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One night in 2008, the Arizona Senate became the backdrop of a showdown over a referral to prohibit same-sex marriage — the same law that was struck down by a federal district court this month.Read More »
Top quotes of 2012
This year's most outstanding quips, gibes and utterances.Read More »
Fake Twitter handles aim to entertain but don't harm politicians, insiders say
At first glance, a newcomer to Twitter may think many politicians have lost their minds.
Their tweets can be outlandish, contain poor grammar and are often filled with ridiculous positions on policy issues.
But it's all by design. And it's often not actually the real politician doing the tweeting.
15 leaving Legislature, 8 running for other offices
Fifteen legislators have announced this year that they will retire or seek another office rather than run for re-election to the Legislature.Read More »
Trans-Pacific trade agreement must protect U.S. intellectual property
As an Arizonan, when you hear about trade agreements, you might not automatically think about jobs in the great Copper State. However, as the most populous landlocked state in the U.S., we should. Trade is a huge driver of our economy, not only as a nation, but also of our state economies.Read More »
Bill aimed at stopping United Nations takeover of U.S. advances
The Arizona House of Representatives on Wednesday gave initial approval to a bill that some proponents say is aimed at stopping a United Nations conspiracy to take away the rights of American citizens. Critics say the bill is not only based on crackpot "one-world-order" theories, but that it would make valuable state programs illegal and take away the state's authority to manage natural resources.Read More »
Panel: Toss one-year wait for lawmakers to become Capitol lobbyists
A state House committee Tuesday narrowly endorsed scrapping a state law the prevents legislators from serving as paid lobbyists at the Capitol for a year after leaving office.
Its author, Rep. Jack W. Harper, R-Surprise, said the moratorium is intended to keep lawmakers from influencing legislation but fails to recognize that staff members are even better positioned to become lobbyists. He said it's unfair to deny former lawmakers the same opportunities allowed for staff members.
Lawmakers, group want to hand big tax break to businesses
Businesses planning on purchasing new machinery in 2013 or later may get some tax relief under a referendum at the state Legislature. HCR 2009, sponsored by Rep. Jack Harper, R-Surprise, and developed by the Arizona chapter of the National Federation of Independent Businesses would exempt the first $2.4 million of new equipment or machinery purchased after 2013 from the business personal property tax. Currently, the exemption is $68,079.Read More »
Cheuvront running again for Senate
Former legislator Ken Cheuvront is running for the Senate.
The outspoken Democrat today announced his candidacy for what essentially is his old seat.
After 'dominating,' Harper to call it quits
Harper won't run for re-election, but he still hasn't scratched everything off of his political bucket list.Read More »


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Cato Institute Study: Regulating Business Databases
February 1, 1998
In a recent study, a Cato Institute analyst expressed skepticism over proposals to require businesses to ask for a consumer's permission before trading information about that individual. Personal information often includes buying habits and hobbies.
Author Solveig Singleton recommends that privacy concerns center on government data collection, rather than private collection.
Here are some of the points made in the study:
- Requiring permission of the consumer would work to the disadvantage of small, startup businesses, since larger, established firms already know who their customers are and the nature of their needs.
- There is little reason to fear the growth of private-sector databases, since the information collected aims only to sell more merchandise.
- Government databases, on the other hand, are inherently dangerous since they involve the exercise of police and defense functions.
- Cordoning off information behind a wall of new privacy rights violates principles of free speech -- threatening to shrink the total domain of freely-flowing information.
Source: Solveig Singleton, "Privacy as Censorship," Policy Analysis No. 295, January 22, 1998, Cato Institute, 1000 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20001, (202) 842-0200.
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subset: commoncrawl


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I've been an avid bread baker for many years and this summer encountered a problem with my rye bread for the first time. I've been using Rose's Sourdough Rye recipe for years, always with great success. Twice this summer I've had what I can only describe as "tearing" in the bread as it rises after shaping. Perhaps it is the humidity? Or poor gluten formation? The dough was slightly more sticky than usual, despite precise weighing, which I compensated for by adding a spoonful of flour so that the consistency was right. Last week's loaves were perfect, this week, I doubt I'll be able to salvage them. I've attached a picture which shows the problem better than I can describe. It is so disheartening to see otherwise lovely dough stretch and break like this!
Thanks so much for any insight anyone has!


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Tift Park Community Market kicks off this weekend
Sun, 20 Jul 2014 17:10:00 GMT —
Despite the rain, organizers of the first Tift Park Community Market say it was a success.
About 70 vendors were at Tift Park early to set up Saturday morning. The park was full before the rain started to move in just before 11 a.m.
There was fresh produce, crafts, artists, representatives from the UGA County Extension Office and more.
The goal is to get more people to come to the park and for the market to go on for years.
Steve Brimberry of the Friends of Tift Park grassroots organization talked about how this all started.
"It started on Facebook, social media, grassroots," Brimberry said. "We're up to 750 members. We started back in March. Our motto is 'preserve, protect and promote Tift Park.'"
The market is at the park every Saturday from 9 a.m. until 2 p.m.


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Shoppach's 3-run blast caps 5-run ninth
CLEVELAND — Talk about perseverance.
The Indians had produced an admirable effort against near impenetrable Oakland ace Rich Haren on Tuesday night and had nothing to show for it. But rather than fold up the teepees and take solace in the moral victory, Cleveland took aim at the next thing in its path — the A's bullpen.
With Haren out of the way, the Indians scored five times in the ninth inning to bully their way to an improbable 8-5 victory, winning it on a walk-off three-run home run by pinch hitter Kelly Shoppach.
"It was just a great effort to finish off the game," said Cleveland manager Eric Wedge, whose team pulled back into a first-place tie with Detroit in the Central Division with its third win in four games.
The Indians were down to their last out when the ninth-inning rally began to pick up steam against former Cleveland reliever Alan Embree.
With Grady Sizemore on second base, Victor Martinez drew a four-pitch walk to bring a struggling Travis Hafner to the plate.
Hafner, who has failed to come through in the clutch on a number of occasions during his first-half slide, didn't miss the opportunity this time around, driving the first pitch he saw from Embree into the gap in right-center to knot the game at 5.
Following an intentional walk to Jhonny Peralta, Shoppach took a ball from Embree before swinging from the heels on the next pitch and clouting it over the wall in left.
Shoppach, who obviously thought the ball was out when he connected, tossed his bat toward Oakland's dugout before sprinting around the bases to a mob scene at home plate. The ball actually just cleared the railing above the wall.
"I hit it really, really good," Shoppach said. "I wasn't expecting it to land in the first row.
"Actually, that was the first time I've ever pinch hit in a game that mattered. I didn't have to think. I just went up there and hit."
"It was a strike," said Embree of his 1-0 fastball to Shoppach. "He showed how good a strike it was by the way he hit it."
The Indians boldly went where just two other teams had gone against Haren this season, joining the Yankees and Reds as the only clubs to generate more than two earned runs against the A's right-hander.
Still, they trailed 4-3 when Haren left after allowing the three runs on eight hits through 6 2/3 innings.
Beating Haren has been a near insurmountable task for anyone, let alone a team such as the Indians, who have been in a collective offensive funk for much of June. Haren has not lost since his first two starts of the season (April 2 and 7, in which he allowed a total of one unearned run).
"I thought our guys battled well against him," Wedge said. "He's a heck of a pitcher. The guy has great stuff and he knows what he wants to do out there."
The Indians took the early lead off Haren and held it through the first four innings.
Much of the offense off Haren was generated by Grady Sizemore, who had a hand in Cleveland's first two runs. Sizemore led off the opening inning with a double to left, then scored the Indians' first run on a two-out single from Jhonny Peralta. He put Cleveland in front 3-1 with a two-run homer to right — his 13th of the year.
But the Indians' leadoff hitter almost wore the goat horns in the ninth. Straying too far off first base on Casey Blake's foul out to left, Sizemore had to race back and slide just ahead of the throw to double him up. Had he not made it back, the game would have been over.
Cliff Lee had designs on besting Haren, limiting Oakland to just a run on three hits through the first four innings.
But Lee was done in by the long ball, allowing two of them to Jack Cust and Mark Ellis, accounting for all of Oakland's runs off the left-hander. Ellis' drive to left-center on the first pitch he saw from Lee tied the game at 3 in the fifth.
"I gave up two homers, but other than that, I felt like I was locating the ball pretty well," said Lee, who allowed the three runs on six hits.
Oakland broke a 3-all tie with a run off Tom Mastny in the eighth, going up by two on a solo homer from Shannon Stewart off Rafael Betancourt — the first run allowed by Betancourt in 17 appearances.
Contact Chris Assenheimer at 329-7137 or email@example.com.
WHO: Cleveland vs. Oakland
WHERE: Jacobs Field
PITCHERS: Carmona (8-3, 3.21 ERA) vs. DiNardo (2-4, 2.35)
TV/RADIO: SportsTime Ohio; WEOL 930-AM, WTAM 1100-AM
A horde of smiling faces awaits Indians catcher Kelly Shoppach at home plate after Shoppach's pinch-hit walk-off three-run home run Tuesday beat the Athletics 8-5 at Jacobs Field. The Tribe rallied to score five runs in the ninth.


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-JS FENZA'S AUTO, INC. v. MONTAGNARO'S, INC. et al
Filing 32
-JS FENZA'S AUTO, INC. v. MONTAGNARO'S, INC. et al, No. 1:2010cv03336 - Document 32 (D.N.J. 2011)
Court Description:
OPINION FILED. Signed by Judge Robert B. Kugler on 3/21/11. (js)
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION (Doc. Nos. 10, 13, 26) IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY CAMDEN VICINAGE ___________________________________ : FENZA S AUTO, INC., individually and : as the representative of a class of similarly- : : situated persons, Civil No. 10-3336 (RBK/JS) : : Plaintiff, : OPINION : v. : : MONTAGNARO S, INC., ALBIN : MONTAGNARO, and ANTHONY : MONTAGNARO, : : Defendants. ___________________________________ : KUGLER, United States District Judge: This matter concerns Plaintiff s receipt of a restaurant menu via facsimile from Defendants pizzeria. Plaintiff claims that the menu was an unauthorized solicitation in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act ( TCPA ), 47 U.S.C. § 227. Plaintiff asserts claims for conversion and violation of the TCPA on behalf of himself and a putative class of plaintiffs who allegedly received unauthorized facsimile solicitations from Defendants. This matter comes before the Court pursuant to Defendants motion to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim (Doc. No. 10), Plaintiff s motion to remand the matter back to the Superior Court of New Jersey for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction (Doc. No. 13), and Plaintiff s motion for leave to file supplemental briefing in support of its motion to remand (Doc. No. 26). For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants Plaintiff s motions and remands the matter to state court for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Court denies Defendants motion to dismiss as moot. 1 I. BACKGROUND A. The Statutory Framework Enacted in 1991 as part of the Federal Communications Act, the TCPA seeks to deal with an increasingly common nuisance telemarketing. Erienet, Inc. v. Velocity Net, 156 F.3d 513, 514 (3d Cir. 1998). The TCPA prohibits various uses of automatic telephone dialing systems, the initiation of certain telephone calls using artificial or prerecorded voices, and the use of any device to send an unsolicited advertisement to a telephone facsimile machine. Id. at 514 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)). The TCPA authorizes states to bring civil actions in federal court on behalf of their residents for violations of the TCPA. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(f). The statute also creates the following private right of action: A person or entity may, if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a State, bring in an appropriate court of that State (A) an action based on a violation of this subsection or the regulations prescribed under this subsection to enjoin such violation, (B) an action to recover for actual monetary loss from such a violation, or to receive $ 500 in damages for each such violation, whichever is greater, or (C) both such actions. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). The TCPA makes no provision for private claims in federal court. The ban on unsolicited facsimile advertisements does not apply if: (1) the sender has an established business relationship with the recipient, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C)(i); (2) the sender obtained the recipient s facsimile number from a directory, advertisement, or site on the Internet to which the recipient voluntarily agreed to make available its facsimile number for public distribution, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C)(ii); or (3) the advertisement contains a disclosure statement that provides, among other things, a telephone number and facsimile number that the recipient can contact to unsubscribe from any future distributions, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C)(iii). The TCPA also 2 provides that [i]f the court finds that the defendant willfully or knowingly violated the regulations prescribed under this subsection, the court may, in its discretion, increase the amount of the award to an amount equal to not more than 3 times the statutory amount of $500 per violation. 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5). B. Factual and Procedural Background On February 9, 2007, Plaintiff, a Pennsylvania corporation, received a facsimile from Defendants. The facsimile contained a menu of food items served by Defendants at their restaurants. It included prices, coupons, contact information for Defendants five locations, and Three Easy Steps to placing an order with Defendants. (Compl. Ex. A). The facsimile also contained the following disclaimer: If you received this fax in error and would like to be removed from our database, call toll free 1-800. . . . (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that it did not invite or authorize Defendants to send it advertisements via facsimile. (Compl. ¶ 11). Plaintiff further claims that Defendants faxed the same and similar advertisements to Plaintiff and more than 39 other recipients without first receiving the recipients express permission or invitation. (Compl. ¶ 14). According to Plaintiffs, by sending facsimiles to recipients without authorization, Defendants damaged the recipients by wasting paper, toner, and time spent by employees sorting and discarding unauthorized facsimiles. Plaintiff filed its Complaint in the Superior Court of New Jersey. It asserts both individual and class action claims for violations of the TCPA and common law conversion. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants use bulk facsimile transmissions as a means of marketing their food and services without first obtaining permission from the recipients to send the facsimiles. Plaintiff defines the putative class for the TCPA claim as: All persons who (1) on or after four years prior to the filing of this action, (2) were sent telephone facsimile messages of material 3 advertising the commercial availability of any property, goods, or services by or on behalf of Defendants, (3) with respect to whom Defendants did not have prior express permission or invitation for the sending of such faxes, and (4) with whom Defendants did not have an established business relationship. (Compl. ¶ 17). Plaintiff alleges the same putative class for its common law conversion claim except that it includes persons who received facsimile messages on or before six years prior to filing of this action. (Compl. ¶ 31). Plaintiff seeks $500 in statutory damages per unauthorized transmission under the TCPA, compensatory damages for the conversion claim, and an injunction prohibiting Defendants from engaging in further TCPA violations. Plaintiff also requests that the Court treble the statutory damages if Defendants knowingly violated the TCPA. The Complaint includes the following allegation regarding federal jurisdiction: Federal jurisdiction does not exist because no federal question or claim is asserted and Plaintiffs individual claims are worth less than $75,000.00, inclusive of all forms of damages and fees. Plaintiff expressly disclaims any individual recovery in excess of $75,000.00, inclusive of all forms of damages and fees. (Compl. ¶ 7). On June 30, 2010, Defendants removed the case to this Court. The Notice of Removal states that the Court has federal-question jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1331 because Plaintiff asserts a claim under federal law. The Notice of Removal makes no mention of diversity jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1332. The Notice of Removal states that Defendants were served with and received a copy of the Complaint no earlier than May 31, 2010. (Notice of Removal ¶ 4). Thus, Defendants assert that removal on the basis of federal-question jurisdiction was timely because they removed the case within thirty days of receiving copies of the Summons and Complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (requiring removal within thirty days). 4 On August 2, 2010, Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint (Doc. No. 10). Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to state a claim for relief under the TCPA and fails to state a claim for common law conversion. Defendants also argue that Plaintiff does not allege facts sufficient to satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 s requirements for class certification. On August 23, 2010, Plaintiff opposed Defendants motion to dismiss and made a motion to remand the matter to state court for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction (Doc. No. 13). Plaintiff argues that this Court lacks jurisdiction because the Third Circuit has held that private claims under the TCPA do not give rise to federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. See Erienet, Inc., 156 F.3d at 519 ( We conclude that because the TCPA reflects Congress intent to authorize consumer suits in state courts only . . . [plaintiffs] cannot rely on the general federal question jurisdiction of § 1331 ). On September 16, 2010, more than two months after filing their initial Notice of Removal and more than three months after receiving the Complaint, Defendants filed a Supplemental Notice of Removal (Doc. No. 17). The Supplemental Notice of Removal asserts, for the first time, diversity jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act ( CAFA ), which grants jurisdiction when any member of a class is diverse from any defendant, the class includes 100 or more members, and the aggregate amount in controversy is more than $5,000,000.00. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). The Supplemental Notice of Removal claims that on August 19, 2010, after Defendants filed their first Notice of Removal and after they moved to dismiss the Complaint, Plaintiff dramatically escalated the number of claimants and amount of damages. (Supp. Notice of Removal ¶ 11). According to Defendants, on August 19, 2010, Plaintiff s counsel sent Defendants counsel two emails asserting that Defendants had authorized a vendor to send the 5 same facsimile received by Plaintiff to 5,000 recipients and that 3,372 of those transmissions were successful. Defendants assert that this transformed Plaintiff s class action from a relatively small class claim involving 39 or more members into a significant claim involving 3,372 members and possibly $5,058,000.00 in statutory damages ($500.00 per statutory violation, trebled for knowing violations, and multiplied by 3,372 class members). Thus, Defendants claim that even if the Court does not have federal-question jurisdiction over Plaintiff s TCPA claim, it has diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). Plaintiff subsequently made a motion to submit a supplemental brief in support of its motion to remand. Plaintiff s proposed supplemental brief addresses Defendants new assertion of diversity jurisdiction. Plaintiff argues that Defendants assertion of diversity jurisdiction is untimely. Alternatively, Plaintiff argues that the home state exception to diversity jurisdiction under the CAFA applies in this case. The home state exception provides that a district court may decline jurisdiction over a class action if the primary defendants and two-thirds of the plaintiffs are citizens of the same state. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4). Defendants opposed Plaintiff s motion to submit supplemental briefing and also addressed the substance of Plaintiff s supplemental arguments in support of remand. Defendants argue that their Supplemental Notice of Removal was timely because they did not learn of the factual basis for diversity jurisdiction until they received the email from Plaintiff s counsel on August 19, 2010. Defendants also argue that the home state exception does not apply because Plaintiff has not presented evidence sufficient to prove that two-thirds of the class members are citizens of New Jersey. II. LEGAL STANDARD Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), a defendant may remove an action filed in state court to a federal court with original jurisdiction over the action. Once an action is removed, a plaintiff 6 may challenge removal by moving to remand the case back to state court for, among other things, lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). To defeat a plaintiff s motion to remand for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, the defendant bears the burden of showing that the federal court has jurisdiction to hear the case. Abels v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 770 F.2d 26, 29 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Pullman Co. v. Jenkins, 305 U.S. 534, 537 (1939)). Generally, where the decision to remand is a close one, district courts are encouraged to favor remand. See Abels, 770 F.2d at 29 ( Because lack of jurisdiction would make any decree in the case void and the continuation of the litigation in federal court futile, the removal statute should be strictly construed and all doubts should be resolved in favor of remand. ). Because the lack of jurisdiction itself precludes the court from asserting judicial power, a court may take no further action in a matter once it determines that it lacks jurisdiction. See First Am. Nat l Bank v. Straight Creek Processing Co., 756 F. Supp. 945, 946 (E.D. Va. 1991) (where diversity of parties is incomplete, court has no jurisdiction to consider plaintiff s motion to dismiss non-diverse defendants; rather, court must dismiss action for lack of jurisdiction). Stated simply, if jurisdiction is lacking, the court must dismiss the action. Trent Realty Assocs. v. First Federal Sav. & Loan Ass n, 657 F.2d 29, 36 (3d Cir. 1981); TM Marketing, Inc. v. Art & Antiques Assoc., L.P., 803 F. Supp. 994, 997 (D.N.J. 1992); Carney v. Dexter Shoe Co., 701 F. Supp. 1093, 1100 (D.N.J. 1988). III. DISCUSSION A. Plaintiff s Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Briefing As a threshold matter, the Court must decide Plaintiff s motion to submit supplemental briefing regarding its motion to remand. Local Civil Rule 7.1(d) generally prohibits parties from filing supplemental briefing without leave of the court. See Colmer v. ICCS Co., LLC, No. 08- 7 2737, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66601, at *4-6 (D.N.J. July 29, 2009). However, the court has broad discretion to consider supplemental briefing as appropriate and fair. See Raube v. X-L Specialized Trailers, Inc., No. 06-4628, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30130, at *17-18 n.6 (D.N.J. Apr. 10, 2008). Supplemental briefing may be appropriate if the briefs concern new arguments and issues not addressed by the primary briefs. See id. ( Although it is within the Court s discretion to disregard impermissibly filed sur-replies, we allow it in this instance because plaintiff is attempting to address arguments raised in defendant s reply ) (internal citation omitted). The Court grants Plaintiff s motion. Plaintiff s proposed supplemental brief is addressed to Defendants Supplemental Notice of Removal. Defendants filed the Supplemental Notice of Removal after Plaintiff s motion to remand was fully briefed. The Supplemental Notice of Removal includes an entirely new legal basis for the Court s subject-matter jurisdiction. Thus, Plaintiff did not have the opportunity to address that basis for jurisdiction in its initial motion for remand. See id. (accepting supplemental briefing because party did not have fair opportunity to address opponent s arguments in primary briefs); Cottrell v. Zagami LLC, No. 08-3340, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6337, at *4-5 (D.N.J. June 23, 2010) (finding that court has discretion to accept supplemental briefing). Moreover, Defendants responded to the substantive arguments contained in Plaintiff s proposed supplemental brief, and Plaintiff filed a substantive reply. Thus, all parties received a fair and equal opportunity to address the substantive and procedural issues raised by Defendants Supplemental Notice of Removal. The Court will therefore consider the parties supplemental briefing. 8 B. Federal-Question Jurisdiction Defendants assert in their initial Notice of Removal that federal-question jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because Plaintiff asserts a claim under the TCPA, which is a federal statute. Plaintiff counters that this Court does not have jurisdiction to hear its TCPA claim because the Third Circuit held in ErieNet that TCPA claims may not be brought in federal court pursuant to . . . federal question jurisdiction. Nicholas v. CMRE Fin. Servs., No. 08-4857, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49105, at *8-10 (D.N.J. June 9, 2009) (citing ErieNet, Inc., 156 F.3d at 519). Defendants respond that the Supreme Court s intervening holdings in Breuer v. Jim s Concrete of Brevard, Inc., 538 U.S. 691 (2003), and Grable & Sons Metal Prods. v. Darue Eng g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308 (2005), undermine the Third Circuit s holding in ErieNet. Defendants highlight that the Seventh Circuit in Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 427 F.3d 446, 450 (7th Cir. 2005), held that ErieNet cannot be reconciled with either Breuer or Grable. In ErieNet, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant sent unauthorized email messages in violation of the TCPA. ErieNet, Inc., 156 F.3d at 514. The plaintiff brought the action in federal court, and the district court dismissed the action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(h)(3). Id. On appeal, the Third Circuit considered whether federal district courts have jurisdiction over consumer lawsuits brought under a federal statute that creates a private cause of action, is silent as to whether such actions can be brought in federal courts, but expressly refers consumer claims to state court. Id. The Court examined the TCPA s text and legislative history and concluded that the most natural reading of the TCPA is that Congress intended to authorize private causes of action only in state courts, and to withhold federal jurisdiction. Id. at 517. In support of its conclusion, the Court found: [The TCPA] creates a private cause of action. It is not silent as to where such actions may be brought; rather, it refers potential 9 plaintiffs to state courts. Neither the text nor the legislative history makes any reference to federal courts. Furthermore, the statute does not appear to reflect any significant federal interest, or one that is uniquely federal. It does not reflect an attempt by Congress to occupy this field of interstate communication or to promote national uniformity of regulation. Rather, Congress recognized that state regulation of telemarketing activity was ineffective because it could be avoided by interstate operations. Id. at 515. In reaching its conclusion, the Third Circuit rejected the argument that TCPA claims fall under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 s general grant of federal jurisdiction over all matters arising under federal law. Id. at 518. The Court held that although § 1331 functions as a general grant of jurisdiction to district courts of cases in which the cause of action was created by federal law, it does not mean that jurisdiction is not precluded by another statute or doctrine of judicial administration. Id. (quoting First Jersey Sec., Inc. v. Bergen, 605 F.2d 690, 694 (3d Cir. 1979)). The Court concluded that because the TCPA unequivocally refers plaintiffs to state rather than federal court, by virtue of such a specific . . . assignment, Congress negates district court jurisdiction under § 1331. 1 Id. at 519. Defendants nevertheless argue that this Court is not bound by ErieNet because the Supreme Court s intervening opinions in Grable and Breuer undermine the Third Circuit s reasoning in ErieNet. In Grable, the Supreme Court considered whether a defendant could remove a case to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) even though the matter did not involve a federal cause of action but the underlying state law cause of action implicated federal law. 545 U.S. at 310-12. The Court held that a federal cause of action is unnecessary for federal-question 1 District courts in this Circuit have held that plaintiffs may bring TCPA claims in federal court based on diversity jurisdiction notwithstanding ErieNet. See, e.g., Cellco P ship v. Dealers Warranty, LLC, No. 09-1814 , 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106719, at *18-19 (D.N.J. Oct. 4, 2010). However, as discussed below, Defendants did not timely assert diversity jurisdiction. Thus, the Court need not address whether the Third Circuit s holding in ErieNet precludes a plaintiff from bringing a TCPA claim in federal court predicated on diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 10 jurisdiction under § 1331 and that embedded questions of federal law can be sufficient to invoke jurisdiction in cases that are removalable pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Id. at 310, 313-14. In Breuer, the plaintiff filed a claim in state court under the Fair Labor Standards Act ( FLSA ). 538 U.S. at 693. The defendant removed the case to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Id. at 693-94. On appeal, the Supreme Court considered whether the FLSA provision stating that claims may be maintained . . . in any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction bars removal of a state court FLSA action to federal court. Id. at 693. Significantly, the Court stated that the district court s subject-matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff s FLSA claim was not at issue. Id. at 694. The Court stated that [t]here is no question that Breuer could have begun this action in the District Court. Id. Thus, the narrow issue before the Court was whether the FLSA bars removal under § 1441(a) even though the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the dispute. Id. at 693-94. The Court found that removal of matters arising under federal law pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) is prohibited only if Congress expressly provided as much. Id. at 694. The Court concluded that the phrase may be maintained . . . in any Federal or State court did not amount to an express bar to removal from state to federal court under § 1441(a). Id. at 694-96. In Brill, the plaintiff filed a class action in state court asserting claims under the TCPA. 427 F.3d at 447. The defendant removed to federal court pursuant to § 1441(a) based on diversity jurisdiction. Id. The district court remanded the case because it found that the TCPA grants exclusive jurisdiction to state courts, and, therefore, a defendant can never remove a TCPA action to federal court under § 1441(a). Id. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The Seventh Circuit determined, without discussion, that Breuer s holding applies equally to both statutory 11 bars to removal under § 1441 as well as limitations on federal subject-matter jurisdiction under § 1331 and § 1332. Id. at 451. The Seventh Circuit reasoned that because the statutory language at issue in Breuer was similar to the TCPA s language, Breuer requires the conclusion that neither the FLSA nor the TCPA prohibit removal or limit federal jurisdiction.2 Id. In reaching its holding, the Seventh Circuit also analyzed the impact of the Supreme Court s rulings in Grable and Breuer on opinions by other Circuits holding that there is no federal-question jurisdiction over private TCPA claims. Id. at 450. The Seventh Circuit found that the cases denying federal-question jurisdiction under the TCPA, including the Third Circuit s ruling in ErieNet, can not be reconciled with either Grable or Breuer. Id. at 450. That criticism was based on the Seventh Circuit s assertion that, although Breuer addressed only bars to removal under § 1441(a), its holding necessarily applies to limitations on federal subjectmatter jurisdiction under § 1331 and § 1332 . Id. at 450. In addressing these issues, it is appropriate to begin with the obvious. This Court is bound by precedent from the Third Circuit. See Vujosevic v. Rafferty, 844 F.2d 1023, 1030 n.4 (3d Cir. 1988) ( It is, of course, patent that a district court does not have the discretion to disregard controlling precedent simply because it disagrees with the reasoning behind such precedent. ). When subsequent Supreme Court decisions implicate Third Circuit precedent, a district court may set aside Third Circuit precedent only if the Supreme Court has effectively overruled that precedent, Pappas v. City of Lebanon, 331 F. Supp. 2d 311, 319 (M.D. Pa. 2004), 2 The Seventh Circuit also concluded that the TCPA s language itself supports the conclusion that 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) does not foreclose federal jurisdiction. See Brill, 427 F.3d at 451. The Court observed that 47 U.S.C. § 227(f), which authorizes states to bring enforcement actions under the TCPA, provides that federal courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all civil actions brought under this subsection. Id. (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 227(f)(2)). The Court concluded: But then § 227(f)(2) is explicit about exclusivity, while § 227(b)(3) is not; the natural inference is that the state forum mentioned in § 227(b)(3) is optional rather than mandatory. Id. at 451. In ErieNet, the Third Circuit presumably rejected this intratextual argument because it concluded that the text of the TCPA requires the conclusion that § 227(b)(3) is an exclusive grant of jurisdiction to state courts. See ErieNet, 156 F.3d at 517. Thus, it is not necessary for the Court to address the merits of the Seventh Circuit s argument because it is based on the TCPA s language and not the Supreme Court s holdings in Grable or Breuer. 12 or has rendered a decision that is necessarily inconsistent with Third Circuit authority, Finch v. Hercules, Inc., 865 F. Supp. 1104, 1121 (D. Del. 1994). Although Breuer is certainly relevant to the issue decided by the Third Circuit in ErieNet, the Court finds that Breuer is not necessarily inconsistent with the Third Circuit s reasoning or holding, and, therefore, the Court remains bound by ErieNet. First, in criticizing ErieNet, the Seventh Circuit overlooks that ErieNet did not involve removal under § 1441(a). ErieNet concerned a case originally filed in the district court. 156 F.3d at 514. The issue was whether there is federal-question jurisdiction over TCPA claims. Id. ErieNet did not address whether the TCPA imposes an express bar to removal under § 1441(a). Breuer, on the other hand, addressed only whether the FLSA bars removal of an action over which the district court otherwise has subject-matter jurisdiction. 538 U.S. at 694. Thus, Breuer did not effectively overrule ErieNet because the two cases address separate issues.3 Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit, which joins the Third Circuit on this issue, has declined to abandon its interpretation of the TCPA notwithstanding Breuer, Grable, and Brill.4 See Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, No. 10-12077, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 24622, at *1-3 (11th Cir. Nov. 30, 2010) ( Neither of those cases [Grable or Breuer] considered the Act [the TCPA], and neither of them explicitly or implicitly overrules our precedent ). 3 The D.C. Circuit has applied Breuer by analogy to statutory jurisdictional provisions. See Lindsay v. Gov t Emples. Ins. Co., 448 F.3d 416, 422 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (relying on Breuer when interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) s provision that federal courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims unless expressly provided otherwise by federal statute ). However, in doing so, the D.C. Circuit recognized that Breuer was only persuasive authority regarding the interpretation of an analogous statutory provision. Id. at 421-22. Thus, the D.C. Circuit rightly recognizes that Breuer s holding, although instructive, is not determinative regarding interpretation of differently phrased jurisdictional provisions in wholly different statutes. 4 The Fourth Circuit has also continued to follow its pre-Breuer ruling that the TCPA grants exclusive jurisdiction to state courts. See Res. Bankshares Corp. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 407 F.3d 631, 634 n. 1 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing Int l Sci. & Tech. Inst., Inc. v. Inacom Communs., 106 F.3d 1146 (4th Cir. 1997)); Wade v. Blue, 369 F.3d 407, 411 (4th Cir. 2004) (same). The Ninth Circuit also continues to favorably cite its pre-Breuer ruling that there is no federal jurisdiction over TCPA claims. See Townsend v. Univ. of Alaska, 543 F.3d 478, 484 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Murphey v. Lanier, 204 F.3d 911, 914 (9th Cir. 2000)). 13 Consequently, even if Breuer requires the conclusion that the TCPA does not bar removal of state court actions, the Court is still bound by the Third Circuit s ruling in ErieNet that there is no federal federal-question jurisdiction over TCPA claims. ErieNet therefore requires the Court to remand this matter for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction irrespective of whether TCPA claims are removable under Breuer as applied to the TCPA. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) ( If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject manner jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded ). Second, even if the Court were to apply Breuer s reasoning by analogy to the issue of federal subject-matter jurisdiction under the TCPA, the language of the TCPA is dissimilar to the language of the FLSA in significant ways. The FLSA expressly authorizes parties to bring claims in either Federal or State court. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). In Breuer, the Supreme Court declined to infer from that language that the FLSA expressly prohibited removal under § 1441. See Breuer, 538 U.S. at 695-96. The TCPA, on the other hand, provides only that parties may, if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a State, bring [a TCPA claim] in an appropriate court of that State. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). The TCPA makes no provision for suits in federal court. See id. In ErieNet, the Third Circuit concluded that this singular assignment of claims to state courts demonstrates Congress intent to foreclose federal jurisdiction under § 1331. ErieNet, 156 F.3d at 517 ( We believe that the most natural reading of this language is that Congress intended to authorize private causes of action only in state courts, and to withhold federal jurisdiction. ). To be sure, the Supreme Court s reasoning in Breuer raises the question of whether a singular assignment of jurisdiction to a particular court is sufficient to constitute an express derogation of another court s jurisdiction. See Breuer, 538 U.S. at 696 (holding that the rule 14 requiring an express bar to removal under § 1441 must mean something more than any verbal hook for an argument. ); ErieNet, Inc., 518-19 (listing federal statutes that assign jurisdiction to a court other than a federal district court). However, Breuer did not decide that issue. Breuer decided only whether a provision that permits parties to maintain an action in Federal or State court forecloses removal of a state action to federal court. Id. at 693 (emphasis added). In ErieNet, on the other hand, the Third Circuit held that the TCPA s singular assignment of claims to state courts limits federal jurisdiction under § 1331. ErieNet, Inc., 156 F.3d at 519. Although one may certainly question the strength of the Third Circuit s reasoning, 5 it is not necessarily inconsistent with Breuer, and this Court is bound by Third Circuit rulings. See Vujosevic, 844 F.2d at 1030 n.4 ( a district court does not have the discretion to disregard controlling precedent simply because it disagrees with the reasoning behind such precedent. ). Third, Breuer held that a statute does not foreclose removal of a state court action over which the district court otherwise has subject-matter jurisdiction unless the statute does so expressly. Breuer, 538 U.S. at 695-96. However, the Third Circuit in ErieNet applied a similar standard when it addressed jurisdiction under the TCPA. See ErieNet, Inc., 156 F.3d at 517-19. The Third Circuit s holding was based on its conclusion that the TCPA includes a specific reference or assignment that negates district court jurisdiction under § 1331. Id. at 519. According to the Third Circuit, the language and history of the TCPA reflect[] Congress intent to authorize consumer suits in state courts only. Id. In other words, the Third Circuit concluded that the TCPA s singular assignment of private claims to state court is more than a verbal hook for an argument because it specifically provides only state courts as the forum for TCPA claims. 5 The dissent in ErieNet criticized the majority s conclusion that the TCPA includes an express derogation of federal jurisdiction. The dissent argued that the TCPA s permissive grant of jurisdiction to state courts does not constitute an explicit statutory directive sufficient to divest district courts of their section 1331 federal question jurisdiction. ErieNet, 156 F.3d at 522 (Alito, J., dissenting). 15 Id. at 517 ( for Congress reference to state courts to have any meaning, it must reflect something other than a mere confirmation of concurrent jurisdiction over private enforcement actions. ); see Breuer, 538 U.S. at 696 (stating that express provision must mean something more than any verbal hook for an argument ). Fourth, this Court is not alone in its conclusion that is remains bound by ErieNet. District courts within the Third Circuit have universally continued to follow ErieNet notwithstanding Breuer, Grable, and Brill. See Landsman & Funk, P.C. v. Skinder-Strauss Assocs., 636 F. Supp. 2d 359, 362 (D.N.J. 2009) ( since Brill was decided, the District of New Jersey has continued to follow ErieNet precedent in finding that suits brought under the TCPA cannot be filed in or removed to federal court based on federal question jurisdiction. ) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Hawk Valley, Inc. v. Taylor, No. 10-804, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19253, at *45 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 25, 2011); Cellco P ship v. Dealers Warranty, LLC, No. 09-1814, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106719, at *18-20 n.3 (D.N.J. Oct. 4, 2010); Goodrich Mgmt. Corp. v. Afgo Mech. Servs., No. 09-43, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75756, at *9 (D.N.J. Aug. 24, 2009) ( Clearly, Plaintiff cannot bring a TCPA claim pursuant to federal question jurisdiction in this Court. ); Bell v. Money Res. Corp., No. 08-639, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11271, at *6-8 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 12, 2009); Margulis v. Resort Rental, LLC, No. 08-1719, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115287, at *3 n.1 (D.N.J. June 30, 2008), adopted by, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53728 (D.N.J. July 14, 2008). The unanimity of this authority within the Third Circuit counsels against the conclusion that Breuer effectively overruled ErieNet.6 6 The Seventh Circuit in Brill asserts that ErieNet can not be reconciled with either Breuer or Grable. However, the Seventh Circuit did not explain ErieNet s inconsistency with Grable, and this Court does not agree that Grable significantly undermines the Third Circuit s reasoning. Grable held that the absence of a federal cause of action does not foreclose the exercise of federal-question jurisdiction under § 1331. 545 U.S. at 310. In ErieNet, the Court expressly acknowledged that the TCPA creates a federal cause of action. 156 F.3d at 518. It nevertheless concluded that the TCPA specifically assigned that cause of action to adjudication in state court, and, therefore, the TCPA 16 Because ErieNet specifically held that district courts do not have general federal-question jurisdiction to hear claims under the TCPA, and because that holding is not necessarily inconsistent the Supreme Court s rulings in Grable and Breuer, the Court finds that it does not have federal-question jurisdiction over Plaintiff s claims. C. Diversity Jurisdiction under the CAFA Defendants Supplemental Notice of Removal nevertheless asserts diversity jurisdiction under the CAFA as an alternative basis for removal to this Court. Plaintiff argues that Defendants are procedurally barred from asserting that basis for jurisdiction because they did not include it in their initial Notice of Removal and their Supplemental Notice of Removal is untimely. Alternatively, Plaintiff argues that there is no diversity jurisdiction under the CAFA in this case because the home state exception to diversity jurisdiction under the CAFA applies. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4). The Court agrees that Defendants are procedurally barred from asserting diversity-jurisdiction under the CAFA. A defendant may remove a case from state court by filing a notice of removal in the appropriate district court as follows: The notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed within thirty days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claims for relief up which such action or proceeding is based. . . . If the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a notice of removal may be filed within thirty days after receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may be first ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable . . . . should be interpreted as foreclosing federal jurisdiction. Id. at 519. Thus, Grable does not undermine the Third Circuit s reasoning or holding in ErieNet. 17 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (b). Prior to the expiration of the thirty-day period for removal, a defendant may freely amend his notice of removal. See USX Corp. v. Adriatic Ins. Co., 345 F.3d 190, 206 n.13 (3d Cir. 2003). However, a defendant s ability to amend the removal petition after the thirty-day time limit for removal . . . extends only to amendments to correct technical defects in the jurisdictional allegations in the notice of removal. Blakeley v. United Cable Sys., 105 F. Supp. 2d 574, 579 (S.D. Miss. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). [A]mendments to remedy a substantive defect in the [removal] petition, i.e., to add a new basis for federal jurisdiction, are not permitted. Id. (collecting cases holding that defendants may not amend their notice of removal to include a new basis for federal jurisdiction after § 1446(b) s thirty-day period expires); Geismann v. Aestheticare, LLC, 622 F. Supp. 2d 1091, 1095 (D. Kan. 2008) ( Although . . . defendant [can] cure technical defects in a notice of removal, [the statute] does not allow for the addition of a new ground for removal ); see also 14C Charles Alan Wright, et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 3733, at 649-55 (4th ed. 2009) ( defendants may not add completely new grounds for removal . . . ). Plaintiff requests that the Court not consider Defendants assertion of diversity jurisdiction under the CAFA because Defendants did not include that basis for removal in their initial Notice of Removal and did not file their Supplemental Notice of Removal within thirty days of receiving the Complaint. Defendants admit that they filed their Supplemental Notice of Removal more than thirty days after they received the Complaint. They argue, however, that the face of the Complaint does not establish a basis for diversity jurisdiction under the CAFA. According to Defendants, they did not learn of the basis for diversity jurisdiction until Plaintiff s counsel sent an email to Defendants counsel suggesting that the putative class included approximately 3,372 members. Defendants argue that the email provided notice of a new basis 18 for jurisdiction and that, pursuant to the second paragraph of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b), they had thirty days from receipt of the email to timely assert that basis for removal. The purpose of § 1446(b) s thirty-day requirement is to ensure that a defendant to a properly initiated lawsuit removes the case to federal court as soon as he can ascertain a basis for federal jurisdiction from the pleadings, motion documents, orders, or other paper. Sikirica v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 214, 223 (3d Cir. 2005). Thus, if the initial pleading provided notice of the grounds for federal diversity jurisdiction, the defendant must remove the case within thirty days of being served with the initial pleading. Id. ( the complaint provided notice of the grounds for federal diversity jurisdiction, so the second paragraph of Section 1446(b) does not apply ). In order to determine whether an initial pleading provides notice of a particular basis for federal jurisdiction, courts expect defendants to look beyond the face of the complaint. See LaCaffinie v. Std. Fire Ins. Co., No. 10-207, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53151, at *10-11 (W.D. Pa. May 28, 2010); Mielke v. Allstate Ins. Co., 472 F. Supp. 851, 853 (E.D. Mich 1979). In making this determination, most federal courts will review the facts available to the defendant at the outset of the action. 14C Charles Alan Wright, et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 3731, at 567 (4th ed. 2009). Indeed, [w]hen the defendant has vital knowledge the plaintiff may lack, it is appropriate to impose a burden on the defendant to come forward with the information . . . so that the choice between state and federal court may be made accurately. Brill, 427 F.3d at 447-48. Thus, the time to remove under § 1446(b) begins to run when the circumstances described in the complaint combined with relevant information available to the defendant would demonstrate the basis for federal jurisdiction. Mielke, 472 F. Supp. at 853; LaCaffinie, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53151, at *10-11. 19 In LaCaffinie, for example, the plaintiff brought a class action against an insurance company on behalf of a putative class of policy holders. 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53151, at *1-2. The defendant removed the case based on diversity jurisdiction under the CAFA more than thirty days after the plaintiff served it with the complaint. Id. at *4-5. The defendant argued that the removal was nevertheless timely because the face of the complaint did not put it on notice that the putative class would likely exceed 100 members and the amount in controversy would exceed the jurisdictional minimum. Id. The defendant argued that the thirty-day requirement began to run only when, in response to a discovery request from the plaintiff, it tabulated the number of its own policies that fit the class definition alleged in the complaint. Id. The court rejected the defendant s argument and held that that the time to remove began to run when the plaintiff served the complaint because [t]he information from which [the] defendant determined the total number of policies and roughly calculated the total amount in controversy was in its possession at the time the complaint was filed, albeit some diligence and effort was required to locate the information. Id. at *10; see Town of Ogden Dunes v. Siwinski, No. 08-78, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32819, at *11 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 17, 2008) (holding that removal was untimely because the defendants had the information at their disposal to know how many violations were encompassed by the complaint, or at least whether there were enough violations to reach the jurisdictional minimum amount. ); Mielke, 572 F. Supp. at 853 (holding that the time for removal begins to run upon service of the complaint if the presence of grounds for removal are unambiguous in light of the defendant s knowledge and the claims made in the initial complaint ). Here, Plaintiff s initial Complaint put Defendants on notice of facts sufficient to demonstrate diversity jurisdiction under the CAFA. First, the Complaint defines the putative 20 class as all persons who received facsimile advertisements from Defendants on or after four years prior to the filing of this action. From this allegation alone, Defendants could have, by reference to their own records, ascertained the approximate size of the putative class and the aggregate amount in controversy. Second, the Complaint specifically alleges that on February 9, 2007, Defendants sent Plaintiff an unauthorized facsimile advertisement. (Compl. ¶ 10). The Complaint attaches a copy of that advertisement. (Compl. Ex. A). Plaintiff s expert report shows that the facsimile Defendants sent to Plaintiff on February 9, 2007, was part of a mass distribution that Defendants successfully sent to 3,372 recipients on the same day. (See Pl s M. for Leave to File Supp. Brief, Ex. A-3). Had Defendants made even the slightest effort to locate in their records the facsimile attached to the Complaint, they would have ascertained that the specific facsimile at issue was part of a mass distribution implicating thousands of recipients. See Brill, 427 F.3d at 447-48 (discussing diversity jurisdiction under the CAFA for a claim based on violations of the TCPA and concluding that the party seeking removal has the burden to investigate the number of allegedly unauthorized junk faxes ). The Court rejects Defendants argument that they had no reason to know that there was a basis for diversity jurisdiction under the CAFA because the Complaint alleges that the putative class consists only of more than 39 members. (Compl. ¶ 14). Plaintiff specifically pleads that the putative class includes [a]ll persons who . . . on or after four years prior to the filing of this action . . . were sent telephone facsimile advertisements. (Compl. ¶ 17) (emphasis added). Thus, the Complaint put Defendants on notice that Plaintiff was suing on behalf of a class that included a minimum of 39 members but nevertheless included all recipients of allegedly unauthorized facsimiles for the last four years. (Id.). As noted above, if Defendants had simply 21 checked to see how many facsimile messages they sent on February 9, 2007, they would have discovered that the putative class encompassed thousands of potential members. Because the Complaint put Defendants on notice of facts sufficient to demonstrate diversity jurisdiction under the CAFA, Defendants were required to assert that basis for removal within thirty-days of service. See Blow v. Liberty Travel, Inc., 550 F. Supp. 375, 376-77 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (holding that § 1446(b) requires that a petition for removal be filed within thirty days of the receipt of any initial pleading which does not on its face preclude removal. ). Defendants admit that they were served no later than May 31, 2010. (Notice of Removal ¶ 4). Defendants did not assert diversity jurisdiction under the CAFA until more than three months later when they filed their Supplemental Notice of Removal on September 16, 2010. Thus, Defendants are procedurally barred from asserting diversity jurisdiction as a basis for removal. See id. at 377 (granting motion to remand solely because assertion of federal jurisdiction was untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)). IV. CONCLUSION Because the Court does not have federal-question jurisdiction over TCPA claims, and because Defendants are procedurally barred from asserting diversity-jurisdiction under the CAFA, the Court remands this matter to the Superior Court of New Jersey for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction.7 Defendants motion to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is denied without prejudice as moot. An appropriate Order shall enter today. 7 Plaintiff asserts a claim under the TCPA and a claim for common law conversion under state law. For the reasons discussed above, Plaintiff is procedurally barred from asserting diversity-jurisdiction under the CAFA regarding its state law conversion claim. Additionally, because the Court does not have jurisdiction over Plaintiff s TCPA claim under § 1331, it also does not have supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff s state law claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). 22 Dated: 3/21/2011 /s/ Robert B. Kugler ROBERT B. KUGLER United States District Judge 23
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text:
RED BANK, N.J. — In less than eight hours, a play space was built at the Community YMCA's Family Health and Wellness Center with the help of more than 200 volunteers from the Community YMCA, Good Neighbor Pharmacy and non profit KaBOOM!, the companies announced Monday. The new playground — which was made possible by funds donated by Good Neighbor Pharmacy and matched by its parent company, AmerisourceBergen — will serve hundreds of children in the community for years to come.
"The Community YMCA is truly grateful to KaBOOM! and Good Neighbor Pharmacy for their generosity and commitment to ensuring that all children have a safe place to play," stated the Community YMCA president and CEO Rhonda Anderson. "We thank them and the many hardworking volunteers and local businesses who supported this project. Together, we are making a lasting impact for children in our community."
Planning for the playground began at a design day event held on Sept. 3, where local children and community leaders met with organizers from KaBOOM! and Good Neighbor Pharmacy to design their dream playground. The children's drawings were then used to create the final playground design.
"Good Neighbor Pharmacy is thrilled to have the opportunity to give back to local communities like Red Bank through our partnership with KaBOOM!," stated AJ Caffentzis, SVP sales and marketing, at AmerisourceBergen. "We are committed to the health and well-being of our customers, employees and communities. Our Good Neighbor Pharmacy members, in particular, remain cornerstones of their respective communities, working to improve patient access and patient health in local neighborhoods across the country. We view our partnership with KaBOOM! as an extension of our commitment to local communities."
The playground is the first of five that will be built together by KaBOOM! and Good Neighbor Pharmacy, the companies noted.


text:
McDonald's is a dividend rich company. The dividend has grown from $2.05/share in 2009 to $3.12 for 2013, a CAGR of 11%. The payout ratio has crept up from 49% in 2009 to 56% (projected) in 2013, which still leaves the company plenty of room to grow their dividend. Not only has McDonald's been able to consistently increase its dividend, but the rate of increase has been impressive, making this company a dividend growth investment stalwart. The stock has experienced a blistering 24% compound annual growth rate in the dividend over the 10-year period ending in 2012. The company confirmed its earlier forecast for 3-5% same store sales growth and 6-7% operating income growth. The payout ratio also is very good. Diluted earnings per share and net earnings rose by 6.3% and 4.6% respectively. Tight expense control drove the revenues from company-owned restaurants and franchised stores by 1.8% and 3.7% respectively.
Head to Head
McDonald's faces stiff competition from Burger King (BKW). The company is offering premium items like Rib Sandwich, Carolina BBQ Favorites, Turkey Burger, Buffalo Chicken Strips, and more. It is modernizing its restaurants in order to improve its brand perception. It has added premium menu options and gourmet coffees, renovated restaurants and overhauled its advertising campaign. MCD has a strong competitive advantage over BKW. It is easier for McDonald's to negotiate more favorable lease terms with landlords and developers, due to its scale of operations. Unlike Burger King, McDonald's is full of assets, from land to hamburgers that can be recognized by most people in the world.
Amongst its peers, Wendy's (NASDAQ:WEN), YUM! Brands (NYSE:YUM), and Domino's Pizza (NYSE:DPZ) give some competition to this company. YUM posted a weak third quarter earnings as net income declined by 68%. The company gets about 50% of its revenue from China, where it is finding it hard to sustain follows a slower economy.
WEN is making up its restaurants in a big way, and has also strengthened its value proposition by adding over $1 billion in market capitalization already. It is the world's third largest quick-service hamburger company. The Wendy's system includes more than 6,500 franchises and company restaurants in the U.S., and 27 countries and U.S. territories worldwide.
Another close competitor of MCD is Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc. (NYSE:CMG). The company currently owns 1,502 restaurants of which 1,490 are in the U.S., five in Canada, six in London and one in Paris. Chipotle is comparatively expensive when compared to MCD. Opening a Chipotle in lower-income areas cannot provide the same returns as opening up a McDonald's in the same area. Its P/E ratio is also much higher than the industry average.
Advancement Plans
MCD has a relatively small market in India, so the beef-centric fast-food chain plans to open vegetarian-only restaurants next year. This is a totally new strategy for the company, signaling a growing effort for expansion in India (where the majority of people doesn't eat beef). McDonald's is also venturing into the coffee market with the expansion of McCafe designed to appeal to coffee lovers with tight budgets, a common pattern in recessions.
McCafe is a great move by McDonald´s - it adds to profitability due to higher profit margins than the traditional fast food business, and it diversifies the company away from those fattening products with their negative health implications. McDonald´s will certainly continue expanding in the coffee business and its size and global presence makes it a company to watch out for.
While the whole breakfast menu will not be available before standard breakfast hours, favorites like the Egg McMuffin (and its Egg White Delight variant), sausage burritos, hot cakes, oatmeal, and hash browns will surely be there. They will co-exist with staples like Big Mac burgers and chicken nuggets. It is unbelievable but true - McDonald's has as many as 140 items on its menu and there are 160 more in the pipeline. The company keeps introducing new items, and pulling off the old ones to keep the menu fresh. Management confirmed it will spend $2.9-3 billion to open 1,500-1,600 stores while remodelling 1,000 more. In 2013, management trimmed its capital spending plans by $100 million to $3 billion due to lagging sales in China and other emerging markets.
On a Concluding Note
The company is a member of the S&P 500 dividend aristocrats, which are companies that have increased their dividend every year for the past 25 years or more. MCD is surely amongst the best breeds in the fast food industry, and it may be a worthwhile investment for the conservative investors. The company boasts a global operation coupled with an iconic brand image and a history of stellar business operations. McDonald's is a safe blue chip with a great yield you can hold for years to come. McDonald´s has an attractive proposition for value-conscious customers.
It is a solid company overall. The global slowdown is certainly making its effects known, but the fast-food giant has solid fundamentals and improving technicals. Consistency usually wins in most aspects of life, and it is no different with fast-food and restaurant menus. This is one of the reasons why Chipotle is highly profitable. MCD is one of the most respected global brands, even despite its current problems. MCD may be a good bargain moving forward, and with its worldwide brand recognition and presence, it is bound to be around well into the future.


text:
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Appendix:FireRed and LeafGreen walkthrough/Section 9
Route 16
Also known as Cycling Road, the path that connects Celadon City and Fuchsia City (Routes 16, 17, and 18) is a favorite hangout spot for bikers. Besides a few battles, it's a pretty easy ride down the slope to Fuchsia. Cut down the small tree near the Snorlax to find a hidden area. Walk through the gate and enter the house on the other side. The girl inside will bribe Trainers with HM02 (Fly) to keep her hideaway a secret. Teach that to something like Pidgeot or Fearow to visit any previous town in seconds.
The sleeping Snorlax blocks any travel, so use the Poké Flute to wake it up. There are only two Snorlax in the region, so if the player defeats this one, make sure to get the one south of Lavender Town. Another of Oak's aides is upstairs, and will hand over the Amulet Coin to Trainers with Pokédex data on at least 40 species. Trainers must bring the Bicycle along as well, or the guard won't let them on Cycling Road.
|Available Pokémon
Route 17
It's all downhill to Fuchsia City. To hit the brakes, hold down the B button. Cruise down the slope to Route 18.
|Available Pokémon
Route 18
Hang a right and ride to the gate. The kid on the second floor is looking for a GolduckFR/SlowbroLG, and is willing to trade his Lickitung (the only one in the game) for it. Battle the three Bird Keepers south of the gate for some quick cash before heading east to Fuchsia.
|Available Pokémon
Fuchsia City
With Team Rocket still reeling from their botched operation in Saffron, Trainers are free to continue on their quest. Fuchsia City hosts the Safari Zone, a wildlife preserve where people can view rare species in their native habitats. Besides the zoo, Fuchsia is also home to the Fuchsia Gym, the sixth in the Indigo League. Stop by the Pokémon Center to the south, and enter the Gym.
Fuchsia Gym
The Fuchsia Gym is teeming with Poison-types. Psychic-type moves will inflict double-damage, as will Ground-type moves. However, all of his Pokémon but Muk have the ability Levitate which makes them immune to Ground-type moves. A good Steel-type Pokémon like Magneton is also a great choice at this Gym, as they are not affected by Poison-type moves. The ninja master has set up invisible walls in his Gym to disorient his challengers, so Trainers will have to find the open spaces between the walls to find the path to the Gym Leader.
Defeating the Fuchsia Gym earn a Trainer their sixth badge. The Soul Badge allows Trainers to use Surf to cross bodies of water. This gives Trainers the ability to leave the mainland and head for Cinnabar Island by way of the Seafoam Islands a little later. It also gives a slight defense boost during battle. Koga rewards his opponent with TM06 (Toxic) as a prize. Leave the Gym, jump off the ledge to the right of the Pokémon Center, and visit the Safari Zone Warden's home.
Warden's home
The Warden is a little upset about losing his set of false teeth. If they turn up, returning them to the Warden will result in the Trainer obtaining HM04 (Strength), perfect for moving the boulder in his house to get the Rare Candy behind it. Before entering the safari, stop in the house next door and talk to the Fishing Guru inside to get the Good Rod. With this, Trainers can finally fish for something other than Magikarp. Some aquatic species like Poliwag and Goldeen can be found in his backyard pond.
Safari Zone
The Safari Zone is the city's main tourist attraction. For 500, all Trainers are given thirty Safari Balls and allowed to catch any Pokémon they find. The catch is that Trainers are not allowed to use their own Pokémon to weaken the wild Pokémon first. A Trainer's only options are to throw either a rock or bait before attempting to capture anything. Throwing bait makes a Pokémon less likely to run, but harder to catch; while throwing a rock makes it more likely to run, but easier to catch. Try different combinations to see what works. There are many species roaming the park, and quite a few items, too. When a Trainer runs out of Safari Balls or walks 500 steps, the game is over. Be sure to return to the park after obtaining the Super Rod to find even rarer species.
From the entrance, head to the northeast to enter the second area, Area 1.
|Safari Pokémon
Area 1
There are four items scattered around the second area. Pick up a Leaf Stone on the rocky ledge, TM11 (Sunny Day) in the pond, a Max Potion to the northwest, and a Full Restore near the rest house. Walk past the rest house and head west.
|Safari Pokémon
Area 2
Go all the way to the left, and head north through the tall grass onto the rocky ledge. From here, follow the S-bend to get to the northern section. Pass through two more patches of tall grass and pick up TM47 (Steel Wing). After looping past the rest house, grab a Protein and follow the path around to the southwest.
|Safari Pokémon
Area 3
In the final area, head straight down to find the Warden's Gold Teeth - return these to him to get HM04 (Strength). Walk to the west to find TM32 (Double Team), and enter the Secret House. It seems that no one else has ventured this deep into the park yet, and the HM03 (Surf) is awarded to the first Trainer to get here. Teach it to something like Gyarados or Lapras to cross the pond south of the Secret House. Pick up the Max Potion and the Max Revive on the way east to the entrance, where Trainers can surf to the central island to reach a Nugget. Otherwise, backtrack and wander through some tall grass until the timer runs out, which probably won't be much longer.
|Safari Pokémon
Back in the city, stop by the Warden's house to return the Gold Teeth. He gives the player HM04 (Strength) as thanks, and teaching this to a sturdy team member like Rhydon or Tauros lets them move those big boulders around. Try it out now to reach the Rare Candy inside the Warden's home.
With Fuchsia City cleared, fly back to Lavender Town and head south to Route 12.
| FireRed and LeafGreen
|This article is part of Project Walkthroughs, a Bulbapedia project that aims to write comprehensive step-by-step guides on each Pokémon game.


text:
I/M/O THE CIVIL COMMITMENT OF S.DAnnotate this Case
Submitted September 10, 2008 - Decided:
Before Judges Lihotz and Messano.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County, MH-1848-07.
Ronald K. Chen, Public Advocate, attorney for appellant (Theodore S. Novak, Deputy Public Advocate, on the brief).
Kavanagh & Kavanagh, LLC., attorneys for respondent (Brendan J. Kavanagh, Assistant County Counsel, on the brief).
S.D., a civil committee at Ancora Psychiatric Hospital (Ancora), appeals from the March 7, 2008 order that continued his involuntary commitment and scheduled his next review date for May 9, 2008. In 2003, S.D. was convicted of second-degree sexual assault and sentenced to a six-year term of imprisonment with an 85% period of parole eligibility. Upon his release from prison in August 2007, he was civilly committed to the Ann Klein Forensic Center, and transferred to Ancora on November 21, 2007. His status was first reviewed in December 2007 and again in February 2008, when his privileges were advanced to Level II. See N.J.A.C. 10:36-1.6.
The hearing that gives rise to this appeal took place on March 7, 2008. The only witness produced was Doctor Toni Calabrese, a psychiatrist on staff at Ancora and part of S.D.'s treatment team. She opined that S.D. suffered from "[m]ajor depression, major depressive disorder, alcohol dependence and [a] borderline personality disorder." Calabrese noted S.D. had been compliant in taking his medication but continued "to have residual symptoms." She further opined that S.D. was "a danger to others if he was released . . . outside the structure." Asked to expand upon the basis for this opinion, Calabrese testified
In view of the fact that past behavior is the best predictor of future behavior, and . . . that [S.D.] is alcohol addicted, that alcohol was involved and intoxication was involved at the time of the offense, in view of the fact that he remains depressed, has borderline personality traits, has poor insight into relationships and his role in relationships, has poor problem-solving skills, there is a likelihood that he will decompensate outside of the structure of the hospital and that when that happens, based on that he has had a previous offense, under those conditions, there is a likelihood that this could happen again.
On cross-examination, Calabrese confirmed that S.D. was not psychotic, not bi-polar, did not suffer from delusions or hallucinations, did not suffer from any paraphilia, and was not suicidal. She also found him "oriented to person, place and time" and coherent in his speech. Calabrese also agreed that S.D. was "generally cooperative" and had not engaged in threatening or agitated behavior while at Ancora.
As cross-examination concluded, the following exchange took place between Calabrese and S.D.'s counsel:
Q. So correct me if I'm wrong, but there's a couple of ifs involved in your concern. If [S.D.] starts drinking, if he has a relationship with a woman, if there's a break-up, if he doesn't handle it well, then the[re]'ll be a problem. Is that sort of the gist of that?
A. Yes.
This prompted further questioning by the judge:
Q. Doctor, you gave a very firm opinion to me . . . that you feel that there's a substantial likelihood that [S.D.] will repeat the offense if I release him.
A. Yes.
Q. Is that what you said?
A. Yes.
Q. Would . . . you be able to address whether you feel that that substantial likelihood . . . would happen in the reasonably foreseeable future . . .?
A. I think that it's possible based on the fact that he could relapse with respect to the drinking . . . .
. . . .
Q. I'm looking for probabilities.
A. I think that without the proper insight and coping skills[] that it is probable that he will relapse with respect to the drinking.
. . . .
Q. And your opinion is, based on reasonable medical certainty, that if all those ifs happen, it[']s probable that [S.D. will] repeat the offense, is that what you're saying? If he gets involved in a relationship, if that relationship turns bad and he starts drinking, is it your opinion . . . that it is probable that he will repeat the sexual offense that he was incarcerated for . . . ?
A. Based on his past behavior, yes.
The judge concluded "there is clear and convincing evidence that [S.D.] remains dangerous to others and property, that he suffers from mental illness, that he will not voluntarily be admitted to this facility and that there is no less restrictive facility." The judge concluded the hearing by noting, "based on the fact that the only witness that [] testified, Dr. Calabrese, and the only expert that's being offered to me has given an opinion that he remains dangerous, I have no choice but to continue the commitment." The judge executed the order under review.
S.D. argues the judge erred "in holding that he had 'no choice'" in continuing the commitment because Calabrese's testimony "failed to meet the standard for involuntary commitment." We have considered this argument in light of the record and applicable legal standards. We agree that the State failed to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that there was a "substantial likelihood" that S.D. would "inflict serious bodily harm upon another person or cause serious property damage within the reasonably foreseeable future," and therefore reverse. N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.2i (emphasis added).
We recognize that our review of a judge's decision reached at a commitment hearing is extremely narrow. State v. Fields, 77 N.J. 282, 311 (1978). That decision is entitled our "'utmost deference' and modified only where the record reveals a clear abuse of discretion." In re J.P., 339 N.J. Super. 443, 459 (App. Div. 2001)(quoting Fields, supra, 77 N.J. at 311). On appeal, "[t]he appropriate inquiry is to canvas the . . . expert testimony in the record and determine whether the lower court's findings were clearly erroneous." In re D.C., 146 N.J. 31, 58-59 (1996). However, a reviewing court must always "consider the adequacy of the evidence." In re M.M., 384 N.J. Super. 313, 334 (App. Div. 2006). In this case, the expert testimony was inadequate to prove the statutory requirement regarding dangerousness.
In reaching a determination that a committee poses a "danger[] to others or property," N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.2i permits consideration of "[that] person's history, recent behavior and any recent act or threat." In this case, in large part, Calabrese based her opinion upon S.D.'s prior sexual offense that involved his ex-girlfriend and was clearly influenced by his alcoholism. She acknowledged that S.D.'s recent behavior had not demonstrated any dangerous tendencies and he had refrained from any aggressive or threatening behaviors during his entire incarceration and commitment. Calabrese acknowledged that S.D. had attended alcohol counseling and had remained abstinent for six years.
While past conduct is a permissible predictive tool in reaching an opinion about a committee's current dangerousness, the State must demonstrate that the person's release poses the substantial likelihood that he will harm others "within the reasonably foreseeable future." N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.2i. Our Supreme Court has construed this phrase as requiring "the risk of dangerousness . . . [to] be relatively immediate[.]" In re N.N., 146 N.J. 112, 130 (1996).
In this regard, Calabrese's opinion was essentially contingent upon several predicate conditions, all of which needed to occur before she believed S.D. posed a substantial threat of danger to others. As to those predicate conditions, with the exception of S.D.'s likely relapse into alcoholism, which Calabrese indicated was "probable," the doctor acknowledged that each could "possibly" occur. Such proof does not meet the requisite standard of clear and convincing evidence that S.D. would pose an imminent danger to others if released. See In re J.R., 390 N.J. Super. 523, 532-33 (App. Div. 2007)(noting "possibility [committee] may stop taking his medication is insufficient to constitute clear and convincing evidence of a substantial likelihood of future harm necessary for involuntary confinement"); In re W.H., 324 N.J. Super. 519, 523-24 (App. Div. 1999)(noting proof of a possibility is insufficient).
We have noted that in order to continue the denial of an individual's liberty rights under the civil commitment statute, "[e]quivocal proofs are not sufficient. The evidence must permit the judge to come to a clear conviction [that person is mentally ill and dangerous], without hesitancy." In re M.M., supra, 384 N.J. Super. at 334 (citations omitted). We conclude that the proof regarding S.D.'s likely risk for dangerous conduct "within the reasonably foreseeable future" was equivocal because the ultimate conclusion was based upon the required occurrence of a series of predicate events, most of which the expert opined were possibilities, not probabilities, and none of which were factually supported by S.D.'s recent behavior. Since there was no proof that these conditions would necessarily occur, much less that they would probably occur in the immediate future, the proof of S.D.'s dangerousness was less than clear and convincing and hence inadequate under the statute.
We were advised by the parties that S.D. has since been released. The State argues the appeal should be dismissed as moot. We disagree. See In re R.S., 263 N.J. Super. 307, 309 (App. Div. 1992) (noting "involuntary commitment has potential ramifications if the need again arises to evaluate [committee's] mental condition").
S.D.'s commitment was not pursuant to the Sexually Violent Predator Act, N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.24 to -27.38. However, as we recently noted, "the State's burden to justify the continued involuntary commitment . . . is no different for [a committee], whose mental illness contributed to past violent criminal behavior, including a sexual assault, than it is for any other patient who has not committed a violent crime or sexual offense." In re T.J., 401 N.J. Super. 111, 122 (App. Div. 2008).
S.D.'s second argument on appeal is that he should have been conditionally released because that would have been the "least restrictive" appropriate setting. That point is moot in light of S.D.'s unconditional release in the interim.
October 14, 2008


text:
This script is Copyright (C) 2007-2015 Tenable Network Security, Inc.
Synopsis :
The remote Gentoo host is missing one or more security-related
Description :
The remote host is affected by the vulnerability described in GLSA-200704-11
(Vixie Cron: Denial of Service)
During an internal audit, Raphael Marichez of the Gentoo Linux Security
Team found that Vixie Cron has weak permissions set on Gentoo, allowing
for a local user to create hard links to system and users cron files,
while a st_nlink check in database.c will generate a superfluous error.
Impact :
Depending on the partitioning scheme and the 'cron' group membership, a
malicious local user can create hard links to system or users cron
files that will trigger the st_link safety check and prevent the
targeted cron file from being run from the next restart or database
Workaround :
There is no known workaround at this time.
See also :
Solution :
All Vixie Cron users should upgrade to the latest version:
# emerge --sync
# emerge --ask --oneshot --verbose '>=sys-process/vixie-cron-4.1-r10'
Risk factor :
Low / CVSS Base Score : 2.1
Family: Gentoo Local Security Checks
Nessus Plugin ID: 25056 (gentoo_GLSA-200704-11.nasl)
Get Nessus Professional to scan unlimited IPs, run compliance checks & moreBuy Nessus Professional Now


text:
63 Wembley Dr., Toronto
Asking price: $989,000
Taxes: Not yet assessed
Lot size: 20 feet by 150 feet
Agent: Noel Trumpour, Keller Williams Advantage Realty
The back story
Williamson Ravine Park is tucked away in Toronto's east end. It's not a geographically large nature reserve but it is surprisingly dense (thickly wooded and home to Small's Creek) and hidden just out of view of busy Coxwell and Gerrard streets. The park is named after William Williamson, who was a man of many hats in Toronto at the turn of the 20th century: a manufacturer, an alderman for the area, a justice of the peace and a builder. It's only fitting that the bronze plaque honouring the namesake of the park now sits on the property edge of 63 Wembley Dr., which is a building and architectural feat in itself.
The three-bedroom house is perched on the west of the ravine. Built by developer Lawrence Hyland and architect Steven Fong, the house is a contemporary mix of Swiss-modern style and New York City loft. Think a nouveau chic cottage built on a quiet Upper Beaches street.
There was nothing particularly easy about the construction of 63 Wembley Dr. It took nearly 10 years to get the zoning of the land in order with the city. But even when Mr. Hyland and his team broke the ground in March, it wasn't smooth sailing because of the challenges posed by the plot of land, which is anything but flat. In fact, before building it was an uneven slope covered by weed-like Norway maples.
"A lot of people didn't think a house could be built on this land," Mr. Hyland says.
But instead of being discouraged, Mr. Hyland considered his options. Levelling the area off wasn't on the table because the Toronto Region Conservation Authority owns the ravine bank below. Initially Mr. Hyland wanted to use caissons (those concrete columns you see during the initial stages of most house-building projects) but between the angled land, the small size of the plot and the sand basin beneath the ground, he realized he couldn't construct this house in a typical fashion.
Helical screws ended up being the solution to Mr. Hyland's foundational challenge. Not only were the galvanized steel screws less cumbersome to work with (unlike caissons, the screws only needed a little Bobcat to install, not a 60-foot tall machine), they were also more ecological, helping Mr. Hyland stick to his goals making 63 Wembley eco-conscious.
"That was the change that made this whole project work," he says.
Design style
Mr. Hyland worked with architect Steven Fong, who also designed Matthew Matheson's Parts and Labour restaurant. Like Parts and Labour, Mr. Fong added a distinct industrial feel to the house with its concrete floors and commercial windows. But the end result is not cold and impersonal, as you might expect from a modern house with an industrial touch, because Mr. Fong also drew inspiration from the abundant nature surrounding the city home.
"You get end-to-end views, with the ravine on one side and the city street on the other," says Mr. Fong. "You go from city to countryside just by turning your head."
To take in as much of the surroundings as possible, the house has huge commercial windows, both front and back. And despite their size, they don't let the heat escape because they are more energy-efficient than regular residential windows. They only let in the view, and perhaps more importantly, light.
Often in long and narrow homes, the middle of the house is dark and cut off from natural light, Mr. Fong explains. So he very consciously laid out the floor plans in a way that would capitalize on the natural light from the large windows and kept all of the house as bright as possible.
"The idea was to do the best of European design, which is a sense of openness, but at the same time provide privacy where it was needed," says Mr. Fong.
Even the decor details were selected with this in mind. Staircases are enclosed with removable glass walls, closets have sliding translucent doors and even the finished basement is bright during the day with its high ceilings and west-facing windows.
Best features
The light is one of two things people always rave about, realtor Noel Trumpour says. The other thing is the floor, and that's not just because it's a pretty shade of grey – nearly a pale platinum. It's also warm. The house's heating comes from the tubes embedded into the one-and-a-half inches of concrete that make up the floors.
And this concrete is not the tough stuff you'll find on the sidewalk. It's smooth, soft and has almost a bounce to it.
But for Mr. Fong, the wow factor is the kitchen.
"You can have 10 friends over and they can have their elbows on the kitchen island, talking together, looking out onto the ravine," he says.
And then there is the third floor, which is an open-concept master bedroom suite. The bedroom aspect of it is in the east-end of the home, looking out over the top of the ravine. Steps away from the bed is a small upper balcony that is like a grown-up's version of a treehouse, with the treetops just out of reach. On the other end of the floor is the bathroom (one of four in the house), which has a bath, shower, two sinks and water closet. In between the spa bathroom and the bedroom space is a luxuriously large walk-in closet.
"It's a little sanctuary," says Mr. Fong.
"The house is both a great place to entertain and to relax."Report Typo/Error
Follow @JournoMaddieon Twitter:


text:
|28 Mar 2014
W10 Pro desktop, W10 laptop, W10 laptop, W10 Pro tablet (all 64-bit)
Welcome to Seven Forums!
This thread is from 2010 and the most recent post was almost 2 years ago. You'd be better off starting a new thread rather than posting in an old thread.
|My System Specs
|28 Mar 2014
Windows 7, Office 2013
I never looked at the dates, actually never do.... I googled this problem, and this thread was one of the top results, and the one that actually helped me, even though it prompted a separate search of its own that actually led me to the solution. Makes sense to me to respond to this one since it is the one that almost completely helped me. Thanks though.
|My System Specs
|12 Dec 2014
Windows 7 Home Premium
Post by Anjelone fixed my problem, after trying several others solutions that were more complex and unsuccessful. Thank you!
|My System Specs
|03 Nov 2015
Window 7 Professional 64-Bit
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text:
Ah, here we go with little brother, who's been dominating the league so far this year. But we have a chance. A chance not just to avenge not just the first game that ended in an OT loss this year, but for every team the Hawks have cheated out of a win thus far. To avenge cabbies everywhere. And to remind little brother why Detroit's been the team to beat for the past 21 years.
For that, we're gonna need a superhero kind of effort to win today. And that's just what Josh Howard has provided us for today's movie poster…
…after the break.
Impressive eh?
Check out Winging It In Motown's Gameday Thread during the game.
And of course…


text:
Learn about this topic in these articles:
energy conversion
...supersonic flight, the fan may be feathered, and a surplus of fuel may be introduced into the core combustor. The unburned fuel passes through the fan turbine and undergoes combustion in the ramjet burner when it mixes with the fresh air entering via the bypass stream from the fan.
...adjacent rock. The technique has largely been superseded by others, however. In hard rocks such as granite that have a significant quartz content, channels may be cut by handheld or automated jet burners. A pressurized mixture of fuel oil and air or of fuel oil and oxygen is burned in a combustion chamber similar to a miniature rocket engine, producing a high-temperature, high-velocity flame....


text:
Nasdaq (a 4-hour chart)
General overview
The global stock markets showed a negative trend yesterday. The demand for risky assets decreased and Nasdaq Composite fell by 1.13%.
Current situation
The Nasdaq returned to sales after a four-day rally. The index reversed at 4440 and fell below 4400. The Nasdaq Composite ended the day at mark 4384. The resistance comes at 4400, the support exists at 4350.
Even though MACD decreased its histogram remained in a positive zone. RSI moved away from the oversold area. Both indicators recommend short positions. The price broke the 200-EMA and touched the 100-day moving average. The 200-day moving direction is horizontal. The 50-EMA and 100-EMA are moving downwards.
Trading recommendations
The price is likely to go to the support level of 4350.


text:
Gloss Finished Canadian Maple Strat 21 Frets Guitar Neck (STM-21)
|FOB Price:
|US $25.68-35.68 / Piece
|Min. Order:
|10 Pieces
|Min. Order
|FOB Price
|10 Pieces
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|Production Capacity:
|Payment Terms:
|T/T, Western Union, Paypal, Money Gram
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- Guitar Kits
- 26 Products
- Content
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- Product Table
- Model NO.: STM-21
- Type: Guitar Neck
- Neck Material: Maple
- Fingerboard Raidus: 9.5"
- Tuner Holes: 10mm, Fit for Die Cast Machine Heads
- Finish: High Gloss
- Scale Length: 648mm(25-1/2")
- Transport Package: Single Box with EPE Foam
- Origin: China
- Material: Wood
- Size: 21 Fret
- Fingerboard Material: Maple
- Nut: Bone, 42mm
- Adjustment: Headstock Adjustment
- Color: Vintage Tint
- Trademark: Grand
- Specification: 72*15*8CM
- HS Code: 9209920000
Neck Material: Canadian maple
Fingerboard Material: Canadian maple
Fingerboard Raidus: 9.5"
Frets: 21, jumbo frets
Nut: Bone,42mm
Tuner holes: 10mm, fit for die cast machine heads
Heel width: 56mm
Scale length: 648mm(25-1/2")
Adjustment: Headstock adjustment
Finish: High gloss
Color: Vintage tint
With skunk stripe
With a wrench for truss rod adjustment
|Neck Material
|Canadian Maple
|Fingerboard Material
|Canadian Maple
|Fingerboard Raidus
|21, jumbo frets
|Bone, 42mm
|Tuner holes
|10mm, fit for die cast machine heads
|Headstock adjustment
|High gloss
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