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decided: April 4, 1974.
THE GUARDIAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,v.GEORGE ROBITAILLE, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE
Appeal from a judgment for defendant entered in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut after trial before M. Joseph Blumenfield, Chief Judge, and a jury. Affirmed.
Kaufman, Chief Judge, Feinberg and Mulligan, Circuit Judges. Mulligan, Circuit Judge (dissenting).
KAUFMAN, Chief Judge:
For the private citizen engaged in litigation, the outcome of his lawsuit may profoundly influence the future course of his life whether the issues presented raise questions of constitutional stature and great moment to the Republic, or merely rules of law that allow of limited application and arouse slight jurisprudential interest. In this appeal we consider a single, narrow question of Massachusetts law which will determine whether Guardian Life Insurance Co. (Guardian) can avoid its obligations under four policies issued to Dr. George Robitaille who, subsequent to the issuance of the policies, was diagnosed as having multiple sclerosis. Following a jury trial, Chief Judge Blumenfeld entered judgment for Dr. Robitaille. After careful scrutiny of the facts and the relevant state law, we affirm.
Since a clear understanding of the complex and technical facts is essential to the determination of this appeal, we turn first to the events preceding the litigation. Dr. Robitaille had entered active service as a medical officer in the United States Navy immediately upon his graduation in 1960 from the Tufts University Medical School. According to his testimony at trial, Dr. Robitaille applied for discharge in 1968 but, because of the ongoing hostilities in Vietnam, his application was denied. In 1969, anxious to return to civilian life and to commence the private practice of medicine in Fall River, Massachusetts, he again requested a discharge, and this time his resignation from the service was accepted.
After a complete medical examination by Navy physicians, the doctor was declared in sound health. Accordingly, just prior to his discharge, Dr. Robitaille signed a statement releasing the Navy from responsibility for any medical problems which might develop subsequently. In anticipation of his departure from the service, and on the advice of a local agent for Guardian, Dr. Robitaille purchased four insurance policies:
1. Life Insurance Policy No. 2147543, Face Amount $50,000, with a provision for waiver of premium in the event of total disability, issued July 29, 1969.
2. Disability Income Policy No. G165503, monthly benefit of $800 for total disability, payable for lifetime of the insured, issued Agust 15, 1969.
3. Disability Income Policy No. G165473, monthly benefit of $800 for five years for total disability, with an additional monthly hospital benefit of $400 and accidental death benefit of $1,000, issued August 15, 1969.
4. Professional Overhead Expense Disability Policy No. G164897, monthly benefit of $600 for 12 months, issued June 12, 1969.
In connection with these policies, Dr. Robitaille, who was 34 years old at the time, executed and signed an application, dated June 17, 1969,*fn1 in which he answered questions concerning his medical history. The following questions evoked responses which are at issue in this lawsuit:
8. To the best of your knowledge and belief, have you ever had or been told that you had: (a) a mental or emotional problem requiring the help of a physician or clinical psychologist, dizziness, fainting spells, epilepsy, convulsions, nervous breakdown, recurrent headaches, stroke, or any other disease or disorder of the brain or nervous system?
(e) nephritis, kidney stone, or any disease of the kidneys, bladder, prostate, genital organs, or venereal disease?
Yes. Mild prostatitis in 1967. Treated by Dr. William Urschel, Chief of Urology, Naval Hospital, Newport, R.I.No recurrence since 1967.
(i) anemia, varicose veins or ulcers, phlebitis, disorder of blood?
Yes. Mild saphenous varicosities L leg. No symptoms.
(j) impairment of sight or hearing or any disease or disorder of the skin, ears, eyes, nose or throat?
Yes. Slight bilateral high tone hearing loss secondary to acoustic trauma (gunfire) in Navy 1961. No difficulty, no change in audiograms since then.*fn2
9. Have you had an X-ray, electrocardiogram, blood studies, or other diagnostic test within the past five years?
Yes, as a matter of routine. All normal. Naval Hosp., Newport, R.I.
13. In the past 5 years have you consulted or been treated or examined by any physician or practitioner
(a) not named above?
or (b) for any cause not recorded above?
In his application, Dr. Robitaille specifically authorized Guardian to examine all his medical records, a privilege which Guardian failed to exercise. On July 8, 1969, Dr. Robitaille was examined by Dr. David Greer, a medical examiner for Guardian, who indicated he was a "first class" candidate for insurance. Accordingly, the policies were issued.
Dr. Robitaille's honorable discharge from the Navy became effective July 1, 1969. Believing himself to be in good health, he immediately proceeded to carry out his intention to establish a private practice in Fall River, Massachusetts, an endeavor which incurred the not inconsiderable expenses of renting and staffing a medical office. His career as a private practitioner was, however, short-lived. Several months after his discharge, Dr. Robitaille developed a burning sensation (paresthesias) in both legs. His condition worsened and, when he developed a weakness of the right leg, he was "no longer able to carry on." On November 17, 1969, he entered Massachusetts General Hospital for extensive tests*fn3 which produced for the first time a diagnosis of multiple sclerosis, a tragic degenerative disease of the nervous system. Following his release from the hospital on December 2, he abandoned his new practice and, in order to pursue a less demanding career, joined the staff of St. Mary's Hospital in Waterbury, Connecticut as a hematologist.
The diagnosis of multiple sclerosis not only had a dramatic impact on Dr. Robitaille's future, it also provided a basis for the perfect hindsight with which to view his past medical history. Such 20/20 hindsight is common when a final diagnosis, even one which had evaded the best medical brains, is made. But, the process of diagnosing disease is not unlike that of fitting together a jigsaw puzzle -- seemingly disjointed pieces are suddenly placed in proper juxtaposition only after the critical connection is supplied. Accordingly, after Dr. Robitaille left Massachusetts General Hospital it became possible to surmise that several symptoms he had exhibited prior to his discharge from the military -- symptoms which had been associated by his Navy doctors merely with the ailments revealed in his insurance application -- might, now that everyone was wiser, really have been early indications of neurological disorder.
A brief recitation of the history of his symptoms is in order.*fn4 In early June 1968, Dr. Robitaille experienced some dizziness (positional vertigo) and oscillations of the eyeball (nystagmus) which were attributed by Dr. E. J. Sacks, a Navy otorhinolaryngologist, to the acoustic trauma Dr. Robitaille suffered in 1961. Apparently no treatment was prescribed and these symptoms disappeared completely by the end of July 1968. In October 1968, Dr. Robitaille noticed a blurring of vision in his right eye which Dr. Dunbar Hoskins, a Navy opthalmologist, examined and believed to be caused by congenital nuclear cataracts. Dr. Robitaille disclosed this finding to Guardian's medical examiner, Dr. Greer, but the condition was subsequently recognized at Massachusetts General as a scotoma, or isolated area of depressed vision.*fn5 According to uncontradicted testimony at trial, a scotoma does not necessarily impair vision and, indeed, Dr. Robitaille's vision remained 20/20.
Finally, in early 1969, Dr. Robitaille experienced a "vague sensory disturbance" in his right leg and a numbness in his hands, which he mentioned to Dr. T. A. Grossi during his annual naval physical in April. The numbness was described as a "pins and needles" sensation which Dr. Grossi attributed to Dr. Robitaille's habit of leaning his elbows on his desk as he worked. In addition, Dr. Grossi conducted a complete neurological examination and found no abnormality.
Despite the transitory nature of these symptoms, when Dr. Robitaille traveled to Chelsea Naval Hospital in Boston on official business in April 1969 he described his physical findings to Dr. Leland Patterson, a neurologist. During their casual conversation, Dr. Robitaille asked whether his symptoms could be associated with any neurological disease or multiple sclerosis. Dr. Patterson conducted an unofficial neurological examination (not reported in Navy records) which proved negative, as had Dr. Grossi's several days earlier. Accordingly, Dr. Patterson found, and informed Dr. Robitaille in emphatic terms, that he did not have any neurological disorder.
We observe therefore, a background of unequivocal assurances that no neurological abnormalities were present, and consistent medical opinions that his symptoms were related to the prostatitis and acoustic trauma. Nevertheless, when multiple sclerosis was subsequently diagnosed and Dr. Robitaille was unable to continue his private practice, Guardian sought to avoid liability under the policies because of alleged material misrepresentations in the application, a ground not infrequently asserted when the insurer faces substantial liability. Accordingly, Guardian brought this action to rescind the four policies and to enjoin Dr. Robitaille from making claims for payment.
In its complaint, Guardian contended that Dr. Robitaille's failure to disclose his symptoms when he applied for the policies constituted material misrepresentations which increased the insurer's risk of loss. In his defense to this suit, Dr. Robitaille claimed that his responses on the application adverted to all disorders which had been diagnosed and for which he had received treatment. He urged, moreover, that in light of the disclosure of all his diagnoses (prostatitis, acoustic trauma, optic inclusions) his failure to specify all symptoms underlying those diagnoses did not misrepresent the status of his health -- in fact it was because of the assurances of good health that he entered private practice, incurring the concomitant expenses that flow from opening a doctor's office. In any event, Robitaille also asserted that he had given Guardian complete access to his medical records and upon simple inquiry at Newport Hospital, it could have ascertained his symptoms. Above all, he claimed that the presence of multiple sclerosis, which was not detected until months later could not have been communicated to Guardian in June or July 1969.
After a two-day trial, Judge Blumenfeld, without objection by counsel for Guardian, submitted a single interrogatory to the jury which, after deliberating for only 20 minutes, returned with a response favorable to Dr. Robitaille. Guardian then moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and, after denying that motion, Judge Blumenfeld entered judgment for Robitaille.
Federal jurisdiction in this case derives exclusively from the parties' diversity of citizenship.*fn6 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Judge Blumenfeld found, and the parties agreed, that Massachusetts substantive law governs the case.*fn7 Accordingly, we turn now to the relevant Massachusetts statute, Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. c. 175 § 186, which provides:
No oral or written misrepresentation or warranty made in the negotiation of a policy of insurance by the insured or in his behalf shall be deemed material or defeat or avoid the policy or prevent its attaching unless such misrepresentation or warranty is made with actual intent to deceive, or unless the matter misrepresented or made a warranty increased the risk of loss.
In applying the statutory standard to the circumstances of this case, we note at the outset that Guardian expressly disavowed any intention to prove that Robitaille acted deceitfully. Guardian's disclaimer of liability, therefore, rested entirely on the "increased risk of loss" provision of § 186. Accordingly, we must look to the long-standing line of Massachusetts cases which make abundantly clear that the question whether misstatements in the application increased the risk of loss is, virtually in every instance, one of fact for the jury. See, e.g., Davidson v. Massachusetts Cas. Ins. Co., 325 Mass. 115, 89 N.E. 2d, 201, 204 (1949); Schiller v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 295 Mass. 169, 3 N.E. 2d 384, 388 (1936); Smardon v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 243 Mass. 599, 137 N.E. 742, 744 (1923); Coughlin v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 189 Mass. 538, 76 N.E. 192 (1905); Levie v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 163 Mass. 117, 39 N.E. 792, 793 (1895). Moreover, it is a factual question on which the insurer must bear the burden of proof. See, e.g., Davidson v. Massachusetts Cas. Ins. Co., supra, 89 N.E. 2d at 204; McDonough v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 228 Mass. 450, 117 N.E. 836, 837 (1917).
At the trial, Guardian attempted to sustain its burden by offering the testimony of Dr. Phillips Lambkin, Guardian's Medical Director, and Dr. D. Sergeant Pepper, who had served in a similar capacity for several other insurance companies. Guardian's witnesses testified that knowledge of the symptoms and diagnostic tests omitted from Dr. Robitaille's application was essential to the underwriters who approved the issuance of the policies. In addition, they contend that the numbness, dizziness, nystagmus, and scotoma were potentially related to multiple sclerosis and, therefore, should have been disclosed. Finally, Guardian relied on a statement Dr. Robitaille submitted to the Naval Board of Record Corrections on December 24, 1969, after his multiple sclerosis had been diagnosed. There he recounted the same symptoms he had discussed previously with Navy doctors and concluded that, upon learning of a firm and conclusive diagnosis of multiple sclerosis, retrospection*fn8 led him to the belief that a connection might have existed between his newly diagnosed condition and the earlier symptoms which had been attributed by all examining doctors to other, less debilitating, conditions.*fn9
Robitaille, on the other hand, asserted at trial that when he completed the application he had an honest belief that it would be more useful to the company if he were to reveal the actual diagnoses of physicians, rather than for him to itemize the various symptoms and tests upon which the diagnoses were grounded. We note, moreover, that on cross-examination even Dr. Lambkin made the telling concession that it was "logical" for a doctor to respond to an application for insurance in that fashion. His premise undoubtedly was that the revelation of a diagnosis of disease would necessarily imply to those examining the application that specific symptoms existed and that appropriate tests had been conducted before diagnosis.
Turning now from our general discussion of the positions taken by the parties to the specific facts before us, we note that in the course of his testimony Dr. Robitaille responded clearly to each alleged misrepresentation. Concerning his negative response to question 8a, he stated that the wording of the application from ("dizziness . . . or any other disease or disorder of the brain or nervous system." (emphasis added) required an affirmative answer only if his physical condition rose to the level of a disease of the nervous system.*fn10 Since both he and Dr. Sacks viewed his dizziness, or vertigo, and nystagmus as by-products of the acoustic trauma listed in response to question 8j rather than as neurological disorders, he believed his response to 8a did not require explication. In addition, the numbness in his hands, which Guardian contended may have been neurologically related, was dismissed by Dr. Grossi, after thorough examination, as a common complaint of desk-workers who habitually lean on their elbows, and certainly not noteworthy. Moreover, Dr. Robitaille testified that the particular type of vertigo he experienced (positional) is not typical of multiple sclerosis.
Dr. Robitaille believed also that his response to question 8e, which candidly set forth his mild prostatitis and treatment by Dr. William Urschel, was sufficient. Guardian argued, however, that the doctor should have disclosed that the diagnosis was based on a reduction in force in his urinary stream which culminated in a complete urinary retention on December 7, 1967. But, at the time the retention occurred, Dr. Urschel had performed a cystoscopy (described at trial as a not uncommon diagnostic procedure for determining the cause of prostatitis) and the condition subsided.*fn11
Dr. Robitaille also rebutted the insurer's attacks against his response to question 9, that other diagnostic tests were "routine" and their results "normal." Guardian claimed that the doctor should have disclosed the cystoscopy, a urinanalysis and a glucose tolerance test in connection with the prostatitis; the examinations with regard to the vertigo and nystagmus; and neurological examinations concerning the numbness in his hands. To this claim, Dr. Robitaille reiterated his position that all the tests Guardian cites were either conducted as part of the examinations leading to the specific diagnoses clearly listed on the application or resulted in findings of "no abnormality." Accordingly, in light of Dr. Robitaille's disclosure of all relevant diagnoses and his consent to an examination of the records at Newport Hospital, one must ask whether he nevertheless was under a duty to furnish additional details to Guardian.*fn12
Finally, Robitaille explained his response to question 13 that, in the five previous years, he had not consulted any physicians other than those listed. The doctor testified at the trial that during his years in the service he did not have a personal physician, but, as is customary in the military, saw various doctors for his annual physical examinations and for specific complaints. Since he did not consult any non-military doctors, all his records were compiled and readily accessible at Newport Naval Hospital.*fn13 Having listed the hospital and having authorized Guardian to examine his files, he did not believe it necessary to enumerate the names of the Navy doctors which were fully recited in the Newport records.
Having failed to sustain its burden of proof to the jury's satisfaction, and despite the obviously complex factual questions presented, Guardian now contends that it is entitled, as a matter of law, to judgment in its favor. For this position, Guardian relies on a few cases which have deviated from the well established Massachusetts rule that the question whether risk of loss was increased is one to be determined by the jury. Our exhaustive study of the relevant Massachusetts case law, however, compels the conclusion that this is not one of those aberrant cases which Massachusetts has narrowly circumscribed, in which the jury's verdict can be lightly overturned. We believe, therefore, that Judge Blumenfeld was entirely correct in entering judgment for Dr. Robitaille.
In every case cited by Guardian for its position that the verdict should have been upset, the insured party had a grave and debilitating disease which had been discovered prior to the application for insurance.*fn14 See, e.g., Pahigian v. Manufacturers' Life Ins. Co., 349 Mass. 78, 206 N.E. 2d 660 (1965) (Hodgkins' disease); Brown v. Greenfield Life Ass'n., 172 Mass. 498, 53 N.E. 129 (1899) ("consumption"); Rainger v. Boston Mut. Life Ass'n., 167 Mass. 109, 44 N.E. 1088 (1896) (alcoholism). Moreover, in each instance the evidence was clear that the insured was aware of his condition at the time he applied for insurance.
Guardian relies heavily on Lennon v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 339 Mass. 37, 157 N.E. 2d 518 (1959), where the applicant for insurance stated he had not received any out of the ordinary medical treatment in the preceding five years, but one week after filing his application and before the policy issued, underwent an operation for throat cancer. Lennon did not inform the insurance company of this operation, claiming later he was not aware the surgery was for cancer. Instead, he argued that he believed he was receiving a treatment for "hoarseness." In voiding the policy as a matter of law, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that even though ignorant of the reasons for which his doctor performed the operation, he had a duty to disclose a medical event as significant as surgery performed before the policy issued because the company, upon further investigation, could have discovered the diagnosis of cancer.
The case before us is clearly distinguishable. Dr. Robitaille was not found by his doctors to have multiple sclerosis until months after the policy had issued. The record indicates that while in the Navy he followed the prudent, and innocent, course of relating minor and transitory symptoms to his physicians -- who were also his colleagues and with whom he was in daily contact -- as soon as they appeared. He apparently followed the road of caution and, when fully assured of his sound health, acted in a manner consistent with the dictates of good faith. Indeed, he returned to civilian life to practice his profession of medicine in an office which he acquired and equipped. Not even a layman, no less a doctor, would have planned for such an active life with knowledge of a crippling disease lurking in his mind. In any event, as we have indicated, his application was not barren of medical information for he did disclose the prostatitis, acoustic trauma, and visual inclusion which, the doctors believed, encompassed all the other symptoms Guardian claimed were concealed. We note that testimony at the trial, by the witnesses for Guardian as well as by Dr. Robitaille himself, indicated that these symptoms are not disease-specific to multiple sclerosis. Accordingly, there is no reason to believe -- indeed, Guardian does not suggest -- that even if the additional symptoms were disclosed, or if Guardian had investigated Robitaille's hospital records as he authorized them to do, the insurer would have diagnosed multiple sclerosis, obviously a disease which is extraordinarily difficult to detect and which all the doctors examining Robitaille failed to discover. There is not the slightest suggestion here that Robitaille was subjected to surgery, to incapacitating therapy, or to any other treatment of a character comparable to the serious operation in Lennon.
Guardian's argument, therefore, is reduced to the claim that Dr. Robitaille concealed information that increased its risk of loss as a matter of law, a claim which even our dissenting brother rejects. To be sure, the application was silent on the symptoms and tests subsumed under the diagnoses which were set forth. Under the standard enunciated in the Massachusetts statute, however, omissions or falsehoods will not void the policies unless they increased the insurer's risk of loss. We have noted that the amalgam of symptoms Robitaille failed to disclose is not the functional equivalent of multiple sclerosis. Accordingly, the question properly before us is not whether multiple sclerosis increases risk as a matter of law -- a question which, in any event, would be one of first impression in a Massachusetts court -- but whether dizziness, nystagmus, and cataracts do. When viewed in this light it is clear from the Massachusetts cases that Guardian's position is untenable. Not only is the instant case distinguishable from the small number of Massachusetts cases which, without consistent reasoning, depart from that state's general rule that the question of increased risk is for the jury to decide, but closer examination suggests that those cases represent isolated, exceedingly rare and not favored exceptions to Massachusetts' oft-announced and firmly entrenched principle.
Several brief examples will illustrate Massachusetts' strong preference for submission of the risk question to the jury. In Levie v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., supra, the insured had suffered a strangulated hernia requiring the attendance of two doctors and an operation one year before he applied for insurance. His application contained a negative response to a question inquiring whether he had sustained any illnesses since childhood. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the trial judge's denial of a directed verdict in favor of the insurer: "Very probably it might make the life of the insured less readily insurable, but whether it did so a question of fact." 39 N.E. at 793. Similarly, in Schiller v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., supra, where oral testimony and hospital records established that the insured suffered from coronary infarct, angina pectoris, sclerosis of the coronary artery, and coronary inclusion before and at the time he applied for insurance, the court held, "there was nothing which required a ruling of law that the risk of loss was thereby increased. . . . Although the evidence appeared very persuasive the question ought not to have been taken from the jury." 3 N.E. 2d at 388. The inelasticity of Massachusetts' rule that the trier of fact is to determine whether risk of loss was increased was reiterated with pristine clarity in Kaufman v. National Cas. Co., 342 Mass. 412, 174 N.E. 2d 35, 38-39 (1961): "The trial judge could have found that the plaintiff [insured] had a heart attack before the issuance of the rider on the policy and that he gave no notice of this change of condition to the defendant [insurer] and still have found that the plaintiff was possessed of no actual intent to deceive. . . and that the risk of loss to the defendant was not increased." Accord, Foss v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 247 Mass. 10, 141 N.E. 498 (1923) (angina pectoris); Hogan v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 164 Mass. 448, 41 N.E. 663 (1895) (kidney disease).
In view of the overwhelming weight of precedent, we cannot say that a state court in Massachusetts would have directed a verdict or granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of Guardian, the party required to carry the burden of proof. See H. Taylor, Life Insurance Law of Massachusetts, supra, 19 B.U.L. Rev. at 294-95. Indeed, our thorough reading of Massachusetts law convinces us, and our dissenting brother agrees, that the state courts would have decided without hesitation that the question whether Guardian's risk was increased was one for the jury to decide. It follows, therefore, that Judge Blumenfeld correctly rejected Guardian's attack on the verdict.
Verdicts in hard fought civil jury cases should be disturbed only under extraordinary circumstances. After all, the framers of our Constitution clearly reflected the important role of the jury in our system of justice. See U.S. Const. Amends. VI, VII. Indeed, the Supreme Court has cautioned appellate courts against tampering with jury verdicts:
Though the case involves a medical issue, it is no exception to the admonition that, "It is not the function of a court to search the record for conflicting circumstantial evidence in order to take the case away from the jury on a theory that the proof gives equal support to inconsistent and uncertain inferences. The focal point of judicial review is the reasonableness of the particular inference or conclusion drawn by the jury. . . . Courts are not free to reweigh the evidence and set aside the jury verdict merely because the jury could have drawn different inferences or conclusions or because judges feel that other results are more reasonable." Tennant v. Peoria & Pekin Union R. Co., 321 U.S. 29, 35, 88 L. Ed. 520, 64 S. Ct. 409.
Sentilles v. Inter-Caribbean Corp., 361 U.S. 107, 110, 4 L. Ed. 2d 142, 80 S. Ct. 173 (1959). See Jacob v. New York City, 315 U.S. 752, 86 L. Ed. 1166, 62 S. Ct. 854 (1942); O. W. Holmes, Jr., The Common Law, 127 (1881).
Dr. Ribitaille's medical history was presented to the members of the jury in a detailed and exhaustive manner by live witnesses. The jurors had the benefit of observing these witnesses and scrutinizing their conflicting testimony in the arena of the courtroom, fully aware of the proper legal standard which was to guide them, and which was incorporated in an interrogatory submitted to them without objection by Guardian:*fn15
Do you find that the plaintiff has proved by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the defendant made or failed to make any statement in answer to questions in his application for insurance which increased the risk of loss under the policies?
Guardian's counsel described this interrogatory, to which the jurors responded in the negative, as "the whole issue completely." It was precisely that and Judge Blumenfeld properly refused to upset the verdict.
MULLIGAN, Circuit Judge (dissenting):
Although I fully sympathize with Dr. George Robitaille, I am of the view that the verdict of the jury in his favor here is unconscionable and should be set aside.
The salient facts are not in dispute. When Dr. Robitaille was discharged from the Navy on July 1, 1969, at the age of 34, he was the victim of an incurable disease, multiple sclerosis. In fact, in December, 1969, he said it was obvious in retrospect that this disease had plagued him for nearly two years prior to his discharge. Although he enjoyed excellent health for most of his naval career, in the last two years of service he was afflicted with a series of disorders and symptoms which were most unusual for a man his age. In 1967, he began to notice a loss of force in the urinary stream which ultimately resulted in total retention in December 1967. In June, 1968, he developed what he was to later term a "distressing positional vertigo associated with nystagmus." In layman's language, he had attacks of dizziness and oscillation of the eyeballs. He also suffered from blurred vision, which was originally considered to have resulted from congenital nuclear cataracts. In early 1969, he became aware of a numbness in the ulnar distribution of both hands and also experienced a vague sensory disturbance in his right leg. Dr. Robitaille was an internist, and the symptoms were so disturbing that he underwent two complete neurological examinations. He obviously suspected the true nature of the symptoms since he asked Dr. Patterson whether they could be caused by multiple sclerosis. While Dr. Patterson's examination showed no abnormalities, Dr. Kramer, a third physician with whom he discussed the matter, advised him that he considered this combination of symptoms to be "most unusual in a man of his age and [they] required further explanation." These examinations and this advice were given to Dr. Robitaille in April, 1969.
On June 17, 1969, Dr. Robitaille applied to Guardian Life for the policies in suit: a life insurance policy in the amount of $50,000, with a provision for waiver of premium in the event of total disability; a "non-cancellable" disability policy providing benefits of $800 per month for total disability for life; another disability policy providing an additional $800 a month for a five-year period, plus $400 per month for hospital benefits; and a fourth policy, termed a professional overhead expense disability policy, providing monthly benefits of $600 for a 12-month period. In his application for these policies, Dr. Robitaille filled out and executed an application which included "Representations to the Medical Examiner." The key questions at issue here and his responses thereto are set forth in the majority opinion. It is, in my view, crucial to this case that not a single response to any of the searching questions gave the slightest indication that Dr. Robitaille had suffered any of the disorders which gave rise to his fear that he was a possible victim of multiple sclerosis. Dr. Robitaille was not a layman but a specialist in internal medicine, and it is totally unreasonable to suppose that he failed to appreciate the significance of these disorders to an insurer who was issuing life and disability policies in reliance upon his representations. Within a few months thereafter, Dr. Robitaille's physical condition had so deteriorated that he could not continue in private practice. In November, 1969, he was hospitalized and the diagnosis of multiple sclerosis was finally made.
The appellant insurer has never claimed that Dr. Robitaille fraudulently concealed, or was guilty of bad faith in failing to reveal, the crucial symptoms. The preoccupation of the majority with the issue of his good faith is thus not really germane. The key questions in the application were not inquiries calling for an opinion. No questions were directed to his evaluation of his physical health or his freedom from a particular disease. The questions were factual and called for answers which were susceptible of precise formulation. Massachusetts follows the traditional distinction between subjective and objective representations, and it is well settled in that state that an innocent misrepresentation of a material fact avoids the policy.*fn1
I think that it is abundantly clear that Dr. Robitaille's responses to the factual inquiries of the insurer were palpable misrepresentations. His rationalization for answering or not answering questions fully as set forth in part III of the majority opinion is at best disingenuous. It is difficult to understand why he failed to report his blurred vision, his nystagmus and the diagnosed congenital nuclear cataracts when he was asked if he had any impairment of sight or any disease or disorder of the eyes. His explanation that he thought that the symptoms were due to naval gunfire in 1961 of course does not excuse his failure to report the disorders which he actually suffered. (On trial, the naval gunfire was identified as pistol fire on a practice range.)
Any doubts of misrepresentation tend to disappear when we consider his answer to question 9. There, he was asked whether or not he had undergone any diagnostic tests in the past five years. He responded: "Yes, as a matter of routine. All normal." In fact, during the previous five years he had undertaken a series of diagnostic tests which cannot be sensibly characterized as routine, since they were occasioned by the symptoms which he considered so troubling. In addition to an eye examination, a cystoscopy, urinalysis and glucose tolerance tests, he submitted to two complete neurological examinations by Dr. Grossi and Dr. Patterson. All of these were prompted by the complete urine retention of December, 1967, the blurred vision, the numbness of hands and leg, the disturbing vertigo and the nystagmus -- none of which are reported in the application. Perhaps the most serious and blatant misrepresentation is found in his answer to question 13:
In the past 5 years have you consulted or been treated or examined by any physician or practitioner (a) not named above? -- Ans. No. or (b) for any cause not recorded above? -- Ans. No.
The only physician named in the application was Dr. Urschel, who treated him for what Dr. Robitaille characterized as "mild prostatitis in 1967." He made no reference at all to his two complete neurological examinations by Dr. Grossi and Dr. Patterson in April, 1969; his consultation with a third neurologist, Dr. Kramer; his examinations by Dr. Sacks and Dr. Bete for vertigo and nystagmus in June, 1968, and his complete opthamology examinations by Dr. Haskins in November, 1968.
I believe it is even more significant that when asked whether or not these examinations were occasioned by any "cause not recorded above," he simply responded "No." All of these consultations were prompted by the very symptoms which created his apprehension that he might have contracted multiple sclerosis. The question does not call for the diagnosis of the physicians visited or consulted but rather for the reasons which caused Dr. Robitaille to seek medical attention. On his trial, Dr. Robitaille admitted that a full and complete answer to the question would have required him to divulge his examinations with Dr. Haskins and Dr. Patterson and also, by implication, Dr. Sacks. Dr. Bete's examination was an annual physical, but this certainly could have been characterized as the reason for consultation. The application requested "complete information . . . specify[ing] . . . conditions, severity, date, duration, frequency of attacks, after effects, and name and address of each medical practitioner and of each hospital." I do not think that there is any doubt but that Robitaille made numerous misrepresentations of fact which, if material, avoid the policy irrespective of his good faith in answering them.
The appellee now urges that Dr. Robitaille's signature on the application giving the customary authorization to the insurer to contact any physician by whom, or any hospital at which, he was treated, in effect, made his naval medical history available to the insurer, and therefore excuses any misrepresentations he may have made. If this proposition were to be accepted as the law, it would not only encourage inadvertence and deceit by applicants but would, for all practical purposes, eliminate the defense of misrepresentation in life insurance cases. Risk selection is still the responsibility of the insurer and not the applicant. The majority opinion states that "in light of Dr. Robitaille's disclosure of all relevant diagnoses and his consent to an examination of the records at Newport Hospital, one must ask whether he nevertheless was under a duty to furnish details to Guardian." The answer, of course, is an unequivocal "Yes." It is a fundamental proposition in insurance law that the insurer has the right to rely upon the representations made in the application which induce the contract. It is only where the applicant's answers put the insurer reasonably on notice of some disability or disorder calling for further investigation that a waiver might be found.*fn2 Here, the answers supplied by Dr. Robitaille were not at all "indicative of something more [that was] tantamount to notice of the unrevealed." Cherkes v. Postal Life Insurance Co., 285 App. Div. 514, 516, 138 N.Y.S. 2d 788, 790 (1st Dep't 1955) (Peck, J.). Dr. Robitaille's answers not only were not revelatory, they were positively reassuring: his prostatitis was described as "mild" with "no recurrence since 1967;" his high tone hearing loss, attributed to naval gunfire in 1961, was characterized as "slight" with "No difficulty, no change in audiograms since then;" his physical examinations were "routine" and "all normal." As we have indicated, he revealed no other consultations or examinations. I cannot subscribe to the view, and there is no authority at all for the proposition, that these responses should have put the insurer on notice that Dr. Robitaille might possibly be a bad risk.
Although there were unquestioned misrepresentations here, I agree that it does not follow that the insurer has established its right to rescind and cancel the policy. The pertinent statute (Mass. Gen. Law Ann. c., 175, § 186) provides that a misrepresentation will avoid the policy if it is made with actual intent to deceive or where "the matter misrepresented . . . increased the risk of loss." The insurer did not choose to establish fraud or bad faith, as we have indicated, but rather relied upon the statutory alternative "increased the risk of loss." On trial, the insurer produced the medical director of Guardian Life, Dr. Lambkin, who testified that the insurer would not have accepted the risk had Dr. Robitaille properly answered the inquiries in the application. He testified that the facts not disclosed would have "markedly increased the risk of loss to the company." His explanation is revealing:
Well, in my opinion, with the sequence of an episode of acute urinary retention, then later positional vertigo, then blurring of vision of one eye and finally with numbness of the hands would have strongly suggested an organic neurological disorder of a progressive nature.
The only other physician to testify on materiality was Dr. Pepper, former Senior Medical Director of Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Company, who, on the basis of Dr. Robitaille's medical history as revealed on trial, testified that "every insurance company that I know about would have to decline or postpone this application."
It is significant that the appellee produced not a single medical expert to contradict the testimony that this insurer, or any prudent insurer, would not have accepted the risk.
The majority argues that even if Dr. Robitaille had answered the questions fully, the insurer would not necessarily have diagnosed that he was the victim of multiple sclerosis. This is not really the issue. The question is whether or not a prudent insurer, alerted by complete and forthright answers in the application to the existence of a combination of symptoms indicative of neurological disorder, would have declined to accept the applicant because of the increase of risk. The amalgam of symptoms in a person of 34 years of age would unquestionably provoke some suspicion that serious neurological illness was present. It certainly created such apprehension in the mind of the applicant, Dr. Robitaille.*fn3 Dr. Greer did examine the applicant for the insurer on July 8, 1969, after Dr. Robitaille had filled out the medical statement which successfully obscured any indication of his disturbing symptoms. Had a full disclosure been made in the application, it would either have been refused or a further investigation would have ensued, which would have unquestionably led to a refusal. This was the testimony at trial, and there was nothing to rebut it. In June, 1969, Dr. Robitaille had been a victim of multiple sclerosis for two years; it was not in its early stages, and only five months later, he was so incapacitated that he was hospitalized and diagnosed as a victim of the debilitating and incurable disease.
We eventually come to the position of the majority that, in any event, the question of materiality was one for the jury, and that, since the jury found against the company, the court below did not commit reversible error in refusing to set aside its verdict. Although no case in Massachusetts has taken the position that multiple sclerosis as a matter of law increases the risk of loss, this would not preclude a federal court from making the prediction that such a decision would represent the law of that Commonwealth. This is, it seems to me, particularly appropriate when we consider that four of the policies in suit involve disability benefits and multiple sclerosis is obviously disabling. However, I would not urge this point. I believe that the appropriate procedure here is to set aside the verdict and remand for a new trial. Respect for the jury system does not mandate that we embrace an aberrational verdict. It is conceded that the determination of materiality is normally one to be made by the jury, but the jury must be properly instructed.*fn4 Here the interrogatory submitted to the jury simply asks whether or not the defendant made or failed to make any statement in his application which "increased the risk of loss under the policies." There is no indication in the interrogatory or any place in the charge to the jury as to the meaning of the term "increase in the risk of loss." The best proof of increase of risk is the practice of prudent insurers.*fn5 Would such an insurer issue a policy had it known the truth which the applicant's answers had concealed? Although the only medical evidence submitted on this point was on behalf of the company, no indication was given to the jury that this was an appropriate criterion. The comment of the majority that the jury was "fully aware of the proper legal standard which was to guide them" is thus misleading. The test of materiality has long been a subject of discussion by legal scholars in insurance law.*fn6 In this case, a group of laymen without any medical testimony bearing on the materiality of the misrepresentation except that in favor of the insurer, promptly returned a contrary verdict. The majority describes the facts here as "complex and technical" and yet the jury returned a verdict for the insured after only 20 minutes of deliberation. The result was predictable under these circumstances.
Dr. Robitaille, who, as a young physician with a large family, stood at the threshold of a private practice after 10 years of service in the armed forces of his country, and who became the victim of a dread disease, is a highly sympathetic figure even to a dissenting judge. Of course, no normal American jury can be expected to have any empathy for the insurer; insurance companies are, after all, less than charismatic institutions. It is particularly important, therefore, in a case such as this that the jury be properly and fully charged so that a just verdict can be rendered. The decision to reverse and remand here does not constitute a rejection of the jury system, but rather a recognition that the jury can only function appropriately if it is properly instructed as to the applicable law.
It seems to me that the verdict below is not sustainable and that it is not our role to sit idly by and supinely accept it.*fn7 It is true that the insurer made no objection to the interrogatory at trial or indeed on appeal. The majority characterize it as "ironic" that the only objection made to the interrogatory was by the appellee. More pungent adjectives come to mind. The fact that counsel did not take exception below only accentuates the travesty, and our action now is a fortiori mandated.
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Tag: win your wishlist
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Popeyes Chicken & Biscuits
Hours And Locations for National City, California
Category: Restaurants
Popeyes Louisiana Kitchen, Inc.
Founded in Atlanta in 1992 as AFC Enterprises, Inc., the Company is a developer, operator and franchisor of quick-service restaurants ("QSRs" or "restaurants") under the trade name, Popeyes® Louisiana Kitchen and Popeyes® Chicken & Biscuits. In January 2014, AFC Enterprises, Inc. changed its corporate name to Popeyes Louisiana Kitchen, Inc. and is traded on Nasdaq under the ticker symbol "PLKI".
Popeyes Profile
The Popeyes® brand was founded in New Orleans, Louis ...
Popeyes Chicken & Biscuits Hours And Locations for National City, California CA
2210 E Plaza Blvd
Hours — Wed: 10:00am-10:00pm
Hours — Wed: 10:00am-10:00pm
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Locations currently open are Green and those currently closed are Red.
As of:5:07 am (PST) Wed Dec 7. [Change]
As of:5:07 am (PST) Wed Dec 7. [Change]
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November 16, 2010
FRANCISCO PERALTA-QUINTANA, PETITIONER,v.UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, RESPONDENT.
On February 16, 2010, petitioner Francisco Peralta-Quintana ("Petitioner") filed a motion to vacate , set aside or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (the "2255 Motion"). Petitioner was convicted by plea of guilty of one count of being a deported alien found in the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(2) on May 26, 2009, and was sentenced at the same proceeding to a 37-month term of imprisonment. Judgment was entered on May 29, 2009. The instant 2255Motion was timely filed on February 16, 2010.
A "Pre-Plea Advisory Guideline Presentence Investigation Report" ("PIR") was prepared in advance of Petitioner's change of plea and sentencing hearing. The PIR indicated a total offense level of 21, which included a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, and a criminal history category of IV. The PIR indicated that the guideline range for an offense level of 21 and criminal history category of IV is 57 to 71 months. At sentencing the government recommended an additional four-level downward adjustment for "early disposition" of Petitioner's case pursuant to U.S.S.G § 5K3.1. Pursuant to the government's recommendation, the court sentenced Petitioner to a term of imprisonment of 37 months, which represents the low end of the guideline range for an offense level of 17 and a criminal history category of IV.
Among other agreements set forth in the Plea agreement, Petitioner agreed "not to move for a downward departure or reduction of his sentence beyond the four (4) level departure agreed to by the government under this plea agreement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K3.1. The [Petitioner] understands and agrees that this agreement by him includes, but is not limited to, not moving for a downward departure of his offense level, criminal history category, or criminal history points as defined by the United states Sentencing Guidelines." Doc. # 12 at 3:2-9. In addition, Petitioner agreed to waive all constitutional and statutory rights to appeal, including the right to direct appeal and the right to "attack collaterally his mental competence and his plea, or his sentence, including but not limited to, filing a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, or 18 U.S.C. § 3742, or otherwise. Id. at 3:17-24. Of some significance, Petitioner also agreed that if he "ever attempts to vacate his plea, dismiss the underlying charges, or reduce or set aside his sentence on any of the counts to which he is pleading guilty, the government shall have the following rights: (1) to prosecute the [Petitioner] on any count to which he pleaded guilty; (2) to reinstate any counts that may be dismissed under this agreement; and (3) to file any new charges that would otherwise be barred by this agreement." Id. at 3:24 - 4:2.
Section 2255 provides, in pertinent part: "A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States ... may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence." Under section 2255, "a district court must grant a hearing to determine the validity of a petition brought under that section, '[u]nless the motions and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.' " United States v. Blaylock, 20 F.3d 1458, 1465 (9th Cir.1994) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255). The court may deny a hearing if the movant's allegations, viewed against the record, fail to state a claim for relief or "are so palpably incredible or patently frivolous as to warrant summary dismissal." United States v. McMullen, 98 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir.1996) (internal quotations omitted), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1269, 117 (1997). To earn the right to a hearing, therefore, the movant must make specific factual allegations which, if true, would entitle him to relief. Id. Mere conclusory statements in a section 2255 motion are insufficient to require a hearing. United States v. Hearst, 638 F.2d 1190, 1194 (9th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 938 (1981).
Petitioner's 2255 Motion alleges four grounds for relief. All are somewhat difficult to understand, but the second and third grounds appear to allege various aspects of the same general claim that Petitioner's attorney provided ineffective assistance because he did not oppose the sentence recommended by the government or contained in the plea agreement at the time of sentencing. Petitioner's first and fourth grounds for relief are more ambiguously worded but seem to indicate that Petitioner may be alleging that his attorney refused to file a notice of direct appeal although he was asked to do so. The court will consider first Petitioner's second and third grounds for relief.
I. Petitioner's Second and Third Grounds for Relief
Petitioner's second ground for relief states "The Defendant argue from the sentence with his lawyer asking the lawyer to try to get less time." Doc. # 15 at 5. Petitioner's supporting facts for this allegation indicate that he was disappointed that his attorney did not argue for a lesser sentence at sentencing and believed that he might have received a lesser sentence if his attorney had asked for less time. Likewise, Petitioner's third ground for relief reflects Petitioner's evident opinion that his attorney's representation was less than professional because the attorney should at least have "put up [a] fight at the time of sentence." Doc. # 15 at 7.
The court construes Petitioner's second and third grounds for relief as alleging ineffective assistance of counsel based on the allegation that Petitioner's attorney did not argue for a shorter sentence at the time of sentencing. Having thus construed Petitioner's second and third grounds for relief, it is clear that the court lacks jurisdiction over these claims. Petitioner's plea agreement comprehensively waives the right to challenge the length of his sentence in any post-conviction proceeding including any habeas petition, and there is no allegation that Petitioner did not understand that he was waiving rights to direct appeal and to collaterally challenge his sentence. See United States v. Jeronimo, 398 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2005) (waiver of the right to appeal or to collaterally attack a conviction or sentence is enforceable if "(1) the language of the waiver encompasses [the] right to appeal on the grounds raised, and (2) the waiver is knowingly and voluntarily made"). However, the court believes that providing Petitioner some additional explanation of why he did not suffer ineffective assistance of counsel might aid in Petitioner's understanding of his rights and responsibilities regarding his plea agreement and might help forestall future pointless pleadings.
Pursuant to United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), district courts must impose a sentence that is reasonable in light of the guideline range set forth in the United States Sentencing Guidelines and the factors set forth at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). United States v. Plouffe, 445 F.3d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2006). The PIR prepared in advance of Petitioner's change of plea and sentencing hearing took the required factors into consideration and determined that a reasonable sentence, considering the nature and circumstances of Petitioner's offense and his criminal history and the other factors required by section 3553(a), was 57 months. Given that a term of imprisonment of 57 months represents the bottom end of the applicable guideline range, Petitioner is not entitled to any lesser sentence unless he can show that consideration of some factor would make a lesser sentence reasonable. As it happened in Petitioner's case, his attorney was able to bargain for a further 4-level reduction of Petitioner's offense level so that the sentence actually imposed was twenty months or nearly two years less than it otherwise would have been. Petitioner qualified for this reduction by, among other things, agreeing not to contest his sentence or to argue at sentencing for a term of imprisonment that was any less than the 37 month term agreed to by the government.
Petitioner's factual allegations and arguments offer absolutely no basis for any finding that Petitioner had any reasonable expectation for a lesser sentence than the one he received. Petitioner seems to be under the impression that a lesser sentence might have been granted if his attorney had argued for one. This is simply not the case. Because the court is bound to establish a reasonable sentence, the court must have a substantial reason for departure either upward or downward from what the guidelines and the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) would otherwise indicate. Petitioner has not made the court aware of anything that his attorney could have argued at sentencing that would have made any difference, nor can the court imagine any factor Petitioner's attorney could have argued that would have produced a better result than the 4-level downward departure Petitioner received by agreeing not to contest his sentence.
What Petitioner's attorney did do was to secure for Petitioner the 4-level downward departure that was available by bargaining for a rapid disposition of Petitioner's case. To obtain this downward departure, Petitioner promised not to contest the sentence recommended by the government at the time of sentencing. Nothing in Petitioner's attorney's efforts on Petitioner's behalf gives even the hint of substandard performance, let alone constitutionally deficient performance. To the extent Petitioner is disappointed by the fact he was told by his attorney that any argument at sentencing would result in a longer sentence, Petitioner should recognize that his attorney was faithfully representing to Petitioner the contents of his plea agreement. An attorney does not provide ineffective representation by telling his client the truth.
II. Petitioner's First and Fourth Grounds for Relief
Petitioner's first ground for relief alleges, "[Petitioner] complain the defense from his lawyer was negative and didn't want to appeal his case." Petitioner explains in his "supporting facts" that "[Petitioner] asked his lawyer regardless [for] a direct appeal but the lawyer did not agree with the [Petitioner] to that which it could be giving less time or it will make some type [of] difference [in] his sentence." Doc. # 15 at 4 (spelling and some grammatik corrections added). Petitioner's fourth ground for relief somewhat more directly alleges, "the [Petitioner] ask his lawyer to appeal his sentence [but] the lawyer say no; if [Petitioner were to] appeal he will get more time." Doc. # 15 at 8. Under supporting facts for ground four, Petitioner alleged:
The [Petitioner] ask to his lawyer to help him to file a direct appeal at the earliest convenience for the lawyer, but the lawyer told [Petitioner] that [Petitioner] didn't have enough ground to support his petition. If anything, the [Petitioner] was going to get more time if [he gave] the judge extra work.
Doc. # 15 at 8.
The court has read Petitioners first and fourth grounds for relief and cannot tell whether; (1) Petitioner asked his attorney to file a notice of direct appeal and his attorney refused to file the notice after explaining that such an appeal would not result in a lesser sentence, or (2) whether Petitioner talked to attorney concerning the prospects on direct appeal and was talked out of filing a direct appeal because his attorney told him the appeal would not result in a lesser sentence. The basic question is whether a reasonable attorney would have understood on the basis of the conversation that took place between the attorney and Petitioner that Petitioner was directing the attorney to file a notice of direct appeal regardless of the futility of such an appeal, or whether the attorney reasonably believed Petitioner had abandoned the idea of a direct appeal after learning that he had waived the right to appeal in exchange for a lesser sentence already. The difference between the two is important.
If Petitioner's attorney reasonably believed that Petitioner had abandoned the idea of filing a direct appeal upon being told that such an appeal would not result in a lesser sentence, then the attorney's performance is not deficient in any way. First, Petitioner did comprehensively waive any right to direct appeal; second, so far as the court can tell from Petitioner's allegations in the 2255 Motion there is absolutely no factual or legal basis for appeal; and third, under the plea agreement, it is in fact possible that Petitioner could be subjected to a longer sentence if he did appeal. As noted above, an attorney does not render ineffective assistance to his client by telling the truth.
On the other hand, if a reasonable attorney in the position of Petitioner's attorney would have understood that Petitioner had expressed a desire to file a direct appeal regardless of its futility and regardless of the possible negative consequences, then the court must find that Petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel and must grant relief by vacating and reentering judgment so that Petitioner can file a notice of direct appeal. Courts, including the Supreme Court, have long held that a lawyer who fails to file a notice of appeal when his client specifically requests that an appeal be filed "acts in a manner that is professionally unreasonable." Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 477 (2000) (hereinafter "Flores-Ortega").
Prior to Flores-Ortega the Ninth Circuit had established a bright-line rule that counsel's performance was deficient as a matter of law where a notice of appeal was not filed unless there was specific instruction from the defendant not to file an appeal. Id. at 478; United States v. Stearns, 68 F.3d 328, 329-330 (9th Cir. 1995); Lozada v. Deeds, 964 F.2d 956, 958 (9th Cir. 1992). The decision in Flores-Ortega moderated the bright-line approach of Stearns and Lozada by removing the presumption of prejudice in the case where there is no affirmative direction by the defendant to not file an appeal, and replaced that presumption with an inquiry that asks whether, in the case where there was no clear direction by the defendant to not file an appeal, there would have been a reasonable probability that an appeal would have been requested. See Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 484 ("to show prejudice in [the circumstance where there is no clear evidence for request for appeal] a defendant must demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's deficient failure to consult with him about an appeal, he would have timely appealed").
The fact that Petitioner affirmatively waived the right to direct appeal does not change the analytical framework set forth in Flores-Ortega. In United States v. Sandoval-Lopez, 409 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2005), the Ninth Circuit examined a habeas corpus petition that alleged ineffective assistance of counsel based on the refusal of counsel to file a notice of appeal following execution of a plea agreement that waived the right of appeal in exchange for substantial benefit. See id. at 1194-1195. The Sandoval-Lopez court noted that the trial court should have conducted an evidentiary hearing to assess the truthfulness of the petitioner's claim that he had actually requested his attorney file a notice of appeal. Id. at 1196. In the absence of such a hearing, however, the court applied the framework in Flores-Ortega without consideration of the effect of the waiver and came to the conclusion that an evidentiary hearing was necessary to determine the truthfulness of the petitioner's claim. The Sandoval-Lopez court further held that, if it was found that a request for appeal was unequivocally made by the petitioner and refused by petitioner's attorney, the prejudicially deficient representation is to be presumed and the district court is bound by case authority to "vacate and re-enter the judgment, allowing the appeal to proceed." Id. at 1198.
The court lacks information necessary to make a determination as to whether Petitioner's attorney failed to file a notice of direct appeal of his sentence. Beyond that, however, the court finds that it is unable to decipher Petitioner's pleading to determine whether Petitioner is actually alleging his attorney failed to file a notice of appeal or whether he is alleging his attorney improperly dissuaded Petitioner from filing an appeal. Before the court can proceed, Petitioner must clarify the grounds for his claims for relief. The court takes Petitioner at his word when Petitioner claims to be unschooled in law and that he could not know whether he had grounds for appeal. The court will order that Petitioner clarify his intentions with regard to his first and fourth grounds for relief, but also takes the somewhat unusual step of explaining Petitioner's prospects should he proceed forward with his 2255 Motion in terms that are as plain as the court can make them. Specifically, Petitioner is advised to take into consideration the following:
! Petitioner agreed in his plea agreement to not bring a direct appeal and received a considerable benefit in the form of a substantial reduction in his sentence. In light of the plea agreement and the benefit Petitioner received, the appellate court will almost certainly honor the plea agreement and will refuse to consider any appeal by Petitioner.
! Even if the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals were to agree to consider Petitioner's appeal, there are absolutely no facts the court is aware of that would entitle Petitioner to a lesser sentence. Petitioner cannot receive a lesser sentence just because he asks for one.
! In his plea agreement, Petitioner agreed that the government would have the right "to prosecute the [Petitioner] on any count to which he pleaded guilty" should he ever appeal his sentence. Should Petitioner decide to appeal his sentence and should the sentence eventually be vacated, Petitioner would be subject to prosecution by the Government on the same charge and, if convicted, would be subject to a substantially longer term of imprisonment than he received.
With those facts in mind, Petitioner is hereby ORDERED to file a statement with the court clarifying his first and fourth grounds for relief by stating whether or not he specifically ordered his attorney to file a notice of direct appeal even though Petitioner was counseled against filing an appeal. If no statement is received from Petitioner within twenty-one (21) days of the date of this order, Petitioner's 2255 Motion will be dismissed without further discussion. If Petitioner files a statement that states that he unequivocally ordered his attorney to file a notice of appeal and his attorney did not obey the order, the court will deem Petitioner to have waived attorney-client privilege for the limited purpose of ordering Petitioner's attorney to file a statement concerning his or her recollection of the conversations that transpired between Petitioner and his attorney.
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Schneider Electric Introduces Wiser Air™ Wi-Fi Smart Thermostat
Wi-Fi-enabled Smart Thermostat is Now Commercially Available Through HomeDepot.com and Amazon.com
ANDOVER, MASS.- December 9, 2015 - Schneider Electric, the global specialist in energy management and automation, is launching Wiser Air™, the company's first Wi-Fi Smart thermostat for residential consumers. Wiser Air is currently available for purchase through HomeDepot.com and Amazon.com, and will be launching with additional retail outlets in the future.
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"Wiser Air fills the gap in the home energy market for smart, easy-to-use solutions that help homeowners simplify energy efficiency," said Yann Kulp, Vice President of Residential Energy Solutions, Schneider Electric. "We're excited to bring our commercial energy management expertise to the consumer market with a product that puts the user experience first in every aspect."
Key features of Wiser Air include:
• Wiser Forecast: Wiser Air incorporates Schneider Electric's industry-leading weather forecasts, which is the technology's first use in a consumer application. Wiser Forecast provides extreme weather alerts and allows homeowners to adapt to the latest weather information, before leaving the home, increasing home comfort and energy efficiency.
• Comfort Boost™: Delivers 15-60 minutes of on-demand heating or cooling at the touch of a button to promote optimal comfort without affecting thermostat settings and schedules.
• Smart Sensors: Smart Sense™ sensors automatically interact with the user when near, and respond to real-time changes in temperature and light.
• Wiser Pulse™: Conveniently provides a status update with just a glance at the user configurable ambient glow, enabling homeowners to be more aware of the energy use.
• Ready Modes: Ready mode functionality allows homeowners to easily tweak their energy schedule to their personal settings with one touch.
• Advanced Scheduling: Flexible scheduling and automatic programming features help homeowners easily maximize energy savings.
The most intelligent climate control solution on the market, Wiser Air is now available online through Schneider Electric's retail partners, including HomeDepot.com and Amazon.com. For more information, please visit www.wiserair.com or follow Wiser Air on Twitter at www.twitter.com/wiserair.
About Schneider Electric
Schneider Electric is the global specialist in energy management and automation. With revenues of $30 billion in FY2014, our 170,000 employees serve customers in over 100 countries, helping them to manage their energy and process in ways that are safe, reliable, efficient and sustainable. From the simplest of switches to complex operational systems, our technology, software and services improve the way our customers manage and automate their operations. Our connected technologies reshape industries, transform cities and enrich lives. At Schneider Electric, we call this Life Is On.
Featured Product
This is Control4 Home Automation with Amazon Alexa.
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Mobile Homes for Sale near Dundee, OR
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Mobile Homes for Sale near Dundee, OR. Looking to buy a mobile home, manufactured house, manufactured housing? MHBay.com has 72 mobile homes near Dundee. Click here to list your mobile home for sale.
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Featured Listings
The Beech III OUR BEST SELLER
Come visit and see why this is our BEST SELLER! Gorgeous style and upgrades throughout HUGE Kitchen w/adjoining Mornin...
On Dealer Lot
3 Beds/2 Baths
22.5 miles
Featured Listing
Featured New Mobile Home Model
Marlette Skamania (Marlette)
This is a great looking new display home with only these few options added: Set Back Foundation Ready Wood burning Firep...
3 Beds, 2 Baths
Regular Listings
1996 Mobile Home
While this is not a Rent-to-Own listing, Owner Financing may be available, in which case you (the buyer) would not need a bank loan to purch...
3 Beds/3 Baths
3.4 miles
1996 Mobile Home
While this is not a Rent-to-Own listing, Owner Financing may be available, in which case you (the buyer) would not need a bank loan to purch...
3 Beds/3 Baths
3.4 miles
1989 Redman
BEAUTIFULLY REMODELED 4BD / 2BA HOME IN NEWBERG,OR. This beautiful large 1989 home is turn key and move in ready for a family/or person wh...
4 Beds/2 Baths
4.1 miles
11-107 Great Donald location in the country but easy freeway access. This four bedroom two bath is Fleetwood Country Squire one of there hig...
4 Beds/2 Baths
Sale Pending
9.1 miles
Quiet senior community. Corner wooded lot next to recreation lodge. Freshly remodeled with covered car port, shed, and deck. Freshly painted...
2 Beds/1 Baths
10.5 miles
1984 Fleetwood
****SOLD*****This is a huge 1800 square foot manufactured home in great family park with reasonable space rent in the beautiful city of Wils...
3 Beds/2 Baths
11.7 miles
1988 Redman
***SOLD***Well cared for 3 bedroom 2 bathroom, doublewide home in a very nice senior park has space rent of only $550.00 per month which inc...
3 Beds/2 Baths
13.2 miles
11-401 Beautiful Home in Premier Sr. Park
Angel Haven MHP - Directory, Tualatin, Oregon
11-401 Large open kitchen with island and open floor plan. All kitchen appliances included. Washer and Dryer included. Jacuzzi tub in Master...
3 Beds/2 Baths
Sale Pending
13.2 miles
1974 Fuqua
****SOLD****This is a rare 3 bedroom 2 bathroom home in a senior park. It measures to be a 1440 square feet, and is a double wide. This la...
3 Beds/2 Baths
13.7 miles
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One Thousand Lies
21st Apr, 2016
Genre: Point-and-click
Platforms: PC (Microsoft Windows)
One day, Ciaran Endyein reads a strange email, sent by an unkown person, who tells him to go to a certain park to retrive a certain object he bought.
This little action will change his life in a romantic comedy, with a really deep physcological background.
In the words of the mysterious Harry H: "if you want answers, go find her"
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I would write a review, but the author made the tough job for me: https://keinart.itch.io/one-thousand-lies The kinetic novel has this exact same humor. Don't let this fool you, it also gets dark and phylosophical. However, the overall tone is happy and chilled. This game made me laugh way more than it should. Wait, did I say game? Ah right sorry. This is a kinetic novel, you won't have any decisions in the entire story. So all you can do is r... Read More
- Five Nights at Freddy's 2
- Masochisia
- Five Nights at Freddy's: Sister Location
- Syberia 3
- The Journey Down: Chapter Three
- Silence: The Whispered World 2
- Five Nights at Freddy's
- Rusty Lake: Roots
- Indiana Jones and the Fate of Atlantis: The Graphic Adventure
- Layers of Fear
- The Secret of Monkey Island
- The Secret of Monkey Island: Special Edition
- Amnesia
- The Neverhood
- The Walking Dead: Season Two
- The Dig
- BATMAN: The Telltale Series
- Le Manoir de L'Étrange
- Sono Hanabira ni Kuchizuke o: Anata ni Chikau Ai


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508 area code is a telephone code used in southeastern parts of Massachusetts. This area code has one overlaying code, 774. 508 area code was created as a split from 617, in 1988.
508 Area Code Places
Here is the list of places that use 508 area code: Ashland, Attleboro Falls, Barnstable, Bass River, Aquinnah, Auburn, Blackstone, Attleboro, Bridgewater, Brewster, Avon, Bourne, Buzzards Bay, Cedarville, Boylston, Cataumet, Chappaquiddick Island, Brockton, Chartley, Bellingham, Cherry Valley, Carver, Acushnet, Cochituate, Cuttyhunk, Assonet, Charlton, Brookfield, Chilmark, Dennis, Centerville, Dartmouth, Douglas, Dudley Hill, Dudley, East Blackstone, East Brookfield, Cummaquid, East Bridgewater, East Falmouth, Dighton, Cotuit, East Douglas, Chatham, East Freetown, Berkley, East Mansfield, East Carver, East Orleans, East Dennis, Dover, East Princeton, East Taunton, Eastham, East Walpole, Elmwood, East Sandwich, Fairhaven, East Millbury, East Wareham, Forestdale, Edgartown, East Harwich, Foxboro, Fiskdale, Edgemere, Falmouth, Easton, Freetown, Globe Village, Foxborough, Harwich, Framingham, Fall River, Hassanamisco, Hatchville, Gosnold, Holden, Gay Head, Harwich Port, Horseneck Beach, Hyannis Port, Greendale, Fayville, Hopedale, Manchaug, Marion, Mansfield, Grafton, Hopkinton, Hardwich, Manomet, Marstons Mills, Lambs Grove, Jefferson, Marlborough, Medway, Franklin, Leicester, Hyannis, Mendon, Middleboro, Marlboro, Millerville, Mashpee, Holliston, Menemsha, Monument Beach, Medfield, Nantucket, Natick, Lakeville, Millbury, New Seabury, Morningdale, North Dartmouth, North Dighton, North Chatham, Milford, North Falmouth, Mattapoisett, North Eastham, North Oxford, North Grafton, North Uxbridge, New Braintree, North Easton, Northborough, North Truro, North Tisbury, New Bedford, Millis, North Carver, Linwood, Oak Bluffs, Osterville, Onset, Plainville, Millville, North Natick, Oakdale, North Attleboro, Provincetown, Richardson Corners, Northbridge, Plymouth, Norfolk, Raynham, Oakham, Rehoboth, North Brookfield, Rochester, Sagamore Beach, Norton, Rochdale, Oxford, Sandersdale, Sagamore, Pocasset, Paxton, Nonquitt, Sheldonville, Sandwich, Orleans, Shrewsbury, South Dartmouth, Saxonville, Rockdale, South Chatham, Saundersville, South Easton, Sherborn, South Attleboro, Rutland, South Orleans, Seekonk, South Mashpee, Siasconset, South Wellfleet, South Carver, Southbridge, Silver Beach, South Walpole, South Dennis, South Grafton, Sturbridge, Swansea, South Harwich, Sutton, Truro, South Natick, Teaticket, Vineyard Haven, South Yarmouth, Somerset, Wareham, Southborough, Upton, Webster Square, West Boylston, Taunton, Uxbridge, Webster, West Barnstable, West Chatham, Waquoit, Sconset, Tisbury, West Chop, Walpole, Spencer, West Falmouth, West Hyannisport, West Millbury, West Tisbury, West Bridgewater, Wayland, West Wareham, West Dennis, West Harwich, White Horse Beach, West Brookfield, West Upton, Wellfleet, Whitinsville, Woodshole, Westborough, West Yarmouth, Wilkinsonville, Westport, Woodville, Westport Point, Yarmouth Port, Woods Hole, West Side, Wrentham, Yarmouth and Worcester.


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Jamie & Jimmy's Food Fight Club (TV Series)
Watch Jamie & Jimmy's Food Fight Club episodes online for free here at Telepisodes via the links provided in each episode page. Mates since childhood, Jamie Oliver and Jimmy Doherty pair up to open a pop-up caff on Southend pier. They also take to the continent to pit the best of British food against Europe's finest. There's some tasty cooking from Jamie, a bit of foodie science from Jimmy, and a lot of laughs with some special friends, including Gwyneth Paltrow, Gary Barlow, Alan Carr and Jonathan Ross. And throughout the series, Jamie and Jimmy put their reputations on the line as they head off to the continent in their trusty Ford Capri to take on the best that Europe's cuisines have to offer. Because good food is worth fighting for.
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Released Date: December 6, 2012 (US)
Genre: Documentary, Celebrities, Cooking, Food
Network: Channel 4 (UK) (channel 4 )
Latest episode: Jamie & Jimmy's Food Fight Club Season 1 Episode 4


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Tiny Heroes iOS Game - HD Gameplay
- App name: Tiny Heroes
- Developer: Simutronics
- Genre: Strategy
- Release: Sep 8, 2011
Let's play Tiny Heroes on iOS. In this part of the walkthrough, you will learn more tips and tricks while playing the Tiny Heroes game on the iPhone.
Gameplay Walkthrough
This page contains Tiny Heroes video walkthroughs for iOS (iPhone/iPad) called "- iphone - us - hd trailer" and has been uploaded on Admin official channel at May 1, 2012.
Still need help with this level? Here you can ask questions and discuss with other Tiny Heroes users.
Hit like if this helped you!
Stuck on some levels in Tiny Heroes? This walkthrough can help you finish the game.


text: im currently jailbreaking my touch RIGHT now and i opened the cmd for the iRecovery -f iBSS211.dfu part and when entered it says the application has failed because its side-by-side configuration is incorrect please see the app event log for more detail. how do i fix this to further complete my jailbreak? Please Register or Log in to view images Please Register or Log in to view images


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I'm not a real historian. I didn't grow up in Princeton. I don't have an Ivy League education.
I'm a total Princeton WannaBe.
Still, I gush about loving the heart of Princeton as much as I can!
Four Perfect Reads for Anyone Who Loves Princeton!
For someone who ADORES Princeton, these four reads will make your special someone fall EVEN MORE in love with Princeton!:
Shakespeare and Company by Sylvia Beach - Sylvia grew up here and is buried here. She and Ernest Hemingway smuggled modern literature into the United States. (Don't believe me? Read the book, silly!)
Poets in Their Youth by Eileen Simpson - Eileen was married to gifted writer, John Berryman. The book talks about what it was like to be the wife of a professor/writer during the 50's. (You'll never drive down University Place or Princeton Avenue and feel the same way if you read this book.)
The Cocktail Party by T.S. Eliot - T.S. wrote this while he was here at the Institute for Advanced Study. I read this and wondered if he was inspired by Princeton's social scene.
The Bascombe Novels by Richard Ford - To me, this trilogy is mandatory reading for anyone that adores the tree streets, Hodge Road, the Witherspoon Jackson neighborhood and Nassau Inn Tap Room. If you've lived or worked near downtown, you'll recognize depictions of Will, Kobe, the parking attendent and one librarian immediately!
Add a Comment
Pi Day Princeton 2016 - You want to be around Princeton!
Einstein was born on March 14th - the numeric equivalent of Pi! The whole town throws the biggest celebration on earth!
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It's easy to become a product junkie when you work for a beauty website. But I have to say, I see a lot of the same as I scrutinize the ingredients labels that adorn bottles and containers, and that takes the edge out of my excitement over products. Recently, though, I've been seeing an unfamiliar ingredient pop up in products that has caught my attention: Baobab. TIA has referred to it a couple of times, and Marta has mentioned that the African Baobab tree, also known as Adansonia digitata, is one of her favorite trees. But limited references didn't satiate my curiosity, so I dug a little deeper.
The enormous tree, sometimes known as "the upside down tree" since it gives off the curious impression that its roots reach towards the sky, is found in several African countries including Namibia and Botswana.
French Botanist, Michel Adanson, for whom the tree is named for, once remarked that of all the trees he had studied, the Baobab "is probably the most useful tree in all." Apparently, he credited consuming Baobab juice for his good health. In fact, people have been consuming various parts of the Baobab since ancient times for its extremely high concentration of calcium and vitamin C. In addition, parts of the Baobab contain high levels of protein and vitamin A.
Interestingly, the Baobab's Integral Antioxidant Capacity (IAC) "is ten times higher than orange pulp due to the abundant presence of ascorbic, citric, malic and succinic acids." The IAC represents the combined capacity of hydrophilic and lipophilic antioxidants; one study found that all parts of the Baobab (including the pulp, leaves and seeds) not only have higher IACs than orange pulp, but also higher IACs than strawberry, bilberry and kiwi pulp. The Baobab is a powerful anti-inflammatory and antioxidant. Yet another study listed extracts of Adansonia digitata as being an antioxidant and displaying "significant radical scavenging properties." Of fourteen species of "wild edible fruits," those from Adansonia digitata came in second place for highest phenolic and flavonoid content.
There hasn't been much written about Baobab's use in cosmetics; I believe it is fairly new. I first encountered it as I was reading the back of Alaffia's Baobab & Shea Butter Skin Renewal Face Cream. Incidentally, Alaffia has been highly reviewed and recommended several times by Marta, both for the company's fabulous ingredients and for its commitment to giving back to Africa. Baobab leaf extract and Baobab bark extract are listed as the very first ingredients in Alaffia's face cream, while Baobab oil is listed a few ingredients later. Alaffia also sells a serum made of pure unrefined Baobab oil.
A major plus in terms of practicality when it comes to cosmetics is that supposedly Baobab pulp has the ability to "remain stable in air tight containers for very long periods despite its own moisture levels." I hope to see more Baobab products popping up, and will be testing an Alaffia product that contains it as a main ingredient over the next few weeks.
Update March 2014: Two new products to the TIA shop that contain Baobab are:
• La Vie Celeste Extra Rich Face Cream
• Elizabeth Dehn for One Love Organics Vitamin C Active Moisture Serum
Baobab Oil Facial Serum Ingredients: Unrefined Baobab oil
Baobab & Shea Butter Skin Renewal Face Cream Ingredients: Baobab Leaf (Adansonia digitata) Extract* (Aqueous), Baobab Bark (Adansonia digitata) Extract* (Aqueous), Handcrafted Shea (Butyrospermum parkii) Butter*, Vegetable Emulsifying Wax, Handcrafted Cocoa (Theobroma cacao) Butter*, Palm Stearic Acid, Baobab (Adansonia digitata) Oil*, Essential Oils of Rose Geranium and Ylang Ylang, Phenoxyethanol, Potassium Sorbate, Limonene (from essential oil), Ascorbic Acid (Vitamin C).
I was doing some research as I came across this ingredient in the Neal's Yard Remedies (NYR Organic) Frankincense Intense Concentrate. I'm thrilled with what I've learned. Thanks for your interesting article.
Alaffia's shampoo(s)/conditioner(s) are certainly one of my favourite new finds.
I have been using Shea Butter African Black Soap and it's too early to tell what the overall results may be, but I do like the product in that it doesn't totally dehydrate my body should I get distracted and don't immediately moisturize. It doesn't leave my skin feeling tight and thirsty. This sounds very interesting. Good review and details, SarahK, gives me something else to put on my list of considerations, LOL. Thank you.
Sarah, I can personally vouch for most of the products produced by Alaffia, they keep it simple but the few ingredients they do use are high quality.
Interesting...! My belief is the ingredients given to us by Mother Nature should be taken in their most natural form to be beneficial, but I would be interested to try a product containing ingredients from the Baobab tree.


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Take Me Home Country Roads, new WV state song
A resolution to make John Denver's Take Me Home Country Roads an official state song comes before the West Virginia legislature today. It is already the official song of West Virginia University, and today's resolution is expected to pass.
To celebrate, Compass Records and Special Consensus are making their new version of the song available for online streaming. The song is included on their upcoming release, Country Boy – A Bluegrass Tribute To John Denver from Special Consensus & Friends.
Friends on this track are John Cowan on second vocal and Jason Carter on fiddle.
Country Boy is scheduled for a March 25 release. Pre-orders are being accepted now.
John Lawless
Latest posts by John Lawless (see all)
- Mike Conner to Graham Talent Group - December 8, 2016
- Noam Pikelny solo project in March - December 7, 2016
- Ray Cardwell to Wilson Pickins - December 7, 2016
Category: Miscellaneous bluegrass news
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I posted this entry about 'Virtual Fax versus Fax Machine' a while back. It talks about the necessity of sending outbound faxes and using an online fax system versus an actual fax machine. Nowadays, there are interesting printer choices for the home office that also include scanning and faxing capabilities. If you know you need to send those inevitable outbound faxes AND you know you need a printer, you might check into these devices.
They're called "All in One" (AIO) printers and Hewlett Packard offers a wide variety of them – both in Laser and Ink Jet. You can review some of their models at their AIO page (link here). Some of them start at less than $200. They're software integrated devices that will send your document out via an online fax service. Since the scanner is built in, the job of faxing a paper document is less cumbersome than it would be with a stand-alone scanner.
AIO printers can save you money and working space that would otherwise be required to buy and install a printer, fax machine, and scanner separately.
Tags: Home Office Fax, Home Office Printing, Online Fax Service, All in One Printers


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Check in from 2:00 PM / Check out prior to 12:00 AM
The Shilla Jeju: Find photos, reviews, information, amenities and compare prices for 5 stars hotels in Seogwipo, South Korea.
Featuring a private beach, an indoor pool and a Jacuzzi, The Shilla Jeju is located in Seogwipo and offers modern accommodation. It also features an executive floor, a mineral bath and free Wi-Fi.
Hotel description
Rooms at Jeju Shilla feature ocean and mountain views, and offer all the essentials so that guests have an enjoyable stay. All provide slippers, a mini bar and a refrigerator.
Guests of Shilla can sit down to a satisfying breakfast each morning at Cheonjee, as well as supper at Hinode served every night. For those with day trips planned, the hotel provides packed lunches if required.
Shilla Jeju is situated amongst the area's well-known attractions, and Cheonjeyeon Waterfalls, the Yeomiji Botanical Garden and Jungmun Marine Park Pacific Land are also close by. The friendly staff at the tour desk are available to book tours and sightseeing trips in Seogwipo.
Hotel features
Room Service, Restaurant, Bar / Lounge, Air Conditioned, Mini Bar, Refrigerator, Cable / Satellite TV, In Room Movies, Connecting Rooms, Coffee / Tea Maker, Hair Dryer, TV, En suite, Private Bathroom, Coffee Shop/Cafeteria
Business Center, Concierge, Elevator / Lift, 24 Hour Reception, Dry Cleaning, Babysitting / Child Services, Conference Room(s), Currency Exchange, Multilingual Staff, Safe-Deposit Box, ATM / Cash Machine, Meeting Rooms, Laundry service, Shops, Photocopier, Supervised child care/activities, Luggage Storage, Designated Smoking Area, Shops in Hotel, Self Laundry
Fitness Room/Gym, Swimming pool, Tour Desk, Massage / Beauty Centre, Bath / Hot Tub, Casino, Garden, Playground, Jacuzzi, Massage, Spa & Wellness Centre, Pool Indoor
High-speed Internet, Internet Connection (wireless)
Airport shuttle, Valet Parking
Private beach, Karaoke, Horse Riding, Hiking, Bathrobes, Private Toilet, Child Pool, Kids Club, Games Available, Picnic Area/Tables, Packed Lunches, Executive Floor, Souvenirs/Gift Shop, Shoe Shine
Availability and Prices
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87, Chilsimni-ro, Seogwipo
87, Chilsimni-ro, Seogwipo
Hyatt Regency Jeju
114, Jungmungwangwang-ro 72beon-gil, Seogwipo
114, Jungmungwangwang-ro 72beon-gil, Seogwipo
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