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February 25, 2011
SHAILJA GANDHI, REVOCABLE TRUST (NOVEMBER 6, 2002), AMIT VYAS, M.D., TRUPTI VYAS, MIHIR "MICK" MAJMUNDAR, M.D., AND MITA MAJMUNDAR PLAINTIFFS,v.SITARA CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, LLC, AND RAJIV PATEL, DEFENDANTS.
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER*fn1
Plaintiffs Shailja Gandhi Revocable Trust (November 6, 2002) ("Gandhi Trust"), Amit Vyas, M.D., and Trupti Vyas, ("the Vyases"), Mihir "Mick" Majmundar, M.D., and Mita Majmundar ("the Majmundars") (collectively, the "plaintiffs") brought this action pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), and various state causes of action after they lost their investment in Sitara Partners,
L.P. ("Sitara Partners") which, they allege, was managed by defendants Rajiv Patel and Sitara Capital Management, LLC ("Sitara LLC") (collectively, the "defendants"). Presently before the court is the defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' amended complaint.*fn2 For the reasons stated herein, the motion is granted.
As the court explained in an earlier opinion: On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of plaintiff. Pisciotta v. Old Nat'l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 633 (7th Cir. 2007) (internal citation omitted). Legal conclusions, however, are not entitled to any assumption of truth. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, --- U.S. ----, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1940, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure distinguish between general claimsand those asserting fraud or mistake. Generally, to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, "the complaint need only contain a 'short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" EEOC v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). The allegations must provide the defendant with "fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S. Ct. 99, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1957)). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), the plaintiff bringing a general claim need not plead particularized facts, but the factual allegations in the complaint must be sufficient to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face[.]" Id. at 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1940 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S. Ct. 1955).
Plaintiffs pleading fraud or mistake must plead with particularity the facts constituting that fraud or mistake. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). "This means the who, what, when, where, and how: the first paragraph of any newspaper story." See DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 627 (7th Cir. 1990). The "who" in a multi-defendant fraud case such as this must itself be pled with particularity: "the complaint should inform each defendant of the nature of his alleged participation in the fraud," to the extent that such information is not uniquely within defendants' possession. Vicom, Inc. v. Harbridge Merchant Servs., Inc., 20 F.3d 771, 777-78 & n.5 (7th Cir. 1994) (quoting DiVittorio v. Equidyne Extractive Indus., Inc., 822 F.2d 1242, 1247 (2d Cir. 1987)).
Defendants assert that each plaintiff must allege his reliance on particular statements, an argument that finds support in a strong hint from the Seventh Circuit. See Ackerman v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 172 F.3d 467, 470-71 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting that "compliance with Rule 9(b) is burdensome" with hundreds of plaintiffs, "[b]ut you cannot get around the requirements of the rule just by joining a lot of separate cases into one."). The Ackerman court's guidance is consistent with its "who, what, when" guidance and with a straightforward reading of Rule 9(b), and so the court will analyze plaintiffs' complaint in this case for specific allegations by each plaintiff in those counts where Rule 9(b) applies.
Finally, plaintiffs have appended multiple exhibits to their complaint. While a Rule 12(b)(6) motion normally tests only the complaint itself, the court properly considers these attachments as well. Forrest v. Universal Savings Bank, F.A., 507 F.3d 540, 542 (7th Cir. 2007).
Shailja Gandhi Revocable Trust v. Sitara Capital Mgmt., LLC, 689 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1007-08 (N.D. Ill. 2010).
A. Counts III-VIII, X, XV, and XVI*fn3
The defendants argue that Counts III-VIII and X must be dismissed because plaintiffs do not allege reliance. In Counts III-VIII and X, the plaintiffs allege fraud in connection with the sale of securities in violation of § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78j,Rule 10b-5, codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5, and subsections (A), (F), (G), (I) and (J) of § 12 of the Illinois Securities Law of 1953, 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/12. To state a claim sounding in fraud under these laws, the plaintiffs must allege reliance. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 159, 128 S. Ct. 761, 169 L. Ed. 2d 627 (2008) (holding that reliance is an "essential element of the § 10(b) private cause of action"); In re HealthCare Compare Corp. Secs. Litig., 75 F.3d 276, 280 (7th Cir. 1996) ("To state a valid Rule 10b-5 claim, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant (1) made a misstatement or omission, (2) of material fact, (3) with scienter, (4) in connection with the purchase or sale of securities, (5) upon which the plaintiff relied, and (6) that reliance proximately caused plaintiff's injuries." (citation omitted)); Tirapelli v. Advanced Equities, Inc., 813 N.E.2d 1138, 1142 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) ("Reasonable reliance is an element of sections 12(F), 12(G), and 12(I) of the Illinois Securities Law . . . and Illinois common law fraud." (citations omitted)); Borsellino v. Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., 477 F.3d 502, 507 (7th Cir. 2007) ("A claim that 'sounds in fraud' -- in other words, one that is premised upon a course of fraudulent conduct -- can implicate Rule 9(b)'s heightened pleading requirements."); Shailja Gandhi Revocable Trust, 689 F. Supp. 2d at 1013 ("Reasonable reliance is an element of fraud claims arising under the Illinois Securities Law.") (citation omitted).
In addition, in counts XV and XVI, the plaintiffs bring an Illinois common law fraud in the inducement claim and a fraudulent misrepresentation claim, respectively. Previously, after explaining that these claims were subject to Rule 9(b)'s heightened pleading standards, the court dismissed counts XV and XVI because the plaintiffs failed to plead with the requisite particularity. Shailja Gandhi Revocable Trust, 689 F. Supp. 2d at 1016-17. The court instructed that if the plaintiffs were to replead, the complaint must include, specifically as to each defendant and each plaintiff, "detailed allegations regarding relevant representations, acts in reliance on those representations and damages suffered as a result."*fn4 Id. at 1017.
In their response brief, the plaintiffs argue that the first amended complaint satisfies the reliance requirement by alleging in paragraphs 53, 54, and 55 that defendants' misrepresentations were made "with the intent to induce and which in fact induced each of the Plaintiff's individual investments." (Pls.' Resp. at 4 (citing Am. Compl. ¶¶ 53-55).) However, the cited paragraphs in the amended complaint do not state that the plaintiffs relied on or "were induced" by any of the misrepresentations; the cited paragraphs state only that defendants' misrepresentations were made "to induce" plaintiffs' investments. (FAC ¶¶ 53,54, 55.) Thus, although paragraphs 53, 54 and 55 contain the defendants' statements allegedly made "to induce" the plaintiffs, these paragraphs do not allege that any of the plaintiffs actually relied on the statements (or were induced to act by them). The defendants' intent that the statements cause the plaintiffs to act is different from the plaintiffs' reliance on the statements.
As best the court can ascertain, within the amended complaint's 180 paragraphs (containing numerous sub-paragraphs) there are only three vague and general statements that come close to alleging that the plaintiffs relied on the defendants' representations. None of these references satisfy Rule 9(b)'s particularity requirement, as the court explicitly instructed the plaintiffs in its previous order. See Shailja Gandhi Revocable Trust, 689 F. Supp. 2d at 1012. First, paragraph 48(G) states:
Etc. -- [Note, there are numerous other representations that are made in the POM upon which each of these Plaintiffs relied in making their initial and subsequent investments in the Fund, too numerous to re-state here. See, generally, POM, Exhibit 1, passim, incorporated herein by reference. Said additional references will be cited as appropriate below.]
(Am. Compl. ¶ 48(G) (emphasis added) (brackets in original).) Next, paragraph 94(A)(A), states "Patel induced investors, including the Plaintiffs to invest in Sitara Partners initially and subsequently by making the following false and misleading statements of fact." (Am. Compl. ¶ 94(A)(A).) The plaintiffs then list five alleged representations, but fail to provide any information as to who was "induced" by Patel's representations. (See Am. Compl. ¶ 95(A)(A)(1-5).) The last general allegation of reliance is in paragraph 175, which pertains to the alleged damages suffered by plaintiffs in Count XV: "Plaintiffs each reasonably relied on such false and misleading material misrepresentations and concealment of material facts to their respective detriment . . . ." (Am. Compl. ¶ 175.) These three vague allegations of reliance fail to indicate which specific representations individual plaintiffs relied on.
Thus, although the plaintiffs' response brief states that the plaintiffs "relied on Defendants' representations" (Pls.' Resp. at 4.), none of the paragraphs in the amended complaint contain any statement that alleges with the requisite particularity that the plaintiffs relied on the defendants' misrepresentations or were in fact induced by them. As the court noted in its previous decision, "Argument in briefs . . . is no substitute for allegations in pleadings." Shailja Gandhi Revocable Trust, 689 F. Supp. 2d at 1016. Because the amended complaint does not state which plaintiffs actually relied on which representations, as required by Rule 9(b)'s particularity requirement, the plaintiffs fail to adequately allege reliance in Counts III-VIII, X, XV, and XVI. As a result, these claims fail and the defendants' motion to dismiss Counts IIIVIII, X, XV, and XVI is granted.*fn5
B. Count IX
In its previous opinion, the court denied dismissal of Count IX because it did not sound in fraud. Because the plaintiffs amended Count IX so that it now contains one paragraph, paragraph 141, alleging fraud, the defendants move to dismiss it for failing to allege reliance. (See Mot. to Dismiss at 4; see also Am. Compl. ¶ 141.) As with the other claims alleging fraud,the plaintiffs fail to allege reliance. However, Count IX is brought under § 12(C) of the Illinois Securities Law, which does not require reliance, and alleges that the defendants failed to register as an investment adviser as required under Illinois law. Paragraph 141 appears to be misplaced as it specifically refers to a section other than § 12(C) and is unrelated to the other paragraphs in Count IX. Thus, Count IX is dismissed, and the plaintiffs may replead to remove paragraph 141.
Additionally, in a footnote, the defendants argue that the plaintiffs' claims under the Illinois Securities Law should be dismissed because the plaintiffs fail to allege that they gave notice of an election of rescission within six months after gaining knowledge that the securities were voidable, as required by the Illinois Securities Law. (Mot. to Dismiss at 6-7, n.2.) In response, the plaintiffs state that their complaint constitutes their notice to rescind and that the plaintiffs "would not have made such a representation in pleadings had the statutory requirements not been met." (Pls.' Resp. at 4, n.1.) Generally, arguments raised only in footnotes are waived. See United States v. White, 879 F.2d 1509, 1513 (7th Cir. 1989) ("[B]y failing to raise this issue other than by a passing reference in a footnote, White has waived it."). However, because the plaintiffs have responded to the merits of this argument, the court will address it as well.
Section 13 of the Illinois Securities Law allows the purchaser of a security to rescind any security transaction that was made in violation of the Act. 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/13(A). However, in order to rescind the transaction, notice of the election to rescind must "be given by the purchaser within 6 months after the purchaser shall have knowledge that the sale of the securities to him or her is voidable." 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/13(B). A complaint seeking rescission must allege that notice of the election to rescind was given within the six-month time limit. Eldean v. Mitchell, No. 07 C 6582, 2009 WL 674340, *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 13, 2009) (determining that the complaint failed because the complaint did not allege that the plaintiff provided the required notice to defendant); see also Reschal Assocs., Inc. v. Long Grove Trading Co., 754 F. Supp. 1226, 1236 (N.D. Ill. 1990) ("Where a plaintiff does not allege that he made such an election [to rescind], a claim for relief pursuant to section 12 cannot stand."). Here, the amended complaint does not allege that the plaintiffs provided the requisite notice; it alleges only that the complaint itself provides notice. (See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 116, 122, 128, 135, 142, 148 ("Contemporaneous herewith each Plaintiff provides, by this Complaint, notice to Defendants of the Plaintiffs' respective elections to rescind their respective purchases of Sitara Partners' Units under sections 13(A) and (B) of the Illinois Securities [Law]." )) Plaintiffs are granted leave to replead that they gave the requisite notice if they can do so consistent with their Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 obligations.
C. Count XI
In Count XI, the plaintiffs allege violations of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act ("ICFA"), 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 505/1 et seq. In its previous order, the court dismissed Count XI without prejudice instructing the plaintiffs to replead with greater particularity. The court specifically stated that a blanket reincorporation of previous paragraphs fails to satisfy the particularity requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). Shailja Gandhi Revocable Trust, 689 F. Supp. 2d at 1014. Nevertheless, Count XI in the amended complaint is unchanged, with factual allegations pled only through a blanket reincorporation of paragraphs 1-94.
In order to bring a claim under the ICFA, the plaintiffs must establish: "(1) a deceptive act or practice by the defendant; (2) the defendant's intent that the plaintiff rely on the deception;
(3) that the deception occur in a course of conduct involving trade and commerce; and (4) actual damage to the plaintiff; (5) proximately caused by the deception." Sound of Music Co. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 477 F.3d 910, 923 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing Oliveira v. Amoco Oil Co., 776 N.E.2d 151, 160 (Ill. 1998)). As with other claims involving fraud, an ICFA claim must be pled with particularity. Davis v. G.N. Mortg. Corp., 396 F.3d 869, 882 (7th Cir. 2005). To show proximate causation, the plaintiffs must set forth individualized allegations that they actually saw and were deceived by the statements at issue. De Bouse v. Bayer, 922 N.E.2d 309, 315-16 (Ill. 2009) ("To maintain an action under the [ICFA], the plaintiff must actually be deceived by a statement or omission that is made by the defendant. If a consumer has neither seen nor heard any such statement, then she cannot have relied on the statement, and consequently, cannot prove proximate causation.")
The defendants argue that Count XI should be dismissed because the plaintiffs have failed to properly plead proximate causation by not alleging with particularity that they "saw, heard, or read the deceptive misrepresentations that caused them to make their investment." (Mot. to Dismiss at 11.) The plaintiffs failed to respond to this argument in their response brief, arguing only that the complaint identifies the specific acts Patel engaged in that violate the ICFA. (See Pls.' Resp. at 6-7.) The court agrees with the defendants.
As noted above, Count XI contains no separate factual allegations, only reincorporating paragraphs 1-94. Additionally, as with the other fraud claims, the plaintiffs have failed to plead that they actually read or heard any of the alleged misrepresentations and therefore do not meet the particularity pleading requirements. In their response brief, the plaintiffs state that paragraph 94 of the amended complaint "specifically identifies acts that violate the [ICFA]." (Pls.' Resp. at7.) However, paragraph 94 contains only general allegations regarding Patel's representations and actions; it does not state that any of the plaintiffs saw or heard these representations. (See Am. Compl. ¶ 94.) Because the plaintiffs failed to heed the court's previous instructions that Count XI must be pled with particularity, Count XI is dismissed.
D. Count XII
In Count XII, the Vyases and the Majmundars allege that the defendants breached the fiduciary duties owed to the plaintiffs under § 404 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1104, and seek the remedies provided for in ERISA § 409(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a). The court previously dismissed this count because the plaintiffs: (1) did not describe the nature of their alleged ERISA investment in Sitara Partners; (2) failed to indicate by what authority they sought to recover for the breach of fiduciary duty; (3) failed to reveal the nature of their relationships to the ERISA plans; and (4) needed to include in their pleadings whether or not the ERISA count should be brought in the plaintiffs' individual capacities or derivatively. Shailja Gandhi Revocable Trust, 689 F. Supp. 2d at 1015-16. The court instructed the plaintiffs that if they chose to replead, they must clearly indicate if the investments made through the ERISA plans were equity investments, state by what authority they sought to recover for the breach of a fiduciary duty, plead their relationship to the ERISA plans, and indicate whether bringing suit individually instead of derivatively was appropriate. Id. Even though the court provided specific instructions if the plaintiffs chose to replead, the plaintiffs have again failed to properly plead Count XII.
In their response brief, the plaintiffs indicate that they are proceeding under § 502(a)(2).*fn6
(See Pls.' Resp. at 7.) ERISA § 502(a) provides that the Secretary of Labor, or a plan participant, beneficiary or fiduciary may bring a civil action for "appropriate relief under section 1109 of this title." 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2). The Vyases and Majmundars have not indicated that they are a plan participant, beneficiary or fiduciary. If repled, each plaintiff should indicate, for each ERISA qualified plan at issue, that plaintiff's relationship with the plan.
Section 1109 provides:
Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any of the responsibilities, obligations or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by this subchapter shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from each such breach, and to restore to such plan any profits of such fiduciary which have been made through use of assets of the plan by the fiduciary . . . . 29 U.S.C. § 1109 (emphasis added). The amended complaint does not state that the ERISA claims are brought on behalf of the ERISA qualified plans. While the Vyases and the Majmundars need not use derivative suit language, see Waldron v. Dugan, No. 07 C 286, 2007 WL 4365358, *5-*6 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 13, 2007) (declining to require a plan participant to bring a § 502(a)(2) claim derivatively or as a class action), they must bring the action on behalf of their respective ERISA-qualified plans. See 29 U.S.C. § 1109; see also LaRue v. DeWolff, 552 U.S. 248, 253 (2008) ("[Section 502(a)(2)] authorizes the Secretary of Labor as well as plan participants, beneficiaries, and fiduciaries, to bring actions on behalf of a plan to recover for violations of the obligations defined in § 409(a)." (emphasis added)); id. at 256 ("[A]lthough § 502(a)(2) does not provide a remedy for individual injuries distinct from plan injuries, that provision does authorize recovery for fiduciary breaches that impair the value of plan assets in a participant's individual account." (emphasis added)). Thus, if the plaintiffs choose to replead, they must indicate that they are bringing the claim on behalf of their respective ERISA qualified plans, and that any requested relief is for the benefit of the harmed plans, respectively.
For the foregoing reasons, Count XII is dismissed; plaintiffs are granted leave to replead as discussed above.
E. Count XIII
Count XIII consists of a state-law breach of contract claim for an alleged breach of the Limited Partnership Agreement. The court previously dismissed Count XIII because the plaintiffs did not identify the provision of the Limited Partnership Agreement that was allegedly breached. Shailja Gandhi Revocable Trust, 689 F. Supp. 2d at 1016. Count XIII in the plaintiffs' amended complaint is unchanged; it again does not identify the provision of the agreement allegedly breached. The plaintiffs argue that the breach of contract claim is brought based on the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. (Pls.' Resp. at 7.) Again, "[a]rgument in briefs . . . is no substitute for allegations in pleadings." Shailja Gandhi Revocable Trust, 689 F. Supp. 2d at 1016. In addition, a breach of contract claim under Illinois law cannot be based solely on the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. See Lyon Fin. Servs., Inc. v. AKB Enterprises, Inc., No. 09 C 6119, 2010 WL 1978703, *2 (N.D. Ill. May 17, 2010) ("Under Illinois law, 'the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is not an independent source of duties for parties to a contract.'" (quoting Fox v. Heimann, 872 N.E.2d 126, 134 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007))). Count XIII is therefore dismissed.
F. Count XIV
As in their original complaint, "[i]n Count XIV, [the] plaintiffs bring a state-law claim for breach of fiduciary duty, alleging that the defendants breached fiduciary duties they owed to Sitara Partners." Shailja Gandhi Revocable Trust, 689 F. Supp. 2d at 1016. The court previously dismissed Count XIV because the complaint inadequately pled the nature of the plaintiffs' interest in Sitara Partners, and it was therefore unclear if the breach of fiduciary duty claim should be brought as a direct or derivative claim. Id. As was discussed in the previous order, "if [the plaintiffs] allege that they are limited partners, then they may have a derivative claim on behalf of the partnership." Id. (citing Caparos v. Morton, 845 N.E.2d 773, 781-82 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006))."However, unless plaintiffs have suffered some injury separate from the other partners in Sitara Partners, they likely do not have an individual claim for breach of fiduciary duty." Id. (citing Caparos v. Morton, 845 N.E.2d at 781-82).
Although the amended complaint still does not explicitly state that the plaintiffs are limited partners in Sitara Partners, the plaintiffs, in their response to the defendants' motion to dismiss, state, "[T]he Complaint identifies the securities as limited partnership interests." (Pls.' Resp. at 8.) Thus, the plaintiffs seek to bring a direct claim. However, the plaintiffs fail to allege any injury separate from the other partners.
The plaintiffs' argument that injury to their individual investments in the limited partnership, based on the breach of fiduciary duty by a general partner, constitutes an individual injury and the plaintiffs are therefore "not alleging any injury to the partnership," (Pls.' Resp. at9), is incorrect. Caparos specifically states that a limited partner's claim against a general partner for breach of fiduciary duty relating to the decrease in value of that limited partner's shares in the limited partnership must be brought in a derivative action. Caparos, 845 N.E.2d at 781 ("Limited partners seeking redress for the decreased value of their shares in the limited partnership must do so in a derivative action."). Indeed, Caparos further explains that "a claim that the general partners' misconduct resulted in a diminished income to the partnership and a decrease in the value of the limited partners' interest in the venture states a derivative claim." Id. at 782. Here, the decrease in value of the plaintiffs' individual investments, which were diminished by the defendants' alleged breach of fiduciary duties, is not a distinct injury from that suffered by other limited partners and therefore must be brought as a derivative claim.
Given the foregoing, Count XIV is dismissed.
G. Count XVIII
In Count XVIII, the plaintiffs seek to hold Sitara LLC liable for Patel's actions under the theory of respondeat superior. Since there are no surviving causes of action on which to base this claim, Count XVIII is dismissed.
For the reasons stated above, the defendants' motion to dismiss is granted. Counts III through XVIII are dismissed. The plaintiffs are granted 21 days to replead Counts IX, XII, and XVIII (which appear susceptible to correction) via an amended complaint if they can do so consistent with their Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 obligations.
JOAN B. GOTTSCHALL United States District Judge
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Note: Sample below may appear distorted but all corresponding word document files contain proper formattingExcerpt from Research Paper:
Technology in Edu
Technology has changed the ways schools operate, the ways teachers communicate, and the ways students learn. At every level of education, from kindergarten until graduate school, technology is being used as a means to develop and deliver course material. Technology is also being used in administrative offices, and also in the home as students have greater access to educational technologies. In traditional classroom environments, technology is being used not just in the most obvious ways such as computer terminals with Internet and library database access. While traditional technological tools such as computers have become indispensable, revolutionary changes to the learning environment itself are technology-dependent. For example, technology can be used to alter lighting and sounds in the classroom in ways that promote learning, cooperation, and concentration. With technology in education comes a great responsibility to monitor usage, upgrade systems, and remain continually mindful of issues such as privacy and intellectual property. As Pula & Goff (1972) pointed out decades ago, technology's impact on education encompasses psychological, philosophical, sociological, and pedagogical issues.
In developing countries, technology is becoming more seamlessly integrated into classrooms than expected. For example, in Bangladesh mobile phone technology is being harnessed as a learning device ("Technology impacts on education" 2010). Mobile phones are being used more like PDAs, portable digital devices, than as telecommunications objects. The use of mobile phones as an educational tool includes a BBC-developed system of language translation services. In Uruguay, the government has ensured that every child in school has a laptop and similar one laptop-per-child initiatives are being implemented in other South American countries ("Technology impacts on education" 2010).
Technology may have had its greatest impact on information delivery, which has reduced geographic and even language barriers in schools. Distance learning options transcend borders, allowing students in countries with poor educational services to have access to libraries, facilities, classes, and degree programs abroad. Online learning is used in conjunction with traditional learning in the classroom setting, in grade school as well as at the university level. The Economist Intelligence Unit found that law school students enrolled in hybrid problems, which used a combination of online and physical classrooms, outperformed their classmates who only studied in one type of learning environment.
In a comprehensive study of how technology is used at the grade school level, Gray, Thomas, Lewis & Tice (2010) found that in the United States, almost all teachers (97%) had one or more computers in their classrooms every day. Most of these computers were used for multiple purposes, and almost all were on the Internet. The average ratio of students to computers in the classroom was about 5 to 1 in the Gray et al. (2010) survey. Other technologies besides computers also played a major role in the learning environment. Projectors, including LCD displays, were used commonly. Even digital cameras were used as teaching tools (Gray, et al. 2010). Teachers in the Gray et al. (2010) survey report using technology for instructional as well as administrative and organizational purposes. For example, grades and attendance records were maintained in an electronic database for more than 90% of all teachers surveyed (Gray et al. 2010). Word processors were among the most common software tools used in an instructional context, followed closely by the Internet. Gray et al. (2010) also found that spreadsheets and presentation software were relatively common in public school classrooms. However, the results of the technology in education survey varied depending on whether the school was located in a low-income or high-income neighborhood. Teachers reported emailing parents far less often in a poor district vs. A wealthy one: 92% of teachers would email parents in the wealthy school district but only 48% did so in the low-income districts. This shows that even in 2009, there still remain socio-economic barriers to educational equality. Moreover, technology is one of the ways to measure barriers to education in the United States and worldwide.
On college campuses, technology is ubiquitous and being used in unexpected ways. For example, the Economist Intelligence Unit (2008) found that "social-networking tools are helping to build connections with alumni and support career service activities," (Sec 1:5). Anderson, Poelhuber, & McKerlich (2010) likewise found that socially-oriented software and social networking enhanced the learning experience, especially for students enrolled in online programs. As with public grade schools in the United States, cost barriers present some major problems for the educational institutions using technology. The cost of maintenance and upgrading are a few of the stated costs (Economist Intelligence Unit 2008).
Technology is aiding students who fall asleep in class or who could not make it to class because they were sick or otherwise disposed. In New York University's tax law program, for instance, each class is filmed using three cameras and a sound mixer for optimal quality video and audio and then within thirty minutes the entire class goes online for the students to review (Economist Intelligence Unit 2008). In fact, Seirup & Tirotta (2010) conducted research into the possible applications of online learning for students who are on academic probation. Online learning was found to mitigate the negative effects of the probation and helped raise test scores among students who had low GPAs (Seirup & Tirotta 2010).
The uses of technology in a higher education setting are, predictably, different from the uses of technology at the public grade school level. The Economist Intelligence Unit (2008) notes that technology is being perceived as a signal of fundamental shifts in pedagogy, with a greater shift on student-centered and student-directed learning. Similarly, technology is enabling a revision of assessment methods. Technology allows a change from a scenario enabling a rote memorization for tests towards a situation in which students apply what they have learned towards the solving of real or simulated problems (Economist Intelligence Unit 2008). Professors will become more like mentors than as traditional instructors and specialized degrees and course customization will become more common (Economist Intelligence Unit 2008, Sec 1:7). Pula & Goff (1972) also predicted that technology would be employed in accordance with systems theory in education, with a tremendous personal and sociological impact. In other words, technology is revolutionizing the role of the university.
Collaboration tools, especially online collaboration tools, were cited as the most important technology in higher education, followed closely by "the dynamic delivery of content and software that supports individually paced learning," (Economist Intelligence Unit 2008, Sec 1:6). Online collaboration tools include wiki, which is being viewed increasingly as a collectivist academic project. Content presents academic material in an accessible and "egalitarian way," (Huett, Huett & Bennett 2010). Huett et al. (2010) also point out that "Wikis promote collaborative knowledge convergence that helps accumulate, organize, and store essential programmatic assets in an easy-to-access format."
Online learning is a major growth area for educational institutions. However, online learning and online program development are not monolithic in education. There are numerous methods and strategies to developing online programs, courses, and course materials. Meyer & Barefield (2010) outline several models for e-learning with the costs and benefits of each. The authors note that programs developed by individual instructors "often fail due to faculty burnout, poor course design, or a technology infrastructure that is so riddled with problems that students quit the program due to the frustration of frequent disconnects and the inability to get the technology to work as intended," (Meyer & Barefield 2010). Unfortunately, schools that are new to online learning or which have not yet developed the administrative level supports for e-learning are likely to leave individual faculty members to "fend for themselves in gathering of support, learning new technology, and designing an online program from scratch with little or no support from the infrastructure in place," (Meyer & Barefield 2010). This may have been the first and initial model used for developing online course materials and content because it seemed like the only way to approach the issue: have teachers develop their online courses the same way they develop their traditional courses. However, instructors need far more training before they can develop effective online courses. Instructors also need to collaborate and have access to available resources.
Therefore, Meyer & Barefield (2010) describe what is becoming a more prevalent model of e-learning development: the team approach. Using a team approach, campus administrators play an active role in coordinating online course development as well as the promotion of online materials and degree programs. Furthermore, instructors are not designing the courses on their own. They have at their disposal IT professionals and consultants: "Other support personnel such as content developers, instructional designers, and administrative support are either realigned to support the online endeavor or new personnel are hired to provide the support," (Meyer & Barefield 2010). Discovering and implementing new and effective ways of developing and delivering online content is crucial for student satisfaction, program recognition, and future success. As Sampson, Leonard, Ballenger, and Coleman (2010) show, students are often dissatisfied with the level of teamwork involved in the distance learning process. Knowing this, administrators and instructors…[continue]
"Technology In Edu Technology Has Changed The" (2010, December 07) Retrieved December 3, 2016, from http://www.paperdue.com/essay/technology-in-edu-has-changed-49225
"Technology In Edu Technology Has Changed The" 07 December 2010. Web.3 December. 2016. <http://www.paperdue.com/essay/technology-in-edu-has-changed-49225>
"Technology In Edu Technology Has Changed The", 07 December 2010, Accessed.3 December. 2016, http://www.paperdue.com/essay/technology-in-edu-has-changed-49225
According to the Technology/Education Curriculum Guide, published by the New Hampshire Department of Education in 2008, technology "is an activity that involves the generation of knowledge and processes to develop systems that solve problems and extend human capabilities." Therefore, all citizens, especially young persons, "need to become technologically literate in order to be productive users of technology" and will thus become "better able to understand the world in which they
Technology (a) Technology is "the branch of knowledge that deals with the creation and use of technical means and their interrelation with life, society, and the environment, drawing upon such subjects as industrial arts, engineering, applied science, and pure science" (Dictionary.com, 2014). 1)(b) High-technology is "scientific technology involving the production or use of advanced or sophisticated devices especially in the fields of electronics and computers" (Merriam-Webster, 2014). 1)(c) A can opener,
Technology in Education Assessing Three Emerging Technologies' Contribution to Learning There are a myriad of new technologies emerging that have the potential to completely re-order and increase the level of learning effectiveness and performance of students. With so many new technologies emerging as diverse as mobile-based learning systems on smartphones to the ability to tailor online learning systems and complete networks, the opportunities for educators to innovate has never been more full
"Numerous studies have shown that impressive results in student achievement have come from students in technology-rich learning environments. Additional benefits such as improved student attitude, enthusiasm and engagement have also been found." (Sebastian J.) However technology is not a solution in itself but can be a useful and often powerful means of enhancing the educational process. In this process technology does not replace teaching as an essential function but is
We agree that people still purchase books. The reason is that today the author gets paid upfront and if people do not read the book, the publisher has to bear the loss. Secondly publishers are able to 'sell the books' to the bookstores' based on 'consignment system', whereby the 'book store' is able to return the books which are unsold against a 'full refund'. (Grossman, 2009) Jeanie Comstock (2009) says
Another problem with e-mail is it can actually impact how we feel about ourselves and our importance in the world. I'm truly disappointed on days when I connect to my e-mail and don't have any messages from friends. I may know that Eddie Bauer is having a sale, but that isn't meaningful communication. Psychologically, when friends don't communicate, we feel a little down (Leonard 242). I suppose this isn't any
Technology and Academic Success Higher education across the world and the lure of new information technologies has remained uncertain as it is unsettling. While few people doubt information technology has great potential of enhancing teaching and learning there is a wide and general agreement on how technology can and should be used to boost academic productivity or whether this type of increase is on its own a valid goal if its

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Illinois Appellate Court
January 28, 2000
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Lake County. No. 97--CF--2057 Honorable Henry C. Tonigan, Judge, Presiding.
Following a bench trial, defendant, Steve L. Gordon a/k/a Derrick Williams, was found guilty of unlawful possession of a controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/402(c) (West 1998)). Defendant timely appeals and asserts that the circuit court erred when it denied his motion to quash his arrest and suppress evidence. Defendant contends that the trial court erred (1) by ruling that his arrest was valid if the police acted in good faith when they relied on an arrest warrant for someone else but mistakenly arrested defendant; and (2) by determining that the police acted in good faith. We affirm.
On August 6, 1997, defendant was arrested and charged with several offenses including unlawful possession of a controlled substance and unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver (720 ILCS 570/401(c)(2) (West 1998)). Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion to quash his arrest and suppress evidence. Following a hearing on the matter, the trial court denied the motion
The case went to trial on the charges of unlawful possession of a controlled substance and unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. The trial court found defendant guilty of unlawful possession of a controlled substance but not guilty of unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. The court initially imposed a 5-year sentence on defendant but reduced the sentence to 4½ years pursuant to defendant's motion to reconsider sentence. Defendant's timely appeal followed. On appeal, defendant raises issues related only to the trial court's denial of his motion to quash his arrest and suppress evidence.
At the hearing on defendant's motion to quash his arrest, the parties stipulated to the following facts. At the time of defendant's arrest, there was an outstanding warrant for the arrest of a person named Darrick Williams whose date of birth was shown on the face of the warrant as December 21, 1967; the address shown on the warrant was 734 Broadway, apartment 1, North Chicago; the subject of the warrant was a black male; a North Chicago police officer would testify that the subject of the warrant was 5 feet 11 inches tall and weighed 220 pounds; it was later determined that defendant was not the subject of the warrant; and, at the time of defendant's arrest and search, there was no outstanding warrant for his arrest or for the search of his person.
Following the stipulations, the State called Waukegan police officer Andrew Hewett as a witness. Hewett testified that he was on duty at about 2:45 a.m. on August 6, 1997, when he was called to the Thriftlodge Motel in Waukegan. Hewett was accompanied by Officer Walles. When Hewitt arrived at the motel, he spoke to the night manager, Mr. Edmaiston. Edmaiston told Hewett that he had been told by some residents of the motel that the person registered in room 419 had offered to sell them drugs. Edmaiston identified the person registered in room 419 as Derrick Williams. Edmaiston wanted the police to remove Derrick Williams from the premises.
Hewett further testified that he, Edmaiston, and Walles then went to room 419. Edmaiston knocked on the door. Defendant opened the door and stood in the doorway while Hewett, Edmaiston, and Walles remained in the hall. Defendant told Hewett that his name was Derrick Williams. Defendant produced a State of Illinois identification card. Hewett testified that the name on the identification card was Derrick Williams, that the picture on the identification card was a picture of defendant, and that the date of birth on the card was December 21, 1968.
After defendant produced the identification card and identified himself as Derrick Williams, Hewett radioed police headquarters and asked the dispatcher to check for warrants on a subject. Hewett testified that he told the dispatcher that the subject's name was Derrick Williams, that the subject's date of birth was December 21, 1968, and that the subject was a black male. Hewett testified that the dispatcher stated that there was "an active warrant for a Derrick Williams with a date of birth of 12/21/1967, male black."
Hewett then advised defendant that there was an active warrant for his arrest. Hewett testified that defendant responded by stating that he had previously attempted to surrender himself to the Lake County sheriff's police for the warrant in question, but the police had determined that he was not the subject of the warrant. Hewett told defendant that he had no proof of this and would therefore place defendant in custody and "take him to the county jail and see if they had a photograph of him and we could determine for sure if he was the subject [of the warrant] or not."
Hewett testified that when the dispatcher gave him the information regarding the warrant he believed that defendant was the subject of the warrant. He believed this because "the name and birth date comparison was similar to indicate that he was the subject. The only difference was one year on the birth date."
Hewett testified that he began to reach for defendant to take him into custody and that defendant then attempted to close the door and run into the motel room. When defendant did that, Hewett pushed the door open, took defendant to the floor, and placed him in custody.
Hewett next placed handcuffs on defendant and searched him. Hewett testified that he reached into each front pocket of the jeans that defendant was wearing and in each pocket found a plastic bag that contained several smaller bags that contained a hard, rock-like substance. Hewett testified that in his search he also found a smaller bag containing cannabis and drug paraphernalia.
On cross-examination, Hewett initially answered that Edmaiston had told him that the person registered in room 419 was "Derrick P. Williams." Hewett later modified his answer and stated that he could not recall whether Edmaiston used the person's middle initial. Hewett acknowledged that the police report he filed stated that Edmaiston checked the registry and told him that the person registered in room 419 was named "Derrick P. Williams." Hewett also acknowledged that the identification card that defendant showed him bore the name of "Derrick P. Williams." Hewett could not recall whether the identification card contained an address of 3940 West 21st Street in Chicago or a social security number (SSN). Hewett conceded that he did not give the dispatcher the SSN shown on the identification card. Hewett did not recall whether he asked the dispatcher if the warrant contained an address. Hewett did not recall whether defendant told him that the warrant could not be for him because he had recently been released from a boot camp. Hewett conceded that his police report did not identify the specific location where he found contraband.
Defendant testified at the hearing on his motion to quash his arrest that his name is "Derrick Paul Williams." Defendant also testified that the identification card he gave Hewett contained the name "Derrick P. Williams," his SSN, and his address of 3940 West 21st Street in Chicago.
Defendant's further testimony included the following. After defendant gave Hewett the identification information, Hewett told defendant that he was under arrest for a domestic battery warrant. Defendant laughed at that and stated that he had just gotten out of a Department of Corrections boot camp and he therefore knew there was no warrant for him because he was on work release. Defendant denied telling Hewett that he had tried to turn himself in on the warrant.
Defendant testified that his height is approximately 5 feet 9 inches or 5 feet 10 inches and his weight is 185 pounds. His height and weight were about the same when he was arrested.
Defendant further testified that, after he told Hewett that the warrant was not for him, Hewett radioed for a warrant check for a Derrick Williams and gave the dispatcher defendant's SSN and date of birth. Defendant further testified that the dispatcher told Hewett "subject clears." According to defendant, after the dispatcher made that statement, Walles said, "I hate drug dealers," and Hewett said "I'm going in that room regardless."
Defendant testified that when he was arrested he was wearing red shorts, no socks, brown sandals, no underwear, and a black Chicago Bulls T-shirt. Defendant denied that any of these items had pockets. After his arrest, defendant was taken to the Waukegan police department. At the time of the hearing, defendant had been in custody in the Lake County jail since his arrest.
On cross-examination defendant acknowledged that in the past he used various names and birth dates. Defendant testified that he was released from the boot camp in question in February 1997. Defendant stated that as soon as he opened the door Hewett told him that he was under arrest for domestic battery. He also reiterated that he heard the dispatcher say "subject clears" after he gave Hewett his identification card.
In rebuttal testimony, Hewett testified that after defendant's arrest Walles transported defendant to the police station, that defendant was wearing the same pants that he was wearing when Hewett searched him, and that those pants were jeans. Hewett also testified that when he last saw defendant at the police station defendant was wearing the same jeans.
After Hewett's rebuttal testimony, the parties stipulated that certain items of clothing were taken from defendant and placed in custody when defendant was booked into the Lake County jail. The items were a pair of red shorts with no pockets, a pair of sandals, two belts, and a black Bulls T-shirt.
Following the hearing, the trial court denied defendant's motion to quash his arrest and suppress evidence. In announcing its ruling, the trial court commented that there were "striking similarities" between the information on the warrant and defendant's race, sex, name, and date of birth. The trial court stated that it considered the items of height, weight, and social security number to be irrelevant because there was no information as to those items on the warrant.
The court also stated that it considered several credibility issues. The court indicated that it found defendant's testimony that he heard the dispatcher say "subject clears" not credible because the dispatcher's statement was said to have been made after the dispatcher was given defendant's SSN, but there was no SSN on the warrant. The court was not persuaded by defendant's testimony that at the time of his arrest he was wearing shorts without pockets and was not wearing jeans. The court also found that defendant's statement that he had just been released from boot camp was dubious.
On appeal, defendant first contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to quash his arrest and suppress evidence because evidence obtained in a search incident to an arrest based on a mistaken belief that he was the subject of an arrest warrant, even if made in good faith, must be excluded. Defendant asserts that no Illinois court has determined whether a good-faith exception applies to allow the use of evidence against an arrestee where a valid arrest warrant is served on the wrong person and a subsequent search reveals contraband. Defendant urges us to follow Grant v. State, 152 Ga. App. 258, 262 S.E.2d 553 (1979).
We initially note our standard of review. In reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, where the ruling involves factual determinations and credibility assessments it will be reversed on appeal only when the ruling is manifestly erroneous. People v. Buss, 187 Ill. 2d 144, 204 (1999). Where there are no factual or credibility disputes, de novo review is appropriate. Buss, 187 Ill. 2d at 204-05.
In this case, whether an arrest involving mistaken identity should be deemed valid if the mistake was made in good faith is a legal question that does not involve factual or credibility determinations. We therefore review the question de novo.
Defendant urges us to follow Grant. In Grant, the police arrested the defendant based on a warrant for another person, conducted a search of the defendant's person, and discovered a small amount of marijuana. The Georgia appellate court reversed the defendant's conviction. The court stated that, even though a police officer acts in good faith in arresting a person other than the person named in a warrant, the warrant will not justify the action. Grant, 152 Ga. App. at 258, 262 S.E.2d at 553.
The State responds that we should follow the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 28 L. Ed. 2d 484, 91 S. Ct. 1106 (1971). In Hill, the police had probable cause to arrest a person named Hill but mistakenly arrested another person, Miller. At the time of the arrest, Miller was at Hill's apartment and fit Hill's description. The Court addressed the questions of whether Miller's arrest was valid and whether a search of Hill's apartment pursuant to Miller's arrest was also valid.
As to the arrest, the Court stated:
"Based on our own examination of the record, we find no reason to disturb either the findings of the California courts that the police had probable cause to arrest Hill and that the arresting officers had a reasonable, good-faith belief that the arrestee Miller was in fact Hill, or the conclusion that '[w]hen the police have probable cause to arrest one party, and when they reasonably mistake a second party for the first party, then the arrest of the second party is a valid arrest.'" Hill, 401 U.S. at 802, 28 L. Ed. 2d at 489, 91 S. Ct. at 1110.
As to the search, the Court stated that "the police were entitled to do what the law would have allowed them to do if Miller had in fact been Hill." Hill 401 U.S. at 804, 28 L. Ed. 2d at 490, 91 S. Ct. at 1111.
Our research reveals that the majority of cases that have cited Hill have followed Hill when addressing factual patterns involving an arrest based on mistaken identity where the police had probable cause to arrest someone else and acted in reasonable good faith. A recent example is United States v. Marshall, 79 F.3d 68 (7th Cir. 1996). In Marshall, the police had a valid arrest warrant for a person named Beasley and, based on information from an informant, mistakenly arrested a person named Marshall thinking he was Beasley. A search of Marshall's person revealed that he was carrying a loaded gun. After the denial of his motion to suppress the evidence on the ground that the search was illegal, Marshall pleaded guilty to a federal gun charge. Marshall later appealed and raised a single issue, whether the gun seized incident to his arrest should have been suppressed.
Citing Hill, the Marshall court stated:
"In circumstances where the police mistake a person for someone else they seek to validly arrest, the arrest is constitutional if the arresting officers (1) have probable cause to arrest the person sought and (2) reasonably believe that the person arrested is the person sought." Marshall, 79 F.3d at 69.
The court also stated that the arrest warrant gave the police a sufficient basis to arrest Beasley and therefore the critical issue before it was whether the police actions were reasonable in thinking that Marshall was Beasley. The court then determined that the police actions were reasonable and affirmed Marshall's conviction.
Our research has not revealed an Illinois case that is precisely on point in terms of relying on Hill in a definite case of mistaken identity, namely, a case involving an arrest pursuant to a valid arrest warrant, or other basis of probable cause, of a person who was not the person being sought. However, our research has revealed several Illinois cases, including one supreme court case, that have cited Hill with approval in closely related contexts.
In People v. Gwin, 49 Ill. 2d 255, 258-59 (1971), our supreme court addressed the question of the validity of a search made subsequent to an arrest. Based on a witness's description, the police had probable cause to arrest a suspected burglar. The police arrested Gwin, who fit the description, near the scene of the burglary. However, even though Gwin was linked to items stolen in the burglary, the complaining witness told the police that Gwin was not the man he had seen in his apartment. Citing Hill, the court stated that the possible mistaken identity in arresting Gwin was of no importance because "where police have probable cause to arrest one person, and they reasonably mistake another for him and make an arrest, the validity of the arrest is not affected by the mistake." Gwin, 49 Ill. 2d at 258-59.
In People v. Safunwa, 299 Ill. App. 3d 707 (1998), this court cited Hill with approval in the context of a traffic stop involving a mistake in identification. The court concluded that officers had a justifiable basis for making the traffic stop where they reasonably believed that the driver of the car they stopped was the subject of an arrest warrant. In support of its conclusion, the court cited Hill for the proposition that sufficient probability, rather than certainty, is the touchstone of reasonableness under the fourth amendment. The court noted parenthetically in the citation that "when officers have probable cause to arrest one party and they reasonably mistake a second party for the first party, then arrest of the second party is valid for purposes of fourth amendment search and seizure analysis." Safunwa, 299 Ill. App. 3d at 711.
In People v. Cunningham, 130 Ill. App. 3d 254 (1984), the Appellate Court, First District, cited Hill with approval in a case involving a determination that it was not necessary to suppress evidence on the ground that it was the fruit of an illegal arrest. After making that determination, the court stated that it also believed that the arrest was legal because it was an arrest made pursuant to a valid arrest warrant of a person the officers could reasonably have believed was the subject of the warrant. Citing Hill, the court stated "[i]t is established that where police are authorized to make an arrest of one person and reasonably mistake another for him, the validity of the arrest is not affected by the mistake." Cunningham, 130 Ill. App. 3d at 262.
We believe that these Illinois cases provide compelling authority to follow Hill where it is applicable. Hill is certainly applicable in this case, and we will therefore follow it.
Defendant's reliance on Grant is misplaced and does not persuade us to reject Hill. Grant did not mention Hill even though Hill was decided well before Grant was decided.
Nor do we find convincing defendant's arguments that the Illinois Constitution prohibits us from following Hill. Defendant correctly notes that our supreme court has held that the Illinois Constitution may provide broader protections than those afforded by the United States Constitution and therefore Illinois courts are not bound to follow in lockstep decisions based on the United States Constitution. See, e.g., People v. Krueger, 175 Ill. 2d 60 (1996) (exclusionary rule in Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §6) provides broader protections than United States Constitution with respect to good-faith use of warrant based on statute subsequently declared unconstitutional). However, defendant has not shown that any of the concerns expressed by our supreme court in Krueger as reasons for not following the lockstep doctrine are concerns here. Defendant has not shown that Hill was somehow fundamentally flawed. In Hill, the United States Supreme Court justices were unanimous in their opinion that the arrest of an individual because of a reasonable mistake in identity based on probable cause to arrest someone else was a valid arrest. Nor has defendant shown that the decision in Hill violates some well-settled Illinois constitutional law.
Having determined that we should follow Hill, we next address defendant's contention that the police did not act in good faith in this case. By its ruling, the trial court implicitly decided that the officers acted in reasonable good faith when they mistakenly arrested defendant on the basis of a warrant for someone else. Because the ruling involves factual and credibility determinations, we will not reverse the ruling unless it was manifestly erroneous. Buss, 187 Ill. 2d at 204.
To determine whether the fourth amendment was violated by the mistaken arrest of a person pursuant to a valid warrant for another person, a court should determine whether the arrest was reasonable under the circumstances, bearing in mind that "sufficient probability, not certainty, is the touchstone of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment." Hill, 401 U.S. at 804, 28 L. Ed. 2d at 490, 91 S. Ct. at 1111.
The parties agree that the proper standard to determine whether an officer's actions were in reasonable good faith in the context of an arrest based on mistaken identity was stated in Sanders v. United States, 339 A.2d 373 (D.C. App. 1975).
In Sanders, the court stated:
"[T]he seizure of an individual other than the one against whom the warrant is outstanding is valid if the arresting officer (1) acts in good faith, and (2) has reasonable, articulable grounds to believe that the suspect is the intended arrestee. Should doubt as to the correct identity of the subject of [the] warrant arise, the arresting officer obviously should make immediate reasonable efforts to confirm or deny the applicability of the warrant to the detained individual." Sanders, 339 A.2d at 379.
Defendant argues that the facts in this case do not rise to the level of good faith under this standard. We disagree.
It is undisputed that after defendant produced his identification card Hewett radioed headquarters to determine whether there was an outstanding warrant for defendant. Hewett testified that the dispatcher told him that there was an active warrant for a person whose name, sex, race, and date of birth either matched or nearly matched the information on the warrant.
Defendant argues that when defendant indicated to Hewett that the warrant was not for him Hewett should have again radioed the dispatcher and sought additional information. We are not persuaded by this argument. We believe that the information Hewett received when he called the dispatcher was a sufficient basis for Hewett to take the actions that he took. Hewett advised defendant that he would be taken to police headquarters to determine whether the warrant was for him. Given the circumstances of this case, we cannot say that the trial court's determination that Hewett acted in reasonable good faith was manifestly erroneous.
Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the circuit court of Lake County is affirmed.
THOMAS and HUTCHINSON, JJ., concur.
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View to Wellfleet Bay and Great Island
10 minutes to National Seashore beaches
Sunset from Deck
Calendar Last Updated: November 16, 2016
Additional availability info:
This is a Saturday to Saturday vacation rental.
Additional pricing info: $110 reservation fee, management by Kinlin Grover Vaca. Rentals, Discount for Multiple Wk. Rental
Nearest beach: 1/10th of a mile Old Wharf Beach
Wellfleet Vacation Planner
Wellfleet Info
I can't decide the very best part....the sea breeze coming through the open windows while I slept; the expansive, sunny deck with comfortable lounge chairs; the 3-minute walk to the beach; or the easy access to kayaking! The location of this house is extraordinary, both because it's in the beautiful town of Wellfleet, and because it looks out onto a gorgeous inlet where the tide comes and goes. The house is very tastefully decorated, and had everything we needed (including an outdoor shower!) I would go back in a heartbeat. show more show less
Wow. This newly renovated property offers the best in views, comfort and recreation. The all new modern interior furniture, carpeting, lighting, beds, and more is quite tastefully done. We thoroughly enjoyed beach walks and exploring the water inlets. And yet in 5 minutes we were out to a restaurant or shopping. This hide-away property will stay on my list for a return vacation.
We had a wonderful vacation in Wellfleet! The house has an amazing view over the marsh, and it was so relaxing to sit on the patio or in the hammocks and watch the tides go in & out. The house is a short walk to the beach and kayaking, and is very secluded - but it's only a short drive to the many wonderful restaurants, interesting shops and sights of Wellfleet. The house is beautifully renovated, clean and welcoming. Our family had a great time, and only wish that we could have stayed longer!
Perched on a rise at the edge of the bay, the wraparound view is spectacular! Lounging on the deck watching the tide come and go, taking long walks or kayaking were just part of what this place has to offer. The house is renovated in an easy and lovely style, with all the amenities you need. A short ride into town for restaurants, or to be on ocean beaches made the location perfect for an easy vacation on the Cape. We had a houseful, and the place and owner couldn't have been lovelier.
The house is roomy, inviting, and well-equipped, with a great deck looking out over the marsh and the bay from which sunsets and sunrises are spectacular. The beach and kayaking are a short walk, and though it feels like being on a peaceful island when in the house and on the deck, food, entertainment, art, and the ocean are only a short drive away. And even if the weather's not cooperating, this house, unlike many beach houses, is spacious and comfortable. This place is a find!
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Rite Aid Pharmacy — Lankford Highway
Exmore, VA Hours and Location
Category: Pharmacies
Hours street map for all businesses nearby.
Rite Aid Pharmacy is currently Closed.
Rite Aid Pharmacy Hours
Mon -
Tue -
Wed -
Thu -
Fri -
Sat -
Sun -
Other Rite Aid Pharmacy Locations
Hours for other Exmore stores...
4053 Lankford Highway
Exmore, VA 23350Driving DirectionsPhone: (757)442-8542(757)442-8542 Maps & Directions
Mon-Thurs: 9:00am-9:00pm
Friday: 9:00am-9:00pm
Saturday: 9:00am-6:00pm
Sunday: 10:00am-6:00pm
Additional Store Information
- Located at 4053 Lankford Highway On Lankford Highway Across Food Lion
- Immunizations available without an appointment.
- Drive-Thru Pharmacy
- Western Union
- Instant Lottery
- Lottery Machine
- Influenza (Flu)
- Shingles (Herpes Zoster)
- Pertusis (Whooping Cough)
- Meningococcal Disease
- Pneumococcal Disease
- MMR (Measles, Mumps, Rubella)
- Varicella (Chickenpox)
- Tetanus (Lockjaw)
- Hepatitis A
- Hepatitis B
- Diptheria
- Human Papillomavirus (HPV)
- One Hour Photo Lab
- Digital Prints
- Blue Rhino Propane
- Beer
- Receutics Active Skin Repair
- higi Blood Pressure Station
Other Rite Aid Pharmacy Locations
Hours for other Exmore stores...
Dot is Green if Rite Aid Pharmacy is currently open and Red if currently closed.
As of: 5:32 am (EST) Sun Dec 4, 2016. [Change]
As of: 5:32 am (EST) Sun Dec 4, 2016. [Change]


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4 Cabaritta Point Kalimna VIC 3909
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Beach Front & Jetty Berth4 Cabaritta Point, Kalimna
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Gender: Girl
Meaning: Quick
Origin: Chinese, Korean
Min is a Girl name, meaning of the name is Quick and origin of the name is Chinese, Korean. This name is mostly used in
If you select the name Min for your baby, Congratulations! But if you don't like Min then please continue searching our site.
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BlackBerry® Wireless Headset HS-300
BlackBerry® Wireless Headset HS-300
We're sorry! This product is not available.
Description & Features+
Enjoy a simple, hands-free calling experience with the headset that's built to help you master your everyday conversations. Stay focused on everything you want to get done: voice prompts keep you in the loop, so you'll know when your battery's getting low, when you're on mute, and more. When it is time for a boost, a quick charge is all it takes to keep you multitasking throughout the day, so you can talk and surf, send emails, and more. The headset even adjusts the volume for you, so you don't have to lift a finger. And because it's small and streamlined, it's convenient for everything you do each day.
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From the Manufacturer +


text:
Insel Haus, our Island Bed and Breakfast, offers luxury and comfort inside, wilderness and adventure outside. No other home can be seen from secluded Insel Haus and it's 200 acres of forest. Pictures alone can't capture its unique character, many antiques, 3000 volume library, fire places, and unusual bedrooms. But our web site does offer an array of photos, general information and prices. Here in Michigan's Upper Peninsula you'll be entering a veritable time machine far off the beaten path where there are no paved roads or traffic lights. Explore this twelve by six mile jewel as you hike, bike or drive its roads and two-track trails. There's one combined general store and restaurant and if you seek local color there is a tavern. A twenty-five mile an hour speed limit is enforced throughout Bois Blanc. Insel Haus accommodates twenty guests. We have retreats, family reunions, and weddings as well as individual visitors. Insel Haus also has suites which include your own kitchen. You may send us a shopping list and the food will be in your suite when you arrive. We serve the obligatory breakfast and gourmet lunch and dinner meals can be arranged. Getting to Insel Haus (German for "Island House") is part of the adventure. We are open all year. Guests arrive by ferry, plane, and helicopter. Ferry from Cheboygan. Two airlines provide service from Cheboygan, St. Ignace and Pellston.
HCR 1 Box 157
Bois Blanc Island, MI 49775
Driving Directions
Reservations: (231) 634-7393
Toll Free: (888) 634-7393
Phone: (231) 634-7393
Fax: (231) 634-7163
Email: firstname.lastname@example.com
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March 16, 2012
PHILIP CARROLL, PLAINTIFF,v.TOWNSHIP OF MOUNT LAUREL, DEFENDANT.
Plaintiff having filed a motion to reopen his case and a motion for relief from a judgment or order pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6) regarding this Court's Order granting summary judgment in favor of defendant, and it appearing that:
1. On November 16, 2006, pro se plaintiff, Philip Carroll, filed a complaint against defendant Township of Mount Laurel (the "Township") pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of his rights under the 5th Amendment's "Takings Clause."
2. On June 20, 2008, this Court granted the Township's motion for summary judgment and dismissed plaintiff's complaint on the ground that plaintiff's claim was not "ripe" and, therefore, not justiciable. See Carroll v. Twp. of Mt. Laurel, No. 06-5515, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47777 (D.N.J. June 20, 2008).*fn1
3. Plaintiff appealed this Court's decision which decision was affirmed by the Third Circuit. See Carroll v. Township of Mount Laurel, 315 Fed.Appx. 402, 405 (3d Cir. 2009).
4. Following which, on February 3, 2010, plaintiff filed an "inverse condemnation" complaint against the Township in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, raising the same claim litigated in the Federal Courts.
5. On May 28, 2010, the Law Division granted the Township's motion to dismiss on grounds that plaintiff's claims had been fully adjudicated on the merits in the Federal Courts.
6. Plaintiff then appealed to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey which affirmed the decision of the lower state court. The New Jersey Supreme Court denied plaintiff's petition for certification.
7. Plaintiff now returns to this Court and files a motion to reopen his case, and a motion for relief from a judgment or order pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6).
8. Plaintiff essentially argues in his motion to reopen that since his claim was found "not ripe" for adjudication, that it was not decided on the merits, and his complaint was not dismissed.
9. While a dismissal of claim as "not ripe" is not a decision on the
merits of the claim, see Rosendale v. Brusie, 374 Fed.Appx. 195, 197
(2nd Cir 2010), plaintiff's complaint was dismissed*fn2
because he did not provide any facts that could show the
Township moved beyond an "intention" expressed in its
10. As this Court explained in detail in its previous opinion, the resolution passed by the Township merely stated an "intention" to protect the area which contains plaintiff's land from commercial and non-residential development; and that plaintiff did not proffer facts that if proven could show that the Township reached a final decision regarding the zoning or land use for plaintiff's property. Carroll, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47777, at *13, 19. Thus, there was no "finality" as to the effect of the resolution on the property. Id.
11. This Court specifically outlined for plaintiff why his claim was not ripe: "He has not addressed the [State of New Jersey, Department of Environmental Protection's] concerns regarding the wetlands; he has not obtained [a "Letter of Interpretation" ("LOI")] or sought any administrative remedy for not obtaining the LOI; he has not sought to sell his property to another buyer; he has not shown that the property is no longer zoned for the use originally zoned (and if appropriate, that he could not obtain variances); he has not shown that he cannot sell his property, or must sell it at a reduced value because of the issuance of the resolution." Id. at *18-19.
12. The Third Circuit also instructed that plaintiff did not bring alternative claims such as a facial challenge to the resolution, or that the resolution lacked a public purpose. Carroll, 315 Fed.Appx. at 405 n.4 (citing County Concrete Corp. v. Town of Roxbury, 442 F.3d 159, 165 (3d Cir. 2006), Carole Media LLC v. New Jersey Transit Corp., 550 F.3d 302, 308 (3d Cir. 2008)).
13. The New Jersey Superior Court also advised that plaintiff was not "precluded from challenging municipal action if there is a change of circumstances that actually affects the use of [his] property."
14. Despite the instructive commentary from the Courts, plaintiff has not alleged any new facts or claims in his motion to reopen. Rather, he wishes to reopen his case in order to relitigate the same claim. Assuming the underlying facts have not changed, however, plaintiff's claim remains unripe.
15. Plaintiff also argues that he may relitigate his claims pursuant to England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 84 S.Ct. 461 (1964).
16. The England case is not applicable here. England involved invocation of the abstention doctrine and a stay of Federal proceedings in order to allow the litigants to file their claims in state court concerning a state law claim. Here, no stay was imposed, and plaintiff raised a Federal constitutional claim. Summary judgment was granted and plaintiff's complaint was dismissed.
17. Plaintiff also filed a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6). Plaintiff's motion will be denied.
18. Pursuant to Rule 60(c), "a motion under Rule 60(b) must be made within a reasonable time - and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) no more than a year after the entry of the judgment or order or the date of proceeding."
19. Plaintiff filed his motion pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6) which permits a court to relieve a party from final judgment or order for "any other reason that justifies relief." See Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6).
20. "[R]elief under Rule 60(b)(6) is extraordinary because it can be given for 'any other reason justifying relief' and is not subject to an explicit time limit." In re Diet Drugs (Phentermine/Fenfluramine/ Dexfenfluramine) Product Liability, 383 Fed.Appx. 242, 246 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Coltec Indus. Inc. v. Hobgood, 280 F.3d 262, 273 (3d Cir. 2002)). "Therefore, a claimant must establish exceptional circumstances justifying the delay for filing under Rule 60(b)(6)." Id.; Jackson v. Danberg, 656 F.3d 157, 165-66 (3d Cir. 2011) (finding relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) is only granted in extraordinary circumstances and is available where the party seeking relief demonstrates that "extreme" and "unexpected" hardship will result absent such relief).
21. Plaintiff argues that since the Court's Opinion in a footnote did not properly state that his land was within the "Business Overlay Zone," which permits 27 categories of uses, that he is entitled to relief.
22. As stated in the Court's previous Opinion, "we do not need to reach the issue of what uses may be have been permitted because plaintiff has not shown that the resolution has the legal effect of restricting the use of the property." Carroll, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47777, at *12-13 n.5. Thus, whether or not plaintiff's land is within the Business Overlay Zone is not controlling at this time because plaintiff has not provided any facts that could show that the resolution prohibiting the uses was legally binding.
23. Plaintiff also argues that this Court should reconsider its Order based on a "precedential" order entered by another judge in this District.
24. Contrary to plaintiff's assertion, the order entered by another judge in this District in the matter of DiCristo v. Township of Mount Laurel, No. 02-3868 ("DiCristo order") has no precedential effect on this Court. First, it was an order, not an opinion. Second, only opinions issued by the U.S. Supreme Court or Third Circuit or have precedential effect in this District. See U.S. v. Harris, 471 F.3d 507, 512 (3d Cir. 2006) (finding no error where neither Supreme Court ruled, nor Third Circuit issued precedential opinion).
25. Furthermore, the DiCristo order found that the resolution passed did have binding legal effect in that it reversed the Zoning Board's grant of a variance. Here, the Court issued a lengthy opinion discussing the legal effect of passing a resolution and took notice of the particular language of the resolution which only stated the Township's intent. Carroll, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47777, at *13-20.
26. Thus, neither reason presented by plaintiff presents grounds to offer relief. Further, plaintiff has not presented "extraordinary circumstances" showing that he is entitled to relief or that "extreme" and "unexpected" hardship will result absent such relief as required under Rule 60(b)(6).
Therefore, plaintiff's motion to reopen case, and motion for relief from judgment or order pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) will be denied.
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What was your source for this sewing project? Online Photo or Website Name of website or photo Coupon Clutch Link to website or photo www.modabakeshop.com/2009/07/coupon-clutch.html What are you most proud of? The color placement turned out great--wish the camera could show you better how rich this looks. What advice would you give someone starting this project? Take your time and have fun rearranging the bricks. Its sort of time consuming project, but not all that difficult. The instructions are clear.
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text:
Parks Associates announced a new report today showing that more than 25% of U.S. households will have a streaming media player by 2015, with continued robust sales and new entries such as Amazon Fire TV driving expansion of this connected CE category. The report, The Evolving Market For Streaming Media Devices, found Roku accounted for nearly one-half of streaming media players (46%) purchased in the U.S. in 2013, while Apple, its closest competitor, had 26%.
Roku is also the most-used streaming media player in the U.S. Among U.S. broadband households with a streaming media player, 44% use a Roku player the most versus 26% that use Apple TV the most. The gap has widened since 2013, when 37% of streaming media player owners used Roku most and 24% used Apple TV most.
"Multiple factors have allowed Roku to outpace Apple in U.S. sales and usage," said Barbara Kraus, director, research, Parks Associates. "Roku has always had a close association with Netflix, the largest source of video downloads, and currently offers more than 1,700 channel apps as well as a choice of models with different features and price points, all of which appeal to consumers' purchasing instincts. With Amazon entering this CE category, there will be renewed pressure on all players to develop the best combination of 'can't miss' content with a simple and intuitive interface. "


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Clay used to get good grades but he has been declining the last few semesters. So much so, that he is being labeled as "dunce" by peers. What should I as a parent do to motivate him to focus more in the classroom and try to keep up by doing his class workIn Topics: Helping my child with reading, Motivation and achievement at school, Helping my child with school work and home work
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Volume 26, number 2
March/April 2006
Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter Arrives
Download this issue as a PDF
(Planetary Society members only)
6 On to Pluto! New Horizons Heads Off to Explore the New Frontier: John Spencer witnessed the long-awaited launch and shares some of his experiences.
8 Stardust@Home: You Can Help Find Particles from Distant Suns! Faced with trying to find only a few dozen microscopic particles in 1000 square cm of gel, scientist Andrew Westphal thought to call on the public to help.
12 Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter: The Next Step in Mars Exploration: Project Manager Jim Graf and Project Scientist Rich Zurek explain what we can expect from this next generation Mars orbiter.
18 Annual Report to Our Members: Neil deGrasse Tyson summarizes 2005, the 25th anniversary of The Planetary Society.
3 Members' Dialogue Society priorities; space mission drama
4 We Make it Happen! Pioneer data saved!
17 World Watch NASA's FY2007 budget
20 Q&A The fate of Saturn's rings, Deep Impact, and Comet Tempel 1
22 Society News ISDC, Comet Crater contest winners, and Postcards from Venus winners
Essential Advocacy
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Sky and Viacom International Media Networks (VIMN) have agreed to extend their commercial partnership in the UK and Ireland for a further five years.
The arrangement ensures Viacom's popular pay-TV channels – including Comedy Central, MTV, Nickelodeon and VH1 – will continue to be available in all Sky homes. The two companies will also extend their advertising sales relationship to include Channel 5 and its associated channels.
Channel 5's suite of channels — Channel 5, 5 USA and 5 — will be added to the portfolio of 17 Viacom channels already sold by Sky Media, Sky's advertising sales division, from June. Channel 5's sponsorship, digital and on-demand sales will also be sold by Sky Media as part of the arrangement.
David Lynn, President, VIMN UK, Australia and Eastern Europe, comments: "Sky is a highly-valued partner for Viacom and we're delighted to extend our relationship for the benefit of our viewers and advertisers. We're convinced Viacom's interests are best served by a single point of advertising sales in the UK and Ireland and that Sky Media, with its strong track record of selling our pay TV channels and its innovative approach to improving the targeting and effectiveness of TV advertising, is best placed to provide it."


text:
Get the airy feel of a sandal and the traction of a trail shoe in one easy slip-on. Open vents on the sides of the waterproof leather and fabric upper create plenty of breathability for a cool, dry foot environment. Hydrophobic (moisture-repelling) mesh lining also helps keep feet dry. The fit is easy to adjust with a bungee lacing system. The multi-directional traction rubber outsole grips terrain, so you can walk with confidence.
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Superfund Site Profile
The Jacksonville Naval Air Station (NAS) is an active U.S. Navy Installation in Jacksonville, Florida. The installation currently provides facilities and support for the operation and maintenance of naval weapons and aircraft. EPA placed the site on the Superfund program's National Priorities List (NPL) in 1989 because of contaminated soil, sediment, groundwater and surface water. The U.S. Navy (Navy), EPA and the Florida Department of Environmental Protection (FDEP) investigated site conditions and have taken measures to address site contamination. EPA has issued cleanup plans to address site contaminants. The site's contamination is not a threat to nearby residents and businesses. The Navy, EPA and FDEP continue to protect people and the environment from site contamination through cleanup and monitoring of soils, sediment and groundwater, land use controls and required Five-Year Reviews.


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This head, along with the fountain it recalls, is relevant for more than just its aesthetic qualities. It serves as a visual reference point for the emerging perception of blacks within French society during the 18th century. Given its clear portraitlike aspect, one naturally wonders what life was like for the model as a black woman living in a country committed to the practice of slavery.
The legal status of people of African descent living in the French colonies had been established by the notorious Code Noir, or Black Code, a body of law ratified by Louis XIV in 1685 to govern the treatment of slaves. Within France itself, however, the situation was less clear. As in England, there was a deeply entrenched, customary notion of the "free soil of the mother country, a concept inimical to the holding of slaves. The unavoidable circumstance of slaves brought to France by their colonial masters proved to be a divisive issue for the nation, and by the middle of the 18th century, some of these slaves were even able to sue successfully for their freedom.
Partly in response to such unexpected occurrences, the royal government introduced tighter controls over the entry of slaves into the country. By 1777, just two years before Houdon's fountain group was set up, only duly registered freedmen from the colonies could legally remain in the country. All other blacks, even freedmen arriving after this date, were to be deported to the colonies. Those remaining were required to carry identity cards and were forbidden to take part in interracial marriages. Such regulations were often ignored, however, and so the woman depicted in this bust could have many identities. She could be slave or free, recently arrived or protected by the law of 1777.
Regardless of these possibilities, her status would soon change dramatically. In 1794, during the radical phase of the French Revolution, slavery was universally abolished in French territory. In recognition of this epochal event, Houdon added an inscription to the base of the bust, still in his studio: "Restored to Liberty and Equality by the National Convention." In this context the young woman, depicted as a servant in the fountain group and perhaps a slave in actual fact, can be viewed as directing her gaze to a new object of contemplation, the right of self-determination.
The Image of the Black in Western Art Archive resides at Harvard University's W.E.B. Du Bois Institute for African and African American Research. The director of the W.E.B. Du Bois Institute is Henry Louis Gates Jr., who is also The Root's editor-in-chief. The archive and Harvard University Press collaborated to create The Image of the Black in Western Art book series, eight volumes of which were edited by Gates and David Bindman and published by Harvard University Press. Text for each Image of the Week is written by Sheldon Cheek.