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Published: December 25, 1988
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Sabah Museum, Bukit Istana Lama, Jalan Muzium, 88000 Kota Kinabalu, Sabah, Malaysia; Tel. (53199 or , 225033). Open from 8:15 A.M. to 12:30 P.M. and 2:15 to 4 P.M. Monday to -Thursday; 8:15am-12:30pm and 2:15-4:00pm; Fri 8:15 to-11:15 A.M. and 2:15 to -4:00 P.M. on Friday. Free admission. Brunei Museum
Borneo's youngest museum is in Brunei, which dominated the region in the 16th century. This sultanate, scarcely larger than Delaware with a population of 227,000, is one of the wealthiest countries in the world, thanks to oil discovered in 1929 and natural gas in 1965.
At the invitation of Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin, uncle of Brunei's present ruler, Mr. Harrisson of the Sarawak Museum, came to Brunei in 1950 to study the feasibility of a museum and concluded that ''the status, history and culture of Brunei'' justified building a museum at Kota Batu, once an important trading center four miles from the present capital of Bandar Seri Begawan. Queen Elizabeth II opened the musem on Feb. 29, 1972.
The Brunei Museum is a long three-story building on a wooded hill, overlooking the Brunei River. The 120-acre site includes the archeological area. Excavations and surface work at Kota Batu have yielded 110,000 stoneware and porcelain shards, dating as far back as the Tang period (A.D. 618 to 907), as well as some 10,000 earthenware shards, which are all in the Brunei Museum collection.
The pride of the museum is the brassware collection, displayed in the Borneo Room. There are huge brass containers with molded designs, gongs and everyday utensils. The museum's 500 brass cannons are one of the finest such collections in the world. Cannons were used to defend the land from pirates, to decorate boats as status symbols and used as dowries. They were fired to announce a birth or death, a local festival, an enemy attack or the arrival of an important visitor.
In another gallery, traditional snares and traps used for hunting and fishing are shown with elaborate dioramas.
Another gallery is devoted to Brunei's petroleum and gas industry. Panels show the history of the oil and gas industry and there are scale models of drilling rigs, simulated drilling operations and a lecture theater.
Flora and fauna of Brunei are also displayed. Eagles, hornbills, reptiles, monkeys and other animals are shown in their natural habitat.
Other exhibits in the Borneo Room include ancient silverware, handwoven cotton sarongs with gold thread and traditional bridal accessories such as embroidered mattresses, bedscreens and pillows. Kenyah wood carvings are similar to those found in Sarawak. In another gallery are Chinese stoneware and porcelain, demonstrating trade links between Brunei and China as far back as the 14th century. The Brunei Museum also acquired several fine collections of antique Chinese bronzes, ivories and gold ornaments from private collectors.
Just down the hill, a large building stands on the riverbank, clearly intended to symbolize a longhouse but resembling a cement factory. The Brunei Museum of Malay Technology, which opened last February, is a $7 million gift from the Royal Dutch-Shell Group to mark the restoration of Brunei's indepndence.
Designed to show traditional technology from 1880-1950's, the museum's collection is still meager. There are models of Dusun, Kedayan and Morut longhouses and the cultural artifacts normally found in them: musical instruments, basketware and farm implements. There is also a machine used to make flour from sago palm. Brunei Museum, Kota Batu, Bandar Seri Begawan 2018, Brunei Darussalam; Tel. (02-23727, or 02-44545). Open from Tues-Sun 9:30 A.M. to -5:00 P.M. Tuesday to Sunday, Fri 9:00 - to 11:30 A.M. and 2:30 to -5:00 P.M. Friday. Free admission. Churchill Museum
More accessible is the Churchill Memorial Museum in the center of the capital. Designed in the form of a crenelated crescent, the Churchill Museum is a tribute to Sir Winston for his role in World War II and his struggle for freedom. It was commissioned by the former Sultan of Brunei and was opened by his son, the present ruler, Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah Muizzadien Waddaulah in 1971.
The museum contains a collection of Churchill memorabilia, manuscripts, photographs and models, illustrating the different phases of his life as a boy, war correspondent, writer, artist, soldier, orator and statesman.
As if to balance this link to the colonial past, part of the Churchill Memorial Building is devoted to Brunei's Constitutional History Gallery. Opened for independence celebrations on Feb. 23, 1984, this exhibition includes all treaties, agreements and regulations affecting Brunei's boundaries and its constitutional and administrative structure.
Churchill Memorial Museum, Jalan Sultan, Bandar Seri Begawan 2085, Brunei Darussalam (02-25354). Open 9 A.M. to noon and 2 to 5 P.M. - Wednesday to Monday. Free. IF YOU GO The Seasons Borneo is a hot, tropical land with the heaviest rains coming between December and March, but sudden downpours can arrive at any time. Getting There Malaysian Airline System (M.A.S.) operates daily flights to Sarawak and Sabah from Singapore and Kuala Lumpur and to Brunei five times a week. Royal Brunei Airlines and Singapore Airlines also offer service. Where to Stay Rates at the following places are for two people in a room.
In Kuching, Sarawak - Aurora Hotel (082-240281), center of town, $38 to $48.
In Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei - Ang's (02-43553), center of town near the Churchill Memorial, $50 to $87.
In Kota Kinabalu, Sabah - Jesselton (088-55633), center of town, $64 to $72. M. H.
Photos of Borneo; map of Borneo (NYT)


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July 13, 2006
INSTALLATION SERVICES, INC., PLAINTIFF,v.CROWN CASTLE BROADCAST USA CORP., SHORENSTEIN REALTY SERVICES, L.P., ELECTRONICS RESEARCH, INC., DEFENDANTS.
In October 2004, Installation Services, Inc. (ISI) sued Electronics Research, Inc. (ERI), Crown Castle Broadcast USA Corp., and Shorenstein Realty Services, L.P., asserting a variety of state law claims relating to a construction project on the Hancock building in downtown Chicago. See Installation Svcs., Inc. v. Electronics Research, Inc., No. 04 C 6906 (N.D. Ill.). After the defendants moved for summary judgment, ISI argued that the defendants' motions did not address a number of the claims in its complaint. The defendants responded that ISI's complaint did not give fair notice of these purported claims, and the Court agreed. See Installation Svcs., Inc. v. Electronics Research, Inc., No. 04 C 6906, 2005 WL 3180129, *2-3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 23, 2005). Consequently, the Court dismissed the claims that the complaint inadequately alleged.
On December 6, 2005, ISI moved to amend its complaint to include the dismissed claims. On December 21, 2005, the Court denied ISI leave to amend, concluding that allowing an amended complaint would cause undue delay as well as unfair prejudice to the defendants. On January 3, 2006, ISI filed this lawsuit, determined to have its additional claims heard one way or another. The complaint seeks relief against Shorenstein and Crown Castle for promissory estoppel (Count 1), breach of contract (Count 2), and defamation and tortious interference with prospective economic advantage (Count 3). Shorenstein responded by filing a cross claim and third-party complaint against Crown-Castle and ERI, respectively, seeking indemnity. Shorenstein has also filed a counterclaim against ISI for negligence (Count 1), conversion (Count 2), promissory estoppel (Count 3), and breach of contract (Count 4). The Court has consolidated the two cases for trial.
The parties have now filed five motions for summary judgment. Shorenstein and Crown Castle have each filed motions for summary judgment on ISI's claims. ISI has moved for summary judgment on Shorenstein's counterclaim.*fn1 ERI has moved for summary judgment on Shorenstein's third-party claim, and Crown Castle has moved for summary judgment on Shorenstein's cross-claim. For the following reasons, the Court grants Shorenstein's motion against ISI in part and denies it in part, grants Crown Castle's motion against ISI in part and denies it in part, denies ISI's motion against Shorenstein, grants ERI's motion against Shorenstein, and grants Crown Castle's motion against Shorenstein.
Familiarity with the facts of the case is presumed. See Installation Svcs., Inc. v. Electronics Research, Inc., No. 04 C 6906, 2005 WL 3180129, *1 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 23, 2005). Any additional facts that are relevant to the case are discussed in the legal analysis that follows.
Summary judgment is proper when the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, presents "no genuine issue as to any material fact" such that 'the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). See also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). In applying this standard, all disputed issues of fact are to be resolved in favor of the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)
1. Shorenstein's Motion for Summary Judgment against ISI
a. Promissory Estoppel
Shorenstein has moved for summary judgment on all three counts of ISI's new complaint. The first count proceeds on a promissory estoppel theory and alleges that Crown Castle's employee, Ray Tattershall -- acting as an agent for Shorenstein -- told ISI to buy a winch and that he "would get the money" for ISI. The complaint further alleges that after ISI purchased the winch, which cost more than $270,000, ISI was never repaid by Crown Castle or anyone else.
Under Illinois law, a plaintiff seeking to recover on a promissory estoppel claim must prove that the defendant made an unambiguous promise to the plaintiff upon which the plaintiff reasonably and forseeably relied to his detriment. Vajda v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 253 Ill. App. 3d 345, 356, 624 N.E.2d 1343, 1350 (1993). Shorenstein has moved for summary judgment, arguing that no jury reasonably could find that Crown Castle's alleged promise was unambiguous. Shorenstein also argues that "there is no evidence that Crown Castle ever unambiguously promised that Shorenstein would reimburse ISI for the cost of this equipment." Shorenstein Mem. at 2 (emphasis in original).
Tattershall's alleged promise, which specified the type of winch ISI should buy and assured ISI that it would be reimbursed, was not too indefinite or ambiguous to satisfy the first element of a promissory estoppel claim. Unlike a promise to loan money that does not specify an interest rate or duration for the loan, Demos v. Nat'l Bank of Greece, 209 Ill. App. 3d 655, 661-62, 567 N.E.2d 1083, 1088 (1991), or a promise to provide employment that does not specify a salary or position, Sembos v. Phillips, 376 F.3d 696, 704 (7th Cir. 2004), a promise to reimburse a promisee's particular expenditure -- even if it does not specify a price -- is not too indefinite to be relied on. See Chatham Surgicore, Ltd. v. Health Care Svc. Corp., 356 Ill. App. 3d 795, 801, 826 N.E.2d 970, 975 (2005) (holding promise to reimburse plaintiff for health care costs unambiguous); Truck City of Gary, Inc. v. Schneider Nat. Leasing, 814 N.E.2d 273, 279 (Ind. App. Ct. 2004) (Indiana law; holding that promise to reimburse plaintiff for truck repairs could support judgment in favor of plaintiff on promissory estoppel theory). Accordingly, a jury reasonably could find that the promise was unambiguous.
Shorenstein also argues -- in cursory fashion -- that ISI cannot recover on its promissory estoppel claim because "there is no evidence that Crown Castle ever unambiguously promised that Shorenstein would reimburse ISI for the cost of this equipment." Shorenstein Mem. at 2 (emphasis in original). Shorenstein concedes, however, that Crown Castle was acting as Shorenstein's agent on the Hancock project, see Shorenstein Resp. to ISI Mot. for Summ. Judg. at 7. As such, Shorenstein was liable for Crown Castle's broken promises, so long as those promises were made with actual or apparent authority. See Phipps v. Cohn, 139 Ill. App. 3d 210, 213, 487 N.E.2d 428, 431 (1985). Shorenstein does not argue that Crown Castle exceeded its authority in making the promise.
For this reason, a jury reasonably could find that Crown Castle's promise was legally binding on Shorenstein. The Court denies Shorenstein's motion for summary judgment on Count 1 of ISI's complaint.
b. Breach of Contract
ISI's breach of contract claim is based on a July 30, 2001 letter from Crown Castle's agent Mead Elliot to ISI's president Ron Romano. The letter states in relevant part as follows:
This letter is intended to confirm our understanding of certain principal terms regarding the performance by [ISI] of work in connection with the East Tower improvement project at the John Hancock Center in Chicago, Illinois.
We have discussed and generally agreed upon a scope of work to be performed in connection with the antenna improvement project. A portion of the project involving the removal of the existing CBS antenna and the removal of the existing pole structure is described in the AIA, A107 Limited Scope Project Agreement among ISI, [CBS], and SRI Michigan Avenue Venture, LLC[,] which is being signed today. As we discussed, the parties anticipate entering into one or more additional agreements with ISI with respect to additional portions of the overall antenna improvement project.
By signing this letter, ISI agrees that it will perform the scope of the work discussed to date for an amount not to exceed $1.3 million (including the amount payable to ISI under the Limited Scope Project Agreement referred to above). Such acknowledgment, of course, will be subject to the execution and delivery of one or more additional contracts in substantially the form as that which is being signed today for the antenna and pole removal work, and to the understanding that the scope of work will not change substantially from that which has been discussed.
Pl. Compl., Ex. A. The letter is signed by Mead Elliot and Ron Romano.
Shorenstein contends that summary judgment is proper on ISI's breach of contract claim because the purported contract contains no "definite and certain" terms. It also maintains that the contract is indefinite because it only refers to "additional agreements," which were apparently never executed. Neither argument is a basis for summary judgment. First, the July 30 letter contains more than enough agreed-upon terms to constitute a contract. The parties agreed upon a price and a description of the work to be performed. It is true that the letter does not itself describe the scope of the work but rather refers to an agreement arrived at during a previous discussion. ISI has, however, offered evidence that in those discussions, the parties agreed that the work would include "[t]he takedown of CBS's antennas, the antennas that were on the side of the tower; pull down the tower; rebuild the tower; and install the new antenna systems and the transmission line feeding system." Romano Dep. at 33. This description of the work along with a price of $1.3 million is sufficiently detailed for a jury to find the contract binding on both parties. See Lankton-Ziegle-Terry and Associates, Inc. v. Griffin, 156 Ill. App. 3d 765, 766, 509 N.E.2d 785, 786 (1987).
Regarding Shorenstein's second argument, Illinois courts routinely enforce preliminary contracts that are made in the context of ongoing negotiations. See Dawson v. Gen. Motors Corp., 977 F.2d 369, 374 (7th Cir. 1992) (citing Quake Construction, Inc. v. Am. Airlines, 141 Ill. 2d 281, 565 N.E.2d 990 (1990); Borg-Warner Corp. v. Anchor Coupling Co., 16 Ill. 2d 234, 6 156 N.E.2d 513 (1958)). It makes no difference whether the contract contemplates future agreements that never materialize, so long as the court can discern sufficient agreed-upon terms. See Dawson, 997 F.2d at 374 ("The fact that a formal written document is anticipated does not preclude enforcement of a specific preliminary promise.").
Shorenstein also argues that ISI's breach of contract fails because after Romano signed the July 30 letter, he discovered there were some terms with which he no longer agreed. We see no reason why Romano's after-the-fact realization that he agreed to a contract with unfavorable terms would alter the binding nature of the contract. Regardless, Shorenstein has cited no case law in support of its argument. Consequently, the argument is forfeited for present purposes.
Because a jury reasonably could find that Shorenstein breached a contract with ISI, the Court denies Shorenstein's motion for summary judgment on Count 2 of ISI's complaint.
c. Defamation
ISI's defamation claim against Shorenstein is based on two alleged statements by John Kapp, in which he said that "ISI was not qualified or competent to do the work on the Hancock project" and that ISI was "overcharging" or "gouging" on the project. Shorenstein has moved for summary judgment, arguing that these statements cannot support an action for defamation because they are statements of opinion. See Doherty v. Kahn, 289 Ill. App. 3d 544, 557, 682 N.E.2d 163, 172 (1997).
For purposes of defamation law, Illinois classifies opinions into two different groups: "pure opinion," in which a speaker states the facts on which he bases his opinion and then expresses a comment, and "mixed opinion," in which a speaker states an opinion that appears to be based on facts that have not been disclosed. Quinn v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc., 276 Ill. App. 3d 861, 866, 658 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (1995). When a mixed opinion gives rise to the inference that undisclosed facts justify the opinion expressed, it may be actionable. Doherty, 289 Ill. App. 3d at 557. To determine whether a statement is a fact or an opinion based on undisclosed facts, courts evaluate the totality of circumstances, including whether the statement has a precise core of meaning; whether the statement is objectively verifiable; whether the literary context of the statement implies that it has factual content; and whether the broader social context in which the statement appears implies fact or opinion. See Brennan v. Kadner, 351 Ill. App. 3d 963, 969, 814 N.E.2d 951, 958 (2004).
In Hopewell v. Vitullo, 299 Ill. App. 3d 519, 701 N.E.2d 99, 104 (1998), the plaintiff sued the defendant for remarking that the plaintiff was "fired because of incompetence." The court said that the broad scope of the term "incompetent" meant that it lacked the detail necessary to have a precise and readily understood meaning. Id. The court elaborated that the meaning of the word was particularly elusive "without the context and content of the statement to limit the scope of "incompetent." Id. at 519, 701 N.E.2d at 104. Other cases cited by ISI have held that similarly ambiguous statements are actionable, but in those cases the court found the statements verifiable because of other factual statements made at the same time. See Bogosian v. Board of Educ. of Community Unit School Dist. 200, 134 F. Supp. 2d 952, 957 (N.D. Ill. 2001) ("Standing alone, [the phrase 'unprofessional'] could be construed as a statement of opinion, but the verifiable factual basis for the opinion is clear from the balance of Ms. Gould's statements.");
Barakat v. Matz, 271 Ill. App. 3d 662, 672, 648 N.E.2d 1033, 1042 (1995) (holding statement that "plaintiff's practice was a joke" was actionable, where defendant also said that he examined some of plaintiff's previous patients and found nothing wrong with them); Quality Granite Const. Co., Inc. v. Hurst-Rosche Engineers, Inc., 261 Ill. App. 3d 21, 26, 632 N.E.2d 1139, 1142 (1994) (holding that comments were actionable where defendants said that the contractor failed to complete the project in a timely manner, did not complete punch list items, and did not properly interpret the contract documents, plans, and specifications as bid).
By itself, Kapp's statement that ISI was "not qualified or competent" is too vague to be capable of verification. And ISI has offered no other statements that shed light on the phrase's meaning. As in Honeywell, therefore, the phrase cannot form the basis of a defamation action.
We come to a different conclusion with respect to the alleged statement concerning "overcharging" and "gouging." This statement is similar to the one recently found actionable in Imperial Apparel, Ltd. v. Cosmo's Designer Direct, Inc., - N.E.2d -, 2006 WL 1766708 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006). In Imperial Apparel, the plaintiff and defendant were competing discount clothing retailers. The defendant published a full page ad in the Chicago Sun-Times, which stated that the plaintiff inflated the price and compromised the quality of its clothing. The court said that the defendant's statement suggested that the plaintiff was selling imitation goods of inferior quality and concluded that it could be construed as an opinion based on undisclosed facts. The court noted that the context of the statement -- a competitor's full page ad in a newspaper -- would not ordinarily lead a reader to infer the statement was factual. It nevertheless concluded that a reasonable reader could conclude that the ad was stating actual facts about the plaintiff and the originality and quality of its goods.
In this case, Kapp's alleged statement about ISI overcharging and gouging only relates to price and does not refer to quality. Nevertheless, the context of the statement, another factor we must consider under Brennan, is more associated with a factual assertion than would be the case with a competitor's advertisement in a newspaper. Kapp's alleged statement was made during a business meeting in which people responsible for supervising the Hancock project were discussing whether the project was proceeding according to plans. A reasonable person would expect, in this professional setting, that one would not accuse a contractor of overcharging unless the opinion were based on facts. Accordingly, the Court denies Shorenstein's motion for summary judgment on ISI's defamation claim in Count 3 of its complaint.*fn2
d. Tortious Interference with Prospective Economic Relations
In its tortious interference claim, ISI alleges that Shorenstein's allegedly defamatory statements prevented it from securing future business from CBS. To prevail on a claim for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, a plaintiff must prove a reasonable expectancy of entering into a valid business relationship, the defendant's knowledge of the expectancy, an intentional or unjustified interference by the defendant that induced or caused a breach or termination of the expectancy, and damage to the plaintiff resulting from the defendant's interference. Anderson v. Vanden Dorpel, 172 Ill. 2d 399, 406-07, 667 N.E.2d 1296, 1299 (1996).
Shorenstein has moved for summary judgment, arguing that ISI has offered no evidence that it had a reasonable expectation of completing the Hancock project. Shorenstein maintains that it "never agreed to ISI's demand of a [twenty-five percent] winter conditions premium[,] and there is no evidence that ISI would be allowed to continue on the project without Shorenstein's agreement to ISI's demand for winter charges." See Shorenstein Mem. at 11. In response, ISI contends that the Court already resolved this issue in its summary judgment ruling in the related case and should not reconsider it here. See Installation Svcs., Inc., 2005 WL 3180129 at *6.
As Shorenstein points out, the issue in this case is distinct from the one we previously decided. In the other case, ISI sued ERI -- not Shorenstein -- for tortious interference, alleging that ERI's defamatory statements convinced CBS to hire someone else to finish the Hancock construction project. ERI responded by arguing that ISI had no legitimate expectation of finishing work on the project because CBS refused to agree to the winter conditions premium. Given the timing of the defamatory statements, however, we concluded that a jury reasonably could find that absent the defamatory statements, ISI would have come to terms with CBS, despite their initial disagreement.
In the present motion, Shorenstein argues that irrespective of any defamatory statements, ISI would not have completed the Hancock project because Shorenstein itself -- not CBS -- would not have approved the winter conditions premium. In addition, Shorenstein maintains that ISI has offered no evidence that it could have continued working on the project without Shorenstein's approval. It is conceivable that the record may contain evidence that disputes this point, but ISI has not indicated what that evidence might be. Instead, it has relied on the evidence and argument it offered in response to ERI's motion for summary judgment in the earlier-filed case. That evidence and argument has no bearing on the argument that Shorenstein has made here.
In sum, ISI has not offered evidence from which a jury reasonably could find that it had a legitimate expectation of completing the Hancock project in light of Shorenstein's refusal to approve the winter condition's premium. Accordingly, the Court grants Shorenstein's motion for summary judgment on ISI's tortious interference claim in Count 3 of ISI's complaint.
2. Crown Castle's Motion for Summary Judgment against ISI
a. Breach of Contract
Crown Castle has moved for summary judgment on ISI's breach of contract claim, arguing that it was not bound by the terms of the letter signed on July 30, 2001 because it signed the letter as an agent acting on behalf of Shorenstein. ISI responds that it did not know who Crown Castle represented and can therefore hold Crown Castle liable.
An agent is not bound by the authorized contracts entered into on behalf of its principal, so long as the agent discloses the name of the principal. See Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas, Health & Welfare Fund v. Pitman, 66 Ill. App. 3d 300, 302, 383 N.E.2d 793, 795 (1978). Where, however, the principal is not disclosed or only partially disclosed, the agent is bound by the contracts into which it enters. See Kimco Corp. v. Murdoch, Coll & Lillibridge, Inc., 313 Ill. App. 3d 768, 771, 730 N.E.2d 1143, 1146 (2000). A principal is partially disclosed when the third party knows that the agent is contracting on behalf of a principal but does not know the identity of the principal. Id.
ISI has offered evidence that it did not know the identity of the principal on behalf of whom Crown Castle was contracting. In his deposition, Ronald Romano testified as follows:
Q: Is it your understanding that Crown Castle was negotiating with you on behalf of someone else?
A: I was just negotiating with Crown Castle for the job.
Q: You don't know whether Crown Castle was negotiating with you on behalf of the CBS or the FM Group or Shorenstein?
A: No. I know the tower going up was for the broadcasters, but I only negotiated with Crown Castle.
Q: Do you know whether Crown Castle was negotiating with ISI on behalf of those broadcasters?
A: No. I was just negotiating with them for the job. Who they were negotiating with, I wasn't privy to. I know the customers that's all.
Romano Dep. at 10-11. Though Romano later contradicted this testimony, when he said, "I think [Crown Castle] represented everybody. I think CBS, Shorenstein," Romano Dep. at 520, an internal contradiction in a witness' deposition testimony cannot be resolved on a motion for summary judgment. See Mears v. Montgomery, No. 02 Civ. 0407BSJMHD, 2004 WL 964093, *21 (S.D.N.Y. May 5, 2004); MCI Worldcom Networks Svcs., Inc. v. Clearwater Drilling, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 9961, 2002 WL 31444940, *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 2002). Because a jury reasonably could find that ISI did not know who Crown Castle represented when it entered into the July 30, 2001 contract, the Court denies Crown Castle's motion for summary judgment on ISI's breach of contract claim (Count 2).
b. Promissory Estoppel
ISI's promissory estoppel claim against Crown Castle -- like the one against Shorenstein -- is also based on Crown Castle's alleged promise that payment for the winch "would be taken care of." Crown Castle has moved for summary judgment, arguing that the promise was too ambiguous to be enforced and that ISI could not have reasonably relied on the promise because it knew that Crown Castle was acting as an agent for someone else.
The Court has already rejected Crown Castle's argument regarding the ambiguity of the alleged promise to reimburse ISI for the winch. In its second argument, Crown Castle contends that ISI could not reasonably believe that Crown Castle would pay ISI for the winch because it knew that ISI represented Shorenstein and CBS. ISI offers no response to Crown Castle's argument and is therefore deemed to have conceded the point. For this reason, the Court grants Crown Castle's motion for summary judgment on ISI's promissory estoppel claim (Count 1).
3. ERI's Motion for Summary Judgment on Shorenstein's Third Party Claims
Shorenstein has sued ERI in a third party complaint, alleging that ERI must indemnify Shorenstein in the event that Shorenstein is found liable for ISI's wrongful removal from the Hancock project. ERI has moved for summary judgment, arguing that the parties' written indemnity agreement does not cover the acts alleged by ISI in its complaint and that common law indemnity does not apply. "Indemnity provisions contained in a contract are interpreted in Illinois according to the intention of parties." Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Gofen & Glossberg, Inc., 902 F. Supp. 150, 153-54 (N.D. Ill. 1995). In addition, "indemnity provisions are not favored and are strictly construed against the indemnitee." Id.
ERI signed a contract in February 2002 agreeing to indemnify Shorenstein for any claims "arising from [or] relating to the Work." The word "Work" is defined as ERI's antenna erection efforts. Shorenstein seeks indemnity for ISI's claims relating to its termination from the Hancock project, arguing that ERI caused the termination by making defamatory statements to CBS and others. Shorenstein contends that ISI's lawsuit makes claims "arising from or relating to the Work," because they involve the manner in which ERI obtained the "Work."
We reject Shorenstein's argument for the same reasons we rejected its similar argument in the earlier-filed case. See Installation Svcs., Inc., 2005 WL 3180129 at *7. ISI's claims against Shorenstein concern acts that allegedly occurred in the fall of 2001 -- well before the indemnity agreement existed and ERI's antenna erection commenced. For this reason, no jury reasonably could find that the parties agreed to include these claims in their indemnity agreement. See Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 902 F. Supp. at 153-54 ("In this case, there is no evidence that [the indemnity agreement's rules] were in effect when the alleged misconduct took place; on the contrary, the only evidence introduced by the parties suggests that the wrongful act occurred prior to [its] promulgation.").
Shorenstein also argues that it is entitled to implied indemnity. In Illinois, the doctrine of implied indemnity provides that "where one party's breach of contract causes a second party to breach a separate contract with a third party, the breaching party is liable for the second party's liability to the third party." Carrillo v. Jam Productions, Ltd., 173 Ill. App. 3d 693, 697, 527 N.E.2d 964, 967 (1988). As ERI points out, however, Shorenstein has offered no evidence that ERI's breach of a contract with Shorenstein caused Shorenstein to breach a contract with ISI. Shorenstein has offered evidence that ERI caused Shorenstein to breach a contract by making defamatory statements about ISI, but that was well before ERI and Shorenstein entered into their contract. Thus, any breach of the ERI/Shorenstein agreement could not have caused a breach of the ISI/Shorenstein agreement.
For these reasons, the Court grants ERI's motion for summary judgment on Shorenstein's third party claim.
4. Crown Castle's Motion for Summary Judgment on Shorenstein's Cross-claim
Shorenstein has also sued Crown Castle for indemnity, alleging that Crown Castle must indemnify Shorenstein if a jury finds it liable to ISI for Crown Castle's promise to pay ISI a winter conditions premium and Crown Castle's promise to repay ISI for its purchase of an expensive winch. Crown Castle has moved for summary judgment, arguing that Shorenstein has offered no evidence that the parties' written indemnity agreement would cover liability stemming for any such promises. The written indemnity agreement between Crown Castle and Shorenstein is found in the Project Management Agreement (PMA), a contract which was signed on July 31, 2001 by, among others, Crown Castle and Shorenstein. The PMA articulates Crown Castle's obligations as supervisor of the Hancock antenna project.
In Crown Castle's opening memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment, it argues that the PMA could not possibly cover liability for the two promises allegedly made because the PMA only allowed indemnity for property damage and bodily injury. See Crown Castle Mem. at 3. In response, Shorenstein points out another indemnity provision in the PMA, which requires each party "to indemnify and hold harmless the other for any breach by it of any term, provision or requirement of the Agreement." See Shorenstein Resp. 2. Shorenstein contends that Crown Castle's promises breached the PMA because they were not authorized under the PMA.
The problem with Shorenstein's argument is that it fails to indicate where the PMA says that Crown Castle was prohibited from making these promises. Shorenstein points to a cost estimate attached to the PMA, which did not include allocations for a winter conditions premium or winch. Neither the estimate nor any other part of the contract that Shorenstein refers to, however, prohibits Crown Castle from approving costs not included in the estimate. Because Shorenstein has not offered evidence that Crown Castle's alleged promises breached the terms of the PMA, no jury reasonably could find that the PMA requires Crown Castle to indemnify Shorenstein for liability arising out of Crown Castle's promises.
Shorenstein also argues that it should be entitled to implied indemnity. As Crown Castle correctly points out, however, Illinois prevents a plaintiff from recovering under a theory of implied indemnity where the plaintiff and defendant have entered a written indemnity agreement. See Carroll v. Acme-Cleveland Corp., 955 F.2d 1107, 1113 (7th Cir. 1992) (citing Quilico v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 58 Ill. App. 3d 87, 97, 374 N.E.2d 219, 226 (1978)) ("Recovery under a contract providing for indemnity obviates any right to recovery under the common law theory of implied indemnity since by such an express contract the parties have already themselves determined how and under what circumstances losses shall be allocated.").
Shorenstein argues that Carroll and Quilico stand only for the obvious proposition that a party cannot recover under a common law theory of indemnity where a valid indemnity agreement covers the particular claim for which the party seeks indemnification. In Quilico, however, the court quoted at length a passage from Booth-Kelly Lumber Co. v. S. Pac. Co., 183 F.2d 902, 906-07 (9th Cir. 1950), which says that the mere existence of an indemnity agreement between two parties precludes recovery under the common law:
"We also agree with the court below that the question of liability is not to be determined under any common law obligation apart from the contract. We think it is important to examine the rules of the common law in order more accurately to determine the meaning of the written contract . . . . But, since the parties have themselves dealt with the question of indemnity in their written contract, we think it is fair to say that they intended it, rather than some general common law rule, to govern their rights and liabilities in this situation."
See Quilico, 58 Ill. App. 3d at 97, 374 N.E.2d at 226(quoting Booth-Kelly Lumber, 183 F.2d at 906-07). Because Shorenstein and Crown Castle agreed to resolve their indemnity rights through a written indemnity agreement, Shorenstein may not recover under a theory of implied indemnity. For this reason, the Court grants Crown Castle's motion for summary judgment on Shorenstein's cross-claim.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies Shorenstein's motion for summary judgment [docket no. 68 in Case No. 06 C 9] on Counts 1, 2, and the defamation claim in Count 3 of ISI's complaint, but grants Shorenstein's motion for summary judgment on the tortious interference with prospective economic relations claim in Count 3 of ISI's complaint. The Court grants Crown Castle's motion for summary judgment [docket no. 165 in Case No. 04 C 6906] on Count 1 of ISI's complaint, but denies Crown Castle's motion for summary judgment on Count 2 of ISI's complaint. The Court denies ISI's motion for summary judgment on Shorenstein's counterclaim [docket no. 65 in Case No. 06 C 9]. The Court grants ERI's motion for summary judgment on Shorenstein's third party claims [docket no. 61 in Case No. 06 C 9]. The Court grants Crown Castle's motion for summary judgment on Shorenstein's cross-claim [docket no. 169 in Case No. 04 C 6906].
MATTHEW F. KENNELLY United States District Judge
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The Haunted Smile
The Story of Jewish Comedians in America
By (author) Lawrence J. Epstein
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Haunted Smile by Lawrence J. Epstein
Book DescriptionLawrence Epstein's The Haunted Smile tackles a subject both poignant and delightful: the story of Jewish comedians in America. For the past century and more, American comedy has drawn its strength and soul from the comic genius of Jewish performers and writers. An incomplete listing of names makes the point: The Marx Brothers, Jack Benny, Fanny Brice, George Burns, Milton Berle, Jackie Mason, Joan Rivers, Rodney Dangerfield, Mel Brooks, Alan King, Mort Sahl, Buddy Hackett, Woody Allen, Lenny Bruce, Andy Kaufman, Richard Belzer, Jerry Seinfeld. These men and women, among others, form the canon of Jewish-American comedy. In the words of the Detroit Jewish News, The Haunted Smile "offers us a deep and subtle understanding of how Jewish culture and American openness gave birth to a new style of entertainment." Often the best way to illuminate a point is to recount some of these comedians' own brilliant routines, and Epstein uses the comedian's work to great effect, making for a book that is both a thoughtful work of history and a great deal of fun.
Buy Haunted Smile book by Lawrence J. Epstein from Australia's Online Bookstore, Boomerang Books.
Book DetailsISBN: 9781586481629
(210mm x 140mm x 26mm)
Pages: 384
Imprint: PublicAffairs,U.S.
Publisher: The Perseus Books Group
Publish Date: 27-Nov-2002
Country of Publication: United States
Other Editions...
Books By Author Lawrence J. Epstein
Polysomnography, an Issue of Sleep Medicine Clinics, Hardback (December 2009)
Covers such topics as: the History of Polysomnography and Sleep Technology, and Generating a Signal - Biopotentials, Amplifiers and Filters, and Recording sleep; and Electrodes, 10/20 Recording system and sleep system specifications, Respiratory monitoring equipment and detection of respiratory events, and Differentiating Nocturnal Movements.
At the Edge of a Dream, Hardback (August 2007)» View all books by Lawrence J. Epstein
This beautiful book tells the nostalgic tale of how millions of Jewish immigrants entered America through the portal of the Lower East Side. There in New York City they struggled and ultimately flourished in a neighborhood that was the center of Jewish work, family, and culture.
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Author Biography - Lawrence J. Epstein
Lawrence J. Epstein is a Professor of English at Suffolk County Community College in Selden, New York. He is widely considered to be a leading expert on American Jewish life and is the author of such books as A Treasury of Jewish Anecdotes and A Treasury of Jewish Inspirational Stories. He frequently lectures on American popular culture and lives with his wife and family on Long Island, New York.
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"Veli VAros" Top 5 Page for this destination Veli Varos Tip by BruceDunning
Veli Varos, Split: 2 reviews and 10 photos
This is the first suburb on the hills overlooking the old town section and built during the Medieval Age, maybe around 14-5th century. A lot was destroyed during the war with Turks in 17th century and the irony was the first settlement was the result of migrants coming to Split for protection from the Turks back in 14th century. Some stone homes remain and are close side by side to neighbors down very narrow streets, are from those 15-17th century period, and it became and integral part of the city in late 1800's. It sits on a crest that tops at about 1800 feet on toward Marjan hill. There are about 5,000 residents living there today and from what was a poor economic place for the fisherman in years past, it is now a pricey and prestige place to live.
To find the main street to access, and also get u to Marjan be foot, find Krizeva just off Marmontova, and right behind the Trg Rebublic complex. You need to look hard to find it, and even harder to find your way to Marjan, but it does go there.
Website: http://www.split.hr/citylights/14/index_en.html
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Warnings and Dangers (3)See All Marjan Hill-300 Steps or 2 mile Hike
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Food industry ready to cut calories all over the place
The government, which lest we forget is full of grade one WEIRDOS like Philip Hammond and Theresa May, is not satisfied with weakening our booze and then charging us more for it – now the wretched bastards are tampering with our food as well.
A whopping 17 food and drink companies have pledged to cut calories in their delicious goods as part of the war on obesity or something. Additionally, Cadbury's have turned themselves into a laughing stock by agreeing to add resealable packaging on many of their chocolate bars – as if THAT'S going to stop us.
Under the new scheme, every chocolate bar made by Mars will have a cap of 250 calories, while the UK arm of Coca Cola says it will introduce a 30% reduction in some of its soft drinks by 2014. Seriously, what is going to be the point of living?
Sneering tossprick health boss Andrew Lansley reckons that three quarters of the food retail sector will be signing up to his joyless scheme. We demand to know the names of the companies that are giving it a swerve so that we can pledge our allegiance to their wares.
TOPICS: Supermarket Government
10 comments
- SicknoteAbout time, I'm sick to death of seeing fat knackers everywhere.
- BorisI can assure you that the companies will not just make the cans of pop and chocolate bars smaller and charge the same prices.
- jenthats a good idea, having re-sealable stickiness on choccie packets :) I always eat some then put them down and one time i had sellotape on the packet of sweets, for some reason the next moment my sweet packet was on the floor, sellotape stuck to my shoe, and i dragged sweets all across my bedroom floor!. There where white chocolate button with hundreds and thousands on the top, i am still finding the sprinkles in my thick pile carpet now even after many many hoovers!.
- shoplifterJen...admit it....you are on drugs.....
- catweazlePoliticians should stick to fucking up the country and lining their own pockets.
- BorisShhhh catweazle - don't say things like that when there's an election on. Vote Boris - you'll loose pounds!
- Doris"loose pounds"? There will only be one looser in this election Boris and that's you. Well technically there will be that lib dem too but nobody knows who the fuck they are.
- Wonkey H.As long as they don't touch my Cornettos
- DickIf there is a war on obesity, why can't the army just shoot fat people instead?
- Mikhe H.ashfybudvjn.rkvjsdk, apologies, that was my belly hitting the keyboard


text:
Roll over Mick Jagger
Abstract:Roundtable discussion on generational politics, looking at the ways in which generation impinges on politics, particularly in relation to jobs, housing and climate change, and including a discussion on generational cultures. It points to the ways in which the last three decades of market dominance have created a society which does not invest in the future of its young people. Unless politicians plan for the future and intervene to shape the world in the interests of the majority, those at the beginning of their lives will inevitably suffer the consequences.
Keywords: FUTURE; GENERATION; HOMES; JOBS; SUSTAINABILITY; YOUNG PEOPLE
Document Type: Research Article
DOI: https://doi.org/10.3898/136266212802019380
Publication date: 2012-07-20
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- Soundings pioneers thoughtful, critical ideas on culture, society and politics. That's why leading left thinkers from Britain, Latin America, Asia, the United States and Europe debate their ideas in our pages.
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text:
The Lakers got the last thing they ever needed was Kobe Bryant going down. The second to last thing they needed was to lose Dwight Howard in an elimination game due to a second technical foul early in the second half.
It has been a rough season for Dwight Howard. Heck, its been a rough couple of years for the big man. From his inglorious departure from Orlando to his landing in Los Angeles and a rather up and down season where he admitted at one time to not being in playing shape--it just wasn't his year.
In all fairness he had moments of glory and played well at various times throughout the season, but he was nothing compared to the dominant player that he had become famous for in Orlando.
Whether this will be his swan song in LA remains to be seen. The Lakers only got him for this year. Come the official end of this season he will become one of the most sought after free-agents on the market.
With how he played does LA really want him back? Kobe Bryant is towards the end of his career and the team does need a new superstar. Pau Gasol is good, but he can't carry a team.
But at the same time, with the drama that he has shown he can create over the last two seasons who wants to have him? It almost appears as if the only team that he'll be happy playing on is one like he had in Orlando (and remember what he said about them? Hint--it wasn't good).


text:
This hotel is fantastic
The best hotel in chennai..
It was a very pleasant stay I had ever before in my life. Excellent hospitality & enjoyed high tech stay with u. Room electrical switches on iPad is a unique concept... really my kids enjoyed it.
The guest has not left a written review for this hotel


text:
How do you cover the edges of the pipe when making napkin holders? I am using PVC pipe.
By Susan from Trinidad and Tobago
You are supposed to use a small pipe so you will not have any edges to cover.
PVC pipe comes in many diameters.
After sanding the rough (cut) edges of the pipe could you perhaps cover the whole ring with fabric or paper, gluing it on inside and out and then decorate?
Elaine in New York State, USA
Add your voice! Click below to comment. ThriftyFun is powered by your wisdom!


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October 23, 2012
KATHRYN WOODS, AND MELISSA WOODS, PLAINTIFFS,v.TOWN OF CHEEKTOWAGA, CHEEKTOWAGA POLICE DEPARTMENT, OFFICER NEIL C. HELD, OFFICER BRADFORD HEBELER, AND JOHN AND JANE DOE, DEFENDANTS.
Plaintiffs commenced this action seeking damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and New York State law. Presently before this Court is Defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the amended complaint in its entirety. The Court has considered the submissions and finds oral argument unnecessary. For the reasons that follow, Defendants' motion is granted in part and denied in part.
This action stems from the events of February 13, 2010, when Defendant Neil C. Held was dispatched to a domestic disturbance at the residence of Robert Geddes. (Dep. of Officer Neil C. Held at 17-20, Docket No. 11 Ex. C.) Geddes is the father of Plaintiff Melissa Woods' youngest child, and an order of protection was in place between Melissa and Geddes. (Held Dep. at 22; Aff. of Melissa Woods ¶ 8, Docket No. 13-7.) Geddes reported to Officer Held that the two had gotten into a verbal argument, following which Melissa stole Geddes' keys to his residence, thereby locking him out. (Held Dep. at 22.) Geddes further reported that Melissa was intoxicated and operating a vehicle, which he described for Held. (Id. at 22, 27-28.) Officer Held corroborated Geddes' story with a neighbor. (Id. at 25-26.)
Officer Held determined that, based on Melissa's reported behavior, the order of protection had been violated. (Id. at 22.) He located the vehicle in which Melissa was reported to have driven away outside the house of her mother, Plaintiff Kathryn Woods. (Id. at 35.) He then requested assistance, and Defendant Bradford Hebeler arrived sometime thereafter. (Id. at 37.) Officer Hebeler positioned himself by the corner of the house, where he could observe if anyone tried to leave while Officer Held was at the front door. (Dep. of Bradford Hebeler at 18, Docket No. 11 Ex. D.)
Officer Held approached the house, and Kathryn opened the front door. (Held Dep. at 38-39.) Held recalls asking about the whereabouts of Melissa and having "a lengthy conversation eight to ten minutes long" with Kathryn at the door, but he does not recall the specifics of the conversation. (Held Dep. at 39-40.) According to Kathryn, Officer Held questioned her at the door for five to ten minutes, "trying to get me to cooperate and I said, I'll do anything when you come back with a warrant. And I said my daughter could be anywhere, and he said that is it." (Dep. of Kathryn Woods at 43-44, Docket No. 13 Ex. B.) Kathryn further testified that she asked Held for a warrant, but "he wasn't willing to provide that at the time, so I didn't feel I had to answer his questions. I like to cooperate, but I wanted a warrant from him." (Id. at 44.)
Kathryn describes the officers' entry into the home as follows: Officer Held "opened up the front door and he pushed his way, pushed me into the closet door, pushed his way into the living room and I had a phone in my hand and I started to call 911, he grabbed the phone from my hand and he threw it and he proceeded to run up the stairs." (Dep. of Kathryn Woods at 46-48.) Officer Hebeler followed Held into the home. (Id. at 47, 51.) The officers entered Kathryn's room upstairs, where Melissa was sleeping. (Id. at 51-52.) As Officer Held "grabbed [Melissa's] hands, started putting handcuffs on her and pushed the blanket back to be able to get at her," Kathryn noticed that her grandson was also in the bed. (Id. at 52.) Kathryn "reached to protect [her] grandson," and Officer Held "grabbed [Kathryn] around [her] throat with a hand" and said that "he could arrest [her], too." (Id. at 53, 56, 58.)
According to Kathryn, Officer Held then "yanked [Melissa] out of bed" and led her into the hallway. (Id. at 59-60.) Although Officers Held and Hebeler described Melissa as struggling and kicking Officer Held, (Held Dep. at 50, 54; Hebeler Dep. at 25, 28), Kathryn testified that Melissa did not appear to be struggling or resisting. (Kathryn Dep. at 59-60.) Instead:
[S]tanding at the top of the stairs in front of the bathroom [Held] put himself in between me and my daughter and him, and it is hard to go down stairs handcuffed with somebody, he was holding onto her by the handcuffs and he was like yanking her and I said, quit hurting her. And I looked at Hebeler square in the face and I said, are you going to just stand here and watch him do this, and he just looked at me with like no response. And about five, six stairs down [Held]*fn1 kneed her really hard in the back. (Id. at 61-62; Dep. of Melissa Woods at 52, Docket No. 13 Ex. A.) Officer Held told Melissa to "quit resisting," to which Kathryn responded, "she's not resisting." (Dep. of Kathryn Woods at 63.)
Melissa testified that she asked Officer Held to allow her to put her sneakers on, but Held refused and placed her in the police car in bare feet. (Dep. of Melissa Woods at 47-48.) She had a cell phone in her pocket which she used to dial 911. (Id. at 47, 49.) When Officer Held realized that she was on the phone, he grabbed it from Melissa and told the 911 dispatcher that if the dispatcher "reported this that [Held] would have his job." (Id. at 51.) Officer Held then drove Melissa to the police station by "speeding down Walden and slamming on his brakes, kept speeding up and slamming on his brakes, he didn't have me buckled." (Id. at 53.) At least once when Held hit the brakes, Melissa's forehead hit the plastic divider in the police car. (Id. at 53-54.)
Once at the police station, Melissa told a male officer that she "needed medical treatment, that my back was hurting, and my side, my wrist." (Id. at 55.) She also told Officer Held that she needed medical attention when he placed her in a cell, and he responded that he would call Melissa's mother and tell her that Melissa was okay. (Id. at
59.) When Melissa was taken to be fingerprinted, she told a female officer that she needed medical attention because she did not "feel good," and the officer told Melissa that she would not be able to get medical attention until after she saw the judge. (Id. at 61.) Melissa did not receive medical attention until after she was released the next day, and at that time she was diagnosed with a wrist sprain and a sacrum-coccyx contusion. (Aff. of Melissa Woods ¶¶ 44-50.)
Plaintiffs commenced the instant action in Supreme Court for the State of New York, Erie County, in February 2011. (Am. Compl., Docket No. 1 Ex. A.) Defendants removed the matter to this Court shortly thereafter. (Docket No. 1.) Plaintiffs' amended complaint asserts nine different causes of action, including four seeking damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against all named*fn2 Defendants for warrantless entry, deliberate indifference to medical need, and excessive force. Plaintiffs also assert state law claims for battery, assault, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and, as against the Town of Cheektowaga ("the Town") and the Cheektowaga Police Department, negligent hiring, supervision, and training. Defendants now move for summary judgment dismissing the amended complaint in its entirety.*fn3
"A motion for summary judgment may properly be granted . . . only where there is no genuine issue of material fact to be tried, and the facts as to which there is no such issue warrant the entry of judgment for the moving party as a matter of law." Kaytor v. Elec. Boat Corp., 609 F.3d 537, 545 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). A court's function on a summary judgment motion "is not to resolve disputed questions of fact but only to determine whether, as to any material issue, a genuine factual dispute exists." Kaytor, 609 F.3d at 545. "A dispute regarding a material fact is genuine 'if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.' " Weinstock 224 F.3d at 41 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). Further, a court must "construe the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the movant." Dallas Aerospace, Inc. v. CIS Air Corp., 352 F.3d 775, 780 (2d Cir.2003).
A. Municipal Liability under § 1983
Initially, Plaintiffs have conceded that Defendant Cheektowaga Police Department should be removed from the action, (Pls' Mem of Law at 21, Docket No. 13), and that Defendant will therefore be dismissed. See Baker v. Willett, 42 F.Supp.2d 192, 198 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) (a police department is an administrative arm of a municipal corporation and does not have a separate legal identity). Defendants further argue that Plaintiffs' § 1983 claims must be dismissed as against the Town as well. (Defs' Mem of Law at 16-17, Docket No. 11.)
Although an employer may not be held vicariously liable under § 1983, "[a] municipality or other local government may be liable under this section if the governmental body itself 'subjects' a person to a deprivation of rights or 'causes' a person 'to be subjected' to such deprivation." Connick v. Thompson, __ U.S. __,131 S. Ct. 1350, 1359, 179 L. Ed. 2d 417 (2011) (citing Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978)). For example, a plaintiff can establish a municipality's liability by proving that " 'action pursuant to official policy' caused [her] injury." Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1359 (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 691). "Official municipal policy includes the decisions of a government's lawmakers, the acts of its policymaking officials, and practices so persistent and widespread as to practically have the force of law." Id.
Here, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' "conclusory allegations against the Town that it did not adequately train and supervise its officers" are unsupported by evidence that an alleged violation of Plaintiffs' constitutional rights was a consequence of a municipal policy or custom. (Defs' Mem of Law at 16-17.) Plaintiff responds that the Town "has policies or customs which allow officers to forego the necessity of a warrant, to use greater force than is required to effectuate an arrest, to fail to follow the use of force continuum, and to deprive arrestees medical attention, all in violation of [the Town's] own policies and procedures." (Pls' Mem of Law at 21.)
Municipal liability under § 1983 may be established by, among other things, evidence establishing that:
(1) the municipality is aware that its policy for handling a given situation, although not unconstitutional in itself, may be applied unconstitutionally, but nevertheless consciously choose not to train its employees in proper application of the policy; or (2) the municipality's practice, as opposed to its formal policy, is to engage in the constitutional violation at issue.
Green v. City of New York, 465 F.3d 65, 80 (2d Cir. 2006). Here, however, Plaintiff offers no evidence of any alleged constitutional violation other than those involving Plaintiffs themselves on February 13th. Accordingly, there is no evidence from which a jury could infer that the practice of Town police officers entering a home without a warrant, using excessive force, or refusing to provide requested medical treatment was so persistent or widespread "as to imply the constructive acquiescence of senior policy-making officials." Green, 465 F.3d at 80 (quoting Sorlucco v. N.Y. City Police Dep't, 971 F.2d 864, 870 (2d Cir. 1992)).
Further, an alleged failure to train "will trigger municipal liability 'only where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights' of members of the public with whom the employees will interact." Green, 465 U.S. at 80 (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388, 109 S. Ct. 1197, 103 L. Ed. 2d 412 (1989)). "[A]t the summary judgment stage, plaintiffs must 'identify a specific deficiency in the [municipality's] training program and establish that that deficiency is closely related to the ultimate injury, such that it actually cause the constitutional deprivation here." Id. at 81 (quoting Amnesty Am. v. Town of Hartford, 361 F.3d 113, 129 (2d Cir. 2004). Plaintiffs make no attempt to do so here, but instead rely on conclusory assertions of an unwritten policy. The § 1983 claims against the Town are therefore dismissed.
B. Individual Defendants' Liability under § 1983
1. Warrantless Entry In their first cause of action, Plaintiffs seek damages for the entry of Defendants Held and Hebeler into Kathryn's house without a warrant or reasonable suspicion that a crime was being or was about to be committed in violation of Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 43-46.) Defendants argue that exigent circumstances existed necessitating the warrantless entry, specifically Officer Held's reasonable belief that Melissa was in need of immediate aid. (Defs' Mem of Law at 6-9.) This argument is patently without merit.
"Warrantless searches inside a home are presumptively unreasonable." Tierney v. Davidson, 133 F.3d 189, 196 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1980)). "One exigency obviating the requirement of a warrant is the need to assist persons who are seriously injured or threatened with such injury. The need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is justification for what would be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or emergency." Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403-04, 126 S. Ct. 1943, 164 L. Ed. 2d 650 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). In arguing that this exception applies here, Defendants rely primarily on Officer Held's knowledge that Melissa was intoxicated when she drove away from the argument at Geddes' residence. (Defs' Mem of Law at 7.) By the time Officer Held located the vehicle in which Melissa drove away, however, the vehicle was parked and Melissa was inside Kathryn's home. Further, Officer Held testified that a verbal argument had been reported, (Held Dep. at 22), therefore there was no basis for a belief that Melissa had been physically harmed in the domestic dispute that had occurred at another location. Compare with Tierney, 133 F.3d at 197 (reasonable for an officer responding to a domestic disturbance reported to be the "worst yet at this location according to experienced observers" to enter suddenly silent house in light of possible presence of injured person). Notably, although Officer Held asserts his belief that Melissa's "welfare was in question," according to his own testimony, upon waking her in her mother's house, he immediately informed Melissa she was under arrest and handcuffed her. (Id. at 42, 48.) There is no evidence in this record that he in fact inquired into her welfare.
Additionally, because Melissa left the scene of the domestic disturbance, this case is much more akin to Welsh v. Wisconsin. 466 U.S. 740, 743, 753, 104 S. Ct. 2091, 80 L. Ed. 2d 732 (1984). There, the Supreme Court held the warrantless entry of officers into the home of a suspect to effect his arrest for the non-criminal traffic offense of driving under the influence was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 466 U.S. at 743, 753. "[A]n important factor to be considered when determining whether any exigency exists is the gravity of the underlying offense for which the arrest is being made." Id. at 753. Here, the officers entered Kathryn's house for the purpose of arresting Melissa for the prior, not ongoing, offense of violating an order of protection. (Held Dep. at 28, 42, 48.) The little evidence in the record regarding this order indicates that it was a no offensive contact order, not a no contact order. Indeed, there is even less cause for the warrantless entry in this case than in Welsh, where the investigating officers were concerned that "evidence of the suspect's blood-alcohol level might have dissipated while the police obtained a warrant." Welsh, 466 U.S. at 754. Here, by all accounts, no new evidence was obtained by Officer Held after entering the house, and there appears no reason why he could not have obtained a warrant prior to arresting Melissa.
2. Excessive Force Defendants argue that the excessive force claims should be dismissed because "it was objectively reasonable for Officer Held to assist Melissa Woods down the stairs by holding on to the handcuffs and maintaining contact with her shoulder." (Defs' Mem of Law at 12); see generally Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 104 L. Ed. 2d (1989) (claims of excessive force in the course of an arrest, stop, or other seizure analyzed under the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard). Ignoring the well-established standard that the facts on a summary judgment motion must be construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, Dallas Aerospace, Inc., 352 F.3d at 780, Defendants base their reasonableness argument on only the deposition testimony of Defendants Held and Hebeler, who each describe Melissa as resisting arrest and kicking Officer Held on the way down the stairs. (Defs' Mem of Law at 11; Held Dep. at 50, 54; Hebeler Dep. at 25, 28.) The discrepancies between the officers' version and Plaintiffs version cannot be accounted for by subjective differences in perspective. See generally Lowth v. Town of Cheektowaga, 82 F.3d 563, 573 (2d Cir. 1996) (courts must consider the perspective of the officer when considering excessive force claims). Further, Defendants fail to address Melissa's claim that Officer Held caused her injury by driving recklessly, or Kathryn's separate claim that Held grabbed her by the neck. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 39, 57, 68.)
Finally, Defendants' argument that these claims should be dismissed against Officer Hebeler for lack of personal involvement fails to account for Plaintiffs' assertion of a failure to intervene claim against this Defendant. (Id. ¶ 68.) A law enforcement official has an affirmative duty to intervene on behalf of a citizen whose constitutional rights are being violated in his presence by other officers. Curley v. Village of Suffern, 268 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir. 2001). Here, considering the facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiffs, Kathryn testified that Hebeler witnessed Held "yanking" Melissa down the stairs and kneeing her in the back, but did nothing despite Kathryn's express request that he intervene. (Dep. of Kathryn Woods at 60-62.) Accordingly, viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiffs, as this Court must, this part of Defendants' motion for summary judgment must be denied.
3. Deprivation of Medical Treatment Plaintiff alleges that her requests for medical attention after her arrest, made to Officer Held, as well as an unidentified male and an unidentified female officer, were ignored. (Dep. of Melissa Woods at 55, 58-59, 61.) A deliberate indifference to a serious medical condition claim requires a plaintiff to establish that she had a "serious medical condition" that was met with "deliberate indifference." Caiozzo v. Koreman, 581 F.3d 63, 72 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 106 (2d Cir. 2000)). A sufficiently serious medical condition is one "which 'contemplates a condition of urgency, one that may produce death, degeneration, or extreme pain.' " Covington v. Westchester County Dep't of Corr., No. 06-Civ-5369, 2010 WL 572125, *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2010) (quoting Hathaway v. Coughlin, 37 F.3d 63, 66 (2d Cir. 1994)). Here, Melissa asserts that she complained generically of pain, without elaboration as to the severity, and of "not feeling well at all." (Aff. of Melissa Woods ¶¶ 36, 41, 43; Dep. of Melissa Woods at 55, 58-59, 61.) She was diagnosed the next day "with a wrist sprain and a sacrum-coccyx contusion." (Id. ¶¶ 42, 45, 47-48, 50.) There is therefore no evidence from which a jury could conclude that Melissa was suffering from a medical condition that could have produced death, degeneration or extreme pain while in Defendants' care. See Dallio v. Hebert, 678 F.Supp.2d 35, 60 (N.D.N.Y. 2009) ("two black eyes, bruising in his kidney area on his left side, kick marks and open lacerations on his knees, bruising and red spots on his thigh, lacerations on his arms and wrists, a headache, and numbness in his hands and fingers" insufficient to establish a serious medical need); Dzwonczyk v. Syracuse City Police Dept., 710 F.Supp.2d 248, 268 (N.D.N.Y. 2008) (bruised rib did not satisfy sufficiently serious requirement); see also Rodriguez v. Mercado, No. 00 CIV 8588, 2002 WL 1997885, *8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2002) (dismissal of claim warranted where plaintiff failed to adduce any evidence to suggest his injuries "were so urgent or life-threatening that they required immediate care"). Plaintiffs' fifth cause of action is therefore dismissed.
4. Qualified Immunity Defendants argue in the alternative that Officers Held and Hebeler are entitled to qualified immunity because their actions in arresting Melissa were objectively reasonable. (Defs' Mem of Law at 12-14.) "The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials 'from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.' " Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231, 129 S.Ct. 808, 815, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)). As discussed above, this Court has already rejected Defendants' argument that the officers' actions were objectively reasonable, inasmuch as this argument is improperly based on a view of the facts in a light most favorable to Defendants, not Plaintiffs. (Defs' Mem of Law at 14.) Further, although it may have been reasonable for Officer Hebeler to rely on Officer Held's indication of "we are in" to enter the house without a warrant, (Hebeler Dep. at 19); see Micalizzi v. Ciamarra, 206 F.Supp.2d 564, 577 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (objectively reasonable for officer to rely on fellow officer's report), Defendants fail to account for Kathryn's version of events. It appears from Kathryn's deposition testimony that Officer Hebeler was present when Officer Held allegedly pushed past Kathryn, took the phone from her hands, and smashed it on the floor. (Dep. of Kathyrn Woods at 48-49.) Accordingly, there is a triable issue of fact whether any belief on the part of Officer Hebeler that Officer Held obtained consent for the entry was reasonable.
C. The State Law Claims
1. Battery, Assault, and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Plaintiffs assert a claim of battery against Held, Hebeler, and the Town with respect to Kathryn (second cause of action), and claims of battery and assault against Held and the Town with respect to Melissa (sixth and seventh causes of action). Defendants' only argument in support of dismissing these claims is the same as that raised in support of dismissal of the § 1983 claims of warrantless entry and excessive force: "Officer Held's use of force was reasonable given the circumstances he faced and Officer Hebeler used no force against the [P]laintiffs." (Defs' Mem of Law at 14-15.) As with Defendants' earlier arguments, however, this argument is also inappropriately based on the facts presented in a light most favorable to Defendants, without consideration of Plaintiffs' deposition testimony or affidavits.
Further, Defendants fail to address the fact that these claims are also asserted against the Town. "[U]nlike a claim pursuant to 42 USC § 1983, a municipality may be vicariously liable on a state law assault and battery claim for torts committed by a police officer under a theory of respondeat superior." Eckardt v. City of White Plains, 87 A.D.3d 1049, 1051, 930 N.Y.S.2d 22 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2011). Thus, "[t]he remaining state law claim[s] of assault and battery against the [Town are] alive due to the potential for vicarious liability for actions of its police officers as its employees." Williams v. City of White Plains, 718 F.Supp.2d 374, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
Plaintiff also allege a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against Held and the Town (eighth cause of action). This claim must be dismissed as against the Town because, under New York law, " 'public policy bars claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress against a governmental entity' " D'Angelo-Fenton v. Town of Carmel, 470 F.Supp.2d 387, 399 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (quoting Wyllie v. Dist. Attorney of County of Kings, 2 A.D.3d 714, 720, 770 N.Y.S.2d 110 (N.Y. App Div 2d Dep't 2003)); see Lauer v. City of New York, 240 A.D.2d 543, 544, 659 N.Y.S.2d 57, 58 (N.Y. App Div 2 Dep't 1997), lv denied 91 NY2d 807 (NY 1998). The same conclusion is not reached with respect to Defendant Held, inasmuch as Defendants rely solely on the facts and argument that this Court already found insufficient to establish their entitlement to summary judgment on Plaintiffs' other claims. (Defs' Mem of Law at 15 ("[f]or the reasons articulated above, the actions of each of the defendants were objectively reasonable . . .")).
2. Negligence in Hiring, Training, and Supervision In their ninth cause of action, Plaintiffs seek damages for the Town's alleged negligent hiring, training, and supervision of Officers Held and Hebeler. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 101-103.) Defendants argue that this claim must be dismissed because "the negligence alleged is based upon activities relating to an arrest," (Defs' Mem of Law at 17), therefore Plaintiffs "must resort to the traditional remedies of false imprisonment and malicious prosecution and cannot recover under the broader principles of negligence." Pawlicki v. City of Ithaca, 993 F.Supp. 140, 143 (N.D.N.Y. 1998). Unlike the cases on which Defendants rely, however, Plaintiffs' negligence claim here is not duplicative of a false arrest or malicious prosecution claim. Compare with Pawlicki, 993 F.Supp. at 143-44 (claims based on lack of probable cause for arrest); Shea v. County of Erie, 202 A.D.2d 1028, 609 N.Y.S.2d 473 (N.Y. App Div 4th Dep't 1994) (false arrest and unlawful imprisonment based on negligent failure to confirm satisfactory completion of conditional discharge requirement); Boose v. City of Rochester, 71 A.D.2d 59, 62 (N.Y. App Div 4th Dep't 1979) (alleged negligence in investigation by police into identity of criminal defendant before obtaining warrant led to false arrest). Here, Plaintiffs need not challenge whether Officer Held had probable cause for the arrest in order to succeed on their claims.
Nonetheless, this claim must be dismissed. Generally, under New York law, "an employer will be held liable for torts committed by an employee who is acting within the scope of his or her employment under a theory of respondeat superior, and 'no claim may proceed against the employer for negligent hiring, retention, supervision or training.' "
Eckardt, 87 A.D.3d at 1051 (quoting Talavera v. Arbit, 18 A.D.3d 738, 738, 795 N.Y.S.2d 708 (N.Y. App Div 2d Dep't 2005)). "Here, the actions complained of occurred during the arrest and detention of the plaintiff by several police officers . . . . It is beyond dispute that these actions were performed by the officers in the scope of their employment with the [Town]." Eckardt, 87 A.D.3d at 1051. Further, because Plaintiffs have not alleged gross negligence on the part of the Town, the exception to this general rule does not apply. See Coville v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 30 A.D.3d 744, 744-45, 817 N.Y.S.2d 179 (N.Y. App Div 3d Dep't 2006) ("such a claim is permitted when punitive damages are sought based upon facts evincing gross negligence" (emphasis added)); see also Sharapata v. Town of Islip, 56 N.Y.2d 332, 338-39, 437 N.E.2d 1104, 1107 (N.Y.1982) (punitive damages may not be assessed against a municipality).
For the reasons set forth above, Defendant Cheektowaga Police Department is dismissed from the action. Defendants' motion is granted with respect to the § 1983, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent hiring, training, and supervision claims as against the Town, and with respect to the fifth cause of action as against all Defendants. The remainder of Defendants' motion is denied.
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 11) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as stated above.
William M. Skretny
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Baltimore Egg Nog
|6 Tablespoon
|1 Pint
|Dark rum
|350 Milliliter (1/2 bottle)
|350 Milliliter (1/2 bottle)
|2 Pint
|Thick cream
|2 Pint
|1 Teaspoon, grated
1) Into a large mixing bowl, add in the egg whites. Set aside.
2) In a punch bowl, add in the egg yolks. Add in the sugar while beating the yolks. The mixture must end up smooth.
3) Next, pour in madeira, rum and brandy while continuing to beat.
4) Beat the egg whites to form stiff peaks.
5) Into the punch bowl, add in the milk and cream. Whip well.
6) Gently fold in the egg whites into the punch bowl.
7) Serve the Baltimore Egg Nog in punch cups, garnished with grated nutmeg.
Recipe Summary
Rate It
Nutrition Rank
Nutrition Facts
Serving size: Complete recipe
Calories 6836 Calories from Fat 3686
% Daily Value*
Total Fat 418 g643.2%
Saturated Fat 249.6 g1248%
Trans Fat 0 g
Cholesterol 2680.2 mg893.4%
Sodium 1197.1 mg49.9%
Total Carbohydrates 186 g61.9%
Dietary Fiber 1 g4.2%
Sugars 151 g
Protein 89 g177.9%
Vitamin A 331.1% Vitamin C 9.9%
Calcium 192.1% Iron 42.6%
*Based on a 2000 Calorie diet


text: Hello everyone, I've discovered this forum today and it's very interesting with a lot of information about the great ipod Please Register or Log in to view images ! I have some questions that i'm worried about and i hope that you can help me because i didn't find the answers on the others threads. Long time ago, i had an jailbreak iphone and it was very fun to play with it. And now i have an ipod touch 2G for some months. Here is the problem : I wanted to try to jailbreak my ipod touch to customise it and add more apps. My ipod was a 2.2.1 firmware and I read some random tutorial on another websites to jailbreak it. However I didn't really paid attention to these tutorials and installed the firmware 3.0 in a non-official way. After that, everything was fine and I had no problem to jailbreak it but I didn't like it ( more difficult for me to use than before with Installer ). So I restored my iPod touch to the 2.2.1 firmware with the DFU method and itune (didn't have the original one, so i had to get it on the net). However, I liked the new firmware (3.0) and I want to buy it through Itunes and use it like before with the appstore. So here is the question. Can I use my ipod freely like before I jailbreak it ? I mean using the appstore and everything that is related to and purchase the 3.0 firmware on itune ? Is there any risks for me since I "temporarily" upgraded my ipod with a non-official method and jailbreak it ? Because when I buy it like 4 months ago (like most of you) I registered my ipod touch with it serial number and everything on the website of Apple (for the warranty and in case of stealing) and I was wondering if they really care about those things like people jailbreaking their ipod touch or installing firmware ? Thanks you very much for reading this and have a nice day ! PS : Can we pay by paypal or do we have to use visa to pay for an upgrade ?


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Quick Look
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(310) 418-0323
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Rita Nickels
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Property DetailsSpectacular coastline and city views from this custom contemporary home situated in a tranquil country setting. Great indoor/outdoor floor plan for entertaining with spacious grassy yard. First floor offers high ceilings in living room with sliding doors to outdoor patio & garden area. Separate dining alcove and comfortable family room adjacent to the kitchen also lead to the outdoors. A bedroom and bath are also on the first level of this lovely home. Second floor has a cozy mezzanine space that can be used as a wonderful home office with amazing ocean views. The Master has a balcony facing the views plus 2 additional bedrooms and full bath and large bonus room that can be used as playroom or home gym. Great custom home you don't want to miss!
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Additional Property InformationThis rental listing located at 572 Lucero Avenue, Pacific Palisades, CA has four bedrooms and three bathrooms. A contemporary style property, it is currently priced at $7,500.
Includes features like patio.
This property is presented by Rita Nickels of Gibson International Inc. headquartered in California.


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Millau Hotel Club: Find photos, reviews, information, amenities and compare prices for 2 stars hotels in Millau, France.
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Millau Hotel Club offers rooms equipped with a telephone. There are also several rooms specially designed for families.
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text:
Say goodbye to the days of awkward aqua hues (I'm looking at you, 1980's) and hello to a new version of one of your fave colors. It's the POP of pretty that's making this wedding sing, along with beautiful details from A Swanky Affair and gorgeous blooms from Tre Bella Florist. Fall in love with every colorful moment captured by Casey Rose Photography in THE VAULT.
From Casey Rose Photography… When Ben, an attorney in NYC, planned his proposal to Leah, a lawyer in the same firm whom he had met at Duke Law School, he knew it had to be memorable. He decided to trick her into coming to his family cabin under the guise their was an emergency at the house. Being more of a city girl, Leah hated the cabin and dreaded making the journey in the freezing winter temperatures, but agreed to go with Ben. When they arrived, Ben had a surprise picnic awaiting them. Even at the site of the candles and champagne, Leah still thought it was for the workers who were supposed to be coming to help with the fallen tree emergency. She couldn't understand why Ben would choose to propose in a setting that was not her favorite place.
Then Ben told her that he chose that location because it represented everything that made Leah uncomfortable. He wanted her to know that even in darker days – he would always stand by her side. He knew marriage was never easy, but always worth it and he couldn't wait to spend the rest of his days with her.
When it decided to rain every day before the week of their planned outdoor garden wedding, Leah and Ben were content with their Plan B. They knew that even in darker days, their marriage and vows would be the focus of the day. Their positive attitudes were rewarded by sunny skies for the entire morning and afternoon of their wedding. When the final picture was taken, a clasp of thunder and lightning greeted them in celebration and as all the guests and wedding party ran to the tent, they knew they had the most perfect day.
As Reverend Malcolm Roberts said in his blessing, "If you don't believe in miracles, all you had to do was witness the end of Leah and Ben's vows."
Photography: Casey Rose Photography | Cinematography: Jon Clark Weddings | Coordination: A Swanky Affair | Event Planning: A Swanky Affair | Floral Design: Tre Bella Florist | Wedding Dress: Monique Lhuillier | Cake: Details Cake Design | Bridesmaids' Dresses: David's Bridal | Catering: The Catering Company of Chapel Hill | Hair + Makeup: Onloktion Makeup Artistry | Lighting: Get Lit Special Event Lighting | DJ: Bunn DJ Company | Groom's Attire: Ermeneglildo Zegna | Officiant: Rev. Malcolm Roberts | String Quartet: Elegant Ensembles | Transportation: Eco-Style Transportation | Hotel: Kings Daughters Inn | Venue: Sarah P. Duke Gardens | Film Processing: Indie Film Lab | Ice Cream: The Freezing Pointe | Rentals: Party Reflections


text:
- Address Show Map
Kedai Makanan Rasa Lain (Wei Bu Tong in Mandarin) is located at 69, Persiaran Medan Bercham 2, Pusat Bandar Baru Bercham, 31400 Ipoh, Perak.
- Business Hour
5pm - 10pm (Closed on Wednesday)
- Contact Info
012-512 8407, 012 485 3085, 016 567 5349
- Food
Claypot Seafood Porridge, Lala, Fishballs, Vegetables, Salted egg crabs, Claypot Crab with Tang Hoon, Claypot Crab Tang Hoon, Crunchy "Shar Chui" Fish, Saito Fish Ball, "Xiao Bai Chai"(Chinese Cabbage), Signature Claypot Glass Noodle, Cheeze Prawn Claypot,...
- Price
Steamed "Bearded" Chicken-lean, muscled and tender-topped with kei chee and spring onion and coriander leaves (45.00), Steamed Lala (18.00), Claypot Teow Chew porridge with pomfret (Tau Tai Chong) chunks in a tasty and clear broth-tummy warming dish...
- Cuisines
low.b.leong posted foodbin.blogspot.com 474 Reviews
The food was exceptionally fresh and delicious and our favorite was those outstanding big steamed springy fish balls.
taufulou posted www.taufulou.com 650 Reviews
I find the price is quite reasonable as 3 of us ate about RM 110 for all the above. It was another great and satisfying mean that Ian had intro me, as on the way back to KL he stop and buy 2 small bottles of mineral water and mee too. Only found out that the dish uses quite alot MSG as no wonder it taste super good!
enqvist posted www.tasteiest.com 218 ReviewsExceptional
Huge clay pot with 2 crabs cook with glass noodle to served a table of 5 persons. The soup is awesomely delicious with a hint of wine and seafood freshness while the crab meat is very firm and fresh, glass noodle fully absorbing the tasty soup while maintaining it springy texture. No wonder everyone recommended this dish as a must try dish, it really awesome and even the big clay pot just doesn't enough to satisfy us, we are asking for more
- Recommended dishes
- Claypot Glass Noodle Crab
- Labels
- Claypot Glass Noodle Crab, Lemon Steamed Lala, Steamed Fish Ball, Claypot Cheese Prawn
enqvist posted www.tasteiest.com 218 ReviewsExceptional
Rasa Lain is very famous in Ipoh and even popular after Axian visit, we have to call upfront for booking to ensure we got a table. It started to get crowded after 6.30PM and hot seafood like crab and prawn are finish fast.
SUPERB! Sweet, Sour, Salty and Cheeses. Big fresh prawn cook with cheese in claypot, very juicy and delicious. It is best dipped into claypot cheese again after taken off the shell.
- Recommended dishes
- Cheese Prawn and Fish Porridge
- Labels
- Cheese Prawn, Fish Porridge, Braised Pig Tail,
small kucing posted www.smallkucing.com 554 Reviews
Claypot Crab Tang Hoon. This dish have to be eaten very fast else all the soup would be gone. Taste not bad la. Would be nicer if they add more wine into
axian posted blog.axian788.com 86 Reviews
Taste with Jason 阿贤人情味 19 July 09
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text:
Sometimes a soul will choose a particularly challenging lifetime in order to accelerate its spiritual progress, or as an act of love to help others who are also going through a difficult lifetime. A hard life is not a punishment, but rather an opportunity.
Soulmate relationships may last for a day, a year, or for decades. Relationships are measured in lessons learned, not in time.
Past life regressions demonstrate again and again that our loved ones return with us to share our steps and to ease our burdens. Love never ends.