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Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Edward
M. Fiala, Judge, presiding.
Defendant, Abelardo Rosario, was found guilty of rape after a bench trial in the circuit court of Cook County. He was sentenced to a term of six years. Defendant appeals.
On appeal, defendant contends (1) that he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) that the State failed to prove venue beyond a reasonable doubt; and (3) that his right to confront witnesses was violated due to his exclusion from the courtroom on two occasions.
We reverse.
Complainant was 17 years old at the time of the incident. She testified that on January 17, 1980, at 4:30 p.m., defendant picked her up from work to drive her home. She recognized his car immediately because it had been her brother's car, and voluntarily got into it. They drove toward complainant's home. When they were one block from her home they parked. Complainant testified that she told defendant that she did not want to have anything to do with him anymore. He responded, according to the complainant, by suggesting that they have dinner at the Ponderosa Steak House. He had left his wallet in his locker at work so they drove there to retrieve it.
The first act of sexual intercourse occurred in the parking lot of the factory where defendant worked. Complainant testified on direct examination that after defendant parked the car, he said that he was tired of her saying "No" to everything. He started grabbing her, very tightly, and attempted to undress her. They struggled for about 30 minutes, he hit her in the face and succeeded in pulling her pants down and having sexual intercourse with her. Afterwards, he left the car to go get his wallet and returned with two cans of soda pop. When asked whether she made any attempts to leave the car, she explained that it was impossible because she was ashamed of what had happened and she did not know where she was. They began driving and after about three hours they stopped for gas. Complainant made no attempts to cry out because defendant had threatened not to drive her home if she did and she did not know the route home.
After they started driving again, complainant testified that the defendant pulled over onto the shoulder and stated, "Okay, now you are mine. You can't marry anybody else, you have to do whatever I tell you." She stated that she had to accept the second act of intercourse or he would not take her home. She explained that the second act took place in much the same manner as the first act of intercourse. Defendant was not charged with rape for the second act of intercourse.
Complainant and defendant arrived at the complainant's home at about 1:30 a.m. on January 18, 1980. She testified that her brother and sister-in-law with whom she lived were waiting for her. There is conflicting testimony concerning what happened after complainant arrived home. Complainant, her sister-in-law and defendant were examined and testified through an interpreter. Complainant's brother was occasionally assisted by an interpreter. It is clear that defendant escorted complainant to the door and entered the apartment with her. The complainant's brother and sister-in-law were waiting for her to return home. However, there were five versions of what the complainant said to her brother at the door. The complainant testified on direct examination that she said "I couldn't resist what happened to me. I been [sic] a victim of him. Please call the police." On cross-examination she testified that she said "I've been a victim, he raped me. Please call the police." Complainant's brother testified that the complainant said, "Brother William, please call the police, I was a victim of rape, Mr. Rosario, Raul." When asked what words she said in Spanish, the brother responded in Spanish, which was translated as: "Raul promised me — I lost my virginity, and call the police up." The brother further testified that the defendant said, "I raped your sister" and attempted to dissuade the brother from calling the police by offering him a stereo, money and a television. Complainant's sister-in-law testified that she heard the complainant say, "I have been a victim of rape, of Raul, he lost my virginity."
On cross-examination, complainant testified that the defendant had lived above her brother's apartment where she lived. She denied ever dating defendant, but after being shown photographs of them kissing in public, remembered meeting him at a club and going to a Greek restaurant and the Ponderosa Steak House with him. She admitted that he had been her boyfriend and that he often drove her home from work. She also admitted kissing him.
Complainant further testified that she did not bite, scratch or kick defendant. When asked on cross-examination if the defendant hit her, she said she was not sure.
Testifying on his own behalf, defendant stated that on January 17, 1980, he picked complainant up from work, as he often did. He drove her within a block of her house. This was routine because the complainant's brother did not approve of their dating. Defendant admitted that complainant said she could not see him anymore, but contended that this was due to complainant's fear of her brother's retaliation. Defendant testified that the complainant did not resist his advances; she responded affectionately. According to defendant, complainant stressed that she could not be late or her brother would beat her. He assured her that he would talk to her brother and that they would be able to remain boyfriend and girlfriend.
Defendant further testified that at about 11:30 p.m. they stopped at Sambo's to get something to eat. Defendant left the car running so that the heat would remain on and went into the restaurant, purchased hamburgers and soda pop, and returned to the car where complainant was waiting. Defendant also testified that they stopped at a rest area. After they returned home, defendant walked complainant to her door and walked into the apartment with her. Her brother was furious that she was late and began slapping her. She then exclaimed that it was not her fault because she had been violated.
Complainant's slacks were admitted into evidence. The belt straps and the corner of the pocket were torn. There was testimony that complainant's face was red and swollen, her cuticle was scratched and there was a mark on her arm.
The principal issue on appeal is whether the admitted act of sexual intercourse was proved beyond a reasonable doubt to be forcible and against the will of the complainant.
• 1, 2 The Supreme Court of Illinois has held that in order to prove the charge of forcible rape there must be evidence to show that the act of intercourse was committed by force and against the will of the female. While useless acts of resistance are not necessary, if the complainant has use of her faculties and physical powers, the evidence must show such resistance as will demonstrate that the act was against her will. (People v. Taylor (1971), 48 Ill.2d 91, 268 N.E.2d 865; People v. DeFrates (1965), 33 Ill.2d 190, 210 N.E.2d 467; People v. Faulisi (1962), 25 Ill.2d 457, 185 N.E.2d 211.) The degree of force exerted by the defendant and the amount of resistance on the part of the complainant are matters that turn on the facts of a particular case. Resistance is not necessary under circumstances where it would be futile and would endanger the life of the female as where the assailant is armed with a deadly weapon. Likewise, where the complainant is paralyzed with fear or overcome by superior strength of her attacker, proof of physical force becomes unnecessary. People v. Taylor (1971), 48 Ill.2d 91, 268 N.E.2d 865.
Here, as in People v. Faulisi (1962), 25 Ill.2d 457, the evidence is undisputed that defendant had no weapon. In Faulisi, the complainant testified that defendant said he would not harm her if she went along with him, but made no other threats of physical violence. In the instant case, defendant made no threats of physical violence whatsoever. Complainant's testimony indicates that she submitted to two acts of intercourse, made no outcries, and did not attempt to escape despite the fact that she was left alone in the car in areas where there were other people around. Her rationale for her behavior was that she did not know where she was and could not communicate.
The first time, defendant left her for a period of five minutes in the parking lot after the first act of intercourse. The factory was open, defendant encountered his boss in the parking lot and got his permission to get his wallet. Complainant's explanation as to why she did not seek help was that she did not know anybody and did not know how to say "help" in English, even though she indicated that she studied English for four years and spoke in English, at times, during the trial. When defendant stopped for gas the attendant came up to the window twice. Complainant stated that she made no outcry because defendant promised to take her home if she remained quiet. On cross-examination, she reiterated that she did not scream or attempt to leave the car at the gas station because she believed she might be in Indiana. Her submission to the second act of intercourse was coerced by further promises to take her home if she accepted.
The instant case is also analogous to People v. Taylor (1971), 48 Ill.2d 91, 268 N.E.2d 865, wherein the Illinois Supreme Court reversed a rape conviction. In both cases, the complainants never mentioned that they cried out or protested or made any efforts to attract attention of others to their alleged predicaments either in the parking lot or throughout the long rides and stops on the streets of Chicago.
• 3 We believe that complainant had sufficient control over her faculties and physical powers to seek assistance, yet failed to do so. The failure to exercise an opportunity to escape or summon assistance was a significant factor in reversing the convictions in People v. Taylor (1971), 48 Ill.2d 91, 268 N.E.2d 865, People v. Qualls (1961), 21 Ill.2d 252, 171 N.E.2d 612, and People v. Anderson (1974), 20 Ill. App.3d 840, 314 N.E.2d 651. We find this factor to be equally significant in the instant case. Voluntary submission by a female who has the power to resist, no matter how reluctantly yielded, amounts to consent and removes from the act an essential element of the crime of forcible rape. People v. DeFrates (1965), 33 Ill.2d 190, 210 N.E.2d 467, citing People v. Qualls (1961), 21 Ill.2d 252, 171 N.E.2d 612.
We are not unmindful that the complainant made an immediate complaint of rape to her brother. However, here, as in DeFrates, the events which preceded the complaint cause it to lose much of its weight. Defendant's actions, escorting complainant to her door and walking into the apartment with her, are hardly those of a man who had just raped a woman. The immediate complaint may be accounted for by the complainant's need to explain her late return. In this regard, the complainant's brother testified that complainant never went out with friends, had never had a boyfriend and stayed in every night after work and over the weekends. Obviously complainant had kept information regarding her social life from her brother.
• 4 A defendant should not be deprived of his liberty without clear and convincing evidence of his guilt. After a careful review of the entire record which is required of a reviewing court, we are constrained to say that the testimony of the complainant is not sufficiently convincing to lead us to an abiding conviction of the defendant's guilt. Because of our decision of the foregoing issue, it is unnecessary to address the remaining issues raised by defendant.
For the above reasons, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.
Judgment reversed.
CAMPBELL, P.J., and O'CONNOR, J., concur.
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September 6, 2012
RICHARD WALLACE, PETITIONER,v.GARY R. STATON, SHERIFF-CORONER, RESPONDENT.
Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding without counsel or "pro se," has filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, together with a request to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Petitioner has submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by § 1915(a). Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).
The exhaustion of state court remedies is a prerequisite to the
granting of a petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. §
2254(b)(1). If exhaustion is to be waived, it must be waived
explicitly by respondent's counsel. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(3).*fn1
A waiver of exhaustion, thus, may not be implied or inferred. A petitioner satisfies the
exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court with a
full and fair opportunity to consider all claims before presenting
them to the federal court. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971);
Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
After reviewing the petition for habeas corpus, the court finds that
petitioner has failed to exhaust state court remedies,*fn2
because the claims have not been presented to the California
Supreme Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509
(1982); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971); Middleton v. Cupp,
768 F.2d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1021
(1986). Further, there is no allegation that state court remedies are
no longer available to petitioner. Accordingly, the petition should be
dismissed without prejudice.*fn3
Good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Petitioner is granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis;
2. The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve a copy of these findings and recommendations together with a copy of the petition filed in the instant case on the Attorney General of the State of California; and
IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner's application for a writ of habeas corpus be dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies and the certificate of appealability referenced in 28 U.S.C. § 2253 should not issue.
These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days after being served with these findings and recommendations, petitioner may file written objections with the court. The document should be captioned "Objections to Findings and Recommendations." Any response to the objections shall be filed and served within fourteen days after service of the objections. Petitioner is advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).
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2016-08-08T10:00:36.764-04:00Alex Rodriguez will be retiring at the end of the week. There will be no farewell tour with teams paying tribute to A-Rod with gifts like they did for Rivera, Jeter, and Ortiz. Red Sox fans at Fenway will be able to bid farewell to A-Rod one last time this week before his last game at Yankee Stadium on Friday. I wonder if they'll cheer or boo. Perhaps a mixture of both.I don't feel bad for Alex Rodriguez. He seems like a dick. And it's tough to pity someone who has made hundreds of millions of dollars playing baseball. However, I do feel bad for his legacy. It deserves better. If you separate the unlikable man from the achievements, you'll see that they deserve more praise and appreciation than they'll receive.Alex Rodriguez took PEDs throughout his career. Does that matter? Are we still pretending that it matters? Did it give him a competitive advantage, or just put him on the same level as everyone else? Compared to his HGH and steroid assisted peers, A-Rod hit hundreds more homeruns. Furthermore, he hit nearly 700 homers off pitchers who went to the same "pharmacy" as he did. It's not an advantage if just about everyone has it.And if you discredit A-Rod's stats because of PED usage, you have to do the same to others who have used. That includes David Ortiz, fellow Red Sox fans. So let's just move on from the PED issue.There were a few years when Alex Rodriguez was the best player in baseball, and it wasn't even close. He won 3 MVPs, and in 2007 he received 26 of 28 first-place votes. With the Rangers, he led the AL in homers 3 years in a row and won 2 Gold Gloves at short-stop. So he hit homeruns and was the best fielder at the toughest defensive position.But all people could talk about was his $252 million contract. His performance was unfairly juxtaposed against the expectations of what was then a ludicrous contract. So no matter how many homeruns he hit, all people saw was the price tag.Looking back, I can't believe how much resentment there was from fans and pundits directed toward A-Rod for being paid. Was he supposed to negotiate the contract down so he would get paid less? That would be like Emma Watson offering to sleep with me, and me responding "Nope, second base is as far as I'm willing to go. I don't want people to hate me."A-Rod also didn't get enough credit in the Great Short-Stop Arguments from 1997 to 2003, probably due to his playing in the AL West. If you don't remember or are too young, those were the days when fans in Boston, New York, and all over the country debated who was better: Jeter or Nomar. And as two large fanbases and an East coast oriented sports media compared the two, the best short-stop in baseball (A-Rod) was being largely ignored. Nobody in the East cared about what happened with the Mariners or Rangers. The 10pm airing of Baseball Tonight started at the same time as their games, and the morning sports page was published too early for full box scores. For a few years, A-Rod was a better short-stop and player than Jeter or Nomar. But the debate was still localized to the Northeast.You can make an argument that A-Rod is a better player than Jeter. Power is an important part of the game and Rodriguez's power numbers dwarf Jeter's. A-Rod has about 440 more homeruns than Jeter, and slugged .550 compared to Jeter's .440. A-Rod also has a slightly higher OBP (.380 vs. .377). Jeter stole only 29 more bases. A-Rod knocked in 773 more runs. So A-Rod got on base, he could run, he could field, he could hit, he could hit for power.Of course, Jeter was clutch and A-Rod was a bit of a choker. And maybe that makes up the difference between the power hitter and the non-power hitter. My point is that A-Rod is in many ways better than one of the most cherished players in the illustrious history of the New York Yankees, and people don't even realize it.And did you know A-Rod has 3,000 hits? I don't remember that. He's 20th all-time in hits, just behind Tony Gwynn.He's on lists with some of the all-time best players in the sport. He's 4th in homeruns behind Bonds, [...]
2016-01-24T12:26:36.432-05:00Patriots, Broncos. Manning, Brady. An AFC Championship and a trip to the Super Bowl on the line. What could be any better than that? I'll tell you what... Drinking so much alcohol you'll need to watch the 4th quarter in the Emergency Room. Here's a drinking game to play while the Patriots face the Broncos Sunday in the AFC Championship...Anytime a commentator says:"AFC" = 1 drink of beer"Championship" = 1 drink"Manning" = 1 drink"Brady" = 1 drink"Winner" = 1 drink"Seventeen(th)" = drink for 17 seconds"Meeting" = 1 drink"Playoffs" = 1 drink"History" = 1 drink"Legacy" = 1 drink"Super Bowl" = 1 drink"Fifty" = 1 drink"Mile high" = 1 drink, 1 hit from a jointAnything about the air being thin = hold your breath for 15 seconds, then drink for 5 secondsAnything about the weather being nice = 1 drink"Crowd noise" = 1 drink"Home field" = 1 drink"Injury" = 1 drink"Malcolm" = 1 drink"Jackson" = 1 drinkAnytime this is on screen...A Roman numeral = drink for as many seconds as the number (e.g. XVII=drink for 17 seconds)Highlights from previous Manning/Brady games = drink during entire highlightHighlights of Brady/Patriots struggling in Denver = drink during entire highlightThe number 18 (on the field or in a graphic) = 1 drinkA trophy = 1 drink per trophyManning face = 1 shot of liquor (and permission to vomit)A Manning besides Peyton = 1 drink per ManningA horse (real or cartoon) = 1 drinkA horseshoe (real or as part of a logo) = 1 drink per shoeA mountain = 1 drink pear peakJohn Elway = 1 drinkBrock Osweiler = 1 drinkWade Philips = 1 drinkMatt Patricia = 1 drinkErnie Adams = 1 glass of wineJosh McDaniels = 1 drinkA graphic about injuries = 1 drinkA coin toss (live or video) = 1 drinkBob Kraft = 1 drinkKraft talking to someone = drink the entire time he's talkingAnytime this happens...Someone says "Omaha" = 1 drinkBroncos fans say that stupid "incomplete" chant = 1 drinkBrady and/or Manning are compared to all-time greats = 1 drink for each player compared toJamie Collins makes a freakishly athletic play = 1 drinkMatthew Slater makes a special teams tackle = 1 drinkJulian Edelman breaks a tackle = 1 drinkRob Gronkowski destroys someone/something = 1 drinkYou're worried Edelman or Gronk is injured = half a beerGronk spikes something = finish your beer, spike empty can/bottle on ground (bonus points for glass bottles)Manning says the name of a city besides Omaha = 2 drinksManning says the name of a state/province = 5 drinksManning says the name of a country = finish your beerManning seems to adjust the play = 1 drinkCommentators praise Manning for a good play call = 1 drinkCommentators avoid criticizing Manning for a bad play call = 1 drinkBroncos run the ball = 1 drinkManning overthrows a receiver = 1 drinkManning underthrows a receiver = 1 drinkManning makes an accurate throw longer than 10 yards = half a beerManning fumbles or throws a pick = 1 shot of liquorCommentators criticize Manning for a mistake (unlikely) = 1 entire beer, 2 shots of liquorThe commentators mention HGH (this will not happen) = drink all alcohol in the building by the end of the game, which will be extra rough in an apartment building or a bar, so feel free to take performance enhancing substances to helpSo enjoy the game on the field between the Patriots and Broncos, as well as the game off the field between you and your liver. Make sure you have a path shoveled wide enough for the paramedics to carry you out on a stretcher.Boston Blood Sox[...]
2015-10-18T17:25:57.197-04:00It's time for revenge. Because somehow beating the Colts by 50+ points will make up for the months of misinformed "11 of 12 footballs being 2+ PSI under" bogus stories that the NFL leaked (what former Jets employees leaked, so the Day of Vengeance should be next Sunday when the Jets come to Gillette). Will beating the Colts by 7 touchdowns put all the BS back into the mouths of morons like Michael Felger? Will a thorough and complete beatdown of the Colts atone for the lack of fact-checking by ESPN and the rest of the sports media, and the subsequent lack of apology for being completely wrong, and allowing themselves to be used as the propaganda arm of the NFL?No.This game isn't about revenge. It's about winning, and winning against a team you have comprehensively dominated for years. And if it's a win by 1 point, I think that'd be so much better than winning by 50. It would be more heart-breaking, more of a tease. Furthermore, it would also trick the Colts into thinking that they're close to the Patriots, just a few minor adjustments away from being contenders. That kind of false hope is priceless, and would be a true revenge. Let them think they're close so they don't fire their horrible GM or their foolish head coach, and don't tell Andrew Luck to stop turning the ball over. So while part of me wants this to be a 50+ point slaughter, part of me also wants this to be a closely fought struggle. Just to fool the Colts that they're in the Patriots' league. False hope is true torture.Anyway, here's a drinking game you can play during the football game. Please make sure you do two things before playing this: #1. call out of work on Monday because you'll be quite incapacitated. #2. Put your last will and testament in order, because it will be needed.The rules of the game (which must be strictly adhered to, or players will be suspended for 4 weeks, and there will be a loss of draught picks, which means you won't be able to pick which beer you drink)...Anytime a commentator says..."Deflate" or any form of the word - take 1 drink of beerA word that ends with "-Gate" - take 1 drink of beerSomething about DeflateGate without saying "deflate" - drink for 12.5 seconds"Air" = 1 drink"Pressure" = 1 drink"Goodell" = 1 drink"Indianapolis" = 1 drink"AFC" = 1 drink"Championship" = 1 drink"Revenge" = 1 drink"Brady" = 1 drink"Gronk" = 1 drink"Luck" = 1 drinkA stupid pun and/or play on words involving the word "luck" (e.g. "luck of the draw," if the Colts run a QB draw) = 1 shot of hard liquor"Al" = 1 drink"C(h)ris" = 1 drink"Bob" = 1 drink"Michele" = 1 drink"D'Qwell" = 1 drink, 1 shot of NyquilAnytime this happens...The Patriots score = drink for as many seconds as the Patriots have points (you must also drink after PATs)A DraftKings or FanDuel commercial = take 1 drinkAir pressure is mentioned = drink 11 of 12 ounces of beerA penalty = 1 drinkTom Brady points out the "mike" = 1 drink, bonus points for drinking from Mike's Hard LemonadeBrady says all or part of "Alpha Milk" = 1 drink, bonus points for drinking a White RussianBrady holds the ball for longer than 2 seconds = 1 drinkRob Gronkowski throws somebody out of the club = finish your beerGronk scores = 1 drinkGronk spikes = finish your beer, then spike the container (bonus points for spiking glass bottles/mugs)Jamie Collins makes a big play = 1 drinkJulian Edelman makes a guy miss = 1 drinkDion Lewis makes a guy miss = 1 drinkThe Patriots run for 5+ yards = 1 drinkKick or punt return = drink during entire returnTouchback = 1 drinkMatthew Slater makes a special teams tackle = 1 drinkAndrew Luck turnover = 1 whole beerAnytime this is on screen...A banner = 1 drink per banner (this will be a lot of drinking)The number 12 (on jerseys, scoreboards, clocks, graphics, etc.) = 1 drinkHighlights from previous Pats/Colts games = 1 shot of liquorP[...]
2015-09-25T10:25:54.979-04:00ESPN's Scott Van Pelt wants daily fantasy sports to drop the "charade" that it isn't gambling. You can watch his short monologue on the subject here. Before I discuss the material of his argument, I want to applaud him for having the balls to make it. DraftKings and ESPN have a huge partnership deal, and daily fantasy sports has become a massive source of advertising revenue. I'll also compliment SVP on the pace and structure of his argument. It's very well put together.And I don't disagree with his premises, just the conclusion, and just the fact that he makes the argument at all. The easy way to describe daily fantasy is to say it's gambling. So he's right. Personally, I'd argue that it's gambling and a skill game. I'd also argue that poker, sports betting, and horse betting are also skill games, but most people treat those as gambling. The skill involved is to capitalize on other players who don't know what they're doing as well as you.So daily fantasy shouldn't be much different. So why can't they just admit that it's gambling? Drop the charade, right Scott?Because in this country we have stupid and nonsensical gambling laws that force you to avoid the G-word at all costs. We also have pious institutions like the NCAA that despise the stigma of gambling while they simultaneously benefit from it. Instead of going after daily fantasy's charade, SVP should ask why the charade is necessary at all.In Massachusetts, gambling is illegal. Unless it's through the state run lottery, or at a casino sanctioned by the state. As long as the State House gets a piece of the action, they're fine with gambling. Otherwise, it's against the law. The government might as well say "Gambling is wrong, unless we do it."The NCAA recently announced that student-athletes who play daily fantasy will lose a year of eligibility. But when March Madness comes around and people fill out brackets with NCAA logos on them, I don't hear much preaching from the NCAA about the evils of gambling. After all, those brackets are used strictly for fun, and not gambling, right?I used to play $5 games of online poker until Congress made it next to impossible to deposit or withdraw money from online poker sites. This caused the reputable sites to stop doing business with US players altogether. One of the major laws that began this crushing of online poker in America (the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act or UIGEA) specifically stated that fantasy sports was not considered gambling. Fantasy sports was a game of skill. This is the law that allowed daily fantasy to one day grow into what it is today.So I can buy $100 worth of scratch tickets, or play in a $200 million multi-state lottery, or go down to Plainridge Park and sit in front of a slot machine for 16 hours, and it's all legal, because the government has a stake in those games. I can also pick a fantasy football team for Sunday's games and risk $20 to potentially win $1,000,000, or risk $1 in hopes of winning $20, and it's legal. Because the law says it's not gambling. If it were gambling, it would be illegal.So why the hell would DraftKings or FanDuel call themselves gambling sites if the reason they are legal and allowed to do business is because the law says they're not gambling sites? That's like demanding that CVS and Walgreen's call themselves drug dealers and not pharmacies.Maybe, Mr. Van Pelt, you should go after the rampant hypocrisy found in this country's gambling laws. Maybe you should point out that sports betting is and has always been a huge ratings booster for the NCAA, NFL, and all other sports that ESPN covers, even while those leagues publicly condemn such activities. Maybe you should ask why Americans love to gamble, but America has a stigma against gambling?But no, it's easier to go after the people who b[...]
2015-09-10T12:22:53.451-04:00It's here! Actual football returns! Finally when we see "Patriots vs." or "Tom Brady vs." it won't be describing a court case. Instead of cross examinations, it's now time for crossing routes. Instead of filing motions, we'll have receivers in motion. Here's a drinking game to play while enjoying the Patriots begin their title defense against the Pittsburgh Steelers. Enjoy the game, do your job, and get lubed up responsibly (which means you should not, under any circumstances, actually play this game)...Anytime a commentator says..."Champions" = take 1 drink of beer, and let out a satisfied sigh"Super Bowl" = 1 drink"Banner" = 1 drink"Ring(s)" = 1 drink"4-time" = 4 drinks"Do your job" = finish your beer"Brady" = drink for 12 seconds"Butler" = drink for 21 secondsAny form of the word "win" or "winner" = 1 drink"ESPN" or "Chris Mortensen" = drink 11 of 12 beers in a 12-pack"Air pressure" or "PSI" = drink for 12.5 secondsAnything about court cases = drink loudly enough to drown them outAny word ending in "-gate" = 1 drink"Suspended" = 1 drink, bonus points for smoking a blunt if they mention LeGarrette Blount"Season" = 1 drink"We're on to..." = 1 shot of liquorAnytime this happens...Touchback = 1 drinkKick or punt return = drink for the duration of the returnGronkowski scores a TD = finish your beer, spike the can/bottle (bonus points for spiking glass bottles)Brady throws to someone besides Edelman or Gronk = 1 drinkThey actually catch the ball = 1 drinkThe Patriots go no huddle = 1 drink per snapBrady says "Alpha milk" = 1 drink, bonus points if you're drinking a White RussianBrady points out the "Mike" = 1 drink, bonus points if you're drinking Mike's Hard Lemonade (only if you're a girl, deduct points if you're a guy)Matthew Slater makes a special teams tackle = 1 drinkJerod Mayo makes a big play = 1 drink, 1 shot of mayonnaiseThe Patriots give up a 10+ yard pass play in soft zone coverage = 1 drinkYou think Roethlisberger will be sacked but he escapes = 1 drinkYou miss Vince Wilfork = 1 drink, 1 shot, eat a turkey legAnytime this is on screen...Roger Goodell at Gillette Stadium = HAHAHAHAHAHAHAA shot of footballs and/or ball boys = 1 shot of liquorHighlights of Super Bowl 49 = finish your beerHighlights of another Super Bowl (including Pittsburgh's SBs) = drink an entire beerA Lombardi Trophy = 1 drink per trophyA Super Bowl ring = 1 drink per ringA banner = 1 drink per bannerA sign about Brady and/or Goodell = 1 drinkBob Kraft = 1 drinkBob Kraft talking to someone = drink the entire time he's talkingErnie Adams = drink a bottle of wine by the end of the gameThe number 12 (including scoreboard and graphics) = 1 drinkA graphic of playoff/championship stats (for the Pats or Steelers) = 1 drinkBonus drinking game rule:Every time Tom Brady takes the field, remember that Roger Goodell and the NFL wanted him banned for this game as well as the next three. So raise your drink, say a toast to Tom, and a big "Fuck you" to Goodell.Boston Blood Sox[...]
2015-08-12T09:30:02.380-04:00DeflateGate. Like Brett Favre, every time this story seems about to go away, it comes back.The more we learn about DeflateGate, the clearer it becomes that high ranking NFL officials were hell bent on crucifying the Patriots. But they were careless and stupid with their conspiracy. And they underestimated the willingness of one man to fight; one of the most competitive and mentally toughest athletes in the history of sports: Tom Brady.The false details in the Mortensen tweet launched this story into orbit. Despite pleas from the Patriots, the NFL didn't correct the leak. They allowed inaccurate information to be the basis of the biggest sports story of the year. The true pressure measurements were revealed 106 days later in the Wells Report.But whoever leaked the inaccurate details to Mortensen, and whoever decided not to correct them, should have known that at some point the truth would come out. And people would ask questions about the NFL's motives behind the leak and their decision not to correct it.The Mortensen tweet has become irrelevant as evidence against the Patriots. But in the case against the NFL, it's Exhibit A.Why fill the Wells Report with so much shoddy science and desperately convoluted logic? The Wells-Pash Report didn't make the NFL's case, it undermined it. For example, referee Walt Anderson's recollection of which pressure gauge he used pre-game, was refuted based on a shaky scientific argument that relied on Anderson's recollection of the Colts' balls' pre-game pressures. So Anderson's memory was deemed unlikely to be true, based on the reliability of his memory. Why allow that to be published?The Wells Report was never about finding truth, it was about finding guilt. It didn't make the case against the Patriots or Brady, it helped start the case against the NFL.The League's motives in DeflateGate became clear when the Patriots and Tom Brady were severely punished. The team in part for previous rules violations (SpyGate). And Brady for being "generally aware," and for not handing over his cell phone.Did Troy Vincent and the NFL do any research into their own precedents? Didn't they remember Brett Favre being fined $50k in 2010 for not turning over his cell phone? Or 2009 when a Jets equipment staffer was suspended for tampering with a kicking ball, but the kicker wasn't punished at all, or even investigated?Why was the NFL so harsh with the punishments? Imagine if the NFL had just fined Brady. This story might have gone to sleep long ago. But just fining Brady was unacceptable. Why?The motives for harshness and revenge against the Patriots are abundant. Goodell wanted to rebuild his reputation as League Sheriff. Former Jets president Mike Kensil's motives are obvious. The Ravens were infuriated about ineligible receivers the week prior. A number of other teams think the Patriots are pathological cheaters. Supported by a handful of owners, the same executives who leaked fake air pressures to Mortensen were likely the same people who pressured for and had the power to enforce the harshest possible punishment.Brady became the scapegoat. The NFL needed a specific villain to blame. Witch hunts need a witch. Pinning such a huge scandal on two no-name team employees wouldn't satisfy.Brady was singled out because he was mentioned in texts. Because he refused to hand over his phone. And if he appealed, the NFL knew they could have their Meathead in Chief Goodell hear the appeal and then deny it. So he'd be compelled to settle (and admit guilt) or go all the way to Court.This was their opportunity to sink their teeth in. So they did. Revenge, paranoia, reputation, all motives were satisfied by the severe punishments.The NFL thought [...]
2015-07-29T12:35:08.088-04:00"Tom Brady destroyed his phone" is the latest salacious and headline hungry statement/leak that the NFL has disbursed in its efforts to make Brady look as guilty as possible, and to make Roger Goodell look like the punisher of the wicked. This was never about PSI, it was about perception: Goodell's perception as the strict disciplinarian, and the perception that some owners around the NFL have of the Patriots getting away with cheating.Brady destroyed his phone. He destroyed his phone? He destroyed his phone! Why did he destroy his phone? Who destroys their phone? Why would an innocent man destroy his phone? The dramatic phrasing was intended to make headlines. The NFL didn't just break news, they wrote the first line of every story.How many times did you hear the word "destroy" in the past 24 hours? The NFL could have said the phone was "replaced," or "disposed of." They could have said the memory card was destroyed, or erased, or swiped. Nope, the whole phone was destroyed. And if Brady had agreed to admit his guilt and accept a reduced suspension, the NFL would have kept his destroyed phone a secret.Think about. This "damning" evidence, this so-called "smoking gun" was something the NFL was happy to keep under wraps, so long as Brady gave them the confession they wanted.The NFL lacks evidence, so they deploy innuendo. Whatever facts there are behind Brady's phone being disposed of become irrelevant. How did he destroy it? Was it physically destroyed or just dismantled and the information erased? Was it smashed to bits or dropped in water or blown up or melted or hurled into space?We don't know the details, and the NFL doesn't care to know them. Details are important when seeking justice. And their lack of importance in the DeflateGate maelstrom demonstrates how uninterested in truth and justice Goodell and the NFL have been since this whole thing started.The investigation into DeflateGate was only secondarily about trying to find out if the Patriots deflated footballs, and if so, under whose authority and with whose knowledge. The primary goal of the Wells Report, and of every leak and NFL statement, has been to make Brady and the Patriots look as guilty as possible.A referee claimed to use one gauge to test footballs, but his memory was refuted by the Wells Report, because it destroyed the NFL's case. His memory was deemed faulty based on the reliability of his own memory. I'm not making that up. You can't make that up. His recollection of the Colts' ball's pressures was used as the basis of the argument to refute his recollection of which pressure gauge he used. So his memory is unreliable, based on an argument that relied on his memory.Remember the leak that broke this entire story? The Patriots were said to have been caught with 11 of 12 footballs 2+ pounds of pressure under the legal minimum. The footballs were indeed below the 12.5 minimum, but not by as much as the leak and the ensuing story claimed. They were, according to one gauge, deflated about as much as the Laws of Physics would predict. But that fact wasn't revealed for months. Even though the NFL knew the leak was inaccurate.Information with incorrect details was leaked, reported, and then was used as a foundation for the biggest story of the 2014 NFL season. The NFL knew the leaked information was inaccurate, and did nothing to correct it.Why?Why be so wary of details? Because details don't matter in a witch hunt. Details don't matter when the owners of the Colts and Ravens want to see the Patriots pay, and the Commissioner wants to appear to be a hardass. Sheriff Goodell needed to prove that he's a man of law and order. So with the backing of a gro[...]
2015-07-28T16:21:55.333-04:00Pedro Martinez was by far the best thing going during the Great Boston Sports Depression between Larry Bird and Tom Brady. Before Boston teams won Super Bowls and World Series, all we fans could be proud of was a skinny, cocky, unbelievably dominant Dominican pitcher.It can be difficult to remember the mindset we had in the late '90s and very early 2000s, before the Patriots won the Super Bowl, before the Curse was Reversed, before Boston teams claimed 9 titles in 14 years. And with the abundance of Boston sports heroes in this young century (Brady, Ortiz, Garnett, Thomas, and so on), we kind of forget how special Pedro Martinez actually was, and how for a few years he provided us with that feeling of joy and sense of superiority once every 5 days. So let's remind ourselves of his greatness beyond greatness.From 1997 to 2000, he was perhaps the best pitcher of all-timeAt the height of the most offensive era in MLB history, Pedro Martinez was by far the best pitcher. From '97 to 2000 he won 77 games (19.25 per season). He struck out 1,153 (288.25 per season) and had a 2.12 ERA. In those 4 homerun heavy seasons, he only allowed 68 balls to leave the park. He allowed an impossibly low 9 homeruns in 1999, only 0.34% of the total homeruns hit by AL batters.He won 3 Cy Youngs in this stretch, and probably should have won an MVP. But we'll get to that later.In 2000 he struck out almost 9 times as many batters (8.88) as he walked. In 1999 he allowed 0.4 HR per every 9 IP. In '97 the barely 170 pound Pedro threw 241.1 innings. In 2000 his WHIP of 0.737 set the record for the lowest of all time, 0.032 lower than Guy Hecker's WHIP in 1882. Yes, Pedro broke a 118-year-old record. And he did that in the steroid era, in a league with a DH.While sluggers were smashing Roger Maris' single-season HR record, Pedro was challenging Bob Gibson's ERA record (which was set on a higher mound, and with pitchers batting). Pedro Martinez did more to limit offense in the steroid era than mandatory PED testing eventually did.His playoff performances were legendaryIn Game 5 of the 1999 ALDS against Cleveland, Pedro Martinez pitched 6 no-hit innings of relief in the deciding game of the series. Despite his arm being worn out and his fastball considerably slowed, he held an offense that had scored 1,000+ runs that season, to zero hits. Manny Ramirez, Jim Thome, the Alomars, Kenny Lofton, all of them failed to get hits off Pedro. He entered the game when it was 8-8, the Sox won 12-8, and claimed their first playoff series since 1986.Then in Game 3 of the '99 ALCS, Pedro beat the Yankees with 7 scoreless innings. He only allowed 2 hits and struck out 12. It was New York's only loss of the post-season.He could have been the winner of Game 7 of the 2003 ALCS if not for poor management. Had Grady Little gone to the bullpen to finish the game, few people in Boston would know who Aaron Boone was. Pedro was brilliant for 7 innings, then began to falter in the 8th. Had he been removed, the Red Sox probably would have gone to the World Series, and had a good chance against the Marlins.He was a big part of the Red Sox winning the 2004 World SeriesSince we tend to associate Pedro so much with the pre-2004 era of Red Sox history, we forget how vital he was to the Sox winning the World Series in '04. Not only with his pitching, but just with his presence. His presence on the team made the Sox a contender, and the new ownership parlayed that in their pursuit of players like Curt Schilling. Pedro was also part of that team's loose yet confident attitude.He wasn't that great in the 2004 regular season. And in the[...]
2015-07-16T15:57:11.212-04:00The Boston Blood Sox Awards (or Bloodies) are awarded for great success and/or pitiful failure in the 2014-15 sports calendar.
2015-07-16T15:16:52.788-04:00The Boston Blood Sox Awards (or Bloodies) are awarded for great success and/or pitiful failure in the 2014-15 sports year.
2015-07-16T14:48:45.344-04:00The Boston Blood Sox Awards (or Bloodies) are awarded for great success and/or pitiful failure in the 2014-15 sports year.
2015-07-16T14:42:15.611-04:00The Boston Blood Sox Awards (or Bloodies) are awarded for great success and/or pitiful failure in the 2014-15 sports year.
2015-07-16T14:37:23.060-04:00The Boston Blood Sox Awards (or Bloodies) are awarded for great success and/or pitiful failure in the 2014-15 sports year.
2015-07-16T14:31:47.172-04:00The Boston Blood Sox Awards (or Bloodies) are awarded for great success and/or pitiful failure in the 2014-15 sports year.


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2 Bedroom Apartment near Hallandale Beach
3161 South Ocean Drive #1607, Hallandale Beach, Hollywood, FL 33009, USA – This neighbourhood is a great choice for travellers interested in sunshine, family friendly exploring, and relaxation – Check location Show map
|Room type
|× 6
|Apartment with Lake View
Very large apartment with a stunning views of the bay. Peaceful and quiet area. Walking distance to the beach, restaurants, cafes, the Village at Gulfstream casino and games. Minutes from the South Beach, Aventura Mall, Bal Harbour Shops, Airports.
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Free! Free private parking is possible on site (reservation is not needed).
Free! WiFi is available in the hotel rooms and is free of charge.
- Dining table
- Coffee machine
- Stovetop
- Oven
- Tumble dryer
- Kitchenware
- Electric kettle
- Kitchen
- Washing Machine
- Dishwasher
- Microwave
- Refrigerator
- Wardrobe/Closet
- Dressing Room
- Towels
- Shower
- Linen
- Bath or Shower
- Bathroom
- Toilet
Living Area
- Dining area
- Sofa
Media & Technology
- Cable Channels
Room Amenities
- Iron
- Clothes rack
- Carpeted
Pets are not allowed.
- Upper floors accessible by stairs only
- Outdoor dining area
- Outdoor furniture
- Outdoor pool (all year)
- Balcony
Pool and wellness
- Hot tub/jacuzzi
Food & Drink
- Tea/Coffee Maker
Outdoor & View
- Riverview
- View
- Car hire
Cleaning services
- Laundry
- Air conditioning
- Non-smoking throughout
- Family rooms
- Non-smoking rooms
Languages spoken
- Russian
- English
Property surroundings – This neighbourhood is a great choice for travellers interested in sunshine, family friendly exploring, and relaxation – Check location Show map
Closest landmarks
- Gulfstream Park 1.5 miles
- ArtsPark at Young Circle 2 miles
- Aventura mall 2.6 miles
- West Lake 3.1 miles
- Anne Kolb Nature Center 3.1 miles
Most popular landmarks
- Las Olas Boulevard 9 miles
- Museum of Art Fort Lauderdale 9.1 miles
- Broward Center for the Performing Arts 9.2 miles
- Bonnet House Museum and Gardens 10.3 miles
- The Galleria at Fort Lauderdale Shopping Center 10.3 miles
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All children under 16 years are charged USD 150 per night for extra beds.
All further older children or adults are charged USD 150 per night for extra beds.
The maximum number of extra beds in a room is 2.
Any type of extra bed or child's cot/crib is upon request and needs to be confirmed by management.
Supplements are not calculated automatically in the total costs and will have to be paid for separately during your stay.
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A security deposit of USD 150 is required upon arrival for incidentals. This deposit is fully refundable upon check-out and subject to a damage inspection of the accommodation.
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According to Mid-Atlantic Sports Network (MASN) reporter Dan Kolko, Taiwanese pitcher Chien-Ming Wang (王建民) is not likely to return to the Washington Nationals roster for the next season. He wrote on the network's website, " I think it's safe to say we can say goodbye to Chien-Ming Wang. He's likely seen his last of a Nationals jersey."
Wang Not Likely to Return to Washington Nationals: Report
From ChinaPost.com
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My mom bought me the Michael Todd Soniclear for my birthday and it is the best facial brush I have used.
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April 19, 1989
538 N.E.2d 613, 182 Ill. App. 3d 672, 131 Ill. Dec. 238 1989.IL.546
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Lester D. Foreman, Judge, presiding.
Rehearing Denied June 7, 1989.
APPELLATE Judges:
PRESIDING JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court. McNAMARA* and RIZZI, JJ., concur.
Plaintiff, Chester Lichon, filed suit against defendant, Aceto Chemical Company, Ltd. (Aceto), in the circuit court of Cook County for personal injuries sustained when he came in contact with drums leaking a chemical known as Phorate Technical, owned by Aceto. Aceto filed a third-party complaint for contribution against the Phorate's manufacturer, J.D. Campbell Sales, Ltd. (Campbell), an English company. Service of summons was had upon Campbell in England. Pursuant to Campbell's motion, the trial court dismissed Aceto's amended third-party complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction on the basis of Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court (1987), 480 U.S. 102, 94 L. Ed. 2d 92, 107 S. Ct. 1026. Aceto appeals.
Aceto's amended third-party complaint alleged the following facts. Campbell shipped 72 drums of Phorate Technical from Greenock, England, to Port Seatrain, Weehawken, New Jersey, for Aceto. The Phorate Technical was intended for delivery to Aceto's customer, Aidex, in Council Bluffs, Iowa. On December 12, 1976, the truck transporting the Phorate to Iowa overturned. On December 15, it was discovered at the Chicago terminal of the trucking company that the drums of Phorate were leaking. The record further reveals that Phorate Technical is used in the manufacture of insecticides.
Aceto also alleged that Campbell knew or should have known that Aceto would transport the Phorate by truck and that, given the highly toxic nature of Phorate, drums of adequate strength and labeling would be required in the event of an accident. Aceto alleged that Campbell's negligent failure to provide adequate containers and labeling was the proximate cause of the leaking drums and the injuries to plaintiff.
In Asahi, eight Justices agreed that the State of California's exercise of jurisdiction over a Japanese defendant would be fundamentally unfair, i.e., not in keeping with "traditional notions of fair play and substantial Justice." (Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 105, 107 S. Ct. at 1033.) The court stated that the reasonableness of the exercise of jurisdiction depended in each case on the burden to the defendant, the interests of the forum State, the plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief and the interests of other States or, as in the case before it, other nations in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 105, 107 S. Ct. at 1033-34.
The Justices split, however, over whether the Japanese defendant otherwise had sufficient minimum contacts with the State of California to allow California to exercise jurisdiction over it.
Justice O'Connor, with whom three Justices concurred, stated that "the substantial connection," necessary for minimum contacts between a defendant and forum State "must come about by an action of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State." She further held that placing a product into the stream of commerce was not such an act "without more." Finally, Justice O'Connor held that a defendant's "awareness that the stream of commerce may or will sweep the product into the forum State did not convert the mere act of placing the product into the stream" into an act purposefully directed at the forum State. Because the Japanese defendant neither solicited, did business, advertised, had offices, agents, employees or property in California, nor created, controlled or employed the distribution system that brought its valves to California, Justice O'Connor concluded that it had not purposefully availed itself of the California market. Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court (1987), 480 U.S. 102, 112, 94 L. Ed. 2d 92, 104, 107 S. Ct. 1026, 1033 (opinion of O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Powell and Scalia, JJ.).
Justice Brennan, with whom three Justices also concurred, concluded that a defendant's mere awareness that the stream of commerce would sweep its product into the forum State sufficed to establish the minimum contacts necessary for an exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant by the forum. Justice Brennan reasoned that as long as a participant in the stream of commerce, i.e., the regular, anticipated flow of products from manufacture to distribution to retail sale, was aware that the final product would be marketed in the forum State, the possibility of a lawsuit there could not come as a surprise. Justice Brennan believed that benefits to such a defendant accrued regardless whether it directly-conducted business in the forum State or engaged in additional conduct directed toward that State. Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court (1987), 480 U.S. 102, 116, 94 L. Ed. 2d 92, 107, 107 S. Ct. 1026, 1035 (opinion of Brennan, J., joined by White, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.).
On appeal, Aceto contends that the requirements of the unanimous opinion in Asahi for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant, in keeping with traditional notions of fair play and substantial Justice, were met in this case. It further asserts that the requirements for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Campbell under the stream of commerce theory of minimum contacts espoused by Justice Brennan in Asahi were also met in this case. Finally, Aceto maintains that our supreme court's opinion in Wiles v. Morita Iron Works Co. (1988), 125 Ill. 2d 144, 530 N.E.2d 1382, does not compel a contrary Conclusion.
In Wiles, our supreme court concluded that both of the stream of commerce theories of minimum contacts articulated in Asahi required the defendant's awareness that his product was being marketed in the forum State. Relying on the defendant's lack of awareness that the plaintiff's employer intended to transport to Illinois two of the four machines purchased from it in Japan or that the employer had a plant in Illinois, the Wiles court found that the defendant did not have the requisite minimum contacts with Illinois. (Wiles, 125 Ill. 2d at 160.) The Wiles court also stated that "[factors] such as the plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief, the burden on the defendant in being forced to litigate in a foreign forum, and the forum State's interest in adjudicating the matter are generally addressed only after 'it has been decided that a defendant purposefully established minimum contacts with the forum State.'" (Wiles, 125 Ill. 2d at 161-62, quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz (1985), 471 U.S. 462, 476, 85 L. Ed. 2d 528, 543, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 2184.) In other words, a court need not inquire whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant would comport with traditional notions of fair play and substantial Justice where the defendant has no minimum contacts with the forum.
Aceto asserts that, unlike the situation in Wiles, Campbell shipped its product to the United States, i.e., introduced it into the stream of commerce, and was aware that Aceto would transport and distribute it through any number of States, including Illinois, to buyers of the product. Aceto reasons that, in using it as a distributor, Campbell was purposefully availing itself of Illinois in the process of marketing its product. Aceto notes the Wiles court's recognition of Justice O'Connor's reliance in Asahi on the fact that Asahi had not designed its product with the California market in mind. In contrast, Aceto asserts, Campbell had to design its product, its container and labelling for all the United States, including Illinois, i.e., for approval by the United States Environmental Protection Agency, regardless whether its product was being used in or merely transported through any State. Because Campbell must have known of the highly toxic nature of its product, EPA requirements to which it was subject and the use for its product throughout the United States, Aceto finally concludes, it had sufficient minimum contacts with Illinois for the exercise of jurisdiction over it.
On the other hand, Campbell asserts that under Wiles we must determine first whether it had sufficient minimum contacts with Illinois and, only if it did, then determine whether an exercise of personal jurisdiction over it would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial Justice. Campbell asserts that under either Justice O'Connor's or Justice Brennan's interpretation of the stream of commerce theory of minimum contacts, it had insufficient contacts with Illinois.
Specifically, Campbell notes the following. It does no business and has no plants or agents in Illinois. Its negotiations and other dealings with Aceto took place either at Aceto's headquarters in Flushing, New York, or Campbell's headquarters in Manchester, England. Moreover, it notes that in Wiles the American buyer of the product at issue delivered it to and used it in Illinois and there was evidence that the Japanese defendant had knowledge of the buyer's intent to do so. It asserts that here, in contrast, its product was intended for delivery to and use in Iowa, not Illinois, and that Campbell was not aware that its product would be marketed in, or even pass through, Illinois. Given the Japanese defendant's knowledge in Wiles of the buyer's intent to deliver its product to and use it in Illinois, Campbell argues, similar knowledge on its part of Aceto's plans for the Phorate would be insufficient to establish minimum contacts with Illinois.
Even assuming that Campbell did have sufficient minimum contacts with Illinois under either Justice O'Connor's or Justice Brennan's interpretation of the stream of commerce theory, Campbell argues, the exercise of jurisdiction over it would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial Justice. Campbell lastly asserts that, contrary to Aceto's assertion, the fact that Phorate is a highly toxic substance has no bearing on the determination whether Illinois may exercise personal jurisdiction over it. Campbell likens Aceto's argument to, inter alia, the "dangerous instrumentality" theory rejected in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson (1980), 444 U.S. 286, 62 L. Ed. 2d 490, 100 S. Ct. 559.
As will be made clear below, we reject Campbell's stream of commerce analysis and its argument that the toxic nature of its product is irrelevant to the issue here. However, we agree with it that Illinois cannot exercise jurisdiction over it in keeping with traditional notions of fair play and substantial Justice.
Notwithstanding the parties' chief reliance on Asahi and Wiles, we do not believe they control the first determination we must make, i.e., whether Campbell had sufficient minimum contacts with Illinois to allow it to exercise in personam jurisdiction over Campbell. Rather, we believe that determination is governed by the analysis undertaken in a line of Federal court cases dealing with hazardous and/or toxic products represented by Violet v. Picillo (D.R.I. 1985), 613 F. Supp. 1563, and including Allied Towing Corp. v. Great Eastern Petroleum Corp. (E.D. Va. 1986), 642 F. Supp. 1339, cited by Aceto.
In Allied Towing, the issue was whether Virginia could exercise personal jurisdiction over a Pennsylvania public utility which did no business, either directly or indirectly, in Virginia. PGW had sold a by-product of an oil-to-natural gas manufacturing process to Sealand, which intended to use the by-product to make roofing materials. Sealand had the by-product stored in a Pennsylvania facility. The storage concern eventually sold the by-product to the Great Eastern Petroleum Corporation which, in turn, sold it to Allied Petroleum, Inc. Great Eastern contracted with plaintiff to transport the by-product from Pennsylvania to Virginia. Upon its arrival in Virginia, Allied Petroleum refused delivery. All prior owners of the by-product denied liability and refused to arrange for its removal. In articulating the parameters of the due process inquiry into whether PGW was amenable to suit in Virginia, the court did not draw a bright line between its minimum contacts inquiry and its fair play/substantial Justice inquiry. Rather, the court noted:
"The 'minimum contacts' analysis of [ International Shoe v. Washington (1945), 326 U.S. 310, 66 S. Ct. 154, 90 L. Ed. 95] is based on 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial Justice.' [Citation.] Determining what constitutes fair play and substantial Justice requires a delicate balancing of the interests of all those involved . . .. While the burden that inconvenient litigation places on the defendant is always a primary concern [citation], the Court must also consider 'the forum State's interest in adjudicating the dispute, . . . the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief . . . the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.'" [Citation.] Allied Towing, 642 F. Supp. at 1354-55.
The court further stated:
"PGW's sole contact with Virginia was the series of events by which the . . . by-product . . . made its way to Virginia. [Citation.] The minimum contacts analysis mandated by the due process clause is not merely a quantitative inquiry, however. In determining whether the defendant's contacts with the forum are such that the defendant should reasonably anticipate being haled into the courts of that forum, the courts consider the nature or quality of the contacts as well as their number. [Citations.] . . .
When the nonresident defendant places an inherently dangerous substance, such as the hazardous waste at issue here, into the stream of commerce, there is a substantial likelihood that the defendant will be called upon to defend in the state whose citizens have been injured or endangered by that instrumentality. Thus, 'the nature of the product may well have a bearing upon the issue of minimum contact, with a lesser volume of inherently dangerous products constituting a more significant contact with the state than would a larger volume of products offering little or no hazard to the inhabitants of the state.' [Citations.] . . .
. . . PGW sold this substance . . . with the knowledge and expectation that it would be further distributed in the stream of interstate commerce. . . . It is immaterial that PGW itself did not sell the substance to a Virginia purchaser or deliver it to Virginia. It is sufficient that PGW placed the substance into the stream of commerce, enabling the waste to pose a threat to the citizens of any state in which it might come to rest. . . . The placement of an article, particularly a hazardous one, in the stream of interstate commerce, makes it foreseeable that one will be called upon to defend in the courts of a state with which one would otherwise have had no direct contact . . .. [Citation.]
Having placed the substance in the stream of commerce, by selling it to an out-of-state manufacturer, PGW took no affirmative step to . . . limit its exposure to suit in foreign jurisdictions. [Citation.] This might have been accomplished, for example, by restricting Sealand's use of the product or by specifying . . . a limited geographic market for Sealand's final product. [Citation.] PGW's failure to exercise any control over the destination of the substance . . . made it possible for that substance to come to rest in any state." Allied Towing, 642 F. Supp. at 1355-56.
In the final portion of its analysis, the court measured the burden foreign litigation would place on PGW against the reduced minimum contacts standards applicable to the case. It concluded that "[given] the . . . weighty considerations militating in favor of a single proceeding . . ., particularly the alleged hazard facing the residents of [the] area, and the minimal burden imposed on PGW by requiring it to defend . . . [in] Virginia, . . . it [is] both fair and reasonable to subject PGW to the court's personal jurisdiction." Allied Towing, 642 F. Supp. at 1357.
The analysis undertaken by the Allied Towing, court is substantially unaffected by Asahi. In O'Neill v. Picillo (D.R.I. 1988), 682 F. Supp. 706, the same case as Violet, the State of Rhode Island sought recovery of the cost of cleaning up a hazardous waste site. The motion of two defendants, to whom the plaintiff had traced 36 fifty-five gallon drums at the site, to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction had been denied in Violet, i.e., before Asahi. One of those defendants renewed its motion post-trial. The court reconsidered its prior ruling in light of Asahi. The O'Neill court concluded:
"[The] extra conduct seemingly required by [ Asahi ] . . . is not necessarily required in cases of the kind presented here. It has long been acknowledged, and it was unanimously reaffirmed by . . . Asahi, that 'the determination of the reasonableness of the exercise of jurisdiction in each case' will depend, not only on an evaluation of the defendant's connection with the forum state, but also on an evaluation of 'the interests of the forum state, and the plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief.' [Citation.] . . . [It] has generally been recognizedthat the nature and significance of [a] state's interest may have a bearing on the nature and extent of the necessary contacts." O'Neill, 682 F. Supp. at 717.
The court then repeated its findings in Violet that Rhode Island had compelling interests in the litigation, including a significant interest in redressing injuries occurring within its borders. O'Neill, 682 F. Supp. at 717-18.
This case involves the ultimate liability for injuries to an Illinois plaintiff allegedly caused by a chemical used in the manufacture of insecticides. Campbell admitted the use to which Phorate is put in its reply memorandum in support of its motion to dismiss. This is a judicial admission which is binding upon Campbell. (Trapkus v. Edstrom's, Inc. (1986), 140 Ill. App. 3d 720, 489 N.E.2d 340.) In view of that fact and Aceto's allegation in its amended third-party complaint that the Phorate is highly toxic, we believe that the analysis undertaken in Violet, Allied Towing and O'Neill applies to this case.
Like the States in Violet, O'Neill, and Allied Towing, Illinois has an undeniable and manifest interest in protecting the health and welfare of its citizens from hazardous substances such as the Phorate involved here. Illustrative of this interest are the Uniform Hazardous Substances Act of Illinois (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 111 1/2, par. 251 et seq.) and the Illinois Pesticide Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 5, par. 801 et seq.). Like those States, it also has an interest in redressing injuries occurring within its borders in its courts.
Moreover, a broadened scope of foreseeability of harm must be ascribed to Campbell in manufacturing and selling a toxic substance such as Phorate. See Violet v. Picillo (D.R.I. 1985), 613 F. Supp. 1563, 1577 (defendants knew or should have known that they were dispatching hazardous chemical wastes into a stream of commerce broad enough to include any or all States).
In addition, Campbell, like the defendants in Allied Towing and Violet, took no affirmative steps to limit its exposure to suit in foreign jurisdictions by, for instance, limiting the number of States in which Aceto could market the Phorate or, more importantly in this case, the number of States through which Aceto could transport it.
In view of the foregoing, we believe that Campbell's act of selling Phorate Technical to an American company, which created a possibility that the Phorate might cause injury in any State, including Illinois, when coupled with the fact that such injury did allegedly occur in Illinois, constitutes sufficient minimum contacts with Illinois to allow it to exercise personal jurisdiction over Campbell.
Moreover, we do not believe that World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson (1980), 444 U.S. 286, 62 L. Ed. 2d 490, 100 S. Ct. 559, requires a contrary Conclusion. In Woodson, the plaintiffs, who had purchased an automobile in the State of New York while they resided there, were involved in an accident in Oklahoma. They brought suit in an Oklahoma State court against, among others, the automobile's regional distributor and its retailer seller. Neither the regional distributor nor retail seller did any business in Oklahoma, shipped or sold any products to or in that State, had an agent to receive process or advertised there. There was also no showing that any other product sold by the defendants had ever entered Oklahoma.
The Supreme Court barred the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendants by the Oklahoma courts. In so doing, it rejected the plaintiffs' reliance on the foreseeability that the defendants' product would cause injury in Oklahoma. The court stated that, although it was foreseeable that purchasers of defendants' automobiles might take them to Oklahoma, "the mere 'unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum State.'" (Woodson, 444 U.S. at 298, 100 S. Ct. at 567, 62 L. Ed. 2d at 502, citing Hanson v. Denckla (1958), 357 U.S. 235, 253, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1283, 1298, 78 S. Ct. 1228, 1239-40.) The court also noted that, if foreseeability were the lone benchmark for personal jurisdiction, under the due process clause, every seller of chattels would, in effect, appoint the chattel as his agent for service of process, i.e., his amenability to suit would travel with the chattel. Rather than a foreseeability of a "likelihood that a product will find its way into a forum State," the foreseeability which was important to a due process analysis was that the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State were such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there. Finally, the court rejected the characterization of an automobile as a dangerous instrumentality as a basis for exercising jurisdiction over the defendants by holding that the concept had no bearing on the issue of jurisdiction. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 295-97, 62 L. Ed. 2d at 500-01, 100 S. Ct. at 566-67.
Although a seemingly insuperable obstacle to the Violet line of cases and thus our Conclusion here, Woodson has not been treated as such by Federal district and appellate courts.
Woodson itself makes clear that jurisdiction may be asserted over the international and national distributors of a product, as opposed to its local sellers, if a sale of the product was not merely "an isolated occurrence, but arises from the efforts of the manufacturer or distributor to serve, directly or indirectly, the market for its product in" the forum State. (Woodson, 444 U.S. at 297-98, 62 L. Ed. 2d at 501-02, 100 S. Ct. at 567; Violet v. Picillo (D.R.I. 1985), 613 F. Supp. 1563, 1575-76.) Furthermore, as the Violet court stated in finding that Woodson supported the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendants in that case:
"[The] key factors justifying a different jurisdictional rule are two-fold.
First, unlike local merchants, such interstate distributors have an 'interest in reaching as broad a market as' possible [citation], and place their products into the stream of commerce with either the subjective intention [citation], or objective reason to know [citation], that their products will be sold 'to a nation-wide market, that is, in any or all states' [citation]. Thus, even if their 'products were sold indirectly through importers or distributors with independent sales and marketing schemes' [citation] . . . -- independent parties whom the defendant distributors do not directly control [citation] -- and even if their products are sold to an intermediary with '"no indication whatsoever as to their ultimate destination"' [citation], the fact that these manufacturers or distributors place their products in a stream of commerce destined for sale through a broad interstate market, and reap the attendant benefits, renders them properly subject to suit in one of the states comprising that market.
The second important distinguishing factor is that, unlike local merchants serving a self-circumscribed market, who 'ordinarily [have] no control over where the buyer takes the product after it is sold' [citation], parties operating on a broad interstate scale can act 'to limit the states in which [their products will] be sold' [citation], and can thereby protect themselves against suit in an undesired forum." Violet, 613 F. Supp. at 1576.
In view of the factors the Violet court found supporting a different rule of jurisdiction as to interstate manufacturers and distributors of a product, as opposed to its local sellers, we do not believe that Woodson prohibits the exercise of jurisdiction by Illinois over Campbell.
Implicitly addressing the Woodson court's rejection of the dangerous instrumentality concept as a ground for exercising personal jurisdiction over a manufacturer or distributor, Violet further stated:
"[This] is not a situation in which the product placed in the stream of commerce is an ordinary one. Rather, these defendants dispatched into that stream volatile and dangerous toxic substances -- and did so without determining where these substances would come to rest. As other courts have recognized, and as common sense suggests, where a defendant deals in such inherently dangerous products, a lesser showing than is ordinarily required will support jurisdiction. [Citations.] This is especially so where, as here, the defendants engaged in heavily regulated activities, such that it is reasonable for them to foresee, given their chosen course of conduct, having to litigate in a distant forum." Violet, 613 F. Supp. at 1577-78.
Citing Woodson and a Fourth Circuit case, the defendant in Allied Towing contended that the expectation that its product might come to rest in any State as a result of its failure to exercise any control over its destination was an insufficient basis for exercising jurisdiction over it. The court rejected this argument by stating:
"Neither case, however, involved an inherently dangerous instrumentality. When an inherently dangerous instrumentality is released in commerce, and . . . causes tortious injury in a foreign forum, the threshold for establishing jurisdiction is less demanding. [Citations.] Similarly, the scope of 'foreseeability' broadens when the enterprise giving rise to the action is subject to pervasive federal regulation." Allied Towing Corp. v. Great Eastern Petroleum Corp. (E.D. Va. 1986), 642 F. Supp. 1339, 1356-57.
In O'Neill, the court found that Rhode Island's interests in adjudicating the suit were enhanced by the fact that the case involved inherently dangerous toxic substances rather than ordinary products. In support, the court, like plaintiff here, cited, inter alia, Justice Stevens' observation in Asahi that the determination whether a defendant has purposefully availed himself of a forum State's market is affected by the volume, value and hazardous character of its product. (Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court (1987), 480 U.S. 102, 122, 94 L. Ed. 2d 92, 111, 107 S. Ct. 1026, 1038 (Stevens, J., Concurring, joined by White and Blackmun, JJ.).) The court lastly held, inter alia, that the fact the defendants operated in a nationally regulated industry also increased the significance of the contact with the forum. O'Neill v. Picillo (D.R.I. 1988), 682 F. Supp. 706, 718.
Similarly, in Morris v. SSE, Inc. (11th Cir. 1988), 843 F.2d 489, the court, relying upon Justice Stevens' reference in Asahi to hazardous products, allowed the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant based, in part, on the fact that the case involved a highly hazardous product, i.e., a device used in the hazardous activity of skydiving. See also Poyner v. Erma Werke GMBH (6th Cir. 1980), 618 F.2d 1186, 1192 (injuries caused by inherently dangerous articles imported through independent distributors fall within class of litigation which a forum State has a deep interest in adjudicating); Chattanooga Corp. v. Klingler (E.D. Tenn. 1981), 528 F. Supp. 372, 378 (requisite contacts might be minimized if the plaintiff's claim involves the placing of a dangerous instrumentality in commerce), rev'd on other grounds (6th Cir. 1983), 704 F.2d 903.
These cases thus reveal that, notwithstanding the dictum in Woodson that the dangerous instrumentality concept is irrelevant to the issue of jurisdiction, the courts still consider the dangerousness or hazardous nature of a product in determining the issue of jurisdiction. The continuing validity of these cases and Justice Stevens' reliance in Asahi on the hazardous nature of a product cast doubt upon the weight to be given the rejection of the dangerous instrumentality concept in a footnote in Woodson. (But see Bodine's Inc. v. Sunny-O, Inc. (N.D. Ill. 1980), 494 F. Supp. 1279, 1284 (stating that Woodson expressly rejected the proposition that different rules of jurisdiction obtain in cases involving dangerous products).) Because this case is more analogous to the Violet-Allied Towing-O'Neill line of cases than to Woodson, we do not find that Woodson requires us to reject the dangerous instrumentality concept as a factor in the minimum contacts determination.
Moreover, we believe that the requirement that the product be placed in the stream of commerce of the forum State is also satisfied in this case. We concede that the Phorate was not placed in the "stream of commerce" of Illinois as that phrase is traditionally used in cases such as this. That is, it was not destined for sale to Illinois consumers. (See World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson (1980), 444 U.S. 286, 297-98, 62 L. Ed. 2d 490, 501-02, 100 S. Ct. 559, 567-68; Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court (1987), 480 U.S. 102, 120, 94 L. Ed. 2d 92, 109-10, 107 S. Ct. 1026, 1037 (opinion of Brennan, J., joined by White, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.).) However, just as the hazardous waste products dumped in Rhode Island in Violet and O'Neill were considered in the stream of commerce of that State, we believe that the Phorate involved here was sufficiently within the stream of commerce of Illinois, although not destined for sale or consumption here.
In Violet, the court stated that, when viewed in the context of a hazardous waste disposal industry permeated by national problems of improper dumping, "each defendant's decision to send its toxic wastes on a virtual one-way journey to anywhere [represented] a decision to avail itself of the benefits of a potentially boundless national disposal market." (Violet v. Picillo (D.R.I. 1985), 613 F. Supp. 1563, 1577.) Similarly here, when viewed in the context of a nationwide hazardous products industry and the use which that industry, like many industries, makes of the interstate transportation system, as revealed in this case, Campbell's decision to sell Phorate to an American company constituted a decision to avail itself of a potentially boundless national market for its product. As such, the decision of Aceto's agent to transport the Phorate manufactured by Campbell through Illinois on its way to Iowa created a sufficient contact between Campbell and Illinois to allow the State to exercise jurisdiction over Campbell. The fact that Aceto, not Campbell, caused the Phorate which injured the plaintiff to be brought into Illinois does not, under Allied Towing, prevent the exercise of jurisdiction over Campbell by Illinois.
Having determined that Campbell has sufficient minimum contacts with Illinois to allow Illinois to exercise personal jurisdiction over it, we must make the second determination in the due process analysis of Allied Towing, Violet and O'Neill, as affected by Asahi. That is, we must determine whether Illinois can exercise personal jurisdiction over Campbell which comports with traditional notions of fair play and substantial Justice. To do so, we must consider the burden on Campbell, Illinois' interest in adjudicating the dispute, Aceto's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, the international judicial system's interest in the most efficient resolution of controversies and the procedural and substantive policies of other nations whose interests are affected by the exercise of jurisdiction by Illinois. Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court (1987), 480 U.S. 102, 114, 94 L. Ed. 2d 92, 105-06, 107 S. Ct. 1026, 1033-34.
Subjecting Campbell to the personal jurisdiction of Illinois would impose upon it the severe burden of traversing the vast distance between England and Illinois and subjecting its dispute with Aceto to a foreign nation's judicial system. This unique burden has "significant weight in assessing the reasonableness of stretching the long arm of personal jurisdiction over national borders." (Asahi, 480 U.S. at 114, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 105, 107 S. Ct. at 1034.) Moreover, we do not agree with Aceto's bald assertion that our judicial system is "not really" foreign to Campbell. Whether based on the common language of England and the United States or the common law heritage of both countries, we find the assertion meritless.
Unlike the situation in Asahi, and as reflected in our minimum contacts determination, Illinois has more than a slight interest in asserting jurisdiction over Campbell, given the context of this case. On balance, however, that interest and Aceto's interests do not outweigh the burden upon Campbell.
Unlike the situation in Asahi, the main plaintiff's claim is still pending here; however, this case, like Asahi, does not involve a dispute over safety standards, in which Illinois has a legitimate interest, but merely a third-party dispute over liability to the main plaintiff. Moreover, as in Asahi, it is, at best, uncertain whether Illinois law will govern Campbell's liability for contribution to Aceto, i.e., whether the most significant contacts test calls for application of Illinois law to Aceto's contribution claim. (See Mech v. Pullman Standard (1985), 136 Ill. App. 3d 939, 484 N.E.2d 776.) Illinois, like the States in Violet, O'Neill and Allied Towing, has an interest in adjudicating all claims arising from plaintiff's injuries in one proceeding. This interest militates in favor of exercising its jurisdiction over Campbell.
As in Asahi, however, no part of the transaction upon which Aceto bases its claim took place in Illinois. Unlike the Asahi situation, Campbell shipped its products to the United States. Also unlike Asahi, we believe that Aceto, an American company, is entitled to a presumption that it would be more convenient for it to litigate its claim in Illinois rather than England. However, we must conclude from Aceto's failure to allege the contrary in its third-party complaint that it is not a citizen of Illinois. This fact considerably diminishes Illinois' interests in this dispute. (Asahi, 480 U.S. at 105, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 106, 107 S. Ct. at 1034.) Finally, we may assume that, if subjected to liability in Illinois, Aceto will, as a purchaser of Campbell's products, pressure Campbell to cease unsafe practices in the manufacture, containment and labeling of those products. These pressures will have a similar effect to the deterrence to such practices which would result from requiring Campbell to defend itself in Illinois against allegations of unsafe practices in the manufacture, containment and labeling of its product. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 115, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 106, 107 S. Ct. at 1034.
Finally, whatever the procedural and substantive interests of Great Britain in Illinois' exercise of jurisdiction over Campbell, those interests and the Federal government's interests in its foreign relations require us to exercise "[great] care and reserve" in extending personal jurisdiction over Campbell. (Asahi, 480 U.S. at 115, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 106, 107 S. Ct. at 1034-35.) As such, we cannot conclude that the interests of Illinois in exercising jurisdiction in this case, albeit greater than the similar interests of California in Asahi, are sufficient to outweigh the serious burdens that we would place upon Campbell. In sum, the exercise by Illinois of in personam jurisdiction over Campbell would not comport with traditional notions of fair play and substantial Justice.
For all of the foregoing reasons, the order dismissing Aceto's amended third-party complaint for contribution from Campbell is affirmed.
Order affirmed.
APPELLATE Judges: FOOTNOTES
* Justice McNamara participated in this opinion prior to his assignment to the sixth division.
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Joseph Fiennes to play transgender character in new FX show.
It's being reported that the lead actor for Ryan Murphy's [creator of Nip/Tuck] sex-change drama 4 oz has been cast (although it's just "Untitled" for now), and it's none other than Shakespeare in Love himself, Joseph Fiennes. Fiennes (who played gay for Murphy in Running With Scissors) plays the transgender lead (who will undergo transition to female over the series' run) and Blythe Danner and Robert Wagner will play his parents.
Considering Fiennes famously wooed Danner's daughter Gwyneth in his breakout role, it's kind of nice to see her playing his mom here. Given the explosion of transgender characters in recent months (everywhere from the doc series Trans Generation to Ugly Betty to Dirty Sexy Money to Big Shots) it's about time we saw a pilot ordered with a lead transgender character. Now we just have to see if it's good, and if FX picks up the show.
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09-05-2009, 01:10 AM #1Junior Guru Wannabe
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domain with new host, please help.
Currently I use a webhost, and need to switch to a new vps.
when I register a new vps with this domain, it should be no problem?
My confusion is that I still want to use the old host for one week or some time. if the dns of old and new hosts is the same(such as ns1.xxx.com), is that ok?
Do i need to tell the new host side that I need the different dns(such as ns99.xxx.com or not?
What is the best way in my case?
Thank you very much!
09-05-2009, 10:22 AM #2Web Hosting Evangelist
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Having the same name server is not an issue. The traffic is going to be directed to the IP address that you assigned at your domain registrar.
In other words, when you get ready to change over, just edit the IP's associated with the nameservers that you have set up with your registrar.
If anyone else would like to chime in, please do. I am 98% sure the information I passed along is correct.Mike
09-05-2009, 11:05 AM #3Web Hosting Guru
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redmeds, it sounds about right.
When I went from shared to VPS, I used my new IP address to upload the content, e.g. http://22.214.171.1249/~accountname. When I was done, I added the new nameservers and made the switch.
To avoid dns propagation downtime, I edited the home pages at the shared server to due a quick redirect via meta refresh to the IP/account address. I watched my stats at the shared server, and when I went two days with no visits to that old site, I then closed out the account.
Worked excellent for me by doing it that way.Sue
A generation which ignores history has no past and no future. --Lazarus Long
09-05-2009, 02:31 PM #4Junior Guru Wannabe
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09-05-2009, 03:10 PM #5Web Hosting Evangelist
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Jungle Book
We ended up heading out to the opening night of late nights at Animal Kingdom and ended up scoring front row seats for one of the shows that night. Photographing the show is definitely going to be a challenge. I'm not talking about the limited amount of lighting that's the issue. It is the stage lighting, which is always a heavily gelled up-lighting. There aren't any spotlights that I saw in the show, on the front platforms, just on the barges further out featuring the singers. The up-lights cast very strong, sometimes creepy looking shadows on the cast. Managed to come away with a few, and processing them pushes noise levels to the limit!
Walt Disney World