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August 12, 1998
FUJISAWA PHARMACEUTICAL CO., LTD. and FUJISAWA USA, INC., Plaintiffs,
JOHN N. KAPOOR, Defendant.
The plaintiffs, Fujisawa Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. ("Fujisawa"), and Fujisawa USA, Inc. ("FUSA"), sued the defendant, John Kapoor, under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq., and on a variety of state law grounds. Dr. Kapoor moves for summary judgment on all claims. For the following reasons, the motion is granted in part and denied in part.
Fujisawa is a Japanese Pharmaceutical company. FUSA is a Delaware corporation and a wholly-owned subsidiary of Fujisawa. Between December of 1984 and August of 1989, Fujisawa purchased stock in Lyphomed, a pharmaceutical company run by John Kapoor, its principal shareholder and executive. Lyphomed was acquired on April 5, 1990 and merged into FUSA.
Under Dr. Kapoor's management, Lyphomed produced both proprietary and generic drugs. A proprietary drug is a new patented drug, while generic drugs are versions of patented drugs ordinarily sold after the patent on the proprietary drug expires. Before a company can manufacture and sell a generic drug, it must submit an abbreviated new drug application ("ANDA") to the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") for approval. An ANDA contains research and development ("R&D") data demonstrating to the FDA that the proposed generic product is equivalent to the patented product being copied and is therefore safe and effective for human use. Based on the information contained in the ANDA, the FDA decides whether to allow the company to produce the generic drug.
Beginning in 1980 and continuing through 1989, Fujisawa claims Lyphomed filed false applications and information with the FDA in connection with thirty-five of its ANDAs. Fujisawa claims many Lyphomed ANDAs violated FDA rules because they contained normalized data without disclosing that fact
and that Lyphomed failed to disclose adverse test results and failed to record, or destroyed the results of, certain tests in violation of the FDA's ANDA regulations. Fujisawa alleges that Dr. Kapoor knew or should have known that Lyphomed had committed all these violations of FDA rules.
In March, 1983, Lyphomed filed an initial public offering with the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"). This filing did not disclose Lyphomed's ongoing ANDA violations. Pursuant to an agreement dated December 3, 1984, Fujisawa purchased 450,000 Lyphomed shares from Lyphomed and 320,000 from Dr. Kapoor. At that time, Dr. Kapoor did not disclose any information about Lyphomed's ANDA violations. Fujisawa continued to purchase additional shares in Lyphomed from both Lyphomed and Dr. Kapoor in several transactions. In making these transactions, Fujisawa allegedly relied on various Form 10-Ks filed by Lyphomed and signed by Dr. Kapoor, annual reports, and other statements issued by Dr. Kapoor. None of these documents disclosed the ANDA violations. By March 1988, Fujisawa owned twenty-eight percent of Lyphomed.
During 1987 and 1988, Lyphomed was cited by the FDA as having Good Manufacturing Practices ("GMP") problems at some of its plants.
By the end of 1988, Lyphomed had received eight FDA observation Reports (known as Form 483s) and an FDA regulatory letter. Form 483s list observations made by an FDA inspector during an inspection of a plant. When a company receives a Form 483, it usually submits a written response to the FDA disputing or explaining the inspector's observations, or promising to correct the problem if the company agrees that it exists. Ordinarily, if the FDA finds the company's response acceptable, the FDA will take no further action. If the FDA finds the company's response unacceptable, the FDA may take further action such as the issuance of a regulatory letter.
The regulatory letter Lyphomed received as a result of the Form 483s was serious -- it informed Lyphomed that it would not be given any new approvals for generic or patented pharmaceutical products until Lyphomed cured the GMP deficiencies (which was subsequently done). In response to the letter, Dr. Kapoor and Lyphomed reassured Fujisawa and other stockholders that Lyphomed was addressing the GMP concerns. Fujisawa then bought more Lyphomed shares on the open market and, in August of 1989, Fujisawa made a tender offer for the remaining shares of Lyphomed. Lyphomed merged into FUSA on April 6, 1990.
FUSA's present problems began in February of 1991 when the FDA initiated an investigation of Lyphomed's ANDAs. In the course of that investigation, the FDA unearthed many ANDAs submitted by Lyphomed between 1980 and 1989 containing allegedly false information. In May, 1991, FUSA was placed on the Alert List, meaning that the FDA would not process or approve any new drug applications or any ANDAs. The FDA issued its first Form 483 in November of 1991. In response, FUSA undertook its own audit of Lyphomed's ANDAs, withdrawing many of its products from the marketplace.
In this suit, Fujisawa
alleges Dr. Kapoor committed securities and mail fraud by failing to disclose the fact that Lyphomed violated FDA rules and filed false information in its ANDAs. According to Fujisawa, the many acts of fraud constitute an illegal pattern of racketeering under RICO. The complaint also alleges state-law violations involving fraud, breach of fiduciary duties, breach of warranty, and constructive trust.
Statute of Limitations5
There is a four-year statute of limitations in civil RICO cases. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 156, 97 L. Ed. 2d 121, 107 S. Ct. 2759 (1987). In the Seventh Circuit, the limitations period begins to run "once there was a RICO violation and the plaintiffs knew or should have known that they were injured." McCool v. Strata Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1452, 1464 (7th Cir. 1992)(citation omitted). Fujisawa filed its complaint on August 17, 1992. Thus, if Fujisawa either knew or should have known it was injured by August 17, 1988, its claim is time-barred.
Fujisawa alleges Dr. Kapoor was aware the ANDAs were fraudulent and thus, committed securities fraud and mail fraud. The issue is when Fujisawa should have discovered the ANDA fraud because at that point, Fujisawa should have known of its injury.
Dr. Kapoor points to a variety of evidence to argue that Fujisawa should have discovered the fraud, and thus its injury, before August, 1988. Dr. Kapoor says Fujisawa had access to Lyphomed's documents before August, 1988. There is a genuine issue of material fact as to which documents Fujisawa had access to before the merger. (Rule 12(M) Statement & Rule 12(N) Response P 18). Further, the Seventh Circuit rejected "the suggestion that the defrauded purchaser of a company is presumed to be on notice of everything in the company's files, so that the statute of limitations begins to run at the moment of acquisition." Fujisawa, 115 F.3d at 1335. There must be suspicious circumstances to alert Fujisawa of the need to review ANDA documents. Id.
Dr. Kapoor argues that Lyphomed's FDA problems in 1987 and 1988 should have alerted Fujisawa to the ANDA fraud. Lyphomed's 1987 and 1988 FDA problems, however, dealt with manufacturing concerns at its production plants and not with the R&D data that was submitted in the ANDAs. (Rule 12(N) Response P 170). Dr. Kapoor testified that the Form 483 issued by the FDA in relation to the manufacturing problems would not have alerted him to lying in the R&D area. (Rule 12(N) Response P 172; Kapoor 12/1/94 Dep. at 820). Further, according to Takashi Aoki, Fujisawa's representative on Lyphomed's Board of Directors during the 1980s, Dr. Kapoor repeatedly reassured him that Lyphomed's manufacturing problems had nothing to do with the rest of the company, particularly R&D. (Aoki Aff. P 15).
Dr. Kapoor argues that, prior to August 1988, Lyphomed employees told Fujisawa that Lyphomed was rushing ANDAs out too quickly. (Rule 12(M) Statement P 151). One of the individuals who expressed concerns about the speed of Lyphomed's ANDAs, Douglas Cary, was a former Lyphomed employee and a competitor of Lyphomed who was attempting to get Fujisawa to do business with his company. (Rule 12(N) Response P 151). Mr. Cary testified he was unaware of Lyphomed ever filing false or misleading data with the FDA and never informed Fujisawa that Lyphomed had filed false or misleading ANDAs. Id. Jeff Yordon, a Lyphomed employee, testified he told Fujisawa employees that he thought Lyphomed would fail under Dr. Kapoor's management. (Rule 12(M) Statement P 151). Mr. Yordon's comments, however, were directed towards Dr. Kapoor's management style and had nothing to do with R&D data or ANDAs. (Rule 12(N) Response P 151; Yordon Dep. at 133).
Dr. Kapoor also notes that a securities fraud class action ("Harman suit"), in which Fujisawa participated, was filed against Lyphomed and Dr. Kapoor in January, 1988. The Harman suit, however, arose from the manufacturing problems Lyphomed encountered. (Rule 12(N) Response P 185). The complaint in the Harman suit alleges Lyphomed made false comments regarding its ability to submit timely ANDAs because Lyphomed knew the FDA was going to prohibit it from submitting new drug applications until it resolved its manufacturing problems, not because of misleading information contained in the ANDAs. (Harman 2d Amended Complaint P 26; APP-3371). Dr. Kapoor testified that none of the allegations in the Harman suit raised any concerns with respect to improprieties in Lyphomed's R&D department. (Rule 12 (N) Response P 190; 12/1/94 Kapoor Dep. at 885).
While Dr. Kapoor presents an array of evidence that could have alerted Fujisawa to ANDA fraud before August, 1998, Fujisawa has raised a genuine of issue of fact as to whether this evidence was sufficient to alert it to the ANDA fraud.
Securities Fraud
To establish a civil RICO claim Fujisawa must prove Dr. Kapoor "(1) conducted (2) [] an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity." Sedima, S. P. R. L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 496, 87 L. Ed. 2d 346, 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985)(footnote omitted). Fujisawa alleges a string of securities frauds that make up the pattern of racketeering activity in this case. To prove a securities fraud violation under Rule 10b-5, Fujisawa must prove Dr. Kapoor "1) made a misstatement or omission, 2) of material fact, 3) with scienter, 4) in connection with the purchase or sale of securities, 5) upon which the [Fujisawa] relied, and 6) that reliance proximately caused [Fujisawa's] injury." Stransky v. Cummins Engine Co., Inc., 51 F.3d 1329, 1331 (7th Cir. 1995)(citation omitted). Dr. Kapoor challenges Fujisawa's ability to prove scienter, materiality, and reliance.
A. Scienter
Fujisawa may establish scienter with evidence Dr. Kapoor knew he was misleading Fujisawa or acted recklessly in making representations or omissions to Fujisawa. Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1043-45 (7th Cir. 1977). Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to prove scienter. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 390 n.30, 74 L. Ed. 2d 548, 103 S. Ct. 683 (1983).
Dr. Kapoor argues that all of the Lyphomed chemists and managers Fujisawa named as knowing about his fraud testified that, in fact, Dr. Kapoor was not aware of and was not involved in any fraud. (Rule 12(M) Statement PP 45-65). Fujisawa notes that the names it provided Dr. Kapoor were in response to an interrogatory that requested the names of chemists and managers who "may have" knowledge of Dr. Kapoor's fraud. (Rule 12(N) Response PP 34, 44). Quite clearly, Fujisawa's list was over-inclusive. Further, Fujisawa contends that the evidence suggests some of Lyphomed's chemists and managers were aware of Dr. Kapoor's fraud.
Fujisawa cites a memorandum by Abu Alam, Vice President of R&D, that indicates he and Dr. Kapoor made a decision to normalize data for the Floxuridine ANDA. (Rule 12(N) Statement P 46). The normalization was not disclosed to the FDA. (Rule 12(N) Statement P 48). Thus, to the FDA, the Floxuridine data appeared to have a beginning potency of 100% and degraded from that percentage over time. In reality, the drug began at a lower potency percentage and degraded to a degree that might have caused the FDA to question the Floxuridine ANDA if non-normalized data had been submitted. (Rule 12(N) Statement P 48). The FDA noted unreported normalization as a basis for the Form 483s issued on Lyphomed ANDAs in November, 1991. (Pl. App. X at APP-3095).
Jim Heinicke, one of Lyphomed's chemists involved in the normalization of Floxuridine, thought normalizing the data without noting normalization was dishonest. (Rule 12(N) Statement P 47).
Dr. Kapoor argues that the normalization was made known to the FDA and regardless, there is no proof he was aware the normalization would not be noted in the Floxuridine ANDA. Based on Dr. Kapoor's position with Lyphomed, his participation with the normalization of Floxuridine, and his association with Lyphomed's R&D Department and the rapid production of ANDAs,
an inference can be drawn that Dr. Kapoor was aware the Floxuridine ANDA would not note the normalization. Additionally, it is unclear whether the normalization was, in fact, ever made known to the FDA. Lyphomed did send additional data to the FDA after the FDA issued a deficiency letter on the Floxuridine ANDA. (Rule 12(M) Response P 46). The additional data, however, was only sent in response to the FDA deficiency letter. Dr. Kapoor's scienter in submitting normalized data in the Floxuridine ANDA is not diminished by any data later provided at the behest of the FDA. Further, it is unclear if the additional data Lyphomed provided was sufficient to alert the FDA of normalization in the Floxuridine ANDA. (Rule 12(M) Response P 46). The additional data does not state normalization occurred in the Floxuridine ANDA.
Fujisawa also presents a note written by David Noll, a project supervisor in Lyphomed's marketing department, at a Lyphomed New Products Committee meeting on April 4, 1986. (Rule 12(M) Statement P 128). The note states: "Do not submit questionable data, out-of-specs, etc. SOP in place in R&D." Id. Mr. Noll attributed this comment to Dr. Kapoor and noted Dr. Kapoor added it was "stupid" to submit questionable data because it would "merely delay FDA approval". (Noll Tr. at 24). Dr. Kapoor argues his comment was only addressed to one particular batch of a drug, Vancomycin, which had not been prepared correctly. (Rule 12(M) Statement P 129). Mr. Noll testified that he believed Dr. Kapoor's comment may only have been directed towards Vancomycin or may have been a general proposition that was to be followed with all questionable data. (Noll Tr. 25-26, 51-55). On its face, the statement indicates not submitting questionable data was to be "SOP [Standard Operating Procedure]," and thus, a reasonable inference may be drawn that the statement was to be followed on all questionable data.
Dr. Kapoor argues that out-of-specification data was submitted with the Vancomycin ANDA and that Lyphomed submitted fifty-five out-of-specification test results on the thirty-five ANDAs at issue in this case.
The FDA, however, in issuing its Form 483s in November, 1991, noted certain Lyphomed ANDA submissions were deficient for failing to report out-of-specification data. (Pl. App. X at APP-3099, 3101).
Additionally, other Lyphomed chemists believed out-of-specification numbers should not be reported. Melissa Wilson testified that Dulal Chatterji, a Lyphomed Director of R&D who reported to Dr. Kapoor, told her that "numbers should never be reported out of specification...." (Rule 12(N) Statement P 39). While Ms. Wilson testified she thought the results Dr. Chatterji wanted discarded may have been faulty, the comment could be interpreted as a general proposition that Lyphomed's questionable data was not to be reported to the FDA. Further, Anne O'Connor, another Lyphomed chemist, testified that Lyphomed generally did not report out-of-specification data. (Rule 12(N) Statement P 41; Rule 12(N) Response P 98). While both Ms. Wilson and Ms. O'Connor testified that they never got directions from Dr. Kapoor to falsify data, in light of Dr. Kapoor's statement to Mr. Noll and the Floxuridine memo, a finder of fact could reasonably infer that Dr. Kapoor was aware of and countenanced the failure to report out-of-specification data.
Dr. Kapoor argues that Fujisawa's own fraud auditors confirm his lack of fraud in the ANDAs. (Rule 12(M) Statement PP 114, 117-119). Fujisawa's auditors testified, however, that their main focus was not "who" was involved in fraud, but "whether" fraud occurred. (Rule 12(N) Response PP 114, 117-119). Further, to the extent Fujisawa's auditors identified employees responsible for fraud, they testified their main goal was to identify current Fujisawa employees that may have been responsible for fraud. Id. They also testified Dr. Kapoor's name was mentioned in relation to wrongdoing, particularly in regards to normalization. (Rule 12(N) Response P 119).
In sum, there is sufficient circumstantial evidence from which a finder of fact could conclude that Dr. Kapoor was aware Lyphomed ANDAs did not alert the FDA to normalized data and omitted out-of-specification data, rendering the ANDAs misleading and fraudulent.
B. Materiality and Reliance
Dr. Kapoor argues any misrepresentations he made regarding the ANDAs were not material to Fujisawa's decision to purchase Lyphomed and that Fujisawa did not rely on these misrepresentations. "An omission or misstatement is material if a substantial likelihood exists that a reasonable investor would find the omitted or misstated fact significant in deciding whether to buy or sell a security and on what terms to buy or sell." Rowe v. Maremont Corp., 850 F.2d 1226, 1233 (7th Cir. 1988). "Materiality presents a mixed question of law and fact, and as the Court in TSC Industries emphasized, 'the determination requires delicate assessments of the inferences a 'reasonable shareholder' would draw from a given set of facts and the significance of these facts to him and these assessments are peculiarly ones for the trier of fact.'" McGrath v. Zenith Radio Corp., 651 F.2d 458, 466 (7th Cir. 1981)(quoting TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 450, 48 L. Ed. 2d 757, 96 S. Ct. 2126 (1976)). Reliance is proven by showing "the defendant's misstatement or omission played a substantial part in the plaintiff's investment decision." Rowe, 850 F.2d at 1233. In contradiction to his scienter argument, Dr. Kapoor presents a variety of evidence to argue that ANDA fraud was obvious at the time Fujisawa invested and thus, the ANDA fraud was not material to Fujisawa's investment decisions and Fujisawa did not rely on any misstatements or omissions.
Dr. Kapoor argues that the deletion of a section of a draft merger agreement ("Section 4.15") prepared in July, 1989, should have alerted Fujisawa to fraudulent ANDAs.
Section 4.15 was a representation by Lyphomed that no set of facts existed that would require withdrawal of any of Lyphomed's pharmaceutical products. Dr. Kapoor notes that Fujisawa's legal counsel on the merger suggested particular attention be paid to Section 4.15. (Rule 12(M) Statement 238). Lyphomed's outside directors refused to include Section 4.15 in the final merger agreement and thus, Dr. Kapoor argues, Fujisawa should have been aware that the company submitted fraudulent ANDAs. The outside directors, however, struck nine of eighteen warranties and representations from the draft agreement on topics from ERISA to environmental matters. (Rule 12(N) Response P 238). Under Dr. Kapoor's reasoning, Fujisawa should also have been alerted to fraud in nine other areas. Further, since the outside directors testified they were unaware of the fraudulent ANDAs, it is illogical to believe the deletion of Section 4.15 was a conscious effort to avoid future liability and to alert Fujisawa that fraudulent ANDAs existed. Id.
Fujisawa states it agreed to delete Section 4.15 because the same representations already existed in Section 4.05 of the merger agreement.
Section 4.05 represented that none of the financial statements Lyphomed filed in connection with the merger contained any untrue statements of material fact or omitted any statements of material fact. Lyphomed's lead counsel on the merger, Thomas Cole, testified that, in theory, Section 4.05 covered the subject of FDA generic drug investigations. Id. ; (Cole Dep. at 87-89).
Dr. Kapoor also argues that Fujisawa, in Section 1.01 of the final merger agreement, agreed that ANDA fraud would not be material to its decision to buy Lyphomed.
paragraph (b) of Annex A of the merger agreement permitted Fujisawa to terminate the merger if a "material adverse change" occurred before closing the merger. (Pl. APP-4084). Section 1.01 states that specific events listed in a Disclosure Schedule attached to the merger agreement would not be considered "material adverse change[s]" for purposes of Paragraph (b) of Annex A. Among the events cited in the Disclosure Schedule was "any consequence resulting from investigation made by the FDA or other governmental agencies relating to manufacturing practices, the filing of ANDA materials, priority of processing of ANDAs, support data behind ANDAs and any fraudulent practices involving the generic drug industry." (Rule 12(M) Statement P 240; Pl. APP-4090). Thus, Dr. Kapoor argues, Fujisawa did not consider ANDA fraud material to its purchase.
The merger agreement, however, does not indicate that ANDA fraud was immaterial to Fujisawa. Rather, Section 9.10(c) of the merger agreement specifically indicates that nothing in the Disclosure Schedule is meant to be considered in determining what was or was not material to Fujisawa. Section 9.10(c) states "the inclusion of any specific item in the Disclosure Schedule hereto is not intended to imply that...the items so included or other items, are or are not material, and neither party shall use the fact of...any such item in any dispute or controversy between the parties as to whether any obligation, item or matter not described herein or included in the Disclosure Schedule is or is not material for purposes of this Agreement." (Rule 12(N) Response P 240; Pl. APP-4079)(emphasis added). Thus, while ANDA fraud, if it was included in the terms of the Disclosure Schedule,
might not have qualified as a "material adverse change" for purposes of closing the merger, it is clear the Disclosure Schedule was not meant to have a bearing on what Fujisawa considered material to its purchase of Lyphomed. Indeed, Mr. Aoki, Fujisawa's representative on Lyphomed's board, indicates that if Fujisawa had known of the fraudulent ANDAs it never would have acquired Lyphomed. (Aoki Aff. PP 2, 14, 24).
Lyphomed argues Section 9.10(c) does not render immaterial the matters included in the Disclosure Schedule. Lyphomed cites the deposition of one of its lawyers on the merger, Janet Kelly, who testified that Fujisawa had made an offer for Lyphomed in the face of an investigation into the generic drug industry and the Disclosure Schedule made Fujisawa take the risk of a problem occurring before closing. (Rule 12(M) Statement P 240). Lyphomed's generic drug problems, however, dealt with manufacturing issues and not R&D issues. No member of the negotiating team responsible for drafting the merger agreement was aware of Lyphomed's ANDA fraud and thus, the Disclosure Schedule could not have been a direct attempt to alert Fujisawa to ANDA fraud.
Dr. Kapoor also contends that Fujisawa had access to information that would have alerted it to the ANDA fraud and thus, cannot complain about its materiality. While Fujisawa may have had access to the information, the evidence before me indicates Fujisawa had no reason to believe such fraud existed and thus, no reason to look for such fraud. Additionally, to discover the fraud would have required review of many thousands of documents and laboratory notebooks to determine if Lyphomed's ANDAs were consistent with the R&D data. Based on the enormity of the audit that took place after the FDA issued the Form 483s in 1991, such a review would have been a monumental task.
As the Seventh Circuit has noted, "the buyer's investigation of things already known to the seller is a wasteful duplication of effort.... We will not establish a legal rule under which investors must resort to the costly self-help approach of investigation on pain of losing the protection of the principal legal safeguard, the rule against fraud." Teamsters Local 282 Pension Trust Fund v. Angelos, 762 F.2d 522, 528 (7th Cir. 1985).
Dr. Kapoor also argues that Lyphomed's 1987 and 1988 FDA problems should have alerted Fujisawa to a risk of ANDA fraud in the future. As noted above, Lyphomed's 1987 and 1988 FDA problems dealt with manufacturing issues and not R&D issues, a distinction even Dr. Kapoor found important. (Rule 12(N) Response 172).
Dr. Kapoor also argues that Fujisawa was aware of the "Kapoor Policies" and thus, could not have considered them material.
It is disputed whether Fujisawa knew of the "Kapoor Policies." (Rule 12(N) Response PP 213-220). Regardless, I do not find the "Kapoor Policies" are persuasive to show Dr. Kapoor should have been aware ANDA fraud was occurring at Lyphomed. Accordingly, I do not find Fujisawa's knowledge of the "Kapoor Policies," if such knowledge did exist, would have alerted Fujisawa to ANDA fraud.
Fujisawa presents the testimony of Mr. Aoki and Hirofumi Onosaka, Manager of Fujisawa's Corporate Planning Department, both of whom dealt directly with Dr. Kapoor and helped plan Fujisawa's acquisition of Lyphomed. Both declare that Fujisawa was unaware of Lyphomed's ANDA fraud, that Dr. Kapoor assured them Lyphomed would have no further FDA problems, and that Fujisawa would never have acquired Lyphomed if it had known of the ANDA fraud. (Pl. Aoki Aff; Onosaka Aff.). Given the totality of the evidence, there exists genuine issues of fact as to the materiality of the ANDA fraud and Fujisawa's reliance.
Harman Release
As noted above, Fujisawa participated in a class action lawsuit against Lyphomed and Dr. Kapoor that arose from the FDA problems in 1987 and 1988. Fujisawa signed a release when it settled with Lyphomed and Dr. Kapoor. Fujisawa released Dr. Kapoor from any claim "asserted or which could have been asserted...arising out of the subject matter..." of the Harman suit. (Rule 12(M) Statement P 188; Pl. APP-3352). Dr. Kapoor argues that the release bars this suit.
As an initial matter, Dr. Kapoor waived the release defense by failing to raise it in his answer. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c); accord Pinto Trucking Serv., Inc. v. Motor Dispatch, Inc., 649 F.2d 530, 534 (1981). Furthermore, none of the stock purchases at issue in this case fell within the Harman class period. While Dr. Kapoor wishes to give the release the broadest reading possible, he admitted the FDA problems that resulted in the Harman suit did not raise concerns about Lyphomed's R&D department. (Rule 12(N) Response P 190; 12/1/94 Kapoor Dep. at 885). Thus, to the extent Fujisawa released claims arising from the "subject matter" of the Harman suit, it does not follow that the claims in this suit were part of the subject matter of the Harman suit.
Finally, a general release only covers claims that a party knows of or could discover through reasonable inquiry. Fair v. International Flavors & Fragrances, Inc., 905 F.2d 1114, 1116 (7th Cir. 1990). As noted above, a review of all of Lyphomed's ANDAs and R&D data would have been a monumental task and thus, the claims in this case could not have been discovered through a "reasonable" inquiry.
State Law Claims
Dr. Kapoor moves for summary judgment on Fujisawa's state law claims of common law fraud, breach of warranty, breach of fiduciary duty, and constructive trust.
A. Common Law Fraud
Dr. Kapoor argues that a recent Illinois Appellate Court decision mandates a three-year statute of limitation for fraud actions that arise under the Illinois Securities Law. Tregenza v. Lehman Bros., Inc., 287 Ill. App. 3d 108, 678 N.E.2d 14, 222 Ill. Dec. 607 (1st Dist.), appeal denied, 174 Ill. 2d 595, 686 N.E.2d 1173, 227 Ill. Dec. 17 (Ill. 1997). The Illinois Securities Law states "no action shall be brought for relief under this Section or upon or because of any of the matters for which relief is granted by this Section after 3 years from the date of sale...." 815 ILCS 5/13(D) (emphasis added). The Tregenza court held that common law claims premised on relief under the Illinois Securities Law are governed by the statute of limitations in the Illinois Securities Law because such claims are premised upon "matters for which relief is granted...." 678 N.E.2d at 15; 222 Ill. Dec. at 608. The limitations period begins to run from the date of the securities transaction. But, the limitations period may be extended to five years if, even with reasonable diligence, Fujisawa could not have discovered the alleged securities violations. 815 ILCS 5/13(D)(2).
As noted above, the exercise of reasonable diligence would not have alerted Fujisawa to the ANDA fraud. Thus, Fujisawa may premise its fraud claim on all securities transactions that occurred after August 17, 1987. Securities transactions before that date are barred by the statute of limitations.
Dr. Kapoor also argues Fujisawa's fraud claim fails because he did not know of any false statements and his statements were not material. Since I have found genuine issues of fact as to these issues, summary judgment is inappropriate.
B. Breach of Warranty
Dr. Kapoor argues that Fujisawa's breach of warranty is barred under the Tregenza ruling. Fujisawa complains that Dr. Kapoor breached a 1984 written stock purchase agreement that was executed with Fujisawa's first purchase of Lyphomed stock. Fujisawa argues that since the basis of its breach of warranty claim is a contract rather than a "matter" for which relief is granted under the Illinois Securities Law, this claim is governed by the ten-year statute of limitations for breach of contract. 735 ILCS 5/13-206. Dr. Kapoor has not rebutted this argument and it is unclear, at best, how the breach of a stock purchase agreement would constitute a violation of the Illinois Securities Law. Summary judgment is inappropriate.
C. Breach of Fiduciary Duty
Dr. Kapoor argues Fujisawa's breach of fiduciary duty is barred by a three-year statute of limitations which begins to run from the time the "'key information is discovered or should have been discovered....'" Litman v. Prudential-Bache Properties, Inc., No. 61,1993, 1993 WL 603303, *1 (Del. Nov. 18, 1993)(quoting Bradley v. Maryland Cas. Co., 563 F. Supp. 602, 607 (D. Del. 1983). Based on the above analysis, there is a genuine issue of fact as to whether Fujisawa should have known of the ANDA fraud before August 17, 1989.
D. Constructive Trust
Dr. Kapoor argues that Fujisawa's claim for a constructive trust is inappropriate because a constructive trust is a remedy, not a claim. A constructive trust is an equitable remedy, not an independent cause of action. Scholes v. Ames, 850 F. Supp. 707, 712-13 (N.D. Ill. 1994). To the extent Fujisawa delineates a separate claim for a constructive trust, it is superfluous. A constructive trust, however, may be "imposed where there is a breach of a fiduciary duty or when fraud is proven." Senese v. Climatemp, Inc., 222 Ill. App. 3d 302, 582 N.E.2d 1180, 1188, 164 Ill. Dec. 236, 244 (1st Dist. 1991). Thus, while the claim itself is superfluous, Fujisawa's allegation that a constructive trust is appropriate is not. Accordingly, while the claim is dismissed, it is understood Fujisawa may attempt to prove a constructive trust is an appropriate equitable remedy should it prevail on other claims.
For the foregoing reasons, Dr. Kapoor's motion for summary judgment is granted on Fujisawa's constructive trust claim and, in part, on Fujisawa's common law fraud claim. Summary judgment is denied on Fujisawa's remaining claims.
Elaine E. Bucklo
United States District Judge
Dated: August 12, 1998
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SKL Cars
commercial vehicles, commercial vehicle, used vans
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Used cars and vans
Skl Cars offer a unique and personal approach to buying a car. If you are not happy with your car - then I am not happy.
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Details of this Paper
'To be solved by AjKaushal' Can you please hel...
'To be solved by AjKaushal' Can you please help with the second requirement? National Supply's shareholders' equity included the following accounts at December 31, 2012: Shareholders' Equity ($ in millions) Common stock, 6 million shares at $1 par $ 6,000,000 Paid-in capital?excess of par 30,000,000 Retained earnings 86,500,000 Required: 1. National Supply reacquired shares of its common stock in two separate transactions and later sold shares. Prepare the entries for each of the transactions under each of two separate assumptions: the shares are (a) retired and (b) accounted for as treasury stock. (If no entry is required for a particular transaction, select "No journal entry required" in the first account field. Enter your answers in whole dollars.) February 15, 2013 Reacquired 300,000 shares at $8 per share. February 17, 2014 Reacquired 300,000 shares at $5.50 per share. November 9, 2015 Sold 200,000 shares at $7 per share (assume FIFO cost). 2. Prepare the shareholders? equity section of National Supply?s balance sheet at December 31, 2015, assuming the shares are (a) retired and (b) accounted for as treasury stock. Net income was $14 million in 2013, $15 million in 2014, and $16 million in 2015. No dividends were paid during the three-year period. (Enter your answers in whole dollars.)
Paper#5892 | Written in 18-Jul-2015Price : $25


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NYC Wedding Photography
Serving New York, New Jersey, and beyond - since 1999.
Extensive online portfolios demonstrate our unique blend of documentary photojournalism and artistic creativity.
Recognized by New York Magazine as a top photographer and a best value!
Experienced, Professional
Our approach is to shoot candid photos, unobtrusively, before and after the portraits. Pre-wedding planning helps us know what emphasize in your coverage, as well the type and style shots most important to you.
We have extensive experience and knowledge of hundreds of wedding locations, parks, and photo spots in the New York City metropolitan area


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equity misvaluation, financing, investment
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Production-based asset pricing, Time-varying expected returns, Simulated method of moments
Mergers, Asset purchases, Efficiency gains, Acquisitions, event study
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cquisitions, asset sales, Tobin's Q, selection models
Tail distributions, high frequency returns, power laws time-varying volatility
Tail distributions, high frequency returns, power laws, time-varying volatility
Financial crises, financial frictions, innovation, total factor productivity (TFP)
Firm lifecycles, Profitability, Quality ladder, Financial frictions
Great Depression, Financial markets
Financial Shock, Impulse Response, VAR
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"My Immortal" - Evanescence.. Beautiful piece of music , this reminds me of my Jason, he loved this song.
Hello, by Evanescence. ---this is also me, and yes accompanied by that look. don't worry, my face just does that. not always about youuuuu---
Save me from the nothing I've become... -Evanescence. I don't really listen to them but this I like.
I have been in love with this band since late 2003, when I was only 11 years old turning 12.
(open Rp.) I found this old piano in one of the rooms. I sit at it and start to sing Mad world as I play I hear a floor board creaking but I continue to play and smirk.-Raven.
When you cried I'd wipe away all of your tears. When you'd scream I'd fight away all of your fears. And I held your hand through all of these years. But you still have. All of me. Link: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5anLPw0Efmo
Amy Lee - Evanescence
"This pain is just too real"-My Immortal by Evanesence. Also, Amy Lee's necklace is awesome ^.^
Amy Lee from Evanescence Style Anime Chibi. THIS IS ADORABLE :D:D:D
Amy Lee Daily


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Our Featured stories
We write about destinations, hotels and tips for the road
Travel Experiences
We take you with us as we describe our experience in detail, enough to make you feel every moment of joy, anticipation and thrill associated with it.
Hotel Reviews
An elaborate account of our experiences in hotels we've stayed at. Arguably some of the finest boutique luxury hotels to be found.
so who/what is Gypsycouple?
We are a Fashionista & Geek couple entwined by fate through an act of arranged marriage. We chose travel as a medium to explore life together and learn about each other on the way. Hence, our travel stories are about the people we meet, the food we eat, markets we explore and experiences we encounter. Gypsycouple was created as a medium to make sense of the chaos in our life through something we both enjoyed, Travel. Somewhere down the line we figured that investing in our experiences provided much better dividends than any stocks or deposits and we haven't looked back since
Follow us now!
Follow us on social media! We always love to hear from our followers. The best way to get in touch is through our comments section or any of our social media channels. Find out more on our contact page.


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In the experience of the pros at Fitness Together, everyone finds a little extra oomph when fitness sessions consist of two to four people. That's just what you'll get with this offer, and the competition, camaraderie, and cooperation make for excellent fringe benefits:
• $125 ($228 value) for six small-group personal training sessions
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Fitness Together's Website | Facebook
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*'lower price' discount may not apply to multiple purchases, select your options to see your final price. By purchasing, you agree to the deal fine print and the LivingSocial terms and conditions.
By purchasing, you agree to the deal fine print and the LivingSocial terms and conditions.
Buy this Deal with confidence, because it's covered by the LivingSocial Good Deal Guarantee up to the Voucher Expiration Date


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What if you held a presidential rally and nobody came?
After his pathetic turnout in Ft. Wayne on Thursday, Ted Cruz and Carly Fiorina suffered another blow on Friday.
The Cruz camp rented an auditorium that could hold a couple thousand people in South Bend, Indiana.
Only a couple hundred people showed up.
How the hell is EliminaTED Cruz so close to Trump in the Indiana polls with only 9 points behind Trump with these tiny crowds? Has anyone seen Trump's crowds? No? Keep reading!
Either his voters are superficial, lazy and not that committed or his numbers are artificially inflated in the polls.
Just a few hours ago Trump also held a rally in Ft. Wayne, Indiana! Guess what!!?!?!!!!!??! AT LEAST 18000 came to see Trump in Fort Wayne! If Ted Cruz wins Indiana, this will be the ultimate proof of severe election fraud across America and it will be worthy of riots and a violent revolution to overthrow the corrupted establishment because if not now, then when? If not for election fraud then for what?
UPDATE! That might not be necessary since according to the latest poll, Trump leads by 15 points in Indiana!
Here are a couple of photos from the Trump rally in Fort Wayne:
Watch Trump's entire speech in Ft. Wayne, Indiana
- Obama Mocked Trump Plan to Keep Carrier Jobs in USA
- CNN Breaking News: Trump Tells Supporters To Vote Multiple Times
- Clinton is now leading Trump by 27%, Total Proof Photos, Huge Crowds
- 2 GOP Offices Destroyed by Democrats, Media Blames Trump
- THOUSANDS of INDIANS Attend Trump Speech, ZERO MEDIA COVERAGE!


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Lassen Volcanic National Park is a United States National Park in northeastern California. The dominant feature of the park is Lassen Peak, the largest plug dome volcano in the world and the southern-most volcano in the Cascade Range. Lassen Volcanic National Park started as two separate national monuments designated by President Theodore Roosevelt in 1907: Cinder Cone National Monument and Lassen Peak National Monument. The source of heat for volcanism in the Lassen area is subduction off the Northern California coast of the Gorda Plate diving below the North American Plate. The area surrounding Lassen Peak is still active with boiling mud pots, stinking fumaroles, and churning hot springs.
Contributions by Mav, Hydrogen Iodide, and MONGO.


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Nickelodeon Embraces Cord-Cutters With Streaming Service
Nickelodeon has plans to launch its own streaming service, but will parents be willing to fork over the cash for kids' programming?By Ben Lawson | January 29, 2015
No one wants to miss out on the video streaming business — not even SpongeBob SquarePants, apparently.
"What do you say, Mrs. Puff, let's get this party started."
Nickelodeon will be be launching its own subscription service sometime this March. The news was revealed by Philippe Dauman, the CEO of Nickelodeon's parent company, Viacom, who didn't go into price or content details.


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"Death Valley National Park" Death Valley Tip by Andraf
Death Valley, California: 34 reviews and 50 photos
Death Valley National Park is located in east-central California, right on the border with Nevada. It is one of the most interesting places to visit in California. No matter what direction you come from you'll be struck when you enter the valley as the landscape will change from High Sierras to desert and the view of the valley like a vast emptiness with the mountains in the background is just breathtaking. Death Valley holds a number of records like being the lowest (282 feet below sea level) and hottest place in the Western Hemisphere. The valley has a lot to offer and is a great place for photography. Just make sure to bring lots of water, it's a very hot and dry place.
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May 30, 2012
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, APPELLANTv.WILLIAM C. STIVER, JR., APPELLEE
Appeal from the Order Entered September 12, 2011 In the Court of Common Pleas of Clinton County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-18-CR-0000155-1987
BEFORE: GANTMAN, J., LAZARUS, J., and MUNDY, J.
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appeals from the order entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Clinton County granting William C. Stiver, Jr.'s application to restore civil rights. Because the trial court did not have the authority to restore Stiver's civil rights to sit on a jury or hold public office, we vacate the trial court's order.
In September 1986, Stiver was convicted by a jury of theft (F3) and other related offenses. As a result of his conviction, Stiver was prohibited under state and federal law from possessing or controlling firearms. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a), (b) (prohibiting firearm ownership following conviction of certain enumerated offenses, including theft); 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)
(prohibiting firearm ownership to anyone who has been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison).
On December 17, 2010, Stiver filed an Application for Exemption pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(d) to the prohibition against owning or possessing a firearm under section 6105(a). Section 6105(d) provides:
(d) Exemption.--A person who has been convicted of a crime specified in subsection (a) or (b) or a person whose conduct meets the criteria in subsection (c)(1), (2), (5),
(7) or (9) may make application to the court of common pleas of the county where the principal residence of the applicant is situated for relief from the disability imposed by this section upon the possession, transfer or control of a firearm. The court shall grant such relief if it determines that any of the following apply:
(1) The conviction has been vacated under circumstances where all appeals have been exhausted or where the right to appeal has expired.
(2) The conviction has been the subject of a full pardon by the Governor.
(3) Each of the following conditions is met:
(i) The Secretary of the Treasury of the United States has relieved the applicant of an applicable disability imposed by Federal law upon the possession, ownership or control of a firearm as a result of the applicant's prior conviction, except that the court may waive this condition if the court determines that the Congress of the United States has not appropriated sufficient funds to enable the Secretary of the Treasury to grant relief to applicants eligible for the relief.
(ii) A period of ten years, not including any time spent in incarceration, has elapsed since the most recent conviction of the applicant of a crime enumerated in subsection (b) or a felony violation of The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(d) (emphasis added).
The trial court scheduled a hearing for April 11, 2011 after instructing Stiver to give notice to his victim that he was seeking the desired relief. At the hearing, the trial court ruled that section 6105(d)(3) was satisfied, finding that the United States Congress had not appropriated sufficient funds to enable the Secretary of the Treasury to grant relief to applicants from the federal firearms disability and that a period of 10 years had elapsed since Stiver's most recent conviction. Therefore, the trial court granted Stiver's application to relieve the disability imposed by section 6105(a).
Subsequently, Stiver attempted to purchase a firearm but the Pennsylvania State Police refused to process his request unless he first obtained a court order reinstating all of his civil rights, including the right to vote, hold public office and sit on a jury. Accordingly, on August 24, 2011, Stiver filed an Application to Restore Civil Rights with the Court of Common Pleas. The court conducted a hearing on September 12, 2011. At the hearing, Stiver's counsel informed the court that the Pennsylvania State Police would not process Stiver's request to own or possess firearms unless the court entered this supplemental order. The court agreed, entering an order purporting to restore all of Stiver's civil rights, notwithstanding the fact that Stiver's right to hold public office or sit on a jury are prohibited under state law. Trial Court Opinion, 11/18/11, at 2.
The Commonwealth filed a timely notice of appeal and complied with the trial court's order to file a statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). The Commonwealth presents two questions for our review:
1. Did the trial court err in finding it had authority and that [Stiver] was eligible to have certain civil rights restored under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(d)(3)?
2. Did the trial court err when it found that the restoration of civil rights was tied to the ability to possess firearms?
Brief of Appellant, at 4.
The trial court correctly ruled in the April 11, 2011 hearing that Stiver was entitled to relief from the firearms disability imposed under state law, as the court made a factual determination that the conditions for relief under section 6105(d)(3) were satisfied. However, subsection 6105(d) simply removes the firearms disability imposed under section 6105(a); it does nothing to restore any other disability that may apply under federal law. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(d); Beecham v. United States, 511 U.S. 368, 373 (1994) (where civil rights have not been restored, individual violates federal law by possessing firearm, even if individual has had disability removed pursuant to state law). Nevertheless, relief under 6105 is not inconsequential. Where the federal prohibition under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) does not apply or is later removed, a petitioner may regain full firearm rights. Thus, section 6105(d) moves a petitioner one step closer to being able to legally own and possess a firearm.
To determine whether the trial court had authority to restore Stiver's full firearm rights, rather than merely remove the disability under section 6105(a), we must ascertain whether Stiver was prohibited from owning a firearm under federal law. Section 922(g)(1) of the United States Crimes Code provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person . . . who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (emphasis added). The term "conviction," for purposes of section 922(g)(1), is defined in section 921(a)(20) as follows:
What constitutes a conviction of such a crime shall be determined in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction in which the proceedings were held. Any conviction which has been expunged, or set aside or for which a person has been pardoned or has had civil rights restored shall not be considered a conviction for purposes of this chapter, unless such pardon, expungement, or restoration of civil rights expressly provides that the person may not ship, transport, possess, or receive firearms.
18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) (emphasis added). Thus, a person who has his full civil rights restored under the law of the convicting state is not restricted from owning a firearm under federal law. See Caron v. United States, 524 U.S. 308, 313 (1998) (convictions, pardons, expungements and restorations of civil rights are determined by reference to law of convicting jurisdiction); see also United States v. Cassidy, 899 F.2d 543 (6th Cir. 1990) (state, not federal, law determines whether individual has had his or her civil rights restored for state conviction).
Here, Stiver was convicted in state court of theft, a third-degree felony punishable by more than one year in prison. However, it does not necessarily follow that Stiver's firearm rights are restricted under federal law, because a person is not "convicted" for purposes of section 922(g) if his civil rights are restored. See 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20); Pennsylvania State Police v. Viall, 774 A.2d 1288, 1291 n.9 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001).
For federal law to recognize the state restoration of rights pursuant to section 921(a)(20), the state restoration must include an unconditional restoration of firearm rights as well as the right to vote, the right to seek and hold public office and the right to serve on a jury. See Commonwealth v. Sherwood, 859 A.2d 807, 809 (Pa. Super. 2004); Logan v. U.S., 552 U.S. 23 (2007). Recognizing this requirement, the trial court declared that Stiver's civil rights had been restored. However, simply declaring that rights are restored does not mean that the rights were actually restored or that the court had the authority to restore them.
As the trial court notes, Article II, § 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution prohibits any person who had been convicted of a felony from holding public office. Pa. Const. Art. II, § 7 (prohibiting persons convicted of "infamous crime" from holding public office); see Commonwealth ex rel. Kearney v. Rambler, 32 A.3d 658, 664 (Pa. 2011) (crime graded as felony in Pennsylvania is an "infamous crime" for purposes of Article II, § 7); see also Commonwealth ex rel Baldwin v. Richard, 751 A.2d 647 (Pa. 2000) (courts of common pleas are without authority to permit plea bargain that would permit convicted felon to stay in office in contravention of the Pennsylvania Constitution). Further, section 4502 of the Judiciary Code prohibits persons convicted of crimes punishable by more than one year of imprisonment from sitting on a jury. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 4502. Thus, the trial court did not have the authority to restore Stiver's right to hold public office or serve on a jury.
Stiver argues alternatively that his firearm rights should be restored under 18 Pa.C.S.A. 6105.1 (Restoration of firearm rights for offenses under prior laws of this Commonwealth). Stiver's claim is without merit. First, Stiver has not applied for, nor has the trial court granted, relief under this section. Second, even if Stiver had applied for the restoration of firearm rights under section 6105.1, no relief would be due.
Section 6105.1 provides in relevant part:
(a) Restoration.--A person convicted of a disabling offense may make application to the court of common pleas in the county where the principal residence of the applicant is situated for restoration of firearm rights.
(e) Definitions.--As used in this section, the following words and phrases shall have the meanings given to them in this subsection
"Disabling offense." A conviction for any offense which:
(1) resulted in a Federal firearms disability and is substantially similar to either an offense currently graded as a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment for not more than two years or conduct which no longer constitutes a violation of law; and
(2) was a violation of either of the following:
(i) the former [Vehicle Code]; or
(ii) the former [Penal Code].
"Restoration of firearms rights." Relieving any and all disabilities with respect to a person's right to own, possess, use, control, sell, purchase, transfer, manufacture, receive, ship or transport firearms, including any disabilities imposed pursuant to this subchapter. The phrase shall also mean the restoration of the right to vote, to hold public office and to serve on a jury.
18 Pa.C.S.A. 6105.1(a), (e).
Section 6105.1 applies only to persons convicted of a "disabling offense;" i.e., persons who have a federal firearms disability that resulted from an offense under the previous Penal or Traffic Code of this Commonwealth, and which is no longer graded as an offense punishable by two or more years' imprisonment under the current laws of this Commonwealth. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. 6105.1(a), (e). Stiver's conviction for theft, a felony of the third degree, is not a "disabling offense" under section 6105.1(e) because it is punishable by more than two years' imprisonment. Accordingly, section 6105.1 does not apply.*fn1
Because Stiver's civil right to hold public office or serve on a jury could not be restored by the trial court under state law, he does not qualify for removal of the firearm disability under federal law based on the restoration of civil rights. See 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20). While Stiver could have had his federal firearm rights restored through expungement or gubernatorial pardon, see id., or an application to remove the federal firearms disability pursuant to federal law, see 18 U.S.C. § 925(c), he has not done so. Absent such relief, the federal firearms disability under section 922(g) still applies. Accordingly, the trial court erred in declaring that Stiver could legally own or possess a firearm and that the Pennsylvania State Police were required to recognize his right to do so. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6111.1(b)(1)(i) (duty of state police to enforce state and federal prohibitions on firearm ownership).*fn2
Order vacated. Jurisdiction relinquished.
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It's all but official: Stricker, Spieth a team
Call it "The Old Man and the Spieth."
Looks like 46-year-old Steve Stricker and 20-year-old rookie Jordan Spieth will be paired as a team for the The Presidents Cup this week. It's a pairing that has been speculated about for weeks and after U.S. captain Fred Couples sent them out together in a practice round (with Phil Mickelson and Keegan Bradley), the pairing became all but official.
Here's what Stricker had to say in a news conference Tuesday:
"I think we both have the ability to stay in the hole. We grind it out, the limited amount I've played with him, he's got a good short game, he putts well, he always seems to be in the hole even if he (misses) the green. He's got the ability to get it up and down and move on. I'm the same way. Our demeanors are pretty similar. He's a pretty calm, collected guy and I am, too. And so I think we hit it off in that respect. ... And you know, I've been saying all week, who doesn't want to play with him? He's playing great. He's a good kid. He's got a good head on his shoulders. So I'm looking forward to it."
Couples is to announce his pairings Wednesday.
- Kaddy Korner: Ready for the stretch drive with Cody
- Midwest Cup has become top-tier amateur tournament
- Kaddy Korner: Things are looking up as Cody finishes 20th
- Stricker inserts himself into Ryder Cup conversation
- Meyer's July 4 by the numbers: 162 holes played, $66,000 raised
- Kaddy Korner: Getting some much-needed rest before the final push
- Meyer set for ninth annual '100 Holes for our Heroes' at Chenequa
- Hallberg, Terasa qualify for U.S. Senior Open
- Kaddy Korner: Another weekend off, more frustration
- Ryan Helminen qualifies for PGA Championship
PGA Tour
LPGA Tour
European Tour
Champions Tour


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Sprigz Pub and Grub
Acoustic Open Mic (music, comedy, poetry)
First Monday of the month at 9pm
Rensselaer, IN
First Monday of the month at 9pm
Hosted by James123 N. Cullen St.
Rensselaer, IN
- This Open Mike has been changed to the first Monday each month.
- reply to this commentterri saltzman (10/2013)
- Acoustic-ish open mic every other Monday in the heart of downtown Rensselaer, the seat of Jasper County! Sign-up begins whenever the host arrives (generally around 8ish). Slated for 9pm-12am, but can go longer. And EVERYONE is welcome to come play--any and all music styles are welcome, from the down home chicken pickers to the freestyle hip hoppers. Kitchen open until 3am! Come check it out!
- reply to this commentMaybe James (8/2012)


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June 16, 2006
UNITED STATES OF AMERICAv.WALTER HIMMELREICH, DEFENDANT
I. Introduction
On June 1, 2005, a Grand Jury returned a three-count indictment charging Defendant Walter Himmelreich with: (i) knowingly permitting his minor child to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing visual depictions of such conduct using materials that were shipped and transported in interstate and foreign commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(b); (ii) knowingly receiving and distributing child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2); and (iii) knowingly possessing child pornography that had been mailed, shipped, and transported in interstate and foreign commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). (Doc. No. 1.) On April 19, 2006, the Grand Jury returned a superseding indictment, charging Defendant with an additional count of knowingly using a facility and means of interstate commerce to attempt to persuade, induce, entice, and coerce a minor to engage in a sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense, and aiding and abetting the same. (Doc. No. 63.)
On October 21, 2005, Defendant filed three pretrial motions seeking to dismiss the indictment for violation of the Speedy Trial Act pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b); seeking to suppress statements given while in custody; and seeking to suppress evidence discovered during a search of his vehicle. (Doc. Nos. 29, 31, 33.) On March 29, 2006, the Court held an evidentiary hearing to consider each of the motions. The Government filed a consolidated brief in opposition to each of the motions on April 14, 2006. (Doc. No. 61.) Defendant filed a reply on April 19, 2006. (Doc. No. 62.)
II. Factual Background*fn1
Between January and November, 2004, Defendant engaged in numerous internet chatting sessions under the screen name "walthpa" with an interlocutor he believed to be a mother willing to make her two minor daughters available for sex acts with Defendant. (Tr. 53.) During these chats, Defendant provided graphic details regarding the sexual activities he sought to engage in with these minor girls, and also various sex acts he had engaged in with his six-year-old daughter. (Tr. 54.) Defendant described using anal lubricants, dildos, condoms, and bananas in the sex acts. (Tr. 54) During the course of these chat sessions, Defendant agreed to meet his chat correspondent and her daughters at a restaurant in Delaware County, Pennsylvania, on November 9, 2004, with a stated plan of engaging in sexual activity with the girls. (Tr. 53-54.) Defendant further agreed to bring to this meeting sex toys, wine, condoms, bananas, and lubricant. (Tr. 54.)
Unbeknownst to Defendant, the individual he believed was a mother willing to make her minor children available to Defendant for sexual activity was in fact undercover law enforcement officer Michelle Deery. At all times during these chats, Ms. Deery was an agent with the Pennsylvania Office of the Attorney General assigned to the Delaware County District Attorney's Office Internet Crimes Against Children ("ICAC") Task Force.*fn2 (Tr. 38-39.) Created in 1999, the Delaware County ICAC Task Force is one of 45 such task forces throughout the United States. (Tr. 7.) Lieutenant David C. Peifer of the Delaware County District Attorney's Office Criminal Investigation Division supervises the ICAC Task Force and testified regarding the ICAC Task Force's funding and criminal investigative functions. (Tr. 6-7.)
The ICAC Task Force receives Federal grant funding through the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention in Washington, D.C., which provides funds to support state and local law enforcement efforts in the investigation of crimes against children committed through use of the Internet. (Tr. 9.) In certain cases, the ICAC Task Force will coordinate its investigative efforts with Federal agencies. (Tr. 11-12.) However, no Federal agency has involvement in the executive committees of ICAC task forces, and all investigations are coordinated and supervised by the local task force. (Tr. 13.) With respect to the investigation into Defendant's conduct through his eventual arrest on November 9, 2004, only the Delaware County ICAC Task Force and a local police department were involved. (Tr. 14.)
On November 9, 2004, Defendant drove from his home in York County, Pennsylvania, to an Applebee's Restaurant in Delaware County, Pennsylvania, where he planned to meet a mother and her two minor children.*fn3 (Tr. 42-43.) Defendant left his vehicle and began walking toward the restaurant, at which point he was placed under arrest by ICAC Task Force officers. (Tr. 42.) While Defendant was being secured, Detective Deery looked in the passenger-side window of Plaintiff's vehicle and observed wine bottles and bananas, two items Defendant referred to in his chat sessions. (Tr. 54.) Following his arrest, Defendant's vehicle was impounded and an inventory search conducted. (Tr. 56-57.) While in custody, Defendant was asked for consent to search his vehicle prior to the inventory search being conducted. Defendant signed a written consent. (Tr. 56.) A subsequent search of Defendant's vehicle yielded dildos, condoms, and lubricant, all items that Defendant stated that he would bring to his planned encounter with the mother and her two minor daughters. (Tr. 57-58.)
Following his arrest, Himmelreich was transported to the Delaware County District Attorney's Office Criminal Investigation Division at the county courthouse in Media, Pennsylvania. (Tr. 17.) While in custody, Defendant was given Miranda warnings. (Tr. 20.) After Defendant waived his rights, he was interviewed by Lieutenant Peiffer and Detective Deery. (Id.) After this interview was complete, investigating officers had Defendant make a recorded statement to memorialize the interview. (Id.) At the beginning of this taped statement, Defendant was once again advised of his constitutional right to remain silent and to have an attorney present, and he executed a form to indicate that he understood and waived these rights. (Id. 20, 107-09; Def. Ex. 2.) As indicated on the transcript of this recorded statement, Defendant acknowledged that he was proceeding without an attorney present and he proceeded to provide a statement.*fn4 (Tr. 20; Def. Ex. 2.)
During the recorded interview, Defendant admitted that he had engaged in Internet chats during which he discussed engaging in sex acts with persons he believed to be children. (Tr. 31.) Defendant also admitted that he had taken nude pictures of his six-year-old daughter, and that he had engaged in oral-genital contact with her, and that there had been instances in which she had oral-genital contact with him through his clothing while he had an erection. (Tr. 28.) Defendant discussed with officers possessing a "doctor's kit" that was used to play with his daughter during the sexual contacts.*fn5 (Tr. 29-30.) Although Defendant claimed that he stopped at the Applebee's Restaurant in Delaware County, Pennsylvania, on November 9, 2004 only to advise his internet chat partner that he was unwilling to go through with their plan, he acknowledged that he had in his possession all of the items that he described in his Internet chat sessions -- namely, lubricants, condoms, dildos, bananas, and wine.*fn6 (Tr. 30-31.) Defendant telephoned Detective Deery several times while he was en route to the Applebee's Restaurant.
Based on all of the foregoing information and statements, Detective Deery prepared an affidavit in support of criminal charges against Defendant in Delaware County. (Tr. 49.) Detective Deery forwarded her affidavit to York County Detective Jeffrey Martz, who used the information in support of an application for a warrant to search Defendant's York County residence. (Tr. 51-52.)
III. Discussion
A. Motion to Dismiss Indictment
Defendant has moved to dismiss the indictment pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b), charging that the delay between his arrest by state law enforcement authorities and his eventual indictment by the United States should be considered a violation of the Speedy Trial Act. Specifically, Defendant argues that because he was arrested by law enforcement officers working for a State task force that receives Federal funding and training, and that frequently coordinates with Federal law enforcement in the investigation and prosecution of child pornography crimes, his initial arrest and detention should be considered a Federal matter subject to the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b). Defendant has offered no legal authority to support this argument, and the Court finds it to be meritless.
The evidence of record demonstrates that there was no Federal agency involvement in the investigation of Defendant's activities through his eventual arrest, aside from the grant funding contributed to the ICAC Task Force by the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention in Washington, D.C. Defendant has not offered, and the Court has not found, any case law to support the theory that this limited financial involvement on the part of the Federal government in the funding of the ICAC Task Force is sufficient to deem a local law enforcement task force a Federal agency, or otherwise cause investigations and arrests conducted by such task force to be subject to the provisions of the Speedy Trial Act. Accordingly, Defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment will be denied.
B. Motion to Suppress Custodial Statements
Defendant claims that his constitutional rights were violated after he invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self incrimination on five separate occasions while in custody, but that his requests were ignored.*fn7 (Tr. 111.) Defendant contends that information obtained from custodial interrogation, after his requests for counsel were ignored, were included in a probable cause affidavit supporting the search of his residence and the seizure of physical evidence therefrom. (Doc. No. 32, at 2.) Defendant seeks suppression of the statements and of the seizure of the items obtained from a search of his home.
Defendant and the United States agree that the Fifth Amendment operates to protect individuals against self-incrimination, and that in order to use statements made while a defendant is in custody, the Government must demonstrate that it scrupulously honored a defendant's request for counsel, and that any evidence derived from such custodial statements was obtained in strict compliance with Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), or otherwise satisfies one of the exceptions to Miranda.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has provided the following guidelines that district courts should follow when determining whether a custodial statement was voluntarily given:
A statement is voluntary if, when viewed in the totality of the circumstances, it is the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker. If an individual's will is overborne or that person's capacity for self-determination is critically impaired, her or his statements are involuntary. A suspect's background and experience, including prior dealings with the criminal justice system, should be taken into account in the voluntariness inquiry. A necessary predicate to a finding of involuntariness is coercive police activity. Further, there must be some causal connection between the police conduct and the confession. The burden is on the Government to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a challenged statement was voluntary.
United States v. Jacobs, 431 F.3d 99, 108 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted). Following careful consideration of the evidence presented during the hearing before this Court on March 29, 2006, the Court can only conclude that the totality of the circumstances demonstrate that Defendant's statements were voluntarily given and in compliance with Miranda.
The evidence reveals that Defendant signed a consent form indicating his willingness to talk with investigators. (Tr. 107-09.) Defendant acknowledged that he did not have counsel, and proceeded to give a statement to law enforcement officers.*fn8 (Id.; Def. Ex. D.) Detective Deery and Lieutenant Peifer each testified that at no time during his custodial interview did Himmelreich invoke his right to counsel or the right to remain silent. (Tr. 20, 49.) The Court also notes that Defendant is well-educated, having earned two bachelor degrees and a masters degree. (Tr. 107-08.) He previously worked as an auditor with the Internal Revenue Service. (Tr. 83, 100.) Moreover, Defendant has had some degree of professional and personal experience with the legal system, and even worked in a part-time capacity selling prepaid legal services. (Tr. 92-93.) Although Defendant claims that he signed the consent form under duress and even alleges that Lieutenant Peifer erased a portion of the recorded statement during which Defendant insists he requested counsel, the totality of the evidence presented does not support Defendant's allegation. To the contrary, the record reflects that Defendant -- a well-educated individual, familiar with the legal process -- knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination when he offered a custodial statement to law enforcement officers. Upon consideration of the testimony presented, the Court does not credit Defendant's testimony that he invoked his rights to counsel on five separate occasions following his arrest, nor does the Court credit his allegation that Lieutenant Peiffer destroyed evidence and otherwise ignored Defendant's alleged requests for counsel. Accordingly, Defendant's motion to suppress these statements will be denied.
C. Motion to Suppress Evidence
1. Warrantless Search of Defendant's Vehicle
Defendant argues that the warrantless search of his vehicle following his arrest should be suppressed because no exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement justified the search. The evidence, however, demonstrates that a cursory search of the vehicle was conducted, in part, upon Defendant's arrest with law enforcement officers having probable cause to believe the vehicle contained evidence of criminal activity, and was conducted fully after law enforcement officers sought and obtained Defendant's voluntary consent. Additionally, the Government presented evidence that the vehicle would have been subject to an inventory search pursuant to a formal policy applicable to all vehicles taken into police custody. As each of the foregoing bases to conduct a search of the vehicle qualify as established exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, the motion to suppress the search will be denied.
A warrantless search is per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973). "It is well settled, however, that a search conducted pursuant to consent is one of the specifically established exceptions to the search warrant requirement." United States v. Givan, 320 F.3d 452, 459 (3d Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). The Supreme Court has instructed that "when a prosecutor seeks to rely upon consent to justify the lawfulness of a search, he has the burden of proving that the consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given." Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 222 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Whether a party has voluntarily consented to a search request is determined from the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 227. The Third Circuit has explained as follows:
[W]hether consent was given is to be resolved by examining all relevant factors, without giving dispositive effect to any single criterion. Certain factors that courts consider in determining whether confessions were voluntary, such as the age of the accused, his education, his intelligence, whether he was advised of his constitutional rights, and whether the questioning was repeated and prolonged are relevant to [the] examination.
United States v. Kim, 27 F.3d 947, 955 (3d Cir. 1994) (internal citations omitted). Although knowledge of the right to refuse consent is one factor to be taken into account, "the government need not establish such knowledge as the sine qua non of an effective consent." Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227. Moreover, the Fourth Amendment does not require that the Government advise a suspect of his right to refuse consent before requesting such consent. Kim, 27 F.3d at 955. Similarly, the Government is not obligated to advise a detained suspect that he is "free to go" in order for a consent search to be deemed voluntary. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 40 (1996).
On the morning after Defendant had been taken into custody, officers asked Defendant for consent to conduct a search of his vehicle. (Tr. 34.) Lieutenant Peifer testified that upon request, Defendant executed a written consent form and agreed to the requested search of the automobile. (Id.) Similar to the Court's finding that Defendant voluntarily provided statements to officers after being given his Miranda warnings, upon consideration of the evidence, the Court finds that Defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently gave his consent to search the vehicle.
Even if the Court had found that Defendant did not voluntarily consent to a search of the vehicle, the search would be upheld as a lawful inventory search conducted following the impounding of Defendant's automobile. It is well established that police officers may conduct warrantless searches of vehicles and other property to protect police against claims of lost or stolen property, and to protect officers from potential dangers, provided the inventory is conducted in accordance with a written policy or standard procedures. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372 (1987); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 371 (1976) (holding that inventory searches represent a reasonable police intrusion and noting that "'[when] police take custody of any sort of container . . . it is reasonable to search the container to itemize the property to be held by the police'") (quotation omitted). In this case, Defendant's vehicle was taken into custody and impounded upon his arrest. The evidence presented establishes that the ICAC Task Force has a formal policy of conducting an inventory search of all vehicles taken into custody. (Tr. 32.) Accordingly, the Court concludes that the search of Defendant's vehicle was lawfully conducted pursuant to a valid inventory search.*fn9
Finally, the Court notes that it has long been settled law that police officers may lawfully search a vehicle when they have probable cause to believe it contains evidence of criminal activity. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 804-09 (1982). Immediately following Defendant's arrest, task force officers conducted a cursory plain-view search of the interior of Defendant's vehicle, and identified bananas and wine -- items Defendant had vowed to bring with him to the planned meeting with his internet chat partner in Delaware County. Taken together, Defendant's graphic chat sessions, his stated plan to travel to Delaware County to meet with his chatting partner, his agreement to bring with him wine, sex toys, lubricant, and bananas with a stated sexual function, and his arrival at the agreed-upon location, provided the officers with probable cause not only to arrest Defendant, but also with probable cause to search the vehicle without first seeking a warrant.*fn10
For all of the foregoing reasons, Defendant's motion to suppress the seizure of evidence found during a consensual search of his vehicle will be denied.
2. Motion to Suppress Search Warrant and Items Seized from Defendant's York County Residence
Defendant has moved to suppress all physical evidence seized from his residence because certain information contained in the search warrant was factually incorrect. Additionally, Defendant argues that the search warrant was overly broad in that it authorized the search of all computer and electronic equipment and did not specify the particular types of information that could be searched for within the equipment. These two arguments will be addressed in turn.
Defendant identifies two discrete inaccuracies that he claim cause the entire search warrant to be rendered unconstitutional: (1) Detective Deery's inaccurate representation that she identified the address of Plaintiff's residence from review of Defendant's Pennsylvania operator's license; and (2) Detective Deery's inaccurate representation that Defendant placed a cellular telephone call to her at 9:00 p.m., when in fact Detective Deery placed a call to Defendant at that time. (Doc. No. 34, 7-8.) Additionally, Defendant argues that the probable cause affidavit incorrectly indicates that Defendant admitted to performing sexual acts upon his daughter at his residence and had purchased a doctor's kit used in conjunction with such acts. (Id., 8.) Defendant appears to assert that without the foregoing inaccurate statements, there was no probable cause supporting a warrant to search Defendant's residence. These arguments will be addressed in turn.
In Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), the United States Supreme Court held that where a defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause, the Fourth Amendment requires that a hearing be held at the defendant's request.
Id. at 155-56. Only if a defendant makes the requisite substantial showing for a Franks hearing, and, at such hearing, demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that material statements contained in the affidavit are either recklessly or intentionally untruthful, "the fruits of the search must be excluded unless the remaining content of the warrant is sufficient to establish probable cause." United States v. Brown, 3 F.3d 673, 676 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56) (emphasis added).
During the hearing held before the Court, Detective Deery acknowledged the factual inaccuracies contained in her affidavit of probable cause. Detective Deery testified that she obtained Defendant's address from a search of his vehicle registration records rather than from review of his driver's license, as she mistakenly represented in the affidavit. (Tr. 50-51, 59.) Additionally, she acknowledged that she had called Defendant at 9:00 p.m. on November 9, 2004, rather than the call having been placed by Defendant. (Tr. 61.) However, the undisputed evidence also demonstrates that Defendant did call Detective Deery at 7:18 p.m., 9:32 p.m., and one additional time that night. (Tr. 61-62; Def. Ex. 3.) The Court finds that the inaccuracy regarding the source of Defendant's address and the precise time of one phone call from him (during an evening in which he placed at least three telephone calls to Detective Deery prior to or during his drive to the Applebee's restaurant in Delaware County) do not undermine the substantial showing of probable cause set forth in the entire affidavit. Moreover, Defendant has made no showing, and the Court does not find, that Detective Deery's factual inaccuracies were intentional or in reckless disregard of the truth. Accordingly, the Court does not find that these minor inaccuracies require that the search warrant be suppressed.
The Court also rejects Defendant's complaints about Detective Deery's characterization of his statements regarding having had oral-genital contact with his six-year-old daughter and his reason for purchasing his daughter a doctor's kit. As evidenced from his testimony to this Court, Defendant continues to deny that his description of these events amounts to an admission of having performed sexual acts upon his daughter and obtaining the doctor's kit for the purpose of using it in sex acts with his daughter. The Court agrees with the Government that the statements, which were given voluntarily in response to questioning during a custodial interview, speak for themselves. Detective Deery's characterization of the statements was not inaccurate, and in no way impairs the validity of the search warrant.
Finally, Defendant argues that the warrant authorizing the search of his residence was overly broad because it authorized executing officers to seize all computers, computer accessories, and electronic equipment, without providing any express limitations or other parameters to the search. The Court finds that the list of items authorized to be seized, albeit somewhat broad, was confined to those items on which images or evidence of child pornography might be found, and was thus sufficiently particular. Accordingly, the Court does not find that the warrant was invalid as overly broad.
Even assuming the totality of the circumstances in this case did not persuade the Court that probable cause existed to issue the warrant and that the warrant was not otherwise invalid for lack of particularity, the evidence would not be excluded because the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies to the facts of this case. In United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), the Supreme Court held that evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant found to be unsupported by probable cause is, nevertheless, admissible if the evidence was obtained by officers acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate judge. Id. at 922. "The test for whether the good faith exception applies is 'whether a reasonably well trained officer would have known that the search was illegal despite the magistrate [judge's] authorization.'" United States v. Loy, 191 F.3d 360, 367 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 922, n.23). The Third Circuit has identified four situations where an officer's reliance upon a warrant would not be reasonable: (1) where the magistrate judge issued the warrant in reliance on a deliberately or recklessly false affidavit; (2) where the magistrate judge abandoned his judicial role and failed to perform his neutral and detached function; (3) where the warrant was based on an affidavit so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable; or (4) where the warrant was so facially deficient that it failed to particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized. United States v. Hodge, 246 F.3d 301, 308 (3d Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). The Court finds that none of these exceptions is applicable to the warrant at issue, and thus even if the warrant were technically defective or otherwise invalid, the executing officers could have relied upon the validity of the warrant in good faith, and thus suppression would be unwarranted.
IV. Conclusion
For all of the foregoing reasons, Defendant's pretrial motions to dismiss the indictment and to suppress his statements and evidence seized from his vehicle and residence will be denied. An appropriate order follows this memorandum.
And now, this 16th day of June, 2006, upon due consideration, and for the reasons set forth in the within memorandum, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Indictment (Doc. No. 29) is DENIED.
2. Defendant's Motion to Suppress Statements (Doc. No. 31) is DENIED.
3. Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence (Doc. No. 33) is DENIED.
Yvette Kane United States District Judge
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Milwaukee anti-apartheid activists pay tribute to Nelson Mandela
When Barbara White visited South Africa several years ago with a group from Milwaukee County, she, like so many others, made a pilgrimage to Nelson Mandela's former prison cell on Robben Island.
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White was among a group of around 50 who paid tribute to Mandela on Sunday afternoon at the African American Women's Center, 3020 W. Vliet St. Many of the folks attending were former members of the Milwaukee Free South Africa Coalition and others who had protested South Africa's apartheid policies during the 1980s.
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You won't be able to dismiss this by usual means (escape or click button), but you can close it programatically based on user choices or actions.
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text: !! OMG, LISTEN TO THIS: Panda Bear shares animated video for 'Boys Latin' !! Indie electronic psychedelic artist Panda Bear is back with a video for his latest track Boy Latin. The animated clip was directed by Isaiah Saxon and Sean Hellfritsch, and you can check it out above! » share: » OMG, read these RELATED ENTRIES: OMG, new Björk video: 'Wanderlust' OMG, LISTEN TO THIS: FKA twigs drops new 'Video Girl' video OMG, how charming: Grizzly Bear fan video! OMG, listen to this: Alvvays' "Adult Diversion" Video » posted by Igor on Friday, January 16th, 2015 Leave a comment | category: Musical | permalink _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ add a new comment Cancel reply Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *comment text (you may use HTML tags for style):name * email *


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