text:
Our Pastoral Discount Program is designed to offer partial tuition assistance to parents who are serving in Christian ministry.
In order to qualify for the discount, the student's parent must be a full time Pastor at a Christian Church, a minimum of 30 hours per week.
The student must attend Monte Vista full-time, have and maintain a minimum unweighted cumulative 2.5 GPA in core classes, and be in good standing in the school community.
The discount applies to tuition only and is based on availability.
Pastoral Discount Application 2017-2018


text:
Healthcare Providers and Services
Company Overview of Backebo Vård & Omsorg AB
Company Overview
Backebo Vård & Omsorg AB operates treatment and care facilities for dementia patients. The company is headquartered in Hörja, Sweden.
Byaliden 31
Hörja, 282 94
46 45 15 41 48
Key Executives for Backebo Vård & Omsorg AB
Backebo Vård & Omsorg AB does not have any Key Executives recorded.
Similar Private Companies By Industry
|Company Name
|AB Lödösehus
|Adviva AB
|Aesthetic Derma Pro
|Akademikliniken AB
|Aktiebolaget Zelda
Recent Private Companies Transactions
|No transactions available in the past 12 months.
The information and data displayed in this profile are created and managed by S&P Global Market Intelligence, a division of S&P Global. Bloomberg.com does not create or control the content. For inquiries, please contact S&P Global Market Intelligence directly by clicking here.
Most Searched Private Companies
|Company Name
|Geographic Region
|Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law
|United States
|NYC2012, Inc.
|United States
|The Advertising Council, Inc.
|United States
|Bertelsmann AG
|Rush University
|United States
Sponsored Financial Commentaries
Sponsored Links
Only a company representative may request an update for the company profile. Documentation will be required.
To contact Backebo Vård & Omsorg AB, please visit www.backeboab.se. Company data is provided by S&P Global Market Intelligence. Please use this form to report any data issues.
Our data partners will research the update request and update the information on this page if necessary. Research and follow-up could take several weeks. If you have questions, you can contact them at email@example.com.

subset: commoncrawl


text:
Free shipping Australia-wide*
1 of 3 images
Ships from Northampton, United Kingdom
+ free shipping
Free gift
International shipping
The pages used are slightly smaller than A5 and measure approximately 15.5 x 21.5cm (approximately 6 x 8.5 inches).
The frames are lightweight and contain no glass so you can feel the lovely old page. They stand up by themselves or hang flush to the wall, and look great on a bookshelf. I hunt down the books in local charity shops and second hand book dealers. Your framed print comes gift wrapped in a lovely old road map.
Country of origin:
This print will be dispatched from the UK, please allow up to 3 weeks for it to reach Australia Post.
This inspirational Shakespeare quote is perfect for your favourite dreamer.
"we are such stuff as dreams are made on"
The lovely old yellow book pages are framed in ethically sourced wood and gift wrapped in a beautiful old road map. The quotation is printed using a hand-drawn font made exclusively for Bookishly, and the original book pages make each one unique. Your page will be randomly picked from Shakespeare's Complete Works.
Free gift wrap
Ships from Northampton, United Kingdom.
This item will be dispatched within 1 business day. Shipping options available at checkout include:
* Delivery times may vary for regional areas.
I Like This Place Housewarming Quote - Frame...
by Bookishly
Greatest Adventure Travel Journal
Gift For Him Shakespeare beard Lover quote ...
We Are The Music Makers... Book Page Print
Teacher gift Einstein quote print
Literary gift print a room without books


text:
YouTube has a got a new web-based Video uploader. The new uploader is capable of uploading 10 files at a time. Each file can be of up to 1GB in size. This update was seen to be necessary as YouTube's competitors already have larger uploading limits.
Previously, the limit on web based uploader was that you were only able to upload files less than 10mb in size. Also the files were not allowed to be more than 10 minute long. It isn't still sure about this 10 minute limit has been raised or not in the new uploader.
The new uploader is still in beta stage and supports many video formats. The other alternative for uploading large video files were the desktop based video uploader's, which can be used an alternative to this.
Check Out Related Posts:


text: The effective tax rate was 32.4 percent and 34.0 percent for the first nine months of 2012 and 2011, respectively. The effective tax rate for the first nine months of 2012 was favorably impacted by changes to statutory tax rates enacted in certain jurisdictions and the resolution of certain issues with tax authorities.Acquisition On August 30, 2012, the Company acquired the plastic thermoformed food business of Rexam PLC. This business, with anticipated sales of approximately $100 million in 2012, provides thermoformed packaging solutions such as retortable bowls and barrier trays to the world's leading packaged food and ready-meal companies. Capital Stock and Dividends The Company repurchased an aggregate of 288,655 shares of its common stock at an average price per share of $40.80, for a total purchase price of $11.8 million, in the third quarter of 2012. On September 18, 2012, the Company paid a quarterly cash dividend in the amount of $0.12 per share to holders of record of common stock of the Company on September 4, 2012. This dividend payment aggregated $8.4 million. Outlook for 2012 The Company refined its estimate of adjusted net income per diluted share for the full year of 2012 in the range of $2.80 to $2.85 from the previous range of $2.80 to $2.90. This estimate compares to adjusted net income per diluted share of $2.63 for 2011. The Company is providing an estimate of adjusted net income per diluted share for the fourth quarter of 2012 in the range of $0.58 to $0.63. This estimate compares to adjusted net income per diluted share of $0.56 in the fourth quarter of 2011. Conference Call Silgan Holdings Inc. will hold a conference call to discuss the Company's results for the third quarter of 2012 at 11:00 a.m. eastern time on October 24, 2012. The toll free number for those in the U.S. and Canada is (888) 401-4691, and the number for international callers is (719) 325-2453. For those unable to listen to the live call, a taped rebroadcast will be available through November 7, 2012. To access the rebroadcast, U.S. and Canadian callers should dial (888) 203-1112, and international callers should dial (719) 457-0820. The pass code is 9647919.


text:
Professional Resume Writing
Whether you're in need of some help writing your first resume or your current version is not attracting the kind of job you want, I can help you pinpoint what's missing, and put your best foot forward on paper so you can get more calls to interview for a good job.
Training & Qualifications
I have over 5 years of first hand experience reviewing and critiquing resumes and providing job search and career advice. As a professional recruiter for a Large private staffing company, I know what HR managers look for when sifting through resumes.
Availability & Preferences
Evenings and weekends.
Reviews of Aziz
KJ received Help with Interview a brand new user: 15 mins from AzizOct 31, 2016
Colleen provided package of Snacks mailed to you for AzizSep 25, 2016
Kristen received session of Tips to Ice Skate or Rollerblade from AzizAug 27, 2016
Mike received session of Travel Tips for San Antonio, TX from AzizAug 26, 2016
Ryan received session of Professional Resume Writing from AzizAug 26, 2016
Kevin received session of Tips on Becoming Yelp Elite from AzizAug 24, 2016
Colleen received session of Travel Tips for San Antonio, TX from AzizAug 23, 2016
Zoey received session of Tips on Becoming Yelp Elite from AzizAug 21, 2016
Kelley provided package of Cards and glitter bombs. for AzizAug 19, 2016
About Aziz Mejia
I'm just another foodie, photography loving, resume rewriting, cinephile who loves picking up skills while going through life. I'm always looking for a good Spanish tutor, videographer, maid etc for o...ngoing services. show moreOpen to other proposals
Aziz Mejia is looking for:
- Children's Lessons
- Language Lessons
- Learning
- Meal Delivery
- Food
- Cleaning
- Massage
- Personal Training
- Photography


text:
New and returning customers : securely link to www.loccitane.co.il with your preferred social network and share one login for both!
Read more here >
Select Product:
This item is in your bag
Transforms into a cushioning mousse on skin. Purifies with Cade complex of Provençal essential oils.
To view all Cade products
Complete your routine with these products
Price for all :
Write a testimonial !
Your rating for the product (5=Great)


text:
Would Hotelling Kill the Electric Car?
- Elijah Craig
- 2 years ago
- Views:
1 Would Hotelling Kill the Electric Car? Ujjayant Chakravorty, a Andrew Leach, b, and Michel Moreaux c a Department of Economics and School of Business, University of Alberta Business Building, University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta, T6G 2R6, Canada b School of Business, University of Alberta (CIRANO, CABREE) 3-40K Business Building, University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta, T6G 2R6, Canada c Toulouse School of Economics (IDEI and LERNA) 21 allée de Brienne, Toulouse, France April, 2010 Abstract In this paper, we show that the potential for endogenous technological change in alternative energy sources may alter the behaviour of resource-owning firms. When technological progress in an alternative energy source can occur through learning-by-doing, resource owners face competing incentives to extract rents from the resource and to prevent expansion of the new technology. We show that in such a context, it is not necessarily the case that scarcity-driven higher traditional energy prices over time will induce alternative energy supply as resources are exhausted. Rather, we show that as we increase the learning potential in the substitute technology, lower equilibrium energy prices prevail and there may be increased resource extraction and greenhouse gas emissions. We show that the effectiveness and the incidence of emissions reduction policies may be altered by increased potential for technological change. Our results suggest that treating finite resource rents as endogenous consequences of both technological progress and policy changes will be important for the accurate assessment of climate change policy. Key words: Resource Extraction; Climate Change; Induced Innovation; Learning-by-doing. JEL classification: TBD Thanks to seminar participants at the University of British Columbia, the Heartland Resource and Environmental Economics Workshop, the CU Environmental and Resource Economics Workshop, the University of Wyoming, the University of Saskatchewan, and the University of Calgary. Corresponding author. address:
2 Would Hotelling Kill the Electric Car? April, 2010 Abstract In this paper, we show that the potential for endogenous technological change in alternative energy sources may alter the behaviour of resource-owning firms. When technological progress in an alternative energy source can occur through learning-by-doing, resource owners face competing incentives to extract rents from the resource and to prevent expansion of the new technology. We show that in such a context, it is not necessarily the case that scarcity-driven higher traditional energy prices over time will induce alternative energy supply as resources are exhausted. Rather, we show that as we increase the learning potential in the substitute technology, lower equilibrium energy prices prevail and there may be increased greenhouse gas emissions. We show that the effectiveness and the incidence of emissions reduction policies may be altered by increased potential for technological change. Our results suggest that treating finite resource rents as endogenous consequences of both technological progress and policy changes will be important for the accurate assessment of optimal responses to climate change. Key words: Resource Extraction; Climate Change; Induced Innovation; Learning-by-doing. JEL classification: TBD
3 1 Introduction The contention of the 2006 film Who killed the electric car is that, among other factors, strategic action on the part of the oil companies to maintain low fuel prices led to the devaluing of the electric car and led to its demise. 1 The scenario does not seem so far fetched as, in the midst of increasing oil prices in the Summer of 2008, Saudi Arabia called an emergency summit to address issues including the possibility that continued high oil prices would lead to increased uptake of alternative energy sources and lead to a permanent residual demand shift, or so-called demand-destruction. While oil prices have declined significantly since mid-2008, the view that alternative energy source may threaten the rents of finite resource owners remains. In late 2009, OPEC stated that, energy policies and behavioural changes are bound to have some impact on consumption and this will gradually feed into overall demand patterns. Our paper models a situation where resource oligopolists consider the future production from an alternative energy sector when determining the optimal supply from their finite resource. While it is often assumed that increasing resource prices driven by scarcity will lead to increased uptake of alternative energy sources which in turn will drive cost reductions in those sources, we show the opposite possibility. Our results suggest that where substitute energy sources have a high potential for learning-by-doing, this may induce higher rates of resource extraction and thus lower energy prices and less alternative 1 see Who killed the electric car?, Sony Pictures,
4 energy supply in spite of resource scarcity. Further, we show that both the effectiveness and price-incidence of environmental policies will be affected by increasing potential for learning-by-doing in alternative energy sources. Strategic responses to competition have been extensively explored in the context of renewable and non-renewable resource management. Crabbé and Long [1993] examine a situation where fishery owners react to the potential entry of poachers by catching more fish even though poachers are less efficient. Mason and Polasky [2002, 1994] find that the actions of a common-property monopolist facing the threat of entry may lead to extinction of the resource, while competition from the outset would not. Harris and Vickers [1995] examine a case where a finite resource owner takes into account the endogenous probability of their consumers developing an alternative source of energy. They find that uncertainty over the time before a backstop technology displaces the resource-owning monopolist from the market is analogous to an increase in the resource owner s discount rate, reducing the shadow value of resource stocks. Similarly, in Cairns and Long [1991], excessive rent-seeking by resource owners leads to diminished future rents as a result of regulation. Long and Sinn [1985] find that extraction paths are altered by the surprise imposition of tariffs which increase extraction cost, and that these effects are ambiguous in sign depending on the magnitude and growth rate of tariffs. Sinn [2008] finds that when policies are applied slowly on the demand-side, supply-side responses lead to lower energy prices today as owners extract rents before it s too late. 3
5 Each of the papers listed above describes changes in future values of resource stocks as a result of competition or policy changes. In our paper, we explore resource extraction responses in a model economy where resource owners face competition from a substitute which is an experience good. The substitute may initially be significantly higher in cost, but potential learning-by-doing implies that this cost disadvantage is affected by the actions of the resource owner. The extraction of rents, and the implied conservation of the resource stock, may be discouraged since higher energy prices encourage production by the emerging substitute. In fact, optimal inter-temporal pricing of the resource may lead to increased near-term exploitation of the resource and less quantity response to impending scarcity. Depending on market conditions, relative costs, and learning potentials, an equilibrium with learning may result in resources being extracted earlier such that greater potential for endogenous technological change may actually exacerbate the climate change problem. And so, while deployment of new technologies will be driven by energy prices, those energy prices are likely to be negatively related to the potential for technological change. The end result is intuitive: the better is the alternative energy source, the less likely are resource owners to encourage its deployment. Our results have important implications for the development of optimal climate policy. The premise that technological change in substitutes will be induced by higher traditional energy prices resulting from resource scarcity as well as by climate policy is common in the economics literature in papers such as Nordhaus [2002] and Popp [2004, 2006a]. In this paper, we argue that induced technological change may not be a magic bullet for climate 4
6 change mitigation and that strategic responses should be included when adapting models to include potential technological progress. For example, Nordhaus [2002] and Popp [2004] each assume that finite resource prices are invariant to endogenous changes in the cost of the emerging alternative energy technology. We provide strong evidence that equilibrium resource pricing functions are likely to be negatively related to the potential for future cost reduction as well as to the stringency of climate change policy. Ignoring this effect may lead to an over-estimate of policy-induced emissions reductions and/or an under-estimate of the optimal carbon tax. The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we develop the theoretical model of the economy, and in Section 3 we characterize the dynamic, competitive equilibrium implied by this model. In Section 4, we use numerical simulations to characterize the dynamic equilibrium with and without policy intervention to illustrate the role of dynamic market incentives. We also test the sensitivity of our results to market structure assumptions. Section 5 concludes. 2 The Model The model characterizes an economy which uses energy at decreasing returns to scale. Energy may be derived from two sources: fossil fuels or alternative energy. 2 Alternative 2 We opt for a model structure which is simplified relative to most Integrated Assessment Models (IAM s). In particular, we do not allow for climate change damages arising from emissions. These simplifications are not crucial since our purpose is not to provide predictions of the magnitude of climate change or to compute optimal climate change policy, but rather to provide meaning- 5
7 energy is an experience good, and so both its total and marginal production costs decline with cumulative production. The industrial organization of the energy sector is a dynamic oligopoly with n price-setting, resource extraction firms who each own an equal share of remaining fossil fuel resources and a price-taking alternative energy sector acting as a competitive fringe with m firms. Each of the firms in the economy act to maximize the net present value of revenues with perfect foresight. 2.1 Energy Demand The economy uses energy as an input to production. Energy, q, measured in million barrels of oil equivalent (MBOE) is paid its marginal revenue product in production. Denote the total revenue product of energy consumption by P(q), and the marginal revenue product of energy by p(q) = P(q) q > 0. Further, P(q) satisfies 2 P(q) q 2 < Resource Extraction An initial, known stock of a composite fossil fuel, X 0, measured in gigatons of carbon equivalent (GtC) units is owned and extracted by n 1 symmetric firms. 4 Denote by X i the resource stock owned by an individual firm and denote that firm s extraction in each ful comparative dynamics regarding energy supply and resource rents. As long as the private incentives to reduce pollution for the sake of preventing future climate change (notwithstanding incentives provided by policies) are negligible, then this assumption will not have significant leverage on our results. 3 This structure is analogous to that used in the integrated assessment literature where the marginal product of energy is the first derivative of a Cobb-Douglas production function. 4 Here and elsewhere, we omit time subscripts and adopt the following notation. We denote, for example, X t by X and X t+1 by X. 6
8 time period by f, so that: X i = X i f, (1) and by symmetry, aggregate resource stock, X, evolves as a function of aggregate extraction, F, as follows: X = X nf = X F. (2) The resource stock is subject to extraction and delivery costs which are constant in both the rate of extraction in each period and cumulative extraction, c X (f) = c X. Conversion parameter φ specifies the ratio of barrel of oil equivalent energy per ton of carbon emissions, such that φ nf is the energy content of fossil fuel supply. 2.3 Alternative Energy Supply An emissions-free substitute for fossil fuels is produced by an alternative energy sector comprised of m symmetric, price-taking, dynamically optimal firms acting as a competitive fringe. Alternative energy is an experience good, such that future costs decrease with cumulative production. Denote each firm s alternative energy supply by a, measured in MTOE, and let the marginal cost of production, given the level of cumulative production experience, A, be given by: C(A,a) = C f + C 0 A η + C s ma. (3) In (3), C f +C 0 is the value of the price-intercept before any learning-by-doing has occurred, while C f 0 represents the lower bound for the cost-intercept. The slope C s 0 represents 7
9 the rate at which marginal costs increase with current production levels, admitting the possibility of a merit-order of alternative energy supply. 5 Let the law of motion for experience be A = A + ma. We make the simplifying assumption that experience is perfectly transferable across firms in the alternative energy sector and is a public good, and so firms capture private gains from learning-by-doing but these are smaller than the total value of learning-by-doing to all firms in the sector if m > 1. 6 The aggregate marginal cost and that for each individual firm will be weakly increasing in production in any period (ma), and weakly decreasing in the level of accumulated experience (A). 7 We will not be able to solve the model as written since accumulated experience will be nonstationary. In order to solve the model, we re-write the alternative energy firms problem in terms of the intercept of the marginal cost function: Λ = C f + C 0 A η. (4) Conditional on initial value C 0, Λ can be expressed as a function of current Λ and current total production (a) as: Λ (Λ,a) = C f + C 0 ((Λ/C 0 ) ( 1/η) + ma) η. (5) 5 The inclusion of the multiplier m in the slope term ensures that the marginal cost of a particular aggregate quantity will be invariant to the number of symmetric firms. 6 We explore, in our results section, cases where all gains from learning-by-doing are internalized by firms in the sector as well as a case where m is sufficiently large that returns to experience are a pure externality. 7 We do not allow for experience depreciation, so that all experience accumulated remains relevant for all future time periods. Depreciation would be analogous to slower learning rates or a higher discount factor and would imply a lower future value of current alternative energy supply. 8
10 The alternative energy firm s problem is stationary since Λ is bounded from above by C 0 + C f and bounded from below by C f. We re-define an individual firm s marginal cost of alternative energy production as: c(λ,a) = Λ + C s ma. (6) 3 Equilibrium and numerical implementation We define optimal behaviour in each sector and solve for the stationary Markov-perfect equilibrium (SMPE) of this economy. The economic state S = {X, Λ} consists of the individual resource stocks owned by each of the n firms (X) and the cost of alternative energy production (Λ). Markov strategies f(x, Λ) and a(x, Λ) depend only on payoffrelevant information, and do not depend on time explicitly. 8 An SMPE is defined where f(x, Λ) is the best response of each of the n resource owners to the strategy a(x, Λ) of each of the m alternative energy firms and vice versa. 3.1 Optimal behaviour: Alternative energy sector Alternative energy firms are identical and act as price takers. Let f(x, Λ) represent the strategy of each fossil fuel firm and ā(x, Λ) represent the total supply from the (m 1) other alternative energy firms at each point in the state space, each taken as given. Each 8 We do not consider punishment strategies or other equilibria which treat non-payoff-relevant histories as part of the information set. Since there is no autonomous technological change or other time trends, calendar time is payoff-irrelevant. 9
11 alternative energy firm solves the following dynamic program: V (X, Λ) = max a p ( nφf(x, Λ) + ā(x, Λ) + a ) a a 0 c (Λ,ã)d +βv (X, Λ ) (7) subject to laws of motion for X in (2) and for Λ in (5) and a constraint of a 0. Omitting the non-negativity constraint and imposing symmetry which implies that ā(x, Λ) = m a(x, Λ), the SMPE strategy for each alternative energy firm, a(x, Λ), is the solution to: p ( ) c (Λ,a(X, Λ)) + β V (X, Λ ) Λ Λ a = 0. (8) The first-order condition in (8) equates the energy price to the marginal cost of alternative energy production net of the present value of the private future benefits of acquired experience, V (X,Λ ) Λ Λ a. In this term, the first multiplier captures the change in net present value of the firm for a change in the cost of supplying alternative energy, and will always be positive. The second multiplier is the change in Λ which occurs due to an increase in alternative energy supply today. If learning is not possible, V (X,Λ ) a = 0. In this case, the problem of the alternative energy firm is static, and is analogous to a backstop energy source. Where learning is possible, the second multiplier will be negative, as future costs decline in a and so V (X,Λ ) a < 0. In this case, the alternative energy firm will be willing to produce at a price below marginal production cost in order to acquire experience to reduce future costs. Equation 3 implies decreasing returns to experience and so this shadow value will be decreasing in A, therefore increasing in Λ. 10
12 3.2 Optimal behaviour: Resource extraction Each resource firm takes the extraction decisions of the other (n 1) resource firms as given. Let f represent the individual firm s decision variable and let f(x, Λ) represent the total supply of the other (n 1) resource owners (where n > 1), and let ma(x, Λ) represent the supply of alternative energy at a given point in the state space (the solution to (8)). Each resource-extraction firm solves the following dynamic program: W(X, Λ) = maxp ( φf + φ f(x, Λ) + m a(x, Λ) ) f c X f + βw(x, Λ ) (9) f subject to laws of motion for X in (2) and for Λ in (5), and with choice constraint X f 0. Since fossil fuel firms are symmetric and take the actions of their competitors as given, f(x, Λ) = nf(x, Λ). The SMPE strategy f(x, Λ) solves the first-order condition for the dynamic program in (9) given by: p ( ) f φf(x, Λ) + p( ) c X = β W(X, Λ ) X. (10) The first terms defining optimal resource extraction in (10) are standard for an oligopolist. 9 The firm equates the marginal revenue from further extraction with the sum of the extraction cost and the marginal future value of resources, W(X,Λ ). The marginal X future value of resources will be decreasing in the level of stock remaining and increasing in the cost of the alternative energy source, i.e. 2 W(X,Λ ) < 0 and 2 W(X,Λ ) X 2 X Λ > 0. While the resource extraction firms do not act as leaders, and so do not internalize the effect of 9 Shadow values for the stock and non-negativity constraints are omitted from (10) for clarity. 11
13 extraction on alternative energy supply, a(x,λ), the response of the alternative energy x sector affects resource extraction strategies. In equilibrium higher learning rates imply greater value of alternative energy supply, and any increase in supply lowers future alternative energy production costs and reduces the future value of resources. Similarly, a low-extraction decision by the firm would imply higher alternative energy production, more gain in experience, and less future resource value. 3.3 Characterizing the equilibrium The SMPE is characterized by stationary Markov strategies f (X, Λ) and a (X, Λ), which satisfy (7), (8), (9), and (10). This simultaneous solution to four differential equations does not admit an analytical solution and so it is not possible to rigourously prove existence or uniqueness. However, we can draw on both results in the literature and numerical approximations to characterize the equilibrium. Our model is analogous to the resource oligopoly in common property characterized by Salo and Tahvonen [2001], but the solution is complicated by the potential for learningby-doing. 10 Like Salo and Tahvonen, we test for the necessary properties of the dynamic programming problem numerically. Rather than approximating the policy functions as adopted by Salo and Tahvonen, we employ a modification of the value function iteration algorithm of Kelly and Kolstad [1999] and Leach [2007], which characterizes the simul- 10 When learning is not possible, (7), (8) become static conditions, since there is no impact of the choice variable, a, on the future cost of alternative energy. 12
14 taneous solution to each firm s dynamic program as the fixed point of a neural network approximation of the firm s value function over a discrete grid representing the state space. 11 The approximate value functions we derive conditional on the parameters defined in Section 3.4, are continuously differentiable over the state space (X, Λ) and the reaction functions intersect at a single locus. This yields a unique pair of f (X, Λ) and a (X, Λ) for each point (X, Λ) in the state space which constitutes the unique SMPE for our problem. 3.4 Parameterization The intent of the present study is to provide qualitatively-informative comparative dynamics, not to draw specific quantitative conclusions which would be sensitive to particular parameter values and functional forms. As a result, we have kept the model sufficiently simple so as to clarify the intuition behind the results. To illustrate the economic relevance of our conclusions, we use parameters and functional forms which are comparable to those used in Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs) of climate change in the economics literature. The complete set of parameters used in the model solution and simulation is provided in Table 1 in the Appendix. We discuss key assumptions made to parameterize the model below. Energy demand is assumed to be constant, and is described by a total revenue product 11 A complete characterization of the algorithm used is available in Leach [2007]. The only change to the algorithm is that approximations for the value function of each firm type are calculated at each iteration. 13
15 function given by Ωq θ, with Ω calibrated to match the total factor productivity, and labour and capital contributions in the first period of Nordhaus [2008]. The energy share of production is separated out by defining θ =.05. We make a strong assumption that the two energy sources are perfectly substitutable, so q = ma + nφf, where φ is the energy content (MTOE/GtC) of fossil fuels, set to 1.45 to match the approximate value of this ratio in International Energy Agency [2007]. There is extensive evidence in the literature suggesting that market power plays a role in fossil fuel pricing. Nordhaus [2008], from which our model is derived, includes a composite fossil fuel which is supplied at marginal extraction cost plus a markup, which captures transportation, distribution costs, and national energy taxes and is assumed to be constant over time. We assume that a portion of the difference between extraction costs and market prices is a result of the collection of oligopoly rents. Evidence, for example from Smith [2009] or Johansson et al. [2009], suggests that market power exercised by OPEC remains an important element in the global pricing of oil. Evidence also exists for market power in other energy commodities including electricity (see Joskow and Tirole [2000]), natural gas (see Hubbard and Weiner [1991]), coal (see Kolstad and Wolak [1983]), and gasoline (see Chakravorty et al. [2008] or Borenstein and Shepard [1996]). Nordhaus [2008] assumes an average markup of $350/ton of carbon (tc) for high income countries. In our benchmark model, we assume that finite resources as described by Nordhaus are owned by a symmetric oligopoly (n=3) which implies that one third of the Nordhaus markup is collected by resource owners in the form of oligopoly rents, with the remainder fixed 14
16 within extraction cost. These rents are endogenous, and so will be modified by the resource 12, 13 owners in response to competition or future market share loss. We model the alternative energy sector by assuming that a composite commodity is produced by price-taking firms. The production cost structure is intended to capture key stylized facts of alternative energy supply. First, the technology exists today to supply small quantities of energy at prices competitive with fossil-fuel-based energy. Second, the marginal cost of emissions-free energy would rise if we attempted to supply a greater portion of total consumption today; i.e. the merit order of supply is upward sloping. Third, as learning-by-doing occurs, costs will decrease and the market share held by emissionsfree energy sources will increase, ceteris paribus. Finally, while learning-by-doing will be important to reducing future costs within the sector, only part of these gains will be realized by the firms currently engaged in alternative energy production. Each of these are discussed in turn below. Our model posits an upward sloping marginal cost curve for emissions-free energy which is consistent with International Energy Agency [2005] and Energy Information Administration [2009] studies of production costs. An upward sloping supply curve at any point in time reflects a number of factors including different emissions-free energy sources, vin- 12 The total value of market power rents varies with the choice of n; for example (n=1) yields oligopoly rents of $230/tC, (n=2) yields rents of $175/tC, and (n=10) yields oligopoly rents of $30/tC. We address sensitivity to the choice of n in Section This assumption, combined with the other parameters of the model described above, implies a fixed extraction cost of $34/bbl ($193/toe), with a market price equivalent to $50/bbl in the first period of our benchmark simulation. 15
17 tage capital, and high-grading of generation sites. 14 The supply curve shifts downward as learning-by-doing occurs. We consider three learning scenarios. For our base case, we adopt a progress rate of 15%. Given historic progress data and estimates of future progress reported by McDonald and Schrattenholzer [2001] and Energy Information Administration [2009], we test 0% and 30% rates of progress for comparison. We base our production cost assumptions on Popp [2006b], Energy Information Administration [2009], and International Energy Agency [2005]. We set the initial value for Λ, the marginal cost of the first unit of alternative energy supply, such that our base case predictions are consistent with International Energy Agency [2007] data showing 55 Mtoe of energy supplied globally using wind, solar and geothermal out of a global total supply of 11,000 Mtoe. Popp assumes that a backstop technology exists which supplies energy inelastically, and tests costs assumptions for this technology of times the cost of fossil fuels, or $432 to $2100/toe. Energy Information Administration [2009] examines current technology and finds that the most expensive technology being employed for new electricity generation is solar photovoltaic at a levelized cost of $4845/toe - almost twice the cost considered by Popp. We assume that the slope of the supply curve of alternative energy is such that, if we were to supply all current energy consumption of more than 11 Gtoe with renewable sources, the marginal cost of that energy would be the mid-range of 14 For example, consider wind turbines where multiple technology vintages may be in use at any point in time, leading to an upward sloping merit-order of supply. Further, even if technology were to be the same in all turbines, better sites would generate at a lower average cost due to higher capacity factors, again implying an upward sloping supply curve. 16
18 the estimates considered by Popp at $1200/toe. The lower bound for emissions-free energy supply is important for our results since its magnitude relative to the extraction cost of fossil fuels will determine whether economic exhaustion of the fossil fuel resource may occur before physical exhaustion. Obviously, the limits to future learning-by-doing are speculative. We assume that as cumulative experience with emissions-free energy production tends to infinity, the price-intercept of marginal cost tends to zero, so C f = 0 in (6). However, the chosen value of C s = $36.4/toe 2 implies that once learning potential has been exhausted, the marginal cost of providing the amount of energy we use today would be $400/toe, or roughly the cost of the cheapest emissions-free energy available today. These assumptions imply that fossil fuel supply would not be completely displaced as our assumed extraction and delivery cost is $193/toe ($282/tC). As such, resource scarcity will always bind in the long run, although the time to exhaustion may be much longer. This implies that alternative energy substitution will not change cumulative emissions of GHG s but may extend the time period over which they occur. Since climate change damages are generally assumed to be emissions-pathdependent, the results remain relevant to the design of effective climate policies. Emissions-free energy firms take prices as given, but internalize the future benefit of cost reductions. We assume that the sector is made up of m = 10 small firms, each with an identical individual marginal cost curve such that the horizontal summation of the individual marginal cost curves yields the market merit order described above. For large 17
Oligopoly: How do firms behave when there are only a few competitors? These firms produce all or most of their industry s output.
Topic 8 Chapter 13 Oligopoly and Monopolistic Competition Econ 203 Topic 8 page 1 Oligopoly: How do firms behave when there are only a few competitors? These firms produce all or most of their industryMore information
IMPACT OF CALIFORNIA TRANSPORTATION POLICIES ON LONG TERM FUEL DIVERSIFICATION, FUEL PRODUCER MARKET POWER, AND MOTOR VEHICLE FUEL (GASOLINE AND DIESEL) PRICES James Fine, PhD, Senior Economist, EnvironmentalMore information
Week 7 - Game Theory and Industrial Organisation
Week 7 - Game Theory and Industrial Organisation The Cournot and Bertrand models are the two basic templates for models of oligopoly; industry structures with a small number of firms. There are a numberMore information
tariff versus quota Equivalence and its breakdown
Q000013 Bhagwati (1965) first demonstrated that if perfect competition prevails in all markets, a tariff and import quota are equivalent in the sense that an explicit tariff reproduces an import levelMore information
Universidad de Montevideo Macroeconomia II. The Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans Model
Universidad de Montevideo Macroeconomia II Danilo R. Trupkin Class Notes (very preliminar) The Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans Model 1 Introduction One shortcoming of the Solow model is that the saving rate is exogenousMore information
Endogenous Growth Theory
Chapter 3 Endogenous Growth Theory 3.1 One-Sector Endogenous Growth Models 3.2 Two-sector Endogenous Growth Model 3.3 Technological Change: Horizontal Innovations References: Aghion, P./ Howitt, P. (1992),More information
Online Supplementary Material
Online Supplementary Material The Supplementary Material includes 1. An alternative investment goal for fiscal capacity. 2. The relaxation of the monopoly assumption in favor of an oligopoly market. 3.More information
MULTIPLE CHOICE. Choose the one alternative that best completes the statement or answers the question.
Economics 103 Spring 2012: Multiple choice review questions for final exam. Exam will cover chapters on perfect competition, monopoly, monopolistic competition and oligopoly up to the Nash equilibriumMore information
. In this case the leakage effect of tax increases is mitigated because some of the reduction in disposable income would have otherwise been saved.
Chapter 4 Review Questions. Explain how an increase in government spending and an equal increase in lump sum taxes can generate an increase in equilibrium output. Under what conditions will a balancedMore information
Oligopoly and Strategic Pricing
R.E.Marks 1998 Oligopoly 1 R.E.Marks 1998 Oligopoly Oligopoly and Strategic Pricing In this section we consider how firms compete when there are few sellers an oligopolistic market (from the Greek). SmallMore information
Market Structure: Duopoly and Oligopoly
WSG10 7/7/03 4:24 PM Page 145 10 Market Structure: Duopoly and Oligopoly OVERVIEW An oligopoly is an industry comprising a few firms. A duopoly, which is a special case of oligopoly, is an industry consistingMore information
Unit 7. Firm behaviour and market structure: monopoly
Unit 7. Firm behaviour and market structure: monopoly Learning objectives: to identify and examine the sources of monopoly power; to understand the relationship between a monopolist s demand curve andMore information
Figure: Computing Monopoly Profit
Name: Date: 1. Most electric, gas, and water companies are examples of: A) unregulated monopolies. B) natural monopolies. C) restricted-input monopolies. D) sunk-cost monopolies. Use the following to answerMore information
ECON 312: Oligopolisitic Competition 1. Industrial Organization Oligopolistic Competition
ECON 312: Oligopolisitic Competition 1 Industrial Organization Oligopolistic Competition Both the monopoly and the perfectly competitive market structure has in common is that neither has to concern itselfMore information
Economics 165 Winter 2002 Problem Set #2
Economics 165 Winter 2002 Problem Set #2 Problem 1: Consider the monopolistic competition model. Say we are looking at sailboat producers. Each producer has fixed costs of 10 million and marginal costsMore information
CHAPTER 18 MARKETS WITH MARKET POWER Principles of Economics in Context (Goodwin et al.)
CHAPTER 18 MARKETS WITH MARKET POWER Principles of Economics in Context (Goodwin et al.) Chapter Summary Now that you understand the model of a perfectly competitive market, this chapter complicates theMore information
MULTIPLE CHOICE. Choose the one alternative that best completes the statement or answers the question.
MBA 640 Survey of Microeconomics Fall 2006, Quiz 6 Name MULTIPLE CHOICE. Choose the one alternative that best completes the statement or answers the question. 1) A monopoly is best defined as a firm thatMore information
Chapter 4 Technological Progress and Economic Growth
Chapter 4 Technological Progress and Economic Growth 4.1 Introduction Technical progress is defined as new, and better ways of doing things, and new techniques for using scarce resources more productively.More information
AS Economics Unit 1: Markets and Market Failure Syllabus, Key Terms & Charts
AS Economics Unit 1: Markets and Market Failure Syllabus, Key Terms & Charts 10.1 The Economic Problem The Nature and Purpose of Economic Activity The central purpose of economic activity is the productionMore information
ECON20310 LECTURE SYNOPSIS REAL BUSINESS CYCLE YUAN TIAN This synopsis is designed merely for keep a record of the materials covered in lectures. Please refer to your own lecture notes for all proofs.More information
Efficient Retail Pricing in Electricity and Natural Gas Markets
Efficient Retail Pricing in Electricity and Natural Gas Markets Steven L. Puller Department of Economics Texas A&M University and NBER Jeremy West Department of Economics Texas A&M University January 2013More information
CHAPTER 8 PROFIT MAXIMIZATION AND COMPETITIVE SUPPLY TEACHING NOTES This chapter begins by explaining what we mean by a competitive market and why it makes sense to assume that firms try to maximize profit.More information
Monopoly and Perfect Competition Compared
Monopoly and Perfect Competition Compared I. Definitions of Efficiency A. Technological efficiency occurs when: Given the output produced, the costs of production (recourses used) are minimized. or GivenMore information
Why do merchants accept payment cards?
Why do merchants accept payment cards? Julian Wright National University of Singapore Abstract This note explains why merchants accept expensive payment cards when merchants are Cournot competitors. TheMore information
Subsidies in oligopoly markets: a welfare comparison between symmetric and asymmetric costs
Subsidies in oligopoly markets: a welfare comparison between symmetric and asymmetric costs Stephen F. Hamilton and Rickard Sandin Oligopolistic industries generally produce less than is socially desirable.More information
11 PERFECT COMPETITION. Chapter. Competition
Chapter 11 PERFECT COMPETITION Competition Topic: Perfect Competition 1) Perfect competition is an industry with A) a few firms producing identical goods B) a few firms producing goods that differ somewhatMore information
Review of Basic Options Concepts and Terminology
Review of Basic Options Concepts and Terminology March 24, 2005 1 Introduction The purchase of an options contract gives the buyer the right to buy call options contract or sell put options contract someMore information
Lecture 3: The Theory of the Banking Firm and Banking Competition
Lecture 3: The Theory of the Banking Firm and Banking Competition This lecture focuses on the industrial organisation approach to the economics of banking, which considers how banks as firms react optimallyMore information
Summary of the Impact assessment for a 2030 climate and energy policy framework
Summary of the Impact assessment for a 2030 climate and energy policy framework Contents Overview a. Drivers of electricity prices b. Jobs and growth c. Trade d. Energy dependence A. Impact assessmentMore information
Some micro- and macro-economics of offshore wind*
Some micro- and macro-economics of offshore wind* EPSRC SUPERGEN Wind Energy Hub University of Strathclyde May 2016 Fraser of Allander Institute Energy Modelling Team Fraser of Allander Institute DepartmentMore information
4. Market Structures. Learning Objectives 4-63. Market Structures
1. Supply and Demand: Introduction 3 2. Supply and Demand: Consumer Demand 33 3. Supply and Demand: Company Analysis 43 4. Market Structures 63 5. Key Formulas 81 2014 Allen Resources, Inc. All rightsMore information
1. Supply and demand are the most important concepts in economics.
Page 1 1. Supply and demand are the most important concepts in economics. 2. Markets and Competition a. Market is a group of buyers and sellers of a particular good or service. P. 66. b. These individualsMore information
Learning Objectives. Chapter 6. Market Structures. Market Structures (cont.) The Two Extremes: Perfect Competition and Pure Monopoly
Chapter 6 The Two Extremes: Perfect Competition and Pure Monopoly Learning Objectives List the four characteristics of a perfectly competitive market. Describe how a perfect competitor makes the decisionMore information
Unraveling versus Unraveling: A Memo on Competitive Equilibriums and Trade in Insurance Markets
Unraveling versus Unraveling: A Memo on Competitive Equilibriums and Trade in Insurance Markets Nathaniel Hendren January, 2014 Abstract Both Akerlof (1970) and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) show thatMore information
A2 Micro Business Economics Diagrams
A2 Micro Business Economics Diagrams Advice on drawing diagrams in the exam The right size for a diagram is ½ of a side of A4 don t make them too small if needed, move onto a new side of paper rather thanMore information
Green Power Accounting Workshop: Concept Note For discussion during Green Power Accounting Workshop in Mexico City, May 13th 2011
Introduction As more companies and government organizations prepare greenhouse gas (GHG) inventories that reflect the emissions directly and indirectly associated with their operations, they increasinglyMore information
AP Microeconomics Chapter 12 Outline
I. Learning Objectives In this chapter students will learn: A. The significance of resource pricing. B. How the marginal revenue productivity of a resource relates to a firm s demand for that resource.More information
Oligopoly: Cournot/Bertrand/Stackelberg
Outline Alternative Market Models Wirtschaftswissenschaften Humboldt Universität zu Berlin March 5, 2006 Outline 1 Introduction Introduction Alternative Market Models 2 Game, Reaction Functions, SolutionMore information
A.2 The Prevalence of Transfer Pricing in International Trade
19. Transfer Prices A. The Transfer Price Problem A.1 What is a Transfer Price? 19.1 When there is a international transaction between say two divisions of a multinational enterprise that has establishmentsMore information
Chapter 12 Monopolistic Competition and Oligopoly
Chapter Monopolistic Competition and Oligopoly Review Questions. What are the characteristics of a monopolistically competitive market? What happens to the equilibrium price and quantity in such a marketMore information
Managerial Economics. 1 is the application of Economic theory to managerial practice.
Managerial Economics 1 is the application of Economic theory to managerial practice. 1. Economic Management 2. Managerial Economics 3. Economic Practice 4. Managerial Theory 2 Managerial Economics relatesMore information
Lecture 2. Marginal Functions, Average Functions, Elasticity, the Marginal Principle, and Constrained Optimization
Lecture 2. Marginal Functions, Average Functions, Elasticity, the Marginal Principle, and Constrained Optimization 2.1. Introduction Suppose that an economic relationship can be described by a real-valuedMore information
Oligopolistic models, because...
Overview Network models of spatial oligopoly with an application to deregulation of electricity generation By Benjamin F.Hobbs Operations Research, vol. 34 (3) 1986, 395-409 Heikki Lehtonen 25th FebruaryMore information
Current Accounts in Open Economies Obstfeld and Rogoff, Chapter 2
Current Accounts in Open Economies Obstfeld and Rogoff, Chapter 2 1 Consumption with many periods 1.1 Finite horizon of T Optimization problem maximize U t = u (c t ) + β (c t+1 ) + β 2 u (c t+2 ) +...More information
Economics II: Micro Fall 2009 Exercise session 5. Market with a sole supplier is Monopolistic.
Economics II: Micro Fall 009 Exercise session 5 VŠE 1 Review Optimal production: Independent of the level of market concentration, optimal level of production is where MR = MC. Monopoly: Market with aMore information
Two Papers on Internet Connectivity and Quality. Abstract
Two Papers on Internet Connectivity and Quality ROBERTO ROSON Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Università Ca Foscari di Venezia, Venice, Italy. Abstract I review two papers, addressing the issue ofMore information
Prices versus Exams as Strategic Instruments for Competing Universities
Prices versus Exams as Strategic Instruments for Competing Universities Elena Del Rey and Laura Romero October 004 Abstract In this paper we investigate the optimal choice of prices and/or exams by universitiesMore information
Pricing in a Competitive Market with a Common Network Resource
Pricing in a Competitive Market with a Common Network Resource Daniel McFadden Department of Economics, University of California, Berkeley April 8, 2002 I. This note is concerned with the economics ofMore information
Market Power and Efficiency in Card Payment Systems: A Comment on Rochet and Tirole
Market Power and Efficiency in Card Payment Systems: A Comment on Rochet and Tirole Luís M. B. Cabral New York University and CEPR November 2005 1 Introduction Beginning with their seminal 2002 paper,More information
Technical Change and the Commons
Technical Change and the Commons by Dale Squires U.S. National Marine Fisheries Service 8604 La Jolla Shores Drive La Jolla, California 92037 Tel 858-546-7113 Email firstname.lastname@example.com Niels VestergaardMore information
Economics I. Decision-making Firm in Imperfect Competition
Economics I Decision-making Firm in Imperfect Competition The aim of the first lecture is to explain and analyze the markets in imperfect competition and firm behavior in imperfectly competitive environment.More information
Inflation. Chapter 8. 8.1 Money Supply and Demand
Chapter 8 Inflation This chapter examines the causes and consequences of inflation. Sections 8.1 and 8.2 relate inflation to money supply and demand. Although the presentation differs somewhat from thatMore information
All these models were characterized by constant returns to scale technologies and perfectly competitive markets.
Economies of scale and international trade In the models discussed so far, differences in prices across countries (the source of gains from trade) were attributed to differences in resources/technology.More information
Chapter 8 Production Technology and Costs 8.1 Economic Costs and Economic Profit
Chapter 8 Production Technology and Costs 8.1 Economic Costs and Economic Profit 1) Accountants include costs as part of a firm's costs, while economists include costs. A) explicit; no explicit B) implicit;More information
CHAPTER 12 MARKETS WITH MARKET POWER Microeconomics in Context (Goodwin, et al.), 2 nd Edition
CHAPTER 12 MARKETS WITH MARKET POWER Microeconomics in Context (Goodwin, et al.), 2 nd Edition Chapter Summary Now that you understand the model of a perfectly competitive market, this chapter complicatesMore information
Mikroekonomia B by Mikolaj Czajkowski. MULTIPLE CHOICE. Choose the one alternative that best completes the statement or answers the question.
Mikroekonomia B by Mikolaj Czajkowski Test 12 - Oligopoly Name Group MULTIPLE CHOICE. Choose the one alternative that best completes the statement or answers the question. 1) The market structure in whichMore information
Pure Competition urely competitive markets are used as the benchmark to evaluate market
R. Larry Reynolds Pure Competition urely competitive markets are used as the benchmark to evaluate market P performance. It is generally believed that market structure influences the behavior and performanceMore information
UNIT 6 cont PRICING UNDER DIFFERENT MARKET STRUCTURES. Monopolistic Competition
UNIT 6 cont PRICING UNDER DIFFERENT MARKET STRUCTURES Monopolistic Competition Market Structure Perfect Competition Pure Monopoly Monopolistic Competition Oligopoly Duopoly Monopoly The further right onMore information
Problems on Perfect Competition & Monopoly
Problems on Perfect Competition & Monopoly 1. True and False questions. Indicate whether each of the following statements is true or false and why. (a) In long-run equilibrium, every firm in a perfectlyMore information
INTRODUCTORY MICROECONOMICS UNIT-I PRODUCTION POSSIBILITIES CURVE The production possibilities (PP) curve is a graphical medium of highlighting the central problem of 'what to produce'. To decide whatMore information
FEEM Seminars Milan, 2 March 2009 Extraction and Trade of Oil under Climate Policy: An Assessment Using the WITCH Model
FEEM Seminars Milan, 2 March 29 Extraction and Trade of Oil under Climate Policy: An Assessment Using the WITCH Model Emanuele Massetti and Fabio Sferra Outline of the Presentation Motivation Oil factsMore information
Practice Questions Week 8 Day 1
Practice Questions Week 8 Day 1 Multiple Choice Identify the choice that best completes the statement or answers the question. 1. The characteristics of a market that influence the behavior of market participantsMore information
The valuation of oil and gas reserves
The valuation of oil and gas reserves Paper by Environmental Accounts branch, Office for National Statistics Executive summary This paper explores a number of issues involved in making a valuation of theMore information
CALIFORNIA ISO. Pre-dispatch and Scheduling of RMR Energy in the Day Ahead Market
CALIFORNIA ISO Pre-dispatch and Scheduling of RMR Energy in the Day Ahead Market Prepared by the Department of Market Analysis California Independent System Operator September 1999 Table of Contents ExecutiveMore information
Tax Credit Extension: Impact on Renewables Investment and Emissions Outcomes
CONCORD, MA - WASHINGTON, DC 47 Junction Square Drive Concord, MA 01742 978-369-5533 www.mjbradley.com MJB&A Issue Brief March 7, 2016 Tax Credit Extension: Impact on Renewables Investment and EmissionsMore information
Economics 100 Exam 2
Name: 1. During the long run: Economics 100 Exam 2 A. Output is limited because of the law of diminishing returns B. The scale of operations cannot be changed C. The firm must decide how to use the currentMore information
Integrating the Input Market and the Output Market when Teaching Introductory Economics
1 Integrating the Input Market and the Output Market when Teaching Introductory Economics May 2015 Clark G. Ross Frontis Johnston Professor of Economics Davidson College Box 7022 Davidson, NC 28035-7022More information
Economics 352: Intermediate Microeconomics
Economics 35: Intermediate Microeconomics Notes and Sample Questions Chapter Twelve: The Partial Equilibrium Competitive Model and Applied Competitive Analysis This chapter will investigate perfect competitionMore information
9.1 Cournot and Bertrand Models with Homogeneous Products
1 Chapter 9 Quantity vs. Price Competition in Static Oligopoly Models We have seen how price and output are determined in perfectly competitive and monopoly markets. Most markets are oligopolistic, however,More information
Managerial Economics & Business Strategy Chapter 8. Managing in Competitive, Monopolistic, and Monopolistically Competitive Markets
Managerial Economics & Business Strategy Chapter 8 Managing in Competitive, Monopolistic, and Monopolistically Competitive Markets I. Perfect Competition Overview Characteristics and profit outlook. EffectMore information
5. Suppose demand is perfectly elastic, and the supply of the good in question
ECON 1620 Basic Economics Principles 2010 2011 2 nd Semester Mid term test (1) : 40 multiple choice questions Time allowed : 60 minutes 1. When demand is inelastic the price elasticity of demand is (A)More information
CHAPTER 14: ECONOMICS OF POLLUTION CONTROL I. Introduction A. Up until this point, we have focused on the flow of resources into the "economic system" Economic System outputs Firms Households inputs extractionMore information
8. Simultaneous Equilibrium in the Commodity and Money Markets
Lecture 8-1 8. Simultaneous Equilibrium in the Commodity and Money Markets We now combine the IS (commodity-market equilibrium) and LM (money-market equilibrium) schedules to establish a general equilibriumMore information
Marginal cost. Average cost. Marginal revenue 10 20 40
Economics 101 Fall 2011 Homework #6 Due: 12/13/2010 in lecture Directions: The homework will be collected in a box before the lecture. Please place your name, TA name and section number on top of the homeworkMore information
This hand-out gives an overview of the main market structures including perfect competition, monopoly, monopolistic competition, and oligopoly.
Market Structures This hand-out gives an overview of the main market structures including perfect competition, monopoly, monopolistic competition, and oligopoly. Summary Chart Perfect Competition MonopolyMore information
MULTIPLE CHOICE. Choose the one alternative that best completes the statement or answers the question.
Chapter 11 Perfect Competition - Sample Questions MULTIPLE CHOICE. Choose the one alternative that best completes the statement or answers the question. 1) Perfect competition is an industry with A) aMore information
Levelized Cost and Levelized Avoided Cost of New Generation Resources in the Annual Energy Outlook 2015
June 2015 Levelized Cost and Levelized Avoided Cost of New Generation Resources in the Annual Energy Outlook 2015 This paper presents average values of levelized costs for generating technologies thatMore information
Should New Merger Guidelines Give UPP Market Definition?
December 2009 (Release 1) Should New Merger Guidelines Give UPP Market Definition? Richard Schmalensee Massachusetts Institute of Technology & LECG www.competitionpolicyinternational.com Competition PolicyMore information
Financial Development and Macroeconomic Stability
Financial Development and Macroeconomic Stability Vincenzo Quadrini University of Southern California Urban Jermann Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania January 31, 2005 VERY PRELIMINARY ANDMore information
Chapter 3 Market Demand, Supply, and Elasticity
Chapter 3 Market Demand, Supply, and Elasticity After reading chapter 3, MARKET DEMAND, SUPPLY, AND ELASTICITY, you should be able to: Discuss the Law of Demand and draw a Demand Curve. Distinguish betweenMore information
Chapter 27: Taxation. 27.1: Introduction. 27.2: The Two Prices with a Tax. 27.2: The Pre-Tax Position
Chapter 27: Taxation 27.1: Introduction We consider the effect of taxation on some good on the market for that good. We ask the questions: who pays the tax? what effect does it have on the equilibriumMore information
Fill in the Blanks. Module 1 S.Y.B.COM. (SEM-III) ECONOMICS 1. The continuous flow of money and goods and services between firms and households is called the Circular Flow. 2. Saving constitute a leakageMore information
In early 2002, with New Jersey facing a $5.3 billion budget gap, Governor
19.1 The Three Rules of Tax Incidence The Equity Implications of Taxation: Tax Incidence 19 19.2 Tax Incidence Extensions 19.3 General Equilibrium Tax Incidence 19.4 The Incidence of Taxation in the UnitedMore information
6. Budget Deficits and Fiscal Policy
Prof. Dr. Thomas Steger Advanced Macroeconomics II Lecture SS 2012 6. Budget Deficits and Fiscal Policy Introduction Ricardian equivalence Distorting taxes Debt crises Introduction (1) Ricardian equivalenceMore information
Introduction to Economics, ECON 100:11 & 13 Multiplier Model
Introduction to Economics, ECON 1:11 & 13 We will now rationalize the shape of the aggregate demand curve, based on the identity we have used previously, AE=C+I+G+(X-IM). We will in the process developMore information
Econ 101: Principles of Microeconomics
Econ 101: Principles of Microeconomics Chapter 16 - Monopolistic Competition and Product Differentiation Fall 2010 Herriges (ISU) Ch. 16 Monopolistic Competition Fall 2010 1 / 18 Outline 1 What is MonopolisticMore information
Response to the Energy White Paper Issues Paper PREPARED BY EMC ENGINEERING FOR THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRY
Response to the Energy White Paper Issues Paper PREPARED BY EMC ENGINEERING FOR THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRY i P a g e www.energym adeclean.com CONTENTSMore information
or, put slightly differently, the profit maximizing condition is for marginal revenue to equal marginal cost:
Chapter 9 Lecture Notes 1 Economics 35: Intermediate Microeconomics Notes and Sample Questions Chapter 9: Profit Maximization Profit Maximization The basic assumption here is that firms are profit maximizing.More information
CEVAPLAR. Solution: a. Given the competitive nature of the industry, Conigan should equate P to MC.
1 I S L 8 0 5 U Y G U L A M A L I İ K T İ S A T _ U Y G U L A M A ( 4 ) _ 9 K a s ı m 2 0 1 2 CEVAPLAR 1. Conigan Box Company produces cardboard boxes that are sold in bundles of 1000 boxes. The marketMore information
Implementing the EU renewable target through green certificate markets.
Implementing the EU renewable target through green certificate markets. by Finn Roar Aune, Hanne Marit Dalen and Cathrine Hagem Statistics Norway, Research Department, PO Box Dept., N-0033 Oslo, NorwayMore information
5 Market Games For Teaching Economics
5 Market Games For Teaching Economics Progression 5 Market Games from website economics-games.com To be played separately or as a sequence: Market Game 1: Sunk costs, monopoly, and introduction to theMore information
Market Structure: Perfect Competition and Monopoly
WSG8 7/7/03 4:34 PM Page 113 8 Market Structure: Perfect Competition and Monopoly OVERVIEW One of the most important decisions made by a manager is how to price the firm s product. If the firm is a profitMore information
Figure 1, A Monopolistically Competitive Firm
The Digital Economist Lecture 9 Pricing Power and Price Discrimination Many firms have the ability to charge prices for their products consistent with their best interests even thought they may not beMore information
Moral Hazard. Itay Goldstein. Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania
Moral Hazard Itay Goldstein Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania 1 Principal-Agent Problem Basic problem in corporate finance: separation of ownership and control: o The owners of the firm are typicallyMore information
Energy and Environment issues in road transport. Prof. Stef Proost KULeuven (B)
Energy and Environment issues in road transport Prof. Stef Proost KULeuven (B) Long term trends? 2050 World Share OECD Road use cars x 2.5 From 50% now to 20% in 2050 Road use trucks x 5 Air transportMore information
Consumer and Producer Surplus. Consumer and Producer Surplus. Consumer Surplus. Consumer Surplus. Consumer Surplus Individual consumer surplus
Consumer and Consumer and February 6, 2007 Reading: Chapter 6 Introduction Consumer surplus Producer surplus Efficiency and the gains from trade s 2 Introduction Connections to: Opportunity costs to consumersMore information
An increase in the number of students attending college. shifts to the left. An increase in the wage rate of refinery workers.
1. Which of the following would shift the demand curve for new textbooks to the right? a. A fall in the price of paper used in publishing texts. b. A fall in the price of equivalent used text books. c.More information
0 100 200 300 Real income (Y)
Lecture 11-1 6.1 The open economy, the multiplier, and the IS curve Assume that the economy is either closed (no foreign trade) or open. Assume that the exchange rates are either fixed or flexible. AssumeMore information
The Basics of Game Theory
Sloan School of Management 15.010/15.011 Massachusetts Institute of Technology RECITATION NOTES #7 The Basics of Game Theory Friday - November 5, 2004 OUTLINE OF TODAY S RECITATION 1. Game theory definitions:More information
4 THE MARKET FORCES OF SUPPLY AND DEMAND IN THIS CHAPTER YOU WILL Learn what a competitive market is Examine what determines the demand for a good in a competitive market Chapter Overview Examine whatMore information


text:
Finished in Magnetic blue metallic with black leather trimmed lightweight ProBax seats , Touring Pack to include electric windows and air conditioning, Alpine sound system, I Pod connection, CD player, remote central locking, twin rear fog lights, integrated passenger foot rest, 3 spoke black leather steering wheel, plus much more standard specification. This stunning Elise is offered in immaculate condition and has covered only 10000 miles . Car comes complete with a full service history
lotus elise s touring 1800cc convertible air-con black-leather fsh lightweight metallic probax 2007 leather black-interior sportscar petrol track british fast rwd mid-engine 2wd dark-interior
Alexander House, Barr Lane Industrial Estate, Roecliffe
Boroughbridge, YO51 9LS, North Yorkshire
United Kingdom
The Lotus Elise was a return to form for Lotus, harking back to the days...
Geely, the Chinese car manufacturer that currently owns Volvo and the Lo...


text:
Aurora District Office
3300 S. Parker Road
Cherry Creek Place IV Suite #305
Aurora, CO 80014
Phone: 720.748.7514
Fax: 720.748.7680
Hours: M-F 8:30 AM - 5:00 PM
Meetings By Appointment Only
Here you can find information for my Washington, DC office. You are welcome to phone or send a message to me through the U.S. Postal Service. Please note that postal mail is the slowest method for contacting me. All postal mail sent to my offices must be scanned for security purposes, which means it will take an additional two weeks for me to receive it. If you prefer, you may contact me by e-mail.


text: "The Haut Barrail 2009 has a very fine bouquet with cedar, black fruits, a touch of X'mas cake and sous-bois with good definition. The palate is medium-bodied with fine tannins, good acidity and a very composed finish with ample freshness. This is a very well made 2009 Cru Bourgeois." (09/11) – 90 Pts Neal Martin – Wine Journal


text:
Subway Gridlock In Washington D.C.
Washington D.C. is facing subway gridlock, and must build a new line through the center of Washington, D.C.
"Metro must build a new subway line through the heart of downtown Washington by 2015 to avoid gridlock on its rail system and serve the region's voracious appetite for more transit service, engineers told the agency's directors yesterday." Transit officials still contend that the future of D.C.'s rail lies in suburb-to-suburb lines, but that this problem must be fixed first.
Thanks to Governing.com


text:
Join as a member. There's a certificate with your name on it.
New features since 6.x-2.9:
Issue #436684: Allow translation of attribute names, labels, help text and option values.
Issue #730120: Add dimensions and package quantity fields to Views.
Issue #1060810: Add shippable field and filter to Views.
Issue #1603740: Allow hook_cart_pane_alter() to change weight and enabled values.
Issue #998630: Add support for 2Checkout header redirect method.
Issue #1556368: Allow 'Notify customer when a role is revoked' conditions to check for role being revoked.
Backport 'uc_quantity' form element from 7.x-3.x.
Issue #1744998: Add id to order total preview table.
Issue #657734: Make uc_payment_get_totals() use a theme function.
Issue #1690466: Add CyberSource transaction request ID to payment data.
Issue #464578: Add <label> tags to checkout address fields for accessibility.
Issue #464578: Add <label> tags to credit card fields for accessibility.
Bug fixes since 6.x-2.9:
Issue #1547810: Mention security issues around 'administer conditional actions' in README.txt.
Issue #1555082: Bad query in tax reports.
Prevent PHP Notices when visiting Attributes and Options tabs on products that don't have attributes.
Issue #1558528 by AntoineSolutions: Missing return array() in uc_ups_update_6201().
Issue #1571116 by balloon: db_query() wrong in papua_new_guinea_598_1.cif.
Fixes an error when running update.php.
See http://drupal.org/node/1547506 for 6.x-2.8 release notes.
Security advisory: SA-CONTRIB-2012-064 - Ubercart - Multiple vulnerabilities.
Changes since 7.x-3.0:
Upgrade notes:
Ensure that only trusted users have roles that have been granted the "administer conditional actions" permission.
Changes since 6.x-2.7:
Changes since 7.x-3.0-rc4:
Changes since 7.x-3.0-rc3:
Some of the changes since 6.x-2.6:
Ubercart 7.x-3.0-rc1 was released with errors that affected the order-edit page and the use of attribute options to change the price of products. Since these errors were so wide-reaching and detrimental to the working of Ubercart, a new release with these fixes has been created.
See the 7.x-3.0-rc1 release notes for the changes since 3.0-beta4.
#1118036-8: add weight_unit to {uc_order_products} table was committed accidentally right when the release was tagged. That was an in-progress patch that causes problems on the order-edit form. See that issue for a small patch to fix that problem.
Changes since Ubercart 6.x-2.5 (not released, due to a bug discovered after tagging):
New features since Ubercart 6.x-2.4:
Some of the changes since 7.x-3.0-beta3 are listed here. A complete list may be found in the Git logs:
Changes since Ubercart 7.x-3.0-beta2:
Changes since 7.x-3.0-beta1:
Final release of Ubercart for Drupal 5.x. No further changes are anticipated; this is a minor release to include the last set of fixes committed to this branch. Please consider upgrading your sites to Drupal 6 or 7.
Changes since DRUPAL-5--1-10:
The following bugs have been fixed, including the security updates outlined in SA-2010-083.
Changes since Ubercart 6.x-2.3 (-r 2130..2135):
Changes since Ubercart 7.x-3.0-alpha2:
#736770: Replace Conditional Actions with Rules Integration
Also, the new features and bug fixes introduced in 6.x-2.3 have been forward-ported.
Changes since Ubercart 6.x-2.2:
Additional country files
Payment method improvements
Printable packing slips
Stock management improvements
Separate node permissions for product kits
Colorbox support for product images
Alter hooks for cart and checkout panes
Themeable order invoices*
Numerous bugs fixed
Because of the changes to order invoices, any customizations made to the invoice template files need to be made as template overrides in the theme layer. Copy uc_order.tpl.php, uc_order-customer.tpl.php, and any other templates you wish to change from uc_order/templates to your theme's folder. uc_order.tpl.php is basically a blank file, but it is necessary for the theme overrides to work correctly. Rename your {template}.itpl.php files to the format uc_order-{template}.tpl.php and change the tokens to PHP variables. See the documentation page for more details.
Drupal is a registered trademark of Dries Buytaert.


text:
Reader: Having a Yelp Account Doesn't Make You a Food Critic
Will Denver diners be over mac and cheese in 2015?
At the end of 2014, Jenn Wohletz served up five food trends that need to die in 2014 -- including snoozy mac-and-cheese rehashes. Mac fans were quick to respond to that suggestion, while other readers trashed more trends. See also: Snoozy Mac-and-Cheese Rehashes and Other Food Trends That Need to Die
Says Joel:
You know what trend needs to die in Denver? Everyone thinking they're a foodie because they watched Anthony Bourdain's show a couple times. Hipster, please -- you're not a craft-beer expert, and quit acting like you'd die without your "pour over" coffee, when ten years ago you couldn't bother to cross Larimer Street to go to The Market instead of Starbucks.
I appreciate what's going on in my city. I LOVE that we're not considered a culinary joke anymore. But just living here and having a yelp account doesn't make every last one of us a food critic.
What do you think of amateur restaurant critics on Yelp? What do you think of the reviews by our professional critic, Gretchen Kurtz?
Follow @CafeWestword
Get the Food & Drink Newsletter
Our weekly guide to Denver dining includes food news and reviews, as well as dining events and interviews with chefs and restaurant owners.
Recommended for You
Powered by SailThru
Popular Stories
Sponsor Content


text:
The above graph displays service status activity for Phpbb.com over the last 10 automatic checks. The blue bar displays the response time, which is better when smaller. If no bar is displayed for a specific time it means that the service was down and the site was offline.
Service Status History
|Ping Time
|Ping Time
|135.58 ms.
|134.4 ms.
|135.54 ms.
|137.1 ms.
|133.19 ms.
|133.79 ms.
|134.39 ms.
|135.52 ms.
|133.54 ms.
|133.06 ms.
* Times displayed are PT, Pacific Time (UTC/GMT 0) | Current server time is 00:46
We have tried pinging phpBB website using our server and the website returned the above results. If phpbb.com is down for us too there is nothing you can do except waiting. Probably the server is overloaded, down or unreachable because of a network problem, outage or a website maintenance is in progress...
If the site is UP but you cant access the page, try one of the below solutions:
Browser Related Problems
Force a full refresh for the site. This can be achieved by pressing CTRL + F5 keys at the same time on your favourite browser (Firefox, Chrome, Explorer, etc.)
Clear the temporary cache and cookies on your browser to make sure that you have the most recent version of the web page. For instructions choose your browser :
Fix DNS Problems
A Domain Name System (DNS) allows a site IP address (192.168.x.x) to be identified with words (*.com) in order to be remembered more easily, like a phonebook for websites. This service is usually provided by your ISP.
Clear your local DNS cache to make sure that you grab the most recent cache that your ISP has. For Windows - (Start > Command Prompt > type "ipconfig /flushdns" and hit enter). For details choose your operating system :
If you can access a website at office or from a 3G network yet it's not working on your computer, it is a good idea to use an alternative DNS service other than your ISPs. OpenDNS or Google Public DNS are both excellent and free public DNS services.
Check our help page for step-by-step instructions on how to change your DNS.
What the hey! sever is down again..
How long do these down times last!? I need the site up right now so I can redownload the current version to effect a fix on a running server!
Yep and I need it up right the F*** now.
Anyone else down?
Submit a comment using your Facebook ID.
Is Phpbb.com down for you right now? Submit your comments about Phpbb.com service status or report an issue below to let others know that they aren't the only ones having trouble. Please note that your country, service provider and browser information will be displayed next to your comment to better analyze a possible outage.


text:
Contact Us
Questions about:
Please visit our extensive FAQ page for more information. For super awesome installation videos, visit our Tutorials Page.
Need to let us know about:
missing shipment
order tracking issue
changes to an existing order
received incorrect order
other immediate need
Please send us an email at email@example.com
or give us a call at 877-807-8897
Want to work with us?
Please send us an email at firstname.lastname@example.com
Want to be an affiliate?
Check out our artist program here.
Check out our blogger program here.
Want to work at WNL?
There are no available job openings at the moment.