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December 1, 2006
KATHY HOGAN, PLAINTIFF,v.TOWNSHIP OF HADDON, ET AL. DEFENDANTS.
William Park SIMANDLE, District Judge
This matter comes before the Court upon the motion of Defendants Township of Haddon ("Township") and William Park ("Park") (collectively, the "Defendants") for summary judgment. The instant lawsuit involves claims that Park, as the Mayor of the Township, (1) violated Hogan's First Amendment rights under the U.S. Constitution and New Jersey State Constitution by preventing her from speaking at Township commissioners' meetings and using Township services (such as the Township's monthly newsletters) and retaliated against her for criticizing Township policies and personnel and (2) violated Hogan's due process and equal protection rights. Park and the Township (collectively, the "Defendants") jointly move for summary judgment arguing that (1) Defendant Park is entitled to legislative immunity or, in the alternative, qualified immunity, with respect to Plaintiff Kathleen Hogan's First Amendment violation claim; and (2) that the Township is also entitled to summary judgment. For the reasons expressed in this Opinion, the Court will grant Defendants' motion for summary judgment.*fn1
Plaintiff is Kathleen Hogan ("Hogan"), a resident of the Township of Haddon, New Jersey. In May 2003, Hogan was elected as a commissioner of the Township along with Defendant William Park ("Park") and William Broderick ("Broderick"). Park, who had been a commissioner and mayor of the Township for a number of years, asked Hogan to be his running mate for the May 2003 Township commissioner election. Hogan, Park and Broderick serve as the commissioners in the three-commissioner form of government that operates under the authority and guidelines of the Walsh Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. 40:72-1, et seq.*fn2 At an organizational meeting shortly after the 2003 election, Park was re-elected mayor of the Township.
A. The Relationship between Hogan and Park Sours Soon After the 2003 Election
Shortly after the 2003 election, Hogan became upset when she learned that she was not entitled to health insurance as part of her compensation as a part-time Township commissioner. At a November 25, 2003 commissioners' meeting, Hogan expressed her surprise at the lack of Township-provided health insurance benefits. Hogan made a motion that health benefits be provided to the commissioners and paid for by the Township. Neither Park nor Broderick seconded the motion and the motion failed. At a December 9, 2003 meeting of the commissioners, Hogan again expressed concern with the lack of support evidenced by Park and Broderick's failure to second her motion for paid health insurance benefits and noted that their relationship over the next three and a half years would be negatively affected by their lack of support for her.*fn3
Hogan's comments proved prophetic. Over the next two years, relations between Hogan and Park severely deteriorated. Relations between the two commissioners reached a particularly low point when Hogan filed this action against Park and the Township, alleging that Park took numerous actions which limited Hogan's right to communicate with the public, limited her right to obtain information regarding the Township's government and retaliated against her for criticizing Township policies and personnel. Specifically, the Complaint alleges that:
* Upon taking office, Hogan ordered a phone for her office but several orders for phone services were cancelled allegedly at the direction of Park. As a result, according to Hogan, installation of her phone was delayed;
* Park personally went to the publisher of the Haddon Township Monthly Monitor (the "Monthly Monitor"), the town newspaper, and demanded that several of Hogan's articles not be published, that her column (titled "The Real Deal" that appeared alongside columns written by the mayor and by the Township chief of police) be terminated, and that her name be removed from other articles that she authored and submitted for publication;
* Park prevented Hogan from accessing the Township's cable access channel and from posting content on the Township's official web site;
* Park conducted meetings as "mayor" without advising the other commissioners of the date, time, location or agenda of the meetings or inviting the other two commissioners to participate;
* Park refused Hogan's request for information about and a copy of Park's official calendar;
* Park refused to provide certain information regarding Township personnel information regarding Township money spent on Park's attendance of the New Jersey League of Municipalities Conference, and prevented Hogan from obtaining tapes of past commissioners' meetings (through the Township Clerk);
* Park refused to provide Hogan with the results of an audit performed by an outside vendor after the Township's computer system (operated by Kris Mustachio) "crashed" resulting in the permanent loss of certain Township tax and financial data;
* Park consistently "gaveled" her down at public meetings and did not allow her to speak;
* When voting on Township business, Park and Commissioner Broderick consistently out-voted Park by a 2-to-1 margin;
* Park repeatedly "stonewalled" Hogan when Hogan attempted to discuss the job performance of other Township employees;
* Park assaulted Hogan by "elbowing" her after a commissioners' meeting; and
* Park generally harassed her in retaliation for Hogan's speaking out against Park's political agenda.
B. Hogan's History of Voicing Her Concerns
It is clear from the record that Hogan has had opportunities to speak her mind in writing regarding issues associated with the governance of the Township. By her own estimate, she has authored and distributed more than a hundred handouts since her election in May 2003. On June 1, 2004, Hogan sent a letter to all Township employees expressing her views about the need for, and potential benefits of, a new police station. In July 2005, Hogan sent a letter to the homes of several Township police officers expressing her views on the hiring practices in the Township's police department. In November of 2005, while the Township was considering undertaking a major redevelopment project, Hogan sent an email urging residents of the Township to undermine a developer's efforts to show the Township's residents certain redevelopment projects that the developer had completed around New Jersey. According to Defendants, Hogan has also had the opportunity to make her views known at public meetings as she has never been prevented or physically restrained from speaking at any public meetings or to anyone outside of a commissioners' meetings.
C. Procedural History
Hogan filed this action on April 30, 2004, seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and alleging three-counts: (1) violation of her First Amendment right to free speech; (2) violation of Hogan's due process and equal protection in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; and (3) violation of Hogan's free speech, due process and equal protection rights guaranteed by the New Jersey State Constitution.*fn4 After an unsuccessful attempt to mediate this matter, Defendants filed this motion for summary judgment on March 9, 2006. [Docket Item No. 28.] Hogan filed opposition to Defendants' motion on May 6, 2006 to which Defendants responded on May 26, 2006. [Docket Item Nos. 33 and 35, respectively.] In the wake of the recent U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos, __ U.S. __, 126 S.Ct. 1951 (2006), with the Court's permission and Hogan's consent, Defendants filed an additional reply on June 6, 2006.
The Court heard oral argument on Defendants' motion on July 19, 2006. At the conclusion of oral argument, the Court instructed Hogan to supply a supplemental affidavit identifying and submitting the articles Hogan wrote for the Monthly Monitor that were allegedly either blocked from publication or altered by Park. [Docket Item No. 37, 38.] The Court also accepted a letter brief from Park and the Township in response to Hogan's affidavit. [Docket Item No. 39.]
Summary judgment is appropriate when the materials of record "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."*fn5 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In deciding whether there is a disputed issue of material fact, the court must view the evidence in favor of the non-moving party by extending any reasonable favorable inference to that party; in other words, "the nonmoving party's evidence 'is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [that party's] favor.'" Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 552 (1999) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). The threshold inquiry is whether there are "any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party."*fn6 Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 250; Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp., 72 F.3d 326, 329-30 (3d Cir. 1995) (citation omitted).
Defendants move for summary judgment on the basis that because Park's actions were taken as part of his legitimate legislative function, he is entitled to legislative immunity. In the alternative, Park is entitled to qualified immunity as Hogan has failed to present evidence that her constitutional rights were violated. Moreover, because Hogan has failed to prove that Park was acting "under color of law," Park cannot be held personally liable for any alleged violation of Hogan's constitutional rights. Finally, because the Court finds that Park is not liable for a violation of Hogan's constitutional rights and because Hogan has failed to present evidence of a law, policy, custom or rule that the Township implemented against her in violation of her First Amendment rights.
A. Park is Entitled to Legislative Immunity
Defendants argue that the doctrine of legislative immunity shields Park and the Township from liability in this matter. Specifically, Defendants argue that, when Park was partaking in actions that allegedly violated Hogan's First Amendment rights, he was engaging in legislative activities involving discretionary decision-making for which he is entitled to absolute immunity.*fn7
It is well settled that state, city and municipal legislators enjoy absolute immunity from suit and liability for their legislative activities. See Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 49 (1998); see also Tenny v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 373 (1951). In Tenny, the Supreme Court held:
The reason for the privilege is clear. It was well summarized by James Wilson, an influential member of the Committee of Detail which was responsible for the provision in the Federal Constitution. "In order to enable and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness and success, it is indispensably necessary, that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that he should be protected from the resentment of every one, however powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty may occasion offence."
Tenny, 341 U.S. at 373. Under Bogan, the Supreme Court specified that local legislators and city officials were immune from liability for claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for their legislative activities. Bogan, 523 U.S. at 49.
A city official's immunity, however, attaches only when the official is acting "in the sphere of legitimate legislative activity." Id. at 55 (citing Tenney, 341 U.S. at 376.) Whether an act is legislative "turns on the nature of the act, rather than on the motive or intent of the official performing it."*fn8
Id.*fn9 Legislative acts are not ministerial duties, but rather are those the legislator's exercise of discretionary powers. Id. at 50; see Youngblood v. DeWeese, 352 F.3d 836, 842 (3d Cir. 2003); compare Montgomery County Comm'rs v. Montgomery County, 215 F.3d 367, 377 (3d Cir. 2000)(firing of an employee is not a legislative act entitled to absolute immunity).
As a commissioner in the form of government authorized by the Walsh Act, Park performed both executive and legislative functions. Many of the actions taken by Park that Hogan claims violated her First Amendment rights where performed as part of his legislative function. Because Hogan is entitled to absolute immunity for legislative acts, the Court will grant summary judgment in favor of Park with respect to certain of the acts Hogan claims violated her First Amendment Rights, because Park is protected by legislative immunity.
First, Hogan alleges that Park "gaveled" her at commissioners' meetings and refused to let her speak. Refusing to allow someone to speak in order to keep a meeting on schedule is the type of legislative act immunity is afforded to as contemplated by the Bogan and Tenny courts. Setting and keeping a legislative meeting agenda involves discretionary, policymaking decisions on the part of the legislator. As such, Park is entitled to absolute immunity for such acts. Second, any claim by Hogan that Park and Commissioner Broderick out-voted her obviously must also be dismissed as legislative acts for which Park is entitled to absolute immunity. Finally, Park is also entitled to immunity related to Hogan's allegation that Park interfered with her efforts to get phone service in her office. Hogan's claim centers on the fact that her legislative office telephone was not installed immediately. As Park testified to at his deposition, immediate installation, however, would have required installation over a weekend and forced the Township pay overtime rates for the installation. (Park Dep. Tr. at 34.) Park made the decision that, due to budgetary concerns, the Township would not pay for a weekend installation at overtime rates. Id. Similar to the holding in Bogan, an action taken by a public official implicating budget concerns is entitled to legislative immunity. Bogan, 523 U.S. at 55. Park's personal motive or intent in delaying the telephone is immaterial where the nature of his act was legislative. Id. As such, summary judgment will be granted as to Park with respect to these claims.
B. Park is Entitled to Qualified Immunity
Defendants next argue that, as a government official, Park is entitled to qualified immunity. Specifically, Defendants contend that summary judgment is appropriate as to Park because Hogan cannot establish a prima facie case showing a violation of her constitutional rights. Defendants also argue that, even if the Court finds Park's actions constitute a constitutional infringement, the rights Hogan claims have been violated were not "clearly established" by law and therefore, Hogan is entitled to qualified immunity.
Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, public officials performing discretionary duties within the scope of their employment are "shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The privilege is more than a defense to liability; it is an immunity from suit. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200-01 (2001) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)). In determining whether a public official is immune from suit, a court must first inquire whether "the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right." Id. at 201. If a plaintiff fails to establish that a constitutional right was violated, the matter of qualified immunity is obviated and the inquiry ends. See id. If, however, a violation could be ascertained when the facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, a court must then inquire whether the right was "clearly established" at the time of the official's allegedly unlawful conduct. Id. In making that determination, the relevant inquiry is "whether it would be clear to a reasonable [official] that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted." Id. at 202.
1. Whether Park's Conduct Violated Hogan's First Amendment Rights
This Court's first inquiry is whether "the facts alleged show the [official's] conduct violated a constitutional right." Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. In support of their position that Park's conduct did not violate Hogan's constitutional rights, Defendants first argue that under Garcetti v. Ceballos, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 1951 (2006), Hogan, as a public employee making statements pursuant to her official duties, has no personal First Amendment rights. Second, Defendants argue that Hogan has failed to present any evidence that Park violated her First Amendment rights.
a. Hogan's First Amendments Rights After Garcetti v. Ceballos
Hogan contends that her First Amendment rights were violated when Park directed the publisher of the Monthly Monitor to withhold from publication or remove her name from the by-line of a number of articles authored by Hogan and submitted to the Monthly Monitor for publication. (Supp. Aff. of Kathleen Hogan ¶¶ 2-9.) Hogan contends that Park directed such actions despite the fact that both he and Chief of Police Gallagher had their own regular columns in the Monthly Monitor. (Id. ¶¶ 10, 11.) According to Hogan, the Monitor was a "limited forum" in which elected and other officials could provide information to the public. As a limited forum, the exclusion of a speaker is an action subject to strict scrutiny.*fn10 (Pl.'s Opp. Br. at 9 citing Int'l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992)). In addition, Hogan also alleges that Park violated Hogan's First Amendment rights when he blocked Hogan's attempts to access the Township's cable access channel and web site.
This Court, following the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Garcetti, concludes that, because her submissions were made in her capacity as a Township commissioner (and not a private citizen), Hogan has no First Amendment rights in anything submitted to the Monthly Monitor or that she might say on the Township's cable channel or post on the Township's web site. Moreover, the Township owns and operates the Monthly Monitor, its cable channel and its official web site, and has the right to control the content published in or contained on it. As such, Hogan's claims regarding the Monthly Monitor and the Township's cable channel and web site shall be dismissed.
In Garcetti, the Supreme Court held that, when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, they are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes. Garcetti, 126 S.Ct. at 1961.*fn11 As such, the First Amendment does not insulate their communications from employer discipline. Id.*fn12 In Garcetti, an employee-deputy district attorney, as part of his official duties, drafted a memo criticizing an affidavit the police used to obtain a critical search warrant and then recounted his observations about the affidavit at a hearing on a defense motion challenging the warrant. Id. at 1955-56. Claiming that he was later retaliated against by his employer for his speaking out, the employee filed a § 1983 action asserting violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 1956. The Court held that the proper inquiry is first whether the employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern. Id. at 1958-59. If the answer is no, the employee has no First Amendment cause of action based on the employer's reaction to the speech because the First Amendment does not prohibit managerial discipline based on an employee's expressions made pursuant to official responsibilities. Id. at 1958. ("Government employers, like private employers, need a significant degree of control over their employees' words and actions; without it, there would be little chance of the efficient provision of public services.")*fn13
In Garcetti, the Court concluded that the statements made by the employee were made pursuant to his official duties as a deputy district attorney, and, therefore, he was not speaking as a citizen for First Amendment purposes. Id. at 1960. Accordingly, the Constitution does not insulate his communications from employer discipline. Id. Such a restriction, according to the Court, "simply reflects the exercise of employer control over what the employer itself has commissioned or created." Id. Indeed, the Court held that it was following prior precedent which established an employer's heightened interests in controlling speech made by an employee in his or her professional capacity. Id. ("Official communications have official consequences, created a need for substantive consistency and clarity [and that] [s]upervisors must ensure that their employees' official communications are accurate, demonstrate sound judgment, and promote the employer's mission.")
Here, it is clear that Hogan's actions of (1) writing articles and a column for the Monthly Monitor and (2) seeking access to the Township's cable access channel and web site were undertaken as part of her official duties and in her capacity as a Township commissioner (and Township employee), rather than a private citizen. For example, in Hogan's by-lined article for "The Real Deal" #3 (dated August 4, 2003 and addressing the Township's redevelopment efforts) that was allegedly "pulled" by Park, Hogan writes almost exclusively in the third person. (Hogan Supp. Aff. ¶ 2, Ex. A.) The Court assumes that Hogan, in referring to "we" in the article, is writing as a representative of all three commissioners. Moreover, only Township officials (including Mayor Park and Police Chief Gallagher) were permitted to contribute to the Monthly Monitor. Thus, it is clear that Hogan was writing in her official capacity as a commissioner and not as a private citizen. See Hill, 455 F.3d at 242 (speech that is based on a report to a borough council made pursuant to the speaker's official duties are not protected speech.) Hence, no First Amendment protection attached to that article.
In addition, no First Amendment protection attaches to either of the other three articles that Hogan submitted for publication in the Monthly Monitor that were allegedly "pulled" by Park or the two articles in which Hogan's name and contact information were removed. (Hogan Supp. Aff. ¶¶ 3-5, 8-9 Ex. B-E.) First, the parties do not dispute that the Monthly Monitor is a local government-owned and sponsored publication, not a public forum or a limited public forum. It is an organ of the municipality itself. Because the Monthly Monitor is not a public or limited public forum, Hogan had no constitutional right to publish material in the newsletter as a municipal official.
Second, Hogan has presented no evidence that Park ordered the three articles withheld from publication because of the viewpoint expressed in them. Indeed, these three articles --- one requesting volunteers from the senior citizen community to start a program teaching seniors about computers, another requesting volunteers for a grant task force, and a third conveying Hogan's experience assisting producers from The Oprah Winfrey Show with their work in the Township --- can not be said to portray Hogan's viewpoint. (Hogan Supp. Aff. ¶¶ 3-5 Ex. B-D.) The same is true for the articles in which Hogan's name and contact information were deleted. Hogan presents no evidence that Park ordered the publisher to withhold the articles because of any viewpoint expressed by Hogan with respect to setting up a meeting for the Historic Preservation or the Haddon Township Arts Alliance. (Id. ¶¶ 8-9, Ex. E.)*fn14
Finally, summary judgment as to Hogan's First Amendment claims for Park's alleged actions of preventing Hogan from using the Township's cable access channel or web site can be granted on similar grounds. As with the Monthly Monitor, the parties do not dispute that the Township's cable access channel and web site are government-owned and sponsored and as such, are not public or limited public forums. Thus, Hogan had no constitutional right to use the cable access channel or publish material on the Township's web site.
b. Hogan Fails to Support her Allegations of a Violation of her First Amendment Rights
Next, Defendants argue that Hogan has failed to show that Park's conduct violated a constitutional right. In order to survive summary judgment when proof of a constitutional violation depends on evidence of improper intent on the part of the defendant, a plaintiff must present affirmative evidence from which a fact finder could find the relevant motive. Monteiro, 436 F.3d at 406. In the context of a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must produce evidence demonstrating that "the alleged retaliatory conduct was sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his First Amendment rights." McKee v. Hart, 436 F.3d 165, 170 (3d Cir. 2006)(quoting Suppan v. Dadonna, 203 F.3d 228, 235 (3d Cir. 2000)("[I]t would trivialize the First Amendment to hold that harassment for exercising the right of free speech is always actionable no matter how unlikely to deter a person of ordinary firmness from that exercise. . . .")(internal quotations omitted)) While the effect of the alleged conduct on the employee's freedom of speech need not be great in order to be actionable, "it must be more than de minimis." Id. (critical statements of an employee's job performance, reprimands and employee's removal from leadership position were de minimis.) In addition, in Brennan v. Norton, 350 F.3d 399, 419 (3d Cir. 2003), the Third Circuit held that a plaintiff's constitutional rights based on a First Amendment retaliation claim were not de minimis where the public employer refused to rehire an employee because of the exercise of his First Amendment rights, or when the employer made decisions related to promotion, transfer, recall and hiring based on the employee's exercise of those rights. According to Defendants, the record here shows the opposite, namely that Hogan produces no evidence for any of the First Amendment violations Park is alleged to have committed. In the alternative, according to Defendants, Hogan's claims do not rise above the level of de minimis acts that would not deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising her First Amendment rights.
i. Hogan's Right to Access Park's Daily Appointment Calendar and Personnel Files of Township Employees
Hogan argues that Defendants violated her First Amendment rights when they prevented her, as an elected official, from obtaining information about official government business in the form of Park's appointment calendar and certain Township employee personnel files. Hogan relies on a number of cases relating to the public's right to access government functions, administrative proceedings, trials and meetings under the First Amendment. See generally Richmond Newspaper, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575 (1980); United States v. Miami Univ., 294 F.3d 797, 824 (6th Cir. 2002); Whiteland Woods, L.P. v. Township of West Whiteland, 193 F.3d 177, 181 (3d Cir. 1999). Hogan does not cite any authority for her position that a public official who is not allowed unfettered access to government records can maintain a claim for violation of the First Amendment, but instead argues that "[l]ogic informs us that elected official[s] cannot participate in the governmental process if they are arbitrarily denied information within the possession of the government." (Pl.'s Opp. Br. at 16.)
Hogan offers no case (and this Court's research has found none) to support her position that the right to access government information includes a federal constitutional right to an account of the daily activities of a public official (such as Mayor Park) or the contents of a Township employee's personnel file. Indeed, even the cases cited by Defendant hold that the First Amendment does not grant a public official unfettered access to government records. See Richmond Newspaper, 448 U.S. at 577 (establishing the right of the public to attend criminal trials but commented that the right of access under the First Amendment is reserved to those places traditionally open to the public.)*fn15 Here, while case law cited by Hogan supports the notion that Park could not exclude Hogan from certain government proceedings, items such as Park's daily calendar and various Township personnel files are not the types of information traditionally held open to the public, nor can such documents be regarded as "proceedings." Because Hogan has no First Amendment rights to access this information, summary judgment must be granted in favor of Park with respect to these claims.*fn16
iii. Hogan's Claim for Retaliation for Criticizing Public Officials
Hogan argues that she has presented a prima facie case of retaliation because (1) she engaged in constitutionally-protected activity; (2) Mayor Park responded with retaliation; and (3) the protected activity caused the retaliation. See Eichenlaub v. Twp. of Indiana, 385 F.3d 274, 282 (3d Cir. 2004). Hogan cites the case of Moore v. Asbury Park Bd. of Educ., No. 05-2971, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18372, at *35 (D.N.J. Aug. 23, 2005) for the holding that "[t]he ability to question the fitness of community leaders (including school employees), especially in the forum created specifically to foster discussion about a community's school system is an important public interest." (internal citation omitted). Hogan claims that Park retaliated against her in a number of ways in response to her public criticism of Township employees such as Kris Mustacchio, Betty Band, Chief Gallagher and Park's secretary Shirley Johnson. Specifically, Hogan claims Park (a) directed his secretary to have an incident report filed against Hogan related to Hogan's continued efforts to obtain access to the Mayor's schedule, (b) "stone-walled" her attempts to seek out and discuss information regarding the job performance and qualifications of other public employees; (c) assaulted her when Park "elbowed" Hogan outside a commissioners meeting and (d) directed Township staff to refuse to give Hogan a copy of an audit performed after the Township's computer system "crashed."
Even if Hogan had a First Amendment right to criticize Township employees at public meetings where she served as a commissioner, for many of these claims, Hogan has failed to present any evidence to support her allegations and demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. First, Hogan admitted at her deposition that she had no evidence to support her claims that Park urged his secretary to file an incident report against her. (Hogan Dep. Tr. at 120.) Second, Hogan presents no evidence that Park denied or restricted Hogan's attempts to access the personnel files and job performance of Township employees. To the contrary, Park presents evidence that Hogan was supplied with the requested personnel information, including Township personnel records of Chief of Police Joseph Gallagher. (Moffa Decl., Exh. 14.) Moreover, Hogan admitted that she received Betty Band's resume and qualification after having requested it. (Hogan Dep. Tr. 91-92.) Third, Hogan also admitted that, in response to a request, she was provided with a written report concerning the Township's computer "crash" and possible loss of Township records. Thus, it appears that she was not denied access to the report.
The Court agrees with Defendants that the remaining act of retaliation Park is alleged of doing --- i.e., elbowing Hogan after a Commissioner meeting --- is de minimis and is not an act sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising her First Amendment rights. Hogan was never physically restrained or prevented from attending or from voicing her views at a public meeting. (Hogan Dep. Tr. at 52.) Moreover, she admits that she has never been prevented by Park or any Township official from speaking with the press or anyone outside of Commissioner's meetings. (Hogan Dep. Tr. at 53.) As such, Hogan's claim of "elbowing" Hogan at a Commissioner's meeting can be characterized as a de minimis act with respect to Hogan's First Amendment rights. Such a minor disturbance or annoyance, however boorish or uncouth, does not rise to the level of a constitutional deprivation.*fn17 The Constitution protects rights and freedoms, but it does not enshrine a code of personal civility.
C. Mayor Park's Personal Liability
Defendants argue that Hogan cannot maintain a § 1983 claim against Park because Hogan cannot prove that Park was acting "under color of state law," a necessary component to a § 1983 claim. (Def.'s Reply Br. at 7-8.) Here, Hogan alleges that Park encouraged (1) his secretary to file an incident report by his secretary, Shirley Johnson, and (2) other township employees to file a lawsuit in retaliation for Hogan's criticism of the Township employees and Park. However, according to Defendants, Hogan has presented no evidence that Park had any involvement in either the lawsuit filed against her by Township employees or the incident report (and Hogan, in her deposition, admits as much.) (Hogan Dep. Tr. at 120.) Moreover, Park testified that he had no control over whether Township employees would file suit. (Park Dep. Tr. at 72, 74.) This claim thus fails for lack of evidence from which a reasonable jury could find in Plaintiff's favor.
D. Liability of the Township
Finally, Hogan argues that the Township is liable for actions of Mayor Park because Mayor Park is the Township's "final decision-maker." Specifically, Hogan argues that governmental liability attaches where the action taken by a decision-maker who possesses final authority to establish policy with respect to the action orders --- even in instances where the action is a "one time" event that is not intended to guide future conduct. See Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986); Sunkett v. Misci, 183 F. Supp.2d 691, 711 (D.N.J. 2002)("Section 1983 plaintiffs can establish policy or custom, among other methods, by identifying a single decision by a final policymaker.")(internal quotations omitted). Defendants argue that Hogan's claims against the Township rely exclusively on conduct allegedly committed by Park and that because Hogan cannot maintain a cause of action against Park, Hogan's claims against the Township fail as a matter of law.
Local governing bodies can be sued directly under Section 1983 for "monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where . . . the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers." Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). Municipal liability attaches only where execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury. See id. at 694. In the case of either policy or custom, a plaintiff must show that an official who has the power to make policy is responsible for either the affirmative proclamation of a policy or acquiescence in a well-settled custom. Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 850 (3d Cir. 1990).
Because Hogan has failed to identify any law, policy, custom, rule or regulation that the Township is implementing against her in violation of her First Amendment rights, this Court will grant summary judgment in favor of the Township.*fn18
Rather, Hogan rests her claim that the Township is liable exclusively on the actions of Mayor Park under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Because this Court has held in Section III.A and B supra, that Park is entitled to summary judgment because none of his actions amount to a violation of Hogan's First Amendment rights, Hogan's claim against the Township necessarily also fails.
For the above reasons, Defendants' motion for summary judgment will be granted. The accompanying Order is entered.
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Here's what you need to know about the 106th World Series between the Texas Rangers and the San Francisco Giants.
• The team with the better regular season W-L record has lost seven of the last 11 World Series. The Giants were 92-70 this season. The Rangers were 90-72.
• The team that averages more runs per game in the regular season has won 11 of the last 14 World Series. That favors the Rangers who averaged 4.86 runs per game to the Giants 4.30 runs per game.
• The team with the better regular season batting average has won 14 of the last 20 World Series. That favors the Rangers, who hit .276 to the Giants .257.
• The team with the better regular season ERA has LOST 15 of the last 19 World Series. The Giants had a 3.36 ERA in the regular season, the Rangers were at 3.93.
• The Giants pitchers led the NL (and MLB) in opponents' batting average while the Rangers hitters led the AL (and MLB) in batting average.
• From Elias, this is the fifth matchup of teams in the Divisional Era (since 1969) in which one led their league in opponents' batting average and the other led their league in batting average. On three of the previous four occasions, the team that led in opponents' batting average won the World Series.
• The Giants and Rangers shared Bengie Molina this season, with the Giants trading him to Texas on July 1. According to Elias, Molina would be the second player to play in the World Series against a team he played for in the regular season, joining Lonnie Smith (1985 Royals vs Cardinals).
• The four Giants pitchers who have won their starts have combined to allow five runs and 16 hits in 29 innings (1.55 ERA). The six Rangers pitchers who have won their starts have combined to allow five runs and 24 hits in 44 innings (1.02 ERA).
Current Rangers
Career vs Brian Wilson
• No current Ranger has a hit against Giants closer Brian Wilson in his career. Only two Rangers have ever reached base against Wilson, one via an intentional walk and one by a hit by pitch.
• FROM ELIAS: The Giants have six one-run wins this postseason, only the third team ever to do that.
• The Giants ranked second in the National League in the regular season in both starters' ERA (3.54) and relievers' ERA (2.99).
• The Giants pitchers in September put together one of the best calendar months in the live ball era (since 1920). Only four teams had a lower ERA in a single calendar month than the 1.78 the Giants posted, and only one team -- the Indians in May 1968 -- had a lower opponents' batting average in a calendar month than the .182 the Giants staff allowed.
Texas Rangers
Notable AL Ranks in 2010
• The Rangers offense has been in top form, having hit at least one home run in every game of the ALDS and ALCS. Their streak of 11 straight games with a home run in a single postseason is second only to the 2004 Houston Astros, who homered in 12 straight postseason games.
• The Rangers finished the season with a 3.93 ERA, their best since 1990 (3.83). Their 3.38 bullpen ERA was their best since 1983 (3.23). Offensively, they led the major leagues in batting average for the third time in team history, the second time in the last three seasons.

subset: commoncrawl


text:
RIVERHEAD - Police have released a sketch of the man wanted for attacking a woman inside a bathroom at the Tanger Outlets in Riverhead.
The sketch is based on the 67-year-old victim's description.
Police say the man hid in a stall in the ladies' room on Tuesday and when the victim entered, he grabbed her around the neck and threw her to the ground. The victim screamed for help and another woman entering the bathroom called 911.
No arrests have been made and anyone with information is asked to call Riverhead Police at 631-727-4500.


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United States District Court, D. Columbia.
March 26, 2014
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY, AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES LOCAL 2401, et al., Plaintiffs,v.DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Defendant
For AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES LOCAL 2401, KAREN M PERRY, KATHLEEN JANSEN, MICHELLE SWINDLER, TOREE HARRIS, JEFFREY ANDERSON, GERALD A. LUCAS, ANGELA S. CAMPBELL, KISHIA M. WATKINS, FRANCAIS P. CHIRINOS, MARIO TYREE PATTERSON, CLARICE JONES, KAREN L. SIMMS, LORETTA SMITH, GWENDOLYN BELL, TISHELLE S. BLAIZE, KAY MILLER, FREDRICA E. SHEPARD-SMITH, ERIC R. WALCOTT, LINSAY N. SEEGARS, KIM A. GROSS, CLEMENT EYO, EVELYN D. BEASLEY, ANDREW L. SELWELL, NATASHA LEWIS, DEBORAH WHITE, LADONNA K. MUHAMMAD, MINNIE P. COHEN, MELISSA K. STOKES, JEAN WASHINGTON, SELINA M. LYLES, Plaintiffs: Donald M. Temple, LEAD ATTORNEY, DONALD M. TEMPLE, P.C., Washington, DC.
For DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, A Municipal Corporation, Defendant: Bradford Collins Patrick, Douglas Stuart Rosenbloom, Gary Daniel Feldon, LEAD ATTORNEYS, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Public Interest Division, Washington, DC; Robert C. Utiger, LEAD ATTORNEY, DC OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Washington, DC.
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Barbara Jacobs Rothstein, U.S. District Court Judge.
This case concerns allegations of age and race discrimination against the District of Columbia (hereinafter " Defendant" or " the District" ) in connection with a reduction-in-force (" RIF" ) at the District of Columbia Department of Health Care Finance (hereinafter " DHCF" ), as well as the hiring of personnel into newly created positions at DHCF after the RIF. Plaintiffs--African-American DHCF employees whose positions were eliminated in the RIF and who were not rehired into newly created positions--allege that there was intentional age-and race-based discrimination in both the RIF and the rehiring process, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the District of Columbia Human Rights Act (" DCHRA" ).[1] See generally Third Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 34) (" Comp." ). Before the Court is Defendant's motion for summary judgment filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Having reviewed the motion, opposition, and reply thereto, the entire record in the case, and the applicable law, the Court GRANTS Defendant's motion for summary judgment.
Prior to the creation of DHCF, Medicaid and the D.C. Healthcare Alliance--which together provide health care services for one in three District citizens--were primarily administered by the Medical Assistance Administration (" MAA" ) within the D.C. Department of Health. See Defendant's Statement of Material Facts Not in
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Dispute (Dkt. No. 98) (hereinafter " Def.'s St. Facts" ) at ¶ 1. It is undisputed that under MAA, the administration of health care services was frequently mishandled, resulting in significant over and under payments on service claims, as well as under-reimbursement from federal programs. Id. at ¶ 2. Accordingly, in 2007, the Mayor of the District of Columbia signed into law the Department of Health Care Finance Establishment Act of 2007 to create a new agency--DHCF--to centralize and improve the administration of health care services in the District. Id. at ¶ 3.
Thereafter, the District retained a team of consultants from the George Washington University (" GW" ) School of Public Health and Health Services to assist the District in establishing DHCF and transitioning the services from MAA to DHCF. Id. at ¶ ¶ 6-7. Ultimately, a Transition Plan was developed that structured DHCF along " functional lines" meant to improve the quality and availability of health care to District citizens, as well as " correct the financial and audit challenges" facing the District. Id. at ¶ ¶ 11, 13. After DHCF's organizational structure was established, the GW consultants developed an organizational chart to implement the changes envisioned by the Transition Plan. Id. at ¶ 14.
DHCF's organizational structure included new positions that had not previously existed at MAA and eliminated some positions that had existed within MAA. Id. at ¶ ¶ 15-17, 31-32. Plaintiffs do not dispute that the GW consultants were primary responsible for drafting the job descriptions for the newly created positions in DHCF. Id. Nor do Plaintiffs dispute that, at the time that the determination was made as to which positions would be eliminated in the RIF, the GW consulting team members did not know the identities of the employees who held those positions. Id. at ¶ 32.
DHCF assumed MAA's responsibilities on October 1, 2008 and thereafter the RIF was implemented. Id. at ¶ ¶ 22, 29-30. Seventy-nine positions were eliminated in conjunction with the RIF and sixty-two positions were created. Id. at ¶ ¶ 29-30. It is undisputed that agency employment records demonstrate that the race and age of DHCF's workforce before and after the RIF remained the same. Id. at ¶ 37. More particularly, before the RIF, 47.58% of DHCF's employees self-identified as African-American; after the RIF, 47.58% of DHCF's employees self-identified as African-American. Id. Likewise, before the RIF, 46 was the median age of DHCF's employees; after the RIF, 46 was the median age of DHCF's employees. Id.
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In addition, DHCF notified its employees of the impending RIF one month before it implemented the RIF. Id. at ¶ 33. The employees whose positions were slated for elimination were encouraged to apply for one of the newly created positions and were given priority in hiring for those positions. Id. at ¶ 38-39. Forty-seven of the seventy-nine employees whose positions were eliminated by the RIF were rehired into new positions at DHCF. Id. at ¶ 41. Plaintiffs are seventeen of the thirty-two former DHCF employees whose positions were terminated, but who were not rehired into any of the newly created positions.[3] It is undisputed that five of the seventeen Plaintiffs did not apply for a new position within DHCF or, in the case of one Plaintiff, applied but then withdrew from consideration for the position. Id. at ¶ 47. This lawsuit followed on September 21, 2009. Dkt. No. 1.
A. Summary Judgment Legal Standard
" The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The mere existence of any factual dispute will not defeat summary judgment; " the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Olatunji v. District of Columbia, 958 F.Supp.2d 27, 29 (D.D.C. 2013) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48) (emphasis in original). A fact is material if, under the applicable law, it could affect the outcome of the case. Olatunji, 958 F.Supp.2d at 29. A dispute is genuine if the " evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48). Because " [c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge," the " evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Id. at 29-30 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255). However, the nonmoving party must establish more than " the existence of a scintilla of evidence" in support of its position, Id. at 30, and the inferences drawn from the evidence " must be reasonably probable and based on more than mere speculation." Rogers Corp. v. E.P.A., 275 F.3d 1096, 1103, 348 U.S.App.D.C. 352 (D.C. Cir.2002) (citations omitted). In addition, the nonmoving party may not rely solely on allegations or conclusory statements. See Greene v. Dalton, 164 F.3d 671, 675, 334 U.S.App.D.C. 92 (D.C. Cir. 1999). He must present specific facts that would enable a reasonable jury to find in his favor. Id. If the evidence presented is " merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50 (internal citations omitted).
B. Plaintiffs' Claims
As a preliminary matter, this Court notes that Plaintiffs' opposition to Defendant's summary judgment motion largely consists of conclusory statements, with little citation to evidence in the record. Indeed, rather than refer this Court to evidence in the record, Plaintiffs cite to their
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own pleadings. It is black letter law that Plaintiffs may not rest upon the allegations asserted in their pleadings, but must instead " present affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257; District Intown Props., Ltd. P'ship v. District of Columbia, 198 F.3d 874, 878, 339 U.S.App.D.C. 127 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (" [T]he court must assume the truth of all statements proffered by the non-movant except for conclusionary statements lacking any factual basis in the record." ).
With this in mind, the Court now turns to the merits of Plaintiffs' arguments. As discussed above, Plaintiffs bring three claims for relief. First, Plaintiffs filed an equal protection claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on the District's alleged age-and-race-based discrimination. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that the District violated their right to the equal protection of the laws as enshrined in the Fourteenth Amendment by " illegally reorganize[ing] DHCF in such a way as to selectively terminate more senior African-American employees while simultaneously protecting and excluding less senior, inexperienced, predominately Caucasian employees" from the RIF. Third Am. Comp. at ¶ 29. Plaintiffs further charge that the District " reclassifi[ed] [] jobs and grade levels" to effectively disqualify " incumbent African-American employee Plaintiffs from consideration for so called new (redefined) positions, resulting in their constructive discharge and exclusion from 'newly created' positions." Id. at ¶ 30.
Second, Plaintiff filed a race-based discrimination claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 based on the District's alleged interference with the collective bargaining agreement between the District and Plaintiffs' union, AFSCME. With respect to this claim, Plaintiffs allege that the District " acted pursuant to a formally adopted policy" to implement " a racially and age biased 'realignment' plan" that " reclassifi[ed] jobs, diminish[ed]/lower[ed] Plaintiffs' ratings and qualifications or skills, in order to effectively eliminate their positions and/or preclude their rehiring." Id. at ¶ 36. Plaintiffs charge that the District's actions " impeded Plaintiffs' enjoyment and protections articulated in the terms and conditions of the [collective bargaining agreement]." Id. at ¶ 37. Lastly, Plaintiff charge that the District violated the D.C. Human Rights Act, D.C. Code § 2-1401 et seq. (hereinafter " DCHRA" ) because it " acted in violation of D.C. laws of [ sic ] governing Reductions-in-Force." Id. at ¶ 41.
The familiar burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), applies to § 1981, § 1983, and DCHRA cases where, as here, a plaintiff presents only circumstantial evidence that discrimination caused an adverse employment action.[4] Royall v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO, 548 F.3d 137, 144, 383 U.S.App.D.C. 331 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (applying the McDonnell Douglas framework to § 1981 claims); Jo v. Dist. of Columbia, 582 F.Supp.2d 51, 60 (D.D.C. 2008) (§ 1983 case applying McDonnell Douglas ); Paquin v. Federal Nat. Mortg. Ass'n, 119 F.3d 23, 27, 326 U.S.App.D.C. 224 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (applying McDonnell Douglas to a DCHRA case). Under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that " (1) [he] is a member of a protected class; (2) [he] suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) the unfavorable action gives rise to
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an inference of discrimination." Chappell-Johnson v. Powell, 440 F.3d 484, 488, 370 U.S.App.D.C. 162 (D.C. Cir. 2006). The burden then shifts to the employer to articulate a " legitimate, nondiscriminatory" justification for the adverse employment action. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Where an employer offers " clear and reasonably specific" nondiscriminatory reasons for the adverse employment action, Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981), the court " should not decide whether the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case," and should instead " proceed[ ] to the ultimate issue of [discrimination] vel non." Jones v. Bernanke, 557 F.3d 670, 678, 384 U.S.App.D.C. 443 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Finally, where a plaintiff can establish a predicate constitutional violation under § 1983, a municipality such as the Defendant in this case is liable only for " action pursuant to official municipal policy." Triplett v. Dist. of Columbia, 108 F.3d 1450, 1453, 323 U.S.App.D.C. 421 (D.C. Cir.1997) (citing Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978)).
Here, Defendant does not challenge whether Plaintiffs have established a prima facie case for discrimination; rather, it offers a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment actions: as Defendant explains, MAA's mismanagement of the District's local and federal public health service programs cost the District " millions of dollars" and resulted in negative audit findings that " jeopardized the city's bond rating." Def.'s Mot. at 3. DHCF was created to " fix the problems and shortcomings of the existent system," which included terminating seventy-nine positions and creating sixty-two new positions. Id. at 4-5. Defendant points out that the reason for the realignment is laid out in " exhaustive detail in the Mayor's Transition Plan," which was submitted to the Council for the District of Columbia for approval more than a year before the RIF took place. Id. at 13. What is more, the Defendant argues, the decision as to which positions were eliminated in the RIF was made by many individuals from multiple District agencies, as well as the GW consulting team. These decision-makers, Defendant contends, did not know which employees were in the positions slated for elimination. In other words, according to Defendant, the determination was made without consideration of race or age.
Defendant further argues that its lack of discriminatory intent in conducting the RIF is underscored by its emphasis on rehiring the individuals who were displaced as part of the RIF. " Employees subject to the RIF were given a list of vacancies, information on applying, a training session, and 'at least 8 hours of administrative leave to work on resumes and applications.'" Id. at 15. In addition, the displaced employees were given priority consideration for reemployment at DHCF. Id. What is more, Defendant claims, DHCF chose to post internally (exclusively) forty-four of the sixty-two new positions created, thereby increasing the likelihood that the displaced employees would be rehired. Id. This led to almost 60% of the displaced employees being rehired within DHCF with little or no break in employment. Id. Defendant alleges that it would likely have been a greater percentage, but 20% of the displaced employees (including five of the 17 Plaintiffs in this case) chose not to apply for a new position. Id. at 15, 16 n. 6. Finally, the District points out that it is undisputed there was no appreciable change in the demographics of DHCF's workforce after the RIF and rehiring occurred (noting that the median age of DHCF employees was 46 before and after the RIF, and the number of
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DHCF employees self-identifying as " Black, not of Hispanic origin" was 47.58% before and after the RIF). Id. at 15-16.
Plaintiffs concede that the District's healthcare system was poorly administered under MAA. Nevertheless, they charge that the District's asserted nondiscriminatory reason for creating DHCF is pretextual, and that the true reason that the District implemented the RIF and created new positions was so that it could get rid of " incumbent and older African American employees" and replace them with " younger, inexperienced Caucasian" employees. Pls' Opp. at 1-2. Plaintiffs direct this Court's attention to the following " facts" that they allege are both material and in dispute, in support of their claim that the District's proffered reason is pretext for discrimination:
1. The District only superficially changed job descriptions so that it could list them as " new positions" ;
2. The District failed to provide " incumbent employees" with an opportunity to review and appeal the job description and classification of the new positions;
3. " [P]reserve[ing] the employment of [DHCF's] existing employees" was not a priority for DHCF;
4. Human Resources at DHCF, not the GW consultants, had the primarily responsibility for drafting the job descriptions for the new positions;
5. The GW consultants did not determine which positions would be eliminated in the RIF;
6. GW consultant team members were hired into the newly created DHCF positions;
7. DHCF intentionally omitted approximately 17 employees from its " retention register" ;
8. Plaintiff Eric Walcott was told at one of DHCF's job fairs that some of the new positions, including the one to which Mr. Walcott was applying, had already been filled prior to the job fair;
9. Mr. Walcott was not included on DHCF's " Displaced Employee and Preferred List," meaning he was not given priority treatment for hiring into the new positions;
10. Another Plaintiff, Clement Eyo, applied but was not selected for one of the new positions; instead, the position went to a lesser qualified candidate; and
11. The individuals who were hired into the new positions were hired because they are Caucasian and friends of the DHCF Director.
A number of these alleged factual disputes can be dispensed with quickly. For instance, in number 4 above, Plaintiffs dispute that the GW consultants had primary responsibility for drafting the job descriptions for the newly created positions; yet, later in their opposition, Plaintiffs concede that the " GW Consultants were primarily responsible for creating the new positions for DHCF." Pls.' Opp. at 12. Accordingly, this is not a disputed fact.[5]
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In addition, several of the above alleged disputes of fact are not supported by citations to the record. For instance, in number 6, Plaintiffs allege that GW consultant team members were hired into the newly created DHCF positions. As evidence of this, Plaintiffs allege that Jessica Schubel, one of the GW consultants, " began working at DHCF in 2009." Pls.' Opp. at 12 (citing Schubel deposition transcript (" Schubel Tr." at 13). However, Plaintiffs' citation to the record in support of this allegation does not support Plaintiffs' claim that Ms. Schubel worked at DHCF, let alone that she was hired into one of the newly created positions. Instead, the record simply states that Ms. Schubel was hired by " the District of Columbia." Schubel Tr. at 13. Moreover, Plaintiffs cite to no evidence in the record demonstrating that other GW consultants were hired by DHCF into the newly created positions.
Similarly, Plaintiffs allege that DHCF intentionally omitted approximately 17 employees from its " retention register," (alleged fact number 7 above), declaring in an incomplete sentence: " Defendant's intentional omission of approximately seventeen (17) or more similarly-situated Caucasian employees hired within the one year immediately preceding the Reduction in Force (" RIF" )." Pls.' Opp. at 13. Not only do Plaintiffs fail to explain the significance of this alleged fact, they fail to cite to any evidence in the record in support of this allegation.[6] As such, Plaintiffs' alleged fact numbers 4, 6, and 7 do not constitute a dispute of material fact that prohibit summary judgment.
The Court will now address the remainder of the " disputed facts" to which Plaintiffs cite in support of their claim that Defendant's proffered reason for creating DHCF was merely pretext for discrimination. First, Plaintiffs claim that the job descriptions for the newly created positions were only " superficially" revised from the descriptions of the eliminated positions. Plaintiffs argue that this is evidence that Defendant created DHCF simply so that it could create the new positions, thereby " circumvent[ing] the inconvenient obstacle of terminating tenured employees for cause." Pls.' Opp. at 9. As evidence of this, Plaintiffs point to the deposition testimony of Lewis Norman, a Human Resources Specialist with the District and the Defendant's designated Rule 30(b)(6) witness. However, this Court has carefully reviewed those portions of Mr. Norman's deposition transcript to which Plaintiffs cite, and there is nothing in the cited evidence that even remotely suggests that the job descriptions were modified in order to further a discriminatory agenda on Defendant's
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part.[7] Next, Plaintiffs argue that DHCF Director, Julie Hudman, admitted that she " was not concerned with preserving the employment of current employees in the reorganization" and this admission, according to Plaintiffs, is evidence that Defendant's proffered reason is pretext for discrimination. Pls' Opp. at 10. However, once again, this Court's review of the cited portion of Ms. Hudman's deposition transcript reveals no facts upon which a reasonable jury could deduce that the RIF and subsequent rehiring was the result of discriminatory intent. Id.
Next Plaintiffs cite to the interrogatory responses of one Plaintiff, Mr. Walcott, as further evidence that Defendant was motivated by discriminatory intent. Dkt. No. 100, Ex. 15. As a preliminary matter, this Court notes that the interrogatory responses contain multiple unsworn, out of court statements that were allegedly made by DHCF employees and that are offered for the truth of the matter asserted. Plaintiffs have not identified any hearsay exception that would allow the Court to consider these statements, much less carried their burden of showing that such an exception applies. Nevertheless, even if this Court were to assume the veracity of such statements, the statements, along with the remaining allegations in Mr. Walcott's interrogatory responses, are not sufficient to create a dispute of material fact.
This is because nowhere in the interrogatory responses does Mr. Walcott even allege (let alone cite to evidence in the record) that he was terminated and later not rehired because of his race or age.[8] Instead, Mr. Walcott's own interrogatory responses offer a nondiscriminatory reason for why he was not rehired. Id. at 15 (noting that the co-worker who interviewed him for the newly created position did not like him because a project had once been taken from the co-worker and given to Mr. Walcott).
Mr. Walcott does allege in his interrogatory responses that he was not included on DHCF's Displaced Employee and Preferred List. Id. at 14. But, once again, Mr. Walcott does not allege that this " oversight" was the result of discriminatory animus. Although failure to follow procedures, as appears to be the case here, can be circumstantial evidence that an employer's stated explanation is pretextual, the employee must also provide sufficient evidence that the offered explanation is pretext for discrimination. See Evans v. Sebelius, 716 F.3d 617, 623, 405 U.S.App.D.C. 50 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (even when employee demonstrates that a hiring decision " was procedurally flawed, ... she must still provide sufficient evidence that the government's proffered explanation is pretext for racial discrimination" ) (emphasis in original). Here, Mr. Walcott does not allege discriminatory intent, and Plaintiffs have failed to cite to any evidence in the record that would allow a reasonable jury to find that Mr. Walcott's exclusion from the Displaced Employee and Preferred List was anything other than a simple mistake.
Lastly, Mr. Walcott alleges in his interrogatory responses that while he was at a
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DHCF job fair, he was told by then-Director of the Medicaid Administration, Bob Maruca, that a number of the newly created positions had already been filled " by a select group of people" who, Mr. Walcott claims, had two things in common: they were (1) Caucasian, and (2) friends of the DHCF Director. Dkt. No. 100, Ex. 15 at 12. Once again, this statement, without more, is insufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that the RIF and rehiring process was motivated by race-and age-based discrimination. Plaintiffs have failed to provide any of the evidence necessary for a jury to reach such a decision, namely: (1) Plaintiffs applied for the positions offered at the job fair, (2) Plaintiffs were qualified for the positions; (3) who was hired into the positions; (4) what the age and race is of those individuals; and (5) Plaintiffs were more qualified for the positions than those individuals. In short, Mr. Walcott's interrogatory responses contain only his personal conclusions, conclusory allegations, bare assertions, and subjective beliefs. They do not include any specific facts to support these conclusions, allegations, and beliefs, and as such, do not create an issue of material fact.
Next, Plaintiffs contend that Plaintiff Clement Eyo's statements in an email to District Human Resources Director Brender Gregory are evidence of discrimination. Specifically, in his email, Mr. Eyo stated that he was denied a new position for which he applied because his name was removed from the list of individuals being considered for the position and replaced with " the name of the person [DHCF] intended to give the job to." Dkt. No. 100, Ex. 16 at 2. However, review of Mr. Eyo's email shows that it is completely devoid of any suggestion that the RIF and rehiring process was tainted by race- or age-based discrimination. Accordingly, Mr. Eyo's email is insufficient to raise a dispute of fact.
Lastly, Plaintiffs cite to an email from Candice Young, a former HR Advisor in the District's Human Resources Office, dated January 2, 2010. Dkt. No. 100, Ex. 11. In the email, Ms. Young accuses the Human Resource Office of hiring improprieties. Id. But, once again, there are no allegations that the improprieties were motivated by race and/or age discrimination. Id. Instead, Ms. Young specifically states that the improprieties were due to cronyism. Id. (" I then stated that I would no longer have anything to do with bringing people on board just because they were friends of the Director." ); (" Our current employees...were losing their jobs because we wanted to hire friends of the administration." ). Even if the Court were to assume that Ms. Young's claims of cronyism are accurate, such statements do not create a dispute of fact as to whether the RIF was motivated by race-and age-based discrimination. Cronyism, while disfavored, is not illegal. See Barry v. Moran, 661 F.3d 696, 708 (1st Cir. 2011) (" [A]n employment decision motivated by cronyism, not discrimination, would be 'lawful, though perhaps unsavory.'" ) (quoting Fernandes v. Costa Bros. Masonry, Inc., 199 F.3d 572, 587 (1st Cir. 1999), abrogated on other grounds by Desert Palace v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 123 S.Ct. 2148, 156 L.Ed.2d 84 (2003); Neal v. Roche, 349 F.3d 1246, 1252 (10th Cir. 2003) (" [E]mployers are free to employ nondiscriminatory criteria that are 'unfair' or even reprehensible, so long as they are not discriminatory." ).
Finally, the Court notes that Plaintiffs fail to address whatsoever the undisputed fact that there is no difference--significant or otherwise--between the demographics of DHCF's workforce before and after the RIF. Def.'s St. Facts ¶ 37. As previously stated, the median age of DHCF employees
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was 46 before the RIF and 46 after the RIF; the number of DHCF employees self-identifying as " Black not of Hispanic origin" was 47.58% before the RIF and 47.58% after the RIF. Id. Plaintiffs' complete failure to address this issue--alone--is sufficient to warrant summary judgment for Defendant. See Aliotta v. Bair, 614 F.3d 556, 565, 392 U.S.App.D.C. 239 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (upholding an award of summary judgment because employees' " statistics could not support an inference of discrimination).
For the foregoing reasons, this Court HEREBY GRANTS Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 98). Plaintiffs' claims are DISMISSED with prejudice.
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June 26, 1968
SIDNEY SCHWARTZ, PLAINTIFF,v.MAX W. GOLDBERG, DEFENDANT
Abraham N. Geller, J.
Motion for an installment payment order pursuant to CPLR 5226 is granted. There is no merit to judgment debtor's argument that this judgment creditor should not be granted a preference over the seven other judgment creditors, who are waiting in line on the basis of income executions delivered to the Sheriff to follow in order the current income execution after each is fully satisfied. This, of course, is no concern of judgment debtor. But, in any event, that is not a valid objection under the statutory scheme of enforcement proceedings. Priority does not depend on the time element of obtaining of judgments but rather of time of delivery of income executions with respect to that particular device under CPLR 5231 or of time of filing of orders for payment, such as under CPLR 5226, which is a distinct and separate device. The installment payment order device may be availed of in a proper case whereby a judgment creditor may proceed under both CPLR 5226 and 5231, as well as to allow a judgment creditor, other than the one collecting on an income execution, to procure payment on his judgment without waiting for full payment of prior income executions. The fact that the other judgment creditors could have, but did not, proceed under CPLR 5226 does not affect the right of this creditor to obtain payment by proper application in accordance with its provisions. In Matter of Caruso v. Schilingo (23 A.D.2d 627), though the facts indicated that it was not a proper case for such relief, it is clear that there is no impediment to granting relief under CPLR 5226 to one judgment creditor despite the existence of several prior income executions. Taking into consideration "the reasonable requirements of the judgment debtor and his dependents" in the light of his salary, the 10% income execution, and the part-time earnings of his wife, installment payments of $25 per week are fixed (cf. Matter of Widder Bros. v. Kaffee, 19 A.D.2d 817).
© 1998 VersusLaw Inc.
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Harley Qwednesday :: Suicide Squad Harley Quinn and Joker ReAction figures
As for blind boxes. I avoid those as a rule. I'll just rely on buying a much-needed figure second-hand if/when they become available.
Then there's the latest in 'taking your money': Blind subscription boxes. These are the absolute worst. You don't know what you might even end up with until you end up with it. Are you insane?
Anyways, like with blind boxes, when I find out there is something awesome in a blind subscription box, I just either try to get it for a good price second-hand, or forget about it because the price is too damn high.
Fortunately when I found out about the recent DC Legion of Collectors subscription box that included a ReAction styled Suicide Squad Harley Quinn and Joker and went looking for them second-hand, I was able to score both (honestly I'd have been happy with just Harley) for less than one would have cost me at retail...shipped!
I've read online that a full line of ReAction Suicide Squad figures are set for release, and as a fan of the movie I may be tempted to complete the team in ReAction form. But if I don't get any more I'm glad I have these two (or at least Harley.) This Harley is definitely a highlight of my Harley Quinn collection. And thankfully I didn't have to sign up for a bind subscription box to get them!
Looney Tunes Kidrobot Mini Series :: Bugs Bunny in Drag
And while Bugs Bunny merchandise isn't exactly slopping all over toy store shelves these days, you would think there'd be a few historical examples of Bugs Bunny in a dress that you could add to your waskally wabbit collection.
But to my admittedly limited knowledge, this Kidrobot vinyl Bugs Bunny is the only Bugs Bunny in drag ever made in toy form.
The figures from the Kidrobot Looney Tunes Mini Series are of course highly stylized, but there's no mistaking Bugs Bunny in the get-up he slapped on to mess with a couple of stupid Southern brothercousin rivals.
The Kidrobot Looney Tunes series is blind-boxed, which I hate, but fortunately Bugs-in-a-dress isn't particularly rare or sought after, so I was able to get him opened for retail price off eBay.
If you know of any other examples of Bugs Bunny in drag merchandise, let me know about it in the comments!
Who BootLEGOs The Watchmen?
I've wanted a Rorschach minifig for ever now, so when he popped up during one of my eBay BootLEGO searches I had to bite. I would have been fine with just Rorschach, but the price of the whole series was only a bit more costly than an official LEGO minifig, so I figured 'what the heck.'
And I'm glad I did! this series (well, with the exception of one) is extraordinary. Top quality bootLEGOs right here!
The Watchmen BootLEGO set is a ridiculous and amazing bunch of minifigs that I recommend for everyone who is a fan of the iconic comic book storyline! They're well made and of the highest bootleg quality.
Who watches the Watchmen? It could be YOU!
DC Superhero Girls Batgirl and Special Guest: The Batmobile!
I wanted to see how her new Batgirl matched up with my Power Attack Batmobile from 2012, and the pair look made for each other!
Also, it only cost me a dollar. A dollar Batmobile is better than a dollar every day of the week!
Although, a DC Superhero Girls Giganta BAF would be AWESOME!
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text:
1345 Quail Creek Circle Curve, Eagan MN, 55123
Sold Price:
6 beds , 2 Full/2 Three-Qtr/1 Half baths
4,566 sqft
Status: Sold
Listing Provided Courtesy Of: D.R. Horton, Inc.
Real Living 1st MSP Realty
Last Updated: 12/2/2016 4:40 PM
Description for 1345 Quail Creek Circle Curve Eagan, MN 55123
Main floor guest bedroom, 4 beds/3 baths up plus loft and laundy, finished lower level w wet bar & fireplace. 3 stall garage. High end finishes, luxury home and home site. Community pool, playground, picnic area. Great access to freeways, MPLS & ST PAUL.
Sold Price:
Sold Date:01/04/2016
2 Full/2 Three-Qtr/1 Half
4,566 (approx)
Main floor guest bedroom, 4 beds/3 baths up plus loft and laundy, finished lower level w wet bar & fireplace. 3 stall garage. High end finishes, luxury home and home site. Community pool, playground, picnic area. Great access to freeways, MPLS & ST PAUL.
Listing Information
4,566 Sq. Ft. (approx)
City Water - Connected
City Sewer - Connected
School Information
Room Information
Main Level, Great Room
Separate/Formal Dining Room, Kitchen/Dining Room
Main Floor 3/4 Bath, Upper Level Full Bath, Upper Level 3/4 Bath, Private Master, Full Master, Jack and Jill, Rough In, Separate Tub & Shower
Interior Features
3,400 Sq. Ft. Above Ground ,1,166 Sq. Ft. Below Ground
Range, Microwave, Exhaust Fan/Hood, Dishwasher, Refrigerator, Disposal
Hardwood, Tile
Central Air
Gas Heat, Forced Air
Finished (Livable), Drain Tiled, Sump Pump, Daylight/Lookout Windows, Poured Concrete, Unfinished
2, Living Room, Gas Burning
Kitchen Window, Vaulted Ceiling(s), Ceiling Fan(s), Washer/Dryer Hookup
Exterior / Lot Features
3 Garage Spaces, Attached Garage
Shakes, Brick, Stone, Fiber Board
Sod Included in Price
Community Features
Community Pool
Driving Directions
INTERSECTION OF PILOT KNOB & CLIFF ROAD - HEAD EAST 1/2 MILE ON CLIFF ROAD. NEIGHBORHOOD IS ON SOUTH SIDE OF CLIFF ROAD. Turn from Cliff on to Dakota Path and take to Shadow Creek Curve.
Financial Considerations
Sanitation, Shared Amenities
Eagan Real Estate
Eagan is located in Minnesota. Eagan, Minnesota 55123 has a population of 64,538.
The median household income in Eagan, Minnesota 55123 is $79,639. The median household income for the surrounding county is $73,288 compared to the national median of $53,046. The median age of people living in Eagan 55123 is 36.3 years.
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Share < br />this article:
Celebs Preview Narciso Rodriguez for Kohl's
Kristin Koch
| October 4, 2012 - 5:32 pm
Share < br />this article:
Olivia Palermo, Jessica Alba, Michelle Williams sport Narciso for Kohl's upcoming line.
Jessica Alba
Michelle Williams
Olivia Palermo
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text:
Mercator LightingMercator Polly Pendant Light- MG1331$69.95 $55.00
Mercator – Polly Pendant Light
The Polly pendant light by Mercator Lighting offers a unique raw industrial look featuring a variety of different finishes to suit individual tastes. The Polly pendant light is part of the raw industrial trend that features the layering of luxurious finishes such as concrete and copper with a neutral colour palette to create a warm, earthy look. A carbon filament globe is the perfect complement to the Polly pendant light.
Available in:
- Natural Timber MG1331TMB
- Concrete MG1331CNT
- Stone (White) MG1331STN
- Metal canopy
- 120cm Black fabric cord
- Energy saving & LED globe compatible
- Wattage 25W max
- Lamp Type E27 (not included)
- Diameter 65mm
- Height 100mm
- Cord Length 1200mm (adjustable at installation)


text:
December 5, 2016 · 5 minute read
Now that our trees balance themselves we can keep replicating the built-in set API.
This week, we'll answer two questions:
And we're going to do it recursively!
November 27, 2016 · 6 minute read
In this series, we've already implemented sets, convenient ways to create them and rotation.
Next, we'll make our trees use those rotation functions!
November 21, 2016 · 6 minute read
Last time we started making a set using a binary search tree.
Let's continue by adding more functionality to our set!
We're going to improve it by making sure our set stays in proper order.
November 13, 2016 · 6 minute read
Today we're starting a series on building functional data structures using Elm.
The goal: build a native set implementation from first principles.
We're going to reimplement the standard library's Set API.
This is going to be a toy implementation, so we won't optimize as much as we could, but we'll be able to learn some new things!
November 7, 2016 · 4 minute read
You know how you stay up late trying to figure out why your recursive types just. won't. decode?
I've done it too.
Wouldn't it be nice if it would, you know, just work how you wanted it to?
Fortunately, Json.Decode.Extra.lazy exists, so it you can get it to work right away!


text:
Empleos de Técnico de teléfonos en Rancagua
…ability to communicate clearly and effectively in writing as well as on the telephone and in person. Be able to document policies, procedures and work instructions.
…supplies to the various nursing units on a routine basis. ?? Answers telephone and work area window, assisting physicians, nursing personnel, and others by directing
…Skill in organization Skill in using basic office equipment, includingcomputer, telephone , photocopier, and fax machine Ability to operate ultrasound equipment
Pharmacy Technician Buyer ( Job Number: 26630-12339 ) Work Location : United States-Virginia-Dulles-Stone Springs Hospital Center Schedule : Full-time Description
…in organizationSkill in using basic office equipment, including computer, telephone , photocopier, and fax machineAbility to operate ultrasound equipmentAbility to
?The Rehabilitation Nurse Technician is responsible for:- Providing direct patient care activities appropriate to training and competency- Assisting RN/LPN in
…Job Responsibilities: Responsible for providing the first-line of post-sales telephone technical support of hardware, systems, sub-systems and/or applications for
…797 standardsDepartmental OperationsParticipates in one on one training of new technician staff.Answers the telephone , identifying self and department. Directs
…to those you serve, apply today! Position Summary The Specialty Pharmacy Technician will assist in providing specialty pharmacy services under the direct supervision


text:
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This product dispatches in 8-10 business days*. Conditions Apply*
Order today with Bajaao Express , and your product will dispatch in 24 hours
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BAJAAO India introduces the Boss DP-8 stereo damper pedal.
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text:
Added to Shopping Bag
Adidas Athletic Shoes
Listed by Penny Lane
Size: 8.5 Regular (M, B)
Price: $194.05
Returnable for Site Credit.
You can request a return for Tradesy Site Credit within 4 days of delivery. FREE return shipping.
If your item was misrepresented in any way, you can file a misrepresentation claim. Tradesy will investigate and you'll be eligible for a Full Refund.
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Athletic Shoes
Shipping Included This item ships with a Tradesy label. Learn More
Pay with Credit Card, PayPal, or Affirm.
This item may have been worn but has no visible signs of wear.
addias high top sneakers
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Sat 12/10/16 - Wed 12/14/16 (4-8 days)
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text:
Provides practical insights from quantitative legal research on corporate law, capital markets, finance, and mergers & acquisitions, as well as law schools and legal education. By Professor Robert Anderson.
Covers Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases.
News and commentary on Directors and Officers Liability. By Kevin M. LaCroix.
Covers mergers and acquisitions, investment banking, IPOs, private equity, hedge funds, venture capital and law. From The New York Times.
Offers legal news, notes and commentary of interest to small government contractors. By Steven Koprince.
Offers Delaware Chancery Court and Supreme Court updates. By Francis G.X. Pileggi.
Edited by D. Daniel Sokol and Shubha Ghosh.
Covers news, events and developments in business, intellectual property, employment law. By Morse, Barnes-Brown & Pendleton.
Covers fraud, international law, immigration and business formation. By Boyer Law Firm, PLLC.
Commentary on law, business, economics and culture. By UCLA School of Law Professor Stephen Bainbridge.
Covers New Jersey business, labor and employment, estate planning and consumer law. By McLaughlin & Nardi, LLC.
Covers compliance and business ethics. By Doug Cornelius.
Edited by C. Steven Bradford, Joshua P. Fershee, J. Haskell Murray, Marcia L. Narine, Stefan J. Padfield and Anne Tucker.
Arent Fox's fashion law blog highlights critical issues for designers, retailers, and manufacturers.
Covers laws relating to pre-need and death care compliance, serving banks, funeral homes, crematories, and cemetaries. By William Stalter.
Commentary on business law, antitrust, and corporate governance by law professors and economists. By Adam Mossoff, Ben Sperry, Eric Helland, Geoffrey Manne, Gus Hurwitz, Larry Ribstein, Mike Sykuta, Paul Rubin and Thom Lambert.
Covers corporate, employment law, environmental, forms, insurance, IP, litigation and more. By Geoffrey G. Gussis.
Covers corporate and securities law. By Broc Romanek.
Covers mergers & acquisitions. From editor Broc Romanek, who is also editor of TheCorporateCounsel.net.
Covers issues that concern business entities, taxation, and employment law. By Parsonage Vandenack Williams LLC.
Covers boards of directors, corporate elections, executive compensation, practice insights, legal developments, securities regulation, and Sarbanes-Oxley. Sponsored by the HLS Corporate Governance Program.
Covers California securities law, corporate governance, mergers & acquisitions and securities litigation. By Keith Paul Bishop.
A collection of insights and analysis on hot topics impacting companies, funds, dealmakers and directors. By Akin Gump.
Reviews Indian corporate and business law. By Umakanth V.
Edited by Franklin G. Snyder, D. A. Jeremy Telman, Nancy S. Kim, Meredith R. Miller, Myanna Dellinger, Jeffrey L. Harrison and Michael Malloy.
Covers North Carolina law.
Covers North Carolina business and personal injury issues.
Covers estate planning, probate, taxes, elder law, business law and employment law issues. By Law Office of David M. Goldman PLLC.
Covers disputes between companies and executives. Published by Zuckerman Spaeder LLP.
A blog focused on the latest class action developments and trends by the attorneys of Carlton Fields Jorden Burt.
Covers practice tips and new legal developments of particular interest to California legal professionals. The CEB blog covers a wide range of practice areas from estate planning to civil litigation, along with posts relating to the practice of law generally.
Covers business litigation, civil procedure, personal injury and punitive damages. By Jeff Blackwell.
Covers issues emerging in the legal and business communities. By Lawson Lundell LLP.
Covers current antitrust news and regulatory developments. By Sheppard Mullin.
Covers Boston Metro Area business law. By Richard Mucci.
Covers false advertising and intellectual property issues. By Professor Rebecca Tushnet.
Covers business law, employment law, estate planning, family law, and nonprofit law information for Lancaster County and Pennsylvania residents. From Russell, Krafft & Gruber.
Covers business, immigration and real estate law. By Stok Folk + Kon, P.A.
By Morris James LLP.
Covers Texas business law. By Leiza Dolghih.
Covers corporate and commercial practice in the Delaware Court of Chancery. By Fox Rothschild LLP.
Covers corporate governance, human rights, trade and transparency. By Foley Hoag LLP.
Covers legal news. By Reid & Hellyer.
Tracks judicial developments in Maryland business law. By the Business Law Section of the Maryland State Bar Association.
Covers class action litigation, fraud, consumer law and shareholder disputes. By DiTommaso Lubin.


text:
Format Maps
Results: 1-2 of 2 | Refined by: Original Format: Maps Remove Subject: Middle Atlantic States Remove Subject: Railroads Remove Subject: Canals Remove
MapMap of the canals and rail roads connecting the Broad Top Coa... Map of parts of Pennyslvania, New Jersey, Maryland, and Delaware indicating major drainage, relief by hachures, boundaries, cities, and towns. A table of distances appears at left of map.
- Contributor: Robert, W. F.
- Date: 184?
MapMap of the canals and railroads for transporting anthracite c... Detailed map of eastern Pennsylvania and parts of New York and New Jersey showing drainage, relief by hachures, state and county boundaries, cities, towns, and coal fields.
- Contributor: Lorenz, William
- Date: 1856


text:
SHIRT GRANDRef..72394
Your little boy will love this shirt with slim-fit jeans. So stylish!
GRAND Shirt, shirt collar, long sleeves with elbow patches, print, fake pocket, button fastening.
Coton 100%
You'll definitely fall in love with this fake fur jacket. A must-have piece for winter. The HIBOU sleeveless {0} jacket, high collar, belt, fake fur.
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text: This is a level pack that I made for Enigmo, it is compatible with the iPhone and iPod touch. This level pack is a bit harder than the original that came on the original app, as if that wasn't hard enough. to install ssh into your device navigate to /private/var/mobile/Applications then find which folder contains enigmo once you find that go into the folder Enigmo.app and replace the MainDataFile.egm with the one provided here. you might want to keep a backup of the old one just in case you want to use it again. Code: http://[PIRACY.rs].com/files/131234421/MainDataFile.egm


text:
Soldiers Club Oldies Night - Cannock
Anglesey Street Cannock WS12 1AA GB
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Soldiers Club Oldies Night Details
Soldiers Club - Anglesy St Hednesford WS12 1AB Northern Soul & Classic Motown Fri 14th Oct 8.00-12.30 £3.00 adm with Gaz Lees, Little Scotty and guests details tel 07956 028190
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text:
Grüezi Audrey!
I'm happy to introduce to the world, Audrey Elizabeth McBride! (For you non-Swiss folks, "grüezi" is equivalent to "hi" or "hello" here in Basel.)
Audrey was born in Basel, Switzerland at the Universitätsspital (University Hospital) at 8:50pm on Tuesday, 24 November 2015. She weighed in at 6 pounds 15 ounces, and measured 19.7 inches in length.
Both Alicia and Audrey are doing great and getting a lot of needed rest. Audrey's middle name is borrowed from Alicia's great grandmother, Elizabeth Daingerfield. The selection of her first name followed precedent set with Marlowe, and wasn't decided until about 20 hours after her birth. There were many great choices, but in the end we chose Audrey and an overwhelming majority of the hospital staff agreed. :-)
For those of you looking for pics, email me.