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No Monkeys, No Chocolateby Melissa Stewart, Allen M. Young, Nicole Wong
This delectable dessert comes from cocoa beans, which grow on cocoa trees in tropical rain forests. But those trees couldn't survive without the help of a menagerie of rain forest
Everyone loves chocolate, right? But how many people actually know where chocolate comes from? How it's made? Or that monkeys do their part to help this delicious sweet exist?
This delectable dessert comes from cocoa beans, which grow on cocoa trees in tropical rain forests. But those trees couldn't survive without the help of a menagerie of rain forest critters: a pollen-sucking midge, an aphid-munching anole lizard, brain-eating coffin fly maggots—they all pitch in to help the cocoa tree survive. A secondary layer of text delves deeper into statements such as "Cocoa flowers can't bloom without cocoa leaves . . . and maggots," explaining the interdependence of the plants and animals in the tropical rain forests. Two wise-cracking bookworms appear on every page, adding humor and further commentary, making this book accessible to readers of different ages and reading levels.
Back matter includes information about cocoa farming and rain forest preservation, as well as an author's note.
Editorial Reviews
Gr 4–6—Chocolate and monkeys may seem worlds apart, but as Stewart and Young point out in their clear text, it takes monkeys (and other critters) to scatter the cocoa beans (seeds) throughout the rain forest. Munching on the soft, tasty pulp lining the pods as they travel through the trees, the monkeys discard the not-so-tasty beans, scattering them indiscriminately. In a format slightly reminiscent of the old "This Is the House That Jack Built," the authors present a simply written look at a complex ecosystem encompassed by one tree's life cycle. Flowers, midges, leaves, maggots, ants, lizards, roots, and more all form parts of the process of producing the cocoa beans so essential to our candy bars and brownies. In a lighter note, two "bookworms" provide an amusing counterpoint in a tiny triangle at the bottom of the page. Wong's realistic watercolors stretch across the pages in warm cocoa browns and soft greens, with occasional splashes of rosy pink. Appended is a page pleading for more rain-forest preservation (not much mention of cocoa "plantations"), another with lists of things to do to make one's life "greener," and still another with an author's note on the origin and development of the book. For slightly older readers, a more traditional look may be found in Adrianna Morganelli's staid The Biography of Chocolate (Crabtree, 2006), but Stewart's book has more visual appeal (and then there are those monkeys…).—Patricia Manning, formerly at Eastchester Public Library, NY
Product Details
- 9781580892872
- Publisher:
- Charlesbridge
- Publication date:
- 08/01/2013
- Pages:
- 32
- Sales rank:
- 205,828
- Product dimensions:
- 11.30(w) x 8.60(h) x 0.40(d)
- Lexile:
- AD740L (what's this?)
- Age Range:
- 5 - 8 Years
Meet the Author
Melissa Stewart is the award-winning author of more than 150 science books for children. She holds degrees in biology and science journalism. Recent books include UNDER THE SNOW (Peachtree, 2009) and the A Place for series (Peachtree). She lives in Acton, Massachusetts.
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1 h d w a l l p a p e r s . c o m / s t r i p e d _ c a t - w a l l p a p e r . h t m l Look that up, no spaces for Rattletrap's picture ~Amber
Melissa has done it again. She has taken a nonfiction subject and made it fun and interesting to read about it. Her use of book worms on each page is a fun way to add humor and get kids to turn the pages. AWell done!
Who doesn't love monkeys? And who doesn't love chocolate? The title alone is enough to draw readers in, and to discover the fascinating interconnectedness of nature that does indeed link monkeys and chocolate. This multi-layered book begs for repeat readings. First, to enjoy the building-block main text. Then back again, to read the in-depth text that explains the fragile balances in the rain forest habitat that produce cocoa beans. (Gross-out loving kids will love some of these details – no brain-eating maggots, no chocolate!) A third layer of text has spunky bookworms making pun-filled comments as they hang out on the pages while reading the book. Lush, detailed artwork lets readers discover something new each time they open the book. Fascinating back matter shares the latest research on rain forest cocoa groves, what we can do to help, and the author's journey from idea to book. Monkeys and chocolate are a winning combination!


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United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division
June 30, 2014
MARGARET FITZPATRICK, Plaintiff,v.CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, [1] Defendant.
MICHAEL T. MASON, Magistrate Judge.
Claimant, Margaret A. Fitzpatrick ("Claimant" or "Fitzpatrick"), brings this motion for summary judgment [18] seeking judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner"). The Commissioner denied Fitzpatrick's claim for disability insurance benefits under Sections 216(i) and 223(d) of the Social Security Act ("SSA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 216(i) and 223(d). The Commissioner filed a cross-motion for summary judgment [29], asking the Court to affirm her decision. This Court has jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). For the reasons set forth below, Fitzpatrick's motion for summary judgment [18] is granted, and the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment [29] is denied. The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
A. Procedural History
Fitzpatrick filed an application for disability insurance benefits on December 1, 2009, alleging a disability onset date of June 20, 2009. (R. 18.) Claimant alleged she was disabled as a result of diabetes mellitus, hypertension, obesity, lumbar degenerative disc disease ("DDD"), osteoarthritis ("OA") of the bilateral knees, coronary artery disease ("CAD"), and sleep apnea. (R. 20.) Her application was initially denied on March 4, 2010 and again on June 3, 2010 after a timely request for reconsideration. (R. 56, 57.) Thereafter, on July 2, 2010, Fitzpatrick requested a hearing, which was held on June 27, 2011 before Administrative Law Judge Karen Sayon ("ALJ" or "ALJ Sayon"). (R. 18, 25, 30.) On July 12, 2011, ALJ Sayon issued a written decision denying Fitzpatrick's request for benefits. (R. 18-25.) Fitzpatrick filed a timely request for review, which the Appeals Council denied on November 16, 2012. (R. 1-6.) The ALJ's decision denying benefits was adopted as the final decision by the Commissioner. See Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 883 (7th Cir. 2001). Fitzpatrick subsequently filed this action in the District Court.
B. Medical Evidence
On May 17, 2006, Fitzpatrick underwent a Myocardial Perfusion Scan and a Stress Cardiolite at Advocate Christ Medical Center. (R. 247-48.) These tests revealed an "apparent anterolateral defect" and "mild nondiagnostic EKG changes at peak stress." ( Id. ) On May 24, 2006, Fitzpatrick had a cardiac status evaluation. (R. 233.) During this evaluation, Claimant complained of "feeling more fatigued and tired recently." ( Id. ) Claimant also reported that on some days she could walk "about one to two blocks without any chest pain, " and that she had quit smoking one month prior to the visit. ( Id. ) The evaluator noted that "patient's recent 2-D echocardiography was relatively unremarkable; however, the patient's Cardiolite stress test revealed a possible anterolateral defect of the anterolateral wall..." and noted that "attenuation needs to be considered also." ( Id. )
In June of 2006, Fitzpatrick had three cardiac procedures at Advocate Christ Medical Center. (R. 246.) They included a selective coronary angiography, left ventricular angiography, and an angioseal administration. ( Id. ) The procedures were completed without any complications and the following observations were noted by cardiologist Sunitha R. Avula, M.D. ("Dr. Avula"): "minimal luminal irregularities of the right coronary artery in the range of 10% to 20% but no critical stenosis, tortuous coronary arteriography, and preserved left ventricular systolic function." ( Id. )
On September 6, 2006, Nasser Zakieh, M.D. ("Dr. Zakieh") saw Fitzpatrick for a follow up and to review her sleep study. (R. 245.) Dr. Zakieh noted that during her last visit, Fitzpatrick's "apnea hypopnea index" was 6.4 with a minimum oxygen saturation of 72%. ( Id. ) He also noted that Fitzpatrick may need oxygen supplementation and that she may suffer from chronic obstructive pulmonary disease due to her history of heavy smoking. ( Id. ) Dr. Zakieh recommended that Fitzpatrick lose weight and participate in a continuous positive airway pressure titration sleep study. ( Id. )
Fitzpatrick's blood tests from June 2, 2008, indicated that she had a suboptimal glycemic control level of 12.3%.[2] (R. 258.) Fitzpatrick had additional blood tests on April 15, 2009, which indicated that she again had a suboptimal glycemic control level of 14.7%. (R. 278.) Another blood test in January of 2010 indicated her glycemic control was 13%. (R. 275).
On May 28, 2009, Dr. Francis Jamilla, performed a pulmonary function test on Fitzpatrick to evaluate her shortness of breath. (R. 255.) Spirometry testing suggested a low FVC[3], a normal FEV-1[4], and a supranormal FEV-1/FVC[5] ratio. ( Id. )
On January 4, 2010, Claimant visited Dr. Avula for a follow-up appointment, and to have her disability forms signed. (R. 271.) During this visit, Fitzpatrick reported knee and back pain, walking restrictions, smoking one pack of cigarettes a day and that she "didn't go back for her CPAP, " machine to treat her sleep apnea. ( Id. ) Claimant also reported dyspnea with exertion, but the physician noted that Fitzpatrick did not have chest pain or palpitations. ( Id. )
On January 26, 2010, Fitzpatrick again visited Advocate Christ Medical Center and complained of pain in her hip, back, and knee, and of her inability to stand for long periods of time. (R. 269.) She further explained that she took Ibuprofen and Tylenol to help alleviate this pain. ( Id. ) Fitzpatrick also stated that she needed her scooter to travel long distances. (R. 270.) During this visit, Dr. Avula ordered x-rays of Fitzpatrick's back, hips and knees. (R. 281-83.) Dr. Avula's review of Fitzpatrick's back x-ray revealed "lumbar spondylosis with facet arthritis" and "degeneration of the L5-S1 disc." (R. 281.) Dr. Avula noted that Fitzpatrick's hip x-ray indicated that there were vascular calcifications, "no significant bony or soft tissue pathology, " and "inferior lumbar spondylosis." (R. 282.) Dr. Avula's review of Fitzpatrick's knee x-rays also revealed vascular calcifications with a finding of "osteoarthritic changes in the knees greater on the right." (R. 283.) The main point of this visit was "to have disability forms signed." (R. 269.)
On February 17, 2010, Dr. Mahesh Shah conducted an independent medical evaluation at the request of the Bureau of Disability Determination Services for the State of Illinois. (R. 299-302.) Dr. Shah noted that Claimant did not seem to suffer from acute distress and walked into the office without an assistive device. (R. 300.) Dr. Shah also noted that Claimant's hips and knees revealed mild tenderness without any swelling or deformity. (R. 301.) He also noted Claimant's lumbar range of motion: flexion was seventy degrees, extension was ten degrees, and straight leg raising was thirty degrees bilaterally. ( Id. ) From these observations, Dr. Shah concluded that Claimant had a full range of motion. ( Id. ) Additionally, he noted that Claimant's gait was normal but slow, that Claimant was able to heel-walk and toe-walk with some discomfort, and that Claimant was able to partially squat. ( Id. ) Dr. Shah concluded that Fitzpatrick was suffering from arthritis in the lumbar spine, hips, and knees, from high blood pressure and diabetes, which are medically controlled, and from heart disease, which was previously treated with an angioplasty with stenting. (R. 302.) Lastly, Dr. Shah noted that Claimant was mildly obese, which could exacerbate her medical problems. ( Id. )
On March 3, 2010, Dr. Charles Kenney, an independent medical consultant, issued a Physical Residual Functional Capacity Assessment ("RFC"). (R. 290-97.) Dr. Kenney found that Claimant could stand and walk for up to six hours in an eight hour workday and sit for a total of six hours in an eight hour workday, and he recommended that she avoid concentrated exposure to fumes and odors. (R. 291, 294.) He stated that Fitzpatrick's "exam in its entirety was within normal limits." (R. 292.) Dr. Kenney's conclusions were based on Claimant's medical records; he did not examine her personally. (R. 291.)
Fitzpatrick visited Oak Forest Hospital on April 22, 2010, for hyperglycemia, hypertension, and to refill her prescription medications. (R. 329.) Claimant reported her pain as zero. (R. 326.) Her hyperglycemia was reported at 720.29 and her hypertension at 401.29. (R 329.) Fitzpatrick visited Oak Forest Hospital again on August 28, 2010 to refill a prescription. (R. 355.) Claimant reported her pain as one out of ten, and complained of having achy arms for the past year. (R. 353, 355.)
On May 26, 2010, Dr. Young-Ja Kim, a medical consultant, affirmed Dr. Kenney's RFC issued on March 3, 2010. (R. 305.) Dr. Kim noted "claimant indicates no worsening of impairments, no new limitations, no new allegations, an updated treating source, and no changes in ADLs." ( Id. )
On November 25, 2010, Fitzpatrick again visited Oak Forest Hospital for a refill of her prescription medication. (R. 362.) At this visit, she reported a pain level of three on a scale of 1 to 10, with ten being the worst. ( Id. ) Her primary concern during this visit was pain and swelling in both feet. (R. 365.) Claimant visited Oak Forest Hospital again on February 25, 2011 for another refill of her prescription medications. (R. 374.) Her pain level was not recorded during that visit. (R. 372, 373.)
C. Claimant's Testimony
At the time of the June 27, 2011 hearing, Fitzpatrick, a sixty-year old woman, weighed 240 pounds and lived with her brother. (R. 37.) Fitzpatrick testified that she completed tenth grade high in high school and that she had experience as a hospital housekeeping supervisor. (R. 37-38.) Fitzpatrick had a driver's license and testified that she had no problems driving. (R. 37.)
Fitzpatrick testified that because of issues with her back, hip, and feet, she has been unable to work since June of 2009. (R. 42.) Fitzpatrick testified that her back problems, which began in 2008, worsened in 2009 and 2010. ( Id. ) Fitzpatrick also testified that she had swelling and numbness in her feet daily and pain in her back and hip. (R. 48.)
The Claimant testified that she used a motorized scooter for the last five years that she worked at the hospital. (R. 39.) Claimant also testified that, although she did not have a prescription for the scooter, she used it every day at her prior job as a hospital housekeeper. (R. 39-40.) Fitzpatrick testified that she used the scooter at work because she could not do all the walking required by her position. (R. 39.) Claimant testified that, without the scooter, she can only walk half a block or stand for about five minutes before her knees, hips, and back start hurting, and she must sit down to rest. (R. 40.) Claimant also testified that for the past year, she relied on a cane when walking short distances and when her scooter is not available. (R. 42.)
Additionally, Fitzpatrick testified about her neuropathy, diabetes, and shortness of breath. (R. 43-45.) Regarding her neuropathy, Claimant testified to having symptoms of numbness and sharp pains at night for approximately the past three years. (R. 43.) Regarding her diabetes, Claimant testified that she did not always follow her diet, but checked her sugars daily, and complied with all of her prescriptions. (R. 43-44.) She also testified to experiencing breathing problems, specifically shortness of breath, when walking. (R. 44.) Claimant also testified to smoking about a pack and a half of cigarettes a day. ( Id. )
Claimant testified about her daily activities. (R. 45-48.) Fitzpatrick described a typical day as waking up, eating breakfast, and alternating between sitting in a chair and lying down due to her back pain. (R. 45-46.) She has no hobbies, and keeps herself occupied by watching television. (R. 45-46.) Fitzpatrick testified that she can do chores such as cleaning, washing dishes, and laundry for approximately five minutes at a time. (R. 45-46.) Fitzpatrick indicated that she no longer has the energy required for a full-time job and has to take naps during the day as she is not able to sleep through the night. (R. 47-48.)
D. Vocational Expert's Testimony
Roy Pagello ("VE"), a vocational and rehabilitation consultant also testified at Fitzpatrick's hearing. (R. 49-54.) The VE reviewed Claimant's file and was present throughout the hearing. (R. 49.) The VE testified that Fitzpatrick worked as a head hospital housekeeper for twenty-five years, which was a skilled position with a light level of physical tolerance. (R. 50.) The VE also testified that housekeeping, within the hospital setting, has a medium level of physical tolerance, but that Claimant performed at a light level because of the accommodation which allowed her to use a motorized scooter. ( Id. )
The ALJ asked the VE to determine if a hypothetical individual with the same educational and work background as the Claimant, who is only able to perform light work that involves no concentrated exposure to respiratory irritants, would be able to find jobs such as her past work as a head hospital housekeeper. ( Id. ) The VE testified that, yes, Claimant would be able to do her past work, both as performed by the hypothetical person and as generally performed. (R. 50-51.) However, the ALJ and VE noted that the role of head hospital housekeeper requires industry specific skills that are not directly transferrable to other sedentary occupations. (R. 51.)
The ALJ also asked the VE if this same hypothetical individual would be able to find a job as a hospital housekeeper if she required an accommodation of a motorized scooter in order to do the job. ( Id. ) The VE responded that she would not be able to find such a job. ( Id. ) The VE further stated that his testimony was consistent with the information contained in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles ("DOT"). ( Id. )
A. Standard of Review
This Court must affirm the ALJ's decision if it is supported by substantial evidence and free from legal error. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Steele v. Barnhart, 290 F.3d 936, 940 (7th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla of evidence and includes "relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Diaz v. Chater, 55 F.3d 300, 305 (7th Cir. 1995) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). We must consider the entire administrative record, but we will not "re-weigh evidence, resolve conflicts, decide questions of credibility, or substitute our own judgment for that of the Commissioner." Lopez v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 535, 539 (7th Cir. 2003)(quoting Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 869 (7th Cir. 2000)). We will "conduct a critical review of the evidence" and will not let the Commissioner's decision stand "if it lacks evidentiary support of an adequate discussion of the issues." Id. Though the ALJ "must build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to his conclusion, " he need not discuss every piece of evidence in the record. Dixon v. Massanari, 270 F.3d 1171, 1176 (7th Cir. 2001). The ALJ must "sufficiently articulate [her] assessment of the evidence to assure us that the ALJ considered the important evidence... [and to enable] us to trace the path of the ALJ's reasoning.'" Carlson v. Shalala, 999 F.2d 180, 181 (7th Cir. 1993)( per curiam ) (quoting Stephens v. Heckler, 766 F.2d 284, 287 (7th Cir. 1985)).
B. Analysis Under the Social Security Act
To be entitled to disability insurance benefits under the Act, the claimant must establish that she is disabled. A person is disabled under the Act if "he or she has an inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of a medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). In determining whether a claimant is disabled, the ALJ must consider the following five step inquiry: "(1) whether the claimant is currently employed, (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment, (3) whether the claimant's impairment is one that the Commissioner considers conclusively disabling ("a listing-level impairment"), (4) if the claimant does not have a conclusively disabling impairment, whether she can perform her past relevant work, and (5) whether the claimant is capable of performing any work in the national economy." Dixon, 270 F.3d at 1176. The claimant has the burden of establishing a disability at steps one through four. Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 885-86 (7th Cir. 2001). If the claimant reaches step five, the burden then shifts to the Commissioner to show that "the claimant is capable of performing work in the national economy." Id. at 886.
The ALJ followed this five-step analysis, though she determined that she did not need to reach step five. At step one, ALJ Sayon found that Fitzpatrick had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since June 20, 2009, the alleged disability onset date. (R. 20.) At step two, the ALJ found that Claimant's diabetes mellitus, hypertension, obesity, lumbar degenerative disc disease, osteoarthritis of the bilateral knees, coronary artery disease, and sleep apnea were severe impairments. ( Id. ) At step three, the ALJ determined that Claimant did not "have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525 and 404.1526)." (R. 21.) Next, the ALJ concluded that Fitzpatrick had the RFC to "perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b), involving no concentrated exposure to respiratory irritants." ( Id. ) At step four, the ALJ determined that Claimant was able to perform her past relevant work, both as she performed it and as the job is generally performed. (R. 23.) As a result, ALJ Sayon determined Fitzpatrick is not disabled and the analysis did not proceed to step five. (R. 24.) The ALJ found that Claimant has not been under a disability from June 20, 2009. ( Id. )
C. The ALJ Properly Analyzed the Medical Evidence
Fitzpatrick argues that the ALJ failed to properly analyze the medical evidence. Specifically, Claimant argues that the ALJ was required to resolve a conflict regarding Claimant's medical evidence, that the ALJ failed to consider that the state agency doctors did not assess Claimant's full medical records, and that the ALJ erred by speculating about the opinions of Claimant's physicians.
The ALJ is not required to address every piece of testimony and evidence in the record. Diaz, 55 F.3d at 308. However, the ALJ cannot discuss only the evidence that favors her ultimate conclusion. Id. at 307; Godbey v. Apfel, 238 F.3d 803, 808 (7th Cir. 2000). The Seventh Circuit has stated that "[w]here a claimant argues that there are fatal gaps or contradictions in the administrative law judge's opinion, thus appealing to the important principle of administrative law that the agency provide a rational articulation of the grounds of its decision, we give the opinion a commonsensical reading rather than nitpicking at it." Johnson v. Apfel, 189 F.3d 561, 564 (7th Cir. 1999).
First, Fitzpatrick argues that the ALJ was required to resolve the conflict posed by the fact that she has flexion of 70 degrees and extension of 10 degrees and the fact that state agency doctors opined that she has no postural limitations. However, Claimant fails to direct the Court to evidence in the record which illustrates that these two facts pose a conflict. In fact, this Court's review of the record reveals that in addition to finding that the Claimant has flexion of 70 degrees and extension of 10 degrees, the examining physician also noted that "the claimant had a fairly good range of motion." (R. 302.) Consequently, it seems no conflict exists, and that it was proper for the ALJ to rely on the state agency doctor's finding that Fitzpatrick had no postural limitations even though she has some limits in flexion and extension. Because the record reflects that the ALJ properly considered the available medical opinions, this Court cannot order a remand based on Claimant's argument that an unresolved conflict of medical evidence exists.
Next, Claimant argues that Dr. Kenney and Dr. Kim did not base their opinions on her medical record in its entirety and that ALJ Sayon failed to evaluate the supportability of their opinions. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(3) requires an ALJ to consider the supportability of a medical opinion when deciding what weight to give that medical opinion. The more consistent an opinion is with the Claimant's record, the more weight the opinion will receive. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(4). Claimant argues that there is no evidence indicating that Dr. Kenney and Dr. Kim considered treating records from Dr. Avula. Claimant, however, fails to identify what in the record confirms that Dr. Kenney and Dr. Kim did not base their opinions on the Claimant's entire medical record. Claimant also fails to point to medical evidence that discredits their medical opinions. Nor has she offered a treating physician's opinion that contradicts opinions of the state agency doctors. Because the ALJ's decision to give the state agency doctors' opinions great weight is supported by substantial evidence and because an ALJ is not required to provide a complete recitation of every piece of evidence, we see no reason to remand on this issue. Diaz, 55 F.3d at 305.
Finally, Claimant argues that the ALJ erred by speculating about the opinions that Claimant's treating physicians may have. Specifically, the Claimant believes that ALJ Sayon improperly speculated that Claimant's treating doctor did not support her disability claim because the disability forms that were presented to the doctor "were not submitted for inclusion into the record." (Pls. Brief at 9.) However, Claimant's argument does not show that the ALJ committed any legal error.
Claimant argues that White v. Apfel requires the Court to remand because, "[s]peculation is, of course, no substitute for evidence, and a decision based on speculation is not supported by substantial evidence." 167 F.3d 369, 375 (7th Cir. 1999). In White, "[t]he ALJ speculated that the probate court might have released the funds if Mrs. White had pursued the claim more vigorously.'" Id. In White, the ALJ arrived at this conclusion without any evidence from the record. Here, however, the Commissioner correctly points out that, "the ALJ appropriately considered Dr. Auula's [sic] notations regarding Plaintiff's presentation for disability and with disability forms. She reasonably concluded that if Dr. Auula [sic] had completed such forms and supported Plaintiff's claim, Plaintiff would have submitted completed forms." (Defs. Resp. at 6.) White is distinguishable from the instant case because the ALJ in White improperly speculated, without any evidence, on a possible outcome, where ALJ Sayon properly arrived at an inference based on Plaintiff's medical records. White does not apply here because ALJ Sayon made an inference based on evidence rather than a mere speculation. Therefore, we see no need to remand on this issue.
D. The ALJ Improperly Assessed Claimant's Credibility
Fitzpatrick argues that the ALJ improperly assessed her credibility by failing to consider her impairments in the aggregate, improperly considered her lack of prescription for her assistive ambulating devices, and improperly considered her failure to comply with medical treatment without probing Claimant for this failure. Fitzpatrick argues that ALJ Sayon improperly dismissed her allegations of pain, fatigue, and difficulties with standing, walking, and stair climbing. This Court agrees.
An ALJ may not disregard a claimant's statements about the intensity and persistence of pain solely because they are not supported by objective medical evidence. SSR No. 96-7p at 3. The Seventh Circuit has reiterated that "a lack of medical evidence alone is an insufficient reason to discredit testimony." Villano v. Astrue, 556 F.3d 558, 562 (7th Cir. 2009). When assessing a claimant's allegations of pain, "an applicant's disabilities must be considered in the aggregate." Martinez v. Astrue, 630 F.3d 693, 699 (7th Cir. 2011). Additionally, it may be the case that sometimes "obesity or some other health condition merely aggravates a disability caused by something else; it still must be considered for its incremental effect on the disability...." Gentle v. Barnhart, 430 F.3d 865, 868 (7th Cir. 2005). The Seventh Circuit has also explained that an "ALJ can appropriately consider a claimant's daily activities when assessing the alleged symptoms." Craft v. Asture, 539 F.3d 668, 680 (7th Cir. 2008).
Here, the ALJ, in a conclusory manner, stated that Fitzpatrick's "allegations are not supported by the medical opinions of record or the objective medical evidence." (R. 23.) ALJ Sayon did not articulate why the Claimant's medical records did not support her allegations of pain and in doing so, failed to "build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to his conclusion." Dixon, 270 F.3d at 1176. The ALJ failed to give specific reasons for discrediting Fitzpatrick's testimony of her alleged pain. Martinez, 630 F.3d at 697.
This same deficiency exists in the ALJ's dismissal of Claimant's allegations of her limited ability to perform daily activities and ability to ambulate, without accounting for Claimant's impairments in the aggregate. ALJ Sayon mentioned Fitzpatrick's obesity, but the ALJ's decision does not indicate that her conclusions were made in light of the affect, if any, that Fitzpatrick's obesity may have on her musculoskeletal impairments and her ability to perform daily activities and her difficulties with standing, walking, and stair climbing. The Commissioner failed to address this shortcoming in its response brief.
In assessing Fitzpatrick's credibility, the ALJ also improperly considered Fitzpatrick's lack of a medical prescription for her assistive ambulating devices and Claimant's failure to comply with medical treatment without probing her on this issue. Fitzpatrick argues that "the ALJ failed to properly develop the record, and inquire whether Plaintiff's scooter, cane and walker use was indeed a medical necessity.'" (Pls. Brief at 14.) The Claimant is partially correct; the ALJ has a duty to develop the record before determining the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(3). However, the Claimant bears the burden of proving the case at steps one through four. Briscoe v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 352 (7th Cir. 2005). Therefore, Claimant, through the assistance of her counsel, was responsible for developing the record regarding her need for a cane or scooter. But because Claimant's need for these devices is not easily ascertainable from the record, the ALJ should not have drawn an inference without a proper inquiry. Before discrediting the Claimant for lacking a medical prescription for her ambulating devices, the ALJ should have probed the Claimant's alleged need for these devices. It is unreasonable to discredit a Claimant's use of an assistive ambulatory device without a prescription, as a prescription is not required in order to use a cane or a motorized scooter. Parker v. Astrue, 597 F.3d 920, 922 (7th Cir. 2010).
Similarly, the ALJ discredited Claimant because she failed to follow through with her prescription for a CPAP machine. The burden to develop the record regarding this omission falls on the Claimant, but the ALJ should have at least attempted to determine why Fitzpatrick opted to disregard the prescription, especially if she were going to use that fact to evidence a lack of credibility.
Because the ALJ erred in improperly assessing Fitzpatrick's credibility by failing to consider Claimant's impairments in the aggregate, improperly considering Claimant's lack of prescription for her assistive ambulating devices, and improperly considered Claimant's failure to comply with medical treatment without probing Claimant for this failure, remand is warranted. On remand, the ALJ must make a proper inquiry into the effect Fitzpatrick's obesity has on her musculoskeletal impairments and her ability to ambulate. Additionally, should the ALJ rely on the Claimant's use of an assistive ambulatory device without a prescription and her failure to comply with her physician's CPAP prescription to assess Claimant's credibility, the ALJ must make a proper inquiry as to these omissions.
E. The ALJ Did not "Impermissibly" Substitute Her Lay Opinion For That of the Physician
Fitzpatrick next argues that the ALJ erred by considering her assessment of the entire medical record and state agency employee observations. The Social Security Administration has explicitly stated that an ALJ "must also consider any observations about the individual recorded by Social Security Administration employees during interviews...." SSR No. 96-7p at 14. Here, Claimant argues that the ALJ improperly relied on recorded observations made by a Social Security Administration Field Office employee. However, SSR No. 96-7p directs ALJs to consider these observations in making their credibility determinations. Thus, the ALJ did not err in considering state agency employee observations.
Claimant also argues that the ALJ impermissibly substituted her own lay opinion for that of the physician when analyzing the Claimant's x-rays of her spine. Particularly, the Claimant is troubled by the ALJ's recitation of the evidence, stating, "x-rays of her lumbar spine showed only lumbar spondylosis with facet arthritis and degeneration of the L5-S1 disc" (emphasis added). (R.23.) Claimant reads this recitation of Claimant's medical records as the ALJ "implying the objective findings reported on x-ray were insufficient to cause the symptoms and disabling effects reported." (Pls. Brief at 12.) Claimant's argument is misplaced. We cannot speculate as to what the ALJ implied in adding the adjective "only" to the physician's findings of Claimant's x-rays. Because the ALJ did not substitute her lay opinion for that of the physician when determining Claimant's credibility, remand is not warranted for this issue.
F. The ALJ Improperly Determined the Claimant's RFC
Lastly, Claimant argues that the ALJ improperly determined Fitzpatrick's RFC because she failed to consider if Fitzpatrick's obesity aggravates her sleep apnea and musculoskeletal impairments, and how these aggravated impairments may limit Fitzpatrick's ability to engage in substantial gainful activity. This court finds that ALJ Sayon properly considered the effect Fitzpatrick's obesity has on her sleep apnea, but that the ALJ failed to engage in a similar analysis of the effect Claimant's obesity has on her musculoskeletal impairments.
ALJ Sayon found that Fitzpatrick has the RFC to perform light work, involving no concentrated exposure to respiratory irritants. Engaging in light work includes the ability to lift objects no more than twenty pounds occasionally or ten pounds frequently, a significant amount of walking, and standing or sitting with some pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls. If a Claimant is deemed able to engage in light work, he or she is also deemed able to engage in sedentary work as well. 20 CFR 404.1567(b). In SSR 02-01p, the SSA outlines its policies regarding the role of obesity in disability claims. SSR 02-01p requires an ALJ to consider obesity in determining whether an individual has a medically determinable impairment. SSR 02-1p at 2. If there is no diagnosis of obesity but the evidence includes clinical notes or other medical records showing consistently high body weight, the ALJ should either consult a medical source, or as is done in most cases, use her judgment "to establish the presence of obesity based on the medical findings and other evidence in the case record." SSR 02-01p at 9. Here, ALJ Sayon conducted an individualized assessment and considered the cumulative effects of obesity on the Claimant's functioning and determined that her obesity was severe.
ALJ Sayon acknowledged and discussed the effect of Claimant's obesity on her diagnosed sleep apnea, and explained that it was secondary to her obesity. Additionally, the ALJ noted that Claimant did not follow through with her prescribed treatment for her sleep apnea. Also, the record, including the Claimant's testimony at her hearing, is devoid of the reason why Claimant did not follow through with her prescribed treatment. She cannot expect to be compensated for an ailment that she has not attempted to treat. Remediable conditions are not a basis for an award. Barrett v. Barnhart, 355 F.3d 1065, 1068 (7th Cir. 2004).
In contrast, we do not know what effect, if any, Claimant's obesity has on her musculoskeletal impairments, as the ALJ's analysis does not make mention of it. It may be that the ALJ believed that Fitzpatrick's obesity is remediable and not completely disabling in itself, however, she made no mention of this and we cannot speculate. In considering the Claimant's ability to engage in light work, "the ALJ would have to determine the effect of her obesity on that ability." Gentle, 430 F.3d at 868. "For example, someone with obesity and arthritis affecting a weight-bearing joint may have more pain and limitation than might be expected from the arthritis alone." SSR 02-1p. at 17. On remand, the ALJ must make a proper inquiry into Fitzpatrick's ability to engage in substantial gainful activity given the Claimant's musculoskeletal impairments in conjunction with the effects that her obesity may have on these impairments.
For the reasons set forth above, Fitzpatrick's motion for summary judgment [18] is granted. The Commissioner's motion for summary judgment [29] is denied. This case is remanded to the Social Security Administration for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Additionally, the Commissioner, on remand, may want to consider - especially in light of the testimony that the use of a scooter would actually preclude past employment - whether it might be necessary to make findings at step five. It is so ordered.
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With a student-centered and experience-based curriculum that fosters love of learning, critical thinking skills, and creativity, it comes as no surpsise: KSG students are the national champions of Kenya's National Music and Elocution Competition!
In late spring and early summer, the girls worked tirelessly to prepare for the district level, where they performed poems and songs in both English and Kiswahili. Afterwards, we were informed that SHOFCO students won the district level, sending 13 of our 15 groups to the regional round. At regionals, two of our poetry entries from our Pre-Kindergarten and Kindergarten classes advanced to the national round in Meru, Kenya. Finally, in August, they represented KSG and SHOFCO with outstanding performances of two poems written by their teachers.
Just recently, we received word that these youngest of our students not only won nationals, but also, broke the national record by scoring 95 marks out of 100. This is the second consecutive year that our students have the distinction of national champions--and we couldn't be more proud!
Enjoy this video of the girls performing one of the winning entries composed by Kindergarten teacher, Julia Alubala: "Mom is My Best Friend".
Many thanks from the entire SHOFCO team--it is your support that makes it possible for our young, creative leaders to thrive!
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Arrhythmias, Ablations, Pacemakers, Defibrillators
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Dr Prapa Kanagaratnam is a Consultant Cardiologist at Imperial College Healthcare NHS Trust based at St Mary's Hospital. He regularly treats patients with all forms of cardiac rhythm abnormalities including ablation of tachycardias and implantation of devices such as pacemaker, defibrillators and biventricular systems.He leads a research programme that pioneers treatments for atrial fibrillation using new technologies such as robotic ablation. He sees pateints regualarly with palpitations, faints and breathlessness caused by heart disease, which can be treated by ablation, pacemakers, defibrillators and resynchronisation devices. He also offers 'Watchman Device' for patietns who cannot take warfarin for atrial fibrillation.
To make an appointment, call HCA on +44 (0)20 7079 4399 or
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Registered Number: 03020522; Registered Office Address: 242 Marylebone Road London NW1 6JL.
£500m has been invested by HCA International in the latest medical technologies and facilities over the last 10 years.
Your hospital will be one of our world-class private hospitals: HCA's world-class hospitals are accredited by The CHKS Accreditation Unit, a leading provider of healthcare intelligence and quality improvement services. The accreditation is a measure of the overall quality of a hospital and hospitals with CHKS accreditation have been shown to provide a better quality of service.
Your safety will be protected because we have more critical care beds than any other private hospital group: HCA hospitals achieved 100% compliance with all Care Quality Commission inspected outcomes of care in 2011.
Your treatment will be undertaken using the most advanced diagnostic and treatment facilities: Oliver Wyman, Corporate Accounts: Driving quality and value, January 2012.


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August 17, 2012
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF,v.$44,748.00 IN U.S. CURRENCY, DEFENDANT. GEORGE DECARLO HARRIS AND RICO DEVILLE BUICE, CLAIMANTS.
This action was filed on May 23, 2012 against defendant $44,748.00 in U.S. currency (the "defendant currency"). Notice was given and published in accordance with law. George DeCarlo Harris ("Harris") and Rico Deville Buice ("Buice") (collectively, the "claimants") claim an interest in the defendant currency, but have not filed a claim in this case or answered the complaint. However, claimants would have filed a claim and answer in this case absent this settlement. Plaintiff United States of America and claimants have reached an agreement that is dispositive of the action. No other parties have appeared and the time for filing claims and answers has expired. The parties hereby request that the Court enter this Consent Judgment of Forfeiture.
1. This Court has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this action.
2. Notice of this action has been given in accordance with law. All potential claimants to the defendant currency other than Harris and Buice are deemed to have admitted the allegations of the Complaint. Harris and Buice are relieved of their obligation to file a claim and answer in this matter. The allegations set out in the Complaint are sufficient to establish a basis for forfeiture.
3. The United States of America shall have judgment as to $37,248.00 of the defendant currency, together with all interest earned by the government on the defendant currency and no other person or entity shall have any right, title or interest therein. The United States Marshals Service is ordered to dispose of said assets in accordance with law.
4. $7,500.00, without interest, shall be returned to claimants. The funds to be returned to claimants shall be paid to claimants by wire transfer to an account designated by claimants. Claimants shall provide any and all information needed to process the return of these funds according to federal law.
5. Claimants hereby release the United States of America, its agencies, agents, and officers, including employees, officers and agents of the Drug Enforcement Administration, as well as all agents, officers, employees and representatives of any state or local government or law enforcement agency involved in the investigation or prosecution of this matter, from any and all claims, actions or liabilities arising out of or related to the seizure of the defendant currency or the prosecution of this action, including, without limitation, any claim for attorney's fees, costs or interest which may be asserted on behalf of claimants, whether pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2465 or otherwise.
6. The court finds that there was reasonable cause for the seizure of the defendant currency and institution of these proceedings. This judgment shall be construed as a certificate of reasonable cause pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2465.
7. The Court further finds that claimants did not substantially prevail in this action, and the parties hereto shall bear their own attorney fees and costs.
cc: Fiscal
[Signatures appear on next page.]
Case 2:12-cv-04479-JFW-RZ Document 11 Filed 08/17/12 Page 4 of 4 Page ID #:79
The parties hereto consent to the above judgment and waive any right of appeal.
United States Attorney ROBERT E. DUGDALE Assistant United States Attorney Chief, Criminal Division STEVEN R. WELK Assistant United States Attorney Chief, Asset Forfeiture Section
DATED: August 15, 2012 /s/
JONATHAN GALATZAN Attorneys for Plaintiff United States of America
DATED: August 13, 2012 /s/
George DeCarlo Harris, Claimant
Rico Deville Buice, Claimant
Approved as to form and content:
DATED: August 7, 2012 /s/
RICKY W. MORRIS, JR. Attorney for Claimants George DeCarlo Harris and Rico Deville Buice
© 1992-2012 VersusLaw Inc.
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It's one of the very few innovations in skincare devices. It made Ophra's list of favourite things. And yet, many experts caution about its use. I'm talking about the Clarisonic (although, everything in this post is true for its many clones as well). What is it, and why is it so controversial?
What is Clarisonic?
Put it simply, the Clarisonic is an electric toothbrush for skin. Developed utilizing the same technology previously used to cleanse teeth, it features a soft and gentle brush that oscillates back and forth over the skin at sonic speed. According to a 2006 study (done by the makers of Clarisonic), "the net result is the inelastic comedones become loosened and detached from the infundibular wall and are then cleared from the acroinfundibulum," which is just a fancy way of saying it can dislodge impurities in the pores. The brush can also remove dirt, makeup, and dead skin's cells.
A cleansing or an exfoliating system?
Clarisonic is marketed as a cleansing, rather than an exfoliating, tool. That's probably why they recommend using this device twice a day, in the morning and at night. They're trying to make you change your cleansing habits, and replacing your usual cleanser with their brush. But while the Clarisonic can cleanse skin well, it also removes dead skin cells, which is what an exfoliant does. And exfoliating too often, especially if you have dry or sensitive skin, can do more harm than good to the skin.
Why overexfoliation is bad for skin
Exfoliation has many benefits for the skin. By removing the superficial layer of dead skin cells from its surface, you expose the newer, brighter, smoother, and even-toned skin underneath. It also makes fines lines and wrinkles appear smaller. As a result, skin looks younger and healthier. That's not all. Exfoliation also allows skincare products to better penetrate into the skin, enhancing their efficacy. Plus, keeping skin and pores clean also helps prevent breakouts.
But those dead cells are there for a reason. They protect the red and raw skin underneath that's not ready to come to the surface yet. If you remove too much of this protective layer, you'll be exposing it, and that can be very painful! Even if you don't reach raw skin, overexfoliation can disrupt the skin's protective barrier, allowing moisture to escape from the skin, causing dryness. Or worse. When this barrier is damaged, skin is more prone to both irritations and infections.
How often should you use the Clarisonic?
The Clarisonic should be used as an exfoliating device. And not everyone can exfoliate skin manually daily. If you have pretty thick skin, you may be able to use this device twice a day without experiencing any side effects. But if your skin is normal, dry, or sensitive, then using it 2 or 3 times a week may be best. For some people, though, even that is too much. It's all about experimenting to find out what frequency is right for you.
Problem is, this stuff is too expensive for experimentation. You don't want to splurge on it only to discover it's too harsh for your skin! Oh, and be careful what you use it with too. If you use it with a AHAs or BHA based exfoliant (whether during the cleansing process or afterwards), you may be getting too much exfoliation as well. Pay attention to how your skin responds and discontinue use at first sign of imitation.
Can anyone use the Clarisonic?
The brand of course says yes. Their website features several studies claiming the device is gentle and safe for use for everyone, including those affected with mild to moderate acne and rosacea. However, these studies were all commissioned by Clarisonic, and were conducted on a small group of people. Only 14, for example, took part in the rosacea study. Also, they don't provide much information on how the Clarisonic was used or how the results were measured, making it impossible to accurately review the findings.
Experts, though, are cautious. Dr Leslie Baumann, for instance, believes that, while people with thicker skin can safely use the Clarisonic, "anyone with sensitive skin – and acne-prone skin is indeed sensitive – should actually avoid these vigorous scrubbing products, which can exacerbate inflammation. Rosacea and the tendency to experience skin allergies are further indications that you should not be using an abrasive exfoliant or a vigorous cleansing brush. Similarly, anyone with very dry skin should avoid exfoliating, which may compromise an already impaired skin barrier and worsen dryness."
Is the Clarisonic the best way to cleanse and exfoliate skin?
Let's say your skin is not too dry or sensitive, and can take being exfoliated regularly with the Clarisonic. Should you invest in it? The cheapest model costs $99.00, while the brush heads, which must be cleaned and replaced regularly, $25.00. That may be worth it if studies showed it worked better than AHAs, such as Glycolic Acid, or Salicylic Acid. But, as far as I know, no such study has been performed yet.
Clarisonic has, however, commissioned a study to test the cleansing ability of its device. The results showed that the Clarisonic Brush removes 6 times more makeup than manual cleansing. That's both impressive and scary! It makes you wonder how much makeup we have trapped in our skin. Well, if you feel the urge of giving your dirty face a good scrub to remove it all, don't. You don't need to.
The Clarisonic Brush removes 6 times more makeup than manual cleansing indeed. But manual cleansing, according to the study, simply means removing makeup by hand with only water! Everyone who has ever used makeup knows that many products, especially longlasting and waterproof ones, are best removed with oil-based rather than water-based makeup removers. And none of us would dream to take makeup off with water alone! It's just not that effective. Any cleanser would remove makeup better than water only. And was the Clarisonic tested against other cleansers and makeup removers? Of course not! Makes you think, doesn't it?
The Bottom Line
This post is pretty negative, but I don't think the Clarisonic is bad. Not for everyone anyway. Like other exfoliants, it can remove dead skin cells, revealing the brighter, younger-looking skin underneath, and enhancing the penetration of skincare products. But does it do it better than other exfoliants and cleansers on the market? We don't know. What's certain is that using it often, especially if you have dry or sensitive skin, can lead to dryness and irritations. If you're not sure it'll work for you, try a cheaper option, like Olay Pro-X Advanced Cleansing System, which is only $30. Personally, until I see scientific studies confirming it works better than other exfoliants, I'll stick to glycolic acid.


text:
Exhibition in Shrewsbury: 'Heavenly Lights - The Untold Story of Stained Glass Artist Margaret Agnes Rope'Today
A major new exhibition telling the untold story of one of the great female artists of the early twentieth century comes to Shrewsbury this autumn.
Tickets for Father Christmas at Attingham Park in ShrewsburyToday
Step into a winter wonderland and enjoy a traditional visit to Father Christmas in his study in the Mansion (includes small gift).
Blists Hill Victorian Christmas in ShropshireToday
Experience the magic of a Victorian Christmas with family and friends at Blists Hill Victorian Town.
Attingham 1920s Christmas in ShrewsburyToday
Discover Christmas traditions old and new, from the 1920s to the present day at Attingham.
Christmas Grotto in ShrewsburyToday
Santa and his grotto return to Shrewsbury at the Charles Darwin Shopping Centre.
Pantomime in Shrewsbury: Cinderella!Today
Get ready for this year's spectacular, fun-filled, family pantomime at Theatre Severn! TICKETS SELLING FAST
Winter Guided Historic Walking Tours of ShrewsburyToday
Shropshire Council guided tours of our historic market town, daily throughout October and continuing through to Spring 2017.
Headway Shropshire Christmas FairToday
Stalls, entertainment and a raffle at the Oxon Business Park to raise funds for Headway Shropshire.
Shrewsbury Jelly Co-working Day08/12/2016
A casual co-working event for for home workers, freelancers and self-employed people to meet up and socialise.
Elf Day with Bluebird Care Shropshire09/12/2016
Bluebird Care Shropshire is supporting The Alzheimer's Society with their nationwide event to promote awareness of Alzheimer's.


text:
I learned this lesson many years ago when racing to my office and almost hitting another car. It didn't dawn on me that our company's biggest customer, Boeing, was strategically near our regional offices for a reason – to be close by. It also didn't occur to me that those crazy drivers on the road could very well be in one of my next meetings of the day at our biggest customer's offices.
To be fair, I must say that it was icy that cold morning I almost hit another vehicle on the road. I remember the "stare" I gave the other driver, as if it was his fault.
Funny thing was, later that day, I did see him in a meeting where I was the vendor and he was part of the customer team who would be deciding on a vendor to do business with. Fortunately this gentleman had a sense of humor and my company was a good vendor so the end result was positive for me. It isn't always, though.
Last week, a contractor I was working with on a family home project drove through a "ROAD CLOSED" barrier and encountered an angry city employee who was yelling at him to not drive on the closed road – he could get into a serious accident. Our contractor laughed it off. Imagine his surpirse when that city worker turned out to be my brother-in-law, David, who showed up at the same house the contractor was working at. I thought the contractor was thinking that this big relative of mine had followed him to attack him or something. He didn't – it just happened that he stopped by to see me. But it jogged my memory about the earlier story I was involved in since this is something that can happen to anyone.
Your actions and words outside of your office may affect you at your office – so think twice about who you are after work, and what you stand for. If you do something outside of work that shows your perceived character or attitude – it can come back to bite you. Remember it is a small world. What do you stand for, and what don't you stand for? If cutting corners and cheating are who you are – then it makes sense to disregard city "road closed" signs, doesn't it?
In the cases mentioned – there was no bad outcome – however, I have other stories where I cannot use real names – but there were grave consequences for actions made in and outside of work. All I am saying is that there are consequences for all of our actions – just remember that, and know that when you least expect it, someone will see you and associate you with that action. If it is a good one – it could help you immensely. If it is a negative one… well… it could really hurt you.


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Meet sweet girl Rumi! This 2 year old, 12 pound Terrier mix came to us recently from Bakersfield, California from an unfortunate hoarding situation. She has been through many changes recently, and is slowly adjusting to her new surroundings.
She has done well with other dogs his size, and may even do well with cats! Rumi has hair, not fur, which makes her great for people with allergies! We are still getting to know this sweetheart, but we know that with the love, patience, and socialization, Rumi will make an amazing companion.
Right now Rumi is still very timid. She should not live with young children or in a hectic environment. An experienced adopter is preferred.
If you'd like to meet Rumi, please fill out an adoption application!


text:
Randy Couture is done playing with our heart strings and done negotiating, which means no more empty threats of retirement on twitter. After making a statement saying he would fight again only if he got a big fight, which I thought would be an unrealistic demand, has actually come true.
"The Natural" will be meeting Lyoto Machida at UFC 129 on April 30 in Toronto, the promotion's first trip to Canada's largest city. Machida is coming off a very close loss after a three-round battle against Quinton Jackson that could have and probably should have been a draw (even though I scored it for Machida but you can argue with me on the article here). Couture's last fight was against James Toney at UFC 118, which he won by dominating and not being an over-the-hill, one dimensional boxer. Machida is still very high up in the standings towards the UFC light-heavyweight title and this is actually a decent litmus test to see where Randy ranks as well. Machida's slower and methodical pace is perfect for Couture's fighting style and this fight offers some interesting ideas in how the fight could end up, and should tell us for a fact how many more times we will see Couture back in the cage.
GSP is also expected to defend his welterweight title against someone, most likely Jake Shields, because St. Pierre is a national hero and this fight is a huge deal. Cain Velasquez was also expected to defend his heavyweight title for the first time against Junior Dos Santos, except someone forgot to tell Cain about the curse of the UFC heavyweight title, and Velasquez has suffered a shoulder injury that will prevent him from setting foot in the octagon for at least 6-8 months. Any early predictions for Couture VS Machida?


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Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
July 14, 2015
Pittsburgh Action Against Rape, Petitionerv.Department of Public Welfare, Respondent
Argued, June 15, 2015
Page 1079
Appealed from No. 021-12-0500 and 021-13-0479. State Agency: Department of Public Welfare.
Erica N. Burns, Pittsburgh, for petitioner.
Amy Jo Carnicella, Assistant Counsel, Pittsburgh, for respondent.
BEFORE: HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Judge, HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge, HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge.
Page 1080
PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH,
This case of first impression addresses whether privileged or confidential communications between sexual assault counselors and their patients or clients are admissible as evidence in child abuse expungement proceedings. Pittsburgh Action Against Rape (PAAR) petitions for review of the May 27, 2014 oral ruling from an administrative law judge (ALJ) denying its motion to quash a subpoena and directing an employee/counselor, V.W., to testify at an expungement hearing concerning communications that a victim made to her during sexual assault counseling.
Upon review, we conclude that the ALJ's ruling is appealable as a collateral order. In keeping with the express purpose of the Child Protective Services Law (CPSL),[1] specifically, to protect the child from sexual abuse, we further conclude that the language of section 6381(c) of the CPSL, 23 Pa.C.S. § 6381(c), pertaining to statements between counselors and their patients or clients, necessarily includes statements between a sexual assault counselor and a victim of sexual assault (patient/client) and renders them admissible as evidence in expungement proceedings. This conclusion is not only compelled by the plain language of section 6381(c) of the CPSL but also furthers the overarching intent and purpose of the CPSL to " encourage more complete reporting of suspected child abuse" and to provide " protection for children from further abuse." Section 6302(b) of the CPSL, 23 Pa.C.S. § 6302(b). Specifically, section 6302(b) of the CPSL states:
(b) Purpose. --It is the purpose of [the CPSL] to encourage more complete reporting of suspected child abuse; to the extent permitted by this chapter, to involve law enforcement agencies in responding to child abuse; and to establish in each county protective services for the purpose of investigating the reports swiftly and competently, providing protection for children from further abuse and providing rehabilitative services for children and parents involved so as to ensure the child's well-being and to preserve, stabilize and protect the integrity of family life wherever appropriate or to provide another alternative permanent family when the unity of the family cannot be maintained. It is also the purpose of this chapter to ensure that each county children and youth agency establish a program of protective services with procedures to assess risk of harm to a child and with the capabilities to respond adequately to meet the needs of the family and child who may be at risk and to prioritize the response and services to children most at risk.
23 Pa.C.S. § 6302(b) (emphasis added).
Clearly, the CPSL's purpose encompasses not only remedying circumstances of past abuse, but preventing further abuse of children who have already been victimized. Expunction proceedings could render prior protection meaningless if necessary information concerning the circumstances of abuse was precluded and the proceedings relied, instead, only on the alleged perpetrator's statement of facts.
Page 1081
In discussing the underlying purpose of the CPSL, our Supreme Court has stated: " The need to prevent child abuse and to protect abused children from further injury is critical. The legislature sought to encourage greater reporting of suspected child abuse in order to prevent further abuse and to provide rehabilitative services for abused children and their families. The [CPSL] also establishes a statewide central registry for the maintenance of indicated and founded reports of child abuse, as identifying perpetrators of abuse serves to further protect children." P.R. v. Department of Public Welfare, 569 Pa. 123, 801 A.2d 478, 483 (Pa. 2002) (citations omitted).[2]
M.L. instituted administrative proceedings seeking expunction of an indicated report identifying him as the perpetrator of child abuse against his daughter, L.S. On May 7, 2014, the Department of Public Welfare (DPW), Bureau of Hearings and Appeals, acting upon the request of Washington County's Children and Youth Social Service Agency (CYS), served a subpoena on V.W. The subpoena was issued to V.W. in her role as a counselor for PAAR and ordered her to testify at M.L.'s May 27, 2014 expunction hearing. (Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 7a-8a.) It is undisputed that V.W. provided sexual assault counseling services to L.S. (DPW's brief at 2; see PAAR's brief at 6-7.)
PAAR and V.W. filed a motion to quash the subpoena, contending that V.W. is a sexual assault counselor and that her testimony was absolutely privileged pursuant to section 5945.1(b) of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 5945.1(b), because L.S. did not waive the privilege through written consent.[3] (R.R. at 3a-4a.)
At the expungement hearing, the ALJ orally denied the motion to quash and ordered V.W. to testify. The ALJ also denied PAAR's request to stay the proceedings pending appeal and considered,
Page 1082
but did not expressly rule on, CYS's objection that counsel for PAAR be present during V.W.'s testimony. CYS argued that counsel for PAAR should not be allowed to attend V.W.'s testimony because V.W. was not a party to the action and people are not normally allowed to observe expungement proceedings. (R.R. at 14a-15a.)
V.W. testified at the hearing, seemingly without the assistance of counsel, and provided information pertaining to her interaction with L.S. and L.S.'s symptoms. (R.R. at 35a-37a.) On direct examination, V.W. was asked by CYS's attorney, among other things, the following questions:
Q. Now, in the course of your counseling with L.S., did [L.S.] ever describe to you or disclose to you what had occurred to her if anything?
A. Well, you know, she wouldn't go into a lot of detail, which sometimes kids don't. I mean, that's not -- we're not there to be fact-finders or investigators and so forth, you know. Try to encourage the kids to talk as much as they can and they're willing to. But our work, you know, doesn't hinge on that. I'll put it that way.
She did at one point say that her dad had hurt her, had hurt her pee-pee, and that he had scared her. She would talk about being frightened by her father. So that's --
Q. Did [L.S.] tell you how [M.L.] had hurt her pee-pee?
A. No. She didn't go into details with that. . . .
R.R. at 36a.)
At the conclusion of V.W.'s testimony, and despite the content of that testimony, the ALJ found that V.W. " made absolutely no revelations about anything [L.S.] told her concerning the sexual issue here." (R.R. at 37a.)
PAAR and V.W. filed a petition for review from the ALJ's May 27, 2014 ruling from the bench denying their motion to quash and compelling V.W. to testify. By per curiam order dated August 13, 2014, this Court directed the parties to address the appealability of this order.
The ALJ's Order is Appealable as a Collateral Order
Initially, we must determine whether we have jurisdiction over PAAR's appeal. As a general rule, an appellate court's jurisdiction extends only to review of final orders. Rae v. Pa. Funeral Dirs. Ass'n, 602 Pa. 65, 977 A.2d 1121, 1124-25 (Pa. 2009). However, PAAR contends that the ALJ's ruling qualifies as an appealable order under the collateral order doctrine because it involves the potential disclosure of confidential or privileged communications. DPW agrees with PAAR's assertion.
Under Pa.R.A.P. 313(a), an appeal may be taken as of right from a collateral order of an administrative agency or court. Pa.R.A.P. 313(a). An order is an appealable collateral order if: (1) the order is separable from the main cause of action; (2) the right involved is too important to be denied review; and (3) the claim would be irreparably lost should review be denied. Pa.R.A.P. 313(b); Ben v. Schwartz, 556 Pa. 475, 729 A.2d 547, 550 (Pa. 1999). Each prong of the collateral order doctrine must be met before an order may be considered appealable. Melvin v. Doe, 575 Pa. 264, 836 A.2d 42, 47 (Pa. 2003).
Although an order denying a motion to quash a subpoena is generally interlocutory and non-appealable, see Darlington, et. al, 20 Pennsylvania Appellate Practice § 312:46 (2013-2014 ed.), orders involving privileged material are usually appealable under the collateral order doctrine because if immediate appellate review
Page 1083
is not granted, the disclosure of privileged material cannot be undone and subsequent appellate review would be rendered moot. MarkWest Liberty Midstream & Resources, LLC v. Clean Air Council, 71 A.3d 337, 342 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2013). See also Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 583 Pa. 208, 876 A.2d 939, 942-44 (Pa. 2005) (holding that the denial of a motion to quash or withdraw a subpoena was an appealable collateral order because it implicated the work-product doctrine); Schwartz, 729 A.2d at 550-52 (same, statutory privileges). Further, statutory privileges concern important rights rooted in public policy and resolution of their applicability is typically an inquiry separate from the underlying merits of the controversy. See Commonwealth v. Harris, 612 Pa. 576, 32 A.3d 243, 247-51 (Pa. 2011); Jacksonian v. Temple Health System Foundation, 2004 PA Super 450, 862 A.2d 1275, 1280 (Pa. Super. 2004).
Here, the ALJ denied PAAR's and V.W.'s motion to quash the subpoena on the ground that it sought disclosure of privileged communications in violation of section 5945.1 of the Judicial Code and ordered V.W. to testify. In the procedural context of this case, the ALJ's ruling essentially determined that section 5945.1 of the Judicial Code was inapplicable and could not be invoked during V.W.'s testimony as a shield to questioning. On this record, the ALJ's oral order was separable from the main issue of expunction of an indicated report; involved an important right deeply rooted in public policy as reflected by statute; and the asserted privilege would be irreparably lost if review were not had. Therefore, we conclude that the ALJ's order satisfied the requirements of the collateral order doctrine and that PAAR can appeal from this ruling as a matter of right. MarkWest; see also Berkeyheiser v. A-Plus Investigations, Inc., 2007 PA Super 336, 936 A.2d 1117, 1123-24 (Pa. Super. 2007) (" Pennsylvania courts have held that discovery orders involving potentially confidential and privileged materials are immediately appealable as collateral to the principal action." ).
V.W's Testimony is Admissible under Section 6381(c) of the CPSL
On the merits,[4] PAAR argues that the ALJ erred in failing to quash the subpoena because V.W.'s testimony was privileged, per se, under section 5945.1(b)(1) of the Judicial Code. PAAR contends that L.S. did not consent or waive the privilege and that she has a reasonable expectation of privacy that her communications with V.W. will remain protected.
DPW asserts that for purposes of expungement hearings, section 6381(c) of the CPSL displaces or renders inapplicable the privilege codified in section 5945.1(b) of the Judicial Code. For support, DPW directs our attention to T.D. v. Department of Public Welfare, 54 A.3d 437 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2012).
When engaging in statutory interpretation or construction, the objective is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly and to construe every statute, if possible, so as to give effect to all of its provisions. Section 1921(a) of the Statutory Construction Act of 1972 (SCA), 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a). See Concerned Citizens for Better Schools v. Brownsville Area School District, 660 A.2d 668, 671 (Pa.Cmwlth. 1995) (" [W]henever possible, the courts must interpret statutes to give meaning to all of their words and
Page 1084
phrases so that none are rendered mere surplusage." ). Generally, words and phrases within a statute are construed in accordance with their common and approved usage, but technical words and phrases shall be construed according to their peculiar and appropriate meaning or definition. Section 1903 of the SCA, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1903.
Section 5945.1(b)(1) of the Judicial Code, governing confidential communications with sexual assault counselors, states:
(b) Privilege.
(1) No sexual assault counselor or an interpreter translating the communication between a sexual assault counselor and a victim may, without the written consent of the victim, disclose the victim's confidential oral or written communications to the counselor nor consent to be examined in any court or criminal proceeding.
42 Pa.C.S. § 5945.1(b)(1). In relevant part, " confidential communication" is defined as: " All information, oral or written, transmitted between a victim of sexual assault and a sexual assault counselor in the course of their relationship . . . ." Section 5945.1(a) of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 5945.1(a).[5]
Section 6381 of the CPSL, which deals among other things with the admissibility of evidence in administrative expungement hearings, provides in pertinent part:
(a) General rule.-- In addition to the rules of evidence provided under 42 Pa.C.S. Ch. 63 (relating to juvenile matters), the rules of evidence in this section shall govern in child abuse proceedings in court or in any department administrative hearing pursuant to section 6341 (relating to amendment or expunction of information).[6]
* * *
(c) Privileged communications.-- Except for privileged communications between a lawyer and a client and between a minister and a penitent, a privilege of confidential communication between husband and wife or between any professional person, including, but not limited to, physicians, psychologists, counselors, employees of hospitals, clinics, day-care centers and schools and their patients or clients, shall not constitute grounds for excluding evidence at any proceeding regarding child abuse or the cause of child abuse.
23 Pa.C.S. § 6381(a), (c) (emphasis added).
We note that section 5945.1 of the Judicial Code was originally enacted by the legislature on December 23, 1981,[7]
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and section 6381 of the CPSL was later enacted on December 19, 1990.[8] We interpret section 5945.1(b)(1) of the Judicial Code as not in conflict with subsections 6381(a) and (c) of the CPSL; because these provisions of the CPSL are the later-enacted and more specific statutory sections, they must take precedence over section 5945.1(b) of the Judicial Code in the context of expungement proceedings. See section 1933 of the SCA, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1933.[9] While section 5945.1(b)(1) of the Judicial Code is applicable " in any court or criminal proceeding," 42 Pa.C.S. § 5945.1(b)(1), in enacting sections 6381(a) and (c) of the CPSL, the legislature created special and specific protection in child abuse proceedings in court and expungement hearings, which would further the interest and protection of the child victim. 23 Pa.C.S. § 6381(a), (c).
PAAR acknowledges this Court's previous interpretation of section 6381(c) of the CPSL in T.D., where a mother sought expunction of an indicated report identifying her as the perpetrator of child abuse for placing her daughter at imminent risk of physical abuse. At the expungement hearing, CYS offered the testimony of a licensed social worker who provided sexual assault counseling to the mother, who had previously been a victim. The mother objected on the ground that allowing the social worker to testify would contravene section 5945.1(b)(1) of the Judicial Code. The ALJ admitted the testimony of the social worker, albeit while purporting to limit its relevancy.
On appeal to this Court, the mother argued that section 5945.1(b)(1) of the Judicial Code operated as an absolute bar to the social worker's testimony. Citing section 6381(c) of the CPSL, and B.K. v. Department of Public Welfare, 36 A.3d 649 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2012) (holding that spousal confidential communication privilege of section 5923 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 5923, could not be invoked in light of section 6381(c) of the CPSL), this Court disagreed. Instead, we concluded in T.D. that the social worker's testimony was admissible per the plain language of section 6381(c) of the CPSL:
The wording of the statute is clear and consistent with the purpose of the [CPSL] which is to prevent the further abuse of children. Any privileged communication between [the mother] and [the social worker], to the extent that one existed, did not constitute grounds for excluding evidence in the expunction hearing.
T.D., 54 A.3d at 442.
Thus, in T.D. this Court held that the rules of evidence of section 6381 of the CPSL
Page 1086
govern in any child abuse proceeding in court and department administrative hearing pursuant to section 6341 of the CPSL relating to the amendment or expunction of information.
PAAR asserts that T.D. is factually distinguishable because T.D. involved the privilege of an alleged perpetrator of child abuse, whereas in this case the privilege of the victim of sexual assault is at stake. However, PAAR's argument fails to recognize that in T.D. the mother had been a victim of sexual abuse and was asserting the privilege on this ground.
Moreover, our legislature chose not to engraft such a distinction into section 6381(c) of the CPSL. Indeed, section 6381(c) of the CPSL does not contain any self-limiting language depending on who possesses the privilege. Rather, subsections 6381(a) and 6381(c) of the CPSL unambiguously state, without exception, that the " privilege of confidential communication between . . . counselors . . . and their patients or clients shall not constitute grounds for excluding evidence," 23 Pa.C.S. § 6381(c) (emphasis added), in expungement hearings. 23 Pa.C.S. § 6381(a). By their very nature and design, these subsections contemplate that a victim's counselor would be called to testify, since expunction proceedings necessarily involve a victim of abuse.
Consequently, we conclude that T.D. is indistinguishable and that this case falls squarely within T.D. 's holding that section 6381(c) of the CPSL permits the admission of testimony that would otherwise be inadmissible by virtue of the privilege codified in section 5945.1(b)(1) of the Judicial Code. Therefore, in accordance with T.D., we conclude that the ALJ did not err or abuse his discretion in failing to quash the subpoena and ordering V.W. to testify.
We note that PAAR also advances policy-based arguments pertaining to the purported purpose and intent of the privilege in section 5945.1(b)(1) of the Judicial Code, expressing concern that the privilege will eventually be rendered meaningless, and proposing that, notwithstanding section 6381(c) of the CPSL, section 5945.1(b)(1) of the Judicial Code can be preserved to protect the privacy rights of victims of sexual abuse. However, these arguments run afoul of the legislature's clear intent to prevent the exclusion of evidence of child abuse in an expungement proceeding, which evidence, if excluded, might result in further abuse of the child. Clearly, the legislature considered this potential result when it enacted section 6381 of the CPSL and its accompanying rules of evidence.
While both PAAR and DPW state that their primary concern is protecting the child, this concern is disregarded by the exclusion of a sexual assault counselor's testimony regarding child abuse that could result in the expungement of a record and, consequently, allow a perpetrator an opportunity to further abuse a child.
Ultimately, it is the legislature which is in a position to assess, as a matter of social policy, the pros and cons of limiting the use of statutory testimonial privileges in expunction hearings. See Naylor v. Township of Hellam, 565 Pa. 397, 773 A.2d 770, 777 (Pa. 2001) (recognizing the legislature's superior ability to examine social policy issues and determine legal standards so as to balance competing concerns). See also Commonwealth v. Spetzer, 572 Pa. 17, 813 A.2d 707, 724 (Pa. 2002) (Nigro, J., concurring) (advocating that in enacting section 6381(c) of the CPSL, " the legislature made a public policy decision to override" certain testimonial privileges in proceedings involving allegations of child abuse). We nevertheless note that " the sexual abuse of a child obviously is a gravely serious offense," Spetzer, 813 A.2d at 722, and that section 6381(c) of the CPSL, by permitting sexual
Page 1087
assault counselors to testify (over a claim of privilege) to statements of abuse conveyed by a victim, promotes the salutary goal of preventing future abuse.
For the above-stated reasons, we conclude that the ALJ's order qualifies as an appealable collateral order, and further, that the legislature clearly stated that the purpose in the CPSL is to " encourage more complete reporting of suspected child abuse" and to provide " protection for children from further abuse." Section 6302(b) of the CPSL, 23 Pa.C.S. § 6302(b). See P.R. v. Department of Public Welfare, 569 Pa. 123, 801 A.2d 478, 483 (Pa. 2002) (discussing the underlying purpose of the CPSL and stating that " [t]he need to prevent child abuse and to protect abused children from further injury is critical." ). In furtherance of this policy objective, the plain language of section 6381(c) of the CPSL, and our precedent in T.D., we conclude that the ALJ did not err in relying on the same in determining that V.W.'s testimony was admissible in the expungement proceeding and section 5945.1(b) of the Judicial Code was not a legal basis for exclusion.
Accordingly, we affirm.
AND NOW, this 14th day of July, 2015, the May 27, 2014 order of the administrative law judge of the Department of Public Welfare, Bureau of Hearings and Appeals, is affirmed.
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|36 Avaliações
|Tipo de imóvel
|Estadia Mínima
|4 - 5 noites
Esta é uma grande cama 2 apt no Upper East Side, acomoda 4 a 6 pessoas. Uma cama queen size, uma cama de tamanho completo, e uma queen size sofá-cama.
Imóvel localizado no leste da década de 80 a quatro quadras da trens locais e expressa. Cozinha com máquina de lavar louça, sala de jantar, sala de estudo, sala de estar, banheiro e 2 quartos totalmente equipados.
Prédio com elevador. Todos os quartos têm ar-condicionado.
Fornecimentos pequeno-almoço incluído no preço de aluguer ... cereais, pão, leite, suco, chá, café etc ..
Todos os lençóis e toalhas ... apartamento está profissionalmente limpos antes e depois de clientes.
Secador de cabelo, ferro de passar roupa, guarda-sóis fornecidos.
Apartamento foi recentemente pintado e decorado.
Arruelas que funcionam com moedas e Secadoras localizado na cave do edifício.
Acesso à internet em apt.
Telefone para uso local incluído.
Upper East Side:
Este espaçoso apt está localizado na 80 East Ave de entre 1 e York Ave. É apenas uma curta caminhada até o East River, que é popular entre os caminhantes e corredores .... Central Park é apenas um 5-10 minutos a pé.
Linhas de ônibus são apenas um quarteirão de distância, o metrô está na 86th Street em Lexington Ave, ambos os trens locais e expressa, a apenas 4 quarteirões de distância. Apt está perto de todas as comodidades, restaurantes, bares, lojas e serviços. O apt pode acomodar até seis pessoas ... é um prédio com elevador, o apt está no 3 º andar.
The apartment is located in a quiet upper East side street in Manhattan. The building is somewhat old fashioned but it is rather clean and not noisy. The apartment was roomy, clean, offering all the required amenities. It offers a cosy atmosphere, which is precisely what I was looking for.
Great place. Our family of three stayed for 6 nights. Good location to subway and restaurants. We liked the frig being stocked with breakfast items - nice touch. Well equipped apt and maintained property. Nice local feel. All the comforts of home as advertised. We look forward to returning.
Mother and I stayed for 10 nights. We felt totally at home and welcome by The Host. The apt was spotlessly clean and very functional. We particularly required the separating door between the sleeping areas which worked well in this "junior one bedroom" apt. The included WiFi was also most effective. The Superintendent (by way of coordination with The Host) of the building also assisted acutely with a plumbing problem which was resolved precipitously and the delivery of some packages.
The lift was most appreciated. Location wise this property is quite good being very close to the M86+SBS bus and 86th Street subway station (lines 4/5/6 Green). The neighbourhood felt very safe and had a good vibe as well as ample shopping and eating options. We would most definitely stay here again - or anywhere this Host manages.
All was as described and the groceries were a nice touch (although I think we'd prefer it if previously opened items from other guests were disposed-of rather than left in the fridge).
Owner very friendly, but communication was a bit last-minute and so I missed a few messages about our arrival.
Overall a superb location and a good place to experience the lifestyle. I hope the next visitors got the benefit of the free tickets to the Comic Strip Live that we won in their raffle when we went!
Wonderful place - plenty of space for our family of 6. The apartment was clean and they had lots of extras in case we had forgotten toiletries or bedding. Breda & Anita were both very helpful and they had plenty of maps and information on visiting New York.
So myself, mum, dad and brother stayed in Breda's apartment over Christmas and New Year for 16 nights and it was the best decision we have ever made! The apartment is located in a friendly, safe and convenient location. There are cute diners, restaurants, grocery stores etc located around every corner and at reasonable prices as well. Fairways supermarket is a couple of blocks away and has everything you need from organic vegetables, fruits and anything else you need! The subway is a pleasant 10 minute walk and is on the green line so you can get a train directly to midtown in a very short period of time. The apartment itself is very sweet and is definitely comfortable and provides a home away from home. You feel as though you actually live there while you are staying there and I was actually quite sad to leave it. The four of us (all adults) fit quite comfortably in the apartment however any more than 4 would be pushing it. The kitchen area is great and Breda provides every appliance you could possibly need for cooking meals. I would definitely recommend this apartment to anybody travelling to New York, and if I ever go back with either family or friends, I will definitely book this place again.
Entre 1 de Ave e York Ave, perto de Central Park, a uma quadra da Rua 86 ocupado, 4 blocos de todos os trens do metrô, os ônibus a uma quadra de distância, 24 restaurantes hora e Supermercado, Starbucks metade de um quarteirão de distância, a menos de um quarteirão da famosa A Filha de Ryan Bar ... localização perfeita.
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Estadia mínima: 4 noite(s)
Christmas 2016
dez 17 2016 - jan 7 2017
Estadia mínima: 4 noite(s)
abr 7 2017 - abr 23 2017
Estadia mínima: 5 noite(s)
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Estadia mínima: 4 noite(s)
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* Tarifa mensal aproximada. O valor real dependerá dos dias em que você de fato se hospedar no imóvel.


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Item arrived quickly and was exactly as described. Very easy purchase and definitely recommend this merchant.
Burner hanger, 36 inch.
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