text:
|Publication number
|Publication type
|Application number
|Publication date
|Oct 13, 2009
|Filing date
|Apr 3, 2003
|Priority date
|Apr 3, 2003
|Fee status
|Also published as
|Publication number
|Elaine Harvey, Matthew Walnock
|Original Assignee
|Network Security Technologies, Inc.
|Export Citation
|BiBTeX, EndNote, RefMan
|Patent Citations (53), Non-Patent Citations (15), Referenced by (63), Classifications (19), Legal Events (9)
|External Links: USPTO, USPTO Assignment, Espacenet
1. Field
The present invention relates generally to network security techniques, and more specifically to detecting characteristics of devices communicating in data networks employing wireless local area network (WLAN) technology.
2. Background
The Institute for Electrical and Electronic Engineers approved the "Standard For Information Technology; Telecommunications and information exchange between systems-Local and Metropolitan networks-Specific requirements; Part 11: Wireless LAN Medium Access Control (MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) specifications: Higher speed Physical Layer (PHY) extension in the 2.4 GHz band" (known as 802.11b) for the development of products to allow computers and other devices to connect to wired Local Area Network (LAN) segments not with wires, but by using radio-based network interface cards (NICs) working in the public 2.4 GHz range. Such wireless access to a wired LAN is often referred to as a wireless network.
As a result of the 802.11 standard, many network products were developed that provide access points that are wired into a LAN segment and provide access to the network for the wireless client computers using these radio-based NICs. Because wireless connectivity can span outside the physical control of a building, the current physical security measures that attempt to prevent unauthorized access to a LAN are no longer effective. By using a Service Set Identifier (SSID), only those attempts to access the wireless network that use the same SSID on the client cards as is on the access point will connect. The SSID does not provide security, however, only identification. The SSID is sent in an unprotected fashion by both the access point and the clients, and can be easily captured and exploited.
Security measures were incorporated into the 802.11b protocol, including Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) data encryption and shared secret passwords. The shared secret passwords provide limited protection and are rarely used. WEP relies on a shared password used by the access point and the clients to encrypt the payload data of the transmission, but does not encrypt the header and other information about the communication. Further, WEP was developed before the export restrictions were lifted on encrypted algorithms. Because of this, WEP was only designed to use 40 bit keys and was not cryptographically complex. After the export restrictions were lifted, a 104-bit version was implemented. Unfortunately, this "stronger" version still used a flawed crypto implementation. It was not long before white papers were written describing how the WEP key could be broken. Soon after that, products appeared that could assist in breaking WEP.
The use of 802.11x wireless networks (where 802.11x refers to any of the 802.11 standards that define wireless protocols, including, for example, 802.11b and the recently released 802.11a) has grown significantly. This, coupled with the availability of low cost equipment in the consumer market, has raised many questions for IT department administrators about whether or not to implement a wireless network, and, if so, how to implement one. Many computer security policies likely preclude the utilization of any wireless network tied into the main network wiring. Others allow limited use for the convenience of their employees, but dictate strict security settings.
Contrasting this, certain industries necessitate the deployment of wireless networks. For instance, the sheer size and topology of an overnight package delivery company such as Federal Express requires the use of handheld wireless nodes in their day-to-day operations. Typically, most early wireless networks employed by companies such as this were proprietary. But due to the increase in available hardware and software, and due to the increased performance and ease to which 802.11x networks can be integrated into existing IT infrastructures, many companies such as Federal Express are switching to the commercially available systems.
In most situations, wireless breaches of wired networks go unnoticed. Unlike the plethora of security devices/services available for the wired network infrastructure few tools exist for the system administrator to detect wireless intrusions.
One security issue with wireless networks is the fact that it is inexpensive and easy to install a new wireless access point onto an existing wired network. This could open an otherwise secure network to outsiders. Many current wireless intrusion detection products work by monitoring the wired network for access points. This requires their use on every separate segment of the network, since each separate network segment would need to be monitored individually. Also, current solutions do not identify any client machines that are attempting to access the wireless LAN.
A second security issue involves locating wireless access devices (particularly unapproved ones) within a wireless network. A wireless access device can include any wireless device that can provide access to a network, including a wireless access point or wireless client. Traditionally, locating the source of radio signals, such as those emitted by a wireless access device, utilizes a TDF (Time/Distance Fix) approach that requires listening stations at known points in space, and the application of a timestamp and direction for a given radio transmission. This requires that all listening stations have directional antennas and highly accurate clocks that are synchronized to the other listening stations. These components of the solution are prohibitive in an office environment. Furthermore, the directional antennas are more expensive than their omni-directional counterparts. The use of directional antennas also implies that complete coverage of a given area can only be achieved with a greater number of listening stations than if omni-directional antennas where used. Lastly, the requirements for the accuracy and synchronization of the clocks increases as the range to the target decreases. Since an 802.11 wireless access device has a range of only several hundred feet, highly accurate and well-synchronized clocks are required, further increasing the expense of any potential solutions.
A third security issue involves early and accurate detection of possibly highly sophisticated network intrusions, such as spoofing. Traditional intrusion detection system (IDS) solutions attempt to capture and store network packets as quickly as possible for the purpose of attack detection, anomaly detection, and event correlation. This typically requires high bandwidth connections to the observed network, fast instruction processing, and large storage capacity.
When applied to wireless networks, the same problems exist. A traditional approach to intrusion detection involving 802.11 would require packets to be captured as quickly as a radio receiver could receive them. In addition, 802.11 networks operate on multiple channels, each of which must be observed separately. Thus, in order to observe all current 802.11b channels (of which there are 14), 14 different observing radios would be required. In addition to being cost prohibitive, power consumption and processing capabilities become greater issues.
There is therefore a need in the art for a wireless intrusion detection system and method that overcomes the above problems by providing a non-intrusive, robust, and transparent wireless intrusion detection capability that allows a wireless access device to be located within a wireless network and quickly and accurately identifies intrusions into the wireless network.
In accordance with the present invention, a wireless intrusion detection system (WIDS) and method performs monitoring of wireless networks (including at least one wireless network being protected, known as the wireless network of interest), stores the results of that monitoring, processes the results to determine whether any unauthorized access of the wireless network of interest has occurred, detects characteristics of the wireless network and notifies users of the results and the processing. Furthermore, the WID system includes one or more WIDS nodes (which may include at least one primary WIDS node) for monitoring a particular geographic area, and a WIDS collector for collecting from the WIDS nodes the information monitored by all of the WIDS nodes. In an embodiment, the WID system can detect characteristics of the wireless network or of wireless access devices. Such characteristics can include the state in which a particular wireless access device is operating and the type of wireless network (which can include, for example, either an infrastructure network or an ad hoc network). Information about a network collected by a WIDS can include tracking of authorized and unauthorized access points and clients, locating any unauthorized wireless access devices, determining the status of any authorized access points, determining whether any authorized access points have changed, determining whether any authorized access points are not operating, identifying any denial of service (DoS) attempts, tracking of multiple connection attempts to the wireless network by any unauthorized wireless access devices, tracking how long any unauthorized wireless access device has attempted to access the wireless network, and identifying attempts to spoof an authorized access point. In an embodiment, the location of a wireless access device is determined by measuring a distance between a node and the wireless access device, measuring a second distance between another node and the wireless access device, determining an area based on the distance measurements, and determining an approximate location based on the intersection of those areas.
In general, the number of WIDS nodes required for a WID system is based on the size of the area to be protected. The WIDS nodes, however, utilize passive detection so they are not easy to detect by an attacker. In addition, the out-of-band communications between the WIDS nodes and WIDS collector are encrypted, providing even further security.
The WID system in
Authorized access to the wireless network can occur through various access points 130 that allow wireless access devices to access local area network (LAN) 170, to which access points 130 are attached. An authorized wireless client 165 can access the LAN via the wireless network through an access point 130 and have the same (or similar) usage of the wired network as an authorized client 167 connected to the LAN via a wired connection.
In addition to access points 130 within LAN 170 that have been authorized, an additional rogue access point 140 is shown in
Rogue access point 140 could be an access point enabled by an authorized employee or could be an access point that an attacker has somehow installed on LAN 170. War driver 150 includes any well known approach for accessing wireless networks using "drive-by" techniques in which a person utilizes a wireless-enabled portable device to access unprotected wireless networks.
LAN 170 in
In an embodiment, management console 180 can be implemented over a Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) encrypted web interface, as would be apparent. In addition, the management console is, in an embodiment, SNMP compatible and so can be used with features found in typical remote SNMP management software (including, for example, the OpenView software suite from Hewlett Packard) to notify the user via electronic mail (e-mail) or any other notification mechanisms. Additionally, the management console can provide multiple user authorization levels, allowing different people within an organization to have differing levels of access to the information in the WID system.
WIDS nodes 120 are loaded with software capable of inferring wireless network electromagnetic characteristics unique to the particular network configuration as deployed. In one embodiment, the location of each WIDS node is, at time of deployment, calibrated using known information from the wireless network of interest. Calibration input types can include, for example, measured distance to a known stationary calibration point, signal and noise levels, and other variables as appropriate. Location of an intrusion of the wireless network can be determined more accurately by applying a neural network or genetic algorithm to historical signal strength statistics collected from continuous input, as would be apparent. In addition, location of a wireless access device can be achieved by triangulating data on the wireless access device using information from multiple WIDS nodes.
WIDS collector 110 contains software that determines the proximity and approximate location of an event source to the WIDS node by implementing known algorithms to spatial coordinates and wireless signal characteristics. In one embodiment, geographic coordinates collected at linear intersections of a structure or coverage area are applied to a rectangular grid overlaid on a representation of the blueprint or spatial area. Using basic cartographic methods, geographic coordinates corresponding to WIDS nodes deployed on a campus, structure or other coverage area may be obtained. In one embodiment, triangulation methods may be used to calculate approximate position given signal information and coordinates.
The communications link between WIDS collector 110 and WIDS nodes 120 uses a proprietary out-of-band radio 208 connected to a standard RS232 UART port 213 of host processor 218. In this particular implementation, out-of-band radio 208 contains the necessary level shift required for 10-12V signaling and is protocol and RF interoperable with out-of-band transistor-transistor logic (TTL) radio 327 of WIDS node 120 (as shown in
In addition, communication means 230 is provided to allow WIDS collector 110 to communicate with WIDS nodes 120 using other radio protocols. These protocols could, for example, include new technologies such as ultra wideband (UWB), or other narrow band and spread spectrum devices. Connection of other radio devices using other radio protocols over communication means 230 in this embodiment is via standard universal serial bus (USB) ports 207A and USB host connector 207, though other I/O such as the host expansion bus 240 could be used.
Connection of WIDS collector 110 to a wide area network (WAN) or monitoring facility is accomplished via an expansion bus shown here as host expansion bus 240 using either the Media Access Controller (MAC) or Physical Interface (PHY) of the main NIC interface 217 or the ancillary NIC subsystem 216, as would be apparent. Additional connectivity to the WAN is provided by a modem 211 or a cellular connection 210 via another UART 214. Other WAN connections could also be used as they become available and interfaced using any other expansion interfaces.
For protection of the data transmission between WIDS collector 110 and WIDS nodes 120 a cryptographic accelerator 219, such as those offered by Broadcom and HiFn, is provided, shown here using host expansion bus 240 to communicate with host processor 218 over host PCI port 220.
As shown in
Power for WIDS node 120 is provided by the power/control subsystem 319 that can be "shore powered" with alternating current (AC) using a typical wall transformer 323. Battery operation or backup can be maintained via a rechargeable cell 322 and charging system 321. Full time battery operation can be selected using jumper 320. Charge voltage and current can be from wall transformer 323, or via solar panels 324 and/or small windmill 325 to eliminate wiring requirements in outdoor locations.
During battery operation, power management can be achieved using a small microcontroller 330, such as the Microchip 16C74. This particular device provides a very low power standby mode using 32 kHz watch crystal 315 for sleep mode and high speed crystal 314 for normal, full power operation. Microcontroller 330 controls the main power supply 319 via relay control 319A. During sleep mode, microcontroller 330 receives power via low quiescent charge pump 317 directly from rechargeable cell 322. Control of power/control unit 319 is also available via the SOC General Purpose I/O (GPIO) port 335.
Microcontroller 330 also provides engineering data for remote WIDS node 120 using the eight on-board analog-to-digital (A/D) converters. For example, case temperature is provided to the microcontroller 330 A/D converters using a thermistor 313. Case tamper information is provided via the tamper mechanism 316, also connected to the microcontroller 330 A/D's since it is always on, even during sleep mode. This data, in addition to other diagnostic info such as supply voltages and battery charge, are monitored and sent to embedded processor 303, in this example, via the UART 313. This information is relayed to the WIDS collector 110 to monitor the health (or status) of the remote WIDS node 120.
WIDS node 120 connectivity to WID controller 110 is provided using the aforementioned proprietary out-of-band radio protocol. Proprietary TTL-level out-of-band radio 327 connects to embedded processor 303 via UART 305. Other protocol radios 310 can be used for both the out-of-band function or as additional monitoring interfaces.
Another method for connection of the typical wireless LAN network interface card (NIC) is provided by a multitude of possible interfaces. Multiple USB WLAN devices 309 are connected using USB port 312A on embedded processor 303 via connector 312. As higher speed WLAN devices become available, connection to the host embedded processor 303 expansion bus, in this case the host PCI 304, affords higher data rate WLAN devices 326 shown here using the MINIPCI form factor. Additionally, provision is made for connection of Card Bus/PCMCIA style of WLAN devices using Card Bus bridge 341 and Card Bus/PCMCIA connector 342.
WIDS node 120 encryption processing is shown as being provided by a dedicated cryptographic accelerator 340 connected to the host PCI bus 304 of embedded processor 303. This off loads the processing of encrypted data from the host embedded processor 303.
As described above with reference to the WID system in
A WIDS trap service describes a simple TCP service present on all WIDS nodes 120 (including primary WIDS node 125) and WIDS collector 110. This service functions to forward data to the appropriate software subsystems. This service provides to the WID system a method of encrypted data transport between WIDS nodes 120 and primary WIDS nodes 125, and primary WIDS nodes 125 and WIDS collector 110. This service is responsible for the communication of all WIDS packet types, in one embodiment to include configuration, diagnostic, and health. The WIDS trap service also transfers unencrypted packet payloads to parser component for further processing or analysis, as appropriate.
A WIDS parser component describes a simple utility present on all WIDS nodes 120 (including primary WIDS node 125) and WIDS collector 110 which communicates received data to appropriate operating system or application components. In one embodiment, the WIDS node parser implementation receives unencrypted packets of type configuration from the WIDS trap service. Packets of type "configuration" contain specific instructions to update WIDS node system files, software, device firmware, and other critical components as appropriate. The WIDS collector parser implementation receives unencrypted packets of type "diagnostic" and "event" from the WIDS collector trap service. In one embodiment, a WIDS collector parser applies basic formatting to the data and forwards the resulting information to a MySQL database service or SNMP-capable enterprise management software.
In an embodiment, a WIDS Communication Protocol (WCP) defines a communications method between WIDS nodes 120 and WIDS collector 110. The primary network service associated with these communications is referred to as the "Trap Service", as described above. WCP is an application-layer transmission control protocol (TCP) that provides communications between WIDS node and WIDS collector Trap Service daemons via Generalized Radio Internet Protocol (GENRIP) packets that have been encrypted with Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). A pre-loaded "customer key" is used to encrypt configuration, initialization, and key exchange packets. A unique "session key" generated by WID collector 110 is used to encrypt event and health packets for each instance of WID node 120. In an embodiment, both the customer key and session key are 256-bit keys, but other key lengths can be used for either key.
The WCP defines at least four different types of packets, each of which is described in further detail below. In general, a generic packet type contains information that defines the packet as a WCP packet and provides common information for all packet types; a diagnostic packet type contains data regarding the status of the WIDS nodes; an event packet type contains information regarding events that have occurred in the wireless network; and a configuration packet type contains information regarding the system configuration, including software versions, applications, and operating system information.
WCP generic packet
In an embodiment, the fields in the generic packet type have the structure shown in Table 1. The generic packet is a component of all other WCP packets, and uniquely identifies them as being WCP packets. The generic packet is used between the WIDS collector and primary WEDS nodes, and between the primary and secondary WIDS nodes (i.e., throughout the WID system). The main function of the generic packet is to identify the packet as a WCP packet. The HEADER field has a length of 16 bits and contains the static value of 0x4E53, providing the WCP packet identification.
The TIMESTAMP field in the generic packet ensures that each packet has a timestamp associated with it. This can be used for a number of purposes, including, for example, to preserve the time of particular events that will allow resolution of issues related to latency caused by network congestion. In an embodiment, the value placed in the timestamp field is provided by a POSIX 0.1 time( ) system call. The type field in the generic packet, in one embodiment of the WCP, is an 8-bit value that indicates to the trap service how to process the packet or specifies to which subsystem that packet belongs.
WCP diagnostic packet
WCP | Tcpu | Tsys | V0 | V1 | V2 | V3 | BATT | CHECKSUM |
The diagnostic packet type (with a TYPE value of 0x01 in an embodiment) shown in Table 2 is sent from the secondary WIDS nodes to the primary WIDS nodes, and the primary WIDS nodes pass it on to the WIDS collector, both communications using 256-bit AES encryption and a session key that will be described in further detail below. The WCP field in the WCP diagnostic packet contains a WCP generic packet, as described above, to provide the basic information to the recipient of the packet.
The diagnostic packet communicates status data from the secondary WIDS nodes to the primary WIDS nodes, including, for example, temperature, battery life, and voltages. Once the WIDS collector receives this diagnostic data on all WIDS nodes from the primary WIDS nodes, the WIDS collector can determine the system status. Once the system status has been evaluated by the WIDS collector, it can cause various courses of action to be taken that are appropriate in light of the received data. For example, if the WIDS collector determines that the battery life of a particular WIDS node is very short, the WIDS collector can send out a message to a system operator notifying the person that the batteries need to be changed.
As shown in Table 2, there are a number of fields in the diagnostic packet in one embodiment. The Tcpu, Tsys, V0, V1, V2, V3, and BATT fields are each 8-bit fields that provide information related to the health of the particular WIDS node. The Tcpu value indicates the temperature of the CPU. The Tsys value indicates the ambient temperature of the WIDS node inside the case. The V0, V1, V2, and V3 values each indicate the level of a different voltage source. The V0 value indicates the voltage level on the 2.5 VDC supply, the V1 value indicates the voltage level on the 3.3 VDC supply, the V2 value indicates the voltage level on the 5.0 VDC supply, and the V3 value indicates the voltage level on the 12.0 VDC supply. The BATT field provides an estimate of the percentage of battery life left.
The checksum field in the diagnostic packet can be used to provide host-based tamper detection and session hijacking detection. In an embodiment, the checksum can be a cryptographic hash value generated from unique system variables, thereby providing data integrity. For example, a hash could be computed from combining the IP address of the radio, the unique serial number of the Geode processor, and a media access control (MAC) address unique to the WIDS node, as would be apparent.
Finally, the RESERVED field in the diagnostic packet can be used for monitoring future events or functionality. For example, individual bit flags could be defined for indicating particular types of tampering.
WCP event packet
The WCP event packet (with a TYPE value of 0x02 in an embodiment) depicted in Table 3 communicates events that occur in the wireless network from secondary WIDS nodes 120 to primary WIDS node 125, and then back to WIDS collector 110, using 256-bit AES encryption and a session key that will be described in further detail below. The WCP field in the WCP diagnostic packet contains a WCP generic packet, as described above, to provide the basic information to the recipient of the packet.
The CLASS field in the event packet is a 6-bit field identifying the class and subclass of packet received by the WID node. In one embodiment, this field describes the packet as one of 802.11b packet classifications Management, Control and Data. Associated sub-classes of packet type Management in this embodiment may indicate 802.11b link-layer mechanisms such as Association, Authentication, Probe, Beacon and others, as are apparent.
The SRC field in the event packet is, in one embodiment, a 48-bit field that contains the MAC address of wireless access devices detected during data collection performed by WIDS nodes 120 in the WID system. In an 802.11 wireless network, for example, the value in the MAC field could correspond to the MAC addresses of detected clients or access points. Upon receipt of the event packet, WIDS collector 120 can determine the significance of the received MAC addresses.
The DST field in the WCP event packet is a 48-bit field containing the MAC address of wireless access devices for which the detected event is destined. In an embodiment deployed for 802.11 technologies, this value applies to the wireless interface of an access point, broadcast address (ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff) or wireless interface of a client supporting ad-hoc mode, as would be apparent.
The SSID field in the WCP event packet is a 256-bit service set identifier of access points. This field allows a determination of specific information about a particular wireless access device, such as the name of an access point. This can be used to help identify whether the wireless access device is a known wireless access device or an unknown wireless access device. Further information on the SSID can be found in Section 22.214.171.124 of IEEE std. 802.11b.
The CHANNEL field in the WCP event packet is an 8-bit value that indicates the channel on which the event was detected. For example, in the 802.11b protocol, channels 1 through 11 are used in the United States, channels 1 through 13 are used in Europe, and channel 14 is used in Japan. Thus, the CHANNEL field in a WID system for 802.11 would contain the channel number being used by the access point or client in the 802.11 wireless network. To maintain applicability of this field to new and emerging wireless network technologies, possible data values exceed those described by an 802.11b network embodiment.
The WEP field in the WCP event packet is a 4-bit value that indicates whether Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) has been enabled. WEP is a security protocol that utilizes encryption to protect 802.11 transmissions, as would be apparent. In one embodiment, the first bit indicates whether WEP is enabled on the detected wireless access device while the remaining bits are reserved. This field could also be used, in another embodiment, to indicate the version of the 802.11 protocol being implemented in the wireless network of interest (e.g., 802.11b, 802.11a, or 802.1 μg).
The RSS field in the WCP event packet is an 8-bit value that indicates the Received Signal Strength (RSS) of the particular event. In one embodiment the signal level is collected by the firmware of the 802.11 interface and passed to the application through a software driver interface. The RSS field would then indicate the signal strength in dBm.
The RESERVED field in the WCP event packet is a 64-bit field that is reserved for future development and expansion. Potential uses include, for example, the mode of operation of the remote 802.11 wireless access device, identifying patterns of hostile traffic or other vulnerabilities, and any other information related to the state of detected events.
WCP configuration packet
The WCP configuration packet (with a TYPE value of 0x03 in an embodiment) depicted in Table 4 updates system configuration information in primary WIDS node 125 and secondary WIDS nodes 120, using 256-bit AES encryption and a preloaded customer key. The preloaded customer key is a unique key for each customer that is loaded into WID collector 110 and WID nodes 120. It is used to encrypt all WCP configuration packets (except those that contain the "enter configuration mode" command). The configuration packets can contain updated system configuration information, drivers, firmware, kernels, and applications. The WCP field in the WCP diagnostic packet contains a WCP generic packet, as described above, to provide the basic information to the recipient of the packet.
The CMD field in the WCP configuration packet is a 4-bit value that contains commands to be executed by the receiving unit (i.e., the WIDS nodes). In an embodiment, the commands with the values 0x0 and 0xF are reserved values.
Numerous commands can be implemented in WCP for performing a number of different functions within the WID nodes. The current command set includes the following:
If the session between primary WIDS node 125 to WIDS collector 110 is disrupted, the WIDS collector broadcasts a Network Reset and indicates error condition on Console. If WIDS collector 110 issues a System Update, primary WIDS node 125 issues Network Reset broadcast to all Nodes. WIDS collector 110 issues a packet of type configuration with command System Update to primary WIDS node 125 to initiate replacement or modification of system configuration data, binaries, device firmware, or other WIDS components as is apparent. In one embodiment, primary WIDS node 125 issues a Key Reset command in a packet of type configuration broadcast to all WIDS nodes. Those WIDS nodes which receive a Key Reset complete transfer of pending diagnostic or event data, and revert to a system state awaiting packets of type configuration encrypted with a unique pre-loaded customer key. Primary WIDS nodes receive system update information from WIDS collector 110 and transmit it to the WIDS nodes 120 for integrity verification and subsequent implementation of system updates.
The protocol above can be used by WID system to exchange information that can be used to locate a wireless access device within the wireless network. In particular, through the use of some simplifying assumptions and known properties of 802.11 wireless access devices, a WID system can be used to locate a wireless access device using omni-directional antennas and without dependencies on system clocks.
A WID system using this approach requires the approximate positions of the listening stations to be known. Additionally, each WIDS node can be tuned using the location of a known target wireless access device. This tuning allows the system to take into account any variations in the immediate environment of the WIDS node.
The determination of the channel on which a wireless access device is operating is affected by the concept of "channel bleed", which is the 802.11 defined method of transmitting a radio signal on a channel adjacent to the intended channel to allow wireless access devices to better find existing wireless networks. Channel bleed results in the ability to detect 802.11 communications, at a lower received signal strength (RSS), on channels other than the channel on which a wireless access device is transmitting at full strength. The inclusion of channel bleed signals in the determination of the location of a target wireless access device would erroneously lead to distance calculations that will make the wireless access device appear further away than it actually is. Consequently, it is necessary to determine the channel on which the target wireless access device is transmitting at full strength.
Channel determination can be affected by certain characteristics of the particular mode of wireless network operation. For example, in an 802.11 network operating in infrastructure mode, access points are responsible for keeping all members of the network transmitting and receiving transmissions on the same channel. According to the 802.11 protocol, the access point either remains on the same channel at all times or has a predictable channel hopping pattern that all members of the network follow. In an ad-hoc network, however, a list of member wireless access devices is not maintained by any single member of the network. Therefore, there is no single device which can provide the current channel of all of the other wireless access devices in the network. In an embodiment of the present invention, a determination can be made of the channel on which a wireless access device is communicating without the need to contact an access point or become a member of the ad-hoc network. The only data required is the RSS of transmissions from 802.11 wireless access devices across the various channels of the 802.11 spectrum.
To determine the channel on which a wireless access device is communicating according to the present invention, each WIDS node in the wireless network observes certain activity on each channel in the wireless network for a limited period of time. The data gathered can then be used to calculate the channel on which each of the observed wireless access devices is communicating. In one embodiment of the present invention, each WIDS node spends two seconds observing an 802.11 channel. The RSS of all transmissions received on that channel is stored. The WIDS node moves onto the next channel and observes that channel for two seconds. After observing and storing the activity on all 802.11 channels, a table containing the channel and signal strength can be formed using wireless access devices as the key. In one embodiment, the table is stored at the WIDS node. To form the table, the WIDS node utilizes the observed data for each wireless access device, which contains the observed channel and signal strength. From this set of data, an average RSS is calculated per wireless access device per observed channel. For each wireless access device, the channel on which the wireless access device is transmitting is determined from the channel with the largest average RSS.
In the case of 802.11 networks that maintain the same channel over the lifetime of the network, the table resulting from the above steps can be maintained over time to further validate the calculated channel. In an embodiment, the weight given to data gained from previous passes through the 802.11 spectrum is reduced with each subsequent pass. In the case of networks that utilize channel hopping, however, the data from previous passes through the 802.11 channels must be discarded before beginning a new pass. Further, the type of network in use can easily be obtained through trivial observation of the 802.11 packets transmitted by the wireless access devices.
As described above, an average RSS for transmissions on the wireless access device's channel is stored in order to generate more accurate location information for a target wireless access device. Since 802.11 wireless access devices tend to be attached to mobile systems, in one embodiment a weighted average RSS is maintained to account for the movement of the target wireless access device. As time passes, a single RSS data point carries less and less weight in the average utilizing this approach. This results in an average RSS that provides information that will allow both an accurate location of a target wireless access device at a given time as well as the ability to track a wireless access device that is moving.
Based on the received signal strength and the sensitivity of WIDS node 410, a distance 420 from WIDS node 410 can be determined. In particular, distance is a function of the RSS of the transmission. The following formula is used to determine distance 420 from WIDS node 410 to a target wireless access device:
RSS(dBm)=C−35 log10 D
where C is a tuning constant and D is the distance, as specified in "A Practical Approach to Identifying and Tracking Unauthorized 802.11 Cards and Access Points," by Interlink Networks, Inc.
Since WIDS node 410 does not have the capability to determine directional information from a wireless access device, distance 420 from WIDS node 410 can be viewed as corresponding to an area around WIDS node 410. In one embodiment, distance 420 can be a radius of a circle 430. Thus, from distance 420, circle 430 can be determined. Circle 430 represents all possible points where a target wireless access device with a particular RSS could be located. In one embodiment, predetermined margin of error 440 is added and subtracted from distance 420 to account for possible error in the determination of distance 420. This produces approximation band 450 which represents the overall approximate area within which a target wireless access device at distance 420 could be located.
In one embodiment, WIDS node 410 is known to have a constant (C) of 80.0. By way of example only, if WIDS node 410 determines a received signal strength of 24 dBm for a particular detected wireless access device, WIDS node 410 can determine that the distance to such a wireless access device is 132.7 feet. With margin of error 440 of 10 feet, approximation band 450 with a width of 20 feet will be centered on WIDS node 410.
In addition to determining the channel on which a wireless access device is communicating, the approach described above can also be used to detect ad hoc networks. In one embodiment, each WIDS node in the wireless network is already observing data in the wireless network, in order to calculate the signal strengths and, ultimately, the distances for each wireless access device detected. That same data can be parsed and examined by the node. In particular, the node can examine the Basic Service Set Identifier (BSSID) of the observed packets. In an infrastructure network, the BSSID of a particular device is set to the MAC address of that device. In contrast, the BSSID in an ad hoc network will consist of a number of random bits generated by the first member to join the ad hoc network. In one embodiment, the BSSID in an ad hoc network can be 46 bits. By examining the BSSID bits, the WIDS node can determine if the observed packets are a part of an infrastructure or ad hoc network.
Since a WIDS node can only determine received signal strength, but not determine direction, multiple WIDS nodes can be used to better approximate the actual position of a wireless access device.
In particular, overlap area 550 shows the intersection of approximation band 514 around WIDS node 504 and approximation band 518 around WIDS node 508. Likewise, overlap area 560 shows the intersection of approximation band 516 around WIDS node 506 and approximation band 518 around WIDS node 508. Overlap area 570 represents the intersection of all three approximation bands. Since this area has approximation bands from three WIDS nodes overlapping, it represents the area where the highest probability exists that a wireless access device is located within that area.
The approach described above, in addition to using only omni-directional antennas, does not require highly precise system clocks for the system components (i.e., the system clocks can be synchronized to a much coarser resolution than prior approaches). The approach also requires fewer listening stations to cover a given area than would be needed for a typical IDS solution. Additionally, the location of a wireless access device can be determined regardless of the device manufacturer or antenna the wireless access device is using. Also, the use of omni-directional antennas allows any wireless access device within the range of the WIDS node to be tracked.
The approach to locating wireless access devices using a WID system as shown in
The above described technique can also be used to detect MAC spoofing, based on the location information for a particular wireless access device. Although the MAC address of a wireless access device represents an identifier that should be unique across all network devices, most 802.11 network wireless access device manufacturers actually allow users to change the MAC address of the wireless access device. This ability to change the MAC address of a wireless access device presents a challenge when an intrusion detection system relies on the uniqueness of the MAC address to track the wireless access device. In addition, numerous attacks on wireless networks begin with a modification to the MAC address of the attacking wireless access device. The ability to identify modified MAC addresses becomes critical to the effectiveness of any wireless IDS system.
To detect modified MAC addresses, the location of a transmitting 802.11 wireless access device can first be determined as described above. This location can then be associated with the observed wireless access device. When a new observation is made of that wireless access device, the new location can be compared with the old location. If the location has not changed or varies within a reasonable range (given the time difference between observations), it can be assumed that the MAC address of the wireless access device has not been replicated. Should the same MAC address be observed in two or more locations in a short period of time, however, it can be assumed that one or more wireless access devices are using the same MAC address. In particular, if the wireless access device is defined to have a static location, the observed location and the static location are compared. If the difference is outside of tolerances, an alert is raised. Similarly, if the wireless access device is defined to be mobile, its observed location is compared to its last observed location. Given the time delta between observations, a reasonable tolerance for the change in location can be calculated. If the delta in observed locations exceeds this tolerance, an alert is raised. This use of location for identifying MAC address spoofing eliminates the need for costly spectrum analysis equipment of other potential approaches and leverages the existing properties of the 802.11 wireless access devices.
In addition to detecting spoofing via changes in the location of a wireless access device, other techniques can be used in a wireless network to detect spoofing and other anomalies. One approach would be to observe and report on every 802.11 packet. This, however, would be difficult to implement because of cost and processing constraints. Instead, a distributed approach can be used to track data that can be used to detect various anomalies. In one embodiment of the present invention, a state table is constructed that tracks the current activity of all observed 802.11 wireless access devices and only reports changes in the state of the wireless access device. This enables the WIDS node to sample all 802.11 channels in a short period of time, store only the current state of the wireless access device, and report only on changes in that state.
While other IDS solutions observe traffic with the goal of identifying intrusions, the source of the intrusion, and the target of the intrusion, a state based approach to wireless intrusion detection focuses on the presence of an intrusion, the location of the source, and the identification of the target. Based on the state changes of the intruding wireless access device and the target wireless access device, the intrusion technique can be determined.
Observing an 802.11 network is equivalent to monitoring a wired network in the sense that all packets seen are at the data-link layer (layer 2) of the well known Open System Interconnect (OSI) model. In 802.11 MAC frames, however, the class and type of packet are included. There are three classes of 802.11 MAC frames: management, data, and control. For each of these MAC frames, the direction and type of data can-be determined by parsing various fields within the MAC frames. This can permit an observer to determine the existence of an intruder and the activity of that intruder without reconstructing higher layer sessions by parsing and storing the data portion of the MAC frame.
In general, 802.11 wireless access devices move through the various states of a session in a predictable manner, as described below with respect to
In an embodiment, tracking the states of one or more wireless access devices can consist of the following process. First, a state transition table is created that includes a wireless access device, its state, and the devices with which it is communicating.
When a wireless access device that does not have an entry in the state transition table is observed as either the transmitter or receiver of an 802.11 packet, an entry in the state transition table is created and an event is sent to the WIDS collector. When a wireless access device that has an entry in the state transition table is observed at a later time, the type of the observed packet as well as the participating device is compared to the contents of the state transition table entry. If either piece of data is different from that of the state transition table entry, the state transition table entry is updated and an event notification is sent to the WIDS collector. The events received by the WIDS collector can then be used to check for security policy violations, new intruders, and anomalous wireless access device behaviors. In particular, the WIDS collector can be configured with one or more policy elements that define the types of activities that are permitted or prohibited for a particular network. In the event that a policy element is violated, a user can be signaled by sending an alert to that user. The user could then evaluate the alert and respond accordingly. For example, a policy element could consist of an indicator that the wireless access device is a fixed wireless access device, a movable wireless access device, a moving wireless access device, an unknown wireless access device, or a spoofed wireless access device. Although these are just a few examples, there are many other policy elements that could be defined for a given network.
While in state 2, infrastructure client authenticating 602, the infrastructure client would receive an authentication response from the access point, then issue an association request. The infrastructure client would then transition to state 3, infrastructure client associating 603. The client would remain in state 3, infrastructure client associating 603, until it receives an association response from the access point. At that point, it would be free to send or receive a data frame from the access point. Upon receipt of such a frame, the infrastructure client would transition to state 5, infrastructure client transmitting data 605. The infrastructure client would remain in state 5, infrastructure client transmitting data 605, until it either (a) issues a disassociation request, (b) powers down, or (c) becomes disassociated due to some other reason. In the latter case, where the infrastructure client has become disassociated and has entered state 4, infrastructure client reassociating 604, the infrastructure client would transition back to state 5, infrastructure client transmitting data 605, upon issuing a reassociation request and receiving an association response.
In the case where the infrastructure client issues a disassociation request, it would enter state 6, infrastructure client disassociating 606. Once in this state, the infrastructure client would then issue a deauthentication request and enter state 7, infrastructure client deauthenticating 607. Once deauthenticated, the infrastructure client would then enter disconnected state 697.
Continuing with the example, at a step 804, WIDS node X could detect Client B initializing with an access point AP002. Step 804 starts out with event 9 corresponding to Client B issuing a probe request, and receiving a probe response back from AP002 in event 10. This will result in Client B being in state 1. Step 804 continues with Client B issuing an authentication request in event 11, and receiving an authentication response from access point AP002 in event 12, resulting in Client B being in State 2. Continuing with the initialization in state 3, Client B issues an association request in event 13 and receives an association response in event 14. At the end of step 804, Client B and access point AP002 begin passing data, with Client B being in State 5.
In a step 806, Client A appears to goes through the same initialization process described above with respect to step 802, but now with access point AP003 instead of access point AP001. Next, in a step 808, an event has occurred where Client A is now communicating again with Access Point AP001. This could be a possible spoof, where one wireless access device is being made to appear as a different wireless access device through, for example, the use of illegitimate credentials. This could occur, for example, where a wireless access device asserts a device identification (e.g., a MAC address) of a different wireless access device known to exist within the wireless network. The state table analysis, which can occur at either the WIDS collector or WIDS node, can detect the potential spoof since Client A appears to have transitioned from State 5 while communicating with access point AP003 to State 5 while now communicating again with access point AP001 (without initializing with access point AP001 again). This indicates that the initialization by the supposed Client A with access point AP003 at step 806 was a likely spoof, since the likely real Client A was still attempting communication with access point AP001 in step 808. Once this illegal set of transitions has been identified, an alert could be raised so that an investigation could be conducted.
In a step 810, Client B issues a probe request at event 27 and receives a probe response from access point AP099. At a step 812, however, Client B immediately begins transmitting data to access point AP099. This is an illegal state transition for which an alert could also be raised.
an auto increment number used as primary key for the
primary data from WIDS node
primary data from WIDS node
primary data from WIDS node
primary data from WIDS node
primary data from WIDS node
primary data from WIDS node
from trap service
set by trap service (e.g., 0 for access point, 1 for client)
Will be set to 0 (null) when created by trap service. As
events process sweep is initiated, it will be set to
1 (processing). After processing is finished, it will
be set to 2 (reported).
Table 5 defines the data fields contained in the IDS_Events schema 904 shown in
an auto increment number as primary key
from trap service
primary data from WID
primary data from WID
primary data from WID
primary data from WID
primary data from WID
primary data from WID
primary data from WID
primary data from WID
Table 6 defines the data fields contained in the Device_Health_Events schema 908 shown in
an auto increment number as primary key
the mac of unknown Access Point
the ssid of unknown Access Point
the ip address of unknown Access Point
the channel this unknown Access Point went though
the signal strength of the unknown Access Point
that the WID detected
the encryption bits this unknown Access Point used
count the total occurrences of a unknown Access Point
which has the same mac, ssid, ip, channel, wep,
will be filled by users when a proper action has
been done
When a new Access Point is discovered and entered,
active == True. The user can change the active == false
if the access point is no longer visible. Once the new ids
events report this unknown Access Point again, it will
be active == true again.
comes from backend process
The first time when this unknown Access Point was
detected by WID
The last time when this unknown Access Point was
detected by WID
The last time when this unknown Access Point record
was modified in the table to track the date of any
modification of this unknown AP
Table 7 defines the data fields contained in the Unknown_AccessPoints schema 912 shown in
an auto increment number as primary key
the mac of unknown Client
the ssid of unknown Client
the ip address of unknown Client
the channel this unknown Client went though
the signal strength of the unknown Client that the WID
the encryption bits this unknown Client used
count the total occurrences of a unknown Client which
has the same mac, ssid, ip, channel, wep, device_id
will be filled by users when a proper action has been
When a new Client is discovered and entered,
active == True. The user can change the active == false
if the Client is no longer visible. Once the new ids events
report this unknown Client again, active == true again.
comes from backend process
The first time when this unknown Client was detected
by WID
The last time when this unknown Client was detected
by WID
The last time when this unknown Client record was
modified in the table to track the date of any modification
of this unknown AP
Table 8 defines the data fields contained in the Unknown_Clients schema 924 shown in
An auto increment number as primary key
the WIDS node's serial number
the ip address of the WIDS node
the descriptive name of the WIDS node
describes the geographic position of the WIDS node
some description of the area of this WIDS node (Note
that the range of area will be wider than the location.
Some WIDS nodes may stay in the same area
with different location.)
the data of this WIDS node's coordinates format
like (x, y) from GPS.
if this WIDS node is a primary WIDS node, this field
will be 1, otherwise it will be 0
the first time when the device registered, it will be
stored into this table as the create date
the last time when the record of the device been
modified, it will be recorded as the date of last update
this field tells which customer this WIDS node belongs to
used for device management to maintain the current
devices as ACTIVE , the historical devices
as NOT ACTIVE
Table 9 defines the data fields contained in the Devices schema 920 shown in
an auto increment number as primary key
the foreign key that points to the Devices table which this
abnormal device belongs
the alarm flag to show the WIDS node's CPU
temperature going too high(Boolean variable)
the alarm flag to show the WIDS node's system
temperature going too high(Boolean variable)
the alarm flag to show the WIDS nodes' voltage going to
alert level (Boolean variable)
the alarm flag to show the battery's life going to be
end level
this is a foreign key to point to Alarm_Types
table, right now there are two types (they are: device
down, device's configuration changed). Note, this
filed will be filled by other process when the alarm
WID is still active, this field will be updated once
any one of the alarms is raised, otherwise it will
insert a new alarm record for this device
before the status of this record is "CLOSED," the
total_alarm will accumulate the occurrences of the alarm
once no matter what kind of alarm or alert it has
the first time this record is created
the last time the event process updates this record
this is a flag to see if this abnormal device report record
has been responded to or not, if yes the record will be
marked as "CLOSED"
the user may add some comment for this record before
the record is closed
marks the last time when the record was updated
Table 10 defines the data fields contained in the Abnormal_Nodes schema 916 shown in
an auto increment number as primary key
the name of the alarm type, so far have "Device_down",
the description of the alarm type;
Table 11 defines the data fields contained in the Alarm_Types schema 918 shown in
an auto increment number as primary key
the FK of the table which points to the Alarm_Types
table to see what type of alarm this record is
this is a flag to see if this record has been CLOSED or
still OPEN
accumulates the occurrences of the same Known AP's
marks the first time when this alarm was detected
marks the last time when this alarm is detected
which device detected this alarm
Table 12 defines the data fields contained in the Known_AccessPoints_Alarms schema 928 shown in
an auto increment number as primary key
the mac of the Access Point
the ssid of the Access Point
the ip address of the Access Point
the channel this Access Point uses
Any useful information about the Access Point
the vendor of this known Access Point
which customer owns this Access Point
if the known Access Point is no longer exist it will be
NOT ACTIVE, otherwise it will be ACTIVE
Table 13 defines the data fields contained in the Known_AccessPoints schema 940 shown in
an auto increment number as primary key
the mac of the Client
the ssid of the Client
the ip address of the Client
the channel this Client uses
any useful information about the Client
the descriptive name for this Client
which customer owns this Client
if the known Client is no longer exist it will be
NOT ACTIVE, otherwise it will be ACTIVE
Table 14 defines the data fields contained in Known_Clients schema 936 shown in
an auto increment number as primary key
the name of the customer
any useful information about the customer
if the Customer is no longer exists it will be NOT ACTIVE,
otherwise it will be ACTIVE
marks the first time when this customer record is created
Table 15 defines the data fields contained in Customers schema 932 shown in
an auto increment number as primary key
the title of user
the first name of the user
the last name of the user
the address of the user
registration information
registration information
registration information
registration information
registration information
registration information
registration information
registration information
registration information
if the user is a Customer Client this field will be
set as 1
if the user is a Customers Admin this field will be
set as 1
if the user is a System Field Engineer this field will be
set as 1
if the user is a System Root Engineer this field will be
set as 1
if the user is no longer exist, it will be set as
NOT ACTIVE, otherwise it will be ACTIVE
marks the time when this user record was created
Table 16 defines the data fields contained in Point of Contact (POC) schema 944 shown in
an auto increment number as primary key
the IP address which is legal for accessing the collector
the host name
any useful information about the entry
describes if the authenticated IP is still active or not
Table 17 defines the data fields contained in Authenticated_ips schema 952 shown in
an auto increment number as primary key
records each user's login time whenever they logged
into the system
records the user id
records which remote authenticated host the user
came from
Table 18 defines the data fields contained in Userlog schema 948 shown in
The main page, shown as web page 1002, consists of a header menu and a welcome message, along with possibly other introductory information. Web page 1004 is a login page, where various users could access information about the WID system. In an embodiment, a user would login to access the WID system over the Internet. Alternatively, the user could login to access the WID system over a private network, such as a corporate intranet. A user can have one or more authorization levels. In an embodiment, the authorization levels can include a customer client, customer administrator, field engineer, or root administrator. A customer client or customer administrator can be associated with different groups or business units within the customer organization.
After logging in, a user could check on numerous types of information, with the specific information available to each user being dependent on the user's login authorization level.
The system functionalities can be divided into four main areas:
(1) Customer Client Level interface 1006 provides access to the following functions and accessibility:
(2) Customer Administrator Level interface 1028 (which includes all of the Customer Client Level privileges described above) provides access to the following additional functions and accessibility:
(3) Field Engineer Level interface 1036 (which includes all of the Customer Client Level and Customer Administrator Level privileges described above) provides access to the following additional functions and accessibility:
(4) Root Administrator Level interface 1044 (which includes all privileges described above for the Customer Client Level, Customer Administrator Level, and Field Engineer Level) provides access to the following root level functions and accessibility:
According to the different access levels listed above, a POC table that maintains the roles of users is created in the database depicted in
The previous description of the disclosed embodiments is provided to enable any person skilled in the art to make or use the present invention. Various modifications to these embodiments will be readily apparent to those skilled in the art, and the generic principles defined herein may be applied to other embodiments without departing from the spirit or scope of the invention. Thus, the present invention is not intended to be limited to the embodiments shown herein but is to be accorded the widest scope consistent with the principles and novel features disclosed herein.
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|International Classification
|Cooperative Classification
|European Classification
|Apr 3, 2003
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text:
RPP #13 Interview: Learning Objects, Blackboard, Wikis and Podsafe Mozart
Document Type
Publication Date
May 2006
Topics covered during this 28 minute podcast:
* Interview: Hal Herzog, VP of Product Development, Learning Objects o We discuss their main product for Blackboard, the Campus Pack. - Wiki tools: Teams LX and Expo LX - Blog tool: Journal LX - Full text search: Search LX
* Podsafe Mozart: Allegro movement from Mozart's Concerto for Flute and Harp in C major by the Philharmonia Baroque Orchestra. The full CD entitled "Mozart Orchestral Works" is available at magnatune.com
Recommended CitationMurray, Rodney B., "RPP #13 Interview: Learning Objects, Blackboard, Wikis and Podsafe Mozart" (2006). Rod's Pulse Podcast. Paper 13.
[Click above link to play this 28 minute podcast]
This document is currently not available here.

subset: commoncrawl


text:
Carter's Chicago 10: Good cast makes 'repetitive, noisy' movie
John Battsek, Oscar-winning producer of One Day In September, on his 2007 Sundance experience, via Monocle:
The consensus on the opening film, Chicago 10, produced by Vanity Fair editor Graydon Carter, is that it wasn't nearly as good as it could or should have been. There was a lot of hype, a good director, a good cast. It's a fantastic story with amazing characters and the best archive footage I've ever seen all of which is sadly undone by its undisciplined two-hour running time. It's repetitive, noisy and frustrating. This film needs another three months in edit.


text:
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Free Asian Recipes | Famous Asian Recipe | Asian Cuisine | Asian Cooking | Asian Food | Authentic Asian Cooking RecipesDescription: Free Asian Recipes, Famous Asia Recipe, Asia Food, Asian Cuisines, Asian Food Recipes, Asian Recipe, Asian Cooking Guide and Asian Online Recipes from all over Asia with Burmese recipes, Chinese recipes, Indian recipes, Pakistani recipes, Indonesian recipes, Japanese recipes, Korean recipes, Laotian recipes, Cambodian recipes, Malaysian recipes, Singaporean recipes, Filipino recipes, Sri Lankan recipes, Thai recipes and Vietnamese recipes.
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Enjoy farm and forest surroundings near Cumberland Falls and the Big South Fork River and Recreation Area. The 1920's Farm House has 3 bedrooms,good for families, fireplaces, spacious breakfast/sunroom with front porch views of wildlife. Fishing ponds, hiking to clifflines, the Cumberland River and waterfalls. Closeby, the Big South Fork Scenic Railroad.
5 on April 16, 2016
Our stay here really was a treat. Peg is a special person and a wonderful host. The farm house itself is lovely, very rustic, cosy and well-equipped. The private land around the farmhouse - which we roamed freely - contains spectacular waterfalls and caves. It's a magical spot, nestled within a very poor county, perfect for exploring Cumberland Falls and Big South Fork. Very highly recommended!
5 on December 20, 2014
The Farm House is simply an incredible place to stay, but what makes it so very special is Peg, the Innkeeper/Owner. This place offers everything - it's a peaceful nature retreat. The trails and beautiful and offer exercise and some of the most exquisite views. You won't find a better breakfast. Peg collects the fresh eggs on her way to house - you can't get any fresher than that! I simply adored this place and Peg an really look forward to going back again. The ride to the Farm House is just as beautiful!
5 on July 28, 2014
The peace and quiet of nature in a very unique place. Awesome trails with sights of waterfalls, rock houses, etc. Breakfast doesn't get any better. We hope to return. Wall family
5 on July 18, 2014
Peg was a delight, and her Farm House Inn was one of the best we have ever stayed in. Would love to go back in the fall and see all the colors. Best breakfast, fresh eggs and great scones.
5 on August 20, 2013
A great wash of peace fell over us at Farm House Inn. Peg Taylor is a gracious host and a wonderful person. Accommodations are immaculate and the breakfast is hearty and delicious. Book it now!
5 on July 20, 2013
We have stayed here numerous times. Peg is a wonderful host, the views are breathtaking, and its the kind of place where you just turn your phone off and ignore time. There are great hiking trails and the different natural wonders on the property are great (Indian Rock Houses, Waterfalls, Lake, etc.). We try to come at least once per year and will continue to do so for as long as we can!
2.4 on July 01, 2013
My husband and I recently spend a nite at the Farm House Inn. The innkeeper was very nice and she let us stay on very short notice. We were just passing through. The meal was very good and enjoyable. If you do not like animals (dogs) in the house this is not the place for you. The dogs were in and out throughout the stay. Under the table as we ate.
5 on August 09, 2012
My wife and I stayed at The Farm House on 08/03 - 08/05/12 for our anniversary. Five star ratings are not high enough for the experience we had. First off, the house and surroundings will take your breath away! It's actually impossible to describe accurately. The owner/hostess is one of the nicest ladies you will ever meet! She is without a doubt the best conversationalist I have ever met. She not only shares her wonderful stories, but she is a wonderful listener also. Now, about the breakfasts that she cooks.....you will be talking about her cooking for days! We have told everybody we know about our breakfasts. I can't remember the name of the egg casserole, but it is awesome! She bakes scones that are delicious and serves home made preserves and fresh fruit. The next morning we had something that I sure can't remember the name of, but it's made with pancake batter and served with maple syrup from Wisconsin. And we had bacon and fresh fruit. If extreme peace and quiet, privacy and the best hostess you could ever have sounds like what you like, this is a must destination for you! Thank you Peg! We will be back! Jeff and Susan
4.8 on July 19, 2012
I took my husband here for a surprise birthday weekend getaway, and we had no idea it would be such an incredible place. Peg is the soul of hospitality- we had a wonderful time getting to know her and the "welcome committee"- her 5 fantastic dogs. We loved Peg and her inn so much that we extended our stay a night and wish we could have extended it many, many more! The Farm House Inn is the perfect spot for quiet reflection, gorgeous and all-to-yourself hiking, incredibly good food, and deep refreshment. It is worth the trip from anywhere to go and enjoy Peg's inn and beautiful farm. We can hardly wait to go back!
4.6 on July 13, 2012
We stayed only two nights at the Farm House Inn, but we'll definitely be back for a longer stay! The Inn is definitely off the beaten path, but worth it. Peg could not have done anything more to make our stay enjoyable. The property itself is spectacular. You could spend your whole trip just hiking on site. To top it all off, Peg's breakfasts were amazing. We will be back for a longer stay and will be telling all of our friends.
Lexington, KY (LEX-Blue Grass Field) 113 miles
From US27 or I-75 follow signs to Cumberland Falls. From KY 90 turn on 896, follow for 3.3 miles,turn right on Rock Branch for .10mile, left on Devil Creek for 1 mile to right on Taylor Branch, thence to Good Spring Farm and the Farm House Inn
BBQ grill, Board games, CD player, Ceiling fans, Fireplace, Library, Private entrance, Satellite/Cable TV, Telephone, VCR, Videos, Washer/dryer
Air conditioning, Alarm clock, Amenities Basket, Coffee/Tea facilities, Desk, Radio
Bird watching, Fishing, Hiking trails, Mountain Bike trails


text:
Astrid Elswyth Rundquist
Astrid Elswyth Rundquist was born on May 30, 2013 at Stevens Community Medical Center, Morris, to William Clay Rundquist and Maylin-Janet I. Rundquist of Morris. Astrid Elswyth weighed 7 lbs. 2 oz. and was 20" long. Grandparents are Clay Rundquist of Morris, Anita Rundquist of California, Miquel Huerta and Isabel C. Mendez of Huntington Beach, Calif.