text:
Traditional Undergraduate Catalog •
Matriculation and Degree Information
Bachelor's Degree Requirements and Procedures
To earn a bachelor's degree from Cedar Crest College, each student must:
- Successfully complete a specific group of courses in the liberal arts curriculum (see liberal arts curriculum and print a copy of the checklist).
- Satisfy the requirements of a major course of study.
- Successfully complete a minimum of 120 credits. Some majors may require additional credits.
- Maintain a 2.000 cumulative grade-point average or higher. Some programs require higher minimums.
- Students are required to complete 26 of their last 30 credits at Cedar Crest. LVAIC courses may be taken in the last 30 credits
- Successfully complete the First Year Experience (first-time, traditional students who inter in the fall semester)
(Please note that some majors require a cumulative GPA higher than 2.000. Check department requirements for details.)
Class Standing
A student's class standing is determined by the student's number of earned credits as certified in the registrar's office at the beginning of each term.
Freshman 0-23.9 earned credits
Sophomore 24-54.9 earned credits
Junior 55-85.9 earned credits
Senior 86 or more earned credits
Conditional Standing
The faculty at Cedar Crest College has adopted the following policy concerning conditional standing and separation from the College:
- Matriculated students who fail to achieve a cumulative grade-point average of 1.800 as first-semester freshmen will be placed on conditional standing for the subsequent term. Students who fail to achieve a cumulative grade-point average of 2.000 for any term after their first-semester term will be placed on conditional standing. Part-time matriculated students will be reviewed for possible conditional standing for every accumulation of 15 credits they complete. Part-time students who fail to achieve a cumulative grade-point average of 2.000 for every 15 credits will be placed on conditional standing for their subsequent 15 credits.
- Matriculated students who fail to achieve a cumulative grade-point average of 2.000 after three terms on conditional standing will be subject to dismissal procedure.
- Matriculated students who fail to achieve a cumulative grade-point average of 1.000 may be subject to dismissal procedure.
The dismissal procedure includes the opportunity to petition the Admissions, Enrollment and Retention Committee for continuation and requires the student to prepare a personal plan for academic progress.
A student dismissed for unsatisfactory academic achievement may petition the Admissions, Enrollment and Retention Committee for re-admission; this petition must include official documentation of specific academic work or equivalent experience during the interval between dismissal and re-admission.
Once re-admitted to the College, the student must achieve a grade-point average of 2.000 or better every semester to remain. If a student is dismissed a second time, there is no appeal.
Declaration of Dual Degrees
A Cedar Crest graduate may be awarded a second bachelor's degree, either B.A. or B.S., if the student completes a minimum of 30 additional approved credits at Cedar Crest with a cumulative grade-point average of at least 2.0 and satisfies the requirements for an additional major. A student may pursue a second bachelor's degree to be awarded either at the same time as the first degree or at a time subsequent to the awarding of the first degree, provided that the pursuit of the second degree reflects a second distinct and comprehensive program of study. The option for the second bachelor's degree is limited to the departmental majors and programs listed in the catalog.
Study Leading to a Second Degree: A student who has earned a baccalaureate or associate's degree at an accredited institution may pursue a program of study leading to a second degree at Cedar Crest College. Credits earned as part of the first degree will be evaluated for applicability toward major requirements and liberal arts curriculum requirements. The student must satisfy all graduation requirements and adhere to all other academic policies.
Declaration of Major and Minors
Students should declare their major any time after the completion of their first semester of study or 12–15 earned credits. Students are required to declare their major once they have completed 45 credits. Transfer students are encouraged to declare their major after the completion of 24 credits at Cedar Crest. An education major or co-major may be declared only after three semesters of full-time study or 45 credits, and successful completion of the Praxis I.
Students enrolling in the School of Adult and Graduate Education are permitted to declare their major upon matriculation into the College.
The official declaration of a major is initiated with a form available from the Registrar's Office. Students declaring a major that may lead to either the B.S. or B.A. degree shall specify at the time of declaration which program they are entering and which degree they are seeking. Students must satisfy a minimum of 18 credits of major requirements through Cedar Crest College coursework. Individual departments may specify higher residency requirements for major coursework or establish further restrictions on the types of transfer credits accepted toward major requirements. Students will graduate according to the major requirements listed in the College catalog and in effect at the time they enter the College, provided the students declare their major within four years of matriculation. After four years, the student will graduate under the requirements in effect at the time of declaration. If the requirements for the major change after a student has declared a major, students may choose to graduate according to curricular changes enacted by the Faculty and stipulated in subsequent catalogs.
Co-majors must be completed in conjunction with a regular academic major. Details of such programs may be found in departmental descriptions found in the College Catalog or may be discussed with appropriates.
Any change in major, including change of B.S. or B.A. program within the same department, shall be processed through the Registrar's Office and have departmental approval. Students declaring a major must have a cumulative GPA of at least 2.000; some majors require a higher GPA for declaration. Students should consult with academic departments.
Declaration of a self-designed major: Matriculated students may design their own major and seek its approval from the Curriculum and Academic Policy Committee. Such proposals will only be considered if the courses required are available at Cedar Crest or within the LVAIC and meet the standards for an academic major at Cedar Crest. A formal petition shall be made indicating her expected degree and be approved by the relevant Department Chairperson before submission to CAPC. For information, see the Registrar. Students are required to declare a self-designed major by the time they have completed 90 credits.
Declaration of more than one major: Students may complete requirements for more than one major. Students declaring additional majors shall indicate one as their primary major. The primary major shall determine the degree to be awarded, i.e., B.S. or B.A.
Declaration of an academic minor: Some departments offer minors. Completion of a minor is optional if it is not required for graduation. A student initiates declaration of a minor with the completion of a form available from the Registrar's Office. A minor must be a minimum of 18 credits with one-half taken at Cedar Crest College. No course with a grade of less than C-may be counted to satisfy a minor requirement. Some departments have higher requirements. A course taken Pass/Fail will not satisfy a minor requirement unless it is a course offered on a Pass/Fail basis only. The minimum cumulative grade-point average for a minor is 2.000.
Matriculated students may design their own minor and seek its approval from the Curriculum and Academic Policy Committee. A formal petition shall be made, including required documentation as set forth by the Registrar, and be approved by the relevant Department Chairperson before submission to CAPC. Students are required to declare a self-designed minor by the time they have completed 90 credits. A minor must include a minimum of 18 credits with half the credits taken at Cedar Crest College. No more than 3 credits may be completed in independent study. All policies pertaining to a minor apply to the self-designed minor.
Declaration of concentration/certification: Some departments offer concentrations or certifications. A student declares a concentration/certification by completing the appropriate form available from the Registrar's Office.
Academic major course requirements: A course with a grade of C- or better may be counted to satisfy a major requirement. Some departments have higher requirements. Students should consult with individual departments for exact requirements. A course taken Pass/Fail will not satisfy a major requirement unless it is a course offered by the department on a Pass/Fail basis only. The minimum cumulative grade-point average for coursework in the major is 2.000. Some departments require a higher cumulative GPA in the major.
If a student re-enters the College to continue a major after an official leave of absence greater than one academic year, the student will graduate according to major requirements in effect at the time of re-enrollment. A student may complete more than one major within one degree.
Grades and Quality Points
Letter grades are used to designate academic achievement, with accompanying quality points:
A = 4.0 quality points
A- = 3.7 quality points
B+ = 3.3 quality points
B = 3.0 quality points
B- = 2.7 quality points
C+ = 2.3 quality points
C = 2.0 quality points
C- = 1.7 quality points
D+ = 1.3 quality points
D = 1.0 quality points
F = 0 quality points
The following grades have no accompanying quality points and are not computed in the grade-point average:
P = Pass, a course taken as Pass/Fail
S = Satisfactory (Audit)
PN = Pass, no grade
U = Unsatisfactory (Audit)
W = Withdrew before official deadline
CR/NC = Credit/No Credit
The grade-point average is computed at the completion of each academic semester and summer session for those courses taken at Cedar Crest College.
For example, a student who has registered for 15 credits in a given semester would calculate his/her GPA in the following manner:
3 credits of A : 3 x 4 = 12.0
3 credits of B+: 3 x 3.3 = 9.9
3 credits of B : 3 x 3 = 9.0
3 credits of C : 3 x 2 = 6.0
3 credits of D+: 3 x 1.3 = 3.9
Total credits: 15 Total quality points: 40.8
Total quality points for each course are calculated by multiplying the number of course credits by the quality points for the grade earned. The average is calculated by dividing the total credits attempted into the total quality points earned.
Students may repeat a course. Third-time repeats require Registrar's approval. Some departments have their own policies regarding repeating a course.
Once the course is repeated, the higher grade earned is computed into the student's grade point average. Both grades appear on the permanent record.
Repeating one or more classes may affect a student's satisfactory academic progress requirement for receipt of financial aid; the student should visit the financial aid office for information.
Incompletes: A temporary grade of incomplete (I) is given only to a student who is doing passing work in a course but who, for reasons beyond the student's control, is not able to complete a major assignment or examination by the deadline for submitting grades. At least 75% of the assigned work for the class must have been completed before a grade of "I" can be requested.
An incomplete must be requested by the student and approved by the instructor, the student's advisor and by the Department Chair. "Request for incomplete" forms are available online at MyCedarCrest. The deadline for requesting an incomplete grade is the last day of class. In cases involving unusual circumstances, such as sickness or injury, a member of Academic Services or the instructor may request an incomplete on the student's behalf.
A grade of "incomplete" is not entered on the permanent record. Work must be completed within the first six weeks after the end of the examination period, or by a date specified by the instructor.
Pass/Fail option: A student may not use a course taken on a pass/fail basis to satisfy major, minor, or liberal education requirements unless the course is offered only on a pass/fail basis. Students may enroll for courses on a pass/fail basis up to 25 percent of the total of their Cedar Crest work applicable for graduation, in addition to courses offered only as pass/fail.
A first-year student may enroll in no more than two pass/fail courses per term.
Instructors are not informed that a student is enrolled as pass/fail. Letter grades are submitted and are recorded as pass/fail in the registrar's office. In order to receive a "Pass," the student must receive a grade of D or higher.
Pass (P) is not computed in the grade-point average; the student receives credit only. Fail (F) is computed as an F in the grade-point average; the student receives no credit.
Changing course registration from graded credit to Pass/Fail: Students who wish to change their registration from graded credit to pass/fail must complete this change in registration by the end of the twelfth (12th) week of the fall or spring semester. (Deadlines for accelerated, winter term, and summer sessions differ and will be announced to students and advisors.) This change is permanent and may not be reversed. Students may not change from Pass/Fail to graded credit.
Declaration of Intent to Graduate: All students are required to apply for graduation in order to complete a degree or certificate program. Students must complete the online application (located on MyCedarCrest) declaring their intent to graduate before the deadlines indicated below:
January Graduation: Apply by August 1 of the previous calendar year
May Graduation: Apply by December 1 of the previous calendar year
August Graduation: Apply by April 1 of the same calendar year
After submission of the application to graduate, a degree audit will be generated by the Registrar's Office for each student with a copy sent to the student and the faculty advisor listing total academic credit requirements for graduation which have been fulfilled.
Independent Studies
The purpose of an independent study is generally to enable a student to investigate topics not covered in depth in regularly scheduled classes. It is generally assumed that the student has taken some necessary background courses and that she will focus on a topic in some depth. The role of the instructor in such a course is primarily for consultation, advisement and possible collaboration. A student proposing an independent study should be of at least a junior standing with a declared major at the time the independent study will occur. Before proposing an independent study, the student should have explored other avenues for receiving instruction or course credit, including course offerings at other LVAIC institutions, course substitutions chosen in consultation with the student's advisor and/or the involved department chair, or a proficiency exam or CLEP test if applicable. If an independent study is deemed appropriate by the sponsoring department, the student proposing an independent study must complete and sign the independent study form available from the registrar's office or at their website, and receive approvals from the sponsoring faculty member, sponsoring department chair, and the Provost. These approvals must be obtained and the paperwork submitted to the Registrar's office prior to the end of the drop/add period. Independent studies are charged at the current day per credit rate. Foundation courses are not available through Independent Study. No more than 9 credits taken through independent study may be counted towards a student's total graduation credits. A student may petition the Curriculum and Academic Policy Committee for exceptions to this policy.
Matriculation is a student's formal acceptance as a degree candidate at Cedar Crest. Matriculation is required for any student who plans to receive financial aid and/or declare an academic major. Students intending to complete a degree are encouraged to matriculate upon entry.
The date of matriculation determines the liberal arts curriculum requirements under which students will graduate unless they choose to graduate according to provisions enacted by the faculty and stipulated in the current catalog. A student who does not matriculate upon entry is required to do so before the student completes the final 30 credits.
In the event that a course section reaches its enrollment maximum, matriculated students are given preference over non-matriculated students.
The date of the acceptance letter as a degree candidate is the date of matriculation. This date of matriculation is important if students find it necessary to interrupt their studies at Cedar Crest. If matriculated students request and are granted an official leave of absence of up to three calendar years, they are not required to re-apply for matriculation when they re-enroll at Cedar Crest.


text:
Topic: select date time.
Is there a way to make select_datetime. only display the next 30 days worth of entries?
This is an archive from Rails Forum. Check out the new community here!
A forum for Ruby on Rails users
Pages 1
Is there a way to make select_datetime. only display the next 30 days worth of entries?
You can do something like:
<%= date_select('order', 'date_entered', :start_year => 2006, :end_year => 2007) %>
Last edited by dahuk (2006-11-13 09:30:55)
The inherit problem with this is that displaying a drop down for the day, month, and year for the next 30 days would only leave you with one year, and a max of two months.
Describe the business problem and we might be able to help with a more suitable solution.
I think it is better to handle this in the validation:
def validate
errors.add(:some_date, 'needs to be within the next 30 days') if some_date > 30.days.from_now
Pages 1
Hosting provided by aTech Media

subset: commoncrawl


text:
QandO hits 7,000,000 visits
Somewhere in the night, QandO rolled 7,000,000 visits. We continue to get about 1,000,000 a year. Not what some of the "big boy" blogs get, but a pretty darn good average. Along with those 7,000,000, we've now surpassed 10,000,000 page views. That's about a page and a half viewed per visit. And our average visit length is 1:43 – which is pretty darn good.
Thanks to all that have and continue to visit, thanks to all the commenters who keep a vibrant and entertaining community alive. So, let's work on 8,000,000.


text:
Brindle pitbull male house broken and very loving needs a good home$85
Dual-masked, tri-colored (brown, black, and white) Olde English Bulldogge Pup for sale. Born 12/6 and will be ready, UTD on shots by February. He loves…$1,750
KENNEL REDUCTION! Beautiful German shepherd adults, males and females 1 year old and up. To be sold for family pets. $500. And up. Call Paul at…$500
akc parti/ traditional yorkie I have one female Parti Yorkie for $1,200 I have 1 male parti Yorkie for $1,000 I have one traditional yorkie female…$800
317-503-1533, Born Oct 5 ready for their new home! Shots and registration papers. Please text$1,200
Bruno is 6 months old, he is a really playful and loving puppy. He loves to play with dogs and kids. My family and I are moving away, and we will not able…$250
1st shot, wormed, female, 8 weeks old. $750. Cash. FMI call or text 317-372-4231$750


text:
A new study reveals how the amygdala is involved in controlling predatory behavior in mice.
Language Gene More Active in Girls
February 21, 2013|
One gene involved in speech produces more of its protein in the brains of young girls than boys.
February 21, 2013|
One gene involved in speech produces more of its protein in the brains of young girls than boys.
February 18, 2013|
A new project to map the activity of the human brain could receive more than $3 billion dollars in federal funds in President Obama's upcoming budget proposal.
February 15, 2013|
A paper describing a new method for imaging synapse formation has been retracted after it emerged that the first author falsified data to prove its effectiveness.
February 15, 2013|
Properly folded prions aid in normal brain development.
February 15, 2013|
The first human trial of a treatment using induced pluripotent stem cells has received conditional approval from an institutional review board in Japan.
February 13, 2013|
A new journal that publishes peer review comments alongside its manuscripts goes live.
February 12, 2013|
The brains of people who cannot hear adapt to process vision-based language, in addition to brain changes associated with the loss of auditory input.
February 11, 2013|
An illustration depicting the damaging effects of a tumor (red) on structural connections within the brain
February 5, 2013|
Tuberculosis bacteria find shelter from drugs and the body's defenses in bone marrow stem cells.
February 5, 2013|
Scientists found a way to cause panic attacks in women with amygdala damage.


text:
Even the most famous skateboarder in history has to call in a few favors when it comes to collaborating with Paul McCartney and Bob Dylan. Tony Hawk learned this while working on his charity project Boards + Bands, which features musicians painting their famous song lyrics on renowned skateboarders' decks.
Stemming from an idea from Ben Harper -- who's also a board member for the Tony Hawk Foundation -- the charity auction will raise funds for new skateparks around the country. The A-list talent involved? McCartney, Dylan, Tom Petty, Metallica's James Hetfield, Jimmy Cliff and the late Adam Yauch, teaming with skaters Jamie Thomas, Rodney Mullen, Bucky Lasek, Bob Burnquist and more.
"The wish list pack is pretty huge and iconic and it took a lot of connections and phone calls," Hawk tells Spinner. "[Dylan's] came in pretty quickly once the board actually got out. The only one that didn't come through, as far as I know, is Elton John."
Hawk chose to donate the board he used in the first-ever skate exhibition in India. Rather than request a specific song, he let McCartney do the honors. The former Beatle opted for "Blackbird."
"He did his own because I didn't want to impose. I didn't know what his feelings are about certain songs, like if John Lennon was the co-writer, so I just let him go and do whatever he wanted. And I knew that I would love it.
Hawk says he mainly spoke with McCartney's manager and finally met him at a dinner party in L.A. during Grammy week. "It was pretty surreal. I didn't realize they had basically rented the entire restaurant, and so when he arrived and sat down he was sitting with Joe Walsh and Elvis Costello and Johnny Depp was nearby and it was crazy.
"I got to talk to him for a bit. He told me his grandson I think was into skating and he was very cool, very conversational. It was one of those things where obviously everyone's clamoring to get to him even though it was sort of a VIP thing, so I didn't want to hog his time. It was very cool for me. Just in terms of the Beatles, they opened my eyes to music. The first album I bought was Sgt. Pepper's."
Hawk was also excited that Yauch, who died in May following a battle with cancer, was able to participate, writing out the words to the Beastie Boys' "Bodhisattva Vow" over three of Bucky Lasek's boards. MCA also illustrated a fourth board.
"To be honest, from all accounts that I knew, he was in recovery," Hawk says of his late friend. "It didn't sound like they were canceling their tour dates, it sounded like they were postponing them, so I never really thought that it was terminal."
The auction kicked off last night and will run until Thursday, Dec. 13. Hawk, who's currently loving the new Grizzly Bear and Paul Banks albums, says he hopes to raise over six figures (skateparks cost anywhere from $5,000 to over $500,000).
"We're really excited about it. They're going to have to outbid me for the McCartney board, that's all I have to say."


text:
Schools & Colleges
How to stay healthy and safe during your time abroad.
For CU Denver students experiencing an emergency while abroad you have several resources.
The university does not carry insurance for students. However, specific programs, including university programs, may carry different types of insurance. Each traveler is responsible for understanding any insurance provided by the program. Equally, each traveler is responsible for securing any additional insurance for their individual requirements.
When the US State Department issues a "Travel Warning" for a country or area, student travel to that specific area is suspended. Students may appeal the warning by following the Appeal Process document.
CU Denver requests that all US citizen students traveling abroad register with the US Embassy.
Student Travel to Countries with a Travel Warning, Travel Health Warning or to Sanctioned Nations.
© The Regents of the University of Colorado, a body corporate. All rights reserved.
Accredited by the Higher Learning Commission. All trademarks are registered property of the University. Used by permission only.


text:
I realized I never did post pics of the bra I made for Charity Wings that was auctioned off at Winter CHA. Here's a bit of background. Charity Wings did a very successful Crafty Flash Mob at Winter CHA 2012. About 100 folks took over the convention center lobby before the show opened. It was my first and only flash mob and I had soooo much fun.
Elena being Elena, she had to up the ante this year. A very dear friend of ours in the industry was diagnosed with breast cancer and we were devastated. Elena and some folks cooked up an idea to do a mob flash where all the crafty peeps created altered bras and then "flashed" them before Winter CHA 2013 show opening. No worries, the ladies wore pink T-shirts with their altered bras on top of the shirts. Because this show was a big one for us with our new releases, there was no way I could sneak out this year and participate in the fun. (sad face here).
As you all know by now, I pretty much support Elena in just about anything she does to raise money for the charities Charity Wings supports. I told her I would make an altered ICE Resin paper bra. I wanted to show the world how cool and transparent tissue paper becomes when a layer of ICE is applied to it, and well, I thought the breast area was the best possible canvas to get my point across. I bought a tiny little bra at the Goodwill, washed it up and then proceeded to cut the cups out of it, keeping the underwire, and attaching resin paper. I also made some wire leaves (a technique Susan created and taught me and a bunch of others how to do in her workshops) and added an Iced Enamels bezel and some German Glass glitter to it. Just for the fun of it, I created an asymmetrical headband to go with the bra. When I finished the whole thing it seemed to me that I somehow channeled a modern-day Moulin Rouge costume inspired by our summer workshop in France.
The one thing I forgot to do was add extra "material" (resin paper) to the cups so the bra will need to be worn by one tiny little flat chested woman. Oops! I wasn't exactly thinking of functional art now was I? The cool part of that all of the bras were auctioned off at a Westcott sponsored party with all the money going toward breast cancer awareness. I have no idea how much money my bra raised, but I do know that it raised a few eyebrows and was the object of a some scandalous jokes. Of course I love that, as art is supposed to inspire, stimulate and elicit emotion!
And to let you in on a little insider joke, when I finished making the bra I held it up for my husband to see. I asked him what else it needed, as in did it need any further crafty embellishments? Being the straight man he definitely is, his response was simply a sly smile, a quick sideways shake of his head and two words; "Just breasts." I had to laugh. I really love my man!
On another non-bra related note, I'm off to Tucson Friday night for the To Bead True Blue show and more workshops and our booth. I doubt I will have time to update while I'm gone. I'll try to take lots of pics and post them when I return.


text:
An emerging leader in innovative Auto-ID solutions
TSC is one of the fastest-growing companies in the Auto-ID industry, offering a diversified line of rugged, competitively priced thermal label printer to customers worldwide. Since our launch in 1991, we have supplied more than 3 million label printers to the Auto-ID market – a testimony to our emerging leadership in the global marketplace. Learn more >
Market: Transportation Application: Parking ticket printing in Taiwan Model: Alpha-3R Learn more >
The MX240P Series industrial thermal printer is ruggedly built for high volume, high quality, label printing. Featuring our fastest print speeds ever, the MX240P Series boosts productivity with faster processing power, communications and printing speeds. It is ideal for applications that include manufacturing, logistics, shipping, and product identification. Learn more >
Zorneding, Germany –April 26, 2016 – TSC Auto ID Technology (TWSE: 3611.TWO), a global leader in the AIDC barcode printer industry, had sponsored Vasaloppet 2016 in early March, one of the largest cross country ski events of the world, took place in the middle of Sweden. Learn more >


text:
Rentals "Vallon Fleuri"
Other products
Sole agent
This apartment is located in a high quality building with private pool, snack bar, visitors car park and close to the beaches of Monaco. Composed as follows;...
Located in a building right in the center of the principality (security 24 hours), you may rent storage spaces at different sizes! Rent to be paid one...
1-bedroom-apt entirely refurbished, air-conditioning, quickly available, possibility to rent car park in the building
In a building close beaches and facilities; 1-bedroom-apt with small sea view and separate kitchen
Bd des Moulins (main shopping street), ancient building, 1-bedroom last floor, refurbished
Stylish bourgeois style residency with live in concierge, situated in a calm and residential area. Fully renovated penthouse duplex apartment in a modern...
In the heart of the Golden Square, next to the Casino, the Fairmont residency offers a luxury life style, with a swimming pool on the roof, the prestigious...
Sole agent
Close to Place des Moulins. Apartment with living room , 1 large bedroom, 1 small bedroom or office, 1 bathroom, 1 wc and 1 cellar. Beautiful sea view.
Office space offering flexibility to customize into open space floor plan.
850 m2 of well priced and customizable office space
2 Bedroom/1 Bathroom with sea views. Fully equipped kitchen.


text:
Pharrell, Drake join iHeartRadio lineup
NEW YORK — Pharrell, Drake and Blake Shelton are among the A-listers set to perform at the first iHeartRadio Music Awards.
Clear Channel announced Monday that Kendrick Lamar, Shakira, Ed Sheeran and Arcade Fire will also take the stage at the May 1 awards show in Los Angeles. Lady Gaga, Katy Perry, Lorde and Coldplay's Chris Martin will make appearances.
Contenders for artist of the year include Rihanna, Maroon 5, Justin Timberlake, Imagine Dragons and Macklemore & Ryan Lewis.
The awards will air live on NBC from the Shrine Auditorium starting at 6 p.m. Mountain.
Canadian author
MacLeod dies
Alistair MacLeod, the award-winning Canadian author who was best known for his short story collections and novel "No Great Mischief," has died. He was 77.
MacLeod had been in a Windsor, Ontario, hospital since suffering a stroke in January.
• • •
NYC mayor sets Barbara Walters Day
NEW YORK — Mayor Bill de Blasio is proclaiming May 16 as "Barbara Walters Day" in New York City.
Walters is retiring that day after a storied television reporting career that has spanned five decades.
De Blasio made the announcement Monday when he appeared on "The View," the daytime talk show that Walters co-hosts. He also gave her an official city proclamation.
• • •
India loves John Travolta
TAMPA, Fla. — John Travolta will appear during the 15th International Indian Film Academy awards here this week.
Organizers of the event said Monday that Travolta will receive the Most Popular All-Time International Star in India award at the ceremony.
The awards, which celebrate Indian films and are making their debut in the United States, will be held Wednesday through Saturday.


text:
The Japan Student Services Organization is the organization that is responsible for data collection on international educational exchange or global mobility. Data have been collected on an annual basis from 1985 to the current year. Students are classified as foreign students if they are not citizens of the country for which the data are collected. Countries unable to provide data or estimates for non-nationals on the basis of their passports were requested to substitute data according to a related alternative criterion, e.g., the country of residence, the non-national mother tongue or non-national parentage. (OECD)
Data are collected on: gender; field of study; academic level; type of host institution attended; and degree/qualification/credential awarded.
© 2016 Institute of International Education, Inc. All rights reserved.


text:
You have no items in your shopping cart.
You're currently on:
Product Description
Color: Black
Type: Compatible
Part No.: 44469801 (Type C17)
Category: Toner Cartridge
No. of pages: Up to 3,500 pages at 5% Coverage Learn more...
Our replacement cartridge includes dedicated Chips be defect free.
100% satisfaction guarantee on all compatible cartridges
(not 30 days or 90 days, 1 full year guaranteed)
Compatiblity with this product
|Okidata C330dn, C331dn. C530dn, C531dn
Okidata MC361, MC362w, MC561, MC562w, MC890, MC950


text:
An optional hydraulic cylinder installed below the unit adjusts the headstay so luff tension remains constant. This prevents halyard and tack attachments from overloading when the headstay is adjusted.
DO NOT use Harken equipment for human suspension unless product is specifically certified and labeled for such use.
Address InformationTel: 262.691.3320 | Fax: 262.701.5780 Email: firstname.lastname@example.com Technical Service: firstname.lastname@example.com our other locations


text:
The 62B District Court is pleased to provide online payment options to our community. This is a convenient and efficient method to settle accounts with the court.
Joyfully, the 62B District Court provides marriage ceremonies to our community. All you need to know about getting married at the Court is just click away.
The 62B District court takes your rights very seriously. We have information to help you understand your rights. Click here to learn more about your rights in criminal matters.
Welcome to the 62-B District Court website. In order to better serve our community and fulfill our mission, the court has made available on this website many services, information, and resources. It is our hope that this website will be of great service to our community, fellow courts, and the legal community. We invite you to explore our website and enjoy our online accessibility.
Our Mission: We strive to earn the public's trust and confidence by serving the community with the highest standards of justice.
The court will do this by:


text:
Bipolar Disorder Research Projects
|Melvin McInnis, M.D., Thomas B. and Nancy Upjohn Woodworth Professor of Bipolar Disorder and Depression, and Principal Investigator of the Prechter Bipolar Research Projects
At the University of Michigan, our integrated bipolar disorder research programs are multi-focused:
- early onset and detection
- trajectory
- outcomes
Bipolar Disorder is known to run in families, but most genes involved have not yet been identified. A person's response to the illness, to various life circumstances and treatment can vary. Through our studies, we strive to make a difference for individuals whose lives have been touched by Bipolar Disorder.
Featured Projects
Phase Specific Variability in Bipolar Disorder: Performance, Neuroimaging, and
Every Day Functioning
Stem Cell Research in Bipolar Disorder
Longitudinal Voice Patterns in Bipolar Disorder (PRIORI smartphone app project)


text:
Backgrounder #2508 on Iran
February 14, 2011
February 14, 2011 | Backgrounder on Iran
Abstract: Iran's theocratic Shia regime has used its oil revenues to export the Islamic revolution and to fund an extensive nuclear weapons program. Yet Iran's energy sector is also its greatest vulnerability, particularly its need to import gasoline to meet domestic demand. The most recent round of U.N. Security Council sanctions and unilateral sanctions by the European Union, Japan, and other countries offer some hope of stopping Iran's nuclear program. The U.S. needs to aggressively enforce its own sanctions and lead efforts to persuade other countries to enforce existing sanctions and to impose their own sanctions.
Iran's Islamist regime has exploited Iran's huge energy resources to fuel a military buildup, develop an extensive nuclear weapons program, maintain itself in power, and export its Shia Islamic revolution. Thus, the Iranian regime has become a major threat to international security and stability.
Yet the future of Iran's energy sector is threatened by economic mismanagement, corruption, inadequate levels of technology, insufficient investment, and rising domestic demand. The regime distorts the domestic energy markets with heavy subsidies of gasoline, natural gas, and other products. In recent years, Iran's oil exports have gradually declined, and sanctions could accelerate this decline. To remain a major energy exporter, Tehran needs massive influxes of oil and gas technology, expertise, and foreign investment. Without these inputs, Iran's oil exports will inexorably fall, further weakening its faltering economy and undermining the unpopular regime's ability to buy off the population with subsidies.
To increase the pressure on Iran to stop developing nuclear weapons and their delivery systems and to open existing nuclear programs to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors, the U.S. should:
Resource Nationalism Meets Islamist Ideology
Iran has been a major oil producer since oil was first discovered in 1908 and is a founding member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). It has consistently taken an anti-market, radical position at the cartel's meetings, demanding production cuts to increase prices as high as possible. However, despite its demands in the cartel, Iran often cheats on its OPEC production quota. For example, in 2009, Iran made only half its promised production cuts in an effort to boost its own oil revenues.[1]
Iran's revolutionary leadership has embraced a radical form of resource nationalism. As the self-proclaimed leader of the Iranian nation and the global Islamic ummah (community), the theocratic regime believes that it alone has the God-given right to decide how to use the oil revenue. Therefore, the regime exploits Iran's oil and gas revenues to enrich itself, maintain its power, and advance its revolutionary Islamist goals, rather than to benefit the Iranian people.[2] This statist economic approach requires an authoritarian control system. Iran is a lower middle-income country, so massive subsidization of the nuclear program would have been impossible without the central control of oil revenues.[3]
Oil: The Islamic Republic's Lifeblood
Iran has an estimated 137.6 billion barrels of oil, about 10 percent of the world's total proven reserves. It ranks third in proven oil reserves after Saudi Arabia and Canada.[4] (See Chart 1.) Iran is the fourth largest exporter of crude oil with 40 oil fields, including 27 onshore, that produce more than 3.68 million barrels per day (bpd) of crude a year.[5]
To fund its nuclear program, support terrorism, and sustain huge economic subsidies, Iran must sell large quantities of oil and gas. Consequently, Tehran has continuously violated OPEC quotas, causing serious concerns after oil prices dropped in July 2008.[6]
However, the country's energy sector is woefully mismanaged. It has not returned to even pre-1979 oil production levels. Production from its onshore oil fields is declining by approximately 8 percent annually, and production from offshore fields is declining by 11 percent annually. These depletion rates could reach 13 percent.[7] Thus, Iran is losing 400,000 bpd to 700,000 bpd annually due to reserve depletion alone. If these trends continue, oil production could drop by 25 percent by 2015. A National Academy of Sciences report suggests that Iranian oil exports could disappear entirely by 2015.[8] These prognoses may explain why the Iranian leadership seems to be prioritizing and intensifying its nuclear program. In coming years, they simply may run out of money.
Natural Gas: Iran's Strategic Energy Reserve
Iran's gas reserves are estimated at more than 29,610 billion cubic meters (bcm), which places Iran second in proven gas reserves after Russia.[9] However, Iran lacks the infrastructure to efficiently extract gas from two-thirds of its natural gas fields and must rely on a complicated system of gas imports and exports.[10] In 2009, Iran produced an estimated 121.0 bcm of natural gas.[11] It plans to increase production by seeking foreign direct investment (FDI) in its natural gas fields.[12]
However, foreign investment in Iranian gas has encountered growing problems because of international sanctions and the leadership's failure to structure the gas sector in a business-friendly way. Western companies are shunning Iranian gas reserves, preferring to work with Russia and Qatar and, of late, to develop shale gas reserves in North America.[13]
Iran's principal trade partners are the EU, China, Japan, India, South Korea, United Arab Emirates, and Russia.[14] Except for Russia, these countries are important markets for Iran's energy exports, but development of Iran's natural gas resources has been severely hamstrung by sanctions, prickly relations with most foreign energy enterprises, and a lack of Iranian expertise and technology.
Iranian gas fields are located primarily in the south, but demand is concentrated in northern and central cities, including Tehran. Because Iran lacks an adequate pipeline network, the country relies on gas imports from its neighbors to fill some of its needs. Thus, Turkmenistan provides 5 percent of Iran's natural gas consumption (about 8 bcm to 9 bcm per year).
Iran also signed an agreement with Azerbaijan, which will supply 0.5 bcm per year beginning in 2010.[15] Iranian government-controlled entities, including Naftiran Intertrade Company (NICO), are major partners in energy projects in Azerbaijan, including in the consortium developing Azerbaijan's Shakh-Deniz gas field.[16] The Iranian Oil Company, a subsidiary of NICO, is an equal partner with BP in the Rhum natural gas project off the coast of Scotland. These commercial ventures give Iran influence over foreign energy resources and potential access to technology and expertise otherwise blocked by U.S. and EU sanctions.[17]
Iran's domestic consumption of natural gas is expected to grow by 7 percent annually for the next decade, so its dependence on imports from Turkmenistan and others will likely increase.[18] At the same time Iran is planning to boost its gas exports by pipeline and as liquefied natural gas (LNG).[19] It sells gas to Turkey via the Eastern Anatolia pipeline, which stretches 926 miles from Doğubayazıt to Ankara through Erzurum, Sivas, and Kayseri.[20] Iran is planning giant LNG developments of the North Pars, South Pars, and other fields in partnership with China. Tehran is also negotiating construction of an Iran–Pakistan–India gas pipeline, which would increase Iran's leverage and influence in South Asia.[21]
Iran's Market-Averse Hydrocarbon Sector
Gross statist mismanagement severely hampered the business environment in Iran by imposing price controls and rationing, breeding corruption, and enforcing excessive regulations. Government-affiliated charities and high-ranking members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps control vast swathes of the economy, including the energy sector.[22] This control is corrupt and inefficient. Iran's oil and gas industries are an energy economist's nightmare.
Despite his campaign promises to stop corruption and improve the business climate, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has helped to increase the politicization and corruption of Iran's hydrocarbon sector. He replaced many skilled technocrats with regime loyalists with little experience.[23] This has made a bad situation worse, much like what Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez has done to PdVSA, Venezuela's previously reasonably managed state-owned oil company.[24] During the first four years of Ahmadinejad's term in office, annual FDI in the energy sector has declined by 64 percent, from $4.2 billion to $1.5 billion—far below what Iran's energy sector needs.[25]
According to official statements, the country will require at least $500 billion in investments in its oil and gas sector over the next 15 years ($33 billion per year), much of which must be FDI.[26] This would be 20 times current investment rates. In today's environment of heightened political risk, corruption, and economic mismanagement, such amounts are simply unrealistic.
The "brain drain" of competent technocrats who have found employment outside of Iran has exacerbated the lack of technical and management skills in the energy industry. It calls into question Iran's future as an oil and gas exporter. Modern technologies are essential to reverse declining production in Iran's older fields and to realize their full potential. Iran's economy, missile and nuclear program, exorbitant military expenditures, and subsidies depend on oil revenue, which accounts for 70 percent of total government revenues.[27]
In August 2010, crude oil prices slid below $80 per barrel, reducing Iran's projected oil revenues, depressing Iran's economic prospects, and exacerbating political tensions within Iranian society and inside the fractious government itself.[28] This is to be expected because the current budget is balanced only when oil is above $80 per barrel.[29]
Mismanaged Domestic Energy Sector. Domestic demand for petroleum has risen steadily. (See Chart 2.) Rising demand is partly due to domestic subsidies that artificially suppress prices. Iran spends $35 billion to $45 billion on fuel subsidies each year, buying regime loyalty with cheap gasoline.[30] Iran imported an estimated 160,000 bpd of gasoline in 2009 because Iran's domestic refining capacity (less than 1.5 million bpd per year) cannot meet domestic demand.[31] As much as one-third of gasoline imports come from Chinese companies.[32]
The most recent round of U.S. and EU sanctions are designed to exploit Iran's dependency on gasoline imports. The U.S. Congress led the way by passing the Comprehensive Iran Accountability, Sanctions and Divestment Act[33] in June 2010, which authorized the Administration to impose sanctions on firms that sell gasoline to Iran. The EU followed suit in July by banning new investment in Iran's energy sector, especially in refining oil into gasoline.[34] Although gasoline imports dropped to 60,000 bpd in June—a 50 percent drop compared to May—the overall effect of sanctions is yet to be determined.[35] There are signs that Iran has embarked on a crash course to eliminate its dependence on gasoline imports. If successful, it will make gasoline sanctions futile. Many experts question Iran's claims that it has reached gasoline self-sufficiency or can do so in the near future. They doubt that Tehran can attract the capital and technology to eliminate its dependence. Recent government plans to eliminate subsidies on gasoline have been repeatedly delayed because the regime fears the potential for significant inflation to further inflame domestic discontent.
While Iran has many sources of resource wealth, the highly corrupt, inefficient, and technologically backward oil and gas sector does not support rapid economic growth. As a result, Iran suffers from widespread unemployment. The official unemployment rate is 14.6 percent, with the unemployment rate among young people between age 15 and 24 approaching 24 percent. However, the real unemployment rate is suspected to be much higher.[36]
The regime's mismanagement of Iran's economy and its proposed sharp reduction in energy subsidies could lead to immense popular pressure for government reform or even regime replacement. Moscow and Beijing, the theocracy's principal allies, are unlikely to welcome such a development.
Iran's Principal Trading Partners
Iran depends on China, Japan, India, Russia, and the European Union for trade and foreign investment to keep its oil and gas production afloat. In particular, it relies on China, Japan, India, and the EU for oil and gas exports, gasoline imports, and infrastructural development. It relies on Russia for nuclear technology, weapons, natural gas investment, and gasoline, at least until Lukoil recently committed to stop selling Iran gasoline.
Japan. Japan has been a leading importer of Iranian oil. In 2009, Japan imported 421,000 bpd from Iran, but 2010 imports will mark a 17-year low in Iranian–Japanese energy trade, particularly because of Japan's active support of the new sanctions against Iran.[37] With its heightened sensitivity to nuclear proliferation issues, Japan is understandably concerned about the Iranian military-focused nuclear program. Reportedly, Japan is considering further unilateral sanctions against Iran.[38] Japan's decision to impose sanctions could particularly influence Iran's policies because Japan maintains a cordial economic and soft-power relationship with Iran.
China. China provides Iran with arms, political support, and much-needed investment and is emerging as Iran's chief trade partner. This support is critical to the regime's security and weakens efforts to isolate the regime.[39] Iran's energy resources are important in diversifying China's energy imports, and Chinese demand for oil and gas is expected to increase in the coming years. Iran also provides China with a unique opportunity to lock in energy supplies in an environment of minimal international competition. As a result, Iran is the fourth-largest recipient of Chinese non-bond investment, trailing only Australia, the U.S., and fellow energy provider Kazakhstan.[40]
Beijing does have concerns about political risk. This is evident in commitments to Iran, which largely take the form of non-binding memoranda of understanding (MOUs). Such MOUs total nearly $80 billion, but only a fraction will likely be realized if Chinese companies fear that these investments could provoke sanctions under U.S. law or if the companies are forced to choose between energy projects in Iran and energy projects in the U.S.[41]
Iran supplied China with more than 23 million metric tons of crude oil in 2009, making it the third-largest supplier of crude oil to China, after Saudi Arabia and Angola and ahead of the Russian Federation. However, import growth fell during 2009, even though the Chinese economy was strengthening. Imports fell by more than 30 percent in the first half of 2010, making Iran the only country to experience declining oil exports to China in 2010.[42] Nevertheless, in July, China and Iran's Oil Ministry announced a $40 billion deal to revamp Iran's petroleum refining industry. The agreement reportedly includes financing construction of a gasoline refinery in southern Iran and overhaul of Iran's Abadan refining facility. China is also negotiating to build a $2 billion railway linking Tehran with the cities of Arak, Malayer, Hamedan, Kermanshah, and Khosravi.[43]
Iran was by far the largest source of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) imports for China in 2009, with imports soaring by more than 150 percent over the previous year and accounting for more than one-fourth of Chinese total LPG imports. Yet LPG shipments plummeted 70 percent in the first half of 2010, relegating Iran to third among Chinese suppliers.
Washington should encourage any drift by Beijing away from Iran toward other energy suppliers, such as Saudi Arabia. Chinese imports of Saudi oil are projected to rise by 19 percent in 2010, and Beijing has already surpassed the U.S. as Saudi Arabia's largest buyer of oil.[44] However, the U.S. government should not hesitate to censure Chinese companies that violate ISA-mandated sanctions.
Russia. Moscow is Tehran's long-standing partner, although a formal alliance has not been consummated. It has provided the regime with sophisticated weapons and nuclear energy technology and expertise. In August, Russian technicians began loading fuel into Bushehr, Iran's first nuclear power plant, violating the spirit of the U.N. sanctions less than two months after the U.N. Security Council passed them.[45]
This is no surprise given that Moscow has long worked to block or dilute sanctions against Iran. Moscow also ensured that its oil, gas, and weapons business ties were excluded from the latest U.N. sanctions, despite President Obama's "reset" policy of cooperation with Moscow. Only a month after the Washington summit between Obama and President Dmitry Medvedev, Russian Energy Minister Sergei Shmatko and his Iranian counterpart established a roadmap for increased Russian–Iranian energy cooperation.[46]
By developing massive oil and gas projects in Iran, Russia hopes to preempt the West and China in gaining access to Iran's huge hydrocarbon reserves, enhance its energy superpower status, and control gas projects and pipelines in Eurasia.[47] Gazprom, Russia's gas giant, announced in June 2008 that it would invest more than $200 million in building an Iranian–Armenian pipeline. In early August 2010, Moscow restarted gasoline exports to Iran with a shipment of 250,000 barrels.[48] On the plus side, Lukoil has publicly committed to stop selling gasoline to Iran.
President Medvedev's decree canceling the sale of the S-300 surface-to-air missile system to Iran is a positive development, provided a third party, such as Venezuela, is not allowed to act as a proxy to acquire the missile system for Iran. Moscow has often used the S-300 as a bargaining chip in its relations with the United States and Israel to extract concessions and to obtain military technology sales from Israel.
Russia and China are two of the weakest links in the Iran energy sanctions regime. Persuading Moscow and Beijing to join in applying economic pressure on Tehran will require U.S. leadership by example, support of European allies, skillful application of diplomatic pressure from the U.S. and the EU, and a combination of carrots and sticks.
The European Union. In 2009, the EU was Iran's most important trading partner, accounting for 20.8 percent of Iran's foreign trade. The EU's major trading partner is the United States, which accounts for 15.9 percent of total EU trade. Iran ranks 27th, accounting for only 0.8 percent of EU trade.[49] This gives the United States significant leverage to compel the EU to follow the U.S. approach to sanctions by targeting oil and gas, related technologies, and financial sectors.
Energy and mining products comprise more than 90 percent of EU imports from Iran. In exchange, the EU exports machinery and transportation equipment.[50] Italy, Spain, and Greece have been major recipients of Iranian oil.[51] However, under international pressure from the fourth round of Security Council sanctions and the U.S. and EU energy sanctions, major European companies—including Glencore, Vitol, Royal Dutch Shell, BP, Eni, and Total— have announced that they will not expand their businesses in Iran and will fulfill only obligations stemming from past contracts.[52] In October, the EU imposed restrictions on the sale of technology and equipment to Iran's oil and gas industries and prohibited investment in those sectors.[53] This unified front is an important step forward in applying economic pressure on the Iranian nuclear program, but much more will need to be done.
India. India is the third largest importer of Iranian oil after Japan and China, but Reliance Industries, its largest private oil company, recently decided to stop importing Iranian oil (about 90,000 bpd per year) and halted exports of refined products (e.g., gasoline) to Iran because of new U.S. sanctions.[54] This suggests that India is hedging its bets on Iranian oil and is growing more cautious about relying on Iran to meet its future energy needs.
India's energy consumption and its dependence on oil and gas imports are expected to skyrocket by 2025.[55] India views anti-Iranian sanctions as an obstacle to meeting its future energy requirements[56] and thus has been reluctant to endorse U.N. sanctions on Iran.[57] Under U.S. pressure, however, India voted against Iran at IAEA meetings in 2005 and 2006.[58] India has also backed away from plans for an energy partnership with Pakistan and Iran to build the proposed Iran–Pakistan–India pipeline system, primarily because of uncertain relations with Pakistan.
The United States and India have long differed in their approaches to Iran, given India's interest in cooperating with Iran in Afghanistan, its desire to drive a wedge between Tehran and Islamabad, and its long-term energy requirements. Yet as U.S.–Indian ties deepen and as Iran becomes more isolated internationally, New Delhi may slightly recalibrate its relations with Tehran. India will constantly balance U.S. pressure to isolate Iran with its own regional security interests, which will likely involve maintaining cordial relations with Iran to hedge against Pakistan and China, India's long-time regional rivals.
If the EU, India, and Japan scale down their involvement in Iran's energy markets, that would increase pressure on the theocratic regime. It would serve Western interests well if Europe and the United States were to find the political will to enforce their unilateral, stringent sanctions regimes and to encourage India and Japan to do the same.
Sanctions Regimes
Sanctions have been the international community's most important tool in disrupting the Iranian nuclear weapons program. According to some reports, the mere threat of additional sanctions has caused investors to shy away from Iran.[59] The U.S. State Department estimates that sanctions have contributed to the termination of $50 billion to $60 billion in upstream energy investments; a 90 percent drop in gasoline sales between August 2010 and August 2011; suspensions of billion-dollar LNG projects; and scores of energy companies, gasoline traders, insurance companies, shipping companies, and banks cutting their ties to Iran or committing to do so.[60]
U.S. Sanctions. In August 1996, Congress enacted the Iran–Libya Sanctions Act to punish Iran and Libya for supporting terrorism and attempting to build weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). The law gave the executive branch authority to impose sanctions on foreign entities that invested in Iran's oil and gas sectors. After Libya renounced terrorism and abandoned its WMD programs, the law was renamed the Iran Sanctions Act (ISA). The ISA remains a key U.S. tool for reducing Iran's ability to fund WMD development and to support international terrorism.
The law gives the President the authority to impose sanctions on any company, organization, or person that invests $20 million or more in one year in Iran's energy sector or sells WMD technology or "destabilizing numbers and types" of advanced conventional weapons to Iran. Construction of energy transit routes, such as pipelines or terminals for oil or LNG, is also subject to these sanctions.
In 2010, Congress passed the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act (CISADA).[61] It requires the President to investigate and make determinations on investments in Iran's energy sector, and it increased the penalties for making such investments in violation of U.S. law. It imposed penalties on companies that provide refined petroleum products to Iran and mandates that companies seeking U.S. government contracts must certify that they are not engaging in sanctionable activities. CISADA also supports divestment from companies investing in the Iranian energy sector, penalizes Iranian officials that abuse human rights, and codifies and expands the ban on imports from Iran. The legislation prohibits licensing exports of nuclear goods, services, or technology to countries helping Iran acquire a nuclear weapons capability. It also prohibits U.S. contracts with companies providing the Iranian regime with sensitive communications technology to suppress freedom of speech.
Additionally, the U.S. Treasury Department is taking various targeted financial measures to track financial flows in an effort to target proliferation and Iran's support for terrorist networks and to discourage investment in Iran's energy sector and other projects in Iran.[62]
The State Department and the Treasury Department are working together to target and isolate the IRGC,[63] which forms the security backbone of the regime. It has amassed growing political, military, and economic power, and its affiliates have gained control over vast swathes of the economy, particularly since the rise of Ahmadinejad, a former IRGC member.[64]
However, U.S. enforcement problems remain unaddressed. For example, previous Administrations never used the 1996 Iran–Libya Sanctions Act to punish companies that collaborated with those regimes. Its successor, the Iran Sanctions Act, has been triggered only once, when the State Department announced on September 30 that it was imposing sanctions on the Switzerland-based Naftiran Intertrade Company for its involvement in Iran's energy sector. However, a March 2010 report from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that 41 firms engaged in commercial activity in Iran's energy sector between 2005 and 2009.[65] A recent GAO study identified 16 firms that sold petroleum products to Iran between January 1, 2009, and June 30, 2010. Five of these firms showed no signs of curbing their sales to Iran: Three are based in China, one is in Singapore, and one is in the United Arab Emirates.[66] These firms seem obvious candidates for CISADA sanctions, but the State Department appears to be in no hurry to enforce this law.
The U.S. Congress remains a leader in passing Iran sanctions legislation, but the executive branch has not always followed Congress's lead and too often has shirked its enforcement duties.[67] It is time for the executive branch to fully implement the stringent sanctions imposed by CISADA.
U.N. Sanctions: Small Steps in the Right Direction. Iran has failed to fulfill its obligations under its nuclear safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Accordingly, the IAEA referred the matter to the Security Council in February 2006,[68] which imposed sanctions on Iran in December 2006.[69] The Security Council augmented the sanctions in March 2007 and again in March 2008.[70] On June 9, 2010, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1929, which broadened the previous restrictions and imposed additional restrictions on Iran. It added to the list of banned technologies related to ballistic missiles and WMDs, established a new inspection regime for suspicious cargoes bound for Iran, restricted the operations of Iran's shipping and air cargo carriers, prohibited transactions with Iranian banks that facilitated proliferation activities, added to the list of Iranian officials and companies subject to asset freezes and travel bans, and targeted the IRGC and its affiliated companies for asset freezes.
However, Russia and China took the lead in watering down the sanctions. The sanctions do not target "defensive" weapons sales, such as S-300 anti-aircraft missiles; financial transactions; or energy-sector dealings, such as the nuclear power reactor in Bushehr. Thus, experts question the effectiveness of U.N. sanctions.[71]
Despite these weaknesses, Resolution 1929 established for the first time the nexus between Iran's energy sector and petrochemical industry and its proliferation activities. This provided an international justification for individual countries to impose energy sanctions, which the U.S., the 27 EU members, Canada, Australia, Japan, and South Korea have since done.
EU Sanctions. The EU has been a vital partner of the Iranian economy and regime, and European countries have pressed the U.S. government to issue sanctions waivers for their companies on multiple occasions. However, the EU has gradually hardened its attitude toward Iran's nuclear proliferation activities, and in July, it imposed new punitive measures that exceeded the U.N. sanctions. The most important are a ban on new investments in Iran's oil and gas industry; prohibitions against the transfer of energy technology and technical expertise, including critical LNG technology; restrictions on dealings with the IRGC; limitations on the financial sector; and prohibitions against insuring Iranian shipping.
Reducing Dependence on Iranian Oil Exports
The EU, India, Japan, and China will be reluctant to reduce their imports of Iranian oil unless they have satisfactory alternative sources of oil and gas. As a world leader, the United States should help them find alternative sources of oil and gas for their energy-hungry economies. For example, Washington can use its clout with the Arab oil-exporting states of the Persian Gulf, which fear Iran's rising power, to provide additional oil exports to Iran's principal oil consumers so that they can wean themselves away from Iran's oil exports.
India and China may be persuaded to buy more oil from more economically reliable and politically amenable trading partners, such as Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. China's increased oil imports from Saudi Arabia are a welcome development in this regard. Asian countries—including China, Japan, India, and South Korea—already buy 50 percent of Saudi oil exports.[72] In the meantime, EU members have expanded their energy trade with Russia and the Caspian Basin countries. Civilian nuclear energy programs, particularly in India, could also reduce their dependence on Iranian oil.[73]
Protecting America's Allies and Expanding Sanctions
To compel Iran to stop developing nuclear weapons and the associated delivery systems and to fully open the nuclear program to IAEA inspectors, the United States needs to lead a broad international coalition to ratchet up targeted sanctions against Iran's oil and gas sector and key Iranian institutions involved in controlling, financing, and procuring technology and materials for the nuclear program. The U.S. should pursue a multilayered strategy to deter foreign companies from investing in Iran's hydrocarbon and related sectors; engage and coordinate measures to reduce Iran's oil and gas exports; block imports of refined product; disrupt imports of oil and gas extraction and transportation technologies; and pressure Iran directly using the full set of U.S. financial tools.
Specifically, the U.S. should:
Although the latest round of international sanctions are beginning to bite, experts generally agree that sanctions alone are unlikely to stop Iran's nuclear weapons program.[76] Sanctions take time to work, but Iran is rapidly nearing a nuclear weapons capability. CIA Director Leon Panetta noted on June 27: "We think [the Iranians] have enough low-enriched uranium right now for two weapons. They do have to enrich it, fully, in order to get there."
The latest round of U.N., U.S., and EU sanctions have yielded some visible achievements. Several of Iran's foreign partners—including Total, Glencore, and Royal Dutch Shell—have stopped sales of gasoline to Iran. Sanctions induced Vitol and Trafigura of Switzerland to terminate their participation in some of the significant modernization projects in Iran's energy sector.[77] Four major insurance companies have announced that they will stop or reduce underwriting of Iran's gasoline trade.[78]
However, given that sanctions alone may not work, a credible threat of the use of force is needed as well as efforts to support opposition and civil society in Iran. The Iranian nuclear program can only be stopped if the U.S. implements a comprehensive policy supported by allies. The U.S. government has a limited timeframe to disrupt Iran's nuclear program with sanctions before it must consider military options. Iran's mismanagement of energy assets, the need to import gasoline, and its dependence on FDI for infrastructure development are vulnerabilitiess of the theocratic regime. The Obama Administration needs to fully exploit these weaknesses, and Congress should encourage the Administration to do so.
These structural weaknesses and the popular discontent that may result from the sanctions might force the current government to change its nuclear policy or lead to an overthrow of the regime. Such an outcome could lead a successor regime to dismantle Iran's nuclear weapons program to escape from the debilitating sanctions. While this outcome is not likely yet, a robust, disciplined, and broad international sanctions regime, if successful, may allay the need for military action.
—Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., is Senior Research Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Energy Policy, James Phillips is Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs, and Owen Graham is Research and Operations Coordinator in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation.
Show references in this report
[1]Steven Mufson, "OPEC to Maintain Oil Output, Urges Nations to Meet Quotas," The Washington Post, March 16, 2009, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/15/AR2009031500401.html (September 7, 2010).
[2]Matthew Levitt, "Why the Iran Sanctions Matter," Foreign Policy, June 11, 2010, at http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC06.php?CID=1476 (Sept. 13, 2010).
[3]The World Bank, Data by Country: Iran, at http://data.worldbank.org/country/iran-islamic-republic (September 7, 2010).
[4]U.S. Energy Information Administration, "Iran," Country Analysis Brief, January 2010, at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Iran/Oil.html (August 17, 2010).
[5]Business Monitor International, "Iran Oil and Gas Report," July 1, 2010, p. 12.
[6]Omar Hasan, "OPEC's Gulf Arab Members Seen to Seek Quota Compliance," The China Post, March 16, 2010, at http://www.chinapost.com.tw/commentary/afp/2010/03/16/248487/OPECs-Gulf.htm (November 16, 2010).
[7]U.S. Energy Information Administration, "Iran."
[8]"Iran Crisis: Aging Oil Infrastructure Could Cripple Its Economy," World Tribune, December 12, 2008, at http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/WTARC/2008/me_oil0785_12_12.asp (August 4, 2010), and Roger Stern, "The Iranian Petroleum Crisis and United States National Security," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, Vol. 104, No. 1 (January 2, 2007), pp. 377–382, at http://www.pnas.org/cgi/reprint/0603903104v1 (August 18, 2010).
[9]Business Monitor International, "Iran Oil and Gas Report," p. 39.
[10]Robert E. Ebel, "Geopolitics of the Iranian Nuclear Energy Program: But Oil and Gas Still Matter," Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 2010, p. 41, at http://csis.org/publication/geopolitics-iranian-nuclear-energy-program (August 9, 2010).
[11]Business Monitor International, "Iran Oil and Gas Report," p. 26.
[12]U.S. Energy Information Administration, "Iran."
[13]Amy Myers Jaffe, "Shale Gas Will Rock the World," The Wall Street Journal, May 10, 2010, at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303491304575187880596301668.html (September 9, 2010).
[14]European Commission, "Iran: EU Bilateral Trade and Trade with the World," September 15, 2010, at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113392.pdf (December 1, 2010).
[15]Business Monitor International, "Iran Oil and Gas Report," p. 42.
[16]The consortium includes Statoil (Norway), BP (U.K.), Lukoil (Russia), Total (France), the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan, and National Oil and Gas Company (Turkey).
[17]Mark Dubowitz, "Will Obama Follow Through on Iran Sanctions?" The Weekly Standard, October 4, 2010, at http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/will-obama-follow-through-iran-sanctions (November 16, 2010).
[18]U.S. Energy Information Administration, "Iran."
[19]Mark Dubowitz and Benjamin Weinthal, "Iran's European Helpers," The Wall Street Journal, September 29, 2010, at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704116004575522090774268372.html (October 21, 2010).
[20]ILF Consulting Engineers, "Caspian/Iraq Export Pipelines," Middle East Economic Survey, Vol. 69, No 52 (December 25, 2006), at http://www.mees.com/postedarticles/oped/v49n52-5OD02.htm (Sept. 13, 2010).
[21]Ariel Cohen, Lisa Curtis, and Owen Graham, "The Proposed Iran–Pakistan–India Gas Pipeline: An Unacceptable Risk to Regional Security," Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 2139, May 30, 2008, at http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2008/05/the-proposed-iran-pakistan-india-gas-pipeline-an-unacceptable-risk-to-regional-security.
[22]Economist Intelligence Unit, "Country Report Iran," April 2010, p. 8.
[23]Ali Sheikholeslami and Ladane Nasseri, "Iran's Mir-Kazemi Wins Parliamentary Approval as Oil Minister," Bloomberg, September 3, 2009, at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aJcm407bVrpU (August 10, 2010); Economist Intelligence Unit, "Country Report Iran," p. 7; Mark Dubowitz and Laura Grossman, "Iran's Energy Partners: Companies Requiring Investigation Under U.S. Sanctions Law," Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, August 2010, p. 4, at http://www.iranenergyproject.org/documents/1323.pdf (August 9, 2010); and Daniel Brumberg and Ariel I. Ahram, "The National Iranian Oil Company in Iranian Politics," Rice University, James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, March 2007, at http://www.rice.edu/energy/publications/docs/NOCs/Papers/NOC_NIOC_Brumberg-Ahram.pdf (August 10, 2010).
[24]Gustavo Coronel, "Corruption, Mismanagement, and Abuse of Power in Hugo Chávez's Venezuela," Cato Institute Development Policy Analysis No. 2, November 27, 2010, at http://www.cato.org/pubs/dpa/dpa2.pdf (September 7, 2010).
[25]Mark Dubowitz, "Beyond Gasoline: Slamming the Door on the Iranian Regime's Access to Energy Expertise," Atlantic Council, July 6, 2010, at http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/beyond-gasoline-slamming-door-iranian-regimes-access-energy-expertise (September 9, 2010).
[26]Economist Intelligent Unit, "Country Report Iran," p. 12.
[27]U.S. Energy Information Administration, "Iran."
[28]Jerry DiColo, "Oil Futures: Crude Falls Below $80/Bbl Ahead of Fed Meeting," The Wall Street Journal, August 10, 2010.
[29]Lesley Wroughton, "Sanctions Hurting Iran Economic Activity, Says IMF," Reuters, August 15, 2008, at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN1444053420080815 (September 7, 2010).
[30]Roshanak Taghavi, "Why Iran's Ahmadinejad Is Pushing to Cut Popular Government Subsidies," The Christian Science Monitor, April 30, 2010, at http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2010/0430/Why-Iran-s-Ahmadinejad-is-pushing-to-cut-popular-government-subsidies (August 9, 2010).
[31]Ebel, "Geopolitics of the Iranian Nuclear Energy Program," p. 39.
[32]Joseph A. Christoff, "Iran Sanctions: Firms Reported to Have Commercial Activity in the Iranian Energy Sector and U.S. Government Contracts," testimony before the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, U.S. Senate, May 12, 2010, at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10721t.pdf (August 9, 2010).
[33]Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, Public Law 111–195.
[34]Stephen Castle, "Europe Imposes New Sanctions on Iran," The New York Times, July 26, 2010, at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/27/world/middleeast/27iran.html (November 16, 2010).
[35]Ali Sheikholeslami, Anthony DiPaola, and Alaric Nightingale, "Iran Sanctions Leave China, Russia as Winners in Trade," Bloomberg, August 9, 2010, at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-08-08/china-embracing-iran-raises-reliance-ship-costs-as-un-sanctions-take-toll.html (September 9, 2010).
[36]Mehr News Agency, "Unemployment Rate Hits 14.6% in Iran," August 9, 2010, at http://www.mehrnews.com/en/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=1130987 (August 9, 2010), and "Are Iran's Leaders Hiding a Severe Economic Downturn," Time, March 3, 2010, at http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1969390,00.html (August 4, 2010).
[37]Amena Bakr, "Japan to Decide on Reducing Iran Oil Imports," Yahoo Maktoob, August 10, 2010, at http://www.business.maktoob.com/20090000505868/Japan_to_decide_on_reducing_Iran_oil_imports/Article.htm (August 18, 2010); Reuters, "Japan's 2010 Iran Crude Imports Set to Hit 17-yr Low," March 30, 2010, at http://in.reuters.com/article/idINTOE62P01E20100330 (August 18, 2010); and Agence France-Presse, "Japan Approves UN Sanctions on Iran," Hindustan Times, August 3, 2010, at http://www.hindustantimes.com/Japan-approves-UN-sanctions-on-Iran/Article1-581649.aspx (August 18, 2010).
[38]TradingCharts.com, "Japan to Slap Extra Sanctions on Iran over Nuke Development," August 3, 2010.
[39]John Keefer Douglas, Matthew B. Nelson, and Kevin Schwartz, "Fueling the Dragon's Flame: How China's Energy Demands Affect Its Relationships in the Middle East," U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission, September 14, 2006, p. 10, at http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2006/China_ME_FINAL.pdf (August 11, 2010).
[40]Derek Scissors, "China Global Investment Tracker: 2010," Heritage Foundation White Paper, updated July 7, 2010, at http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/02/china-global-investment-tracker-2010.
[41]Erica Downs, in "China and the Persian Gulf," panel discussion, video file, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, July 12, 2010, at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1426&fuseaction=topics.event_summary&event_id=609102 (August 12, 2010).
[42]"China Invests $40bn in Iran Oil and Gas Sector," Gulf Daily News, August 1, 2010, at http://www.gulf-daily-news.com/NewsDetails.aspx?storyid=283696 (August 12, 2010).
[43]Ilan Berman, "The Chinese Moment in Iran," Forbes, September 16, 2010, at http://blogs.forbes.com/ilanberman/2010/09/16/ the-chinese-moment-in-iran (September 17, 2010).
[44]Glen Carey, "Chinese Imports of Saudi Oil Will Rise 19% This Year to 50 Million Tons," Bloomberg, September 29, 2010, at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/print/2010-09-29/chinese-imports-of-saudi-oil-will-rise-19-this-year-to-50-million-tons.html (October 20, 2010).
[45]Ariel Cohen, "Fueling Bushehr: Did Russia Light Iran's Nuclear Fuse?" The Foundry, August 17, 2010, at http://blog.heritage.org/2010/08/17/fueling-bushehr-did-russia-light-iran%E2%80%99s-nuclear-fuse (August 18, 2010).
[46]Alexei Danichev, "Iran and Russia to Discuss Road Map for Energy Cooperation," RIA Novosti, December 7, 2010, at http://en.rian.ru/business/20100712/159773157.html (August 18, 2010).
[47]Ariel Cohen, "Russia's Iran Policy: A Curveball for Obama," Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 2359, January 15, 2010, at http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/01/Russias-Iran-Policy-A-Curveball-for-Obama.
[48]Luke Pachymuthu and Vladimir Soldatkin, "Russia's LUKOIL Resumes Gasoline Supply to Iran—Trade," Reuters, August 11, 2010, at http://af.reuters.com/article/energyOilNews/idAFLDE67A17G20100811 (August 18, 2010).
[49]European Commission, "Iran," July 19, 2010.
[50] Ibid.
[51]U.S. Energy Information Administration, "Iran."
[52]Stanley Carvalho, "Western Oil Firms Stop Business with Iran," Reuters, June 28, 2010, at http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKDAH85080620100628 (August 18, 2010).
[53]Thomas Erdbrink and Glenn Kessler, "E.U. Rules Let Iran Import, Export Oil, Gas," The Washington Post, October 28, 2010, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/10/27/AR2010102707782.html (November 9, 2010).
[54]"Iran's Oil Export Drops by 378,000 Barrels a Day," Khabar Online, April 15, 2010, at http://www.khabaronline.ir/news-55090.aspx (August 13, 2010).
[55]Kari Lipschutz, "Global Insider: Iran–India Energy Relations," World Politics Review, June 8, 2010.
[56]Sandeep Dikshit, "Unilateral Sanctions on Iran Will Hurt India: Nirupama Rao," The Hindu, July 2006, at http://www.thehindu.com/news/article501752.ece (September 13, 2010).
[57]Jayanth Jacob, "India Against Iran Sanctions," Hindustan Times, April 12, 2010, at http://www.hindustantimes.com/India-against-Iran-sanctions/Article1-530143.aspx (Sept. 13, 2010).
[58]Lisa Curtis, "Building a Strategic Partnership: U.S.–India Relations in the Wake of Mumbai," testimony before the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, February 26, 2009, at http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/111/cur022609.pdf (November 16, 2010).
[59]Dubowitz and Grossman, "Iran's Energy Partners," p. 4.
[60]Mark Dubowitz and Laura Grossman, "Iran's Chinese Energy Partners: Companies Eligible for Investigation Under U.S. Sanctions Law," Foundation for Defense of Democracies, September 2010, p. 3, at http://www.iranenergyproject.org/ documents/1674.pdf (October 19, 2010).
[61]"Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010," The Library of Congress, Thomas, CRS Summary, at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:HR02194:@@@D&summ2=m& (January 10, 2010).
[62]Kenneth Katzman, "Iran Sanctions," Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, December 13, 2010, pp. 32–33, at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS20871.pdf (August 18, 2010).
[63]Press release, "Treasury Targets Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps," U.S. Department of the Treasury, February 10, 2010, at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tg539.htm (September 9, 2010).
[64]Jim Dexter, "CNN Fact Check: Iran's Revolutionary Guard," CNN, February 15, 2010, at http://articles.cnn.com/2010-02-15/world/fact.check.iran.guard_1_irgc-iranian-president-mahmoud-ahmadinejad-rand-corporation2010-02-15/world/fact.check.iran.guard_1_irgc-iranian-president-mahmoud-ahmadinejad-rand-corporation (September 9, 2010).
[65]Joseph A. Christoff, "Firms Reported in Open Sources as Having Commercial Activity in Iran's Oil, Gas, and Petrochemical Sectors," U.S. Government Accountability Office, March 23, 2010, at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10515r.pdf (November 16, 2010).
[66]Joseph A. Christoff, "Firms Reported in Open Sources to Have Sold Iran Refined Petroleum Products Between January 1, 2009, and June 30, 2010," U.S. Government Accountability Office, September 3, 2010, at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/files/fp_uploaded_documents/101005_d10967R.pdf (November 16, 2010).
[67]Katzman, "Iran Sanctions," pp. 5–6.
[68]International Atomic Energy Agency, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran," February 4, 2006, at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2006/gov2006-14.pdf (August 10, 2010).
[69]Press release, "Security Council Imposes Sanctions on Iran for Failure to Halt Uranium Enrichment, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 1737 (2006)," U.N. Department of Public Information, December 23, 2006, at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8928.doc.htm (August 10, 2010).
[70]U.N. Security Council, "Resolution 1747 (2007)," S/RES/1747, March 24, 2007, at http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/unsc_res1747-2007.pdf (August 10, 2010), and "Resolution 1803 (2008)," S/RES/1803, March 3, 2008, at http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/unsc_res1803-2008.pdf (August 10, 2010).
[71]James Phillips, "Iran Economic Sanctions at the U.N. Security Council: The Incredible Shrinking Resolution," Heritage Foundation WebMemo No. 2853, April 2, 2010, at http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/04/iran-economic-sanctions-at-the-un-security-council-the-incredible-shrinking-resolution. Russia unilaterally cancelled the S-300 sale and returned the downpayment to Iran.
[72]U.S. Energy Information Administration, "Saudi Arabia," Country Analysis Brief, updated November 2009, p. 6, at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Saudi_Arabia/pdf.pdf (September 13, 2010).
[73]Ashley Tellis, "U.S.–India Civil Nuclear Accord: An 'Epochal' Agreement," interview by Bernard Gwertzman, Council on Foreign Relations, October 10, 2008, at http://www.cfr.org/publication/17498/usindia_civil_nuclear_accord.html (September 13, 2010).
[74]Joe Parkinson, "Turkey Aims to Triple Iran Trade, Despite International Sanctions," The Wall Street Journal, September 17, 2010, at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703440604575496031866586468.html (November 16, 2010).
[75]Bloomberg, "Turkish Gasoline Sales to Iran Soared Amid New Sanctions," Hurriyet Daily News and Economic Review, August 11, 2010, at http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=turkish-gasoline-sales-to-iran-soared-amid-new-un-sanctions-2010-08-11 (September 17, 2010).
[76]Katzman, "Iran Sanctions," p. 47.
[77] Ibid., p. 13.
[78]Dubowitz and Grossman, "Iran's Energy Partners," p. 5.


text:
Jonathan Cebra serves as Public Diplomacy Officer for the Regional Reconstruction Team in Erbil, Iraq.
Last week, my boss was one of the few American diplomats in Iraq asked to set off an explosion. We were working with a group called the Mines Advisory Group (MAG) – which as the name suggests is involved in de-mining operations in a number of countries. Here in Iraq, MAG's activities also include disposing of small arms and light munitions. MAG's operations in the Sulaimaniyah area (where the demolition took place) are funded by the Department of State's Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement. You can read MAG's description here.
Unfortunately there are a lot of abandoned munitions all around the country which creates a variety of problems: munitions can explode accidentally; abandoned munitions are also a source of explosive materials that can be used to make IEDs. The weapons and munitions that we destroyed came from a junk yard south of the city of Sulaimaniyah. The junk yard included non-military scrap metal along with an old tank several pieces of artillery, mortar rounds, and tank ammunition. The junk yard was next to a school, neighborhood children had been passing through on their way to and from school until a member of the community reported the site to MAG. Apparently, one of the curious children had taken a mortar round home and put it in a fire to see what would happen – there weren't any serious injuries, but it did explode. The experts also showed us one mortar shell which had been unscrewed to remove the explosives and another which had had copper portions of the casing removed. Copper has good resale value, but is it worth that risk?
After touring the site where the munitions were being collected – including anything found within the last couple days, we went up a bit into the mountains to the demolition site. At the demolition site, MAG had buried 1.7 tons of munitions recovered during the previous two weeks in a small valley surrounded by hills on all sides in order to minimize any peripheral damage that the blast might cause.
The folks at MAG know much more about safely destroying weapons than we diplomats do, but our value added was in raising awareness of MAG's activities within the community. As the MAG country director explained, most minefields in Iraq are marked and people know where they are, but weapons caches are scattered around the country. In some cases they may have been deliberately hidden, in others, like this site, simply abandoned. Either way, MAG relies heavily on the local community to alert them to the existence of such sites. Community liaison is an important element of their work, and MAG has been running a public information campaign to encourage people to contact them; by bringing in television cameras and newspaper reporters we helped MAG to publicize their activities and encourage citizens to report other caches.
Ronald in New York writes:
The elimination of mines is a good thing. How about making their sources transparent before you blow them up? This would name and shame the purveyors of death in the world's most vulnerable regions. There are literally hundreds of millions of small arms, light weapons, and ordnance of all manner and devastating shape being shipped around the globe. Licit and illicit. conventional and non-conventional...just think of the monetary value of the products of war...trillions....just consider the value of human life in the face of these weapons...less-than-zero...
Why wouldn't a poor Iraqi risk life and limb for the few dollars paid for a piece of copper....Why can't a sane economy be created without WMD?....It is just bizarre to think that the USG makes the weapons, tracks them, funds their dismantling, and promotes their removal by explosion.
I still don't get it.
Ronald in New York writes:
Cache in...cache out....
OK...removing dangerous munitions is good. How about making their sources known and tracking back to the suppliers for punitive damages? How about not creating these deadly weapons by the millions to begin with. How about creating new economies so people don't have to risk life and limb to peel off a bit of copper to sell to live?
The USG is making, selling, dumping, and doing PR on the elimination of WMD's all around the globe...what a stupid and costly game.
Sorry, even with the picture of the exploding munitions...no sale.
Zharkov in U.S.A. writes:
Eliminating land mines in Iraq is wonderfully altruistic, if not heroic work, but where are the Iraqi soldiers who should be training to do this work?
As in the Vietnam War, Americans seem to have to do everything in Iraq. Are there no Iraqi people willing to learn to use a mine detector and a shovel?
There is an old saying about teaching a man how to fish rather than just giving him a fish dinner. It's got a lot of wisdom packed into a few words. I recommend someone look it up sometime, because Iraq will eventually have to take care of itself, maybe in 100 years or so, if the U.S. government lasts that long.


text:
William J. "Billy" Lynch Jr., age 66, longtime Ridgway resident, died unexpectedly on Sunday, Aug. 17, 2014.
Billy as most knew him was born on the family farm in the area known as the Bottoms on May 27, 1948, to the late Bill and Anna Mae (McGhee) Lynch. Billy married Lois (Rider) on March 29, 1975.
Billy retired from the Village of Ridgway after 32 years working on the Street and Water Department. He loved the outdoors, especially camping and fishing. His real love was his family especially his grandchildren. Billy was a member of the First Baptist Church in Ridgway. He was a good husband, father, grandfather and friend and will be missed.
Billy is survived by his wife, Lois of Ridgway; along with a son, Kelly Lynch of Shawneetown; and two daughters, Shelly and Ernie Rigdon and Rachel Lynch, all of Ridgway. He is also survived by grandchildren, Caitlyn Lynch, Gabrielle Rider (Jared Combs), Joseph Rider and Samantha Lynch (Joseph Flahardy); and one great-grandchild, Jayce Combs.
He was preceded in death by his parents; a son, Brian Joseph; a granddaughter, Jennifer Weiland; and a sister, Linda Dale.
Visitation for Billy will be 11 a.m. to 1 p.m. Thursday, Aug. 21, 2014, at the Cox & Son Funeral Home in Ridgway. His funeral service will follow starting at 1 p.m. at the funeral home with the Rev. John Wright officiating. Interment will be in the Westwood Cemetery in Shawneetown.
You may leave a note of comfort to the family at www.coxandson.com.
Location, ST | website.com


text:
Jaime Hernandez:
The 1970-D Roosevelt Dime is a very common issue that can still be found in circulation. Examples in low Uncirculated grades can probably also still be found in circulation with proper searching. Only in MS66 condition and higher does it become somewhat challenging to locate. However, there are still probably thousands of examples that survive in MS66 condition. In MS67 it is difficult to find with possibly hundreds in existence. In MS68 it almost unheard of with less than dozen known. With Full Bands it is very scarce in any condition and any examples displaying Full Bands is a diamond in the rough.


text:
Political ideologies of social workers: An under explored dimension of practice
This article explores relationships between social workers' political ideologies and the effects on practice. Self-administered surveys from 294 licensed social workers in a mid-Atlantic state generated quantitative and qualitative data on whether and to what extent their ideologies influenced professional practice. Findings suggest that while social workers largely believe that their political ideology is separate from their practice, those who identified with more liberal political ideologies claim they used their ideologies more in practice than those who were more conservative. Additionally, strategies for monitoring political ideology in practice are shared. Implications for practice include the need for practitioners' increased awareness of their political ideologies and the profession's responsibility for establishing venues in which the ideology -- practice link can be explored and debated.
Political ideology; Political diversity; Practice
Full Text:PDF
Copyright (c)
Indiana University School of Social Work
902 West New York Street
Indianapolis, Indiana, USA, 46202
Voice: 317.274.6705
Indiana University - Quality Education. Lifetime Opportunities.
Last updated: November 20, 2007
Comments: email@example.com
Copyright 2007, The Trustees of Indiana University
Content ©2007 IUSSW


text:
Just Brilliant:The Works of Doctor Illingsworth
My fried Doc Illingworth, man so much I can say about the guy. Whether its video clips or tunes, he makes good stuff. How great is the homie well, yesterday he posted probably one of the greatest Facebook statuses, I have ever read.
So, There's been these posts that start something to the effect of this
"In response to the new facebook guidlines…"
I'm sure, you've seen it.
People post them under the notion that it protects the use of anything you post share photos etc anything, you share on facebook without your consent. Not gonna lie I've re-posted these myself on some better safe than sorry blindly doing so nonetheless.
Doc's take on the whole thing was probably was one of the smartest downright funny things I have ever read. Without further due a few words from my friend…
The funny was brought.
As a bonus
here's a sampling of that music of his i mentioned earlier.
follow him here
Doc on the Facebooks
props to my buddy.
Just Brilliant.
you can find both of us here on this Friday Nov. 30th here Old miam fun rap times.


text:
Seagate Technologies, the company that ships most enterprise-class hard disk drives (SEDs), on Monday said that shipments of its self-encrypting drives (SEDs) have exceeded one millions of units. The company intends to greatly expand its lineup of SEDs as it believed that the demand for such drives will grow fast.
Seagate shipped its first self-encrypting drive back in 2005 and for several years was the only supplier of SEDs in the world. SEDs keep all security keys and cryptographic operations within the drive, separating them from the operating system to provide greater protection against hacking and tampering than traditional software alternatives, which can give thieves backdoor access to encryption keys and are otherwise more vulnerable to key theft. As a consequence, despite of the fact that encryption brings loads of benefits for many users who require security, those drives were not installed by many computer makers because they wanted them to come from several manufacturers. Besides, governmental organizations wanted SEDs to pass certain tests before adopting them. All in all, it took Seagate more than five years to ship over a million of drives. But from this point, the company believes, that the popularity of SEDs will grow faster than before.
Six original equipment manufacturers – Dell, Fujitsu, Hitachi, IBM, LSI and Network Appliance – now offer products powered by Seagate enterprise self-encrypting drives (SEDs). Dell, Lenovo and Panasonic are shipping or qualifying standard-sized or thin laptops with Seagate Momentus and Momentus Thin SEDs as optional features. Seagate now ships 24 products in a family of enterprise drives that includes Savvio, Cheetah, Constellation ES and Constellation SEDs.
Seagate's family of Savvio, Cheetah, Constellation and Momentus SEDs have secured FIPS 140-2 certification from the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). This key government certification clears the way for deployments of Seagate self-encrypting drives by all U.S. and Canadian federal agencies, many state and local governments, and regulated industries such as healthcare, finance and defense required to use FIPS-certified gear to help protect sensitive data on PCs and computer networks and in data centers. The Seagate laptop and enterprise hard drives are the first with native encryption to earn the FIPS certification.
According to Seagate, Momentus SED shipments have doubled in each of the past three years and naturally last year the demand for them accelerated. Seagate believes that as data leaks and security breaches because of HDD-related purposes get more common, organizations will start to buy more self-encrypting drives. At present Seagate is considering solid-state drives with self-encrypting feature, but the company is tight lipped about any concrete plans in that direction.
"Companies and government organizations worldwide increasingly are securing confidential information on self-encrypting hard drives, recognizing that this commonsense yet powerful approach simplifies the deployment of security for data at rest. As storage and security continue to converge, solutions like Seagate's self-encrypting hard drives are leading the way by providing organizations with the strong, easy-to-use security they need to protect their data assets," said Charles Kolodgy, research director of security products for analyst group IDC.