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Frege s Subjects: First-Person Thoughts and Their Thinkers
- Gladys Laureen Davidson
- 2 years ago
- Views:
1 Frege s Subjects: First-Person Thoughts and Their Thinkers Everything is unimportant to us if we cannot communicate it to others. Kant (1789/1998: 55) 1. INTRODUCTION We each associate specific thoughts with uses of the first-person pronoun or inflexion. For instance, I might think the thought that I would like a cup of tea. And I might aim to express that thought by use of the sentence I would like a cup of tea. My hope would be that my audience would be able to understand my words and thereby gain access to what I think. So there is the thought that I associate with my use of I would like a cup of tea. And there is the thought that you associate with my use of that sentence. I ll refer to thoughts that are associated in these ways with uses of the first-person pronoun or inflexion as first-person thoughts. A central question about such thoughts is: Can they be shared so that, for example, your thinking can engage with my first-person thoughts? I shall present part of an argument that all first-person thoughts can be shared. Of course, that doesn t get us very far. The significance of the claim that firstperson thoughts are shareable is dependent on what it takes to think a firstperson thought and for what purposes it might matter whether such thinking can be shared. In this paper, I shall focus on three questions: (Q1) Are all firstperson thoughts accessible impersonally, so that there are no first-person thoughts with which only one person can engage and that others are unable, in principle, to access? (Q2) What are the requirements on the type of access to a thought that can suffice for understanding my use or for being aware of that which I think? Must you think the very thought that I express in order to gain access to that thought? If not, under what conditions will your thinking amount to your accessing the thought that I aim to express? (Q3) What is it for a thought that I think to be the same as a thought that you think? Must our thoughts correspond at the level of sense that is, must we correspond in the specific ways that we think of referents when we think those thoughts? If not, what are the appropriate standards for identity of the thoughts that are engaged on two or more occasions of thinking? There are other important questions in this area, including questions about the relevant properties of first-person language and its 1
2 uses and related questions about the epistemology of first- and third-personal access to thought. But (Q1) (Q3) are the questions that will occupy me here. My aim here is to make progress in addressing the three questions through reflection on a partly historical question: How should Frege have answered them? The question is partly historical, since a good answer must be tethered by Frege s most central commitments. But, for at least three reasons, it is only partly historical. The first reason is that, in the places where Frege explicitly addresses questions about first-person thought, his answers to our three questions are at best partial and equivocal. Indeed, as we ll see, Frege s views about first-person thought appear less settled than his views on other topics. Second, Frege appears to acknowledge that first-person thought differs in important respects from some other types of thought. So it s not a straightforward task to apply to the first-person case the results of Frege s more detailed and decisive discussions of other cases. Third and finally, our aim is to reach a sort of equilibrium position on first-person thought on the basis of Frege s work. Although that doesn t require provision of fully adequate answers to our three questions, it may yet involve radical departures from Frege s system. In particular, it may involve revisions to Frege s system that he would have been unable or unwilling to contemplate. 1 Here, in sketch form, are the answers to the three questions that I ll defend. (A1) Thought is impersonally accessible: there is no thought, and in particular no first-person thought, that is as a matter of principle accessible to only one thinker. A requirement on two thinkers being in a position genuinely to agree or disagree with a with respect to a thought is that they share access to the very same thought. From (A1), attaining that position is always possible, at least in principle. (A2) The most fundamental mode of access to thought is grasp a way of thinking thoughts, rather than thinking about them. Although there are other ways of accessing a thought for instance, by way of certain forms of thinking about the thought, rather than thinking the thought itself thought is impersonally accessible in the most fundamental way. For genuine agreement or disagreement with respect to a thought requires shared grasp of that thought. Thus, there is no thought, and in particular no first-person thought, that is as a matter of principle or by virtue of the nature of the thought thinkable by only one person. (A3) Thoughts are individuated in the same way as senses, so that two instances of thinking are instances of thinking the same thought just in case they involve the same way of thinking of the same reference. Thus, I shall argue that Frege should have said this: there is no specific way of thinking of a particular reference, and in particular no such way of thinking of oneself associated with the first-person pronoun or inflexion, that is as a matter of principle or by virtue of the nature of that thought available to only one person. As I said above, I shall here present only part of the argument for (A1) (A3). A complete argument in their favour would consist in a positive component in which it is argued that there are powerful Fregean reasons for requiring those answers and a defensive component in which it is argued that there are no 1 Compare Dummett, 1981: 83,
3 powerful Fregean reasons for resisting those answers. My main aim in this paper is to develop the positive component of the larger argument. I pursue the crucial defensive component in a sister paper. My presentation of the positive argument proceeds as follows. In section 2, I present five principles that I take to constitute fundamental components of Frege s account of thoughts and their explanatory roles. And I describe an apparent tension that arises between something that Frege writes about the first-person and the five principles. In section 3, I use the five Fregean principles as a background against which to present three broad lines of response to the apparent tension, each involving a specific revision to one of the five principles. A secondary aim of this discussion is to gain clarity about the specific form that the three main responses to the conflict can take, in light of the presentation of the Fregean principles in section 2. In section 4, I argue that neither of the two most plausible responses to the apparent tension that are considered in section 3 is acceptable. For neither of the two accounts is able to capture a central explanandum of Frege s account of thoughts: the possibility, with respect to any accessible thought, of genuine agreement and disagreement amongst thinkers. 2. BASIC FREGEAN PRINCIPLES Thoughts are the basic objects of attitudinal psychology: they are the things one is related to when one adopts various stances with respect to how things are in one s environment. For one putative example, where one believes that smoking is dangerous, one adopts the belief relation to the thought that smoking is dangerous. Attitudinal psychology is the domain of reason: a domain controlled by requirements on thinking on the adoption of attitudes to thoughts if it is to attain to truth. So the basic objects of attitudinal psychology, thoughts, are required to be bearers, or determinants, of truth-values and to stand in various relations of compatibility or incompatibility that depend on how things have to be in order for them to bear or determine one or another truth-value. 2 Central notions of attitudinal psychology, including correctness and incorrectness of attitudes, or agreement and disagreement amongst attitudes, apply derivatively on the basis of more fundamental properties of the thoughts on which the attitudes are directed. For instance, adopting the belief that smoking is dangerous is correct just in case the thought that smoking is dangerous is true. And you and I agree that smoking is dangerous just in case you and I both stand in the belief relation to the thought that smoking is dangerous. Since attitudinal psychology is, in the above sense, the domain of reason, its fundamental objects, thoughts, appear to be required to uniquely determine truth-values, or at least conditions on truth-values that are uniquely satisfied in any possible situation. 3 For otherwise, transitions amongst attitudes that perfectly satisfy demands applicable to the objects of those attitudes might come out of step with demands on truth, so demands on correctness of attitude. For 2 E.g. CP: E.g. CP: 159, 171,
4 instance, suppose that a given thought is true in one context of thinking, and false in another. Then one might retain an attitude of belief to that thought as one moved from the first context to the second. In that way one might move from correctness to incorrectness of belief despite one s thinking remaining the same from the perspective of one s relation to thought. And one might agree with someone, in bearing the same attitude to the same thought, despite that thought being true in one s context and false in the other s. In that way two thinkers might agree even though only one of them was correct in thinking what they did. To avoid the internal and external demands of reason coming apart in that way, it is required that thoughts determine truth-conditions. 4 Thoughts are required to uniquely determine truth-values (at least given the way things are). In order to meet that requirement, one might simply identify thoughts with truth-values or truth-conditions. However, Frege holds that it is possible rationally to adopt and withhold the same attitude to thoughts that determine the same truth-value or truth-condition. 5 For instance, one might adopt the attitude of belief to the thought that Hesperus twinkles, a thought that is true just in case Hesperus twinkles. Since Hesperus is the very same heavenly body as Phosphorus, what one thereby believes is true just in case Phosphorus twinkles. Nevertheless, Frege holds that one might yet fail to adopt the attitude of belief to the thought that Phosphorus twinkles. If the thought that Hesperus twinkles were the very same thought as the thought that Phosphorus twinkles then instancing that pattern of attitudes would appear to be impossible. It would appear to involve one s both standing in the belief relation, and also failing to stand in the belief relation, to a particular thought, something that is ruled out by the indiscernibility of identicals. 6 Perhaps in some cases something like the required pattern can be instanced. For it may be that, in some cases, one s attitudinal relations to thoughts are derivative from more basic relations between one s sub-components and those thoughts. In that case, one might count as adopting the belief relation to a thought by virtue of one of one s sub-components adopting the belief relation to a thought. And one might count as withholding belief in the same thought by virtue of another of one s sub-components not adopting the belief relation to that thought. That wouldn t be a way of one s both adopting and failing to adopt belief in the same thought. But it would be a close analogue. However, such cases are ruled out by the condition that it is possible rationally to instance the required pattern. In cases where one s attitudinal relations to thoughts are mediated by insulated sub-components the required division compromises one s 4 For a powerful development of this line of argument, see Evans 1979/ E.g. CP: 144 5, 158, 176 7, 241, PMC: 80, , Here and throughout I use truth-condition so that if two truth-condition bearers or determinants are true in all the same possible situations, then they have the same truth-conditions. (For present purposes, I needn t also commit to a necessary condition on sameness of truthcondition.) Thus, they are individuated in a way that is more coarse-grained than are the specifications of truth-condition to which Frege appeals in Gg: I m indebted here to the discussion in Salmon 1986: 57, 77, 80. 4
5 rationality. For as things stand, someone in such a case is not in a position to bring everything that they think into rational contact so as either to assess what they think for compatibility or incompatibility or to bring together what they think in chains of reasoning. And it would only be possible to attain such a position if it were possible to adopt the required pattern of attitudes in propria persona. Frege also exploits differences amongst thoughts that determine the same truth-conditions in order to explain how thinkers can take rationally conflicting attitudes towards thoughts that determine the same truth-conditions. For example, attitudes of endorsement conflict with attitudes of rejection so that one cannot rationally stand in a relation of endorsement and a relation of rejection to the same thing. Yet it appears possible rationally to endorse the thought that Hesperus twinkles while rejecting the thought that Phosphorus twinkles. In this case, treating the required pattern of attitudes as relations to a single thing is not immediately ruled out by the indiscernibility of identicals, since that principle leaves open the possibility that a thinker might bear two attitudinal relations to one thing. Rather, what rules out the possibility is the nature of the required relations: the attitude of endorsement and the attitude of rejection exclude one another, so that it is impossible for a thinker to adopt both attitudes to the same thing. 7 Again, it might be that a proxy for the required pattern can be implemented by appeal to psychological division, so that one of a thinker s subcomponents endorses, while another sub-component rejects, a single thing. But, again, such division would amount to a compromise of the thinker s rationality. A rational thinker can adopt the required pattern of rationally conflicting attitudes only if they are directed at different things, hence only if thoughts are not determined by their truth-conditions. Now Frege holds that these features of basic attitudinal psychology can be discerned in our treatment of the attitudinal psychology of knowledge and belief. However, nothing central in Frege s account depends essentially on his being correct about that. Perhaps knowledge and belief only approximate to the demands on basic attitudinal psychology for example, because belief is a relation either to something that doesn t determine truth-conditions or to something that is determined by truth-conditions. 8 In that case, some of the specific claims that Frege makes, both about belief and knowledge and about our talk about belief and knowledge, would be incorrect. But as long as there is a more basic form of attitudinal psychology that meets the twin demands imposed by Frege s account one that involves attitudinal relations to thoughts that determine, but are not determined by, truth-conditions the most basic 7 Frege puts the point as follows, in considering the options available to one engaged with the question whether p or not-p: This opposition or conflict is such that we automatically reject one limb as false when we accept the other as true, and conversely. The rejection of the one and the acceptance of the other are one and the same. (PW: 8) See also PW: For one such account, see Salmon
6 components of his account can stand. And it is hard to see how that could be denied. 9 Frege often characterizes the constituents of thoughts that are responsible for the possibility that they might differ despite determining the same truthconditions by appeal to his notion of sense. 10 Frege views senses as specific ways of thinking about truth-values and their referential determinants. 11 Thus, wherever it is possible for a rational subject to bear a relation to one thought, T1, while failing to bear the same relation to a thought, T2, T1 is a different thought from T2. Specifically, T1 differs with respect to its constituent senses from T2. That is, wherever such a pattern of attitudes is possible, the thinker must be thinking in different ways, either about the same or different truth-values or referential determinants of truth-values. As with thoughts and for the same reasons it is a requirement that, in general, senses determine the constituent references carried by the thoughts that they constitute, and thus the truthconditions of those thoughts. Since senses are individuated in the same way as thoughts, there is some temptation to identity thoughts with the organizations of senses that constitute them. However, it may also be possible to exploit the flexibility made available by a distinction between thoughts and their constituent senses in order to distribute labour in a slightly different way. For instance, one might hold that in certain special cases only thoughts determine truth-conditions, while their constituent senses are only partial determinants of those truthconditions. And one might hold that a particular thought might be constituted out of different senses, for instance if one held that thoughts are determined by truth-conditions, but also include one or another range of constituent senses that determine those truth-conditions. For present purposes we can set aside the latter possibilities. (We ll return to them below.) We are now in a position to state two basic Fregean principles: (I) Sense determines possible distributions of attitude. Necessarily, for all subjects S, times t, attitudes Φ, thoughts T1 Tn, and senses C1 Cn, D1...Dn, if it is 9 For a time, Russell attempted to deny that there is such a form of attitudinal psychology: for him, the possibility of adopting conflicting attitudes towards thoughts evinces divergences in the constituent referents of those thoughts. Since he seeks to allow for roughly the same range of possible conflicts as Frege, the result is a view on which the immediate subject-matter of our attitudes is individuated as finely as senses are on Frege s view so one form of a sense-data based view of the subject-matter of thought. See e.g. Russell 1912 and the useful discussions of Russell in McDowell 1984/1998: 233 and Taschek 1992: 777. Frege often presents arguments that reference and referenceconditions fail to determine thought or sense as defences of the possibility of sameness of reference in cases of conflicting or otherwise incompatible patterns of attitude towards thoughts. See e.g. CP: Important general defences of broadly Fregean attitudinal psychologies may be found in Burge 2005: 27 59, 2009, Dummett 1978, and Salmon E.g. CP: , PMC: Strictly, Frege classifies as senses only those thoughtcomponents that are expressed, or expressible, through the use of language. On Frege s view, however, that is not a restriction. See e.g. PW: E.g. CP: 157 9, Gg:
7 (II) possible that: S at time t bears attitude Φ to thought T1 with constituent senses <C1 Cn> and it is not the case that S at t bears Φ to T2 with constituent senses <D1 Dn>, then <C1 Cn> <D1 Dn>. 12 Thought determines sense. Necessarily, for all thoughts T1 Tn and constituent senses C1 Cn, D1 Dn, if the constituent senses associated with thought T1 are <C1 Cn> and the constituent senses associated with thought T2 are <D1 Dn>, then if T1 = T2 then <C1 Cn> = <D1 Dn>. Frege holds that our most basic form of access to, or engagement with, thoughts involves thinking the thoughts in a way that is both first-order and also non-committal with respect to their truth or falsity. He thinks that one must engage in that way with thoughts in order to be in a position to adopt committal attitudes to them. He labels the basic form of first-order non-committal engagement with a thought grasp. 13 For certain purposes, it matters whether there is a non-committal form of engagement with thoughts and whether that form of engagement underwrites all other forms. For present purposes, however, we can remain neutral on both issues. For our purposes, the more important requirement on grasp is that it is a mode of first-order engagement with thoughts. On Frege s view, our attitudes are most fundamentally attitudes immediately to thoughts rather than, say, to representations of thoughts. Believing that smoking is dangerous differs from believing that it is believed that smoking is dangerous, or that Frege believes that smoking is dangerous, or even that one believes that smoking is dangerous. Believing that it is believed that smoking is dangerous is at least one order above believing that smoking is dangerous. Even so, it might be that believing that smoking is dangerous is at least one order above bearing a more fundamental attitude to the thought that smoking is dangerous. Frege holds that at the most fundamental level one bears attitudes immediately to thoughts, rather than to thoughts about thoughts, so that at the most fundamental level one s attitudinal relations are at first order. I shall depart from Frege in treating grasp as a generic mode of first-order engagement with thoughts, rather than as a distinct necessary condition on any such engagement. I ll therefore use grasp as a generic label for any form of first-order attitudinal relations to a thought. On that basis we can state a third Fregean principle (using access for the time being as a placeholder that will acquire content from the remaining principles): (III) Access to thoughts requires grasp. Necessarily, for any subject S and thought T, if S has access to T, then S grasps T. 12 See e.g. PMC: 80, 127, 153, I use angle brackets here and throughout to signal reference to constituent senses as structured in a particular way. As is well known, principles (I) and (II) appear inapplicable to basic logic principles, since it is plausible that such principles can be constituted from different thoughts or senses and yet failure to acknowledge the truth of such principles would appear to be indicative of a failure of rationality. 13 E.g. CP: 164, fn.10, 198, 355 6, 363, 368 9, 371, 374 5, 382, PW: 7, 137 9, 145, 211, 267, Gg: xxiv, PMC: 20, 67. 7
8 It is a basic presupposition of Frege s account that thoughts are objects of grasp. The most fundamental reason for this presupposition arises from the considerations driving his denial that thoughts are determined by truthconditions. We can begin by distinguishing first-order thoughts e.g. thoughts about environmental conditions not involving thoughts and second-order thoughts thoughts about thoughts. Now suppose that our relations to secondorder thoughts mediate our relations to first-order thoughts. In that case, we are required to hold that our relations to the second-order thoughts are immediate. For to hold that those relations are themselves mediated by relations to thirdorder thoughts threatens a regress. So at least at that level, our attitudinal relations are immediate and so are first-order, despite their being targeted on second-order thoughts. Ignoring the threat of regress though, the considerations that led to slicing thoughts more finely than truth-conditions require that at some order thoughts are sliced more finely than truth-conditions. But they require only that. So if our most basic engagement with first-order thoughts goes via immediate engagement with second-order thoughts, then one might respond to those considerations by holding that only second- (and higher-) order thoughts are fine-grained. That would enable one to hold that first-order thoughts are determined by their truth-conditions. For in that case something like the required pattern of attitudes could then be explained as one s being related to one second-order thought about a first-order thought, without being related to every second-order thought about that first-order thought. Of course, we might view such a situation as one in which what had appeared to be second-order thoughts are really first-order, since they are directed in the first instance on truthconditions, rather than on something of the same nature as themselves. But we would be powerless in the face of a more minimal, sceptical consequence. Absent the assumption that our most fundamental engagement with thoughts is at first order, we would be unable to derive any consequences concerning the individuation of first-order thoughts from reflection on possible patterns of attitude towards those first-order thoughts. We would thus lack reason to endorse principles (I) and (II) with respect to all thoughts. I take it then that it is a basic presupposition of Frege s account that our most fundamental mode of engagement with thoughts is first-order. The connection between sense and thought enforced by principle (II) enables us to state a fourth Fregean principle: (IV) Grasp of thought determines grasp of sense. Necessarily, for any subjects S1, S2, any thoughts T1, T2, and any constituent senses C1 Cn, D1 Dn, such that S1 grasps T1 by grasping <C1 Cn> and S2 grasps T2 by grasping <D1 Dn>, if T1 = T2, then <C1 Cn> = <D1 Dn>. Although Frege typically characterizes grasp as relating thinkers to thoughts, we noted above the possibility of adding flexibility to his system by exploiting a distinction between thoughts and their constituent senses. If we make use of that possibility, then we might distinguish grasp of thoughts from grasp of senses. In that way, we might allow that grasp of senses can constitute grasp of thoughts, because while both senses and thoughts determine truth-conditions, only 8
9 thoughts and not senses are determined by truth-conditions. (Compare the suggestion above concerning the upshot of a second-order account of grasp of first-order thoughts with a conception of first-order thoughts on which they are determined by truth-conditions.) Alternatively, we might allow that grasp of senses can constitute one form of access to thoughts, but cannot constitute grasp of those thoughts, since such mediated access would amount only to a form of second-order engagement with thoughts. However, Frege s basic account requires that grasp of a particular thought requires grasp of the particular range of senses determined by the thought (in accord with principle (II) above) so that principle (IV) is enforced. Frege held that thoughts are impersonal, so that one does not have to be any particular thinker in order to grasp them. By their nature, thoughts are available to be grasped by more than one thinker. 14 He had three main reasons for this. First, Frege held that the objectivity of truth required the objectivity of the fundamental bearers of truth, thoughts. And he held that objectivity required impersonal accessibility. 15 (More carefully, he held that objectivity of thought required that nothing in the nature of any thought exclude the possibility of its impersonal accessibility.) The first reason is related to the second. Second, Frege held that a fundamental role for thoughts is to mark points of possible agreement or disagreement amongst thinkers. Suppose that two thinkers bear attitudes that conflict only in the minimal sense that they cannot both be correct. For instance, suppose that one holds that Hesperus twinkles while the other denies that Phosphorus twinkles. Although the thoughts engaged by the two thinkers have the same truth-conditions, the thoughts differ at the level of sense. Because of that difference it is plausible that the thinkers are not in genuine disagreement: genuine disagreement is ruled out by an analogue of equivocation. In order to implement genuine disagreement it is plausible that the thinkers must adopt conflicting attitudes to the very same thoughts that is, by principle (II), thoughts constituted in the same way at the level of sense. If thoughts are to play the required role in implementing cases of agreement and disagreement, then it is plausible that they must be not only impersonally accessible but also possible objects of grasp by more than one thinker. 16 That doesn t rule out the possibility of thoughts that can only be grasped by one thinker. But it would mark a fundamental distinction in explanatory function between those thoughts that can be grasped by more than one thinker and those that can t. Moreover, one who invoked such thoughts would be required to show that the invocation was indispensable by appeal to some explanatory function other than marking points of possible agreement or disagreement. That is, they would be required to show, first, that some essential explanatory function is served by such elements and, second, that that function must be discharged by elements of the very same kind as those that discharge the more central function. I ll return to this issue and provide a more detailed discussion of the role of 14 E.g. PW: 7, 133, CP: 160, 162 fn.7, 198, 368, 371, 376, 382, Gg: xix, PMC: 67, E.g. PW: 138, CP: 368, Gg: xxiv. 16 E.g. PW: 133 4, CP: 198 9, 368 9, Gg: xix, PMC: 80. 9
10 grasp of thoughts in implementing agreement and disagreement below when we turn to consider views that assert the existence of elements at the level of sense that cannot be shared. The second reason provides the basis for the third. The third of Frege s reasons for requiring that thoughts be impersonal is this. It is a central feature of Frege s system that psychological attitudes are relational: they relate thinkers with thoughts. The question therefore arises why we should adopt such a relational conception of attitudes rather than a view on which attitudes are monadic properties of thinkers instances of which properties Frege classifies as ideas. The possibility of shared grasp can sponsor an argument in favour of the relational conception by way of a plausible inference to best explanation. For suppose that it is possible for two thinkers to disagree with respect to a particular thought. The simplest account of that possibility is that they stand in different and conflicting relations to the very same thought. By contrast, the monadic conception can make some sense of cases in which thinkers agree, since in those cases it will treat them as sharing a monadic property. 17 But it is bound to struggle with cases of disagreement, since such cases involve both difference in properties since the subjects of those properties disagree together with sameness in properties since the subjects do not just differ, but disagree. In order to cope with such cases, the monadic approach would be forced to make appeal to agreement with respect to shared properties of its basic range of monadic properties, so that thinkers who disagree instance different monadic properties while those properties themselves share a higher-order property. Since the structure of first and higher-order properties on such an account would ultimately have to correlate with the structure of the relational account, the relational account is favoured on grounds of simplicity. 18 However, in any case where the possibility of disagreement was ruled out due to 17 In fact, the issues here are delicate. Instancings of monadic properties cannot be shared. In order for two thinkers to share a monadic property to have the very same property it appears that they must both instance that property. But conceived in that way, their instancing the same property involves their each standing in instances of the instancing relation to that property. Hence, even agreement might require a minimal analogue of relational structure. 18 There are deeper reasons for favouring the relational account of disagreement and, indeed, agreement. For suppose that sameness of higher-order properties is required to implement either agreement or disagreement. And suppose that it is allowed that the required form of sameness of property would be undermined if the higher-level properties themselves differed in their higher-level properties. On those assumptions, it would be a necessary condition on agreement or disagreement that there were no such higher-level differences. And it is not clear how that could be ruled out in a natural and systematic way. By contrast, the analogue is ruled out on the relational view simply through the fact that a single object a thought is the locus of agreement or disagreement so that the indiscernibility of identicals rules out the possibility of disruptive higher-level differences. 10
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text:
Discussion in 'Off Topic' started by Blandt, Mar 16, 2011.
Well .. Anyone is using it ?
your complaints ?
Yes, but using 1.6.1...only complaint is the lack of themes/extensions compared to 1.5 but many of the newer 1.5 extensions work with 1.6 anyway.
I have 5, 1.5 websites mainly on hold because some of the extensions are not compactible. I'll use jUpgrade when it's time to merge from 1.5 to 1.6
i don't see any reason to upgrade from 1.5 to 1.6... yet.
Mine was a brand new install and I'm using Coop's addon here: http://xenforo.com/community/threads/joomla-bridge-using-jfusion.12674/
I did a brand new install starting with 1.6, I ended up reverting it to the last version of 1.5, as 1.6 & 1.6.1 still has significant issues, and then to make it worse, they are already saying 1.7 will be out within six months... so this is just a kick in the nuts IMHO for all Joomla users, especially developers, having to now try and keep up with constant architecture changes for their mods. It will kill the modding community IMHO.
The problem is these changes that makes the previous code useless. I migrated some of my websites from joomla to wordpress for that reason. Wordpress becomes more CMS friendly with every release and it's very easy with plugins to extend & add features. The beauty is that it's easy to upgrade, from themes to plugins. I began with joomla and vBulletin as forum software. Now, wordpress as CMS and xenforo as forum solution.
I don't know, I'm using extensions from 1.5 successfully on a 1.6.1 install, depends on how old the extension is.
I really wish they had held off 1.5 until they could make it forwards compatible for 1.6. Just to have the groundwork laid. Now, all of the plugins and themes that were rewritten for 1.5 must again be rewritten for 1.6. Then again 1.6 should really have been 2.0, as it's a big enough change to warrant the bump.
The admin panel underwent major changes. They finally got rid of Section->Category->Item and now allow hierarchical organization of your content. They decoupled menus from the old stilted architecture. But the big change was full usergroup permissions. Up until Joomla 1.6, you could not restrict certain plugins, certain pages, sections, categories, etc. to certain users. Either you were an Author, Editor, or Administrator for the entire site. We had to depend on fly-by-night outfits like JACLPlus to grant access to edit certain pages or categories to certain users.
The addition of ACL/Usergroups to Joomla 1.6 finally makes it viable for multi-user setups. It's really amazing how much ground Joomla gained considering it had such poor usergroup management. Joomla needed all these changes, but unsurprisingly, it's taking mod and theme developers off-guard. Styling Joomla is a breeze, but programming for it is still quite tricky.
to be clear...1.6 and that jfusion bridge are working fine?
That was addressed.
Which is why I asked Elizabeth to clarify. She claims to be running 1.6 and this bridge. See her posts.
It's not a claim, it's a fact. I am running it on two sites. WLSurgery Help and Secret City Designs
hehe a claim isn't an unproven fact or alleged fact, it is merely an assertion of a fact.
Anyway, by using 1.6 and this bridge...have you noticed any bugs or problems? I'd like to use 1.6 but am concerned about having to always explain to users that there are issues and "eventually", they will be resolved.
I did find errors though. On your first site, when I tried to register, recall a login or pw (anything using the front script) via Joomla on the front page, I got a 500 error message: http://www.wlsurgeryhelp.com/en/component/jfusion/
On your 2nd site, when trying to register via the front page, I got this error:
Fatal error: Call to undefined method JDatabaseMySQLi::Execute() in /home/etramsey/secretcitydesigns.com/administrator/components/com_jfusion/models/model.jfusion.php on line 1076
So...it would appear that while you may indeed have them installed, there are plenty of bugs with 1.6 and this bridge.
Well, then it's obvious we need to report said bugs. LOL
Indeed. But it would also seem obvious that this bridge isn't yet compatible with 1.6 and we should use 1.5 until it's been updated.
Well until you tested it, I didn't know that.
One thing you should consider here is that those sites are not yet complete but intended as working examples. Both sites are setup to use XenForo as the master software. In JFusion, the master software is used to register on the site. Joomla is set as a slave and has registration disabled.
What is actually needed on these sites is for the registration links to be updated so that you go through the XenForo registration process when you try to register via Joomla.
See my comment above, but as posted in the other topic on this bridge, there is no release of JFusion that is compatible with Joomla 1.6, only a version that I hacked to make it work as we needed installed on Liz's sites.
OK, so by editing the registration area in Joomla 1.6 so that it takes you to the XF registration instead, the hacked bridge will work (on 1.6)? Sorry if I'm asking what should be obvious, still new to the bridge thing.
And if that is the case...how do you edit the reg links in Joomla to have its registration forward to XF? Is it hardcoded?
Separate names with a comma.

subset: commoncrawl


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Stand Up To Wake Up, Simple As That » Yanko Design
Easy enough. Hear the alarm and transition to your feet to turn off the mat. While you're up, take a big, day-welcoming stretch. An interesting concept in the realm of zen alarm clocks, and simple to store just under your bed for when you're not trying to wake yourself up.
This might actually get me out of bed in the morning.Added 9 Years Ago from Yankodesign


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Automated monitoring with Pacemaker resource agents
Being There
When a cluster node fails, the Pacemaker high-availability tool launches the services on another node. A lesser known feature is Pacemaker's ability to put failed services back on their feet in the cluster manager.
Pacemaker [1] has developed into the undisputed, standard high-availability solution for Linux systems. If one of two nodes in a cluster fails, Pacemaker launches the failed services on the other cluster node. But if you only use Pacemaker for failover actions, you are missing one of its best features. Many administrators are unaware that Pacemaker can automatically put failed applications back on their feet.
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Kolab Now Integrates Collabora Online
Kolab Now subscribers now have access to Collabora Online.
Endless OS, a Distribution Without Internet
A new version of Endless OS has been released.
GitHub Announces Open Source Friday Program
They encourage people to take time out and work on open source projects on Friday.
System76 Announces Their Own Distro, Pop!_OS
Pop!_OS is based on Ubuntu and uses the Gnome stack.
Linus Torvalds Talks About His Motivation
He never tires of working on the Linux kernel.
Debian 9 Stretches Its Wings
The new release of Debian has a very strong focus on security.
Trojan Turns Raspberry Pi into a Cryptocurrency Mining Device
Two trojans in the wild are targeting Linux machines.
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The workstation comes with the latest Gnome desktop environment and support for many application build systems.
Raspberry Pi Foundation Merges with CoderDojo Foundation
The two foundations join forces to expand their efforts to reach young people.
Samba Security Hole Patched but Risk is Bigger
Millions of devices that use Samba Server are vulnerable to attacks.


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by Staff Writers
Washington (AFP) Dec 16, 2010
A top US general said Thursday it was unclear why an interceptor meant to knock out incoming ballistic missiles failed in a test for the second time in a row.
General James Cartwright, the military's second highest ranking officer, said he had no doubts that the country's missile defense system could fend off potential threats, despite Wednesday's failed test.
"I'm not the least bit concerned that we don't have a capability to defeat, should we need to, that rogue threat that the system's been designed against," Cartwright told reporters.
In the test on Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands, an interceptor rocket launched from a base in California failed to intercept its target, an intermediate-range ballistic missile, the Missile Defense Agency said.
Officials will carry out an "extensive investigation to determine the cause of the failure to intercept the target," the agency said in a statement.
A similar test carried on January 31 resulted in failure.
Cartwright said the latest test involved an "upgraded version" of an interceptor, but that older models currently deployed were reliable.
"We test in order to find out if something works," Cartwright said.
"The question now is, make sure we understand, was it two failures that were of the same ilk or was it two very different failures?" he said.
"We just don't know those answers yet."
Out of 15 tests of ground-based interceptors since 1999, seven have failed, according to the Missile Defense Agency.
"The next flight test will be determined after identification of the cause of the failure," the agency said.
Aerospace giant Boeing is the lead contractor for the missile defense program.
The ground-based defense system is meant to shield the United States from a potential ballistic missile attack, possibly from North Korea or Iran.
Related Links
Learn about missile defense at SpaceWar.com
Learn about nuclear weapons doctrine and defense at SpaceWar.com
All about missiles at SpaceWar.com
Learn about the Superpowers of the 21st Century at SpaceWar.com
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Obama: Rice Must Provide Answers About New Guidelines For Contractor Accountability
U.S. Senator Barack Obama (D-IL) today sent the following letter to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, asking her to further clarify the new guidelines she proposed for contractors operating in Iraq and Afghanistan. Obama called on Rice to clarify the legal framework the State Department intends to use to hold contractors accountable for their actions in Iraq and Afghanistan, and to provide more information on the rules of engagement contractors will employ.
Yesterday, Obama introduced legislation (S.2147) to increase accountability of American security contractors operating in war zones by subjecting the contractors to U.S. criminal law. Companion legislation offered by Representative David Price (D-NC) passed the House of Representatives by an overwhelming margin yesterday.
text of the letter is below:
Dear Secretary Rice:
I am writing to express my concern about the lack of accountability for contractors working with the Department of State, even under the new policies you are reportedly planning to implement to improve oversight of private security contractors working with diplomatic convoys.
Press reports indicate you have accepted recommendations from an internal commission that call for Diplomatic Security agents to accompany every convoy, the use of video cameras in security vehicles, audio recordings of communication between the U.S. Embassy and diplomatic convoys, and improved coordination between diplomatic convoys and the U.S. military. These new policies are positive developments that could indeed improve oversight of the activities of private security contractors working with the State Department.
Notwithstanding this important development, it appears the new guidelines you announced are deficient in at least two respects. I remain concerned that there will still be a dangerous lack of accountability for these contractors because it is not clear what, if any, legal framework you intend to employ to hold contractors responsible for their conduct. And it is also not readily apparent what rules of engagement you will require contractors to follow.
1. Will you clarify - either to me in writing or through your spokesperson to the public - the legal infrastructure the State Department will employ to hold contractors accountable under your new guidelines for such contracts?
2. And will you clarify - either to me in writing or through your spokesperson to the public - the rules of engagement that your new guidelines envision requiring State Department contractors to employ?
We need to ensure that the tens of thousands of security contractors in Iraq are subject to U.S. law to ensure that their activities are not jeopardizing our military's efforts to bring this war to a responsible end.
I look forward to your prompt responses to these questions. Thank you.
Barack Obama
United States Senator
Source: http://obama.senate.gov/press/071005-obama_rice_must/


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Beef Stock, Carrots, Potatoes, Tomato Puree (Water, Tomato Paste), Enriched Macaroni Product (Wheat Flour, Egg Whites, Niacin, Ferrous Sulfate, Thiamine Mononitrate, Riboflavin, Folic Acid), Celery, High Fructose Corn Syrup, Corn, Green Beans, Peas, Modified Food Starch, Contains Less than 2% of: Salt, Yeast Extract, Cabbage, Dehydrated Onions, Onions, Monosodium Glutamate, Celery Leaves, Hydrolyzed Yeast Protein, Flavoring, Beef Fat, Beef Flavor (Contains Beef Stock, Yeast Extract), Dehydrated Garlic, Paprika Extract, Hydrolyzed Soy Protein, Spice, Dextrose, Disodium Guanylate, Disodium Inosinate, Parsley, Caramel Color, Hydrolyzed Wheat Gluten, Curry (Spice, Turmeric).
1. Lift tab to rim. 2. Pull back slowly. Do not purchase if tab is lifted. Mix Soup + 1 Can Water: Microwave: Heat, covered, in microwavable bowl on High 2-1/2 to 3 minutes. Careful, leave in microwave 1 minute, then stir. Stove: Heat, stirring occasionally. Creamier Soup: Use 1 can milk. Caution: Metal edges are sharp. Recommend use by date on can end. Promptly refrigerate unused soup in separate container.
Always refer to the actual package for the most accurate information


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For those facing any life threatening illness, the stress and anxiety that comes along with it can be almost as challenging as the illness itself. From the onset of symptoms to a diagnosis and the need to choose treatment options, those individuals hoping to beat illnesses like cancer can face tough emotional uphill battles.
According to this latest Jack Bristol post, various facilities across the UK are now adopting a wellness plan first developed by the Penny Brohn Cancer Care Centre in Pill, just outside of Bristol. This no cost program is meant to compliment a patient's treatment plan and concentrates on introducing different relaxation techniques to help deal with a patient's stress. Also included is a healthy eating and exercise program.
Michael Connors, Head of Services, said:"The Living Well course offers an introduction to how a person with cancer can live as well as possible. It can help people take back some control of their own physical health, their spiritual and emotional wellbeing and even their financial situation.
"We know from feedback from people who've taken part in our Living Well courses that they're really making a difference. Participants have described the course as life-changing, uplifting and helping them to develop and maintain a positive outlook and our Open Day is a great way for people to learn more about these courses and all our other services."
The organisation runs various residential and non-residential courses which are free of charge and available to anyone over the age of 18 suffering from cancer.
Read more about the relaxation techniques in The Living Well course here.


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Adoption requests → Dragon's Crown Wiki
Username: Estebant
Wikia URL: http://dragons-crown.wikia.com
Current edit count: 190
How long I have edited there: 30 Days
Last admin to edit and when: ???
Other information: null
- Hi. Your contributions look good, but I see there is another active contributor, NekoSavior. Please leave a message for him about adopting the wikia and make sure he is ok with it. Keep editing yourself while you wait for his response. We will check back, but you can also leave a message on my wall if he responds before then. -- Wendy (talk) 02:24, March 21, 2014 (UTC)


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Review of Profile Analyzer
Page reviewed 2015-02-27
Recommendations:Publish posts more often.
Create more engaging posts.
Publish more photos.
Encourage your fans to ask more questions for you to answer.
Add a website.
Page Information
Pagename: Profile Analyzer [Visit]
Category: Community [Visit]
Username: Profile.analyzer
You have registered your username. Good!
Usernames allow you to easily promote your business, brand or organization's presence on Facebook with a short Page address.
Usernames allow you to easily promote your business, brand or organization's presence on Facebook with a short Page address.
Website: Not specified
You should add your website to your information for your visitors to easily navigate their way there and find out more information about you or your organization.
About: Information specified.
You have provided a presentation for your organization. This gives the visitor information about you and what to expect if they choose to follow you on Facebook.
Milestones: 0
Milestones are a great way of telling your company's story. You should add more milestones to highlight moments that you are proud of or want to emphasize.
Pages liked: 6
You should like more Pages and integrate with them.
Here are some Pages you like:
Name in the Heart
App page
How Much Are You Loved
App page
Good or Bad ?
App page
Here are some Pages you like:
Name in the Heart
App page
How Much Are You Loved
App page
Good or Bad ?
App page
Page Performance
Likes: 168,332
Wow, there are a lot of amazing things you can do with 168,332 likes.
Likes Growth: N/A
We couldn't calculate your Like Growth for the last month.
With that amount of likes you should be able to engage more of your followers.
Engagement Rate: 0.01%
The Engagement Rate is calculated by taking the total PTAT (people talking about this) and divide by the total number of likes. Our surveys has shown us that in order to reach success on Facebook you should have an engagement rate greater than 7%.
Posts by Pages
Posts per Week: 0.22
You should definitely publish posts more often. Your Facebook Page is almost dead.
Likes, Comments & Shares per post: 4
With that amount of likes, you should be able to activate more followers with your posts. Time to break your pattern and try something new. Try to post about a current and engaging event, post something funny or try Promoted Posts in order to boost your engagement.
Posts per type:
By having a good variety in your posts, your fans never get bored and they can always expect something new and exciting.
The variety in your posts is ok but we recommend that you post more photos.
The variety in your posts is ok but we recommend that you post more photos.
Timing: Perfect timing!
You publish the majority of your posts between 09 - 12 (GMT). At this time, your followers seem to be most active.
Length of posts: Between 100 and 500 characters.
The length does matter. The majority of your posts are between 100 and 500 characters long, which is appreciated by your followers!
Curiosity: A good amount of questions.
Asking your fans lots of questions? Of course you do - perfect!
Hashtags: Not using.
Create or be a part of big discussions on Facebook by using hashtags in your posts. This will expose your brand to relevant users that might find you interesting.
Comments:Something might have gone wrong when we imported Profile Analyzer's posts. Only one post could be retrieved which may be a result of you not publishing any more posts or that we are not allowed to obtain more from the Facebook Graph API.
Because of this, our analysis may not be correct.
Posts by others
Everyone can post to your timeline? Yes.
Posts by fans: No messages last month.
Facebook is an amazing network for dialogue with your clients and customers. You should encourage your fans to ask more questions.
Facebook is an amazing network for dialogue with your clients and customers. You should encourage your fans to ask more questions.
Like / Share
Share and make the world a better place. Please select which Social Network you would like to share your result to.
Page Comparison
Profile Analyzer
50Average in
|Pages in 'Community'
|*** بنات الفيس بوك ***
|100,000 Jobs Mission
|Profile Analyzer
|'t is altijd iets met de wijven
|See more statistics
Some nice links specially selected for you:
- 10 Powerful Tips to Increase Fan Engagement on Facebook
- 10 Easy Ways to Expand Your Facebook Reach and Improve Engagement
- Facebook Help Center: What are the most engaging types of posts?
- Facebook Help Center: How do I add contact information to my Facebook Page?
- Create a Facebook Campaign with Meltwater Connect
On Facebook, everyone's got something to say. But what does it all mean for you?
Read our new guide to modern media intelligence and find out how top social media managers spur engagement, measure results, and shape their company's brand voice in real time.


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Here Comes JohnnyFavorites [+]
Pay-Per-Minute Viewing
You can now enjoy this movie on your iPhone®, iPad®, or compatible Smart TV & Android devices.
Purchase Options
Pay-Per-MinutePurchase Minutes
Streaming Rentals
Available MP4 sizes:SD 480p (0.94 GB)
DRM-free downloads offer content that is not limited by standard Digital Rights Management (DRM) access technologies. These technologies allow hardware manufacturers, publishers, copyright holders and individuals to limit the usage of digital content.
When you purchase DRM-free downloadable content, that content is available for you to download on any computer and save to a disk whenever you like. You can also download to multiple computers. There is no timeframe associated with your purchase and the content will not expire.
Running Time: 61 minutes
Released: 01/2008
Studio Name: Alpha Blue Archives
Director: D.E. Senoj
Description: For this evening's entertainment, we showcase the tremendous shaft of the legendary John Holmes. "Here Comes Johnny" is a super showcase of Mr. Holmes stretching the holes of a bevy of hot young women!
7 Scenes from Here Comes Johnny
Here Comes Johnny: Scene 1 Free Preview
Sex Acts: Breast Play, Vaginal Sex, Oral Sex
Positions: Laying, Missionary, Standing
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Sex Acts: Vaginal Sex, Oral Sex, Masturbation, 3-Way, Blowjob
Positions: Cowgirl, Spoons position, Laying
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Sex Acts: Orgy, Vaginal Sex, Oral Sex
Positions: Missionary, Sitting, Standing
Settings: Living Room
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Positions: Doggy Style, Laying, Kneeling, Missionary
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Sex Acts: Vaginal Sex, Oral Sex, Masturbation
Positions: Cowgirl, Spoons position, Side Saddle, Laying, Missionary
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Sex Acts: Vaginal Sex, Oral Sex, 3-Way
Positions: Doggy Style, Laying, Cowgirl
Settings: Generic Room
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Sex Acts: Vaginal Sex, Oral Sex, Masturbation, Orgy
Positions: Doggy Style, Cowgirl, Reverse Cowgirl, Kneeling, Sitting, Laying, Missionary
Recommended Movies
AEBN Cams


text:
I just made a buttercream recipe i found here on cake central. It called for 2 sticks of butter and milk. I know that these ingrediants should be refrigerated but i've read so many people say that they dont refrigerate their buttercream. What to do?
0 replies
Quote by @%username% on %date%


text:
|Property type
|Minimum Stay
|7 nights
Quiet family friendly neighborhood. Comfortable 3 bedroom home close to beaches, golf, shopping and fishing. Relax in the screen porch after a day at the beach. Barbecue on the patio while children play ball or ride bikes on the child safe cul de sac. Golf at 1 of 5 Dennis Golf Courses. Great fishing in Nantucket Sound or Cape Cod Bay.
Favorite beaches include Haigus and Glendon Beaches a short mile away or full amenities at West Dennis beach, or take a brief ride to bayside beaches Corporation or Mayflower.
Short drive to Dennis Pines or Dennis Highlands courses in Dennis, Cranberry Valley or Harwichport Golf in Harwich or Bayberry Hills or Bass River Golf course in Yarmouth. For the mini golfer there are a variety of courses along Rte 28 in Dennis, Yarmouth and Harwich.
Marie's home was great! It was clean and everthing about it was perfect. We loved the backyard. Every afternoon we would relax out there and play ladder ball (which we brought with us). Marie provides so many amenities...beach chairs, boogie boards, games, books... We also loved that it was on a cul-de-sac. The kids loved riding their scooters and the neighboorhood kids joined them. The screened in porch was so nice to eat dinner in and the outdoor shower was great after a day at the beach. Marie was so nice and her home was lovely! Thank you again! We can't wait to go back next year!!!!
We just love this house. It is in a great location and has a lot of amenities. I would recommend this as a terrific vacation rental
Nice cottage in a quiet neighborhood has pretty much everything. Clean and neat. The central air and the washer/dryer are the plus-es. The cottage has a cookout grill and bikes. There are beaches near the cottage (a mile or two away) . Almost everyday I rode my bike on the road along the shores including West Dennis Beach ( nice view) and also rode on the Cape Cod Rail Trail which starts on Rte 134. Beautiful trail to ride on.
I love the screened porch. A great place to eat in. I enjoyed doing yoga in the porch.
The location is good. Close to beaches, Stop n Shop, gas station, Rte 6, Dunkin Donuts to name a few.
I would recommend this cottage.
We couldn't be happier with this rental property. We have been renting this same house for 6 years! Marie is wonderful with her communication and we look forward to our vacation every year. Marie provides beach chairs, bikes, games, books, coolers, etc which makes packing for a week a lot lighter:) Her house is absolutely beautiful and immaculate. The dead end street and big backyard are perfect for the kids! It is located close to Rte 28 and 134 and near many beautiful beaches. I highly recommend this house for your Cape Vacation!!!
Our vacation couldn't have been better! Marie is very personable and her house is well maintained and absolutely beautiful. My family feels very comfortable there and we look forward to it every year.
We had a great vacation. The property is very well kept, clean and neat. Recent AC and upgrades really made for a perfect stay. We have rented this house multiple years now and it is just perfect. In a culdesac quiet beautiful neighborhood. Strongly recommend!!
Located in the heart of Cape Cod near Nantucket sound beaches, boating and fishing areas. There are local shops, restaurants, theatre and golf courses nearby. This quiet cul de sac encourages leisurely walks, cycling, or shoot some hoop. Large back yard to play horseshoes or badminton. Relax after a fun day at the beach with a soothing outdoor shower, unwind in the screened porch or barbecue off the casual patio. The perfect beach retreat!
|Rate Period
|Weekend Night
|Monthly *
Summer 2017
Jun 17 2017 - Sep 15 2017
7 night minimum stay
Autumn 2017
Sep 17 2017 - Nov 30 2017
7 night minimum stay
My Standard Rate
7 night minimum stay
|Refundable damage deposit
Multi week discount $50.00 with online E-check only . Credit Card payments are available, however no discounts apply for Credit Card payments. $250 refundable security deposit collected with final payment. Vacation weekly rentals begin/end on Saturday
* Approximate monthly rate. Actual rate will depend on the days of the month you stay.