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Cosmetic Plastic Surgeons in Fairfax
You can choose a cosmetic plastic surgeon in Fairfax from this list with confidence, knowing that he or she possesses exceptional training, outstanding credentials and experience with all areas of the face and body.
This list features only plastic surgeons in the city of Fairfax. To widen your search, choose a nearby city from the list to the left, or click here to search by ZIP code.
|Surgeons highlighted below have purchased an Enhanced Practice Profile
|Personal Website
G. Wesley Price, M.D., FACS5550 Friendship Blvd. Suite 130 Chevy Chase, MD Tel: Click for phone number301-652-7700
|14.2 Miles
Paul G. Ruff IV, M.D. F.A.C.S.2440 M Street, NW Suite 200 Washington, DC Tel: Click for phone number202-785-4187
|14.23 Miles
Jeffery C. Posnick, D.M.D., M.D.5530 Wisconsin Avenue Suite 1250 Chevy Chase, MD Tel: Click for phone number301-986-9475
|14.3 Miles
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|14.33 Miles
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|14.38 Miles
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|14.4 Miles
J. William Little, M.D., FACS1145 19th Street N.W. Suite 802 Washington, DC Tel: Click for phone number202-467-6700
|14.74 Miles
Chester Z. Haverback, M.D., FACS8218 Wisconsin Avenue Suite 320 Bethesda, MD Tel: Click for phone number301-657-4747
|15.13 Miles
Brian M. Braithwaite, M.D.801 Wisconsin Avenue Dept. of Plastic Surgery Bethesda, MD Tel: Click for phone number301.295.0217
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Kathy Huang, M.D.11210 Old Georgetown Road Rockville, MD Tel: Click for phone number301-881-7770
|16.51 Miles
The surgeons listed above are members of The American Society for Aesthetic Plastic Surgery, licensed by the state of Virginia and certified by The American Board of Plastic Surgery (ABPS).
Choose Your Plastic Surgeon Carefully
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Alexandra residents are offered incentives to help out in an attempt to curb growing rodent infestation in the Johannesburg suburb.
As it was in medieval Hamelin, so it is today in the South African township of Alexandra: wherever you go, you are never far from a rat.
But residents of the Johannesburg suburb have been offered a deal unavailable in the era of the Pied Piper – a free mobile phone for every resident who catches 60 of the rodents.
Alexandra has just turned 100 years old and was the young Nelson Mandela's first home when he moved to Johannesburg. Its cramped shacks and illegal rubbish dumps sit in brutal contrast with neighbouring Sandton, dubbed the wealthiest square mile in Africa.
The crumbling structures, leaking sewage and discarded piles of rotting food are a perfect breeding ground for rats, much to the torment of residents. There have reportedly been cases of children's fingers being bitten while they sleep.
In an attempt to fight back, city officials have distributed cages and the mobile phone company 8ta has sponsored the volunteer ratcatchers.
Resident Joseph Mothapo says he has won two phones and plans to get one for each member of his family. "It's easy," he told South Africa's Mail & Guardian newspaper, wielding a large cage containing rats. "You put your leftover food inside and the rats climb in, getting caught as the trap door closes."
But there were signs that the PR stunt could backfire, as animals rights activists criticised the initiative on social networks.
On Monday 8ta denied responsibility for the initiative. It said it was a long-time sponsor of a charity called Lifeline, which had taken the decision to hand out phones.
"You will have to ask Lifeline why they decided to use these promotional products," said Pynee Chetty, an 8ta spokesman. "They do a lot of good community work, including in Alexandra. They used the promotional material to incentivise members of the community. I wasn't aware this is how they were going to resolve the problem [of rats]."
He added: "We won't distance ourselves from Lifeline. It is a charity that does a lot of good work and our support for them is steadfast. I don't want to deny the story. What I'm saying is that it's not our initiative."
The Mail and Guardian reported that thousands of rats have been gassed to death by a specialist, Ashford Sidzumo, at the local sports centre. "We record all the people's details so we can see where the rats are causing the biggest problem," he was quoted as saying. "We use this to send fumigation teams there."
Local councillor Julie Moloi told the Mail & Guardian there had been no choice but to carry out the drastic experiment. "We are afraid these rats will take over Alex and it will become a city of rats," she said.
In another measure, owls have been given to three local schools because of their rat-catching prowess. But wider deployment of the birds may be difficult: Moloi said people kill them because of traditional beliefs that they are to be feared.
guardian.co.uk © Guardian News & Media Limited 2010
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subset: commoncrawl


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Trond Giske
|Trond Giske
|Norwegian Minister of Trade and Industry
|In office
20 October 2009 – 16 October 2013
|Harald V
|Preceded by
|Sylvia Brustad
|Succeeded by
|Monica Mæland
|Norwegian Minister of Culture and Church Affairs
|In office
17 October 2005 – 20 October 2009
|Prime Minister
|Jens Stoltenberg
|Preceded by
|Valgerd Svarstad Haugland
|Succeeded by
|Anniken Huitfeldt
|Norwegian Minister of Church, Education and Research
|In office
17 March 2000 – 19 October 2001
|Prime Minister
|Jens Stoltenberg
|Preceded by
|Jon Lilletun
|Succeeded by
|Kristin Clemet
|Member of the Norwegian Parliament
for Sør-Trøndelag
|In office
1 October 1997 – present
|Leader of the Workers' Youth League
|In office
|Prime Minister
|Gro Harlem Brundtland
|Preceded by
|Turid Birkeland
|Succeeded by
|Anniken Huitfeldt
|Personal details
7 November 1966
Trondheim, Norway
|Political party
|Labour Party
|Alma mater
|University of Oslo
Trond Giske (born 7 November 1966, in Trondheim, Norway) is a Norwegian politician, representing the Norwegian Labour Party, where he from 2015 is one of two deputy leaders. He was Minister of Trade and Industry in the government headed by Jens Stoltenberg from 2009 to 2013.
Giske was elected into the Norwegian parliament for Sør-Trøndelag county in 1997, and served as Minister of Education, Research and Church Affairs in the first cabinet of Jens Stoltenberg 2000-2001. He was re-elected to parliament in 2001, 2005, and 2009. Giske was appointed Minister of Culture and Church Affairs in the Stoltenberg's Second Cabinet.
As one of the most prominent Labour politicians in Norway, Giske has had numerous appearances in the media. He displays an interest in culturally related subjects such as film, literature and especially football. He is also well known for his personal friendship with members of the Royal family, namely Princess Märtha Louise of Norway and her previous husband, the author Ari Behn. He is also known for being a big supporter of his home town football club Rosenborg.[1]
Early life and education[edit]
Born 7 November 1966 in Trondheim, Sør-Trøndelag. He is the son av engineer Bjørn Giske (1938-) and associate professor Norunn Illevold (1935-). He attended both University of Oslo and Norwegian University of Science and Technology receiving a degree in economy in 1997.[2]
Political career[edit]
Active in the Workers' Youth League from an early age, Giske became the leader of its Trondheim branch in 1988, before becoming the leader of its Sør-Trøndelag branch the following year. In 1992 Giske was elected head of the Workers Youth League as a whole. He served until 1996, the following year he was elected to the parliament, the Storting for the first time, he has since been reelected on three occasions. In March 2000 Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg appointed Giske as the new Minister of Education and Church affairs. He would serve in this capacity until the minority Labour government fell in the 2001 elections.[3] 4 years later, the 2005 elections again swept the Labour party to power as a part of the Red-green coalition and Trond Giske was then appointed Minister of Culture.[4] He would remain in this position until October 2009, when as a part of a cabinet reshuffle he was appointed Minister of Trade and Industry, succeeding Sylvia Brustad.[5]
Minister of Trade and Industry[edit]
In January 2012, Giske received widespread attention for his opposition to the sale of TV 2 to a Danish company. Giske spoke out against the transfer of 100% of TV 2's shares to the Egmont Group, at a price of 2.1 billion NOK (274 million euros), despite Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg stating his government would have no opinion on the case.[6][7] It was reported that Giske threatened the head of the Telenor Group, Harald Norvik, with the loss of his position if the sale went through.[7][8]
One of the policies championed during Giskes tenure as minister has been the so-called "salary moderation". The idea is that the leaders of state owned companies or companies where the Norwegian government was majority shareholder should not earn more in salary than their counterparts in the private sector.[9] Giske called on board members and CEO's to adhere to this policy or risk being replaced.[10]
In October 2012 Trond Giskes long-time friend and Labour party colleague Rune Olsø was appointed CEO of Entra Eiendom a company wholly owned by the Ministry of Trade and Industry. Olsø was to receive NOK 4.2 million in salary, which was perceived by some to be in violation of Giske's own policy of moderation.[11] Later it was revealed that the chairman and vice-chairman of the board opposed the appointment of Olsø, but lost the vote due to pressure from members who had personal or political ties to Giske.[12] In the wake of the affair, prime minister Jens Stoltenberg appointed Bård Vegar Solhjell to handle the matter, as Giske had recused himself. Solhjell responded by firing three board members, including two who was largely seen as having close ties to Giske.[13] Ten days after the story broke, Rune Olsø resigned as CEO of Entra.[14]
In October 2012 several media reported that Giske had demanded that his close friend and colleague Tore O. Sandvik be appointed to the board of directors of The Telenor Group, even though the board had stated that Sandvik "was not even close to being qualified", the board also objected due to the fact that Sandvik was considered one of Giskes closest friends.[15] According to the media-reports Giske eventually relented, but only after the board accepted another colleague Hallvard Bakke instead.[16] Giske vehemently denied ever having made the demand, claiming it might have been a mere proposal.[17]
On 25 October it emerged that Giske in 2009, when he was Minister of Culture, had personally appointed Tore O. Sandvik's wife and former party colleague Trine Brænden to the board of directors at the prestigious Trondheim Symphony Orchestra (TSO).[18] Giske stated that they were not close friends.[19]
Personal life[edit]
Giske was in a relationship with Anne Grethe Moe until they separated amicably in 2006. They have one daughter, Una, together.[20] Since 2014, he has been in a relationship with singer and television host Haddy N'jie and the couple got a daughter in 2016.[21]
- 2009: Mangfold eller enfold: 21 stemmer om kultur i vår tid, Aschehoug
- 2009: "Hvem snakker for Bob Kåre?", Aschehoug (with Hadia Tajik)
See also[edit]
- ^ Rasmussen, John. "- Rosenborg er i ferd med å miste sjela si". Dagbladet.no (in Norwegian). Retrieved 23 October 2012.
- ^ "Biografi: Giske, Trond". Biografier. Stortinget. Retrieved 23 October 2012.
- ^ Lyssand, Halvard (17 March 2000). "Trond Giske ny utdanningsminister". Paraplyen.no (in Norwegian). Retrieved 23 October 2012.
- ^ "Tidligere kultur- og kirkeminister Trond Giske (Perioden 17.10.05-20.10.09)". Personer og enheter. Regjeringen.no. Retrieved 23 October 2012.
- ^ "Nærings- og handelsminister Trond Giske". Regjeringen.no. Retrieved 23 October 2012.
- ^ Egmont acquires the rest of Norwegian TV 2
- ^ a b Berglund, Nina (January 19, 2012). "Giske faces disciplinary action". Views and News from Norway.
- ^ Berglund, Nina (January 12, 2012). "Trade Minister still in hot water". Views and News from Norway.
- ^ "Giske kaller inn styreledere for å diskutere lønn". e24.no (in Norwegian). NTB. 23 May 2012. Retrieved 23 October 2012.
- ^ Riber Sparre, Martin (23 August 2012). "- Jeg har nå gjort det enda tydeligere at jeg mener alvor". Dagens Næringsliv (in Norwegian). Retrieved 23 October 2012.
- ^ Hegvik, Gunn Kari (11 October 2012). "Dette er Entra-saken". e24.no (in Norwegian). Retrieved 23 October 2012.
- ^ NTB (7 October 2012). "Entra-styret visste ikke om båndene til Olsø". Nrk.no (in Norwegian). Retrieved 23 October 2012.
- ^ NTB. "Entra-styremedlemmer må gå". Dagens Næringsliv (in Norwegian). Retrieved 23 October 2012.
- ^ Skarvøy, Lars-Joakim (17 October 2012). "Rune Olsø går av som Entra-sjef". Vg.no (in Norwegian). Retrieved 23 October 2012.
- ^ Wergeland, Paal (22 October 2012). "- Giske ville ha venn inn i Telenor-styret". Nrk.no (in Norwegian). Retrieved 25 October 2012.
- ^ Dalen, Per-Magne (23 October 2012). "Giske ville ha kompisen inn i Telenor-styret". tv2.no (in Norwegian). Retrieved 25 October 2012.
- ^ Bilstad, Camilla (23 October 2012). "- Har aldri krevd styreplass, Giske: – Dette viser at valgkampen er i gang". Nrk.no (in Norwegian). Retrieved 25 October 2012.
- ^ NTB (24 October 2012). "Giske ga styreverv til vennens kone". Abcnyheter.no (in Norwegian). Retrieved 25 October 2012.
- ^ Redaksjonen (24 October 2012). "Giske ga styreverv til vennens kone". Tv2.no (in Norwegian). Retrieved 25 October 2012.
- ^ Kristiansen, Bjørn (11 October 2012). "- Som kulturminister burde jeg vært nøyere på å sjekke habiliteten". Dagbladet.no (in Norwegian). Retrieved 23 October 2012.
- ^ Maiken Svensen (1 April 2016) Haddy N'Jie og Trond Giske har fått barn VG.
|Political offices
|Preceded by
Sylvia Brustad
|Norwegian Minister of Trade and Industry
|Succeeded by
Monica Mæland
|Preceded by
Valgerd Svarstad Haugland
|Norwegian Minister of Culture and Church Affairs
|Succeeded by
Anniken Huitfeldt
|Preceded by
Jon Lilletun
|Norwegian Minister of Church, Education and Research
|Succeeded by
Kristin Clemet
|Party political offices
|Preceded by
Turid Birkeland
|Chairman of Workers' Youth League
|Succeeded by
Anniken Huitfeldt
- 1966 births
- Living people
- Norwegian economists
- Norwegian University of Science and Technology alumni
- University of Oslo alumni
- Politicians from Trondheim
- Labour Party (Norway) politicians
- Members of the Storting
- Government ministers of Norway
- Ministers of Culture of Norway
- 21st-century Norwegian politicians
- 20th-century Norwegian politicians


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Click on the images below for further information about the grantee and research project.
Click on the images below for further information about the grantee and research project.
Maureen Penelope Howard, University of Aberdeen, Scotland, UK, Dissertation Fieldwork Grant, 2006, "Seascape: Voyaging through the Movements of Experience, Histories, Ecologies"
Penny Howard working as crew on board a small trawler on the west coast of Scotland near Skye. She has just finished working with the skipper to pull the net on board, and is finishing the process by pulling the 'dogrope' out of the water (August 2007).
Olga Shevchenko, Williams College, Williamstown, MA, and Oksana Sarkisova, Moscow State U., Moscow, Russia, International Collaborative Research Grant, 2006, "Snapshot Histories: Family Photography and Generational Memory of Russia's Socialist Century."
ICRG grantee, Olga Shevchenko, doing the family-album interview with a retired military pilot and his wife, in the interviewee's home in Vladimir, Russia (2008).
Joel D. Irish U. of Alaska, Fairbanks, AK. Post-PhD Research Grant, 2007, "Nubians in Ancient Egypt: Excavation of the C-Group Cemetery at Hierakonpolis."
Joel Irish studying a mandible in the field laboratory Hierakonpolis, Egypt (March 2007)
Rebecca Jabbour, City University of New York, New York, NY, Dissertation Fieldwork Grant, 2004, "Postcranial Skeletal Diversity and Ecomorphology of African Apes."
Rebecca Jabbour collecting data from a chimpanzee femur at the Royal Museum for Central Africa in Tervuren, Belgium (February 2005)
Jun Ueno Sunseri, U. California, Santa Cruz, CA, Dissertation Fieldwork Grant, 2006, "Historic Archaeology of a Spanish Colonial Buffer Settlement in Northern New Mexico," supervised by Dr. Judith A. Habicht-Mauche.
Jun Sunseri (left) mapping LA 917 ("casitas viejas") in the Rito Colorado Valley with a geodetic total station, research assistant Ben Curry examines surface deposits inside the standing walls of the "chapel."
Jin-Heon Jung, University of Illinois, Urbana, IL, Dissertation Fieldwork Grant, 2007, "Post-Division Citizenship: The Christian Encounters of North Korean Refugees and South Korean Protestant Church."
Jin-Heon Jung at a Sino-North Korean border area in the northeast China where North Korean refugees come to first encounter Christianity.Tomun, China (June 2007).
Karline R. Janmaat, U. of St. Andrews, St. Andrews, Scotland, UK, Dissertation Fieldwork, 2002, "Fruits of Enlightenment, Food-Localization Skills in Free Ranging Gray-Cheeked Mangabeys"
Lori Coppola Klivak, Syracuse U., New York, NY, Dissertation Fieldwork Grant, 2007, "Zapotec Tourism: The Community Politics of Indigenous Organizing and Ethnic Revival in Southern Mexico 'Zapotec Tourism'"
Lori Coppola Klivak preparing to harvest watercress with the owner of the watercress field. Benito Juarez, Oaxaca, Mexico (2008)
Brandon Kohrt, Emory University. Atlanta, GA, Dissertation Fieldwork Grant, 2006, "Wounded Hearts, Wounded Minds: The Embodiment of Trauma in Nepal"
Brandon Kohrt (right) interviewing Ram Bahadur Sitawal (left) and Puru Regmi (center), community leaders discussing peace-building programs for children. Nalang, Dhading, Nepal. (February, 2007)
Debra Komar, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM, Post-Ph.D. Research Grant, 2006, "The Use of Material Culture to Establish Ethnic Identity in International Investigatons of Genocide."
Debra Komar examines remains from a mass grave in Zenica, Bosnia and Herzegovina (Feb. 2007).
Dr. Linda Ann Brown George Washington U., Washington, DC, Post Ph.D Research Grant 2007, "Indigenous Archaeologies: Contemporary Meanings, Social Lives and Material Signatures of Maya Antiquities Reused as Sacra"
Linda Brown (right) and research assistant Manuel Jaminez Tambriz (left) at the site of El Baul, Guatemala. Manuel is placing his divination bundle in contact with a carved archaeological monument important in contemporary indigenous rites. July 2008
Charlene Makley, Reed College, Portland, OR, Post-PhD Research Grant, 2008, "Dilemmas of Development Among Tibetans in the PRC"
Charlene Makley converses with a Tibetan village elder in the mountains above his village. His son sits nearby (July 2008).
Irena Martinović Klarić, Institute for Anthropological Research, Zagreb, Croatia, Post-Ph.D. Research Grant, 2005, "Population Structure and Genetic History of Western Balkan Roma"
A group photograph of Bayash Romani and the research team from the Institute for Anthropological Research, Zagreb at the end of a typical day of the field research (village Kursanec, northwest Croatia, November 2006).
Anduamlak Meharie, University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY, Dissertation Fieldwork Grant, 2005, "Development and Displacement in Peri-Urban Areas of Addis Ababa: Impacts on Youth and Households"
Anduamlak Meharie in the field site. The young men in the background are participants in the research. Periphery of Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (May 2006).
Carmin Montserrat Soler Cruz, Rutgers U., New Brunswick, NJ, Dissertation Fieldwork Grant, 2005, "Religious Commitment and Cooperation in Candomble Terreiros in Salvador da Bahia, Brazil"
From left, Equede Maria, Soler Cruz, and Pai Nene, whose real name is Jose Mario. Equede Maria and Pai Nene are members of Candomble and he is a priest. The photo was taked at Pai Nene's house during a conference cycle he organized to promoto safe sex and AIDS awareness for teenagers in his community. Salvador, Brazil (December, 2005)
Luc Moreau, Romisch-Germanisches Zentralmuseum Mainz, Neuwied, Germany. Post-Ph.D Research Grant, 2009, "Spatial Behavior in the Aurignacian: New Excavations at Breitenbach, Germany"
Luc Moreau (left) discussing the excavation technique in regard to the general morphology of the archaeological horizon with a prehistorian from Slovenia, Bostian Odar. Breitenbach, Eastern Germany (July 2009).
Sean Myles, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Leipzig, Germany, Post-PhD Research Grant, 2007, "Uncovering the Genetic Basis for Blond Hair in Island Melanesia"
Sean Myles obtaining informed consent to acquire saliva samples and measure hair and skin pigmentation from a participant and his son on Savo, Solomon Islands. June 2009
Dani Nadel, U. of Haifa, Haifa, Israel, Post-Ph.D. Research Grant, 2006, "Natufian Burials and Associated Mortars at Raqefet Cave, Israel: Growing Economic Social Complexity on Threshold of Agriculture"
Dani Nadel (standing, right) with colleagues during excavations at the Raqefet Cave (mt. Carmel, Israel).. Photo by Dror Maayan, summer 2006
Maria Nakhshina. University of Aberdeen, Scotland, UK, Dissertation Fieldwork Grant, 2006, "Making Sense of Home: Movement and Metaphor among Villagers and Townspeople in the Kola Peninsula"
Maria Nakhshina having caught her first white fish during ice fishing on the river Varzuga, Kuzomen' village, Kola Peninsula, Russia. Ice fishing is one of the most popular activities among the local people in winter and spring. (February 2007)


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Buffy the Vampire Slayer alumni event
Galapagos is casting you as the characters Wed 3. In honor of the Scooby gang, we offer tips on how to relive the premillennium.
Thu May 28 2009
Photographs: Cordelia, Oz, Xander: Courtesy of 20th Century Fox Home Entertainment; Buffy, Anya, Willow: The Everett Collection
Embrace your nerdiness
When you arrive, you'll get a packet about your character's identity. But be sure to bone up on Buffy facts and witty banter beforehand, so you can dominate the trivia smackdown: Winners will score Sunnydale-related prizes (along with the requisite admiration and envy), and one lucky alum will also be presented with the "Class Protector" award.
Party like it's 1999
Expect to shake it to classic Britney Spears, the Spice Girls as well as the various Bronze-friendly artists who soundtracked various episodes (like Cibo Matto and Fatboy Slim). Character-based costumes and end-of-the-century attire aren't required, but they'll certainly come in handy during the Buffy-oke contest.
Remember the dearly departed
Event organizer Clinton McClung compiled an Oscars-style video that pays tribute to Sunnydalers who met their demise at the hands/jaws/pincers of the Hellmouth's various demons and dangers. But don't lob too many insults—you never know who might be ready to rise again and invite you to join their killer after-party.
WELCOME BACK TO THE HELLMOUTH!: The Sunnydale High School Class of 1999 Ten Year Reunion: Galapagos Art Space, 16 Main St at Water St, Dumbo, Brooklyn (718-222-8500, buffysings.com). Wednesday 3 at 8pm, $10.
NEXT Reunion special


text:
Our assets are our employees!
Hafner-Muschler is a leading and growing refrigeration and air-conditioning systems company based in Balingen, with offices in Stuttgart, Cologne and Sinsheim.
Acting as a systems supplier, we plan, develop, manufacture and install products and systems related to refrigeration, air-conditioning and geothermal combined heating and cooling.
Our extensive innovative developments have given us an exceptional place in the market and we would like to offer you the best prospects for the future.
We not only offer apprenticeships for mechatronics engineers in refrigeration technology every year, we also offer varied and responsible positions for electricians with some professional experience, planning engineers in the fields of planning and tender preparation, and order processing staff.
In addition to these positions, we are always on the lookout for installers for fitting refrigeration and air conditioning equipment in industrial and commercial systems, service technicians for refrigeration equipment and sales staff in both the industrial and commercial refrigeration fields.
If we've aroused your interest and one of the available positions appeals to you, we would be delighted to receive your completed application including your earliest possible start date.
Reimbursement of applicants' travel expenses
Before travelling always confirm with the Hafner-Muschler HR department whether your expenses will be reimbursed, to what value and which mode of transport you plan to use. The travel expenses claim form can be found here.


text:
Recent vernal scenes in London — sporadic sunshine, the chance to unbutton one's duffel coat — have been greatly spiriting. This week I even drank a fancy foamy gin and tonic outdoors, 38 floors up at Sushisamba, standing by its magical Enid Blyton-style glowing tree, wearing nowt more than a Westwood frock and slingbacks, and had one of those jolly dinners at The Delaunay where people arrive breezy and chipper, gushing of spring having sprung, not in bobble hats with nose stalactites.
Sensing my good mood, my chums in the ES office conspired to send me off for an X-treme Chinese meal by Alvin Leung at Bo London. I tried to keep an open mind, but in truth the mere sight of the word 'X-treme' spelled with an X — a writing style only favoured by virgins with an off-road buggy fixation — had made my mood malevolent. £138 for 14 courses of X-treme cooking. To my mind, tasting menus are a dismal plan at the best of times. Anything over ten courses in London will be a charming idea but in reality, the antithesis of dinner. Instead, it's basically a long evening of starvation in captivity.
All efforts to chat with your dining companion will consistently be scuppered by a waiter bearing two more spoons of Bushtucker-trial gloop representing the chef's nervous breakdown. This is not dinner. It's edible immersive art catering to a no-repeat clientele of affluent tourists and bloggers on freebies.
Alvin's case wasn't helped by Bo London's website, which features him wanging on about demons and spirits and threats to push my limitations and comfort zones, sounding a bit like a drama student employed at Alton Towers to liven up a roller-coaster queue. To these type of restaurants I tend to take my friend Matt Park; a childhood at boarding school means that his knee-jerk reaction to any food put in front of him is to eat it, unquestioningly.
Course one, entitled 'Dead Garden', was a small wooden box filled with soil and two twigs. But — surprise! — it's all edible. It's actually green onion, lime, avocado, enoki and morel. 'It tastes like salty snot,' I said. 'Nonsense, it's fine,' Matt said, shovelling glumly. 'OK, eat mine then,' I said. 'Bugger that, I couldn't eat two,' he said, 'it's making me gag.'
Course two: 'Bed and Breakfast': a smoked quail's egg, warm, runny centred, covered in caviar. It tasted exactly like this. I should have won a gold star for eating this one. Next up, a dish entitled 'Cloud': a spoon of raw fish covered in an ominous black foam. Then foie gras covered in 'Abby's Sauce' — Abby being Alvin's wife. Many wives might have pointed out that a sauce that sounds like a hospital discharge report might dismay customers, but not Abby.
At the course called 'Tomato' — featuring a marshmallow made of tomato — I began hatching a plot to go home via Balthazar for some proper dinner. I sent the sweetbreads course back untouched as it had an aroma not dissimilar to urine. The main course — I type this waving my ankles in the air with mirth — was Wagyu beef (one mouthful) on a black truffle skidmark.
Bo London's signature pudding — £16 for two — is 'Sex on the Beach', a pile of what appears to be sand topped with an edible condom containing fake sperm. Then a bill appeared for £510, including service. For the first time in 20 years of dining in London, I felt truly sad for wasting that type of money. I wish I'd given it to a school. I couldn't shake that awful feeling right through the following day either. And I didn't even choose to go there. And it wasn't even my money. So if Alvin was looking for an X-treme reaction, well, I suppose in an odd way, he won.
Bo London, 4 Mill Street, W1S 2AZ, bolondonrestaurant.com
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|edoc-Server der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
Andrzej Ruszczynski, Rutgers University
Robert J. Vanderbei, Princeton University
|Frontiers of stochastically nondominated portfolios
|Date of Acceptance:
|Submission Date:
|Series Title:
Stochastic Programming E-Print Series
|Julie L. Higle; Werner Römisch; Surrajeet Sen
|Keywords (eng):
|stochastic dominance, linear programming, Fenchel duality, mean-risk analysis, Portfolio optimization, least absolute deviations, parametric simplex method, robust statistics
|Appeared in:
Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an international society for the advancement of economic theory in its relation to statistics and mathematics 4 (Vol. 71, 2003)
Econometric Society [u.a.] (Evanston, Ill. [u.a.])
|Metadata export: To export the complete metadata set as Endote or Bibtex format please click to the appropriate link.
|Endnote Bibtex
|Abstract (eng):
|We consider the problem of constructing a portfolio of finitely many assets whose returns are described by a discrete joint distribution. We propose mean-risk models which are solvable by linear programming and generate portfolios whose returns are nondominated in the sense of second-order stochastic dominance. Next, we develop a specialized parametric method for recovering the entire mean-risk efficient frontiers of these models and we illustrate its operation on a large data set involving thousands of assets and realizations.
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Advanced Excel Topics: LOOKUP, INDEX, and MATCH
iteach Lounge
Wednesday, April 2, 2014 from 10:00 AM to 11:00 AM (EDT)
Who's Going
San Francisco, California
London, United Kingdom
Florence, Italy
Event Details
Facilitator: James Welsh
This session will cover the extremely powerful LOOKUP, INDEX, and MATCH functions. If you use Excel with large datasets regularly, these functions can change the way you work!
Staff, faculty, and students are welcome!
We will work through several examples of real-world datasets using both LOOKUP functions and INDEX/MATCH combinations. Example data will be provided, but feel free to bring your own data.
The LOOKUP (and the related VLOOKUP and HLOOKUP) function finds and returns a specified value from a data set. The INDEX and MATCH functions serve a similar purpose. You will learn how to write formulas that take advantage of these functions.
When & Where
The iteach Lounge, EDU252
Wednesday, April 2, 2014 from 10:00 AM to 11:00 AM (EDT)
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text:
The Sino-Soviet Split:
This file is also available in Adobe Acrobat PDF format
BEFORE OLEG TROYANOVSKII left his position as the last Soviet ambassador to the People's Republic of China, he met Wu Xiuquan for a chat about old times. The former vice-head of the Central Committee Liaison Department of the Chinese Communist Party remarked to the past adviser of Nikita Khrushchev: "When you now read the messages that our countries exchanged at a time not too long ago, you don't know whether to laugh or cry."1 The pettiness and hyperbole of the Sino-Soviet polemics and their impact on the foreign and domestic policies of both countries, from the Great Leap Forward to the war scare of 1969, forces any contemporary observer to pause in incredulity. The Sino-Soviet Split was one of the key events of the Cold War, equal in importance to the construction of the Berlin Wall, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Second Vietnam War, and Sino-American Rapprochement. The split helped to determine the framework of the second half of the Cold War in general, and influenced the course of the Second Vietnam War in particular. Like a nasty divorce, it left bad memories and produced myths of innocence on both sides.
Until very recently, much of the source material that could shed light on the dynamics of the Sino-Soviet Split was stashed away in inaccessible archives. While the literature on the topic is vast, much of it was written during the Cold War on the basis of selective published sources or tends to be speculative and theoretical. Since its slow opening in the early 1980s, China has produced a wealth of published primary and secondary sources and, recently, even made some archives accessible to foreign researchers. The collapse of the Soviet Union and communist East Europe threw open the doors of countless party and governmental archives.
The newly available documents point to the vital role of ideology in the Sino-Soviet Split. Both the Chinese Communists and the Soviets were true Marxist-Leninist believers. Discord between Beijing and Moscow arose over the method of establishing a socialist society domestically and over the direction of the joint policy of the socialist camp toward the capitalist world. Furthermore, while ideology was central, it increasingly became entangled in internal politics. Leadership conflicts led Mao Zedong to exploit the worsening of Sino-Soviet relations for his goals abroad and at home.
The first point of ideological disagreement emerged in 1955 over the Stalinist socioeconomic development model. Facing a structural economic crisis, Mao replaced the development model that the People's Republic of China (PRC) had inherited from the late Iosif Stalin with a development strategy resembling earlier Soviet policies that had already been discredited in the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics (USSR). Despite its failure, Mao returned to their basic ideas in the Great Leap Forward of 1958–60, only to reap disaster.
De-Stalinization in the Soviet Union provided the second moment of ideological conflict. While Khrushchev's Secret Speech in February 1956 was rooted mainly in domestic necessities, it reverberated throughout the socialist world. As a result, over the course of 1956 and 1957, Mao and Khrushchev took up opposite positions on Stalin as a theoretician and practitioner.
Third, Sino-Soviet ideological disputes arose over the correct method of dealing with imperialism. Launched in early 1956 as well, Khrushchev's policy of peaceful coexistence with the United States did not cause immediate conflict with the Chinese Communists because they were preoccupied with de-Stalinization. From late 1957, however, tensions over this policy grew, and, by the mid-1960s, dominated Sino- Soviet relations.
Most other points of Sino-Soviet conflict were either the result of these ideological disagreements or of lesser importance. Security disputes—such as the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1958—and economic disagreements—in particular trade and the sudden withdrawal of the Soviet specialists from China in 1960—arose as the consequence of ideological arguments. Similarly, territorial disputes that predated the Sino-Soviet alliance did not threaten the relationship until the two countries had developed their ideological disagreements. Finally, personality clashes contributed to but did not cause the existing ideological problems.
In the end, the new documents suggest that the Chinese side was far more active in pursuing ideological conflict. The PRC established itself through the alliance, in both positive and negative terms. Although China had sought the alliance in 1949 and 1950, Mao eventually pushed for its collapse after 1959, when he decided that it had run the full course of what he considered its usefulness to the country. Moreover, the Chinese leader increasingly linked Sino-Soviet disagreements with his internal disputes. In 1962, the struggle against domestic ideological revisionism merged with his battle against its counterpart in the policy of the socialist camp toward imperialism.
Previous Lines of Explanation
Before the end of the Cold War and the gradually increasing accessibility of new archival and documentary evidence, scholars offered four main explanations for the Sino-Soviet Split. First, some have argued that the split resulted from conflicts of national interest.2 As early as 1952, one observer predicted the Sino-Soviet Split in light of the aspiration of Stalin's totalitarian regime to control its allies; inevitably, according to this line of thinking, this would violate their national interests.3 Other authors identified nationalist conflicts, such as claims of fear of foreign domination or claims of cultural superiority, as a cause for the split.4
Second, the concept of the strategic triangle appealed to many observers, especially with the Sino-American Rapprochement since 1969. This theory posited that the United States, the Soviet Union, and China formed a triangular great power relationship; within this unique setup, the two weaker countries allied to balance against the strongest. Proponents of the strategic triangle tried to explain the Sino-Soviet Split as the result of relative changes in the military and political power of the three countries—changes that gradually questioned the rationale for the Sino-Soviet alliance and eventually triggered its collapse.5
Third, a small body of literature attempted to locate the source of the Sino-Soviet Split in domestic politics. Scholars have argued that unrelated Chinese domestic leadership conflicts had a negative impact on the Sino-Soviet alliance,6 that Mao's anti-Soviet policies led him to undermine "the positions of all those [fellow] leaders who did not fully support his tough stance toward the USSR,"7 or that the Chinese leadership attempted to use anti-Soviet policies to divert attention from internal legitimacy problems.8 Others have focused on Soviet domestic politics by identifying factional infighting after Stalin's death as a source for the Sino-Soviet Split.9
Fourth, the role of ideology in the Sino-Soviet estrangement attracted scholarly attention as soon as public disputes started in 1960. In a seminal study published the following year, Donald Zagoria offered a multicausal interpretation that combined ideological with other causes (historical, personal, contextual, economic, and political).10 Subsequent early authors saw the split as purely ideological,11 or as the result of a mix of ideological and national interest factors.12 Another interpretation promoted the idea that the split was not principally about ideology but merely articulated in ideological rhetoric.13 Since the early 1980s, the "China under threat" interpretation garnered much academic interest; it promoted the idea that security concerns arising over an ideologically influenced threat perception shaped Chinese foreign policy behavior.14 In a more general debate, early observers of the collapse of socialist unity after Khrushchev's Secret Speech argued that the intrinsic nature of Marxism-Leninism tended, over time, to create friction among its adherents. According to this argument, the absolute assertions of Marxism - Leninism (in the form of a dogma) and its promotion of hierarchical political structures (one leading communist party worldwide and one vanguard communist party within each country) made it liable both to degenerate into factional battles over the correct interpretation of Marxism-Leninism and, in the process, to increase competing claims to sole leadership of the international communist movement.15
The examination of the newly available evidence allows us to reconsider these arguments. Conventional wisdom defines national interest in terms of securing the physical survival of the country and developing its economic potential. There is no evidence that a clash of national interest emerged because one of the two partners entered the alliance with the intention of undermining the military or economic security of, or even of obtaining control over, the other. The major lines of Sino-Soviet conflict emerged over unrelated issues at a time, in 1955–57, when clashes of national interest, such as conflicts over unresolved territorial disputes, were irrelevant. Sino-Soviet debates over the correct handling of imperialism are the closest to a national interest interpretation, but they occurred only after ideological conflict had already emerged.
In any case, the discussion of the national interest interpretation must focus on China, since it was more active in pursuing the split. Starting in 1958, it was Mao who vigorously implemented policies that destabilized the alliance and eventually led to the country's self-imposed isolation from the world and its economic impoverishment by 1969. On the one hand, proponents of a national interest approach might object that this could have been the unexpected result of sensible, but ultimately unsuccessful, policies. However, belligerent self-isolation from the world and the insistence on ideological correctness rather than the pursuit of friendly external relations and economic prosperity were conscious policy choices by Mao. Barbara Tuchman called such a pursuit of policy contrary to the country's interest a "folly."16 On the other hand, adherents of the national interest interpretation might argue that Mao misperceived China's national interest, but by doing so they merely acknowledge that national interest is dependent on another variable at the heart of the split. In essence, Mao's pursuit of what he considered to be China's global interests poses a methodological problem for existing academic definitions of national interest. Only if one accepts Mao's extreme conviction that China's national interest was its duty to spread world revolution aggressively or to follow his brilliant policy of withdrawing the PRC from a putrid world into the splendid isolation of a solitary model society, one might agree that Mao acted in the country's national interest.
Nationalism similarly seems not to have been a major contributing factor in the Sino-Soviet Split. Certainly, the Chinese Communists had been nationalists even before they became communists in the early 1920s, and Mao appealed to Chinese national feelings when he claimed that the PRC was the center of world revolution in the 1960s. These, however, were subsidiary aspects rather than central factors in his pursuit of policies that were designed to prove the ideological correctness of Chinese Communist—that is, his own—positions in the leadership conflict at home and in the struggle against Soviet ideological revisionism.
Explanations that rely on the relative changes in the strategic triangle between the PRC, the USSR, and the United States also seem unsuccessful in explaining the Sino-Soviet Split. The vast majority of the literature focuses on the period after the late 1960s and thus is outside the scope of this book.17 Although some authors have applied it to the post-1949 period,18 others have suggested that the strategic triangle has limited or even no explanatory power because China was too weak to count as a great power during the years covered in this book.19 I tend to agree with the critics of the triangular concept, though for different reasons. Despite its descriptive appeal, there is little evidence from the post-1949 period that can support its claims. While it is true that the Sino-Soviet alliance was directed against the United States, and that the Americans tried to drive a wedge into the partnership, no documentary evidence that the Chinese or the Soviets thought about their relationship within a triangular framework during the period covered in this book has surfaced. Maoist thinking from the 1940s to the 1960s proceeded from the assumption of a Sino-American conflict over the intermediate zone—basically, over the rest of the world.20 Thus, when Mao's PRC turned away from the Soviet Union in the 1960s, it did not turn toward the United States but toward one of the two intermediate zones he had just redefined, claiming to be the head of, even the model for, the international movement of national liberation in the Asian-African-Latin American intermediate zone (the other intermediate zone, according to this idea, consisted of Europe and other developed countries). Similarly, in 1949, Moscow looked at Beijing as an asset in its world revolutionary enterprise that had fallen into its lap rather fortuitously. In the end, the triangular concept is, methodologically speaking, an ahistorical model that greatly limits the ability to explain the inner dynamics of the split.
In a related discussion, scholars have addressed the U.S. role in the Sino-Soviet Split. The focus on an outside factor, however, also tends to obscure rather than explain the inner dynamics of the split. There is no evidence that "the root cause of the Sino-Soviet dispute was . . . the fear of [a] potential [U.S.] nuclear attack that made the Soviet leadership ignore Chinese interests in favor of détente with the West," as one author maintained.21 Similarly, the study of American policies toward the Sino-Soviet alliance tends to overestimate their effects on it.22 In general, I contend that American policies—including the wedge strategy that attempted to split the alliance through a combination of punishments and enticements—only worked in the later stages of the Sino-Soviet breakup, thereby exacerbating a process that had started for independent reasons.
Those authors who have investigated the role of domestic politics in the split have pointed out important pieces of the puzzle. There is no doubt that Khrushchev's de-Stalinization, though launched mainly for domestic reasons, reverberated throughout the socialist world. The central question is why only Mao's China (together with Enver Hoxha's Albania) sought sharp conflict with the Soviet Union while most other socialist states and communist parties merely used de-Stalinization to enhance their autonomy. In my view, it was China's internal conditions that provided a ripe environment for ideological radicalism in the late 1950s and the manipulation of ideology for domestic aims throughout the 1960s.
The greater availability of primary documentation helps to refine the scholarly understanding of how domestic politics influenced Sino-Soviet relations. Roderick MacFarquhar's three volumes on the origins of the Cultural Revolution provided abundant evidence for the important role of Chinese domestic politics in the Sino-Soviet Split. While these tomes supplied many important details for this book, their focus was not primarily on the increasingly close links between internal and external Chinese behavior I identify during the 1956–66 period.23
Writing on Sino-American relations, Thomas Christensen asserted in the mid-1990s that Cold War powers manipulated foreign crises to mobilize their own citizens for domestic aims. In a case study on the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, he argued that Mao exploited an international crisis in order to mobilize the Chinese people to support the launching of the radical Great Leap Forward.24 More recently, Chen Jian has pushed this argument further, claiming that Mao's concerns over the revolution at home led him to create foreign enemies with the aim to keep the Chinese people mobilized.25 Both thus argue that foreign policy was mustered for domestic objectives. Although my findings support both Christensen's and Chen's interpretations, I suggest that this process could work both ways. While domestic needs shaped foreign policy, as in the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, events abroad, such as the Polish October or the Hungarian Revolution, greatly influenced Mao's thinking and his domestic policies. Even as Mao was willing to provoke crises in international affairs to mobilize the Chinese people—or at least to render pressure on internal opponents, real or invented—there were also instances where he mobilized domestic policies in order to influence international affairs. His attempts to create a model communist society during the Great Leap Forward were certainly supposed to underscore his claim to the leadership of the socialist camp.
The Role of Ideology
The story of the Sino-Soviet breakup cannot be told without a focus on ideology. I identify ideology broadly as a set of beliefs and dogmas that both construct general outlines—rather than a detailed blueprint—of a future political order, and define specific methods—though no explicit pathways—to achieve it. In line with this characterization, Marxism-Leninism envisioned the communist society as the final objective of history, and granted the communist party the exclusive vanguard role in this process, at the expense of all other political movements or even the democratic process itself. Although Marx and Lenin wrote in great detail about how communism would look like once it was achieved, they in fact left relatively few concrete cues on the exact path of transforming the bourgeois present into the communist future.
In daily politics, ideology functions both as a belief system and as a political tool. On the one hand, ideology is about the political commitments made by its adherents to its theoretical postulates. Consequently, ideological claims tend to be claims in principle. Similarly, ideological disagreements that arise within the general outlines or as the result of the contradictions within the theory often are disagreements in principle. The unsophisticated understanding of theoretical postulates by their believers can exacerbate ideological disagreements. On the other hand, ideology may be manipulated for short-term political, or even personal, objectives. Such manipulation might happen inside the general outlines of ideology when, for example, a leader exploits theoretical ambiguities or contradictions to his political or personal benefit. However, ideological claims might also be cynically used for objectives incongruent with theoretical postulates. Methodologically, these two forms of manipulation are not always easy to distinguish.
The available evidence suggests that both the Chinese Communists and the Soviets genuinely believed that they were working toward the realization of the communist dream. For the most part, in my view at least, neither used the high-sounding promises of Marxism-Leninism in purely cynical fashion. However, the theoretical ambiguities of Marxism Leninism, combined with each side's underdeveloped understanding thereof, provided the two sides not only with ample opportunities for disagreement over their long-term domestic and foreign policies—both of which were at the root of the Sino-Soviet conflict—but also with a tool to achieve short-term political gains either against each other or against internal dissenters. Thus, although the ideological objective of Marxism-Leninism—the creation of a communist society—was clearly defined, the theoretically correct path to achieve it was sufficiently indeterminate to create discord both in principle and in daily political life.
Most previous authors tended to underestimate the disruptive role of ideology in the Sino-Soviet Split. In 1961, without the hindsight of history, Zagoria attributed great binding force to the shared ideology of the Sino-Soviet allies.26 Similarly, interpretations of the Sino-Soviet Split that stress the rhetorical role of ideology or the ideologically influenced threat perceptions of a defensive China also seemed to undervalue the role of ideology itself.27 Those authors who pointed out the intrinsic potential of dogmatic Marxism-Leninism to create discord correctly identified the ideological roots of the collapse of socialist unity in the period after Khrushchev's Secret Speech.28 However, since most communist parties continued to maintain satisfactory, though not always cordial, relations with each other, disagreements on ideological principles alone cannot adequately explain the reasons for China's (and Albania's) split from the Soviet Union and, by extension, from the socialist world. Only specific internal conditions, such as the manipulative use of ideology, can achieve this.
My view of the role of ideology in the Sino-Soviet Split differs slightly from other interpretations that have previously benefited from the new archival evidence. For example, I tend to give more weight to ideology than O. Arne Westad, who argued that it was "not sufficient to explain the breakdown in Sino-Soviet relations."29 Without the vital role of ideology, neither would the alliance have been established nor would it have collapsed. Chen Jian's recent claim that the domestic mission of the revolution shaped its international mission and that foreign policy—even to the extent that "Mao acted to create an enemy" in international relations—functioned as a "source of domestic mobilization" is closer to the view presented in this book.30 However, I take his interpretation even further, arguing that either policy realm, foreign and domestic, could influence—or even mobilize—the other. Moreover, I argue that Mao created international crises, not merely foreign enemies, for his domestic needs.
By the same token, the roles of security and economics in the Sino-Soviet Split cannot be understood without reference to ideology. It is true that, since the fall of 1950, American military might threatened China on the Korean peninsula. Equally, the military situation in the Taiwan Strait during the 1950s and in Indochina starting in the mid-1960s changed to China's disadvantage. However, these security threats were not the result of an inherent U.S. imperialist aggressiveness, as Mao and his comrades believed, but were largely the consequence of Chinese Communist commitments to world revolution since the 1920s—that is, to the overthrow of the imperialist international system that happened to be headed by the United States since 1945—and of Mao's assertive security policies since the late-1949 establishment of the PRC. Once Beijing recognized Hanoi diplomatically in early 1950 and committed itself to Pyongyang even before the Korean War, Washington's military and political responses turned Mao's beliefs about imperialist aggression into self-fulfilling prophecies. Furthermore, the Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence with the United States, which Khrushchev had been promoting since early 1956, did not undermine Chinese security (with regard to American military support for the Republic of China in Taiwan), as some observers have argued, but it was a point of ideological dispute between Mao and Khrushchev. By the late 1950s, firmly persuaded by the supposed might of the Soviet missile that carried Sputnik into space in 1957 and uncritically applying crude Leninist interpretations on the inherent inability of capitalists to cooperate with each other, Mao was convinced that imperialism was weak and internally split. Given this ideological preconception of the world, the Chinese leader simply could not understand why Khrushchev sought Soviet-American rapprochement.
Likewise, it is true that the structural economic problems the PRC faced in 1955 were genuine and that they threatened the material health of China. However, the solutions Mao proposed—first the Socialist High Tide, then the Great Leap Forward—were highly ideological, and ultimately poisonous for Sino-Soviet relations. I thus disagree with those authors who believed that "economics was never at the heart of the Sino-Soviet dispute."31 On the contrary, I support, and even extend, Lowell Dittmer's contention that ideological disagreements over the economic model were a cause of the Sino-Soviet Split.32 Similar to the ideological underpinnings of the Sino-Soviet economic debates in the second half of the 1950s, Moscow's withdrawal of its specialists from the PRC seems to be, at least superficially, an example of Soviet great power attempts at coercive or punitive diplomacy; in reality, however, it occurred only after antagonistic ideological campaigns by Beijing. Economic disagreements had deep ideological roots.
The findings of this book strengthen various interpretations put forward by New Cold War Historians. Ideology was significant to the policies of the socialist states, at least in the first half of the Cold War.33 Equally, the Sino-Soviet relationship confirms empirical findings that smaller Cold War allies were often able to set the agenda of their superpower patrons on both sides of the Cold War divide.34 Many of the arguments put forward by Vojtech Mastny and Malcolm Bryne in a recent study on the Warsaw Pact also apply to this book. Like the Sino-Soviet alliance, the principal socialist pact system ultimately collapsed as a result of the failure of ideology to provide clarity of purpose and unity of means.35
Additional Factors
Apart from ideology, a range of other factors contributed to the Sino-Soviet Split. The PRC was more active in bringing about the breakup than the Soviet Union. Particularly in the 1960s, Beijing controlled the pace of the relationship's deterioration and its eventual collapse, while Moscow was often left having to react to recurring provocations.
This development was rooted in the nature of the Sino-Soviet relationship. The two countries never matched each other in real power or global influence, although Beijing claimed equality with Moscow in 1956–57. In truth, Khrushchev was heading a superpower with increasing commitments around the world, while Mao was running a regional power that was progressively getting poorer and more isolated as a result of his own blunders. For the PRC, the Sino-Soviet alliance it had sought in 1949–50 was the defining moment in its early history; for the Soviet Union, the partnership was just another asset, though an important one, in its world revolutionary mission. Little wonder that, once disagreements emerged, Beijing invested a lot of energy in reinventing and then divesting itself of the alliance, while Moscow became negligent in maintaining the partnership.
A number of other factors played notable, though less central, roles. The United States was not the immediate cause of the Sino-Soviet Split; its policies, while designed to strain the alliance, turned out to be effective only once Sino-Soviet disagreements had emerged over unrelated issues. Although territorial controversies predated the alliance, it was only the emerging ideological disputes that turned them into points of conflict and, eventually in 1969, into a cause for war.36 Accidents, such as the U-2 Incident on May 1, 1960, or Soviet Defense Minister Rodion Malinovskii's drunken insult of Mao on November 7, 1964, wreaked havoc on the relationship, but it was the Chinese side that unduly exploited them for its own benefit. Finally, personality clashes contributed to but did not cause the Sino-Soviet Split.37 Mao's and Khrushchev's strong personalities and their far-reaching, unchecked powers within their respective political systems had an undue, negative influence on the alliance.
Ideology and Alliance Theory
This book further provides an empirical challenge to the theoretical literature on alliances. Political scientists who have explored alliances have mostly concentrated on their formation, which is not the focus of this book.38 In comparison, the literature on alliance cohesion is less well developed. Because the Sino-Soviet Split occurred when the PRC and the USSR were still weaker than the United States, the implicit Realist assumption that changes in the balance of global power will trigger transformations in alliance systems seems not to apply to the partnership between Beijing and Moscow. Stephen Walt, one of the leading Realist alliance scholars, saw the collapse of the Sino-Soviet alliance not as the result of ideological disagreements but as the consequence of China's security concerns that defied any ideological consideration.39 Mark Haas argued that while Mao's ideological radicalization during the Great Leap Forward was the "root cause" for the Sino-Soviet disagreements, conflicts resulting from their geographical proximity—territorial disputes and the militarization of the mutual border during the period after 1960—were ultimately responsible for the split.40
Although they are not connected to ideology, I concur, though with some qualifications, with several of the internal causes Glenn Snyder has proposed as to why alliances collapse. While the PRC indeed feared entrapment by the Soviet Union, this fear predated the alliance. Snyder's claim that allies try to restrain each other applies to several moments in the Sino-Soviet alliance. While it is true that China incited the Soviet Union to demonstrate greater anti-imperialist commitments, it did so not in order to make it fight the United States alone, as Snyder would argue, but in order to force it to join the PRC in such a struggle. Similarly, although Beijing often accused Moscow of failing to live up to alliance commitments, this usually happened over territorial conflicts with third parties that had occurred as a result of Chinese provocations or clumsy diplomacy.41
In a twist on alliance theory, Thomas Christensen recently promoted an ingenious argument on the role of ideology in alliance cohesion. Looking at the Sino-Soviet alliance through the lens of U.S. containment, he argued that it was less radical in times of great cohesion (1954–58) because Moscow was better at managing the partnership. In times of internal competition (1958–69), however, the alliance was more revolutionary because both partners vied for the allegiance of other socialist states or revolutionary movements.42 While I do agree with his counterintuitive insight that ideological conflict might have led to an unintended congruence with the original alliance goals, I also must stress the great destructive force of such ideological competition within the Sino-Soviet alliance even before 1969. The rivalry between Beijing and Moscow for Hanoi's allegiance during the Second Vietnam War complicated Washington's attempts to contain communist expansion in East Asia, but, in my view, it simultaneously demolished the last vestiges of the alliance by 1966.
The Structure of the Book
Chapter 1 explores the background of the Sino-Soviet dispute. It includes accounts of the historical roots of the theoretical debates that rattled the alliance in 1955–66, Sino-Soviet relations since 1921, and the first six years of the alliance. The chapter ends with the emergence of the first major ideological disagreement in the Sino-Soviet relationship—the Socialist High Tide of 1955.
The impact of Khrushchev's Secret Speech of February 1956 on the Sino-Soviet relationship stands at the center of chapter 2. Although the speech briefly checked Mao's preeminence in China's domestic politics, its catalytic effect on Poland and Hungary provided the Chinese leader with an opportunity to rethink the role of Stalinism in China's political and economic development. Over the course of 1957, political developments in the PRC—the failure of Mao's attempt at political liberalization—and in the Soviet Union—the failure of the remaining Stalinist stalwarts in the Soviet leadership to stop de-Stalinization by overthrowing Khrushchev—set the two countries on paths of political development that were diametrically opposed to one another. Nevertheless, both Beijing and Moscow sought to obscure these disagreements at the Moscow Meeting of the world communist movement in late 1957.
Chapter 3 addresses Mao's double challenge to Khrushchev's leadership of the socialist camp in 1958. The Chinese leader rejected both the contemporaneous Soviet development model in favor of a more radical economic policy—the Great Leap Forward—and peaceful coexistence for a confrontational stance during the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis in August of 1958. Ultimately, the two events were closely linked; military conflict off the coast of the PRC was supposed to help Mao mobilize the Chinese people to participate in the radical policies of the Great Leap Forward.
The connection between domestic and foreign policy was less tangible in the following year (chapter 4). Mao's refusal to address the congenital problems of the Great Leap Forward and his suppression of criticism further radicalized China's political discourse, and thereby produced a negative context for the development of Sino-Soviet relations throughout the year. Although Beijing had not openly provoked the Tibetan Uprising, nor had it started the ensuing Sino-Indian Border War, its clumsy way of dealing with these crises alienated Moscow in the period before Khrushchev's seminal visit to Washington. At the end of the year, both the Chinese Communists and the Soviets reassessed their relationship. Each side nursed misgivings about the other.
Chapter 5 revolves around China's so-called Lenin Polemics and the collapse of economic relations. Mao's decision to make the ideological disagreements public on the occasion of Lenin's ninetieth birthday in April of 1960 reflected his mounting ideological disagreements with Khrushchev. The U-2 Incident on May 1 seemed to confirm his opinion of the inherent aggressiveness of U.S. imperialism. An ideological campaign against the Soviet Union, both within and outside of China, provoked Khrushchev into the punitive action of withdrawing all Soviet advisers from the PRC in July. Although, as a result, economic relations broke down, the eventual collapse of the Great Leap Forward in China and the failure of Soviet-American rapprochement forced Beijing and Moscow to seek reconciliation during the Second Moscow Meeting in late 1960. The ideological compromise reached at the meeting, however, was only temporary.
From early 1961 to mid-1962, Sino-Soviet relations experienced a period of ambiguity (chapter 6). The collapse of the Great Leap Forward had limited Mao's prerogatives to set China's domestic and foreign policies. The country's internal needs led to sound economic reform policies, promoted by other Chinese leaders against Mao's desires, and even to related Sino-Soviet cooperation. At the same time, Mao tried to seize on Sino-Soviet disagreements over de-Stalinization and Albania in 1961 in order to keep pressure on Khrushchev. Ultimately, though, he was unable to prevent high-ranking party cadres from calling for a less radical foreign policy. While the PRC seemed to embark on moderate domestic and foreign policies in the first half of 1962, the sudden outbreak of ethnic conflict in Xinjiang and the mass flight of ethnic Central Asians and Russians to the Soviet Union taxed the relations between Beijing and Moscow.
The following two chapters cover the intertwined stories of the period from mid-1962 to mid-1963. Chapter 7 starts with Mao's political resurgence in the summer of 1962. After accusing his fellow leaders of propagating the reintroduction of capitalism in China's economy at the Beidaihe work conference, he was able to reclaim the preeminent position in daily policy making. Subsequently, he terminated the relaxation of Sino-Soviet relations and exploited Khrushchev's public humiliation during the Cuban Missile Crisis. By early 1963, Mao had decided to work actively for the Sino-Soviet Split, though he sought to achieve it in ways that would force Khrushchev to assume responsibility.
Chapter 8 deals with U.S. President John Kennedy's attempt to instrumentalize the rift for the conclusion of the Limited Nuclear Test Ban (LNTB) treaty that, among other aims, was supposed to prevent China from acquiring nuclear know-how or even isolate the PRC internationally. In the summer of 1963, Sino-Soviet reconciliation talks, requested by the Vietnamese Communists, and the Soviet–British–American test ban negotiations were held simultaneously in Moscow. While the former failed as a result of Mao's uncompromising position, the Soviet Union and the United States were able to make a sufficient amount of concessions to reach a minimal agreement.
The final two chapters address the collapse of Sino-Soviet party and military relations. Internationally isolated after the LNTB treaty, Mao increased the ideological attacks on the Soviet revisionists in propaganda and at the five communist party congresses in Europe in the period from mid-1963 to mid-1964 (chapter 9). The shrill and redundant anti-Soviet claims were related to his goal of pressuring domestic opponents, real and invented, into ideological and political acquiescence. Firm in his belief that Khrushchev's fall would mean a return of the Soviet comrades to correct—that is, to his own—theoretical positions, Mao misunderstood the October 1964 leadership changes in Moscow. When he realized that the new Soviet leaders had hardly modified Khrushchev's foreign policies, he knew that anti-Soviet propaganda had failed to cow his domestic opponents into political submission. Starting in early 1965, Mao thus used anti-Soviet positions to prepare for a purge of what he called revisionists and capitalists within the party leadership. With that, the collapse of the Sino-Soviet partnership had become a function of domestic politics. The mid-1966 launch of the party purge in the Cultural Revolution thus required the complete abrogation of Sino-Soviet party relations.
This ideological development set the stage for the collapse of Sino-Soviet military relations over the early Second Vietnam War (chapter 10). The U.S. escalation of the Indochina conflict paralleled the leadership changes in Moscow. Khrushchev's hands-off policy toward Vietnam was among the few policies the new Soviet leaders revised completely and quickly. Although the U.S. escalation and the sudden Soviet willingness to provide massive military aid to North Vietnam created security problems for China in early 1965, Mao's unconstructive response was ideologically predetermined. The Sino-Soviet military relationship collapsed in 1965–66 not because of Moscow's failure to honor the alliance's anti-imperialist spirit, but as a result of Beijing's attempt to redefine it as a tool for radical policies that reflected Mao's distinct, ideological goals.
File created: 12/14/2007
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text:
Cadillac SRX First Generation Forum - 2004 - 2009 Discussion, Timing chain in 2007 SRX4 in Cadillac SRX / XT5 Forums; I also have an 07 srx v6 awd that has been in the shop for 2 weeks now... The dealer ...
- 03-13-08 08:04 PM #16Cadillac Owners Member
- Automobile(s): Cadillac SRX
- Join Date
- Aug 2007
- Location
- East GTA
- Posts
- 14
Re: Timing chain in 2007 SRX4
I also have an 07 srx v6 awd that has been in the shop for 2 weeks now... The dealer informed me they got another one in a few days after mine also ... Both have this same timeing chain issue... My srx only had 11000 km's on it... What kind of compansation have people been getting from GM for this problem .. My dealer got me a rental (07 trailblazer which has 50k km's and is a piece of junk.. ) The car is only 6 months old but was built in early 07.. They tell me it could be at least a week longer or more before I see it again .. this is totaly unaceptable for what is a $70,000+ car here in Canada.... I have not called customer service yet, but after seeing this thread I will tomorrow... Just wondering what people got for compensation and how they went about it .. Any help would be greatly apreciated..
after reading other posts and seeing how long it took for this repair it seems GM has really dropped the ball... Knowing there is a problem they should have parts available for this fix.. Being a Gm employee who listens everyday to GM preach quality I am ashamed! There is no reason in the world for it to take so long for these parts to become available except that this is a huge problem...If you make a mistake in assembly they slap you hard with disipline such as days off for making a what is usually a human error.... With the possibility of more problems down the road from this defect, I will be dealing this car as soon as it is fixed if i can get anyone to take it ... When people who research future purchases come across these type of issues they will run fast and hard away from these cars.. So much for resale value..... Sorry for the rant but this is very disconcerning as an employee and a customer....
Re: Timing chain in 2007 SRX4
I made a thread before I knew this one existed:
I wasn't driving the car, but my fiancee was. A dash light came on and so she called OnStar. They told her it was a Secondary Timing Chain failure and she'd have to take it to the dealer as soon as possible.
So it's there now. Both the dealer and OnStar told her there was a TSB issued for this, but I haven't been able to find the exact bulletin (I checked NHTSA and this site).
Is this a serious issue? I know Timing Chains are a critical. How long should it take to correct?
I didn't expect a timing chain issue from such a new vehicle. I'm a little shocked.
Re: Timing chain in 2007 SRX4
Don Henry,
You use the same dealer that I do.
Frank Kent Cadillac.
I have always had good service there.
Never any problems that were not quickly and correctly fixed.
Texas Jim
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- 03-14-08 12:00 AM #19Cadillac Owners Member
- Automobile(s): Cadillac
- Join Date
- Sep 2007
- Posts
- 23
Re: Timing chain in 2007 SRX4
I have always had excellent service and treatment from them.
They are friendly and fix problems and do recalls in 1/2 days.
It's just this POS SRX GM product that is falling apart around us. In the first year, it's been back about 2 months total for different defects which get corrected and something else breaks. I could fill up this post with the list. It's going back Monday for oil leaking out of rear end and unknown loud howling noise from rear axle as you drive. Recall done on rear seal last week. Steering gear also replace last week and 2 new 20" rear tires replaced due alignment issues - slick at 22,000.
Again my issue is with the initial poor quality of this car.
As I stated before, I bet it doesn't last the 100,000 warranty.
Of course the resell value of these have tanked.
- 03-15-08 10:36 AM #22Cadillac Owners Member
- Automobile(s): 07 srx w/prem lux and sport pack
- Join Date
- Apr 2007
- Location
- scranton pa
- Posts
- 8
Re: Timing chain in 2007 SRX4
talk about a tanked resale....i went to trade my 07 srx awd v6 with every option..i mean everyhting and 8000 miles and i am getting quotes of 23-27 grand. thats nice for a car that was 49 grand i know a car loses its vale but 50 percent? mine is leased also but between what i got the car for..43 grand plus the fact that i am payin only 529 a month for 36 months i just cant beleive that thats all i am gettin...my buyout is 36 grand and thats all i want...i have settled with caddy for all my troubles and i received 4 grand from them plus free oil changes and inspections..i stupidly accepted so now i am bound to it.....
- 03-16-08 10:10 PM #23Cadillac Owners Member
- Automobile(s): '07 AWD MRC V8 SRX
- Join Date
- Feb 2007
- Location
- Salt Lake City
- Posts
- 35
Re: Timing chain in 2007 SRX4
It certainly sounds, from this thread, that GM/Cad is trying to intimidate some of its own loyal customers. I'm going through Mediation in a week through the BBB on a buy back also. GM has refused to even negotiate a buy back. Engine (V8) replaced at 400 miles, front timing cover leak on replacement engine at 2700 miles, valve cover leak at 4000 miles and an engine case-half leak at 4800 miles. I've owned or leased 19 new cars since 1968 and 10 of them have been GM's, no Ford or Chrysler products. The last 10 years I buy or lease 2 cars every 2-3 years. Five of the cars (of the 19) have been Corvettes including a 2007 going in one month to be replaced by a '08 Porsche Turbo. GM has now burned a bridge...no disrespect GMJim, but there will be no more GM vehicles purchased by me or my family and it is large one. My SRX now has 5700 miles on it. If I lose at mediation, which does not bind me to accept, I'll pursue a State Lemon Law complaint. Thank god I only have 28 months left on the Lease...and then it's gone. I now understand why GM lost $38B in the last quarter of 2007. Customer service and build quality are no longer in GM's game plan.
Re: Timing chain in 2007 SRX4
I am glad my experience with GM don't mirror some of what I read on this board. I would be so mad.... as some of you are... and rightly so.
I bought a new 1999 Chevy Van. It was still going strong till Nov 2006 when my garage caught on fire and burned my new 2006 Cadillac DTS and the Van.
I had put over 225,000 miles on it with almost ZERO trouble. It still had the original plugs, wires and shocks on it. In fact, except for tires and an alternator at around 150,000 and a battery or two... EVERYTHING on it was still original. One of the most trouble free vehicles I have ever owned.
The 2006 DTS that burned had over 35,000 miles on it. Not counting oil changes... it had been back to the dealer ONE TIME for repairs. The Air Conditioned seat control mudule went out and the back glass was leaking when it rained. It was fixed correctly the first time.
The 2006 van I have now has NEVER been back to the dealer. Now has almost 35,000 miles on it.
The replacement DTS I now have, has 30,000 miles on it. It has been back once for the same AC seat module and once for when one of the parking sensors went out in the front bumper.
I am really sorry to hear of all of your troubles and am just glad it is not me.
Texas Jim
- 12-19-13 06:09 PM #25Cadillac Owners Member
- Join Date
- Dec 2013
- Posts
- 1
Re: Timing chain in 2007 SRX4
I ( thought ) I had the same problem and did the mechanic. So they replaced all timing chains,tensioner,head gaskets. The problem still existed. The problem actually ended up being the cam shaft actuators. I got all 4 replaced, the problem was fixed. 2007 SRX4 V8
Re: Timing chain in 2007 SRX4
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text:
I-270/Roberts Rd interchange to re-open with smoother traffic flow
COLUMBUS, Ohio (WTVN) --Ohio's first-ever Diverging Diamond Interchange, or DDI, opens Monday afternoon on Columbus's west side.
According to the Ohio Department of Transportation (ODOT), the interchange shaped like a diamond will allow more vehicles to travel more efficiently and safely through the interchange instead of waiting in separate turn lanes to get on the freeway.
The project, completed almost a week ahead of time, took 90 days.


text:
Ross, CA, USA < change city >
Photographers (105)
Caterers (66)
Florists (62)
Bands (53)
Cakes (49)
DJs (47)
Wedding Day Beauty (43)
Wedding Fashion (19)
Decorations (18)
Rentals (18)
Officiants (16)
Invitations (14)
Limos (11)
Favors (9)
Jewelry (9)
Ceremony Sites (65)
Reception Sites (52)
See All Vendors >
Ams Entertainment
Sonoma, CA, USA
Bands/Live Entertainment, DJs
4 ratings, 4 reviews, 4 weddings
Melissa & Skip did such a great job keeping things going during our cocktail hour...
Fog City Entertainment
2603 Camino Ramon suite 200, San Ramon, CA 94583
2107 Van Ness Ave suite 405
San Francisco, CA 94109, USA
DJs, Bands/Live Entertainment
4 ratings, 3 reviews, 4 weddings
Ashley and I met and spoke several times before the wedding. We gave her a list a...
DJ KenFused
Benicia, CA 94510, USA
DJs, Bands/Live Entertainment
2 ratings, 2 reviews, 3 weddings
All I can tell u is, all the 150 guests at the reception were at the dance floor....
Keith Johnson All Stars
San Francisco, Ca 94080, USA
Bands/Live Entertainment, DJs
1 rating, 1 review, 1 wedding
Keith Johnson and the All Stars were AWESOME!! We did a 9 piece band. I would r...
Pacific Entertainment
173 Coleridge Drive
Vallejo, CA 94591, U.S.A.
1 rating, 1 review, 1 wedding
Did exactly what we wanted!
CSagum Entertainment
San Francisco/Bay Area, California
DJs, Ceremony & Reception
1 rating, 1 review, 1 wedding
Chris was simply awesome. You really couldn't ask for a better DJ.
Photo-matica Photo Booth...
740A 14th Street
Suite 200
San Francisco, CA 94114, US
(415) 466-8700
Photo Booths, DJs
1 rating, 1 review, 1 wedding
Very professional, on time, high quality prints that you can customize! Matt was...
Ams Entertainment
Sonoma, CA, USA
1 rating, 1 review, 1 wedding
AMS was amazing. They were so easy to work with. Our DJ Alex was incredible. He k...
Traviss Crumpacker
San Francisco, CA, USA
1 rating, 1 review, 1 wedding
Such a fun DJ! Non-imposing, plays a great variety.
Full Swing Entertainment
San Francisco, CA, United States
1 rating, 1 review, 1 wedding
Wendell Davis is one of our good friends and is by far one of the best DJs. He's...


text:
Stay connected with us
around the nation »
Capital Construction Fund - Documents and Forms
Application Documents
The law requires that applicants enter into a formal agreement with the Secretary of Commerce. The agreement allows the vessel's owner to deposit tax deferred funds which can be used for the construction, reconstruction, or acquisition and reconstruction of a qualified vessel. Applications are accepted at any time, however a complete application must be submitted by your tax due date including extensions to be effective for that particular tax year.
These forms are all .pdf files. Adobe Acrobat Reader is required to view .pdf files. Various versions are available for different systems. To download Adobe Acrobat Reader for FREE!
List of all CCF Application Documents
Schedule A and Schedule B Forms
Complete a Schedule A for each income producing vessel. Complete a Schedule B form for each qualified vessel project. Schedule B data should include actual or anticipated plans for either construction, acquisition, reconstruction or safety reconstruction. If you are not currently a CCF agreement holder, these forms should be submitted as part of the application.
- Schedule A - Eligible Vessel
- Schedule B - Qualified Vessel for Construction, Acquisition and/or Mortgage Payments
- Schedule B - Qualified Vessel for Reconstruction
- Schedule B - Qualified Vessel for Safety Reconstruction
Energy Savings Projects
CCF Regulations at 50 CFR 259.31(d) allows the use of CCF funds to include qualified withdrawals for acquisition and installation of equipment to improve the energy efficiency of a fishing vessel. Energy savings projects must be for a Schedule A listed CCF Agreement vessel, and must otherwise be for the purchase of a capitalizable item. When tax deferred CCF funds are used, the tax basis of the energy saving equipment must be reduced. The Regulation allows the use of CCF funds to pay for fishing vessel energy saving projects without regard to the usual reconstruction requirements of: (1) the cost of the energy saving project; (2) whether the fishing vessel involved in the energy saving project had its useful life extended, its value increased, or was converted to a different fisheries use; and, (3) conditional fishery requirements.
Safety Projects
CCF funds can be used for acquisition and installation of safety equipment if the expenditure is required under the Commercial Fishing Industry Vessel Safety Act of 1988, or its central purpose is to materially increase the safety of the vessel. This objective is limited to safety items only.
Documents Dealing with Withdrawal permission Requirements
Withdrawal permission is conditioned upon receipt of certain forms. These forms include:
Deposit/Withdrawal Report Annual Filing (NOAA Form 34-82)
The Deposit/Withdrawal Report is required to be filed each year within 30 days after the due date of that year's tax return, even if no deposits or withdrawals are made. The Deposit/Withdrawal Report must be signed and be attached to a complete copy of the tax return (as filed with the IRS).
- NOAA FORM 34-82 General Information
- Deposit/Withdrawal Report Form
- Net Proceeds Worksheet
- Non-Qualified Withdrawals Interest Rate
Prior to terminating your agreement, you must notify us in writing. You must include the date the account was closed or will be closed. Your file will be reviewed by the CCF Staff and any documents that are missing will be requested. We must receive all missing documents and all requirements of your Agreements must be met before we can terminate your Agreement. Under limited circumstances, you may be relieved of the paperwork burden of supplying missing Deposit/Withdrawal Reports and for tax returns by filing the following forms:


text:
After months of jockeying and rivalry between potential candidates, the Bronx Democratic Party organization reached a decision early yesterday to support Councilman Adolfo Carrión Jr. for Bronx borough president.
To clear the way for an endorsement of Mr. Carrión, 40, a former urban planner who is completing his first term on the City Council, the Bronx organization successfully urged another candidate, Assemblyman José Rivera, to withdraw from the borough president race and to run instead for re-election to the Assembly next year.
The decision about whom to endorse for borough president had been a particularly painstaking one for the organization and its chairman, Roberto Ramirez. Both Mr. Carrión and Mr. Rivera have been loyal supporters of the party organization, but it was widely thought that neither candidate would prevail if both ran in the primary. In the end, Mr. Rivera, 64, said he withdrew in the interest of party unity.
''This is an election that is important for this organization and this borough,'' Mr. Rivera said yesterday. ''We have put personal desire aside for the good of the whole.''Continue reading the main story
Despite this organizational unity, Mr. Carrión faces an intensely competitive race. Two candidates have already entered the race officially: State Senator Pedro Espada Jr. and Willie Colón, the salsa performer and onetime candidate for Congress. And two City Council members, June M. Eisland and Lawrence A. Warden, are in the early stages of formulating a campaign.
''We have competition and we never underestimate the intensity of a race,'' Mr. Carrión said yesterday. ''But we have reached a strong consensus and I'm very excited about it because it creates a very strong political team.''
In last year's Democratic primaries, the Bronx organization placed its political prestige behind many races for Assembly, State Senate and Congress, losing virtually all of them. But this year, with the endorsements the organization has made for borough president and several Council seats, Mr. Ramirez said things will be different.
''I expect that all the races will be challenging and difficult,'' he said yesterday. ''But I believe that the voters of the Bronx will give these candidates their vote of confidence.''
While Mr. Carrión will have the support and resources of the organization behind him, he faces a formidable opponent in Mr. Espada, who reclaimed his Senate seat last year in a full-throttle political battle against the Democratic organization. Mr. Espada, who also operates a large health services operation in the Bronx, is expected to spend a considerable amount of money on the primary campaign.
''People who play at the top don't always see what's coming from the bottom up,'' Mr. Espada said. ''I understand that there is a real hunger for meaningful change and real coalitions. That's who I am and that's what the people feel I am.''
Another complication for Mr. Carrión and the Democratic organization is that while Mr. Rivera has withdrawn from the race, the field still includes three Puerto Rican candidates. That has given rise to the political hopes of Ms. Eisland, who is white, and Mr. Warden, who is black. Although non-Hispanic white voters make up less than a third of the Bronx electorate, Ms. Eisland's strategists say they are confident that she will capture the vast majority of those votes.
The Democratic organization endorsed Mr. Carrión after more than a day of intense discussion among an unusually large number of officials. His endorsement and those for City Council candidates were intended to reduce tensions between various party factions and to present the best opportunity for victories.
Among the organization's decisions in Council races, the most notable was the one to back the Council candidacy of the Rev. Ruben Diaz Sr., a Pentecostal minister who has at times been at odds with Mr. Ramirez and the local party. Mr. Diaz's son, Assemblyman Ruben Diaz Jr., has been a loyal worker for the Democratic organization, and some party officials feared that if the organization did not endorse his father, both might support a rival candidate for borough president.
Less surprising was the decision to endorse José Marco Serrano, a 28-year-old information systems manager and the son of Representative José E. Serrano. Mr. Serrano is running for the City Council seat currently held by Mr. Espada's son, Councilman Pedro Gautier Espada.
The organization endorsed Michael Benjamin, an aide to Assemblywoman Aurelia Greene, in a Council race in which he will face Helen Foster, the daughter of Councilman Wendell Foster. The organization also endorsed former State Senator Larry B. Seabrook, who is running for the Council seat now held by Mr. Warden. Mr. Warden cannot run for re-election because of term limits.Continue reading the main story


text:
Faculty Profile
Philip Huber
email@example.com | 141 Sloan Fine Arts Building, Lock Haven, PA 17745 | (570) 484-2130
Master of Fine Art, September 1995 and Master of Art, August 1992 Syracuse University, Syracuse, New York
Bachelor of Fine Art, May 1990, Kutztown University, Kutztown, Pennsylvania
Courses Most Commonly Taught: Color and Two-dimensional Design; Photography as Art; Drawing and Drawing II; Studies Abroad: London and Paris, a Humanities Seminar author of syllabus; Visual Thinking
Courses Developed: Drawing 2; Studies Abroad: London and Paris, a Humanities Seminar; Visual Thinking; Conflict in Spanish Art a statewide honors course in Spain for the Pennsylvania State System of Higher Education
Programs Developed: The Bachelors of Fine Arts Program, Graphic and Online Design
Professional Publications:
2010- Harrisburg Art Association Annual, Harrisburg, PA
2009- Sprama Gallery second exhibition.
2009- Sprama Gallery opening exhibition.
2009- 81st Annual International Art Association of Harrisburg, PA, Third place.
2009- University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada
2008- Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.
2008- Small group show, Art association of Harrisburg, PA
2008- 80th Annual International Art association of Harrisburg, PA.
2008- Appleton Museum, Ocala Florida.
2008- Central Florida Community College, Ocala Florida.
A Crossing of Zebras, Boyds Mills Press, 2008
Advanced Professional Skin Care, second ed., a textbook by Peter T. Pugliese, M.D. (260 illustrations), 2005
Down the Susquehanna to the Chesapeake, by Jack Brubaker, two photographs, 2002, Illustrations Ophthalmic Management of the Peri-Ocular Skin (14 illustrations), 2001
Illustrations for Optometric Management Magazine (5 illustrations), 2001
Portraits for SFU Alumni Library, 2000
Lock Haven University - University Academic Handbook cover drawing, 2002; Fredricks' Family Memorial CD cover drawing, 2002; Pergola drawing for fund raiser 1999; President's holiday card, 2000
International publications:
Architecture of Bukhara from the Ninth to the Twentieth Century, by Mavlyuda Yusupova, 2006
Colonial Architecture of the Fargana Valley, by Mavlyuda Yusupova, 2005
Illustration for Secrets de la Carte a` Gratter, by Marco D. Elliot, LTA publishers, Paris, 2000
Advanced Professional Skin Care, Portuguese edition, Av. Paulo de Frontin, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 1995
Professional Presentations:
Presentations International
CESS, University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada 2009
University of Sfax, Sfax, Tunisia Presentation and exhibition, The Etchings of John Sloan, from the Lock Haven University collection, 2005
University of Sfax, Sfax, Tunisia Presentation on Digital Photography, AMIDEAST, Tunis, Tunisia Presentation and exhibition, The Etchings of John Sloan, from the Lock Haven University collection, 2005
Presentations National
CESS, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., 2008
Rotary International, Fulbright in Uzbekistan, 2007
Lock Haven University, Outcomes of Digital Photography Printing, 2005
Areas of Expertise: International Education, Islamic architectural photography


text:
You have been warned
On Tuesday MPs turned down requests for statutory regulation of the press following the royal phone-tapping scandal at the News of the World. But they fired a warning shot across the bows of editors by telling them they were in danger of become 'complacent' about their journalists.
No need to get catty
ITV TV chief Simon Shaps hit back at BBC director-general Mark Thompson's accusations that ITV has been 'copycatting'. 'Put it like this,' he said, 'we're definitely not doing our version of Castaway.' Ouch.
Cutting remarks
BBC director radio Jenny Abramsky warned the Radio Festival in Cambridge on Wednesday of cuts on the way: 'We have taken 15 per cent out [of our budget] over three years and are probably going to have to take out a similar amount over the next few years.' She could start with Chris Moyles' pay packet.
Quote of the week
'Speculation about us and Emap... seems to have come from a 30-second chat with Tom Moloney. We did say 'this is the sort of thing we should talk about'. But literally we were walking out [of a restaurant] in Charlotte Street, he went one way, I went the other.'
GCap chief executive Ralph Bernard
It ain't over till it's over
Billionaire and millionaire Ron Burkle and Brad Greenspan clubbed together in New York to see if they could come up with an alternative to Rupert Murdoch's $5bn bid for Dow Jones. This one's running longer than a Broadway smash.
Good week for...
Sky's share price hurdled the £7 barrier after it revealed that it added 90,000 subscribers to its pay-TV service in the second quarter of this year. Sky now has 8.6 million customers and a very smug smile. Virgin who?
Bad week for...
The BBC had a double whammy. On Monday it was fined £50,000 by Ofcom over the Blue Peter scandal; on Thursday came Queengate. The Beeb had to apologise after suggesting that HM had had a queeny fit and flounced off in a huff. Off with somebody's head.
Headline of the week
Bombs, guns, gangs - now Basra falls prey to the monster badger
The Times


text:
Originally posted on Mets Merized Online | Last updated 1/5/13
Ike Davis had an incredible second half for the Mets last season and even led the NL in home runs during that span. Plagued with some rust from an ankle injury that wiped out his 2011 season and a bout with Valley Fever, Davis had two very forgettable months to start the 2012 campaign - combining for a .169 batting average in April and May. He came dangerously close to being demoted to the minors, but Terry Collins stuck with him and Davis rewarded him with 27 homers and .541 slugging percentage the rest of the way. That leads to the question of if the young first baseman can hit the 40 homer plateau. Fake Teams' Ray Guilfoyle believes he can and writes: But, Davis will have to improve in two areas before reaching the 40 home run plateau. He needs to hit better than .174 vs lefties, as he did in 2012. He hit .295 vs lefties in 2010, so if he can split the difference and hit around .240 against southpaws, that should help him get there. In addition, Davis was horrible at home last se...
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