text: TCREUR_Public/130916.mbx T R O U B L E D C O M P A N Y R E P O R T E R E U R O P E Monday, September 16, 2013, Vol. 14, No. 183 HeadlinesF I N L A N DNOKIA OYJ: Credit Protection Cost on Debt Now at 'BB+' LevelsG E R M A N YDECO SERIES 2005: Fitch Cuts Rating on Cl. G Notes to 'BBsf'SOLARWORLD AG: Investor Challenges Restructuring PlanI C E L A N DGLITNIR BANK: Winding-Up Committee Seeks Settlement TalksI R E L A N DHARVEST CLO VII: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating to Class E NotesHARVEST CLO VII: Fitch Assigns 'BB' Rating to Class E NotesJUNO ECLIPSE 2007-2: Fitch Cuts Rating on Class C Notes to 'D'I T A L YRIVA GROUP: To Shut Down Companies After Asset SeizureM A L T AGOLDEN TRAVEL: Files for Bankruptcy; Calls for DissolutionN E T H E R L A N D SEUROCREDIT CDO III: Moody's Cuts 2 Note Classes Ratings to Caa3HERBERT PARK: Fitch Rates EUR12-Mil. Class E Notes 'B-'HERBERT PARK: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating to Class D NotesSNS BANK: Moody's Hikes Bank Financial Strength Rating to 'D-'R O M A N I AAVERSA: Michael Topolinski Acquires BusinessGALLI GALLO: Poultry Market Woes Prompt InsolvencyR U S S I ABREBORO HOLDINGS: S&P Assigns 'B-' CCR; Outlook Stable* Moody's Notes Higher Credit Risks for Russia's Consumer BanksS L O V E N I A* Slovenian Bank Clean-Up Still Uncertain Despite ProgressS P A I NBANCO DE SABADELL: S&P Affirms 'BB/B' Ratings; Outlook NegativeCODERE SA: Decision to Delay Bond Coupon May Trigger CDS PayoutsPESCANOVA SA: Damm-Led Shareholder Group Ousts Former Chairman* SPAIN: Falling Bank Lending Threatens Small CompaniesU N I T E D K I N G D O MDIXONS RETAIL: Moody's Changes Outlook on 'B1' CFR to StableFORDGATE COMMERCIAL: Fitch Affirms 'B' Rating on Class B NotesLEHMAN BROTHERS: Payout to Unsecured Creditors Expected in Nov.X X X X X X X X* High-Yield Bond Issuance for EMEA Surges Past US$100 Billion* Moody's Says Better EUR Economy to Result in Fewer Downgrades* Fitch Sees Improvement in Credit Quality of Eurozone Entities* BOND PRICING: For the Week September 9 to September 13, 2013 *********=============F I N L A N D=============NOKIA OYJ: Credit Protection Cost on Debt Now at 'BB+' Levels-------------------------------------------------------------The credit default swap (CDS) market seems to be reactingfavorably to Microsoft's plans to acquire Nokia Oyj, according tothe latest case study from Fitch Solutions.Following the US$7.2 billion acquisition on announcement onSept.3, CDS spreads on Nokia have tightened 59%, while Microsoftremains largely illiquid. Additionally, the cost of creditprotection on Nokia's debt is now at 'BB+' levels.That said, CDS liquidity for Nokia remains high. Trading in thethird global percentile, 'Nokia is trading with more CDSliquidity than 97 percent of Fitch's CDS pricing universe,signaling still-high market uncertainty over future pricing,'said Director Diana Allmendinger.Fitch Solutions case studies build on data from its CDS PricingService and proprietary quantitative models, including CDSImplied Ratings. These credit risk indicators are designed toprovide real-time, market-based views of creditworthiness. Assuch, they can and often do reflect more short term market viewson factors such as currencies, seasonal market effects and short-term technical influences. This is in contrast to Fitch Ratings'Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs), which are based on forward-lookingfundamental credit analysis over an extended period of time.=============G E R M A N Y=============DECO SERIES 2005: Fitch Cuts Rating on Cl. G Notes to 'BBsf'------------------------------------------------------------Fitch Ratings has downgraded DECO Series 2005 - Pan Europe 1plc's class G commercial mortgage-backed notes and affirmed classH as follows: EUR2.2 million class G due July 2014 (XS0227116950) downgraded to 'BBsf' from 'Asf'; Placed on Rating Watch Negative (RWN) EUR4.9 million class H due July 2014 (XS0227117503) affirmed at 'CCCsf'; Recovery Estimate (RE) 95%Key Rating DriversThe downgrade of the class G notes is driven by the failure tocomplete the notarized sale of the last properties securing theAWOBAG loan, particularly in light of the approaching July 2014note maturity. With less than 11 months to go, the specialservicer's operational flexibility is narrowing, which couldweaken its bargaining position with potential purchasers.Nevertheless, in Fitch's view investors in the class G notes arewell-protected from discounting; what explains the multi-categorydowngrade of this class and its placement on RWN is theilliquidity of the collateral, which threatens to impede therequired swift resolution.The AWOBAG loan failed to repay at its maturity in July 2012.Following a progressive sell down of the portfolio, the loan isnow secured by a portfolio of 26 residential clusters in Kiel,Germany. In March 2013, the residual portfolio was revalued atEUR19.9 million. This is only marginally down from the EUR20.6million value reported in May 2005, despite the portfolio beingcharacterized by a poor state of repair and high vacancy rate(30.9%).Since Fitch's previous rating action in December 2012, thenotarised sale of the Kiel properties failed to complete. Theservicer, Situs Asset Management, expected the sale to completefirst at the October 2012 interest payment date (IPD) and then atthe January 2013 IPD. At the January 2013 IPD, the servicerreported that the sale was unable to complete due to furthernegotiations with the purchaser arising from additional technicaldue diligence and some of the conditions precedent in the SPA notbeing met. In a special notice dated February 26, 2013, thespecial servicer, Hatfield Philips International Ltd (HPI), alsoconfirmed the sales process had fallen through.Given its advanced stage, a collapse in the sales process was notexpected by Fitch. The loan has since been accelerated and aninsolvency administrator appointed. Since the opening of theinsolvency proceedings, Fitch understands the insolvencyadministrator has marketed the properties to more than 40investors. HPI has indicated to Fitch that the insolvencyadministrator expects indicative bids during September andbinding offers a few weeks later.Due to the high level of expenditure needed to maintain theproperties in their current state, little cash is available toservice the debt. Indeed at the last IPD the issuer paid seniorexpenses and note interest using only drawdowns of the liquidityfacility. This was not sufficient to cover class H note interest,with the excess above the loan interest rate not paid. Pursuantto an available funds cap, this class of notes continues toperform, with the distressed rating reflecting rather the risk ofprincipal remaining outstanding at note maturity. Even if loanproceeds are sufficient, the risk of a spike in final issuercosts warrants a sub-100% RE for this class.Rating SensitivitiesThe RWN will be resolved within the next six months. If the classG notes remain outstanding at this time, they will very likely bedowngraded.SOLARWORLD AG: Investor Challenges Restructuring Plan-----------------------------------------------------Alexander Kell at Bloomberg News, citing The Wall Street Journal,reports that a spokeswoman of Solarworld AG doesn't know detailsof a legal action filed by investor Karl Walter Freitag withHigher Regional Court Cologne yet.According to Bloomberg, the Journal said Mr. Freitag filed legalaction challenging the company's restructuring plan. Bloombergnotes that the Journal said the investor sees Solarworldbondholders favored over shareholders. Restructuring PlanAs reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Aug. 7,2013, Bloomberg News related that Solarworld creditors backedproposals to try to save Germany's biggest solar-panel maker.According to Bloomberg, Solarworld said in a statement that atotal of 99.96% of noteholders representing 35.78% of thecompany's EUR150 million (US$198.9 million) of bonds dueJuly 2016 backed the restructuring plan. A group representing atleast 25% of the notes was required, Bloomberg disclosed.Solarworld reported net debt of EUR806.4 million in the firstquarter, up from EUR757.6 million the year before, Bloombergsaid, citing a company filing. The company has a EUR250 millionrevolving credit facility maturing in 2016, according to datacompiled by Bloomberg.SolarWorld AG is Germany's biggest solar-panel maker. Thecompany is based in Bonn.=============I C E L A N D=============GLITNIR BANK: Winding-Up Committee Seeks Settlement Talks---------------------------------------------------------According to Bloomberg News' Omar R. Valdimarsson, Kjarninn,citing a letter, said that the winding-up committee of failedlender Glitnir Bank asked Iceland's Prime Minister, FinanceMinister and Central Bank Governor for talks about creditorsettlements.Premier Sigmundur David Gunnlaugsson, as cited by Kjarninn, saidin August he hoped for an offer from lenders creditors "soon",Bloomberg notes.Glitnir requested that the central bank grants an exemption tothe island's capital controls so it can complete creditorsettlements, Bloomberg discloses. Sedlabanki has yet to respondto the request, Bloomberg says.Mr. Gunnlaugsson has signaled he'll ask for writedowns on US$3.6billion of krona-denominated claims held by creditors of GlitnirBank, Bloomberg states. About Glitnir BankiHeadquartered in Reykjavik, Iceland, Glitnir banki hf --http://www.glitnir.is/-- offers an array of financial services to corporation, financial institutions, investors andindividuals.Judge Stuart Bernstein of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court forthe Southern District Court of New York granted Glitnirpermission to enter into a proceeding under Chapter 15 of theU.S. bankruptcy code on January 6, 2008.=============I R E L A N D=============HARVEST CLO VII: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating to Class E Notes---------------------------------------------------------Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its credit ratings toHarvest CLO VII Ltd.'s class A, B, C, D, and E senior securedfloating-rate notes. At closing, Harvest CLO VII also issuedunrated subordinated notes.S&P's ratings address timely interest and principal on the classA and B notes, and ultimate interest and principal on the classC, D, and E notes.CAPITAL STRUCTURE NotionalClass (mil. EUR) Interest Deferrable OC (%) RatingA 177.0 6mE+1.35% No 41.00 AAA(sf)B 34.0 6mE+1.75% No 29.67 AA+(sf)C 20.0 6mE+2.80% Yes 23.00 A(sf)D 13.6 6mE+3.70% Yes 18.47 BBB(sf)E 23.0 6mE+5.50% Yes 10.80 BB(sf)Subordinated 42.0 N/A N/A 0.00 NR6mE - Six-month Euro Interbank Offered Rate (EURIBOR).N/A - Not applicable.OC - Overcollateralization = [portfolio target par amount - tranche notional (including notional of all senior tranches)]/portfolio target par amount.NR - Not rated.At the end of the ramp-up period, S&P understands that theportfolio would represent a well-diversified pool of corporatecredits, with a fairly uniform exposure to all of the credits.Therefore, S&P has conducted its credit and cash flow analysis byapplying its 2009 corporate cash flow collateralized debtobligation criteria.In S&P's cash flow analysis, it used a portfolio target paramount of EUR300.0, assuming that 10% of the portfolio comprisesfixed-rate assets, using the covenanted weighted-average spreadand weighted-average coupon (4.35% and 5.0% respectively), andthe covenanted weighted-average recovery rates at each ratinglevel.The portfolio's replenishment period will end 4.1 years afterclosing, and the portfolio's average maturity date will, at allzimes, fall before 2021.Elavon Financial Services Ltd. is the bank account provider andcustodian. The issuer will enter into asset swaps with eitherCredit Suisse International, or JP Morgan Securities PLC to hedgethe foreign exchange risk arising from non-euro-denominatedassets. The participants' downgrade remedies are in line withS&P's current counterparty criteria.The issuer is in line with S&P's bankruptcy-remoteness criteriaunder its European legal criteria.Following S&P's analysis of the credit, cash flow, counterparty,operational, and legal risks, S& considers that its ratings arecommensurate with the available credit enhancement for each classof notes.Harvest CLO VII is a cash flow collateralized loan obligation(CLO) transaction securitizing a portfolio of primarily seniorsecured loans made to speculative-grade European corporates. 3iDebt Management Investments Ltd. manages the transaction. STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORTSEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying acredit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined inthe Rule, to include a description of the representations,warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors anda description of how they differ from the representations,warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similarsecurities.The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in thiscredit rating report is available at: http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1717.pdfRATINGS LISTRatings AssignedHarvest CLO VII Ltd.EUR309.6 Million Senior Secured Floating-Rateand Subordinated NotesClass Rating Amount (mil. EUR)A AAA (sf) 177.0B AA+ (sf) 34.0C A (sf) 20.0D BBB (sf) 13.6E BB (sf) 23.0Subordinated NR 42.0NR-Not rated.HARVEST CLO VII: Fitch Assigns 'BB' Rating to Class E Notes-----------------------------------------------------------Fitch Ratings has assigned Harvest CLO VII Ltd's notes finalratings, as follows: EUR177.0 million Class A: 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable EUR34.0 million Class B: 'AA+sf'; Outlook Stable EUR20.0 million Class C: 'Asf'; Outlook Stable EUR13.6 million Class D: 'BBB+sf'; Outlook Stable EUR23.0 million Class E: 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable EUR42.0 million subordinated notes: not ratedKey Rating DriversSufficient Credit EnhancementCredit enhancement (CE) for the rated notes, in addition toexcess spread, is sufficient to protect against portfolio defaultand recovery rate projections in the applicable rating scenario.CE for the rated notes is higher than the average for Fitch-ratedlegacy CLOs.'B'/'B-' Portfolio Credit QualityFitch expects the average credit quality of obligors to be in the'B'/'B-' range.Above-Average RecoveriesAt least 90% of the portfolio comprises senior secured loans andsenior secured bonds. Recovery prospects for these assets aretypically more favorable than for second-lien, unsecured andmezzanine assets.Limited Basis/Reset RiskBasis and reset risk is naturally hedged for most of theportfolio through the floating rate, semi-annually payingliabilities. Fixed rate assets can account for no more than 10%of the portfolio and no more than 5% of the assets can payinterest less frequently than semi-annually.Limited FX RiskAsset swaps are used to mitigate any currency risk on non-euro-denominated assets. All non-euro assets have to be hedged usingsuitable asset swaps. Non-euro assets are limited to 30% of theportfolio.Transaction SummaryHarvest CLO VII Ltd (the issuer) is an arbitrage cash flow CLO.Net proceeds from the issuance of the notes will be used topurchase a EUR300 million portfolio of European leveraged loansand bonds. The portfolio is managed by 3i Debt ManagementInvestments Limited. The reinvestment period is scheduled to endin 2017.The transaction documents may be amended subject to rating agencyconfirmation or note holder approval. Where rating agencyconfirmation relates to risk factors, Fitch will analyze theproposed change and may provide a comment if the change would nothave a negative impact on the then current ratings. Suchamendments may delay the repayment of the notes as long asFitch's analysis confirms the expected repayment of principal atthe legal final maturity.If in the agency's opinion the amendment is risk-neutral from theperspective of the rating Fitch may decline to comment.Noteholders should be aware that the structure considers theconfirmation to be given in the case where Fitch declines tocomment.Rating SensitivitiesA 25% increase in the expected obligor default probability wouldlead to a downgrade of one to three notches for the rated notes.A 25% reduction in the expected recovery rates would lead to adowngrade of one to four notches for the rated notes.JUNO ECLIPSE 2007-2: Fitch Cuts Rating on Class C Notes to 'D'--------------------------------------------------------------Fitch Ratings has downgraded Juno (Eclipse 2007-2) Limited classC due 2022 as follows: -- EUR60.6 million Class C (XS0299976836): downgraded to 'Dsf' from 'Csf'; Recovery Estimate (RE) 50%Key Rating DriversThe downgrade follows a EUR11.4 million principal write-down ofthe class C notes. This reflects a loss of EUR24.1 million beingrealised on the EUR25 million Senior Den Tir reference loan,which also led to the 'Dsf' rated class D notes being fullywritten off.As this outcome is in line with Fitch's expectations, there is noimpact on the ratings of the other classes of notes of thisissuer.Rating SensitivitiesAt 'Dsf', the rating of the class C notes is no longer sensitiveto transaction performance.Fitch will continue to monitor the performance of thetransaction.=========I T A L Y=========RIVA GROUP: To Shut Down Companies After Asset Seizure------------------------------------------------------Giulia Segreti at The Financial Times reports that Italy's RivaGroup, owner of one of Europe's largest steel plants, hasannounced it will shut down almost all the companies it controlsin the country after a court seized assets and wealth worth aboutEUR900 million from the family-owned company.Steel making and logistics operations in 13 companies owned bythe Riva family, which employ almost 1,500 workers, will behalted from Thursday, Sept. 12, the FT discloses.The Riva family been at the center of a long-running court caseopened by prosecutors alleging corruption and violations ofenvironmental standards leading to deaths around its Ilva ironand steel plant in the southern port city of Taranto, the FTnotes. The group has denied all the allegations, the FT states.Ilva, which produces about 30% of Italy's steel output andemploys 12,000 directly, will continue its activities undergovernment supervision, the FT says.The decision to freeze all of the Riva family's Italian assets,including blocking current accounts, was taken by a judge basedin Taranto on Sept. 9, the FT relates. Assets confiscatedinclude the family's shares in Alitalia, the Italian airline,worth about EUR70 million, the FT notes.Halting production at the companies was necessary as the seizures"impeded the normal cycle of company payments and do not allow(normal) operative and economic conditions", Riva, as cited bythe FT, said in a statement on Thursday.According to the FT, a company representative said Riva wouldappeal against the court order "unexpectedly extended" to thewhole group.=========M A L T A=========GOLDEN TRAVEL: Files for Bankruptcy; Calls for Dissolution----------------------------------------------------------Matthew Xuereb at Times of Malta reports that Golden Travel ClubLimited, the company which runs Fantasy Tours, has filed forbankruptcy and called for the troubled firm to be dissolved.The request was filed by company shareholders Karl and AudreyAzzopardi, Times of Malta discloses. They asked the court todissolve the company, which operated from its registered addressin Psaila Street, Birkirkara, since it could not repay its debts,Times of Malta notes.According to court documents seen by Times of Malta, they filedthe request on August 8, the same day Fantasy Tours sent textmessages to clients informing them that due to financial problemsit was unable to provide the holidays they had paid for.In the application filed through company lawyer Kris Borg, theyclaimed that although the firm had tried to maximize its businessduring the summer months, not many people chose its services,Times of Malta relates.As a result, the company began operating at a loss and the moreit carried on trading, the larger the losses became, Times ofMalta states.They therefore called on the court to dissolve the company interms of a specific article of the Companies Act relating tobeing unable to pay debts, Times of Malta says.As with similar cases, they also called on the court to appoint aprovisional administrator to run the company on an interim basis,Times of Malta notes.Golden Travel Club Ltd was hit with class action week when 138clients filed a judicial letter in court, giving the travel agentthree days to refund the money they had paid for the holidaysthat never happened, Times of Malta recounts.The company axed its tours via SMS on August 8, just hours afterurging those who had booked holidays to pay in advance for theirexcursions, Times of Malta discloses.The police say more than 250 official complaints against thetravel agency have been received and the losses amount toEUR374,058, according to Times of Malta.Times of Malta previously reported how an insolvency fund thatcould have been used to pay those who had their holidayscancelled by Fantasy Tours was enacted in 1999 but never broughtinto force. The fund, which tourism operators were meant tocontribute towards, would have compensated any traveller,licensed tourism operation or tourist for any debt arising fromthe insolvency of any licensed tourism operator, Times of Maltasays. The setting up of the fund came through the Malta Traveland Tourism Service Act, which was enacted in 1999, Times ofMalta recounts.=====================N E T H E R L A N D S=====================EUROCREDIT CDO III: Moody's Cuts 2 Note Classes Ratings to Caa3---------------------------------------------------------------Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of thefollowing notes issued by Eurocredit CDO III B.V.: EUR20.5M Class B Senior Floating Rate Notes, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Sep 20, 2011 Upgraded to A1 (sf)Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of thefollowing notes issued by Eurocredit CDO III B.V.: EUR12.5M Class D-1 Senior Subordinated Deferrable Floating Rate Notes, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Sep 20, 2011 Upgraded to B1 (sf) EUR1.5M Class D-2 Senior Subordinated Deferrable Floating Rate Notes, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Sep 20, 2011 Upgraded to B1 (sf) EUR2.3M Class E-1 Senior Subordinated Deferrable Floating Rate Notes, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 20, 2011 Upgraded to Caa2 (sf) EUR1.5M Class E-2 Senior Subordinated Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 20, 2011 Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)Moody's Investors Service also affirmed the following notes: EUR161M (current amount outstanding EUR62M) Class A-1 Senior Floating Rate Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 11, 2003 Assigned Aaa (sf) EUR10M (current amount outstanding EUR3.8M) Class A-2 Senior Accreting Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 11, 2003 Assigned Aaa (sf) EUR10M Class C-1 Senior Subordinated Deferrable Floating Rate Notes, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Sep 20, 2011 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf) EUR12M Class C-2 Senior Subordinated Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Sep 20, 2011 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)Eurocredit CDO III B.V., issued in September 2003, is a singlecurrency Collateralised Loan Obligation ("CLO") backed by aportfolio of mostly high yield European loans. The portfolio ismanaged by Intermediate Capital Managers Limited. Thistransaction ended its reinvestment period in October 2008. It ispredominantly composed of senior secured loans.Ratings Rationale:According to Moody's, the upgrades of the Class B notes areprimarily a result of continued deleveraging of the A1 and A2notes and subsequent increase in the Class A/Bovercollateralization ratio. Moody's notes that the Class A1 andA2 notes have paid down by approximately 47% over the last yearand approximately 60% since the last rating action in September2011. The downgrades of the Class D1, D2, E1 and E2 notes aredriven by the decrease of their overcollateralization ratios,increased in defaults, increased in long dated assets andexposure to assets rated B3 and below.As a result of the deleveraging, the overcollateralization ratiosfor the senior notes have increased. As of the latest trusteereport dated August 2013, the Class A/B, C, D and Eovercollateralization ratios are 151.38%, 120.64%, 106.84% and103.62%, respectively versus August 2011 levels of 130.16%,116.11%, 108.64% and 106.78%, respectively. The Trustee reportedWARF has increased to 3,053 from 2,860 between August 2011 andAugust 2013. During the same period total amount of securitiestreated as defaulted by Moody's have increased to EUR 10.4million from EUR 1.7 million.In its base case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral poolto have a performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR113.23 million, defaulted par of EUR10.4 million, a weightedaverage default probability of 20.02% over 2.3 years (consistentwith a WARF ("Weighted Average Rating Factor") of 3,851), aweighted average recovery rate upon default of 46.41% for a Aaaliability target rating, a diversity score of 19 and a weightedaverage spread of 3.10%.The default probability is derived from the credit quality of thecollateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life ofthe collateral pool. The average recovery rate to be realized onfuture defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assetsin the collateral pool. For a Aaa liability target rating,Moody's assumed that 89.7% of the portfolio exposed to seniorsecured corporate assets would recover 50% upon default and 10.3%non-first-lien loan corporate assets would recover 15%. In eachcase, historical and market performance trends and collateralmanager latitude for trading the collateral are also relevantfactors. These default and recovery properties of the collateralpool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they aresubject to stresses as a function of the target rating of eachCLO liability being reviewed.In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performedsensitivity analyses on key parameters for the rated notes:1) The portfolio is exposed 12.66% to obligors located in Spainand Ireland, both of which have a country ceiling of A3. OnAugust 14, 2013, Moody's released a report, which describes howit proposes to incorporate the additional credit risk ofexposures domiciled in countries with country ceilings that aresingle A or lower when rating CLO tranches that carry ratingshigher than those ceilings. In its analysis, Moody's incorporatedsensitivities applying the par value haircuts suggested in thereport, reflecting country risks in CLOs. The Aaa and Aa parvalue haircut scenarios generated model outputs that wereconsistent to these rating actions.2) Deterioration of credit quality to address the refinancingtogether with the sovereign risks -- Approximately 36.79% of theportfolio is rated B3 and below with maturities between 2014 and2016, which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. Theportfolio is also exposed 12.66% to obligors located in Spain andIreland. Moody's considered the scenario where the WARF of theportfolio was increased to 4,745 by forcing to Ca the creditquality of 25% of such exposures subject to refinancing orsovereign risks. This scenario generated model outputs that wereup to one notch lower than the base case results.Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level ofmacroeconomic uncertainty, which could negatively impact theratings of the notes, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of creditconditions in the general economy and 2) the large concentrationof lowly rated debt maturing between 2014 and 2016 which maycreate challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'performance may also be impacted either positively or negativelyby 1) the manager's investment strategy and behavior and 2)divergence in legal interpretation of CDO documentation bydifferent transactional parties due to embedded ambiguities.Sources of additional performance uncertainties:1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in thistransaction is the pace of amortization of the underlyingportfolio. Pace of amortization could vary significantly subjectto market conditions and this may have a significant impact onthe notes' ratings. In particular, amortization could accelerateas a consequence of high levels of prepayments in the loan marketor collateral sales by the Collateral Manager or be delayed byrising loan amend-and-extend restructurings. Fast amortizationwould usually benefit the ratings of the senior notes but maynegatively impact the mezzanine and junior notes.2) Moody's also notes that around 65% of the collateral poolconsists of debt obligations whose credit quality has beenassessed through Moody's credit estimates. Large single exposuresto obligors bearing a credit estimate have been subject to astress applicable to concentrated pools as per the report titled"Updated Approach to the Usage of Credit Estimates in RatedTransactions" published in October 2009.3) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations indefaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to bedefaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal'sovercollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveriesand the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaultedassets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzeddefaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price andthe recovery rate in order to account for potential volatility inmarket prices. Realization of higher than expected recoverieswould positively impact the ratings of the notes.4) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyondthe CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidationrisk on those assets. Moody's assumes that at transactionmaturity such an asset has a liquidation value dependent on thenature of the asset as well as the extent to which the asset'smaturity lags that of the liabilities. Realization of higher thanexpected liquidation values would positively impact the ratingsof the notes.The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's GlobalApproach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published inMay 2013.Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial ExpansionTechnique, as described in Section 184.108.40.206 of the "Moody's GlobalApproach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" ratingmethodology published in May 2013.Under this methodology, Moody's used its Binomial ExpansionTechnique, whereby the pool is represented by independentidentical assets, the number of which is being determined by thediversity score of the portfolio. The default and recoveryproperties of the collateral pool are incorporated in a cash flowmodel where the default probabilities are subject to stresses asa function of the target rating of each CLO liability beingreviewed. The default probability range is derived from thecredit quality of the collateral pool, and Moody's expectation ofthe remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recoveryrate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on theseniority of the assets in the collateral pool.The cash flow model used for this transaction is Moody's EMEA CLOCash-Flow model.This model was used to represent the cash flows and determine theloss for each tranche. The cash flow model evaluates all defaultscenarios that are then weighted considering the probabilities ofthe binomial distribution assumed for the portfolio default rate.In each default scenario, the corresponding loss for each classof notes is calculated given the incoming cash flows from theassets and the outgoing payments to third parties andnoteholders. Therefore, the expected loss or EL for each trancheis the sum product of (i) the probability of occurrence of eachdefault scenario; and (ii) the loss derived from the cash flowmodel in each default scenario for each tranche. As such, Moody'sanalysis encompasses the assessment of stressed scenarios.In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitlymodeled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committeeconsiderations. These qualitative factors include the structuralprotections in each transaction, the recent deal performance inthe current market environment, the legal environment, specificdocumentation features, the collateral manager's track record,and the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. Allinformation available to rating committees, includingmacroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analyticalgroups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature andseverity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence thefinal rating decision.HERBERT PARK: Fitch Rates EUR12-Mil. Class E Notes 'B-'--------------------------------------------------------Fitch Ratings has assigned Herbert Park B.V.'s notes finalratings, as follows: EUR235.0m Class A-1: 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable EUR40.0m Class A-2: 'AA+sf'; Outlook Stable EUR37.0m Class B: 'Asf'; Outlook Stable EUR21.0m Class C: 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable EUR23.5m Class D: 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable EUR12.0m Class E: 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable EUR44.68m Subordinated Notes: not ratedTransaction SummaryHerbert Park B.V. (the issuer) is an arbitrage cash flowcollateralized loan obligation (CLO). Net proceeds from theissuance of the notes will be used to purchase a EUR400mportfolio of European leveraged loans and bonds. The portfolio ismanaged by Blackstone/GSO Debt Funds Management Europe Limited.The reinvestment period is scheduled to end in 2017.The transaction documents may be amended subject to rating agencyconfirmation or note holder approval. Where rating agencyconfirmation relates to risk factors, Fitch will analyze theproposed change and may provide a comment if the change would nothave a negative impact on the then current ratings. Suchamendments may delay the repayment of the notes as long asFitch's analysis confirms the expected repayment of principal atthe legal final maturity.If in the agency's opinion the amendment is risk-neutral from theperspective of the rating Fitch may decline to comment.Noteholders should be aware that the structure considers theconfirmation to be given in the case where Fitch declines tocomment.Key Rating DriversFour-Year Reinvestment PeriodThe reinvestment period is longer than recent similartransactions. The maximum weighted average life of thetransaction is eight years from closing, reducing to four yearsat the end of the reinvestment period.Portfolio Credit QualityThe covenanted minimum weighted average (WA) Fitch rating factoris 34. Fitch therefore expects the average credit quality ofobligors to be in the 'B'/'B-' range. Fitch has credit opinionson all the obligors in the indicative portfolio.Above-Average RecoveriesAt least 90% of the portfolio will comprise senior securedobligations. Recovery prospects for these assets are typicallymore favorable than for second-lien, unsecured, and mezzanineassets. The covenanted minimum WA Fitch recovery rate is 69.5%.Fitch has assigned Recovery Ratings to 95% of the indicativeportfolio.Limited Basis/Reset RiskBasis and reset risk is naturally hedged for most of theportfolio through the floating rate, semi-annually payingliabilities. Fixed rate assets can account for no more than 10%of the portfolio and no more than 5% of the assets can payinterest less frequently than semi-annually.Limited FX RiskAsset swaps are used to mitigate any currency risk on assets notdenominated in euro. The transaction is allowed to invest up to10% of the portfolio in non-euro-denominated assets, providedthat suitable asset swaps can be entered into.Lower Obligor ConcentrationUnlike many recent CLO's, there are no exceptions to the maximumobligor concentration limit of 2.5% and a limit of 1.5% isincluded for non-senior obligors. This will lead to a lowerportfolio correlation in our asset analysis.Rating SensitivitiesA 25% increase in the expected obligor default probability wouldlead to a one to two notch downgrade for each class of notes. A25% reduction in the expected recovery rates would lead to a onenotch downgrade for all rated notes.Key Rating Drivers and Rating Sensitivities are further describedin the accompanying new issue report.HERBERT PARK: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating to Class D Notes------------------------------------------------------Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its credit ratings toHerbert Park B.V.'s EUR368.5 million floating-rate class A-1, A-2, B, C, D, and E notes. At closing, Herbert Park also issued anunrated subordinated class of notes.S&P's ratings reflect its assessment of the collateral's creditquality. The portfolio is diversified, primarily comprisingbroadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term loansand senior secured bonds.S&P's ratings also reflect the available credit enhancement forthe rated notes through the subordination of cash flows payableto the subordinated notes. S&P subjected the capital structureto a cash flow analysis to determine the break-even default ratefor each rated class of notes.In S&P's analysis, it used the target par amount, the covenantedweighted-average spread, the covenanted weighted-average coupon,and the covenanted weighted-average recovery rates. S&P appliedvarious cash flow stress scenarios, using four different defaultpatterns, in conjunction with different interest rate stressscenarios for each liability rating category.The ratings assigned to the notes are commensurate with S&P'sassessment of available credit enhancement following its creditand cash flow analysis. S&P's analysis shows that the availablecredit enhancement for each rated class of notes was sufficientto withstand the defaults applicable under the supplemental tests(not counting excess spread) outlined in our corporatecollateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria.In S&P's analysis, it considered that the transaction documents'replacement and remedy mechanisms adequately mitigate thetransaction's exposure to counterparty risk under S&P's currentcounterparty criteria.Following the application of S&P's criteria for nonsovereignratings that exceed eurozone sovereign ratings, it considers thetransaction's exposure to country risk to be sufficientlymitigated at the assigned rating levels as the concentration ofthe pool comprising assets in countries rated lower than 'A-' islimited to 10% of the aggregate collateral balance.The transaction's legal structure is bankruptcy remote, inaccordance with S&P's European legal criteria.Herbert Park is a European cash flow corporate loancollateralized loan obligation (CLO) securitization of arevolving pool, comprising euro-denominated senior secured loansand bonds issued by European borrowers. Blackstone/GSO DebtFunds Management Europe Ltd. is the collateral manager. STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORTSEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying acredit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined inthe Rule, to include a description of the representations,warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors anda description of how they differ from the representations,warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similarsecurities.The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in thiscredit rating report is available at: http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1801.pdfRATINGS LISTHerbert Park B.V.EUR413.18 Million Floating-Rate And Subordinated NotesClass Rating Amount (mil. EUR)A-1 AAA (sf) 235.00A-2 AA (sf) 40.00B A (sf) 37.00C BBB (sf) 21.00D BB (sf) 23.50E B (sf) 12.00Sub NR 44.68NR-Not rated.SNS BANK: Moody's Hikes Bank Financial Strength Rating to 'D-'--------------------------------------------------------------Moody's Investors Service has confirmed SNS Bank N.V.'s Baa3long-term and Prime-3 short-term debt and deposit ratings. At thesame time, Moody's upgraded the bank's standalone bank financialstrength rating (BFSR) to D-, equivalent to a baseline creditassessment (BCA) of ba3 (from E/ca). Concurrently, Moody's hasupgraded the provisional (P) rating for SNS Bank's subordinatedMTN program to (P)B1 from (P)C.The confirmation of debt and deposit ratings reflects the bank'simproved standalone credit profile and Moody's assumption of ahigh likelihood that the Dutch government (Aaa, negative) wouldprovide support to SNS in case of need. The upgrade of the BFSRreflects the material improvement in the bank's solvency positionand the drastic reduction of credit risk on its loan portfolio.The outlook on the BFSR is positive and the outlooks on the long-term debt and deposit ratings are stable.Moody's has also confirmed the Baa2 (stable) insurance financialstrength ratings (IFSRs) of SRLEV N.V. and REAALSchadeverzekeringen N.V., and the B1(hyb) ratings, with adeveloping outlook, of SRLEV's hybrid instruments. The ratingagency also confirmed the (P)Ba2 senior debt rating and upgradedto (P)B2 from (P)C the subordinated debt rating of SNS REAALN.V., the holding company of the group.Moody's also withdrew ratings on the dated subordinated debt andhybrid instruments, previously rated C and C(hyb), respectively,issued by SNS Bank and the holding company, SNS REAAL which haveceased to exist following the expropriation as part of the rescueand nationalization of the group.These actions conclude the review of SNS REAAL entities' ratingsthat Moody's initiated on November 21, 2012 and extended on April30, 2013.The backed Aaa ratings assigned to notes issued by SNS Bank underthe guarantee of the Kingdom of the Netherlands are unaffected bythis action.Ratings Rationale:Confirmation of Long- And Short-Term Debt And Deposit Ratings ofSNS Bank:The confirmation of SNS Bank's senior unsecured debt and depositratings at Baa3/Prime-3 was driven by (1) the achievedimprovement in the institution's standalone financial strengthwith further recovery potential over the medium-term; and (2)Moody's assessment of the Dutch state's high willingness andability to provide public support to SNS in case of need.Moody's bases its view on (1) the bank's state ownership --albeit provisional -- implying the Dutch government wouldactively protect its own investment and see the bank through theprocess of regaining its standalone independence; (2) Moody'ssovereign rating for the Netherlands of Aaa (negative),reflecting the government's financial flexibility to do so; and(3) the bank's systemic importance for the domestic bankingsector as the fourth largest bank in the country, which thegovernment intended to preserve through the rescue measures andnationalization of the group earlier this year.The Baa3 rating currently incorporates three notches of systemicsupport uplift, which also factors the current temporaryextraordinary support until SNS Bank has recovered more fully andprospects for a re-privatization become more likely.Upgrade of SNS Bank's BFSR to D-:The upgrade of SNS Bank's standalone BFSR to D-/ba3 is primarilydriven by (1) the material improvement in the bank's solvencyposition following the measures announced at the time of theinstitution's nationalization; and (2) the drastic reduction ofcredit risk on its loan portfolio following the recognition of aEUR2 billion provision on its legacy Commercial Real Estate (CRE)portfolio.At end-June 2013, SNS Bank reported a core Tier 1 ratio of 12.2%,significantly above the level reported at year-end 2012 (6.1%).The material improvement of SNS Bank's nominal capital base wasdue to (1) the expropriation of capital (as decreed); (2) thelosses imposed on hybrid instruments; and (3) subsequent EUR1.9billion capital injection by the Dutch state. Against thisbackground, the risks on the legacy CRE portfolio, which SNS Bankstill holds until its transfer to the state-owned Real EstateManagement Company (REMC), have also materially abated followingthe recognition of the aforementioned EUR2 billion provision.Although Moody's expects further deterioration in the domesticCRE sector, the rating agency does not anticipate that SNS Bankwould incur additional losses on this portfolio until itstransfer to the REMC, as the EUR2 billion provision and existingloan loss provisions provide a substantial cushion againstfurther impairments (total provisions represent around 45% ofoutstanding legacy exposures according to data disclosed in SNSBank's June 2013 interim report).The upgrade of SNS Bank's BFSR also reflects Moody's view that(1) SNS Bank's risk profile will be considerably lower as thebank will focus solely on its core domestic retail bankingactivities; (2) profitability will materially improve, as thebank no longer incurs credit losses on its legacy portfolio andthe core activities generate sound recurring earnings; and (3)the bank's liquidity profile will remain a credit strength. Thebank has quickly compensated for the deposit outflows thatpreceded nationalization and its structural reliance on wholesalefunding will decline after the transfer of the legacy CREexposures.Rating Outlooks on SNS Bank's Long-Term Ratings and BFSR:The outlook on SNS Bank's BFSR is positive, reflecting Moody'sexpectation that the bank's standalone financial strength islikely to improve further if (1) the final restructuring plan isapproved by the EC; (2) tail risks within the legacy CREportfolio are addressed; and (3) the bank successfully restoresits domestic retail franchise.The outlook is stable on SNS Bank's long-term debt and depositratings. The outlook reflects Moody's view that an improvement ofthe bank's standalone financial profile would not automaticallyresult in an improvement of its long-term creditworthiness. Thisstance is consistent with Moody's assessment that, if SNS Bankrequired a third state-support package (1) the EuropeanCommission (EC) would likely seek to impose burden sharing, inline with its restructuring plan guidelines; and (2) burdensharing could impact senior instruments, given the current stateownership and in the absence of junior instruments in theliability structure.Confirmation of the Ratings of SNS REAAL'S Insurance Operations:Following the group's announcement that it will separate itsbanking and insurance operations, Moody's believes that thecontagion risks between SNS REAAL's insurance operations and SNSBank have abated. Therefore, SRLEV and REAALSchadeverzekeringen's IFSRs now reflect the standalone financialprofile of SNS REAAL's insurance operations.The Baa2 IFSRs and the stable outlook assigned to SRLEV and REAALSchadeverzekeringen take into account Moody's expectation ofcontinuous pressures on the profitability, solvency and financialflexibility of SNS REAAL's insurance operations because of (1)the low interest-rate environment; (2) the challenging Dutchinsurance market; and (3) the weak economic environment in theNetherlands.Moody's says that the insurance operations' leverage hasincreased to 45% at year-end 2012, notably as a result of adecline in shareholders' equity. Total shareholders' equitydecreased by 34% between year-end 2011 and year-end 2012,following significant impairment of intangible assets. Earningscoverage (0.7x on a five-year average basis) is also pressurizedby weakening profitability.The Baa2 IFSRs also reflect the uncertainties on the franchise ofthe insurance group. In Moody's opinion, the period preceding thenationalization had a negative impact on SNS REAAL's insuranceoperations franchise. The rating agency notes the continueduncertainty regarding SNS REAAL's ability to maintain itshistorically strong market positions, especially in the rapidlyevolving Dutch life insurance market, where insurance savings arefalling and competition in the pensions segment is growing. Theseuncertainties are reinforced by potential remedies that the ECcould impose on SNS REAAL's insurance operations, as part of theapproval of the Group's restructuring plan.Confirmation of SRLEV'S Hybrid Ratings:The B1(hyb) ratings on the hybrid securities issued by SRLEV arefive notches below its IFSR, which is wider than Moody's standardnotching practices for debt issued by operating insurancecompanies. This wider notching reflects the deferral of couponson these securities imposed by the EC under the authority grantedby its temporary approval on February 22, 2013, following thestate aid granted to SNS REAAL.At the same time, Moody's says that the B1(hyb) ratings and thedeveloping outlook attached to these ratings incorporate avariety of positive and negative credit scenarios.In particular, Moody's notes that the EC's approval of the stateaid was only temporary and the EC will shortly give its finaldecision on the basis of the restructuring plan submitted by SNSREAAL. At this stage, it remains uncertain whether the EC's finalapproval will lift or prolong the coupon ban on SRLEV's hybriddebts.Moody's says that the B1(hyb) ratings could be downgraded if thecoupon ban persists, thereby deferring coupons for a prolongedperiod of time. On the contrary, the B1(hyb) ratings may beupgraded if the coupon ban is lifted rapidly, and if the risks ofa liability exchange exercise, undertaken by SNS REAAL,diminished.Confirmation of the Holding Company's Senior Debt Rating:The confirmation of SNS REAAL's senior debt rating at (P)Ba2follows the confirmation of SNS Bank's deposit rating and ofSRLEV and REAAL Schadeverzekeringen's IFSRs. The (P)Ba2 ratingreflects the combination of (1) the relative credit strengths ofthe banking and insurance operations of SNS REAAL; (2) thestructural subordination of the revenues that the Group receivesin the form of dividends from operating companies; and (3)Moody's current assessment of systemic support for the bankingunit, and the resulting benefits attributable to creditors at theholding operations.SNS REAAL's (P)B2 subordinated debt rating reflects thesubordinated position of these creditors at the holding company,and, consistent with Moody's approach for rating subordinateddebts issued by a bank's holding company, is anchored by thestandalone financial profiles of the bank and the insuranceoperations.Moody's does not factor diversification benefits into SNS REAAL'sratings given the group's intention to separate its banking andinsurance operations.Withdrawal of Tier 1 And Dated Subordinated Debt Ratings:Moody's withdrew the C(hyb) ratings on all Tier 1 instruments andthe C ratings on all dated subordinated debt instruments issuedby SNS REAAL and SNS Bank. These instruments were expropriated onFebruary 1, 2013 by the Dutch government as part of thenationalization of the SNS REAAL group and have therefore ceasedto exist.Upgrade of SNS Bank's Subordinated Debt Program Rating:The upgrade to (P)B1 from (P)C of SNS Bank's provisionalsubordinated MTN program rating is driven by the improvement inthe institution's standalone credit profile and the resultinglower risks for subordinated bondholders. The provisional programrating is one notch below SNS Bank's BCA of ba3, reflecting thesubordinated claim in liquidation of the instruments that thebank could issue in the future under this program.What Could Move The Rating Up/Down- SNS BankSNS Bank's BFSR may be upgraded following a combination of thefollowing: (1) a successful restoring of the bank's franchisewith no material restriction from the EC on its businessactivities; (2) the approval of the final restructuring plan anda complete removal of tail risk on the legacy CRE portfolio; and(3) the bank maintaining a sound financial position against thecurrent domestic economic backdrop.The outlook is stable on SNS Bank's long-term senior unsecuredand deposit ratings, consistent with Moody's view that the bank'slong-term creditworthiness would not automatically strengthen asa result of an improvement of the bank's standalone financialprofile.The positive outlook on SNS Bank's BFSR indicates that Moody'sdoes not anticipate a downgrade in the foreseeable future.However, the BFSR could be downgraded in the event of any furtherdeterioration of the macroeconomic environment that affects thebank's financial position beyond Moody's expectations, notably asa result of higher-than-anticipated risks on domestic mortgageloans. The bank's BFSR may also be downgraded if the bank failsto restore its franchise or if the EC were to attach materialconditions to (or materially alter) its restructuring plan. Moregenerally, any deterioration in the bank's solvency or liquidityprofile or in its recurring earnings generation capacity, maylead to a downgrade of its BFSR.SNS Bank's long-term senior unsecured and deposit ratings couldbe downgraded as a result of a similar action on its BFSR, or ifMoody's lowers its probability of systemic support assumptionsfor SNS Bank's senior creditors or depositors. This reassessmentmay result notably from lower systemic importance for theinstitution, or from developments on the willingness to supportsenior creditors in the Netherlands.- SRLEV and REAAL SchadeverzekeringenAccording to Moody's, the IFSRs of the insurance companies couldbe downgraded if their franchises were to deteriorate, with anegative impact on the profitability of these operations, or iftheir solvency continued to deteriorate significantly.Conversely, the IFSRs could be upgraded if SRLEV and REAALSchadeverzekeringen were able to maintain strong marketpositions, while restoring good levels of profitability andcapitalization.Moody's adds that SRLEV's B1(hyb) debt ratings could bedowngraded if the rating agency believes that the probability ofa prolonged coupon deferral has increased for those instruments,for example if the EC maintained a coupon ban for theseinstruments. On the contrary, the B1(hyb) ratings could beupgraded if the EC lifted its coupon ban and if Moody'sconsidered that the risks of a liability exchange exercise onthese instruments -- implying losses for bondholders -- wereremote.- SNS REAALThe rating agency says that as long as SNS REAAL remains theholding company of both the banking and the insurance operations,a change in the bank's long-term ratings or of the insuranceentities' IFSRs could result in a change of the holding company'sratings. Furthermore, the provisional senior debt rating of SNSREAAL could be downgraded if Moody's lowers its assessment of theprobability of systemic support available to SNS REAAL'screditors.The following ratings were upgraded: - SNS Bank's bank financial strength rating upgraded to D-/ba3 from E/ca, and outlook revised to positive - SNS Bank's provisional subordinated program rating upgraded to (P)B1 from (P)C - SNS REAAL N.V.'s provisional subordinated program rating upgraded to (P)B2 from (P)CThe following ratings were confirmed: - SNS Bank's long-term senior unsecured and deposit ratings confirmed at Baa3, and outlook revised to stable - SNS Bank's provisional MTN program rating confirmed at (P)Baa3 - SNS Bank's short-term senior unsecured and deposit ratings confirmed at Prime-3 - SNS Bank's provisional short-term program rating confirmed at (P)Prime-3 - SRLEV N.V.'s insurance financial strength rating confirmed at Baa2, and outlook revised to stable; - REAAL Schadeverzekeringen N.V.'s insurance financial strength rating confirmed at Baa2, and outlook revised to stable; - SRLEV N.V.'s dated subordinated debt rating confirmed at B1(hyb), and outlook revised to developing; - SRLEV N.V.'s perpetual junior subordinated debt rating confirmed at B1(hyb), and outlook revised to developing; - SNS REAAL N.V.'s provisional senior unsecured program rating confirmed at (P)Ba2The following ratings were affirmed: - SNS REAAL N.V. commercial paper affirmed at Not Prime - SNS REAAL N.V. provisional short-term program rating affirmed at (P)Not PrimeThe following ratings were withdrawn: - SNS Bank's and SNS REAAL's subordinate notes previously rated C, no outlook - SNS Bank's and SNS REAAL's pref stock non-cumulative instruments, previously rated C(hyb), no outlookThe principal methodology used in rating SNS Bank N.V. was GlobalBanks published in May 2013.The methodologies used in rating REAAL Schadeverzekeringen N.V.and SRLEV N.V. were Moody's Global Rating Methodology forProperty and Casualty Insurers Published in May 2010, Moody'sGlobal Rating Methodology for Life Insurers published in May2010, and Moody's Guidelines for Rating Insurance HybridSecurities and Subordinated Debt Published in January 2010.The methodologies used in rating SNS REAAL NV were Global Bankspublished in May 2013, Moody's Global Rating Methodology forProperty and Casualty Insurers Published in May 2010, and Moody'sGlobal Rating Methodology for Life Insurers published in May2010.List of affected Issuers by Releasing Office France:Releasing Office: Moody's France SAS 96 Boulevard Haussmann 75008 Paris FranceIssuer : SNS Reaal N.V.Issuer : SRLEV NVIssuer : REAAL Schadeverzekeringen NV=============R O M A N I A=============AVERSA: Michael Topolinski Acquires Business--------------------------------------------Cristi Moga at Ziarul Financiar reports that Michael Topolinskihas acquired bankrupt pump maker Aversa in Bucharest.Mr. Topolinski was assisted in the transaction by law firm BirisGoran, Ziarul Financiar discloses.Aversa is based in Romania.GALLI GALLO: Poultry Market Woes Prompt Insolvency--------------------------------------------------Gabriel Razi at Ziarul Financiar reports that Galli Gallo wentinsolvent at its own request amid difficulties on the poultrymarket and weighed down by debts.Galli Gallo is the largest turkey farmer and turkey meatprocessor in Romania.===========R U S S I A===========BREBORO HOLDINGS: S&P Assigns 'B-' CCR; Outlook Stable------------------------------------------------------Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it has assigned its'B-' long-term corporate credit rating and 'ruBBB-' Russianational scale rating to Cyprus-registered holding companyBreboro Holdings Co. and its fully owned subsidiary LLC MCKvartstroy, which develop residential real estate in Russia. Theoutlook is stable.S&P has also assigned its 'B-' long-term and 'ruBBB-' issueratings to the proposed RUB1.5 billion senior unsecured notes tobe issued by Kvartstroy. The recovery rating on these proposednotes is '4', reflecting S&P's expectation of average recovery(30%-50%) for bondholders in the event of a payment default.The rating reflects S&P's assessment of Breboro's business riskprofile as "vulnerable," based primarily on the generally highcyclicality and capital intensity of the real estate developmentbusiness in Russia. It also factors in the risks associated withthe relatively small size of the company, and a highconcentration of income derived from projects in one area, NizhnyNovgorod. S&P believes that Breboro has weak long-term equitysupport, which constrains the scope of future developmentprojects and, consequently, the company's ability to improveoperating margins and free cash flow from operations. S&P viewsequity support as weak because just over 30% of the company'sequity capital may be called back by its holders in 2015, unlessa new agreement is drawn up or new equity investors are found.This consideration drives S&P's assessment of Breboro'smanagement and governance score as "weak," which contributes tothe overall business risk profile assessment.S&P believes that Breboro has well-established market positionsin some of Russia's larger industrial cities, such as NizhnyNovgorod and Volgograd. S&P acknowledges the company's trackrecord in developing and marketing quality smaller-sizeapartments that address the needs of mid-income consumers. S&Pbelieves that demand for residential housing in Russia hasreceived a boost from a range of government initiatives -- suchas residential mortgage lending expansion by state-owned or -supported banking organizations -- which seek to addressshortages of quality housing in Russia.However, cyclicality of demand and prices is high in the house-building industry. Furthermore, S&P views Breboro's exposure tohouse price volatility as above average because of the modestsize of its development portfolio -- 261,500 square meters underconstruction -- and high concentration of income derived fromonly four projects in 2013 -- three in Nizhny Novgorod and one inVolgograd. S&P believes that the geographical focus on NizhnyNovgorod is likely to increase over the next three years as 80%of the 1,303,000 square meters currently in the predevelopmentphase relates to projects in the city. S&P also factors in theunpredictability of local regulatory decisions in Russia andgrowth prospects in Nizhny Novgorod and Volgograd, which are, inS&P's view, lower than in Moscow or St. Petersburg. Althoughthere is structural demand for new homes in Russia, it remainshighly correlated to GDP growth. S&P projects Russia's GDP willslow in 2013 to 2.5% compared with 3.4% in 2012. The supply ofhousing developments also relies greatly on the current lowinterest rates."We view Breboro's financial risk profile as "highly leveraged."In our view, Breboro has high short- to medium-term liabilities,stemming from the put options that the 30.5% shareholder, ConluLtd., can exercise over the next three years, namely atcompletion of two major projects in 2014 and 2015 and attermination of the shareholders' agreement in March 2015. Weview the latter put option as a potential risk affecting thelong-term continuity of Breboro's equity. However, weacknowledge Conlu's strong commitment to find a third-partyinvestor without hampering Breboro's self-funding capacity,should the 69.5% shareholder Kvartstroy Investment Ltd. be unableto redeem its shares," S&P said.S&P believes the company's financial flexibility also remainsconstrained by the high working capital needs of its residentialdevelopment projects, which are likely to require additionalexternal liquidity before there is a material step-up in freecash flow generation from its development operations. As aresult, S&P forecasts the ratio of debt to debt and equity,including its adjustments, to remain close to 60%, which S&Pviews as consistent with a highly leveraged financial riskprofile.The stable outlook on Breboro reflects S&P's opinion that itsoperating performance over the next 6-12 months should benefitfrom stable demand for smaller apartments in its main localmarkets, as well as from stable prices in the broader residentialproperty segment. S&P believes that Breboro's establishedoperations will allow it to seek alternative sources of debt andequity funding to stabilize its capital structure before 2015.That said, S&P's credit rating highlights the long-term businessand financial constraints that are placed on the company by itscurrent capital structure.S&P could lower the ratings if an unexpected fall in demandaffected the company's cash flow generation and operating margin.S&P could also take a negative rating action if it saw evidenceof Breboro's shareholder support weakening further over the next12 months.Rating upside is limited at this stage, as it would be contingenton Breboro being able to significantly increase its equity base.* Moody's Notes Higher Credit Risks for Russia's Consumer Banks---------------------------------------------------------------Russia's consumer finance banks face increasing credit risks inthe unsecured retail lending market, says Moody's InvestorsService in a new Special Comment entitled "Russian ConsumerFinance Banks: Rising Credit Risks Accelerate Asset QualityWeaknesses." Higher credit risks have accelerated thedeterioration in the banks' asset quality in 2013, leading tolower profits and reduced capital buffers over the next 12-18months.Moody's bases its view on three key drivers (1) Russianconsumers' growing debt burden; (2) the banks' rapid growth inpersonal loans; and (3) the country's weak growth outlook. Thesefactors are exerting credit negative pressure on the ratedRussian consumer finance banks.Banks that are likely to continue to be affected the most interms of a deterioration in asset quality, are those with highercredit-risk appetites, as measured by (1) a track record of rapidretail lending growth; (2) historical and current high creditcosts ; and (3) modest capital buffers and lower core earnings,which imply weaker loss-absorption capacity. Banks that arefollowing more prudent risk strategies will likely continue to beaffected to a lesser extent.Despite Moody's expectation of slower lending growth in H2 2013following new bank regulations introduced, most consumer financebanks are still growing very rapidly. The continued high lendinggrowth rate will likely lead to further deterioration in thebanks' asset quality due to households' weakening capacity torepay debt. Indicative of this, credit costs for rated consumerbanks increased by 1.5 times in the first half of 2013 andMoody's expects this trend to continue.Moody's will continue to assess how the deteriorating trend inRussia's consumer finance banks asset quality develops and anyresulting implications for the banks' credit profiles.===============S L O V E N I A===============* Slovenian Bank Clean-Up Still Uncertain Despite Progress----------------------------------------------------------The announcement of the resolution of two small Slovenian banksunderlines the authorities' determination to tackle weaknesses inthe banking sector without imposing losses on senior creditors,Fitch Ratings says. But the banks involved are small and withouta timely transfer of problem assets to the state-owned "badbank", a much-needed clean-up of the system remains uncertain.The overall clean-up costs could be underestimated by theSlovenian government. The EUR1 billion guarantee issued by thesovereign to support the liquidity of Probanka and Factor Bankais large, particularly as these two banks make up just 4.5% ofbanking sector assets. This indicates that the contingent risksfor the sovereign could rise."There is already significant divergence between official andFitch estimates of bank recapitalization costs. We estimateSlovenian banks could need EUR2.8 billion (8% of GDP) of freshcapital, more than 2x the official estimate, because we maketougher assumptions on peak non-performing loan levels, theircoverage and target capital ratios. In addition, the sovereignmay also need to provide liquidity to support the transfer ofassets to the bad bank. However, our base case remains that thesovereign can afford the bank restructuring costs," Fitch says.Non-performing loans have continued to increase and we believethey have yet to peak despite a recent slowing in the pace ofeconomic contraction. The uncertain market conditions mean thatagreeing an appropriate transfer value for the bad bank assetsamong several parties, including the European Commission, is achallenge. It is possible the asset transfer could be pushed backagain, having already been extended by four months to October.The sub-investment grade Issuer Default Ratings of the threelargest banks -- NLB, NKBM and Abanka -- already reflectsignificant uncertainty about timely provision of sufficientsupport to the banks.The delays with the timing of asset transfers to the bad bankincrease the risk that additional credit losses will arise asportfolios continue to deteriorate. Further weakening ofcapitalization from loan impairment losses could also lead tofurther downgrades for the Viability Ratings of Slovenian banksfrom already low levels.The announced wind-down of the two small banks has had limitedimpact on customer deposits within the system so far. However,the Slovenian market is highly interconnected and a sharptightening of liquidity at those two banks could raise systemicrisk."We continue to believe that support will be forthcoming for thelargest banks, so the recapitalizations will not involve lossesfor senior creditors. The treatment of bank depositors and seniorcreditors in the resolution of the two small banks supports thisview. The resolution stipulates that hybrid and othersubordinated debt will be subject to burden sharing, consistentwith new EU state aid requirements introduced in August. Butthere is significant uncertainty, particularly in light ofcontinued delays with recapitalizing the banks, which is why theIDRs are low," Fitch says."We expect further consolidation in the banking sector in themedium term, which combined with restructuring should help createa smaller number of more efficient and viable institutions. Thiscould involve foreign investors."=========S P A I N=========BANCO DE SABADELL: S&P Affirms 'BB/B' Ratings; Outlook Negative---------------------------------------------------------------Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'BB/B' long- andshort-term counterparty credit ratings on Spain-based Banco deSabadell S.A. (Sabadell). The outlook is negative.The affirmation reflects S&P's view that Sabadell's announcedcapital increase will improve the bank's creditworthiness bymaterially strengthening its relatively weak capitalization,although S&P believes that the bank's capital position is stillexposed to potential risks, mainly relating to the challengingoperating environment in Spain.On Sept. 9, 2013, Sabadell announced a plan to increase capitalby between EUR1.3 billion and EUR1.4 billion through thecombination of accelerated bookbuilding and a rights issue. Thebookbuilding, which has already been completed, will cover EUR650million and the bank will raise the rest through the rightsissue. The operation is fully underwritten for the amount stillto be raised. S&P understands that Sabadell has undertaken thiscapital increase to strengthen regulatory capital ratios, inaccordance with its capital management policy.In S&P's opinion, the announced capital increase, together withSabadell's ongoing deleveraging and internal capital generation,will meaningfully improve the bank's solvency from its currentlyrelatively weak position. S&P now estimates that over the next24 months its risk-adjusted capital (RAC) ratio for Sabadell willreach just under 5%, a level that remains consistent with itscurrent assessment of Sabadell's capital. S&P also acknowledgesSabadell's financial flexibility, which it has demonstratedthrough being able to raise capital even in difficult times.Sabadell has raised EUR2.3 billion of fresh capital in total in2012 and 2013.However, S&P still sees potential risks to the bank'sprofitability from the weak operating environment in Spain.S&P's assessment is also constrained by Sabadell's relativelymodest quality of capital because of the level of deferred taxassets, which is higher than peers'. Deferred tax assetsrepresented 53% of total adjusted capital (pro forma, includingthe effect of the capital increase currently underway) as ofyear-end 2012.S&P has maintained its assessments of Sabadell's "adequate"business position, "moderate" risk position, "average" funding,and "moderate" liquidity. S&P continues to assess Sabadell'sstand-alone credit profile (SACP) at 'b+'.S&P also continues to incorporate a one-notch uplift in itsratings for short-term support to reflect its belief that theEuropean Central Bank's (ECB) long-term refinancing operationsshould give Sabadell time to address its liquidity imbalances andachieve adequate funding and liquidity. S&P also maintains aone-notch uplift over the SACP for potential extraordinarygovernment support, based on its view of Sabadell's high systemicimportance and Spain's supportive stance towards its bankingsystem.The negative outlook on Sabadell reflects the possibility thatS&P could lower the rating if the conditions in which Spanishbanks operate deteriorate further or S&P lowers the long-termsovereign credit rating on Spain. If the latter happened, allelse remaining equal, S&P would no longer include the one-notchuplift for potential extraordinary government support into itsratings on Sabadell, in accordance with its criteria.S&P could also consider lowering the rating if it believes thatthe bank's liquidity position is unlikely to improve in line withits current expectations, and that it is likely to continue torely on short-term wholesale funding, including the ECB liquidityfacilities."We could revise the outlook on Sabadell to stable if we alsorevised the outlook on the long-term sovereign credit rating onSpain to stable and we expected an easing in the negative trendswe see for the operating environment for banks in Spain. Wecould also revise Sabadell's outlook to stable, all else beingequal, if we anticipated a sustainable strengthening ofSabadell's asset quality and solvency beyond our currentexpectations. Specifically, we could revise the outlook to stableif the bank smoothly manages the nonperforming assets of BancoCAM and improves asset quality performance closer to the systemaverage (as it was before Sabadell acquired Banco CAM). Anoutlook revision to stable would also hinge on Sabadell meetingour expectation that the bank will sustain a stronger level ofcapital both in quantitative and qualitative terms, including aRAC ratio comfortably above 5%," S&P noted.CODERE SA: Decision to Delay Bond Coupon May Trigger CDS Payouts----------------------------------------------------------------Katie Linsell and Julie Miecamp at Bloomberg News report thatCodere SA's decision to delay payment of a bond coupon until twodays after the money is due may trigger payouts on credit-defaultswaps insuring US$444 million of the Spanish gaming company'sdebt.Bloomberg relates that Codere said on Friday it paid a penalty tochange the terms of a EUR99 million (US$132 million) loan fromprivate-equity firms Canyon Partners LLC and Blackstone GroupLP's GSO Capital Partners requiring the facility to be repaidshould the coupon be paid. According to Bloomberg, the statementsaid that it will now miss a payment on its US$300 million of9.25% bonds due Sept. 15 and pay the money two days later.That delay will enable buyers of credit-default swap protectionto seek a ruling from the International Swaps & DerivativesAssociation that there's been a failure-to-pay credit event andthat the contracts should be settled, Bloomberg states.Stan Manoukian, founder of Independent Credit Research, whichsupplies analysis to distressed debt investors, said that maysimplify a restructuring of Codere because the company could thenwork with the remaining creditors to repair the business,Bloomberg notes."Non-payment of the coupon would trigger the CDS and allow somefunds involved in the restructuring to cash out," Bloombergquotes Mr. Manoukian as saying.According to Bloomberg, the statement said that some of Codere'ssenior lenders agreed to increase the loan from Canyon and GSOCapital by EUR35 million. The facility matures on Jan. 5 and canbe drawn down as many as three times between Sept. 17 and Dec. 5,Bloomberg notes. The statement said that the commitment fee is3.25% per year on the undrawn borrowing and the company has topay the greater of 7% over benchmark rates or 8%a year for anymoney taken, Bloomberg relates.Investor confidence in the company deteriorated as it negotiatedwith lenders, with its 8.25% notes due June 2015 falling to 51cents on the euro from 80 cents in May, according to Bloombergdata.According to Bloomberg, the company said that the majority ofholders of Codere's 8.25% bonds agreed to amend the terms toallow the loan to be increased. Investors in both Codere'sdollar- and euro-denominated notes agree they won't forcerepayment when the coupon is paid late, Bloomberg notes.A total of 3,192 swaps contracts insuring Codere's debt wereoutstanding as of Sept. 6, Bloomberg says, citing the DepositoryTrust & Clearing Corp.Five-year contracts signaled a 97% chance of the companydefaulting during that period and cost EUR5.2 million in advanceand EUR500,000 annually to insure EUR10 million of Codere's debt,Bloomberg states.Codere SA is a Spain-based company engaged, together with itssubsidiaries, in the operation of activities related to theprivate gaming sector, principally in the operation of arcade andslot machines, sports betting houses, bingo halls, casinos andracetracks. The Company has presence in Spain, Italy, Argentina,Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Panama and Uruguay. * * *As reported by the Trobuled Company Reporter-Europe on Aug. 22,2013, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it had lowered to'SD' from 'CC' its long-term corporate credit rating on Spain-based gaming company Codere S.A.PESCANOVA SA: Damm-Led Shareholder Group Ousts Former Chairman--------------------------------------------------------------Miles Johnson at The Financial Times reports that a group ofshareholders in Pescanova SA seized control of the scandal-hitSpanish frozen fish company from its former chairman in a vote onThursday, as it seeks to renegotiate previously hidden debts ofEUR3.6 billion with its lenders.Investors led by Damm, the Catalan brewing company, which isPescanova's second-biggest shareholder with a 5.84% stake, won asweeping victory in the vote to remove the fishing group's formerchairman from the board and install new directors, the FTrelates.Juan Manuel Urgoiti, a veteran banker who ran the nownationalized Banco Gallego and sits on the board of clothinggroup Inditex, was installed as the company's new non-executivechairman, at the Damm-led investors' suggestion, the FTdiscloses.Damm's proposal for the board, which along with its own candidateincluded three members who were present during the period whenPescanova concealed its debts, won 70.8% of the votes of theinvestors present, or 37% of the total outstanding shares, the FTsays.Cartesian Capital, a US-based fund that holds 5% of Pescanova,had proposed Baldomero Falcones, former chief executive of theconstruction company FCC, as its candidate for chairman, arguingthat an entirely new group of directors with no connection to thecompany was required, the FT notes.According to the FT, Manuel Fernandez de Sousa, former chairmanof Pescanova, who as the son of its founder remains its largestsingle investor with a 7.5% stake, had also proposed at themeeting that the current board, including himself, should remainin place. But this was voted down at the meeting in Vigo in thenorth-western region of Galicia, the FT relays.Mr. Fernandez de Sousa, who has denied any wrongdoing, is beinginvestigated in both Spanish criminal and civil courts forallegedly presiding over accounting fraud at the company, andhaving secretly sold half of his then 15% stake before thebusiness revealed its problems, the FT discloses.Pescanova is a Galicia-based fishing company. The companycatches, processes, and packages fish on factory ships. It isone of the world's largest fishing groups.Pescanova filed for insolvency on April 15, 2013, on at leastEUR1.5 billion (US$2 billion) of debt run up to fuel expansionbefore economic crisis hit its earnings. The Pontevedramercantile court in northwestern Galicia accepted Pescanova'sinsolvency petition on April 25. The court ordered the board ofdirectors to step down and proposed Deloitte as the firm'sadministrator.* SPAIN: Falling Bank Lending Threatens Small Companies-------------------------------------------------------Angeline Benoit at Bloomberg News reports that while Spanishmanufacturing and services expanded in August for the first timein more than two years, falling bank lending threatens smallcompanies in a country where only 2% of businesses employ morethan 20 people. That is overshadowing the recovery PrimeMinister Mariano Rajoy forecasts after a two-year recession,Bloomberg notes."Spanish companies are most often small family-run operations,"Bloomberg quotes Nathalie Gianese, director of studies at InformaD&B, the research arm of Spanish risk insurer CESCE S.A., assaying. "Between the slump in revenue and their limited means,these small firms are disadvantaged at a time when banks areseeking to reduce risk as much as possible."The number of companies seeking protection from creditorsincreased by 26% through August compared with the same period ayear earlier, Bloomberg says, citing a report published byInforma D&B. According to Bloomberg, Spain's national statisticsinstitute said last month that in the second quarter, 73% ofbusinesses in such a predicament employed fewer than 20 people.Lending by banks to non-financial corporations fell 1.3% in Julyfrom June in Spain, more than in Portugal, Ireland and Greece,while it rose in Italy, Bloomberg says, citing data compiled bythe European Central Bank. Since January, it has declined almost10% in Spain, Bloomberg notes.Bank of Spain Chief Economist Jose Luis Malo de Molina said inJuly that deleveraging in the economy makes funding restrictionsfar worse for smaller enterprises, which are paying interestrates at least 2 or 3 percentage points higher than similarbusinesses elsewhere, Bloomberg relates.Asked about the option of developing so-called mezzanine creditfor such businesses, which would give lenders the rights toconvert debt into equity, European Central Bank President MarioDraghi said that the ECB is working on measures with the EuropeanCommission and the European Investment Bank, Bloomberg notes. Hedidn't specify a time frame, Bloomberg states.According to Bloomberg, the reluctance of Spanish banks to lendis forcing businesses to resort to other methods of finding cash.===========================U N I T E D K I N G D O M===========================DIXONS RETAIL: Moody's Changes Outlook on 'B1' CFR to Stable------------------------------------------------------------Moody's Investors Service changed to stable from negative theoutlook on the B1 corporate family rating and senior unsecuredrating of Dixons Retail plc. Concurrently, Moody's affirmed theB1 corporate family rating, B1-PD probability of default ratingand B1 senior unsecured rating assigned to the company."The change in outlook to stable is prompted by our view that inthe past few quarters, Dixons has delivered a resilientperformance in its core UK market, where it now benefits from astronger competitive position," says Yasmina Serghini-Douvin aVice President-Senior Analyst at Moody's and lead analyst forDixons. "The outlook change also factors in the irrevocable offerreceived by the company with respect to its loss-making onlineretailer PIXmania, as well as Dixons' disposal of its Turkishoperations, which, in our opinion, will boost its profitabilitygoing forward and will enable management to focus more onstrengthening the core businesses."Ratings Rationale:The rating action reflects Moody's view that in the past fewquarters, Dixons' performance has been resilient in its coremarket, the UK & Ireland. In its first quarter ended July 31,2013, Dixons' total like-for-like sales growth was 2%, driven bya positive performance in its main market, where the company'slike-for-like sales increased by 6%, in the Nordics (+5%), anddespite deeply negative sales in southern Europe (-12%) and atPIXmania (-28%). Although Moody's believes that Dixons willremain subject to tough trading conditions in the UK, it benefitsfrom an improved competitive position there as a result of thecollapse last year of one of its main competitors, Comet. This,together with Dixons' sustained efforts in narrowing the pricingdifferential with e-tailers and enhancing its store and serviceoffering, should support its operational performance goingforward.The change in outlook to stable also incorporates Moody's viewthat the company's decisive actions to sell its Turkishoperations and its pure-play e-tailer PIXmania will be beneficialto Dixons' profitability and credit metrics. Dixons has receivedan irrevocable offer from mutares A.G., a German industrialholding company, to purchase PIXmania. As part of thistransaction, Dixons will provide approximately EUR69 million(approximately GBP58 million) to mutares, before any adjustmentrelated to PIXmania's working capital, to support its plan forPIXmania. Dixons has also entered into an agreement to sell itsElectroWorld operations in Turkey to Bimeks, one of the leadingelectrical specialist retailers in Turkey. The rating actionassumes that both transactions will close in the course of thisfinancial year: Dixons expects the sale of ElectroWorld Turkey toclose by the end of this calendar year and the transaction onPIXmania to complete within the next few months, after aconsultation period with PIXmania's Works Councils.In light of the considerable pressure on earnings of electricaland electronic retailers in Continental Europe, Moody's believesthat these transactions will enhance Dixons' profitabilitybecause PIXmania and the Turkish business were both loss-makinglast year and a drag on the company's consolidated earnings: theyreported an underlying operating loss of, respectively, GBP31.3million and GBP9 million in the financial year ended April 30,2013, compared with an underlying operating profit of GBP178.1million for the group as a whole (before central costs). From astrategic standpoint, the sale of PIXmania -- which had been afocus of Dixons management's attention in the recent past -- willalso enable Dixons to focus more on its core businesses,especially in the UK & Ireland.Whilst the sale of PIXmania will result in a material cashoutflow for Dixons, not offset by the cash consideration of GBP2million to be received from Bimeks, Moody's believes that thetransaction will support Dixons' credit metrics going forwardbecause the company will deconsolidate the losses of its Turkishoperations and PIXmania, and any liabilities held by thesesubsidiaries including leases. In Moody's view, thesetransactions, and Dixons' positive sales momentum in the UK, arelikely to result in a reduction in the company's adjusted (gross)debt/EBITDA towards 5.5x compared with 6.5x in the year to April2013. This would position the company more adequately in the B1rating category.What Could Change The Rating Up/DownPositive pressure on the rating or outlook could occur if thecompany's earnings were to sustainably improve, translating intobetter credit metrics including a debt/EBITDA ratio comfortablybelow 5.0x and an EBITA/interest expense ratio sustained at, orhigher than, 2.0x.Conversely, negative pressure could occur if the company'soperating performance or liquidity profile were to deteriorate.Quantitatively, this would translate into a debt/EBITDA ratioincreasing towards 6.0x and an EBITA/interest expense ratio below1.5x.Principal MethodologyThe principal methodology used in this rating was the GlobalRetail Industry published in June 2011. Other methodologies usedinclude Loss Given Default for Speculative-Grade Non-FinancialCompanies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA published in June 2009.Headquartered in Hemel Hempstead, England, Dixons Retail plc. isone of Europe's leading specialist consumer electrical retailers.It posted revenues of GBP8.2 billion for the financial yearending April 30, 2013.FORDGATE COMMERCIAL: Fitch Affirms 'B' Rating on Class B Notes--------------------------------------------------------------Fitch Ratings has affirmed Fordgate Commercial SecuritisationNo.1 plc's notes, as follows: GBP238.1m class A (XS0027160018): affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable GBP23.8m class B (XS02716505148): affirmed at 'Bsf'; Outlook StableKey Rating DriversThe affirmation reflects that a slight improvement in collateralperformance has not changed Fitch's view on a likely loan defaultat maturity in October 2013. Although the whole loan-to-valueratio (LTV) is reported at 87%, this is based on values as at theOctober 2006 closing; Fitch's estimate of 130% is consistent withan expectation not of refinancing (particularly as the sponsor isunlikely to inject equity) but rather of a managed disposalprocess. Fitch estimates a securitized LTV of between 85% and90%, which together with excess cash flow should allow for noterepayment by maturity in October 2016.Since the previous rating action in September 2012 gross rentshave risen to GBP24.8 million from GBP24.0 million, whilst thesecuritized interest coverage ratio (ICR) has increased to 1.50xfrom 1.44x. This improvement is largely down to the Friar Bridgeasset, located south of the River Thames on Blackfriars Road,which experienced a rise in occupancy to approximately 90% from75% 12 months ago. Although rent achieved is much lower thanlevels seen prior to the market slow-down, the successful re-letting of a few units (following the recent expansion of onetenant's presence after the previous occupier vacated) suggeststhere is continued interest in Aberdeen among oil majors.The portfolio includes three Aberdeen offices, so this is awelcome sign. Overall, the collateral comprises mainly largesecondary assets let to financially strong tenants, but on shortremaining lease terms. In assets such as these Fitch has assumedhigh levels of structural vacancy.Following the expected loan event of default at maturity, Fitchunderstands that debt ranking subordinate to the securitized loanwill stop benefitting from cash sweep of excess funds. Theborrower's interest rate swap will also expire, allowing fundingcosts to fall in line with market rates of interest. Both thesechanges should establish a stream of excess cash flow capable ofcontributing materially towards either note amortization(sequentially) or (more likely) a capex program. In Fitch's view,exploiting excess funds in this way will be vital for asuccessful work-out and note repayment by October 2016.Rating SensitivitiesIf the work-out becomes protracted, and is not accompanied by asubstantial capex program and/or deleveraging, this will likelyresult in a downgrade for both classes of notes.LEHMAN BROTHERS: Payout to Unsecured Creditors Expected in Nov.---------------------------------------------------------------Terry Murden at The Scotsman reports that all creditors in thecollapse of Lehman Brothers five years ago are a step closer torecovering the entirety of their claims, with the -- possibilityfor additional -- interest payments.According to The Scotsman, administrators at PwC said thatanother significant payout to unsecured creditors is expected inNovember. In March this year, a top-end payout of 116.2p in thepound was forecast, but this could be higher, The Scotsmannotes.Since the start of the administration PwC has returned GBP21billion to creditors through a 68.5p in the pound payout, TheScotsman discloses. The prospect of a 100% recovery for anyinsolvent estate is unusual, The Scotsman states. According toThe Scotsman, Tony Lomas, joint administrator and PwC partner,described it as "one of the most complex insolvencies thefinancial world has ever seen."A total of 2,100 unsecured creditor claims totaling GBP9 billionhave now been admitted to the Lehman estate and -- another 1,300claims worth GBP7.5 billion have been filed but -- remain to beagreed, The Scotsman discloses. About Lehman BrothersLehman Brothers Holdings Inc. -- http://www.lehman.com/-- was the fourth largest investment bank in the United States. Formore than 150 years, Lehman Brothers has been a leader in theglobal financial markets by serving the financial needs ofcorporations, governmental units, institutional clients andindividuals worldwide.Lehman Brothers filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.Case No. 08-13555) on Sept. 15, 2008. Lehman's bankruptcypetition disclosed US$639 billion in assets and US$613 billion indebts, effectively making the firm's bankruptcy filing thelargest in U.S. history. Several other affiliates followedthereafter.Affiliates Merit LLC, LB Somerset LLC and LB Preferred SomersetLLC sought for bankruptcy protection in December 2009.The Debtors' bankruptcy cases are handled by Judge James M. Peck.Harvey R. Miller, Esq., Richard P. Krasnow, Esq., Lori R. Fife,Esq., Shai Y. Waisman, Esq., and Jacqueline Marcus, Esq., atWeil, Gotshal & Manges, LLP, in New York, represent Lehman. EpiqBankruptcy Solutions serves as claims and noticing agent.Dennis F. Dunne, Esq., Evan Fleck, Esq., and Dennis O'Donnell,Esq., at Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy LLP, in New York, serveas counsel to the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors.Houlihan Lokey Howard & Zukin Capital, Inc., is the Committee'sinvestment banker.On Sept. 19, 2008, the Honorable Gerard E. Lynch of the U.S.District Court for the Southern District of New York, entered anorder commencing liquidation of Lehman Brothers, Inc., pursuantto the provisions of the Securities Investor Protection Act (CaseNo. 08-CIV-8119 (GEL)). James W. Giddens has been appointed astrustee for the SIPA liquidation of the business of LBI.The Bankruptcy Court approved Barclays Bank Plc's purchase ofLehman Brothers' North American investment banking and capitalmarkets operations and supporting infrastructure for US$1.75billion. Nomura Holdings Inc., the largest brokerage house inJapan, purchased LBHI's operations in Europe for US$2 plus theretention of most of employees. Nomura also bought Lehman'soperations in the Asia Pacific for US$225 million.Lehman emerged from bankruptcy protection on March 6, 2012, morethan three years after it filed the largest bankruptcy in U.S.history. The Chapter 11 plan for the Lehman companies other thanthe broker was confirmed in December 2011.Lehman made its first payment of $22.5 billion to creditors inApril 2012, a second payment of $10.2 billion on Oct. 1, 2012,and a third distribution of $14.2 billion on April 4, 2013. Thebrokerage is yet to make a first distribution to non-customers,although customers are being paid in full.Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., publishes Lehman BrothersBankruptcy News. The newsletter tracks the Chapter 11 proceedingundertaken by Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc., and otherinsolvency and bankruptcy proceedings undertaken by itsaffiliates.===============X X X X X X X X===============* High-Yield Bond Issuance for EMEA Surges Past US$100 Billion--------------------------------------------------------------Speculative-grade rated non-financial corporates in EMEA issuedbonds totaling US$12 billion in July/August, taking the last 12months issuance to US$104 billion says Moody's in the Septemberedition of its "High Yield Interest -- European Edition"publication. Year-to-date issuance of US$75 billion alreadyexceeds the previous record full year issuance of US$70 billionin 2012."The market has returned speedily from the problems experiencedin June, with new issuer yields adjusting to revisedexpectations, particularly for B-rated companies," saysChetan Modi, Managing Director in Moody's European leveragedfinance team. "We now anticipate that full year issuance willexceed US$100 billion, in line with the last 12 months."In addition, the September edition includes new charts and dataincluding on issuance activity in the euro area periphery thatwill provide investors with greater clarity on high-yield trends.The report also discusses Moody's new methodology for debt andequity treatment of speculative-grade hybrid instruments, and therating agency's expectation that the slight improvement in macrotrends will result in fewer downgrades for non-financial EMEAcorporates.* Moody's Says Better EUR Economy to Result in Fewer Downgrades---------------------------------------------------------------The slightly improving macroeconomic trends in Europe could leadto a narrowing of the gap between rating upgrades and downgradesfor EMEA corporates, says Moody's Investors Service in a SpecialComment report entitled "EMEA Non-Financial Corporates: FewerDowngrades Likely to Follow Improvement in Europe's MacroeconomicTrends.""The percentage of ratings with negative outlooks or ratings onreview for downgrade has fallen slightly for the first time inseveral quarters to around 26% due to slightly improvingmacroeconomic trends in Europe, reflected by euro area GDP risingby 0.3% on the quarter in Q2 2013," says Jean-Michel Carayon, aMoody's Senior Vice President and author of the report. "We stillexpect more rating downgrades than upgrades in the third quarterbut are likely to approach a balance between the two in Q4 unlessthere is an unexpected, dramatic deterioration in cyclicalindustries such as mining, steel or chemicals."Moody's currently expects the fundamental business conditions forthe following nine sectors covering EMEA corporates to be stableover the next 12-18 months, reflected by their stable outlooks:airlines, automotive manufacturers, building materials,integrated oil, oilfield services and drilling, refining andmarketing, exploration and production, pharmaceutical, andtobacco. Seven other sectors are currently on a negative outlook:automotive parts suppliers, base metals, chemicals, retail, steelproducers, shipping and telecommunications. Meanwhile, only foursectors carry a positive outlook: beverages, cable operators,consumer products, and paper and forest products. However, thereare unlikely to be any significant shifts before the end of theyear, especially as cyclical industries remain under pressurefrom emerging market slowdowns.Despite signs that Europe is exiting recession, the creditquality of select non-financial corporates will still be affectedby the macroeconomic weakness in the euro area periphery.Corporates in the periphery remain more exposed to downgradesthan corporates in other regions of Europe as their exposure tothe region is usually significant.Overall, liquidity remains solid. Despite Moody's concerns thatliquidity might deteriorate, investor appetite for bonds remainsstrong, which favors market access for all corporates, and hasbeen beneficial for liquidity.* Fitch Sees Improvement in Credit Quality of Eurozone Entities---------------------------------------------------------------Fitch Ratings says in the latest edition of its Credit MarketQuarterly EMEA that the credit quality of eurozone entities isbeginning to turn a corner. Rating downgrades continue todiminish as the region emerges from six quarters of economiccontraction. The rating stabilization is driven by financials butthe potential for further downgrades is highlighted by the still-elevated level of Negative Outlooks and Rating Watches for thesector.On-going bank deleveraging caused the 28% fall in overall bondissuance in the year to end August compared with the same periodlast year - pre-funding by non-financials at 2.5 times maturitieswas insufficient to alleviate a 44% decline in new bonds fromfinancials. Investor sentiment remains cautious, reflected in therelatively high allocation to cash. Opportunities are seen infinancial-sector bonds and high-yield despite a concern that thelatter is overvalued.Peripheral Europe is also showing signs of improving credittrends, following a significant reduction in negative ratingactions on entities in GIIPS nations. However, this is not yetreflected in higher issuance volumes, with both financials andnon-financials exhibiting declines -- although recent investorreception to issuance from their associated sovereigns has beenpositive.* BOND PRICING: For the Week September 9 to September 13, 2013--------------------------------------------------------------Issuer Coupon Maturity Currency Price------ ------ -------- -------- -----AUSTRIA-------A-TEC INDUSTRIES 8.750 10/27/2014 EUR 27.75A-TEC INDUSTRIES 2.750 5/10/2014 EUR 29.13IMMOFINANZ 4.250 3/8/2018 EUR 4.29RAIFF CENTROBANK 8.907 7/24/2013 EUR 58.30RAIFF CENTROBANK 8.588 1/23/2013 EUR 73.37RAIFF CENTROBANK 7.965 1/23/2013 EUR 55.53RAIFF CENTROBANK 7.873 1/23/2013 EUR 66.96RAIFF CENTROBANK 7.646 1/23/2013 EUR 45.43RAIFF CENTROBANK 5.097 1/23/2013 EUR 58.24RAIFF CENTROBANK 8.417 1/22/2014 EUR 67.62RAIFF CENTROBANK 7.122 1/22/2014 EUR 66.49RAIFF CENTROBANK 11.134 7/24/2013 EUR 66.13RAIFF CENTROBANK 9.200 7/24/2013 EUR 56.71RAIFF CENTROBANK 9.304 1/23/2013 EUR 62.19RAIFF CENTROBANK 9.876 1/23/2013 EUR 60.11RAIFF CENTROBANK 9.558 1/23/2013 EUR 67.69RAIFF CENTROBANK 8.920 1/23/2013 EUR 52.62BELGIUM-------ECONOCOM GROUP 4.000 6/1/2016 EUR 22.94TALVIVAARA 4.000 12/16/2015 EUR 72.61FRANCE------AIR FRANCE-KLM 4.970 4/1/2015 EUR 12.38ALCATEL-LUCENT 5.000 1/1/2015 EUR 2.62ALTRAN TECHNOLOG 6.720 1/1/2015 EUR 5.62ASSYSTEM 4.000 1/1/2017 EUR 23.27ATOS ORIGIN SA 2.500 1/1/2016 EUR 58.17CAP GEMINI SOGET 3.500 1/1/2014 EUR 38.69CGG VERITAS 1.750 1/1/2016 EUR 31.64CLUB MEDITERRANE 6.110 11/1/2015 EUR 17.80EURAZEO 6.250 6/10/2014 EUR 55.33FAURECIA 3.250 1/1/2018 EUR 17.91FAURECIA 4.500 1/1/2015 EUR 19.45INGENICO 2.750 1/1/2017 EUR 48.14MAUREL ET PROM 7.125 7/31/2015 EUR 17.13MAUREL ET PROM 7.125 7/31/2014 EUR 18.15NEXANS SA 2.500 1/1/2019 EUR 66.69NEXANS SA 4.000 1/1/2016 EUR 56.09ORPEA 3.875 1/1/2016 EUR 47.89PEUGEOT SA 4.450 1/1/2016 EUR 23.56PIERRE VACANCES 4.000 10/1/2015 EUR 73.63PUBLICIS GROUPE 1.000 1/18/2018 EUR 54.06SOC AIR FRANCE 2.750 4/1/2020 EUR 21.24SOITEC 6.250 9/9/2014 EUR 7.25TEM 4.250 1/1/2015 EUR 54.36GERMANY-------BNP EMIS-U.HANDE 9.750 12/28/2012 EUR 58.32BNP EMIS-U.HANDE 10.500 12/28/2012 EUR 47.62BNP EMIS-U.HANDE 9.500 12/31/2012 EUR 64.67BNP EMIS-U.HANDE 7.750 12/31/2012 EUR 49.92COMMERZBANK AG 6.000 12/27/2012 EUR 73.49COMMERZBANK AG 7.000 12/27/2012 EUR 60.71COMMERZBANK AG 13.000 12/28/2012 EUR 47.48COMMERZBANK AG 16.750 1/3/2013 EUR 73.77COMMERZBANK AG 8.400 12/30/2013 EUR 13.74COMMERZBANK AG 8.000 12/27/2012 EUR 43.32DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 69.20DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 64.90DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 67.10DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 72.90DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 71.60DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 74.20DEUTSCHE BANK AG 12.000 2/28/2013 EUR 75.00DEUTSCHE BANK AG 11.000 4/2/2013 EUR 73.80DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 69.50DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 72.10DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 70.30DEUTSCHE BANK 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EUR 68.12UBS AG 10.690 12/21/2012 EUR 71.60UBS AG 10.810 12/21/2012 EUR 63.85UBS AG 11.000 12/21/2012 EUR 67.59UBS AG 11.260 12/21/2012 EUR 66.14UBS AG 11.270 12/21/2012 EUR 70.63UBS AG 11.330 12/21/2012 EUR 70.28UBS AG 11.770 12/21/2012 EUR 61.53UBS AG 11.970 12/21/2012 EUR 65.67UBS AG 11.980 12/21/2012 EUR 69.02UBS AG 12.020 12/21/2012 EUR 64.27UBS AG 12.200 12/21/2012 EUR 56.09UBS AG 12.400 12/21/2012 EUR 68.07UBS AG 12.760 12/21/2012 EUR 59.39UBS AG 12.800 12/21/2012 EUR 62.51UBS AG 12.970 12/21/2012 EUR 63.87UBS AG 13.320 12/21/2012 EUR 66.64UBS AG 13.560 12/21/2012 EUR 65.71UBS AG 13.570 12/21/2012 EUR 60.85UBS AG 13.770 12/21/2012 EUR 57.41UBS AG 13.980 12/21/2012 EUR 62.18UBS AG 14.350 12/21/2012 EUR 59.29UBS AG 14.690 12/21/2012 EUR 64.44UBS AG 14.740 12/21/2012 EUR 63.53UBS AG 14.810 12/21/2012 EUR 55.58UBS AG 15.000 12/21/2012 EUR 60.59UBS AG 15.130 12/21/2012 EUR 57.81UBS AG 15.860 12/21/2012 EUR 53.88UBS AG 15.920 12/21/2012 EUR 56.41UBS AG 15.930 12/21/2012 EUR 61.51UBS AG 16.030 12/21/2012 EUR 59.10UBS AG 16.600 12/21/2012 EUR 50.18UBS AG 16.710 12/21/2012 EUR 55.09UBS AG 16.930 12/21/2012 EUR 52.30UBS AG 17.070 12/21/2012 EUR 57.69UBS AG 17.500 12/21/2012 EUR 53.84UBS AG 18.000 12/21/2012 EUR 50.83UBS AG 19.090 12/21/2012 EUR 51.52UBS AG 10.770 1/2/2013 USD 38.33UBS AG 13.030 1/4/2013 EUR 73.40UBS AG 13.630 1/4/2013 EUR 71.63UBS AG 14.230 1/4/2013 EUR 69.95UBS AG 14.820 1/4/2013 EUR 68.36UBS AG 15.460 1/4/2013 EUR 74.82UBS AG 15.990 1/4/2013 EUR 65.39UBS AG 16.500 1/4/2013 EUR 73.32UBS AG 17.000 1/4/2013 EUR 73.98UBS AG 17.150 1/4/2013 EUR 62.69UBS AG 17.180 1/4/2013 EUR 74.58UBS AG 18.000 1/4/2013 EUR 73.54UBS AG 18.300 1/4/2013 EUR 60.23UBS AG 19.440 1/4/2013 EUR 57.99UBS AG 19.750 1/4/2013 EUR 69.92UBS AG 20.500 1/4/2013 EUR 70.21UBS AG 20.570 1/4/2013 EUR 55.94UBS AG 21.700 1/4/2013 EUR 54.05UBS AG 21.750 1/4/2013 EUR 69.65UBS AG 23.750 1/4/2013 EUR 66.55UBS AG 11.020 1/25/2013 EUR 67.05UBS AG 12.010 1/25/2013 EUR 65.34UBS AG 14.070 1/25/2013 EUR 62.22UBS AG 16.200 1/25/2013 EUR 74.54UBS AG 8.620 2/1/2013 USD 14.04UBS AG 8.980 2/22/2013 EUR 72.86UBS AG 10.590 2/22/2013 EUR 69.90UBS AG 10.960 2/22/2013 EUR 67.35UBS AG 13.070 2/22/2013 EUR 63.96UBS AG 13.660 2/22/2013 EUR 61.23UBS AG 13.940 2/22/2013 EUR 73.02UBS AG 15.800 2/22/2013 EUR 67.24UBS AG 8.480 3/7/2013 CHF 58.00UBS AG 10.000 3/7/2013 USD 72.30UBS AG 12.250 3/7/2013 CHF 59.20UBS AG 9.000 3/22/2013 USD 11.16UBS AG 9.850 3/22/2013 USD 19.75UBS AG 16.500 4/2/2013 EUR 72.16UBS AG 17.250 4/2/2013 EUR 72.45UBS AG 18.000 4/2/2013 EUR 73.44UBS AG 19.750 4/2/2013 EUR 69.63UBS AG 21.250 4/2/2013 EUR 69.05UBS AG 21.500 4/2/2013 EUR 73.98UBS AG 21.500 4/2/2013 EUR 73.88UBS AG 22.250 4/2/2013 EUR 67.19UBS AG 22.250 4/2/2013 EUR 69.43UBS AG 24.250 4/2/2013 EUR 65.24UBS AG 24.750 4/2/2013 EUR 68.24UBS AG 10.860 4/4/2013 USD 37.21UBS AG 9.650 4/11/2013 USD 27.17UBS AG 9.930 4/11/2013 USD 24.77UBS AG 11.250 4/11/2013 USD 24.39UBS AG 10.170 4/26/2013 EUR 67.84UBS AG 10.970 4/26/2013 EUR 66.50UBS AG 12.610 4/26/2013 EUR 64.06UBS AG 7.900 4/30/2013 USD 33.75UBS AG 9.830 5/13/2013 USD 30.07UBS AG 8.000 5/24/2013 USD 63.90UBS AG 11.670 5/31/2013 USD 35.12UBS AG 12.780 6/7/2013 CHF 62.60UBS AG 16.410 6/7/2013 CHF 64.70UBS AG 9.330 6/14/2013 USD 22.00UBS AG 11.060 6/14/2013 USD 28.17UBS AG 6.770 6/21/2013 USD 10.43UBS AG 7.120 6/26/2013 USD 29.83UBS AG 15.250 6/28/2013 EUR 74.98UBS AG 17.000 6/28/2013 EUR 74.05UBS AG 17.250 6/28/2013 EUR 72.59UBS AG 19.250 6/28/2013 EUR 70.54UBS AG 19.500 6/28/2013 EUR 70.28UBS AG 20.250 6/28/2013 EUR 74.82UBS AG 20.500 6/28/2013 EUR 70.91UBS AG 21.000 6/28/2013 EUR 68.62UBS AG 22.000 6/28/2013 EUR 71.86UBS AG 22.500 6/28/2013 EUR 66.83UBS AG 23.000 6/28/2013 EUR 67.15UBS AG 23.500 6/28/2013 EUR 71.72UBS AG 24.000 6/28/2013 EUR 68.94UBS AG 24.500 6/28/2013 EUR 67.97UBS AG 11.450 7/1/2013 USD 27.96UBS AG 6.100 7/24/2013 USD 30.07UBS AG 8.640 8/1/2013 USD 27.87UBS AG 13.120 8/5/2013 USD 4.62UBS AG 0.500 4/27/2015 CHF 52.50UBS AG 6.070 11/12/2012 EUR 65.82UBS AG 8.370 11/12/2012 EUR 59.26UBS AG 8.590 11/12/2012 EUR 53.53UBS AG 9.020 11/12/2012 EUR 43.76UBS AG 9.650 11/12/2012 EUR 37.64UBS AG 10.020 11/12/2012 EUR 71.72UBS AG 10.930 11/12/2012 EUR 64.23BARCLAYS BK PLC 11.000 6/28/2013 EUR 43.13BARCLAYS BK PLC 11.000 6/28/2013 EUR 74.83BARCLAYS BK PLC 10.750 3/22/2013 EUR 41.06BARCLAYS BK PLC 10.000 3/22/2013 EUR 42.44BARCLAYS BK PLC 6.000 1/2/2013 EUR 50.37BARCLAYS BK PLC 8.000 6/28/2013 EUR 47.66ESSAR ENERGY 4.250 2/1/2016 USD 72.62MAX PETROLEUM 6.750 9/8/2013 USD 40.36 *********Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative pricesfor bond issues that reportedly trade well below par. Prices areobtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources duringthe prior week we think are reliable. Those sources may not,however, be complete or accurate. The Monday Bond Pricing tableis compiled on the Friday prior to publication. Prices reportedare not intended to reflect actual trades. Prices for actualtrades are probably different. Our objective is to shareinformation, not make markets in publicly traded securities.Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy orsell any security of any kind. It is likely that some entityaffiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'public debt and equity securities about which we report.Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies withinsolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 pershare in public markets. At first glance, this list may looklike the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sellshort. Don't be fooled. Assets, for example, reported athistorical cost net of depreciation may understate the true valueof a firm's assets. A company may establish reserves on itsbalance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize. Theprices at which equity securities trade in public market aredetermined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in eachThursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged. Send announcements firstname.lastname@example.com Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a bookof interest to troubled company professionals. All titles areavailable at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com. Go tohttp://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today. *********S U B S C R I P T I O N I N F O R M A T I O NTroubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and PeterA. Chapman, Editors.Copyright 2013. All rights reserved. ISSN 1529-2754.This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale orpublication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronicre-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without priorwritten permission of the publishers.Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed tobe reliable, but is not guaranteed.The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,delivered via e-mail. Additional e-mail subscriptions formembers of the same firm for the term of the initial subscriptionor balance thereof are US$25 each. For subscription information,contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at202-241-8200. * * * End of Transmission * * *