text:
Teen allegedly led gardai on chase which resulted in stolen car being driven into Liffey
A YOUTH, who allegedly led gardai on a high-speed chase which ended when a stolen car crashed through a wall and plunged into the Liffey, has been sent forward for trial.
The 17-year-old boy, who cannot be named because he is a minor, appeared at the Dublin Children's Court where he was served with a book of evidence by Garda Gerry Smith.
He is charged with burglary of a house at Weston Drive in Lucan in Dublin in the early hours of April 13 last. An additional connected charge was put to him on Thursday for criminal damage to a wall over the Liffey at Cellbridge village.
Judge John O'Connor warned the Dublin youth that if he intended to use an alibi in his defence he must notify the prosecution within 14 days.
He then made an order sending the boy forward for trial to the Dublin Circuit Criminal Court where he will face his next hearing on Oct. 14 next.
At an earlier stage, Judge O'Connor said the teen was lucky to be alive, and he held that the case was too serious to be dealt with in the juvenile court.
He ruled that the teen should be tried in the Circuit Court which has tougher sentencing powers. The boy, who was accompanied to the hearing by his mother and a family support worker, has not yet formally entered a plea.
An older youth is also before the courts in connection with the incident.
In an outline of the allegations, the juvenile court was told that the teen and a co-accused, who has faced separate proceedings, "fished" keys through a door at a house and stole a car from the driveway.
He was allegedly the driver of one stolen car while another youth was in a second vehicle. Following a pursuit the teenager allegedly crashed through a wall in Cellbridge and plunged into the Liffey.
He was followed in by another car driven by the alleged accomplice and both youths had to be rescued from the river.
Approximately €20,000 worth of damages were caused to the wall.
Pleading for jurisdiction to be accepted defence solicitor Gareth Noble asked the juvenile court to note that it happened at an unstable time for the boy who at one stage asked to be remanded in custody because of his then chaotic circumstances.
However, the judge refused jurisdiction.
A welfare report on the boy, who has not yet entered a plea, was also ordered by the court.


text:
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Vehicle: GMC Sierra
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Service Date: 05/05/2014
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This review was collected via phone interview by Customer Research Inc.

subset: commoncrawl


text:
The Berkshires Calendar for April 8
Norman Rockwell Museum: In Concert: Aimee Banks, 2 p.m., 14-year-old soprano from Galway, Ireland. Art Talk — "Norman Rockwell in Detail," 2:30 p.m. 9 Glendale Road, Route 183, Stockbridge.
Williams College: "REwind: a Cantata for Voice, Tape, and Testimony," art installation featuring music and text built around testimony from the Truth and Reconciliation Commission hearings that followed South Africa's transition from apartheid to democracy. On video monitors in Sawyer Library, Hollander Hall, WCMA, '62 Center, Schow, Davis Center, and Milne Public Library, each showing one clip. Screened continuously in Thompson Memorial Chapel on Main Street, through April 17. Williamstown.
Bingo: Every Friday, includes raffles, prizes, food, doors open at 5 p.m., games begin at 6:30 p.m., St. Mary's School, Orchard Street, Lee, 413-243-1079.
Meditation Group: Open to all faiths, sit in silence in the sanctuary to enjoy teachings and meditative practices, 9 to 9:30 a.m., Congregation Beth Israel, 53 Lois St., North Adams, 413-663-5830.
Mountain Road School: Open house. 9 to 11 a.m. Free; call ahead if possible 4575. Information: 518-794 8520 or firstname.lastname@example.com. County Route 9, New Lebanon/East Nassau, N.Y.
Northern Berkshire Community Coalition: Monthly forum, "The Landscape of Food Security in Northern Berkshire." 10 a.m. to noon. Bring a non-perishable food item for donation. Information: 413-663-7588 or e-mail firstname.lastname@example.com. First Baptist Church, North Adams (Use the Eagle Street entrance).
Pembury Bridge Club: ACBL-sponsored duplicate bridge, open game at 12:30 p.m., South Congregational Church, 110 South St., Pittsfield; Peter Samsel, 413-655-2416.
Pittsfield Sangha: "Buddhism & the 12 Steps," 5:30 to 6:30 p.m., by donation, George Crane Center, 81 Linden St., Pittsfield. Information: 413-358-2626.
Planetarium Show: Williams College astronomy students host free shows from the high-precision Zeiss Skymaster ZKP3/B opto-mechanical planetarium projector at 8 p.m., Milham Planetarium, Old Hopkins Observatory at Williams College, Williamstown. Reservations recommended: Michele Rech at 413-597-2188. Others admitted as space permits. Large groups should call for special appointments.
Spring Luncheons: Soup, sandwich, dessert and beverage. 11:30 a.m. to 1:15 p,m, Cost: $8. All welcome. Takeouts available, 413-499-0866. First United Methodist Church, 55 Fenn St. , Pittsfield.
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints: "Meet the Mormons," a 75-minute documentary. Italian buffet dinner at 6:30 p.m. Free; RSVP, 413-212-3355 or firstname.lastname@example.com. 470 E. New Lenox Road, Pittsfield.
Old Chatham Quaker Meetinghouse: Screening of "Peace Officer," followed by a community discussion. 6 p.m. potluck dinner, 7 p.m. screening. RSVP: bit.ly/ChathamPeaceO. Information: wmht.org/blogs/independent-lens/independent-lens-peace-officer. 539 County Route 13, Old Chatham, N.Y.
Health and Fitness
Berkshire Family YMCA — Northern Berkshire Branch: SilverSneakers Circuit. 7 to 8 a.m. Safe, heart-healthy and gentle on the joints. Must be at least 60 years old. Visit the Y at to receive two free passes to SilverSneakers classes. Information: 413-499-7650 x111. 22 Brickyard Court, North Adams.
Easy Exercise: Easy exercise class offered by Kim Conley, certified instructor, $5 donation, 9 to 10 a.m. at St. Ann Parish Center, Lenox.
Gentle Yoga: Yoga for Arthritis, Injuries and Anti-Aging. Instructor Sonya Boesse will lead classes that include centering, breath work, guided movement therapy, stretching, strengthening, balancing, meditation and deep relaxation. All ages and levels welcome. 10-11 a.m. at Sweetwood of Williamstown, 1611 Cold Spring Road, Williamstown, 413-458-8371.
Kids' Stuff
Adams Free Library: Interactive storytime featuring classic children's tales and new favorites. 10 a.m. For preschoolers and their caregivers. Songs, rhymes, stories, fingerplays and crafts. Free. Information: 413-743-8345, ext. 103. 92 Park St., Adams.
Adams Youth Center: Play & Learn Group for young children and their families. Art and movement activities, educational toys and themes. Circle time and snack. 10-11 a.m. East Street, Adams.
Berkshire Family YMCA: Kids' Night Out. 6-8:30 p.m. An evening of games, sports, pool time (bring a swimsuit) and pizza. Open to youth and teens, ages 7 to 14 years. Cost: $5. Financial assistance is available. Information: 413-499-7650 or at firstname.lastname@example.com. Berkshire Family YMCA's Northern Berkshire branch, 22 Brickyard Court, North Adams, and at the Pittsfield branch, 292 North St.
Berkshire Museum: "WeeMuse Adventures," songs, stories, scavenger hunts, play time for ages 18 months to 3 years, 11 to 11:30 a.m., free with museum admission, 39 South St., Pittsfield.
Berkshire South Regional Community Center: "Skip & Dip," program of CHP Family Services/S. Berk. Kids, 10 a.m. to noon, 15 Crissey Road, Great Barrington.
CHP Family Services/S. Berk. Kids: "English/Spanish Discussion Group," 8:15 to 9:15 a.m.; "Early Intervention Group," 9:30 to 10:30 a.m., sign-up required at 413-644-0104; "Art & Nature," 10:30 to 11:30 a.m., CHP Family Services Building, 442 Stockbridge Road, Great Barrington.
Lenox Library: Toddler story time for children ages 18 months to 3, program features stories, songs and fingerplays, 10:30 to 11 a.m., Youth Department, 18 Main St., Lenox. Information: 413-637-0197, Ext. 105.
Mason Library: Sing-a-long Playgroup, program of CHP Family Services/S. Berk. Kids, 10:30 to 11:30 a.m. After-School Legos (ages 7 and older), 3:45 to 4:45 p.m. 231 Main St., Great Barrington.
Ramsdell Library: Storytime for Tots (baby and toddler), 10:30 to 11:15 a.m. Information: 413-274-3738. 1087 Main St., Housatonic.
Hevreh of Southern Berkshire: Knosh & Knowledge — Norton Owen from Jacob's Pillow Dance Festival "New Beginnings at Jacob's Pillow." 10:45 a.m. Followed by lunch. Admission: $11, includes lunch; program only, $5. Advance reservations for required; 413-442-4360, ext. 10, or email email@example.com. 270 State Road, Great Barrington.
Sheffield Historical Society: Gary Leveille, "Streetcar to Sheffield: A Photographic History of the Berkshire Street Railway Trolley". 7:30 p.m. Free. Information: 413-229-2694, email@example.com or sheffieldhistory.org. Dewey Hall, 91 Main St., Sheffield.
Williams College: Douglas Hofstadter, professor of cognitive science at Indiana University, computer science colloquium, "A Tale of Luck and of Pluck: The Fortuitous Discovery, Forty-two Years Ago, of the Hofstadter Butterfly." 2:35 p.m. Free. Wege Auditorium. Jeff Nunokawa, English professor at Princeton University, "Art of the Essay" lecture series, 3 p.m.,free, Thompson Memorial Chapel. Williamstown.
New Lebanon Library: Sean Gaskell in concert. 6:30 p.m. Traditional songs and original compositions for the West African Kora. Information: 518-794-8844. 550 State Route 20, New Lebanon, N.Y.
Pittsfield High School: "Tusk, the Ultimate Fleetwood Mac Tribute." 7:30 p.m. Benefit to raise funds for the band trip to Quebec City, Canada. PHS Band will perform background orchestration with the Tusk musicians. Tickets: purplepass.com, Wood Bros. Music Store or 800-316-8559. Robert Boland Theater, Berkshire Community College, 1350 West St., Pittsfield.
Spectrum Playhouse: Karaoke Night. Sign up, 6:30 p.m.; show, 7 p.m. Free. 40 Main St., Suite 1, Lee.
Williams College: Handbell Choir, 4:30 p.m., Brooks-Rogers Recital Hall. Visiting Artist Series — Sierra Leone's Refugee All Stars, 8 p.m., free, Chapin Hall. 54 Chapin Hall Drive, Williamstown.
The Eagle calendar publicizes free or low-cost community-oriented events of broad public interest. These listings represent nonprofit or not-for-profit organizations and are printed as a public service. The calendar puts a priority on publishing one-day events. The deadline is seven days prior to the date of the event. Emailed entries (no attachments) are preferred to firstname.lastname@example.com; list the event name and date in the subject line. Questions: 413-496-6298, Monday through Friday, 8 to 12.
If you'd like to leave a comment (or a tip or a question) about this story with the editors, please email us. We also welcome letters to the editor for publication; you can do that by filling out our letters form and submitting it to the newsroom.


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Guides for fly fishing Nantahala River.
Western NC Fly Fishing Guides take you fishing on the Nantahala River. A guided trip is the best way of catching trout on the Nantahala if you are not familiar with the river and the flies the trout want.
The "Upper" Nantahala River runs through the Nantahala Gorge and is the tailwater to the Lake Nantahala and has a wonderful Delayed Harvest section from Old River Road to the first bridge by the Duke Power Plant. The Nantahala River below the power plant comes from the huge aqua duct (from Lake Nantahala) that can be seen behind the power plant. It is known for its fast and turbulent waters for kayakers and rafters, but it is also a wonderful fishery. The river can be fished before and after the release of the water by Duke Power which is approximately before 9-10 am and after 5 pm, though the schedule is quite flexible. Some anglers find places along the river during the big flow to fish. You would be fishing at your own risk, due to the heavy flow of water. The river is Hatchery Supported and there are some really big surprises.
The "Upper-upper" Nantahala River. From the upper end of the Delayed Harvest section of the Nantahala River (River Road at Wayah Road) to the Lake Nantahala Dam there are lots of fish in the Hatchery Supported section (April 1-Feb 29). This is fun summer time fishing adventure.
The "Lower" Nantahala River starts at the generator at Wayah Road and Hwy 19. This beautiful river known for white water rafting also happens to have lots of hungry trout. There are Hatchery Supported sections of this river that are quite accessible. Please note that Duke Power releases the mail flow for white water rafters without a streamed warning. Please check the schedule for the release, but maintain a cautious eye on the water level. Leave the river immediately at the sign of rising water. It is not a good idea to fish this water during full flow.
A wonderful part of the "Upper"*Nantahala are the waters above the power plant…..all year long, not just the Delayed Harvest times Oct-May. This river is surrounded by breathtaking beauty, including a 250 ft water falls. The fish tend to be a bit smaller the further upstream you go, but the whole experience is really big!
*Not to be confused with the Upper Nantahala River that originates above Standing Indian Park to Lake Nantahala.
By the way the river from below the Lake Nantahala along Old River Road to Wayah Road, is a fun place to fish. It is Hatchery Supported and can be fished from April 1 through the last day in February.
To book a trip call Tom Hopkins (828) 342 – 6480
Tuckasegee River Fly Fishing Guides, Guided Fly Fishing on the Tuckasegee River, Tuckasegee River fishing report, fishing guide Tuckasegee River


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from broadcast to digital, social to web, we build brand engagement.
Standing Apart: Broadcast
We use a wide range of online and traditional broadcast advertising and media planning tools to build brand awareness and drive product growth. From cable to network TV spots and radio, broadcast brings brand personalities to life.
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We craft messages that drive big results. By building the narrative of your brand, we utilize storytelling to set you apart.
Communicating a financial brand's personality and values to diverse audiences requires a skillful balance of writing, design, and persuasive tools.
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"Amy" — a business banking commercial for OnPoint Community Credit Union.
Today, Amy will make something. Because in her community, great things are happening, and she joins in.
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"don't feed the goat" — an in-theatre commercial for First Entertainment.
Curtis Armstrong demonstrates the value of banking with First Entertainment, in this spot that speaks directly to the entertainment community.


text:
Author | exchange4media News Service | Tuesday, Jul 24,2007 9:45 AM
India TV, the news and current affairs channel, has recently won a partial victory in an Internet domain case against a US-based firm. The case was adjudicated by Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul of the Delhi High Court. While the judgment protects the petitioner's case that India TV is a distinctive mark, at the same time it also allowed the US-based firm to use the domain name 'indiatvlive.com' with a disclaimer.
In its petition, India TV had alleged that the Internet domain, indiatvlive.com, used by India Broadcast Live (IBL), was similar to its trademark. India TV had also averred that the defendants were attempting to represent themselves as the plaintiff or representative of the plaintiff. India TV had alleged that the registration of the impugned domain name by the defendants constitute infringement, passing off and dilution of the plaintiff's trademark, besides unfair competition.
In an interim order delivered by Justice Kaul in January this year, IBL was restrained from using any domain name containing the words 'India TV', and also barred from transferring the rights to any other entity.
Significantly, in its judgment this month, the High Court has also restrained the defendants from proceeding against India TV in the suit it had filed in the district court in Arizona, USA. The court has also directed the US-based firm to file six-monthly statement of revenue earned from the impugned website in India.
While the HC has permitted the defendants to use the domain name, it also asked them to use a disclaimer to be placed prominently next to the logo of indiatvlive.com. The court said the disclaimer should read: "The website has no connection, affiliation or association whatsoever with India TV."
However, the court observed that the defendants had already shifted to another domain name, indiabroadcastlive.com. "Thus, the respondents have rectified the position," Justice Kaul said in his order, adding that in view of the aforesaid, it does not deem appropriate to proceed further with the petition.
The court observed that when the impugned domain name is typed, the person browsing is redirected to 'indiabroadcastlive.com', which is another domain name of the US-based firm. It also noted that a redirection notice appears which states that the website is not operational due to interim orders passed, and surfers are automatically redirected to indiabroadcastlive.com.
Welcoming the High Court's decision, IBL Inc., in a press statement, called it "a historic judgment as well as reaffirmation of people's faith in the fair judicial process". It also said that "the larger suit is still very much alive and will be decided in due course".
"Further, it may be noted that as of July 23, 2007, the domain registrar has lifted the 'domain lock' and restored full operations back to IBL in compliance of the court order of July 10," the statement said.
Programming HeadRadio Mango


text:
The Clubhouse Wath Brow Cleator Cumbria CA23 3EW View with Google Maps
This website is part of the Pitchero Rugby League network. Create your own free Rugby League club website with Pitchero.
© Pitch Hero Ltd 2008-2017
Pitch Hero Ltd Registered in ENGLAND | WF3 1DR | Company Number - 636 1033


text:
|Page (1) of 1 - 11/01/11
|email article
|print page
Mont. metals mine under closure order after deathWork suspended at Montana precious metals mine after fatality 1,200 feet beneath surface
Page: 1
Related Keywords:Montana Mining Accident, Personnel, Corporate news, Business, Materials, Industries, Corporate capital, Accidents, Accidents and disasters, General news
Source:Copyright 2011 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed.. All Rights Reserved


text:
|Publication number
|Publication type
|Application number
|Publication date
|Mar 25, 2003
|Filing date
|Jul 14, 1998
|Priority date
|Jul 15, 1997
|Fee status
|Publication number
|Thomas J. Wu
|Original Assignee
|The Board Of Trustees Of The Leland Stanford Junior University
|Export Citation
|BiBTeX, EndNote, RefMan
|Patent Citations (3), Non-Patent Citations (3), Referenced by (117), Classifications (20), Legal Events (6)
|External Links: USPTO, USPTO Assignment, Espacenet
This application claims priority on U.S. provisional patent application 60/052,575, filed Jul. 15, 1997, which is hereby incorporated by reference in its entirety.
This invention was made with Government support under contract DABT63-94-C-0055 awarded by the Advanced Research Projects Agency. The Government has certain rights in this invention.
The present invention relates generally to systems and methods for enabling a user using a host computer to securely log onto a server computer even in the presence of eavesdroppers and other forms of security attacks.
While there are many different password authentication protocols, they all solve the same problem: one party must somehow prove to another party that he knows a password p, which might have been set in advance. These protocols vary from the trivial to the incredibly complex, and many offer some form of protection from various attacks mounted by third parties.
Password protection has been the cornerstone of multiuser system security for decades. The advent of networking has given users convenient and transparent remote access to their systems. It has also created a whole new set of problems for people who use public networks to access these systems, because such networks are vulnerable to passive snooping and to some degree, active interference.
The present invention addresses these issues with a protocol that can be safely negotiated over an insecure network without compromising system security and which has several other useful properties not present in other commonly-used authentication protocols. Some of these properties make the present invention uniquely suitable for integration with existing system security applications.
All multiuser systems need some mechanism to identify which users are allowed to access the system and what privileges those users have. Nearly all such systems require that the user type in some sort of secret string, referred to as a password, that presumably is known only to that user. When the user identifies himself at login time, the system asks him for his password, and if he enters it correctly, the system gives him access to his account. This works fine when users are sitting at the console of the machine or at terminals connected directly to it, but networked systems are troublesome because even an inexperienced intruder can monitor the activity on a network fairly easily. Since most systems carry out the login and password exchange without encryption, anyone can "snoop" the network while someone logs in, capture their usemame and password as they are typed, and impersonate that user at a later time on that system.
Although networking has been commonplace for over a decade, most modem multiuser systems still do not employ any built-in form of encryption to prevent passwords from being snooped. Instead, there exist a variety of add-on products that attempt to address the security problems associated with networks. They offer varying degrees of protection from different kinds of potential attacks, but they generally require both users and administrators to take extra steps to achieve this security. Some of them require that the user maintain an entire list of passwords or keep key files on the client side for use by the authentication software.
The present invention relates to direct password authentication. Mechanisms that fall into this category of authentication cannot rely on persistent stored information stored on the client side. The user's password, which is a memorized quantity, is the only secret available to the client software. It is assumed that the network between the client and server is vulnerable to both eavesdropping and deliberate tampering. In addition, no trusted third party such as a key server or arbitrator can be used; only the original two parties can engage in the authentication protocol.
The present invention distinguishes itself from the rest of the field by offering features long thought to be unattainable simultaneously:
Secure against passive snooping. A passive attacker cannot obtain any information that would enable him to authenticate successfully to the server. This includes immunity to replay attacks.
End-to-end session encryption. An intruder cannot monitor a user's activities or "hijack" an authenticated session. In other words, any attempt to tamper with the network connection and to hijack an authenticated session will fail.
Forward secrecy and compromise containment. A captured password cannot be used to compromise past or currently encrypted sessions. A broken or compromised session key will not help an attacker deduce or even make guesses at the password.
Two-party operation. Neither a trusted third party nor a secure, central key server is needed.
Password-only client-side operation. Users do not need to maintain any files or keys on the client side. They only need to input their password to the client login program.
No secret information stored on the server. The password file stored on the server can be made public with little or no impact on system security. Very few secure protocols permit this, and those that do invariably fail to meet one or more of the other requirements.
The last two features taken together allow the protocol of the present invention to be used as a general-purpose remote and local authenticated login system, augmenting or even replacing the utilities now found on most operating systems.
For the rest of this document, computer login security will be described with reference to the following set of hypothetical characters and the computer system 100 shown in FIG. 1:
Steve operates the network's server 102.
Carol, a user sitting at a client machine/terminal 104, wishes to log in remotely to the server 102 belonging to Steve.
Since Steve knows Carol, he has given her some privileges that an ordinary (and potentially hostile) user on the system, like Henry, doesn't have.
Henry is also a user of the system who assesses the server using another client machine or terminal 106. However, Henry would like nothing more than to gain access to Carol's account, if for no better reason than to use all those fancy privileges and read Carol's e-mail.
Eve is an eavesdropper who has managed to install some packet sniffing software on her computer 108, which happens to be located on the network between Carol's client computer 104 and Steve's server 102.
Mallory works for a rival company and has a client computer 110 with direct access to the same network (and more resources). He can intercept, alter, and inject messages into the network at will, and he can make any of his messages appear to come from anywhere he chooses.
In other words, Carol's computer 104 is a client, and Steve's computer 102 is the server. Alice is another friendly party requiring parallel access to the system. Henry is a hostile user who already has access to the system but who seeks access to Carol's account. Eve is conducting passive (eavesdropping) attacks over the network, while Mallory is conducting active (malicious) attacks.
It is assumed that Henry, Eve, and Mallory are cooperating and can exchange information freely, while Steve and Carol might not be able to meet very often and do not have any other means of secure communication that cannot be compromised by Eve or Mallory.
The server computer 102 includes a central processing unit 120, memory 122 and a network interface (NIC) 124. The memory 122, which will typically include both random access memory (RAM) and non-volatile memory (e.g., disk storage), stores:
an operating system 126;
a server side password authentication procedure 128, used for verifying that user asking to log onto the server are who they claim to be;
a password file 130, which may be a publicly accessible file (i.e., readable by all users of the system 100) containing password information for each authorized users of the system;
client files 132, including programs and data belonging to the various authorized users of the server 102.
As will be described in more detail below, the password information in the password file 130 for each user may be the users public key, or the hash of the user's password, or some other value that can be used to verify a user's asserted password without revealing the password itself.
Carol's client computer 104 includes a central processing unit 140, memory 142, a network interface (NIC) 144, and a user interface 146 (e.g., including a display, keyboard, pointer device, and so on). The memory 142, which will typically include both random access memory (RAM) and non-volatile memory (e.g., disk storage), stores:
an operating system 150;
a client side login procedure 152, used for logging onto the server; and other programs and data not relevant to the present discussion.
As in the real world, Eve, Mallory, and Henry have quite a few options for compromising system security. Attacks can be classified based on the following categories:
Passive attacks are based on information that an intruder observes being exchanged between Carol and Steve. For this scenario, Eve will be mostly responsible for these attacks. Passive attacks are considered to be easy to carry out; anyone with access to any of the networks between Carol and Steve can monitor traffic with minimal difficulty, so it is important that a protocol not be susceptible to such attacks.
Active attacks involve some form of manipulation of the network between Carol and Steve. Examples include intercepting, substituting, or replaying packets, or forging entire messages that appear to come from one party. Mallory will carry out active attacks under this scenario. These attacks require much more effort to carry out and are generally considered less of a threat for a typical system. Nevertheless, there are some situations in which such an attack becomes feasible, so an authentication protocol should guard against them as well.
Off-line attacks are carried out in their entirety without directly involving Carol or Steve. For example, making a copy of Steve's password file and running a password-cracking program on it constitutes an off-line attack, since the attack does not require either Carol or Steve to be active while the attack takes place.
On-line attacks can only take place with at least one of the parties active. The obvious example would be for an intruder to attempt to log in to Steve's system repeatedly, guessing different passwords each time. All systems can be attacked this way, and it is assumed that the inefficiency of these attacks, coupled with the high possibility of detection given suitable precautions, makes them impractical.
External attacks are mounted by agents who are untrusted and unknown to Carol and Steve. They only have access to information that is advertised as "public." For the purposes of this document, any information that is sent over the public network between Carol and Steve will fall into this category. Either Eve or Mallory could execute an external attack.
Internal attacks can be carried out by someone who already has some kind of access to either end of the protocol. Examples might be other people who have access to the client or server hosts. Obviously, these are more difficult to prevent than external attacks. In our scenarios, only Henry has the access needed for an internal attack.
All of the known attacks fall into one or more of the above categories. Furthermore, some of the attacks discussed later can take advantage of a compromise of some other part of the system. Such conditions will be noted where applicable.
Many existing systems authenticate session participants by sending a password from the client to the server in cleartext or by encoding it with an easily reversible transform. This is highly insecure, as Eve could easily obtain Carol's password by eavesdropping.
"Challenge-response" systems provide slightly more security, by requiring the client to respond to a randomly-generated challenge from the server. These protocols, however, are universally subject to brute-force attack against the secret password. To fix this, the system must use some form of private key storage, like a smartcard, which loses the convenience benefits of a password-only system. Related systems like S/Key and Kerberos all suffer from this weakness. In addition, these systems store plaintext-equivalent information in the password file, making a compromise of the password file potentially disastrous.
The newest systems, up until now, have been "public-key-assisted" authentication schemes, like the Secure Shell (ssh) and the Secure Socket Layer (SSL). These protocols attempt to set up a secure channel between client and server, and use this channel to send the password to the server. While this resists passive attacks better than challenge-response protocols, the practice of encrypting before authentication is actually a subtle protocol design error. It allows active attacks such as the "man-in-the-middle" attack, allowing Mallory to intercept the password in some cases. This can be prevented by resorting to a public-key or certificate infrastructure, but is potentially expensive and difficult to maintain for a simple login method.
The Diffie-Heliman protocol, described in U.S. Pat. No. 4,200,770, is an unauthenticated key agreement protocol. While not specifically designed for login management, it is easily adapted for that purpose. In Diffie-Hellman, the two parties each generate a public/private key pair (e.g., Carol generates public/private key pair xp and xs, and Steve computes a public/private key pair yp an ys), typically selecting the private key randomly. The two parties exchange their public keys and then each generate an identical session key, S, as follows:
This is usually used as part of a public-key assisted system. Once both sides agree on the session key, a normal login session is performed with all communications being encrypted using the session key as a symmetric encryption key, which protects the password and all other communications from eavesdroppers.
Like any public-key assisted protocol, however, Diffie-Hellman is not secure against active attacks like the "man-in-the-middle" attack, in which an interloper (e.g., Mallory) intercepts all communications between Steve and Carol, conducts a valid-looking session with each, and develops two session keys, one for each party. While Carol and Steve think they are communicating securely with each other, Mallory is actually decrypting and re-encrypting all their communications, including any passwords.
Up until know, attempts at creating a secure, authenticated variant of Dfffie-Hellman have resulted in protocols that are still vulnerable to some form of active attack or that require a high-entropy shared secret. The present invention solves these problems and maintains the user-level convenience necessary to replace the standard login mechanism for most modem operating systems.
In summary, the present invention is a system and method for a server computer and a login procedure executed by a client host computer to establish a session key in a manner that is secure against both passive and active security attacks, and which utilizes the user's password so as to enable the server to determine whether or not the user in fact knows the password for the usemame account specified by the user during the login process.
Prior to a login session, the server computer stores a password verification value xp for each of a plurality of authorized users of the server computer. Each user generates a password verification value xp by applying a first one-way hashing function to a password p specified by the user to generate a secret value xs, and then applying a second one-way function to the secret value xs to generate xp.
When a client computer attempts to establish a login session between the server computer and client computer, the following steps are performed. The server computer receives a user identifier from the client computer, and retrieves the password verification value stored by the server for the user. The client computer generates a first secret value ws and then generates a corresponding first public value wp by applying the second one-way function to the first secret value ws. The client computer sends the first public value wp to the server computer.
The server computer generates a second secret value ys and then generates a corresponding second public value yp by applying the second one-way function to the second secret value ys. The server computer sends the second public value yp to the client computer. The server computer also generates a server session key K1 by applying a first predefined session key generation function to the first public value wp, the retrieved password verification value xp, and the second secret value ys.
The client computer regenerates the user's secret value xs, and then generates a client session key K2 by applying a second predefined session key generation function to the second public value yp, the first secret value ws, and the regenerated secret value xs.
Then the client and server computers exchange a set of messages so that each can verify that the other computer's session key is equal to its locally generated session key. The login session is established only if the server computer verifies that the server and client session keys match.
Additional objects and features of the invention will be more readily apparent from the following detailed description and appended claims when taken in conjunction with the drawings, in which:
FIG. 1 is a block diagram of a distributed computer system having a server computer and multiple client computers.
FIG. 2 is a flow chart of a preferred embodiment of a login and password authentication procedure in accordance with the present invention.
FIG. 3 is a flow chart of an procedure for a server to verify a client computer generated session key.
FIG. 4 is a flow chart of a preferred embodiment of an extension to the login and password authentication procedure of FIG. 2.
FIG. 5 is a flow chart of a second preferred embodiment of a login and password authentication procedure in accordance with the present invention.
The following is the basic set of requirements that is met by the present invention, along with reasons why each one should be considered an essential part of any client-server authentication system:
The protocol must be secure against passive snooping. Monitoring traffic on a public network is one of the easiest attacks an enemy can carry out. The enemy should not be able to deduce either the user's clear text password or in any way obtain information that would allow them access to the server. There are a variety of attacks that can be launched from snooped data; they will be discussed at length.
The protocol must encrypt the login session. Without session encryption, Eve could monitor Carol's keystrokes, and if Carol uses an unencrypted session to log into another host, her password on that host will be compromised. An unencrypted session also invites active, on-line attacks, such as altering input or hijacking sessions.
The protocol must not depend on trusted third parties or central servers. Centralizing authentication of a large number of services increases the amount of damage that can be caused by a security compromise. An additional party also increases the level of complexity involved in installing and maintaining an authentication system.
The protocol must maintain "forward secrecy." This means that a compromise of one part of the system must not lead directly to further compromises. For example, a stolen password must not allow an enemy to decrypt past or present encrypted sessions.
The protocol must not use any persistent storage on the client side. Passwords are inherently portable, since they are memorized by the user, while files are not. A system that requires Carol to have a copy of her personal key file on each client that she uses adds another level of complexity and inconvenience. It also introduces the possibility of internal attacks based on stolen key files. In contrast, a password-only system is easier to use because it does not require manual key-management. It also uses a secret that is less likely to be stolen and easier to change on a regular basis, which is essential for long-term security.
The protocol must not depend on having secure persistent storage on the server side. A secret database or password file is a potential risk no matter how carefully it is administered. Depending on the servers operating system to guard against internal attacks from users who already have system access is at best a dubious strategy and, as stated before, it makes user-level password verification and password-file distribution much more difficult to perform securely. A public password file removes this tempting target. Although the protocol can tolerate a publicly-readable password file, keeping this file private may have security benefits, such as the complete elimination of dictionary attacks from any adversary.
The protocol and any algorithms behind it must be publishable. The security of the protocol must not rest in the secrecy of its inner workings but in the passwords. Only protocols that satisfy this property have been considered in the writing of this document; secret-algorithm schemes for password authentication cannot be considered viable solutions for modem-day needs.
The preferred embodiment of the password authentication method or protocol of the present invention will be called the Secure Remote Password protocol, or SRP, for the remainder of this document.
The following notation will be used in the description of the SRP protocol:
The user's password
A random number used as the user's salt
One-way hash functions
The message M encrypted with key k
The same message decrypted with key k
A large prime number. All computations are performed
modulo N.
A number that generates a large multiplicative group
modulo N (often called a generator)
A private key derived from the password and salt
The host's password verifier. A distinct value of v is
stored in the server password file for each user.
Random scrambling parameter, publicly revealed.
ws, ys
Secret values, not known to the outside
wp, yp
Public values corresponding to the secret values
a, b
The concatenation of two strings, a and b
Session key
The number N is a "safe prime," which means that both N and (N−1)/2 are prime. It is recommended that N be sufficiently large to resist discrete-log computation attacks. To achieve a high level of security with respect to computational technology available in the year 1998, N is preferably a number whose binary representation has a length of at least 1024 bits (308 digits). The parameter "g" can be of any size, as long as it is a primitive root modulo N, and it is often set equal to 2 for improved performance.
All numbers are nonnegative integers. It is also noted that while the three one-way hash functions H1, H2 and H3 may be different hash functions, they could also all be same one-way hash function.
The server establishes values of N and g that it will use for all users. Alternatively, individual users might have their own N and g values.
To establish or set a password locally, Carol selects a random salt s and a password p and computes x and v as follows:
The use of a random salt, s, when generating x is optional, but is preferred because it helps to ensure that all passwords values in the password file are unique, even if two users select the identical password.
Carol sends Steve a copy of v, and her salt s, and Steve stores v and s as Carol's public password verifier and salt along with N and g. Carol preferably discards x immediately after generating v because retention of x in her client computer represents an unnecessary security risk, and because x can be easily regenerated by the client side login procedure each time Carol logs onto the server. This initial communication of Carol's password verifier v and salt s to Steve needs to be performed either in person or using any other mechanism by which Steve can be assured that v and s are actually Carol's password verifier and salt (and have not been provided by a possibly hostile third party).
The server (Steve) will reveal Carol's salt s each time Carol logs in, but her password verifier v is preferably kept secret. In the event that the server password file is compromised, the login procedure remains secure, but is more vulnerable to dictionary attacks than if the password verifiers are kept secret.
Referring to FIGS. 2, 3, and 4, the following is a step-by-step description of how SRP authenticates a remote login attempt by Carol:
1. Carol sends Steve her usemame, (e.g. carol) (step 200).
2. Steve looks up Carol's password entry and fetches her password verifier v, salt s, and the associated field parameters N and g. Steve sends N, g and s back to Carol (step 202).
A left arrow, as shown above will be used to indicate transmission from Steve to Carol, and a right arrow will be used to indicate transmissions from Carol to Steve.
3. Carol generates a random number ws, 1<ws<N, which she keeps secret, and sends Steve the corresponding public value wp (step 204):
4. Steve receives wp, generates a random number u, 1<u<N, and another random number ys, 1<ys<N, which he keeps secret, and computes a public value yp and an encryption key K1 (step 206) as follows:
Steve also verifies that wpvu≠�1 (step 208). If this is not true, Steve aborts the authentication attempt. A hostile client may try to guess the value of u (which should be impossible unless Steve is not generating u randomly or the client has information about Steve's random number generator that he shouldn't have) and send the server wp=�v−u mod N, which would result in the session key being K1=H2(�1) regardless of the value of ys. This would allow an imposter client posing as Carol to have his/her "password" authenticated without knowing her private key x.
5. Carol takes the values yp, her password p, and her salt s, and computes her private key x and encryption key K2 (step 212) as follows:
If Carol's password p matches the one she used to generate her password verifier v, then the session key, K2, she generates will match the session key, K1, generated by Steve.
6. To prove to the server that she has the correct session key, and thus that she is really Carol, Carol generates a predefined message M1 and sends it to Steve (step 214). In one embodiment, the message M1 is generated by hashing the concatenation of the two secret keys yp, wp and the session key K2:
7. Steve receives message string M1 and verifies that M1=H3 (yp, wp, K1) (step 216). If M1≠H3 (yp, wp, K1), the login session is aborted by Steve because either Carol has forgotten her password or the person communicating with the server is not really Carol.
8. If the value of M1 computed by Steve matches the value he received from Carol, he generates and a predefined message M2 and sends it to Carol to prove that he has the correct session key, and thus that he really is Steve (step 218). In one embodiment, the message M2 is generated by hashing the concatenation of secret key wp, message M1 received from Carol, and the session key K1:
9. Carol receives message string M2 and verifies that M2=H3 (wp, M1, K2) (step 220). If M2≠H3 (wp, M1, K2), the login session is aborted by Carol because either Steve has forgotten her password verifier or the person communicating with Carol is not really Steve. Otherwise (step 222) Carol proceeds with the remainder of the login session using K2 as the session encryption key.
To summarize, the purpose of the M1 and M2 message generating and verification steps 214, 216, 218 and 220 is for the server to verify that the client has computed the same session key as the server, which also authenticates the identity of the client, and for the client to authenticate the identity of the server.
The reason that the server generates and uses the parameter u in the SRP protocol, even though it is transmitted in the clear to the client, is as follows. Assume that an intruder has knowledge of the client's password verifier v and that he has somehow discovered the value of u as a result of a flaw in the sever's random number generator. Under these circumstances, the intruder can gain access to the server by starting the normal login procedure, pretending to be the client (Carol). At step 3 (step 204 in FIG. 2), the intruder computes the value A=wpv−u and sends it to the server instead of wp. The server responds by sending (v+gy s ) mod N back to the intruder (step 206, FIG. 2).
Then the intruder computes the session key K as
The reason the exponential parameter in this equation for K does not contain "+ux" in it is that value A sent by the intruder to the server at step 3 (step 204 of FIG. 2) eliminated the dependence of the session key from u and v. In other words, if the intruder knows the value of u when he sends his public key to the server at step 3, he can cause the session key to be independent of the actual client's password.
To prevent the intruder from being able to cancel out the client password from the computation of the session key, the server must not reveal the value of u until after he receives the user's public key wp. Since u is communicated publicly, it is possible to piggyback it on top of another public value, thus transmitting it implicitly. For example, both side could compute u as a simple function of yp, in which case the server must wait for the client (or alleged client) to send her public key wp before he sends by yp and reveals u. In either case, u=0 must be avoided because that also would make the session key independent of the client's password.
Referring to FIG. 3, another way for the server to verify that the client computer has generated the same session key as the server is for the server and client to exchange encrypted messages, each using the session key they have generated as the encryption key. More specifically, in this alternate embodiment, steps 5 through 9 (steps 212-220 in FIG. 2) are replaced with the following sequence of steps.
4A. Steve generates a random string r1, encrypts it with the server generated session key K1 to generate a message string M1, and sends Carol public value yp and message string M1 (step 210A):
5. The client session key generation step (212) remains unchanged. If Carol's password matches the one she used to generate xp, then K2=K1.
6A. Carol decrypts M1 with K2 (hopefully getting r1 back). She then hashes and re-encrypts the message to generate message string M2 and sends it back to Steve (step 214A).
7A. Steve receives message string M2 and verifies that DK
Referring to FIG. 4, as an optional safeguard Carol can also perform an authenticity check, sending Steve an encrypted nonce Ek
More specifically, Carol generates a random string r2 and sends it to the server, Steve (step 230).
Steve concatenates the random string r2 and the session key K1 which he previously generated, and hashes the resulting string with the H3( ) hash function to generate message string M2.
Steve then sends message string M2 to Carol (step 232).
Next, Carol verifies that the message string M2 sent by Steve is equal to H3(r2, K2) (step 234). If they match, then she proceeds with the login session, using K2 as the session encryption key (step 236).
It should be understood that the client side authentication steps 230, 232, 234, 236 only verify that the server has computed the same session key as the client (i.e., it confirms that the server knows the client's password verifier v and salt s). If the password file on Steve's server is publicly readable, these steps cannot authenticate that the party with whom Carol is communicating is actually Steve's server because it is possible for another party to impersonate Steve's server without Carol being able to detect that fact, at least during the login procedure. If the password file is protected from public access, then the client side authentication steps 230, 232, 234, 236 do establish the identity of the server.
Another way for the server to verify that the client has the same session key as the server, would be for the client to simply hash the client generated session key K2 with a hash function H3( ) and send it to the server, who would then compare that value with the hash of the server generated session key K1. While this alternate session key authentication technique is slightly simpler than the technique described above with reference to FIGS. 2 and 3, this technique cannot be used by both parties to verify the other's session key (because one party could simply send back the hashed session key he received from the other party). Thus, if both parties are to verify the other's session key, at least one of the two verification messages will need to be based on a combination of the session key and another (preferably randomly generated) value.
To change her password remotely, Carol would simply go through steps 1 through 9 to prove to Steve that she knew her old password. Then, the remaining steps would be:
10. Steve sends Carol the current set of parameters:
Note that these values may be different from the ones used to authenticate Carol originally.
11. Carol takes her new password, p′ and computes
12. Carol then combines the new public key v′ and the hash of v′ and encrypts it all with the session key K1. She sends this whole package to Steve:
13. Steve decrypts Mp with K1, extracts H(v′) and v′, and checks to see that v′ does indeed hash to the supplied value of H(v′). If so, he updates Carol's password entry with v′.
Executing Carol's side of the protocol requires knowledge of the secret value x, but executing Steve's side only requires knowledge of the potentially public value v. The SRP protocol can be strengthened by assigning a public/private key pair zs, zp to each host, where zs<N and
z p =g z s mod N
Steve generates zs, keeps it in a safe place, and publicizes the corresponding zp. When Carol logs into Steve's host, she obtains the value zp for that host, perhaps through some directory service or even by having it compiled into her client software. To compute the session key K1 in Step 4 (step 206 of FIG. 2), Steve now calculates:
while Carol changes the computation in Step 6 (step 212 of FIG. 2) to:
The remainder of the protocol is unchanged.
The main advantage of this variant is that mutual authentication can be achieved even when the password file is made public. The server need only secure the private value zs. However, the public value zp must now be made available to clients, which presents exactly the kind of problem that SRP was designed to avoid, namely that of client-side key and certificate management. In practice, mutual authentication can still be obtained by securing the password file containing the values of xp, so the main benefit of this variant would really be centralizing the server's secret information. The mutual authentication variant also will not work in its present form if different users are allowed to have different N and g parameter values.
This variant will not be considered further in this document.
The values ws and wp can be thought of as two halves of a client-generated salt, and ys and yp two halves of a server-generated salt. The asymmetry is in the handling of x and v, which are based on Carol's password.
Steve gets the "public" half v, while Carol keeps the "private" half x, only revealing it within the confines of volatile memory in her SRP login client software. Because of the way in which the three pairs of values are combined at either end, Steve doesn't need to know x, but he can pose a challenge using v that requires Carol to know x. From a mathematical standpoint, the two parties can agree on a key because
after substituting for wp, xp, and yp in the equations for K1 and K2. This holds true if and only if Carol provides the correct value of x on her side of the connection; she cannot construct the correct shared session key without it.
Upon determining the session key, Carol and Steve can destroy their copies of ws, x and ys in memory. Note that not even the hashed version of the password ever sees the network or any kind of persistent storage during the login process.
The password change mechanism is designed to protect the contents of the password change transaction from either accidental or malicious alteration. The combination of a hash and encryption makes it nearly impossible for an intruder to alter the new public password key without being detected by Steve.
While the main purpose of encrypting the password change is to ensure message integrity, it also has the side effect of hiding the new public password key from snoopers. More specifically, even if Eve knew Carol's current password, she could not obtain Carol's new password by decrypting the contents of the password change, since it only contains v′ and not x′ or p′ in any form.
The present invention (the preferred embodiment of which is described above) is based loosely on the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol, and preliminary cryptanalysis has shown that the security of the two methods are closely related. Specifically, the difficulty of conducting a dictionary attack against the present invention is known to be at least as hard as compromising one Diffie-Heliman exchange in the same multiplicative group.
Despite extensive public peer review of the present invention, no successful attacks, either passive or active, have been found against the full protocol, assuming that all conditions and precautions are properly observed. The novel approach of using a key exchange protocol directly to achieve authentication is partially responsible for the cryptographic strength of this method.
The standard Unix password scheme has survived for a long time despite its lack of security in a networked environment. It has done so primarily because it is simple, convenient, and easy-to-understand from a user's standpoint. System administrators like it because it is easy to set up and trivial to administer. While attempts have been made in the past to fix its obvious insecurities, they have always come at the expense of convenience. Understandably, the majority of vendors and administrators have been reluctant to adopt anything that would make a system more difficult to use.
Since SRP meets all seven of the requirements discussed above, it could potentially replace the standard Unix login system, raising the level of system security without sacrificing the external simplicity that users have come to expect.
The SRP protocol can be generalized as follows. The following notation will be used in the description of the generalized SRP protocol, herein called the Authenticated Key Exchange (or AKE) protocol:
w, x, y, z
Arbitrary parameters
A one-way hash function
Q(x,y), R(x,y)
"Mixing" functions
The session key generation function
Session keys
No assumptions are made about the domain, range or input/output types of the functions listed above, except that for all w, x, y and z
The above equation must be satisfied for AKE to work properly. However, by itself, this property guarantees nothing about the security of the AKE protocol.
To set things up for the AKE protocol, Carol and Steve select parameters x and z, respectively. These serve as the passwords in the protocol. Carol computes P(x) and gives it to Steve, and Steve computes P(z) and gives it to Carol. Carol and Steve are now ready to use AKE to exchange keys using the following steps.
These initial communications of Carol's and Steve's public keys P(x) and P(z) need to be performed either in person or using any other mechanism by which they can be assured that public values have actually been provided by the appropriate parties. Also, it is assumed that Carol and Steve durably store the other's public key value and remember their respective passwords (but preferably don't store the passwords on their respective computers). However, as noted below, the server's parameter z and public key P(z) can be replaced by fixed publicly available values, such as 0 and 1, eliminating one half of the public key exchange requirement.
After these initial preparations have been performed, subsequent login sessions can be conducted as follows (see FIG. 4):
1. Carol identifies herself to Steve (i.e., sends Steve her usemame), computes a random parameter w, computes P(w), and sends P(w) to Steve (step 250).
2. Steve computes a random parameter y, computes P(y), and sends P(y) to Carol (step 252).
3. Carol computes her session key (step 254)
Note that P(z) is the value previously sent by Steve to Carol before the login session, P(y) is the value sent by Steve to Carol at step 2, w is the random parameter computed by Carol at step 1, and x is Carol's password, which she is presumed to remember.
4. Steve computes his session key (step 256)
Note that P(x) is the value previously sent by Carol to Steve before the login session, P(w) is the value sent by Carol to Steve at step 1, y is the random parameter computed by Steve at step 2, and z is Steve's password, which he is presumed to remember.
At this point, Carol and Steve and performed the basic AKE protocol and have their respective session keys. If the values of x and z used to compute the session key correspond to the previously agreed-to values of P(x) and P(z), then K1 will be equal to K2.
To complete the authentication process, Carol and Steve can use any mutually agreeable method to verify that their keys match. The security of the resulting protocol is dependent on the choice of this method. In a preferred embodiment, the session key match verification steps for AKE are the same as those described above for the SRP method.
In the AKE protocol, x and z are the long-term secrets held by the two parties, while w and y are ephemeral parameters generated by each side to ensure that the session key varies from session to session. The security of AKE depends on the P( ), Q( ), R( ) and S( ) functions it uses. P( ) must be difficult to invert, and its output should reveal little or no information about its input. The same can be said for S( ); it should be chosen to especially protect its second argument from leakage. Additionally, it should be infeasible to reconstruct either K1 or K2 using only P(w), P(x), P(y) and P(z). No closed-form expression that does this should exist, and ideally we would like this to be as difficult as inverting P( ).
In a preferred embodiment, the server's secret password value z is set permanently to an arbitrary value, such as 0, and the servers public password value P(z) is permanently set to a corresponding value, such as 1. This eliminates the need for the server to securely store a secret value and also eliminates the need for the client computer to durably store any server key values.
The SRP protocol is one example of an implementation of the AKE protocol when (A) the server's secret password value z is set permanently to an arbitrary value, such as 0, and the server's public password value P(z) is permanently set to a corresponding value, such as 1, and (B) the following function substitutions are made:
where g is a generator value and N is a large prime number.
While the present invention has been described with reference to a few specific embodiments, the description is illustrative of the invention and is not to be construed as limiting the invention. Various modifications may occur to those skilled in the art without departing from the true spirit and scope of the invention as defined by the appended claims. For instance, the present invention (e.g., as explained above with respect to the AKE protocol) can be implemented using alternative mathematical groups, such as elliptic curves, to produce a secure authentication protocol.
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|Feb 2, 2006
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|Feb 9, 2006
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|Method and apparatus for remote management
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|Apr 20, 2006
|Wong Daniel M
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|Nov 19, 2009
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|Apple Inc.
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|Sureprep, Llc
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|May 28, 2008
|Thomson Licensing
|Method and a first device for associating the first device with a second device
|Nov 4, 2002
|May 22, 2003
|International Business Machines Corporation
|Methods, apparatus and computer programs performing a mutual challenge-response authentication protocol using operating system capabilities
|Nov 4, 2002
|Jan 8, 2004
|Methods, apparatus and computer programs performing a mutual challenge-response authentication protocol using operating system capabilities
|Feb 27, 2007
|Sep 7, 2007
|Authentication system for online financial transactions and user terminal for authentication of online financial transactions
|Oct 11, 2007
|May 29, 2008
|Thomson Licensing
|Method and a first device for associating the first device with a second device
|Oct 11, 2007
|Jul 24, 2008
|Thomson Licensing
|Method and a first device for associating the first device with a second device
|Dec 11, 2008
|Jun 18, 2009
|Sreg International Ab
|Login system
|Mar 11, 2016
|Sep 15, 2016
|Eyelock Llc
|Methods and systems for managing network activity using biometrics
|U.S. Classification
|713/151, 380/285, 709/200, 726/6, 709/228, 709/223, 380/227, 380/279, 709/224
|International Classification
|Cooperative Classification
|European Classification
|Jul 14, 1998
Owner name: BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE LELAND STANFORD JUNIOR UN
Free format text: ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST;ASSIGNOR:WU, THOMAS J.;REEL/FRAME:009330/0406
Effective date: 19980713
|Sep 22, 2006
|Fee payment
Year of fee payment: 4
|Sep 24, 2010
|Fee payment
Year of fee payment: 8
|Oct 31, 2014
|Maintenance fee reminder mailed
|Mar 25, 2015
|Lapse for failure to pay maintenance fees
|May 12, 2015
|Expired due to failure to pay maintenance fee
Effective date: 20150325


text:
मेरा airdroid site पर मेरे mobile का कैमरा काम नहीं कर रहा है। प्लीस Help me
Charlene, I can delete the email on the phone. I don't get any Airdroid message to delete on the phone though.
i have airdroid on my note 4 and my desktop.i need to transfer contacts file to laptop .how do I do this.step by step please?


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Tim Kroenert |
25 May 2011
The same week that Warwick Thornton sat down to write the screenplay for his 2009 masterpiece Samson and Delilah, fellow Indigenous filmmaker (and Thornton's wife) Beck Cole began work on her own film script. She broke from it during the ensuing years to work, among other things, on a documentary about Thornton's film, and on the acclaimed series First Australians. But Here I Am never left her completely. Five years on, the finished film will hit Australian screens next week.
The central character is Karen (Shai Pittman), a woman in her 20s who has just been released from a two-year stint in prison in Adelaide, and is determined to make a fresh start. This includes trying to find an honest job (no easy task for an Aboriginal ex-con) and attempting to reconnect with her toddler daughter. The young girl has been in the care of Karen's mother Lois (Marcia Langton), who is far from convinced that Karen has turned (or, indeed, is even capable of turning) over a new leaf.
Producer Kath Shelper has said that Here I Am may be the first film about Aboriginal women in a contemporary urban setting. Writer-director Cole agrees that she was keen to capture the particular experience of urban Aboriginal women. 'I grew up bouncing between Alice and Adelaide,' she says, 'and have always been keen to set a film in Adelaide. I don't speak an Aboriginal language. I live in Alice, but there's so many of us that don't live out in the regions. It's important to represent that.'
In the film, Karen derives emotional support from her fellow residents at an Aboriginal women's shelter in Port Adelaide. As filmmaker Cole cast mostly non-professional actors, based upon their natural suitability for certain roles, or as characters conceived especially with them in mind. (Vanessa Worrall, for example, who plays the shelter's manager, is a psychologist who served as an unofficial consultant on the script before being written into it.) This underscores the film's raw naturalism.
'We didn't do a lot of rehearsals,' says Cole. 'We did read-throughs and talked about the script, but that was it. I was attracted to the spontaneity of the performances. The women get the humour, they get the story without me having to bang on about it, because they've all lived it. None of the women ever asked, "What's my character here for? What did she do? What's her back-story?" They get it.'
Given that Thornton served as the film's cinematographer (he and Cole are frequent collaborators), comparisons between Here I Am and Samson and Delilah are perhaps inevitable. For the most part they will be favourable. The films do share a contemplative stillness that contrasts with the at times emotional chaos and the coarse beauty of the locations on screen. In Here I Am this reinforces the sense of Karen's inner strength, and her resolve to move into a better future from a dark past.
Like Samson and Delilalh, too, Here I Am avoids being explicitly political; its themes emerge not from sermons but from finely observed character studies. That said, Cole allowed herself one didactic moment. As the women bond over a covert bottle of booze, one of them quotes statistics that reveal the vastly disproportionate numbers of Aboriginal Australians caught in a 'revolving door' prison system. 'If there's one thing I want people to know,' says Cole, 'it's that.'
If the moment borders on preachy, it doesn't last long. Soon afterwards, the women turn up the radio and join in a tuneless but passionate chorus of Archie Roach's song about domestic violence, 'Walking Into Doors' (as in, 'She's sick and tired of ...'). 'No man's ever going to lay another fucking hand on me again!' one of the women sobs-shrieks as the song fades. The song is no mere anthem, but a hymn that evokes lived experience.
The film, too, is art that reflects reality. Pauline Whyman, who portrays Skinny, one of the residents, says Here I Am resonates powerfully with the experiences of the Aboriginal women who see it. 'They approach me and say "It's so real. I felt like I was in my own community and my own home." That to me is one of the greatest compliments. To know that we're representing other Aboriginal women.'
But the film is also universal; not an 'Aboriginal film', but a film for a wide audience that features Aboriginal characters. 'The urban setting makes it more accessible than some other interpretations of a story like this,' says Cole. She says she wanted to deal with the subject 'in a way that's not slit-your-wrists, boring and depressing'. Here I Am, then, is a hopeful story, in which forgiveness and redemption are attainable goals. 'Karen really wants to turn her life around for the better,' says Cole.
Tim Kroenert is Assistant Editor of Eureka Street. He is a contributor to Kidzone, Inside Film and The Big Issue, and his articles and reviews have appeared in Melbourne's The Age and Brisbane's Courier-Mail. Follow Tim on Twitter
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'Gran' from ABC1's Angry Boys is irreverent enough to be her charges' friend, authoritative enough to demand respect, compassionate enough to earn real affection. Australian comedian Chris Lilley differs from other satirists such as The Chaser. Their humour is often nasty. His is marked by warmth.
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Hatred against paedophiles and fantasies of violent retaliation are stoked by gossip around dining room tables. Snowtown portrays the evil that humans are capable of under mundane circumstances, and the devolution of morality when it is nourished by sick ideologies.
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A company pay slip is found in the pocket of a migrant who was killed in a terrorist bombing. A nosy journo notes the company's apparent failure to notice their employee's absence, and threatens to run a story about indifference and neglect. The human resources manager slips into damage-control mode.
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Follow the Panthers on Twitter: @ChapmanSports Chapman University Athletics is now on Twitter. In the continuing effort to make Chapman Athletics more accessible to... Full Story
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Panthers participate in San Diego Crew Classic The Chapman University women's crew team competed in the 38th Annual San Diego Crew Classic on Saturday and... Full Story
Varsity 8 team takes fifth place finish at Berg Cup over the weekend Battling choppy waters and a head wind for much of its race, the Chapman University women's crew team finished in... Full Story
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Doubles boat takes second in four-team event Chapman University's women's crew team got a big lift from its doubles boat on Sunday in a home event in the Newport... Full Story
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Baseball SCIAC Tournament Preview Fresh off a sweep of Occidental, the Panthers head into the SCIAC Tournament with confidence.
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2017 Chapman Baseball Preview The Panthers look to make their way back to the SCIAC Tournament and take the next step as they prepare for 2017.
2017 women's lacrosse season preview A young women's lacrosse team looks to continue the momentum from last year's NCAA Tournament berth.
First in 10 (February 10, 2017) The first spring edition of First in 10 recaps what happened with Chapman Athletics over the winter break.
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We have developed a simplified version of the side-pumped pulsed dye laser which has a spectral halfwidth of 1.25 GHz and a peak power of 10 kW at 600 nm. The basic laser consists of only four components (output mirror, dye cell, diffraction grating, and tuning mirror) and is exceptionally easy to align. Since the beam expander has been eliminated, the laser cavity can be made quite compact. Under the condition of reduced gain, the laser has been operated in a single mode.
© 1978 Optical Society of AmericaFull Article | PDF Article
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The Boss's Unconventional Assistant View_Series_▾
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Special to Page 2
I no longer need to hype this column. In a secret, yet-to-be-published poll of NFL coaches, my Top 10 NFL Facts column was tabbed as the No. 1 reading material for league coaches.
In fact, my sources in Dallas told me this week that Bill Parcells had to break up a fight between two of his assistants who were arguing over exactly what makes me the foremost authority on the NFL.
One coach was convinced my playing experience at Ball State gave me keen insight. The other coach contended my sources throughout the league feed me inside information.
Both are wrong. It's Madden '06.
Here's what you should think about as we head to Week 4:
10. The gap between the NFC and the AFC is closing.
Other alleged NFL experts will say it's too early to suggest that the NFC is gaining ground on the AFC. I'm not an "alleged" expert.
So far, the two conferences have split 12 games evenly. A year ago, the AFC dominated NFC competition, posting an impressive 44-20 record when the two conferences met on the field.
Why will things even out?
There are more average-to-good teams in the NFC than in the AFC. The top of the AFC -- New England, Pittsburgh and Indianapolis -- is still better than the top of the NFC. But if you take away the NFC's top three teams -- Atlanta, Tampa and Philly -- and the AFC's best, I'll take the rest of the NFC over the rest of the AFC.
9. The Raiders are the lone winless NFL squad with a chance to qualify for the playoffs.
At some point, Oakland head coach Norv Turner will figure out a way to generate an explosive offense out of Randy Moss and Jerry Porter. If he doesn't, Al Davis should waste little time before acknowledging the mistake of hiring Turner.
The Raiders are averaging 19 points per game. That's criminal when you have two receivers as big and as talented as Moss and Porter. Turner isn't making a big enough effort to get either receiver the football. That won't last forever. When Turner figures it out, the Raiders will start scoring 30 and will win nine games, which might be enough to win the AFC West.
8. Ben Roethlisberger is the reason Buffalo's offense stinks.
Stick with me on this one. Second-year quarterback J.P. Losman has no business starting in the NFL. Buffalo coach Mike Mularkey isn't stupid. He knows better than anyone that Losman isn't ready. But because Roethlisberger held the reins as a rookie while Pittsburgh's defense and Jerome Bettis won 15 regular-season games last season, Mularkey is convinced Losman can do the same thing.
He can't. The Bills would have a far better chance of sneaking into the playoffs with backup Kelly Holcomb running the offense. Last week, Losman couldn't take advantage of an injury-riddled Atlanta defense. Losman is an inaccurate passer and lacks poise in the pocket.
7. Blame Big Ben for Chicago, too.
With average play from the QB position, the Chicago Bears could've upset the overhyped Cincinnati Bengals. Instead of average QB play, the Bears are stuck with rookie Kyle Orton, who threw five interceptions last week.


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A sextant is an instrument used to measure the angle between any two visible objects. Its primary use is to determine the angle between a celestial object and the horizon which is known as the object's altitude. Using this measurement is known as sighting the object, shooting the object, or taking a sight and it is an essential part of celestial navigation. The angle, and the time when it was measured, can be used to calculate a position line on a nautical or aeronautical chart. Common uses of the sextant include sighting the sun at solar noon and sighting Polaris at night (in the Northern Hemisphere), to find one's latitude. Sighting the height of a landmark can give a measure of distance off and, held horizontally, a sextant can measure angles between objects for a position on a chart. A sextant can also be used to measure the lunar distance between the moon and another celestial object (e.g., star, planet) in order to determine Greenwich time which is important because it can then be used to determine the longitude.
The scale of a sextant has a length of ⅙ of a turn (60°); hence the sextant's name (sextāns, -antis is the Latin word for "one sixth"). An octant is a similar device with a shorter scale (⅛ turn, or 45°), where as a quintant (⅕ turn, or 72°) and a quadrant (¼ turn, or 90°) have longer scales.
Sir Isaac Newton (1643–1727) invented the principle of the doubly reflecting navigation instrument (a reflecting quadrant—see Octant (instrument)), but never published it. Two men independently developed the octant around 1730: John Hadley (1682–1744), an English mathematician, and Thomas Godfrey (1704–1749), a glazier in Philadelphia. John Bird made the first sextant in 1757. The octant and later the sextant, replaced the Davis quadrant as the main instrument for navigation.
We stock a range of metal and plastic Sextants from Celestaire, Freiberger and Davis to suit all budgets


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Question: Distinguish among results conclusions and recommendations
Distinguish among results, conclusions, and recommendations.
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Answer to relevant QuestionsWhy are philosophies important to decision makers? What is the marketing concept? What are the two sources of marketing problems? Think of what you may imagine as being an opportunity in the marketplace. Explain how Figure 3.2 would help you in conducting or not conducting marketing research. When should you acknowledge you have a limitation/s in your report? What are the components of the marketing research report?
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Author | Cassandra Serpes | Thursday, Nov 26,2009 8:08 AM
As in the case of most other language publications, Marathi publications, too, have a mixed bag of highs and lows as per the Indian Readership Survey (IRS) 2009 R2 data. Just four of the Top 10 Marathi dailies have shown growth. Lokmat, the highest read Marathi publication, is at No 1 position and has seen a growth of 4.64 per cent in average issue readership (AIR). At No 2 is Daily Sakal, which has seen a decline of 3.69 per cent in AIR. Pudhari at No 3 has seen a fairly good growth of 6.83 per cent in AIR, while Punya Nagari has registered a decline of 4.62 per cent. Tarun Bharat (Belgaum, Maharashtra and Goa) has also seen an 8.51 per cent decline.
Loksatta is placed at sixth position and has seen a decline of 8.30 per cent in AIR, while Maharashtra Times has seen a 5. 86 per cent drop. Deshonatti, on the other hand, has seen a 3.21 per cent growth, while Navakal at No 9, too, has seen a good growth in AIR of 14.93 per cent. Saamana, however, has registered a steep decline of 21.07 per cent.
Among Marathi magazines, three out of the four top magazines have shown growth, which is an encouraging sign. Girhashobhika, the No 1 Marathi magazine, has grown by 19.62 per cent. Saptahik Sakal has seen a growth of 11.40 per cent growth, while Chitralekha Marathi has seen a 17.14 per cent growth. Lokprabha is the only magazine among the Top five to have registered a drop in AIR of 1.64 per cent.
Programming HeadRadio Mango