim). Such	a	sensibility for the	rules	of the	game is	a	direct result	of	moving in the	right social	circles,	and	thus	of	social	capital. This pattern can also be observed in philosophy, where, as we saw, highprestige departments tend to hire primarily from other departments with similar high	PGR	rankings	(see	Figure	1).	While	these	data	do	not,	by	themselves,	establish causation, it	would	be very	odd that	only	one candidate from	an	unranked school was	deemed	of	good	enough	quality	to	be	hired	by	a	top-20	department.	This	is	at least suggestive of the fact that search committees use departmental prestige (independent of other qualities,	which	may also play a role in varying degrees) to guide their hiring decisions. How	much it guides hiring decisions depends on the schools	and	what	they	look	for	in	candidates.	For	example,	teaching-focused	schools will	often	request	more	extensive	teaching	dossiers	and	letters	of	recommendation, teaching	awards,	and	other	forms	of	evidence	that	speak	to	a	candidate's	qualities	in the classroom, and put less weight on prestige. For research-intensive schools, teaching usually plays a far less prominent role, and prestige becomes more important	(see,	e.g.,	Kelsky	2015:	Chapters	26	and	27,	for	comparisons).	To	sum	up, my analysis in this section is not intended to show that there is no correlation whatsoever	between	prestige	and	quality-the	data	do	not	allow	one	to	draw	such	a strong conclusion. What they do show is that prestige guides hiring decisions independently of other features a candidate	might have, and that the correlation between	prestige	and	quality	is	unreliable. 5.	Prestige	Bias	Disproportionately	Affects	Minorities	in	Philosophy 18 Having	shown	that	prestige	is	not	a	reliable	measure	of	quality, I	will	now	examine whether	everyone	has	equal	access	to	it	by	looking	at	the	effects	of	prestige	bias	on minorities in philosophy. Given that rankings of departments (in philosophy and other fields) express social capital, one would expect that such departments are populated	by	people	who	have	the	economic,	cultural,	and	social	capital	to	be	part of	these	networks.	This	leads	to	an	underrepresentation	of	people	who	are	less	well networked	in	academia. 5.1.	Prestige	Bias	Leads	to	an	Underrepresentation	of	Ethnic	Minorities	and	People of	Low	Socio-Economic	Status	in	Philosophy Since	the	prestige	of	one's	undergraduate	school	influences	one's	chances	of	getting into	a	prestigious	graduate	school,	it	is	worthwhile	examining	why	ethnic	minorities, including	African	American and	Asian	American students, are underrepresented at most	American	elite	institutions.	Admission	systems	tend	to	privilege	wealthy	white applicants.	For	instance,	Harvard,	Yale,	Stanford,	Princeton,	and	Columbia,	which	are in	the	PGR	top	20,	uphold	the	practice	of	legacy	preferences.	Legacy	preferences	are preferential admissions for the children of alumni. Such practices were originally designed	to	keep	Jewish	students	out.	As	Karabel	(2005)	details,	a	focus	on	academic performance led to an increase of admissions of Jewish students of Eastern European	descent	in	the	early	20th	century.	To	solve	this	"Jewish	problem,"	(Karabel 2005:	130)	and	to	prevent	a	"WASP	flight"	(2005:	134)	that	would	be	prompted	by what was perceived as an unacceptable increase of non-Christian immigrants, a number	of	prestigious	universities	created	a	new	admission	system	based	on	legacy preferences and subjective evaluations of character and personality. "By emphasizing the inherently subjective character of admission decisions, the new system	of	selection	left	the	elite	colleges	free	to	adapt	to	changing	circumstances	by admitting-and	rejecting-pretty	much	whomever	they	wished"	(Karabel	2005:	135). As a result, the	background	of freshmen in	universities such	as	Harvard, Yale, and Princeton narrowed quickly to include mostly white, wealthy students of WASP backgrounds. While	this	system	was	originally	designed	to	keep	Jewish	students	out,	it	now continues	to	exclude	Asian	and	Asian	American	students.	Since	the	1980s,	empirical 19 evidence consistently shows that Asian Americans outperform all other ethnicity categories in SAT scores	and	other relevant	measures	of academic	achievement, a difference	which	seems	due	to	greater	academic	effort	(see,	e.g.,	Hsin	&	Xi	2014;	Sue &	Okazaki	1990;	Zhou	&	Lee	2014).	In	spite	of	this,	the	odds	of	admission	for	Asian Americans in	prestigious	US	universities are	nearly	30% lower than those	of	white students. Legacy students are about twice as likely to be accepted as non-legacy students	in	prestigious	institutions	(Espenshade,	Chung,	&	Walling	2004).	Therefore, some	authors	(e.g.,	Mandery	2014)	have	argued	that	legacy	preferences	perpetuate injustice	and	should	be	discontinued. Other data demonstrate that admission to undergraduate elite institutions (and,	by	extension,	graduate	school	admission	and	future	professional	success)	is	not purely a	matter of	merit and talent. In 2007, about 15% of freshmen enrolled at highly selective US colleges were white teenagers who failed to meet their institutions' minimum admissions standards: some secured a place as athletes; others	gained	admission	due	to	connections	to	people	important	for	the	institutions, in	particular	donors,	faculty	members,	administrators,	and	politicians	(Schmidt	2007). But even if athlete studentships and preferential treatment due to social capital	were	to	end,	and	admissions	were	to	be	purely	based	on	measurable	criteria, minorities	would	still	be	affected	by	factors	outside	of	their	control.	The	problem	is not so much the cost of a tertiary education, since there are student loans and scholarships. Rather, gaining admission to a	prestigious	university already requires significant advantages, such as access to good primary and secondary education (which,	in	turn,	is	sensitive	to	house	prices,	or	can	be	bought	in	the	form	of	private education	if	no	satisfactory	public	school	is	nearby),	and	access	to	private	tutors	and other forms of additional support. As Giubilini and Minerva (in press) observe, physiological	factors	involved	in	cognitive	development	are	highly	sensitive	to	socioeconomic status,	with frequent developmental delays in the frontal and temporal lobes of the	most economically disadvantaged children (Hair, Hanson,	Wolfe, and Pollak 2015). Even if children of low socio-economic status overcome all these hurdles and do well academically, they are still less likely to end up in elite undergraduate	and	graduate	institutions,	because	of	lack	of	cultural	capital:	in	their cultural milieus there is less awareness of the importance of prestige.	While in a 20 middle-class	family,	the	concern	for	a	child	on	the	cusp	of	higher	education	would	be to	get	into	a	"good"	school,	concerns	in	working-class	families	are	different:	getting into university at all is already regarded as an accomplishment. As the African American philosopher Tommie Shelby (cited in Phillip 2008) observes, "I went to Florida	A&M	by chance .... I'm	a first generation college student, so	no	one in	my family had really gone and knew the ropes." The same holds true for graduate school: a student from a working-class background does not have the same awareness	of	the	importance	of	the	prestige	of	a	graduate	school	as	a	student	from a	middle-class	background. Taking together these cultural differences between students from the middle-class and those from lower socio-economic background, and the extra hurdles that	especially first-generation	college	students face, it is	unsurprising that only	14%	of	students	in	US	prestigious	schools	come	from	the	lowest	socio-economic background	(Walton	Radford	2013).	Given	the	distribution	of	wealth in	the	US	and the	UK, those students	are	disproportionally likely to	be	people	of color, including African Americans in the US and Blacks/Caribbeans in the UK. The wealth gap between	white and African-American and	Hispanic people has increased after the 2008	recession,	with	whites	having	12.9	times	as	much	as	African-Americans	in	net worth,	and	10.3	times	as	much	as	Hispanics	in	2013	(Kochhar	&	Fry	2014).	In	the	UK, a	large-scale	survey	by	the	Office	for	National	Statistics	estimated	mean	net	wealth for	white	households	in	2014	at	GBP	228,100,	compared	to	GBP	24,700	for	Blacks	of Caribbean	ancestry	and	GBP	15,300	for	Blacks	of	African	ancestry.20 Given that students from	high-prestige schools	dominate the job	market,	we are	now	in	a	position	to	explain	why,	for	example,	black	philosophers,	who	are	more likely to come from low socio-economic backgrounds compared to whites, are underrepresented	in	academic	philosophy.	Botts,	Bright,	Cherry,	Mallarangeng,	and Spencer (2014)	calculated	that	only	about	1.32%	of	philosophers	at	US	universities (at	all	professional	ranks,	including	graduate	students)	are	black.	Since	about	12.3% of the US population is black, this is a significant underrepresentation. In the UK 20https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/personalandhouseholdfinances /incomeandwealth/adhocs/005233wealthbyhouseholdcharacteristicsforlondonjuly2012toju ne2014 21 there	are	about	1.5%	students	who	are	of	Caribbean	heritage,	but	only	0.5%	attend Russell	Group	universities.	Black	Africans	(3%	of	the	UK	population)	make	up	4.4%	of total domestic students,21	but comprise just 2.1% of students attending Russell Group universities (Barn 2014). Barn links this differential access to prestigious graduate	degrees	to	the	underrepresentation	of	Black	academics: In an increasingly competitive academic job	market, one's pedigree in the form of university background is highly important, with qualifications from elite universities serving as Pavlovian indicators of academic	capability.	It	seems	that	young	black	British	people	are	far	less likely	to	attend	the	UK's	most	selective	universities,	a	factor	which	could be	making	it	harder	to	get	academic	jobs.	(2014) Looking	at	publications	in	prestigious	journals,	which	are	important	for	hiring, tenure	decisions,	promotions,	and	senior	offers,	we	also	see	how	prestige	filters	out ethnic minorities in philosophy. If African American philosophers published proportional	to	their	numbers in	the	top	general journals,	one	would	expect	them to have authored about 1.3%	of the contributions. However, Bright (2016) found that in	a list	of	15	high-prestige	philosophy journals (which included	both	general and specialist periodicals) black philosophers only authored 0.28% of articles (including	book	reviews),	and	only	0.19%	of	research	papers (i.e.,	15	papers) from 2003	to	2012.	The	low	representation	of	black	philosophers	in	the	most	prestigious philosophy	journals	thus	also	has	a	negative	influence	on	their	further	chances	for career	advancement. 5.2.	Prestige	Bias Leads to	Testimonial Smothering	and	Silencing	of	Philosophical Work	outside	the	Dominant	Traditions Prestige	bias	can	result in	testimonial	silencing	(terminology	from	Dotson	2011)	for work in philosophical traditions that is considered fringe or optional, such as philosophy	of	race	and	non-western	philosophy. In	testimonial	silencing	people	are 21	This	also	includes	overseas	African	students.	Statistics	do	not	give	a	breakdown	in	terms	of domestic	versus	international	black	students. 22 silenced	and	not	taken	seriously	as	testifiers	as	a	result	of	their	group	membership. There are at least two forms of testimonial silencing: testimonial quieting and testimonial smothering. As speakers, we have a certain vulnerability toward our audience. We cannot force others to listen to what we have to say, so any communicative	act	requires	some	cooperation	on	the	part	of	listeners.	They	need	to be	both	willing	and	capable	to	receive	testimony.	Testimonial	quieting	occurs	when one	fails	to	recognize	the	speaker	as	a	knower,	which	damages	a	speaker's	agency. Search	committee	members	who	make	a	first	cut	of	job	applications	on	the	basis	of the	prestige	of the	doctoral	department	are	engaged in testimonial	quieting. They systematically	ignore	the	testimony	of	applicants	who	lack	the	required	social	capital. It	is	an	injustice	that	the	potential	audience	is	not	even	willing	to	look	at	the	merits of a candidate, in terms of publication record, teaching experience, and other measures	merely	because	she	does	not	come	from	the	right	school. Testimonial smothering occurs	when a speaker notices that an audience is unwilling	or	unable	to	take	up	her	testimony	and	so	"smothers"	her	own	testimony. She	will	then	try	to	insure	that	"the	testimony	contains	only	content	for	which	one's audience demonstrates testimonial competence" (Dotson 2011: 244). When graduate	students	and	other	jobseekers	are	unable	to	secure	a	place	at	a	prestigious graduate school, they	might try to	compensate for this	by	changing their topics	of work to fit more prestigious fields, in order to get into journals that are highly prestigious. The	most	prestigious	journals	in	philosophy	tend	to	be	general	journals	that in	principle	accept	a	wide	range	of	papers	from	different	subdisciplines.	For	instance, Colyvan's22	list of (what he thinks philosophers would consider to be) the best journals are	Australasian Journal	of	Philosophy, Journal of	Philosophy,	Mind,	Noûs, Philosophy	and	Phenomenological	Research,	Philosophical	Review,	and	Philosophical Studies.	This	is	in	line	with	other	lists,	such	as	Leiter's	2015	poll	of	the	top-20	general philosophy journals. The top 5 in this poll consists of Philosophical Review,	Noûs, 22	http://www.colyvan.com/journals.html 23 Journal of Philosophy, Mind, and Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.23 Brooks's	journal	rankings	for	philosophy	has	the	same	five	journals,24	and	adds	Ethics and Philosophical Quarterly as top-rated journals. While these journals are not necessarily the highest in quality, they are regarded as the	most prestigious. The journals	avow	themselves	generalist,	but in	practice they tend	to	publish	a	narrow range of specializations, with a heavy focus on analytic philosophy of language, epistemology, metaphysics, and philosophy of mind, the so-called "Lemming" subdisciplines. This leaves many areas of philosophy underrepresented in these journals. Consider Asian philosophy, which offers a large and diverse number of traditions, including Chinese and Indian philosophies. Olberding (2016) looked at abstracts in general philosophy journals, many of which were high-prestige, for keywords that one can expect to frequently occur in papers in Asian philosophy: "Confucian",	"Buddhist",	"Daoist",	and	"Indian."	For	each	of	these	journals,	articles in Asian philosophy were vanishingly rare. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research	was	the	most	fruitful	venue,	with	19	papers	in	Asian	philosophy	appearing in the total time period studied (1940–2014). However, the interest in Asian philosophy	had	tapered	off	in	this	journal	as	the	last	article	appeared	in	1993.	Noûs does	not	have	a	single	article	in	Asian	philosophy	in	the	entire	period	that	was	under study	(1967–2013).	On	the	whole,	the	representation	of	Asian	philosophy	in	general journals	has	flatlined	over	the	years.	Although	there	is	an	increasing	body	of	work	in Asian	philosophy	available	to	English-speaking	scholars,	with	journals	such	as	Journal of Chinese Philosophy, Journal of Indian Philosophy, and Dao: A Journal of Comparative	Philosophy, this	research	does	not	seem	to	find its	way into	the	most prestigious	venues. To	examine	whether	area	of specialization	might	discourage	submissions to the	most prestigious journals, I conducted a survey among academic philosophers (N=251,	76.9%	men,	see	appendix	for	the	questions	and	more	details	on	the	survey). I asked respondents if they had submitted to one	of the top-5 general journals in 23	http://leiterreports.typepad.com/blog/2015/09/the-top-20-general-philosophy-journals2015.html 24	http://the-brooks-blog.blogspot.co.uk/2011/09/journal-rankings-for-philosophy_29.html 24 philosophy	over	the	past	12	months.25	The	majority	of	respondents	(68%)	said	they did	not	submit	anything	to	these	journals	during	this	period. Philosophers who worked in Lemming subdisciplines (N = 109) submitted about twice as much to the top-5 journals (Mean=.81, SD=1.350), compared to scholars	who	worked	outside	of	these	fields	(N	=	141)	(Mean=.45,	SD=.906).	This	was a statistically significant difference, following an independent-samples t-test, t(179.5)=2.35, p=.02 (two-tailed), albeit	with a small effect size, Cohen's d = 0.31. There	was	no	statistically	significant	difference	in	how	much	Lemmings	submitted	to any refereed journal compared to non-Lemmings, t(249)=1.16, p=.248 (NS). Moreover,	non-Lemmings	submitted	more	papers	to	specialist	journals	(Mean	=	1.86, SD	=	1.56)	than	Lemmings	(Mean	=	1.07,	SD=1.39),	t(247)=4.1,	p	<	.01,	Cohen's	d	= 0.53,	a	medium	effect	size.	These	data	suggest	that	Lemmings	submit	more	of	their work	to	the	top-5	generalist	journals,	and	people	outside	of	Lemming	subdisciplines submit	more	of	their	work	to	specialist	journals.	A	possible	reason,	suggested	by	the open responses to the question of why participants do not submit to the top prestige	journals,	is	that	they	are	perceived	as	not	welcoming	to	work	outside	of	the Lemming subdisciplines. A number of respondents gave as reason that their	work would	not	fit	in	these	journals,	for	example: "My perception is that the areas in which I work (Continental Philosophy, Philosophy of Race, Aesthetics) would not be taken seriously	by	these	venues.	Why	waste	time?" "Many	people	I'd like	to	read	my	papers	do	not	typically	read	those journals." "I do interdisciplinary work that is more likely to be read by the audience	I'm	most	interested	in	in	specialty	journals." In	this	way,	the	prestige	of	journals	leads	to	testimonial	smothering. 25	Based on the aforementioned lists, I included the following five journals: Philosophical Review,	Mind,	Journal	of	Philosophy,	Noûs,	Philosophy	and	Phenomenological	Research. 25 5.3. Prestige Bias Leads to an Underrepresentation of Women in Prestigious Journals Does	prestige	bias	play	a	role	in	the	underrepresentation	of	women	in	philosophy? The	picture	here is less clear-cut than for low socio-economic status	philosophers, philosophers from ethnic minorities, and philosophers working in non-dominant subdisciplines. Schwitzgebel and Jennings (2017) note that gender disparity in philosophy is still stark, and that the proportion of women in philosophy is only slowly	rising,	but	they	find	mixed	evidence	for	their	specific	hypothesis	that	gender disparity would be largest for the most prestigious journals, conferences, and schools. Contrary to their hypothesis, they found that the percentage of women faculty members at PGR-ranked departments was similar to the percentage of women	in	the	discipline	as	a	whole,	and	that	on	average	women	did	not	receive	their PhDs	from	lower-ranked	institutions. By	law,	departments	in	the	US	can	use	affirmative	action	policies	in	hiring	and graduate	school	admission to	mitigate the	effect	of	gender	bias.	This	option is	not available in many other countries. For example, throughout Europe, affirmative action	in	hiring	is	illegal.	In	the	UK	(following	the	Equality	Act	2010),	the	only	thing	an employer can do to have a staff that reflects the wider society's diversity is to encourage minorities to apply to job advertisements, and host special events for them (e.g., job fairs). An employer can also choose the	minority candidate if two candidates are equally well qualified. Women are underrepresented in the most prestigious UK departments. Research-intensive universities, such as those of the Russell Group, have fewer women among their full professors compared to less prestigious	institutions.	Only	6	of	the	24	Russell	Group	universities	have	higher	than average female representation among the professoriate. The BPA/Good Practice Scheme	recognizes	this,	and	prompts	organizers	of	conferences	to	cast	a	wider	net	in order to have a good representation of women: "Women	may well be at lower- 26 prestige institutions and/or in lower-ranked jobs .... They	may therefore have less access	to	institutional	funding."26 Given the importance of publications in top journals for promotion, senior offers,	and increasingly	also for junior	employment, I	will	also	briefly	consider	how prestige and gender interact in journal publications. Schwitzgebel and Jennings (2017)	found	that	women	were	less	likely	to	publish	in	the	top-3	general	philosophy journals	(Philosophical	Review,	Journal	of	Philosophy,	Mind),	and	in	the	top	specialist journals for ethics (Ethics, Philosophy and Public Affairs). Only 12% of authors in these journals in the	period	2013–2015	were	women,	which is substantially	below the percentage of women in the profession (around 21–26%). A recent study (Wilhelm, Conklin, and Hassoun in press) widened the sample to 25 prestigious journals as ranked by the PGR (2015) for 2004 and 2014–2015. Again, the percentage	of	women in these journals	was	very low,	14–16%,	substantially	below the percentage of women at US philosophy faculties. It is currently not known whether	this	underrepresentation	of	women	in	the	most	prestigious	journals	is	due to lower acceptance rates	or lower submission rates, due to a lack	of information about submission rates.	Perhaps the	underrepresentation	of	women in	prestigious journals	can	be	explained	by	lower	submission	rates.	This	is	not	unproblematic,	as	it would	suggest	that	prestige	acts	as	a	barrier	for	women	to	submit	work	to	the	most prestigious	journals.27 Journal	prestige	plays	an	important	role	in	evaluations	of	CVs, especially	for	tenure	and	promotion	decisions,	and	for	grant	applications,	where	CV and	prior	experience	play	an	important	role	in	the	decision	process. Healy	(2013)	found	that	women	were	not	only	underrepresented	in	the	most prestigious philosophy journals, but also undercited. He looked at the	most cited authors in the top-4 general philosophy journals, Philosophical Review, Journal of 26	Guidelines	can	be	found,	for	instance,	at	the	British	Society	of	Aesthetics,	which	provides grants	for	conferences.	One	condition	of	the	grants is	that	organizers	of	conferences	abide by the BPA/SWIP good practice scheme: http://british-aesthetics.org/?portfolio=smallgrants. 27	Indeed, several studies (reviewed in Bright 2017: Section 2) suggest that	women in the sciences	believe	that	their	work	will	be	held	to	a	greater	standard	and	face	more	negative scrutiny	compared	to	that	of	male	authors.	If	this	is	also	true	for	philosophy,	it	could	explain why	women	submit	fewer	papers	to	high-prestige	journals. 27 Philosophy,	Mind,	and	Noûs.	He	examined	2200	articles	over	the	past	two	decades, having a total of 34,000 citations, and focused on papers that have at least 10 citations.	This	brought	to	light	intricate	citation	networks,	from	which	women	were systematically	excluded.	Of	the	most	highly-cited	papers	(N=520),	only	3.6%	were	by women.	Healy	(2015)	further	found	that	this	disparity	was	due	to	a	large	difference in	citation	rates	of	the	most	highly-cited	papers,	with	highly-cited	male	authors	being more	cited	than	highly-cited	female	authors.	While	having	highly-cited	papers	in	top journals is	surely	a	mark	of	prestige,	one	may	wonder	whether	being	part	of	these citation	networks	matters	given	how	few	philosophers	publish	in	these	highly-ranked journals, and	how few	of them	are cited at all (most philosophy	papers are	never cited). However, as Healy (2015) points out, the most highly-cited papers at top journals	(i.e.,	the	most	prestigious	papers)	tend	to	shape	the	field	by	being	studied by	graduate	students	and	ending	up	in	philosophy	syllabi.	Thus,	at	a	very	visible	level of	prestige,	women	are	suffering	from	prestige	bias.	This	has	downstream	effects	on syllabi	and	on	the	further	engagement	with	women	authors	in	the	field. 6.	How	to	Mitigate	Prestige	Bias Having made the case that prestige bias is an obstacle to a more inclusive and diverse	philosophy, I	will now look at concrete	ways to	mitigate its effects. As	we have seen, prestige bias already has an adverse effect on diversity at the undergraduate level. In order to counter prestige bias, a wide range of	measures would	need to	be introduced, including improving	primary and secondary schools, extra-curricular support for children from lower economic status households, and axing	legacy	preferences	and	other	college	admissions	systems	that	unfairly	privilege white,	wealthy	students.	Such	extensive	policy	changes	are	not	easy	to	implement	by individual	academics.	Nevertheless,	there	are	concrete	steps	we	can	take	to	mitigate prestige bias. I will propose the following three: correct for prestige bias in one's citation	practices	and	syllabi,	diminish	prestige	bias in	graduate school	admissions, and	counter	prestige	bias	in	hiring	decisions. Compared	to	many	other	disciplines,	including	other	humanities,	philosophers tend	to	cite	fewer	authors.	In	such	a	climate,	citations	are	in	danger	of	becoming	a 28 commodity, a favor to be bestowed, presumably in exchange for other goods.28 Citing	sparingly	also	makes	it	more	difficult	for	newcomers	in	the	field	to	get	a	grasp of	the	literature	(Schliesser	2015).	Citing	more	generously	may	be	a	way	to	counter this:	more citations	make citations less	of an	exchange commodity and	mean that papers become	more accessible to newcomers. Individual philosophers could also cite more mindfully, taking care to cite minority authors who have substantially contributed	to	a	debate,	even	if	this	means	citing	papers	published	in	less	prestigious venues.	Something	analogous	to	the	Bechdel	test	could	work	(De	Cruz	2014).	If	one is	worried	about	underrepresenting	women,	one	could	use	the	simple	rule	of	thumb that	one's	paper	cites	at	least	two	women	authors,	actively	engages	with	at	least	one woman	author	(i.e.,	not	just	citing	but	engaging	with	her	work),	and	does	not	solely mention women because they write about a male philosopher.29	One could use analogous	rules	for	other	minorities. Next to citation practices, philosophers can take an active role in reducing prestige bias when vetting graduate school applications. For instance, in 2015 Pennsylvania State University awarded PhDs to five black, female philosophers, which is an unusually high number given the low representation of African Americans	in	philosophy,	especially	women.	Robert	Bernasconi,	who	was	involved	in the	admission	process,	argues	that	his	attempts	to	diversify	were	successful in	part because	they	actively	tried	to	counteract	prestige	bias: Philosophy doctoral programs, and doctoral programs in general, pay too	much attention to a student's résumé and academic pedigree, an attitude that perpetuates privilege.	The question he [Bernasconi] asks himself while reviewing applications is: With five years of intensive preparation,	will	the	student	be	as	good	as	any	other	new	Ph.D.?	"I	read 28	The	earlier-mentioned	citation	networks	(Healy	2013)	are	a	clear	illustration	of	this. 29	The original Bechdel test is about works of fiction and a work passes the test if it (1) features	at	least	two	women,	(2)	who	talk	to	each	other,	(3)	about	something	other	than	a man. I am grateful to David Chalmers for proposing the third element of the philosophy paper Bechdel test; I think the third element is defeasible in areas such as history of philosophy,	where the baseline rate of philosophers discussing	male authors is very high. However, even there, a philosopher could take care to cite women in the secondary literature,	e.g.,	for	Kant	scholars,	Onora	O'Neill,	Jill	Buroker,	or	Lisa	Shabel. 29 the writing samples very carefully," he says, "I'm looking for a spark, something	that	suggests	insight."	(Patel	2016) Philosophers	can	also	choose	to	decrease	prestige	bias	in	their	hiring	decisions. Recently,	two	philosophy	faculties	(Sheffield,	UK	and	Miami,	US)	aimed	to	reduce	bias in their hiring by anonymizing applicants in the early stages of the search and by changing	the	weight	placed	on	different	parts	of the	application.	Both	departments used anonymous CVs. Note that markers of prestige were not omitted from the applications: the anonymized CVs still contained the doctoral school where the candidate graduated, and the names of journals in	which the candidate published. The	aim	of	these	searches	was	not	specifically	to	reduce	prestige	bias,	but	rather	to reduce	bias	overall.	Jennifer	Saul	(Sheffield,	personal	communication)	explained	how her	department	cut	down	a	list	of	about	150	applications.	Instead	of	making	a	ranking of candidates, search committee	members looked at anonymized CVs and asked if they	met two	criteria:	whether the	applicant could teach in the relevant	areas	and whether	they	had	a	publication	record	that	made	them	look	suitable	for	the	next	REF. On the basis of these criteria, they retained 20 candidates. This procedure is less holistic	than	the	typical	search,	and	thus	reduces	bias	overall.	Members	of	the	search committee subsequently read writing samples and created a shortlist. Letters of reference	hardly	played	a	role,	which	may	have	mitigated	the	bias	in	favor	of	famous letter	writers. Miami had 600 anonymous applications; the department distributed anonymized	writing samples of all applicants to external referees. On the basis of these referee reports, they created a long list of 20 candidates. They held Skype interviews	and	looked	at	letters	of	reference	(mainly	to	spot	potential	problems	with candidates).	After	these	interviews,	they	invited	a	few	interviewees	to	campus.	While this	process	did	not	eradicate	prestige	bias,	it	did	decrease	it	(particularly	in	the	early stages	as	the	writing	samples	were	anonymized).	As	Berit	Brogaard	(Miami,	personal communication)	writes,	"We	did	end	up	hiring	someone	with	a	PhD	from	a	German university,	which	may	not	have	happened if	we	had	not	gone	anonymous." In	both searches,	prestige	bias	was	not	completely	eliminated,	but it	was	made less salient than it	would	otherwise	be,	given	the	reduced importance	of letter	writers	and	the 30 use of non-prestige criteria (writing samples, publication record, and teaching competence)	as	deciding	factors.	Citation	practices,	graduate	school	admissions	and hiring practices indicate that individual philosophers can go some	way to	mitigate prestige	bias,	and	hence	create	a	fairer	playing	field	for	the	discipline. 7.	Concluding	Remarks Not	many philosophers object to the role of prestige in their discipline in	making hiring and promotion decisions, and in deciding who and what to cite. As I have shown, prestige bias generates and exacerbates different forms of inequality in philosophy	and	facilitates	exclusion	of	minorities,	including	ethnic	minorities,	women, and philosophers who work outside of dominant traditions. I have argued that prestige bias is harmful, in part, because it disproportionately affects minorities. Assuming that checks and balances	were somehow in place to guard against this, would	this	make	prestige	bias	acceptable?	Presumably	not,	because	of	prestige	bias' inability to track what it allegedly tracks (quality, philosophical talent), and its arbitrary preference for some philosophers over others. I have centered my argument	on	the	exclusion	of	minorities,	because	it	is	something	philosophers	seem to	be	nearly	unanimous	in	seeing	as	a	bad	feature	of	the	profession. Prestige bias is both the first and the final hurdle to make academic philosophy more inclusive. It is the first hurdle because countering it provides a wide-reaching	way to	make	philosophy	more	diverse	even if	we	did	not	make	any other efforts to increase diversity. By actively countering prestige bias in our assessment of doctorate-granting institutions, journals, topics to work on, and authors to cite, we can get diversity on the cheap. We can cast a wider net in recruiting and retaining young philosophers, and many philosophical ideas can flourish. Prestige bias is also the final hurdle, because it has been relatively unchallenged	compared to	other	biases. I	have shown that individual	philosophers can mitigate prestige bias through relatively simple adjustments in their citation practices,	graduate	school	admissions,	and	hiring	processes. Acknowledgments 31 I	wish	to	thank	Ian	James	Kidd,	Liam	Kofi	Bright,	Richard	Pettigrew,	Johan	De	Smedt, Tim Kenyon, Eric Schwitzgebel, Olivier Morin, two anonymous referees, an anonymous	area	editor,	and	audiences	at	Bristol	and	Nottingham	for	comments	to earlier versions of this paper. I also wish to thank Carolyn Dicey Jennings for providing me with the raw hiring data, and Jennifer Saul and Berit Brogaard for discussions	on	anonymized	hiring	practices. Appendix: Questionnaire and	Methodology Used for Survey on	Who Submits to Top	5	Journals Survey	conducted	September	2014,	spread	via	philosophy	blogs	and	mailing	lists. 1.	In	your	estimation,	since	September	2013,	how	many	papers	in	total	did	you submit	to	any	of	the	following:	Philosophical	Review,	Journal	of	Philosophy,	Noûs, Philosophy	and	Phenomenological	Research,	Mind?	Do	not	include	resubmissions, only	original	submissions	in	your	count. 2.	(If	answer	is	0)	Why	did	you	not	submit	to	any	of	these	journals?	(select	all	that apply)	The	review	time	is	too	long/The	probability	of	acceptance	is	too	low/The journal	I	wanted	to	submit	to	didn't	accept	new	submissions/	The	papers	I	wrote during	that	period	do	not	fit	in	these	journals/	Other	reasons	(please	explain	briefly) 3.	In	your	estimation,	since	September	2013,	how	many	papers	did	you	submit	to any	refereed	journal	(philosophical	or	otherwise)?	This	does	not	include resubmissions,	but	only	original	papers. 4.	In	your	estimation,	since	September	2013,	how	many	papers	did	you	submit	to specialist	journals?	This	does	not	include	resubmissions,	but	only	original	papers. 5.	What	is	your	gender?	(Male/female/other) 6.	How	would	you	describe	your	institution	(please	select	all	that	apply)	(public/ private/small	liberal	arts	college/R-1	(research	oriented)/ranked	in	the	PGR	top	15/ 32 Ivy	League	(in	US)	or	similar	status	outside	of	US/	Teaching-oriented/focused/I	do not	have	an	institutional	affiliation) 7.	What	is	your	academic	position?	(Graduate	student,	tenure-track	faculty,	tenured faculty,	non-TT	faculty,	adjunct	or	other	part-time	teaching	position,	non-academic, unemployed) 8.	What	is	your	ethnic	identity?	(White,	African-American	or	Black,	Asian,	Hispanic, Mixed,	Other) 9.	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