text:
MI Supreme Court
PEOPLE v LARDIE
PEOPLE v HUDICK
Docket Nos. 101640, 102742. Argued March 5, 1996 (Calendar Nos. 8-9). Decided July9, 1996.
Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909
Chief Justice
James H. Brickley
Charles L. Levin
Michael F. Cavanagh
Patricia J. Boyle
Dorothy Comstock Riley
Conrad L. Mallett, Jr.
Elizabeth A. Weaver
No. 101640
No. 102742
In these cases, consolidated on appeal, we are asked to consider the constitutionality of a Michigan statute, MCL 257.625(4); MSA 9.2325(4), that creates a felony with a
maximum punishment of fifteen years in prison for a person who drives while intoxicated[1] and, by the operation of the vehicle, causes the death of another. Under this statute, the people must prove that the driver had the general intent to drive while intoxicated and that this wrongful act, i.e., the intoxicated driving, must be the cause of the death. Because we conclude that this statute does not violate defendants' due process rights, we affirm the Court of Appeals decision in People v Lardie, 207 Mich App 615, 621; 525 NW2d 504 (1994), concluding that the statute was constitutional, and affirm the Court of Appeals order in People v Hudick, entered April 3, 1995 (Docket No. 176774), refusing to grant leave to defendant Hudick after the trial court approved the statute's constitutionality.
People v Lardie
On May 22, 1993, defendant Lardie drank alcohol and smoked marijuana at a party at his parents' home.[2] Defendant was seventeen years old. He left his home at approximately 1:50 a.m. to give several people from the party a ride to one
of their cars. From the physical evidence, defendant apparently drove the car off the paved road and traveled about 130 feet on the shoulder. The car hit a small tree and then, traveling another sixty or seventy feet, struck a larger one, killing the three passengers in the back seat, Jason Stutesman, Kendra Tiernan, and Erinn Tompkins. Lardie had an estimated blood-alcohol level of 0.12 percent or greater at the time of the accident and tested positive for marijuana use. The medical expert testified that taking these two substances together creates a "synergistic type impairment," multiplying the impairment rather than just adding to what each would cause alone.
The people charged Lardie with three counts of causing death by operating a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. MCL 257.625(4); MSA 9.2325(4). He moved to dismiss the charges, claiming that the statute violated his right to due process because it did not require proof of either a mens rea or some form of negligence. The circuit court dismissed the counts against Lardie because it concluded that the statute was unconstitutional:
[H]olding the drunk driver accountable for incapacitating injury or death, without allowing the jury to examine his mental state, denies him basic due process, eliminates the jury as the arbiter of morally-culpable conduct, deprives the Court of facts necessary to fashion a proportional sentence, and erodes individual freedom. The record before this Court is insufficient to support such a draconian approach to this social problem created by drunk driving.
If OUIL Causing Death, a 15-year felony, is countenanced as consistent with due process requirements of the Michigan and United States Constitutions, then that determination must be made by an appellate court. This trial court sees
neither a basis in law or principles of moral culpability, nor evidence of need for easier convictions that would justify holding a drunk driver accountable for a death without allowing the jury to evaluate his mental intent.
The people appealed by right in the Court of Appeals. In an opinion per curiam, the Court of Appeals reversed because it concluded that the statute was constitutional.[3] In so concluding, the Court determined that the statute was not a codification of a common-law offense, but, rather, it characterized the statute as a "strict liability, public welfare offense" without an element requiring the people to prove mens rea.[4]
Defendant Lardie appealed the decision to this Court, which granted leave. The case was argued with Hudick.[5]
People v Hudick
On March 6, 1994, at approximately 1:30 a.m., on a rainy night, defendant Hudick was driving a truck in the right lane of a four-lane highway. William Wienclaw, a pedestrian, was intoxicated and was standing in the right lane in the dark when Hudick struck him with his vehicle and killed him.[6] Hudick was given a Breathalyzer test at 2:45 a.m., which showed a blood-alcohol level of 0.13 percent. Another driver, Christa Holbrook, testified at the preliminary examination that she was driving on the road at the same time and did not
see Wienclaw until she was about sixty or seventy feet away from him. She said she was able to see him because a vehicle turned out of a truck station across the street, crossed in front of her, and shined its lights on him. She crossed into the other lane nearer the median.[7] Defendant was in the same lane as Holbrook when he hit Wienclaw.[8]
The people charged Hudick with involuntary manslaughter with a motor vehicle and, under MCL 257.625(4); MSA 9.2325(4), with causing death by operating a vehicle while intoxicated. At the preliminary examination, defendant argued that the statute was unconstitutional, claiming that it denied him due process by eliminating the need for finding a mens rea. The district court rejected this argument, concluding that the statute was not unconstitutional, and bound him over for trial on these charges. Hudick again moved to dismiss the charges in the Detroit Recorder's Court, but the court denied the motion, and held the trial in abeyance pending the outcome of defendant's appeal.
Hudick applied for leave to appeal in the Court of Appeals. After holding the application in abeyance pending the outcome of Lardie, the Court denied the application on April 3, 1995. Hudick applied for leave to appeal in this Court, which granted leave to hear this case with Lardie.[9]
I. Mens Rea of the Crime
The statute at issue, established by 1991 PA 98, provided at the time of these accidents in pertinent part:
A person, whether licensed or not, who operates a motor vehicle upon a highway or other place open to the general public or generally accessible to motor vehicles, including an area designated for the parking of vehicles, within this state, under the influence of intoxicating liquor or a controlled substance, or a combination of intoxicating liquor and a controlled substance, or with a blood alcohol content of 0.10% or more by weight of alcohol, and by the operation of that motor vehicle causes the death of another person is guilty of a felony, punishable by imprisonment for not more than 15 years, or a fine of not less than $2,500.00 or more than $10,000.00, or both. [MCL 257.625(4); MSA 9.2325(4).]
The same statute, under subsection 6,[11] made it a misdemeanor to drive while intoxicated, establishing a maximum penalty of imprisonment for ninety days or a fine between $100 and $500
for the first offense. Subsection 6 also provided for a one-year maximum sentence in prison and up to a $1,000 fine for a second violation within seven years, and for a five-year maximum sentence and $5,000 fine for a third violation if the two previous violations occurred within ten years.
In order to determine whether a statute imposes strict liability or requires proof of a mens rea, that is, a guilty mind, this Court first examines the statute itself and seeks to determine the Legislature's intent. People v Quinn, 440 Mich 178, 185; 487 NW2d 194 (1992). In interpreting a statute in which the Legislature has not expressly included language indicating that fault is a necessary element of a crime, this Court must focus on whether the Legislature nevertheless intended to require some fault as a predicate to finding guilt. Id. In this statute, the Legislature did not expressly state that a defendant must have a criminal intent to commit this crime.
Criminal intent is ordinarily an element of a crime even where the crime is created by statute. People v Rice, 161 Mich 657, 664; 126 NW 981 (1910). Statutes that create strict liability for all of their elements are not favored. Quinn, supra at 187. Nevertheless, a state may decide under its police power that certain acts or omissions are to be punished irrespective of the actor's intent. Id. at 186-187; People v Hatinger, 174 Mich 333, 335; 140 NW 648 (1913). Many of the crimes that impose strict liability have been termed "public welfare regulation." Quinn, supra at 187; see also Morissette v United States, 342 US 246, 255; 72 S Ct 240; 96 L Ed 288
(1952) (public-welfare offenses). Chief Justice Thomas Cooley succinctly described the general rule that a criminal statute requires a mens rea:
I agree that as a rule there can be no crime without a criminal intent; but this is not by any means a universal rule. One may be guilty of the high crime of manslaughter when his only fault is gross negligence; and there are many other cases where mere neglect may be highly criminal. Many statutes which are in the nature of police regulations . . . impose criminal penalties irrespective of any intent to violate them; the purpose being to require a degree of diligence for the protection of the public which shall render violation impossible. [People v Roby, 52 Mich 577, 579; 18 NW 365 (1884).]
Specific intent is defined as a particular criminal intent beyond the act done, whereas general intent is merely the intent to perform the physical act itself. People v Beaudin, 417 Mich 570, 573-574; 339 NW2d 461 (1983); People v Langworthy, 416 Mich 630, 639, 644; 331 NW2d 171 (1982).[12] For a strict-liability crime, the people need only prove that the act was performed regardless of what the actor knew or did not know. Quinn, supra at 188. On this basis, the distinction between a strict-liability crime and a general-intent crime is that, for a general-intent crime, the people must prove that the defendant purposefully or voluntarily performed the wrongful act, whereas, for a strict-liability crime, the people merely need to prove that the defendant performed the wrongful act, irrespective of whether he intended to perform it. Under MCL 257.625(4); MSA 9.2325(4), this distinction is important only in the rare circumstances
where a defendant was driving when he honestly did not know he had consumed alcohol, which subsequently caused him to be intoxicated, or where he was forced to drive for some reason despite his intoxication.
In both Lardie and Hudick, the people argue on appeal that the statute did require proof of a mens rea: The people claim that the statute requires proof that the defendant had the general intent to commit the underlying misdemeanor of driving while intoxicated. Where a statute is a codification of the common law and that common-law crime includes a mens rea as an element, this Court will interpret that statute to require a mens rea even if the statute is silent regarding knowledge as a necessary element. See Quinn, supra at 185-186. The people in Lardie claim that this statute was a codification of the common-law crime of involuntary manslaughter caused by intoxicated driving as articulated by this Court in People v Townsend, 214 Mich 267, 273; 183 NW 177 (1921). The Court of Appeals decided that the statute was not a codification of the common law.[13]
In Townsend, the defendant was driving while intoxicated and struck and killed a pedestrian. This Court concluded that the information charging the defendant with involuntary manslaughter was sufficiently definite to inform him of the offense on which he would be tried because "[t]he information clearly show[ed] that defendant was engaged in an unlawful and culpably negligent act and that such act directly contributed
to the death of [the victim]." Id. at 274.[14] In so concluding, this Court reasoned that "[i]t is gross and culpable negligence for a drunken man to guide and operate an automobile upon a public highway, and one doing so and occasioning injuries to another, causing death, is guilty of manslaughter." Id. at 273. This is what MCL 257.625(4); MSA 9.2325(4) provides even though it does not term the crime a kind of involuntary manslaughter. The Court in Townsend, supra at 280, also approved[15] the jury instructions given by the trial court, which provided that if the jury found that
the defendant was driving while intoxicated, and by his intoxicated operation of the vehicle caused the victim's death, he was guilty of involuntary manslaughter.[16] The Court reasoned that the intent to drive while intoxicated was irrelevant because involuntary manslaughter does not require proof of a criminal intent.[17]
The Court distinguished the case from an earlier involuntary-manslaughter case, in which the death was caused by a person speeding in an automobile, where the Court had found the instructions to be erroneous. In People v Barnes, 182 Mich 179, 181; 148 NW 400 (1914), the trial court instructed the jury that it could convict the defendant of involuntary manslaughter if it found that he was exceeding the speed limit, which was an unlawful act, and thereby killed the victim. Id. at 188-189.[18] This Court reversed because it held, among other things, that violation of the speeding law, by itself, was not adequate to establish involuntary
manslaughter, but, instead, the people must prove gross negligence. Id. at 192-193, 196-197, 199.[19] Townsend distinguished Barnes by stating that the unlawful act in Townsend was malum in se (wrong in itself), as opposed to being malum prohibitum (wrong because prohibited). See Townsend, supra at 280-281.[20]
Thus, in Townsend, unlike Barnes, the people did not need to prove gross negligence because it was presumed, as a matter of law, from the malum in se act of driving while intoxicated. Or, on a different theory of common-law involuntary manslaughter, this Court in Townsend may have distinguished Barnes because the people in Townsend established involuntary manslaughter through evidence that the defendant killed another during the commission of an unlawful act when that misdemeanor was malum in se. Under either interpretation of Townsend, the statute at issue accomplishes the same basic end because it does not require a showing of gross negligence, but only that the defendant committed the underlying misdemeanor of intoxicated driving. Nevertheless, the statute does not appear to be a codification of the common law for several reasons.
The statute is designed to deter motorists from deciding to drive after they have become intoxicated. Therefore, the culpable act that the Legislature wishes to prevent is the one in which a person becomes intoxicated and then decides to drive. The statute is not designed to prevent "voluntary intoxication." The Court in Townsend, supra at 272, not only addressed the evil of intoxicated driving, but also focused on the vice of voluntary intoxication, identifying it as a violation of common decency and good morals since the time of Noah. Unlike Townsend, the statute unambiguously seeks to punish the harm caused by intoxicated driving, not voluntary intoxication.
Moreover, the statute at issue creates a threshold of 0.10 percent alcohol content, above which the defendant is considered to be in the same category as someone "under the influence of intoxicating liquor." This aspect of the statute does not come from the common law, but is a statutory creation.
Furthermore, the Legislature created its own statutory penalty for a violation of this statute. The statute does not adopt the manslaughter penalty provided by MCL 750.321; MSA 28.553.[21] The Legislature would likely have referred to the manslaughter statute for the penalty for the crime if it wished to codify the crime from the common law.
Finally, there is no basis from the legislative history of this statute to conclude that the Legislature was attempting to codify Townsend, or the common law more generally, when it created this criminal offense. Consequently, we conclude that this statute was not codified from the common law, and so cannot look to it alone to determine if there is a mens rea requirement.
Where the offense in question does not codify the common law and omits reference to the element of intent, this Court will examine the Legislature's intent in enacting the legislation to determine whether there is a mens rea requirement. Quinn, supra at 186. Before the passage of 1991 PA 98, the people could charge an intoxicated driver who
caused the death of another with involuntary manslaughter, as defined by the common law, the lesser charge of negligent homicide under MCL 750.324; MSA 28.556,[22] or, of course, murder if warranted by the facts.[23] By statute, manslaughter (either voluntary or involuntary) is a felony that carries a maximum penalty of fifteen years imprisonment, or a fine of $7,500. MCL 750.321; MSA 28.553. Negligent homicide is a misdemeanor punishable by two years in prison, or by a fine of $2,000. MCL 750.324; MSA 28.556.[24]
For either of these crimes, the Legislature likely believed that under Michigan law the people must prove some form of negligence. For negligent homicide, the people must prove that the driver was negligent or driving at an unreasonable speed. See People v Paulen, 327 Mich 94, 99; 41 NW2d 488 (1950). See also CJI2d 16.14.[25] For involuntary
manslaughter, the Court of Appeals held in 1987 that the people must prove that the driver was grossly negligent. See People v Thinel, 160 Mich App 450, 455, 458; 408 NW2d 474 (1987),[26] vacated on other grounds 429 Mich 859, 859-860; 412 NW2d 923 (1987).[27] See also CJI2d 16.12.[28]
Under the plain language of MCL 257.625(4); MSA 9.2325(4), there is no requirement that the people prove gross negligence or negligence in order to prosecute someone for causing another person's death by operating a vehicle while intoxicated. Thus, in light of Thinel, supra, and the standard jury instructions, the Legislature must have intended to eliminate this element as a requirement when it enacted the statute.
We must then determine whether the Legislature intended to make this a strict-liability crime, not requiring proof of
any fault other than the act of driving while intoxicated, when it eliminated the element of gross negligence. In interpreting this statute, the Court of Appeals in Lardie, supra at 618, concluded that the Legislature did not require the people to prove either general or specific intent, but imposed a penalty as a matter of strict liability. The Court of Appeals reasoned that the Legislature intended to create a strict-liability offense because it omitted any reference to criminal intent when it amended the statute.[29]
This Court examines the legislative history of a statute to determine whether the Legislature intended to eliminate the requirement that the people prove any element of fault. Quinn, supra at 190-191.[30] In enacting 1991 PA 98, the Legislature must have been aware that under common-law involuntary manslaughter, gross negligence is equivalent to a criminal intent. People v Datema, 448 Mich 585, 604; 533 NW2d 272 (1995), citing Barnes, supra at 198. In eliminating the issue of gross negligence as a question of fact for the jury, the Legislature essentially has presumed that driving while intoxicated is gross negligence as a matter of law. Once the people prove that a defendant was driving while intoxicated, the people need not prove the further point that the defendant's driving was grossly negligent.
In eliminating this requirement, the Legislature likely wished to require proof of a criminal intent for the criminal act of intoxicated driving. The presumption of gross negligence from the act itself is only reasonable if the defendant (1) voluntarily decided to drive and (2) drove knowing that he had consumed an intoxicating liquor or a controlled substance and, therefore, knowing he could be intoxicated.[31] Under common-law involuntary manslaughter, the people must prove three elements in order to establish gross negligence to a jury:
(1) Knowledge of a situation requiring the exercise of ordinary care and diligence to avert injury to another.
(2) Ability to avoid the resulting harm by ordinary care and diligence in the use of the means at hand.
(3) The omission to use such care and diligence to avert the threatened danger when to the ordinary mind it must be apparent that the result is likely to prove disastrous to another. [People v Orr, 243 Mich 300, 307; 220 NW 777 (1928).]
Under the statute at issue, the Legislature's determination that as a matter of law the act of driving while intoxicated is gross negligence would only satisfy this definition if the driver voluntarily chose to drive with the knowledge that he had consumed alcohol.
The Legislature may also have had reservations about the ability of the people to prove the third prong of the Orr test because a defendant's irresponsible decision to drive while intoxicated is not necessarily "likely to prove disastrous." (Emphasis added.) See CJI2d 16.18(4).[32] The Legislature reasonably may have decided that the voluntary act of driving while intoxicated is grossly negligent because it "shows a culpable indifference to the safety of others . . . ." See People v Campbell, 237 Mich 424, 428; 212 NW 97 (1927).
Moreover, in creating this irrebuttable presumption of gross negligence from the wrongful act, the Legislature intended to deter drunk driving and, therefore, must have intended that the people prove that the driver voluntarily, i.e., "willing[ly]," decided to commit this culpable act.[33] Otherwise, the statute would impose a penalty on a driver who was forced to drive while intoxicated or honestly did not know
that he had drunk alcohol before driving.[34] Such a result would not further the Legislature's intent to deter this gravely dangerous conduct because, in those circumstances, the act would not be willingly chosen.[35]
Furthermore, this crime does not fit the definition of a public-welfare strict-liability offense despite the opposite conclusion of the Court of Appeals in Lardie, supra at 620. Generally, such statutes are designed to protect the public welfare by placing the burden of protecting society on a person "'otherwise innocent but standing in responsible relation to public danger.'" Quinn, supra at 187, quoting
United States v Dotterweich, 320 US 277, 281; 64 S Ct 134; 88 L Ed 48 (1943).[36] The United States Supreme Court explained that these regulatory statutes do not require a criminal intent because the accused generally is in a position to prevent the harm. Morissette, supra at 256.[37]
In Quinn, supra at 187, this Court explained that a statute creating a misdemeanor with a maximum two-year sentence for transporting a loaded firearm was a public-welfare regulation because "[t]he statute does not punish crimes mala in se, but, rather, regulates conduct under the
state's police power to promote the social good . . . ."[38] In contrast, the legislation in the present case seeks not to regulate the conduct of a person who is otherwise innocent, but punishes a person's gravely irresponsible act of operating a vehicle while intoxicated when that act causes another person's death. As this Court explained in Townsend, supra at 273, such conduct is malum in se.[39]
Also, the penalties for public-welfare strict-liability crimes generally are "relatively small" and do no "grave damage to an offender's reputation." Staples v United States, 511 US 600, ___; 114 S Ct 1793, 1803; 128 L Ed 2d 608 (1994), quoting Morissette, supra at 256.[40] Whereas, the penalties
under this statute are relatively severe and are designed to harm a person's reputation, in order thereby to operate as a deterrent for others. Thus, we would not characterize this statute, creating a fifteen-year felony, as a public-welfare offense. See Staples, supra, 114 S Ct 1803.
Consequently, consistent with the Legislature's decision to presume gross negligence as a matter of law and its desire to deter intoxicated driving, the Legislature must reasonably have intended that the people prove a mens rea by demonstrating that the defendant purposefully drove while intoxicated or, in other words, that he had the general intent to perform the wrongful act.[41] Where a statute requires a "criminal mind" for some, but not all, of the elements of the crime, the statute does not impose strict liability. Quinn, supra at 187, citing United States v Freed, 401 US 601; 91 S Ct 1112; 28 L Ed 2d 356 (1971). Because the statute requires proof of a mens rea, it does not impose strict liability. Rather, we conclude that the statute requires the people to prove that a defendant, who kills someone by driving while intoxicated, acted knowingly in consuming an intoxicating liquor or a controlled substance, and acted voluntarily in deciding to drive after such consumption.
II. Causation
The statute provides that a defendant is guilty of this crime when, "by the operation" of his vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, he "causes the death of
another person." MCL 257.625(4); MSA 9.2325(4). The Legislature passed 1991 PA 98 in order to reduce the number of alcohol-related traffic fatalities.[42] The Legislature sought to deter drivers who are "willing to risk current penalties" from drinking and driving.[43] In seeking to reduce fatalities by deterring drunken driving, the statute must have been designed to punish drivers when their drunken driving caused another's death.[44] Otherwise, the statute would impose a penalty on a driver even when his wrongful decision to drive while intoxicated had no bearing on the death that resulted. Such an interpretation of the statute would produce an absurd result by divorcing the defendant's fault from the resulting injury.[45] We seek to avoid such an interpretation. See
Jennings v Southwood, 446 Mich 125, 141-142; 521 NW2d 230 (1994).[46]
Moreover, this interpretation would not directly further the Legislature's purpose of reducing fatalities because there is no reason to penalize an intoxicated driver with a fifteen-year felony when there is an accident resulting in a fatality if that driver, even if not intoxicated, would still have been the cause in fact of the victim's death. There would be no reason because it would not prevent that fatality from occurring again. Therefore, in proving causation, the people must establish that the particular defendant's decision to drive while intoxicated produced a change in that driver's operation of the vehicle that caused the death of the victim.[47] In this way, the statute does not impose a severe
penalty when the injury was unavoidable for that particular driver (regardless of whether he was intoxicated), because the statute ensures that the wrongful decision caused the death in the accident.[48]
On the basis of this analysis, the elements of the crime that the people would be required to prove are similar to those for involuntary manslaughter except that the people would not have to prove gross negligence. Hence, the people must prove that (1) the defendant was operating his motor vehicle while he was intoxicated,[49] (2) that he voluntarily
decided to drive knowing that he had consumed alcohol and might be intoxicated,[50] and (3) that the defendant's intoxicated driving was a substantial cause of the victim's death.[51] Cf. CJI2d 16.12 (Involuntary Manslaughter with Motor Vehicle), quoted in n 28.
III. Due Process
)Sufficiency of Moral Culpability
Defendant Lardie argues that the general intent to commit a misdemeanor (the mens rea) cannot be transformed into the bad intent sufficient for due process purposes to justify a fifteen-year felony, unless the people demonstrate that this culpable decision (deciding to drive the vehicle while intoxicated) was the cause of the victim's death.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that there are due process limitations on the state's police power to impose a penalty for a violation of a law when a person charged with the crime did not have a criminal intent. See Lambert v California, 355 US 225, 228; 78 S Ct 240; 2 L Ed 2d 228 (1957) (the defendant, a convicted felon, violated a Los Angeles ordinance requiring felons to register with the city when she failed to do so within five days of arriving because she had no actual knowledge of the provision).[52] However, as we noted in part I, this is not a strict-liability statute. Therefore, any limitations articulated by the United States Supreme Court for a strict-liability offense as a matter of substantive due process do not apply to this statute. See also Stanley v Turner, 6 F3d 399, 401-402 (CA 6, 1993).[53]
Defendant also relies on this Court's analysis in Datema, supra at 602, and in People v Aaron, 409 Mich 672; 299 NW2d 304 (1980), in arguing that the statute violates due process.
However, the Court in Datema, supra at 601, and in Aaron, supra at 721-729, was reviewing the question whether this Court should modify the common law by examining its treatment of the relationship between criminal intent and criminal liability. In those cases, the Court was not determining whether the common-law misdemeanor-manslaughter rule (Datema) or the common-law felony-murder rule (Aaron) violated the Due Process Clauses of the United States or Michigan Constitutions. Rather, the Court was exercising its role in developing the common law. See Aaron, supra at 733. As the Court in Aaron noted, "'it is for this Court to decide whether a common-law rule shall be retained unless the Legislature states a rule that is inconsistent with or precludes a change in the common-law rule.'" Id. at 723, n 112, quoting Gruskin
v Fisher, 405 Mich 51, 58; 273 NW2d 893 (1979) (emphasis added). In the present case, this Court is reviewing a statute, and, therefore, we may not set aside the statute on due process grounds on the basis of this Court's authority to modify the common law.
Moreover, even if the analyses of these cases were relevant to examining whether this statute violated defendants' due process rights, we do not believe that this statutory crime is inconsistent with the principles found in the common law as articulated by Aaron and Datema.[54]
In Aaron, supra at 733, this Court struck down the common-law felony-murder rule because it violated "the basic premise of individual moral culpability upon which our criminal law is based" by allowing proof of an intent to commit a felony as adequate to establish a defendant's liability for murder. In its place, the Court held that under common law, in order to prove that a defendant committed murder, the people must demonstrate that he either intended to
kill or to inflict great bodily harm, or acted with a wanton and wilful disregard of the likelihood that the natural tendency of his conduct would be to cause death or great bodily harm. Id. The Court noted that the first-degree murder statute, MCL 750.316; MSA 25.548, would nevertheless continue to elevate murder to first-degree murder if the murder was committed during the perpetration or attempted perpetration of certain enumerated crimes. Aaron at 733-734.
In Datema, supra at 601-602, this Court examined the misdemeanor-manslaughter rule, which elevates a misdemeanor to involuntary manslaughter if that wrongful act causes another's death, in a case in which a defendant committed an assault and battery that unexpectedly resulted in the death of the victim. This Court upheld the common-law misdemeanor-manslaughter doctrine under the facts of the case because (1) "[the] rule requires a jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt that there was a direct and proximate connection between the underlying crime and the resulting death" and (2) assault and battery, the underlying misdemeanor, was a specific-intent crime in which the people must prove that the defendant had the intent to injure.[55]
The statute at issue, like Datema, supra at 602, requires that there be a "causal relationship" between the defendant's culpable state of mind, i.e., intentionally driving while
intoxicated, and the resulting death. See part II.
In the present cases, however, the underlying crime, driving while intoxicated, is not a specific-intent crime. Nevertheless, the crime is malum in se as this Court explained in Townsend, supra at 273. The Court in Datema specifically decided not to address this question for the common law in which the underlying crime that caused the death was malum in se, but did not involve an intent to injure:
We do not resolve whether an act that was malum in se at common law but that does not involve the intent to injure can furnish the mens rea for involuntary manslaughter.
* * *
Unanticipated and unusual situations arising from death caused by the commission of offenses defined as malum in se at the common law but that do not require an intent to injure must be dealt with case by case. [Id. at 607-608.]
The statutory crime at issue in the present cases is analogous to common-law involuntary manslaughter in two different respects. Under the statute, a defendant is criminally responsible for causing death (1) by committing an unlawful act (driving while intoxicated) or (2) by performing a lawful act (driving) with gross negligence (presumed as a matter of law by the statute when a person drives while intoxicated). See Datema, supra at 595-596, quoting People v Ryczek, 224 Mich 106, 110; 194 NW 609 (1923), for the general theories of involuntary manslaughter.[56] The crime can analogously fit into either theory of common-law involuntary manslaughter. These theories are not mutually exclusive.
Datema, supra at 596. Because the nature of the statute is to impose criminal liability on a defendant for the culpably (grossly) negligent decision to drive while intoxicated, which is an unlawful act, the statute includes both these theories of common-law involuntary manslaughter.
In comparing this statute to gross-negligence involuntary manslaughter under the common law, we conclude that this statute does not conflict with the basic premise of "individual moral culpability" from the common law articulated in Aaron even though it imposes a fifteen-year felony for an act that would only lead to a ninety-day misdemeanor (for a first-time offense) if it did not cause the death of another. The only difference between causing death by operating a vehicle while intoxicated and the crime of involuntary manslaughter with a motor vehicle is that under the common law the people must prove gross negligence, whereas under the statute the people must prove that the defendant voluntarily drove, knowing that he might be intoxicated. The Legislature's decision to define the purposeful act of driving while intoxicated as gross negligence does not diminish a defendant's moral culpability. The moral culpability for the person who decides to drink and drive, where any reasonable person must recognize that he is creating a grave risk to himself and others, corresponds to the punishment of a fifteen-year felony when that decision causes the death of another.[57] This is a just punishment. See Perkins & Boyce,
Criminal Law (3d ed), pp 890-896.[58] The gravity of this crime, of course, depends on whether the guilty decision results in harm. Yet, this is the very nature of criminal negligence. The basic premise of Michigan criminal law from the common law requiring that the culpable mental state have a causal connection to the crime as stated in Aaron is not contradicted.
IV. Application to Lardie and Hudick
In each of these cases, there is evidence that the driver was intoxicated while driving, his driving was impaired, and he killed another person while so driving. Lardie and Hudick do not claim that they did not voluntarily drive while intoxicated or that they did not know that they consumed alcohol before they drove. However, they may do so on remand. Moreover, each party may raise a question at trial about whether the people have met their burden of proving that the particular driver's decision to drive while intoxicated was a substantial cause of the deaths. The question of causation is a factual one for the jury.
Although for different reasons than the Court of Appeals offered in Lardie, we affirm its decision to reverse the trial court's ruling. Moreover, in Hudick, the Court of Appeals
properly denied leave to appeal after the trial court concluded that the statute was constitutional.
The statute, MCL 257.625(4); MSA 9.2325(4), creating a fifteen-year felony for death caused by intoxicated driving, is similar to common-law involuntary manslaughter except that it eliminates the people's need to prove gross negligence. By doing so, the Legislature instead has required that the people prove that the defendant had a general intent to commit the wrongful act: to drink and then drive. Thus, the statute does not impose strict liability. Moreover, the statute requires that the culpable mental state, the mens rea, have a causal relation to the harm that the statute seeks to prevent. The statute does not violate defendants' right of due process. We affirm the Court of Appeals decisions in Lardie and Hudick.
Brickley, C.J., and Levin, Cavanagh, Boyle, and Mallett, JJ., concurred with Riley, J.
v ———– No. 101640
No. 102742
WEAVER, J. (concurring).
I join in the majority's holding that the OUIL causing death statute[1] is constitutional and in its affirmance of the decision of the Court of Appeals. I agree with the majority's finding that the statute does not codify the common law or impose strict liability. I further concur with the majority that the first two elements of the statute are: "(1) the defendant was operating his motor vehicle while he was
intoxicated, (2) that he voluntarily decided to drive knowing that he had consumed alcohol and might be intoxicated…."[2]
However, I write separately because I disagree with the majority's use of the term "intoxicated driving" in the third element, the causation element, to include not only the culpable condition of being intoxicated, but also the change, if any, in the particular defendant's manner of driving.[3] The majority's definition of "intoxicated driving" is contrary to the plain language of the statute and undermines the legislative intent. To avoid this mistake, the third element should be more precisely defined as: that the operation of the vehicle by the defendant, while "under the influence,"[4] was a cause of the victim's death.[5] Further, I would not require the prosecution to "establish that the particular defendant's
decision to drive while intoxicated produced a change in that driver's operation of the vehicle that caused the death of the victim." Slip op at 27. The defendant's manner of driving, and any change in that manner attributable to the defendant's intoxicated state, is not an element of the statute. Rather, I would find that the causation element requires the people to prove that the death resulted from the defendant's commission of the culpable act prohibited by the statute, which occurs when "a person becomes intoxicated and then decides to drive," and actually does so. Slip op at 13.
The relevant parts of the statute, which established the third element, provided:
A person, whether licensed or not, who operates a motor vehicle upon a highway or other place open to the general public or generally accessible to motor vehicles… within this state, under the influence of intoxicating liquor or a controlled substance, or a combination of intoxicating liquor and a controlled substance, or with a blood alcohol content of 0.10% or more by weight of alcohol, and by the operation of that motor vehicle causes the death of another person is guilty of a felony, punishable by imprisonment for not more than 15 years, or a fine of not less than $2,500.00 or more than $10,000.00, or both.
This statute is the fourth of nineteen subsections within the driving while intoxicated, and reckless driving provisions, set forth in MCL 257.625; MSA 9.2325. Rules of statutory construction dictate that this fourth subsection be construed as consistently as possible with the other subsections of MCL 257.625; MSA 9.2325.
The other relevant subsections of MCL 257.625; MSA 9.2325 included:
(1) A person, whether licensed or not, shall not operate a vehicle upon a highway or other place open to the general public or generally accessible to motor vehicles… within this state if either of the following applies:
(a) The person is under the influence of intoxicating liquor or a controlled substance, or a combination of intoxicating liquor and a controlled substance.
(b) The person has a blood alcohol content of 0.10% or more by weight of alcohol.
(2) The owner of a vehicle or a person in charge or in control of a vehicle shall not authorize or knowingly permit the vehicle to be operated upon a highway or other place open to the general public … within this state by a person who is under the influence of intoxicating liquor or a controlled substance, or a combination of intoxicating liquor and a controlled substance, or who has a blood alcohol content of 0.10% or more by weight of alcohol.
(3) A person, whether licensed or not, shall not operate a vehicle upon a highway or other place open to the general pubic… when, due to the consumption of an intoxicating liquor, a controlled substance, or a combination of an intoxicating liquor and a controlled substance, the person's ability to operate the vehicle is visibly impaired.
(5) A person, whether licensed or not, who operates a motor vehicle upon a highway or other place open to the general public… within this state, under the influence of intoxicating liquor or a controlled substance, or a combination of intoxicating liquor and a controlled substance, or with a blood alcohol content of 0.10% or more by weight of alcohol, and by the operation of that motor vehicle causes a long-term incapacitating injury to another person is guilty of a felony, punishable by imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or a fine of not less than $1,000.00 or more than $5,000.00, or both.
As the emphasized portions of these subsections indicate, none consider the manner, or the change in the manner, in which the vehicle is being operated. Instead, these companion provisions of the OUIL causing death statute turn on the driver's condition or status while operating the vehicle.[8] While the Court of Appeals was incorrect in concluding that the statute imposes strict liability, the Court was correct in asserting:
The crime of OUIL causing death contains the same elements as OUIL with the only additional element being the aggravated circumstances of death resulting from the prohibited conduct
where the prohibited conduct was acting upon the decision to drive while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.[9] Absent clear legislative intent to the contrary, the section of MCL 257.625; MSA 9.2325 that includes the OUIL causing death statute should be construed in accordance with its companion provisions so that the manner of operation, i.e., how the intoxicated defendant was driving, is not an element of the offense that the people must prove.[10]
The majority's definition of causation will require the people to "establish that the particular defendant's decision to drive while intoxicated produced a change in that driver's operation of the vehicle that caused the death of the victim." Slip op at 27. In other words, the people will have to prove that the intoxicated driver was not operating the vehicle as that person would have operated the vehicle if sober and driving under the same circumstances. Therefore, the majority's interpretation of the causation element in this statute requires the people to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) how the defendant typically drives when sober, taking into account any individual idiosyncracies or limitations, (2) how that typical, sober manner of operation would affect the defendant's driving leading up to the fatal accident, (3) how the hypothetical results of the particular defendant's typical, sober manner of operation compare to the actual, intoxicated manner of operation and that there is an identifiable difference between the two manners of operation, and (4) that this difference in typical, hypothetical, sober driving and actual, intoxicated driving is "a substantial" cause in fact and "a proximate cause" of the victim's death. Slip op at 27-29. As established below, this demanding burden of proof was not intended by the Legislature and is not found in the language of the statute.
The plain language of the statute clearly indicates that the Legislature intended causation to turn on the fact that the defendant operated the vehicle while intoxicated, rather than the changed manner in which, or how, the defendant operated the vehicle while intoxicated. Therefore the defendant's culpability arises and should be evaluated in light of the defendant's culpable decision to drive while intoxicated.[11]
Unlike statutes, discussed below, that prohibit similar conduct, the clear language of the OUIL causing death statute contains no reference to the manner in which the defendant operated the vehicle. The Legislature has enacted the following statutes that, unlike OUIL causing death, do manifest an intent, through express language, that causation be strictly tied to the specific manner in which the defendant operated a motor vehicle. For instance, negligent homicide requires the people to prove that the driver operated the motor vehicle "at an immoderate rate of speed or in a careless, reckless or negligent manner …." MCL 750.324; MSA 28.556 (emphasis added). Michigan's felonious driving statute, MCL 752.191; MSA 28.661, also specifically requires proof that the manner of operation caused the harm. That statute targets
[e]very person who drives any vehicle upon a highway carelessly and heedlessly in wilful and wanton disregard of the rights or safety of others, or without due caution and circumspection and at a speed or in a manner so as to endanger or be likely to endanger any person or property and thereby injuring . . . .
Similarly, involuntary manslaughter requires proof that the defendant operated the motor vehicle "in a grossly negligent manner."[12]
However, the OUIL causing death statute does not contain similar language that manifests a legislative intent to tie causation to the specific manner of operation. Instead, the language in this statute indicates that the people need only prove that the defendant's operation of the vehicle while intoxicated, not the defendant's uncharacteristic and intoxicated operation,[13] was a cause of the victim's death.
In enacting this statute, the Legislature sought to prohibit and punish all intoxicated driving that results in a fatality, not just intoxicated driving that is performed in a manner that the people can prove is different from that particular defendant's typical and sober operation of a vehicle in the same situation. The statute is aimed at
prevention and deterrence.[14] As the legislative analysis reveals, this statute was enacted because
too many drinkers are irresponsible drivers who are willing to risk current penalties to get behind the wheel. The proposed legislation will deter those drivers by closing technical loopholes in the law, promising swift and sure punishment for drinking drivers . . . .
The majority's definition of causation creates an unintended loophole and diminishes the chances of swift and sure punishment by requiring the people to prove that, in a similar situation,
that particular defendant, if sober, would not have caused the death.
I disagree with the majority's assertion that
there is no reason to penalize an intoxicated driver with a fifteen-year felony when there is an accident resulting in a fatality if any ordinary, nonintoxicated driver would also have been the cause in fact of another's death. There would be no reason because it would not prevent that fatality from occurring again.
The Legislature enacted the statute so that the burden of prevention rests clearly and heavily with the party most capable of avoiding fatalities, the intoxicated person who decides whether or not to drive. The Legislature drafted the
statute so that the intoxicated driver would be responsible for all consequences that flow from his decision to drive while intoxicated.[17] The majority's determination that the defendant's "drunken driving" must be a substantial cause of the victim's death significantly frustrates the Legislature's intent to prevent intoxicated driving, which always has the potential to result in death.
In essence, Michigan law imposes two distinct duties on drivers—to drive reasonably[18] and not to drive while intoxicated.[19] If, as the majority acknowledges, there is an "irrebuttable presumption of gross negligence"[20] in driving while intoxicated, then intoxicated driving is never safe or reasonable conduct. Therefore, there is no such thing as safe or nonculpable driving while intoxicated. Any intoxicated driving is a violation of the duty all motorists owe to those
with whom they share the road—to drive only when not intoxicated, or to suffer the consequences.[21]
People v Lardie
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, and Dennis LaBelle, Prosecuting Attorney [324 Court Street, Traverse City, MI 49684], for the people in Lardie.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, John D. O'Hair, Prosecuting Attorney, and Timothy A. Baughman, Chief, Research, Training and Appeals, and Janice Joyce Bartee, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney [12th Floor, 1441 St. Antoine, Detroit, MI 48226], for the people in Hudick.
Running, Wise, Wilson, Ford & Phillips, P.L.C. (by J. Bruce Donaldson and Douglas J. Donaldson) [326 E. State Street, P.O. Box 686, Traverse City, MI 49685-0686], for Lardie.
Barry A. Resnick and Darryl Fink [30300 Northwestern Hwy., Suite 303, Farmington Hills, MI 48334] for Hudick.
Amici Curiae:
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, and Charles D. Hackney and Michael E. Moody, Assistant Attorneys General [6520 Mercantile Way, Suite 2, P.O. Box 30218, Lansing, MI 48909], for the Prosecuting Attorneys Appellate Service.
Gregory E. Smith [2030 Dow Center, Midland, MI 48674] for Mothers Against Drunk Driving of Michigan.
Roger L. Conner, Robert Teir, and Timothy Burke [1146
19th Street, N.W., Suite 250, Washington, D.C. 20036-3703] for the American Alliance for Rights & Responsibilities.
)At the time of these incidents, MCL 257.625(4); MSA 9.2325(4) defined this condition as follows: "under the influence of intoxicating liquor or a controlled substance, or a combination of intoxicating liquor and a controlled substance, or with a blood alcohol content of 0.10% or more by weight of alcohol . . . ."
)At the preliminary examination, James Raggett testified that Lardie had three cans of beer soon after Raggett first arrived at 7:30 p.m., drank three or four shots of whiskey at about 9:45 or 10:00 p.m., had another four or five shots at about 10:30 p.m., and was smoking marijuana at about 10:45 p.m.
)Lardie, supra at 621.
)Id. at 620.
)450 Mich 865 (1995).
)The officer described the area where Wienclaw was standing as providing "poor visibility."
)Holbrook confirmed that she would not have seen Wienclaw except that the car flashed its lights on him.
)After Hudick hit Wienclaw, Holbrook turned her car around and parked in front of the body with the flashers on so that no one else would hit him. Someone then hit her car.
)450 Mich 866 (1995).
)This statute was amended by 1994 PA 211 (effective November 1, 1994), 1994 PA 448, and 1994 PA 449 (effective May 1, 1995), and now provides in pertinent part:
A person, whether licensed or not, who operates a motor vehicle upon a highway or other place open to the general public or generally accessible to motor vehicles, including an area designated for the parking of vehicles, within this state, in violation of subsection (1) [under the influence of intoxicating liquor] or (3) [a person's ability is visibly impaired because of intoxicating liquor], and by the operation of that motor vehicle causes the death of another person is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 15 years or a fine of not less than $2,500.00 or more than $10,000.00, or both.
This amendment does not substantially change the statute for the purposes of our analysis.
)Now subsection 7.
)This Court expressed reservations about this dichotomy in Langworthy, supra at 641, but nevertheless decided not to abolish the common-law distinction.
)See Lardie, supra at 618.
)In reviewing the information, the Court was relying on the traditional definition of the three theories of involuntary manslaughter:
To make the information for involuntary manslaughter good it must allege that the accused was [1] in the commission of some unlawful act or [2] negligently doing some act lawful in itself, or [3] by the negligent omission to perform a legal duty, and that death resulted therefrom. [Id. at 273.]
See also People v Beach, 429 Mich 450, 477; 418 NW2d 861 (1988); People v Ryczek, 224 Mich 106, 110; 194 NW 609 (1923) ("Involuntary manslaughter is the killing of another without malice and unintentionally, but [1] in doing some unlawful act not amounting to a felony nor naturally tending to cause death or great bodily harm, or [2] in negligently doing some act lawful in itself, or [3] by the negligent omission to perform a legal duty").
The Court in Townsend, supra at 273-274, did not make it clear whether it was relying only on the first or on both the first and second theories of involuntary manslaughter in determining that the information was sufficiently specific. In People v Datema, 448 Mich 585; 533 NW2d 272 (1995), this Court discussed the continuing vitality of the first theory, known as the misdemeanor-manslaughter rule, under the common law. This Court concluded that an unlawful act committed with an intent to injure or in a grossly negligent manner that proximately causes death was a sufficiently culpable state for involuntary manslaughter. Id. at 606.
)In fact, the Court stated that the instructions were "more favorable to defendant than he was entitled to."
)The instructions provided in pertinent part:
If the respondent operated the automobile while intoxicated and, as a direct and natural result thereof, [the victim] received injuries from which she afterwards died, the respondent is guilty of manslaughter . . . . [Id. at 277.]
It is not the law that one who commits


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Wornstar Essentials Pants - Starchaser Black Denim Flare Cut
Waist sizes 28-36 shipping in April
• Wornstar Essentials Collection
• Designed in the USA
• Slim fit, lower rise, flare cut, denim pants
• Classic black
• 98% Cotton / 2% Spandex 11oz stretch denim
• Zipper fly
• 34" inseam standard
• $10 alteration fee for other inseams
• Altered items are not returnable
I have a question about this item
All orders ship from the Wornstar Clothing Headquarters, Lake In The Hills, IL, USA. All orders placed on this site are subject to product availability and will be shipped according to Wornstar Clothing shipping policies. We will process your order once payment is received. Stage Clothing orders are hand made and take on an average 2-4 weeks to ship out, but it could be longer depending on availability of materials to produce the item and work load in the custom studio at time you place your order. If you have an important event and need your item rushed please contact us at email@example.com to make sure we can meet your date. All custom work must be pre-paid in full before any work is begun.
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International orders are shipped using USPS which is the US Postal Service or FedEx. For postal orders, the packages are handed off to your country's postal service for 'door-to-door' delivery.
Priority Mail Express International Service comes with tracking and is insured. It is more expensive but has expedited brokerage which means your package will zip through customs and has the added protection of $100 free insurance coverage. We've rarely had an express package lost (although sometimes it will be returned if the destination address is wrong), and it is recommended for international packages.
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Wornstar Clothing does not accept items back for refunds – only exchanges. There are 3 reasons why we will accept an exchange:
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If we shipped you a defective item, you must notify us within 5 business days of receiving the item in order to qualify for an exchange. If you do not provide us with proper notification within the allotted timeframe, we will not authorize your exchange. We do not refund shipping costs on exchanges unless we made a processing error. If we do make an error, we will refund your shipping costs up to $9.99 USD. All returns for exchanges are to be packed in the original packaging we shipped the items to you if available. Please include the original invoice (photocopy is ok) with the reason for exchange written on the invoice. We are not responsible for lost, stolen, or damaged packages. Once your package has been received and is processed you will be notified via email when it's shipped back to you. You are responsible for any shipping costs back to us including insurance. Custom items are not refundable. Please ask any questions prior to purchasing your item at email@example.com.
Please follow our return guidelines shown above when returning your product for exchange. Please note on the packing slip the item you are exchanging, the desired item, and the reason for exchange. For best results, please contact our customer service at email@example.com so we may assist you in getting the correct size or item. Our stock changes frequently, contacting us prior to your exchange is the best way to insure we have your desired exchange item in stock.
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Send your return or exchange to:
Wornstar Clothing
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9240 Trinity Drive
Lake In The Hills, IL 60156
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Aaron's Profit Suite Review By Aaron Martin Is Aaron's Profit Suite System A Scam Or Legit? Does Aaron's Profit Suite System Works? لي Aaron's Profit Suite Review Explore The Truth About Aaron's Profit Suite System APP
اسم المنتج: Aaron's Profit Suite
Aaron's Profit Suite Website: AaronsProfitSuite.co
Aaron's Profit Suite CEO: Aaron Martin
Aaron's Profit Suite Cost: حر
Aaron's Profit Suite Review
In the past while learning about the binary options trading investment began, I decided to start from the first point and I read basic books on personal finance along with the "guidance" to understand everything that goes on in the world of investment. Most of these authors were aware of and extensive knowledge, but investment advice to me was largely the province and not commensurate with Aaron's Profit Suite Profile. Understanding repeat literally chapter after chapter in their writings the difference between investment portfolios, which according to them may yield back up to 5% per year, in exchange for investment "riskier," which usually means diversified equity – investment funds that may yield (as I believe) returns slightly higher than the type first. What kind of returns that can be accepted in the stock market? Well, they say that the market since the creation of Adam and Eve rises at a rate of 10% per year. Famous indicators such as the Dow Jones and currently the most famous S & P500 is always "continuous record highs over time" just as happens in real estate.
Now, the market indicators this is the golden Aaron's Profit Suite investors they belong. Frequently, may dig in my mind the concept that there are hundreds (thousands) of fund managers and others was not "professionals" are present in this market and they hold degrees from Harvard University and decades of experience and millions of dollars under their management and spend about 15 hours a day in analysis of any information even if only a simple issue in the market in the hope of defeating this golden calves a few points.
So what is the chance that I will have in this market. If Mr. Fund who eats and sleeps and breathes in the market and has the credentials than the number of vertical hair director not be able to achieve an annual return of up to 20% on a regular basis … well … forget it … you baby almost virtually non-existent. That is why I believe that it is better to buy some shares in an investment fund Aaron's Profit Suite and accept some crumbs left by geniuses securities on the table.
No !
Foreign currency exchange market gives several advantages not owned by the stock market. Most of these features have been in search of her murder in various forums, blogs, articles, e-books, and so on. Nevertheless, it is good to emphasize this positive re-(cause my conviction comes finally Profile): binary options market liquidity presents unprecedented, where it is trading more than two trillion dollars a day, which makes it filling any request to buy or sell semi intraday. This in turn means a minimum price slide and a higher degree of profitability. "Paper trading" in the stock market as opposed to the actual trading is completely different, because the trade orders may not be filled immediately. The difference between the real Aaron's Profit Suite trading demo account and the account is almost almost non-existent. – Aaron's Profit Suite is available 24 hours a day, 5.5 days a week, compared with the morning trading hours for equity markets. Binary Options Trading can not be controlled by the major entities. The owners of wealth and major banks and fund managers who have a significant weight in the stock markets can make a tremendous effects on the movement of prices. But given the huge volume of trades in the currency market and that flows on a daily basis, the market can never move it by "big hands" even central banks can not control the binary market. Aaron's Profit Suite displays 1 leverage: 200 compared with the stock market lever 1: 2 . – Aaron's Profit Suite is not friendly to any restrictions of short-selling, as opposed to "escalate" base that the stock market control – Binary options can be traded anywhere around the world, even if the Irish Republican Army camps. Aaron's Profit Suite profits taxed at a rate of 60/40 favorite, regardless of which method you use Trade (daily or sung or central) Unlike tax penalties for carrying stock for short periods.
The list is still ongoing, but the best feature for me is the psychological advantage. I know that it may seem silly bit, but the fear and dread sometimes beats us before you even take a first step, I do not like the idea of living in competition with "professional managers" who have knowledge of the fundamentals of the market more than I know or it is possible to know the rest my life. Aaron's Profit Suite but you always play in the field and the level and you are comfortable with, I do not have the mentality of competition against thoughts anyone about what profits "acceptable and realistic" and what the profits that are "pure fantasy." Everything is that the continued trading until I find an acceptable rate of return of risk to opportunities and consistent profitability. And then, the self is the only thing that competing against him in options trading.
Is Aaron's Profit Suite A Scam
Aaron's Profit Suite Software ليست عملية احتيال انها شرعي وآمن ثنائي خيارات نظام التداول. Aaron's Profit Suite is Automated Binary Options Trading Signals Software . تحميل Aaron's Profit Suite System APP %100 بلا مخاطر + $1K مكافأة الآن مجانا…


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Originally Posted by TriniMike: don't think i'm posting picks tonight, just leans... will be doing more observing than betting
Oh thanks for the update old wise one!
TriniMike, the Warren Jeffs of Covers..
And you really believe that!? Or are you another one of his fake accounts? Bw ha ha ha ha ha..If you do, I'm 65-0..Follow me! I've seen this liar go 1-5 and claim the next day he was 1-0 because the other 4 plays weren't "system plays"...Overall, he's 43%..41% after last night


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Binary Champ System Review by Tom Jackson Is Binary Champ System A Scam Or Legit? What is Binary Champ Software? My Binary Champ System Review Share The Truth About Binary Champ Software Before Download & Invest in It
Binary Champ System is completely FREE! You simply signup for access and you get to use the Binary Champ software. You will need a trading account and funds to trade with but Binary Champ is yours to use at no charge. We limit the number of members to Binary Champ so as to keep it exclusive and offer the best support.
Product Name: Binary Champ
Binary Champ Website: BinaryChamp.eu
Binary Champ CEO: Tom Jackson
Binary Champ Cost: FREE
Binary Champ Review
It's easy to start trading binary options. You can follow these seven simple steps and start trading binary options in a matter of minutes, do not hesitate to contact customer support
1. Create your account binary option trading – complex arrangements between exchanges and brokerages is no longer necessary for binary options trading. Instead, you can start the binary options in less than five minutes of trading by registering for an account and enter your basic information in the Binary Champ trading system you can start trading with real account or use demo account
2. Choose your core market and property – once you've registered your account, choose a market for trading in Binary Champ System enables traders to buy options on many markets including stocks, commodities, currencies and indices pairs. It is best to choose the assets in the markets in which you are familiar. For example, if you are a Binary Champ trader, you can binary options trading on the currency pairs from around the world. Or if you are more familiar with the goods, you can trade oil, gold and silver on the commodities market.
3. Choose your time to expiration – after that you have chosen the original, you must determine how long you want the option to another. The end of the binary options expiration time can be long, such as one month or a short one. Usually binary options contracts not shorter than one hour, but Binary Champ allows traders to buy options up to five minutes before the expiry time, unless Turbo trade that allows clients to trade in an even shorter period of time 60 seconds
4. make your final analysis you – Once you've identified your basic trade standards (assets and time validity) is finished, you will need to predict, or forecast, and the direction that the price of the underlying will move before the expiration time. Binary Champ Traders are conducting technical and fundamental analysis by anticipate the direction in which the assets will move. If you want to learn how to conduct fundamental analysis before taking the first your business, you can read about how to conduct a technical and fundamental analysis in Binary Champ e-book.
5. Buy your choice – then you will need to choose which option
Trading will be in it. There are four different types of binary options to choose from, digital, scale, and rapid touch. All options are fixed yield between 75-85% if traders were in the money.
6. Setting the amount – Now that you have set up your commerce, all you have to do is determine how much money to invest. You can trade binary options start from $ 10 to as much as $ 5,000 on any option on any case, the most successful bilateral trade option to purchase multiple options that are traded at one time. Once you have registered, you can easily make a deposit in your trading using a variety of payment methods convenient account.
7. Wait for the expiration of the option and get ready for your return – now all you have to do is wait for the option to expire. You can continue to follow-up how to perform your choice in your account online under the heading "Trades". If your Commerce ended up in the money you'll get a return of 75% – 85% on your initial investment head.
Is Binary Champ A Scam
Binary Champ Software is Not A Scam It's legit and Safe Binary Options Trading System. Binary Champ is Automated Binary Options Trading Signals Software . Download Binary Champ System APP %100 Risk-Free + $1K Bonus Free NOW…


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Red, Orange & Blue Solid Standard or Mini Cupcake Baking Liners
Product Info
These Baking Liners are the perfect solution for your cupcakes, muffins, candy, cake balls or cake pops. They are also great fun for crafting!
This listing is for the following:
Orange, Red & Blue
Mini 1 1/4" base 3/4" wall
Standard 2" base 1 3/8" wall
Choose your size and amount on the drop down box.
Sizes listed are approximate as size varies on manufacturer.
Mini's fit basic mini baking tin & standard fits basic standard baking tin.
If exact size is needed please message us BEFORE checkout.
Colors may vary slightly depending on your monitor
All manufacturers liners claim to be greaseproof.
Liners can react differently depending on batter and weather.
If using for a special event a test bake is recommended.
Please read our shop policies before purchasing for greatest satisfaction and best results.
A completed purchase agrees to our shop policies.
PLEASE message us with any questions or concerns prior to purchasing.
Thank you for visiting DK Delektables!
Deann & Kathy
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and follow us on instagram @ dkdelektables


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Frostburg State University accounting courses
Think about what career is best suited for you, and where you want to study. Request more information now.
Think about what career is best suited for you, and where you want to study. Request more information now.
Think about what career is best suited for you, and where you want to study. Request more information now.
Information about Frostburg State University accounting courses, and registering for elective discussion sections and seminars. As a student, your first stop should be the registrar's office, where you can pick up a free copy of both the academic calendar and course catalog, in order to find available credit classes that you may be interested in taking. In-person class registration has largely been replaced with online sign-up, and many schools offer mobile apps that streamline the course registration process. Finally, check with the admissions office for assistance with prerequisites, tuition payment deadlines, and Frostburg State University accounting major requirements information. Please use the form above to request admissions info for Frostburg State University.
The average entry-level salary in public accounting is over $60,500 per year, and given five to ten years of job experience, you can expect to earn up to $90,000 annually. Accounting salaries are higher in the private sector as compared to government jobs, and higher again if employed at one of the Big 4 accounting firms such as PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, Ernst & Young, and KPMG. Budget analysts prepare budget reports and monitor institutional spending, while cost estimators collect and analyze accounting data. A certified public accountant (CPA) may utilize these reports in preparing summaries for managerial accounting purposes, as well as in tax filings and SEC reporting.
The income statement shows revenues, expenses, gains, and losses, but it does not include cash receipts nor cash disbursements. Revenues from primary activities are often referred to as operating revenues. The primary activities of a business are purchasing merchandise or raw materials and selling products, referred to as sales revenues or simply gross sales. Non-operating revenues, on the other hand, are earnings that fall outside of purchasing and selling goods and services. For example, when a retail business earns interest on some of its idle cash, or sells an commodity investment for a capital gain, these items are reported on the income statement in a separate section. Beyond degree requirements such as Frostburg State University managerial accounting, you may consider University of Akron classrooms for complementary electives to your primary course of study.
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Great Restaurant Recipes of New York
- - Per Person
What You Will Learn
If a dish can make it here, it can make it anywhere. The food capitol of the world is known for its variety of ethnic-influenced cuisines, fantastic restaurants and the accessibility of just about any type of food you might want at any hour. Indulge yourself in some choice selections from the Big Apple's best. Join us as we show you how to create popular selections from five of Manhattan's legendary eateries.
What To Expect:
Great cooking isn't about recipes—it's about techniques. In our classes you'll work together with other students in a fun, hands-on environment led by our professional chef instructors.
- Learn fundamental skills for a lifetime of great cooking
- Work side-by-side with other students to prepare each dish
- Interact with classmates and the instructor for a rich learning experience
- Classes are 2 to 2 1/2 hours and each student enjoys a generous taste of every dish
- Held in our professional teaching kitchens, each class is led by experienced chef instructors
- Students receive a 10% discount coupon to use the week after the class


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Project Description
- Type: Cylinder Head Gasket
- Bore Diameter: STD
- PISTONG RING Diameter: STD
- Car Make: NISSAN
- Place of Origin: China
- Brand Name: KRKFIRE
- Model Number: NS102111
- MATERIAL: graphite ; metal ; asbestos ; non-asbestos ;
- THICKNESS: 1.6mm ; 1.8mm ;2.0mm ; 2.4mm ;
- Quality Guarantee: 50,000km / 2 years.
- Application: Engine Parts
- Packing: Paper Packing or Nylon Packing
- Payment: T/T ; L/C ; WESTERN UNION ;
Wenzhou KRK Industrial Co., Ltd. is a fast-growing auto parts supplier specialized in high-quality aftermarket Piston ring and Engine gasket . We partner with clients to offer top-flight value in a fast, efficient, professional and reliable manner. While many companies claim to put the "customer first", we actually do.
To us customer means both our direct client and the end-user and we therefore thoroughly research the needs of both and abide strictly to all agreements and commitments to each – including market exclusivity. As such, we are well on our way to becoming China's top auto engine parts brand KRKFIRE.
- Address: Linyang Linbei industrial zone, Nanbin subdistrict, Ruian, Wenzhou city,Zhejiang province, China.
- Phone: +86-577-65555100
- Fax: +86-577-65555200
- Mobile: +86-13967763773
- Wechat: H13967763773
- Email: email@example.com


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Fort Collins, CO
1812 Essex Drive, Fort Collins, CO
2207 Wakefield Drive, Fort Collins, CO
Pierce, Colorado musicians are a wonderful way to personalize an event and set the tone for the festivities. From weddings to intimate dinner parties, musicians of all genres create a specific mood while also entertaining your guests. You can find talented many singers and musicians close to Pierce, Colorado who would be perfect for your party.
Have something specific in mind for your Pierce musicians? Maybe you have a favorite classical song that you want to walk down the aisle to? Hire a violin soloist or a string quartet to create an elegant ambiance. A jazz pianist provides an upbeat setting for a corporate dinner and gospel singers will have your guests standing at their seats.
A vocalist in Pierce can serenade a couple with their favorite song for an anniversary party, while bluegrass musicians add southern flair to a casual event. A guitarist makes a soothing addition to any party and they often use less equipment than bands and DJs requiring only an instrument and a microphone.
Hiring local musicians from Pierce is an excellent way to support talent in the area, while also creating a memorable and entertaining event.
Register now to list your business on Punchbowl.


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The Rapha Cap
The classic berretta has been loved by riders since the birth of road racing. Unlike most cycling caps, however, which are little more than promotional items for carrying sponsors' names, the Rapha Cap is an essential piece of performance roadwear.
The cap is made from a soft, lightweight technical cotton. It is highly water resistant, windproof and extremely breathable. The inside of the cap is lined with moisture-wicking anti-bacterial tape, and has a thick elastic fastener to hold it in place. With clean, modern lines the cap can be worn under a helmet or on its own and can be folded into a jersey pocket when not needed.
"The perfect addition to the well dressed cyclist's wardrobe'
– Cycling Plus


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PVC colour matched straight joint for Zenolite plus fossil panels
Delivered direct by experienced couriers
Made from PVC in a matt finish
To cover the joint between two panels
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Quality products you can trust
Because we believe in the superior quality of our products, we offer FREE extended guarantees, giving you complete peace of mindFind out about our product guarantees
PVC colour matched straight joint for Zenolite plus fossil panels
Delivered direct by experienced couriers
Made from PVC in a matt finish
To cover the joint between two panels
|2500 mm
|4 mm
|4 mm
|0.75 kg
|Guarantee Length
|10 years
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Fast, convenient, keeping you informed... there are many, many reasons why we now offer one of the best delivery services around. Here are just a few:
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If you're not happy with your purchase, for any reason, we offer a 30 day no quibble returns policy. Return your product to us and we'll refund you.
After 30 days, you can exchange your product for another one up to 365 days after receiving it. Collection and redelivery fees apply. We can't accept returns or exchanges for products that have been used or installed.
Whilst all our products pass strict quality standards, on very rare occasions you may find an item arrives damaged. Please make sure you inspect your goods as soon as you receive them and let us know within 30 days of receipt if an item is damaged, by calling us on 0344 804 48 48.
Once the damage has been confirmed, we'll ensure it's replaced free of charge, and with the minimum of fuss.


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Our unique search agent technology monitors the marketplace for event tickets, tracking prices across major exchanges. Each event page offers a 'name your price' search option that emails you as it finds lower priced listings for that event. Exploit situations where sellers drop prices as the event date nears!
Below are the ticket marketplaces we search, including direct access to both Ticketmaster exchanges. Click logos for details.