text: Transportation Law - Justia Case Law Summaries http://law.justia.com/summaryfeed/transportation-law/ 2017-05-28T06:22:23-08:00 Justia Inc http://www.justia.com/ Justia Law https://justatic.com/v/20170526221934/shared/images/social-media/law.png Copyright 2014 Justia Inc http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2017/27719.html Donze v. General Motors 2017-05-17T06:03:09-08:00 2017-05-18T05:14:19-08:00 Comparative negligence does not apply in crashworthiness cases, and that South Carolina's public policy does not bar a plaintiff, allegedly intoxicated at the time of the accident, from bringing a crashworthiness claim against the vehicle manufacturer. This case concerned the applicability of comparative negligence to strict liability and breach of warranty claims in a crashworthiness case brought by Plaintiff Reid Donze against Defendant General Motors ("GM"). The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina certified two questions to the South Carolina Supreme Court Court addressing the defenses available to a manufacturer in crashworthiness cases brought under strict liability and breach of warranty theories. View "Donze v. General Motors" on Justia Law 2017-05-17 state South Carolina South Carolina Supreme Court Kaye Gorenflo Hearn 27719 http://law.justia.com/cases/georgia/supreme-court/2017/s17a0004.html Abramyan v. Georgia 2017-05-15T04:01:08-08:00 2017-05-15T10:45:30-08:00 During the 2015 General Session, the legislature amended certain statutes governing Certificates of Public Necessity and Convenience ("CPNCs," also known as taxi medallions) and created new provisions authorizing (and regulating) ride-sharing programs throughout the state. Appellants, taxicab drivers who operated in the City of Atlanta and owned CPNCs, filed suit claiming that the Act resulted in an unconstitutional taking and inverse condemnation of their CPNCs. The State moved to dismiss, arguing, among other things, that Appellants failed to state legally cognizable claims. The trial court agreed and granted the motion. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. View "Abramyan v. Georgia" on Justia Law 2017-05-15 state Georgia Supreme Court of Georgia Carol W. Hunstein S17A0004 http://law.justia.com/cases/kansas/supreme-court/2017/111521.html Heartland Apartment Ass'n v. City of Mission 2017-04-07T06:31:31-08:00 2017-04-07T12:25:03-08:00 In 2010, the City of Mission passed a Transportation User Fee (TUF), which is assessed on all developed real property based on a formula that estimates the number of vehicle "trips" a particular property generates. The revenue raised by the TUF is used for the maintenance and upkeep of the City's streets. Plaintiffs challenged the TUF as an impermissible excise tax levied by the City in violation of Kan. Stat. Ann. 12-194. The district court granted summary judgment to Mission. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the TUF is an impermissible excise tax. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Mission is prohibited from levying the TUF because the City's TUF is an excise tax that does not meet any of the exceptions in section 12-194. View "Heartland Apartment Ass'n v. City of Mission" on Justia Law 2017-04-07 state Kansas Kansas Supreme Court Carol A. Beier 111521 http://law.justia.com/cases/utah/supreme-court/2017/20150792.html Tesla Motors UT, Inc. v. Utah Tax Commission 2017-04-04T10:34:06-08:00 2017-04-04T19:27:23-08:00 The administrator of the Utah Motor Vehicle Enforcement Division denied Tesla Motors UT, Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of a motor vehicle manufacturer, an application for a license to sell new motor vehicles, determining that the application implicated both the Motor Vehicle Business Regulation Act (Licensing Act) and the New Automobile Franchise Act (Franchise Act). The Tax Commission affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Licensing Act and Franchise Act together prohibit a wholly owned subsidiary of a motor vehicle manufacturer from obtaining a license to sell the manufacturer's new motor vehicles in stores in Utah, and the statutory scheme is constitutional. View "Tesla Motors UT, Inc. v. Utah Tax Commission" on Justia Law 2017-04-03 state Utah Utah Supreme Court Thomas R. Lee 20150792 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/16-50115/16-50115-2017-03-17.html United Motorcoach Association, Inc. v. City of Austin 2017-03-17T15:30:34-08:00 2017-03-17T18:49:29-08:00 Plaintiff, a national association of charter-bus companies, sought to enjoin regulations affecting their operations enacted by the City of Austin. At issue was whether federal law preempted the City's exercise of its regulatory authority over the intrastate operation of charter buses. The court affirmed the district court's holding that the regulations were not preempted. The arguments about preemption were based on a federal statute captioned "Federal authority over intrastate transportation." See 49 U.S.C. 14501. The court agreed with the district court's conclusion that section 14501(c)(2)(A) may appropriately be considered in interpreting and applying section 14501(a)(2), because both subsections use identical language. The court concluded that the distinctions between sections 14501(a) and (c) do not persuade it to construe "safety regulatory authority" more narrowly in the former than in the latter. The court applied a test that was similar to the Ninth Circuit, concluding that, in light of the permitting regulation's expressed purpose and effect, there was a safety motivation for the ordinance, and there was a nexus between the permitting regulations and the safety concern. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United Motorcoach Association, Inc. v. City of Austin" on Justia Law 2017-03-17 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Leslie H. Southwick 16-50115 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/16-1726/16-1726-2017-03-17.html CSX Transportation, Inc. v. South Carolina Department of Revenue 2017-03-17T11:01:18-08:00 2017-03-17T21:46:10-08:00 This case involved the differences between how ad valorem taxes are determined in South Carolina for railroad property and how they are determined for most other commercial and industrial property. CSXT filed suit against the State, alleging that the property taxes imposed for the 2014 tax year will discriminate against CSXT. CSXT sought a judgment declaring that excluding CSXT from the benefit of the caps of the South Carolina Real Property Valuation Reform Act (SCVA), S.C. Code 12-37-3140(B), violates the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, 49 U.S.C. 11501(b)(4), which prohibits the imposition of "another tax that discriminates against a rail carrier." CSXT also sought preliminary and permanent injunctions. The district court ultimately rejected CSXT's section 11501(b)(4) challenge. The court explained that Congress designed section 11501(b)(4) to prohibit taxes that discriminate against railroads. In this case, CSXT alleged that if it is not allowed to benefit from the SCVA cap, its 2014 property tax will be just such a tax. The court concluded that there was no basis for precluding CSXT from proving the claim it alleged – discrimination – and requiring CSXT instead to fit its challenge into a provision that does not even address discrimination and that required proof of facts CSXT has not even alleged. Therefore, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings because the district court granted judgment against CSXT without ever reaching the question of whether the challenged tax was discriminatory. View "CSX Transportation, Inc. v. South Carolina Department of Revenue" on Justia Law 2017-03-17 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Traxler 16-1726 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/15-3580/15-3580-2017-03-10.html Wedemeyer v. CSX Transportation 2017-03-10T14:00:44-08:00 2017-03-10T18:38:46-08:00 A year after CSX successfully petitioned the ICC to end CSX's obligation to provide common-carrier rail service on a portion of track in Putnam County, Indiana, CSX notified ICC that it had abandoned that segment. CSX then leased a portion of its track, including the abandoned segment, for use by a grain-shipping company. Plaintiffs, owners of property adjoining the abandoned track segment, filed suit seeking removal of the tracks and possession of the real property underlying the rail line. The district court granted CSX's motion for summary judgment. The court affirmed the district court's finding that plaintiffs' claims were preempted under the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (ICCTA), 49 U.S.C. 10501(b). In this case, plaintiffs seek to eject CSX from land with active, ongoing rail operations, and thus preemption applied to their claims. View "Wedemeyer v. CSX Transportation" on Justia Law 2017-03-10 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Joel Martin Flaum 15-3580 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/15-2905/15-2905-2017-03-10.html Gunderson v. BNSF Railway 2017-03-10T08:30:54-08:00 2017-03-10T08:46:16-08:00 Plaintiff filed suit alleging that BNSF violated the Federal Rail Safety Act (FRSA), 49 U.S.C. 20109, when it terminated his employment for harassing a co-worker and threatening a supervisor. The district court ultimately granted BNSF summary judgment on the merits and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. The court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's retaliation claim because he failed to submit evidence that would permit a reasonable jury to infer that his FRSA-protected activities were a contributing factor in BNSF's decision to discharge him for harassing and intimidating a co-worker. Because BNSF did not sufficiently develop its alternative waiver argument, did not raise a laches or estoppel defense in the district court or on appeal, and presented insufficient proof (if any) on these fact intensive issues, the court left these questions for another day. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Gunderson v. BNSF Railway" on Justia Law 2017-03-10 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit James B. Loken 15-2905 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/15-1299/15-1299-2017-03-07.html ABM Onsite Services - West, Inc. v. NLRB 2017-03-07T07:31:22-08:00 2017-03-07T08:12:52-08:00 ABM petitioned for review of the Board's determination that the Union's effort to represent the workers who handle airline baggage was governed by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 151 et seq., and not the Railway Labor Act (RLA), 45 U.S.C. 151 et seq. The court concluded that the Board violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(a), by applying a new test to determine whether the RLA applies, without explaining its reasons for doing so. Because an agency's unexplained departure from precedent was arbitrary and capricious, the court vacated the Board's order. In this case, the court held that the Board was not free to simply adopt the NMB's new approach without offering a reasoned explanation for that shift. The court explained that an agency cannot avoid its duty to explain a departure from its own precedent simply by pointing to another agency's unexplained departure from precedent. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review, denied the Board's cross-application for enforcement, and vacated the order, remanding for further proceedings. View "ABM Onsite Services - West, Inc. v. NLRB" on Justia Law 2017-03-07 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit Thomas Beall Griffith 15-1299 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/15-3369/15-3369-2017-03-02.html Mercier v. U.S. Department of Labor 2017-03-02T08:30:42-08:00 2017-03-02T17:07:13-08:00 Petitioner sought review of the Board's decision and order affirming the ALJ in petitioner's Federal Rail Safety Act (FRSA), 49 U.S.C. 20109, retaliatory termination action. The court concluded that the ALJ correctly applied the background evidence rule enunciated by the Supreme Court in National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, which held that an employee can use prior acts as background evidence for a timely claim even when those same acts are time-barred; the court rejected petitioner's argument that hearsay evidence at the hearing undermines the ALJ's ultimate conclusions where the evidence was not offered to prove the truth of the matters asserted, but instead, to show the effect of the assertions on the decision maker; and the ALJ's determination that petitioner's protected acts were not a contributing factor in his termination was supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the court denied the petition and affirmed the final decision and order. View "Mercier v. U.S. Department of Labor" on Justia Law 2017-03-02 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Beam 15-3369 http://law.justia.com/cases/oregon/supreme-court/2017/s063929.html Figueroa v. BNSF Railway Co. 2017-03-02T08:09:42-08:00 2017-03-02T12:44:14-08:00 Plaintiff was working for BNSF Railway Company in Pasco, Washington, where she was repairing a locomotive engine. While she was reaching up to remove an engine part, the "portable stair supplied by [BNSF] rolled or kicked out from under [p]laintiff," causing her to sustain substantial injuries. The question that this case presented was whether, by appointing a registered agent in Oregon, defendant (a foreign corporation) impliedly consented to have Oregon courts adjudicate any and all claims against it regardless of whether those claims have any connection to defendant's activities in the state. Defendant moved to dismiss this action because the trial court lacked general jurisdiction over it. When the court denied the motion, defendant petitioned for an alternative writ of mandamus. The Oregon Supreme Court issued the writ, and held as a matter of state law, that the legislature did not intend that appointing a registered agent pursuant to ORS 60.731(1) would constitute consent to the jurisdiction of the Oregon courts. View "Figueroa v. BNSF Railway Co." on Justia Law 2017-03-02 state Oregon Oregon Supreme Court Rives Kistler S063929 http://law.justia.com/cases/oregon/supreme-court/2017/s063914.html Barrett v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. 2017-03-02T08:09:41-08:00 2017-03-02T12:45:59-08:00 Plaintiff sustained injuries while working for Union Pacific Railroad Company "as a spiker machine operator near Minidoka, Idaho." Union Pacific's decision to reduce "the spiker machine's customary three-[person] crew to a two-[person] crew" placed greater physical demands on plaintiff, causing or contributing to the injuries he suffered. As a result of Union Pacific's alleged negligent maintenance of the spiker machine and its decision to reduce the number of persons operating that machine, plaintiff suffered economic and noneconomic damages totaling approximately $615,000. The question this case presented was whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment permitted Oregon to exercise general jurisdiction over an interstate railroad for claims unrelated to the railroad's activities in Oregon. The trial court ruled that it could exercise general jurisdiction over the railroad and denied the railroad's motion to dismiss plaintiff's negligence action for lack of personal jurisdiction. After the railroad petitioned for a writ of mandamus, the Supreme Court issued an alternative writ to the trial court, which adhered to its initial ruling. After review, the Supreme Court held that due process did not permit Oregon courts to exercise general jurisdiction over the railroad. View "Barrett v. Union Pacific Railroad Co." on Justia Law 2017-03-02 state Oregon Oregon Supreme Court Rives Kistler S063914 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/15-3532/15-3532-2017-02-27.html Heim v. BNSF Railway 2017-02-27T08:30:48-08:00 2017-02-27T17:11:36-08:00 After plaintiff was seriously injured on the job, BNSF disciplined him for violations of BNSF rules that led to his injury. Plaintiff filed suit, alleging that BNSF's discipline violated the employee-protections provision of the Federal Railroad Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. 20109(a)(4). The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for BNSF, concluding that plaintiff failed to establish that his supervisors intentionally retaliated against him for filing his injury report. In this case, without more specific evidence of an improper retaliatory motive, the court found that plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case. View "Heim v. BNSF Railway" on Justia Law 2017-02-27 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Melloy 15-3532 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/15-3192/15-3192-2017-02-27.html Blackorby v. BNSF Railway 2017-02-27T08:30:47-08:00 2017-02-27T17:11:34-08:00 After plaintiff was disciplined by his employer, BNSF, for not promptly reporting a workplace injury, he filed suit claiming that BNSF's discipline violated the employee-protections provision of the Federal Railroad Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. 20109(a)(4). The jury awarded plaintiff damages for emotion distress. The court concluded, however, that its decision in Kuduk v. BNSF Railway Co. required plaintiff to establish intentional retaliation and that the jury instructions did not compel such a finding. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Blackorby v. BNSF Railway" on Justia Law 2017-02-27 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Melloy 15-3192 http://law.justia.com/cases/illinois/supreme-court/2017/120438.html Wardwell v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. 2017-02-17T09:31:32-08:00 2017-02-17T16:25:31-08:00 Plaintiff was employed by the railroad, as a switchman and conductor. On August 9, 2008, plaintiff was riding in a railroad van, going from a railway yard to a train, driven by the railroad's agent, Goodwin. The van was rear-ended by Behnken's vehicle. Plaintiff suffered a severe back injury and can no longer perform his job duties. He is employed by the railroad as a security guard at significantly reduced wages. Plaintiff filed suit under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. 51, alleging that Goodwin had negligently cut in front of Behnken and that Goodwin's negligence caused the accident. Behnken testified that she was drunk at the time of the collision, that she was arrested for driving under the influence, and that she was found to be legally intoxicated two hours later when she took a breath test. Behnken stated that she did not see the van before she hit it and that she either "fell asleep or was blacked out" and did not know if she had her headlights on. The jury ruled in favor of the railroad. The appellate court reversed, holding that the FELA does not allow a defendant railroad to argue that a third-party's negligent conduct was the sole cause of the employee's injuries. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. Under FELA, the employee cannot recover unless the railroad was a cause, at least in part, of the plaintiff's injuries. In this case, after considering all the evidence, the jury agreed that it was not. There is no basis for disturbing that determination. View "Wardwell v. Union Pacific Railroad Co." on Justia Law 2017-02-17 state Illinois Supreme Court of Illinois Anne M. Burke 120438 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/16-40553/16-40553-2017-01-30.html Heniff Transportation Systems v. Trimac Transportation Services 2017-01-30T16:30:34-08:00 2017-01-30T21:57:20-08:00 Heniff, hired to transport chemicals, filed suit against Trimac, the company Heniff hired to clean the tanker prior to the trip, for damages after the cleaning was performed incorrectly and chemicals became contaminated. The district court dismissed Heniff's state law claims. The Carmack Amendment, 49 U.S.C. 14706 et seq., establishes a federal liability regime for claims concerning goods damaged or lost during transportation in interstate commerce. The court affirmed the judgment and agreed with the district court that Heniff's claims are preempted by the Carmack Amendment because the service that Trimac provided, a tanker wash, was a service related to the movement of property in interstate commerce. View "Heniff Transportation Systems v. Trimac Transportation Services" on Justia Law 2017-01-30 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit E. Grady Jolly 16-40553 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/15-14646/15-14646-2017-01-09.html Foudy v. Indian River County Sheriff's Office 2017-01-09T12:01:09-08:00 2017-01-09T18:34:29-08:00 Plaintiffs filed suit against defendants under the Driver's Privacy Protection Act (DPPA), 18 U.S.C. 2721-2725, and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court dismissed the complaints based on statute of limitations grounds. The Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (DHSMV) maintains a Driver and Vehicle Information Database (DAVID), which contains drivers' personal information. Plaintiffs claimed that defendants repeatedly accessed plaintiffs' private information through the DAVID database without their knowledge or consent. The court concluded that the statute of limitations began to run on plaintiffs' claims when the alleged DPPA violations occurred; plaintiffs have failed to present any theory that would entitle their claims to be treated as filed within the limitations period; and thus their actions are time-barred. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Foudy v. Indian River County Sheriff's Office" on Justia Law 2017-01-09 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Black 15-14646 15-14659 15-15015 http://law.justia.com/cases/connecticut/supreme-court/2016/sc19558.html Dattco, Inc. v. Commissioner of Transportation 2016-12-20T05:00:46-08:00 2016-12-20T12:00:06-08:00 Plaintiffs were four bus companies operating buses over routes in and around the cities of New Britian and Hartford. Each plaintiff had authority to operate a bus service over a specific route pursuant to a certificate of public convenience and necessity. When a new busway was constructed by the state, the state sought to hire new companies to operate buses over the routes Plaintiffs currently operate. In a separate action, Plaintiffs sought to enjoin the Commissioner of Transportation from transferring the routes at issue to new operators. While that case was pending, the Commissioner condemned the certificates pursuant to the State's power of eminent domain. Plaintiff filed the actions that were the subject of this appeal, claiming that the Commissioner lacked the statutory authority to condemn their certificates. The trial court consolidated the actions and granted the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment, concluding that Conn. Gen. Stat. 13b-36(a) gave the Commissioner authority to condemn the certificates. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the legislature did not intend for the term "facilities" in the statute to refer to intangible operating rights reflected in the certificates at issue. View "Dattco, Inc. v. Commissioner of Transportation" on Justia Law 2016-12-27 state Connecticut Connecticut Supreme Court Peter T. Zarella SC19558 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/16-1186/16-1186-2016-12-19.html City of Ozark, AR v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. 2016-12-19T08:30:44-08:00 2016-12-19T17:15:12-08:00 The City filed suit against Union Pacific in state court, seeking an order requiring Union Pacific to restore a public at-grade rail crossing or, alternatively, allowing the City to condemn Union Pacific's land across that public crossing. The district court granted the City summary judgment and a permanent injunction, rejecting Union Pacific's contention that the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (ICCTA), 49 U.S.C. 10501(b), grants the Surface Transportation Board (STB) exclusive jurisdiction over the City's claims. The court concluded that ICCTA's express preemption provision applies to this dispute; Union Pacific has made a strong showing that the remedy the City seeks would "impede rail operations or pose undue safety risks," the STB's governing preemption standard; and therefore the court remanded with instructions for the district court to rule on Union Pacific's motion to dismiss the City's amended complaint for lack of jurisdiction unless the City obtains a ruling from the STB that it lacks or declines exclusive jurisdiction over this dispute. View "City of Ozark, AR v. Union Pacific Railroad Co." on Justia Law 2016-12-19 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit James B. Loken 16-1186 16-1187 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/14-3755/14-3755-2016-12-15.html DND International, Inc. v. Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration 2016-12-15T13:30:45-08:00 2016-12-15T16:17:02-08:00 On the night of January 27, 2014, DND's driver, Velasquez, crashed his semi-truck into two emergency vehicles and another semi which were stopped on an unlit highway. An Illinois Toll Authority employee was killed and a police officer was seriously injured. The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) immediately revoked Velasquez's commercial-driving privileges and opened a company-wide investigation. After a very thorough, two-month investigation, FMCSA issued an imminent-hazard out-of-service order (IHOOSO) without warning, directing DND to immediately halt its trucking operations nationwide and freeze trucks in place within eight hours. During the investigation DND had been permitted to continue normal operations and there were two or three minor problems. An administrative law judge opened a hearing nine days after the order issued and rendered his decision after another six days, finding that the IHOOSO should not have been issued and was an effective "death penalty" to the small company. Apparently, the sudden halt to the company's operations put the company out of business. The Seventh Circuit dismissed, for lack of Article III standing, a petition for review seeking to correct a decision of an assistant administrator that upheld the ALJ grant of relief to DND. The case is moot. View "DND International, Inc. v. Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration" on Justia Law 2016-12-15 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Daniel Anthony Manion 14-3755 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/14-35414/14-35414-2016-11-23.html Oregon Coast Scenic Railroad, LLC v. State of Oregon Department of State Lands 2016-11-23T10:05:47-08:00 2016-11-23T18:12:34-08:00 Oregon Coast is a non-profit corporation that operates tourist trains on a portion of track in Oregon that is owned by the Port of Tillamook Bay, a federally regulated railroad authorized by the Board. In 2014, the State sent Oregon Coast a cease and desist order, alleging that Oregon Coast's repair work was violating a state "removal-fill law," which, among other things, requires a state permit for the removal of any amount of material from waters designated as Essential Salmonid Habitat. Oregon Coast filed suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that the removal-fill law is preempted by the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (ICCTA), 49 U.S.C. 10101 et seq., which governs federal regulation of railroads. The court concluded that the repair work done by Oregon Coast under its agreement with the Port falls under the Board's jurisdiction because the work is done under the auspices of a federally regulated rail carrier and is sufficiently related to the provision of transportation over the interstate rail network. The State's removal-fill law is preempted as applied to this work, and the district court erred in concluding otherwise. The court reversed and remanded for further proceedings because the district court's rulings on the preliminary injunction, permanent injunction, and declaratory relief were all premised on this incorrect legal determination. View "Oregon Coast Scenic Railroad, LLC v. State of Oregon Department of State Lands" on Justia Law 2016-11-23 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Sidney Runyan Thomas 14-35414 http://law.justia.com/cases/west-virginia/supreme-court/2016/15-0935.html Matkovich v. CSX Transportation, Inc. 2016-11-16T12:04:45-08:00 2016-11-16T18:45:10-08:00 W. Va. Code 11-15A-10a affords taxpayers a credit for sales taxes paid to other states, which offsets the West Virginia Motor Fuel Use Tax ("use tax") a fuel importer must pay under W. Va. Code 11-15A-13a. After it was assessed a use tax on the fuel it uses in West Virginia, CSX Transportation sought a refund of the sales taxes it had paid on its motor fuel purchases to cities, counties, and localities of other sales pursuant to section 11-15A-10a. The Tax Commissioner rejected the refund request. The Office of Tax Appeals (OTA) granted CSX's refund request and vacated the assessment, finding that CSX was entitled to a credit under section 11-15A-10a for the sales taxes it paid to other states' subdivisions on its purchases of motor fuel therein. The circuit court affirmed. The Tax Commissioner appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred by not limiting the credit to sales taxes paid only to other states upon the purchase of a motor fuel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the sales tax credit afforded by section 11-15A-10a applies both to sales taxes paid to other states and to sales taxes paid to the municipalities of other states. View "Matkovich v. CSX Transportation, Inc." on Justia Law 2016-11-16 state West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia Robin Jean Davis 15-0935 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/15-2781/15-2781-2016-11-02.html Brooks v. City of Des Moines 2016-11-02T07:30:47-08:00 2016-11-02T15:59:32-08:00 Plaintiffs, six drivers, filed suit against the City alleging that the Automatic Traffic Enforcement (ATE) system violates federal and state law. The district court dismissed plaintiffs' claims. Plaintiffs argue that the district court should not have relied on Hughes v. City of Cedar Rapids because the facts here are materially different. The court concluded that Cedar Rapids and Des Moines offer direct access to the district court or an optional administrative proceeding with de novo appellate review. Based on this court's holding, the other differences that the drivers allege are irrelevant. Therefore, plaintiffs' claims are addressed in the Hughes opinion. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Brooks v. City of Des Moines" on Justia Law 2016-11-02 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit William Duane Benton 15-2781 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/15-2703/15-2703-2016-11-02.html Hughes v. City of Cedar Rapids 2016-11-02T07:30:45-08:00 2016-11-02T15:59:35-08:00 Plaintiffs, a group of drivers, filed suit against the City and Gatso, alleging that the Automatic Traffic Enforcement (ATE) system violates their right to procedural due process, their fundamental right to travel, Iowa Code 602.6101, and causes unjust enrichment for the City and Gatso. The City contracted with Gatso to install and operate the ATE system. The district court dismissed plaintiffs' claims. The court concluded that the district court did not err by determining that plaintiff Hughes lacks Article III standing where he does not allege that he has incurred any costs to mitigate or avoid the threat of ATE enforcement, or that the threat of an ATE citation is sufficiently imminent, and plaintiff Mazgaj lacks third party standing where he failed to show a hindrance to his wife's ability to protect her own interests. The court concluded, however, that plaintiff Lee's claims are ripe where he was found guilty of violating the ordinance and no further factual development is necessary. Thus, Lee has the hardship of citation and the cost of litigation. The court further concluded that the district court never had jurisdiction of Hughes and Mazgaj's claims and therefore their claims should be remanded to state court. Plaintiffs Robinson, Sparks, Northrup, Yarpezeshkan, French, and Stimpson have established standing to bring procedural-due-process claims. However, these plaintiffs failed to state a violation of their procedural due process rights. The court rejected plaintiffs' claims that the system violated their substantive rights, Equal Protection claim, and unjust enrichment claim. Because the City's appeal of the IDOT's ruling is still pending, this claim is not ripe. Therefore, the district court should dismiss without prejudice the drivers' state-law claims based on the alleged violation of IDOT rules. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Hughes v. City of Cedar Rapids" on Justia Law 2016-11-02 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit William Duane Benton 15-2703 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/15-3756/15-3756-2016-10-31.html Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association, Inc. v. United States Department of Transportation 2016-10-31T12:01:36-08:00 2016-10-31T14:06:16-08:00 Since 1935, federal law has regulated the hours of service of truck drivers operating in interstate commerce. Drivers must keep paper records showing their driving time and other on‐duty time. In 2012, Congress directed the Department of Transportation to issue regulations to require most interstate commercial motor vehicles to install electronic logging devices (ELDs) linked to vehicle engines to automatically record data relevant to hours of services: whether the engine is running, the time, and the vehicle's approximate location. Congress instructed the Department to consider factors including driver privacy and preventing forms of harassment enabled by the ELDs, 49 U.S.C. 31137. The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration promulgated the final rule: Electronic Logging Devices and Hours of Service Supporting Documents, 49 C.F.R. Pts. 385, 386, 390, 395 (2015). The Seventh Circuit rejected a challenge by the Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association and drivers. The court rejected arguments that the rule permits ELDs that are not entirely automatic; uses a narrow definition of "harassment" that will not sufficiently protect drivers; that the agency's cost‐benefit analysis was inadequate; that the agency did not sufficiently consider confidentiality protections for drivers; and that the ELD mandate imposed, in effect, an unconstitutional search or seizure on truck drivers. Even if the rule imposes a search or a seizure, inspection of ELD data recorded would fall within the "pervasively regulated industry" exception to the warrant requirement. View "Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association, Inc. v. United States Department of Transportation" on Justia Law 2016-10-31 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit HAMILTON 15-3756 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/16-1577/16-1577-2016-10-31.html Koziara v. BNSF Railway Co. 2016-10-31T07:30:41-08:00 2016-10-31T08:40:56-08:00 Plaintiff was supervising a BNSF crew, removing and reinstalling timber crossing planks. The crew had difficulty removing one plank, and with plaintiff's approval, used a front‐end loader, which caused the plank to fly loose as plaintiff was walking on the track and to strike his leg. Days later he went to his doctor and learned that he had fractured his tibia. After first stating that he had been injured at home, on advice of his union, plaintiff told his supervisor, Veitz, about the injury. BNSF paid his medical bills and, pursuant to its policy, staged a reenactment and concluded that plaintiff had been careless. Later, a crew member told Veitz that he thought plaintiff was injured 10 days before the incident, while removing railroad ties from railroad property. Pursuant to its collective bargaining agreement, BNSF investigated. For his carelessness in the front-loader incident (which cost it medical expenses), BNSF imposed a 30-day suspension, but discharged plaintiff for the theft. Veitz testified that he had not given plaintiff permission to take ties, which are soaked in creosote. BNSF does not give or sell creosote products to employees or the public because of potential hazards The National Railroad Adjustment Board and OSHA denied plaintiff's appeals. A jury awarded plaintiff damages under the Federal Railroad Safety Act, which forbids a railroad to discriminate against an employee for reporting a work-related injury, 49 U.S.C. 20109(a). The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding no evidence that the firing was related to the injury report. The company has a firm policy of firing employees discovered to have stolen company property. View "Koziara v. BNSF Railway Co." on Justia Law 2016-10-31 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Richard Allen Posner 16-1577 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/15-2310/15-2310-2016-10-21.html Flock v. United States Department of Transportation 2016-10-21T12:00:09-08:00 2016-10-23T18:58:04-08:00 The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMSCA) maintains a database of inspection history and safety records relating to commercial motor vehicle operators. Appellants, a group of commercial motor vehicle operators, brought suit against the FMSCA and the Department of Transportation, arguing that the potential disclosure to employers of "non-serious" driver-related safety records contained in the database violates the Privacy Act. The district court granted the FMCSA's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, concluding that 49 U.S.C. 31150 was ambiguous as to the agency's authority to include non-serious driver-related safety violations in the database and, further, that the agency's interpretation of section 31150 was a reasonable and permissible construction of the statute and was entitled to Chevron deference. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) section 31150 is ambiguous as to the question of non-serious driver-related safety violations; and (2) the agency's interpretation of the statute is not arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. View "Flock v. United States Department of Transportation" on Justia Law 2016-10-21 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Stahl 15-2310 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/15-3203/15-3203-2016-10-18.html Fox v. Transam Leasing 2016-10-18T08:00:59-08:00 2016-10-18T09:08:15-08:00 Plaintiffs, three independent truckers representing themselves and a class of similarly situated truck drivers, contended that Defendants TransAm Trucking, Inc. and TransAm Leasing, Inc. (collectively "TransAm") violated the Department of Transportation's truth-in-leasing regulations by requiring the truckers to pay TransAm $15 per week to use TransAm's satellite communications system. This $15 usage fee violated 49 C.F.R. 376.12(i), which precluded a motor carrier like TransAm from requiring a trucker "to purchase or rent any products, equipment, or services from the authorized carrier as a condition of entering into the lease arrangement." To that end, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed partial summary judgment granted in favor of the truckers. However, the truckers also asserted a claim for damages, which the district court certified as a class action. Because the truckers failed to present any evidence of their damages resulting from the unlawful usage fee, the Tenth Circuit concluded the district court should have entered summary judgment for TransAm on that damages claim. View "Fox v. Transam Leasing" on Justia Law 2016-10-18 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit David M. Ebel 15-3203 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/16-2980/16-2980-2016-10-07.html Ill. Transp. Trade Ass'n v. City of Chicago 2016-10-07T12:01:59-08:00 2016-10-07T12:50:04-08:00 Plaintiffs own and operate Chicago taxicabs or livery vehicles or provide services to such companies, such as loans and insurance. Taxi and livery companies are tightly regulated by the city regarding driver and vehicle qualifications, licensing, fares, and insurance. Ride-share services, such as Uber, are less heavily regulated and have a different business model. Chicago's 2014 ride-share ordinance allows the companies to set their own fares. The plaintiffs challenged the ordinance on four Constitutional and three Illinois-law grounds. The district judge dismissed all but the two claims that accuse the city of denying the equal protection of the laws by allowing the ride-shares to compete with taxi and livery services without being subject to the same regulations. The Seventh Circuit ordered dismissal of all seven claims. There are enough differences between taxi service and ride-share service to justify different regulatory schemes. Chicago has legally chosen deregulation and competition over preserving the traditional taxicab monopolies. A legislature, having created a statutory entitlement, is not precluded from altering or even eliminating the entitlement by later legislation. View "Ill. Transp. Trade Ass'n v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law 2016-10-07 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Richard Allen Posner 16-2980 16‐2009 16‐2077 16‐1008 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/16-1008/16-1008-2016-10-07.html Joe Sanfelippo Cabs, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee 2016-10-07T11:30:45-08:00 2016-10-07T13:24:36-08:00 From 1992-2013, a Milwaukee ordinance limited taxicab permits to those in existence on January 1, 1992 that were renewed. The ordinance lowered the ceiling over time by virtue of the nonrenewals. By 2013 the number of permits had diminished from 370 to 320. The price of permits on the open market soared as high as $150,000. In 2013, after a successful equal protection and substantive due process challenge, the city conducted a lottery, which attracted 1700 permit seekers. Milwaukee had only one taxicab per 1850 city residents, a much lower ratio than comparable cities. The city eliminated the cap in 2014. In the meantime, "ridesharing" companies such as Uber, had diminished the profitability of the existing taxi companies. Plaintiffs, cab companies, alleged that the increased number of permits has taken property without compensation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal. The taxi companies were aware that there was no guarantee that the ordinance would remain in force indefinitely, and that, were it repealed, they would be faced with new competition that would threaten their profits. The ordinance gave them no property right; its repeal invaded no right conferred by the Constitution. The court similarly rejected state-law claims of breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and equitable estoppel. View "Joe Sanfelippo Cabs, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee" on Justia Law 2016-10-07 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Richard Allen Posner 16-1008 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/15-4021/15-4021-2016-10-07.html Allied Erecting & Dismantling Co., Inc. v. Surface Transp. Bd. 2016-10-07T10:30:36-08:00 2016-10-07T11:02:59-08:00 East of Youngstown's Center Street Bridge, Allied owns land containing the "LTV tracks." Mahoning Railroad Company has an easement to use those tracks. Mahoning began parking rail cars on the tracks, which Allied considered a violation of the easement. A state court referred the matter to the Surface Transportation Board. Allied challenged the Board's jurisdiction, arguing that the tracks were "spur, side, or industrial tracks," excepted tracks under 49 U.S.C. 10906. The Board concluded (erroneously) that it had previously authorized Mahoning to provide common-carrier service using the LTV tracks; that Mahoning, therefore, was a "railroad carrier"; and that the easement did not forbid the use. Allied introduced an affidavit from a former Mahoning employee, asserting that the LTV tracks had been built as part of a strictly in-plant system and were never subject to Board control, then argued that the LTV tracks were private tracks outside the Board's jurisdiction, rather than excepted tracks. The Board agreed that it had not authorized Mahoning to use the tracks, but concluded that the LTV tracks were mainline tracks, over which it had jurisdiction. Because Allied waited five years to clarify its position, the Board did not consider the "new evidence" and reaffirmed. Mahoning alleges that it owns lot 62188, west of the bridge; Allied alleges that it bought the lot and sought to evict Mahoning. The Board concluded that the 62188 tracks are either excepted or mainline tracks, within its jurisdiction, and remanded to state court for determination of land title. The Sixth Circuit denied an appeal. Mahoning's use of the tracks fits the statutory definition of "transportation by rail carrier . . . by railroad" and is within the Board's jurisdiction View "Allied Erecting & Dismantling Co., Inc. v. Surface Transp. Bd." on Justia Law 2016-10-07 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Raymond M. Kethledge 15-4021 14-3094 15-4020 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/15-3703/15-3703-2016-10-05.html Am. Premier Underwriters v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. 2016-10-05T09:05:08-08:00 2016-10-05T13:05:33-08:00 APU holds 5.2 million shares of Amtrak common stock pursuant to the Rail Passenger Service Act, 84 Stat. 1327. The 1997 Amtrak Reform and Accountability Act, 49 U.S.C. 24304 mandated that "Amtrak shall, before October 1, 2002, redeem all common stock previously issued, for the fair market value." In 2000, Amtrak proposed to redeem APU's common stock for three cents per share. APU rejected Amtrak's offer in November 2000. The statutory deadline passed without Amtrak making any further offer to redeem the shares. APU and Amtrak negotiated until January 2008, when Amtrak declared that the shares were worthless and that further negotiations would be futile. The parties never reached a settlement. In May 2008, APU sued Amtrak. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit remanded one claim. On remand, the district court dismissed that claim as barred by the three-year statute of limitations. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that there is no disputed question of fact regarding the dates of the three key events: Amtrak valued APU's shares at three cents each in 2000; the deadline for redeeming the shares lapsed in 2002; and Amtrak terminated negotiations in 2008. The court rejected an argument that the limitations period began to run in 2008. View "Am. Premier Underwriters v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp." on Justia Law 2016-10-05 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Ronald Lee Gilman 15-3703 http://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2016/f071533.html Freitas v. Shiomoto 2016-09-14T14:00:55-08:00 2016-09-14T15:55:40-08:00 Plaintiff challenges the trial court's denial of his petition for a writ of mandate to overturn a hearing officer's decision to suspend plaintiff's license after he violated Vehicle Code section 13353.2 by driving with a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of 0.08 percent or more. In this case, the trial court's ruling was based on its rejection of the unrebutted testimony of plaintiff's expert, who opined that the blood testing procedure used to measure plaintiff's BAC was scientifically invalid. In Najera v. Shiomoto, which involved the same expert, the court held that the expert's testimony, that single-column gas chromatography was incapable of valid measurement of BAC, rebutted the presumption that the laboratory was using methodology "capable of the analysis of ethyl alcohol with a specificity which is adequate and appropriate for traffic law enforcement." Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment. View "Freitas v. Shiomoto" on Justia Law 2016-09-14 state California California Courts of Appeal Smith F071533 http://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2016/151976.html Bd. of Supervisors of Loudoun County v. State Corp. Comm'n 2016-09-08T06:34:25-08:00 2016-09-08T20:31:09-08:00 These consolidated appeals arose from a Va. Code Ann. 56-542(D) investigation by the State Corporation Commission of the tolls charged by Toll Road Investors Partnership II, LP for the Dulles Greenway, a privately owned toll road located primarily in Loudoun County. The Board of Supervisors of Loudoun County and David Ramadan (collectively, Appellants) requested that the Commission reduce the tolls. After concluding the investigation, the Commission issued an order in which it decided not to substitute new toll rates for the Greenway under the authority of section 56-542(D). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Commission did not err in its construction and application of section 56-542(D); and (2) the Commission did not err in its factual findings that the Greenway's existing toll rates satisfy the section 56-542(D) criteria while Appellants' proposed rates did not. View "Bd. of Supervisors of Loudoun County v. State Corp. Comm'n" on Justia Law 2016-09-08 state Virginia Supreme Court of Virginia Elizabeth A. McClanahan 151976 160002 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/14-5195/14-5195-2016-09-06.html Scenic America, Inc. v. US DOT 2016-09-06T06:31:20-08:00 2016-09-06T14:59:29-08:00 Scenic filed suit challenging a guidance memorandum issued by the FHWA in 2007, which interpreted the prohibition on "flashing, intermittent or moving" lights to permit state approval of those digital billboards that met certain timing and brightness requirements. The Highway Beautification Act (HBA), 23 U.S.C. 131, requires the FHWA and each state to develop and implement individual federal-state agreements (FSAs), detailing, among other things, "size, lighting and spacing" standards for the billboards now found towering over many of our country's interstate highways. The court held that it lacks jurisdiction to hear Scenic's notice-and-comment claim because Scenic failed to demonstrate that it has standing to bring that challenge. The court concluded that Scenic has standing to bring a claim under section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 706, and that the Guidance constitutes final agency action. On the merits, the court concluded that, because the FHWA's interpretation of the FSA lighting provision was reasonable, the interpretation cannot be "contrary to customary use." Accordingly, Scenic's claim under section 706 fails. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for dismissal of Scenic's notice-and-comment claim. View "Scenic America, Inc. v. US DOT" on Justia Law 2016-09-06 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit Wilkins 14-5195 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/14-3527/14-3527-2016-09-01.html Kampschroer v. Ramsey County 2016-09-01T07:31:04-08:00 2016-09-01T11:17:10-08:00 Plaintiffs filed separate actions against various Minnesota cities, counties, and law enforcement entities alleging violations of the Driver's Privacy Protection Act (DPPA), 18 U.S.C. 2724(a). In separate orders, the district court denied in part defendants' motions to dismiss, including claims by many defendants that they are entitled to qualified immunity. The City of Minneapolis appeals the denial of qualified immunity in the Karasov action, and numerous Minnesota counties appeal the denial of qualified immunity in the Kampschroers action. After the parties briefed these appeals, the court issued its decision in McDonough v. Anoka County, which squarely addressed the issue of qualified immunity. The court concluded that McDonough is controlling precedent. The court also concluded that its decision that the statutory term "obtain" is unambiguous controls defendants' additional argument that the rule of lenity entitles them to qualified immunity. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Kampschroer v. Ramsey County" on Justia Law 2016-09-01 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Per Curiam 14-3527 14-3529 14-3533 14-3537 14-3539 14-3540 14-3542 14-3543 14-3600 15-1488 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/14-3151/14-3151-2016-09-01.html Ray v. Anoka County 2016-09-01T07:30:54-08:00 2016-09-01T11:17:09-08:00 Plaintiffs, Minnesota driver's license holders, filed suit against local entities, Law Enforcement Does, Commissioners, and DPS Does, alleging that defendants violated the Driver's Privacy Protection Act (DPPA), 18 U.S.C. 2721-2725, by accessing or disclosing personal information from the DPS database without a permissible purpose. The district courts dismissed the actions for failure to state a claim. The present appeals raise issues similar to those presented in the court's opinion in McDonough v. Anoka County and are governed by the court's holding in that case. McDonough discussed the history, purpose, and applicability of the DPPA. The court addressed the individual complaints in this group of cases and affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Ray v. Anoka County" on Justia Law 2016-09-01 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Roger Leland Wollman 14-3151 14-3188 14-3225 14-3288 14-3750 15-1288 15-1846 14-2964 14-3404 14-3448 14-3673 15-1805 14-3651 http://law.justia.com/cases/alabama/supreme-court/2016/1140632.html Cottles v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co. 2016-08-26T07:30:19-08:00 2016-08-26T08:31:42-08:00 Before the incident that precipitated this lawsuit, Jeff Cottles had worked as a track switchman for Norfolk Southern Railway Company for seven years. The process of "throwing" a switch involves pulling the handle up, moving it in an arc from right to left, stopping in the upright position, and then continuing to move the handle down and to the left. Cottles testified that the track 4 switch was harder to throw than the other switches in the Daikin plant. One early morning during his shift, Cottles attempted to throw the track 4 switch again. This time when he pushed the handle down the switch suddenly froze about one foot from the ground, and, according to Cottles, he felt pain in his back and neck. Within a week of the incident, Cottles's pain from his injuries had become so severe that he was unable to continue his job. He was diagnosed with bulging disks in his neck and a pinched nerve in his back. Cottles has not been able to return to work since rotator cuff surgery. It was undisputed that Daikin, not Norfolk Southern, owned the tracks and switches inside its plant. Regardless of who was notified, Daikin itself was required to address the issue and then to notify Norfolk Southern that the problem had been fixed. After Norfolk Southern received word from Daikin that maintenance had been performed, a Norfolk Southern track inspector would inspect the switch to confirm that the repairs had been completed. Cottles filed a Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) action against Norfolk Southern alleging that Norfolk Southern "failed to provide [Cottles] with a reasonably safe place to work" and that, as a result, Cottles sustained permanent damage to his neck and his back. In addition to his claims of negligence, Cottles asserted that Norfolk Southern was strictly liable under the Federal Safety Appliance Act ("FSAA") and/or "applicable FRA standards." Norfolk Southern moved for summary judgment, contending that Cottles' own testimony that he had thrown the track 4 switch three to six times earlier during his shift "without incident" and the fact that his own visual inspection before each throw had not revealed any defects in the switch demonstrated that Norfolk Southern had no notice that the track 4 switch was defective. At the hearing on Norfolk Southern's motion for a summary judgment, Cottles's counsel conceded that Cottles' strict liability claim under the FSAA should have been dismissed. The trial court later entered summary judgment in favor of Norfolk Southern on the FELA claims too. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that Cottles presented substantial evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Norfolk Southern negligently failed to provide him with a reasonably safe workplace. Accordingly, the Court reversed summary judgment in favor of Norfolk Southern, and remanded the action to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Cottles v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co." on Justia Law 2016-08-26 state Alabama Supreme Court of Alabama Glenn Murdock 1140632 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/15-56556/15-56556-2016-08-24.html Bhd. of Maint. of Way v. BNSF 2016-08-24T09:05:15-08:00 2016-08-24T18:13:36-08:00 After BNSF suspended an employee, BMWED filed a complaint against BNSF alleging that BNSF's disciplinary actions interfered with and subverted the Railway Labor Act's (RLA), 45 U.S.C. 151-188, grievance and arbitration processes, and sought a declaration that BNSF's actions violated the RLA. BNSF subsequently filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to enjoin BMWED from proceeding with a threatened strike. The district court ruled in favor of BNSF, concluding that the dispute was minor and subject to mandatory arbitration, and enjoining the threatened strike. BMWED filed an interlocutory appeal of the preliminary injunction. The court concluded that the subsequent entry of the final judgment in the case mooted the question of the procedural propriety of the preliminary injunction. The court concluded that the district court properly applied the ConRail test (Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway Labor Executives. Ass'n ) and properly concluded that the parties' dispute is a minor one. The court rejected BMWED's attempts to sidestep the ConRail framework by claiming that the distinction between minor and major disputes does not apply to the case. Rather, the court concluded that this is a dispute that fits squarely within the major/minor framework from the RLA and ConRail. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Bhd. of Maint. of Way v. BNSF" on Justia Law 2016-08-24 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Milan D. Smith 15-56556 16-55070 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/15-2710/15-2710-2016-08-22.html Alexander v. Tutle and Tutle Trucking 2016-08-22T07:31:23-08:00 2016-08-22T13:07:47-08:00 Plaintiffs, employed as truck drivers, filed suit against Tutle and Schlumberger, alleging that defendants failed to pay them overtime compensation in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 207(a)(1), and the Arkansas Minimum Wage Act (AMWA), Ark. Code Ann. 11-4-211(a). The district court granted summary judgment for defendants. The court affirmed, concluding that plaintiffs are exempt under the federal Motor Carrier Act, 29 U.S.C. 213(b)(1), where the evidence establishes that the character of plaintiffs' job duties was such that they were called upon "either regularly or from time to time" to drive in interstate commerce. There was a reasonable expectation of interstate travel, the Motor Carrier Act exemption applies to plaintiffs, and plaintiffs thus are not entitled to overtime compensation. View "Alexander v. Tutle and Tutle Trucking" on Justia Law 2016-08-22 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Steven M. Colloton 15-2710 http://law.justia.com/cases/new-mexico/supreme-court/2016/35-198.html Noice v. BNSF Ry. Co. 2016-08-18T09:10:26-08:00 2016-08-18T13:14:01-08:00 Lenard E. Noice worked as a conductor for Petitioner BNSF Railway Company (BNSF). He fell from a BNSF train that was moving at speed and perished. Respondent, Lenard Noice II, acting as personal representative for Noice (the Estate), filed a wrongful death action against BNSF under the Federal Employee's Liability Act (FELA), asserting, among other claims, that BNSF negligently permitted the train from which Noice fell to operate at an excessive speed. The undisputed facts established that the train from which Noice fell never exceeded the speed limit for the class of track upon which it was operating. BNSF moved for summary judgment arguing that the Estate's FELA excessive-speed claim was precluded by the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA). The district court accepted this argument and dismissed the Estate's FELA claim. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that FRSA did not preclude a FELA excessive-speed claim. Because FRSA contained no provision expressly precluding the Estate's FELA excessive-speed claim and because permitting the Estate's FELA claim to proceed furthered the purposes of both statutes, the New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Noice v. BNSF Ry. Co." on Justia Law 2016-08-18 state New Mexico New Mexico Supreme Court Nakamura 35,198 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/15-1181/15-1181-2016-08-16.html Great West Cas. Co. v. Robbins 2016-08-16T13:00:50-08:00 2016-08-16T13:14:55-08:00 In 2011, Linda Phillips, an employee of Hoker Trucking, driving a semi‐truck in Indiana, struck a vehicle driven by Robbins, who died as a result of the injuries he sustained in the accident. The truck driven by Phillips was pulling a trailer Hoker borrowed from Lakeville. Lakeville had a Great West Casualty insurance policy covering the trailer. There was a separate suit concerning the liability of Phillips and Hoker. To preempt a possible claim against Lakeville's policy, Great West sought a declaratory judgment against Hoker, Phillips, and Robbins's estate, that it did not have to indemnify Hoker and Phillips for any liability in connection with the accident. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Great West. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that Great West's policy was ambiguous as to whether Hoker and Phillips were excluded from coverage and should be construed against Great West; that even if the exclusions are not ambiguous, they do not exclude Hoker and Phillips from coverage; and regardless of whether the exclusions apply to Hoker and Phillips or not, such exclusions are invalid under Wisconsin law, the state where the trailer is registered. The court found the policy unambiguous. View "Great West Cas. Co. v. Robbins" on Justia Law 2016-08-16 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit KANNE 15-1181 http://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2016/b259868.html Weiss v. City of Los Angeles 2016-08-08T13:00:56-08:00 2016-08-08T16:50:58-08:00 The City and Xerox appealed the trial court's grant of petitioner's petition for writ of mandate. At issue is whether the City, as the "issuing agency" for notice of parking violations in the City, Veh. Code, 40202, must conduct the "initial review" of challenged citations, section 40215, subd. (a), or whether it may delegate that duty to Xerox, its "processing agency," section 40200.6, subd. (a), with which it contracts "for the processing of notices of parking violations," section 40200.5, subd. (a). The court held that, based on the language of section 40215, subdivision (a) and relevant legislative history, the City is required to conduct the initial review, and cannot contract with Xerox to perform that duty. Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court's issuance of a writ of mandate, as well as the trial court's award of approximately $722,000 in attorney fees pursuant to the California private attorney general statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. View "Weiss v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law 2016-08-08 state California California Courts of Appeal Thomas L. Willhite, Jr. B259868 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/15-9504/15-9504-2016-07-15-0.html Transam Trucking v. Administrative Review Bd. 2016-08-08T08:01:27-08:00 2016-08-08T11:54:57-08:00 Alphonse Maddin worked as a truck driver by Petitioner TransAm Trucking ("TransAm"). In January 2009, Maddin was transporting cargo through Illinois when the brakes on his trailer froze because of subzero temperatures. After reporting the problem to TransAm and waiting several hours for a repair truck to arrive, Maddin unhitched his truck from the trailer and drove away, leaving the trailer unattended. He was terminated for abandoning the trailer. Both an administrative law judge ("ALJ") and Respondent, the Department of Labor ("DOL") Administrative Review Board ("ARB"), concluded Maddin was terminated in violation of the whistleblower provisions of the Surface Transportation Assistance Act ("STAA"). He was ordered reinstated with backpay. TransAm filed a Petition for Review of the ARB's Final Decision and Order to the Tenth Circuit which concluded that there was no reversible error in the ARB's decision, and affirmed. View "Transam Trucking v. Administrative Review Bd." on Justia Law 2016-07-15 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Michael R. Murphy 15-9504 http://law.justia.com/cases/connecticut/supreme-court/2016/sc19522.html Giannoni v. Comm'r of Transp. 2016-08-03T04:30:59-08:00 2016-08-03T17:06:16-08:00 Nicholas Giannoni was riding his bicycle on the sidewalk along a state highway. The highway ended at a private driveway and lawn and led directly to a stream culvert. When the sidewalk ended, Nicholas inadvertently rode his bicycle across the driveway, over a patch of grass, and into the culvert, injuring himself. Plaintiffs brought this highway defect action on behalf of Nicholas under Conn. Gen. Stat. 31a-144 against the Commissioner of Transportation. The Commissioner moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of sovereign immunity. The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs alleged a cognizable highway defect claim under section 31a-144. View "Giannoni v. Comm'r of Transp." on Justia Law 2016-08-09 state Connecticut Connecticut Supreme Court Richard A. Robinson SC19522 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/15-2090/15-2090-2016-08-02.html OOIDA v. US Dep't of Transp. 2016-08-02T07:01:09-08:00 2016-08-02T13:03:42-08:00 Petitioners, the Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association and one of its members, seek review of regulatory guidance issued by the FMCSA, which exempts from federal accident-reporting regulations certain accidents involving commercial motor vehicles known as attenuator trucks. The court dismissed the petition for lack of an Article III case or controversy because petitioners have failed to identify a concrete and particularized injury that would give them standing to proceed. View "OOIDA v. US Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law 2016-08-02 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Steven M. Colloton 15-2090 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/15-2201/15-2201-2016-07-28.html Williams v. Central Transport Int'l 2016-07-28T07:31:15-08:00 2016-07-28T13:12:43-08:00 Plaintiff filed suit alleging that Central Transport violated the overtime requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 207(a)(1), when it employed him as a "switcher" at its St. Louis terminal. The district court granted summary judgment to Central Transport. The FLSA exempts "any employee with respect to whom the Secretary of Transportation has power to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service" under the Motor Carrier Act (MCA), 29 U.S.C. 213(b)(1). Based on the Supreme Court's controlling precedents, the court concluded that, if an employee spends a substantial part of his time participating in or directing the actual loading of a motor vehicle common carrier's trailers operating in interstate or foreign commerce, the Secretary of Transportation has the authority to regulate that employee's hours of service and the MCA Exemption applies, regardless of the employee's precise role in the loading process. Because the summary judgment record conclusively establishes that a substantial part of plaintiff's time during the relevant period was spent loading Central Transport trailers for interstate transportation, the MCA Exemption applies in this case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Williams v. Central Transport Int'l" on Justia Law 2016-07-28 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit James B. Loken 15-2201 http://law.justia.com/cases/montana/supreme-court/2016/da-15-0722.html Rimrock Chrysler, Inc. v. Lithia Motors, Inc. 2016-07-12T14:32:23-08:00 2016-07-13T12:44:05-08:00 When Chrysler Group, LLC filed with the Montana Department of Justice, Motor Vehicle Division a notice of intent to establish an additional Chrysler-Jeep dealership in Billings, Lithia Motors, Inc. filed an administrative protest. The Department sustained Lithia's protest. Rimrock Chrysler, Inc. sought judicial review, but the district court dismissed the petition on the grounds of mootness and lack of a justiciable controversy. While Rimrock's appeal was pending, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that section 747 of the United States Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2010 preempted state regulation of new dealerships issued under certain dealership protest laws. The Montana Supreme Court dismissed Rimrock's appeal. On remand, Rimrock moved to vacate the Department's administrative decision and to dismiss the the judicial review proceeding on the ground that section 747 preempted Montana dealer protest laws and deprived the state of subject matter jurisdiction to hear the administrative claim. The district court denied Rimrock's motion and dismissed the appeal. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court's order denying Rimrock's motion to vacate and to dismiss, holding that Rimrock waived its section 747 preemption defense when it entered into the settlement agreement; and (2) reversed the district court's order dismissing Rimrock's petition for judicial review, holding that Rimrock's petition involved a justifiable controversy, and the court erred in concluding otherwise. View "Rimrock Chrysler, Inc. v. Lithia Motors, Inc." on Justia Law 2016-07-12 state Montana Montana Supreme Court Beth Baker DA 15-0722 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/15-2689/15-2689-2016-07-08.html Cochran v. Ill. State Toll Highway Auth. 2016-07-08T07:31:16-08:00 2016-07-08T15:37:03-08:00 Ohio tollways assess a toll only when a driver exits a highway. Illinois' toll system assesses periodic tolls as a driver continues on the highway and allows drivers to use electronic transponders. At each toll plaza, Illinois has full‐speed lanes for transponder users and lanes for drivers who stop and pay cash. If a driver without a transponder uses a transponder lane, there is a seven‐day grace period for payment online or by mail, without incurring a fine, after which the car's owner incurs a $20 fine per violation. If an owner incurs three fines in two years, the tollway sends a notice, showing the date, time, and location of each violation, and explaining the right to contest the violations at a hearing. Toll evasion is a strict liability and vicarious liability offense. Transponder users are granted a second grace period: After notice is mailed, transponder users have until the due date on the notice to pay their missed tolls and update their account information to avoid fines. In December 2013, an Ohio resident drove to Chicago. He alleges that there was no signage informing him of how Illinoisʹ toll system worked, and that he did not understand the signage at the toll plazas. Plaintiff used the transponder lanes and missed three tolls before he realized his mistake. He called the tollway authority and was told that no violations appeared in the database. Weeks later, he received notice of the violations and his right to a hearing. Plaintiff paid $64.50, then filed a putative class action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging equal protection and due process violations. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal, applying the rational basis test. View "Cochran v. Ill. State Toll Highway Auth." on Justia Law 2016-07-08 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Adelman 15-2689 http://law.justia.com/cases/connecticut/supreme-court/2016/sc19454.html Raymond's Auto Repair, LLC v. Comm'r of Motor Vehicles 2016-07-06T04:30:41-08:00 2016-07-06T17:20:09-08:00 The Department of Motor Vehicles found that Raymond's Auto Repair, LLC had overcharged for the use of its rotator truck to recover a damaged vehicle prior to the actual towing of that vehicle. The hearing officer ordered Raymond's to pay a $600 restitution fee. The trial court vacated the reimbursement order, holding that state regulation of the pretowing recovery services at issue was subject to federal preemption. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that state regulation of pretowing recovery services, such as Raymond's use of the rotator truck in this case, was not preempted by federal law. View "Raymond's Auto Repair, LLC v. Comm'r of Motor Vehicles" on Justia Law 2016-07-12 state Connecticut Connecticut Supreme Court Peter T. Zarella SC19454 http://law.justia.com/cases/connecticut/supreme-court/2016/sc19453.html Modzelewski's Towing & Recovery, Inc. v. Comm'r of Motor Vehicles 2016-07-06T04:30:40-08:00 2016-07-06T17:10:46-08:00 The Department of Motor Vehicles found that Plaintiff, a towing service, had overcharged for the nonconsensual towing of a motor vehicle trailer and ordered Plaintiff to pay restitution in the amount of $12,787 to the trailer's insurer. In so finding, the Department rejected Plaintiff's claim that Connecticut's statutes and regulations regarding nonconsensual towing services are preempted under 49 U.S.C. 14501(c)(2)(C). The trial court reversed in part, concluding that the fees charged by Plaintiff were not subject to state regulation. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's judgment with respect to the determination that state regulation of fees charged for pretowing recovery services provided in connection with a nonconsensual towing is preempted by federal law, holding that state laws regulating the fees charged for recovery services performed in connection with a nonconsensual towing are not preempted by federal law. View "Modzelewski's Towing & Recovery, Inc. v. Comm'r of Motor Vehicles" on Justia Law 2016-07-12 state Connecticut Connecticut Supreme Court Peter T. Zarella SC19453 http://law.justia.com/cases/new-york/court-of-appeals/2016/112.html Pasternack v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings 2016-06-30T06:02:53-08:00 2016-06-30T09:39:22-08:00 Plaintiff filed an action alleging that Defendants committed fraud and negligence when performing and evaluating a random drug test that Plaintiff was required to take as an airline pilot. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit certified two questions of New York law to the New York Court of Appeals. The Court accepted the questions and answered (1) drug testing regulations and guidelines promulgated by the Federal Aviation administration and the Department of Transportation do not create a duty of care for drug testing laboratories and program administrators under New York negligence law; and (2) a plaintiff may not establish the reliance element of a fraud claim under New York law by showing that a third party relied on a defendant's false statements resulting in injury to the plaintiff. View "Pasternack v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings" on Justia Law 2016-06-30 state New York New York Court of Appeals Sheila Abdus-Salaam 112 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/14-1251/14-1251-2016-06-24.html Stovic v. RRRB 2016-06-24T07:02:11-08:00 2016-06-24T13:53:02-08:00 Petitioner seeks review of the Board's denial of his request to reopen the Board's 1999 benefits determination. The court concluded that the Railroad Retirement Act, 45 U.S.C. 231g, grants the court jurisdiction to review Board decisions denying requests to reopen initial benefits determinations. The court concluded, however, that the Board's decision to deny petitioner's request to reopen was reasonable where it was reasonable for the Board to conclude that there were no errors in the allocation of petitioner's earnings that, if corrected, would have given him insured status at the time of the decision. Further, petitioner provided little to no explanation of how his initial decision contained a clerical error or an error that appears on the face of the evidence. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Stovic v. RRRB" on Justia Law 2016-06-24 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit Brett M. Kavanaugh 14-1251 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/15-2548/15-2548-2016-06-17.html Sapp v. City of Brooklyn Park 2016-06-17T07:31:12-08:00 2016-06-17T11:13:14-08:00 Plaintiff filed suit against various municipalities and their employees under the Driver's Privacy Protection Act (DPPA), 18 U.S.C. 2721-25, after municipal and state personnel had accessed plaintiff's personal information approximately sixty times between 2003 and 2012. The district court dismissed plaintiff's claims without prejudice but allowed her to file an amended complaint. Plaintiff instead requested that the district court enter final judgment dismissing her case with prejudice. Then plaintiff appealed the district court's decision without receiving the judgment she requested. The court concluded that, because plaintiff did not obtain a final judgment following the district court's dismissal of her complaint with leave to amend, the court lacked jurisdiction over the appeal. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal. View "Sapp v. City of Brooklyn Park" on Justia Law 2016-06-17 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Raymond W. Gruender 15-2548 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/15-1482/15-1482-2016-06-01.html Walker v. Trailer Transit, Inc. 2016-06-01T10:00:43-08:00 2016-06-01T11:41:44-08:00 Trailer Transit contracts with shippers for the movement of cargo, then contracts with independent drivers, who provide the rigs that carry the cargo, promising those 71% "of the gross revenues derived from use of the equipment leased herein (less any insurance related surcharge and all items intended to reimburse [Trailer Transit] for special services, such as permits, escort service and other special administrative costs." In a class action, about 1,000 drivers claimed that Trailer Transit made a profit on its "special services" and owes 71% of that profit to the drivers. The district court rejected that argument. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, explaining: "That just isn't what the contract says. Drivers are entitled to 71% of the gross charge for "use of the equipment" (the rigs), but the contract does not provide for a share of Trailer Transit's net profit on any other part of the bill." View "Walker v. Trailer Transit, Inc." on Justia Law 2016-06-01 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Frank Hoover Easterbrook 15-1482 http://law.justia.com/cases/pennsylvania/supreme-court/2016/17-map-2015.html S & H Transport v. City of York 2016-05-25T12:03:00-08:00 2016-05-26T09:08:10-08:00 In this appeal, the issue raised for the Supreme Court's review was whether freight brokerage services were excepted from local business privilege taxation1 under the "public utility" exception found in Section 301.1(f)(2) of the Local Tax Enabling Act ("LTEA"), Act of December 31, 1965, P.L. 1257, as amended, 53 P.S. sec. 6924.301.1(f)(2). The Commonwealth Court concluded that S&H Transport was not excepted. The Supreme Court affirmed the Commonwealth Court's decision because the Supreme Court concluded that the rates of the common motor carriers with whom S&H did business were not fixed and regulated by the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, and thus the entire exception was inapplicable. View "S & H Transport v. City of York" on Justia Law 2016-05-25 state Pennsylvania Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Donohue 17 MAP 2015 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/15-1035/15-1035-2016-05-25.html Conrad v. CSX Transp., Inc. 2016-05-25T11:00:22-08:00 2016-05-25T12:38:51-08:00 After CSX charged plaintiff, one of its employees, with "serious" violations of the company's safety policy, plaintiff filed suit under the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA), 49 U.S.C. 20109, alleging that he was disciplined in retaliation for his activities as local chairman of the transportation union. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of CSX, concluding that plaintiff had failed to show that any CSX employee involved in the disciplinary process had also known about his union activities. The court held that the "knowledge" relevant for a retaliation claim under the FRSA must be tied to the decision-maker involved in the unfavorable personnel action. The court concluded that, because plaintiff does not present sufficient evidence that the relevant CSX decision-makers knew of his protected activities, his claims fail as a matter of law at the prima facie stage. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Conrad v. CSX Transp., Inc." on Justia Law 2016-05-25 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Davis 15-1035 http://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2016/a139238.html Harris v. Delta Air Lines 2016-05-25T10:30:23-08:00 2016-05-25T11:16:44-08:00 California's Online Privacy Protection Act of 2003 (OPPA), under the unfair competition law (Bus. & Prof. Code 17200 et. seq.), addresses the obligations of an operator of a commercial Web site or online service regarding the posting of a privacy policy on the Internet. The state sought damages and injunctive relief under OPPA, alleging that Delta's Fly Delta mobile application violated the privacy policy requirements. The trial court dismissed, finding the suit expressly preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (49 U.S.C. 41713 (b)(1)). The court of appeal affirmed. To compel Delta to comply with the OPPA would effectively interfere with the airline's "selection and design" of its mobile application, a marketing mechanism "appropriate to the furnishing of air transportation service," for which state enforcement has been held to be expressly preempted. View "Harris v. Delta Air Lines" on Justia Law 2016-05-25 state California California Courts of Appeal Jenkins A139238 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/15-3116/15-3116-2016-05-23.html Mazzarella v. Fast Rig Support LLC 2016-05-23T12:41:21-08:00 2016-05-23T12:56:15-08:00 The drivers worked transporting water to hydraulic fracking sites within Pennsylvania. The lead plaintiff asserts that he and his coworkers often worked more than 40 hours in a week, but were paid overtime only for work performed above 45 hours per week, in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 207(a) and Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act (PMWA), 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. 333.104(c). Before trial, the court ordered briefing on whether the employers (trucking companies) were subject to the Motor Carrier Act exemption to the FLSA's overtime requirements, applicable to certain interstate employment activity that is subject to the jurisdiction of the Department of Transportation. The employers stipulated to a judgment requiring them to pay overtime. The Third Circuit affirmed. While the movement of the fracking wastewater out of state could theoretically be one involving a practical continuity of movement in interstate commerce, depending on the intent of the shipper at the time shipment commenced, the role the drivers played, whether the water is altered during the fracking process, and the steps for water removal and outgoing transportation, the employers produced no evidence concerning these matters and did not meet their burden to "plainly and unmistakably" show that the MCA exemption applies. View "Mazzarella v. Fast Rig Support LLC" on Justia Law 2016-05-23 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Patty Shwartz 15-3116 http://law.justia.com/cases/maryland/court-of-appeals/2016/82-15.html Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Seenath 2016-05-23T12:40:58-08:00 2016-05-23T14:44:36-08:00 The Advice of Rights form assists law enforcement officers with making the advisements that are required by Md. Code, Transp. 16-205.1,2, (the implied consent, administrative per se law), which provides a basis for the automatic suspension of the licenses of drivers who refuse to submit to testing for alcohol and drugs. Seenath, a holder of a commercial driver's license, argued that the Advice form violated due process under the U.S. Constitution and the Maryland Declaration of Rights because it does not advise that a holder of a commercial driver's license who drives a non-commercial motor vehicle and fails an alcohol concentration test is ineligible for a "restrictive license," which allows a driver to drive only for certain purposes, for example, in the course of employment. The Motor Vehicle Administration asked the Maryland Court of Appeal: "Does the standard Advice of Rights form (DR-15) provide the necessary information to a driver who holds a commercial driver's license of the consequences of submitting to a test of blood alcohol content if the driver's results are 0.08 or more?" That court responded "yes," and held that the form is not misleading as to the eligibility for a restrictive license of a holder of a commercial driver's license and comports with due process. View "Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Seenath" on Justia Law 2016-05-23 state Maryland Maryland Court of Appeals Hotten 82/15 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/15-2363/15-2363-2016-05-20.html Stampley v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co. 2016-05-20T11:30:54-08:00 2016-05-20T11:48:46-08:00 Stampley, an independent truck driver, sued Altom Transport, alleging that Altom had failed to pay him enough for driving his truck for it. Altom turned to its insurer, Westchester, for coverage in the suit. Westchester denied coverage; Altom handled its own defense; and the parties tried to settle. At that point, counsel for both Stampley and Altom tried to pull Westchester into the case, by making settlement offers within the limits of the Westchester policy and seeking Westchester's approval. Westchester did not participate. Altom sought a declaratory judgment establishing that Westchester had a duty to defend, that it wrongfully had failed to do so, and that its handling of the matter had been unreasonable and vexatious. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of the suit, finding that all of the claims in the underlying suit arise directly from Stampley's lease agreement with Altom and fell within the policy's contract claim exception. View "Stampley v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co." on Justia Law 2016-05-20 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Diane Pamela Wood 15-2279 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/14-1804/14-1804-2016-05-16.html In Re: Asbestos Prods. Liability Litig. 2016-05-16T09:00:05-08:00 2016-05-16T11:21:56-08:00 Between 1945 and the mid-1970s, Hassell was employed as an electrician by the Railroad, responsible for the maintenance and repair of passenger railcars designed and manufactured by defendants' predecessors. Steam pipes running underneath those railcars were insulated with material containing asbestos. As a consequence of his exposure to asbestos, Hassell contracted asbestosis and mesothelioma. He died in 2009, during the pendency of his lawsuit. Defendants argued that state law claims were preempted by the Locomotive Boiler Inspection Act (LIA), 49 U.S.C. 20701, the Safety Appliance Act, 49 U.S.C. 20301, and the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA), 49 U.S.C. 20101. The district court held that Hassell's claims were preempted by the LIA. The Third Circuit vacated, noting the lack of evidence supporting defendants' assertion that the railcar pipes at issued formed an "interconnected system" with the locomotive. Even assuming that evidence for the "interconnected system" could have been gleaned from the record, Hassell produced evidence from a former Railroad supervisor showing that, instead of being connected to locomotives, the pipes were connected to "power cars" that separately supplied steam heat to the passenger coaches. There was a genuine dispute material fact precluding summary judgment. View "In Re: Asbestos Prods. Liability Litig." on Justia Law 2016-05-16 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Hardiman 14-1804 14-1715 http://law.justia.com/cases/alaska/supreme-court/2016/s-15529.html Lingley v. Alaska Airlines, Inc. 2016-05-13T09:00:11-08:00 2016-05-14T04:51:05-08:00 In February 2012, Alaska Airlines terminated Helen Lingley, a longtime employee, for violating company rules and polices after she allegedly took earbuds from a left-on-board box, made contradictory statements during the ensuing investigation, and made discourteous comments about her coworkers. The terms and conditions of Lingley's employment were governed by a collective bargaining agreement negotiated by Lingley's union,the International Association of Machinists and AerospaceWorkers, pursuant to the federal Railway Labor Act (RLA). This agreement broadly incorporated Alaska Airlines' rules and policies and gave the company the right to change those rules and policies at any time. Lingley sued Alaska Airlines for wrongful termination without first attempting to arbitrate her claims under the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement subject to the RLA. The superior court denied the Lingley leave to amend her complaint, concluding that her claims and proposed claims were precluded by failure to exhaust contractual remedies and were preempted by the RLA. The Supreme Court found the collective bargaining agreement did not clearly and unmistakably waive the Lingley's right to litigate her claims, a prerequisite to finding her claims precluded. "And a number of her proposed claims may have an independent state law basis that does not depend on an interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement; such claims would not be preempted by the Railway Labor Act." Accordingly the Court reversed the superior court order denying leave to amend. View "Lingley v. Alaska Airlines, Inc." on Justia Law 2016-05-13 state Alaska Alaska Supreme Court Joel H. Bolger S-15529 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/15-1908/15-1908-2016-05-11.html Massachusetts Delivery Ass'n v. Healey 2016-05-11T12:30:07-08:00 2016-05-11T18:35:01-08:00 The Massachusetts Delivery Association (MDA), a trade organization representing same-day delivery companies in Massachusetts, brought this suit on behalf of its members seeking a declaration that "Prong 2" of the Massachusetts Independent Contractor Statute is preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (FAAAA) as well as an injunction barring the Attorney General from enforcing Prong 2 against its members. After the First Circuit twice remanded the case, the district court held that the FAAAA preempts Prong 2 as to the members of the MDA as a matter of logical effect. Applying the logic of the First Circuit's decision in Schwann v. FedEx Ground Package System, Inc., the First Circuit affirmed, holding that the application of Prong 2 to the members of the MDA is preempted by the FAAAA. View "Massachusetts Delivery Ass'n v. Healey" on Justia Law 2016-05-11 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Sandra Lea Lynch 15-1908 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/15-5385/15-5385-2016-05-06.html Edwards v. CSX Transp., Inc. 2016-05-06T09:02:13-08:00 2016-05-06T10:37:35-08:00 Edwards worked as a CSX train engineer for 31 years. He arrived at work on May 28, 2012, with an upset stomach. The bathroom in the lead locomotive was "nasty," Edwards saw and smelled:"[U]rine, human waste, . . . [and] blue chemical" splattered all over the toilet and floor. Edwards sprayed disinfectant, closed the door, and started the trip. During a stop, about 80 miles and six hours later, Edwards' nausea escalated. Unwilling to use a foul bathroom, he sprinted to a catwalk, outside of the locomotive. He threw up over the side. Then he vomited a second time and, in the process, fell over the handrail onto the ground below. He broke two of his vertebrae and cracked a rib, ending his career with CSX. Edwards sought damages under Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. 51; its regulations required CSX to keep its locomotive bathroom sanitary. On remand, CSX again obtained summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. CSX complied with the rules the day before Edwards' injury, when it inspected and cleaned the bathroom; the regulations do not require railroads to ensure that the toilets are clean at any given moment between inspections. Edwards had abandoned his other negligence claims. View "Edwards v. CSX Transp., Inc." on Justia Law 2016-05-06 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Jeffrey S. Sutton 15-5385 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/15-1220/15-1220-2016-04-21.html Deherrera v. Decker Truck Line 2016-04-21T13:03:04-08:00 2016-04-21T14:59:08-08:00 Decker Truck Lines, Inc. was a for-hire motor carrier, regulated by the U.S. Department of Transportation (USDOT) and the Secretary of Transportation, with its principal office in Fort Dodge, Iowa. Decker signed a transportation contract with New Belgium Brewing Company (New Belgium) to make two classes of shipments: (1) outbound shipments of beer from New Belgium's brewery to its warehouse (known as the "Rez"), and (2) backhaul shipments of empty kegs, pallets, hops, and other materials from the Rez to the brewery. These two facilities are located approximately five miles apart in Fort Collins, Colorado. And Decker employed Plaintiffs (all of whom are commercial truck drivers) to transport both categories of shipments. This case involved a dispute over the scope of the Motor Carrier Act exemption from the overtime pay requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and the Colorado Minimum Wage Order (Wage Order). Joe Deherrera and several other complainants (Plaintiffs), who were commercial truck drivers for Decker, claimed Decker failed to pay them proper overtime wages. Decker contended Plaintiffs were exempt employees under both the FLSA and the Wage Order. The district court granted summary judgment to Decker, and after review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed: "By driving an intrastate leg of shipments in interstate commerce, Plaintiffs became subject to the authority of the Secretary of Transportation and were thus exempt from the overtime pay requirements of the FLSA and the Wage Order." View "Deherrera v. Decker Truck Line" on Justia Law 2016-04-21 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Carolyn Baldwin McHugh 15-1220 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/15-1498/15-1498-2016-04-20.html In re: World Imports LTD 2016-04-20T09:00:05-08:00 2016-04-20T09:41:05-08:00 WI buys furniture wholesale. OEC provided WI with non-vessel-operating common carrier transportation services. WI signed an Application for Credit that granted a security interest in WI property in OEC's possession, custody or control or en route. As required by federal law, OEC also publishes a tariff with the Federal Maritime Commission, which provides for a Carrier's lien. WI filed voluntary Chapter 11 bankruptcy petitions. OEC sought relief from the automatic stay, arguing that it was a secured creditor with a possessory maritime lien. OEC documented debts of $458,251 for freight and related charges due on containers in OEC's possession and $994,705 for freight and related charges on goods for which OEC had previously provided services. The estimated value of WIs' goods in OEC's possession was $1,926,363. WI filed an adversary proceeding, seeking release of the goods. The bankruptcy court ruled in favor of WI, citing 11 U.S.C. 542. The district court affirmed, holding that OEC did not possess a valid maritime lien on Pre-petition Goods. The Third Circuit reversed, noting the strong presumption that OEC did not waive its maritime liens on the Prepetition Goods, the clear documentation that the parties intended such liens to survive delivery, the familiar principle that a maritime lien may attach to property substituted for the original object of the lien, and the parties' general freedom to modify or extend existing liens by contract. View "In re: World Imports LTD" on Justia Law 2016-04-20 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Jordan 15-1498 http://law.justia.com/cases/west-virginia/supreme-court/2016/15-0127.html City of Morgantown v. Nuzum Trucking Co. 2016-04-07T11:03:43-08:00 2016-04-07T13:57:47-08:00 The City of Morgantown passed an ordinance seeking to regulate the weight and size of certain vehicles using a portion of West Virginia State Route 7 that passes through Morgantown. Plaintiffs filed a complaint arguing that the ordinance was preempted by state law. The circuit court granted Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a municipality is not statutorily authorized to prohibit the operation of trucks or to impose limitations on the size or weight thereof on a connecting part of the state road system, and therefore, Morgantown was not authorized to regulate the size or weight of trucks traveling on the portion of W. Va. Route 7 that lies within the city. View "City of Morgantown v. Nuzum Trucking Co." on Justia Law 2016-04-07 state West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia Robin Jean Davis 15-0127 http://law.justia.com/cases/maine/supreme-court/2016/2016-me-48.html Darling's Auto Mall v. General Motors LLC 2016-03-31T07:02:31-08:00 2016-03-31T12:03:04-08:00 Darling's Auto Mall is a franchisee of General Motors LLC (GM) and and authorized dealer. Darling's filed two small claims actions in district court alleging that it had been underpaid by GM for certain warranty repairs in violation of the Business Practices Between Motor Vehicle Manufacturers, Distributors and Dealers Act (Dealers Act). The district court ruled in favor of Darling's on both small claims. GM appealed and requested a jury trial de novo. The superior court granted GM's request. After a jury trial, the superior court entered a judgment in favor of GM. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the superior court's decision to grant a jury trial de novo was not an appealable determination; (2) the trial court did not err in denying Darling's motion for judgment as a matter of law; and (3) the trial court properly rejected Darling's proposed jury instructions. View "Darling's Auto Mall v. General Motors LLC" on Justia Law 2016-03-31 state Maine Maine Supreme Judicial Court Andrew M. Mead 2016 ME 48 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/15-1766/15-1766-2016-03-25.html Trevarton v. South Dakota 2016-03-25T07:30:55-08:00 2016-03-26T12:09:17-08:00 BN applied for an exemption permitting expeditious abandonment of a railroad line. The STB granted but then revoked an exemption prior to completion of the abandonment and instead authorized BN to enter into an "interim trail use/rail banking agreement" in accordance with the National Trails System Act (Trails Act), 16 U.S.C. 1247(d), as implemented by the STB in 49 C.F.R. 1152.29. In 2014, plaintiffs, ranchers who own properties underlying and surrounding the railway right-of-way easement, filed two separate actions against the State and the Department, seeking a declaration quieting title to the right-of-way because the easement terminated by operation of law when BN ceased railroad operations. The district court consolidated the two cases and concluded that plaintiffs' claims fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the STB, and granted Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) dismissals for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court concluded that plaintiffs' claims are not within the STB's exclusive jurisdiction, but that the Amended Complaints - alleging that defendants "stand in the shoes" of the BN, and therefore defendants cannot impose non-railroad restrictions on plaintiffs' rights as servient landowners,- failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Accordingly, the court modified part of the district court judgment and otherwise affirmed. View "Trevarton v. South Dakota" on Justia Law 2016-03-25 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit James B. Loken 15-1766 http://law.justia.com/cases/minnesota/supreme-court/2016/a14-1652.html Wayzata Nissan, LLC v. Nissan N. Am., Inc. 2016-03-18T19:58:52-08:00 2016-03-20T11:10:01-08:00 Nissan North America, Inc., a motor vehicle manufacturer, and Stephen McDaniels, a prospective Nissan dealer (collectively, Defendants), sought to relocate a Nissan dealership to a location 7.6 miles from a dealership operated by Wayzata Nissan, LLC. Wayzata filed an action against Defendants and then moved for a temporary restraining order, challenging the relocation under the Minnesota Motor Vehicle Sale and Distribution Act, Minn. Stat. 80E.01-.17. The district court denied the motion, determining that the exception in section 80E.14(1) for the "relocation of an existing dealer" applied. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed on the merits, holding (1) even though the relocation at issue has already occurred this appeal is not moot; (2) the notice and good-cause requirements of section 80E.14(1) apply on the date that a manufacturer develops the intention to authorize a relocation, not on the date of the physical relocation of a dealership; and (3) the existing-dealer exception does not apply when the relocation of a dealership is accompanied by a change in the person or entity operating the dealership, and therefore, the existing-dealer exception does not apply in this case. View "Wayzata Nissan, LLC v. Nissan N. Am., Inc." on Justia Law 2016-02-17 state Minnesota Minnesota Supreme Court Wilhemina M. Wright A14-1652 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/15-1426/15-1426-2016-03-18.html Solo v. United Parcel Serv. Co. 2016-03-18T07:30:45-08:00 2016-03-18T08:10:36-08:00 An individual and a company filed a putative class action suit alleging that United Parcel Service (UPS) overcharges customers for liability coverage against loss or damage for packages with a declared value of $300 or more. The complaint alleged breach of contract; sought declaratory relief (28 U.S.C. 2201); claimed violation of 49 U.S.C. 13708(b) (regulating billing and collecting practices for motor carriers); and, in the alternative, alleged unjust enrichment. The district court dismissed, agreeing with UPS that the language of the shipping contract at issue unambiguously precluded the plaintiffs' interpretation. The Sixth Circuit affirmed with respect to 49 U.S.C. 13708(b), but reversed the dismissal of the remaining claims. Reasonable minds could differ on the correct interpretation of UPS's Service Guide provision; the provision is at least ambiguous, so its meaning is a question of fact that is not properly answered by the court at this early stage in the proceedings. An unjust enrichment claim—that a benefit was unjustly conferred on UPS when customers paid an extra charge on packages despite UPS's representations that it provided a portion of this service for free—is not precluded by his breach of contract claim. View "Solo v. United Parcel Serv. Co." on Justia Law 2016-03-18 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Jane Branstetter Stranch 15-1426 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/15-1554/15-1554-2016-03-03.html Citizens for Appropriate Rural Roads v. Foxx 2016-03-03T12:30:54-08:00 2016-03-03T13:37:08-08:00 Study of the I-69 extension between Evansville and Indianapolis began in 1944. The 1991 Intermodal Surface Transportation Act designated a new route from Indianapolis to Memphis,, via Evansville as a "high priority corridor" for development. As the project progressed, the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) divided the project into two "tiers" for environmental analysis. After the plans were finalized, construction work on the six sections of Tier 2 began; 90 percent of the work on the extension is complete. The FHWA and Indiana Department of Transportation issued a Draft Environmental Impact Statement for Tier 2, Section 4, in 2010. A Final Environmental Impact Statement and a Record of Decision issued in 2011. The agencies selected the final route and construction plan for Section 4 after reviewing 48 options and produced a record reflecting consideration of impact on historic sites, geological formations, and air-quality, among other factors. Pursuant to its obligations under the Endangered Species Act, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service engaged in consultation and issued a Biological Opinion regarding the possible impact of tree-clearing on the endangered Indiana bat. Opponents filed suit. After a lengthy period of inactivity by Plaintiffs, including several missed case management deadlines, the district court granted summary judgment upholding the approvals. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Citizens for Appropriate Rural Roads v. Foxx" on Justia Law 2016-03-03 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Bruce 15-1554 http://law.justia.com/cases/florida/supreme-court/2016/sc14-54.html Mlinar v. United Parcel Serv., Inc. 2016-03-03T08:00:53-08:00 2016-03-03T10:53:23-08:00 Plaintiff, a professional artist, brought suit against the United Parcel Service (UPS) and other defendants, alleging that two of her paintings were unscrupulously removed from their packaging during the interstate shipment process and sold to a third party without her consent or knowledge. The trial court dismissed all of Plaintiff's claims against UPS, concluding that they were preempted by the federal Carmack Amendment. The Court of Appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court quashed the Court of Appeal's decision to the extent it was inconsistent with this opinion, holding that Plaintiff's state law causes of action were not preempted because neither the Carmack Amendment nor public policy supports UPS's attempt to evade liability arising from its intentional misconduct. View "Mlinar v. United Parcel Serv., Inc." on Justia Law 2016-03-03 state Florida Florida Supreme Court James E.C. Perry SC14-54 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/15-1143/15-1143-2016-02-29.html Cause of Action v. CTA 2016-02-29T10:30:58-08:00 2016-02-29T13:20:58-08:00 Under the Urbanized Area Formula Program, 49 U.S.C. 5307, the Federal Transportation Administration (FTA) administers grant funding to urban transit programs for "operating costs of equipment and facilities for use in public transportation." Recipients must submit "financial, operating, and asset condition information" to the National Transit Database. The agency apportions grants based, in part, on the number of Vehicle Revenue Miles (VRM) that accrue while a vehicle is "in revenue service," available to the general public. In 2005, the Illinois House of Representatives called for a performance audit of the Chicago Transit Authority (CTA). The audit concluded that the CTA, from possibly as early as 1986, had been overstating its VRM and had received higher than justified UAFP disbursements. Notified of the report, the FTA required that CTA revise its data from 2011 forward. In 2012, a nonprofit watchdog organization contacted the Department of Justice requesting an investigation into the CTA's reporting practices. The group then filed suit under the qui tam provision of the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3730. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal, agreeing that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the allegations of wrongdoing had been publicly disclosed at the time the action was filed. View "Cause of Action v. CTA" on Justia Law 2016-02-29 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Kenneth Francis Ripple 15-1143 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/15-7021/15-7021-2016-02-25.html Hill v. J.B. Hunt Transport 2016-02-25T10:03:39-08:00 2016-02-25T11:44:37-08:00 In 2012, O.K. Farms, Inc. hired J.B. Hunt Transportation, Inc. to deliver chickens to Roger Gentry, a poultry grower with a farm near Wister, Oklahoma. Hunt, in turn, hired truck driver Troy Ford to deliver the chickens. In 2012, friends and relatives of Gentry were present to help him receive the delivery, among them, Jimmy Hill. As Ford drove into the chicken house on a Moffett (a vehicle similar to a forklift), he hit Jimmy's leg and injured his ankle. Jimmy's ankle became infected, and he died. Michael Hill, Jimmy's son and the special administrator of his estate, brought a wrongful death action in Oklahoma state court against Hunt, alleging it was vicariously liable for Ford's negligent driving. Hunt then filed a notice of removal based on diversity of citizenship, and the case was removed to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma. Hill subsequently amended his complaint, adding O.K. Farms as a defendant. A few days before trial, Hunt's counsel discovered Ford was unwilling to appear at trial, despite having been subpoenaed. On the second day of trial, Hunt moved the court to compel Ford to appear, or alternatively, to admit his video deposition testimony. The district court denied Hunt's motion. The jury returned a $3.332 million verdict against Hunt. Hunt moved for a new trial or, alternatively, remittitur under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a) and (e), arguing: (1) the court's decision not to compel Ford's appearance and its exclusion of his deposition testimony prejudiced Hunt; and (2) the jury award was excessive and unsupported by the evidence. The district court denied Hunt's motion. Hunt appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Hill v. J.B. Hunt Transport" on Justia Law 2016-02-25 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Scott Milne Matheson, Jr. 15-7021 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/15-1214/15-1214-2016-02-22.html Schwann v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc. 2016-02-22T13:00:04-08:00 2016-02-22T19:51:47-08:00 Plaintiffs, individuals who contracted with FedEx to provide pick-up and delivery services, filed a complaint claiming that FedEx should have treated and paid them as employees rather than as independent contractors because FedEx could not satisfy all three requirements under the Massachusetts Independent Contractor Statute (Massachusetts Statute). Plaintiffs sought damages for loss of wages, improper wage deductions, and loss of benefits. The district court ultimately granted FedEx summary judgment on all counts, concluding (1) application of one of the requirements of the Massachusetts Statute is preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (FAAAA), and this preempted requirement is not severable from the two remaining requirements; and (2) the remaining two requirements are preempted. The First Circuit reversed, holding (1) the express preemption provision of the FAAAA preempts the application of one of the Massachusetts Statute's requirements to FedEx, but the preempted requirement is severable from the two remaining requirements; and (2) the district court erred by concluding, sua sponte, that application of the remaining two requirements was also preempted by the FAAAA. View "Schwann v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc." on Justia Law 2016-02-22 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit William Joseph Kayatta, Jr. 15-1214 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/15-1624/15-1624-2016-02-18.html Haines v. Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin. 2016-02-18T08:01:17-08:00 2016-02-18T09:29:36-08:00 Haines operates a tour bus company. In 2000, he modified the luggage compartment in a bus to become a sleeper area, designed to comply with Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) regulations. In May, 2011, FMCSA informed Haines that he could use the luggage compartment as a sleeper area without additional approval if he complied with 49 C.F.R. 393.76. On May 29, 2011, Haines permitted family members to ride in the sleeper area while the bus was in motion. An unidentified individual notified authorities. On June 10, FMCSA placed all of Haines' busses, including three without sleeper areas, out of service, and identified Haines Tours as an "imminent hazard" to public safety based on its finding that the "unauthorized transportation of passengers in the cargo area . . . substantially increase[d] the likelihood of serious injury or death." The suspension lasted five days. Haines sued, alleging that the handling of the temporary suspension violated his due process and equal protection rights and gave rise to a claim under the Administrative Procedures Act. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal without leave to amend; "Bivens" claims were time-barred by Michigan's three-year statute of limitations and a Bivens remedy was not available because Haines had an adequate, alternative remedy. View "Haines v. Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin." on Justia Law 2016-02-18 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Eric L. Clay 15-1624 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/15-869/15-869-2016-02-16.html Flight Attendants in Reunion v. Am. Airlines, Inc. 2016-02-16T07:30:08-08:00 2016-02-16T15:33:04-08:00 Plaintiffs filed suit claiming that American Airlines violated its obligation under the McCaskill‐Bond amendment to the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. 42112 note, to provide for the integration of the American Airlines and U.S. Airways seniority lists "in a fair and equitable manner." Plaintiffs also claimed principally that the Association of Professional Flight Attendants ("APFA"), the labor union representing American Airlines flight attendants, violated its duty of fair representation under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. 151‐165, by failing to represent the former TWA flight attendants adequately during the creation of the integrated seniority list. The district court granted defendants' motions to dismiss. The court concluded that McCaskill‐Bond did not require American Airlines to reorder its own seniority list upon entering into a new merger in order to redress plaintiffs' endtailing in 2001. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' claim against American Airlines under McCaskill‐Bond. The court also concluded that the union's refusal to reorder the list, in accordance with its policy and the condition imposed by American Airlines, was not irrational or arbitrary; nor was the union's decision to use the "length of service" rule to integrate the seniority lists unlawfully discriminatory in violation of the Railway Labor Act; and the amended complaint's allegations do not raise an inference of "bad faith" on the part of APFA. The court considered plaintiffs' remaining arguments and concluded that they are without merit. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Flight Attendants in Reunion v. Am. Airlines, Inc." on Justia Law 2016-02-16 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Raymond Joseph Lohier, Jr. 15-869 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/15-1052/15-1052-2016-02-10.html Town of Portsmouth v. Lewis 2016-02-10T13:30:04-08:00 2016-02-10T19:21:10-08:00 The Town of Portsmouth, Rhode Island filed claims against various federal and state transportation agencies and officers in federal district court challenging tolls collected on the Sakonnet River Bridge. The Town alleged that the tolls violated of the anti-tolling provision of the Federal-Aid Highway Act and the National Environmental Policy Act and sought injunctive and declaratory relief, attorney fees, and unspecified general relief. After the Town filed suit, the Rhode Island legislature repealed the tolls. Thereafter, the Town filed a motion seeking restitution of previously collected tolls. The district court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss all claims as having been rendered moot by the legislative repeal. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly found that the legislative repeal rendered moot the Town's claims for injunctive and declaratory relief; and (2) the Town did not sufficiently allege or preserve a restitution claim, and even if it did, the restitution claim would still fail because the Town lacked a right of action. View "Town of Portsmouth v. Lewis" on Justia Law 2016-02-10 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Jeffrey R. Howard 15-1052 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/14-2633/14-2633-2016-02-02.html Baumeister v. Deutsche Lufthansa AG 2016-02-02T10:01:51-08:00 2016-02-02T10:56:18-08:00 In one of two consolidated purported class actions, Baumeister bought a ticket from Lufthansa for flights from Stuttgart to Munich, and then from Munich to San Francisco. The first flight, as indicated on his itinerary, was to be flown not by Lufthansa but by a regional German airline, Augsburg. That flight was cancelled. Lufthansa arranged substitute air transportation, but Baumeister arrived more than 17 hours after he was originally scheduled to arrive. European Union regulation EU 261 specifies damages for certain cancelled or delayed flights into and out of the European Union. Lufthansa's contract with its passengers incorporates EU 261. In U.S. district court, Baumeister argued that the airline was contractually obligated to pay damages. That court dismissed, finding that the bridge carriers in both suits (Augsburg), not the airline that sold the tickets (Lufthansa) were liable for any damages. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the German regulatory body charged with enforcing EU 261 dismissed Baumeister's claim after Lufthansa's counsel notified it that Lufthansa had not operated the flight between Stuttgart and Munich. Similarly, in the companion case, the court rejected theories of contract and agency law, where EU 261 would not apply directly. View "Baumeister v. Deutsche Lufthansa AG" on Justia Law 2016-02-02 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Richard Allen Posner 14-2633 14-2414 http://law.justia.com/cases/maryland/court-of-appeals/2016/10-15.html State v. Roshchin 2016-01-26T07:01:33-08:00 2016-01-26T12:22:46-08:00 American Sedan Services, Inc. is a commercial transportation service that has a permit from Maryland Aviation Administration (MAA) to provide ground transportation services at the Baltimore Washington International Thurgood Marshall Airport (BWI). Vadim Roshchin, who was employed as a driver by American Sedan, was picking up passengers at BWI without displaying the permit as required by an MAA regulation when Maryland Transportation Authority (MdTA) police arrested him and impounded the American Sedan. Roshchin and American Sedan sued MAA, MdTA, the MdTA police, and the State, alleging, among other claims, false arrest and false imprisonment. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the State on all counts. The Court of Special Appeals reversed, concluding that there was no legal justification for the arrest of Roshchin. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the regulation requiring commercial transportation services to display permits was not required to be posted at the airport as a prerequisite to its enforcement; and (2) there was legal justification for the arrest, as nothing in the MAA regulation or the Transportation Article deprives a police officer of the general authority to arrest an individual who commits a misdemeanor in the presence of the officer. View "State v. Roshchin" on Justia Law 2016-01-26 state Maryland Maryland Court of Appeals Robert N. McDonald 10/15 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/15-1109/15-1109-2016-01-19.html Costello v. BeavEx, Inc. 2016-01-19T15:00:45-08:00 2016-01-19T15:09:57-08:00 BeavEx is a same-day delivery service that uses 104 couriers to carry out its customers' orders throughout Illinois. By classifying its couriers as independent contractors instead of employees, Beav-Ex attempted to avoid the requirements of state and federal employment laws, including the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act (IWPCA), 820 ILCS 115, which prohibits an employer from taking unauthorized deductions from its employees' wages. Plaintiffs, and the putative class, were or are couriers who allege that they should have been classified as employees of BeavEx for purposes of the IWPCA, and that any deductions taken from their wages were illegal. The Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA), 49 U.S.C. 14501(c)(1) expressly preempts any state law that is "related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier." The district court held that the FAAAA does not preempt the IWPCA and denied BeavEx's motion for summary judgment. The court also denied Plaintiffs' motion to certify the class but granted their motion for partial summary judgment, holding that Plaintiffs are employees under the IWPCA. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of BeavEx's motion for summary judgment, vacated the denial of class certification, and remanded for further proceeding View "Costello v. BeavEx, Inc." on Justia Law 2016-01-19 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit KANNE 15-1109 15-1110 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/14-1298/14-1298-2016-01-15.html Silverado Stages, Inc. v. FMCSA 2016-01-15T07:31:07-08:00 2016-01-15T18:39:05-08:00 Silverado Stages, a California charter bus service, petitioned for review of the FMCSA's determination denying Silverado's petition for administrative review after the FMCSA publicly reported that Silverado violated a number of federal and state safety regulations. The court concluded that Silverado's contention that the FMCSA's dismissal of Silverado's petition was arbitrary and capricious lacks merit because the FMCSA was not required to provide Silverado with any more process than it received. The court also concluded that Silverado's contention that the violations issued against it are invalid because they were not promulgated pursuant to notice-and-comment procedures and because they constitute impermissible sanctions are foreclosed by the court's decision in Weaver v. FMCSA. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Silverado Stages, Inc. v. FMCSA" on Justia Law 2016-01-15 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit Wilkins 14-1298 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/13-5098/13-5098-2015-12-28.html Rogers v. United States 2015-12-28T08:32:51-08:00 2015-12-28T09:17:40-08:00 Abutting landowners claimed that the United States effected a taking of their property without just compensation when it converted a former railroad corridor between Sarasota and Venice, Florida, into a recreational trail pursuant to the National Trails System Act Amendments of 1983, 16 U.S.C. 1247(d), because deeds transferred by their predecessors-in-title to a railroad company granted only easements on their land for railroad purposes and, upon termination of the use of the land as a railroad, left the landowners unencumbered title and possession of their land. The Federal Circuit affirmed partial summary judgment in favor of the government, holding that the owners lacked a property right or interest in the land-at-issue because the railroad company, had obtained fee simple title to the land. The court noted that the state's highest court has confirmed that, under Florida law, a railroad can acquire either an easement or fee simple title to a railroad right-of-way and that no statute, state policy, or factual considerations prevails over the language of the deeds when the language is clear; the language of the six deeds-at-issue clearly convey fee simple title on their face. View "Rogers v. United States" on Justia Law 2015-12-28 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit O'Malley 13-5098 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/14-3898/14-3898-2015-12-28.html Tubbs v. STB 2015-12-28T08:31:37-08:00 2015-12-28T19:00:08-08:00 Petitioners filed suit against BNSF and its contractor, Massman, alleging that the loss they suffered when their family farm was flooded was caused by BNSF's maintenance of a railway embankment running across their farm. The Board concluded that the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (ICCTA), 49 U.S.C. 10501(b), preempted petitioners' state law claims but that they retained a federal claim based on BNSF's alleged violation of federal regulations. The court concluded that petitioner failed to properly challenge the Board's use of the unreasonable-burden-or-interference test for as-applied preemption. Therefore, the court declined to overturn the Board's use of the test. The court also concluded that petitioners' state law claims unreasonably burden or interfere with rail transportation and the Board's determination is supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Tubbs v. STB" on Justia Law 2015-12-28 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Lavenski R. Smith 14-3898 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/15-1338/15-1338-2015-12-15.html Stenger v. Bi-State Dev. Agency 2015-12-15T08:30:54-08:00 2015-12-15T20:14:37-08:00 Mechanics, members of the Union and employees of Metro, filed a declaratory judgment action, seeking a declaration under section 13(c) of the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964 (UMTA), 49 U.S.C. 5333, that Metro must establish a framework through which they could form a bargaining unit separate from the Union. The Union intervened and the district court granted the Union's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The court concluded that the district court correctly determined that section 13(c) does not entitle mechanics to the relief they seek because Congress did not intend to provide a federal forum for disputes between unions and transit authorities; the language and structure of section 13(c) does not suggest that Congress intended to create a federal private cause of action; and the consistent theme in Section 13(c)'s legislative history was that "Congress intended that labor relations between transit workers and local governments would be controlled by state law[.]" Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Stenger v. Bi-State Dev. Agency" on Justia Law 2015-12-15 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Roger Leland Wollman 15-1338 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/15-3032/15-3032-2015-11-05.html Exel, Inc. v. S. Refrigerated Transp., Inc. 2015-11-05T09:00:47-08:00 2015-11-05T09:52:02-08:00 Exel, a shipping broker, sued SRT, an interstate motor carrier, after SRT lost a shipment of pharmaceutical products it had agreed to transport for Exel on behalf of Exel's client, Sandoz. On summary judgment, the district court awarded Exel the replacement value of the lost goods pursuant to the transportation contract between Exel and SRT, rejecting SRT's argument that its liability was limited under the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. 14706. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Whether SRT had limited its liability was a question of fact for a jury. To limit its liability under the Carmack Amendment, a carrier must: provide the shipper with a fair opportunity to choose between two or more levels of liability obtain the shipper's written agreement as to its choice of liability; and issue a receipt or bill of lading prior to moving the shipment. SRT did not meet its burden on summary judgment of establishing that it provided Sandoz with the opportunity to choose between two or more levels of liability. SRT did not explain what "classification or tariff . . . govern[ed]" the shipment, nor indicate whether it made this information available to Sandoz. View "Exel, Inc. v. S. Refrigerated Transp., Inc." on Justia Law 2015-11-05 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Suhrheinrich 15-3032 14-3990 14-3953 http://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2015/2014-0862.html Risner v. Ohio Dep't of Transp. 2015-10-29T05:02:38-08:00 2015-10-29T19:04:09-08:00 Amber Risner was killed in a collision with a tractor-trailer at the intersection of State Route 220 and State Route 332. Appellees, Amber's parents, filed a complaint as the administrators of Amber's estate against the Ohio Department of Transportation ("ODOT"), alleging negligent design and maintenance of the intersection. The court of claims granted summary judgment in favor of ODOT, concluding that ODOT was performing maintenance, rather than highway improvement, when it installed flashing lights in the intersection, and therefore, ODOT did not have a duty to upgrade the intersection to current design standards. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) ODOT is immune from liability with respect to its decisions whether to improve an existing highway and what type of improvements it will make; (2) however, in executing its decisions to improve a highway, ODOT may be subject to liability if it fails to act in accordance with current construction standards; and (3) applying the discretionary-function doctrine to the facts of this case, ODOT is immune from liability for damages resulting from its decisions at issue here. View "Risner v. Ohio Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law 2015-10-29 state Ohio Supreme Court of Ohio Judith Ann Lanzinger 2014-0862 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/14-1094/14-1094-2015-10-26.html Mokdad v. Lynch 2015-10-26T06:31:06-08:00 2015-10-26T08:06:45-08:00 Mokdad, a naturalized U.S. citizen, alleges that he has been denied boarding on commercial airline flights between the U.S. and his native country, Lebanon because he was on the No Fly List. Mokdad applied for redress under the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (TRIP). Mokdad received a letter that did not confirm or deny whether he was on the List but informed him that "we have conducted a review of any applicable records in consultation with other federal agencies ... no changes or corrections are warranted at this time." The letter notified him of his right to file administrative appeal with the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) within 30 days, that the TRIP determination would become final if he did not, and that final determinations are reviewable by the Court of Appeals under 49 U.S.C. 46110. Mokdad did not file a TSA administrative appeal or a petition with the Court of Appeals but filed a complaint in the Eastern District of Michigan against the Attorney General, the FBI, and the Director of the Terrorist Screening Center. Mokdad did not name TSA or any TSA officer. The Sixth Circuit reversed dismissal, finding that the district court had jurisdiction, but declined to address the challenge to the adequacy of procedures to contest inclusion on the No Fly List, for failure to join a necessary party. View "Mokdad v. Lynch" on Justia Law 2015-10-26 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Gibbons 14-1094 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/14-9503/14-9503-2015-10-23.html Transam Trucking v. Federal Motor Carrier Safety 2015-10-23T09:06:41-08:00 2015-10-23T19:43:06-08:00 In this case, TransAm Trucking, Inc. petitioned the Tenth Circuit for review of an email it received from the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration's (FMCSA) counsel expressing the agency's refusal to issue TransAm a third amended compliance review report pursuant to the parties' settlement agreement. After granting review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that email was not a "final order" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 2342(3)(A), and dismissed TransAm's petition for lack of jurisdiction. View "Transam Trucking v. Federal Motor Carrier Safety" on Justia Law 2015-10-23 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Moritz 14-9503 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/15-3028/15-3028-2015-10-13.html Helicopters, Inc. v. Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd. 2015-10-13T10:30:49-08:00 2015-10-13T12:39:26-08:00 In 2014, two people were killed when a Seattle news helicopter crashed. The National Transportation Safety Board investigated, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 1131(a)(1), "to ascertain measures that would best tend to prevent similar accidents or incidents in the future." NTSB "does not engage in traditional agency adjudications, nor does it promulgate or enforce any air safety regulations. Rather, it simply analyzes accidents and recommends ways to prevent similar accidents." No part of an NTSB accident report may be admitted into evidence or used in a civil action for damages. In 2015, the Board released a Factual Report concerning its investigation of the Seattle crash; it has not yet released an analysis of the likely cause of the accident. The Illinois company that owned and operated the helicopter involved in the crash asserted that the Report "omits significant information that will make it impossible for the Board to reach an accurate determination of Probable Cause" and unsuccessfully requested that NTSB rescind the Report and refrain from releasing its Probable Cause Report until "errors in the Factual Report are addressed." The Seventh Circuit dismissed a petition seeking an order requiring NTSB to rescind or withhold reports. The court concluded that the Board's reports are not final orders subject to review. View "Helicopters, Inc. v. Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd." on Justia Law 2015-10-13 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Per Curiam 15-3028 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/14-5089/14-5089-2015-10-05.html Rasmuson v. United States 2015-10-05T07:02:49-08:00 2015-10-05T07:49:23-08:00 Plaintiffs own land adjacent to central Iowa railway corridors. Pursuant to the National Trail System Act Amendments of 1982, the Surface Transportation Board issued Notices of Interim Trail Use (NITUs) for the corridors. NITUs "preserve established railroad rights-of-way for future reactivation of rail service" and permit the railroad operator to cease operation without legally abandoning any "rights-of-way for railroad purposes," 16 U.S.C. 1247(d). The trial court found that but for issuance of the NITUs, the railway easements would have reverted to plaintiffs upon cessation of railroad operations, held that a taking occurred, and, focusing on parcels for which the highest and best use was farmland, used the "before and after" method to determine the value of the land subject to the easement. The court determined that the "before" state of the land should take into account the value of the land as it existed before the NITU easements, but ignore any physical remnants of the railway's use, which would have remained if the railway easement had been permitted to lapse. The Federal Circuit vacated, holding that an appraiser must consider the value of a landowner's property before the easement, which in this case includes the physical remnants of the railroad. View "Rasmuson v. United States" on Justia Law 2015-10-05 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Todd Michael Hughes 14-5089 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/14-2981/14-2981-2015-10-01.html Baumann v. Zhukov 2015-10-01T07:30:47-08:00 2015-10-01T08:30:11-08:00 Around 4:20 a.m. Zhukov, driving a tractor-trailer on I-80, struck an object in the road. His vehicle lost air-brake pressure. Zhukov stopped with the trailer in the right-hand lane. Experts opined that he could have pulled completely onto the shoulder. Zhukov turned on his hazard lights and placed warning reflectors closer to the trailer than federal regulations require, in a formation that guided traffic to the right shoulder rather than the left lane. At 4:34 a.m., Johnson's semi-tractor-trailer crashed into Zhukov's trailer without slowing down, killing Johnson, causing a fire, and completely blocking both lanes. The Schmidts, traveling in two cars, safely stopped at the end of the traffic jam. Vehicles in the lineup -- including both Schmidt cars and the truck in front of them -- activated hazard lights; emergency vehicles had overhead lights flashing. At 5:14 a.m., Slezak's semitractor-trailer smashed into Schmidt's car at 75 miles per hour, propelling Christopher's car into his wife's car, which was pushed under a semi-trailer. The entire Schmidt family perished. A Nebraska State Trooper determined that Slezak did not brake or attempt to avoid the cars; he had been driving for at least 14 hours -- three more than permitted by 49 C.F.R. 395.3(a)(3)(i). The Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Zhukov and Zhukov's and Johnson's employers. Schmidts' injuries were not proximately caused by their negligence because the unanticipated negligence of Slezak was an "efficient intervening cause." View "Baumann v. Zhukov" on Justia Law 2015-10-01 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit James B. Loken 14-2981 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/14-1585/14-1585-2015-09-17.html Lee v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co. 2015-09-17T11:02:05-08:00 2015-09-17T17:45:21-08:00 Plaintiff filed suit against his employer, NS, alleging that NS suspended him on the basis of his race in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1981. The district court granted summary judgment to NS and then plaintiff filed a second suit, claiming that NS in fact suspended him for reporting rail safety offenses, in violation of the whistleblower protection provision of the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA), 49 U.S.C. 20109. The district court again granted summary judgment to NS. The court concluded, however, that the Election of Remedies provision in the FRSA does not bar plaintiff's second suit. The court explained that a suspension on the basis of race is not "the same allegedly unlawful act" as a suspension in retaliation for FRSA whistleblowing. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Lee v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co." on Justia Law 2015-09-17 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Floyd 14-1585 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/14-6286/14-6286-2015-08-28.html CSX Transp., Inc. v. Tenn. Dep't of Revenue 2015-08-28T08:00:55-08:00 2015-08-28T08:57:32-08:00 The 1976 Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act prohibits states from imposing taxes that "discriminat[e] against a rail carrier," 49 U.S.C. 11501(b)(4)A, including: Assessing rail transportation property at a value with a higher ratio to the true market value of the property than the ratio applied to other commercial and industrial property; levying or collecting an ad valorem property tax on rail transportation property at a tax rate that exceeds the rate applicable to commercial and industrial property in the same jurisdiction; or imposing "another tax that discriminates against a rail carrier providing transportation." Railroads sued, claiming that Tennessee sales and use tax assessments were discriminatory. The district court agreed, holding that imposition of those taxes on railroad purchases and use of diesel fuel was discriminatory. In response, in 2014, Tennessee enacted a Transportation Fuel Equity Act that repeals the sales and use tax on railroad diesel fuel, but subjects railroads to the same per-gallon tax imposed on motor carriers under the Highway User Fuel Tax. Previously railroads, like other carriers using diesel fuel for off-highway purposes, were exempt from a "diesel tax." The Railroads contend the Act is discriminatory because it now subjects only railroads to taxation of diesel fuel used off-highway. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of the Railroads' motion for a preliminary injunction on its targeted or singling-out approach and the functional approach, but remanded for consideration of the Railroads' argument under the competitive approach. View "CSX Transp., Inc. v. Tenn. Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law 2015-08-28 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Donald 14-6286 14-6285 14-6287 14-6288 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/13-2518/13-2518-2015-08-17.html Camara de Mercadeo v. Vazquez 2015-08-17T13:00:03-08:00 2015-08-17T17:48:58-08:00 Appellants in this case were three shipping operators who pay a fee to Puerto Rico to conduct business out of the Port of San Juan. The Commonwealth supplied each company with cargo-scanning technology, required them to scan all of their inbound cargo at the port, and then, to pay for the scanning, charged each an additional fee on top of the existing fees that it already charged operators to utilize the port. A magistrate judge concluded that the additional fee was constitutional as applied to the three shipping operators equipped with the scanning technology and did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the three shipping operators failed to prove that the additional fee, as applied to them, violates the dormant Commerce Clause. View "Camara de Mercadeo v. Vazquez" on Justia Law 2015-08-17 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Jeffrey R. Howard 13-2518 http://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2015/b254753.html Everett v. Mountains Recreation & Conservancy Auth. 2015-08-13T11:00:26-08:00 2015-08-13T12:04:32-08:00 Plaintiff filed a putative class action suit against MCRA, alleging that the stop sign violation for which MRCA cited him occurred on a "highway" as defined by Vehicle Code section 360, that Vehicle Code section 21 makes the provision of the Vehicle Code uniformly applicable to all "highways" located in California, that Vehicle Code section 21455.5 governs automated traffic enforcement systems, and that MRCA failed to comply with the requirements of Vehicle Code section 21455.5 in establishing its automated video camera traffic enforcement system. At issue on appeal is whether MCRA is unlawfully imposing administrative penalties - in substantive effect fines for moving traffic violations - on motor vehicle owners. The court concluded that the trial court correctly ruled that it is "immaterial" whether or not the roadway in MRCA-controlled parkland where plaintiff was administratively cited is a "highway" as defined in Vehicle Code section 360. Highway or not in plaintiff's case, the court found that the MRCA Ordinance does not conflict with Vehicle Code section 21's general prohibition against local vehicle ordinances in favor of uniform state vehicle laws. Because the court held that MRCA's automated video camera traffic enforcement system is not subject to the Vehicle Code's provisions governing automated traffic enforcement systems, the trial court correctly sustained MRCA's demurrer. View "Everett v. Mountains Recreation & Conservancy Auth." on Justia Law 2015-08-13 state California California Courts of Appeal Tricia A. Bigelow B254753 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/14-1825/14-1825-2015-07-08.html Lu Junhong v. Boeing Co. 2015-07-08T08:01:09-08:00 2015-07-08T10:24:17-08:00 Plaintiffs, airplane passengers, filed suit against Boeing in state court after a Boeing 777 hit a seawall at the end of a runway at the San Francisco International Airport and injured 49 passengers, killing three passengers. Suits were also brought in federal courts and were consolidated by the Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) under 28 U.S.C. 1407(a). Boeing removed the state suits to federal court, asserting admiralty jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1333 and asserting federal officials' right to have claims against them resolved by federal courts under 28 U.S.C. 1442. The MDL decided that the state suits should be transferred to California to participate in the consolidated pretrial proceedings, but the district court remanded them for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court agreed with the district court that Boeing was not entitled to remove under section 1442(a)(1) because Boeing was not acting as a federal officer in light of Watson v. Philip Morris Cos. However, the court concluded that subject-matter jurisdiction exists under section 1333(1) because section 1333(1) includes accidents caused by problems that occur in transocean commerce. In this case, the plane was a trans-ocean flight, a substitute for an ocean-going vessel. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded with instructions. View "Lu Junhong v. Boeing Co." on Justia Law 2015-07-08 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Frank Hoover Easterbrook 14-1825 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/14-2346/14-2346-2015-07-02.html Chlorine Institute, Inc. v. Soo Line R.R. 2015-07-02T07:31:14-08:00 2015-07-02T12:56:36-08:00 In 2009, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration of the Department of Transportation (tasked with regulating the transportation of hazardous materials) finalized extensive amendments to the regulations for the transportation of toxic inhalation hazard (TIH) materials, 7 49 C.F.R. 171-174 & 179). The regulations included substantial background information regarding the safety issues concerning the transportation of hazardous materials and prior train derailments leading to tragic harms. Chemical and fertilizer entities sought to enjoin the railway (CP) from imposing a requirement that any TIH materials transported on CP's railways be transported in normalized steel rail cars. Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the district court held the Surface Transportation Board should address whether CP's requirement is reasonable in the first instance, denied the request for injunctive relief, and dismissed without prejudice. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding no likelihood of irreparable harm. The court rejected an argument that CP's requirement would amount to a national crisis for an adequate water supply or fertilizer for crops. Any minimum reduction in the ability to transport TIH materials by rail does not outweigh the real concerns which prompted CP to implement the requirement. View "Chlorine Institute, Inc. v. Soo Line R.R." on Justia Law 2015-07-02 federal U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Kermit Edward Bye 14-2346