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October 29, 2007
SHARON ANGLIN, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,v.PRUDENTIAL FINANCIAL INC.,*FN1 DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Civil Division, Essex County, Docket No. L-7583-04.
Submitted October 11, 2007
Before Judges Wefing, R. B. Coleman and Lyons.
Plaintiff Sharon Anglin (Anglin) appeals from an order granting summary judgment to defendant Prudential Investment Management, Inc. (Prudential) on plaintiff's claims of gender and race discrimination. We affirm.
The following factual and procedural history is relevant to our consideration of the issues advanced on appeal. On July 22, 1985, Anglin, an African-American female, began her employment with Prudential. By January 1999, Anglin had been promoted to Operations Analyst and reported to Joann Rich (Rich). In May 1999, Rich promoted Anglin to her final position as Accounting Associate. On August 10, 1999, Rich performed an annual review of Anglin in her new position, which included four categories in which Anglin received a less than satisfactory grade.
From May 1999 to July 2000, Anglin reported to Associate Manager Rosemary Zeppetella (Zeppetella). Prudential claimed that Zeppetella found Anglin difficult to manage, for example, demanding a vacation during "peak times of the month that she performs her core responsibilities." Prudential further claimed that when Zeppetella and her supervisor, Bob Orth (Orth), refused the vacation, Anglin complained to Human Resources (HR). On June 1, 2000, Orth sent an email to HR detailing his interactions with Anglin. In that email, Orth stated that he felt that [Anglin] deliberately requested these days off, knowing the reaction that would be received by her management team, and is now making false accusations that her management team is restricting her vacation time alone.
She currently intends not to come in the office during the weeks requested off, regardless of her management's decision, and is apparently following up with HR as well.
In late July 2000, Zeppetella performed a review on Anglin, wherein Anglin received a performance grade of "3," which is a grade that means "meets expectations."*fn2 Anglin received a "not meeting expectations" in one area, "Partnering: Collaborating for Better Results." The comment to this rating said in relative part, "More open communication between Sharon and her unit's management would help to establish more effective working relationships." Anglin believed that this comment was "deliberate and malicious and . . . would have an impact on [her] future career."
Joseph McDonald (McDonald) was promoted to vice president of the Regulatory and Investment Reporting Group in early 2000. As vice president, McDonald was responsible for the management of approximately fifty employees, including Anglin, Orth, John Drust (Drust), Zeppetella, and Raymond Falconer (Falconer). As part of his job responsibilities, McDonald met with Anglin on August 2, 2000, to discuss the review. According to McDonald's affidavit, "Anglin complained to me about her review and accused Zeppetella of being 'vicious' and 'manipulative' and further claims that Zeppetella was 'harassing' her."
When Anglin emailed Orth on October 4, 2000, concerning Zeppetella's comment, Orth was able to provide several examples substantiating it, all of which, however, were denied by Anglin. When McDonald and Anglin met again on October 9, 2000, Anglin said that the review was "a conspiracy," was inaccurate, and was inappropriate. McDonald claimed that Anglin disputed the review's language in eight out of twelve of the core competency areas, even though she had received a grade of "meets expectations" in all of them except one.
Falconer replaced Orth as Zeppetella's supervisor in early October 2000. Zeppetella then reported directly to Falconer, while Anglin continued to report to Zeppetella. Anglin told McDonald that this was "a positive" and that she was pleased with the change in her reporting structure.
On October 20, 2000, Anglin eventually signed the Zeppetella evaluation, but attached a rebuttal, which included, "Paragraph III: Communicating with my Manager is a two way proposition. For me to know that there is a miscommunication it should not be on my appraisal. I will strive to see that this situation is remedied."
Falconer stated that he reorganized the reporting structure for the period from January 2001 to December 2001 to alleviate issues between Anglin and Zeppetella by having Anglin report directly to him. In February 2001, Anglin applied for a senior analyst position in another group and met with David Collier (Collier), manager of that group. Collier requested a copy of Anglin's current resume and a signed copy of her last full year performance review. Anglin provided a 1998-1999 review. Anglin stated that she intended on sending the most recent one the next day. Collier, however, called Falconer and asked if there was a more recent review of Anglin's performance. Falconer replied that there was, but claimed that there was no additional substantive conversation with Collier. Collier then asked Anglin for the most recent review and Anglin sent him a copy of the review Zeppetella conducted, including Anglin's appended comments. After interviewing Anglin, Collier decided not to hire Anglin based on "several different reasons, one of which concerned [Anglin's] failure to originally send [Collier] her most recent review, and none of which had anything to do with Falconer."
Anglin alleged that Falconer began approaching her in the spring of 2001, approximately March or April, indicating that he wanted to "have sex" with her. Anglin claims that "[h]e specifically . . . said: I want to go to your house to have sex with you." The next incident occurred around July 2001. Falconer allegedly asked Anglin to reconsider allowing him to come to Anglin's house because "he's a good guy." The third incident took place about four weeks later. Anglin alleged that Falconer attempted to make Anglin feel guilty for not having sex with her and invited her to his New Year's party. The last incident was in September 2001. Anglin did not remember the specifics of any of these conversations and did not remember if anybody witnessed them.
While this harassment was allegedly occurring, Anglin interviewed with Bethany Abraham (Abraham) for a position as an Associate Analyst in another department. On July 18, 2001, Abraham informed Anglin that the reason she was not selected for the position was due to Anglin's performance review that "mentioned that there was room for improvement for communications between yourself and your unit's management. [These] skills would be vital for this position."
On February 19, 2002, Falconer rated Anglin a "3," "Meets Expectations," on her 2001 calendar year performance review.
Falconer stated that Anglin's "performance over the past year has been satisfactory."
Falconer changed the reporting structure again and, beginning in February 2002, Anglin began reporting directly to Drust, who reported to Falconer. According to McDonald, Anglin expressed disappointment at this change.
On May 31, 2002, McDonald and Falconer met for a regular status meeting, at which the topic of whether to promote Anglin was raised. Falconer stated that Drust, who had been supervising Anglin for approximately three months, thought that "Anglin was doing well and that she might be on track for a promotion to Team Lead." McDonald stated that although Anglin was "meeting expectation," she was not "exceeding expectations" and had several developmental areas. In his affidavit, McDonald asserted:
I make the decisions regarding whether to promote an employee within my Department. I do not typically give consideration to the promotion of an employee unless he/she has received an overall performance evaluation grade of 4 which equates to "Performance Exceeding Expectations" (i.e., defined as "this employee consistently meets and frequently exceeds performance expectations while demonstrating a high level of proficiency in many of the competencies requires in his or her job"). (A grade of 5 is the highest grade and equates to "Performance Greatly Exceeding Expectations").
In McDonald's view, "based on [Anglin's] performance appraisals, several developmental areas and her fairly recent insubordinate treatment of her supervisors, Anglin was not ready for a promotion."
Anglin, however, disputed that McDonald was the decision maker. She claimed that Drust told her that Falconer would be the person to make the promotion decision. She alleged that Drust told her that Falconer said, without any justification, not to promote Anglin. Anglin further alleged that Drust said that he would speak directly to McDonald on Anglin's behalf if Falconer did not agree with the promotion.
On July 31, 2002, Anglin filed a charge against Falconer with the Human Resources Department (HR) claiming that Falconer had sexually harassed Anglin when he was supervising her. Annie Wong-Degnan (Degnan) met with Anglin on July 31, 2002, to discuss Anglin's claim of sexual harassment and retaliation.
After meeting with Anglin for three hours on August 22, 2002, Elaine LoCassio (LoCassio) began an investigation into Anglin's allegations. As a result of the investigation, LoCassio prepared an interoffice memorandum dated December 20, 2002, summarizing her investigation into Anglin's allegations. LoCassio first stated that Anglin claimed:
1. [T]hat beginning in or about February 2001 or March 2001, Ray Falconer, Manager of Investment Reporting, subjected her to unwelcome sexual advances;
2. [T]hat two of Falconer's direct reports, Rosemary Zeppetella and Marguerite Pilsbury, are having "affairs" with Falconer, as is Susan Conlin, another Prudential employee who does not work in Falconer's area;*fn3
3. [A]nd that because she refused to comply with Falconer's sexual advances:
a. Falconer gave negative feedback about her to a posting manager;
b. Falconer denied her a promotion;
c. Falconer took away one of her projects;
d. [A]nd Falconer gave her poor Mid Year Reviews and Performance Appraisals;
4. In addition, Anglin claimed that in or about June, 2002, she informed her Associate Manager, John Drust, that she believed Falconer denied her a promotion and "inhibited her career" because she refused to comply with his sexual advances.
5. Lastly, Anglin asserted that Drust has been retaliating against her by treating her poorly.
As part of the investigation, LoCassio conducted private interviews with over a dozen people. After an extensive, four-month investigation, LoCassio was unable to find any support for Anglin's allegations.
McDonald claimed that after Anglin filed her charge with HR, she acted "in an insubordinate manner toward her supervisors and was extremely difficult for Drust and Falconer to manage," including failing to respond to questions, picking up the telephone when Drust tried to speak with her, walking away from Drust when he was speaking with her, and refusing to accept the individual development plan that Drust and Falconer had prepared for her. McDonald contended that even after a series of warnings, Anglin's behavior got even worse. On March 14, 2003, Degnan, Falconer, Anglin, and McDonald met to discuss Anglin's behavior. At the meeting, the absenteeism-occurrences policy was explained to Anglin. Degnan stated that upon Anglin's next unexcused absence, Anglin would begin attendance counseling.
After the receipt of her mid-year review from Drust in mid-August 2003, Anglin did not report to work for the entire following week. As a result of her absences, Anglin received a "final warning" for attendance occurrences on August 18, 2003, and attended a counseling session with an HR representative, Barbara Briggs (Briggs), and Drust on August 27, 2003, at which time she refused to sign a mid-year review.
Prudential alleged that even after the counseling, Anglin arrived late on August 29, 2003, and September 8, 2003. Anglin, however, had no recollection of arriving late. Prudential further alleged that on September 10, 2003, Anglin again ignored Drust when he tried to speak with her. On the same day, Drust sent Anglin a meeting invitation for September 12, 2002, which was declined. After Anglin allegedly refused to speak to Drust, he advised Falconer and Briggs of "Anglin's continuing insubordinate conduct" and emailed them that "[Anglin] declined my request to meet. What should I do next? I am at a loss as she is not responding to me when I talk to her."
On September 11, 2003, around 8 a.m., Briggs spoke to Anglin while she was still at home. Prudential claimed that Briggs requested that they meet at 9:30 a.m. Anglin showed up at work at 9:00 a.m., but did not attend the meeting as requested. Briggs left her a voicemail at 9:50 a.m. and followed up with an email at 10:12 a.m. Anglin responded by email at 10:30 a.m. stating that she would not meet with Briggs.
McDonald stated that he discussed Anglin with Briggs and Chuck Crocco, a vice president of HR, who was involved in issues regarding Anglin over the years. Based on these discussions, McDonald decided to terminate Anglin's employment with Prudential. The HR representatives concurred with McDonald's decision. McDonald stated that the decision to fire Anglin was his and not Falconer's or Drust's. On September 11, 2003, Anglin was fired.
On September 3, 2004, Anglin filed her complaint in Essex County Law Division which consisted of nine counts:
(1) Sexual harassment - hostile work environment in violation of the Law Against Discrimination;
(2) Quid Pro Quo sexual harassment in violation of the Law Against Discrimination;
(3) Failure to promote was gender discrimination in violation of the Law Against Discrimination;
(4) Sex discrimination in wage payment in violation of N.J.S.A. 34:11-56.1 et seq.;
(5) Race discrimination in wage payment in violation of N.J.S.A. 34:11-56.1 et seq.;
(6) Terminating Sharon Anglin was a reprisal taken against her in violation of the Law Against Discrimination;
(7) Aiding and abetting;
(8) Intentional infliction of emotional distress; and
(9) Tortious interference with prospective economic gain.
Prudential filed its answer and affirmative defenses on December 10, 2004. Interrogatories were exchanged and both parties conducted depositions. Anglin deposed three Prudential employees: Falconer, Drust, and Zeppetella. Prudential deposed Anglin. It should be noted that Anglin did not depose McDonald, even though McDonald's role as a decision-maker should have been known to Anglin.
On March 10, 2006, the parties entered into a "consent stipulation voluntarily withdrawing plaintiff's claims for emotional distress" wherein they stipulated "that all claims for damages relating to emotional distress alleged in Plaintiff's Complaint in Counts One through Counts Nine, and Count Eight of Plaintiff's Complaint are dismissed with prejudice but without costs."
On September 22, 2006, Prudential filed a motion for summary judgment on counts one through seven and nine, which included a brief, a statement of material facts, and thirty-four exhibits. Among these exhibits were Prudential's anti-harassment and attendance policies, various emails, Anglin's performance reviews from before and after the alleged harassment, various memoranda, Drust's log of his interactions with Anglin, transcripts, and affidavits.
On October 17, 2006, Anglin filed opposition to the motion, which included a three-page letter brief, a counterstatement of material facts, and two exhibits. Although Anglin's counsel failed to cite any law, the brief provided a short summary of Anglin's argument that, in the spring and summer of 2001, Falconer made sexual advances to Anglin. Additionally, Anglin claimed that she was subject to "harassment and abuse which, given reasonably [sic] inferences favorable to my client, was either directed or influenced by Raymond Falconer."
Anglin mentioned four "milestone events" in opposition to the summary judgment motion. First, Anglin claimed that she was denied a promotion in 2002 because Falconer would not promote her. Second, Anglin argued that the investigation into the alleged sexual harassment took six months during which time her cubicle was still across the aisle from Falconer's. Third, Anglin alleged that Falconer thwarted her efforts to transfer out of the department. Fourth, Anglin claimed that her employment was terminated "based on fabricated claims of insubordination" by Falconer and Drust. Anglin claimed that since this "continued course of conduct" began in spring of 2001 and ran until Anglin was fired on September 11, 2003, which is both before and after the statute of limitations, "the courthouse doors should not be closed simply because some of the facts occurred prior to the statutory period."
On October 30, 2006, Prudential filed a reply brief and a response to Anglin's counterstatement of material facts. On November 3, 2006, Judge Donald Goldman heard the motion. Judge Goldman began by asking Prudential to address whether "there is not at least a retaliation claim" which he characterized as Prudential's "most difficult hurdle." Prudential's counsel argued, inter alia, that the chronology does not support a claim of retaliation and that Anglin's pattern of insubordination is well-documented. Anglin's counsel had nothing to add.
When questioned by the court, Anglin's counsel responded that he had no support to prove that McDonald was influenced by Falconer. Anglin's counsel then represented that discovery was complete and a trial date was set for December 11, 2006. Anglin's counsel conceded that they had no evidence to prove that McDonald acted in a retaliatory fashion. Without adopting the argument, the court then summarized Anglin's position:
THE COURT: And what I see your best case arguing is that, A, there is a valid retaliation claim which is not barred by statute of limitations because the lawsuit was filed a few days less than a year after the termination; that that retaliation claim piggybacks onto it. The harassment immediately preceding thereto that is also retaliatory and perhaps the argument is that that also piggybacks onto it the prior discrimination claims as a kind of a course of continuing conduct.*fn4 . . . .
MR. STERN: That's essentially what I'm saying, right.
THE COURT: I'm not saying I agree with it, but I think -- have I fairly articulated what your position is?
MR. STERN: I think that's a fair statement and just that I think --THE COURT: And my concern with it is that if the retaliation claim fails at the end, the rest of it falls down, too.
MR. STERN: At the end, yes. Retaliation claim to the extent that falls within the limitations period. It's within the good period, then --
THE COURT: And if there's no valid retaliation claim, the rest of it's untimely.
MR. STERN: Right. Or it may be -- the continuing course of conduct may be evidential of the retaliation within the period, although damages may be limited to those that happen within the period.
After the colloquy continued with both parties, Judge Goldman concluded that Anglin had failed to prove a prima facie case for several of her claims. The court found that "[t]he other claims, the quid pro quo, sexual harassment, the gender discrimination, and the failure to promote, the hostile work environment, harassment claims are all time-barred unless they can be bootstrapped in with a continuing violation claim." The continuing violation argument, in turn, relied on the validity of the retaliation claim.
Judge Goldman found no evidence that retaliation was "a determinative factor" in McDonald's decision. The judge also found no basis in fact for the assertion that there was some "under the table" influence upon McDonald that played a role in his firing of Anglin. The trial court then granted summary judgment in favor of Prudential. The order also dismissed the remaining counts with prejudice.
Anglin now appeals from that order requesting that it "be reversed and the matter remanded for a full trial." In her appeal, Anglin raises the following for the court's consideration:
We begin our consideration of this argument by restating applicable legal principles. According to Rule 4:46-2, summary judgment must be granted if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law." R. 4:46-2. Even though the allegations of the pleadings may raise an issue of fact, if the other papers show that, in fact, there is no real material issue, then summary judgment can be granted. Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co. of Westfield, 17 N.J. 67, 75 (1954). An opposing party who fails to "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial" cannot complain if the court takes as true the uncontradicted facts in the movant's papers. R. 4:46-5(a); Judson, supra, 17 N.J. at 75.
In consideration of a summary judgment motion, the trial court must not "weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter," it must only decide whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995). Furthermore, the trial judge must decide whether, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the evidence is "sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party." Ibid.
On appeal, the court uses the same standards. It decides first whether there was a genuine issue of material fact. The fact must be not just one "'of an insubstantial nature'; a non-movant will be unsuccessful 'merely by pointing to any fact in dispute.'" Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Boylan, 307 N.J. Super. 162, 167 (App. Div. 1998), certif. denied, 115 N.J. 59 (1989), (quoting Brill, 142 N.J. at 529-30). If there was not, the court then decides whether the lower court's ruling on the law was correct. Ibid. (citing Antheunisse v. Tiffany & Co., 229 N.J. Super. 399, 402 (App. Div. 1988)). We review the "trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts" de novo. Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm., 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995); Pressler, Current N.J. Court Rules, comment 3.1 on R. 2:10-2 (2008).
The trial court found, and Anglin's counsel conceded, that should the retaliation claim fail, Anglin's other counts under the New Jersey's Law Against Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -49, would be barred by the statute of limitations. A valid retaliation claim would give rise to a continuing course of conduct analysis that could rescue the LAD claims from being time-barred. We agree with Judge Goldman's analysis. Therefore, we must first address the retaliation claim, which is the keystone of Anglin's argument.
To establish a prima facie claim of retaliation under the LAD, an employee must establish: (1) the employee engaged in a protected activity known by the employer; (2) thereafter his or her employer unlawfully retaliated against him or her; and (3) the employee's participation in the protected activity caused the retaliation. Craig v. Suburban Cablevision, 140 N.J. 623, 629-30 (1995). See also Woods-Pirozzi v. Nabisco Foods, 290 N.J. Super. 252, 274 (App. Div. 1996); Romano v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 284 N.J. Super. 543, 548-49, (App. Div. 1995); Jamison v. Rockaway Twp. Bd. of Educ., 242 N.J. Super. 436, 445 (App. Div. 1990). If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden of production -- but not the burden of persuasion -- shifts back to the employer to articulate a legitimate reason for the decision. Woods-Pirozzi, supra, 290 N.J. Super. at 274. "Plaintiff must then show that a retaliatory intent, not the proffered reason, motivated defendant's actions. Plaintiff may do this either indirectly, by proving that the proffered reason is a pretext for the retaliation, or directly, by demonstrating that a retaliatory reason more likely than not motivated defendant's action."
Assuming that Anglin sufficiently alleged that she engaged in a protected activity known by Prudential, such as reporting sexual harassment, Prudential has produced voluminous evidence to support its assertion that there was, in fact, a legitimate reason for firing Anglin. We agree with Judge Goldman that there is no evidence in the record, nor has Anglin presented any evidence other than conclusory statements, that McDonald's rationale for firing Anglin was merely pretextual.
Again, Anglin complained that "the factual context of this case shows that only after [she] complained to Human Resources did she become 'persona non grata' and allegedly difficult to work with, i.e., 'not a team player.'" The evidence presented simply does not support this allegation. Anglin's job performance was documented as "failing to meet expectations" before any allegation or report of sexual harassment. Anglin has failed to present any proofs that a "retaliatory reason more likely than not motivated defendant's action." Woods-Pirozzi, supra, 290 N.J. Super. at 274. Simply put, Anglin has failed in her burden to sufficiently demonstrate retaliatory intent and that Prudential's proffered reason was a mere pretext.
Rule 4:46-5 requires more from a non-movant in a summary judgment proceeding than mere speculation and conclusory statements. "[A]n adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the pleading, but must respond by affidavits meeting the requirements of [Rule] 1:6-6 . . . setting forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." R. 4:46-5(a). Rule 1:6-6, in turn, requires that affidavits be "made on personal knowledge, setting forth only facts which are admissible in evidence to which the affiant is competent to testify . . . ." R. 1:6-6. Contrary to these rules, Anglin merely provided the court with her unsupported speculation that the firing decision was made by, or based upon information from, Falconer. Anglin had the opportunity during discovery to depose McDonald to substantiate her claims. She failed to do so. Lacking these proofs, her retaliation claim fails and, as there is no continuing course of conduct within the period allowable by the statute of limitations, all of the remaining LAD claims are time-barred.
We have carefully considered, in light of the record and the applicable law, each of Anglin's remaining contentions on appeal. We are satisfied that none of those contentions is of sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion, and we affirm. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
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"A therapist once said to me, "If you face the choice between feeling guilt and resentment, choose the guilt every time." It is wisdom I have passed on to many others since. If a refusal saddles you with guilt, while consent leaves resentment in its wake, opt for the guilt.
Resentment is soul suicide.
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One of the best ways to make money in this market is to try to get in ahead of catalysts. The market isn't stupid, but it doesn't really like to let these things run until a fairly short amount of time beforehand, especially since the "hot money" is busy chasing the nearest-term catalysts on the market. In this article, I would like to highlight a number of upcoming catalysts for shares of Nvidia (NASDAQ:NVDA) that could help confirm what seems to be the beginnings of a real uptrend. I'll review the technical picture so far, and then dig right into the catalysts. Let's begin!
The Chart: Looking Pretty, But Still Need A Final Cross
Here's a chart of Nvidia with the 50, 150, and 200-day moving averages included:
Life has gotten easier for Nvidia shareholders as the stock has managed to stay quite nicely above its 50 DMA for a number of trading sessions. Even better, the stock has now cleared its 150 DMA and 200 DMA values quite nicely, which helps to signal vastly improving technical health. I further like that the 150 DMA is actually above the 200 DMA (we want short-term moving averages to be above longer-term ones), but I would really like to see the 50 DMA cross above both the 150 DMA and the 200 DMA. At the rate things are going, this looks pretty plausible, especially as the 50 DMA works off the $13+ values baked in from the hype of a potential Amazon (NASDAQ:AMZN) Kindle Fire HD win.
So, the technical picture looks good, but the fireworks really start when/if the 50 DMA crosses the longer-term 150 DMA and 200 DMA.
Now, let's talk catalysts!
Catalyst #1: GPU Technology Conference (3/18 - 3/21)
Nvidia's "big" tech-geek event is the GPU Technology Conference. Nvidia is a technical company first and foremost, and GPU technology is the firm's baby. Every year at the GPU Technology Conference, investors and GPU enthusiasts alike are treated to an exhibition of Nvidia's latest and greatest tech. While hearing about GPUs is fine and dandy (and I'll be honest -- my inner geek probably cares more about the tech than the stock during these types of events), the real gem for investors is that CEO Jen Hsun Huang will be addressing the financial community in a special session. This could generate some buzz/positive momentum, especially as investors may get a clearer picture of how GeForce GRID is expected to contribute to the business.
Catalyst #2: Analyst Day (4/11)
The more important event for the stock/financial community is the upcoming Analyst Day on 4/11. Tech stocks are usually quite influenced by what is said at analyst day. Things to look for:
- Full year guidance for the "Tegra" business
- Update on the recovery in the workstation "Quadro" business
- Growth projections for the HPC "Tesla" business.
- Full year gross margin guidance
- The health/market share of consumer GPU business, especially as AMD (NYSE:AMD) has gotten more aggressive in recent months
- Full year revenue/earnings guidance
Right now, the average analyst expectation for the business is as follows:
- EPS: $0.71 (down 21% Y/Y)
- Revenue: $4.25B (down 0.6% Y/Y)
Essentially, you have the Street believing that earnings are going to drop dramatically and revenue will be flat at best. This seems incredibly pessimistic, so any guidance that shatters this view could lead to quite violent and dramatic upside for the stock.
The Nvidia story is getting more exciting each day. Nvidia showed off a working version of its "Grey" (baseband + apps processor on a single die), which will allow it access to the larger volume smartphone markets. Further, Tegra 4 should start hitting the shelves in 2Q 2013, which could also shatter some of the more pessimistic estimates that the Street currently has. Finally, the GPU/Workstation business could be on track to grow at a much pronounced rate than is expected.
The technical picture is looking better, and management is less about "hype" and more about "execution" than has traditionally been the case, which could signal a real shift in how Wall Street treats the stock. Only time will tell, but for those of you who like catalysts, I just gave you two pretty nice near-term plays.
Disclosure: I am long NVDA, AMD. I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it (other than from Seeking Alpha). I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article.


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transactional/order processing interface – which makes reselling a
popular start-up entrepreneurial opportunity for home-based businesses.
The resale business model is almost limitless in its scope and
opportunity, some businesses focus exclusively on resale as their main
source of income. Others choose to supplement their existing product and
revenue streams with resale goods (either by becoming an affiliate or
channel partner of the manufacturer – a common approach for small
technology businesses.
There are many channels for reselling goods. Some entrepreneurs
resell goods through eBay or via their own Web sites. Others sell
through their stores, or direct through B2B or B2C sales channels. Some
even buy from eBay and resell through another channel.
While it's somewhat of a misconception to suggest that becoming a
reseller requires little up front risk-taking, training or skill,
becoming a reseller does offer entrepreneurs a great way to get into
If you are interested in becoming a reseller, here are a few
things to understand about how the reseller industry works together with
some pointers for finding, assessing and securing the right reseller
opportunity for you.
- Finding the Right Fit
Finding the right fit means starts with finding the right product(s)
or service to resell. This doesn't mean you have to be a product expert,
but you do need to be able to feel and demonstrate the motivation and
emotional investment needed to make your resale business a success.
To assess the potential success of your chosen product, you will also
need to research and understand the market landscape (demand,
competition, price points, etc.) – something your supplier or affiliate
will hope to see you demonstrate too.
This Market Research Guide from
Business.gov is specifically geared towards small business owners and
walks you through each stage of conducting market research. It also
includes links to free market and demographic data.
- Finding the Right Opportunity
If you are looking to supplement your existing products and services
with a resale relationship – for example, you specialize in computer
repair services, but want to expand your offerings to include computer
hardware and peripherals – you might want to consider a resale
opportunity with a known brand manufacturer.
On the other hand, if you are a start-up and are interested in
becoming an Internet reseller, you may need to dig a little deeper. Read "Step One to Becoming an Internet
Reseller: Choosing the Right Product" in which StartUpPrincess.com
expert, Erika Wilde offers tips for not only finding the right product
to sell but also how to find and approach the source of that product,
whether it's a manufacturer or Internet wholesaler.
- Avoid Scams
Be mindful of business opportunity scams – many of which prey on
home-based business owners with enticing work-at-home schemes. The
government keeps a keen eye on much of this activity and through
Business.gov offers advice about evaluating business opportunities, looking out for
scams, as well as how to report scams.
- Have a Business Plan
As you start to research reseller business opportunities, start to
think about formalizing your ambition with a business plan. Writing a business plan not only makes you think long
and hard about the market opportunity, it will also help you build a
clear view of your goals, and most importantly how you are going to
reach them. It will show potential affiliates, wholesalers and lending
institutions that you are serious about your venture.
- The Application Process
Most reseller opportunities start with an online application. Be
prepared to submit information about your business profile including
your company size, years in business, number of employees, region of
service coverage, selling channels, Web presence, online merchant tools,
and so on.
From here the manufacturer will determine whether they believe you
are a good fit for their program.
- Understand the Compensation Model
Resellers are typically compensated by either a "buy rate "or a "percentage" model.


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July 24, 2008
MARK KERIK PLAINTIFF,v.MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, DEFENDANT.
Judge Nora Barry Fischer
Plaintiff Mark Kerik ("Plaintiff") brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking review of the final determination of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner") denying Plaintiff's application for Social Security Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") under Title II of the Social Security Act ("Act"). The parties have filed cross motions for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, and the record has been developed at the administrative level.
Plaintiff filed his application for Social Security Disability on December 28, 2005, alleging disability as of November 20, 2005. (R. at 98). On March 27, 2007, a hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") in Morgantown, West Virginia. (R. at 266). Plaintiff, who appeared with counsel, testified at the hearing. (R. at 266). James Ganoe, a Vocational Expert ("VE"), also testified. Id. On April 11, 2007, the ALJ issued a decision in which he determined that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. (R. at 7). The Appeals Council subsequently denied the Plaintiff's request for review, thereby making the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner in this case. (R. at 4-7). Plaintiff now seeks review of that decision by this Court.
This Court's review is limited to determining whether the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Adorno v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 43, 46 (3d Cir. 1994). The Court may not undertake a de novo review of the Commissioner's decision or re-weigh the evidence of record. Monsour Medical Center v. Heckler, 806 F.2d 1185, 1190 (3d Cir. 1986). Congress has clearly expressed its intention that "[t]he findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive[.]" 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence "does not mean a large or considerable amount of evidence, but rather such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988). As long as the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, it cannot be set aside even if this Court "would have decided the factual inquiry differently." Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999). "Overall, the substantial evidence standard is a deferential standard of review." Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 503 (3d Cir. 2004).
In order to establish a disability under the Act, a claimant must demonstrate a "medically determinable basis for an impairment that prevents [her] from engaging in any 'substantial gainful activity' for a statutory twelve-month period." Stunkard v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 841 F.2d 57, 59 (3d Cir. 1988); 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1). A claimant is considered to be unable to engage in substantial gainful activity "only if [her] physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that [she] is not only unable to do [her] previous work but cannot, considering [her] age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).
To support his ultimate findings, an ALJ must do more than simply state factual conclusions. Baerga v. Richardson, 500 F.2d 309, 312-13 (3d. Cir 1974). He must make specific findings of fact. Stewart v. Secretary of HEW, 714 F.2d 287, 290 (3d Cir. 1983). The ALJ must consider all medical evidence contained in the record and provide adequate explanations for disregarding or rejecting evidence. Weir on Behalf of Weir v. Heckler, 734 F.2d 955, 961 (3d Cir. 1984); Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 705 (3d Cir. 1981).
The Social Security Administration ("SSA"), acting pursuant to its rule making authority under 42 U.S.C. § 405(a), has promulgated a five-step sequential evaluation process for the purpose of determining whether a claimant is "disabled" within the meaning of the Act. The United States Supreme Court summarized this process as follows:
If at any step a finding of disability or non-disability can be made, the SSA will not review the claim further. At the first step, the agency will find non-disability unless the claimant shows that he is not working at a "substantial gainful activity." [20 C.F.R.] §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). At step two, the SSA will find non-disability unless the claimant shows that he has a "severe impairment," defined as "any impairment or combination of impairments which significantly limits [the claimant's] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities." [20 C.F.R.] §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). At step three, the agency determines whether the impairment which enabled the claimant to survive step two is on the list of impairments presumed severe enough to render one disabled; if so, the claimant qualifies. [20 C.F.R.] §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). If the claimant's impairment is not on the list, the inquiry proceeds to step four, at which the SSA assesses whether the claimant can do his previous work; unless he shows that he cannot, he is determined not to be disabled. If the claimant survives the fourth stage, the fifth, and final, step requires the SSA to consider so-called "vocational factors" (the claimant's age, education, and past work experience), and to determine whether the claimant is capable of performing other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy. [20 C.F.R.] §§ 404.1520(f), 404.1560(c), 416.920(f), 416.960(c).
Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 24-25 (2003)(footnotes omitted).
If it is shown that the claimant is unable to resume previous employment, the burden shifts to the Commissioner (Step 5) to prove that, given plaintiff's mental or physical limitations, age, education and work experience, he or she is able to perform substantial gainful activity in jobs available in the national economy. Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 461 (1983); Kangas v. Bowen, 823 F.2d 775, 777 (3d Cir. 1987); Doak v. Heckler, 790 F.2d 26, 28 (3d Cir. 1986).
A. General Background
Plaintiff was born on July 20, 1957. (R. at 44). At the time of his hearing before the ALJ, Plaintiff was 6 months shy of his fiftieth birthday. (R. at 293). For decisional purposes, Plaintiff was considered a "younger individual" under 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1563, 416.963. (R. at 23). Plaintiff has a twelfth-grade education. (R. at 23). Plaintiff is married and has three children. (R. at 50). Plaintiff smokes one pack of cigarettes per day and drinks socially. (R. at 174, 278). Plaintiff's prior work history includes stints as a van driver, supply man/motorman, foreman, and laborer/coal miner. (R. at 80). He last worked as a laborer/coal miner before being laid off on November 20, 2005. (R. at 98). Plaintiff claims November 20, 2005 as the onset date of the disability which renders him unable to work. (R. at 98). Plaintiff received unemployment benefits for a period ending November 30, 2006.
(R. at 74).
B. Medical Background
Plaintiff applied for DIB on December 28, 2005, after being laid off from his employment as a coal miner/laborer on November 20, 2005. (R. at 14, 48). Plaintiff contends he was laid off due to vascular problems which prevented him from keeping up with the work pace. (R. at 19). Plaintiff testified that his vascular problems began on November 20, 2005. (R. at 49). He alleges he became unable to work due to his disability on the same date. (R. at 49). Plaintiff sleeps on the first floor, claims that on a usual day, he will have leg, foot, buttocks, and back pain, and that his wife has to help him in the shower. (R. at 90).
Plaintiff was diagnosed with peripheral vascular occlusive disease and underwent a successful distal femoral to tibial bypass grafting on December 12, 2005.*fn1 (R. at 232). Gene Manzetti, the operating surgeon, noted on February 20, 2006 that Plaintiff was showing a "marked improvement" and there was no need for follow-up for six months. (R. at 231). At Plaintiff's follow-up appointment in August of 2006, Dr. Manzetti noted that Plaintiff's vital signs were stable, there were audible pulses in both feet, and there was no evidence of ischemic ulceration*fn2 . (R. at 230).
On February 17, 2005, Plaintiff began treatment with Dr. Arnold S. Broudy for a right middle finger injury. (R. at 160). The finger was smashed in November 2004 as a result of a work-related incident. Id. Plaintiff never fully lost the use of said digit. (R. at 147). Dr. Broudy declared the wound completely healed on June 2, 2005. (R. at 150). On July 14, 2005, Dr. Broudy examined Plaintiff and found that Plaintiff's finger wound was well healed, and that Plaintiff had reached a plateau with regard to his recovery. (R. at 148). Plaintiff returned to work shortly thereafter. Id.
Plaintiff began seeing Dr. John Martin as his primary care physician on January 23, 2006. (R. at 204). At that time, Dr. Martin found Plaintiff's lungs clear, cardiac rhythm regular, and generally, no acute distress. Id. Dr. Martin also found Plaintiff to have hypertension and hyperlipidemia.*fn3 Id. At a March 30, 2006 follow-up with Dr. Martin, Plaintiff had some symptoms of vascular problems, though the hypertension and hyperlipidemia were under control. (R. at 201). Dr. Martin found Plaintiff's left leg vascularly insufficient on September 22, 2006. (R. at 199). At this time, Plaintiff complained of pain in his elbow which Dr. Martin noted could be osteoarthritis pain. Id. Subsequent tests on the elbow revealed no abnormalities. (R. at 22). Dr. Martin noted the issues of hypertension, hyperlipidemia, and vascular disease on November 20, 2006. (R. at 196). Additionally, Drs. Manzetti and Martin repeatedly warned Plaintiff to quit smoking. (R. at 199, 230).
In June 2006, Plaintiff began treating with Dr. R.K. Mehta, a psychiatrist, for depression resulting from his surgery. (R. at 248). Dr. Mehta diagnosed Plaintiff with a single moderate case of major depression and prescribed medications. Id. On July 27, 2006, Dr. Mehta examined Plaintiff and reviewed his chart. (R. at 249). Dr. Mehta noted that Plaintiff was "not too bad" and that he had gangrene in his left foot which was expected to be gone within one year of his surgery (i.e. December, 2006). Id. Dr. Mehta saw Plaintiff on August 16, 2006, noting that while the gangrene was improving, Plaintiff now complained of a backache. (R. at 250). Plaintiff was anxious, preoccupied, and having hallucinations according to his initial Mental Status Exam. Id. However, Dr. Mehta found that Plaintiff's memory was intact, he had fair concentration, was organized and alert, and appeared to be in good hygiene. Id. There were no changes in Plaintiff's subsequent Mental Status Exams conducted on October 11, 2006, December 6, 2006, and March 21, 2007. (R. at 252, 254, 256).
C. Plaintiff's Hearing
Plaintiff's application for disability benefits was denied on May 24, 2006 and a hearing request was completed on June 5, 2006. (R. at 21).
A hearing was scheduled for March 27, 2007. (R. at 44). At the hearing, the ALJ found the following: that Plaintiff had met the period of disability required by § 216(I) of the Social Security Act; Plaintiff had not engaged in any substantial gainful activity during the period at issue; Plaintiff has had severe medically determinable impairments for at least twelve consecutive months including popliteal-tibeal and foot arch occlusive vascular disease, post December 2005 left femoral-tibial bypass grafting, history of pre-gangrenous changes to the first, second, and third left toes and dry gangrenous changes to the left great toe, mild residual effects of a post November 2004 right middle finger crush injury and subsequent infection, history of nicotine addiction/abuse, history of hypertension which has been controlled, and a single moderate episode of a major depressive disorder. (R. at 18)
At the March 27, 2007 hearing, the VE testified. (R. at 292). The ALJ proceeded to describe a hypothetical person and ask what work that person could perform. (R. at 294, 295). The ALJ described someone of Plaintiff's age and educational background who could perform light work with further limitations that he could lift no more than twenty pounds; would need to alternate between sitting and standing at ten minutes every hour; could not climb any ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; could not crawl or kneel; and could not be exposed to hazards such as moving plant machinery or unprotected heights. (R. at 294). The VE testified that this person could not return to the work that Plaintiff performed in the past. Id. However, the VE identified that the hypothetical person could do the job of a mail clerk or garment sorter under the light exertional level,*fn4 though he reduced the number of those jobs available in the national economy in half due to the hypothetical person's need to alternate between sitting and standing. (R. at 295).
At the sedentary level,*fn5 the VE testified that the hypothetical person could perform the work of a garment sorter and a bench worker. (R. at 296). According to the VE, these jobs exist in significant numbers in the national economy. Id. Finally, the ALJ asked the VE if, assuming the truth of all facets of Plaintiff's testimony, including no ability to do any exertional work and no ability to concentrate or maintain attention to conduct any unskilled type of job, there would be any jobs that he could identify for the hypothetical person to engage in. (R. at 296). The VE testified there were no identifiable jobs under that scenario. Id.
The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff's medically determinable impairments do not meet the requirements for receipt of DIB and that Plaintiff retained the ability to engage in some unskilled work activity which requires no more than light exertion and affords the ability to alternate between sitting and standing. (R. at 18). The ALJ found insufficient medical evidence to show Plaintiff was precluded from the performance of any limited range work activity for any consecutive 12-month period. (R. at 23). The ALJ also concluded that Plaintiff's complaints of pain and depression appear calculated toward gaining a compensable disability claim, and therefore Plaintiff is not fully credible or reliable. (R. at 20, 23).
At the hearing before the ALJ, Plaintiff's counsel requested that the record be held open for a week because there may have been a form from Dr. Mehta which he did not receive. (R. at 298). The ALJ agreed, representing to Plaintiff's counsel that he would have at least a week to add any evidence to the record. (R. at 299). The ALJ said that if he did not receive anything, he would then issue his written decision. (R. at 299).
Plaintiff's reply brief to Defendant Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner of Social Security ("Defendant"), contains an attachment of a fax cover sheet dated March 29, 2007 to the attention of ALJ George Mills at the SSA and the form completed by Dr. Mehta, dated January 31, 2007 diagnosing Plaintiff as permanently disabled (Docket No.13 at 4-5, R. at 265). Further, Plaintiff's counsel, Gregory T. Kunkle testified in an affidavit that he sent the completed form of Dr. Mehta to the ALJ via facsimile and by mail, both dated March 29, 2007--two days after the hearing. (Docket No.13, at 2, 3). The ALJ never mentions the form in his decision promulgated on April 11, 2007. (R. at 12-23). The Appeals Council subsequently made Dr. Mehta's form part of the record on November 17, 2007, though it denied Plaintiff's request for review of the ALJ's decision. (R. at 7, 10).
Employing the five-step sequential evaluation for analyzing disability claims as set forth in Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 24-25 (2003), the ALJ determined at step one that Plaintiff had not engaged in any substantially gainful activity since his alleged disability onset date. (R. at 17). At step two, the ALJ found Plaintiff to be suffering from the following "severe" impairments within the meaning of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c): politieal-tibial and foot arch occlusive vascular disease; history of pre-gangrenous changes to the first, second, and third left toes and dry gangrenous changes to the left great toe; right middle finger injury and subsequent infection; history of nicotine addiction; hypertension; and a single, moderate episode of a major depressive disorder. (R. at 17). At step three, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff's impairments, although "severe", were insufficient to meet or medically equal the severity for any impairment enumerated in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (R. at 17). More specifically with regard to mental status, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not exhibit any debilitating combination of psychological symptoms sufficient to meet or equal the 12.04C criteria or the severity requirements of any other 12.00 Mental Disorders series listing for any consecutive twelve-month period. (R. at 18). Moving to step four, the ALJ made the following residual functional capacity ("RFC") assessment:*fn6
[t]he claimant has had the residual functional capacity to perform a range of unskilled work activity that: requires no more than a "light" level of physical exertion; affords hourly the option to alternate between sitting and standing for a period of at least ten minutes; requires no crawling or kneeling, or climbing of ladders, ropes or scaffolds; entails no exposure to hazards (e.g. dangerous moving machinery, unprotected heights); and involves only simple, one-totwo-step instructions, processes and tasks.
(R. at 18). Given this assessment, it was determined that Plaintiff could not return to past relevant work as it was a "highly physical job" and he was limited to no more than simple, unskilled work activity. (R. at 19, 22). After considering Plaintiff's age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, it was determined that a significant number of light exertional and sedentary jobs exist in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform. (R. at 24). Consequently, at step five, and after considering the above findings, Plaintiff was found not "disabled" under §§ 216(I) and 223(d) of the Social Security Act. (R. at 25).
The ALJ also found that Plaintiff's application for disability benefits "[w]ould appear clearly motivated more by immediate financial concerns than any actual...impairment-related inability to perform any and all forms of work activity for 12 consecutive months." (R. at 19). While admitting Plaintiff has impairments, the ALJ found the Plaintiff's statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of his symptoms to be not entirely credible. (R. at 19).
Plaintiff raises the following arguments in support of his motion for summary judgment: (1) the ALJ erred as a matter of law in failing to accord great weight to the Plaintiff's complaints of pain; (2) the ALJ's credibility assessments are not supported by substantial evidence; (3) the ALJ erred in failing to consider and accord controlling weight to the opinion of Dr. Mehta; and (4) the ALJ failed to accurately portray Plaintiff's limitations in the question posed to the VE (Docket No. 8). Plaintiff requests that the decision of the ALJ be remanded for further consideration or reversed. (Docket No. 8, at 15). The Court will address each of the Plaintiff's arguments in turn.
A. Subjective Complaints of Pain Issue
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in failing to accord great weight to Plaintiff's testimony concerning the intensity, persistence, and effects of his impairment on his ability to work.*fn7 (Docket No. 8, at 5). At the hearing held on March 27, 2007, Plaintiff testified that he suffered from the following: (1) arthritis in his back for which he was taking medication (R. at 281); (2) pain in his leg which he described as being similar to a "toothache" (R. at 282); (3) toe pain from gangrene which still "bothers" him sometimes and for which he walks with a cane (R. at 282); (4) burning in his feet "like if they're on fire." (R. at 284); (5) limited ability to bend at the waist (R. at 284); (6) some difficulty with memory (R. at 285); (7) difficulty walking up and down stairs (R. at 291); (8) numbness in the tip of the right middle finger (R. at 291); and (9) pain in the legs when sitting for more than an hour. (R. at 292).
Subjective complaints of pain need not be fully confirmed by the objective medical evidence to be afforded significant weight. Smith v. Califano, 637 F.2d 968, 972 (3d Cir. 1981). While "there must be objective medical evidence of some condition that could reasonably produce pain, there need not be objective evidence of the pain itself." Green v. Schweiker, 749 F.2d 1066, 1070-71 (3d Cir. 1984). Where a claimant's testimony as to pain is reasonably supported by medical evidence, neither the Commissioner nor the ALJ may discount a claimant's pain without contrary medical evidence. Ferguson v. Schweiker, 765 F.2d 31, 37 (3d Cir. 1985); Chrupcala v. Heckler, 829 F.2d 1269, 1275- 76 (3d Cir. 1987); Akers v. Callahan, 997 F.Supp 648, 658 (W.D. Pa. 1998). Once a claimant has submitted sufficient evidence to support his or her claim of disability, the Appeal's Council may not base its decision upon mere disbelief of the claimant's evidence. Instead, the Secretary must present evidence to refute the claim. Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178, 1184-85 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied 507 U.S. 924 (1993) (citing Smith v. Califano, 637 F.2d 968, 972 (3d Cir. 1981) (where claimant's testimony is reasonably supported by medical evidence, the finder of fact may not discount the testimony without contrary medical evidence)).
In the instant case, the ALJ found the Plaintiff to be suffering from the following "severe" impairments within the meaning of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c):*fn8 Popliteal-tibeal and foot arch occlusive vascular disease, post-December 2005 left femoral-tibial bypass grafting, history of pre-gangrenous changes to the first, second, and third left toes and dry gangrenous changes to the left great toe, mild residual effects of a post November 2004 right middle finger crush injury and subsequent infection, history of nicotine addiction/abuse, history of hypertension which has been controlled, and "a single moderate episode of a major depressive disorder." (R. at 18).
Plaintiff relies on Green v. Schweiker for the proposition that a claimant need only submit evidence of some condition which may cause the pain complained of, not evidence confirming the pain itself. 749 F.2d 1066, 1071 (3d Cir. 1984). However, Green also reinforces that standard that "subjective complaints of pain, without more, do not in themselves constitute disability." Id. at 1070. Plaintiff's reliance is misplaced as the ALJ clearly accorded weight to Plaintiff's complaints and considered them in rendering his decision. For example, after fully considering the record, the ALJ found that Plaintiff's impairments could be expected to produce the symptoms alleged (R. at 19). Moreover, in presenting the hypothetical questions to the VE, the ALJ accounted for many of the Plaintiff's symptoms. (R. at 293). The ALJ limited his hypothetical person to lifting a maximum of twenty pounds on occasion and ten pounds frequently, no climbing, crawling, or kneeling, and took into account the need to alternate between sitting and standing. (R. at 293). The ALJ did not discount such medical evidence, though he did find that the Plaintiff himself was not entirely credible and the evidence did not show that Plaintiff was precluded from all forms of work.*fn9 Therefore, the Court finds that the ALJ gave sufficient weight to Plaintiff's complaints of pain, though the complaints were balanced with the ALJ's credibility determinations and finding that Plaintiff's complaints are not equivalent to a statutory disability.
B. Credibility Issue
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to properly assess his credibility and thus the ALJ's credibility determination is not supported by substantial evidence. (Docket No. 8, at 8). Plaintiff also makes the following arguments which all challenge the ALJ's credibility determination: Plaintiff's receipt of unemployment benefits is not relevant to his credibility, the date Plaintiff filed for benefits is not probative of credibility, Plaintiff's work history does not undermine his credibility, and Plaintiff's smoking and occasional use of alcohol is irrelevant. (Docket No. 8, at 9-12). Since these arguments all go to the credibility issue, the Court will address them all here.
An ALJ's credibility determinations must be taken as conclusive when supported by "substantial evidence." Van Horn v. Schweiker, 717 F.2d 871, 873 (3d Cir. 1983). Further, a credibility determination made by the ALJ is entitled to great deference by the district court. Refer v. Barnhart, 326 F.3d 376, 380 (3d Cir. 2003). Inconsistencies in a claimant's testimony or daily activities permit an ALJ to conclude that some or all of the claimant's testimony about her limitations or symptoms is less than fully credible. Salles v. Commissioner of Social Sec., 229 Fed.Appx 140, 146 (3d Cir. 2007). Even limitations which are supported by medical evidence but also contradicted by other record evidence may or may not be found credible--the ALJ may choose to credit portions of the existing evidence. Id. (quoting Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 554 (3d Cir. 2005)). It is also clear that under the applicable regulations, a plaintiff's daily activities are a valid factor to be considered by the ALJ when conducting an inquiry as to the reliability of the claimant's subjective complaints. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3), 416.929(c)(3). Still, the ALJ's credibility determination must "contain specific reasons for the finding on credibility, supported by the evidence in the case record, and must be sufficiently specific to make clear to the individual and to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the individual's statements and the reasons for that weight." SSR 96-7p at *2 (1996); See also Lang v. Barnhart, No. Civ. A. 05-1497, 2006 WL 3858579, at *10 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 6, 2006). Where a claimant's testimony is reasonably supported by medical evidence, the finder of fact may not discount the testimony without contrary medical evidence. Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.3d 1178, 1184-85 (3d Cir. 1992).
In the instant case, the ALJ found that though the Plaintiff's impairments could reasonably be expected to produce some of the alleged symptoms, his statement concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of his impairment-related symptoms were not entirely credible.
(R. at 19). For example, the ALJ noted that when Plaintiff applied for disability in December of 2005, he neither complained of depression nor listed any prior medical treatment for any mental illness or psychological disorder. (R. at 20). However, only after the denial of Plaintiff's application for disability benefits on May 24, 2006 did he begin seeking mental health services. (R. at 20).
The ALJ also noted that as of June, 2006, Plaintiff had shown significant use of addictive narcotic pain medications from at least February of 2005. (R. at 20). Due to Plaintiff's long-term use of pain medication, the ALJ concluded that it is reasonable to believe that one with such a dependency is less likely to report a decrease in symptoms which warranted the medication in the first place, even if the symptoms did in fact subside. (R. at 20). In addition, the ALJ concluded that the use of said pain medication, in conjunction with Plaintiff's use of alcohol and cigarettes do not seem compatible with a desire to improve health. (R. at 20). The record indicates numerous warnings of physicians to get Plaintiff to stop smoking. (R. at 199, 230).
Moreover, the Plaintiff testified that he could no longer hunt or fish. (R. at 23). Yet later, he admitted to having gone hunting twice and fishing three times during the alleged disability period.
(R. at 23). Plaintiff testified that he is able to go to the grocery store, where he walks, and attend monthly meetings of the hunting and fishing club. (R. at 288, 289). The record also shows that as of May 9, 2006, Plaintiff was not engaged in physical therapy for any injury despite having attended in the past. (R. at 114). As already mentioned, under 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3), 416.929(c)(3), a plaintiff's daily activities are a valid factor to be considered by the ALJ when conducting an inquiry as to the reliability of the of the claimant's subjective complaints. The ALJ concluded that these activities evidence a significant degree of functionality, such that the Plaintiff can perform certain kinds of work. (R. at 23). Further, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff's smoking and alcohol use showed that Plaintiff was not committed to getting well. (R. at 20). These findings based on Plaintiff's daily or regular activities are within the ALJ's discretion and bolster his credibility determination.
Next, the ALJ found that Plaintiff's historical employment record contains a number of unexplained gaps and that Plaintiff's receipt of unemployment benefits tends to undermine his desire to return to work. (R. at 20, 21). The ALJ found that Plaintiff committed to the disability process one-month after being laid off, indicating his inability to work, and then six-months later drew unemployment compensation,*fn10 which requires a willingness to work. (R. at 19). The ALJ is entitled to point out the inconsistency between the receipt of unemployment benefits and an application for disability as it adversely affects his credibility. See Jernigan v. Sullivan, 948 F.2d 1070, 1074 (8th Cir. 1991); Johnson v. Chater, 108 F.3d 178, 180 (8th Cir. 1997) ("the Commissioner's decision to deny Johnson disability benefits is bolstered by the fact that Johnson received unemployment compensation during the time she claimed to be disabled."). Further, the gaps in Plaintiff's employment history (i.e., 1983-1985, 1992-1993 and 1995-1996) in combination with the receipt of unemployment benefits led the ALJ to conclude that Plaintiff was committed to not returning to work. (R. at 21). The ALJ's citation of specific evidence in support of his finding bolsters his credibility determination and meets the requirement of substantial evidence.
Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ's finding that the claimant's employment ended due to a layoff, not due to any impairment-related inability is not probative of Plaintiff's credibility. While it is true that Plaintiff applied for disability benefits on December 28, 2005 after being diagnosed with and undergoing surgery for peripheral vascular occlusive disease, Dr. Manzetti never claimed that Plaintiff was permanently disabled.*fn11 In fact, the record reveals that shortly after the surgery, Dr. Manzetti found that Plaintiff's vital signs were stable, there were audible pulses in both feet, and there was no evidence of ischemic ulceration. (R. at 230). The ALJ acknowledged that Plaintiff has legitimate health problems but found it unlikely that a "compensable disability" arose on the same day that he was laid-off. (R. at 19, 20). In support of this finding the ALJ noted that until this point, Plaintiff had performed a job which included standing/walking for eight hours, climbing for four hours, crawling for one hour, carrying eighty pounds up ladders frequently, and supervising five other persons. (R. at 19, 20). Though the ALJ credited Plaintiff's testimony that he was laid off for being unable to do the work, he cited sufficient and specific evidence to justify his determination and make clear to Plaintiff the weight given to that testimony and the reasons for attributing such weight. (R. at 19). See SSR 96-7p (1996).
The ALJ's explanation of his credibility determination provides substantial analysis as to why he found Plaintiff not fully credible. After reviewing the ALJ's analysis, the Court finds that the ALJ did not err in his credibility determination as said determination is supported by substantial evidence.
C. Consideration of Dr. Mehta's Permanent Disability Opinion
Plaintiff argues that the check-box disability form filled out by Dr. Mehta should have been submitted into evidence and considered by the ALJ in rendering his decision because Dr. Mehta was a treating physician. (Docket No. 13, at 1). Plaintiff contends that because the ALJ agreed to keep the record open for Plaintiff to submit the disability form from Dr. Mehta, it should have been considered.*fn12 (Docket No. 8, at 13).
A treating physician's opinion is entitled to significant weight. Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 317 (3d Cir. 2000). However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that check-box form reports, such as the report at issue here, are weak evidence, with their reliability suspect where unaccompanied by "thorough written reports." Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1065 (3d Cir. 1993). A medical opinion is not entitled to controlling weight where it is not "well supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques" or is "inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in the case record." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2). Though an ALJ may not reject pertinent or probative evidence without explanation, she may overlook evidence that is neither "pertinent, relevant, or probative." Johnson v. Commissioner of Social Security, 529 F.3d 198, 204 (3d Cir. 2008).
In Johnson, Plaintiff, who sought judicial review of order affirming denial of disability benefits after being diagnosed with thoracic outlet syndrome of her right shoulder, argued that the ALJ overlooked the opinions of several of her treating physicians which supported a finding that she was disabled. Id. at 199. Of particular relevance, Plaintiff argued that an ALJ cannot reject evidence without reason. Id. at 203. She asserted that it is the ALJ's duty to explain why evidence was accepted or rejected. Id. In addressing this argument, the Court found that the Plaintiff had selectively quoted from Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 705 (3d Cir. 1981), ignoring the fact that Cotter stands for the proposition that all pertinent evidence must be credited. Id. The Court found that "[o]verwhelming evidence in the record discounted [the evidence in question's] probative value, rendering it irrelevant." Id. at 204. The failure to cite the evidence meant the ALJ implicitly rejected it. Id. at 205.
A district court may remand a determination of the ALJ when the claimant seeks to rely on evidence that was not before the ALJ. Matthews v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 589, 592 (3d Cir. 2001). In order to do so, however, the evidence must be new and material, and it must be demonstrated that there was good cause for why the evidence was not previously presented to the ALJ. Id. at 593. A failure to show good cause for why the evidence was not submitted to the ALJ earlier will result in the evidence not being considered. Id. at 596.
In the instant case, the record shows that the ALJ permitted Plaintiff to submit additional evidence at the March 27, 2007 hearing. (R. at 296-297). The ALJ stated that Plaintiff's counsel would have at least a week to submit the record of Dr. Mehta, but if nothing were received, the ALJ stated he would simply issue a written decision. (R. at 298, 299). Dr. Mehta checked the "permanently disabled" box indicating a primary diagnosis of "major depression moderate single." (R. at 265). The form indicated that the diagnosis was based on "clinical history." (R. at 265). The ALJ does not cite the opinion of Dr. Mehta in denying Plaintiff's disability application. (R. at 12-25). In addition, the Appeals Council made the form and a letter from Plaintiff's counsel dated June 8, 2007 part of the record on November 17, 2007. (R. at 10). Nonetheless, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review of the ALJ's decision.*fn13 (R. at 7).
Aside from a fax cover sheet, there is no evidence presented by Plaintiff to show the form was received by the ALJ before rendering his decision. (Docket No. 8-2, at 1). Moreover, Plaintiff makes no attempt to address why the evidence was not made part of the record before his hearing except to say that he may not have received it. (R. at 296-297). Even so, in line with Third Circuit precedent, the Court finds that the disability form on which Dr. Mehta opines that Plaintiff is "permanently disabled" is weak evidence and not supported by the rest of the record. See Mason, 994 F.2d at 1065. Moreover, there is no supporting documentation to substantiate Dr. Mehta's opinion. Essentially, the form constitutes a mere assertion of permanent disability. As weak evidence with suspect reliability due to a glaring lack of supporting documentation, the Court does not find Dr. Mehta's opinion to be probative of the ALJ's determination. See Johnson, 529 F.3d at 204. For example, the record shows that on March 21, 2007, Dr. Mehta noted the Plaintiff was "doing ok" despite the fact that he labeled the Plaintiff "permanently disabled" on January 31, 2007. (R. at 256). If Plaintiff were permanently disabled on January 31, 2007, surely Dr. Mehta would have reinforced the point at a subsequent appointment.*fn14 (R. at 22, 265).
In summary, even if Dr. Mehta's form were part of the record, the ALJ would not have to address it or explain why it was rejected because substantial evidence supports the ALJ's findings. See Johnson at 204. Further, Dr. Mehta's opinion does not square entirely with the record and, under Third Circuit precedent, the form on which Dr. Mehta's opinion appears is weak evidence. See Mason, 994 F.2d at 1065. Moreover, the lack of written reports in support limits its probative value, leading the Court to conclude that ultimately, Plaintiff's disability determination would remain the same. See Mason at 1065; Szubak v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 745 F.2d 831, 833 (3d Cir. 1984)("the materiality standard requires that there be a reasonable possibility that the new evidence would have changed the Secretary's determination."). Finally, Plaintiff made no showing of good cause for not submitting the evidence prior to his hearing. See Matthews, 239 F.3d at 592. As such, the ALJ did not err in not addressing the opinion of Dr. Mehta and this case need not be remanded for further consideration.
D. Did ALJ Accurately Portray Plaintiff's Limitations in his Hypothetical?
Plaintiff next argues that the hypothetical question posed to the VE did not accurately portray Plaintiff's impairments and therefore the testimony of the VE should not be considered. (Docket No. 8, at 15). Plaintiff contends that because the ALJ did not give sufficient weight to his complaints of pain, the hypothetical questions posed were defective. Id. Having already addressed Plaintiff's argument that his subjective complaints of pain were not given weight, the Court is faced with whether the limitations of the Plaintiff were accurately portrayed such that the VE's determination is credible.
Plaintiff cites to Podedworny v. Harris, 745 F.2d 210(3d Cir. 1984) to support his contention that a VE's testimony may only be considered if the question posed by the ALJ accurately portrays the claimant's physical and mental impairments. Id. at 218. In Podedworny, the ALJ posed three hypothetical questions to the VE. Id. However, the ALJ focused his denial of disability benefits around the third question, which according to the hypothetical, presented a scenario in which the Appellant could again work in a variety of sedentary, semi-skilled jobs. Id. The ALJ's first and second hypothetical questions garnered a response from the VE that the Appellant could not engage in other work. Id. In finding that the ALJ's third question was defective, the Court said the question was "incomplete in that it failed to address two specific impairments:" dizziness and impaired vision. Id. Alternatively, had the question addressed those issues, it would not have been defective, and the Vocational Expert's response would have constituted substantial evidence. Id.
In this case, the ALJ took into account Plaintiff's physical and mental impairments in presenting his hypothetical to the VE. The ALJ limited this hypothetical person to twenty pounds lifting on an occasional basis and ten on a frequent basis; alternating between sitting and standing every ten minutes on every hour; no climbing, crawling, or kneeling; and no exposure to hazards such as machinery and heights. (R. at 294). Additionally, in addressing the mental impairments of the Plaintiff, the ALJ asked the VE to account for limitations due to depression or mental condition "that would limit a person to simple, unskilled, one or two-step type of work activity." (R. at 295). Accounting for the mental impairments, the VE determined that the same jobs would be available as if only the physical impairments were present. Id. Unlike Podedworny, the ALJ did not fail to accurately portray any impairments brought to his attention by the Plaintiff and found in the record. Therefore, the Court finds that the hypothetical posed to the VE is not defective and the VE's testimony constitutes substantial evidence.
Based upon the evidence of record, the parties' cross motions and briefs outlining their arguments, and the supporting documents filed in support and in opposition thereto, this Court concludes that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's findings that Plaintiff was not statutorily disabled as of November 20, 2005. The decision of the ALJ denying Plaintiff's application for disability benefits is affirmed. An appropriate order follows.
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Montecito Inn
Montecito Inn - Santa Barbara California Hotel. the Inn was built in 1928 by Hollywood legend, Charlie Chaplin, as one of the most desirable destinations along the California coast, between Los Angeles and San Francisco.
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Montecito Inn, just off the lobby. Different furniture 9/2016
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Category:Treaties extended to Akrotiri and Dhekelia
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
|← British Cyprus
Treaties extended by the United Kingdom to Akrotiri and Dhekelia (1960–). Prior to 1960, Akrotiri and Dhekelia was part of British Cyprus.
This category has only the following subcategory.
- ► Treaties extended to British Cyprus (36 P)
Pages in category "Treaties extended to Akrotiri and Dhekelia"
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The band I am in has a song called "Bad" and another song called "Big Bad"; we decided to make a shirt for those songs.
Sizes YL - M say "Bad" and Sizes L - XL say "Big Bad"
Available via Gumroad at http://shop.youthrevisited.us
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- UltraStar GardenWalk Cinemas
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The Orange County Register is reporting that the CinemaFusion - Anaheim GardenWalk in Anaheim, California, has closed the IMAX theater, and that the future of the rest of the theater is in doubt:
North Orange County's only IMAX theater has shut down and the attached 21-and-over screening rooms – the county's only movie theaters serving alcohol – are in jeopardy amid continuing financial troubles at the GardenWalk mall. Owners of CinemaFusion Theatre and Sky Lobby Lounge, who failed to remain current on lease payments leading to bankruptcy hearings, had first been ordered to be out by Friday.
But after shutting down the IMAX theater and beginning to unbolt chairs from seven of the 14 theaters, the property owner, Citicorp, asked the theater operator, Newport Beach-based Sanborn Theatres Inc., to halt the dismantling and keep operating what is left of the theater until mid-August.
The article goes on to say that the owners of the theater are talking to UltraStar Cinemas about taking over the location.
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Hotel San Giorgio, Bologna
- Free buffet breakfast and WiFi
Main amenities
- 30 guestrooms
- Room service
- 24-hour front desk
- Air conditioning
- Car rentals on site
- Front desk safe
- Laundry service
- Multilingual staff
- Luggage storage
- Tour/ticket assistance
For families
- Free cribs/infant beds
- Private bathroom
- Free toiletries
- Hair dryer
- Elevator/lift
- In-room climate control (air conditioning)
What's around
- In Bologna City Centre
- Tower of the Asinelli (0.4 mi / 0.6 km)
- Tower of the Garisenda (0.4 mi / 0.6 km)
- University of Bologna (0.4 mi / 0.6 km)
- National Art Gallery of Bologna (0.4 mi / 0.6 km)
- Fountain of Neptune (0.4 mi / 0.7 km)
Hotel San Giorgio, Bologna
Hotel Info: 866-539-8117from $57
- Twin Room
- Single Room
- Double Room
More great choices
At a glance
Key facts
Hotel size
- This hotel has 30 rooms
- This hotel is arranged over 5 floors
- Check-in time 2 PM-midnight
- Check-out time is 11 AM
Required at check in
- Credit card or cash deposit required
- Government-issued photo ID required
Travelling with others
- One child (6 years old and younger) stays free when occupying the parent or guardian's room, using existing bedding
- Pets not allowed
- Free WiFi in public areas
- Free WiFi in rooms
Nearby Three Star Bologna hotels
In the hotel
- Free buffet breakfast daily
- Room service (during limited hours)
- 24-hour front desk
- Tours/ticket assistance
- Dry cleaning/laundry service
- Luggage storage
- Multilingual staff
- Number of buildings/towers - 1
- Elevator/lift
- Safe-deposit box at front desk
In the room
- In-room climate control (air conditioning)
- Air conditioning
- Ceiling fan
- Private bathroom
- Shower only
- Free toiletries
- Hair dryer
- Satellite TV channels
- Desk
- Free WiFi
- Phone
Top Bologna hotels
Recently reviewed hotels in Bologna
- Hotel Corona d 'OroFrom
"Superb -- chic place in the center of town. Beautiful neo classical decor and comfort. Great breakfast..."Dec 5, 2016
- Starhotels ExcelsiorFrom
"nice hotel location , nice stuff , good hotel services , rooms are ok "Dec 3, 2016
- Al Cappello RossoFrom
"The hotel is well located to all sites. The room pretty weird. We got the JFK room, dark. Booked a junior suite, but this is no suite. Just an extra chair!! Large bathroom but not…"Nov 24, 2016
- Royal Hotel CarltonFrom
"Room clean and spacious. Most staff friendly. Wifi good. Room service food not so great. Restaurant food good. "Nov 22, 2016
Also popular with travelers from the USA
Hotel San Giorgio, Bologna's small print
Also known as
- Hotel San Giorgio Bologna
- San Giorgio Bologna
All guests, including children, must be present at check-in and show their government-issued photo ID card or passport.
Cash transactions at this property cannot exceed EUR 2999.99, due to national regulations. For further details, please contact the property using information in the booking confirmation.
Mandatory fees
You'll be asked to pay the following charges at check in or check out:
A tax is imposed by the city and will be collected at the property. The tax ranges from EUR 1.50 to EUR 5 per person, per night. The amount has been determined by the local administration and depends on the length of stay, property classification, and room price. This tax does not apply from the 6th consecutive night of stay onward. Guests exempted from this tax include residents of Bologna and children under 14 years of age. Please note that further exemptions may apply. For further details, please contact the property using the information contained in the confirmation received after booking.
- A tax is imposed by the city: EUR 1.5 per person, per night. This tax does not apply to children under 14 years of age.
We have included all charges provided to us by this hotel. However, charges can vary, for example, based on length of stay or the room you book.
Recent reviews
Good 3.6 /5 from 29 reviews
Great front desk people; good central location; windows have been updated and keep out street noise.
It was a good hotel for the price overall. The room was nice and clean, the staff was very helpful (the concierge offered me his personal charger when I forgot to bring mine), breakfast was plentiful with a large selection for a 3-star? and the hotel itself was in good condition. The only problem was the nightlife, people were yelling, drinking, and making noise throughout the night. I don't know if I can blame the hotel though, it could have just been the neighborhood. However there was no insulation in the walls so I could hear everything.
Nice hotel. Very helpful staff. Close to Bologna Central and Piazza Magiore. Room is clean, but the quality is so so. Probably the best you can get for the price. Except that, if you are looking for some peace, this is not the best choice. Because of the central location, and the young community, streets around are noisy until early in the morning.
its in traffic restricted area so car can't enter, very close to all happenings thing like what need to be seen in Bologna but also very noisy so not good for families with kids for sure. room is too old and smelly maybe because the window is never opened.
I was in Bologna just for one night, the hotel is strategically located between the train station and the town centre. A little noisy at night because it is close to the University part of the town, so it is full of young students who enjoy the Italian nights.
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Bibliographic Details
Title: REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR FROM DIARIES ...
Publisher: Chicago: J.F. Leaming & Co.
Publication Date: 1904
Binding: Hardcover
Book Condition: Good
293pp. Plates, roster. First edition. Original cloth, mottled. Staining to preliminaries. The 103rd Illinois, a three-year regiment, saw action from the Vicksburg operations of 1863 through the close of the war, participating in the battles of Missionary Ridge, Resaca, Kennesaw Mountain, Atlanta and Jonesboro before closing out its service in the Carolinas. DORNBUSCH I, IL-326. NEVINS I, 111. NICHOLSON p.727. Bookseller Inventory # ABE-14083256147
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Store Description: For the past 22 years, Hughes Books has specialized in printed material and photographs related to the Civil War, the South and the West. We have a particular affinity for Confederate imprints.


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Moan and droneMarch 27,2013
Moan and drone
In case you havent caught on yet, the geniuses at the Statehouse prefer to target for taxes the things that most people use: gas, drinks, food, etc. And they have a willing accomplice in the governor. So dont be surprised at a tax on toilet paper. The legislators are in touch with this and the governor probably uses it occasionally to wipe off that grin.
Oh, and on the federal level, look for Congress to pass a law making it an act of treason for a private citizen to shoot down a drone. That will be just before they approve the use of drones by the federal government to spy on American citizens. All together now, Hope and change, hope and change, O-ba-ma, yes, we can!
David McKnight
PlainfieldMORE IN LettersMSNBC news analyst Rachel Maddows report on the election of Republican Rutherford B. Full StoryThe Barre Historical Society wishes to thank all the many people who made the Rise Up Bakery... Full StoryI was so pleased to see the picture and the write-up of the kittens and children at the school in... Full Story
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Mossy Oak Properties America
For a brand that was birthed from a fistful of dirt, starting a franchised-based real estate network devoted to assisting buyers and sellers of rural and recreational land seemed natural. Since our start in 2002, our goal has been two-fold: provide the consumer access to the finest rural and recreational properties across the country by associating with the best land brokers in the business.
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Mossy Oak Properties Alaska
Gustavus, AK
First Class Establish Glacier Bay Lodge Business w/ 15,000 sf
hand crafted Log building w/ 14 large bedrooms w/ private baths,
included is a new 4 bedroom home w/ greenhouse and garden,
all on 57 secluded acres w/ city electric, private DEC approved
Well & Septic systems, sm salmon creek meanders through the
property, mountain view and surrounded by Glacier Bay National
Park lands. Location: 255 Rink Creek Road, Gustavus, Alaska
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