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January 18, 2012
DONALD OLENDZKI, PLAINTIFF,v.NEIL ROSSI, BECKY SUDBRINK, RICHARD PILLOW, JENNIFER ) STOUDT, TERRY POLK, AND RICHARD ORR, DEFENDANTS.
E-FILED 3:08-cv-03196-RM-BGC # 31 Page 1 of 59
Thursday, 19 January, 2012 11:39:58 AM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
Donald Olendzki, an Illinois Department of Corrections psychologist, has filed this § 1983 action against six of his supervisors.
He claims that Defendants retaliated against him because of his union advocacy, in violation of the First Amendment.
In sum, and for the reasons that follow, the Defendants' summary judgment motion is Allowed.
Since 1989, Plaintiff Donald Olendzki has been employed with the Illinois Department of Corrections as a Psychologist III at the Jacksonville Correctional Center (JCC). In 2004, the Plaintiff was elected to the Executive Board of Local 3549 of the American Federation of States, County, and Municipal Employees ("AFSCME"). In that office, he represented its members in labor disputes with the management team at the JCC.
The Plaintiff filed a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, wherein he alleged that Defendants retaliated against him in violation of his First Amendment rights for activities conducted on behalf of his union. The named Defendants include six of his supervisors: Neil Rossi, Becky Sudbrink, Richard Pillow, Jennifer Stoudt, Terry Polk, and Richard Orr.*fn1
The Defendants claim that summary judgment is warranted for a number of reasons. They contend that: (1) several claims are time-barred; (2) the Plaintiff has failed to identify constitutionally protected activity; (3) the Plaintiff has no evidence that Defendants' alleged actions were caused by protected activity engaged in by the Plaintiff; (4) the Plaintiff has not demonstrated that he has suffered a deprivation under the First Amendment; (5) even if the Plaintiff could assert a prima facie case of retaliation, the evidence shows that Defendants acted for valid non-retaliatory reasons; and (6) the Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. The Plaintiff contends that Defendants' contentions are without merit.
The Plaintiff filed his Complaint on September 10, 2008. Several of his claims concern incidents that occurred more than two years prior to the Complaint's filing, including: (1) the Plaintiff's claim that his pager was removed on June 8, 2006; (2) his claim he was removed from his responsibilities to engage in after hour call back activities on June 8, 2006; and (3) his claim he was prevented from making decisions regarding the observation and care of suicidal inmates in 2005 because Defendant Sudbrink did not inform him about a torn safety smock.
Defendant Neil Rossi became the Assistant Warden of Programs at the JCC in 2004. The Plaintiff reported to Rossi from 2004 until February of 2005. From February of 2005 until November 15, 2006, the Plaintiff's direct administrative supervisor was Defendant Becky Sudbrink, who is the Health Care Unit Administrator for the JCC. Sudbrink has not supervised the Plaintiff since November 15, 2006. Effective November 15, 2006, by order of Warden Terry Polk, the Plaintiff was supervised by the Assistant Warden of Programs. At that time, Assistant Warden Rossi informed the Plaintiff that he no longer fell under the Health Care Unit. He was now considered part of Programs.
The Plaintiff claims that he suffered retaliation for activities he allegedly engaged in on behalf of the union, including but not limited to the following: (1) participating in labor management meetings and safety and health committee meetings; (2) representing union members in the presentation of grievances; and (3) representing union member Missy Utter during a September 2006 meeting with Defendants Rossi and Sudbrink and union vice president John Clegg. Sudbrink has never participated in labor management meetings.
As a Psychologist III, the Plaintiff's job duties include providing mental health services to inmates in need of such services, providing crisis management for inmates, and screening inmates for work release. He is also required to:
a. "Ensure that all mental health services delivered are accurately documented, distributed, and maintained."
b. "Maintain safety and sanitation standards."
c. "Serve as the Mental Health Professional, coordinating and providing mental health services."
d. "Be an active participant of the Health and Safety Committee."
e. "[S]erve as a member of the Quality Assurance Committee, rendering recommendations."
f. "Schedule and coordinate Crisis Intervention Team training."
g. Keep track of inmates with mental health problems, monitor their care, and prepare the "call line" list of inmates to be seen by the psychiatrist.
h. Exercise management responsibilities over the care of suicidal inmates and ensure their safety.
i. File incident reports whenever an unusual incident occurs.
j. Report sanitation issues to management.
k. "Perform all additional duties as they relate to the Psychologist III position as directed which are reasonably within the scope of [Plaintiff's] job description."
In June of 2006, Warden Polk instructed Defendant Sudbrink to
deny the Plaintiff's request for two hours of call-back pay regarding two after-hours phone calls the Plaintiff placed to Jacksonville on May 28 and 29, 2006. The Plaintiff filed a grievance over the matter, which was resolved by paying the Plaintiff one hour of compensatory time.
Following the denial of callback pay, the Plaintiff asked Assistant Warden Rossi and Warden Polk if he was required to wear a pager. Defendants Rossi and Polk claim they believed that Plaintiff did not want to carry his pager if he was not required to do so. The Plaintiff says that he had no problem carrying a pager. The Defendants allege that Plaintiff was not and is not required to carry a pager. It is voluntary.
The Defendants allege that on June 8, 2006, Rossi told the Plaintiff he should turn in his pager and that he did not need to carry it. Rossi also informed the Plaintiff that he would be turning in his pager, and that "[h]e is no longer required to wear a pager." On June 8, 2006, Sudbrink sent out a memorandum providing that per Warden Polk, the Medical Director was to be called with all after hours mental health issues. The Defendants allege that Plaintiff did not at that time possess a pager and the facility did not have a means of ensuring that he could be reached at all times.
The Plaintiff served on a statewide hostage Negotiations Management Team ("NEMAT") from its inception sometime in the 1990s until October 1, 2006. The Plaintiff also served on a local hostage negotiations team at the Jacksonville facility. Service as a hostage negotiator is a voluntary undertaking, for which there is no compensation. At the time that Plaintiff's service with NEMAT ended, Deputy Director Ron Meek and Statewide Coordinator Jeffrey Hooker were in charge of the team. However, the Plaintiff's position at Jacksonville fell under the administrative chain of command of Deputy Director Richard Orr. On June 21, 2006, at the request of Mr. Hooker, Defendant Terry Polk sent Hooker a memorandum listing several reasons why Polk felt that Plaintiff should be removed from NEMAT. The Plaintiff disputes that the memorandum was sent at Hooker's request.
Defendant Polk felt that Plaintiff should be removed from NEMAT because: (1) he did not want to carry his pager; (2) the Plaintiff had complained about not having enough time to attend to his duties at Jacksonville; (3) being removed from NEMAT would give the Plaintiff enough time to focus on his duties at Jacksonville; (4) Terry Louden, Correctional Counselor II at Jacksonville, was also on NEMAT, and Defendant Polk felt one member from Jacksonville was sufficient. The Plaintiff notes that he never voluntarily surrendered his pager. The Plaintiff had in fact complained about insufficient time and resources to complete his job duties. However, the Plaintiff alleges that his time commitment to NEMAT was only four hours per quarter and Polk and Rossi made assignments which unreasonably increased his workload.
The Plaintiff received a memorandum dated September 27, 2006 from Deputy Director Rick Orr indicating that as of October 1, 2006, the Plaintiff's service as a hostage negotiator would end. The Plaintiff believes the decision was made because of a meeting he allegedly had with Assistant Warden Rossi three days prior to becoming a member of AFSCME, and because of a number of conflicts Plaintiff allegedly had with Rossi.
The Plaintiff states that it was Defendant Polk who requested that Plaintiff be removed from NEMAT. The Defendants assert that Meek and Hooker made the decision to remove the Plaintiff from NEMAT. The Plaintiff states that this was only to the extent their approval was necessary and that Polk was the driving force behind his removal from NEMAT. Because the Plaintiff's position at JCC fell under Defendant Orr's administrative chain of command, Orr drafted the September 27, 2006 memorandum terminating the Plaintiff from NEMAT.
The Defendants claim that the reasons for removal conveyed to Orr by Deputy Director Meek and Mr. Hooker concerned the Plaintiff's performance on the team. The Plaintiff disputes this assertion and emphasizes that he attended periodic drills, assisted in the training of other negotiators, and participated in the negotiations at a hostage crisis at the Dixon Correctional Center. Following the incident at Dixon which occurred in May of 2006, the Plaintiff received several complimentary notes, including one from Meek and Hooker.
No one asked Defendant Orr or Jeff Hooker to remove the Plaintiff from NEMAT because of the Plaintiff's union activities. Neither individual removed the Plaintiff from NEMAT because of his union activities, or for any other retaliatory purpose. The Plaintiff claims this assertion is immaterial because it was Warden Polk who requested that he be removed. The Plaintiff believes that Defendant Orr's memorandum of September 27, 2006 also removed him from the local hostage negotiation team at the JCC. The Plaintiff admitted that Polk expressed an interest in keeping him on the local hostage negotiation team. The Plaintiff did not want to be on the local hostage negotiation team after he was removed from NEMAT, and states that he would refuse to re-volunteer if asked to remain on the team.
From 1989 until early 2006, the Plaintiff's office was located in the Clinical Services area at the JCC. Clinical Services is housed in a single building between the facility's Segregation Unit and the Health Care Unit. The three areas are separated by brick firewalls. From at least 1989 until the present, inmate medical records have been located in the Health Care Unit. From 1989 until early 2006, the Plaintiff would see inmates for psychological evaluations in his office in Clinical Services without security personnel present. During this 16 to 17 year period, there was no security guard posted in Clinical Services. Throughout the period, the Plaintiff would pick up his patients' medical charts from the Health Care Unit and take them to his office in Clinical Services. To get from his office to the Health Care Unit, the Plaintiff would exit the Clinical Services area and travel approximately 40 feet to the entrance. The Plaintiff would have to travel an additional 30 feet from the Health Care Unit entrance to the records room to pick up charts.
In early 2006, at his request, the Plaintiff's office was relocated to the Health Care Unit. It remained there until February of 2007. Defendant Rossi informed the Plaintiff in December of 2006 that he would move back to his former office in Clinical Services. The Defendants allege Warden Polk testified that Plaintiff was moved back to his former office in order to free up space in the Health Care Unit for Dr. Lochard. However, the Plaintiff asserts that his office in the Health Care Unit remained vacant. Dr. Lochard is one of the medical doctors associated with the Wexford Corporation, a private vendor contracting with the state for medical services. The office space in the Health Care Unit was used by Dr. Lochard, though the Plaintiff notes he was only occasionally at the JCC.
After being moved back to his former office in Clinical Services, the Plaintiff stated that he did not want to see his patients in Clinical Services without security present. However, the Plaintiff could have continued to see patients in Clinical Services as he had from 1989 through 2006 if he so chose. The Defendants contend that in response to the Plaintiff's concerns about safety, Jacksonville management offered the Operations Building as an alternative place to see patients. The Plaintiff asserts that he was "directed" to see inmates in the operations conference room. Prior to receiving that directive, he had been seeing inmates in the Health Care Unit where a security officer was present. The Plaintiff testified that seeing patients in the Operations Building required him to pack up a portable office and added five to ten minutes of travel time, a situation which Plaintiff described as "less than ideal." During this time period, Defendant Polk sent the Plaintiff an email inquiring as to whether there was an office in the Health Care Unit in which the Plaintiff could see patients, to which the Plaintiff responded, "No . . . The only exception is on Wednesday from 4-6 pm when I have been instructed to use Amanda Tomhave's office in HCU after she goes home."
In June of 2007, the Plaintiff's office was again moved to the Health Care Unit. On April 4, 2008, the JCC's next warden, Jennifer Stoudt, moved the Plaintiff's office back to Clinical Services, where it has remained ever since. The Plaintiff believes Defendant Stoudt moved his office because of a phone call Plaintiff had with Defendant Becky Sudbrink on April 3, 2008, concerning the preparation of a "call line," or list of patients to be seen by the psychiatrist during a telepsychiatry clinic scheduled for that day. The Defendants allege Stoudt testified that she moved the Plaintiff's office back to Clinical Services because his position fell under Program Services, which is associated with Clinical Services and because the facility needed a space for telepsychiatry services in the Health Care Unit. However, the Plaintiff claims that available office space remained in the Healthcare Unit after Olendzki's relocation.
The Plaintiff claimed that he was banned from attending health care staff meetings after his position was transferred from the Health Care Unit staff to the Clinical Services Unit. Defendant Rossi testified that since Plaintiff fell under Programs, he was no longer considered part of the Health Care Unit staff. The Plaintiff notes that he previously attended healthcare staff meetings after he was relocated to the Clinical Services Unit. The Plaintiff did not attempt to attend one of these staff meetings after being designated a part of Programs.
Telepsychiatry is a means of providing psychiatric services to inmates through video by a psychiatrist located at a remote location. Wexford Corporation provides medical services, including telepsychiatry, to JCC on a contract basis. The Plaintiff claims that Defendant Sudbrink prevented him from performing one of his job duties by failing to provide him with a time sheet used by Wexford psychiatrists referred to as a TM-02 form. Defendant Sudbrink does not work for Wexford, use the TM-02 form, or receive the TM-02 form. The Plaintiff does not know if anyone at the Department of Corrections received the TM-02 form. Acting Assistant Warden Walls sent the Plaintiff an email on December 9, 2009, stating that Sudbrink is not responsible for providing the Plaintiff with the TM-02.
As one of his job duties, the Plaintiff prepares lists of patients (or "call lines") to be seen by remote psychiatrists through telepsychiatry. The Plaintiff claims that Defendants Sudbrink and Pillow interfered with his ability to prepare the patient list by failing to inform the Plaintiff of the times in which Wexford psychiatrists would be holding their clinics, and by permitting Amanda Tomhave, a Wexford employee, to remove a few patients from the psychiatrist's call line in March of 2008.
The Plaintiff was supposed to receive information of the psychiatrist's schedules from Amanda Tomhave, but sometimes received that information in an untimely manner or not at all. The Plaintiff asserts that Tomhave was supervised by Defendant Sudbrink, but admits that Tomhave was not a state employee and did not work for the Department of Corrections. Sudbrink was not the Plaintiff's supervisor for the period in which he claims to have been denied information by Sudbrink. The Plaintiff testified that he contacted one of the psychiatrists to obtain his schedule and was told that the psychiatrist only gave that information to Tomhave.
Defendant Pillow sent the Plaintiff an email on March 12, 2008, stating that the psychiatrist requested a shortened patient list after Plaintiff had left the premises. Pillow told Tomhave to remove the last three patients that were scheduled, thinking that Plaintiff had listed the patients in order of importance. The Plaintiff has no reason to doubt Pillow's explanation.
Defendant Sudbrink is the privacy officer for the JCC. Prior to November 13, 2008, the Plaintiff had received copies of medical records, specifically telepsychiatry reports, which he would sometimes hold in his office for a day or two while he gathered the data he needed. After she was named the privacy officer by the warden, Sudbrink reviewed the Department's administrative directives, whereupon Sudbrink questioned whether copies of medical records should be going to the Plaintiff. Sudbrink contacted the state privacy officer for input on the matter. Jonathan Sisson, Chief Privacy Officer for the Department of Corrections, informed Sudbrink that if at all possible, staff should access medical and mental health information directly from the medical file in a controlled environment. Mr. Sisson also informed Sudbrink that it was not a good practice to make copies of medical documents unless there are extenuating circumstances. The Plaintiff has access to all the information he needs in the original medical files.
Defendant Sudbrink informed the Plaintiff that he could no longer keep copies of medical records in his office for any period of time due to privacy concerns under the HIPPA law. On November 13, 2008, Defendant Sudbrink sent out a memorandum stating that per the state privacy officer, telepsychiatry records were to be printed and considered original documents. No copies of these records were to be made, as the record set resides in the Health Care Unit medical records department.
While seeing an inmate in the Operations Building conference room in February of 2007, the Plaintiff had what he describes as a "close call" in which he had to step outside of the room and shout for help before security came running to assist. After the close call, the Plaintiff was directed to see inmates in any available space in the Health Care Unit, including Dr. Lochard's office, Defendant Sudbrink's office, Amanda Tomhave's office, the break room or one of the two exam rooms. On October 1, 2007, Defendant Rossi issued an order allowing the Health Care Unit officer to carry handcuffs so that an inmate could be restrained before or after an interview at the Plaintiff's request.
In the summer of 2008, the Plaintiff filed several incident reports claiming that he had been ordered by Defendant Pillow and Defendant Stoudt to see inmates in Clinical Services without security. When asked about this order, the Plaintiff testified that Pillow instructed him that Stoudt had directed Plaintiff to see inmates in Clinical Services from 4 to 6 on Wednesdays, even though there was no security present. The Plaintiff filed an incident report every time he saw patients without security in Clinical Services, pursuant to Pillow's alleged instructions. The Plaintiff had access to phones and radios in the Clinical Services building if he required help. Counselors, assistant wardens, and clerical staff all have contact with inmates in Clinical Services without security stationed in the building. The Plaintiff notes this does not apply to psychotic inmates.
The Defendants allege that the level of security provided to the psychologists at JCC under Warden Stoudt was consistent with the practice at other facilities, including Taylorville Correctional Center. The Plaintiff disputes this assertion.
The Plaintiff claims that Defendant Pillow required him to do vendor (Wexford) work by providing a witness signature on a mental health treatment plan (or "Doc 0284 form") used by the Department of Corrections. The DOC 0284 form is used in conjunction with telepsychiatry and contains a section wherein the inmate acknowledges his consent to treatment. By institutional directive, "[a] Mental Health Treatment Plan, DOC 0284, shall be completed and signed by both the mental health professional and the offender who will be receiving ongoing, non-emergency mental health treatment, such as medication, individual or group therapy." On April 7, 2008, Defendant Pillow instructed the Plaintiff to obtain consent from offenders for the telepsych line, per instruction from Dr. Navarro. On October 8, 2008, the Plaintiff sent an email to Defendant Sudbrink noting that he had called inmates to complete the mental health treatment plans and sign as a witness, only to discover the nurses had previously signed as witnesses. The Plaintiff asked if this was a new procedure. Assistant Warden of Programs Kim Kirchner advised Defendant Sudbrink that he wanted the Mental Health Professional, Plaintiff, to sign the treatment plan. In response, Sudbrink sent a memo to the nurses instructing them not to sign as a witness on the treatment plan, DOC 0284 form. The Plaintiff acknowledged that the Department of Corrections needs an inmate's consent to provide non-emergency medical services, including issuing medication.
Prior to August 11, 2008, the JCC had a registered nurse who served as a "designated psych nurse." The Plaintiff testified that at one point the designated psych nurse prepared the case load and call passes in conjunction with the Plaintiff, before he assumed those responsibilities himself. After the Plaintiff took over full responsibility for managing the mental patient caseload, the designated psych nurse was still needed to handle medication issues, contact the doctor, and provide daily information as needed regarding mental patients.
On August 11, 2008, Defendant Sudbrink issued a memorandum stating that there would no longer be a designated psych nurse at JCC. Instead, orders received from the psychiatrist would be taken by whichever nurse was handling physician orders that shift, as on any other medical line. Sudbrink had previously sent an email on July 31, 2008, to Warden Stoudt and Assistant Warden Kirchner stating that a number of other institutions did not have a psych nurse, that abolishing the designation would open up nursing time, and that there were likely duel patient lists created by the designated psych nurse and the Mental Health Professional. The Plaintiff admits that in the absence of the designated psych nurse, another nurse would step in to cover responsibilities. Although the Plaintiff asserts that every other chronic clinic has a designated nurse associated with it, those clinics do not have a health professional similar to the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff testified that when there was no longer a designated psych nurse, the individual nurse would send the Plaintiff notes if there were issues regarding a particular mental patient, but that Plaintiff would simply take those notes back without taking any action. He claimed that he was prevented from contacting the psychiatrists regarding the nurses' notes by Sudbrink and Cindy Holbrock, but admitted that neither Sudbrink nor Holbrock supervised the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff could not recall any specific communication that would have caused Defendant Sudbrink to discontinue the psych nurse designation. However, the Plaintiff claims that he had continuing encounters with Sudbrink based on what he alleges were violations of the collective bargaining agreements.
The Defendants allege that on November 29, 2006, Defendant Rossi sent an email stating that the warden, Polk, would "have the final say on whether an inmate is to be strip-celled without a safety smock or blanket." Rossi indicated that the segregation gallery is extremely cold in the winter and he did not want to explain how an inmate expired due to cold conditions. The Plaintiff asserts that pursuant to Department protocols, those decisions are to be made by a mental health professional. According to the Plaintiff, strip-celling means the inmate is left naked with a metal bunk. The Plaintiff testified that in his opinion, the strip-cell policy was initiated because an inmate at Menard Correctional Center had frozen to death.
The Plaintiff applied for ten days of Advance Sick Time in December of 2008, which was denied by the Director of the Department of Corrections, as well as the Director of the Department of Central Management Services. The Plaintiff claims that the denials occurred because of misinformation provided by Defendant Stoudt. The Defendants assert that Plaintiff's belief Stoudt retaliated against him by allegedly recommending denial of sick time is based solely on his assertion that such requests are routinely approved.
The Plaintiff filed a grievance alleging that Defendant Stoudt denied his request to attend statewide contract negotiations on behalf of AFSCME. Stoudt suggested to Labor Relations that Plaintiff be denied permission to attend the contract negotiations because there was a continual issue of inmates at Jacksonville not receiving needed services. Stoudt indicated that she could not afford the Plaintiff to be absent from the facility for three to four days a week to attend negotiations because the Plaintiff was the facility's only psychologist. The Plaintiff's request to attend negotiations was ultimately approved.
The Plaintiff claims that Defendant Sudbrink retaliated by filing false charges of harassment against him. Sudbrink's discrimination and harassment complaint was substantiated by the Department's Office of Affirmative Action.
The Plaintiff claims that Defendant Pillow retaliated against him by revising institutional directives without his input. Moreover, the Plaintiff states that he was not informed of the changes even though they affected his job responsibility. Revising institutional directives is not listed as a part of the Plaintiff's job duties. Institutional directives concerning mental health services are authored by the Director of Mental Health Services and the Warden.
The Plaintiff testified that he was ordered by Defendant Stoudt not to communicate mental health business at Jacksonville to the Chief of Mental Health, Dr. Navarro. When the Plaintiff informed Defendant Pillow that he would not comply with the order, Pillow implied he could be disciplined. The Plaintiff also testified that Vickie Fair of the Office of Affirmative Action told him that someone could be disciplined with respect to the harassment complaint filed by Sudbrink against the Plaintiff.
The Plaintiff testified that he has been diagnosed with post traumatic stress disorder as a result of hostage incidents at Dixon Correctional Center and Jacksonville Correctional Center. He has been on medical leave for psychological reasons caused by those hostage incidents. The Plaintiff notes that the hostage incidents occurred over three years prior to his medical leave during which he was able to engage in his duties for the Department. The Plaintiff has never been disciplined. The Plaintiff has never been denied an employment opportunity.
A. Legal standards
Summary judgment is appropriate if the motion is properly supported and "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The Court construes all inferences in favor of the Plaintiff. See Siliven v. Indiana Dept. of Child Services, 635 F.3d 921, 925 (7th Cir. 2011).
The parties dispute what is necessary in order for a plaintiff to demonstrate a prima facie case of retaliation. The Plaintiff claims that he need only establish that his constitutionally protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor for retaliatory conduct. The Defendants assert that but-for causation is required.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has held that but-for causation is required in cases which involve First Amendment chilling claims. See Fairley v. Andrews, 578 F.3d 518, 525 (7th Cir. 2009). However, at the summary judgment stage, a plaintiff need only present evidence from which a reasonable jury could find causation. See id. at 526. The Seventh Circuit recently explained:
To meet the prima facie burden regarding causation in a First Amendment case, a plaintiff needs to show only that the defendant's conduct was a motivating factor, i.e., a "sufficient factor," meaning when something present makes something else bound to happen. . . . The defendant can then rebut that showing, but only by establishing that his or her conduct was not a but-for or "necessary condition" of the harm, i.e., that the harm would have occurred anyway.
See Surita v. Hyde, F.3d , 2011 WL 6644218, at *9 (7th Cir. Dec. 22, 2011) (citing Greene v. Doruff, 660 F.3d 975, 978-79 (7th Cir. 2011)). Therefore, a plaintiff must prove "that (1) he engaged in constitutionally protected speech; (2) the defendants, as public officials, engaged in adverse conduct against him; and (3) the defendants were motivated, at least in part, by his protected speech." Bivens v. Trent, 591 F.3d 555, 559 (7th Cir. 2010). In asserting adverse conduct, a plaintiff must show that he suffered a deprivation that would "deter a person of ordinary firmness" from exercising his First Amendment rights. See Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 552 (7th Cir. 2009).
B. Time-barred claims
The Defendants contend that certain claims which occurred prior to September 10, 2006, are barred by the two year statute of limitations. These claims include the removal of the Plaintiff's pager, the removal of after hour call back activities, and the Plaintiff's claims regarding a ripped safety smock. The Plaintiff acknowledges that each of those claims standing by itself is time-barred, though he notes that the claims can be considered as relevant "background evidence" of the claims that accrued after September 10, 2006. See O'Neal v. City of Chicago, 588 F.3d 406, 409 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113 (2002)).
C. Speech Concerning Official Duties/Health and Safety Issues The Defendants contend that Plaintiff has not asserted a prima facie claim of retaliation in violation of his First Amendment rights with respect to his speech concerning health and safety issues, including speech made at Health and Safety Committee meetings. The Defendants contend that such speech was part of his official duties and thus not entitled to First Amendment protection.
A public employee has a protected right, in certain circumstances, to speak "as a citizen addressing matters of public concern." See Bivens, 591 F.3d at 560 (quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 417 (2006)). However, "when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline." Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421. "This is because when employees speak pursuant to their official duties they are not speaking as citizens, regardless of whether the speech is about a matter of public concern." Bivens, 591 F.3d at 560.
According to the Individual Development and Performance System, the Plaintiff's job required him to "[b]e an active participant of the Health and Safety Committee" and maintain safety and sanitation standards in accordance with institutional directives. Therefore, the Court concludes the Plaintiff's speech regarding certain matters for the most part concerns internal matters relating to his job. These include: (1) the safety of mental patients under his supervision; (2) the adequacy of safety and sanitation at the facility; (3) the alleged failure to monitor healthcare services; (4) the alleged attempts to have outside contractors and non-bargaining unit employees assume and perform work allegedly designated for union members; and (5) the alleged failure to provide adequate security protections for JCC employees.
However, the Plaintiff emphasizes that he was appointed to the Health and Safety Committee by the Union instead of the Department. His service on the committee was as the Union's representative. Prior to his election as a Union official, the Plaintiff had never served on the Committee. Moreover, the Department's job specifications do not specify that psychologists must serve on the Health and Safety Committee of a correctional facility. The Plaintiff notes that when he left that Committee, he continued to serve as the JCC psychologist. Additionally, his departure from the Committee was directed by the President of the Union.
Nevertheless, the Plaintiff was evaluated for his participation on the Health and Safety Committee. He was serving on the committee at the time in question. The Plaintiff signed his evaluation which included this job requirement. Given the environment of a correctional facility, it would seem surprising if any professional employee's responsibilities did not include reporting health and safety issues.
For these reasons, the Court concludes that when the Plaintiff was speaking about conditions at the facility, he generally was speaking as an employee of the Department of Corrections and not as a private citizen. Pursuant to Garcetti, the Plaintiff's claims relating to speech concerning health and safety issues, including speech made at Committee meetings, is generally not protected by the First Amendment. However, the Court recognizes that in this context, there is some overlap between speech that is protected and speech that is not. While speech which touches on internal office affairs does not amount to a "public concern," speech that brings attention to an issue that could compromise prison security can constitute a "public concern," even if the public employee's duties involve security. See Cygan v. Wisconsin Dept. of Corrections, 388 F.3d 1092, 1100-01 (7th Cir. 2004). Therefore, the context and content of the speech must be examined in order determine whether there was a First Amendment violation.
D. Speech and whether constitutional right was violated The Defendants contend that summary judgment is warranted as to some of the claims because much of the Plaintiff's speech concerned matters which related to his job responsibilities, instead of matters of public concern.
Courts employ the Connick-Pickering*fn2 test in analyzing whether a public employee's First Amendment rights were violated. See Hernandez v. Cook County Sheriff's Office, 634 F.3d 906, 914 (7th Cir. 2011). The first step is to determine whether the speech addressed a matter of public concern. See id. "If it did, the court must then apply the Pickering balancing test to determine whether the interests of the [plaintiff] as a citizen in commenting upon the matters of public concern are outweighed by the interest of the state, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees." Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). If the speech does not address a matter of public concern, then the Pickering balancing test is not reached because the employees are not speaking as citizens. See id.
Speech involving issues of public safety is "generally a matter of public concern." See Delgado v. Jones, 282 F.3d 511, 517 (7th Cir. 2002). However, "not every prison employee complaint is a matter of constitutional magnitude." Cygan, 388 F.3d at 1100. "[G]overnment employee speech tied up in personal grievances or internal office affairs does not fall within the ambit of 'public concern.'" Id. at 1101. In Cygan, the court determined that a prison guard's speech which brought attention to a staffing issue that potentially could compromise prison security did amount to a matter of public concern. See id. Specifically, the guard complained that the prison dining room did not have enough correctional officers present. See id. at 1096-97. This occurred two weeks after a fight had broken out between inmates when there was a shortage of staff. See id. at 1096. Four officers sustained minor injuries breaking up that fight. See id. These unique circumstances distinguished the prison guard's speech from routine complaints about office policies. See id. at 1101.
The Defendants assert that the vast majority of the Plaintiff's speech concerns matters solely related to his job responsibilities. This includes his job duties with respect to preparing the list of patients to be seen by the psychiatrists, the adequacy of his office location, the efficiency of seeing patients in different locations, the adequacy of security in these locations, whether he was entitled to copies of medical records or other information, and what role he was required to play in the implementation of telepsychiatry at the facility. Because purely personal grievances are not entitled to First Amendment protection, the Defendants contend that Plaintiff cannot meet the first prong of the Connick-Pickering test.
The Plaintiff notes that even if his speech might further his self-interest, it may still be protected under Connick/Pickering if his speech went beyond his own interests and also served the interests of his bargaining unit. See Gregorich v. Lund, 54 F.3d 410, 416 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that plaintiff's activities which were not only designed to regain his own lost benefits, but also to obtain union representation for other employees, satisfied the requirements of Connick/Pickering). "[S]uch activity, in a broad sense, touches upon matters of public concern." Id. at 415.
The Plaintiff maintains that the context of his speech would enable a reasonable factfinder to determine that it arose as part of his duties as an officer of the Union. The Plaintiff notes that his speech generally occurred in the following settings: (1) Health and Safety Committee Meetings he attended as a representative of the Union; (2) labor management meetings called for the specific purpose of addressing labor relations issues; and (3) situations where the Plaintiff was bringing labor relations issues to the attention of his superiors.
Second, the Plaintiff asserts that the content of his speech related to either public health and safety issues, which were issues of concern to the Union membership. He raised issues regarding: (1) the lack of adequate protection of staff members in view of the dangers posed by mentally ill inmates; (2) the sanitation practices of the prison dentist; and (3) the need to engage in collective bargaining concerning telepsychiatry so that it could be effective and ensure better safety at the JCC. The Plaintiff contends that this speech falls within the public safety component of a matter of public concern.
The Plaintiff claims that he has consistently raised issues concerning the failure of JCC management to adhere to the terms of the collective bargaining agreement and the failure of JCC management to engage in collective bargaining over telepsychiatry issues. His speech also arose out of representing individuals regarding their labor relations interests. Therefore, the Plaintiff alleges the speech was a matter of public concern.
It appears that Plaintiff's alleged protected speech generally occurred in appropriate settings. There are questions about whether the Plaintiff may have been disruptive or belligerent at times in raising various issues. Accordingly, it is difficult in some instances to determine, pursuant to Pickering, whether the Plaintiff's interest as a citizen in commenting on matters of public concern is outweighed by the Defendants' interest in promoting the interest of JCC and the public services it provides.
E. Sufficiency of the deprivation
The Defendants assert that Plaintiff has not suffered a deprivation sufficient to establish a claim under the First Amendment. He has never been disciplined for failing to do his job or for any other reason and has not been denied any employment opportunities. Moreover, the Plaintiff testified that he is on medical leave for psychological reasons which are unrelated to the Defendants' actions.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has observed that an adverse employment action is not necessary in § 1983 cases such as this. See Mosely v. Board of Educ. of City of Chicago, 434 F.3d 527, 533 (7th Cir. 2006). Rather, "[a]ny deprivation under color of law that is likely to deter the exercise of free speech . . . is actionable." Id. (quoting Power v. Summers, 226 F.3d 815, 820 (7th Cir. 2000)). Although isolated criticisms may not be enough to constitute such a deprivation, the Seventh Circuit has observed that the alleged injury "need not be great in order to be actionable." Id. at 534 (citations omitted). It has held that "a campaign of minor harassment was sufficient to deter the exercise of free speech." Id. In Mosely, the court found that plaintiff's inability due to defendants' actions--which included withholding information and being told to rubberstamp proposals--to participate meaningfully in her role as a parent chairperson of a federally sanctioned school committee was sufficient to deter the exercise of free speech. See id. at 534-35.
The Plaintiff claims that the harms he has alleged are not trivial. His removal from a prestigious statewide negotiating team is sufficient to implicate his First Amendment rights, given the professional status of his membership. The Plaintiff further asserts that he was forced to treat dangerous, mentally ill inmates in an environment where he had no security protection. He claims that being forced to work in such a dangerous environment would have a "chilling effect" upon the exercise of his First Amendment rights.
The Plaintiff further alleges that he was denied benefit time and subjected to conduct which made it more burdensome to do his job (i.e., being required to move from location to location, denied knowledge of changes in the JCC mental health protocols which he needed to know in order to perform his job, being given unnecessary increases in his workload by requiring him to personally engage in in-service training instead of doing it through a video presentation). The Plaintiff asserts that even if this is classified as a minor form of retaliation, it is still actionable.
The Plaintiff further notes that he was accused of harassing a supervisor. False accusations can be actionable under the First Amendment. See Mosely, 434 F.3d at 534.
The Plaintiff contends that a reasonable fact finder could conclude that the actions taken against him considered singularly or collectively was conduct of a type which could have a "chilling effect" upon a reasonable public employee's exercise of First Amendment rights.
The Court will address the sufficiency of the claimed deprivations in turn.
F. Whether Defendants would have acted despite protected activity
(1) NEMAT/Local Team Decision
Given the professional status associated with NEMAT, the Court concludes that the claimed deprivation is sufficient to be actionable under the First Amendment. Therefore, the issue becomes whether the Defendants would have acted despite any protected activity.
The Defendants contend that Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that Defendants would not have acted even without the Plaintiff's protected activity. They assert that Plaintiff's belief that Defendant Orr removed him from NEMAT in retaliation for his union activities is based on: (1) the Plaintiff's assertion that he participated in a meeting with Assistant Warden Rossi concerning the rights of a union member three days prior to his receipt of the September 27, 2006 memorandum; (2) hearsay statements by third parties that an unnamed warden called someone at an unknown time asking that Plaintiff be removed for unarticulated reasons; and (3) the Plaintiff's assertion that he had a number of conflicts with Assistant Warden Rossi.
The Defendants contend that the record establishes that Plaintiff was removed from NEMAT by the Statewide Coordinator, Jeff Hooker, and Deputy Director Ron Meek because of the Plaintiff's performance on the team. In his affidavit, Hooker states that Plaintiff exhibited "irrational behavior that impacted his fitness for the hostage negotiation team" in the Spring or Summer of 2006, at a NEMAT training exercise at Vandalia Correctional Center. Hooker states, "During the exercise, Mr. Olendzki burst into a restricted area, acted unprofessionally, and complained about communications between negotiators and the command center." He further stated that Plaintiff appeared "emotional, upset, and displayed inappropriate behavior." Hooker further states that after observing the Plaintiff's behavior, he spoke with Deputy Director Meek and Chief of Mental Health Services Dr. Wendy Navarro about removing the Plaintiff from NEMAT. Meek directed Dr. Navarro to evaluate whether the Plaintiff should remain with the team. Hooker further says that he had discussions with management concerning behaviors exhibited by the Plaintiff, including reports that Plaintiff had been seen crying over Katie Couric's then-recent departure from the Today Show.
According to his affidavit, Statewide Coordinator Hooker asked Defendant and then-Warden Polk to provide him with a memorandum documenting reasons why, from the JCC's perspective, the Plaintiff should be removed from NEMAT. Hooker states that during a conference with Dr. Navarro and Deputy Director Meek, Dr. Navarro recommended the Plaintiff's removal from NEMAT because his behavior at the time could present a liability for the Department. According to Hooker, he and Meek made the decision to remove the Plaintiff. The primary reason for the decision was the Plaintiff's irrational behavior and the recommendation of Dr. Navarro.
Defendant Orr was asked to and did prepare the September 27, 2006 memorandum because the Plaintiff was an employee in his district, and Defendant Polk provided reasons for recommending removal. Orr's memorandum said nothing about any irrational behavior by the Plaintiff. It said changes were being made by IDOC "in an effort to streamline and more effectively operate and manage" the agency. NEMAT was part of "this restructuring." The Defendants do not dispute the Plaintiff's assertion that other than his removal, nothing else was done in 2006 to streamline or restructure NEMAT.
For the reasons noted above, the Defendants claim that Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that his removal from NEMAT was caused by his union activities. Additionally, the Plaintiff cannot establish injury for his removal from the local team, because he did not wish to be on the team after being removed from NEMAT. The Defendants assert they are entitled to summary judgment on this claim.
The Plaintiff notes that he worked at JCC for over 15 years prior to his election to a union office. He states that during that time, he maintained good professional and personal relationships with JCC command staff. The Plaintiff claims that his problems with management coincided with his active involvement with the Union.
The Plaintiff contends that Polk, Rossi and Sudbrink all played a role in his removal from NEMAT. In June of 2006, Rossi sent an email to Polk encouraging the removal. In a communication with Polk and Rossi, Assistant Warden McKinney reminded them that when the Plaintiff's pager was removed, it was assumed that he no longer would be on the NEMAT team. On June 21, 2006, Polk sent a memorandum to the NEMAT administration asking that Plaintiff be removed from NEMAT because he needed more time to devote to his caseload and no longer wanted to carry a pager. The Plaintiff claims that much of the information in Polk's request came from false information provided by Sudbrink.
The Defendants have provided a number of potential explanations for the Plaintiff's removal from NEMAT. Any one of them alone or in conjunction may be legitimate reason(s) for that decision. It appears that the pager issue may have resulted from a misunderstanding, or anger on the Plaintiff's part because of the June 2006 denial of callback pay. Certainly, it may have been reasonable for the Defendants to question the Plaintiff's commitment to NEMAT when he asked Rossi and Polk after being denied callback pay if he was required to wear a pager.
Nevertheless, the reasons for the Plaintiff's removal are somewhat confusing. Based on his own alleged observations at Vandalia, Statewide Coordinator Hooker may have had legitimate reasons for removing the Plaintiff. However, he asked Polk and then Orr to provide reasons for removing the Plaintiff from NEMAT. Polk acknowledged playing a role in the Plaintiff's removal.
There is some evidence in the record that Rossi and Sudbrink were concerned about the Plaintiff's productivity and quality of work, though the Plaintiff's performance evaluations indicate no such problems. No one communicated any problems with productivity. Moreover, service on NEMAT did not require much of a time commitment.
A number of potential explanations for the Plaintiff's removal from NEMAT are offered by the Defendants. Although Polk, Orr and Rossi were not the decisionmakers, the Seventh Circuit has held in Title VII cases that "the retaliatory motive of a 'nondecisionmaker' may be imputed" if "the 'nondecisionmaker' influenced the employment decision by concealing relevant information from, or feeding false information to, the ultimate decisionmaker." See David v. Caterpillar, Inc., 324 F.3d 851, 861 (7th Cir. 2003). The Court notes that Statewide Coordinator Hooker sought the input of the Defendants. The Plaintiff asserts that during this period, his relationship with Defendants Polk, Rossi and Sudbrink was acrimonious due to labor issues. However, there is nothing in the record suggesting that those Defendants influenced Hooker or Meek.
Although the Plaintiff has asserted a potential First Amendment violation, the Court concludes that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. "Generally, qualified immunity protects government agents from liability when their actions do not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Hernandez, 634 F.3d at 914 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). This involves a two-part inquiry: "(1) whether the facts, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, show that the defendant violated a constitutional right; and (2) whether that constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation." Id. In terms of the second inquiry, it must be clear "to a reasonable [person] that his conduct was unlawful in the situation that he confronted." Id. "[Q]ualified immunity provides ample room for mistaken judgments and protects all those but the plainly incompetent and those who knowingly violate the law." Purvis v. Oest, 614 F.3d 713, 720 (7th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
There is nothing in the record tending to show that the Defendants knowingly violated the Plaintiff's First Amendment rights. It appears that the Defendants may have mistakenly believed that Plaintiff did not want to carry a pager. However, it was a reasonable mistake based on the Plaintiff's own actions. Because qualified immunity allows for reasonable mistakes, the Court concludes that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on this claim.
(2) Other Alleged Harms
The Plaintiff further asserts that he was forced to treat dangerous, mentally ill inmates in an environment where he had no security protection, which created a risk to his safety.
The Plaintiff alleges that he was denied benefit time and subjected to conduct which made it more burdensome to do his job (i.e., being required to move from location, denied knowledge of changes in the JCC mental health protocols which he needed to know in order to perform his job, given unnecessary increases in his workload by requiring him to personally engage in in-service training rather than doing it through a video presentation).
Additionally, the Plaintiff was accused of harassing a supervisor. Even minor forms of retaliation, including "petty harassment," can be actionable. See DeGuiseppe v. Village of Bellwood, 68 F.3d 187, 192 (7th Cir. 1992) ("Lesser retaliation such as demotions, diminished responsibilities, or false accusations all may suffice"); see also Mosely, 434 F.3d at 534.
The Plaintiff next asserts that after he was reassigned to the Clinical Services Unit by Stoudt, she ordered that he not have security protection when he saw inmates and refused various requests made for security protection when he saw dangerous mentally ill inmates.
Although the office moves might otherwise be described as merely inconvenient or "less than ideal," the Court will consider whether there is any connection with the Plaintiff's complaints about security. Public safety can be a public concern. Defendant Sudbrink admitted that Plaintiff confronted her about allegedly not complying with the collective bargaining agreement. It appears that these events occurred around the same time. If there were a connection between those events, there is little doubt that an ordinary person could be deterred from pursuing his First Amendment rights. If the Plaintiff's office was moved and security concerns were ignored on multiple occasions due to any union activity on his part, then the Pickering balancing test would weigh in favor of the Plaintiff. However, it does not appear that there was any connection between any protected activity and the office moves.
The undisputed facts show that Defendants did not simply ignore the Plaintiffs' complaints. The record shows that after a "close call" in the Operations Building, the Plaintiff was directed to see inmates in any available space in the Health Care Unit, including Dr. Lochard's office, Defendant Sudbrink's office, Amanda Tomhave's office, the break room, or one of the two exam rooms. Moreover on October 1, 2007, Defendant Rossi issued an order allowing the Healthcare Unit officer to carry handcuffs so that an inmate could be restrained before or after an interview at the Plaintiff's request. Pursuant to Defendant Pillow's alleged instructions, the Plaintiff filed an incident report every time he saw patients without security in Clinical Services. It is undisputed that Plaintiff had access to phones and radios in the Clinical Services building if he required help. Moreover counselors, assistant wardens, and clerical staff all have contact with inmates in Clinical Services without security being stationed in the building, though these employees did not have individual contact with psychotic inmates.
The Plaintiff may not have been satisfied with the Defendants' responses to his complaints. There may be a legitimate argument that Defendants did not do all that they should have done. At the very least however, qualified immunity protects the Defendants from such mistaken judgments.
The Court further notes that Defendants have alleged that the level of security provided to the psychologist at JCC under Defendant Stoudt was consistent with practices at other facilities, including Taylorville Correctional Center. Although the Plaintiff disputes this assertion, the allegations that he cites in support of the proposition do not directly address the Defendants' contention.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as to the Plaintiff's claim that his security concerns were ignored.
The Plaintiff further claims that Defendant Sudbrink retaliated against him by filing false charges of harassment. There does not appear to be any connection between Sudbrink's claims of harassment and the Plaintiff's exercise of his First Amendment rights. Sudbrink's discrimination and harassment complaint was substantiated by the Department's Office of Affirmative Action. Given that finding, there appears to have been a basis for Sudbrink to believe that she was being harassed by the Plaintiff. Even if she was mistaken, Sudbrink is still entitled to qualified immunity.
a. Defendant Rossi
The Plaintiff asserts that prior to his more active involvement in union activities, he had a cordial relationship with Defendant Rossi. Subsequently, they had various differences pertaining to issues involving Sudbrink, the JCC dentist, and various other health and safety work issues.
The Plaintiff contends that Rossi removed his authority to direct when a suicidal inmate would be in a strip cell status, even though the Department's directives required those decisions to be made by a mental health professional.
Additionally, the Plaintiff contends that when he complained that he needed more clerical assistance to keep up with his workload in view of the increasing number of mentally ill inmates, Rossi instead gave him unnecessary busy work. Specifically, he required the Plaintiff to personally attend in-service training classes to provide instruction rather than doing it by video presentation as had been done in the past. The Plaintiff claims this resulted in an unnecessary 15% increase in his workload. When he complained, Rossi not only threatened to take over scheduling his work, but also gave him additional unnecessary busy work.
The Court concludes that the harms alleged here do not rise to the level such that they would deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his First Amendment rights. It does not appear that the removal of authority to direct when a suicidal inmate would be in a strip cell status affected the Plaintiff's prestige or professional status. The alleged addition of busy work because of the Plaintiff's activities also does not merit First Amendment protection.
b. Defendant Sudbrink
The Court does not believe that the slight delay in obtaining medical charts due to the actions of Sudbrink rises to the level of a First Amendment violation.
The Plaintiff asserts that although it had been the practice at JCC to have a nurse assigned to each medical clinic, Sudbrink removed the mental health nurse who helped him. This increased his workload and made him less capable of having an effective system to monitor the condition of mentally ill inmates. This appears to be a minor workplace annoyance. Orders received from the psychiatrist would be taken by whichever nurse was handling physician orders at that time. The Court concludes that this is not a First Amendment violation.
The Plaintiff's claim regarding an incident alleged to have occurred when JCC was on lockdown status in February of 2006 is time-barred.
The Plaintiff alleges that, in October of 2008, a psychiatrist noted in a report after a telepsychiatry session that an inmate expressed homicidal ideations toward him. However, Sudbrink had refused to provide the Plaintiff with telepsychiatry reports and thus he was not informed of the inmate's thoughts even though he continued to work around the inmate. The Plaintiff claims that Sudbrink directed that Plaintiff was not to receive copies of telepsychiatry reports. A memorandum from Sudbrink on November 13, 2008, stated that per instructions from the state privacy officer, telepsychiatry records were to be printed and are to be considered original documents, and were not to be forwarded to anyone but the medical records official and kept in the file in the Health Care Unit. Accordingly, the Plaintiff was treated like others in this regard and was not subjected to a First Amendment violation.
The Plaintiff asserts that in February of 2008, Defendant Sudbrink sent an email to staff members concerning procedures developed for the telepsychiatry program. She refused to share them with the Plaintiff, though he claims the procedures were necessary in order for him to perform his job. The Defendants claim that Plaintiff has not shown that Sudbrink had a duty to comply with his demands. The Plaintiff does not explain why the procedures were necessary for him to do his job. The Court is unable to conclude there was any First Amendment violation.
c. Defendant Stoudt
The Plaintiff alleges that, in the Spring of 2008, soon after Defendant Stoudt's arrival at JCC, there were some serious disagreements between JCC management and the Union. In March of 2008, the disagreements were reduced to a class wide grievance. Soon thereafter, the Plaintiff claims that Stoudt retroactively denied previously approved time off slips for him to attend collective bargaining negotiating sessions. Because the record establishes that Plaintiff's request ultimately was granted, the Court concludes that this was not a First Amendment deprivation.
The Plaintiff further asserts that in May of 2008, when he was concerned about comments made to him by correctional officer Ben Tomhave, which the Plaintiff interpreted as a threat, Stoudt refused to see him about his concern. According to the Plaintiff, Stoudt responded via email telling him that he should reduce his concern to an incident report. The Plaintiff told Stoudt that he had already submitted an incident report.
The Plaintiff further alleges that Stoudt responded to his email by saying that she had seen an incident report from both himself and a witness to the Tomhave incident. She ignored his request for a meeting.
The Plaintiff has not advanced any argument as to why this amounted to a First Amendment violation. Stoudt may well have believed that a meeting would serve no purpose. She may have thought that Plaintiff had no reason to feel threatened. The Court is unable to determine that Stoudt's refusal to meet with the Plaintiff would deter an ordinary purpose from exercising his First Amendment rights.
The Plaintiff next asserts that in November of 2008, he was scheduled to undergo knee replacement surgery. As was his right under the collective bargaining agreement, he made a request to take advanced sick leave. The Plaintiff claims that the request was denied based upon Stoudt's false comments that she had no written justifications for his request. The Plaintiff states that he not only provided a reason for his request but also had never previously abused sick leave with the Department. The record establishes that the request for advanced sick leave was denied by the Director of the Department of Corrections, as well as the Director of Central Management Services. The Plaintiff believes that the request was denied based upon Stoudt's alleged false comment that he had provided no justification for his request and on his assertion that such requests are routinely approved. However, this is speculative on the part of the Plaintiff and insufficient to defeat summary judgment.
d. Defendant Pillow
The Plaintiff asserts that in addition to continually accusing him of being obstructive with respect to the telepsychiatry program, when the Plaintiff was given inadequate information concerning that program to do his job, Pillow modified some institutional directives relevant to the Plaintiff's job without informing him of the changes. As the Defendants contend in reply, however, the Plaintiff has not established that Pillow had a duty to confer with him prior to promulgating institutional directives affecting his job. Moreover, the Plaintiff has not shown that he suffered any detriment.
The Plaintiff further asserts that after becoming the acting warden, Pillow informed him that he was not entitled to speak at labor management meetings. This potentially could be a First Amendment violation, but it is unclear why Pillow allegedly told the Plaintiff he could not speak. As the Defendants contend in reply, the Plaintiff has not established any act or speech that resulted in Pillow's alleged action. The Court declines to speculate as to whether the Plaintiff allegedly was told not to speak for permissible reasons (i.e., because he was belligerent) or impermissible reasons (i.e., in violation of his First Amendment rights).
The Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on all claims. Some of the Plaintiff's claims are time-barred. Regarding some of the other claims, the Court has found that the conduct was not sufficiently severe to "deter a person of ordinary firmness" from exercising his First Amendment rights. Finally, the Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as to other claims.
The Court notes that Defendants filed a Motion to strike portions of various affidavits in support of the Plaintiff's Response to the Summary Judgment Motion. The Defendants pointed to a number of deficiencies which they alleged rendered the applicable portions of the affidavits inadmissible. In ruling on the Motion, the Court has considered individually the admissibility of all materials offered in support or in opposition to Summary Judgment.
Ergo, the Motion for Summary Judgment [d/e 17] is ALLOWED. The Motion to Strike Affidavits [d/e 26] is DENIED AS MOOT.
The Final Pretrial Conference is Canceled.
The Clerk will enter Judgment in favor of the Defendants and against the Plaintiff.
Richard Mills United States District Judge
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Ariel! Now how beautiful is this grey tabby princess. Often the first to come up and greet any visitor Ariel is extremely social and ready to roll over and have her tummy rubbed. And oh what a tummy! This once petite princess has grown into a fluffy girl with so much affection to share. Awesome Ariel will keep you on your toes as she adores playtime and amusing you with her playful antics. A terrific tabby who enjoys the company of people of all ages and other felines, Ariel is an outgoing & charismatic kitty who promises you a lifetime of love and laughter! Thank you for choosing to ADOPTING versus SHOPPING for your next furry family member! The Emmet County Animal Shelter is an all-volunteer organization. We strive to answer inquiries in a timely fashion, yet it may take a day or so as those pesky jobs may get in our way, so thanks in advance for your patience. Our fabulous felines head home either spayed or neutered and current on vaccinations. If you are interested in meeting Ariel please visit our website at- www.emmetcountyanimalshelter.org to fill out an adoption application, and as always, our cat & kitten adoptions are a freewill donation!
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When I first saw this sweet heart I knew I wanted to pet her.
michael gappa

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I'm Cat , 18 yo and live in Sarasota, Florida. Will be going to SCF Bradenton for college comming up this fall. I've Been into anime and manga for several years and will be going to Japan summer of 2017!
My fav animes are Rurouni Kenshin , Yu Yu Hakusho , Inu-Yasha , HxH , FMA and Gekkan Shojo Nozaki-kun.
Fav Mangas include Rurouni Kenshin , The Gentlemens Alliance Cross , D.Gray-man , Vampire Knight , Tail of the moon , Special A and Yu Yu Hakusho.
Nobuhiro Watsuki is a huge inspiration to me, so is Arina Tanemura and Yoshihiro Togashi.
I enjoy manga , j-pop, historical books, making art , singing , cooking and dressing up semi-formal/ corperate casualy.
Feel free to wright me , ignor me or stalk me as you please.
5,681 total episodes
I have revenged the most hated list and rightfully put the devil back on top, let us rejoice and be glad.
"Congrates fandom for voting Sakura Haruno; a dedicated ninja to her village and comrades, as being worse than man whores, rapists, serial killers and psychopaths!"
You're welcome.
I don't see why she should NOT be the worst anime character. This disgrace is whiny, selfish, mean, weak and a huge cry-baby. She is an annoying fangirl who would do anything for a guy who tried to kill her thrice. This girl made fun of Naruto not having parents in front of her darling sasuke who is an Orphan. She even broke up with her best friend Ino who stood up for her and protected her from bullies and this insensitive and mean girl broke up with her just because she happened to like the same guy. She is that horrifying shoujo character who is a huge fangirl of a good-looking guy misplaced in a shounen manga
The thing that is great about anime-planet is that the community's always here! So if you have to leave for a while then come back it isn't a problem trying to hook up again with anime-minded folks!
Not everyone likes the same things, so if you end up not really feeling anything for Angel Beats!, that's fine! I haven't yet seen or read Skip Beat! I've had it on my Want to Watch list for a little while; gonna move up priority on seeing this soon!
Good luck getting all those drawings done. I'm envious of your talent to be so creative!
Haha don;t worry bout it. And that sounds tough, any art kind of thing that needs to be graded is tough :P Good luck!


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June 18, 2012
GIFT DIVINE ALLAH,PLAINTIFF,v.P. PATTERSON, ET AL., DEFENDANTS.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, RECOMMENDING THAT THIS ACTION BE DISMISSED, WITH PREJUDICE, FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF MAY BE GRANTED UNDER SECTION 1983 (Doc. 11.) OBJECTIONS, IF ANY, DUE IN THIRTY DAYS
Gift Divine Allah ("Plaintiff") is a former state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed the Complaint commencing this action on May 31, 2011. (Doc. 1.)
The Court screened the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and entered an order on January 24, 2012, dismissing the Complaint for failure to state a claim, with leave to amend. (Doc. 10.) On February 13, 2012, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint, which is now before the Court for screening. (Doc. 11.) This screening was referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge.
The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally "frivolous or malicious," that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). "Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
A complaint is required to contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007)). While a plaintiff's allegations are taken as true, courts "are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences," Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Plaintiff must set forth "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim that is plausible on its face.'" Iqbal 129 S.Ct. at 1949. While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id. The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id.
It is unclear from the Amended Complaint when or where the events at issue in this lawsuit occurred. Plaintiff names as defendants Magistrate Judge Gary S. Austin, Clark Kelso, the Secretary of the CDCR, the Chief of Inmate Appeals, the Warden of Wasco State Prison, and Parole Agent Collier. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint consists of a rambling narrative, largely consisting of conclusory legal arguments. Plaintiff appears to allege that his inmate appeals are not being properly addressed, that a parole agent delayed his mail, and that the Mail Room Sergeant at Wasco State Prison improperly returned his mail to the Court as undeliverable. Plaintiff requests as relief a court order "to show cause that the Federal Receiver is not doing his fiduciary duty."
To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant acted under color of state law and (2) the defendant deprived him of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law. Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006). To state a claim, the complaint must state what each named defendant did that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff's constitutional or other federal rights. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1948-49; Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). A person deprives another of a constitutional right, where that person "does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which [that person] is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made." Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)). The "requisite causal connection can be established not only by some kind of direct, personal participation in the deprivation, but also by setting in motion a series of acts by others which the actors knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict the constitutional injury." Johnson at 743-44.
Upon review of the Amended Complaint, the Court finds that even under liberal pleading standards, Plaintiff has not alleged facts showing participation by any defendant in an act resulting in a violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state any claims in the Amended Complaint.
The Court has screened Plaintiff's Amended Complaint and finds that Plaintiff fails to state any claims upon which relief can be granted under § 1983 against any of the defendants. In this action, the Court previously granted Plaintiff an opportunity to amend the complaint, with ample guidance by the Court. Plaintiff has now filed two complaints without alleging facts against any of the defendants which state a claim under § 1983. The Court finds that the deficiencies outlined above are not capable of being cured by amendment, and therefore further leave to amend should not be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000).
Accordingly, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that:
1. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), this action be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under § 1983; and
2. This dismissal be subject to the "three-strikes" provision set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Silva v. Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1098 (9th Cir. 2011).
These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within thirty days after being served with these findings and recommendations, Plaintiff may file written objections with the Court. Such a document should be captioned "Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations." Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).
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Pride in the Job Awards Recognising the industry's best site managers
Latest news: Regional Awards winners announced for Northern Ireland and Isle of Man!
Over the past year our judges have rigorously assessed which site managers will be rewarded in this year's Pride in the Job competition, and we are now delighted to reveal the Regional Award winners for 2016.
Congratulations to our winners - we look forward to welcoming you at our Supreme Awards Gala held in January 2017!
What is Pride in the Job?
Pride in the Job is the house-building industry's most prestigious awards programme. Running for 36 years, Pride in the Job is dedicated to recognising site managers who achieve the highest standards in house-building.
All site managers running a site with a home or homes that are registered for NHBC Buildmark cover, are automatically entered into the competition. There are no entry fees or forms. There are categories for smaller, independent builders as well as the medium, large and specialist high rise developers.
About Pride in the Job
Driving quality in house-building
Categories and stages
Find out how the competition works
What the
judges look for
What does it take
to be a winner?
Benefits of Pride in the Job
For site managers, trades and homebuyers
Award ceremonies
Recognising the UK's best site managers
Meet this year's and past winners
Other NHBC
Awards &


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ERIC Number: ED164960
Record Type: RIE
Publication Date: 1978-Dec-2
Pages: 25
Abstractor: N/A
Reference Count: 0
Remarks of Ernest L. Boyer, U.S. Commissioner of Education at the 1978 Convention of the American Vocational Association, Dallas, Texas, Saturday, December 2, 1978.
Boyer, Ernest L.
Dan Dunham, my Deputy Commissioner, and I agreed on six top priorities for occupational and adult education to guide our administration in the days ahead. First, we agreed that we must continue to expand access. Second, we must have equity of opportunity. Third, we must develop better accountability and data systems in vocational education. As a fourth priority, we must enlarge our capacity in vocational education to provide the most effective guidance. Fifth, we must have closer linkage between vocational education and the basic and life skills. Sixth, we must have a close and workable relationship between CETA (Comprehensive Employment and Training Act) programs and vocational education. We must work together to build a new kind of work/education structure to serve a generation of lost students. Today 24 percent of high school students drop out before they finish, often without jobs and essential skills. Jobs for the under-educated are scarce and often non-existent. There is a mismatch between the services we promote and the needs of those who leave school early. However, there are pieces of programs to serve their needs, such as the Work Experience and Career Exploration Program and Title I of CETA. It is time to develop a unique kind of institution to help the dropout unemployed youth. (EM)
Publication Type: Speeches/Meeting Papers
Education Level: N/A
Audience: N/A
Language: English
Sponsor: Office of Education (DHEW), Washington, DC.
Authoring Institution: N/A
Identifiers: United States
Note: Speech delivered at the Convention of the American Vocational Association (Dallas, Texas, December 2, 1978)


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Hotels in South Beach
Search all hotels in South Beach
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Trending now in Miami
- Most booked1 Hotel South Beach
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"Gorgeous hotel, right on the beach. Staff and property were exceptional!! Perfect for all types and has so many different areas, there's something everyone will love. So comfortable, beachy and organic. I've stayed at a number of hotels in Miami and this is by far my favorite one. Others are fun ..."
A Traveller, Dec 2016, US
502 people looked at this hotel in the last hour
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"Service was great. Renovations are nice. The only thing I didn't like was the dirty windows. I paid for ocean view and couldn't see it due to the scum and dirt on the windows. "
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497 people looked at this hotel in the last hour
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"For the money stay at the fountain bleu, ritz or w hotel. No view of the ocean from our "ocean view" room. Hotel staff accidentally (I hope) over charged us 200 a bottle on cheap champagne. Room was tiny for around 450 a night, understandably it is an old hotel that was redone. I stay in Miam..."
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"Stayed for one night prior to leaving on a cruise. Enjoyed the stay, however brief. Room and hotel shows lots of signs of wear. While lobby is striking, the rest of the place could use a makeover, especially the rooms, hallways, and pool area. Also, didn't even get to use the pool area or any..."
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"Clean, good customer service I'd like to come back again "
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"Very helpful and friendly staff. Arriving at 9.30 a.m. after a cruise, we were able to have our room straight away which was an unexpected bonus."
A Traveller, Nov 2016, GB
351 people looked at this hotel in the last hour
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"Hotel and the location were great... They had a complementary happy hour from 7pm to 8pm and some live entertainment. What I did not like was the upcharge they had us pay to have a "quieter and bigger" room of $20 bucks per night. Other than that it was a great hotel."
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"The hotel has the nicest and most accommodating staff in South Beach. Recommend for anyone looking for quality treatment at an excellent price. "
A, Dec 2016, US
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"Enjoyed the spot. Nice location, friendly staff, free drinks at happy hour. Had TV issues and buckle problems but I'd return."
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135 people looked at this hotel in the last hour
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"We had a great stay! The location was suitable to our needs. The staff was all great and all went out of their way to help if any was needed. The condition of the property was actually better than I expected. The price was such a good one for the time of year that I didn't think it would live up ..."
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Map of hotels in South Beach
- Ocean Drive
- Dolphin Mall
- American Airlines Arena
- Seminole Hard Rock Casino Hollywood
- Sun Life Stadium
- Lincoln Road Mall
- Las Olas Beach
- Fort Lauderdale Beach Park
- Bayside Marketplace
- Miami Beach Convention Center
- Aventura Mall
- Bayfront Park
- Las Olas Riverfront
- University of Miami
- Greater Fort Lauderdale-Broward County Convention Center
- Dadeland Mall
- Florida International University
- Gulfstream Park Racing and Casino
- Miami International Mall
- Little Havana
What you should know about South Beach
If you've been dreaming of a Miami vacation, then there's one special spot you simply can't miss: South Beach. There are countless reasons to hit South Beach during your travels, and here at Hotels.com, we're ready to help you every step of the way to making it a reality! When you book with us at Hotels.com, you're opting for only the best services, selection, and assistance in the industry. In order to find that perfect hotel to suit all your unique travel needs, you can browse online at your leisure through over 500 fantastic Miami and South Beach hotels, or you can call us up any time to speak with an expert travel assistant who will guide you to "the one." And, you'll be able to read through thousands of online hotel reviews from real Hotels.com users to add even more peace of mind before you embark. So hop online or give us a call today and we'll start planning your trip to "SoBe!"
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Traveling to any new and unfamiliar place can be made a lot easier if you learn a few handy tips ahead of time to help you get along with and blend in with the locals! Thankfully, we at Hotels.com are proud to be more than just your travel partner -- we're ready with our local and regional experts to provide real, helpful, and knowledgeable tips to help you make the most of your trip. As in any destination to which you may travel, Miami and South Beach have some particulars you should know ahead of time, like how tip is very often included on the check! Many people don't know this and end up tipping double. You'll also likely see some aggressive driving on the roads, so if you're renting a car, know your route well ahead of time to avoid frustrating the locals and to keep your attention on the road. And when it comes to hitting the beach, make sure you're frequently checking for any advisories or jellyfish spotting; South Beach hotels often offer reports. Last but not least, always remember the sunblock and lots of water to help you stay safe in the abundant sun!
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By K. Becker, V. Wulfmeyer, T. Berger, J. Gebel, and W. Münch
Stuttgart, Germany (July 31, 2013) -As the world starts feeling the effects of increasing atmospheric carbon dioxide and consequent global temperature rise, researchers are looking for a Plan B to mitigate climate change. A group of German scientists has now come up with an environmentally friendly method that they say could do just that. The technique, dubbed carbon farming, consists in planting trees in arid regions on a large scale to capture CO2. They publish their studyin Earth System Dynamics, a journal of the European Geosciences Union.
Abstract: Researchers present a comprehensive, interdisciplinary project which demonstrates that large-scale plantations of Jatropha curcas – if established in hot, dry coastal areas around the world – could capture 17–25 t of carbon dioxide per hectare per year from the atmosphere (over a 20 yr period). Based on recent farming results it is confirmed that the Jatropha curcas plant is well adapted to harsh environments and is capable of growing alone or in combination with other tree and shrub species with minimal irrigation in hot deserts where rain occurs only sporadically. Our investigations indicate that there is sufficient unused and marginal land for the widespread cultivation of Jatropha curcas to have a significant impact on atmospheric CO2 levels at least for several decades.
In a system in which desalinated seawater is used for irrigation and for delivery of mineral nutrients, the sequestration costs were estimated to range from 42–63 EUR per tonne CO2. This result makes carbon farming a technology that is competitive with carbon capture and storage (CCS). In addition, high-resolution simulations using an advanced land-surface–atmosphere model indicate that a 10 000 km2 plantation could produce a reduction in mean surface temperature and an onset or increase in rain and dew fall at a regional level. In such areas, plant growth and CO2 storage could continue until permanent woodland or forest had been established. In other areas, salinization of the soil may limit plant growth to 2–3 decades whereupon irrigation could be ceased and the captured carbon stored as woody biomass.
Source: Carbon farming in hot, dry coastal areas: an option for climate change mitigation
Related Resources:
Could planting trees in the desert mitigate climate change?
Planting Trees To Combat Climate Change: Scientists Suggest Carbon Capture With Barbados Nut Plant
Should we turn deserts into carbon-sucking tree plantations?
Scientists Say Nature 'Is Better at Carbon Farming'


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We're sorry, this listing is off the market. Try these listings instead:
Child Care Early Education Center Montgomery Co. #454771 posted Sep 28, 2016
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Founded in 2004, serving children ages sixteen months to 5 years for preschool and up to age 8 for before and after school programs. Reputation for excellence. Pennsylvania Keystone STARS rating School has a five-year grant from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania under the Pre-K Counts program, supporting...
Successful Child Day Care #449490 posted Jul 14, 2016
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Successful Children's Day Care Center in Burlington County, New Jersey. The owner's family is relocating out of state and has priced the business aggressively at fair market value. At this Childcare Center, the children are exposed to early concepts through play and hands-on exploration. The environment...
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Meat Marinade
Total Time
Prep 15 mins
Cook 5 mins
Great way to marinade beef or chicken depending which broth you are using..
Ingredients Nutrition
- 10 ounces beef broth or 10 ounces chicken broth
- 2 tablespoons oil
- 1 large onion, thin sliced
- 2⁄3 cup red wine
- 1 bay leaf
- 2 garlic cloves, finely sliced
- 2 teaspoons thyme
- salt and pepper
- Place all ingredients in pot.
- Simmer for 5 minutes to blend flavors.
- Keep in fridge until ready to use.
Most Helpful
Super marinade. I use a meat tenderizer tool on the meat first and let it sit in the marinade for several days in the refrig. I also use more garlic. Thanks, Harlynne


text:
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An excerpt from www.HouseOfNames.com archives copyright © 2000 - 2016
Origins Available: English, German
Anglo-Saxon tribes that once ruled over Britain that the name Ebert was formed. The name was derived from the Old German name Hildeberht, which literally means battle-glorious.
Ebert Early Origins
Yorkshire where Marton Hall in Marton was the ancient residence of the Heber family. [1]CITATION[CLOSE]
Lewis, Samuel, A Topographical Dictionary of England. Institute of Historical Research, 1848, Print.
Ebert Spelling Variations
Ebert Spelling Variations
Until the dictionary, an invention of only the last few hundred years, the English language lacked any comprehensive system of spelling rules. Consequently, spelling variations in names are frequently found in early Anglo-Saxon and later Anglo-Norman documents. One person's name was often spelled several different ways over a lifetime. The recorded variations of Ebert include Heber, Hayburgh and others.
Ebert Early History
Ebert Early History
This web page shows only a small excerpt of our Ebert research. Another 231 words (16 lines of text) covering the years 118 and 1180 are included under the topic Early Ebert History in all our PDF Extended History products and printed products wherever possible.
Ebert Early Notables (pre 1700)
Ebert Early Notables (pre 1700)
More information is included under the topic Early Ebert Notables in all our PDF Extended History products and printed products wherever possible.
Ebert In Ireland
Ebert In Ireland
Some of the Ebert family moved to Ireland, but this topic is not covered in this excerpt. Another 45 words (3 lines of text) about their life in Ireland is included in all our PDF Extended History products and printed products wherever possible.
The Great Migration
The Great Migration
Thousands of English families boarded ships sailing to the New World in the hope of escaping the unrest found in England at this time. Although the search for opportunity and freedom from persecution abroad took the lives of many because of the cramped conditions and unsanitary nature of the vessels, the opportunity perceived in the growing colonies of North America beckoned. Many of the settlers who survived the journey went on to make important contributions to the transplanted cultures of their adopted countries. The Ebert were among these contributors, for they have been located in early North American records:
Ebert Settlers in United States in the 18th Century
Ebert Settlers in United States in the 19th Century
Ebert Settlers in United States in the 20th Century
Ebert Settlers in Canada in the 18th Century
Contemporary Notables of the name Ebert (post 1700)
Contemporary Notables of the name Ebert (post 1700)
The motto was originally a war cry or slogan. Mottoes first began to be shown with arms in the 14th and 15th centuries, but were not in general use until the 17th century. Thus the oldest coats of arms generally do not include a motto. Mottoes seldom form part of the grant of arms: Under most heraldic authorities, a motto is an optional component of the coat of arms, and can be added to or changed at will; many families have chosen not to display a motto.
Motto: Prest d'accomplier
Motto Translation: Ready to accomplish.
Ebert Family Crest Products
Ebert Family Crest Products
See Also
See Also
Other References
The Ebert Family Crest was acquired from the Houseofnames.com archives. The Ebert Family Crest was drawn according to heraldic standards based on published blazons. We generally include the oldest published family crest once associated with each surname.
This page was last modified on 1 September 2016 at 15:42.
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