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argued: April 15, 1988.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICAv.MICHAEL SCIARRA AND JOSEPH SHERIDAN, PETITIONERS HONORABLE HAROLD A. ACKERMAN, NOMINAL RESPONDENT. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA V. LOCAL 560 OF THE INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN, AND HELPERS OF AMERICA, SALVATORE PROVENZANO, PRESIDENT; JOSEPH SHERIDAN, VICE PRESIDENT, JOSEPHINE PROVENZANO SEPTEMBRE, SECRETARY-TREASURER; J. W. DILDINE, RECORDING SECRETARY; THOMAS REYNOLDS, SR., TRUSTEE; MICHAEL SCIARRA, TRUSTEE; STANLEY JARONKO, TRUSTEE; TRUCKING EMPLOYEES OF NORTH JERSEY WELFARE FUND, INC.; SALVATORE PROVENZANO, EMPLOYEE TRUSTEE; THOMAS REYNOLDS, SR., EMPLOYEE TRUSTEE; LOCAL 560 OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES SEVERANCE PAY PLAN; SALVATORE PROVENZANO, TRUSTEE AND ADMINISTRATOR; JOSEPHINE B. SEPTEMBRE, TRUSTEE AND ADMINISTRATOR; ANTHONY PROVENZANO, INDIVIDUALLY; NUNZIO PROVENZANO, INDIVIDUALLY; STEPHEN ANDRETTA, INDIVIDUALLY; THOMAS ANDRETTA, INDIVIDUALLY; GABRIEL BRIGUGLIO, INDIVIDUALLY. MICHAEL SCIARRA AND JOSEPH SHERIDAN, APPELLANTS
Petition for Writ of Mandamus, N.J. Civil No. 82-0689.
Hutchinson, Scirica, and Rosenn, Circuit Judges.
Opinion OF THE COURT
ROSENN, Circuit Judge.
This complex appeal presents several novel questions arising out of a federal district court's continuing efforts to purge Local 560 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters of a twenty-five year history of corruption and indignity. On December 17, 1987, the United States sought an order from Judge Harold A. Ackerman of the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey compelling the petitioners, Michael Sciarra and Joseph Sheridan, to give testimony by oral examination. The petitioners thereafter filed a cross-motion demanding Judge Ackerman's recusal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455. By order dated February 8, 1988, the district court granted the Government's application, and denied petitioners' cross-motion. Sheridan and Sciarra now appeal. We affirm the district court's order compelling the petitioners to submit to oral depositions. We additionally vacate the district court's denial of petitioners' cross-motion and dismiss their appeal without prejudice.
We begin our disposition of the present appeal with an excursion into the history of its controversial antecedents. On March 9, 1982, the Government filed a civil complaint against Local 560 and twelve individual defendants alleging violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § § 1961 et seq.*fn1 See United States v. Local 560, International Brotherhood of Teamsters Chauffeurs, Warehousemen, and Helpers of America, et al., 581 F. Supp. 279 (D.N.J. 1984). Among the named individual defendants were the petitioners who at the time of suit, were members of Local 560's executive board. After a fifty-one day bench trial, the district court held that members of the Provenzano crime family, aided and abetted by Local 560's executive board, acquired an interest in and control of the union through a pattern of racketeering activity in contravention of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b), (c) and (d).
Relying upon the expansive provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 1964, the district court proceeded to fashion an equitable remedy unprecedented in scope and in imagination. See id. at 337-38. Recognizing the likelihood of future RICO violations, the court enjoined Provenzano group defendants Stephen Andretta and Gabriel Briguglio from any subsequent affiliation with Local 560.*fn2 It additionally directed the removal of the Local's entire executive board in favor of a trusteeship designed to "foster the conditions under which reasonably free supervised elections can be held . . . ."*fn3 Id. at 337. Upon the completion of free elections, the trusteeship was to be dissolved.*fn4 Id. To further effectuate its remedy, the court retained jurisdiction over Local 560 as a nominal defendant. Id. The Local's Welfare Fund and Severance Pay Plan were, however, explicitly dismissed from the action. Finally, the court stayed the implementation of its injunctive relief pending appeal.
On December 12, 1985, we affirmed the district court's opinion in its entirety, United States v. Local 560, 780 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1985), and subsequently denied petitioners' applications for panel rehearing and for rehearing in banc.*fn5 Thus, on June 23, 1986, some two years after the issuance of its final judgment, the district court vacated the stay and appointed Joel R. Jacobson trustee. As a result, Sciarra relinquished his position as executive board president, an appointment he had held since October 29, 1984. Sheridan correspondingly resigned the board's vice-presidency.
In the succeeding months, the trustee acted in conformity with the district court's 1984 judgment: Peter DeCarlo was permanently enjoined from entering Local 560's premises, and Teamster Joint Council 73 was compelled to recognize the trusteeship as the functional equivalent of the Local's former executive board. On May 12, 1987, however, the court replaced Jacobson with Edwin Steir.*fn6
On December 17, 1987, the Government, relying upon 18 U.S.C. § 1964, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, and upon the 1984 judgment, applied to Judge Ackerman for an order directing Sciarra, Sheridan, and former defendant Stanley Jaronko to show cause why they should not be compelled to submit to oral depositions at the Newark, New Jersey offices of the United States Attorney. Specifically, the Government sought information regarding Local 560's operations during the two year stay period, including Sciarra's role in the de-unionization of New England Motor Freight Company, his post-1984 communications with Stephen Andretta and Matthew Ianniello concerning the continued influence of the Provenzano group on Local 560, his employment of the DiBiasi law firm*fn7 to manage Local 560's Prepaid Legal Services Plan, and his failure to institute safeguards against corrupt union practices during his two year term as president of the executive board. The Government additionally intended to depose Sheridan regarding his participation in Sciarra's appointment as president and his failure, as vice-president of the executive board, to institute safeguards against abuses by employers and by employee representatives. The Government concluded its application by acknowledging that the petitioners' testimony might indeed form the predicate "for additional relief . . . necessary in order to prevent future racketeering violations involving the continued domination . . . and exploitation . . . of Local 560."
In response to the Government's discovery request, the petitioners filed a cross-motion seeking Judge Ackerman's disqualification pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) and (b)(1). Sheridan and Sciarra predicated their motion, in part, upon an affidavit submitted by Joel Jacobson which averred*fn8 that during the winter of 1986-1987, Judge Ackerman directed the former trustee to terminate two members of Local 560's Pension and Welfare Funds. When Jacobson expressed reluctance, the judge allegedly replied: "Joel, when it comes to members of Local 560, they're guilty until proven innocent." Jacobson added that Judge Ackerman repeated the phrase at a second meeting several days later. Jacobson's affidavit concluded by asserting that his discharge was based upon his "refusal to support [Judge Ackerman's] abandonment of the presumption of innocence for the officers and members of Local 560."*fn9
Petitioners additionally relied upon statements made by Judge Ackerman to several newspapers. In the October 8, 1987, edition of the "Bergen Record," Jacobson asserted that Judge Ackerman had directed him "to go get something on [Sciarra]." Moreover, an article appearing in the "Wall Street Journal" on February 10, 1987, quoted the judge as stating that:
Elements of the old regime are plotting to regain power. They're there, I know it . . . . It's like squeezing water out of a wash rag . . . . There's still a lot of dirty water in that rag . . . .
Finally, Sheridan and Sciarra based their motion upon a recent nationally televised CBS "60 Minutes" broadcast in which Judge Ackerman made extensive comments regarding the Local 560 litigation. For example, the judge asserted that:
Mikey Sciarra testified that he was praying for the return of Tony Pro Provenzano. Can you imagine? Here's a man who's president of a local union who knows that another individual, Anthony Provenzano, killed a fellow member of the union -- had him strangled -- was convicted of that charge -- stands convicted today of an extortion -- yet he's praying that Provenzano should return? What does it say for his character? . . . You had a police state in effect here in which democracy in this local union was just -- uh -- non-existent. They'd like to have an election which is similar to that conducted in the Soviet Union today -- one candidate, that's it.
In addition to alleging grounds for recusal based upon the appearance of partiality,*fn10 the petitioners contended that Judge Ackerman had "personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts" in violation of § 455(b)(1), and was related to a potential material witness in violation of § 455(b)(5)(iv). Specifically, Sheridan and Sciarra contended that the judge had extrajudicial knowledge of Local 560's Prepaid Legal Services Plan, and that he was related to Gerald Glassman, a former attorney of New England Motor Freight, whose testimony might be necessary to future litigation.
On January 28, 1988, Judge Ackerman heard oral argument on the respective motions. The judge initially considered the appropriate substantive standard for recusal under section 455(a). Relying upon our decision in United States v. Dalfonso, 707 F.2d 757, 760 (3d Cir. 1983), he noted that disqualification is mandated "when a reasonable man knowing all the circumstances would harbor doubts concerning the judge's impartiality." The judge added that evidence of impartiality must relate to extrajudicial events or sources of information, "what a judge learns through proceedings in the case from which recusal is sought does not give rise to bias . . . ." See Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 290-291 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999, 68 L. Ed. 2d 200, 101 S. Ct. 1704 (1981). Judge Ackerman next observed that section 455(a) specifies no procedural guidelines for deciding a recusal motion. Therefore, he turned to 28 U.S.C. § 144,*fn11 and in conformity with it, accepted the truth of the allegations contained in the relevant affidavits.*fn12
Considering the merits of the petitioners' cross-motion, the judge decided that the contents of the February 10, 1987, "Wall Street Journal" article failed to demonstrate the requisite extrajudicial bias. He concluded that his statements asserting "that the 'old regime' still plotted to regain power, or that more 'squeezing' was required," constituted nothing more than restatements of his earlier trial findings recognizing the need to insulate Local 560 against the continuing influence of the Provenzano group. He similarly asserted that his alleged remark instructing Jacobson "to get something on [Sciarra]" also failed to support a finding of extrajudicial bias. Judge Ackerman relied upon his prior adjudication of Sciarra's RICO liability to justify his directive to the trustee "to focus part of his energies on Mr. Sciarra in working to ensure that the Provenzano Group was out and staying out."*fn13
The judge next evaluated the prejudicial implications of his alleged statement concerning the application of a presumption of guilt to Local 560's members. Judge Ackerman found that an examination of the context in which the comment was made precluded any inference of bias. Specifically, he noted that although the alleged comment appeared to concern a discussion between Jacobson and the court about criminal trials, "the case at hand is a civil case, in which civil liability, not guilt, is ultimately at stake." The judge concluded that the comment would therefore make "no sense to a reasonable, informed person . . . ."*fn14 Finally, the judge rejected the petitioners' allegations that he had extrajudicial knowledge of a disputed fact, and that he was related to a potential material witness within the meaning of § 455(b)(iv).
Having denied petitioners' cross-motion, the district court next considered whether it had authority to compel Sheridan and Sciarra to submit to oral depositions notwithstanding their compliance with the 1984 judgment.*fn15 Initially, the court held that the Government had standing to apply for discovery without the trustee's approval. Relying upon the petitioners' continuing status as defendants to the 1984 action, and the broad authority granted by the RICO statute to effectuate appropriate relief, the court concluded that Sheridan and Sciarra could indeed be required to give testimony. An order memorializing the court's respective dispositions was executed on February 8, 1988.
On February 9, 1988, the petitioners sought a stay of the court's order pending appeal. Observing that the importance of effectuating the objectives contained in the 1984 judgment outweighed any harm that petitioners might suffer by giving testimony, the court denied the application. Sheridan and Sciarra filed a notice of appeal on February 10, 1988. On February 16, the petitioners again applied for a stay and for a writ of mandamus, this time to the court of appeals.*fn16 On February 18, we denied petitioners' application and referred all subsequent motions to a merits panel.
On February 19, the petitioners, citing Judge Ackerman's bias against them, refused to comply with the district court's discovery order. After a hearing, Judge Ackerman held both Sheridan and Sciarra in contempt, but deferred the issue of sanctions for three days. On February 22, Sheridan agreed to testify, but upon Sciarra's continued refusal to obey the order, Judge Ackerman imposed a civil sanction of $500 per day which he stayed for twenty-four hours. On February 23, Sciarra also agreed to testify and the judge vacated the contempt order. This appeal followed.
The Government raises an initial challenge to our appellate jurisdiction, arguing that the February 8 order is not appealable within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 or any of its statutory exceptions.*fn17 The Government additionally contends that the petitioners are not entitled to a writ of mandamus based upon their failure to establish an irreparable injury, or a clear error of law. We first consider the appealability of that portion of the order compelling petitioners to give testimony.
Contrary to the Government, Sheridan and Sciarra contend that section 1291 confers jurisdiction upon us to review the discovery order. Noting that the order was entered long after the district court rendered a final judgment in the 1984 action, the petitioners argue that declaring it final will not result in interference with continuing trial court proceedings, nor create the possibility of repetitious appellate consideration of related issues. See 15 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 3916 at 607; United States v. State of Washington, 761 F.2d 1404 (9th Cir. 1985) (post-judgment order modifying fishing rights between Indian tribes and State of Washington held appealable under section 1291). Secondly, petitioners note that if the depositions fail to culminate in an actual suit, we will never again have occasion to review the order.
In the alternative, Sheridan and Sciarra assert that the discovery order is appealable under the collateral order doctrine, or as an interlocutory injunction pursuant to section 1292(a)(1). In the event that none of the preceding statutory predicates confers jurisdiction, petitioners request us to issue a writ of mandamus. Because we hold that the discovery order is appealable pursuant to section 1291, we need not address any of the petitioners' remaining jurisdictional arguments.
Section 1291 of 28 U.S.C. provides, in pertinent part, that "the court of appeals . . . shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States." The Supreme Court has observed that a final judgment or order is one that conclusively determines the rights of parties to the litigation, leaving "nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment." Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 467, 57 L. Ed. 2d 351, 98 S. Ct. 2454 (1978) (quoting Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233, 89 L. Ed. 911, 65 S. Ct. 631 (1945)). Perhaps recognizing the futility of attempting to distill the elusive and irreducible requisites of section 1291 into a single phrase, the Court has also observed that "finality is to be given a practical rather than a technical construction." Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152, 13 L. Ed. 2d 199, 85 S. Ct. 308 (1964). It may therefore prove more illuminating to examine the finality rule with reference to its underlying policies and purposes.
In Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374, 66 L. Ed. 2d 571, 101 S. Ct. 669 (1981), the Court asserted that the finality rule "emphasizes the deference that appellate courts owe to the trial judge as the individual initially called upon to decide the many questions of law and fact that occur in the course of a trial." Therefore, its well established hostility to piecemeal review derives, in part, from its desire to facilitate the independence of the trial judge, "as well as the special role that individual plays in our judicial system." Id. Moreover, the Court added, the rule is in accordance with the policy of avoiding "'the obstruction to just claims that would come from permitting the harassment and cost of a succession of separate appeals from the various rulings to which a litigation may give rise, from its initiation to entry of judgment.'" Id. (quoting Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325, 84 L. Ed. 783, 60 S. Ct. 540 (1940)). See also DiBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 124, 7 L. Ed. 2d 614, 82 S. Ct. 654 (1962). Finally, the rule also serves the important policy of promoting judicial administration. Firestone, 449 U.S. at 374; Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 170, 40 L. Ed. 2d 732, 94 S. Ct. 2140 (1974). In Borden v. Sylk, we succinctly summarized the preceding principles by suggesting that "the most important considerations in deciding the issue of finality are 'the inconvenience and costs of piecemeal review on the one hand and the danger of denying justice by delay on the other.'" 410 F.2d F.2d 843, 845 (3d Cir. 1969) (quoting Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 511, 94 L. Ed. 299, 70 S. Ct. 322 (1950)).
It is well established that discovery orders are generally not final, and hence not immediately appealable under section 1291, because the litigation in conjunction with which the discovery is sought is still pending in the district court. Gross v. D. Searle & Co., 738 F.2d 600, 602 (3d Cir. 1984); DeMasi v. Weiss, 669 F.2d 114, 121 (3d Cir. 1982). We have noted that discovery orders typically bespeak their own interlocutory character; they are necessarily only a stage in the litigation and almost invariably involve no determination of the substantive rights involved in the action. DeMasi, 669 F.2d at 122 (quoting Borden, 410 F.2d at 845).
We have also consistently held that a non-party witness to an action may obtain immediate review of a discovery order upon disobedience and contempt. DeMasi, 669 F.2d at 122. For example, in Gross, this court rejected an attempt by Eyelab Inc., a non-party witness, to obtain appellate review of its refusal to comply with a subpoena duces tecum absent the issuance of a contempt order. 738 F.2d at 603-04. Relying upon Alexander v. United States, 201 U.S. 117, 121, 50 L. Ed. 686, 26 S. Ct. 356 (1906), we noted that:
The Supreme Court [has] held that until the witness is adjudicated in contempt such an order lacks finality: "Let the court go further and punish the witness for contempt of its order, then arrives a right of review . . . ." . . . The non-party witnesses therefore have a remedy by appeal, but that right must await their willingness to stand in contempt of the district court's order. [citations omitted].
Requiring a non-party witness to stand in contempt as a precondition for appellate review accords with section 1291's policy of avoiding piecemeal litigation. The contempt order effectively transforms the "interlocutory" into the "final" by giving the witness a distinct and severable interest in the underlying action. See Cobbledick, 309 U.S. at 328. Although the disobedient witness inevitably disrupts the orderly progress of the litigation, courts are willing to tolerate his interference when, upon issuance of a contempt order, the witness has obtained a "stake" in the underlying action sufficient to warrant judicial intervention.*fn18 See id. at 328. Finally, we note that because a party may appeal from a final judgment, he may not obtain appellate review of a discovery order notwithstanding the entry of a civil contempt order against him. See DeMasi, 669 F.2d at 122; Cromaglass Corp. v. Ferm, 500 F.2d 601, 604 (3d Cir. 1974) (in banc).
Are there, however, situations in which a non-party witness may obtain appellate review of a discovery order without being held in contempt? We believe the answer lies in recognizing that section 1291's proscriptions against piecemeal review and against obstruction of just claims are not implicated absent the disruption of an ongoing case or controversy. We note that the phrase "interlocutory" necessarily implies some underlying proceeding from which the challenged discovery is an "off-shoot." The many cases that characterize discovery orders as interlocutory become inapposite, therefore, when there simply is no underlying suit to disrupt. The rationale for requiring a witness to incur a contempt order as a jurisdictional predicate similarly breaks down when there is no central proceeding from which he must be severed. See Cobbledick, 309 U.S. at 328; and see IBM v. United States, 493 F.2d 112, 115 n.1 (2d Cir. 1973) ("where the contempt proceeding is the sole court proceeding involved, as is the case where administrative agencies attempt to enforce orders, the civil contempt is not interlocutory in any sense"); Newton v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc., 726 F.2d 591, 593 (9th Cir. 1984) (discussing exceptions to requirement that non-party in discovery dispute must first suffer contempt). Thus, Professors Wright and Miller observe that the general rule precluding appellate review of discovery orders is inapplicable "if the only proceeding pending is the application for discovery . . . ." 8 C. Wright and A. Miller, supra, § 2006 at 29. See also 9 J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice, para. 110.13[2] at 155-157 (2d ed. 1987).
We find additional support for our position in Sheehan v. Doyle, 513 F.2d 895 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 874, 46 L. Ed. 2d 106, 96 S. Ct. 144 (1975), a case construing the authority of a district court to order discovery in aid of a patent interference proceeding. Invoking Fed. R. Civ. P. 34, the court ordered defendant to disclose various unprivileged documents. On appeal, the First Circuit considered whether the discovery order was reviewable pursuant to section 1291. Id. at 898. It observed that the order was the only facet of the interference proceeding pending before the district court;*fn19 upon entry of the order, the business of the court was, at least temporarily, concluded. Id. Notwithstanding the general policy against appellate review of discovery orders, the court of appeals held that the finality rule had been satisfied:
The instant order, therefore, concluded -- at least for the moment -- the business of the district court. Thus, while the usual policy against piecemeal appellate review dictates otherwise, we must regard the order as final and appealable. See Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686, 689 (10th Cir. 1968). (Indeed, Doyle has sought more discovery since this appeal was heard, and the district court's next ruling would likewise be final and appealable).
Similarly, in Cobbledick, 309 U.S. at 323, the Supreme Court considered whether an appeal was available from a district court's denial of motions to quash subpoenas duces tecum directing several witnesses to appear and produce documents before a grand jury. In denying jurisdiction, the Court asserted that like a conventional criminal trial, a grand jury proceeding is entitled to protection against undue interruption and delay. Id. at 327. Thus, to safeguard the "orderly progress" of what it characterized as a "judicial inquiry," the Court mandated that the disobedient witnesses be held in contempt as a precondition for appellate review. Id. at 329-30. However, in reliance upon Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 38 L. Ed. 1047, 14 S. Ct. 1125 (1894), and upon Harriman v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 211 U.S. 407, 53 L. Ed. 253, 29 S. Ct. 115 (1908), the Court contemplated situations where, based upon the absence of an underlying case or controversy, a witness might be able to obtain review absent contempt:
But a proceeding like that under § 12 of the Interstate Commerce Act may be deemed self-contained, so far as the judiciary is concerned -- as much so as an independent suit in equity in which appeal will lie from an injunction without the necessity of waiting for disobedience. After the court has ordered a recusant witness to testify before the Commission, there remains nothing for it to do. Not only is this true with respect to the particular witness whose testimony is sought; there is not, as in the case of a grand jury or trial, any further judicial inquiry which would be halted were the offending witness permitted to appeal. The proceeding before the district court is not ancillary to any judicial proceeding. So far as the court is concerned, it is complete in itself.
Id. at 330.
In light of the preceding discussion, we conclude that a non-party witness*fn20 may obtain appellate review of a discovery order absent contempt only if there is no real possibility of disrupting an underlying action. See Alexander, 201 U.S. at 121. Applying our conclusions to the case before us, however, presents another problem to which we now turn.
Before deciding the issue of appealability, we must determine whether the petitioners are parties to an actual suit or merely non-party witnesses to the Government's exercise of its investigative authority. As we have already noted, a determination that the petitioners are parties would effectively preclude their jurisdictions argument under section 1291. A review of the district court's 1984 final judgment provides an appropriate place to begin our inquiry.
In addition to creating the trusteeship, the 1984 judgment permanently enjoined defendants Andretta and Briguglio from future participation in Local 560, and mandated the removal of the union's entire executive board, including the petitioners. The judgment imposed no additional substantive remedy against Sheridan and Sciarra. Following our affirmance, the stay of the district court's judgment was vacated and the petitioners appropriately relinquished their executive positions. The Government does not attempt to argue, nor could it, that Sheridan and Sciarra are in contempt of the 1984 judgment. We additionally observe that neither the trustee nor the Government has instituted any subsequent action against the petitioners designed to alter or affect their substantive rights, such as a suit enjoining them from participating in Local 560's upcoming elections.
We construe the Government's oral deposition demand as a mere request for information that may, or may not, ultimately lead to an action against the petitioners.*fn21 The closing paragraph of the Government's order to show cause application candidly concedes:
In order to formulate the precise nature of that relief and to structure a future course of action with respect to the restoration of democratic processes within Local 560, the Government needs additional information about the matters identified herein, as well as about a number of similar matters which have come to the Government's attention during the period of the Trusteeship. (emphasis added).
Based upon the foregoing, we conclude that the petitioners are, at this point,*fn22 only non-party witnesses to an investigation, rather than parties to an actual case or controversy designed to adjudicate their substantive rights.
In support of its discovery order, the district court held that petitioners were presently before it as defendants to the ongoing 1984 action.*fn23 We reject that conclusion. The district court explicitly retained jurisdiction only over Local 560 as a nominal defendant, and released the union's retirement and pension funds. 581 F. Supp. at 337. No mention of either the petitioners' release or retention is contained in the final judgment. There is no basis to imply the petitioners' continuing status as defendants from the district court's silence, especially in light of their compliance with the 1984 judgment.
We finally come to the essence of our jurisdictional inquiry; whether section 1291 confers appellate jurisdiction upon us to review the district court's discovery order. We must determine whether our assertion of jurisdiction in the context of an ongoing trusteeship will violate the purposes and policies underlying section 1291 by disrupting what amounts to an ongoing actual case or controversy. In this regard, we note that petitioners' characterization of the instant appeal as a naked "post-judgment order" is simply inaccurate; the existence of the trusteeship thrusts this case into the darkest recesses of the finality rule.
We again observe that the court fashioned the trusteeship as a means of implementing the objectives contained in the 1984 judgment, namely, to facilitate free elections by purging Local 560 of the persistent remnants of racketeering. To that end, the court empowered the trustee to seek modification of the 1984 judgment, or any other necessary relief. We therefore cannot deny that the trusteeship retained some vitality as an ongoing proceeding, although not of sufficient character to require protection from disruption and delay under section 1291. At the time the court ordered discovery there was no pending judicial action in which the rights of these, or any other individuals, were being adjudicated. Indeed, the court's only act was to order the petitioners to provide depositions. Once it implemented the order, the district court, at least for the moment, completed its business. See Sheehan, 513 F.2d at 898, and Cobbledick, infra at 19.
Concededly, the court ordered discovery in the context of an ongoing trusteeship. However, we cannot say that the trusteeship, standing alone, is analogous to the underlying actions in DeMasi and Gross in which substantive rights of parties to actual disputes were being adjudicated. Absent the trustee's initiation of a substantive adversarial proceeding, we cannot characterize the instant discovery order as interlocutory to anything. Similarly, we note that the trusteeship is distinguishable from the grand jury proceeding in Cobbledick. While the grand jury investigation constituted an ongoing judicial inquiry, 309 U.S. at 327, the discovery order here amounts to nothing more than an isolated judicial act.
Based on the absence of an underlying judicial action, we hold that the discovery order is appealable pursuant to section 1291 notwithstanding petitioners' failure to incur a contempt order.*fn24 Under the unique circumstances present here, our holding is consistent with the policies of section 1291; there is no threat of piecemeal review or of obstruction to a just claim. To the Government's contention that our holding will disrupt the administration of the trusteeship, we respond: when and if the trustee institutes an action modifying the substantive rights of the petitioners or of another third party, any discovery orders issued in conjunction with that suit, including those issued to non-party witnesses, will be held interlocutory for the purposes of section 1291.
We now consider the merits of the discovery order; that is, whether the district court had authority to compel non-party witnesses Sheridan and Sciarra to give testimony. Not surprisingly, petitioners challenge the court's exercise of authority and additionally argue that the Government had no standing to seek discovery, and that it did not articulate the scope of the depositions with sufficient clarity. We first consider the question of standing.
Entitled "Depositions Upon Oral Examination," Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(a) states in pertinent part: "After commencement of the action, any party may take the testimony of any person, including a party, by deposition upon oral examination." (emphasis added). We are immediately confronted by the question of whether, given the entry of a final judgment in the 1984 action, the Government is a "party" to an "action" within the meaning of the Rule. We once again are required to define the role of the trusteeship in this suit.
As we have already noted, the trusteeship is not, at present, engaged in any proceeding designed to affect the substantive rights of either the petitioners or any other third party. Although this apparent dormancy might compel us to conclude that there is no "action" pursuant to Rule 30(a), a review of the trusteeship's objectives leads to an opposite holding. In replacing Local 560's executive board, the court designed the trusteeship to oversee the union's day-to-day operations and eradicate the residual impact of past racketeer domination. We therefore hold that the ongoing maintenance and protection of the trusteeship constitutes an action for the purposes of Rule 30(a). Moreover, the Government was a party to the 1984 action which created the trusteeship. Therefore, we conclude that the Government remains a party, within the meaning of the Rule, to any subsequent investigative activities it takes to effectuate the objectives of the 1984 final judgment.*fn25 Accordingly, we hold that the Government had standing to seek petitioners' depositions.
We next reject petitioners' contention that the deposition request failed to state the scope of the proposed examinations with sufficient clarity. The Government's order to show cause explicitly sought information regarding Sciarra's role in the deunionization of New England Motor Freight Company, his communications with Andretta and Briguglio, his management of Local 560's prepaid Legal Services Plan, and his failure, while executive board president, to institute safeguards designed to eradicate the continued influence of the Provenzano group. Similarly, the Government sought testimony from Sheridan regarding his participation in Sciarra's appointment as president, and his failure, while executive board vice-president, to institute safeguards against abuses by employers or employee representatives.
Petitioners finally contend that the court had no power to compel them in their capacity as non-party witnesses to submit to oral depositions absent the institution of a criminal or civil proceeding. We disagree. Relying upon the broad authority conferred upon district courts to remedy violations of the RICO Act, this court in Local 560 upheld Judge Ackerman's removal of the executive board and establishment of the trusteeship. 780 F.2d at 295. Over the petitioners' objection, the judge construed our affirmance as empowering him to order depositions in order to effectively protect and maintain the administration of the trusteeship. We recognize that he premised his order, in part, upon his belief that the petitioners were before the court as defendants to the 1984 action. Although we have rejected that conclusion for reasons heretofore stated, we nonetheless affirm the district court's discovery order.
Section 1964(a) of the RICO Act reinforces our conclusion. It enables courts to prevent violations of section 1962 by "issuing appropriate orders, including, but not limited to: ordering any person to divest himself of any interest, direct or indirect, in any enterprise and imposing reasonable restrictions on the future activities or investments of any person." In its report accompanying the proposed RICO Act, the House of Representatives acknowledged section 1964(a)'s expansive scope:
[Section 1964(a)] contains broad provisions to allow for reform of corrupted organizations. Although certain remedies are set out, the list is not meant to be exhaustive, and the only limit on remedies is that they accomplish the aim set out of removing the corrupting influence and make due provision for the rights of innocent persons.
H.R. Rep. No. 91-1549, 91st Cong. 2nd Sess. 2, reprinted in 1970 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4007, 4034. See also Local 560, 780 F.2d at 295. Quoting Sedima v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 497-98, 87 L. Ed. 2d 346, 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985), we have similarly observed that:
RICO is to be read broadly. This is the lesson not only of Congress' self-consciously expansive language and overall approach, see United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 586-87, 69 L. Ed. 2d 246, 101 S. Ct. 2524 (1981), but also of its express admonition that RICO is to "be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes." Pub.L. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947.
Local 560, 780 F.2d at 295.
In initially establishing the trusteeship, the district court, as did we in affirming, recognized the continuing need during the life of the trusteeship for judicial supervision and control over the daily operations of Local 560. Accordingly, we now hold that the district court properly ordered the petitioners to submit to oral depositions to effectuate the administration of the trusteeship. We believe that any other conclusion would preclude the trusteeship from fulfilling its mandate.
We now consider the final issue presented by this appeal -- whether the district court erred in denying petitioners' motion to recuse, asserted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) and (b)(1). Our disposition of this issue requires us to examine the important question of justiciability.
Article III of the Constitution limits the 'judicial power" of the United States to the resolution of actual "cases" and "controversies." Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471, 70 L. Ed. 2d 700, 102 S. Ct. 752 (1982). The concept of standing is an incident to the elaboration of this basic constitutional requirement. Id. Unlike associated doctrines, standing "focuses on the party seeking to get his complaint before a federal court and not on the issues he wishes to have adjudicated." Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 37-38, 48 L. Ed. 2d 450, 96 S. Ct. 1917 (1976). Essentially, "the question of standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498, 45 L. Ed. 2d 343, 95 S. Ct. 2197 (1975). The Supreme Court has consistently observed that the standing inquiry entails a blend of constitutional requirements and prudential considerations. Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99, 60 L. Ed. 2d 66, 99 S. Ct. 1601 (1979). The dichotomy has often proven more troublesome than illuminating. See Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 471. In any event, the doctrine, in both its constitutional and prudential respects, "is founded in concern about the proper -- and properly limited -- role of the courts in a democratic society." Warth, 422 U.S. at 498. In its constitutional dimension, the doctrine requires a litigant invoking a federal court's authority to "'show that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant,' and that the injury 'fairly can be traced to the challenged action' and 'is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.'" Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472 (quoting Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 99, and Simon, 426 U.S. at 38, 41). In Warth, the Court recognized that the standing inquiry may, at times, be resolved with reference to the nature and source of the claim asserted by the litigant. 422 U.S. at 500. Specifically, it observed that "the actual or threatened injury required by Art. III may exist solely by virtue of 'statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing.'" Id. (quoting Flast, 392 U.S. at 99). See also Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3, 35 L. Ed. 2d 536, 93 S. Ct. 1146 (1973): Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 732, 31 L. Ed. 2d 636, 92 S. Ct. 1361 (1972). Applying Warth to the present dispute, we seek to determine for the first time in any recorded decision whether section 455(a) confers standing upon non-party witnesses who have not been adjudged in contempt to challenge the impartiality of a federal judge.
In 1974, Congress enacted the present version*fn26 of the federal disqualification statute. Based largely on Canon 3C of the ABA Code of Judicial Conduct, § 455 states in relevant part:
§ 455 Disqualification of justice, judge, or magistrate.
(a) Any justice, judge, magistrate, or referee in bankruptcy of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.
(b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances:
(1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;
(5) He or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such a person:
(iv) Is to the judge's knowledge likely to be a material witness in the proceeding . . . .
Congress designated subsection (a) of the statute as a "general or catch-all provision" designed to enhance public confidence in the impartiality of the judicial system by requiring a federal judge to disqualify himself in any proceeding when "his impartiality might reasonably be questioned."*fn27 See H.R. Rep. 1453, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. Cong. Code & Admin. News 6351, 6354-55; and see also State of Idaho v. Freeman, 507 F. Supp. 706, 720-21 (D. Idaho 1981). Our court has interpreted subsection (a) to mean that "a judge should recuse himself where a reasonable man knowing all the circumstances would harbor doubts concerning the judge's impartiality." United States v. Dalfonso, 707 F.2d at 760. We have also held that only extrajudicial bias*fn28 requires disqualification. Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d at 290-91.
In the legislative history accompanying section 455, Congress observed that subsection (b) of the statute established particular instances in which disqualification is required. 1974 U.S. Cong. Code & Admin. News at 6355. It noted that the "specific situations in subsection (b) are in addition to the general standard set forth in subsection (a)." Id. Appropriately, we have recognized a distinction between the two subsections. Although subsection (a) requires only the objective appearance of bias, subsection (b)(1) requires bias-in-fact. United States v. Nobel, 696 F.2d 231, 235 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1118, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1348, 103 S. Ct. 3086 (1983). See also United States v. Heldt, 215 U.S. App. D.C. 206, 668 F.2d 1238, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied sub nom. Hubbard v. United States, 456 U.S. 926, 72 L. Ed. 2d 440, 102 S. Ct. 1971 (1982). Other courts have rejected our dichotomy. See Parrish v. Board of Comm'rs of Alabama State Bar, 524 F.2d 98 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub nom. Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs., 425 U.S. 944, 48 L. Ed. 2d 188, 96 S. Ct. 1685 (1976) (bias-in-fact standard governs all motions to disqualify under sections 144, 455(b)(1) and 455(a)).
We note that a second apparent distinction between the two subsections presents a question of even greater significance for our purposes: Subsection (b) mandates disqualification for personal bias concerning a party, but subsection (a) requires recusal in any proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might be questioned. (emphasis added) We must decide whether section 455(a)'s failure to explicitly limit its application to "parties" permits a motion by non-party witnesses, or stated in another way, whether the subsection's reference to a "proceeding" embraces the discovery order at issue.*fn29
We note that section 455(d)(1) defines "proceeding" to include "pre-trial, trial, appellate review, or other stages of litigation." Each of the statutory examples of a proceeding implies the judge's participation in decisions affecting the substantive rights of litigants to an actual case or controversy. For example, the "pre-trial" stage, in most instances, begins with the filing of a complaint, an indictment, or some other adversarial document that identifies the parties and the substantive issues to be litigated. Almost all of a judge's pre-trial rulings and orders might affect the ultimate adjudication of substantive rights. Accordingly, section 455 confers a right upon the litigant to seek recusal at this stage. It follows that the statute grants a similar right during subsequent phases of the litigation, when a judge has already decided, or is in the process of deciding, the most significant issues presented in a case. We therefore construe section 455(a)'s "proceeding" requirement to embrace only such activity following the initiation of an action by a private party or governmental agency designed ultimately to modify or affect the substantive rights of a litigant.
Our conclusion is supported by section 455(a)'s legislative history which states in relevant part:
[T]his general standard is designed to promote public confidence in the impartiality of the judicial process by saying, in effect, if there is a reasonable factual basis for doubting the judge's impartiality, he should disqualify himself and let another judge preside over the case. (Emphasis added).
1974 U.S. Cong. Code & Admin. News at 6355. We believe that Congress's reference to "a case" implies its intention to limit the application of section 455 to actual controversies. We also acknowledge those precedents asserting, albeit in dicta, that section 455 may be invoked by a party to an action. Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, 517 F.2d 1044, 1051 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944, 96 S. Ct. 1685, 48 L. Ed. 2d 188 (1976); United States v. Conforte, 624 F.2d 869, 880 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 449 U.S. 1012, 66 L. Ed. 2d 470, 101 S. Ct. 568 (1980).*fn30
Accordingly, we hold that the petitioners have no standing to invoke section 455 in their capacity as non-party witnesses.*fn31 As we have already observed, there is no pending action before Judge Ackerman in which the rights of the petitioners are at issue. Moreover, the petitioners' depositions were not taken in conjunction with a substantive proceeding against a third party. Admittedly, the thread of judicial intervention in this dispute is thin; the district court's sole activity with respect to Sheridan and Sciarra was to compel them to submit to depositions at the offices of the United States Attorney. The court neither conducted the depositions nor attended them. Under these circumstances, we can safely say that section 455's directive to enhance public confidence in the judiciary is simply not implicated by declaring petitioners outside the scope of the statute.*fn32 Appropriately, we conclude that the petitioners have not sustained an "actual injury" within the meaning of Article III. They have done nothing more than their public duty, inconvenient as it may have been, to provide nonprivileged information requested by their government. We acknowledge that compelling a witness to disclose privileged information might indeed result in an irreparable injury "because appellate courts cannot always 'unring the bell' once the information has been released." Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 460-61, 42 L. Ed. 2d 574, 95 S. Ct. 584 (1975). Petitioners have not, however, raised such a claim. Finally, we express no opinion regarding the standing of a non-party witness to invoke the disqualification statute in the context of an actual case or controversy.
This is not to suggest, however, that we in any way seek to minimize the force of petitioners' allegations of bias. In the event that a proper party institutes an adversarial action before Judge Ackerman designed to modify or alter the substantive rights of Sheridan and Sciarra, the petitioners may reassert without prejudice a motion requesting the judge's recusal. Only then will petitioners have suffered an actual or threatened injury, and have achieved the status to invoke section 455. At that point, the court will be presented with an action in which petitioners' rights are at stake.
In sum, the district court's order compelling the petitioners to submit to oral depositions will be affirmed. Petitioners' appeal from the denial of their cross-motion demanding recusal will be dismissed without prejudice and with additional directions to the district court to vacate its order on the cross-motion and dismiss it without prejudice for reasons consistent with this opinion. Each side to bear its own costs.
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Jerusalem Artichoke Veggie Mix
Total Time
Prep 10 mins
Cook 10 mins
Quick & easy veggie dish add salt & pepper to your liking and any other spices you fancy like oregano, parsley or Italian spice blend. Use your own imagination.
Ingredients Nutrition
- 1 1⁄2 cups sliced cleaned jerusalem artichokes (1/4" slices)
- 20 baby carrots, cleaned
- 16 Brussels sprouts, cleaned & cut in half
- 4 cloves garlic, peeled,sliced
- vegetable oil cooking spray
- 3⁄4 cup water or 3⁄4 cup dry white wine
- Heat you wok or skillet.
- Lightly spray with oil.
- Add carrots and stir fry for 3 minutes.
- Add remaining ingredients, cover and steam until the veggies are cooked to your liking.
- (I usually only steam for 6 minutes but this leaves them quite crisp).
- Watch that the wine has not all evaporated and your veggies get seared on the bottom before you finish steaming them add a bit more wine as necessary.
Most Helpful
Hi Bergy; I have a small area where I grow Jerusalem Artichokes. This year they grew so well. Dug up a batch yesterday and they are just beautiful, clean and a real nice size. Then what to do with them besides the standard, sliced and light fried in butter and olive oil. Found your recipe and WOW, what a great Veggie Mix. Besides, my DW got some brussels sprouts for me and this worked in just super great. I did add some oregano and Italian Spice Blend along with some fresh garlic. I will be making this again as I have loads of artichokes. However, I must try your other recipes, Jerusalem Artichokes with Parmesan and Jerusalem Artichoke Stir Fry. Thanks BIG loads for your delightful recipes. "Uncle Bill"
Great recipe! Quick and easy to make. Love the combination of flavors and textures. I got sunchoke from my organic produce delivery company (California!), and also added some wild mushrooms to the recipe. Ran out of white wine, but next time will definitely use it -- I'm sure it'll be a nice touch!

subset: commoncrawl


text:
Neutrogena Norwegian Formula Lip Moisturizer SPF 15 Reviews
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- Lip Balms
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Read 2 Reviews
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Comments about Neutrogena Norwegian Formula Lip Moisturizer SPF 15:
I love Neutrogena Lip Moisturizer because it leaves my lips feeling satiny soft and shiny (a little less so than lip gloss). There is no scent or flavor, which I like, and it is easy to use. I like the softness of my lips when I use this product, and it seems to last a pretty long time.
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When using this product, there is a shiny finish to your lips. It is not shiny like gloss or matte like other products. So, this may not be ideal for men who don't want shiny lips. But, as a woman, I like the shine.
Comments about Neutrogena Norwegian Formula Lip Moisturizer SPF 15:
I have horribly dry, chapped lips. I always have. This problem has lead me to try just about every lip product out there. None of them have worked. When I saw this at my mom's I thought it would be like all the others, but I tried it anyway. Boy, am I glad I did! Not only are my lips soft and supple, I only have to put it on twice a day! I apply it before bed and then after I shower in the morning. The only bad thing is it can be hard to find. You may have to get it online, but you'll be glad you did.


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Sage Snowboard Boots - Women's 2017
The Ride Sage Women's Snowboard Boot features Lock Down™ Turbo interior lacing to lock in the heel, quick-adjusting Boa™ lacing, and a responsive, comfortable Intuition™ liner. You'll be venturing out into new zones, stepping up to new features in the park, and looking damn good while you do it. Plus, thanks to LSD C.A.T. calf adjustment--built to accommodate all calf sizes--you won't be fighting pressure points whenever you ride. Get the support you need and the comfort you want in the Ride Sage Boa Coiler Snowboard Boots.
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text:
The NSAID class of drugs includes traditional nonselective NSAIDs — like aspirin, ibuprofen, naproxen, and others — as well as selective COX-2 inhibitors, like celecoxib. In a recent blogpost [available here] we noted that NSAIDs are widely prescribed and many are accessible over-the-counter (OTC), so they are used by millions of persons to treat fever, inflammation, and acute or chronic pain. While there can be very serious risks associated with these agents, only a limited amount of high-quality evidence exists to guide their safe use. At the same time, the U.S. FDA is considering new restrictions, some quite severe, on acetaminophen products [see prior blogpost discussion here] and on opioid analgesics via REMS initiatives [blogposts here and here]. Furthermore, as we recently discussed [here], in many parts of the world access to opioid analgesics already is being denied to millions of patients who would benefit. Taken together, these developments may compel greater reliance on NSAID use, even though there is insufficient awareness of the risks or knowledge of safety-enhancing strategies.
NSAIDs Risks Greater Than Many Realize
A recently-developed website from the American Gastroenterological Association (AGA) — called "Connect to Protect" [http://www.connecttoprotect.com/] — attempts to educate healthcare providers and consumers about gastrointestinal (GI) complications associated with NSAID use and ways to manage those risks. It should be acknowledged that funding for the site was provided by a grant from Horizon Therapeutics, Inc., a manufacturer developing combination products containing NSAIDs with high dose famotidine, a potent H2-antagonist. The site notes and references some alarming data:
- An estimated 60 million Americans regularly use NSAIDs, resulting in clinically significant upper GI complications in up to 2% of users (1.2 million cases).
- More than 80% of patients developing GI complications have no prior symptoms or warning signals.
- GI hemorrhages due to NSAID use result in up to 120,000 hospital admissions annually.
- Estimates are that more than 16,500 persons die from NSAID-related GI adverse events each year in the U.S. alone.
Based on the data above, the graph at left shows a proportional comparison of annual mortality attributable to APAP, opioids, and NSAIDs (using the most conservative number). Clearly, NSAID-related mortality might be of much greater concern than the other two classes of analgesics. Therefore, it is puzzling that the FDA is focusing on promoting further restrictions and controls on APAP and opioid products; an initiative that, if successful, could have unintended consequences of driving a shift toward increased use of NSAIDs with concomitant rises in mortality. Deaths associated with any medications are of great concern and worthy of ameliorative measures; however, would it make more sense to first examine the largest sector of mortality — NSAIDs — with a goal of developing better education and safety measures?
Newly Recognized Risks
There have been recent controversies about the benefits of low-dose daily aspirin (usually 81 mg/day) as antithrombotic therapy for preventing heart attack or stroke [Mathews 2010; Ong et al. 2009]. Although possibly appropriate in high-risk individuals, there are still dangers of GI complications with such therapy, particularly in the elderly, and the relative benefits in men versus women need further elaboration. In one retrospective, large-scale investigation of medical records, patients taking daily low-dose aspirin combined periodically with either ibuprofen or naproxen had up to a 3-fold increased risk of GI problems [Ivanhoe 2005]. And, there is recent evidence that COX-2 inhibitors undermine the anticlotting benefits of daily low-dose aspirin if they are taken in combination [blogpost here]; conversely, the gastroprotective benefits of COX-2 inhibitors are partially or totally lost if aspirin is used concomitantly for cardiovascular prophylaxis [Ong et al. 2009].
Furthermore, hearing loss attributed to non-opioid analgesic use has recently come to light [Curhan et al. 2010]. Writing in the American Journal of Medicine researchers reported on a survey of nearly 27,000 men, repeated every 2 years from 1986 to 2004. About one-fourth of the men had been diagnosed with hearing loss and those who used non-opioid pain relievers at least twice weekly were more susceptible than nonusers: aspirin users were 12% more likely to have hearing loss, those taking other NSAIDs were 21% more likely, and users of acetaminophen were 22% more likely. Compared with nonusers, men younger than 50 years old at the start of the study faced an even greater likelihood of hearing loss, and regular combined use of more than one type of non-opioid analgesic as well as longer duration of such use had a further negative impact on hearing. Although hearing loss is a relatively innocuous adverse effect compared with life-threatening GI and cardiovascular complications, it is noteworthy that new problems associated with non-opioid analgesics are still being discovered.
Managing Risks, Enhancing Analgesic Therapy
Judging by available evidence it seems apparent that the concept of "safe analgesia" may be an oxymoron; some risks can be managed but all of them cannot be avoided. And, the omnipresence of NSAIDs in society and cavalier attitudes toward their use may be serious deterrents to risk mitigation. Surveys have indicated that 8 out of 10 Americans use OTC NSAIDs to some extent each year; however, most of those persons (up to 60%) either are not aware of any risks or are not concerned about potential adverse events [Wilcox et al. 2005]. Consequently, more than 4 of 10 users (44%) take greater doses than recommended on the warning labels and 22% falsely believe alerting symptoms will always precede any NSAID-induced complications.
An excellent evidence-based overview by Ong and colleagues [2007, available here] discusses balancing NSAID benefits and risks. Evidence for NSAID effectiveness in treating many acute and chronic pain conditions is highly favorable, with higher-dose oral NSAIDs often outperforming comparably-dosed opioid analgesics or acetaminophen for short-term relief of acute pain [also see, Bandolier 2003]. However, there are unresolved questions about the safety of NSAIDs for treating chronic pain conditions, and adverse GI or cardiovascular events associated with NSAIDs often result in benefit-to-risk ratios favoring acetaminophen or opioid analgesics.
A further complication is that risk-mitigation strategies for using NSAIDs most effectively and safely are complex, somewhat controversial, and still being determined [Ong et al. 2007]. There are currently no comedications for reducing the cardiotoxic effects of NSAIDs. Naproxen has been viewed as somewhat less cardiotoxic but it may confer up to a 3-fold greater risk of GI complications than other NSAIDs. COX-2 inhibitors are considered as having greater GI tolerability but there have been cardiotoxicity concerns with these agents.
Four classes of drugs are available as co-therapy for reducing GI toxicity with traditional oral NSAIDs: proton pump inhibitors (PPIs), histamine H2-blockers, antacids, and prostaglandins (eg, misoprostol). The decision to initiate such co-therapy is dependent on several factors, including increased risks of serious GI complications in the following groups: [see, Ong et al. 2007; Risser et al. 2009].
- Patients with a prior history of peptic ulcer disease,
- those taking corticosteroids or anticoagulants,
- patients adjunctively taking aspirin as antithrombotic therapy,
- patients over the age of 65.
In sum, NSAIDs are effective for relieving many types of pain but they carry a heavy burden of risk as demonstrated by the considerable evidence of their GI and cardiovascular adverse effects and consequent high rate of associated fatalities. This points toward a need for greater public education on NSAID hazards and better practitioner training on therapeutic strategies to help minimize risks. Acetaminophen, opioids, and opioid/non-opioid combination medications offer alternative and often better solutions for achieving effective analgesia, without the attendant problems of NSAIDs; however, these medications also carry risks that must be managed. It is important that all options are retained and remain widely available. If proposed FDA regulatory actions are realized — resulting in diminished access to and/or availability of acetaminophen and opioid products — along with a reluctance to rely on NSAIDs as awareness of their risks grows, there would be fewer analgesic choices available. The outcome might be an unprecedented American public health crisis in terms of human suffering and morbidity. What's your opinion? Comment below.
[Postscript: To keep this blogpost brief, many discussion points have been greatly condensed. For readers interested in learning more, key points are referenced with direct links provided to full documents or, at least, to published abstracts. Links have been coded to open documents in a new browser window, so access to this page will not be lost if you take "side trips" to examine the background resources. — SBL]
UPDATE ADDENDUM: According to yet another source — U.S. CDC, National Center for Health Statistics [available here, p. 6] — opioid analgesic deaths in 2005 were nearly 11,000 and increased to about 13,800 in 2006. This is in contrast to the 8,500 deaths in 2005 reported by the National Drug Intelligence Center [NDIC 2009], noted above (ref. below), and exemplifies the inconsistencies in data reported by various government agencies. At the same time, however, it is very conservatively estimated that NSAID-related deaths have increased to 20,000 or more per year in the U.S. [see CLAAD document, p. 2]. Although there are probably biases inherent in all of the data, it still seems evident that NSAIDs may pose a significantly greater threat to public health than opioids.
REFERENCES: (also see links within the text)
> AGS (American Geriatrics Society). Pharmacological Management of Persistent Pain in Older Persons. J Am Geriatr Soc. 2009 [available here].
> Bandolier (Evidence-Based Health Care). Acute Pain. 2003 [PDF here].
> Curhan SG, Eavey R, Shargorodsky J, Curhan GC. Analgesic use and risk of hearing loss in men. Amer J Med. 2010;123(3):231-237 [ (March 2010) [article here].
> Gislason GH, Rasmussen JN, Abildstrom SZ, et al. Increased mortality and cardiovascular morbidity associated with use of nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs in chronic heart failure. Arch Intern Med. 2009;169(2):141-149 [abstract here].
> Ivanhoe. Presentation at the 70th Annual Scientific Meeting of the American College of Gastroenterology; Honolulu, Hawaii; October 28 - November. 2, 2005. Ivanhoe Medical Newswire. 2005(Nov 1) [archive access requires subscription].
> Machado LAC, Kamper SJ, Herbert RD, Maher CG, McAuley JH. Analgesic effects of treatments for non-specific low back pain: a meta-analysis of placebo-controlled randomized trials. Rheumatology 2009;48(5):520-527 [abstract].
> Mathews AW. The danger of daily aspirin. Wall Street Journal. 2010(Feb 23) [available here].
> NDIC (National Drug Intelligence Center). National Prescription Drug Threat Assessment 2009 [executive summary]. 2009(Apr) [available here].
> Ong CKS, Lirk P, Tan CH, Seymour RA. An evidence-based update on nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs. Clin Med Res. 2007;5(1):19-34 [PDF here].
> Risser A, Donovan D, Heintzman J, Page T. NSAID prescribing precautions. Am Fam Physician. 2009;80(12):1371-1378 [available here].
> Wilcox CM, Cryer B, Triadafilopoulos G. Patterns of use and public perception of over-the-counter pain relievers: focus on nonsteroidal antiinflammatory drugs. J Rheumatol. 2005(Nov);32(11):2218-2224 [article here].
> Wolfe MM, Lichtenstein DR, Singh G. Gastrointestinal toxicity and nonsteroidal antiinflammatory drugs. NEJM. 1999;340(24):1888-1899 [abstract here].


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Note: Sample below may appear distorted but all corresponding word document files contain proper formattingExcerpt from Essay:
Hydrofracking NY
What is hydrofracking?
To those who support the idea, hydrofracking is the next (and possibly only) real alternative to the U.S.'s continued dependence on the world's oil supply (Energy Vision, n.d:1). To those who doubt the viability of this claim -- or to those who worry about the accuracy about what is being claimed -- hydrofracking is really more the setting up of the next great asbestos industry -- or the establishment of an endless serious of public health and benefit legal fights over what is likely a dangerous or even deadly misstatement of opportunities (Pericorn, et al., 2012).
Hydrofracking is the pressurized use of liquid (mostly water) within the horizontal drilling sites of natural gas fields to help separate and force out the captured reserves of the gases for refinement. A contemporary White Paper produced by Energy Vision defines it as: "High-volume hydraulic fracturing, or "Hydrofracking," is a method of extracting natural gas from shale rock formations buried up to 10,000 feet under 30 or more states. It involves blasting these formations horizontally with water, sand and chemicals and creating fissures so the gas is released" (Energy Vision, n.d.:3). The pressure impact comes about because a "gun" of sorts is lowered into the well to the point where it faces across the 7,000-mile horizontal hole. "When fired, the gun produces micro-fractures in the shale, releasing the trapped gas, which flows under natural pressure up the well pipe to the surface" (Pericorn, 2012:39).
What is so big about the Marcellus Shale deposits?
The Marcellus Shale is possibly the largest U.S.-based natural gas field. It is thought to be 5,000 below the surface (within the range for hydrofracking), and covers and estimated 150,000 square miles that incorporates five states (New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Maryland and West Virginia). "In New York, Marcellus Shale underlies much of the Southern Tier, stretching from Chautauqua and Erie Counties in the west to the counties of Sullivan, Ulster, Greene and Albany in the east, to the approximate location of the east-west portion of the New York State Thruway between Schenectady and Auburn" (Lee et al., 2011:5). What may be just as important is the assumption that below this gas bed lies Utica Shale, which is thought to be even larger and the next target for tapping should Marcellus pan out. It has been estimated that this location contains between 168 and 516 trillion cubic feet of potential product (Energy Vision, n.d.: 7). This amount of resource is thought to be sufficient to bring about a viable alternative to oil-based fuels since, in addition to being cleaner, it is less expensive and easier to handle, assuming that one believes what opponents or proponents of the process say.
Pros and cons of corporate development of Marcellus?
Those who favor the use of hydrofracking often do so because they believe it is practical and worth the return on the investments, even if some of the costs may be high in terms of health and environmental concerns (Reinhart, 2011:2). Natural gas has a much lower carbon footprint than does coil or oil, and the supply seems to be much greater. "Natural gas is the only fuel that can make a major dent in this country's dangerous reliance on foreign oil and that can, in fact, put a major sector of transportation on the path to a fully sustainable fuel: the renewable form of natural gas made from waste" (Energy Vision, n.d.:1).
In addition, it is assumed that the harvesting of this resource will also bring about immediate jobs on several fronts. The process is easily integrated into what is already done and thus can be operationalized quickly. It is a taxable commodity too, so the government (and thus the public) benefits readily in the budget discussions, which may not always be the case with other alternatives such as solar and wind energy (Reinhard, 2011:2). It has been estimated that as a good share of the major trucks and other commercial vehicles on the road could be converted to natural gas usage easily, thus helping to immediately respond to the gasoline and energy crises. This could have major impact on issues such as global warming if undertaken and sustained for the future:
Just 7% of current natural gas use (2009) could power all the buses and trucks (6.7 million) serving cities and towns across the U.S. with routes taking them 50 miles or less from home base.4 Since these vehicles account for more than 1/3 of the diesel fuel consumed by trucks and buses, this fuel shift would eliminate 13.6 billion5 out of the 38 billion gallons of diesel used a year and do so where the clean air gains will mean most (Energy Vision, n.d.:2).
Those who do not favor hydrofracking have many other concerns. The most significant of these issues involved just what fracking itself does and how it might impact the public's health and wellness. It has been estimated that there may be as many as 200 chemicals associated with the fluid that is used to cause the ruptures. "While these make up just a fraction of the total materials in the fluid, they include recognized carcinogens (benzene, arsenic and polycyclic aromatics). Other substances are associated with endocrine disruption, damage to reproductive health, immune suppression, and genetic mutations" (Lee et al., 2011:5). A New York Times investigation uncovered that only about 60% of these liquids are recovered. The EPA has indicated that as much as 50 million gallons of this dangerous substance is already unaccounted for (Energy Vision, n.d.: 6).
A professional legal journal has contributed to the concerns in its own way, even though they presented their information presumably to help attorneys get ready for the business that might head their way (Pernicorn, 2012). Issues such as negligence, nuisance, fraud, strict liability and statutory violations are all areas where legal challenges will likely arise. In an opening paragraph, Preliminary Insights into hydrofracking at Marcellus alone suggests the breadth of legal avenues:
Among the many potential defendants in Marcellus Shale litigation are energy and drilling companies; landowners; designers and manufacturers of drilling- and well-related equipment, including well pads; waste transporters and waste-storage companies; states, counties, and municipalities; insurance companies, subject to direct action under the New York Navigation Law; and various federal, state, and county agencies (Pernicord, 2012: 40).
New York impact on government and its people.
The reason for so many concerns is because the potential impact may be so widespread. The Nature Conservancy has undertaken a major assessment of the concerns with a focus on many of the implications for the New York region (Nature Conservancy, 2012). They identify four specific areas of major importance:
• Hydrofracking can directly impact streams, lakes, rivers and entire groundwater supplies;
• The Marcellus Shale is under NY's watershed and the Delaware River Basin which supports the drinking water for some 16 million residents;
• Hydrofracking can require up to 9 million gallons of water for each effort, which is sufficient to bring about serious water shortages even without pollution considerations; and, • Expanding the production fields to achieve the measurable amounts of products would do much damage to the NY forest lands that would bear the brunt of the required exploration and likely feel the impact of the pollutions that escape.
Legal action has already begun in relation to the impact on NY as well as elsewhere. A 2011 suit alleges that the U.S. government has failed to undertake a proper environmental review of these issues, listing the damaging impact of fracking on the Delaware River Basin in particular. The NY Attorney General's office has also filed suit claiming that federal agencies have failed to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act -- each early actions that are virtually certain to be costly for local residents who…[continue]
"Hydrofracking NY What Is Hydrofracking To Those" (2012, April 18) Retrieved December 9, 2016, from http://www.paperdue.com/essay/hydrofracking-ny-what-is-79410
"Hydrofracking NY What Is Hydrofracking To Those" 18 April 2012. Web.9 December. 2016. <http://www.paperdue.com/essay/hydrofracking-ny-what-is-79410>
"Hydrofracking NY What Is Hydrofracking To Those", 18 April 2012, Accessed.9 December. 2016, http://www.paperdue.com/essay/hydrofracking-ny-what-is-79410
Business Rhetoric: Drilling in the Marcellus Shale and Environmental Politics Inexpensive energy sources are a requirement if the country is going to continue to thrive the way it has for more than 200 years. The United States is trying to decrease the amount of fossil fuels that it uses in everyday applications. However, the worry is not the fuels themselves, but the costs associated with the fuels. Fossil fuels are a viable


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Drew Tractor Inc
50715 Us Highway 31 Bay Minette, Alabama 36507(251) 937-8480
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AboutDrew Tractor Inc is located at the address 50715 Us Highway 31 in Bay Minette, Alabama 36507. They can be contacted via phone at (251) 937-8480 for pricing, hours and directions.
Drew Tractor Inc has an annual sales volume of 0 - 500K. .For more information contact David Drew, Owner
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Not-so-casual nubile bang-out
Duration: 6min 13sec Views: 14 974 Submitted: 10 months ago Submitted by:
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Check in from 2:00 PM / Check out prior to 11:00 AM
Premiere Classe la Rochelle Sud Aytre Hotel: Find photos, reviews, information, amenities and compare prices for 1 stars hotels in Aytre, France.
Premiere Classe la Rochelle Sud Aytre Hotel offers a comfortable setting when in Aytre. It is ideally positioned for guests wanting to visit the area's popular attractions.
Hotel description
There are a range of amenities on offer to guests of Hotel Premiere Classe La Rochelle Sud Aytre, including a vending machine and a 24-hour reception.
The rooms at Premiere Classe la Rochelle Sud Aytre Hotel are comfortable with facilities such as a private bathroom. There is also a flat-screen TV with cable/satellite channels.
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Goldman restricted stock02 Jan 2014
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Nine Goldman executives raise $27m from sale of restricted stock
Nine Goldman Sachs executives raised a combined $26.8m on Monday by exercising restricted stock units granted to them in prior years, the investment bank has revealed in filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
On average, the stock sales on New Year's Eve were priced at $126.24 apiece, Reuters reported. According to the SEC filings, Goldman Sachs chief executive Lloyd Blankfein and former chief financial officer David Viniar netted $4.2m each through the transactions, while seven other senior executives at the firm - including vice-chairmen Michael Evans and John Weinberg - raised between $1.5m to $3.8m.


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Occasion Cardigan (0-18mths)
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U.S. Airways Kicks Disabled Vet Off Flight
August 6, 2014 2:42pm PST
Not all veterans come back with wounds that you can see, and as we all know, PTSD (post traumatic stress disorder) is a very real condition with serious ramifications. In order to combat the effects of PTSD, sometimes veterans are offered service animals that are trained to sooth the effects of a PTSD flair up – and one recently got a disabled vet kicked of a U.S. Airways flight.
Just about a year ago now, a disabled Vietnam veteran was kicked off because he wanted his service animal to ride in the unoccupied seat next to him rather than lie on the floor in between his feet. Anyone who's ridden in an airplane before knows there isn't much room between your feet and the seat immediately in front of you – especially not enough to accommodate a large golden retriever.
(See also: Graphic New Footage Shows Israeli Tractor Terrorist Flip Bus, Shot By Police
According to the U.S. Airways regulations however, this was a guideline those flying the plane were apparently not willing to negotiate with. Instead of letting the man hold his dog, they instead decided to fully disrespect him, and in such his service, by arrested him.
Take a peek at the video above and let us know what you think – was this at all justified?
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Microwave Apple Banana Muffins Fakeout
Total Time
Prep 25 mins
Cook 2 mins
2 single serve, almost sugar free muffins! Although they are not traditional, they are very warm and comforty when you just wish you could cheat a bit on the diet. Feel free to substitute splenda for the optional brown sugar or a mixture of spices for the pumpkin pie spice. Prep time is mostly allowing ingredients to absorb. Measurements were approximated.
Ingredients Nutrition
- 2⁄3 cup instant oats
- 1 banana (ripe, mashed)
- 1⁄2 cup applesauce (or 1 Mott's Snack Cup)
- 1 egg
- 2 teaspoons oil
- 1 tablespoon pumpkin pie spice
- brown sugar
- Combine banana, apple sauce, oil and egg with a fork until smooth.
- Add oats, sugar (OPTIONAL) and spices and allow to soak for up to 20 minutes.
- Add baking soda.
- Microwave on HIGH for 1-2 minutes in a mug or ceramic cup (I used a tea cup). Cooking times will vary depending on strength of microwave, so watch it to make sure it does not over flow.
- Allow to cool for about 5 minutes.


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I don't know if it has been already stated why Namco has not added a character creation to a Tekken game but I think it would be cool if in one of the games in the Tekken series had a create-a-fighter like in SoulCalibur. Let me know what yall think.Read more >


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disney crossover
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disney crossover images "Piglet, honey, I've made a pie..." HD wallpaper and background photos
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"Piglet, honey, I've made a pie...". "...and it's full of haycorns just for you!". HD Wallpaper and background images in the disney crossover club tagged: disney.
Submitted by PrincessBelle2 over a year ago
Keyword: disney
Mother and Daughter
Rapunzel & Ariel
Arista In Cinderella's Dress
Jasmine as Chel
House of Mouse Ariel and Jasmine interaction
Elsa and Tiana
Someone is Missing
Beauty part 16
Whose idea was this anyway?
Our Realm of Chaos
LightningRed's 5 in 1 Icon Set - Miguel and Arista
It's Over
Pocahontas Show Belle Spirit The Stallion
A Kiss Under The Mistletoe.
Lead Your People Moses
The Taming of the Shrew
Street Musicians
Mushu and Sid are scared of Rhinos and Evil Penguin
The Withersedge Witches
Cinderella as Carrie
I Am a Pirate, You Are a Princess
Rapunzel X Hans-.Ture Love
Wanna play poker!
A bird of hope
What Would I Want with a Dumb Rose Anyway
Jasmine and Shanti
Arranged Marriage
Magical Place
"Mermaids are real?"
"So she will pull my hair if I try to kiss you?"
Friend on the Rooftops
Germany and Ariel
We chose the fire
Belle and Merlin Clean Up!
Princess Jasmine
The Princess Diaries
Peter Pan and Ariel
Jane as Pocahontas
Happy Birthday CaterdayGirl
Human Scar and Esmeralda
Melody & her older sister
Lunar Chronicles
Aurora and Ariel
aladdin and kida <3
"Oh, well!"
Pocahontas and Ariel: Best Friends
A New Friend!
"Soup smells good, Snow White, may I try it?"
Tiana & Jasmine
Butterfly Watching With Dragons
Wild Horses
Fauna's Cakes For All Occassions!
Jungle Family
Swan sisters
Belle meets the Genie
"He Just Couldn't Handle My Free Spirit!"
Keep Right On Dreaming
Dodger & Angel
Prove to me youve got what it takes!!
You're So Cute When You're Angry
Cinderella & Mulan
What do you say... Twisty?
OC Tea Party
The Hunger Games Tributes
Choir Practise
Bartok is Jealous
Little Mermaid and...a Meerkat?
Dance La Arabiana
Whatever You Do, Don't Fall Asleep
Disney LOTR Poster(new version)
Why, Gaston, Why!
The Zombie Apocalypse
Romantic Walk
Cheering up Shanti
Ariel and Cindy Sleepover
ariel, jasmine and mulan
Meg Simbad and Melody
Daffy and Donald Duck
Cinderella and Ariel
non/disney ladies
Creepy Snow and Beast
Pocahontas crossover
Disney Crossovers
Aurora and Elsa
jasmine, ariel and mulan
Eugene's Funeral
Ariel and the mermaids
"Harry Potter and the Philosopher's Stone"
peter pan and astrid
Peter's Facebook Profile
pocahontas and ariel
Helena and Gaston
aladdin and ariel
Ariel and Sinbad ♥
Surrounded by my BEST FRIENDS EVER!
John Smith and Ariel
Centaur Meg
Scar x Esmeralda (BFFs)
Phoebus and Anya
Peter Pan kidnapped
Anastasia Tremaine with her Once Upon A Time counterpart
The Green Mile Disney Style
Jack Frost & Nod
Sid and Lilo running from Rhinos
Hi Violet
Que Que Na-To-Ra
I love to hate you.
Yandere Ariel?
gods dating mortals
disney crossovers
Hatter's New Look (costume crossover)
kida and pocahontas
Belle and Naveen
Disney Villans Crossover
A Love Like Ours
"You can fly!"
Ariel Hawkins
John & Ariel
Scar and Esmeralda
Human Scar
Saving Aurora
Just a Kiss
Looking through your eyes
Aurora's Funeral
Protecting Wendy
Jim / Melody GIF
Peter Pan and Ariel
Mulan/Nita Preparing for the wedding.
Talking Teapot!
Pinocchio and Odette
I cant believe we did this
Keeping it calm
Love Triangle
You're beautiful
Peter Pan x Alice
Me and My Horses
Tzipporah and Tarzan's Son
"Miriam's mom has got it going on..."
Who I Once Was... Cinderella
Pffffft There is absolutely NO such thing as Iron Giants!!!
"Let us see if your loved one recognises you...!"
Jim's a HOT mess
Violet Melody
Snow White & Mulan
My True Lovely Story •Part 40•.


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Aruma Resources Limited (ASX: AAJ) is a focused West Australian exploration company with three advanced project areas in Western Australia.
Since listing on the ASX five years ago, Aruma's tenement package has been turned over as diligent exploration requires. The project types have now expanded to include not only gold, but copper and bauxite as well. Aruma now has just over 3,600km² of tenements covering important structural and geochemical prospects, the majority of which are at its flagship copper project at Bulloo Downs.
Each of the project areas can be readily accessed from the regional towns of Kalgoorlie-Boulder or Newman.
The Company's experienced Board and management team is committed to achieving the Company's vision of establishing a mine at all or some of its project areas to enter the ranks of small to mid-tier producers.
24 October, 2016
Notice of General Meeting
20 October, 2016
Offer Document Rights Issue
3 October, 2016
Appendix 4G
3 October, 2016
Annual Report 2016
29 September, 2016
29 September, 2016
Gold Exploration Update
8 August, 2016
Quarterly Activities Statement for the quarter ended 30 June 2016


text:
Pumpkin Spice Scones with White Chocolate Chips
Carmen Pearlswig
Sweet, low sugar treat for breakfast, desert or snack to serve with tea, coffee or milk.
If you want to use sugar, substitute 3 tbls sugar for the Truvia.
If you want to use sugar, substitute 3 tbls sugar for the Truvia.
Featured Pinch Tips Video
- 2 c
- bisquick mix
- 1/2 tsp
- pumpkin spice
- 1/2 c
- vanilla or white chocolate chips
- 1/3 c
- heavy whipping cream
- 1 1/2 Tbsp
- truvia baking blend
- 1
- egg
- 1 tsp
- vanilla
- additional whipping cream
- additional truvia
Directions Step-By-Step
1Heat oven to 425˚F. Stir Bisquick mix, white chocolate chips, whipping cream, Truvia, egg and vanilla until soft dough forms.
2Lightly coat hands with Bisquick, knead dough and pat into approximately an 8-inch circle and place in the center of a round pizza stone. With a pizza cutter (or knife), cut into 8 pieces, like cutting a pizza, then separate pieces giving room to expand. Brush tops with additional whipping cream, then sprinkle with remaining Truvia.
3Bake for 12 minutes or until golden brown. Serve warm. Good cold also.
About this Recipe
Course/Dish: Other Breakfast, Other Desserts, Other Snacks
Main Ingredient: Flour
Regional Style: American
Other Tags: Quick & Easy, For Kids
Hashtags: #Pumpkinspice, #lowsugar


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Trophy Oscar for boy several times. Your favorite artist deserves an award. For being the best friend, the best lover or simply the funniest guy you know. Let them know with e Oscar trophy
3 item in stock items in stock
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Leave tonight to hijack all the limelight and shine with the light that characterizes it. When to pick up your Oscar trophy all eyes will focus on this guy so special that it certainly has star.
The stickers that Oscar trophy allow you to customize the message you want to surprise the guy in question. Who is? The 'more horny guy'? 'The most elegant'? 'Best partner'? Think of the quality that best defines him and rewards his genius with this figurine.
|Diablo Picante
|Top box
|24 cm
|Box width
|6.5 cm
|Long box
|6.5 cm
|Box weight
|0.13 Kg
|Totally safe packing
|Unmarked package


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decided: February 1, 1973.
SUN SHIPBUILDING & DRY DOCK COMPANY, APPELLEEv.AMERICAN EXPORT ISBRANDTSEN LINES, INC., APPELLANT
(D.C. Civil Action No. 69-1219). APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA.
Kalodner, Adams and Rosenn, Circuit Judges.
Opinion OF THE COURT
Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Company ("Sun") built four cargo vessels for American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc. ("Export") under a construction contract. The Maritime Administration*fn1 ("MarAd") agreed to subsidize construction of the ships, sharing the construction cost with Export in specified percentages. Export, with MarAd's approval, requested Sun to perform certain changes in the plans and specifications involving the refrigeration of cargo space. Sun completed the changes and all the parties agreed upon the amount of costs incurred, for which Sun was entitled to compensation under the contract. However, a dispute arose between Export and MarAd as to the latter's share of the costs incurred as a result of the changes. Export contended that MarAd was obligated to subsidize changes to the same extent that it subsidized the basic contract work; MarAd contended that it was not so obligated, claiming that its obligation was to subsidize only the amount that the alterations would have cost had they been included in the original construction plans.
Export and MarAd each paid Sun in accordance with its own conception of its obligation, and Sun received $217,200 less than the amount all parties agreed was due it.
Export made its disagreement with MarAd a dispute under the construction contract and submitted the matter for administrative adjudication by the Maritime Subsidy Board. The Board subsequently decided that MarAd was correct, that the obligation for the unpaid amount was Export's and that Export was to satisfy the obligation. However, Export considered the decision of the Subsidy Board incorrect, refused to pay Sun, and sought some means of taking an appeal. Because of its close relationship with Export, Sun refrained from suing Export for the $217,200. Instead, both Sun and Export looked for a means of presenting the issues to a tribunal that could make a binding adjudication of the rights of all three parties. To this end, a meeting was held in March, 1965, attended by representatives of Sun and Export.
At the meeting, which was the subject of a written report, the following was proposed: (1) a suit would be brought in Sun's name against the United States in the Court of Claims for $217,200; (2) a law firm that had previously represented Export would act as counsel for Sun, and Export would pay all fees and expenses of the suit; (3) Export would be bound by the outcome of the suit; and (4) Export would pay to Sun reasonable interest on the $217,200 if the suit in the Court of Claims should be decided in favor of the government.*fn2
According to Sun's evidence, an agreement in principle had been reached and suit was filed in the Court of Claims. Subsequent to the filing of the suit, the United States filed a third-party complaint against Export and Export responded by intervening as a party plaintiff. The Court of Claims held that the United States was responsible to Sun in the amount of $217,200, but that Export was liable in turn to the United States for the same amount. Nevertheless, Export contends that it is not liable for the interest, since Sun had prevailed in its suit against the government.
Export's position, however, is not congruent with the following factors. First, because of the limitations of its jurisdiction and the procedural posture of the case, the Court of Claims could not enter a judgment against Export in Sun's favor. Second, the Court of Claims did state, in the course of its adjudication, "It is our opinion that Export should be required to pay the difference in the increase in costs due to the change in the work, which has not been paid by MarAd." Third, and perhaps most importantly, the practical effect of the Court of Claims disposition was that the government won the suit and Export was liable for the sums owing. Thereafter, Export paid Sun the $217,200, but refused to pay Sun any interest thereon.
Following Export's refusal to pay the interest, Sun filed suit against Export in the district court, claiming interest on the $217,200. In Count I of its complaint, Sun averred that it was entitled to interest at the legal rate, and in Count II Sun claimed that Export had contracted to pay Sun reasonable interest as defined at the March, 1965 meeting.
The trial court submitted the issues under both counts to the jury, who brought in verdicts in favor of Sun on each Count, in the respective amounts of $65,160 and $47,579.55. The district court entered judgment only on the verdict under Count II, in conformity with the view expressed by Sun that Export had contracted at the March, 1965 meeting to pay reasonable interest.
We hold that the trial court did not err in submitting the issue to the jury, and that there was adequate evidence to support the verdict of the jury as to Count II.
Export also contends that the trial judge made a number of errors in the course of its charge. We have carefully reviewed the various contentions of Export in this respect and find them to be without merit.
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court, based on the verdict of the jury in regard to Count II, will be affirmed.
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text:
Etudes Galileennes.
• Terms • Ask a Question
Place Published: Paris
Publisher: Hermann
Date Published: 1939
Description: 3 vols., original printed wrappers. Paris: Hermann, 1939. First Editions. Fine.
Comments: Actualites Scientifiques et Industrielles, nos. 852-854. "Fundamental to the study of Gallileo's scientific work" DSB 5:248.Binding: paperback
Condition: fine
Language: French
Type: Books
Book ID: 167544