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decided: October 7, 1977.
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIAv.JAMES WILLIAM SUTLEY AND JAMES D. PARKER, APPELLANTS
William J. Rundorff, Henry J. Russo, Asst. Public Defenders, Mercer, for appellants.
Joseph J. Nelson, Dist. Atty., Robert F. Banks, Asst. Dist. Atty., Mercer, for appellee.
Eagen, O'Brien, Roberts, Pomeroy, Nix and Manderino, JJ. Jones, former Chief Justice did not participate in the decision of this case. Pomeroy, J., files a concurring opinion. Roberts, J., files a dissenting opinion. Manderino, J., files a dissenting opinion.
[ 474 Pa. Page 258]
Appellants James William Sutley and James D. Parker were convicted in the Court of Common Pleas of Mercer County in unrelated prosecutions for possession of marijuana, a felony under the Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act of 1961, Act of September 26, 1961, P.L. 1664, § 4, 35 P.S. § 780-4 (1964) (now repealed). Appellant Sutley entered a plea of guilty to the charge and was sentenced on July 2, 1971, to a term of imprisonment for not less than one nor more than three years in a state correctional institution. Appellant Parker, who also pleaded guilty to the charge, was sentenced on March 3, 1972, to a term of one and one half to four years in a state correctional institution. No direct appeal was taken from the judgment of sentence by either appellant.
Thereafter, on April 14, 1972, the General Assembly enacted the Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act, Act of April 14, 1972, P.L. 233, No. 64, § 1, 35 P.S. § 780-101 et seq. (Supp.1976-77) which repealed and extensively revised the prior law governing this field.*fn1 Among the more significant changes, the new Act classified possession of marijuana as a misdemeanor, and the penalties for violation were accordingly reduced. The maximum sentence provided upon conviction for possession of more than thirty grams was up to one year of imprisonment and/or a five thousand dollar fine,*fn2 while possession of thirty grams or less resulted in no more than a thirty day prison term and/or a fine of one hundred dollars.*fn3
[ 474 Pa. Page 259]
The revised Act was subsequently amended by the legislature on July 25, 1973, to provide for the resentencing in certain cases of individuals convicted of possession of marijuana under the prior Act. The amended section provides in full as follows:
The provisions of this act shall not affect any act done, liability incurred, or right accrued or vested, or affect any suit or prosecution pending to enforce any right or penalty or punish any offense under the authority of any Act of Assembly, or part thereof, repealed by this act: Provided, however, That in any case final on or before June 12, 1972 in which a defendant was sentenced for the commission of acts similar to those proscribed by subsection (16) or (31), but not (30), of section 13(a) of this act, such defendant shall be resentenced under this act upon his petition if the penalties hereunder are less than those under prior law and in such case the prior criminal record of the defendant shall be expunged to the extent that such record shall no longer contain any reference to the prior grade of the offense if higher than the grade of the offense to which defendant is resentenced. Act of April 14, 1972, P.L. 233, No. 64, § 38, as amended by Act of July 25, 1973, No. 54, § 1, 35 P.S. § 780-138 (Supp.1976-77).
Appellants Sutley and Parker, in separate petitions filed with the Court of Common Pleas of Mercer County, sought resentencing under the amendment. It is conceded that both petitions alleged facts which, if proven would have required that appellants be resentenced in accordance with the amendment. A rule was issued upon the Commonwealth to show cause why the appellants should not be resentenced. The Mercer County District Attorney filed an answer to the petitions alleging only that the statute upon which appellants relied was unconstitutional. The lower court agreed and dismissed the petitions for resentencing. A timely appeal from the order dismissing the petitions was
[ 474 Pa. Page 260]
taken to the Superior Court, and that court certified the matter here for disposition.*fn4 We now affirm.
The court below determined that the 1973 amendment was constitutionally repugnant as violating the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, because the enactment intruded upon the governor's power to commute sentences under Article IV, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, Pa.Const. art. IV, § 9 (1968) and operated as a legislative impairment of existing final legal judgments. We agree that the amendment undermines and thus fatally interferes with final judgments of the judiciary and therefore we need not consider the alternative basis of constitutional invalidity relied upon by the court below.
We note at the outset that it is a fundamental principle in our conception of judicial authority that courts are not to inquire into the wisdom, reason or expediency behind a legislative enactment. Commonwealth v. Moir, 199 Pa. 534, 49 A. 351 (1901). Nor are the motives of the legislators in passing the act open to judicial consideration. Commonwealth v. Keary, 198 Pa. 500, 48 A. 472 (1901). Our inquiry in such cases can only be directed to the manner in which the legislature effectuates its will, to insure that the enactment does not transgress some specific constitutional prohibition.
The standards to be applied in making this determination are equally well settled. It is axiomatic that a legislative enactment is presumed to be constitutional.
"There is, of course, a strong presumption in favor of the constitutionality of statutes -- a presumption which reflects on the part of the judiciary the respect due to the legislature as a co-equal branch of government." (footnotes omitted) School Districts of Deer Lakes and Allegheny Valley v. Kane, 463 Pa. 554, 562, 345 A.2d 658, 662 (1975).
Accordingly, the burden rests on those alleging unconstitutionality to show that an enactment "clearly, palpably and
[ 474 Pa. Page 261]
plainly" violates the constitution. Tosto v. Pennsylvania Nursing Home Agency, 460 Pa. 1, 331 A.2d 198 (1975); Daly v. Hemphill, 411 Pa. 263, 191 A.2d 835 (1963); Rubin v. Bailey, 398 Pa. 271, 157 A.2d 822 (1960); Clark v. Meade, 377 Pa. 150, 104 A.2d 465 (1954); Lighton v. Abington Township, 336 Pa. 345, 9 A.2d 609 (1939); Sharpless v. Mayor of Philadelphia, 21 Pa. 147 (1853).
We are satisfied in the instant case that the appellee has sustained its burden of demonstrating the unconstitutionality of the 1973 amendment. A plain reading of the enactment reveals that it is couched in mandatory language; it unquestionably directs that a defendant "shall be resentenced under this act upon his petition if the penalties hereunder are less than those under prior law . . ." The amendment is, in operation and effect, a legislative command to the courts to open a judgment previously made final, and to substitute for that judgment a disposition of the matter in accordance with the subsequently expressed legislative will. The vesting in the legislature of the power to alter final judgments would be repugnant to our concept of the separation of the three branches of government.
The doctrine of the separation of governmental powers into the legislative, executive and judicial departments has been inherent in the structure of this Commonwealth's government since its inception.
[ 474 Pa. Page 262]
This separation appeared in Pennsylvania as early as 1776 in the Plan or Form of Government for the Commonwealth or State of Pennsylvania, prepared by the convention in that year. The separation was continued in our constitutions of 1790, of 1838, and of 1873. Accordingly, when the Constitution of 1873 was adopted, the people acted in the light of generations of experience with the operation of the doctrine of the separation of powers, and with the resulting necessity for judicial review to resolve differences of opinion between the legislative, executive or judicial departments concerning the scope and extent of the delegated powers. Dauphin County Grand Jury Investigation Page 262} Proceedings (No. 2), 332 Pa. 342, 352-53, 2 A.2d 804, 807 (1938) (footnote omitted).
See generally, Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, 442 Pa. 45, 274 A.2d 193 (1971); Pennsylvania Company v. Scott, 346 Pa. 13, 29 A.2d 328 (1943); Wilson v. Philadelphia School District, 328 Pa. 225, 195 A. 90 (1937); Commonwealth v. Mathues, 210 Pa. 372, 59 A. 961 (1904); De Chastellux v. Fairchild, 15 Pa. 18 (1850); Greenough v. Greenough, 11 Pa. 489 (1849). Similarly, we have long recognized that the judicial branch is not subordinate to the other branches of government but is co-equal, distinct and independent.
The judiciary is a constituent or coordinate part of government; it is not subordinate to other powers, nor does it depend for existence on the legislative will. Its powers come directly from the people, without intervening agency. From the very nature of its time-honored powers, it should be kept a separate, distinct and independent entity in government . . . The domain of the judiciary is in the field of the administration of justice under the law; it interprets, construes and applies the law. Commonwealth v. Widovich, et al., 295 Pa. 311, 322, 145 A. 295, 299 (1929).
See also Bedford v. Shilling, 4 S. & R. 401, 410 (1818). Thus, it necessarily follows that any encroachment upon the judicial power by the legislature is offensive to the fundamental scheme of our government. Bailey v. Waters, 308 Pa. 309, 162 A. 819 (1932); Ervine's Appeal, 16 Pa. 256 (1851); Greenough v. Greenough, supra.
We recognize that the doctrine of the separation of powers was not intended to hermetically seal off the three branches of government from one another. It was obviously intended that there would be a degree of interdependence and reciprocity between the various branches. Cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976). It is also true as noted by the dissenters that there may be some areas where the dividing lines between the respective responsibilities of the three branches may be difficult to
[ 474 Pa. Page 263]
define.*fn5 Stander v. Kelley, 433 Pa. 406, 422, 250 A.2d 474, 482 (1969). However, a recognition that final judgments of the judicial branch are not to be interfered with by legislative fiat in this Commonwealth has long been established and is no longer open to serious question. As early as 1859 this Court observed:
In the very nature of things, a law that is enacted after the case has arisen can be no part of the case. Such a law can have only a forced and unnatural relation to the case, and must produce an untrue decision; a decision, not of the case arising between the parties, as it ought to be, but of a case partly created by the legislature.
When, therefore, the constitution declares that it is the exclusive function of the courts to try private cases of disputed right, and that they shall administer justice "by the law of the land," and "by due course of law;" it means to say, that the law relating to the transaction in controversy, at the time when it is complete, shall be an inherent element of the case, and shall guide the decision; and that the case shall not be altered, in its substance, by any subsequent law.
Menges v. Dentler, 33 Pa. 495, 498-9 (1859).
We further explicated this concept in our decision in Pennsylvania Co. v. Scott, 346 Pa. 13, 16-17, 29 A.2d 328, 329 (1942):
"It is elementary that the legislature may not, under the guise of an act affecting remedies, destroy or impair final judgments obtained before the passage of the act, and this principle prohibits not only a statutory re-opening of cases previously decided by the court but also legislation affecting the inherent attributes of judgments . .
[ 474 Pa. Page 264]
There are two reasons for this limitation of legislative power; . . . that under our system of the division of governmental powers the legislature cannot invade the province of the judiciary by interfering with judgments or decrees previously rendered."
Again in Leahey v. Farrell, 362 Pa. 52, 66 A.2d 577 (1949), we reaffirmed the proposition that a legislative attempt to alter the effect of final judicial action imposed under prior law is a direct assault upon the power of the judicial branch:
The legislature cannot, by an act of assembly, overrule a judicial decision: Greenough v. Greenough, 11 Pa. 489; it may not direct a statute to be construed in a certain way: In re East Grant Street, 121 Pa. 596, 16 A. 366; Titusville Iron Works v. Keystone Oil Co., 122 Pa. 627, 15 A. 917; it cannot grant a new trial: De Chastellux v. Fairchild, 15 Pa. 18; or order an illegitimate child to be regarded as legitimate under terms of prior deed: Appeal of Edwards, 108 Pa. 283; it may not change the effect of judgments or decrees previously rendered: Pennsylvania Company, etc., v. Scott, 346 Pa. 13, 29 A.2d 328.
Id. 362 Pa. at 56, 66 A.2d at 579 (emphasis added).
Thus, it is clearly established in this jurisdiction that even though the legislature possesses the power to promulgate the substantive law,*fn6 judicial judgments and decrees entered pursuant to those laws may not be affected by subsequent legislative changes after those judgments and decrees have become final. Conceding the inviolability of final judgments of the judiciary, even though the legislature possesses the broad power to enact the substantive law, it is difficult to appreciate the thrust of appellants' argument that the result should be different in this instance because the legislature has the right to prescribe the permissible range of punishment to be meted out for crimes. The legislature's right to promulgate the penal sanctions for the various offenses is only a small segment of its broader power
[ 474 Pa. Page 265]
to promulgate all of the substantive law for this jurisdiction. Appellants have failed to suggest any reason for carving an exception where the power to regulate sentences is involved. To the contrary, our caselaw indicates that the same principles obtain.*fn7
This Court has long recognized the applicability of the principles of "the inviolability of final judgments of the judiciary" in criminal cases as well as in civil cases. As early as 1862, this Court held that a statute providing for a graduated deduction from the term of imprisonment for which a prisoner was sentenced, as a reward for good conduct, was a constitutionally impermissible interference with the final judgment of our courts. Commonwealth ex rel. Johnson v. Halloway, 42 Pa. 446 (1862).
It is to be observed, that these questions have no reference to the power of the legislature to prescribe a general rule of law that shall be inconsistent with a previous judicial decree. Such a rule, when it operates on future cases and not retrospectively, is quite legitimate. Their power to legislate in that manner is not to be doubted. But under the act in question the good conduct of a particular individual, under judicial sentence, is to work out for him an abatement of a part of his sentence. In respect to one of the relators who was convicted and sentenced before the law was passed, it is considered very clear that it is a legislative impairing of an existing legal judgment.
[ 474 Pa. Page 266]
Id. at 448.
This language was cited with approval in Commonwealth v. Scoleri, 399 Pa. 110, 134-5, 160 A.2d 215, 227-28, cert. denied, 364 U.S. 849, 81 S.Ct. 93, 5 L.Ed.2d 72 (1960); see also, Commonwealth ex rel. Haun v. Cavell, 190 Pa. Super. 346, 154 A.2d 257 (1959).
Appellants' argument that the legislature's power to determine the penological system for this state prevents a usurpation of judicial power in these cases was addressed and answered by this Court in Commonwealth ex rel. Banks v. Cain, 345 Pa. 581, 28 A.2d 897 (1942). There, in a learned opinion by Mr. Justice (later Chief Justice) Stern, it was noted that although the General Assembly had the power to provide the courts such measure of discretion in the imposition of sentences as it deemed proper, once that discretion had been exercised in accordance with existing law a final judgment of sentence could not be disturbed by a subsequent legislative change.
"While the court determines the guilt or innocence of the accused and pronounces upon the guilty the penalty provided by law, the manner of executing the sentence is prescribed by the legislature, to be put in force and effect by administrative officers.
"The exercise of the power of parole being but an administrative function which does not impinge upon the judicial power of sentencing the accused in conformity with the law, it follows that the present act may constitutionally be applied to cases where sentences were imposed before its effective date. The sentence is in no wise interfered with, especially since the act provides that a parole cannot be granted until the expiration of the minimum term prescribed by the court. The parolee is not discharged, but merely serves the remainder of his sentence by having his liberty restrained in a manner analogous to that employed in the 'trusty' or 'honor' system of prison discipline. 'The parole authorized by the statute does not suspend sentence or operate to shorten the term.'
[ 474 Pa. Page 267]
" It is only if the duration of the sentence is not affected that a parole does not infringe upon judicial power ; therefore we are of opinion that the portion of section 21 which attempts to give to the board the power to extend the period of parole beyond the maximum term imposed by the sentence, and section 24, which attempts to give to the board the power to discharge a parolee before the expiration of the parole period, are unconstitutional. The fixing of the term of the sentence is exclusively a judicial function."
Id. 345 Pa. at 588-89, 28 A.2d at 901 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
It is argued that the Cain Court in permitting the application of a statute providing for parole to be applicable to sentences that were final at the time of its enactment was an implicit rejection of the "inviolability of final judgments" concept at least with respect to the right of the legislature to modify existing judicially-imposed sentences. This argument ignores the clear thrust of the Cain decision and misperceives the nature of the court's sentencing power. The Cain opinion stressed the fact that the parole power did not impinge upon the traditional judicial function involved in the sentencing process.
"It is not . . . an interference with judicial authority, nor an assumption of judicial power, for the supervisors of penal institutions to administer the very conditions of punishment or clemency which the law prescribed and itself wrote into the judge's sentence. Where conditions of punishment are beforehand prescribed, and form constituent parts of the sentence of conviction, it is not an assumption of judicial power for an administrative officer, acting within the law and the terms of the sentence, to take upon himself the task of ascertaining whether the conditions have been complied with. While the court determines the guilt or innocence of the accused and pronounces upon the guilty the penalty provided by law, the manner of executing the sentence is prescribed by the legislature, to be put in force and effect by administrative officers."
[ 474 Pa. Page 268]
or modify the judicial sentence which had become final.*fn8 On the other hand, that Court found unconstitutional those provisions of the Act in question which would have permitted an alteration of the duration of the sentence.
In Pennsylvania we embraced the concept of a tripartite government with three equal, separate and autonomous branches in an effort to prevent governmental power from becoming concentrated into a single body. See Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, supra; Commonwealth v. Mathues, supra; De Chastellux v. Fairchild, supra. It was believed that each branch would act as a check on the other and by this diffusion of power prevent tyranny where the rights of the individual citizen would be ignored. See generally, Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, supra; Wilson v. Philadelphia School District, supra; Commonwealth v. Mathues, supra; De Chastellux v. Fairchild, supra. While this consideration motivated the adoption of this form of government, now that this format is firmly entrenched there are other considerations which require the perpetuation of the principle of the "inviolability of final judgment."*fn9 One such
[ 474 Pa. Page 270]
example was alluded to in Commonwealth ex rel. Johnson v. Halloway, supra. In that decision this Court pointed out that the subsequent statute might well have frustrated the sentencing decision because it introduced factors not considered at the time the sentence was imposed. An even more graphic example of how a retroactive application can completely frustrate the judicial discretion and bring about a miscarriage of justice can be found in the appeal of Mr. Sutley. Although the court accepted a plea of possession of marijuana, the testimony of the arresting officer established a clear case of sale. Trooper Oliver's statement indicated that on September 12, 1970, at approximately 5:20 P.M., he purchased from James W. Sutley a substance which was later identified to be marijuana. At the time of the sentencing hearing, which was conducted by a judge other than the one who had accepted the plea, the following statement occurred:
THE COURT: Well, the problem we've had concerning Mr. Sutley all along is where he is going to live and what he is going to do. We've had him living at various places. We had him on the work release program for four days when it turned out he was busted, arrested for this charge of selling marihuana. I don't know why the District Attorney reduced it down to possession. It appeared as if the offense was reasonably clear. I didn't take the plea.
It appears that although the sentencing judge was convinced that the offense amounted to a sale of a controlled substance rather than merely possession, he was nevertheless content to proceed with sentencing in view of the flexibility afforded
[ 474 Pa. Page 271]
to him under the sentencing provisions of the former Act.*fn10 We are therefore faced with a situation which is quite commonplace where a plea to a lesser offense is accepted because the sentence range for that offense affords the court an adequate opportunity to punish the offender for the actual conduct committed. If, however, the new Section is held to apply in this instance and a resentencing is required, the court is powerless to impose a new sentence which would be commensurate with the true nature of the offense. Thus, not only does such a result completely distort the exercise of judicial discretion which permitted the plea to the lesser offense, but it also frustrates the legislative purpose sought to be achieved by a new Act since the new provision was specially designed only for those who committed the crime of possession and not for those who were engaged in the unlawful sale or distribution of controlled substances.*fn11
Finally, the dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice ROBERTS raises the question of whether the Amendment may be justified on the basis of the exercise of the pardoning power of the legislature. Initially, it should be noted that this question was not raised by the litigants themselves. Ordinarily such issues should therefore not be considered sua sponte by an appellate court. Phillips Home Furnishings, Inc. v. Continental Bank, 467 Pa. 43, 354 A.2d 542 (1976); Wiegand v. Wiegand, 461 Pa. 482, 337 A.2d 256 (1975). See also Dilliplaine v. Lehigh Valley Trust Co., 457 Pa. 255, 322 A.2d 114 (1974). However, since we are sustaining the trial court's findings of unconstitutionality and because the matter
[ 474 Pa. Page 272]
is one of public concern, we will discuss the merits of this contention.
Relying upon the federal constitution and various decisions of the federal courts, the dissent attempts to develop the theory that our legislature possesses an inherent power of pardon. "[T]he legislature has the power to enact legislation which reduces the punishment of individuals whose convictions have become final or which pardons such individuals, exempting them from further punishment and relieving them from any legal disabilities resulting from conviction." Dissenting opinion, ROBERTS, J. (infra p. 792) While it is appealing at first blush to analogize that such a concept has been adopted in this jurisdiction as well, it must be emphasized that we are here concerned with those powers enumerated under our state constitution.
Article IV Section 9 of the State Constitution expressly provides:
(a) In all criminal cases except impeachment, the Governor shall have power to remit fines and forfeitures, to grant reprieves, commutation of sentences and pardons; but no pardon shall be granted, nor sentence commuted, except on the recommendation in writing of a majority of the Board of Pardons, after full hearing in open session, upon due public notice. The recommendation, with the reasons therefor at length, shall be delivered to the Governor and a copy thereof shall be kept on file in the office of the Lieutenant Governor in a docket kept for that purpose.
Further, the composition of the Board of Pardons is set forth by paragraph (b) of the same section of the Constitution:
"It shall consist of the lieutenant governor who shall be the chairman, the attorney general and three members appointed by the governor with the consent of two-thirds of the members elect of the Senate . . ."
The specificity in defining the limitations of the express grant of the power of pardon would negate an inference that the Constitution intended to confer an implied power of pardon free of any restrictions in another branch of government.
[ 474 Pa. Page 273]
It would require an unwarranted distortion of the express language of our Constitution to infer that an implied power of pardon was conferred in the legislature by that document.
While the federal courts have adopted the principle of the English common law which recognized an inherent power of pardon in the legislative branch under that body's supreme lawmaking power, see United States v. Hughes, 175 F. 238 (W.D.Pa.1892) and United States v. Hall, 53 F. 352 (W.D.Pa.1892), there is nothing in the jurisprudence of this Commonwealth to suggest that we have accepted that concept as part of our governmental system. To the contrary, our caselaw has shown the exclusivity of the power as vested in the executive branch. Commonwealth ex rel. Banks v. Cain, supra, 345 Pa. at 585, 28 A.2d at 899-900. See also Commonwealth ex rel. Cater v. Myers, 412 Pa. 67, 194 A.2d 185 (1963). While the law permits a liberal construction of our Constitution, Likens' Petition, 223 Pa. 456, 72 A. 858 (1906), a power does not inhere to the legislature if it has specifically been withheld or entrusted to another co-equal branch of government. See Commonwealth ex rel. Kelley v. Keiser, 340 Pa. 59, 16 A.2d 307 (1940).
Not only do we find that there is no power of pardon or commutation in the legislature and that the power is specifically and singularly granted to the executive branch, but it is equally clear from the very language of the resentencing amendment that the legislature was not attempting to exercise the power of pardon.*fn12 As defined by this Court, pardon is:
"the exercise of the sovereign's prerogative of mercy. It completely frees the offender from the control of the state. It not only exempts him from further punishment but relieves him from all the legal disabilities resulting
[ 474 Pa. Page 274]
from his conviction. It blots out the very existence of his guilt, so that, in the eye of the law, he is thereafter as innocent as if he had never committed the offense: Diehl v. Rodgers, 169 Pa. 316, 319, 32 A. 424, 425; Commonwealth v. Quaranta, 295 Pa. 264, 273, 145 A. 89, 93; Commonwealth v. House, 10 Pa. Super. 259, 264, 265."
Commonwealth ex rel. Banks v. Cain, supra, 345 Pa. at 584-5, 28 A.2d at 899.
The amendment in question in no way relieves the offender from all legal disabilities resulting from his conviction. Instead, it requires his resentencing if the penalty under the new law is less than that under the prior law and further, provides for an expungement of his record for the prior offense only to the extent where the grade of the prior offense is greater than the offense to which he was resentenced. Thus, the legislature specifically intended that the individual would still be required to serve a sentence and the stigma attached to the conviction would remain.
Accordingly, the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Mercer County is affirmed.
POMEROY, Justice, concurring.
I join in the opinion of the Court, and add these few supplemental lines only to sharpen the focus of decision as I see it.
Obviously, the legislature had second thoughts about the severity of the punishment it had decreed for violation of the Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act of 1961, Act of September 26, 1961, P.L. 1664, § 4, 35 P.S. § 780-4 (1964), where that violation consisted of possession (not the sale or delivery) of the drug marijuana. By the Act of 1972, it reduced
[ 474 Pa. Page 275]
the offense from a felony to a misdemeanor, with corresponding lessening of sentences. It is the attempt to make this amelioration of the offense applicable to offenders convicted under the prior law that is here in issue.
Unfortunately for appellants and others in like cases, their judgments of sentence had become final before enactment of the new law.
While the attempt of the General Assembly to rectify what it must have considered to be an inequitable punishment visited upon prior offenders is laudable, I agree with the Court that relief must come in some fashion other than mandatory resentencing and expunging from the criminal records the fact of conviction of a felony. The concept of the finality of judgments and the integrity of the judicial process would, I fear, be seriously jeopardized were the understandable effort of the legislature in this situation to be validated. Courts may sentence only for acts made criminal by the legislature and may do so only within limits set by the legislature. When, however, those steps are taken, they are judicial acts, and in my view may not be undone by the legislature because it has come to believe that its prior treatment of the offense was mistaken.*fn*
ROBERTS, Justice, dissenting.
In 1972, the Legislature enacted the Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act [Controlled Substance Act],*fn1 which replaced the Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act.*fn2 The Controlled Substance Act substantially reduced the penalties for possession of marijuana. Compare section 13(g) of the Controlled Substance Act*fn3 (imprisonment not to exceed
[ 474 Pa. Page 276]
thirty days for possession of a small amount of marijuana for personal use) with section 20(c) of the Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act*fn4 ("imprisonment by separate or solitary confinement at labor of not less than two (2) or more than five (5) years" for possession of marijuana, including possession of a small amount for personal use). When it enacted the Controlled Substance Act, the Legislature made the reduced penalties of the Act applicable not only to crimes committed after its effective date, but to crimes committed earlier if the convictions were not yet final on the Act's enactment date.*fn5 35 P.S. § 780-139 (Supp.1977);*fn6 Commonwealth v. Thomas, 450 Pa. 548, 301 A.2d 359 (1973). In 1973, the Legislature enacted an amendment to the Controlled Substance Act [Resentencing Amendment]*fn7 which made the reduced penalties of the Controlled Substance Act applicable to persons whose convictions became final before the adoption of the Controlled Substance Act.
[ 474 Pa. Page 277]
The Resentencing Amendment reflects a legislative decision that, to the fullest extent possible, all persons should be treated equally for the same substantive conduct. The majority holds that the Resentencing Amendment is an unconstitutional infringement on the powers of the judiciary. I dissent because the Resentencing Amendment is a proper exercise of legislative power, which in no way interferes with or infringes upon the powers of the judiciary.
The separation of powers among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government is central to our constitutional scheme. Yet the dividing lines among the three co-equal branches "are sometimes indistinct and are probably incapable of any precise definition." Stander v. Kelley, 433 Pa. 406, 421-22, 250 A.2d 474, 482 (1969) (plurality opinion). The Constitution does not comprehend the total separation of the three branches of government. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121, 96 S.Ct. 612, 683, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976). As Justice Holmes wrote:
"The great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and white. Even the more specific of them are found to terminate in a penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to the other.
It does not seem to need argument to show that however we may disguise it by veiling words we do not and cannot carry out the distinction between [the powers of the separate branches] with mathematical precision and divide the branches into water tight compartments."
Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 209-11, 48 S.Ct. 480, 485, 72 L.Ed. 845 (1927) (dissenting opinion).
The impossibility of making a neat separation among legislative, executive, and judicial powers requires accommodation among the three branches:
"Under the system of division of governmental powers it frequently happens that the function of one branch may overlap another. But the successful and efficient administration
[ 474 Pa. Page 278]
of government assumes that each branch will cooperate with the others."
Leahey v. Farrell, 362 Pa. 52, 57, 66 A.2d 577, 579 (1949) (emphasis deleted). This need for accommodation, while preserving the essential features of the separation of powers, requires a close inquiry, on a case by case basis, into actions alleged to violate the principle of separation of powers. The problem does not easily lend itself to rigid, simplistic rules. Unlike the majority, I do not believe this case can be decided without careful consideration of the principles which underlie the separation of powers doctrine.
To decide whether legislative action offends the principle of separation of powers, we must look to the purposes of the doctrine.
"This 'separation of powers' was obviously not instituted with the idea that it would promote governmental efficiency. It was, on the contrary, looked to as a bulwark against tyranny."
United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 443, 85 S.Ct. 1707, 1712, 14 L.Ed.2d 484 (1965). In reviewing legislative actions alleged to infringe on the province of the judiciary, we must be especially mindful of the need to preserve a separation of powers in order to protect the rights of the individual:
"'"Were the power of judging joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control, for the judge would then be the legislator."'"
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 120, 96 S.Ct. at 683, quoting The Federalist No. 47 (J. Madison), quoting Montesquieu (emphasis in original).
[ 474 Pa. Page 279]
Legislative infringement on the province of the judiciary, and the concomitant threat to individual liberties, may take one of two forms. First, the Legislature may take action which impairs the independence of the judiciary, either by requiring the performance of non-judicial functions, see United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 40, 14 L.Ed. 42 (1852), or by interfering with the power of the judiciary to perform its essential functions, see Commonwealth ex rel. Page 279} Carroll v. Tate, 442 Pa. 45, 274 A.2d 193 (1971) (plurality opinion); Stander v. Kelley, 433 Pa. at 427-28, 250 A.2d at 486 (1969) (Concurring Opinion of Roberts, J., joined by Jones and Pomeroy, JJ.). Second, the Legislature may usurp the power of the judiciary by taking it upon itself to judge individual cases. This latter infringement on the province of the judiciary is specifically prohibited by the bill of attainder clause. U.S.Const. art. I, § 10; Pa.Const. art. I, § 18. See also U.S.Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
The Legislature's effort in the Resentencing Amendment to equalize sentences among individuals convicted for marijuana possession does not offend these principles. The Resentencing Amendment does not involve an attempt by the Legislature to judge individual cases. Nor does it impair the independence of the judiciary: the courts are not required to perform non-judicial functions, and the courts' capacity to perform their essential functions is not affected.
The Resentencing Act is a statute of general application, representing a policy determination that the sentences being served by a certain class of offenders should be reduced to be comparable to those of other offenders found guilty of the same conduct but sentenced under a later statute. Enactment of such a rule of general application is a proper legislative function:
"'It is the peculiar province of the legislature to prescribe general rules for the government of society; the application of those rules to individuals in society would seem to be the duty of the other departments.'"
United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. at 446, 85 S.Ct. at 1713, quoting Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch.) 87, 136, 3 L.Ed. 162 (1810). As a general rule which leaves to the judiciary the power to impose sentences on the individuals to whom it applies, the Resentencing Amendment does not violate the separation of powers. Rather than impairing or usurping the power of the judiciary, enactment of legislation such as the Resentencing Amendment is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature.
[ 474 Pa. Page 280]
The distribution of power among the three branches of government assigns to the Legislature the power to define criminal offenses and determine what punishments would be imposed. As this Court stated in Commonwealth v. Glover, 397 Pa. 543, 545, 156 A.2d 114, 116 (1959):
"There is no question that it is within the province of the legislature to pronounce what acts . . . are crimes and to fix the punishments of all crimes . . . . The legislature has the right to fix the maximum and likewise can, if it sees fit, name the minimum. If it does so it does not thereby violate Article V, Section 1 of the Constitution, vesting judicial power in the courts."
Subject to specific constitutional protections, such as the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, U.S.Const. amend. VIII, XIV; Pa.Const. art. I, § 10, and the prohibition against ex post facto laws, U.S.Const. art. I, § 10; Pa.Const. art. I, § 17, the Legislature may, through the enactment of standards of general applicability, exercise complete control over sentencing. See United States v. Lewis, 300 F.Supp. 1171 (E.D.Pa.1969).
The Legislature's power to define criminal offenses, and determine the range of punishments which may be imposed, encompasses the power to decide that the punishment for certain conduct should be reduced or eliminated. It also encompasses the power to reduce or eliminate the punishment of classes of offenders who have been convicted and sentenced, but whose convictions have not yet become final. See Commonwealth v. Thomas, 450 Pa. 548, 301 A.2d 359 (1973). Finally, I believe that the Legislature has the power to enact legislation which reduces the punishment of classes of offenders whose convictions have become final, or which pardons such offenders, exempting them from further punishment and relieving them from any legal disabilities resulting from conviction. See United States ex rel. Malesevic v. Perkins, 17 F.Supp. 851 (W.D.Pa.1936); United States v. Hughes, 175 F. 238 (W.D.Pa.1892); United States v. Hall, 53 F. 352
[ 474 Pa. Page 281]
(W.D.Pa.1892) (verbatim repetition of Hughes).*fn8 See generally Comment, Today's Law and Yesterday's Crime: Retroactive Application of Ameliorative Criminal Legislation, 121 U.Pa.L.Rev. 120, 147 (1972).
Historically, general pardons have more commonly been granted by legislatures than by the executive. Weihofen, Legislative Pardons, 27 Calif.L.Rev. 371, 375 (1939). As a grant of a general pardon involves the adoption of a general rule applicable to a class of offenders, it is appropriate that this power be exercised by the Legislature:
"[T]he power to exercise clemency in a particular case, and in favor of an individual or individuals, . . . charged with the offense [is] an executive act of a quasi judicial kind, . . . while an amnesty act establishes a general rule . . . applicable to all persons or persons of a given class, [which is] more especially an act legislative in nature."
State v. Bowman, 145 N.C. 452, 454, 59 S.E. 74, 75 (1907); see Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 16 S.Ct. 644, 40 L.Ed. 819 (1896).
The Pennsylvania Constitution does not prohibit legislative pardons, at least where the pardon is pursuant to a law of general applicability, rather than special legislation enacted only to benefit particular offenders.*fn9 See Lusky, Congressional
[ 474 Pa. Page 282]
Amnesty for War Resisters: Policy Considerations and Constitutional Problems, 25 Vand.L.Rev. 525 (1972). Compare Weihofen, Legislative Pardons, 27 Calif.L.Rev. 371 (1939) (legislatures have power to pardon) with Radin, Legislative Pardons: Another View, 27 Calif.L.Rev. 387 (1939) (distinction must be made between general pardons -- or amnesties -- and individual pardons,*fn10 and the power of the legislature does not extend to the latter).
It is the Legislature which is constitutionally empowered to set the punishment for criminal conduct. Since the Legislature's control over the determination of what conduct should be made criminal, and what punishments should apply, includes the power to grant a general pardon, it must also include the authority to provide for reduced sentences for a class of offenders convicted of a particular crime.
Unquestionably, the Legislature has the power to provide for reduced sentences for marijuana possession, as it did in the Controlled Substance Act. The subsidiary judgment as to whether individuals whose convictions have become final should benefit by such a change in legislation is appropriately a matter of legislative choice. See Comment, Today's Law and Yesterday's Crime: Retroactive Application of Ameliorative Criminal Legislation, 121 U.Pa.L.Rev. 120, 147
[ 474 Pa. Page 283]
(1972). See also Pa.Const. art. I, § 17.*fn11 The Resentencing Amendment was enacted to permit those whose sentences were imposed before the Controlled Substance Act was adopted to be resentenced so that their sentences would conform, as nearly as possible, with sentences imposed on those convicted after the adoption of the Controlled Substance Act. While the Pennsylvania Constitution does not require that those sentenced before the adoption of ameliorative legislation receive the benefits of that legislation, it should not be interpreted to prohibit the Legislature from equalizing the treatment of such offenders when it considers such treatment to serve the public interest. The power to determine what classes of offenders should benefit by the reduced penalties provided for in the Controlled Substance Act is a necessary incident to the Legislature's power to enact legislation, such as the Controlled Substance Act, which changes the penalties for certain crimes.
The majority concludes that the Resentencing Amendment is an unconstitutional violation of the separation of powers because it has the effect of altering final judgments. I cannot agree.
[ 474 Pa. Page 284]
The majority relies on a general rule recognizing "the inviolability of final judgments of the judiciary." There is no such general rule. Rather, the Pennsylvania Constitution has several specific prohibitions which restrict the power of the Legislature to alter final judgments. E. g., Pa.Const. art. I, § 10 (no taking without just compensation); art. I, § 17 (no law may impair the obligation of contracts); art. III, § 32 (the Legislature may not pass any local or special Page 284} law remitting fines, penalties and forfeitures). Thus, when the private rights of parties have become vested in the judgment of a court, that judgment ordinarily cannot be taken away by subsequent legislation without violation of some specific constitutional provision.*fn11a Where the private rights of individuals are not infringed, however, and none of the specific prohibitions of the Pennsylvania Constitution has been violated, the Legislature has the power to enact legislation which mitigates the consequences of a final judgment.
"[A] suit brought for the enforcement of a public right . . . even after it has been established by judgment
[ 474 Pa. Page 285]
of the court, may be annulled by subsequent legislation and should not thereafter be enforced . . . ."
Hodges v. Snyder, 261 U.S. 600, 603, 43 S.Ct. 435, 436, 67 L.Ed. 819 (1923).
The enforcement of the sentences upon persons convicted before the adoption of the Controlled Substance Act constitutes "the enforcement of a public right." Judgments of sentence are enforced to vindicate the public's interest in obedience to the law, and to protect the public against future violations. It is also clear that the Resentencing Amendment does not offend any of the specific prohibitions in the Pennsylvania Constitution which restrict the power of the Legislature to alter final judgments. Because only public rights are involved, and the Legislature has decided that the harsh penalties formerly applicable no longer serve the public interest, the Legislature's decision to provide for resentencing should be respected.
I see no reason to adopt a sweeping prohibition, applicable even though none of the specific prohibitions in the Pennsylvania Constitution is implicated, against statutes which may alter final judgments. The Pennsylvania Constitution does not expressly provide for such an indiscriminate rule, and I do not believe that this Court should fashion one on the basis of the separation of powers doctrine. As explained in Part I of this opinion, the separation of powers principle is in no way offended when the Legislature provides, pursuant to a statute of general application, that persons convicted under prior laws should be resentenced by the courts in accordance with the lesser penalties provided for by the statute currently in force.*fn12 In enacting the Resentencing Amendment the Legislature is not reviewing a finding of guilt. Nor is the Legislature deciding that the trial court's choice of sentence
[ 474 Pa. Page 286]
in a particular case, although within the limits still recognized by the Legislature as proper, was an abuse of discretion. Rather, the Legislature has revised its own determination of the appropriate sentence for the offense in question. The decision to reduce punishment for a class of offenders is a matter within the province of the Legislature. It evinces no disrespect for the decisions of the judiciary, and does not impair the ability of the judiciary to reach its decisions. Simply because final judgments may be affected does not mean that the Legislature has infringed on the province of the judiciary.
The majority relies on Commonwealth ex rel. Banks v. Cain, 345 Pa. 581, 28 A.2d 897 (1942), for the proposition that legislation may not alter the sentence which has been imposed after judgment has become final. This reliance is misplaced, for Banks upheld the power of the Legislature to provide that convicted criminals sentenced to imprisonment may instead be released on parole. Thus, Banks demonstrates that the Legislature has the power to provide for the application of ameliorative legislation to convictions which have become final.
There is dictum in Banks, relied on by the majority, that legislation may not affect the duration of a sentence. I do not believe that such a rule would be sound, or that it could be reconciled with the holding in Banks. The parole legislation upheld in Banks, which provided that convicted criminals sentenced to imprisonment, in some cases at solitary confinement, could be released into the community, clearly had the effect of altering final judgments of the judiciary. While the freedom granted a parolee may be less than that given by a reduction in sentence, the difference is only a matter of degree and is not of constitutional significance. In either case, the effect is to alter a final judgment.
In support of its dictum that legislation may not affect the duration of sentences, Banks relied on the proposition that "[t]he fixing of the term of the sentence is exclusively a judicial function." 345 Pa. at 589, 28 A.2d at 901. This statement is correct insofar as it refers to the sentence to be
[ 474 Pa. Page 287]
imposed upon a particular offender when the Legislature provides for a range of permissible sentences. It is the province of the Legislature, however, to determine the range of permissible sentences for an offense. Commonwealth v. Glover, 397 Pa. 543, 146 A.2d 114 (1959); see United States v. Lewis, 300 F.Supp. 1171 (E.D.Pa.1969). Indeed, with the abolition of common law crimes, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 107(b) (1973), the judiciary has no power to fix penalties for criminal offenses unless they have been provided for by the Legislature. See Commonwealth ex rel. Varronne v. Cunningham, 365 Pa. 68, 73 A.2d 705 (1950).*fn12a
The Court in Banks stated that the parole legislation did not alter the sentence which had been imposed, relying on the fiction that the parolee was in fact being imprisoned
[ 474 Pa. Page 288]
while on parole: "'The parole authorized by statute does not suspend service or operate to shorten the term. . . . [I]t is in legal effect imprisonment.'" Commonwealth ex rel. Banks v. Cain, 345 Pa. at 588-89, 28 A.2d at 901, quoting Anderson v. Corall, 263 U.S. 193, 196, 44 S.Ct. 43, 46, 68 L.Ed. 247 (1923) (emphasis supplied in Banks). This theory, however, cannot be reconciled with subsequent cases, e. g., Commonwealth ex rel. Rambeau v. Rundle, 455 Pa. 8, 314 A.2d 842 (1973), which held that, after parole revocation, a prisoner is not entitled to have credited against the time he must serve in prison the time spent while at liberty on parole.*fn13
The dictum in Banks, that legislation may not affect the duration of sentences, apparently was an effort to avoid overruling Commonwealth ex rel. Johnson v. Halloway, 42 Pa. 446 (1862). In Johnson, a majority of the Court expressed its belief that legislation could not interfere with a judicially imposed sentence by providing for the discharge of prisoners before the expiration of their terms on the basis of "good time" credits.*fn14 I believe the time has come for this Court to recognize that the reasoning of Johnson is unsound. Johnson reasoned that criminal sentences may be fixed "only by the exercise of that judicial discretion which the constitution
[ 474 Pa. Page 289]
has vested in the judiciary." Id. at 449. Even assuming that this proposition may once have been valid as to common law offenses, it has no application to offenses created by statute. See generally Commonwealth ex rel. Varronne v. Cunningham, 365 Pa. 68, 73 A.2d 705 (1950). When it imposes sentence, the judiciary only has such discretion as has been granted to it by the Legislature, Commonwealth v. Glover, 397 Pa. 543, 156 A.2d 114 (1959), and there is no requirement that the judiciary be granted any discretion over the sentence to be imposed, United States v. Lewis, 300 F.Supp. 1171 (E.D.Pa.1969).
Although Banks tried to distinguish Johnson, the cases cannot be reconciled. The fiction employed in Banks does not change the fact that the legislation upheld in Banks reduced the punishment imposed by final judgments of the judiciary. This Court should follow Banks' sound result, and recognize that the Legislature has the power to enact a statute of general applicability providing for the mitigation of the punishment imposed pursuant to existing judgments.
I would uphold the Resentencing Amendment as a valid exercise of legislative power. The need to preserve the independence of the judiciary and to protect the people against overreaching by the Legislature neither requires nor justifies a decision holding the Resentencing Act unconstitutional. Indeed, for the majority to strike down such legislation, which the Legislature has the power to enact and which presents no real danger to the separation of powers, is an unwarranted judicial invasion of the province of the Legislature.
MANDERINO, Justice, dissenting.
Because the majority misconceives the nature of the separation of governmental powers, I dissent. Article 2, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution states,
"[t]he legislative power of this Commonwealth shall be vested in a General Assembly, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives."
[ 474 Pa. Page 290]
The "legislative power" has been interpreted to be the power to make, alter, and repeal laws. In re: Marshall, 363 Pa. 326, 69 A.2d 619 (1950). See also, Petition of City of Pittsburgh, 376 Pa. 447, 103 A.2d 721 (1954). Traditionally, legislative enactments are general in character. See, Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 29 S.Ct. 67, 53 L.Ed. 150 (1908). This power to make, alter, and repeal laws is derived from the people. Except where limitations have been imposed by the state or federal constitutions, or by valid treaties and statutes, the power of the legislature is unlimited. See generally 16 Am.Jur.2d, Constitutional Law §§ 227-234; and McGinley v. Scott, 401 Pa. 310, 164 A.2d 424 (1960). Among the powers granted to the legislature by the people at the time of the creation of our constitutional form of government, was the power to pardon those convicted of crimes. U. S. v. Hughes, 175 F. 238 (D.C.1892). In fact, the legislative pardoning power was recognized in United States v. Wilson, 7 Pet. 150, 163, 8 L.Ed. 640, 644 (1833), as being superior to the pardoning power of the executive because,
". . . [a legislative pardon] is considered as a public law; having the same effect on the case as if the general law punishing the offense had been repealed or annulled."
The executive power is more limited, being the power only to execute the laws as they have been enacted by the legislature and interpreted by the courts. Except where limited by the constitution, the legislature may stipulate what actions the executive branch shall or shall not perform. The executive branch, although co-equal to, and independent from, the legislature, exercises this limited power because of the nature of the Constitution itself. The authority of the legislature is unlimited so long as the exercise of that authority does not violate any constitutional limitations. Commonwealth v. Wormser, 260 Pa. 44, 103 A. 500 (1917); Sharpless v. Mayor of Philadelphia, 21 Pa. 147 (1853). The authority of the executive, on the other hand, extends only so far as is expressly provided in the Constitution. One of the powers expressly granted to the executive is the pardoning power. Pa.Const. Art. 4, Section 9.
[ 474 Pa. Page 291]
The judicial power is one of interpreting, applying, and enforcing existing laws as they relate to past transactions or to conditions existing at the time of the exercise of the judicial power. Once the court is created, its power derives from the Constitution, not from the statute creating it.
The judicial power of the Pennsylvania Courts is derived from Article 5 of the Constitution of Pennsylvania which vests the judicial power in a unified court system. Like the executive branch, the power of the judicial branch is limited in extent to that expressly provided for by law. Const. Art. 5, §§ 2-8. Among the judicial powers so provided by law is the power to sentence those judged guilty of crime.
As was stated in United States v. Hughes, supra, at 242:
"[f]rom the very nature of government, it required no reasoning to prove the self-evident proposition that in Pennsylvania the power of pardon was vested in the legislative branch by the inherent power of the supreme law making power and in the executive by constitutional provision. The grant of this power to the executive was no limitation on the right of the power granting it to exercise it also."
The legislative pardoning power has been said to be "precisely that which would have been afforded to the criminal if the Governor of the State issued free and unconditional pardon." Perkins v. United States ex rel. Malesevic, 99 F.2d 255, 258 (3d Cir. 1938), citing Diehl v. Rodgers, 169 Pa. 316, 32 A. 424 (1895). See also, former Act of March 31, 1860, P.L. 382, § 181 (19 P.S. 893) (repealed in part by 18 P.S. 5201).
Having the authority to pardon absolutely, it follows that the legislature could devise a system to partially pardon those convicted of possession of certain controlled substances. This was done by the resentencing provision of the Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act.
Clearly, the exercise of the authority to pardon those convicted and sentenced by the courts, whether done by the executive or by the legislative branch, affects a "final judgment"
[ 474 Pa. Page 292]
of the judiciary. A "final judgment" in a criminal case, however, has never been held to be free from the power of pardon. None of the cases relied on by the majority for the proposition that the legislature may not interfere with judicial judgment of sentence stands for that proposition. The cases cited by the majority fall into two classes: the cases cited either, (1) upheld legislative attempts to affect judicial decisions, and thus the passages quoted from them by the majority are merely dicta, or (2) the cases cited deal with legislative attempts to interfere with judicial judgments in civil cases, and, as becomes clear when these cases are analyzed, they are either inapposite or involved legislative attempts to deprive litigants of property in violation of the constitutional prohibition against taking property without due process of law, or they violated the constitutional prohibition against amending a statute by reference to its title only. The case before us involves neither of these constitutional provisions.
Into the first group of cases fall Comm. ex rel. Banks v. Cain, 345 Pa. 581, 28 A.2d 897 (1942), (upholding the legislative creation of a board of parole, and allowing the Act's provisions to be applied to cases where sentence was imposed before its effective date); Comm. ex rel. Johnson v. Halloway, 42 Pa. 446 (1862), (where the court decided on non-constitutional grounds that the challenged statute granted the "inspectors of the Penitentiary" a measure of discretion as to whether a prisoner was entitled to discharge under the Act, and that the inspectors had not abused that discretion, thereby upholding the statute); and Leahey v. Farrell, 362 Pa. 52, 66 A.2d 577 (1949), (holding that a statute regulating the method of determining the number and fixing the salaries of court employees is not unconstitutional because of legislative encroachment on the judiciary so long as the legislature does not arbitrarily and capriciously fail to provide a sufficient number of court employees or for the payment of adequate salaries).
Into the second group fall Greenough v. Greenough, 11 Pa. 489 (1849); In re East Grant Street, 121 Pa. 596, 16 A. 366
[ 474 Pa. Page 293]
(1888); Titusville Iron Works v. Keystone Oil Co., 122 Pa. 627, 15 A. 917 (1888); De Chastellux v. Fairchild, 15 Pa. 18 (1850); Appeal of Edwards, 108 Pa. 283 (1885); and Pennsylvania Company, etc. v. Scott, 346 Pa. 13, 29 A.2d 328 (1942).
Greenough v. Greenough, supra, involved a disputed claim under a will. The court held that the challenged legislative enactment could not be applied retroactively because to do so would violate a provision of the Pennsylvania Constitution providing that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property except by judgment of his peers or the law of the land. Greenough thus stands for the proposition that the legislative attempt to overrule a judicial decision was invalid because it violated a specific constitutional prohibition, not because of any legislative encroachment on the judicial power.
De Chastellux v. Fairchild, supra, held that the legislature could not direct the grant of a new trial in a trespass action because to do so deprived the plaintiff ". . . of a judgment, which is essentially his property . . . ." Thus De Chastellux, like Greenough, prohibits the legislative taking of property without due process of law because it violates a specific constitutional prohibition.
Pennsylvania Company v. Scott, supra, also held that the legislature could not affect previously rendered judgments because a judgment is "property" of which the judgment creditor cannot be deprived without due process of law under the state and federal constitutions.
In In re East Grant Street, supra the court stated that the Act of June 8, 1881 ". . . professes to declare the meaning of the said section of the act of 1874, and if this were all, the act of 1881 would conflict with Section 6 of Article 3 of the Constitution which declares that 'no law shall be revived, amended, or the provisions thereof extended or conferred, by reference to its title only, but so much thereof as is revived, amended, extended, or conferred shall be re-enacted, and published at length.'" The court continued, however, and pointed out that the Act of 1881 went
[ 474 Pa. Page 294]
further and validly amended the Act of 1874. East Grant Street thus stands simply for the proposition that a legislative attempt to change a pre-existing law by reference to its title only, is violative of Article 3, § 6, of the Pennsylvania Constitution, and that to amend a pre-existing statute the legislative must re-enact and publish "at length."
Titusville Iron Works v. Keystone Oil Co., supra, held only that the Act of June 17, 1887, violated Article 3, Section 6 of the Pennsylvania Constitution in providing that two other acts (mentioned only by title and date) should be construed in a certain way. Like, East Grant Street, Titusville Oil held only that the legislature violates a specific constitutional prohibition when it attempts to amend a pre-existing statute by reference only to its title.
Appeal of Edwards, supra, held that the legislature could not alter the fact of illegitimate birth so as to entitle such a child to take by purchase under a limitation in a prior deed of trust to "lawfully begotten children." The court said that the legislature did have the power to confer legitimacy upon an illegitimate child so as to render him capable of inheriting from an ancester to the same extent as if he had been born in wedlock. That legislatively conferred legitimacy, however, did not make him "lawfully begotten" so as to come within the condition in the trust. Edwards in no way stands for the proposition urged by the majority.
Clearly therefore, none of the cases relied on by the majority opinion support the proposition that the resentencing provision of the revised Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act encroaches upon the exclusive province of the judiciary. The resentencing provision does not encroach on exclusively judicial powers and should be upheld.
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The first genome-wide screen for protein complexes is completed
Today researchers in Germany announce they have finished the first complete analysis of the "molecular machines" in one of biology's most important model organisms: S. cerevisiae (baker's yeast). The study from the biotechnology company Cellzome, in collaboration with the European Molecular Biology Laboratory (EMBL), appears in this week's online edition of Nature.
"To carry out their tasks, most proteins work in dynamic complexes that may contain dozens of molecules," says Giulio Superti-Furga, who launched the large-scale project at Cellzome four years ago. "If you think of the cell as a factory floor, up to now, we've known some of the components of a fraction of the machines. That has seriously limited what we know about how cells work. This study gives us a nearly complete parts list of all the machines, and it goes beyond that to tell us how they populate the cell and partition tasks among themselves."
Anna-Lynn Wegener | alfa
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subset: commoncrawl


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text: So I was really hoping for the new iPod touch 3G to be available in 8 GB form but unfortunately it is only available in 32 and 64 GB form. I was hoping that I could sell my current iPod touch 2G for about $200 and then buy the new iPod touch 3G but there is very much out of the question now. Even if I sell my iPod touch 2G now for $200 I would still have to come up with another $100. Does anyone have any advice besides washing cars? Haha. I've heard that about 25 times. Thanks.


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text:
ERIC Number: ED250124
Record Type: RIE
Publication Date: 1983-Nov-10
Pages: 28
Abstractor: N/A
Reference Count: 0
Rural Transportation in New York State: A Preliminary Report.
New York State Legislative Commission on Rural Resources, Albany.
The report catalogs strengths, defines problems, and establishes goals for the next two decades for rural New York in the area of transportation. Describing where rural New York is today, section one lists 12 trends, 8 strengths, and 16 weaknesses affecting transporation. Trends include increased rural population inflow and demands on local planners, switch in road emphasis from building to maintenance, and growth of regional transportation hubs and markets. Strengths include extensive road networks, rail lines, waterways, ports, airports, and terminal facilities; responsive maintenance forces; and accountable systems of local government. Problems include overdevelopment, use of obsolete technologies, inappropriate funding mechanisms, and absence of rural input in decision making. Section two presents 13 goals, including training local officials to make wise use of transportation funds, making railroads profitable, enforcing weight limits, and encouraging use of inland water systems. Section three outlines public policy questions including incompatibility of federal, state, and local regulations and replacement of disappearing federal transportation funds. A summary statement, list of workshop participants, and appended data showing cost of road neglect, means of transportation and travel time to work, and vehicles per household complete the report. (NEC)
Publication Type: Legal/Legislative/Regulatory Materials; Collected Works - Proceedings
Education Level: N/A
Audience: Policymakers; Administrators; Practitioners
Language: English
Sponsor: N/A
Authoring Institution: New York State Legislative Commission on Rural Resources, Albany.
Identifiers: Goal Setting; New York
Note: One of nine reports from the Statewide Legislative Symposium on Rural Development (1st, Albany, NY, October 5-7, 1983). For the other reports from this Symposium, see RC 015 005-013.


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I run an exchange 2003 server and my GM has asked if it possible to add a signature line to all outgoing email's sent from our domain. Now I know it would be possible to this individually on each mailbox but I was kind of hoping for an automated process for all the mailboxes. Anyone know if this is somehow possible?
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State of Affairsby Kool & the Gang
Product Details
- Release Date:
- 03/26/1996
- Label:
- Curb Mod Afw
- 0715187778627
- catalogNumber:
- 77786
- Rank:
- 324562
Album Credits
Performance CreditsKool & the Gang Primary Artist
James "J.T." Taylor Vocals,Background Vocals
Amir-Salaam Bayyan Guitar
Ronald Bell Alto Saxophone,Tenor Saxophone
Jeff Catania Guitar
Kirk Lyons Bass
Robert Meeks Keyboards
Dennis "D.T." Thomas Alto Saxophone
Curtis "Fitz" Williams Organ,Keyboards,Moog Synthesizer
Clifford Adams Trombone
Shawn McQuiller Guitar
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Paul Sinclair Piano
Technical CreditsKool & the Gang Composer
James "J.T." Taylor Arranger,Composer,Programming,Vocal Arrangements,drum programming
Ronald Bell Composer,Arranger,Programming,Producer,Vocal Arrangements,drum programming
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Customer Reviews
Average Review:
Most Helpful Customer Reviews
See all customer reviews


text:
Ben Nguyen is an American wedding photographer, based-in Seattle. He usually incorporates film along with digital in his work. "I love the look of film. The differences are subtle but very lovely."
Ben is now using a variety of different film cameras: a Contax 645, a Mamiya 645, a Canon EOS 1v, a Canon Canonet G-III QL QL17, and Holga and Diana Cameras. "I shoot a majority of my clients in Seattle but have traveled to handful of exotic locales for destination weddings." He also have a lot of reasons to keep shooting film but here are 5 main things he would like to share with us.
1. I love how organic the results are.
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See more of his work at:
Sunday, January 4, 2015
Ben Nguyen - 5 things I love about Film
Posted by Pankha Nguyen
Labels: 5 things I love about Film , Ben Nguyen , Portrait , Wedding
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November 16, 1961
COMMONWEALTH EX REL. SHERMAN, APPELLANT,v.DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF LANCASTER COUNTY.
Appeal, No. 151, Oct. T., 1961, from order of Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County, Jan. T., 1961, Habeas Corpus Docket No. 4, page 162, in case of Commonwealth ex rel. Edward Sherman v. District Attorney of Lancaster County et al. Order affirmed.
Edward Sherman, appellant, in propria persona.
No argument was made nor brief submitted for appellee.
Before Rhodes, P.j., Ervin, Wright, Woodside, Watkins, Montgomery, and Flood, JJ.
[ 196 Pa. Super. Page 283]
This is an appeal by relator from the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County, dated January 6, 1961, dismissing relator's petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
A true bill was found by the grand jury at No. 52, September Term, 1957, Court of Quarter Sessions of arson. Relator was tried, found guilty by a jury, and
[ 196 Pa. Super. Page 284]
sentenced on December 10, 1957, to a term of not less than five years nor more than ten years. At his trial relator was represented by counsel appointed by the court. No motion in arrest of judgment or for a new trial was filed.
On January 6, 1961, relator filed a petition in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County seeking a writ of habeas corpus. On the same day, the petition was dismissed on the ground that it raised no questions cognizable in habeas corpus, but only matters which should have been raised on a motion for new trial. In his petition in the court of common pleas relator avers his innocence, attacks the credibility of the Commonwealth's evidence and witnesses, questions the conduct of his counsel, and avers other alleged trial errors. He also alleges his inablility to pay for and obtain a copy of the notes of testimony taken at the criminal trial.
Relator's mere averments of illegality of sentence and deprivation of constitutional rights do not set forth any facts which, it true, would make out a prima facie case for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. The petition raises no factual questions requiring a hearing. Com. ex rel. Hunter v. Banmiller, 194 Pa. Superior Ct. 448, 452, 469 A.2d 347; Com. ex rel. Wolcott v. Burke, 173 Pa. Superior Ct. 473, 476, 98 A.2d 206. "In the absence of any allegations in the petition which make out a prima facie case for allowing a writ of habeas corpus, no hearing on the petition was necessary, and the issuance of a rule to show cause was not required. Com. ex rel. De Poe v. Ashe, 167 Pa. Superior Ct. 23, 74 A.2d 767. See Act of May 25, 1951, P.L. 415, 12 PS § 1901 et seq." Com. ex rel. Rogers v. Claudy, 170 Pa. Superior Ct. 639, 641, 90 A.2d 382, 383. See Com. ex rel. Chambers v. Claudy, 171 Pa. Superior Ct. 115, 117, 90 A.2d 383; Com. ex rel. Bishop v. Claudy, 373 Pa. 523, 97 A.2d 54.
[ 196 Pa. Super. Page 285]
A writ of habeas corpus is not a substitute for an appeal and cannot be used to inquire into matters that should have been raised on a motion for a new trial. Com. ex rel. Wilson v. Banmiller, 393 Pa. 530, 532, 143 A.2d 657; Com. ex rel. Murray v. Keenan, 186 Pa. Superior Ct. 107, 109, 140 A.2d 361; Com. ex rel. Patrick v. Banmiller, 194 Pa. Superior Ct. 511, 513, 168 A.2d 798.
Relator's complaint that he has not been able to obtain a transcript of the stenographic notes of testimony of the criminal trial is also not cognizable in habeas corpus. Com. ex rel. Kimble v. Keenan, 194 Pa. Superior Ct. 169, 172, 166 A.2d 668.
The court below properly dismissed relator's petition.
The order is affirmed.
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text:
Duracin Bracers
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- Duracin Bracers
- Binds when picked up
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- +3 Stamina
+7 Agility
- Durability 35 / 35
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