text:
Washington, DC
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the purpose and evolution of certain rules and institutions that govern the civil service system. The main focus is on the link between these rules and the performance of the bureaucracy. In particular, the fact that several countries have opted to organize their bureaucracies with high proportions of career civil servants is examined. This fact seems paradoxical given that providing tenure to bureaucrats is widely seen as a cause of inefficient performance. There is a prevailing sense that job tenure has removed the incentives for high productivity and accountability. The bureaucratic public administration is perceived as not being able to guarantee fast, neither cheap, nor high quality services. On the contrary: Public bureaucracy as it is today, is seen as slow, expensive and not well oriented to serve the citizens. If this picture is true, why is job tenure for most civil servants maintained? Why isn't this system changed?
In the next section, it will be shown that the current civil service model arose as a reaction to patronage and clientelism, which were prevalent in many countries and which have even lower results in terms of efficiency. Section 2 will trace the historical evolution of the civil service towards a system of meritocracy and stability.
It will be shown that this new system brought problems of its own. Employment tenure turned out to be a factor that mitigated the incentives for employees to put more effort into their jobs, since they could not be fired based on poor performance. In many countries (including, amongst others, Brazil and the United States of America), there were periodic attempts at reforming the civil service system throughout this century, in order to make the bureaucracy more efficient. However, these attempts have not been successful.
This paper intends to focus on these questions, arguing that one of the main reasons for the maintenance of this model is the competition between the Executive and Legislature to control the agencies.
Section 2 - From Patronage to Meritocracy. The Current System
According to Melo (1996), presidential control over bureaucracy can be divided in three historic phases. The first was patronage control over access to the public careers. Secondly, there was a professionalization of the bureaucracies, with stability, autonomy and insulation from the political process. This can be seen as equivalent to the process of construction of the "Weberian" bureaucracies. It is in this context of independent bureaucracies that the principal-agent problem first appears in the relationship among elected officials and the bureaucracy. The third phase, beginning in the Seventies, introduced standards instead of routines, with flexible and entrepreneurialists characteristics, in order to, among other things, demand more accountability from the bureaucracies, reducing their insulation.
Indeed, there has been major institutional change over the last 100 years, from a patronage system for federal employees to the current civil service system. When the bureaucratic public administration replaced patronage, it represented an immense innovation against corruption and nepotism. The main European countries adopted it by the end of the last century; by the United States of America at the beginning of this century; and by Brazil in 1936. Job tenure for federal civil servants is a characteristic of bureaucratic administrations. It was a way of protecting the employees and even the government against the negative effects of patronage. In this section first the evolution of the Civil Service System in the USA is examined before tracing its development in Brazil.
2.1. The Evolution of the Civil Service System in the USA
In the U.S.A., up until the early part of the twentieth century, most federal employees were hired on the basis of patronage. There was no job tenure and employees were routinely replaced after elections whenever their political benefactors were defeated. The shift away from patronage to a merit system began with the Pendleton Act of 1883, although the change was neither homogeneous nor fast.
The Pendleton Act assigned specific positions for inclusion into a merit system called the classified service. The civil service was classified into two components: classified (merit) and unclassified (patronage) employees (Johnson & Libecap, 1994). This system reduced the influence of the local party officials over federal workers. The change was gradual, however, taking over two decades for more than 50% of the total federal civilian labor force to be under the merit system.
The Pendleton Act, however, did not grant tenure to the employees, even though it did state that they could not be dismissed for refusing to perform partisan services. Nevertheless, the fact that employees could still be dismissed or declassified indicated that there remained room for further rules to avoid political interference. The first move in that direction came in 1897 when President McKinley issued an Executive Order which stated that dismissal from the classified services could only be made with written notification and the right to respond. President Roosevelt strengthened this Order in 1902. Subsequently, other acts in 1920 (Civil Service Retirement Act), 1923 and 1949 (Classification Acts) and 1978 (Civil Service Reorganization Act) reiterated the principle.
According to Johnson and Libecap (1994, 91-119), the adoption of a merit system was an attempt by federal politicians to obtain more effective control over the actions and the performance of the federal labor force. Also, pressure on politicians by interest groups demanding efficiency gave them an incentive to seek arrangements to deliver better public services to those constituencies.
The patronage system was completely scrapped by the Hatch Act of 1939 and 1940, which prohibited the direct involvement of federal employees in political campaigns.
In 1987 it was estimated there were approximately 5000 political appointees within the federal work force, amounting to less than 1% of total civilian employment. Nowadays, about 80% of federal civil servants have guaranteed stability by federal law. The federal civilian white-collar employees are hired on the basis of merit, promoted within the framework of civil service rules, and are not to be explicitly involved in political campaigns. Once beyond a probationary period, federal employees essentially have job tenure.
2.2. The Evolution of the Civil Service System in Brazil
In the history of job stability in the public sector of Brazil, the rules alternated several times. Sometimes, job tenure was guaranteed for all of the public servants, in other moments it was assured only for a few officials, or nobody.
The Federal Constitution of 1824, for the first time, clearly established the fundaments of a meritocratic system. In 1827, during the Imperial period, when Dom Pedro I was the Emperor of Brazil, some careers, such as justice officials and academics amongst others, had guaranteed tenure. The purpose of this system was to avoid the replacement of these servants each time a new government came to power. In 1868 another national decree increased the number of careers graced with tenure. Despite this decree a high percentage of employees continued to be removed whenever there were changes in government.
Finally in 1888, a further decree was passed establishing job tenure for all public servants. According to the 1888 Decree, civil servants could only be fired after a lengthy administrative process or as a direct consequence of serious misconduct. The next change in the relevant legislation came in 1896. The government then revoked all past decrees and proclaimed itself able to transfer or fire any civil servant indiscriminately.
The legislative pattern was to change in 1934 when for the first time in the history of Brazil, a Federal Constitution assured job tenure for public officials. The 1934 Constitution also established competitive examinations for new applications into some careers, assuring for all those approved in such exams the right to belong to the civil servant career. Still, the Constitution kept the possibility of appointing officials for the high careers, a tradition that is still partially maintained today. During the mandate of President Getulio Vargas, in the 1930s, the first concrete administrative reform occurred in Brazil. The main point was to introduce the bureaucratic model, as proposed by Max Weber, in order to avoid the expansion of patronage practice.
The Federal Constitution of 1946 maintained job stability for all public civil servants admitted by public examination. Officials who had been working for more than five years, even if not admitted by public examination, were also granted job tenure.
Incongruous to the trend, and solely as a means to punish adversaries of the military regime, in 1964, a federal act (AI-5) suspended job tenure for all officials for six months. The Federal Constitution of 1967 continued to guarantee job tenure for the federal public servants. The privilege of tenure was, however, revoked in 1968. It was only when the military government ended in 1985, those public servants regained job stability.
In 1988, the Congress voted a new Federal Constitution. It guaranteed job tenure for public civil servants that had been admitted by public examination, after a two-year probation period. The privilege was also given to employees who had been in their jobs for more than five years.
The Federal Congress just voted a reform for the public sector in Brazil, which will be explained in Section 6.
2.3. The trade-off between political insulation and efficiency
The merit system was adopted because it represented a better alternative to patronage in the control of corruption and nepotism. However, this new system brought problems of its own. The precepts of efficiency, in which this system was based on, turned out to be unreal (Pereira, 1996). When the small liberal state of the nineteenth century turned into the social economic state of the twentieth century, it could be observed that the bureaucratic administration was not guaranteeing fast, cheap, nor high quality services.
The existence of job tenure for federal employees is a characteristic of bureaucratic administrations. If on the one hand it may prevent the perverse effects of a patronage system, on the other hand it does imply in costs of its own. Its adoption prevents easy changes in the size of the work force to respond to necessities faced by the State. Also, the protection granted to federal employees may turn out to be a factor hindering employees from fully committing themselves to their jobs, as they are aware of the low likelihood of dismissal. The implementation of an effective system of incentives and punishments is also prevented. The merit system was very useful to finish with patronage, and served well while the Liberal State only supplied limited public services. However, its shortcomings became apparent as the role of the State grew. (Pereira, 1996).
It is true that tenured bureaucracies do have an advantage in challenging other interests. This is so for the obvious reason that, unlike elected officials, it allows bureaucrats to be spared from the immediate threat of being removed from office by disgruntled constituencies. Furthermore, the formal structure and organizational goals of bureaucratic agencies may give them both the autonomy and the capacity to pursue courses of action that are adverse to any groups. Among students of public administration there remains the notion that effective administration requires protecting bureaucrats from the intervention of politicians, so they can perform their duties in a neutral, technical and professional manner. But the rules that were adopted to shield federal career employees from political manipulation, at the same time insulated the bureaucracy from more legitimate political control, contributing directly to voter complaints about responsiveness and productivity. The increase in the autonomy of the bureaucracy should not be confused with bureaucratic insulation from political pressure. In a democratic government, the high career bureaucracy is necessarily involved with the political process, as part of the process.
Section 3 - Principal-Agent model
The principal-agent model applies across a number of situations in which a principal contracts with an agent to perform some tasks on its behalf, i.e. when there is a delegation of power.
The model can be applied to situations such as voters and politicians, owners and workers of a company, regulatory agency and regulated firm, shareholders and managers, landowners and tenants, etc. In executing the task the agent chooses a course of action which will produce a set of consequences: an outcome. It is important to note that this outcome will affect the welfare of both principal and agent. Moreover, since the principal is not on a par with the agent, it is likely that situations will arise in which their goals significantly differ.
The goal of the shareholders of a firm, for example, is that the firm makes a large profit and the price of their shares increase in value. The goal of the manager of the firm, who is hired by the shareholders, may differ significantly from the goal of the shareholders. He/she may want to maximize his/her own income and/or his/her power. Generally, the objectives of shareholders in any given business will not match those of the managers, even though they will not be completely opposed to each other. Lacking the time (relatively high opportunity cost), knowledge, and skill to run the company directly the shareholders need hire and delegate managers to do this for them. The fact that their goals differ and that monitoring is costly means that a standard contract between the two may not be sufficient to make the relationship prosper. The principal-agent model predicts that in such a situation a special contract will arise that aligns the incentives and allows it to do so. In this example share options accomplish this task.
Key issues in a principal-agent problem are delegation of power, monitoring costs and asymmetric information. The agent has more information than the principal does about the details of individual tasks assigned, as well as the actions, abilities and preferences. The standard problem in a principal-agent model arises because monitoring is costly and incentive contracts may not insure compliance with the principal's objectives. Agents will often take advantage of the high costs involved in monitoring characteristics and performances and in enforcing contracts. Awareness of the high costs involved in monitoring will in this case act as an incentive for agents to engage in shirking or opportunistic behavior. If the principal can monitor the effort of the agent at low cost, then the problem is less likely to arise. The existence of a contract, be it formal or informal, covering the specific tasks required should be sufficient in most cases. However, in many situations low cost monitoring is simply not possible. Standard monitoring solutions for the principal-agent problem are costly and hence inadequate as a solution to the problem of institutions with tight inflexible budgets as the politicians' agency.
Alternatives need be found in order to align the objectives of both principal and agent. In some cases the parties may produce a contract which satisfies all the necessary incentives of both sides. The existence of such a contract would make it unnecessary to monitor agents' efforts as closely. In order to achieve such an agreement it is usually necessary to create incentives that makes the agent act in a way which conforms to the principal's interests. The owners in a firm, for example, can offer the workers some participation in the profits. Therefore, both sides now share similar interests, which although are not necessarily identical are nonetheless significantly closer than before the incentives.
The principal-agent model can explain why relationships amongst people are sometimes structured in ways that at first sight may appear inefficient. The way a relationship is set up may be a response to some form of asymmetric information or high monitoring cost. Had a solution not been found, then it is unlikely the two parties would choose to enter the relationship, with the result that a mutually beneficial opportunity would be missed. The principal-agent model thus provides a framework for analyzing many every day relationships where very particular forms of contracting evolve to solve the information problems and bring the parties' interests into reasonable alignment. Below it will be argued that the persistent question of job tenure in the civil service, despite its perverse incentives, is an outcome of the principal-agent problem mentioned above.
Principal-agent problems are at the center of democratic life. At first instance they occur between the voters and the elected officials, where the voters are principals and politicians are agents. The people elect politicians, but the elected officials have to delegate the implementation of their programs to relevant agencies. A central problem in politics is to ensure that those who are given political power will faithfully use that power in the interests of the citizens.
Problems also occur between the elected officials and the bureaucracy to which the implementation of chosen policies is delegated. In this relationship, the elected officials act as principal, with bureaucracy as agent. It is on this last type of principal-agent problem that this paper focuses. More specifically, this paper looks at a principal-agent problem with two principals (Congress and the President) and one agent (bureaucracy).
The policy process and the implementation stages in public policies are full of such relations where the principal monitors the efforts of different agents in living up to the terms of agreement made between them.
It is not easy for politicians to control bureaucracy, nor is it easy for private firms once they grow past a certain size. It is however difficult to compare the situation that is being studied with private firms because of the complexity in defining and measuring the results achieved by the public bureaucracy. For this reason, monitoring the performance of the public bureaucracy is difficult. In some cases, new structures may be needed to mitigate principal-agents problem.
For Mace (1992) the structure and design of administrative agencies can be explained as the end result of the incorporation of mechanisms for controlling the principal-agent problem between the political actors delegating authority to administrative agencies and the bureaucrats within those agencies. Since legislators delegate legislative power to administrative agencies which they themselves create (although some agencies are created by executive decree), the chances of possible administrative-agency deviation from the original intent, by the manipulation of the structure and design of those agencies, can be reduced.
Elected officials are often concerned that administrative agencies will act in ways contrary to their interests. The question of political control of agencies is a straightforward principal-agent problem: elected officials who create administrative agencies must worry about future shirking by the bureaucrats within the agency (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast, 1987; Mitnick). In this case shirking can be defined as the administrative agency taking any action that might harm the elected officials. This may include simply not doing their job correctly, and irritating the officials' constituency, or taking actions that have a direct perverse effect on the officials, such as benefiting other politicians constituencies. As with other sorts of principals in complex agency relationships, politicians not only find it costly to monitor the behavior of the agencies they create and fund; they find it equally costly to inform themselves of any relevant issues and determine which outcome among many may be the best. As such, standard monitoring solutions to the principal-agent problem, which include political oversight in the form of hearings and budget reviews, may prove to be a costly and hence imperfect solution to the politicians' agency cost problem (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast, 1987: 248-53). (Macey, 1992: 93-110).
In section 5 it will be argued that the prevalence of the high level of tenured civil servants arise partly as a solution to a principal-agent problem for the control of the bureaucracy by the Congress and the President. The tensions between the two principals competing for control over the bureaucracy has important implications for understanding the civil service system and the special principal-agent problems that exist within the federal government.
Section 4 – The Relationship between Congress, President and the Bureaucracy
In a democratic system the politicians delegate the implementation of public policy to the bureaucracy. This fact brings the question of how the elected politicians can control the bureaucracy, since the policies implemented by the bureaucracy sometimes do not coincide with the policies defined by the politicians (President and Congress).
The relationship between elected politicians and the bureaucracy contains the elements of a principal agent problem.
The U.S.A. Constitution is not clear about the authority over the federal bureaucracy. The civil service system operates in an environment where there is no clear structure of political control over federal bureaucracy. These conditions complicate the principal-agent problem. Both the Congress and the President influence the agencies in many different ways. Agencies are created as parts of the legislative or the executive branches of government and are formally responsible to the Congress or the President respectively, but in reality, the lines of authority are blurred. The President has control over appointments, budget and administrative procedures. However Congress also has many ways to impose controls on the agencies and potentially get the policies they want. Neither the President nor the Congress has well-defined property rights over the federal bureaucracy.
There is great controversy in the literature as to who, if anyone, controls the bureaucracy (Hammond and Knott, 1996), on how the Congress and the President are able to influence the bureaucracy and also why the bureaucracy, in many instances, may be able to act autonomously. The objectives of Congress and the President are usually not the same. Therefore, you have two principals. In this situation controlling the agent is even harder. Indeed, not only must a principal contend with the fact that the agent has its own objectives, but also that there is another principal trying to influence the agent in a possibly opposing manner.
4.1. Control by the Congress
Coexisting with the literatures on bureaucratic autonomy and congressional dominance has been a literature arguing that the Congress controls the bureaucracy. It does so by imposing controls on the agency after it takes an action or by influencing agency choices before action is taken. For Wilson (1989), Congress retains enormous influence over the bureaucracy. The American Constitution makes the President and Congress rivals for control of the American administrative system. In comparison, in Great Britain the prime minister and Parliament are not rivals because the House of Commons has little power to supervise, investigate, intervene in, or even obtain answers from the bureaucracy. The very factors that make agencies more susceptible to presidential influence also make them more susceptible to congressional control.
McCubbins, Noll and Weingast (1987, 1989) argue that administrative procedures are designed by politicians to confine agent discretion and to force their decisions to be consistent with the enabling legislation, constraining the evolution of future policies so as to maintain the interests of the enacting coalition.
For Macey (1992), since legislators delegate legislative power to administrative agencies that they themselves create, they can reduce the chances of possible administrative-agency deviation from the original intent by manipulating the structure and design of those agencies.
4.2. Control by the President
As Wilson explained (1989: 258-259) the notion that the President, as the chief executive officer of the United States, should administer and hold accountable to him executive branch agencies is a relatively recent one. Before 1921 bureaus and departments submitted their own bills directly to Congress. It was changes that occurred mainly during Roosevelt administration that made the President the effective head of the government.
The literature that argues that Presidents have the major impact on bureaucratic policy-making describes the President as having a wide variety of tools for controlling the bureaucracy, like the control over appointments; control of the agencies budget submission; and influence over administrative procedures (Hammond and Knott, 1996). About this last item, a growing body of literature documents how Presidents have created and managed this administrative presidency.
4.3. Autonomy of the bureaucracy
The literature on who controls the bureaucracy also presents the argument that the bureaucracy is autonomous, since it is difficult to regulate all of its actions in all situations. The bureaucracy can have its own goals, not coinciding with the interests of the principals. Hammond and Knott (1996) suggested that three broad classes of reasons have been advanced for why an agency might become an autonomous policy-making body:
- indifference by the President and Congress toward the agency's policy domain. It is sometimes argued that the politicians indifference stems from the fact that agency policies are of little interest to their constituents, so trying to change these policies has too little electoral payoff to make the effort worthwhile;
- information asymmetries between the agency and those who would control it. Two different kinds of asymmetries can be distinguished. There may be hidden information, which refers to the fact that agencies may control information or have technical expertise which the President and Congress lack. There may also be hidden actions, referring to the fact that agencies can take actions that are not easily observable. Each kind of information asymmetry enables an agency to pursue its own goals; and
- conflicts among the multiple principals who have authority over the agency. The argument is that the agency can take advantage of a presidential-congressional impasse to pursue its own policies.
Competition over the bureaucracy has important implications for understanding the civil service system and the principal-agent problem. Within this competitive environment, the roles played by political appointees and career civil servants are quite different.
The federal civilian labor force (both is the U.S.A. and Brazil) has in its structure both political appointees and career civil servants. Both American and Brazilian systems rely on the use of political appointees to head most federal agencies. There are, basically, three categories of federal civilian employees: presidential appointees, who are responsible for setting administration policies, accountable to the President, who can also remove them, like agency head level; high career officials, who are also part of agency management and policy administration, but not responsible directly, and are protected by civil service tenure guarantees; and rank-and-file career employees, who perform agency functions and have day-to-day contact with constituents, having, also, tenure protection. Each of these groups works under different constraints with separate motives, and any discussion of the control of the bureaucracy must consider the implications of these distinctions (Johnson & Libecap 1994, 155).
The purpose of this section was to show that in fact the relationship between the bureaucracy, the President and Congress can be usefully examined within a principal-agent framework, or more precisely, a multiple principle agency framework. All the elements of such a relationship are present; (i) delegation of a task; (ii) asymmetric information; (iii) high monitoring costs; and non-aligned incentives. According to the standard solution to a principal-agent problem we would therefore expect there to arise some special way of organizing the relationship so as to overcome the basic problem. The next section will argue this is one of the reasons for the persistence of tenure in the civil service, despite its shortcomings.
The purpose of this section is not to determine whether Congress, the President or the agency is more influential. It is just to show that the relationships between them are characterized by some conditions that suggest that they will seek to establish special ways of organizing their interaction.
Section 5 – Theories on the Structure of Civil Service Rules
This section examines theories that argue that aspects of the civil service rules are a response to competition between Congress and the Executive over control of the bureaucracy. In particular this section will focus on theories that explain how tenure promotes control. The theories examined are those of Libecap and Johnson (1994) and Spiller and Urbiztondo (1994).
5.1. Libecap and Johnson (1994) argue that the change from a patronage to a merit system for the federal civil service was an attempt by federal politicians to obtain more effective control over the actions and performance of the federal labor force. The change was due to the fact that, in the late nineteenth century it became increasingly costly for both the President and members of Congress to effectively control and benefit from the patronage workers as had been the case until then. Shifting economic and political conditions at that time meant that the President and certain members of the Congress had incentives to replace the system for staffing federal positions. Whereas before the patronage system provided political benefits to politicians, it gradually came to be that these returns were lower than the costs the system imposed on them. There was considerable pressure from business groups on politicians to provide government services more effectively than was possible under patronage. Indeed, the merit system that begun in 1883 addressed the control problems that the President and members of Congress had faced with respect to local politicians in the allocation and use of federal workers.
Within this context, another question emerged: whether the President or the Congress was to have direct control over the new merit employees. Incomplete property rights in the legislation allowed both the President and the Congress to control certain aspect of the agencies. Thus both sides had to deal not only with the problem of getting the bureaucracy to act according to their interests, but also to avoid the bureaucracy being influenced by the other principal. Libecap and Johnson see the creation and gradual extension of the merit system and the addition of tenure protection as an attempt of the President and of the Congress to reduce each other's influence on federal employees. Were it the case that only one side had control over the bureaucracy, that side would not want tenure, since that would reduce its influence. But given the existence of the other competing principal, each side is willing to give up some control as long as this also removes the other side's control, so in order to mitigate the costs of political competition over the bureaucracy, the President and members of the Congress have agreed to civil service rules that inhibit their influence over career federal employees. Since neither side wanted to run the risk of allowing the other to control the bureaucracy, the merit system with tenure protection, is preferred. Although, the rules that had been adopted to shield federal career employees from political manipulation, however, have insulated the bureaucracy from more legitimate political control, contributing directly to voter complaints about responsiveness and productivity.
5.2. Spiller and Urbiztondo (1994) see the choice of using a higher proportion of political appointees rather than career civil servants as a result of competition between the President and Congress to control the bureaucracy.
Both of these principals have ways of influencing the bureaucracy (as showed in the previous section), and they usually also have different interests. Therefore, it is natural that each side will try to influence the bureaucracy to act in such a way that will serve its own interests. Because the other principal is also trying to influence the agent, each will try to make it harder for the other to exert influence. The idea presented in Spiller and Urbiztondo's paper is that the structure of the civil service in political appointees or career civil servants is one way of doing this.
The main idea behind their paper is that the President is a short-lived principal compared to Congress. In the United States this has been true since the beginning of the century, when the average time in office for congressmen and senators became significantly longer than that of the President. From this, Spiller and Urbiztondo conclude that Congress will prefer a stable bureaucracy because it will have a greater influence on the it, since a long term relationship can be established. The President, on the other hand, will be in office for a shorter period, and therefore, will not be able to set-up means of influencing the bureaucracy that depend on repeated interaction. The President will, therefore, generally prefer political appointees, which he has greater control over.
If, however, the President and the Congress have similar preferences, then there is less need for political appointees, since there is less competition to control the bureaucracy. The authors note that parliamentary systems are such that the executive power is formed from the legislative, so preferences are similar. This fits in with the observed fact that most parliamentary systems have less political appointees than presidential systems.
Another point is that, because the President prefers political appointees, in countries where there is separation of powers and the legislative bargaining power is small compared to the executive, we would expect there to be more political appointees. This helps to explain differences between countries like the United States and Mexico, where in the case of the latter the executive power is relatively stronger and there is a higher proportion of political appointees.
They also find evidence in favor of their argument from the fact that different cities in the United States have different forms of government and civil service structures. Cities where the mayor is elected indirectly are closer to a parliamentary system and tend to have less political appointees than cities where the mayor is elected directly by voters, which resemble Presidential systems.
The basic idea of the paper is, in conclusion, that the choice of civil service structure, as relates to the proportion of political appointees to career civil servants, is determined by the attempt of the President and the congress to control the bureaucracy, and avoid the other from doing the same. As they note "…the U.S. Congress was willing to give up the power to choose or replace public employees, among other reasons, because it was useful to restrict the Presidents power" (Spiller and Urbiztondo, pg. 467).
5.3. For both theories, the structure of the civil service system with job security and merit-based hiring and promotion had a functional reason for existing. Simply put, it was a direct result of each of the principals (President and the Congress) trying to reduce the influence of the other in the bureaucracy. Thus the fact that a system which has some apparent problems is adhered to over time, despite the clear knowledge of the problems it causes, can be understood. As was stated by Dixit:
"(m)any apparently inefficient outcomes can in fact be understood as consequences of constraints imposed by various transaction costs, or as credible attempts to cope with them. For example, the weakness of incentives in bureaucracies can be seen as a consequence of their being open to influence of multiple principals…"
Section 6 – Civil Service in Brazil
In Brazil there is considerable competition between the President and the Congress, and it is reasonable to assume that many of the same forces are at play here too. While the political institutions in Brazil are similar, in many ways, to those in the U.S.A, there are also many important differences. Thus those theories may or may not be relevant for Brazil.
By the Brazilian Federal Constitution, neither the President nor the Congress has well-defined property rights over the federal bureaucracy.
Article 48 of the Federal Constitution of Brazil stipulates that it is incumbent upon Congress to provide for all the matters within the jurisdiction of the Federal Union, and especially on: the pluriannual plan, budgetary directives and annual budget (II); the administrative and judiciary organization (IX); the creation, transformation and extinction of public offices, positions and functions (X); creation, structuring and responsibilities the Ministries and government administrative agencies (XI).
Article 49 determines that it is exclusively incumbent upon Congress to stay normative acts of the Executive Branch which exceed the regulamentary authority or the limits of legislative delegation (V); to establish for each fiscal year the wages of the President and Vice-President of the Federative Republic, and of Ministers of State (VIII); to each year examine the accounts rendered by the President of the Republic and evaluate the reports on the execution of government plans (IX); to supervise and control the acts of the Executive Branch, including those of the indirect administration (X); to choose two-thirds of the members of the Federal Audit Court (XIII).
Article 52 establishes the competencies of the Federal Senate, which includes the giving of its prior approval on the selection of: the President and Directors of the Central Bank, the Justices of the Federal Audit Court that had been chosen by the President; holders of other offices as determined by law.
Article 70 determines that the control of the accounts, finances, budgets, operations and property of the Federative Republic of Brazil and of the direct and indirect administration entities as to lawfulness, legitimacy, economic application of subsidies and waiver of revenues shall be exercised by the Congress, by means of external control, with the assistance of the Federal Audit Court (Art. 71). The Court has also to examine the lawfulness of acts of hiring personal, as well as the approval of civil and military retirement and pension (III).
Article 84 establishes it is incumbent exclusively upon the President of the Republic: to appoint and dismiss the Ministers of State (I); to exercise, with the assistance of the Ministers of State, the higher management of the federal administration (II); to provide for the organization and operation of the federal administration, in accordance with the law (VI); to appoint, after approval by the Senate, the Justices of the Federal Supreme Court, the Attorney-General of the Republic, the President and the Directors of the Central Bank and other public officials, when required by law (XIV); to appoint the Justices of the Federal Audit Court (XV); to submit to Congress the proposals of the pluriannual plan, the budget and directives bill of law (XXIII); to create and extinguish federal government offices, in accordance with the law.
The understanding of Johnson and Libecap (1994) can also be applied in Brazil. They argue that the confusion over who controls the bureaucracy that exists in the American Constitution reduces the incentives of politicians to engage in long-term, meaningful reform. The absence of a clear principal who would benefit from reform of the bureaucracy seriously complicates any efforts to change the system.
The progress of modernization of the public administration in Brazil represents an attempt of substituting patronage for meritocracy. This process can be characterized as discontinuous. According to Bresser Pereira (1996), who is also the current Minister of Federal Administration and Reform of the State of Brazil, patronage had been a constant in the federal bureaucracy of Brazil. His work argues that the crises of the bureaucratic model in Brazil began in the military regime. It was not only because of the incapability to limit the patronage, that has always been present in the federal bureaucracy, but also because, instead of consolidating a professional bureaucracy, through the definition of careers, public examination for high officials etc, it was preferred as the easy way of recruiting high officers through state firms. This fact reduced the possibility of the creation of a strong and professional bureaucracy. The Federal Constitution of 1988 increased the problem. It represented a shift from one extreme point to another. The Constitution of 1988 stipulated very rigid rules for the bureaucracy. The consequences of the surviving of patronage and of the rigid system, sometimes perversely mixed, represented the high costs and low quality of the public administration in Brazil. The Minister of Administration of Brazil supports a shift to a modern management administration for the public sector, since the "weberian" bureaucratic model is no longer efficient.
Bresser Pereira defends this model of public administration management, whose implementation started in the 1980's in Great Britain, New Zealand and Australia, and in the 90's in the United States, when it started to be noticed because of the publishing of "Reinventing Government", and with the adoption of the National Performance Review, by the President Clinton administration. In Brazil the process begun with the approval, in 1995, of the Director plan of the Reform of the State (Plano Diretor da Reforma do Estado).
As mentioned in Section 2, a reform for the public sector in Brazil was just approved by the Congress, in which is contained the end of job tenure for all public civil servants. Public servants, in this new situation, may be dismissed when they are not considered efficient. Moreover, employees may be dismissed whenever the government's total wage expenditure surpasses 60% of the net revenue. The new rules are applicable not only to the Federal Government, but also to States and Municipalities.
According to this constitutional amendment approved by the Congress, job tenure is maintained only for officials in careers deemed as typical of the public service. As such, officials whose duties do not have correspondent career in the private sector - police, internal revenue officials, diplomats etc. - have guaranteed job tenure. Still, even such employees may be dismissed if they commit a serious administrative fault.
All remaining officials will be regulated by a regime that is being called the "flexible job tenure". Theoretically, public employees still enjoy stability. However, dismissals are allowed for inefficiency or for occasions when it is necessary to decrease public expenditure.
For rank-and-file career employees complete tenure guarantees make little political sense for the President and the Congress. More remote from policy determination and management, lower-level workers are less susceptible to (and less valuable for) political manipulation than are those at more senior policy-administration levels. Further, it is in the interests of politicians to have federal employees perform effectively in the delivery of services to constituents.
In the view of the World Bank , for most of the Latin American countries, it is essential to improve the incentive structures of civil service agencies. This includes improving the financial remuneration and other reward systems of public-sector workers and using "performance contracts", through which public-sector workers and agencies can be held accountable for the realization of goals. In some cases, new structures may be needed to mitigate principal-agent problems. It is important to ensure some congruence in the incentives and behaviors of bureaucrats and politicians. Reforms may include the creation of institutional checks and balances and the introduction of mechanisms to increase contestability.
For the current Minister of Administration of Brazil, Bresser Pereira, in an abstract form, it is possible to view the reform of the state through a principal-agent perspective, where the reform is a way of creating incentives and punishments for the preferences of the voters to be realized by the State. According to this model, in its most simplified form, the voters are the principals and the elected politicians their agents; these, in turn, are the principals of the bureaucracy and the civil servants. But most of the literature takes a rational choice perspective that assumes that politicians are only motivated by rent-seeking and by the desire for reelection. The fact that public interest, a third possible motivation, is excluded, reduces the explanatory power of these models. When the analysis limits the motivations of public administrators to rent-seeking and reelections, and ignores that of public interest, the behavior of a large number of administrators and the meaning of the reforms that inspire the "new public administration" - the Managerial Public Administration - become incomprehensible.
One view in opposition to this is that politicians do in fact pursue public interest, however they only do so when this does not harm their other motivations. That is, a politician has his/her own view of what is in the public interest, but is constrained from pursuing this by the need to remain in power. Since the interest of his/her constituency will generally not coincide with the public interest, a politician who pursues it anyway will tend to be removed in the next election. Thus politicians will only do so when their constituency will not be affected or will not notice. One would thus expect this to happen more frequently when the next election is far away than when it is near. Note also that the level of political participation of the population also affect how constrained politicians are by public opinion.
Section 7 – Conclusion
In this paper I have shown that the structure of the civil service system, in countries like Brazil and the US, based on job security and merit-based hiring and promotion, has a functional reason for existing. It was argued that this structure arose as a direct result of the President and the Congress trying to reduce the influence of the other in the bureaucracy. This was done by showing that the nature of the relationship between these parties and the bureaucracy had all of the conditions that characterize a principal-agent problem, that is, delegation, asymmetric information and high monitoring costs. By putting the relationship in terms of a principal-agent model it became possible to understand why an apparently inefficient way of structuring the civil service was maintained over time. The general principal-agent model predicts that in order to overcome the information problems that are present in a relationship, the parties will try to find a way to structure the contract between them so as to align their interests. In the case of the bureaucracy, the President and Congress, the contact that was arrived at was one based on high proportions of tenured workers.
The fact that this may be a very inefficient way of overcoming the problem does not contradict the hypothesis. After all, society is full of examples of objectives that are consistently pursued through apparently inefficient means, such as the U.S. sugar program which uses a costly way of redistributing income to some special interest groups when a direct transfer would be much cheaper. In the case of the sugar program, it turns out that a system of tariffs and quotas are probably the only way to do the redistribution in a politically acceptable way. As for the case of the bureaucracy and job tenure it is argued here that the inefficiency has been purposefully created and maintained, for it plays an important role. This idea is well expressed in the following quote by Williamson :
"…political property rights are especially insecure in democratic regimes where programs that are put in place by one generation of politicians are subsequently subject to reversal when incumbent politicians are voted out of office. If efficiently designed bureaus and programs are more responsive but easier to reverse than are those which are encumbered, then politicians face an intertemporal tradeoff: inefficiency (nonresponsiveness; inertia) that has been crafted into the design of bureaus is the price of assuring that original purposes are not quickly reversed. To be sure, the originators would prefer to have programs that are both efficient and responsive now and are resistant to redirection by successors who would use them for other purposes. Not having that choice, however, inefficiency – both now and later – is intentionally introduced as the means by which to achieve program persistence."
In the case of Brazil it is very likely that job tenure has been maintained, at least in part, for the reasons explained above. Future research on this subject could study if the structure arose as a direct result of the President and the Congress trying to reduce the influence of each other in the bureaucracy. To do this it would be necessary to examine, in greater detail than this paper has done, the institutional rules that govern the relationship between the parties.
Although the political institutions both in Brazil and in the U.S.A. are quite similar, there are also important differences. Future research could study if in Brazil the President has more influence over the federal bureaucracy, as seems to be the case, given the current institutional rules. If that hypothesis is correct, the President may be less concerned about the influence of the Congress over the bureaucracy, and maybe that is an explanation for the administrative reform that just occurred in Brazil, with the partial end of job stability for the federal employees.
Barbosa, Lívia. 1996. "Meritocracia à Brasileira: o que é desempenho no Brasil?" Ano 47, V 120, N 3, Revista do Serviço Público 59-102.
Burki, Shahid Javed and Guillermo E. Perry. 1997. The long march: a reform agenda for Latin America and the Caribbean in the next decade. The World Bank. Washington D.C.
Dixit, Avinash 1996, The Making of Economic Policy: A Transaction-Cost Politics Perspective, Cambridge Mass: MIT Press.
Foss, Pal. 1995. Economic approaches to organizations and institutions: an introduction. Brookfield: Dartmouth Publishing Company
Hammond, Thomas H., and Jack H. Knott. 1996. "Who Controls the Bureacracy?: Presidential Power, Congressional Dominance, Legal Constraints, and Bureaucratic Autonomy in a model of Multi-Institutional Policy-Making," 12 Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 119-166.
Johnson, R. N. and Gary D. Libecap. 1994. The Federal Civil Service System and the Problem of Bureaucracy. Chicago. The University of Chicago Press.
Johnson, R. N. and Gary D. Libecap. 1994. "Patronage to Merit and Control of the Federal Government Labor Force," 31 Explorations in Economic History 91-119.
Macey, Jonathan R. 1992. "Organizational Design and Political Control of Administrative Agencies," 8 Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 93-110.
McCubbins, Mathew D., Roger G. Noll, and Barry R. Weingast. 1987. "Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control," 3 Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 243-77.
McCubbins, Mathew D., Roger G. Noll, and Barry R. Weingast. 1989. "Structure and process, politics and policy: Administrative arrangements and the political control of agencies," Virginia Law Review 75, no. 2, 432-82
Melo, M. André. 1996. "Governance e reforma do Estado: o paradigma agente x principal," Ano 47, V 120, N 1, Revista do Serviço Público 67-81.
Mucciaroni, Gary. 1995. Reversals of Fortune: Public Policy and Private Interests. Washington, DC. The Brookings Institution.
Nassuno, Marianne. 1997. "Organização dos usuários, participação na gestão e controle das organizações sociais," Ano 48, N 1, Revista do Serviço Público 27-41.
Pereira, L. C. Bresser. 1997. A Reforma do Estado nos Anos 90: Lógica e Mecanismos de Controle. Brasília. Ministério da Administração Federal e Reforma do Estado. Cadernos MARE da reforma do estado.
Pereira, L. C. Bresser. 1996. "Da administração pública burocrática à gerencial," Ano 47, V 120, N 1, Revista do Serviço Público 7-39.
Spiller, Pablo T. and Santiago Urbiztondo. 1994. "Political appointees vs. career civil servants: A multiple principals theory of political bureaucracies," 10 European Journal of political Economy 465-497.
Spiller, Pablo T. and John Ferejohn. "The Economics and Politics of Administrative Law and Procedures: An Introduction," V 8, N 1 Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 1-7.
Williamson, O.E., 1996. "The Politics and Economics of Redistribution and Inefficiency". In The Mechanisms of Gvernance, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press
Wilson, James Q. 1989. Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies do and why they do it. Basic Books.
Suely Dib de Sousa e Silva
Funcionária do Ministério da Fazenda, Suely Dib é Procuradora da Fazenda Nacional e atua como Coordenadora na Coordenação Geral de Operações Financeiras da União. ocupando-se da análise de contratos de empréstimo de interesse da União, Estados, Municípios e outros junto a bancos estrangeiros e agências multilaterais e bilaterais de crédito.
Mail to:
Suely Dib de Sousa e Silva - email@example.com
ICM - Instituto Cultural Minerva
IBI - Institute of Brazilian Issues -
The George Washington University
Ensaios de ex-bolsistas -
Conselho Curador do Instituto Cultural Minerva
Presidente: Roberto Campos;
Vice-presidente: Sérgio Lins Andrade;
Demais membros: Aspásia Camargo;Aloizio Mercadante; Antônio Delfim Netto; Edmar Bacha; Ernane Galvêas; Francisco Dornelles; Jorge Paulo Lemann; Jorge Oscar de Mello Flôres; José Serra; +Mario Henrique Simonsen; Marcílio Marques Moreira; Murilo Macedo; Walther Moreira Salles.
Rua da Ajuda, n° 35 - 20° Andar - Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brasil,20040-000.
Tel.: (021) 211-8060


text:
|Video Software
|Video Publishing & Sharing
Publisher's Description+
Vringo is the next-generation ringtone. With its award-winning video ringtone application, Vringo takes a sledgehammer to the traditional call signature, transforming the basic act of making and receiving mobile phone calls into a highly visual, social experience.
By installing Vringo's application, which is compatible with more than 200 handsets, users can create or take video, images and slideshows from virtually anywhere, including Vringo's 4,000-clips-and-counting video ringtone library or the Web, and make it into their personal call signature. In a first for the mobile industry, Vringo has introduced VringForward, a technology that lets its users select which video ringtone their friends will see when they call.
What's new in this version:
Version 2.0 is the first version on CNET Download.com.

subset: commoncrawl


text:
City Arborist chit-chats about trees, slams BNSF
If it's one thing Seattle has a lot of, it's trees. Counting just street trees maintained by SDOT, Seattle has 40,000. And that's not including trees in parks or on private property.
City Arborist Nolan Rundquist dropped by the Ballard District Council last night to chat about trees, a subject which curious residents had a barrel full of questions for.
Acting as Mediator
Mayoral candidate Peter Steinbreuck dropped by the BDC and asked a simple question of the Arborist: What do you do, exactly?
Rundquist explained that as City Arborist, he works as a mediator between the departments when it came to trees.
"Trees are one of the chunks of infrastructure that have to compete with a lot of different things," Rundquist said.
It's true: The Department of Transportation (street trees), the Department of Planning and Development (trees near pipes), City Light (trees near power lines) and Parks and Recreation (trees in a park or greenbelt) all have a stake when it comes to trees.
Often, residents are confused about who they should call when it comes to tree issues. Rundquist said that one of the big things the City Arborist does is run a central phone line, 206-684-TREE (8733). From there, residents will be redirected to the appropriate city department to deal with their particular problem.
Commenting on the tree massacre
When it came to BNSF Railway's clear-cutting by the Salmon Bay Natural Area (read our in-depth coverage), Rundquist was candid in his response.
"That's a classic case of federal government usurping us," he said. "... Excessive in my opinion, yeah, but they didn't ask for my opinion, and it's unfortunate the way it rolled down. We're hoping to work with them."
He said the Department of Planning and Development attempted to put a stop work order on them, saying they were violating city rules. But BNSF came back with legal counsel saying they had the right to cut the trees.
"Kind of really ham-handed on their part, but I guess that's how they rock and roll," Rundquist said.
Rundquist did submit that all the trees were on BNSF property and that, in the end, there was nothing the city could do to stop BNSF. Moreover, Rundquist himself has no jurisdiction as City Arborist over trees on private property.
Preserving exceptional trees
Preserving older and exceptional trees also came up in conversation. Through the heritage tree program, SDOT has helped save over 200 trees as of March, 2011.
SDOT has this to say about heritage trees:
"Heritage trees may be on either City or private property. Each candidate tree is assessed by a certified arborist and evaluated by a review committee. Trees can be nominated as an individual or a collection, but must have the owner's approval and meet criteria for health in addition to being selected according to one of the following categories:
- Specimen: A tree of exceptional size, form, or rarity.
- Historic: A tree recognized by virtue of its age, its association with or contribution to a historic structure or district, or its association with a noted person or historic event.
- Landmark: Trees that are landmarks of a community.
- Collection: Trees in a notable grove, avenue, or other planting."
Residents who want to nominate a tree may go to http://www.seattle.gov/transportation/heritagetree.htm
Planting and removing trees
Of course, everyone wants to know how they can go about planting trees. You can find procedures on planting a street tree at http://www.seattle.gov/transportation/treeplanting.htm
In addition, SDOT has an energetic free street tree planting program, planting over 800 trees a year. In order to qualify for it, there must be a five-foot-wide curbed planting strip. Rundquist said that the department will usually respond to areas with intense community interest, via a suggestion form. You can suggest a location at http://www.seattle.gov/transportation/btg_streettrees.htm
Of course, there are times when a tree can simply stay no longer. You can request tree pruning or removal at http://www.seattle.gov/transportation/treepruneapp.htm
And of course there is much more. For all your tree questions, we suggest calling (206) 684-TREE or going to http://www.seattle.gov/transportation/forestry.htm
Zachariah Bryan can be reached at email@example.com
Follow Ballard News-Tribune on Facebook at www.facebook.com/ballardnewstrib
And Twitter at http://twitter.com/ballardnewstrib
We encourage our readers to comment. No registration is required. We ask that you keep your comments free of profanity and keep them civil. They are moderated and objectionable comments will be removed.


text:
Is there anyone else who had vaser lipo from a doctor who neglected to do any post op treatment including massage therapy?
- smurph
- East Weymouth, MA
- Last updated: 3 years ago
I had vaser lipo 6 months ago on my upper and lower abs, as well as my flanks My post op consisted of a 7 day follow up and a 15 week follow up appt in which I had Picts taken. I was told I wouldn't see any real results until at least 6 months, which is this month. In six months I've had two follow up apps. I've never received any massage therapy or lymphatic drainage and now I don't know what to do to get the fluid out. Any advice would be greatly appreciated. Thank you.


text: Just one day remains until Red Bull X-Fighters Texas, the world's premier, most-progressive freestyle motocross series, returns to the world famous Historic Fort Worth Stockyards. Last year, Swiss superstar Mat Rebeaud captured the Texas event with an exhilarating final run on his way to the overall series championship, and he looks to fend off 11 of the world's best riders to repeat his win. The 12 riders will take on the challenges of a massive, Texas-sized course, sculpted from more than 850 truckloads of dirt over the past three weeks. The numerous ramps and dirt jumps will provide the riders with several ways to impress the judges and thrill the crowd. In addition to Rebeaud, the competitor list includes previous Red Bull X-Fighters winners Robbie Maddison (Australia), Dany Torres (Spain) and Jeremy "Twitch" Stenberg (USA). Also competing are Eigo Sato (Japan), Thomas Pagès (France), Andre Villa (Norway), Nate Adams (USA), Adam Jones (USA), Cameron Sinclair (Australia) and Rob Adelberg (Australia). Jeff "Ox" Kargola (USA) has been named to replace Levi Sherwood, who was injured in training last week. Tickets are still available and can be purchased by visiting www.redbullxfighters.com, or locally at Billy Bob's box office. Tickets will also be sold at the event venue tomorrow. Three price categories are available - General Admission is $20; Grandstand Seating is $40; and Premium Grandstand Seating is $50. Gates will open to the public at 6:30 p.m. local time and the event will begin at 8:30 p.m. Fans unable to attend can watch the live HD webcast at www.fuel.tv/xfighters, beginning at 11:30 p.m. ET / 8:30 p.m. PT tomorrow night. Red Bull X-Fighters Texas will be broadcast on ABC on Sunday, July 19 at 1:30 p.m. ET / 10:30 a.m. PT, immediately following the British Open golf tournament. For additional information on Red Bull X-Fighters, please visit www.redbullxfighters.com and for hi-res images, free for media use, visit www.redbull-photofiles.com.


text:
[display_podcast]Be forewarned: The content about to be expressed in this podcast is explicit in nature, but deals with real issues facing men and women all across the country in all aspects of life - even our pastors. Author, national speaker on the topic of sex addition and creator of the Sampson Society Nate Larkin joins Jeff this week for An Examined Life.Nate was raised in the church with a huge amount of honor and respect for his dad - who also happened to be his pastor.As … [Read more...]
An Examined Life 4: Nate Larkin
February 24, 2014 by Christian Podcast Central Leave a Comment
Filed Under: Uncategorized Tagged With: 12-step program, Addiction, bible, christian, christian culture podcast, christianity, church, cocaine, confession, discipleship, does God love me?, drugs, forgiveness, grace, hooker, Jesus Christ, love, marriage, masturbation, mercy, monks, pastor, pirates, playboy, pornography, pride, prostitution, recovery, relationships, scripture, sex, Sex addiction, shame, sin, what does it mean to be born again?, what is the church? Leave a Comment


text:
A big hello from Utah.
This is a discussion on G'Day within the New Members Introduce Yourself forums, part of the Welcome To DefensiveCarry.com category; Welcome from Alabama....
Welcome from Alabama.
Two things are infinite: the universe and human stupidity; and I'm not sure about the universe. Albert Einstein
A big hello from Utah.
John Steinbeck: Don't pick a fight with an old man. If he's too old to fight, he'll just kill you.
from Eastern Idaho.
Μολὼν λαβέ
USN 78-82/USAF 82-93 Medically Retired
Desert Shield/Desert Storm
DAV Life Member
NRA Life Member
Welcome aboard!
Training means learning the rules. Experience means learning the exceptions.
Welcome, from the Catskill Mountains of New York State!
"Democracy is two wolves and a lamb voting on what to have for lunch; Liberty is a well-armed lamb contesting the vote."
-- Benjamin Franklin
Welcome from Alabama.
It's not what you go thru in life, but how well you go thru it.
Hi and welcome from Fort Worth TX!
- - - - -
Outside of a dog, a book is man's best friend. Inside a dog, it's too dark to read. -Groucho Marx
welcome from Texas!
jump right in and join the info discussions
the water is fine....no sharks
Certified Glock Armorer
NRA RSO, Instructor
Independence is declared; it must be maintained. Sam Houston-3/2/1836
If loose gun laws are good for criminals why do criminals support gun control?
Welcome from Savannah
The situation will NEVER BE THE WAY YOU WANT, it WILL BE THE WAY IT IS. You must be FLEXIBLE ENOUGH TO ADAPT and just "DEAL WITH IT".
Welcome from North Carolina, had a great time in Sydney back in 1970.
Welcome from West Tennessee!
,=====o00o _
l_--- \___l---[]lllllll[]
(o)_)-o- (o)_)--o-)_)
Thank you one and all for your warm welcomes


text:
From Art Blakey's Catster Photos[ View profile page ]
|"Me and Mini-Me chillin'"
You two make us smile with joy.
Every handsome tux on here is getting a mini me! I think I need a mini me too! You two look great together, and that sun looks super comfy!
River, you really should get one! These mini-mes are a load of fun!
Brothers are FUN!


text:
1974 Dart shift kit
I need some opinions on whether I should install a shift kit in a 1974 Dart with 318 and I think 727 trans. The car and trans have 132K miles on them and I'm a little afraid the shift kit might end the life of the 727 trans. Any thoughts are appreciated. :confused:
Well, I have an opinion...If putting a shift kit in the car will make you want to manual shift the tranny, or bang it harder through the shift points, which these kits may give you a tendency to do, then don't do it. Then again, those are probably the very reasons you want a shift kit. Depending on how you drive the car now, and then , after the kit is put in, may very well affect the tranny.
It's a 904 trans.
Good question. Maybe someone will know for sure.
I'm thinking on one hand the stock trans will shift softer and slower so, if the frictions are worn and glazed, it might last a awhile.
On the other hand, putting in the shift kit will quicken the shifts, putting a load on the frictions the instant the gear changes, increasing the chance of slipping. But the kit increases line pressure some :confused: .
You can change the 2nd gear band apply rocker arm so it will shift quicker AND hold harder.....so I say GO FOR IT!
Put the shift kit in and adjust it for the [strip] mode and tell your Mom to hold on to her dentures :D when she drives it to the Rite Aid for her prescriptions! :thumbup:
|All times are GMT -6. The time now is 06:30 PM.
Powered by vBulletin® Version 3.8.7
Copyright ©2000 - 2017, vBulletin Solutions, Inc.
Search Engine Optimization by vBSEO 3.6.0 PL2
vBulletin Security provided by vBSecurity v2.2.2 (Pro) - vBulletin Mods & Addons Copyright © 2017 DragonByte Technologies Ltd.
Copyright Hotrodders.com 1999 - 2012. All Rights Reserved.


text:
Idaho's online health care insurance exchange opens
POCATELLO, Idaho - Tuesday is the first day Idahoans can jump onto the state's health care insurance website and start hunting for an insurance plan.
Despite the partial government shutdown looming over sectors of the nation, the state was able to meet its Oct. 1 deadline to allow Idahoans who do not yet have health insurance, to choose a plan before the January 1 deadline.
Here are some questions many of our viewers have been inquiring about.
What is the state-based exchange?
Think of the exchange as an online marketplace with numerous plans people can pick and choose from in order to determine what healthcare insurance plan is best suitable for them.
The website is: http://www.yourhealthidaho.org/ (This link will open-up in a new page.)
Do I qualify to purchase insurance on the exchange?
Chairman of the Health Insurance Exchange Board Stephen Weeg said if an individual is between 100 and 400 percent of the federal poverty level, you have a range of options on the exchange you can choose from and some of your costs will be subsidized and paid for.
For example, a minimum-wage worker making $15,000 a year will have his or her plan subsidized so their cost for comprehensive health coverage will be roughly between $25-30 each month. The insurance company will be paid partly by the individual and partly by an advanced tax credit paid by the federal government.
If an individual makes between $11,490 and $44,000, they will receive some form of help with their insurance premium. If a family of four earns between $23,000 and $92,000, they will also receive help with their premium costs.
"The affordability was impacted two ways," Weeg said. "First, the starting point cost of the insurance plans have come in lower than expected. Second, If you qualify for a subsidy, you need to look at how that subsidy will make that even more affordable for you, and in a nutshell, that is what the exchange is all about."
What if I am below the poverty level?
If a person is below 100 percent of the poverty level, they are not required to have health insurance because of the high cost. But, there are still a range of plans they can look at to see what would be most affordable and then look at the tax credit discount available to make sure the plan is even more affordable for them.
Some plans have a higher premium with a lower out-of-pocket cost and some plans have a lower premium with a higher out-of-pocket cost, so people who are hunting for a plan have plenty of options to choose from.
Great, but now how do I get started?
Weeg said they now have people called "connectors" who help you navigate through the website along with licensed insurance agents to help people understand insurance plans, and a call center people can use starting Tuesday.
Weeg also mentioned the website might be running fairly slow since it is overrun with large numbers of people logging on to start shopping for insurance.
What if I want to figure this out on my own but I'm still having trouble calculating premium costs according to my income?
You can visit Kaiser Family Foundation website, http://kff.org/, which has a calculator that will tailor to your exact financial standings.
For more information, see our Health Care Reform section, http://www.localnews8.com/healthcare.


text:
John Nichol, president of the Royal British Legion's Gulf veterans' branch, said troops had been given a cocktail of anti-anthrax and plague vaccines.
They were also possibly exposed to nerve agents when Iraqi weapons storage
sites were destroyed, he said.
A woman blamed the death of her baby on drugs given to her husband in Iraq.
Vichy Warriner, 36, from Peterborough, told the inquiry her late baby girl was born with deformities which she thinks were caused by injections and tablets given to her former husband why he was deployed in the Gulf.
In 1999, the couple learned from a scan at 35 weeks that their baby was hydrocephalus, having a disproportionately big head.
When baby Catherine was born she had several deformities, including no ears, widely spaced eyes, a club foot and a set of ribs missing.
She died after seven and a half hours.
Support groups claim about 6,000 veterans have suffered unexplained ill health.
Hundreds of veterans have tried to claim compensation, but solicitors advised earlier this year that there was insufficient evidence to prove their cases in court.
The Ministry of Defence (MoD) maintains the illnesses are so varied there can be no distinct syndrome or a specific cause.
Flight Lieutenant Nichol told the inquiry opening on Monday that symptoms complained of included chronic fatigue, memory loss, depression, mood swings, aching joints, sensitivity to chemicals and cancerous tumours.
The former RAF Tornado navigator, who was held as a prisoner of war for 49 days after his plane was shot down on the first day of the conflict, said: "The members of our armed forces were ready and willing to give everything, including their lives.
"And now, in their hour of need, they expect - they deserve - their country to help them."
He said 1991 Gulf War troops had been given up to 14 inoculations and experienced the first mass use of nerve agent pre-treatment NAPS, as well as being exposed to the use of pesticides, depleted uranium dust and atmospheric pollution from burning oil wells.
One of the first witnesses, Larry Cammock, chairman of the Gulf Veterans Association, said the inoculation programme had been "chaotic".
He said he awoke one night to find somebody putting a needle into him.
"When I asked what it was, he said 'you don't want to know, don't worry about it'."
Mr Cammock said he now suffered from immune deficiency problems, diabetes, post-traumatic stress disorder and arthritis.
The inquiry, which is being funded by an anonymous donor, aims to take evidence from 30 ex-servicemen, medical experts and government representatives.


text:
Have Book Will Travel! The Trailer
Summer Reading begins in two weeks with an exciting international theme. Our Round Wall will feature books from every continent on this planet and from other worlds as well. The Children's and Young Adult departments will have a roster of fun and interesting programs; and they will not be alone. The Adult Department is working on a number of interesting programs to help and entertain you over the summer.
E*Book*Aid will be available in the front lobby every Monday afternoon from 2-4. A team of volunteer tech wizards will give you personal help with using your digital device to read and listen to electronic books.
You'll be able to Learn the Art of Quilling--that's about making those impressive delicate spirally things made from paper--Saturday morning, June 8th at 10 o'clock in Room L 129.
Mystery author Jane Cleland will grace the library with a presentation about her 'antique mystery' books on Monday, July 1st.
On July 10th we'll be inviting artists in the community to drop your daily chores and bring your art supplies to the library for a mellow morning of sketching and/or painting--an Artist's Date--followed by lunch and a demo.
Then, on Saturday, August 3rd, we'll be "Speed Friending". Share your favorite books with other library customers and get some new ideas for great reads.
And then, right AFTER Summer Reading Program there will be another free bus trip to the Museum of Fine Arts Houston. That will be on August 15th. We'll start booking seats online and at the reference desk in June.
Come to the library, have some fun, and let us help you find what you need for a relaxing, enjoyable summer read.


text:
Translation of "renowned" - English-Turkish dictionary
(Translation of "renowned" from the Cambridge Learner's Dictionary English-Turkish © Cambridge University Press)
Get a quick, free translation!
- renewables noun
- renewed adjective
- renounce verb
- renovate verb
- renowned adjective
- rent noun
- rent verb
- rental noun
- rented adjective
Create and share your own word lists and quizzes for free!
Word of the Day
a person who has spent a lot of their life doing yoga and studying the philosophy of yoga


text:
These super soft blankets by Riegel are made of 100% polyester and offer the lightweight of natural cotton with the warmth of pure wool. These blankets are durable with a superior softness that lasts.
Standard - 2 to 6 business days
This product is covered by the Sam's Club Member Satisfaction Guarantee.


text:
I would love to hear what other artist have set up for still life sessions. I remember Robert Recommending a certain light bulb. I searched "still life" in this seciton but it didn't yield any results.
What different types of bulbs? What type of light works? Should I have a black back drop? I'm asking for general still lifes such as fruits, books, mugs etc. What about for shooting people as ref? How can I build a good set up for taking my own ref photos?
I always see a black backrop and a white sheet on the ground, but why? I hope this will satisfy the curiousity of others because it will my own. Thanks.


text:
Bok Choi butts. Photo by flickr user The Marmot.
An 88-year-old woman almost died last year from a myxedema coma–a life-threatening condition caused by extreme hypothyroidism. I'll let the New York Times take it from there:
The culprit, it turned out, was raw bok choy. The patient had been eating two to three pounds of it every day for several months, in the belief it would help control her diabetes. Instead, the vegetables may have suppressed her thyroid.
Bok choy contains compounds called glucosinolates that have been found to inhibit thyroid function in animals.
"I don't want to say people shouldn't be eating raw vegetables, but everything in moderation — even things that are good for us," said Dr. Michael Chu, an NYU resident physician who was one of the letter's authors. "This probably wouldn't have happened if the vegetables were cooked."
So that pretty much proves conclusively that raw foodists are all gonna die soon, right?
4 Comments
Comment by
beek0on #
I think the thing to note here is that vegans and raw foodists can be as ignorant about the effects of nutrients on the body as everyone else. (Said the vegan with thyroid disease.)
Comment by
Alon #
Three pounds of bok choy…every single day? Of course that's obviously going to lead to problems. You have to eat a BALANCED diet full of variety and difference in order to be healthy. Duh!
Comment by
vegyumon #
now im interested! Has there been findings that raw foodists are at risk for thyroid issues? (or any other issues for that matter)
Al's right- the bok choy overload was a problem…I just wonder now if a balanced raw food diet in general does have similar effects (in subtler forms most likely)
Comment by
jptownleyon #
88 Years old. Just saying maybe the thyroid is sort of, you know, wobbling. She'
And that's a hella lotta bok choy!


text:
Feed the Homeless Tour's 2nd Annual Costume Party Fundraiser!
The Feed the Homeless Tour, Inc
Saturday, October 27, 2012 at 12:00 PM (EDT)
Join us for our 2nd Annual Halloween Fundraiser & help us raise funds to provide coats & blankets for the homeless this Winter!
It's that time of the year & it's getting cold!
While everyone else is Trick-or-Treating we encourage you to get your kids involved in an important mission to help the homeless while they have fun!
We are a 501c3 non-profit organization with our headquarters in Tucker, GA. We travel the globe providing food, clothing & hygiene products to the homeless & in need. We help them find jobs, secure housing and get back on their feet. Ultimately we want to END HOMELESSNESS! But we need your help! With no government funding, we depend on your participation in our fundraising events and volunteer opportunities to continue our service to the community! We thank you for your support with our vision!
In order to purchase these tickets in installments, you'll need an Eventbrite account. Log in or sign up for a free account to continue.


text:
Common Type
Fun Stuff
- #1440
- Greek (culture)
- Forest Dweller (attribute)
- Neutral (behaviour)
- Fairies and Nymphs (common type)
Spirits of the forest that are bound to the trees unlike the dryads who move within the forests. They have the upper-half of a woman and the lower-half of a tree trunk. When the tree they belong to is cut down, they die.
Hamadryads has been viewed 1418 times.
Previous: Ham
Next: Hamou Ukaiou
Know something about Hamadryads?
If there's something that I've missed or would like to add then please let me know and I'll update the article. If you've seen this creature in films, TV, computer games, books or even old stories, please post a comment.
© Copyright 2013 Mythical Creatures List Hamadryads
Background Illustrations (Left top-bottom, right top-bottom): Medusa by Gonzalo Ordonez, Loch Ness Monster by dyb,
Basilisk by JustMick, Shuck by Serphire, Ts Um A Kas - Illustration of a rock painting (from Dover publications).


text:
LeAnn Rimes & Eddie Cibrian Play Nice at Soccer Game
Putting their family dispute behind them, LeAnn Rimes and Eddie Cibrian were spotted enjoying a family soccer game with Eddie's ex, Brandi Glanville, at Canoga Park in Los Angeles, California on Sunday (May 6).
Although the white shorts and flowing nude top clad 29-year-old country singer seems to be in the middle of a feud with her hubby's ex, she played nice for the day while sitting just feet away from Brandi on the sideline, but made sure to cuddle up to her husband several times during the contest.
And while LeAnn and Brandi might have seemed cordial to one another face to face Sunday afternoon, the tension between the two has been spilling out on Twitter.
Some time after the game a fan tweeted LeAnn, "BEHIND EVERY B*TCH IS A MAN THAT MADE HER THAT WAY!" making the country singer respond with, "HAHAHAHAHAHA kinda true but some are just b*tches".
The tension seems to stem from Cibrian banning his ex, Glanville, from letting their son make an appearance on her Bravo reality TV show, The Real Housewives of Beverly Hills.
"Brandi was upset because she could have got to spend time with her sons while she was working. She felt Eddie and LeAnn were being unreasonable," a source tells Us Weekly. "The other cast members have been supportive of Brandi and just now the morale of the cast is good."
Earlier this week the reality star took to Twitter to vent, writing, "Someone is still being a dick, but it's not Bravo." Then adding, "Funny no one really knew or knows my work status and after on talk woith my ex husband its splattered all over the internet #leakmuch?". . . "I just want my kids around me wen I'm wrkn otherwise I will never see them.#notok."
In addition to the digs Brandi made towards her ex, Cibrian - who cheated on her with LeAnn - she tweeted, "nothing I do is selfish. Going to therapy with my ex and his wife for my kids sake?? Hard but not selfish".
LeAnn has recently denied any sort of feud with Brandi and, when asked by a Twitter fan if the run in with Brandi at Jake's soccer game was awkward, LeAnn replied, "Nope! It's our life and I'd do anything for those boys! I have a great time."


text:
I contacted a company called Spray Nine in regards to a product I use in my home frequently (it kills many nasty things like MRSA and is approved for hospital use) in regards to it's effectiveness on Parvo.
Here is the reply I received:
We have not tested Spray Nine for Parvo – we focus on viruses and bacteria that pose health risks to humans –
FYI, bleach does NOT kill Parvo, either
With regards to Parvo, there are disinfectants that have the Parvo claim (some are like 10-20 minutes)-I would suggest you contact a few businesses in the industry of servicing veterinary businesses – they may recommend one – probably several would be surprised to hear that bleach doesn't kill it.
I thought this would be some good information to pass along to anyone who has had Parvo in their home, or has had any kind of exposure to it...
Here's some more information on picking a product to actually kill Parvo.


text:
Hi CGTalk,
I use mental ray for rendering and gave all the glass in this building a mia-material with glass preset.
Now when there is only one layer of glass everything is fine. But now that I have a glass box behind another wall of glass, strange things happen.
You would say that this is because of the trace settings, but I have those set high enough.
Someone has any ideas on what to change?


text:
The Rev. Al Sharpton has apparently turned down multiple offers to compete on ABC's 'Dancing with the Stars', at least that is what he said in a recent interview with TMZ. Sharpton said the reason he had to turn them down, multiple times, is that his commitment to civil rights and education is too important to take a break from, therefore not allowing him to participate on the show.
"You have to have your priorities," Sharpton said. "There's a difference in taking one night doing 'Saturday Night Live' and taking weeks doing 'Dancing With the Stars.' So I thought about it, but I took a pass."
Sharpton does however admit that he has some skills on the dance floor, "Oh, I've got moves now," he said, "I'd blow them out. There would be no chance for anybody to touch me. But I just don't have the time." I guess we may never know.
The Season 12 cast of "Dancing With the Stars" will be announced Feb. 28 during "The Bachelor." Will you be watching? Would you like to have seen Rev. Al on the show? Sound off below!


text:
Ukrainian opposition icon Yulia Tymoshenko has addressed protesters in Kyiv, hours after her release from custody. President Viktor Yanukovych is reported to have been stopped from boarding a plane to Russia.
Seated in a wheelchair, she tearfully addressed protesters in Independence Square, also known as the Maidan. "I dreamt of this day, I dreamt of seeing your eyes. You are heroes, you are the best sons of Ukraine."
"When I came to Kyiv I just couldn't recognize this city – the barricades, the burnt cars – but this country is now free; you gave this country its freedom," she said, adding that those responsible for scores of deaths in recent days would be brought to justice.
"No-one will escape the responsibility," said Tymoshenko. "We have to bring to justice anyone who shot these heroes of Maidan." In a trembling voice, she urged protesters to stay in Independence Square and keep up the pressure for change.
'No drop of blood forgotten'
Upon her release, the 53-year-old, who has been suffering from a back complaint, said she would stand for the office of president after parliament voted for fresh elections. Referring to the scores of people who died in protests during the past week, she said she would "make it so that no drop of blood that was spilled will be forgotten."
Tymoshenko's daughter Yevhenia had earlier welcomed a vote in parliament on Saturday to free the former prime minister.
Tymoshenko has served more than two years in prison after being convicted on a charge of abuse of office, for which she was sentenced to seven years. The trial was internationally condemned as being politically motivated. She was the charismatic leader of the 2004 Orange Revolution, and challenged Yanukovych in a bitterly contested presidential election in 2010.
Two of Tymoshenko's close political allies were on Saturday named as interim prime minister and speaker of parliament.
Yanukovych 'barred' from exit
Border police were reported to have blocked Yanukovych from flying to Russia. "He tried to take a plane to Russia but he was blocked in doing so by border police. He is currently hiding somewhere in the Donetsk region," the Ukrainian news agency Interfax reported the new speaker, Oleksandr Turchyno, as saying.
In the eastern city of Kharkiv earlier, Yanukovych said he would not leave the country and that he had no intention of resigning after parliament voted to oust him. As protesters seized his offices, he compared events in the capital – which he described as a coup – to the coming to power of the Nazis in 1930s Germany.
"This is not an opposition," he said. "These are bandits." Yanukovych added that his car had been targeted by a gunman, although he showed no signs of injury. "I feel sorrow for my country," he told UBR television.
Ukraine's army on Saturday had ruled out playing any part in the crisis currently gripping the country. "The army will in no way become involved in the political conflict," it said in a statement.
For the past three months, pro-European demonstrators have turned Kyiv's Independence Square into a rallying point, demanding fresh elections. Opposition to Yanukovych turned to unrest – with an estimated 88 deaths in recent days – after the president backed out of an association treaty with the European Union in November, instead opting to strengthen ties with Russia.
International leaders urge cooperation
Foreign leaders hailed Tymoshenko's release on Saturday, while also calling on the interim leadership to implement reforms swiftly and justly.
"We need a lasting solution to the political crisis," EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton said. "This must include constitutional reform, the formation of a new inclusive government and the creation of the conditions for democratic elections."
Germany's foreign minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, who played a prominent role in peace negotiations, also urged opposition politicians to "keep a sense of proportion."
"I urge those with responsibility to halt the political escalation…Maintaining channels of communication and being willing to compromise given the situation and regional differences are more vital than ever," Steinmeier said.
The United States has offered to assist Ukraine to rebuild its economy following the months of crippling protests.
At a meeting with Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov on the sidelines of the G20 meeting in Sydney, US Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew said the US "stands ready to assist Ukraine as it implements reforms to restore economic stability and seeks to return to a path of democracy and growth." His remarks were reported by a US Treasury official.
Meanwhile, Moscow, which had backed President Yanukovych's government, criticized the developments.
"Illegal extremist groups are refusing to disarm and in fact are taking Kyiv under their control with the connivance of opposition leaders," Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said during a phone conversation with US Secretary of State John Kerry.
The Russian foreign minister also called his German counterpart to exercise his influence over the opposition in order to "change the situation [in Kyiv] immediately."
rc/jm (AP, AFP,dpa, Reuters)


text:
e46 Convertible problem..!
View Single Post
Brett LaCroix
Registered User
Join Date: Nov 2009
Location: Newport, Oregon
Posts: 69
My Ride: 2001 330CiC 5-speed
View My Garage
Originally Posted by
you are not supposed to put the top down in cold weather. says so in the manual.
Mine was already down... in the garage... before I took my car for a ride.
It was cold... but certainly not freezing... when I attempted to put my top up.
It stopped a few inches from "closed"... just died... and gave me the "blinking red light of death". I had to manually close it the rest of the way.
I am waiting for a sunny day to pull my car out... let the top warm up... then try to manually close the top all the way to see if that resets it.
However, I seem to remember trying to manually close the top the day it happened, but did not have any luck. I hope something is not broken or jammmed inside.
:) Brett
Brett LaCroix
View Public Profile
Find more threads by Brett LaCroix
Find More Posts by Brett LaCroix
Leave feedback for Brett LaCroix (0)


text:
From Doban Architecture's Think Fabricate division comes the Stepping Up Chair, the latest addition to the New York-based company's Stepping Stones collection. The chair's commanding sculptural presence was constructed to evoke an ethos of collaboration with the use of various grades of fabric and leather on each of its mini-bolsters—an effect amplified when multiple pieces are used together in one space. The walnut-wood-frame chair is 36 inches tall, 24 inches wide, and 32 inches deep with an 18-inch-by-24-inch-by-30-inch ottoman; each also is available in a 36-inch width. The chair can be used indoors and outdoors. Think Fabricate, www.thinkfabricate.com; 718.456.7218.
Design Studio


text:
Kilt Society™
Classic Wool Blanket in Jacob Tartan
Product Details
Our Classic Jacob Tartan Blanket, available in full or knee size finished with short (4") purled fringing
We have sourced local and international suppliers that we are proud to work alongside. Our Essential range offers the most traditional, sought after designs at affordable prices.
- Full size approx 68" x 59" (175cm x 150cm)
- Knee Size approx 36" x 59" (91cm x 150cm)
- Made from Wool
- Imported


text:
Milton, NY Gets Their Very Own Theme Song – Your Town Thursday [AUDIO]
Now it's your turn, Milton, NY to be added to the prestigious list of towns who can say that they have their own theme song. How's that for shameless self promotion?
The Town of Milton is located in Saratoga County. Ballston Spa, which is technically the county seat is incorporated into this town. I've already covered Ballston Spa in a former Your Town Thursday segment, so there might be a little overlap in terms of information here.
I now proudly present your theme song, Miltonites. That's not a word. I just invented it. Further explanation and lyrics are below, by the way.
This is a parody of the Grateful Dead's "Truckin'". Why" Milton has the same amount of syllables as Truckin', that's why! Did I omit something important in the song? Let me know below!
It's Milton, and I'm gonna 'splain to you
Founded in 1792
it's got its share of things to do
But most importantly, let's talk fast food
Take a ride with me and if not I will meet ya
I know a spot or two where they will sure feed ya
there's more than one little place to get you a pizza
Wheats and sweets bakery they're there as well (and it rhymes)
Milton oh yes of thee I sing
It rhymes with Wilton but that doesn't mean a thing
Cuz Wilton doesn't have Kessering
and they can also brag cuz it's the home of the paper bag
(George West, you were the best!)
Around these parts you could spend a week
Fishing on the The Kayaderosseras Creek
The name of that creek's really hard to speak
What a long long word that is
Milton ….. let the fun begin
It's got no Hilton, but it's got the Medbery inn
Buttermill Falls let the relaxin begin
We salute your town today on 'GNA


text:
One thing is certain Thursday night.
Either Virginia's 15-game home win streak will end or it will stop third-ranked Duke's eight-game run of victories in an ACC rivalry that has been lopsided in recent seasons.
Duke (24-3, 11-3) is in second place and Virginia (19-8, 9-5) is tied with North Carolina for third. This contest may be far more important to the Cavaliers since their NCAA tournament hopes are uncertain thanks to losses to Old Dominion and Delaware.
"You don't sit there and play those games, and say what does this mean long range?" coach Tony Bennett said. "You're just thankful we're playing better basketball now."
The Cavaliers are 16-1 at home, with the loss coming 59-53 to Delaware on Nov. 13. Only one home win has come against a ranked team, and notching the first victory over the Blue Devils in six seasons would help offset Virginia's poor play away from Charlottesville.
Duke has won 17 of the last 18 matchups, although its run of seven straight double-digit victories in this series ended with last season's 61-58 home win.
The Blue Devils would like to catch No. 5 Miami for first place and want to avoid a slip-up that could cost them a No. 1 seed in the NCAAs. Duke was dominant last week in winning by an average of 26.5 points over Virginia Tech and Boston College.
Freshman Rasheed Sulaimon was sensational in averaging 22.0 points on 65.4 percent shooting, recording a season-high 27 points in Saturday's 89-68 rout of Boston College.
"I think he's had a great year and he happens to be a freshman," coach Mike Krzyzewski said. "He's had a great year for any player, but as a freshman, it's been terrific."
The Blue Devils are 9-3 without injured forward Ryan Kelly, whose return date is unclear.
Virginia will have to also worry about slowing down leading scorer Mason Plumlee, who has 16 double-doubles.
There could be a good reason why the Cavs have enjoyed success in neutralizing Seth Curry, the Blue Devils' top perimeter threat at 16.8 points per game.
In three career games against Virginia with Duke, Curry is averaging 8.3 points - his lowest versus an ACC team as a member of the Blue Devils. Curry played his freshman season at Liberty under Ritchie McKay, a Cavs assistant the last four years.
While Duke averages 78.9 points, Virginia averages 65.0 for one of the ACC's worst marks. The Cavaliers, however, are averaging 74.0 points on 50.9 percent shooting during a 4-2 stretch that has caught Krzyzewski's attention.
"I don't think they're a slow-down team, I think they're a smart basketball team that will take opportunistic shots," the coach said. "When they get a good shot, they'll take it. They're more so an efficient team, they're a very efficient offensive team."
Virginia top scorer Joe Harris is averaging 20.9 points over his last nine contests, although that figure is 12.3 in three career games against Duke.
"Harris is really one of the better players in the country," Krzyzewski said. "He's a warrior. He reminds me of (former Duke great Kyle) Singler as far as their toughness."


text:
Twin Bed Mattress Connector
Item #: 017155029312 Stock Status: In Stock
Rated 4.8 of 5
Hudson Industries, Inc.
Shop by Brand
Transform the convenience of two twin beds into the comfort of a king with this Twin Bed Mattress Connector. Just push two twins together, then place the connector pad over the top to create one seamless king bed sleep experience. The pad has a built-in foam wedge underneath running right down the center. It's designed to fit perfectly into the space created between two twin beds, and to create a spacious, comfortable sleeping environment.
Product Dimensions Additional Product Info
Twin Bed Mattress Connector Features
- White color pad similar to a mattress cover.
- Standard King Size: 2 x 76 x 80 inches.
- Fits and connects twin beds to give the comfort of a large bed.
- Foam center/quilted pillow top construction.
- Built in wedge is laminated in place and fits between the center gap to created a smooth, comfortable sleep surface.
- Important Product Information:
- Ground shipping only.
- Items may be drop-shipped from the manufacturer. Please allow an extra week for delivery.
- Gift wrapping not available for this item.
Product Dimensions Additional Product Info