text:
Home /
Our Sources / About Us
/ FAQs /
Advanced Search
Not what you're
looking for? Try an advanced search.
Official citation and/or docket number and footnotes (if any) for this case available with purchase.
Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.
decided: October 19, 1973.
SOUTH EAST CHICAGO COMMISSION ET AL., PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS,v.DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT ET AL., DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES
SWYGERT, Chief Judge.
Plaintiffs, mostly residents of the Kenwood and Hyde Park communities of Chicago, brought this action in the district court to set aside a commitment made by the federal defendants*fn1 and approved by the City of Chicago to provide Lake Village Associates with mortgage insurance and interest subsidization in connection with a low-income housing project which Lake Village planned to erect at the border of Kenwood. In three of four counts,*fn2 the plaintiffs claimed (1) that the commitment was in violation of the Constitution, various statutory provisions, and regulations issued by HUD, (2) that the commitment was finalized in violation of plaintiffs' rights to due process and fair procedure, and (3) that the commitment was sought by Lake Village and accepted by the City in violation of a contract between them which plaintiffs, as third party beneficiaries, had a right to enforce. Both sides moved for summary judgment on the three counts. The defendants prevailed. The district judge found, upon a narrow review of the agency action, that the commitment of FHA and HUD was within the law as a matter of both substance and procedure, and that Lake Village and the City were in compliance with the contract sued upon. This appeal followed.
The City of Chicago invited bids in 1966 for the acquisition and development of certain parcels of land to which it had acquired title a few years earlier pursuant to an urban renewal plan for the Hyde Park and Kenwood areas of Chicago. One of those parcels, designated HR-1 by the City, was bounded on the north by 47th Street, the southern terminus of a census tract adjacent to HR-1 which had a white population of approximately one percent. The census tract in which HR-1 was located had a forty-two percent black population. In 1966, HR-1 and adjoining parcels were the subject of two detailed offers for acquisition and development made by Lake Village and the United Dwelling Foundation of Metropolitan Chicago.
The bids were reviewed by the Department of Urban Renewal of the City of Chicago, which issued a recommendation that both bidders develop the parcels jointly. Lake Village and United Dwelling Foundation, on June 20, 1967, signed an agreement that Lake Village would withdraw its bid and that, upon a conveyance to United Dwelling Foundation of the property, United Dwelling Foundation would reconvey to Lake Village for development a portion of the land which included the northern three acres of HR-1, a parcel subsequently designated HR-1B. The entire tract of land was then conveyed to United Dwelling Foundation pursuant to this agreement by a resolution of the Department of Urban Renewal. At approximately the same time the United Dwelling Foundation entered into a redevelopment agreement with the City of Chicago, to the terms of which Lake Village became bound by a partial assignment from the United Dwelling Foundation.
Some two years later FHA committed itself to fund a project which Lake Village intended to erect on parcel HR-1B. Upon learning of this, certain of the plaintiffs voiced objections based on their fear that federal subsidization -- which necessarily limited the prospective tenancy of the Lake Village project to persons of low income -- would bring a number of poor blacks into the Kenwood area, upsetting the racial balance of that predominantly white area. Defendant Ernest C. Stevens, the local Insuring Office Director for FHA, arranged a conference between Lake Village, the objectors and himself. On July 15, 1971, all parties were allowed to present documentary matter and to argue in support of their respective positions. Stevens refused to transcribe the meeting, to allow cross-examination of witnesses, or to grant the objectors access to certain information known to FHA. At the completion of the conference, and after a meeting of FHA and HUD personnel, Stevens issued a written administrative determination not to rescind the commitment of FHA to Lake Village.
Plaintiffs thereupon filed suit on August 10, 1971, and recorded a lis pendens notice. In the first count of their complaint, they sought to enjoin the federal defendants from issuing to Lake Village Associates, and the City of Chicago from approving, mortgage insurance and interest reduction subsidies under 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1 in connection with the Lake Village project. In support of their right to contest the use of federal subsidy programs, the plaintiffs cited the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, the National Housing Act, the 1964 and 1968 Civil Rights Acts, and regulations of HUD and FHA. In a second count, the plaintiffs set out a challenge to the procedural integrity of the decision by HUD and FHA to provide the Lake Village project with federal assistance. They sought relief by a trial de novo on the merits of their substantive claims and an injunction such as was sought in the first count, or, alternatively, by an order directing the federal defendants to afford them an adequate rehearing. A fourth and final count, founded on the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, made reference to the redevelopment contract between the City and Lake Village, stated that the plaintiffs were the "intended beneficiaries" thereof, alleged that the contract had been violated by Lake Village and the City by their arrangement of extensive federal funding for the project, and asked for specific performance of the contract by Lake Village and the City.
On motion of defendants, the district judge entered a summary judgment against plaintiffs on all three counts. He found that the federal defendants had employed a proper legal standard and that their decision was based on a "consideration of the relevant factors . . . [with] no clear error of judgment." As to the procedural claim of plaintiffs, he denied it on the ground that "plaintiffs' rights are adequately protected by their opportunity to obtain judicial review," citing Shannon v. Dept. of Housing and Urban Development, 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970). He found, lastly, that the contract claim of plaintiffs was contradicted by the very terms of the agreement sued upon.
According to the plaintiffs, the law which dictates national housing policy for the purposes of this case is contained in 24 C.F.R. § 200.700 et seq., 42 U.S.C. § 3608(d) (5), Shannon v. Dept. of Housing and Urban Development, 436 F.2d 809, 820-821 (3d Cir. 1970), Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1971), and Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969). The defendants would concur in this list did it not contain a citation to 24 C.F.R. § 200.700 et seq., known to the parties as the Project Selection Criteria. Director Stevens, in particular, paid no heed to the Criteria in weighing the objections of plaintiffs to the FHA commitment. Our first task is to resolve this difference. Loosely speaking, the question is one of retroactivity, for the Criteria, though first published on June 24, 1971, did not become effective until February 7, 1972, long after HUD and FHA had solidified their commitment to Lake Village.
There are few principles of our law more ancient, and none more respected, than the canon which holds that laws are enacted for the future. A legislative pronouncement may not operate on acts which predate its passage. Neither may it serve to divest rights which have come into concrete existence before its date of effect. In our early days, the principle was seen by many judges to be a transcendental limitation upon the power of the legislature. See, e.g., Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43, 47, 3 L. Ed. 650 (1815) (Story, J.); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 1 L. Ed. 648 (1798) (Chase, J.). Modern times have refined this perception, and the principle today stands embodied in a number of constitutional principles: Laws acting ex post facto are void; so, too, are enactments which work to the impairment of contract or the deprivation of property without due process. Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 54 S. Ct. 840, 78 L. Ed. 1434 (1934); McCracken v. Hayward, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 608, 11 L. Ed. 397 (1844). See generally, Smead, The Rule Against Retroactive Legislation: A Basic Principle of Jurisprudence, 20 Minn. L. Rev. 775, 789-97 (1936). In construing legislation, then, courts have rigorously adhered to a rule of construction that a law will not be given retroactive effect without a clear mandate to that end from its enacting body, for judges have always been reluctant to decide constitutional questions unless they must. See Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Laramie Stock Yards Co., 231 U.S. 190, 199-200, 34 S. Ct. 101, 58 L. Ed. 179 (1913). As put in Greene v. United States, 376 U.S. 149, 160, 84 S. Ct. 615, 621, 11 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1964):
The first rule of construction is that legislation must be considered as addressed to the future, not to the past . . . [and] a retrospective operation will not be given to a statute which interferes with antecedent rights . . . unless such be "the unequivocal and inflexible import of the terms, and the manifest intention of the legislature. " 376 U.S. at 160, 84 S. Ct. at 621.
This is a rule of long standing. See, e.g., Claridge Apartments Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 323 U.S. 141, 164, 65 S. Ct. 172, 89 L. Ed. 139 (1944); United States v. Magnolia Co., 276 U.S. 160, 162-63, 48 S. Ct. 236, 72 L. Ed. 509 (1928); United States v. Heth, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 399, 248, 2 L. Ed. 479 (1806).
In sum, courts are charged with a threefold task when a statute is to be found retroactive. They must determine, first, whether a statute "interferes with antecedent rights."*fn3 If so, retrospective operation becomes a question purely of legislative intent; such must be the "unequivocal and inflexible import of the terms, and the manifest intention of the legislature." Only then may a court rightly reach the constitutional question presented. See Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Laramie Stock Yards Co., 231 U.S. 190, 199-200, 34 S. Ct. 101, 102, 58 L. Ed. 179 (1913).
Perhaps the earliest example of this analysis in the Supreme Court is contained in the case of United States v. The Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 2 L. Ed. 49 (1801). There a French ship had been seized as a prize of war by a naval vessel of the United States and condemned thereafter as forfeited to the use of the United States by a final judgment of a circuit court. Before the case was heard in the Supreme Court, the governments of France and the United States made a treaty which provided for the return of French vessels not "definitively" condemned. Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, found that the vessel at suit fell within the terms of the treaty:
The last decree of an inferior court is final, in relation to the power of that court, but not in relation to the property itself, unless it be acquiesced under. The terms used in the treaty seem to apply to the actual condition of the property, and to direct a restoration of that which is still in controversy between the parties. On any other construction, the word definitive would be rendered useless and inoperative. Vessels are seldom, if ever, condemned, but by a final sentence: an interlocutory order for a sale is not a condemnation. 5 U.S. at 68.
The Chief Justice undertook this construction in the face of his recognition that by the treaty, so construed, "the nation [had] given up the vested rights of its citizens." 5 U.S. at 69. He concluded that the divestiture was within the power of the government:
It is true, that in mere private cases between individuals, a court will and ought to struggle hard against a construction which will, by a retrospective operation, affect the rights of parties, but in great national concerns, where individual rights, acquired by war, are sacrificed for national purposes, the contract making the sacrifice ought always to receive a construction conforming to its manifest import; and if the nation has given up the vested rights of its citizens, it is not for the court, but for the government, to consider whether it be a case proper for compensation. 5 U.S. at 69.*fn4
The judgment of condemnation was accordingly set aside.
In disagreement, the plaintiffs read Schooner Peggy to state a general rule, that a court must apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision, evidently relying on the same interpretation of that case by the Supreme Court in Thorpe v. Housing Authority of the City of Durham, 393 U.S. 268, 281-282, 89 S. Ct. 518, 21 L. Ed. 2d 474 (1969). We need not quibble, however, over the question of whether the general rule or its exceptions -- the existence of which the Court in Thorpe acknowledged -- are such in fact or the reverse, for Thorpe and each of its foundation cases exemplify the traditional mode of analysis. The question in Thorpe was whether a tenant of a federally assisted housing project was entitled to eviction proceedings consistent with a HUD circular which first came into effect while a challenge to her eviction was pending in the Supreme Court. The Court went no farther than the first inquiry, for it found:
Requiring the Authority to apply the circular before evicting petitioner not only does not infringe upon any of its rights, but also does not even constitute an imposition. The Authority admitted during oral argument that it has already begun complying with the circular. It refuses to apply it to petitioner simply because it decided to evict her before the circular was issued. Since petitioner has not yet vacated, we fail to see the significance of this distinction. 393 U.S. at 283, 89 S. Ct. at 527.
To the same effect are Vandenbark v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 311 U.S. 538, 61 S. Ct. 347, 85 L. Ed. 327 (1941), and Carpenter v. Wabash Ry. Co., 309 U.S. 23, 60 S. Ct. 416, 84 L. Ed. 558 (1940), each of which involved a situation where retroactive application of a particular law involved, at most, a minimal disturbance of antecedent rights.*fn5 See also Ziffrin, Inc. v. United States, 318 U.S. 73, 78, 63 S. Ct. 465, 87 L. Ed. 621 (1943); Jones v. Lynn, 477 F.2d 885 (1st Cir. 1973).*fn6
A somewhat different case is United States v. Chambers, 291 U.S. 217, 54 S. Ct. 434, 78 L. Ed. 763 (1934), where the government had obtained an indictment under a law which subsequently became invalid upon repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment. That the government was not allowed to continue with its prosecution is consistent with traditional principles. A curative law -- the Twenty-First Amendment -- was involved, one which legalized conduct which had theretofore been illegal. See Smead, The Rule Against Retroactive Legislation: A Basic Principle of Jurisprudence, 20 Minn. L. Rev. 775, 785 n. 36 (1936). Chambers is unique, too, in that a criminal conviction was at stake; had the Court reached the opposite result, Chambers would have been punished for conduct which society as a whole no longer considered reprehensible, all for the sake of a vested indictment.
The instant case is much like Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 91 S. Ct. 814, 28 L. Ed. 2d 136 (1971), yet another case conforming to the analysis of Schooner Peggy. There the Court was presented with a regulation which required the Secretary of Transportation to make formal findings when he approved the use of parkland for highway construction pursuant to 23 U.S.C. § 138 and 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f). Partially at issue was the applicability of this regulation to an approval by the Secretary which had taken place before the regulation was in effect. The petitioners conceded that the regulation "was not intended to have retrospective effect," 401 U.S. at 418, 91 S. Ct. at 824, but argued that Thorpe required an opposite conclusion. Finding that an interference with antecedent rights would occur, the Court limited the regulation to prospective effect:
While we do not question that DOT Order 5610.1 constitutes the law in effect at the time of our decision, we do not believe that Thorpe compels us to remand for the Secretary to make formal findings. Here, unlike the situation in Thorpe, there has been a change in circumstances -- additional right-of-way has been cleared and the 26-acre right-of-way inside Overton Park has been purchased by the State. Moreover, there is an administrative record that allows the full, prompt review of the Secretary's action that is sought without additional delay which would result from having a remand to the Secretary. 401 U.S. at 419, 91 S. Ct. at 825.*fn7
Having Overton Park and its predecessors before us, and mindful of the principles they represent, we turn our attention to the question before us.
There can be little doubt that antecedent rights would be disturbed by a retroactive application of the Criteria. On August 11, 1971, HUD became contractually obliged to provide Lake Village with mortgage insurance and interest reduction payments. Lake Village has since erected a building on the faith of that obligation. Plaintiffs do not suggest that Lake Village would not suffer grave harm were HUD to rescind its obligations; they argue, instead, that Lake Village took its chances by electing to proceed with construction in the face of their appeal of the HUD commitment to the district court and their filing of a lis pendens notice prior to the execution of the contracts at issue. Neither the filing of suit nor a lis pendens notice, however, requires a party being sued to stand in his tracks. The preservation of the status quo pending a final judgment is the function of a preliminary injunction. Having failed to obtain this, the plaintiffs cannot complain of activity by Lake Village after this suit was filed.*fn8
As in Overton Park, that activity has led to a change in circumstances; Lake Village will feel far more than an "imposition" in the Thorpe sense if HUD must rescind its commitment. It follows that the Criteria have no pertinence to this case, for the regulation holds not a hint that its authors intended for it a retroactive effect.*fn9 Thus, we need not reach the question of whether rights have vested in Lake Village under the due process clause.
Plaintiffs next contend that the HUD commitment was illegal notwithstanding the inapplicability of the Criteria. Illegality, they say, derives not only from a clear error of judgment on the part of Director Stevens in weighing and analyzing the facts before him, but also from a misapprehension on his part of the governing legal standard.
In support of the last contention, plaintiffs point to the following passage of the administrative determination:
There exists a compelling need to provide low and moderate income housing for the substantial number of negroes who were displaced by the Renewal Project, as well as other low and moderate income people of the City of Chicago. The need for such housing far outweighs the speculative concern of whether the Redevelopers of Lake Village will be completely successful in their efforts to achieve the racial and economic mix sought for the Project.
If we read their argument correctly,*fn10 plaintiffs assert that Stevens evidenced in this passage a general conviction that the need for public housing was a factor far more important to its placement than was the possibility of increased racial segregation. We cannot concur. What Stevens did was to weigh the need for the project against the possibility of a largely black tenancy; having concluded that the latter was reasonably improbable, he struck the balance in favor of need.*fn11 And if plaintiffs mean to contend that the need for public housing at a particular location may never be weighed against the possibility that segregation will be continued or exacerbated by its erection, they are contradicted by their own authority:
We [are not] suggesting that desegregation of housing is the only goal of the national housing policy. There will be instances where a pressing case may be made for the rebuilding of a racial ghetto. We hold only that the agency's judgment must be an informed one; one which weighs the alternatives and finds that the need for physical rehabilitation or additional minority housing at the site in question clearly outweighs the disadvantage of increasing or perpetuating racial concentration. Shannon v. Dept. of Housing and Urban Development, 436 F.2d 809, 822 (3d Cir. 1970).
Certainly neither Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1971), nor Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969), stands for the proposition that public housing may not be erected in or at the border of a racial ghetto. Indeed, when the latter case came before the district court for a ruling on remedy, it was specifically held that ghetto placement was permissible provided that public housing in white areas was likewise erected. Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 304 F. Supp. 736 (N.D. Ill. 1969). See generally, Note, Public Housing and Urban Policy; Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 79 Yale L. Rev. 712, 717-18 and sources at 718 nn. 16, 17 (1970).
We turn to a review of the administrative factual findings. Our inquiry must be a narrow one. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A). As was stated in Overton Park :
Scrutiny of the facts does not end . . . with the determination that the Secretary has acted within the scope of his statutory authority. Section 706(2) (A) requires a finding that the actual choice made was not "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A) (1964 ed., Supp. V). To make this finding the court must consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment. . . . Although this inquiry into the facts is to be searching and careful, the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one. The court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency. 401 U.S. at 416, 91 S. Ct. at 824.
We are not charged, moreover, with determining whether the administrative findings are supported by substantial evidence. Just the opposite is the case. Were we to require that substantial evidence support Stevens in his determination, we would overstep the careful mandate of the Administrative Procedure Act. Compare 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A) with 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (E).
The decision by the Director to maintain his commitment to Lake Village was based upon three separate conclusions. He found, first, a substantial probability that the Lake Village project would be adequately integrated when erected and rented. Assuming that the opposite would come to pass, Stevens concluded that "no significant impact upon the stability or racial concentration of Hyde Park-Kenwood" would result. He found, finally that the project was greatly needed by low income residents of the area.*fn12
Plaintiffs attack the decision on all fronts. It is said that the facts do not support Stevens in any of his conclusions, particularly the one regarding the probability of an integrated project. In support, the plaintiffs state that Stevens "totally ignored" certain facts, most notably these:
No housing project subsidized under Section 221(d) (3) of the National Housing Act (the predecessor to Section 236) in the vicinity of Lake Village is less than 90% black in occupancy, including one project (Greenwood Park) built by the defendant LVA and managed by the defendant Draper & Kramer, as well as two others managed by Draper & Kramer. Prior to the rent-up of Greenwood Park, defendant LVA stated that the racial balance achieved at that project would have a lot to do with the racial balance of Lake Village. . . . By the time of Stevens' "Administrative Determination," however, Greenwood Park was substantially all-black in occupancy.
Like the Lake Village project, Greenwood Park is located on the south side of 47th Street but a few blocks west, and was developed by the same defendant Lake Village Associates, managed by the same defendant Draper & Kramer, and is subsidized as a moderate income development by these same federal defendants. Greenwood Park has a 91% black occupancy; although located in a census tract (3905) that is only 72% black.
Stevens' reliance in the "Administrative Determination" on the design emphasis of the project on efficiency and one bedroom units "calculated to attract elderly and young married couples" is totally undetermined by his failure to consider that the presence of 18 efficiency apartments and 151 one bedroom apartments in the completed Section 221(d) (3) projects in the Lake Village area has not prevented those developments from achieving an overall black occupancy of at least 95%. App. Br. at 18, 19.
We cannot agree that these facts were overlooked.*fn13 Stevens was well aware of nearby failures at integration, as is apparent from a memorandum which he received from the Economic and Market Analysis Division of HUD on July 23, 1971. That report detailed previous FHA occupancy experience and made a number of suggestions for enhancing the possibility of an integrated Lake Village project. The great majority of these ideas were incorporated into Stevens' final ruling:
In response to a request by the Chairman of the Conference for compromise proposals, the representatives of the Redevelopers have volunteered to accept a waiver by the Government of the Section 236 income limitations for any number of units which HUD in its discretion should determine. Since such offer will enhance the probability of a racial mix in the tenancy of the Project, it is hereby determined that the Section 236 income limitations be waived for not more than twenty percent of the Project units developed with Federal assistance.
In order to further enhance the probability of said racial mix, it is hereby further determined to permit the utilization of exception income limits for all two-bedroom units in the Project Tower developed with Federal assistance.
The Redevelopers of the Project are directed to submit to the Chicago FHA Insuring Office, prior to initial endorsement of the Mortgage Note, their written agreement to stage the development of the low-rise Project units (18 three-bedroom units) in order to delay their availability until the high rise Project units have been rented.
He also required this of Lake Village:
The Redevelopers shall submit for HUD approval within twenty days from the date hereof, a detailed plan of tenant selection procedures devised to attain the maximum possible racial mix in the occupancy of the Project, in furtherance and in implementation of the tenant selection policy set forth in Volume I of its Memorandum to the undersigned.
That memorandum set out an extensive, though somewhat general, program to "attract applicants of all races" through promotional activities, advertising, and tenant recruitment. It thus appears that Stevens did considerably more than passively accept the estimate by Lake Village of eventual integration; aware of the problems and failures of the past, he sought to improve thereon with a fresh approach. That his efforts bore some risk of failure is not, we think, reason enough to overturn them as a product of a clear error of judgment.*fn14 It follows that the concern of plaintiffs for a segregated project was, on this record, arguably speculative and that Stevens did not err in looking to the issue of need for a counterweight.
Plaintiffs attack the finding of need on the ground that all of the persons displaced in the original urban renewal effort had been relocated as of December 31, 1970. Stevens, however, did not base his assessment of need solely on the urban renewal displacement nor was he willing to accept as adequate the relocation sites:
The black population of Chicago is increasing in both percentage and absolute terms. If low and moderate income minorities are displaced by urban renewal and not permitted to live in clearance areas because of high rents and white areas are closed to them -- they are forced only to settle in other areas of high black concentration where the housing stock is either substandard or marginal. Such areas then become over-crowded, the conditions of slum and blight emerge, and the urban renewal cycle begins anew.
As with this finding of probable integration, we see no clear error on the part of Stevens. The administrative decision stands on these two grounds and we need not reach the question of whether Stevens erred in finding that an all-black project would have, at worst, a de minimis effect on the racial balance of Hyde Park-Kenwood.
Plaintiffs cite Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S. Ct. 1011, 25 L. Ed. 2d 287 (1970), as authority for their complaint that they were denied due process in their appearance before HUD. Director Stevens, they claim, was not an impartial decisionmaker and erred in not allowing their cross-examination of witnesses.*fn15 They must do more than cite Goldberg, however, to prevail on their contention, for Goldberg was a very different case from this. "Due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands. . . . Its flexibility . . . is a recognition that not all situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the same kind of procedure." Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481, 92 S. Ct. 2593, 2600, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484 (1972).
It is curious, indeed, to find the plaintiffs arguing for advanced procedural protections in a context where their right even to a hearing is open to question. Shannon had this to say:
Plaintiffs urge that some sort of adversary hearing or at least an opportunity for residents in the area to be heard should be required. They rely on the district court decision in Powelton Civic Home Owners Ass'n v. HUD, [284 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa. 1968)]. Without suggesting how this court would rule on the Powelton situation, we think a case involving the adequacy of relocation procedures which are dealt with specifically in the Housing Act of 1949, 42 U.S.C. § 1455(c), is distinguishable from the more general problem of racial concentration presented here. In this case the judgment to be made by HUD is quasi-legislative. So long as it adopts some adequate institutional means for marshaling the appropriate legislative facts the rights of affected residents will be adequately protected, we think, by the opportunity to obtain judicial review pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act after the agency decision. For deliberately discriminatory action by a LPA there are other adversary type remedies available. 436 F.2d at 821.
Perhaps in recognition of this, plaintiffs conceded at oral argument that no authority bore directly on their claim. They argued, nevertheless, that we might make a ruling limited to the parties and facts of this case. Taking this approach, we decline their invitation.
In their quest for a right of cross-examination, plaintiffs suggest that the administrative determination involved the resolution of "complicated and disputed questions of fact -- whether the Section 236 subsidy for Lake Village would lead to an increase in racial concentration." App. Br. at 33. It is apparent, however, that Stevens accepted most, if not all, of the facts which plaintiffs offered and which they say he ignored. The real question is whether the measures which Stevens took to prevent a repetition of the failures at similar, nearby projects were adequate to serve that end. Plaintiffs raise no objections to the commitment modifications -- other than to term them, without support, "woefully inadequate" -- and we must conclude that plaintiffs had little need for cross-examination. The modifications to the HUD commitment are much like the CAB regulation in American Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 123 U.S. App. D.C. 310, 359 F.2d 624 (1966), and the words of the court of appeals in that case have bearing here:
The particular point most controverted by petitioners is the effect of the CAB regulation on their business. The issue involves what [one scholar] calls "legislative" rather than "adjudicative" facts. It is the kind of issue involving expert opinions and forecasts, which cannot be decisively resolved by testimony. It is the kind of issue where a month of experience will be worth a year of hearings. 359 F.2d at 633.
See also Hahn v. Gottlieb, 430 F.2d 1243, 1246-1249 (1st Cir. 1970); Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v. United States, 188 Ct. Cl. 644, 413 F.2d 568, 590 (1969).
With respect to plaintiffs' claim of partiality to Lake Village by Stevens, we find that the record does not bear them out. In response to a letter of objection to the HUD commitment by the plaintiff SECC, Stevens stated on May 3, 1971:
Inasmuch as we have already issued a commitment on subject proposal after a great deal of expense by the proponents and since it is adjudged as needed and feasible by this office, we cannot at this time morally rescind this commitment.
A few days later, he made what plaintiffs concede to be a restatement of this position: "We cannot arbitrarily rescind a commitment which has been issued" (emphasis added). An opposition to administrative arbitrariness is hardly a position which evidences prejudice in favor of Lake Village. As his letter of May 28, 1971 reveals, Stevens was open to plaintiffs' criticism.*fn16 Plaintiffs would attach significance, lastly, to testimony that Stevens came into a meeting of HUD personnel "with his decision and with his mind made up." This is scant evidence of prejudgment, however, for the HUD meeting took place after plaintiffs had conferred with HUD. Stevens can hardly be faulted for having reached a conclusion on the basis of what came to light at and pursuant to that conference.
Our last task is to assess plaintiffs' contention that their contractual claim against the City and Lake Village was deserving of a summary judgment in their favor, or, at least, of a trial on a genuine issue of material fact.
Lake Village became obligated to the City by an assignment of a redevelopment contract between the United Dwelling Foundation and the City. In return for certain parcels of land, including HR-1B, to be conveyed directly to Lake Village by the City upon payment of the purchase price, Lake Village agreed "to assume all of the obligations of the Redevelopers [United Dwelling Foundation]" under the redevelopment contract and "to be subject to all the conditions and restrictions to which the Redevelopers are subject thereunder." One of those conditions was this:
The terms and conditions of the Offer, the Instructions to Bidders, and Department of Urban Renewal Resolution No. 67 -- DUR-85 are made a part of this Contract and incorporated by reference thereto.
It is the contention of plaintiffs that the urban renewal resolution bound Lake Village to comply with the original offer it made for development of the entire site. This argument is without merit.
The resolution states in part:
Whereas, the [United Dwelling Foundation and Lake Village] have entered into a Memorandum Agreement in regard to their proposals to overcome the incompatible features of the same; and
Whereas, the Department of Urban Renewal has reviewed said Memorandum Agreement and finds that said Agreement will effect a satisfactory solution; and
Whereas, in consideration of the terms of the Memorandum Agreement between said offerors, [Lake Village] has withdrawn its offer to purchase said parcels:
The approval conferred by this Resolution is further contingent upon the land contract for sale of said . . . Parcels between the City of Chicago and [United Dwelling Foundation] providing that [United Dwelling Foundation] convey a part of parcel HR-1 and parcels LR-1 through LR-3 to [Lake Village] for redevelopment in accordance with their proposal for the price paid for same by [United Dwelling Foundation] and that said [Lake Village] purchase and redevelop said parcels under the same conditions and covenants required by the City under its land contract with [United Dwelling Foundation] (emphasis added).
Plaintiffs assert -- despite the recitation that Lake Village "has withdrawn its offer" -- that the word "proposal" in the italicized phrase refers to the original Lake Village offer.*fn17 Lake Village and the City contend that "proposal" refers to the memorandum agreement between Lake Village and United Dwelling Foundation to which reference is made throughout the urban renewal resolution, an agreement which makes no reference to the original offer of Lake Village. We agree with the defendants, for the opposing interpretation is inconsistent with the use in the resolution of the pronoun "their" to modify "proposal." Where Lake Village is referred to by a pronoun elsewhere in the resolution, the singular form is used. Thus, the pronoun "their" must refer to Lake Village and one or more additional parties. This would make no sense if "proposal" was meant as a reference to the original Lake Village offer, for Lake Village alone was a party to that.
Plaintiffs suggest that this contractual arrangement left Lake Village free of the "elaborate controls [which the City] had previously established on ultimate development of the property." Reply Br. at 24. The short answer to this is contained in the redevelopment contract, where numerous provisions granting the City control over construction by Lake Village are set out, as well as in the urban renewal resolution itself, where Lake Village is required to "redevelop . . . under the same conditions and covenants required by the City under its land contract" with United Dwelling Foundation.
The summary judgment entered by the district court is affirmed.
Our website includes the main text of the court's opinion but does not include the
docket number, case citation or footnotes. Upon purchase, docket numbers and/or
citations allow you to research a case further or to use a case in a legal proceeding.
Footnotes (if any) include details of the court's decision.
Official citation and/or docket number and footnotes (if any) for this case available with purchase.
Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.
LRC, Inc. About Us


text:
Official Route
rcn 76 - Ibergeregg–Sattelegg-Linth (Schwyz–Uznach)
Route Stats
62 km Mapped distance
unknown Stoupání
unknown Klesání
Route from OpenStreetMap
This route is based on data from OpenStreetMap, a world map that you can edit. This route may be incomplete, feel free to improve it!Learn more
Part of
Regional cycling network of Switzerland
Sargans, Canton of St. Gallen, Switzerland
7427km unknown unknown
rcn 76 - Etappe 2 (Einsiedeln (Willerzell)-Uznach)
Schübelbach, Canton of Schwyz, Switzerland
29km unknown unknown
rcn 76 - Etappe 1 (Schwyz-Einsiedeln (Willerzell))
Schwyz, Canton of Schwyz, Switzerland
32km unknown unknown
Similar routes
There are no similar routes.
O aplikaci Bikemap
Bikemap is the world's biggest collection of cycle routes. Create your perfect bike route with the online cycle route planner and get our mobile apps for simple navigation, route tracking and for finding popular cycle routes near you.

subset: commoncrawl


text:
Saturday, May 05, 2012
Thousands lose power after suspected wire thief is badly shocked
About 14,000 San Bernardino residents lost power early Saturday morning after a man shocked himself himself while trying to steal wires from a Southern California Edison substation, according to police.
San Bernardino police received a report around 2 a.m. of a blown transformer at the substation at Rialto and Stoddard avenues. When officers arrived at the scene, they found a man who had apparently been shocked by up to 33,000 volts of electricity while trying to steal wiring.
The man, who was not identified, was taken to a nearby hospital where he is in grave condition, police said.
About 14,000 customers lost power right after the incident, according to an Edison spokeswoman. Crews are working to repair the damage and about 600 households are still without electricity.
23 comments:
I once had a joke book and when you opened it you were shocked.
- May 5, 2012 at 11:56 PM
Had to be a fucking stupid nigger or a wetback. This guy is a real brain trust. Darwin Award candidate.
- May 6, 2012 at 12:32 AM
Self induced Juice!
- May 6, 2012 at 3:45 AM
Reminds me of a call I handled in the 3500-block of W. Cermak Rd. Call comes in of "assist CFD." I get there and there's a crowd in the alley. When I walk up I see a young black male, sitting flat in the alley with his legs in front of him. I also noticed his hair was smoking. Turns out he was trying to "steal" electricity by running a direct wire from the pole to the house, bypassing the meters. Apparently he came in contact with the 10,000 volt primaries and it knocked him off the pole, depositing him on his ass where I found him sitting.
Best part was his girlfriend yelling at him as he was being wheeled to the ambulance. "And you should've known better...seeing as this is how YOUR BROTHER DIED!"
Yes, you guessed it: his brother didn't get zapped off the pole. Brother had apparently "Rode the Lightning" until they found the Crispy Critter (or what was left of him) still holding onto the 10Kv lines.
God, these fuckers are stupid!
- May 6, 2012 at 4:33 AM
here again.the fool did something illegal yet he will sue and win!!
- May 6, 2012 at 5:10 AM
" taken to a nearby grave in perfect condition!"
- May 6, 2012 at 5:43 AM
Darwin was right on!!!!!
- May 6, 2012 at 8:14 AM
That must have been a SHOCKING experience !!
- May 6, 2012 at 8:31 AM
He had to be black, 33,000 volts is simply not enough to kill a fully grown black man.
- May 6, 2012 at 9:06 AM
I wonder waht they'll CHARGE him with?
- May 6, 2012 at 10:03 AM
"taken to a nearby hospital where he is in Grave condition", police said. This Copper has a great sense of humor.
- May 6, 2012 at 10:05 AM
How'd you like to have to pick up this crispy critter?
- May 6, 2012 at 10:06 AM
Ok, her are the standard line I can come up with. Feel free to add on.
He was really wired.
Shocking behavior.
Re-volting situation.
He asked the Officer "Do you mind if I smoke"
What was he charged with?
Here hold these cables my car needs a jump.
He gave a glowing report.
He was a well grounded person. Maybe not?
- May 6, 2012 at 10:16 AM
....this guy is STILL more qualified to be POTUS than Bearick...
- May 6, 2012 at 11:04 AM
Lol i love it.niggers are the best comedians!!!
- May 6, 2012 at 11:12 AM
Was it the same guy who stole the 4 reels of wire from that city of chicago warehouse last year?
- May 6, 2012 at 12:44 PM
hilarious animal that nigger
- May 6, 2012 at 3:18 PM
I do not know whole stole the wire at the warehouse and I deny any accusations about it even though I was the alarm and camera guy and neither of these systems were working at the time of the theft by others
Only recently have I returned to work after my accident of falling up the stairs and tearing my shoulder to return to that location to try and once again repair the alarm for the new agencies who now reside in that building who displaced over 100 electricians who worked in the building prior to the wire theft
- May 6, 2012 at 4:51 PM
OHM my! WATT will his family do?
- May 6, 2012 at 6:27 PM
Anonymous said...
He had to be black,
May 6, 2012 9:06 AM
If he wasn't, he sure is now.
- May 6, 2012 at 6:45 PM
I do love a happy ending. I watched a you-tube video of some dumbass rag riding on top of a train grabbing the primary power line. Current went through him to ground through the train, and he fell off the train, smoking and burning. I couldn't think of an appropriate, witty comment at that time. Thanks for all the suggestions you guys made. Better late than never.
- May 6, 2012 at 9:06 PM
Hahahahaha! Luv it.
- May 8, 2012 at 3:10 AM
- I Voted For Obama said...
If you try to steal wire from a live power line, you voted for Obama.
- May 8, 2012 at 9:03 AM


text:
Leap Frog Coupon Codes 2016
Complete list of Leap Frog promotional codes & discounts for 2016
Leap Frog
Expired Coupon Code for Leap Frog
- Buy 1 Game Cartridge, Get 40% Off the 2nd at Leap Frog with coupon codeDiscountOnlineGet Coupon CodeWINNERCode Copied!This site has been opened in a new window for you to shop. To redeem the discount enter the code WINNER when you reach the checkout. If the website did not open, click here.Apply coupon code at checkout.20/02/2013
There are currently no comments for this coupon.


text:
Home /
Our Sources / About Us
/ FAQs /
Advanced Search
Not what you're
looking for? Try an advanced search.
Official citation and/or docket number and footnotes (if any) for this case available with purchase.
Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.
May 22, 1950
COMMONWEALTHv.FLICKINGER, APPELLANT
Appeal, No. 227, Jan. T., 1949, from judgment of Superior Court, Oct. T., 1949, No. 73, affirming judgment and sentence of Court of Quarter Sessions of Lehigh County, June Sessions, 1948, No. 40, in case of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Alfred D. Flickinger. Judgment and sentence affirmed.
James C. Lanshe, for appellant.
Ralph B. Umsted, Deputy Attorney General, with him Kenneth H. Koch, District Attorney and T. McKeen Chidsey, Attorney General, for appellee.
Before Drew, C.j., Stern, Stearne, Jones and Bell, JJ.
[ 365 Pa. Page 60]
Does the Act of June 21, 1947, P.L. 911, which makes it a crime to possess 200 or more untaxed cigarettes,*fn1 unconstitutionally interfere with interstate commerce? That is the sole substantial question raised by this appeal.
[ 365 Pa. Page 61]
On or before July 13, 1948, Alfred D. Flickinger, defendant, purchased 350 cartons of 200 cigarettes each in Wilmington, Delaware. The following evening, 332 of those cartons, upon which no Pennsylvania tax had been paid, were found in the trunk of his automobile while it was parked in the rear of his home in the City of Allentown, Lehigh County. Defendant intended to sell those cigarettes, without paying any Pennsylvania tax on them, wherever he might find customers. He was brought before an alderman who found him guilty of having in his possession 332 cartons of untaxed cigarettes in violation of the Act of 1947. An appeal was taken to the Court of Quarter Sessions which, after hearing testimony, made the above findings of fact and sentenced defendant to pay a five of $5.00 per carton or $1660. The Superior Court unanimously affirmed that judgment and this appeal followed.
The Act of 1947 was passed to prevent evasion of the tax imposed by the Cigarette Tax Act of June 14, 1935, P.L. 341, as amended, and must be read in conjunction with it. In enacting the 1947 statute the legislature was exercising its police power by providing penalties for failure to comply with the Cigarette Tax Act. Defendant, while attacking the 1947 Act, supra, has inferentially questioned the constitutionality of the 1935 Act. A proper disposition of the issue raised requires therefore consideration of the validity of both Acts, for if the 1935 Act is unconstitutional, the 1947 Act is likewise unenforceable.
Defendant contends that a carton of cigarettes is an "original package" and therefore any attempt to levy a tax on cartons of cigarettes transported from another state is an unconstitutional interference with interstate commerce. In answering this argument it is not necessary to determine whether a carton of cigarettes is an original package. Assuming arguendo that it is, the Supreme Court of the United States has repeatedly held
[ 365 Pa. Page 62]
that goods transported in interstate commerce are subject to tax when they have reached their destination and become part of the mass of property within the taxing state even though such goods are still in the original packages: Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 582; Wiloil Corp. v. Pennsylvania, 294 U.S. 169, 175.
Defendant purchased the cigarettes in Delaware and returned with them to his home in Allentown. That was not merely a temporary stopping point. He had reached his home, his ultimate destination. It was the termination of the interstate trip. It is true that he intended to resell those cigarettes wherever he might find customers for them and that might have resulted in sales in other states. However, that would not have been a continuation of the interstate transportation from Delaware but rather would have been a new and distinct journey originating in Pennsylvania. No tax immunity can be derived because defendant might at his own whim eventually decide to transport goods from one state to another for resale: Superior Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 280 U.S. 390. The cigarettes had reached their destination and become a part of the mass of property within this Commonwealth. Therefore, the Commonwealth had the right to tax them.
Nor does the cigarette tax discriminate against, or place an undue burden on interstate commerce. The tax is levied on all cigarettes found in this Commonwealth and "The commerce clause does not prevent taxation of goods by the State in which they are found merely because brought from another State, for that would unduly trammel state power of taxation and produce gross inequality and injustice.": Wiloil Corp. v. Pennsylvania, supra at 174; Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. 123. Where the tax burden is imposed equally on all goods coming to rest in a state, without regard to point of origin, it is not discriminatory against interstate commerce: Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query, 286 U.S. 472.
[ 365 Pa. Page 63]
Defendant then argues that even though the tax be valid the Act of 1947, by making it a crime to possess untaxed cigarettes, establishes an effective barrier to interstate commerce. However, in the words of Mr. Justice ROBERTS in Milk Board v. Eisenberg, 306 U.S. 346, 351: "Every state police statute necessarily will affect interstate commerce in some degree, but such a statute does not run counter to the grant of Congressional power merely because it incidentally or indirectly involves or burdens interstate commerce." Such is the case here. The Act of 1947 is aimed at preventing tax evasion. It is equally applicable whether the untaxed cigarettes were bought in Pennsylvania or in another state and transported here. It does not prohibit cigarettes from being brought across the state line but rather prescribes a penalty for a person failing to pay the Pennsylvania tax on such cigarettes. Any diminution of interstate commerce which might possibly result from this Act is merely incidental to the valid exercise of the police power by the Pennsylvania Legislature. To hold such an act unconstitutional would be to permit wholesale avoidance of legally imposed taxes. Defendant also urges that the Act of 1947 is unconstitutional because it denies him equal protection of law and deprives him of his property without due process. However, the same considerations which have been discussed above apply equally to these contentions: Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query, supra; Gen. Amer. Tank Car Corp. v. Day, 270 U.S. 367.
Nor is there any merit to the argument that the penalty provisions of the statute are too extreme. The statute provides for fines of not more than $25.00 per carton. There is no provision requiring that the maximum fine be assessed in all cases. In fact the penalty here imposed was only one-fifth of that maximum in spite of the flagrance of the violation. The actual fine to be levied is left to the sound discretion of the sentencing
[ 365 Pa. Page 64]
judge who has before him all of the facts of the particular case. In the instant case it is quite clear that the learned judge did not abuse his discretion.
The Acts of 1935 and 1947 are constitutional and defendant was properly convicted under the latter statute.
Judgment and sentence affirmed.
Our website includes the main text of the court's opinion but does not include the
docket number, case citation or footnotes. Upon purchase, docket numbers and/or
citations allow you to research a case further or to use a case in a legal proceeding.
Footnotes (if any) include details of the court's decision.
Official citation and/or docket number and footnotes (if any) for this case available with purchase.
Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.
LRC, Inc. About Us


text:
Find Info For
Quick Links
We are on the cutting edge of research to adapt crops to the ever-changing environment. We are developing cropping systems technology to provide a competitive edge for Indiana farmers and the agriculture industry to help feed Indiana, America, and the world on fewer acres of agricultural land. Our expertise includes environmental sustainability through cropping systems, developing responsible fertilizer and pesticide practices to increase crop yields and reduce contamination, creating and using precision farming technologies, and reducing greenhouse gases through innovative cropping systems. The genetic discoveries we make will feed the world, improve human nutrition, and provide new uses for plants such as biofuels, building products, and substitutes for plastics.
Develop Resilient Crop Production Practices
Improve Crops Globally Through Genetics, Genomics, and Breeding
Enhance Nutritional & Industrial Quality
Go back to graduate student research areas
Katy Martin RaineySoybean Breeding & Genetics(765) firstname.lastname@example.com
Steven Scofield (USDA/ARS)Plant Molecular Biology(765) firstname.lastname@example.com
This sections allows you more control over what appears when someone shares this page. This will only be saved for this page.
Specify below a specific image and/or description to accompany this page. When users share this page, it will override the information automatically gathered from this site by social media sites.
Specify the absolute URL for the image you want shared. Recommended Size: 470px x 246px Minimum Size: 200px x 200px
Provide some text that will accompany the image and title of your page when a user shares.
Department of Agronomy, 915 West State Street, West Lafayette, IN 47907-2053 USA, (765) 494-4773
© 2016 Purdue University | An equal access/equal opportunity university | Integrity Statement | Copyright Complaints | Maintained by Agricultural Communication
Trouble with this page? Disability-related accessibility issue? Please contact us at email@example.com so we can help.


text:
The Cat Corner The Cat Corner
Here's a sample of our volunteer opportunities:VIEW AS
Mission Statement
The Cat Corner is a non-profit, no-kill shelter for domestic cats.
The Cat Corner is a private non-profit organization which operates a no-kill shelter for cats, open since 1981. We provide lifetime care for resident cats who are offered for adoption into suitable homes. Cats are accepted as space in the shelter becomes available. All cats are screened by a veterinarian before being placed in the shelter, and are spayed or neutered, given distemper and rabies shots, tested for FLV and FIV, and receive medical care as needed. We have an adoption program, a foster parent (cat sponsor) program, and maintain a feral cat colony. We are staffed solely by volunteers; there are no paid workers. Donations are tax deductible. We participate in the Paws to Recycle program.
- Fran Corey
- 757-722-0590
- Need admin access?
This information
Might be out of date
Do you work for this organization?
Request administrator status and update its information!


text:
Home /
Our Sources / About Us
/ FAQs /
Advanced Search
Not what you're
looking for? Try an advanced search.
Official citation and/or docket number and footnotes (if any) for this case available with purchase.
Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.
March 19, 2009
THAI ZE XIONG, PLAINTIFF,v.MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, DEFENDANT.
Plaintiff seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner") denying his applications for Disability Income Benefits ("DIB") and Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act ("Act"), respectively. For the reasons discussed below, the court grants plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and remand, and denies the Commissioner's cross-motion for summary judgment.
Plaintiff, born October 2, 1960, applied for disability benefits and supplemental security income on March 3, 2005. Administrative Record ("AR") 169-171. Plaintiff stated that he became unable to work on February 20, 2004, as a result of diabetes, high blood pressure, high cholesterol, and pain in his right leg, right arm, shoulder, and left lower abdomen, resulting in constant pain and an inability to engage in extended standing and walking. AR 69-70. Plaintiff previously worked for a mobile glass company (1998-1999), and then for a company that made and installed vehicle "starters" (2000-2004). AR 70, 61, 42-28, 99. His most recent job required plaintiff to open, lift, carry, stack and pack boxes. He was required to walk, stand, climb, stoop, reach, handle and manipulate small objects eight hours a day, and his job included the use of machines, tools or equipment, and the performance of writing or completing reports or similar tasks. He was required frequently to lift items weighing 25 pounds, and occasionally 50 pounds. AR 70-71. Plaintiff has no formal education. AR 73. He takes several medications for pain, stomach ulcer, sleeping and diabetes.*fn1 AR 72. He lives in an apartment with his wife and six children, born 1988 to 1996. AR 170.
At the February 16, 2007 hearing before administrative law judge ("ALJ") Theodore Slocum, plaintiff testified, assisted by both an interpreter and a personal representative, that he was born in Laos in 1960 and came to the United States in 1980. AR 179. Plaintiff testified that he went to school for five years in Laos, and worked as a farmer. AR 180. He was a CIA soldier in Laos from 1972 to 1975. AR 184. He joined the military when he was 13 years old. AR. 185. Plaintiff testified that while he was a soldier he had to "shoot a big gun a lot," and as a result, now has right shoulder pain and hearing loss. AR 185, 189. Also while a soldier, plaintiff was shot in the right foot. That same foot was later bit by a dog and is now painful, with medications providing only temporary relief. AR 188.
Plaintiff testified that in the United States, he worked for one year packaging computers, but left "because I don't understand English, and I don't know the job well, so they don't want me." AR 181. Plaintiff worked from 2001 to 2004 for an auto parts company that built and installed alternators and starters. AR 181, 182. He was required to lift up to 50 pounds all day.
AR 185. He was laid off when told that "the job's very slow, so I need to go home." AR 181. Previously, from 1983 to 1990, for "four years," plaintiff worked sorting newspapers. AR 186. He left because "[t]hey said it got slow, so they laid me off." Id. Plaintiff testified that he hasn't looked for work since leaving the auto parts job because he doesn't feel well. AR 182. He testified that he has not learned English "[b]ecause I working, and I don't have time to go study." Id.
Plaintiff testified that he watches what he eats, measures his blood sugar regularly, and goes to the doctor monthly. AR 183-184. He stated that he gets headaches, lasting three or four hours, that make him nauseous and "cannot see," his doctor gave him medication that helps temporarily but the pains come back. AR 188-189, 196-197. Plaintiff testified that he doesn't sleep well due to his headaches, and the pain in his leg and shoulder, as well as coughing and "throw up." AR 192. Plaintiff stated that he takes daily naps lasting 30 minutes, and that he walks a mile in the morning and a mile in the afternoon to reduce his blood pressure, as directed by his doctor, taking five-minute breaks in the middle of each walk to rest. AR 194-195. Plaintiff testified that he drives his car only to the school, about five minutes away; that his son drives him to medical appointments; and that his wife and children do all the shopping, largely because the smells make him nauseous. AR 195. Plaintiff testified that he has no friends other than his brother-in- law, with whom he visits a few minutes once or twice a week. Id.
Plaintiff testified that he is home alone during the days and usually sits on the sofa and relaxes. He does not watch television or listen to music. He generally remembers to take his medications and test his diabetes but, if he forgets, his wife or children remind him. AR 197-198, 189. Plaintiff testified that he was scheduled for hernia surgery the following month. AR 192, 198.
Plaintiff testified that he went to "Northgate Point" (a Sacramento County mental health treatment clinic) because "I was so lonely, that's why I made a check-up right then." AR 191.
The ALJ stated, "[t]hat could be very important to this case," and left open the record to obtain plaintiff's information from Northgate Point. AR 191, 199. The ALJ also noted that "the idea that he can walk a mile is not harmful to him. . . . [T]hat's an indication that he may be trying to keep his health in good shape." AR 199.
The ALJ issued a decision on September 17, 2005, finding that plaintiff is not disabled.*fn2
AR 11-18. The ALJ made the following findings:
1. The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through September 30, 2009.
2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since February 20, 2004, the alleged onset date (20 C.F.R. 404.1571 et seq., 416.920(b) and 416.971 et seq.).
3. The claimant has the following severe impairments: Diabetes, hypertension, and shoulder, leg and abdominal strain (20 C.F.R. 404.1520(c) and 416.920 (c)).
4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 C.F.R. 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926).
5. After careful consideration of the record, the undersigned finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light work activity.
6. The claimant is unable to perform any past relevant work (20 C.F.R. 404.1565 and 416.965).
7. The claimant was born on October 2, 1960 and was 43 years old, which is defined as a younger individual age 18-44, on the alleged disability onset date (20 C.F.R. 404.1563 and 416.963).
8. The claimant is illiterate and is not able to communicate in English (20 C.F.R. 404.1564 and 416.964).
9. Transferability of job skills is not an issue in this case because the claimant's past relevant work is unskilled (20 C.F.R. 404.1568 and 416.968).
10. Considering the claimant's age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform (20 C.F.R. 404.1560(c), 404.1566, 416.960(c), and 416.966). . . . Based on a residual functional capacity for the full range of light work, considering the claimant's age, education, and work experience, a finding of "not disabled" is directed by the Medical-Vocational Rule 202.16.
11. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from February 20, 2004 through the date of this decision (20 C.F.R. 404.1520(g) and 416.920(g)).
On August 30, 2007, the Appeals Council denied plaintiff's request for review, and the ALJ's decision became the final decision of the Commissioner. AR 3-5.
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in assessing plaintiff's residual functional capacity and applying the Medical-Vocational Guidelines, by: (1) failing to develop the record regarding plaintiff's depression, (2) failing to credit plaintiff's allegations of pain and functional limitations, and (3) failing to secure the testimony of a vocational expert. These contentions are meritorious and require remand of this case for further development of the record and the testimony of a vocational expert.
The Commissioner's decision that a claimant is not disabled will be upheld if the findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence in the record and the proper legal standards were applied. Schneider v. Comm'r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 223 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir. 2000); Morgan v. Comm'r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999); Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999).
The findings of the Commissioner as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive. See Miller v. Heckler, 770 F.2d 845, 847 (9th Cir. 1985). Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 521 (9th Cir. 1996). "'It means such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).
"The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and resolving ambiguities." Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). "Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ's decision, the ALJ's conclusion must be upheld." Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002).
Plaintiff's treatment records, from Hmong New Life and Sacramento Family Medical Clinic, demonstrate regular care for his diabetes and hypertension, coupled with plaintiff's consistent subjective complaints of pain in his right leg and heel, and lower back (he also complained of pain in his upper back, neck, shoulder, and hands), treated with medication but without objective testing such as x-rays. AR 116-166. Plaintiff's treatment records also note that plaintiff appeared depressed, see AR 120, 126, 128, 166 (each describing plaintiff as a "depressed male"), and that he was prescribed antidepressant medications, see AR 72, 80, 86, 101 (Amitriptyline ("Elavil"),*fn3 prescribed to treat plaintiff's sleeping problems), and AR 93, 97 (Seroquel and Fluoxetine HCl ("Prozac"), the former for sleeping, the latter for depression).
On April 5, 2005, Liana Turkot, M.D., examined plaintiff, with the assistance of an interpreter, at the request of the Commissioner. AR 100-105. Despite making the following diagnoses -- hypertension, diabetes, hypercholesterolemia, periodic abdominal discomfort, right shoulder arthralgia, pain in the right lower extremity, frequent headaches, and hearing loss -- Dr. Turkot found no functional restrictions, opining that plaintiff can perform the full range of medium work. She opined that plaintiff's blood pressure was uncontrolled, "probably secondary to noncompliance," but that "[t]his is a treatable condition and it could be improved with adjustment of his medication." AR 105, 104.
Also in April 2005, non-examining State Agency consultant Sandra Clancey, M.D., completed a Physical Residual Functional Capacity Assessment, and concluded that plaintiff can perform the full range of medium work, without limitations. AR 106 -113. Dr. Clancey found significant Dr. Turkot's note that plaintiff's reduced right grip strength "was probably related to poor effort." AR 111, 103. The findings of Dr. Clancey were affirmed by non-examining State Agency consultant Dr. Jensen in October 2005. AR. 113.
The Medical-Vocational Guidelines in table form ("grids"), 20 C.F.R., Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 2, are an administrative tool the Commissioner may rely upon when considering claimants with substantially uniform levels of impairment. Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1340 (9th Cir. 1988). They reflect combinations of residual functional capacity, age, education, and work experience, and can be used to determine whether work other than a claimant's past relevant work is available. See Desrosiers v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 846 F.2d 573, 577-78 (9th Cir. 1988) (Pregerson, J., concurring).
The Guidelines "may be used, however, only when the grids accurately and completely describe the claimant's abilities and limitations. When a claimant's non-exertional limitations are sufficiently severe so as to significantly limit the range of work permitted by the claimant's exertional limitations,*fn4 the grids are inapplicable. In such instances, the [Commissioner] must take the testimony of a vocational expert, and identify specific jobs within the claimant's [specific] capabilities." Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d at 1340 (citations, internal quotations, and internal fn. omitted).
However, the ALJ is not automatically required to deviate from the grids whenever a claimant has alleged a non-exertional limitation. Desrosiers, 846 F.2d at 577 ("[T]he fact that a non-exertional limitation is alleged does not automatically preclude application of the grids."); 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 2, § 200.00(e)(2) (1996). Rather, the ALJ must weigh the evidence with respect to work experience, education, and psychological and physical impairments to determine whether a non-exertional limitation significantly limits plaintiff's ability to work in a given category. Desrosiers, 846 F.2d at 578. "A non-exertional impairment, if sufficiently severe, may limit the claimant's functional capacity in ways not contemplated by the guidelines," and would then render application of the grids inappropriate. Desrosiers, 846 F.2d at 577-78.
Proper application of the grids therefore rests on a supported finding that the claimant does not have a significant non-exertional limitation, a finding which is itself dependent on adequate information upon which to make such a determination.
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in failing to develop the record regarding his depression, a non-exertional impairment which, if significant, renders application of the grids inappropriate. See, e.g., Jones v. Bowen, 660 F. Supp. 197, 200 (N.D. Cal. 1987). Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by failing to secure his medical records from Northgate Point, and by failing to order a psychiatric consultative examination.
An ALJ's duty to develop the record is triggered when there is ambiguous evidence or when the record is inadequate to allow for proper evaluation of the evidence. Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 459-60 (9th Cir. 2001). "The ALJ in a social security case has an independent duty to fully and fairly develop the record and to assure that the claimant's interests are considered." Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations and internal quotations omitted). This duty is heightened where the claimant may have a mental illness and thus be unable to protect his own interests. Id.; see also Crane v. Shalala, 76 F.3d 251, 255 (9th Cir.1996) (ALJ has duty to develop the record even when claimant is represented); and Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1288 (where there is some objective evidence suggesting a condition which could have a material impact on the disability decision, the ALJ must further investigate).
Here, the ALJ's decision did not address, or even reference, plaintiff's alleged depression, despite evidence in the record that plaintiff appeared depressed, was prescribed antidepressants, and had sought mental health treatment. While the ALJ left the record open to obtain plaintiff's records from Northgate Point, the failure of plaintiff's representative to provide these records (not identified as mental health records in the decision) was relied upon only to discredit plaintiff. AR 16-17. However, the failure of plaintiff's former representative to provide the Northgate Point treatment records did not relieve the ALJ of his duty independently to develop the record. Had the ALJ expressly considered the matter, rendering an opinion on the available evidence, then leaving open the record may have satisfied this duty even though the additional evidence was not provided. Cf., e.g., Tidwell v. Apfel, 161 F. 3d 599, 602 (9th Cir. 1998). However, the ALJ was not free simply to ignore the pertinent references in the record, which included the following. Plaintiff stated in his initial application for benefits that his medical records reflect treatment for "physical/medical, mental health and emotional issue." AR 72. Plaintiff stated in his appeal of the initial denial of his application that "I have so depress, anxiety, nervous and suicidal thought and I take medications everyday and night," AR 90; "I had no motivation and no energy to care for my personal needs. I just stay home no interest about anything," AR 94; and noted that he went to "Turning Point" [sic] to treat his "mental health, emotional issue, depression, sleeping problem, nightmare, suicidal thought," AR 91, see also AR 98 (referencing treatment at Northgate Point). Plaintiff repeated these statements in his request for an administrative hearing. AR 27 ("I can't work due to my medical and mental health, emotional issue"). Finally, at the administrative hearing, plaintiff responded to the ALJ's questioning that he went to Northgate Point because "I was so lonely," to which the ALJ then conceded, "[t]hat could be very important to this case." AR 191. This evidence required the ALJ's express consideration.
Accordingly, the court finds that the ALJ failed to develop the record regarding plaintiff's alleged mental impairment, and will remand this case for that purpose. In addition to obtaining plaintiff's records from Northgate Point, the ALJ shall order a psychiatric consultative examination of plaintiff.*fn5 This evidence, as well as the evidence discussed below concerning plaintiff's additional non-exertional limitations, must be submitted to a vocational expert for consideration of all of plaintiff's limitations in order to determine whether plaintiff can perform work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy. See, e.g., Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517 (9th Cir. 2001) (hypothetical questions asked of the vocational expert must set out all of the claimant's impairments); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1566 (e), 416.966(e).
Submitting this matter to a vocational expert is also required based upon plaintiff's other non-exertional impairments, particularly his various allegations of pain, but also hearing loss, and non-exertional symptoms associated with plaintiff's diabetes, hypertension and high cholesterol.
In rejecting a claimant's subjective complaints, the administrative law judge "must provide specific, cogent reasons for the disbelief. Without affirmative evidence showing that the claimant is malingering, the Commissioner's reasons for rejecting the claimant's testimony must be clear and convincing." Morgan v. Apfel, 169 F. 3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999). The ALJ's reasons for rejecting plaintiff's subjective complaints were as follows (AR 16):
Despite his complaints of pain, the claimant testified that he walks 1 mile in both the morning and afternoon for exercise and helps around the house. The claimant testified that he left his other jobs because he was laid off in one instance and because of his lack of skills in English and not because of a basi[c] inability to do the work. It is certainly within his power to learn English which would improve his employability. Moreover, the record was kept open for the claimant's representative to provide treatment records [Northgate Point]; however, no records were forthcoming.
Although the ALJ properly relied on plaintiff's treatment records and the findings of Dr. Turkot that plaintiff's complications associated with diabetes and hypertension may be treatable with better compliance, AR 14, 17, see, e.g., 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1530, 416.930 (claimant cannot qualify for benefits unless he is following prescribed treatment), the ALJ's additional reasons for discrediting plaintiff are neither clear nor convincing. As the ALJ acknowledged at the hearing, plaintiff's walking may also support a finding that he is doing his best to follow his doctors' directions. Moreover, no weight can be attached to plaintiff's failure to learn English; it is not an accepted basis for discrediting his testimony. Nor can any weight be attached to the failure of plaintiff's representative to provide the Northgate Point treatment records, as has already been addressed. Finally, the fact that plaintiff was laid off from previous employment, rather than quit, is not probative as to his current physical and mental status, given the passage of time since plaintiff's last employment (2004).
As the ALJ repeatedly noted throughout his decision, this case presents a marked absence of adequate information upon which to make a decision: "Diagnostic testing has not been performed as to the claimant's right upper and lower extremity and low back." AR 16. "[I]maging studies have not been performed on the claimant's right shoulder, right leg, right ankle or low back." AR 17. "[T]he record is largely devoid of medical opinion as to functionality with no residual analysis by treating physicians." AR 17.
Apparently in recognition of this absence of evidence, the ALJ did not accept the conclusions of the Dr. Turkot and the State Agency consultants that plaintiff can perform the full range of medium work. Rather, the ALJ credited plaintiff's complaints sufficiently to find that "substantial evidence of record . . . confirms that the claimant continues to have problems with control of diabetes and hypertension and experiences pain primarily in his right upper and lower extremity and low back," thus supporting a finding that plaintiff can perform light, rather than medium, work. AR 17. This implicit concession underscores the necessity of further and fully developing plaintiff's medical record be before concluding whether plaintiff can perform gainful activity.
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, Dckt. No. 19, is granted;
2. The Commissioner's cross-motion for summary judgment, Dckt. No. 20, is denied;
3. This case is remanded to the Commissioner pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. 405(g), for further proceedings consistent with this order; and,
4. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of plaintiff.
Our website includes the main text of the court's opinion but does not include the
docket number, case citation or footnotes. Upon purchase, docket numbers and/or
citations allow you to research a case further or to use a case in a legal proceeding.
Footnotes (if any) include details of the court's decision.
Official citation and/or docket number and footnotes (if any) for this case available with purchase.
Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.
LRC, Inc. About Us


text:
- Home
- New Arrivals
- Celia Maxi Dress Red-PP
- 100% Poly Self, 100% Poly Liner
- NOTE: the zipper in the back is doesn't quite lay flat and it is slightly loose in the chest area
Recently Viewed
Customer Reviews
Write Review
Fits beautifully
Posted by jessilyn garcia on 3rd Mar 2016
{"size":"10/12","age":"35-44","height[ft]":"5","height[in]":"5","bra[size]":"","bra[cup]":"","waist":"","hips":"","fabric":"5","quality":"5","stars":"5","comment":"This is my 3rd time ordering from shabby Apple . I was a bit scared at first but I'm glad I did order! The dresses fit amazing to size! The material s great! I would recommend the Celia red maxi. It's a great flattering fit. "}


text:
Family Express
Release Date: January 1st, 1991
Not Yet Rated|1 hr. 40 min.
Plot Summary
An orphan helps a suicidal magician and his girlfriend escape from a gang of mobsters.
Cast: Peter Fonda, Victoria Vera, Maurizio Latini, Nicola Pistoia, Teco Celio, Edmondo Sannazzaro, Antonio Juorio, Monika Kalin
Director: Georges Nicolas Hayek
Genres: Drama


text:
My Masters is finished, guys. It's done. I've been reading and reading for the last three weeks. It's been such a relief to rediscover reading for fun. 815 more words
Tags » Jane Bennet
Banana Skins and Broken Noses
In response to this note written by a friend. Apologies in advance to those who may not be able to access that hyperlink.
To the Janes of this world… 592 more words
Pride and Prejudice
One of the literary masterpieces by Jane Austen, a.k.a the classic novel that has elevated the expectations of women worldwide giving them the hope of meeting someone like "Mr. 439 more words
The Darcys and the Bingleys
THE DARCYS & the BINGLEYS, Pride and Prejudice Continues
Marsha Altman
Rating: 5 out of 5
One Sentence Summary:
After a year of witty, … 730 more words
The Secrets of Netherfield Abbey- Chapter Four
Chapter Four
Although Elizabeth teased Catherine for being so eager to meet with the Miss Thorpe, by Tuesday morning, she could think of no better idea. 2,065 more words
Characters of The Lizzie Bennet Diaries
What I enjoy so much about The Lizzie Bennet Diaries is that they really are all about THE Lizzie Bennet although they sometimes refer her as rambling on about… 1,353 more words
Currently... (Thursday edition)
Currently reading: Fahrenheit 451
the bookmark my husband got me from the school he works for… lol
I started reading this book today. It seems interesting, the plot reminds me a bit of the movie Equilibrium. 380 more words


text:
Loving Deep Caramel Copper Hair Color
Super adorable video blogger Shoni gives Madison Reed an awesome review on her YouTube channel.
Hair Color with Love
Blogger Kim Miller got adventurous and decided to try out Madison Reed's sultry Sardinia Red.
Mar Rosati Takes Genova Red Around the World
Mar Rosati stays a confidently roaming redhead with Madison Reed.
Is Red Right for You?
Fall is a great time to try some red hues. If you've ever fantasized about being a redhead, here are some basic tips.
Your Perfect Hair Color: Vivacious Vesuvius Red
Looking for your perfect hair color? We're here to help! Twice a month we feature one of Madison Reed's radiant, multi-tonal...
Sandra C. Loves Her Vesuvius Red
Everyone knows, red hair is not easy to do on your own. Luckily for Sandra, Vesuvius Red gave her such rich, deep color.


text:
Check in from 3:00 PM / Check out prior to 11:00 AM
Krone Hotel Solothurn: Find photos, reviews, information, amenities and compare prices for 4 stars hotels in Solothurn, Switzerland.
Located amongst a variety of popular attractions, boutiques and eateries, Krone Hotel Solothurn is ideal for guests wanting to explore Solothurn and its surroundings. It is also conveniently situated minutes on foot from Solothurn Railway Station.
Hotel description
Guests can start the day with breakfast each morning at the hotel. There is also the added advantage of an in-house restaurant.
The area surrounding Krone Hotel Solothurn is famous for its nightlife, with plenty of places to go for a drink or dance. Bern-Belp Airport is a 45-minute drive away.
Hotel features
Golf Course
Availability and Prices
Booking Site
Room Type
Per room
Per night
Per night
Users who viewed Krone Hotel Solothurn also viewed these 4 stars Solothurn hotels:
Ramada Hotel Solothurn
Schanzlistrasse 5, Solothurn
Schanzlistrasse 5, Solothurn
Search hotels
based on
13 reviews
Nearest hotels
- Roter Turm
0.1 miles
- Zunfthaus zu Wirthen
0.1 miles
- Youth Hostel Solothurn
0.1 miles


text:
Discussion in 'iPod touch 1.1.4 Jailbreak' started by vesperance, Mar 16, 2008.
I cannot connect using the program Fugu, I'm on a mac. Any suggestions???
Open Fugu, go to Preferences >Known Hosts, Then delete everything in Known Hosts. Shut Fugu down and restart. You should then be able to connect.
ok i will try again
still connection refused and when i tpe in the ip address it still autofills?????
Guess I am chasing you between "discussiions" and "jailbreak"
Since you ask the question on both.
You are using lowercase "root" and port 22?
Connection refused says that there is no connection with the ipod. did you see my post on the other forum to you about cydia?
root yes but port 22??
Your ip address on the first line
root on the second
22 in the port (3rd line)
just leave the directory empty
ok I will try agian
this is so annoying!
ssh: connect to host (my ip) port 22: Connection refused
You just need to install the Cydia Packager. Then uninstall the old openssh and reinstall the one from Cydia.
Separate names with a comma.


text:
Trending Articles
Commenting & sharing free 5th innovating pedagogy report #pedagogy #EdTech #OU
Ignatia Webs
While I was reading the latest innovative pedagogies report, some comments came to mind, which I will gladly share a bit further down this blogpost after a quick description of the report itself. full-text PDF version of this 47 page report is available to download from www.open.ac.uk/innovating. innovating. In the report they provide an overview of emerging innovative pedagogies.
3 Tricks for Working with SMEs on Branching Scenarios
Experiencing eLearning
If you've ever worked with a SME on scenario-based learning, you know it can sometimes be challenging. SMEs who are accustomed to working on traditional elearning may be uncomfortable or unsure how to help you write scenarios. have used these 3 tricks to help SMEs get "unstuck" while working together. Ask for Their Stories. What were they able to accomplish by doing it right?
How to Implement Spaced Learning into Your eLearning Strategy
eLearning Brothers
Spaced learning will be one of the key eLearning techniques to look out for in 2017. At least, that's according to John Curran, expert in Instructional Design and chair of the eLearning Network. know what you're thinking. Spaced learning is old news. It dates back to 1885 when Ebbinghaus theorized the Forgetting Curve—the concept that we forget things over time unless we revisit them. Take a break.
Takeaways from Learning 2016
Association eLearning
I attended my first conference, Learning 2016, in October. Now that I've had time to digest everything and read over my notes I want to share some of what I learned and experienced. In several cases the concepts themselves weren't new to me, but what I did brought me a renewed or expanded understanding of them. In no particular order: Application is Critical for Transfer. Everything is Iterative.
Get an Exclusive Articulate Storyline Game Show Template from eLearning Brothers
Download one of the most popular game templates from eLearning Brothers with a look and feel exclusively made for eLearning Learning subscribers! eLearning Brothers creates awesome templates and assets to help you look like an eLearning Rockstar!
More Trending
6 Common Training Software Myths Dispelled
Most training operations have common objectives – namely, keeping better track of learner progression and the training itself, reducing time spent on admin tasks, delivering exceptional elearning and of course, in the case of training companies, increasing course bookings. However, the commonality can extend beyond their objectives. Training professionals often share the same concerns Read More. Published on December 8, 2016. The post 6 Common Training Software Myths Dispelled appeared first on Administrate. All Training Tips
Insight – The Top 50 LMS 2017 Report
eLearning 24-7
It's that time of the year, when research firms, industry firms, Fred your mailman and Judy the person who nags you each day you come into your office, announces their best of the best awards. And I'm along with them. Well, sort of for authoring tools. For the whole whammy of LMSs, the list has been out for nearly 12 months (for 2016). You can still buy the 2016 Top 50 LMS Report (BTW). Let's move on to 2017… The report is being built as we speak, with a release for purchase on Jan. 30, 2017. . Top 50 2017 Report – What you can expect to see. is in the report.
Our Unique Adobe Captivate New Stone Theme
eLearning Brothers
2016 is nearing its inevitable end, and as it does, we here at eLearning Brothers look toward the future. As such, we've added a new theme to our Adobe Captivate library of templates. The theme in question—called "New Stone"—wonderfully utilizes vibrant colors against deep charcoal grays, giving the templates a uniquely modern if not futuristic appearance. Ask an Expert.
The post JOHN STEPPER – CRYSTAL BALLING WITH LEARNNOVATORS appeared first on Learnnovators. Interviews WOL Working Out Loud Albert Bandura crystal balling Crystal Balling with Learnnovators Guided Mastery Intrinsic Motivation John Stepper Learnnovators Reciprocal Altruism Robert Cialdini TEDx TEDx Talks The Strength of Weak Ties WOL Circle Working Out Loud Circle
Transform Your Video Strategy for Enterprise Learning & Communication
We sat down with Tom Clancy, former CLO of EMC, to discuss the role of video in the future of enterprise learning and communication.
Learning Strategy Issues
Clark Quinn
The other thing that I was involved in at Online Educa in Berlin was a session on The Flexible Worker. Three of us presented, each addressing one particular topic. One presentation was on collaborating to produce an elearning course on sleeping better, with the presenter's firm demonstrating expertise in elearning, while the other firm had the subject matter expertise on sleep health. And, per our design, issues emerged. The format was interesting: our presentations were roughly 10 minutes each. And we were using a tool (sli.do) to collect and rank questions. user-generated content).
It's Time to Quit Locking Your Course Navigation
Rapid eLearning
"How do I lock navigation?" " is one of the first questions we get when showing people how to use our software. In fact it's one of the questions we had to revisit in a recent Articulate Live webinar where people wanted to see the features used to lock navigation. Why Are We Asked to Lock Navigation? There are a number of reasons why courses are locked. Want to learn more?
7 Ways to Improve Engagement with E-Learning
Content Raven
The old adage in business that "if you build it they will come" doesn't necessarily apply to e-learning courses. employees Corporate Training elearning employee engagement
Corporate Learning's Transformation in the Digital Age
CLO Magazine
Corporate academies or universities are entering their second century just as the businesses that created them are transforming themselves for the digital age. When pioneers such as General Electric began offering in-house training programs about 100 years ago, they focused on lower-level skills. Now, a new phase is unfolding. What's worrying is the current level of dissatisfaction.
Customer Training Completion Rates
Curious to learn how different factors in your training courses may affect completion rates? We crunched the numbers to help you set goals for course completion and build your content strategy. Download the study to learn what kind of content keeps learners engaged, how long courses should be, and more.
Virtual Reality: The Next Frontier in Adult Education
Web Courseworks
There I was, standing in my cubicle. My job seemed easy enough: the printer on my desk would print out red or black folders, and I had to file them in the red or black cabinets. glanced up at the clock. checked the calendar to see if I had anything interesting planned further into the week. Nope, just work. returned to my folder sorting task. glanced up at the clock again. Was I imagining things?
Aligning Learning
Clark Quinn
Last week, at Online Educa in Berlin, I gave a tutorial on deeper elearning as a pre-conference event. In it, I talked about getting more meaningful objectives, writing practice that actually develops meaningful outcomes, and content (concepts & examples) aligned to support effective practice. also talked about emotional engagement and social learning, before talking about revising design processes to incorporate these deeper elements in an effective and not-too-different approach. In short, I was talking about aligning our designs, and our design processes, to how we think and learn.
The post LEARNING DESIGNERS! BORING BULLETS ARE NOT YOUR WORST ENEMY! appeared first on Learnnovators. Custom E-Learning E-Learning Learning Consulting Cammy Bean Cathy Moore Learning Learning Design Learning Designer Learning Designers Learnnovators Srividya Kumar
E-Learning: Key to Effective Onboarding
Content Raven
Most people remember their first day in a new workplace. Without a carefully elaborated onboarding process and approach, the first day can lead to frustration, if not despair. employees Corporate Training elearning alignment blended learning onboarding employee engagement
Skill based learning – How it drives an organization's performance
Training and learning organizations today play an active role in contributing to the bottom line of any organization by aligning their objectives to the immediate business objectives. This provides a solid ground for cost justification and encourages businesses to place training groups right where they should be, at the heart of a growing, thriving, learning culture.
Supply and Demand, the Battle for Knowledge and Skills
CLO Magazine
The world is changing incredibly fast, and like hamsters on the spinning wheel, learning leaders are trying to keep up. Sadly, many of us are running faster and faster and falling ever further behind. The issue here is not the state of the world, but how we are reacting to it. For instance, consider the supply and demand for the talent, skills and knowledge needed to compete in the global economy.
Best LMS? 2016 Talented Learning LMS Vendor Awards
Talented Learning
It is not easy choosing the best LMS for 2016. In fact, it is impossible to choose just one. That's because the learning management systems market has never been stronger or more diverse. LMS specialists of every size, shape and focus continue to enter the space with impressive new capabilities. But it wasn't always this way. Finding the Best LMS in a Complex World. Docebo. Expertus.
#OEB16 results from personalised learning session #personalLearning
Ignatia Webs
This session, which I facilitated at OEB16, had one of the 'slow cooking' formats. It takes time for all the elements to come together, and you work with those elements you find in the room (so thank you to all the participants) and … somehow magic happened as you can see from the results shared below. Each of the participants got this synopsis sent to them. To all, feel free to add your interpretation, as many brains make stronger solutions. The list of solutions we started to think off: How can we enable personalised learning looking at what the participants shared.
MTA: Why the Kirkpatrick Model Works for Us
Every year at the ATD conference, Charles Denault makes it a point to attend the Kirkpatrick session. He is always learning something new about evaluating and demonstrating the value of learning programs. This past spring, he had the good fortune of sitting next to Michael Wiedecker, Director of Operations Training at the Maryland Transit Administration.
Seven Simple Secrets to Off-the-Shelf Course Success
Off-the-shelf elearning is applicable for a wide audience, but it won't address your organization's unique situations or distinctive content. So are these courses all that helpful? For sure! Read on for 7 secrets to make off-the-self learning your own.
Digital (Learning) Readiness: A Call for L&D Action
Learning Wire
Digitization is seriously challenging today's business world and the way we live, work and relate to one another. The pace of technological change is accelerating and disrupts our current business models (although creating new inspiring ones). Many companies and their workforce are challenged in terms of location, roles and capabilities. How ready are our organizations for the digital disruption?
And the Winner Is…
CLO Magazine
Kellye Whitney. Too often the learning leader's good work goes unrecognized. peer may say, "well done." And program participants may generously share, "That really helped me, thank you," or "This was time well spent." And these compliments are not to be discounted. Held Sept. Find out who walked away with this year's top learning honors. You do reap what you sow.
The Demonetization of Indian Education
Viplav Baxi Meanderings
Very recently, the Indian government announced a demonetization measure by removing 500 and 1000 rupee notes as legal tender, ostensibly to combat cash hoarding (black money) and counterfeiting (which was helping fund terror). Of course, we have seen the impact of fiscal demonetization on the economy in the short term, though the long term prognosis is yet to emerge. The immediate impacts that I see on the system of education in our country are as follows (not an exhaustive list): Slowdown in the rate of growth of private schools. The push to online payments at school. On another note.
designing the emergent organization
Learning and Working on the Web
In The Rise of Emergent Organizations, Beth Comstock, Vice Chair at GE, cites five rules of thumb to guide organizational design for the emerging network era. It is wonderful to see a large corporation putting into practice the recommendations I, and many others, have been making on organizational design for more than a decade. I. Read more » Communities ConnectedEnterprise Wirearchy
Leaving performance reviews behind: Where to start [Guide]
Is your company ready to move beyond the annual performance review? Where do you start? What are the keys to success? In this guide, you'll gain an understanding of: the forces driving change, three foundations of success and take a deep dive into the skills gap many managers have that will sink your efforts before they start and how to address them.


text:
The suggestion — in essence, "tokenism," whether it's encouraging black people to have white friends or white people to pick up nonwhite friends just to say they have some — is laughable. People — black, white, brown and all other colors — should select their friends based on who they mesh with, period. I don't want any token friends, and I certainly don't want to be the token black friend for anybody else.
Demetria L. Lucas is a contributing editor at The Root, a life coach and the author of A Belle in Brooklyn: The Go-to Girl for Advice on Living Your Best Single Life. Follow her on Twitter.