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United States District Court, District Circuit
August 9, 2013
FOGO DE CHAO CHURRASCARIA, LLC, Plaintiff,v.U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, et al., Defendants.
REGGIE B. WALTON, District Judge.
This case, which implicates the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2006), and the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. § 701 (2006), is currently before the Court on the parties' cross motions for summary judgment. For the following reasons, the Court must grant the defendants' motion for summary judgment and deny the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.[1]
A. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1990
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1990 sets forth the criteria under which foreign nationals may receive immigrant or nonimmigrant visas in order to lawfully study, work, or reside in the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1151. Among the various visas granting access to the country is one for a nonimmigrant individual
who, within 3 years preceding the time of his application for admission into the United States, has been employed continuously for one year by a firm or corporation or other legal entity or an affiliate or subsidiary thereof and who seeks to enter the United States temporarily in order to continue to render his services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a capacity that... involves specialized knowledge.
Id. § 1101(a)(15)(L). The Act provides further that "an alien is considered to be serving in a capacity involving specialized knowledge with respect to a company if the alien has a special knowledge of the company product and its application in international markets or has an advanced level of knowledge of processes and procedures of the company." Id . § 1184(c)(2)(B). And the Act's implementing regulations define specialized knowledge as:
knowledge possessed by an individual of the petitioning organization's product, service, research, equipment, techniques, management, or other interests and its application in international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge or expertise in the organization's processes and procedures.
8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(1)(ii)(D). The United States Customs and Immigration Service ("USCIS"), which is part of the Department of Homeland Security, has further interpreted specialized knowledge "through historical precedent decisions and numerous internal policy memoranda." See Administrative Record ("AR") at 5 (citing Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. 49 (Comm'r 1982); Memorandum of James A. Puleo, Executive Assoc. Comm'r, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Interpretation of Special Knowledge (Mar. 9, 1994) ("Puleo Memorandum"); Memorandum of Fujie Ohata, Director, Service Center Operations, USCIS, Interpretation of Specialized Knowledge for Chefs and Specialty Cooks Seeking L-1B Status (Sept. 9, 2004) ("2004 Ohata Memorandum")).[2] Nonimmigrant, intracompany transferee visas for individuals possessing specialized knowledge are commonly known as "L-1B" visas. See, e.g., AR at 3.
For an individual to obtain an L-1B visa, the American company that seeks to hire the employee "must file a petition on Form I-129, Petition for Nonimmigrant Worker." 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(2)(i). Among other types of evidence, the petition must be accompanied by
[e]vidence that the alien will be employed in a[]... specialized knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed, ... [e]vidence that the alien has at least one year of continuous full-time employment abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of the petition, [and] [e]vidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that... involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior education, training, and employment qualifies him/her to perform the intended services in the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the same work which the alien performed abroad.
8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(3)(ii)-(iv).
B. Fogo de Chao
The plaintiff, Fogo de Chao ("Fogo"), owns and operates a chain of churrascarias, or Brazilian steakhouses, in several locations in both Brazil and the United States. AR at 842. Its first United States restaurant opened in 1997 in Dallas, Texas, and "[t]oday, Fogo has steakhouses in six locations in Brazil, and in sixteen cities throughout the [United States]." Id. at 843. The staff of each steakhouse includes "genuine Brazilian gaucho chefs (known as churrasqueiros), who grew up as gauchos in the rural pampas region of Southern Brazil." Id . The churrasqueiros, "specialize[] in churrasco, a traditional method of preparing and serving meat that descended from the gauchos or cowboys of the Rio Grande do Sul region of southern Brazil." Id. at 3 n.2.
The chefs at Fogo begin their careers by training for at least two years at one of the Brazilian steakhouses, after which certain chefs are chosen for potential transfer to restaurants in the United States. Id. at 843. Specifically, Fogo "selects as L-1B candidates its best-performing genuine gaucho churrasqueiros who express an interest in the transfer, and who have worked a minimum of two years in Fogo's restaurants in Brazil and have completed the training program there." Id. at 849.
C. The Gasparetto Petition
Fogo chose Rones Gasparetto as an L-1B transferee candidate after he expressed interest in a transfer, id. at 849, and then filed an L-1B visa petition (the "Gasparetto Petition") with the Vermont Service Center of the USCIS on his behalf on February 4, 2010, id. at 81-322, 359. In the petition, Fogo represented that, "[l]ike all of [its] other churrasqueiros in Brazil, Mr. Gasparetto is a genuine gaucho, born and raised in the Rio Grande do Sul region, " and "[h]e has well more than two years' experience as a churrasqueiro in Fogo Brazilian restaurants." Id. at 849. Fogo represented also that Mr. Gasparetto had "completed the training program in Brazil." Id.
Thereafter, the USCIS "determined that the petition... was not approvable on the record; that [the] petitioner had not met the burden of persuasion; and that additional evidence was needed." Id. at 359. The USCIS then "issued a[] [Request for Evidence] on February 19, 2010, ... which explained that [the] USCIS had reviewed the case and found insufficient evidence that the beneficiary [Mr. Gasparetto] was eligible for L status as an intracompany transferee in a position requiring or involving specialized knowledge." Id .; see also id. at 323-25. Fogo responded to the Request for Evidence on May 5, 2010. Id. at 326-57. The "USCIS re-reviewed the record in light of [Fogo's] response but concluded that [Fogo] still had not established" that Mr. Gasparetto was eligible for an L-1B visa, and thus denied the petition on May 20, 2010. Id. at 360.
Fogo filed a motion with the USCIS to reconsider the denial, but later requested to withdraw the motion. Id. at 360-61. The USCIS then reopened the petition "on its own motion" on October 25, 2010, id. at 361, 545, and Fogo responded to that motion on April 26, 2011, id. at 361, 373-538. The response included "a submission of new arguments and additional evidence." Id. at 361. The USCIS again found, "[a]fter a complete review of the record of proceeding, ... that the grounds for denial ha[d] not been overcome, " and therefore reaffirmed the denial of the Gasparetto Petition. Id. at 371.
Because the USCIS also found that "th[e] case involves an unusually complex or novel issue of law or fact, " the decision was "certif[ied]... to the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)." Id . In doing so, the "USCIS [sought] clarification on application of regulation to the particular fact pattern presented by petitions filed by Fogo... for specialized knowledge intracompany transferees for the position of churrasqueiro and for [Mr. Gasparetto] in particular." Id.
The Administrative Appeals Office considered Fogo's submissions, including its initial filing and the sixteen attached exhibits, id. at 9, the additional information submitted in response to the Request for Evidence, id. at 13-14, and supplemental briefs and additional evidence submitted directly to the Office, id. at 4. In its decision, the Office addressed
(1) what is the appropriate standard that should be applied to determine "specialized knowledge"; (2) whether [Fogo's] churrasqueiro chef position requires specialized knowledge according to that standard; and (3) whether [Mr. Gasparetto]... possesses specialized knowledge, and has been and will be employed in a specialized knowledge capacity.
Id. at 21. The Office first found that specialized knowledge could not be determined using a bright-line test, but rather that "Congress created a standard that requires [the] USCIS to make a factual determination that can only be determined on a case-by-case basis, based on the agency's expertise and discretion." Id. at 36. The Office found also that Fogo "failed to corroborate its claims that the Brazilian employees possess knowledge or perform duties that are uncommon or different compared to those generally performed by churrasqueiro chefs in the Brazilian churrascaria restaurant industry." Id. at 51. With respect to Mr. Gasparetto in particular, the Office found that he did not possess specialized knowledge, but rather that he "possesses general cultural knowledge, values, and culinary skills acquired as a result of his upbringing in a rural area of Rio Grande do Sul and due to his family and community traditions." Id. at 40. Additionally, the Office noted that the Gasparetto Petition, Fogo's supporting documentation and its legal submissions "neither addressed nor attempted to clarify th[e] discrepancy" between Mr. Gasparetto's "foreign position of garcon churras' or churrasqueiro waiter' and the proffered position of churrasqueiro chef.'" Id. at 41. Thus, the Office found that "the record as presently constituted does not clearly document that [Mr. Gasparetto] completed the foreign entity's 24-month training program, or that such training was followed by one year of employment as a churrasqueiro chef in the foreign entity's restaurants, " even though "[t]hese are [Fogo's] stated minimum qualifications for transfer of its Brazilian churrasqueiro chefs to the United States." Id. at 41; see also id. at 50. Finally, the Office was "not persuaded that [Mr. Gasparetto's] inherent qualities give him special knowledge of [Fogo's] product, ' as opposed to general knowledge of his native regional culture gained through life experience." Id. at 41-42. Accordingly, the Office affirmed the denial of the Gasparetto Petition. Id. at 54.
D. The Current Lawsuit
Although Fogo instituted the current action after the initial denial of the Gasparetto Petition, the parties filed a joint motion to stay the proceedings while the defendants reconsidered the petition. See ECF No. 30; March 28, 2011 Minute Order (granting stay of proceedings). Upon the Administrative Appeals Office's final adjudication affirming the denial of the petition, the parties filed a joint status report agreeing that:
the remaining claims to be resolved on staggered cross-motions for summary judgment are Fogo's challenge to the actions taken by [the] [d]efendants with respect to Fogo's L-1B petition on behalf of Mr. Gasparetto, including but not limited to the [Administrative Appeals Office's] October 3, 2011 decision, affirming the [Vermont Service Center's] June 16, 2011 denial of that petition.
Such challenge is grounded in: (1) the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. [§] 1101 et seq.)..., its implementing regulations, and memos and analyses of the [d]efendants interpreting such authority, and (2) the [APA], including all arguments applicable under that statute and its case law.
ECF No. 34 at 2. The parties subsequently filed cross motions for summary judgment, which are currently before the Court. Fogo contends that the defendants violated the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1990, the "specialized knowledge" regulations promulgated thereunder, and the APA. Pl.'s Mot. at 1-2. The defendants contend that they complied with the APA because the Administrative Record supports the Administrative Appeals Office's decision, and because the decision was based on a reasonable interpretation the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1990. Defs.' Mem. at 42.
"Summary judgment is the proper mechanism for deciding, as a matter of law, whether an agency action is supported by the administrative record and consistent with the APA standard of review." Loma Linda Univ. Med. Ctr. v. Sebelius , 684 F.Supp.2d 42, 52 (D.D.C. 2010) (citing Stuttering Found. of Am. v. Springer , 498 F.Supp.2d 203, 207 (D.D.C. 2007), aff'd, 408 F.Appx. 383 (D.C. Cir. 2010)); see also Richards v. INS , 554 F.2d 1173, 1177 & n.28 (D.C. Cir. 1977). But due to the limited role a court plays in reviewing the administrative record, the typical summary judgment standards set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 are not applicable. Stuttering , 498 F.Supp.2d at 207. Rather, "[u]nder the APA, it is the role of the agency to resolve factual issues to arrive at a decision that is supported by the administrative record, whereas the function of the district court is to determine whether or not as a matter of law the evidence in the administrative record permitted the agency to make the decision it did.'" Id . (quoting Occidental Eng'g Co. v. INS , 753 F.2d 766, 769-70 (9th Cir. 1985)). In other words, "when a party seeks review of agency action under the APA, the district judge sits as an appellate tribunal, " and "[t]he entire case' on review is a question of law." Am. Bioscience, Inc. v. Thompson , 269 F.3d 1077, 1083 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (footnote and citations omitted).
A. Fogo's Challenge to the Defendants' Interpretation of Specialized Knowledge
Fogo argues that the Administrative Appeals Office violated the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1990 in two ways: "(1) by improperly relying on the repudiated specialized knowledge standard found [in] its 1987 regulations and based on the 1970 Act's legislative history; and (2) by resurrecting evidentiary tests long-since invalidated by the 1990 Act." Pl.'s Mem. at 30.
"When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter." Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. , 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984). Thus, "[w]here... the plain language of [a] statute is clear, the court generally will not inquire further into its meaning." Qi-Zhuo v. Meissner , 70 F.3d 136, 140 (D.C. Cir. 1995). If Congress' intent is unclear, the court proceeds to the second step under Chevron, under which the court must "defer to the agency's interpretation as long as it is based on a permissible construction of the statute.'" Bluewater Network v. EPA , 372 F.3d 404, 410 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (quoting Chevron , 467 U.S. at 842-43)).
As to Chevron step one, the Immigration and Nationality Act unambiguously provides that, with certain exceptions not applicable here, "[t]he Secretary of Homeland Security shall be charged with the administration and enforcement of [the Act] and all other laws relating to the immigration and naturalization of aliens." 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1). Although Congress included no statutory definition of specialized knowledge in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1970, it did include a definition when it enacted the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1990. The definition in the 1990 Act provides that "an alien is considered to be serving in a capacity involving specialized knowledge with respect to a company if the alien has a special knowledge of the company product and its application in international markets or has an advanced level of knowledge of processes and procedures of the company." 8 U.S.C. § 1184(c)(2)(B). As the defendants correctly note, however, "[b]y defining specialized knowledge' as special knowledge' or advanced knowledge, '" the plain language of § 1184(c)(2)(B) is not clear, but rather is circular and "inherently ambiguous." Defs.' Mem. at 19; see also 1756, Inc. v. Att'y Gen. of the U.S. , 745 F.Supp. 9, 15 (D.D.C. 1990) ("Simply put, specialized knowledge [as used in the Immigration and Nationality Act] is a relative and empty idea which cannot have a plain meaning.").[3] Accordingly, the Court must look elsewhere to determine the meaning of specialized knowledge. See, e.g., United States v. Bestfoods , 524 U.S. 51, 56 (1998) ("The phrase owner or operator' is defined only by tautology, however, as any person owning or operating' a facility, and it is this bit of circularity that prompts our review." (citation omitted)).
In the absence of an unambiguous and plain meaning, "the court may be forced to look to the general purpose of Congress in enacting the statute and to its legislative history for helpful cues." United States v. Braxtonbrown-Smith , 278 F.3d 1348, 1352 (D.C. Cir. 2002). There are only two pieces of legislative history that address the meaning of "specialized knowledge" as that term is used with respect to L-1B visas. The first is a 1970 House Committee Report, H.R. Rep. No. 91-851 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2750, which discusses the initial implementation of the L-1B nonimmigrant intracompany transferee visa. The report indicates that the addition of such visas "would help eliminate problems [then] faced by American companies having offices abroad in transferring key personnel freely within the organization. This proposal would meet the objective of American industry which has been seriously hampered in transferring personnel, particularly from Canada." H.R. Rep. No. 91-851 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2753-54. The report further stated that "the proposed L' category will not be large. The class of persons eligible for such nonimmigrant visas is narrowly drawn and will be carefully regulated and monitored by the Immigration and Naturalization Service." Id. at 2754.
Second, and as relevant here, is a 1990 House Committee Report, H.R. Rep. No. 101-723(I) (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6710, which addresses the 1990 amendment that introduced the statutory definition of specialized knowledge. Fogo correctly argues that the legislative history indicates that Congress, in amending the provisions of the statute concerning L-1B visas, intended to broaden the visa category. Pl.'s Mem. at 31; see H.R. Rep. No. 101-723(I) (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6749 ("Th[e] [L] visa has been a valuable asset in furthering relations with other countries but the Committee believes it must be broadened to accommodate changes in the international arena."). The Committee enumerated four specific ways in which the 1990 Act was intended to broaden the L visa program, namely: (1) "allow[ing] accounting firms access to the intracompany visa"; (2) incorporating into the statute "the streamlined blanket petition available under [the then] current regulations"; (3) expanding "the requirement of employment with the company within the one-year period immediately prior to admission... so that the one year may be within three years prior to admission"; and (4) providing a "seven-year period of admission for managers and executives" to encourage "greater continuity for employees." H.R. Rep. No. 101-723(I) (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6749. The report proceeds to separately, in the following paragraph, discuss the need for "more specificity" with respect to the meaning of specialized knowledge. Id . Thus, while the legislative history does indicate a broadening of the L visa category, it does not similarly indicate that the inclusion of a definition of specialized knowledge was intended as part of that broadening effort. Indeed, the report's reference to providing "more specificity" for the meaning of specialized knowledge, as well as the acknowledgment that "[v]arying interpretations by [the Immigration and Naturalization Service] have exacerbated the problem" of the lack of specificity, id., point only to Congress' intent to reconcile and harmonize the interpretation of the statute. Fogo's arguments to the contrary are unavailing.
The "more specific" definition contained in the report is the same as the definition in the statute itself: "special knowledge of the company product and its application in international markets, or an advanced level knowledge of processes and procedures of the company." Id .; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1184(c)(2)(B). The legislative history thus does nothing to aid the Court in determining Congress' intent concerning the meaning of specialized knowledge.
The Court must therefore proceed to Chevron step two. Under this step, if
the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.
Chevron , 467 U.S. at 843 (footnotes omitted). But "[t]he court need not conclude that the agency construction was the only one it permissibly could have adopted to uphold the construction, or even the reading the court would have reached if the question initially had arisen in a judicial proceeding." Id. at 843 n.11.
The Department of Homeland Security, through its USCIS component, has interpreted the term specialized knowledge both through the regulations discussed above, and in the Puleo and Ohata Memoranda. The Puleo Memorandum states:
Since the statutory definitions and legislative history [of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1990] do not provide any further guidelines or insight as to the interpretation of the terms "advanced" or "special", officers should utilize the common dictionary definitions of the two terms as provided below.
Webster's II New Riverside University Dictionary defines the term "special" as "surpassing the usual; distinct among others of a kind." Also, Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines the term "special" as "distinguished by some unusual quality; uncommon; noteworthy."
Based on the above definition, an alien would possess specialized knowledge if it was shown that the knowledge is different from that generally found in the particular industry. The knowledge need not be proprietary or unique, but it must be different or uncommon.
Further, Webster's II New Riverside University Dictionary defines the term "advanced" as "highly developed or complex; at a higher level than others." Also, Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines the term "advanced" as "beyond the elementary or introductory; greatly developed beyond the initial stage."
Again, based on the above definition, the alien's knowledge need not be proprietary or unique, merely advanced. Further, the statute does not require that the advanced knowledge be narrowly held throughout the company, only that the knowledge be advanced.
Defs.' Mem., Exhibit ("Ex.") A (Puleo Memorandum) at 1-2.
Another 2002 memorandum, authored by former Director of Service Center Operations at the USCIS, Fujie Ohata, reiterates:
The alien should possess a type of specialized knowledge or advanced knowledge that is different from that generally found in the particular industry.
The knowledge need not be proprietary or unique. Where the alien has specialized knowledge of the company product, the knowledge must be noteworthy or uncommon. Where the alien has knowledge of company processes and procedures, the knowledge must be advanced. Note, the advanced knowledge need not be narrowly held throughout the company. Further, there is no test of the U.S. Labor Market in determining whether an alien posses[ses] specialized knowledge. Only an examination of the knowledge possessed by the alien is necessary.
Requests for additional evidence for specialized knowledge cases should not run contrary to the 1994 [Puleo] Memorandum on specialized knowledge.
Defs.' Mem, Ex. B (Memorandum of Fujie Ohata, Director, Service Center Operations, USCIS, Interpretation of Specialized Knowledge (Dec. 20, 2002) ("2002 Ohata Memorandum")) at 1-2.
Finally, a 2004 Ohata Memorandum, which specifically addresses "Chefs and Specialty Cooks seeking L-1B status, " states:
Chefs or Specialty Cooks generally are not considered to have "specialized knowledge" for L-1B purposes, even though they may have knowledge of a restaurant's special recipe or food preparation technique.
[A]n important factor, for L-1B purposes, is the degree to which the alien's knowledge contributes to the uninterrupted operation of the specific business for which the alien's services are sought. In adjudicating a petition involving a chef, it is therefore necessary to consider not only how skilled the chef is and whether or not his or her skills are common to other chefs, but also the role the chef plays within the petitioning organization and the impact his or her services would have on the operations of the U.S.-based affiliate. For example, a chef in a themed restaurant may be required to perform functions ancillary to cooking food such as singing or entertaining in a particular manner. In deciding whether those responsibilities constitute specialized knowledge, it would be necessary to assess the length and complexity of in-house training required to perform such duties. This assessment is necessary in order to determine the amount of economic inconvenience, if any, the restaurant would undergo were it required to train another individual to perform the same duties.
To qualify as "specialized knowledge, " the knowledge of the product or the process must be of the sort that is not generally found in the particular industry, although it need not be proprietary or unique. Further, the knowledge must be of a certain complexity.
The following are examples of scenarios in which a Chef or Specialty Cook would not be considered to possess specialized knowledge:
Example 1
The petitioner claims that a particular type of ethnic cooking represents the culmination of centuries of cooking practices and that some dishes are at least a millennium old. The petitioner also states that there are subtle nuances in cooking the same item that give the dish with the same name a different taste. The petitioner further lists the process in order to explain the expertise needed to accomplish these tasks and the need for a highly trained chef, starting from choosing the ingredients until the final product is delivered.
Recipes and cooking techniques that can be learned by a chef through exposure to the recipe or cooking techniques for a brief or moderate period of time generally do not constitute specialized knowledge. Despite the petitioner's claims that this particular style of cooking is ancient and has subtle nuances to it that must be learned, these claims do not generally establish that these skills are so uncommon or complex that other chefs in the industry could not master them within a reasonable period of time.
The petitioner, therefore, has failed to show that it would cause significant economic inconvenience were it not allowed to employ the alien in L-1B classification.
Defs.' Mem., Ex. C (2004 Ohata Memorandum) at 1-3.
It is well understood that "[d]eference in accordance with Chevron... is warranted only when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.'" Gonzales v. Oregon , 546 U.S. 243, 255-56 (2006) (quoting United States v. Mead Corp. , 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001)). And "[i]f the agency's interpretation is reasonable, ' then it is entitled to deference." McGrady v. Mabus , 635 F.Supp.2d 6, 14 (D.D.C. 2009) (citing Sierra Club v. EPA , 536 F.3d 673, 677 (D.C. Cir. 2008). Courts have found dictionary definitions helpful in determining whether an agency's interpretation is reasonable. See, e.g., Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife , 551 U.S. 644, 666-67 (2007); Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., ___ F.3d ___, ___, 2013 WL 3836237, at *6 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (finding that "the agency reasonably concluded that the ordinary meaning of" a statutory term was the definition found in Webster's New International Dictionary).
As noted above, Congress has unambiguously deferred to the expertise of the Department of Homeland Security, and in turn the USCIS, to implement the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1990. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1). And the USCIS relied on dictionary definitions to provide greater clarity to the term specialized knowledge. Defs.' Mem., Ex. A (Puleo Memorandum) at 1-2. In the absence of a clear statutory definition of specialized knowledge, and given that the relevant legislative history evidences only that Congress intended for the USCIS to use a consistent definition for specialized knowledge, it cannot be said that the Puleo Memorandum and the Ohata Memoranda constitute an unreasonable interpretation of the specialized knowledge provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1990.
The Court's review of the Administrative Record in this case reveals that, in reviewing the Gasparetto Petition, the Administrative Appeals Office relied on the Puleo Memorandum and the Ohata Memoranda, as well as a reasoned interpretation of the statutes, legislative history, and applicable regulations. See, e.g., AR at 4-6, 28-37. Accordingly, the Court finds that the USCIS interpretation of the term specialized knowledge, as used by the Administrative Appeals Office in the Gasparetto Petition, is reasonable, and thus is entitled to Chevron deference.
Fogo argues that the Administrative Appeals Office's position that "there is no indication that Congress intended to liberalize the L-1B visa classification'... is untenable as a matter of logic." Pl.'s Mem. at 30 (quoting AR at 32). Fogo points to the fact that Congress' definition of specialized knowledge in effect "removed two elements from [the 1987] regulatory definition of'" specialized knowledge, "and that such elements likely had the effect of restricting the class of people eligible for the classification.'" Id. at 31 (quoting AR at 32) (emphasis deleted). Fogo notes also that "it is undisputed that Congress did not impose any new requirements to offset those two deletions." Id . Fogo recasts this same argument-that Congress intended the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1990 to broaden the scope of the L-1B visa-in several different ways throughout its initial memorandum of law. Id. at 30-36. Although it is true that Congress' statutory definition of specialized knowledge differed from the former regulatory definition of specialized knowledge, it does not follow that Congress intended to liberalize or broaden the scope of the L-1B visa in the manner advanced by Fogo. Rather, as discussed in detail above, the legislative history indicates only that Congress intended for there to be "more specificity" and coherence in the USCIS's interpretation of specialized knowledge. H.R. Rep. No. 101-723(I) (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6749.
Fogo argues also that Congress' enactment of Public Law Number 111-230 indicates an intent to broaden the scope of the L-1B visa category. Pl.'s Mem. at 32. The relevant portion of Public Law Number 111-230 provides in its entirety that
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act or any other provision of law, during the period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act and ending on September 30, 2014, the filing fee and fraud prevention and detection fee required to be submitted with an application for admission as a nonimmigrant under section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(L)) shall be increased by $2, 250 for applicants that employ 50 or more employees in the United States if more than 50 percent of the applicant's employees are nonimmigrants admitted pursuant to section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of such Act or section 101(a)(15)(L) of such Act.
(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act or any other provision of law, during the period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act and ending on September 30, 2014, the filing fee and fraud prevention and detection fee required to be submitted with an application for admission as a nonimmigrant under section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b)) shall be increased by $2, 000 for applicants that employ 50 or more employees in the United States if more than 50 percent of the applicant's employees are such nonimmigrants or nonimmigrants described in section 101(a)(15)(L) of such Act.
(c) During the period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act and ending on September 30, 2014, all amounts collected pursuant to the fee increases authorized under this section shall be deposited in the General Fund of the Treasury.
Act of Aug. 13, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-230, § 402, 124 Stat. 2485, 2487-88 (providing emergency supplemental appropriations for border security for the 2010 fiscal year). Although the legislation clearly contemplates the possibility of there being an employer with "more than 50 percent of [its] employees" working in the United States as "nonimmigrants admitted pursuant to... section 101(a)(15)(L), " id., nowhere does it state that Congress desired to increase the number of nonimmigrant intracompany transferees. Quite the opposite, the fact that the legislation imposes a fine on employers who hire a large number of nonimmigrant intracompany transferees could indicate that Congress intended to deter the practice of hiring large numbers of such individuals.
Fogo contends also that the evidentiary tests used by the Administrative Appeals Office to evaluate the Gasparetto Petition violated the terms of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1990. Pl.'s Mem. at 37; Pl.'s Reply at 32-35. Specifically, Fogo argues that, "[i]n requiring Fogo to make [a] showing" that "it can stake an ownership claim' in Mr. Gasparetto's special knowledge, " the Administrative Appeals Office "impos[ed] the long-since invalidated proprietary knowledge' test in violation of the 1990 Act." Pl.'s Mem. at 37. It is true that, according to the Puleo Memorandum, "[t]he [specialized] knowledge [possessed by an L-1B visa beneficiary] need not be proprietary or unique, but it must be different or uncommon." Defs.' Mem., Ex. A (Puleo Memorandum) at 1. However, even if Fogo is correct that the Administrative Appeals Office applied a proprietary knowledge test, the Office denied the Gasparetto petition on separate grounds. In its own submissions to the Administrative Appeals Office, Fogo argued that it imparted "specialized knowledge" to potential L-1B visa beneficiaries through a special training program. See, e.g., AR at 68 ("The special knowledge required for the position is one that involves (i) first-hand, personal knowledge and upbringing in the gaucho lifestyle of Rio Grande do Sul region in Southern Brazil; and (ii) successful completion of an extensive training program by Fogo de Chao's tenured, experienced Churrasqueiro Chefs." (emphasis added)). But the Administrative Appeals Office found that Fogo had failed to submit documentation regarding Mr. Gasparetto's completion of the training program. Id. at 40. Accordingly, even if the Administrative Appeals Office erred by requiring Fogo de Chao to effectively show "proprietary knowledge, " that error was harmless.[4] See PDK Labs. Inc. v. DEA , 362 F.3d 786, 799 (D.C. Cir. 2004) ("In administrative law, as in federal civil and criminal litigation, there is a harmless error rule: § 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706, instructs reviewing courts to take due account... of the rule of prejudicial error.' If the agency's mistake did not affect the outcome, if it did not prejudice the petitioner, it would be senseless to vacate and remand for reconsideration.").
Fogo next contends that the Administrative Appeals Office "violate[d] the 1990 Act by requiring Fogo to show that [Mr. Gasparetto]... has skills different from Fogo's other churrasqueiros." Pl.'s Mem. at 39. Specifically, Fogo argues that "[t]here is no legal basis to require this comparison-which amounts to a requirement that the beneficiary (here, Mr. Gasparetto) must have more specialized knowledge' than Fogo's other Brazilian churrasqueiros." Id. at 40 (emphasis deleted). Fogo further cites the Puleo Memorandum's instruction that "the test for specialized knowledge involves only an examination of the knowledge possessed by the alien." Id . (citing AR at 915) (emphasis deleted). These characterizations of the Puleo Memorandum and the Administrative Appeals Office's decision are misleading. Although the Puleo Memorandum does indeed require "only an examination of the knowledge possessed by the alien, " the Memorandum goes on to direct "officers adjudicating petitions involving specialized knowledge [to] ensure that the knowledge possessed by the beneficiary is not general knowledge held commonly throughout the industry but that it is truly specialized." AR at 915. Undoubtedly, other churrasqueiro chefs employed by Fogo are members of the same industry, and so it follows that a comparison to others in Fogo's workforce was reasonable.
Fogo next argues that the Administrative Appeals Office "cannot require Fogo to show uniqueness, which was previously required under the 1970 Act." Pl.'s Mem. at 41. Fogo contends that the Office nonetheless required Fogo to show uniqueness by imposing a showing that Mr. Gasparetto's knowledge was "different or uncommon, " that Fogo's "churrasqueiro chefs differ from other churrasqueiro chefs, " and that Fogo itself is "distinguished by some unusual quality that sets [it] apart from others in the industry." Id. at 42 (citing AR at 44-47). These arguments do not hold water. Fogo argues in essence that, in using words somewhat similar to the word "unique, " the Administrative Appeals Office required a showing of uniqueness. However, the words used by the Office are words used in the Puleo Memorandum, Defs.' Mem., Ex. A (Puleo Memorandum) at 1-2 (defining special as, among other things, "distinguished by some unusual quality; uncommon; noteworthy"), which in turn relies in part on dictionary definitions of the word "special." The fact that these words are similar to the word unique does not mean that the Administrative Appeals Office applied a uniqueness test. Indeed, the dictionary definition of unique is much more stringent. See Webster's Third International Dictionary 2500 (1981 ed.) (defining unique as "being the only one: sole" and "being without a like or equal: single in kind or excellence: unequaled"). The word "special, " as defined in the Puleo Memorandum, requires only comparative distinction. The word "unique, " on the other hand, requires superlative distinction. Put differently, while something "special" must be somehow more, better than the norm, or, as the dictionary and the Puleo Memorandum indicate, "uncommon" compared to others of its kind, something "unique" must be the best or only one of its kind.
Finally, Fogo argues that the Administrative Appeals Office should not have relied on a Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decision, Boi Na Braza Atlanta, LLC v. Upchurch, 194 F.Appx. 248 (5th Cir. 2006), which affirmed the "denial of L-1B petitions brought on behalf of certain Brazilian chefs trained to cook in the gaucho manner." Pl.'s Mem. at 42 (citing Boi Na Braza; AR at 53-54). Any similarities between the case before this Court and Boi Na Braza aside, the Court notes first that, after extensive discussion and before ever addressing the merits of Boi Na Braza, the Administrative Appeals Office stated that "[b]ased on the evidence presented, it is concluded that the beneficiary does not possess specialized knowledge, nor would the beneficiary be employed in a capacity requiring specialized knowledge. For this reason the [Administrative Appeals Office] will affirm the director's decision to deny the petition." AR at 51. In any event, the Administrative Appeals Office did not err insofar as it relied on Boi Na Braza. In that case, the district court found that the agency's "decisions [denying L-1B visa petitions for churrasqueiro chefs] were not arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion, " but rather "detailed the requirements of 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(1)(ii)(D), as well as the agency's interpretive memoranda, applied the record evidence to the regulations, considered the applicable legislative history and reached a logical result after an adequate treatment of the issues presented." Boi Na Braza Atlanta, LLC v. Upchurch, No. 3:04-CV-2007-L, 2005 WL 2372846, at *10 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 27, 2005), aff'd, 194 F.Appx. 248. While Fogo is correct that "[n]either the District Court nor the Fifth Circuit in Boi Na Braza found that churrasqueiros in general lack specialized knowledge, '" Pl.'s Mem. at 42, both courts did find that the agency had not acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner when it denied the L-1B visa petitions because of the agency's careful consideration of the evidence and applicable law in that case, Boi Na Braza, 2005 WL 2372846, at *10; Boi Na Braza, 194 F.Appx. at 249 ("In particular, the agency could rationally have concluded that plaintiff did not provide the [US]CIS with sufficient information about the beneficiaries' skills and abilities, nor did it demonstrate that the beneficiaries' knowledge of Brazilian cooking was sufficiently specialized to merit L-1B status."). Here, the Administrative Appeals Office made reference to the evidentiary "deficiencies that led the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals" to affirm the district court in Boi Na Braza, and then noted that the evidence presented in the Gasparetto Petition similarly failed to "document [Mr. Gasparetto's] training or clarify the discrepancy with respect to his job title or role with the foreign entity." AR at 54. The Office did not, as Fogo suggests, use the Boi Na Braza decision to reach the conclusion that no churrasqueiro chefs could ever be granted L-1B visa.
In short, the Court finds that the Administrative Appeals Office's interpretation of the term "specialized knowledge, " as used in the Gasparetto Petition, is reasonable and thus entitled to Chevron deference.[5]
B. Fogo's Contention that the Defendants Violated the APA
The APA requires courts to "hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). "The arbitrary and capricious' standard of review as set forth in the APA is highly deferential, " and the Court must therefore "presume the validity of agency action." Am. Horse Prot. Ass'n v. Yeutter , 917 F.2d 594, 596 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
Fogo argues first that the defendants violated the APA because the Administrative Appeals Office's decision "violates the 1990 Act and the 1991 Regulations" and is therefore "not in accordance with law." Pl.'s Mem. at 43. However, as extensively discussed above, the Administrative Appeals Office's interpretation of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1990 and its underlying regulations are reasonable and entitled to deference. The Court, therefore, finds that the defendants' interpretations did not violate the APA.
Fogo argues next that the "USCIS violated the APA by adversely prejudging, on the record, all Fogo specialized knowledge' petitions." Pl.'s Mem. at 43. In particular, Fogo notes that the defendants stated in a brief filed with this Court that "[i]n view of [the] USCIS's determination that these individuals do not qualify for L-1B specialized knowledge' visas and therefore that such visa petitions will not be approved in the future, the parties are at an impasse." Id . (quoting ECF No. 18 at 7) (emphasis deleted). Fogo relies on Cinderella Career & Finishing Sch., Inc. v. FTC , 425 F.2d 583 (D.C. Cir. 1970), in which the Circuit vacated an FTC order and required the recusal of then FTC Chairman Paul Rand Dixon, id. at 592. In that case, the Circuit chastised Chairman Dixon for ignoring court mandates and repeatedly making public speeches indicating that he had prejudged specific actions pending before the FTC. Id. at 590-92. Here, on the other hand, Fogo has identified a single statement in a single brief. Pl.'s Mem. at 43. Further, the statement was made in the midst of the defendants' assertions that they did not want to enter into a settlement with Fogo that "would bind the [a]gency's future exercise of discretion, and would guarantee an outcome with respect to [the] [p]laintiff's visa petitions." ECF No. 18 at 8. Although potentially troubling, the defendants' representation that the USCIS would not approve future L-1B visa petitions similar to Mr. Gasparetto's does not rise to the level of the arbitrary and capricious action demonstrated in Cinderella Career & Finishing Schools, Inc. Indeed, it is possible that the defendants were referring only to petitions that, like Mr. Gasparetto's, failed to present the requisite evidence for a finding of specialized knowledge. And the defendants' own statements concerning the importance of preserving the USCIS's ability to exercise its discretion in the future, ECF No. 18 at 8, belie the notion that the USCIS has foreclosed the possibility approving any future L-1B visa petitions from Fogo.
Fogo argues next that the "USCIS violated the APA because its failure to explain its departure from the precedent of Fogo's 251 prior approvals was arbitrary and capricious." Pl.'s Mem. at 44. However, the defendants are correct that the regulations require the USCIS to make "[a] determination of statutory eligibility... only on information contained in the record of proceeding which is disclosed to the applicant or petitioner." 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(16)(ii). Thus, regardless of the previous approvals, the USCIS would be justified in denying a petition if the information upon which it relied did not provide sufficient evidentiary support to warrant granting an L-1B visa petition. And indeed, as the Administrative Appeals Office stated and as discussed above, the Gasparetto Petition failed to "document [Mr. Gasparetto's] training or clarify the discrepancy with respect to his job title or role with the foreign entity." AR at 54. In other words, the evidence before the Administrative Appeals Office concerning the Gasparetto Petition was insufficient for the Office to find that Mr. Gasparetto was eligible for an L-1B visa. The prior approvals are therefore of no moment.
Fogo contends that the USCIS "violated the APA by failing to conduct notice and comment rulemaking before it effectively revised its definitive interpretation of the specialized knowledge term in 2007.... [as] embodied in the Puleo Memo[random]." Pl.'s Mem. at 47. It is true that, "[w]hen an agency has given its regulation a definitive interpretation, and later significantly revises that interpretation, the agency has in effect amended its rule, something it may not accomplish without notice and comment." Alaska Prof'l Hunters Ass'n v. FAA , 177 F.3d 1030, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 19199). And so, as Fogo points out, Pl.'s Mem. at 47, a problem would exist if the USCIS had "depart[ed] from established precedent without a reasoned explanation, " ANR Pipeline Co. v. FERC , 71 F.3d 897, 901 (D.C. Cir. 1995); see also Northpoint Tech., Ltd., v. FCC , 412 F.3d 145, 156 (D.C. Cir. 2005) ("A statutory interpretation... that results from an unexplained departure from prior [agency] policy and practice is not a reasonable one."). Here, however, the Administrative Appeals Office did not depart from an earlier agency interpretation, but instead relied heavily on both a reasoned interpretation of the relevant statute and regulations as well as the Puleo Memorandum throughout its decision. See generally AR at 1-54. And in doing so, as discussed above, the essential problem with the Gasparetto Petition was one of insufficient evidence.[6] Id. at 54. Accordingly, the Court cannot find that the USCIS acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner in its resolution of the Gasparetto Petition without employing notice and comment.
Fogo also argues that the USCIS decision concerning the Gasparetto Petition was arbitrary and capricious because it failed to consider evidence that Mr. Gasparetto completed the training program. Pl.'s Mem. at 50. Specifically, Fogo notes that the Gasparetto Petition included an affidavit signed by Fogo's CEO that indicated that Mr. Gasparetto had completed the training program. Id . (citing AR at 849). To be sure, agencies are required to consider relevant evidence during their decision making processes. See, e.g., Tenneco Gas v. FERC , 969 F.2d 1187, 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1992). However, it is equally true that the requirement that an agency consider and rely on the evidence in the record is not "intended to negative the function of the [agency] as one of those agencies presumably equipped or informed by experience to deal with a specialized field of knowledge, whose findings within that field carry the authority of an expertness which courts do not possess and therefore must respect." Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB , 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951). Here, the Administrative Appeals Office, in exercising its discretion, found that the evidence presented by Fogo was insufficient. AR at 54. And as the defendants note, while the Office "does not disregard evidence because it is self-serving, ' it requires the introduction of corroborative testimonial and documentary evidence, where available." Defs.' Reply at 23 (emphasis in original) (citing Matter of S-A- , 22 I. & N. Dec. 1328, 1332 (June 27, 2000); AR at 47 n.8). Thus, although Fogo is correct that there was no evidence contradicting the CEO's affidavit, it cannot be said that the agency's decision was arbitrary and capricious where Fogo failed to provide any other corroborative evidence.
Finally, Fogo argues that "the [Administrative Appeals Office's] findings-regarding competitors' use of gaucho culture and tradition, the incidence of Fogo's cooking method and style of service across the industry, and the culinary skills required for an authentic churrascaria-are impermissible because these are facts that concern' Fogo's petition with no basis in the record." Pl.'s Mem. at 52. While an agency must make findings based on the "testimony and exhibits, together with all papers and requests filed in the proceeding, " the APA provides that a party is entitled the opportunity to rebut a fact that does "not appear[] in the evidence in the record" only where that fact is "material." 5 U.S.C. § 556(e) (emphasis added). And, as noted several times above, the Administrative Appeals Office determined that the Gasparetto Petition lacked sufficient evidence that Mr. Gasparetto possessed specialized knowledge because it was unclear from the record that he had completed the required training program, and because Fogo failed to clarify the nature of Mr. Gasparetto's foreign position. AR at 41, 54. Accordingly, even if the USCIS considered evidence outside of the record, such considerations were not material to the ultimate finding that Mr. Gasparetto did not possess specialized knowledge and thus is ineligible for an L-1B visa.
For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that the denial of the Gasparetto Petition was neither arbitrary nor capricious. Accordingly, the Court grants the defendants' motion for summary judgment and denies Fogo's motion for summary judgment.[7]
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United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
August 12, 2014
BROADCAST MUSIC, INC., et al.,v.CROCODILE ROCK CORPORATION, et al.
MICHAEL M. BAYLSON, District Judge.
The procedural history of this case is set out in detail in the Court's Memorandum dated June 25, 2014. ECF 92. Defendants filed a Motion for Reconsideration and for Amendment of Judgment, ECF 95, with regards to the Court's Memorandum dated June 25, 2014, ECF 92, and accompanying orders, ECF 93 and 94. For the reasons discussed below, the Motion is denied.
I. Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of Judgment
Defendants do not indicate whether they are moving for reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) or under 60(b).
Although motions for reconsideration under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e) and 60(b) serve similar functions, each has a particular purpose. Rule 60(b) provides six bases for reconsideration, including mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.... A motion under Rule 59(e) is a device to relitigate the original issue decided by the district court, and used to allege legal error.
United States v. Fiorelli , 337 F.3d 282, 288 (3d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The Court will treat the Motion as if the Defendants moved under both rules.
A court may grant a motion for consideration under Rule 59(e) if the moving party shows: "(1) an intervening change in the controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence that was not available when the court issued its order; or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or fact or to prevent manifest injustice." Max's Seafood Cafe ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros , 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999). Where the basis of the motion for reconsideration is to correct a manifest injustice, the party must persuade the court not only that its prior decision was wrong, "but that it was clearly wrong and that adherence to the decision would create a manifest injustice." In re City of Philadelphia Litig. , 158 F.3d 711, 720-21 (3d. Cir. 1998). Based on the content of Defendants' Memorandum in support of its Motion, the Court will treat the Motion as if it is based on grounds (2) and (3).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) a party may seek relief from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for one of the following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud..., misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b).
Defendants do not indicate on what ground they base their Rule 60(b) motion. However, based on the Motion's reference to Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. , 507 U.S. 380 (1993)-which discusses excusable neglect under Rule 60(b)-and Defendants' submission of new evidence, the Court will treat the Motion as if it is based on grounds (1) and (2).
II. Discussion
The Court rejects Defendants arguments based on the new evidence attached as exhibits to its Motion. As the Defendants concede, these documents were available when the court issued its order. See Memo of Law in Support of Motion for Reconsideration and For Amendment of Judgment, ECF 96 at 4 ("All the items referred to in this memo were available to prior counsel, who did not even make an attempt to use them."). These exhibits therefore are not proper grounds for reconsideration under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b). See Blystone v. Horn , 664 F.3d 397, 415-16 (3d Cir. 2011) ("We have made clear that new evidence, ' for reconsideration purposes, does not refer to evidence that a party submits to the court after an adverse ruling. Rather, new evidence in this context means evidence that a party could not earlier submit to the court because that evidence was not previously available.") (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). Accordingly, this new evidence will not be considered.
It appears that Defendants attached these exhibits to emphasize their arguments regarding manifest injustice and excusable neglect, rather than to support a newly discovered evidence ground. Their Motion contends that this evidence was available to their prior counsel and he failed to present it to the Court. They contend further that this evidence shows that they have a meritorious defense to Plaintiffs claims and that, according to the Supreme Court's ruling in Pioneer , "the sins of the lawyer should not be visited upon the client., " ECF 95 at 4.
Pioneer clarified the standard for "excusable neglect" under Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b)(1). 507 U.S. at 388-97. Although Pioneer involved a bankruptcy rule, that opinion drew a close analogy to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). The Third Circuit has held that Pioneer 's construction apples in the Rule 60(b) context. George Harms Const. Co. v. Chao , 371 F.3d 156, 163 (3d Cir. 2004).
Pioneer , however, does not aid Defendants' cause. Although Defendants attempt to conflate Pioneer 's discussion of excusable neglect with the "professional neglect" allegedly committed by Defendants' prior counsel, s ee ECF 96, Pioneer does not excuse Defendants from the consequences of their prior counsel's alleged actions. See 507 U.S. at 396 ("[W]e have held that clients must be held accountable for the acts and omissions of their attorneys."); id. (noting that there is "no merit to the contention that dismissal of petitioner's claim because of his counsel's unexcused conduct imposes an unjust penalty on the client" (quoting Link v. Wabash R. Co. , 370 U.S. 626 at 633-34)). Pioneer expressly observed that the petitioner
voluntarily chose this attorney as his representative in the action, and he cannot now avoid the consequences of the acts or ommissions of this freely selected agent. Any other notion would be wholly inconsistent with our system of representative litigation, in which each party is deemed bound by the acts of his lawyer-agent and is considered to have notice of all facts, notice of which can be charged upon the attorney.
Id. at 397 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Accordingly, in so far as Defendants regard Pioneer as a shield for clients against the actions of their counsel, they are mistaken.
Perhaps even more importantly, Defendants assert that their prior counsel was entirely to blame for the handling of their case, but their Motion supports this assertion by claiming that prior counsel should have presented and argued the exhibits attached to the Motion. By contrast, at a hearing held on May 30, 2014, Defendants' prior counsel stated on the record that he sought to withdraw from representing Defendants because they would not respond to his repeated requests to discuss the case, failed to pay for his services, and were otherwise uncooperative. At that same hearing, Defendant Joseph Clark testified that he never had time to reach out to prior counsel about disagreements about representation. He also testified that he never received notice of the complaint. Yet, when presented with the proof of service with his signature, Defendant Joseph Clark stated that it either was not his signature or that he did not remember signing it because, in Defendant Joseph Clark's own words, "I sign stuff without looking at it. I do, I'm very busy." ECF 81 at 15. It was on this and similar testimony that prompted the Court to permit Defendants' prior counsel to withdraw from the case. ECF 78. The conduct of Defendants' prior counsel, as evidenced in the record, does not support a claim for manifest injustice or excusable neglect.
III. Conclusion
Defendants have failed to produce any new evidence that was not available at the time the Court filed its Memorandum and orders. ECF 92, 93, 94. Defendants have also failed to demonstrate that the conduct of their prior counsel in any way relates to Defendants suffering a manifest injustice. Accordingly, Defendants Motion is DENIED.
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"No government of the left has done as much for the poor as capitalism has. Even when it comes to the redistribution of income, the left talks the talk but the free market walks the walk. What do the poor most need? They need to stop being poor. And how can that be done, on a mass scale, except by an economy that creates vastly more wealth? Yet the political left has long had a remarkable lack of interest in how wealth is created. As far as they are concerned, wealth exists somehow and the only interesting question is how to redistribute it." ~ Thomas Sowell
10 Freest States For Homeschooling
Submitted by Bradley Keyes on Fri, 2012-11-30 00:00
Homeschooling is legal in all 50 states. Yet, since education is regulated by the states, requirements vary dramatically from state to state for homeschoolers. The difference ranges from complete freedom with no requirements to forced curriculum and achievement tests.
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Chunky Monkey Ice Cream Bread
Found on FB, I haven't tried this yet; but it sounds YUMMY!!
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Chunky Monkey Ice Cream Bread (2 loaves or 1 large loaf) ->
2 pints Ben & Jerry's Chunky Monkey, softened or melted
3 cups self-rising flour
1 very ripe banana, chopped
1 chocolate bar, chopped
Handful of walnuts, chopped
Preheat oven to 350 degrees. Grease and flour bread pan, or line with parchment paper. Mix melted ice cream and flour until well combined. Add chocolate, banana and nuts. Pour into prepared bread pan. Bake for 45 minutes per loaf or 60-90 minutes for a larger double loaf. If the top starts to brown too much, cover it with aluminum foil and continue to bake. The bread is done when a skewer inserted into the middle comes out clean
About this Recipe
Course/Dish: Other Breakfast, Other Desserts, Sweet Breads
Main Ingredient: Dairy
Regional Style: American
Other Tag: Quick & Easy


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The Simply Sexy Bustier Cami Top is a sleek and sexy fitted top with a built in bra. The cami top features stretch knit fabric, a hook & eye closure in back, removable straps and garters and three removable bows. G-string and hosiery not included.
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Preheat oven to 375°F (190°C).
In a skillet, brown roast on all sides in hot oil over medium-high heat.
Transfer meat to a deep casserole and sprinkle herbs over top.
In the same skillet, lightly brown onions over medium heat.
Add beer and reduce by half. Add broth and bring to a boil.
Pour beery onion broth round the roast. Season. Cover and roast for 2 - 3 hours or until tender.
Cut roast into thin slices and serve over beery onions.
These medium-bodied wines are characterised by their smooth tannins that usually confer a certain roundness. They are often dominated by a nose of ripe fruit or woody notes (toast, coffee or vanilla).
Product category: red wine.
© Société des alcools du Québec, 2007
Make sure you are using only lactose-free milk, yogurt, butter, cheese and other lactose-free 'dairy' products, and read the labels carefully when you buy these products.
Metro Richelieu inc. , its affiliated companies and affiliates are not responsible for any circumstance that should come up when using the suggested recipes. Each person using this site must check that each of the ingredients is allowed in his/her diet and is not part of his/her restricted foods.
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Angelfish, octopuses, seahorses they're all missing from the tanks! With Team Umizoomi's help, gamers go on a mission to put them back before the aquarium opens.
Age: 3-6
Sing along with finger puppets Milli, Geo, and Bot as they perform an umi-riffic tune.
There's an elephant sprinkler at the water playground in UmiCity. Learn how it works with Team Umizoomi.
The alarm at the Umi City Fire Station is ringing! Oh no-a kitty is stuck in a high tree! Team Umizoomi needs your child's help to collect rescue gear and save the day.
Age: 3-6
Math is everywhere this Thanksgiving--especially at the kids table!
Join Team Umizoomi as they build kites for the Kite Festival. Your kids will identify the shapes, figure out the patterns, and then go on to design their very own kite.
Age: 3-6


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Take a trip Around the World in 80 minutes with Bunbury's beloved South West Philharmonic and the Bunbury City Band! The Family Proms Concert is back by popular demand to provide an afternoon of fun family entertainment not to be missed.
This year's Family Proms Concert is sure to delight the whole family with a unique and interactive afternoon of music where you're encouraged to clap your hands, tap your toes and shake those noisemakers!
The event will showcase all of your traditional Proms classics as well as some of the finest tunes from all four corners of the globe and beyond. Bunbury City Band and South West Philharmonic will be joined by special guests South West Opera Company and two nine year old violin soloists, Naomi King and Isadore Farnworth.
Patrons are encouraged to bring their party hats, blowers and noisemakers for a true proms style musical celebration!
Children are 16 are FREE! (Reserved seating essential - call the box office on 1300 661 272 to book)
The South West Philharmonic aims to foster excellence and innovation in the performance and presentation of classical music, and to provide concerts that educate, entertain, and inspire the community.
The Bunbury City Band celebrates its 110th anniversary this year- a huge milestone for the band. The Bunbury City Band is a traditional British Brass Band consisting of 25 parts, and the members come from all walks of life ranging from school students to retirees.
The Bunbury City Band also operate as a marching band faithfully serving many civic and community functions such as Australia Day celebrations and ANZAC Day. The band enjoys performing all types of music from classics through to pop, folk and jazz.


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List all words starting with anacoluthon
2 words found.
List all words starting with anacoluthon sorted by length or by how common the words are.
Some random words: pe lo klatch mnemonic kvetch ka dream
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CAKE lovers are needed to join a fundraising business bake-off to support ill children and adults across the county.
Oxford-based business Focus Independent Financial Advisers & Independent Insurance Consultants is organising the fundraiser in aid of Helen and Douglas House.
Keen bakers from across the region's business community are urged to sign up to the event by tomorrow to ensure the fundraising target of £1,000 is reached.
Nick Walker, partner at Focus, said: "We have been supporting Helen & Douglas House for many years and wanted to do something different to help fund the charity.
"If baking isn't your thing, people are welcome to just sample or buy the goodies – for a donation to Helen & Douglas House of course."
Bakers can enter three bake-off categories including cakes, savoury bites, and cupcakes and muffins for a fee of £5 per person for each category.
Prizes to be won include a day's cooking course at Gloucestershire's Thyme Food School, restaurant vouchers and baking goodies.
The contest takes place between 11.30am and 4.30pm on Monday, September 22, at Botley's Seacourt Tower.
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Creamy Coleslaw Dressing
Total Time
Prep 5 mins
Cook 5 mins
When I was little, the only salad dressing I would eat was coleslaw. Try as I may, I can't seem to find a lower fat/sodium version in the stores. So I had to create this.
Ingredients Nutrition
- 1⁄3 cup low-fat mayonnaise (I just use miracle whip)
- 1⁄4 cup fat free sour cream
- 1 tablespoon sugar
- 1 tablespoon prepared mustard (I made it with dijon as well, but you can use which ever one you like best)
- 1 tablespoon vinegar
- 1⁄2 teaspoon dried dill
- 1⁄4 teaspoon salt (optional)
- Mix all ingredients in a bowl or a jar with a lid so you can shake it!
- Combine well.
- Refrigerate for at least one hour before using so the flavours can blend.
Most Helpful
Good recipe! Tastes great and will try again. Nice and creamy. I used Dill seed, just a bit strong for me. I likely should have used actual dried dill:)


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- RN / CNA / HOUSEKEEPER - Join us at The Garlands of Barrington JOB FAIR!! Wed, 11/23/16, 1-4pm On the spot interviews for Candidates who want to make a difference! Open Positions: Part Time: CERTIFIED NURSE ASSISTANTS (CNA's), Servers, Bussers, Activities Asst. Full Time: Housekeeping Supervisor & Cook Beautiful Campus Work/Life Balance Benenfits for Full Time Team Memebers Apply NOW: http://www.thegarlands.com/employment/ (id:4457452) PACKER/PICKER - Packer/ Picker $10.50/hr 1st Shift working 12 Hour Shifts Fast paced seasonal jobs in Chicago start immediately! Call 773-205-1555 NOW! (id:4457343) FIELD INSPECTOR - Wauconda Township Part-time Position Announcement Assessor's Office Wauconda Township Assessor's Office is accepting resumes for a part-time Field Inspector position. Resumes will be accepted until the close of business Friday, December 3, 2016 at email@example.com Job Title: Field Inspector Department: Township Assessor's Office Classification: Part-time (Maximum 24 hours per week) Immediate Supervisor: Township Assessor Summary Inspection of residential, commercial, industrial, and other structures during construction, repair and alteration pursuant to the issue of building permits to ensure the gathering of accurate information to allow proper assessment of properties within Wauconda Township. This position requires the use of measuring tools and devices to collect data necessary to accomplish the field inspection. Use of a personal vehicle may be required with appropriate reimbursement. Qualifications Must possess good work habits, being able to work without intense supervision and have the physical ability to perform all duties. Ability to accurately measure and record data needed to establish a fair and uniform assessment of properties. The position requires abilities to effectively communicate with residents and business owners within the Township, working associates and supervisors. This position requires a valid State of Illinois Drivers License, a functional and reliable automobile along with personal vehicle insurance. Education and Experience A minimum of a high school diploma is required. Experience in construction, building trades or surveying. The position demands abilities to use measuring devices, digital cameras, and experience in automated data entry. Hours Not to exceed 24 hours per week, work hours to be determined by the Township Assessor. (id:4457443)
- FREIGHT INVENTORY CONTROL CLERK - Freight Inv Control Clerk Corp office seeks clerk to perform inventory order allocation, freight bill and shipment confirmation processing, and related duties. Cmptr exp a must. ERP exp desired. Email resume w/sal hist to email@example.com (id:4457346) RF ENGINEER III - Engineer RF Engineer III, Sprint Corporation, Schaumburg, IL. Provide radio frequency (RF) and/or wireless transmission design. Apply at www.sprint.com/careers, Req #207407BR. Sprint is a background screening, drug screening, and E-Verify participating employer and considers qualified candidates regardless of previous criminal history. EOE Minorities/Females/Protected Veterans/Dis- abled. (id:4457314) MAINTENANCE MECHANICS - Nation PIZZA AND FOODS, a rapidly expanding baking and prepared foods business company in Schaumburg, has excellent opportunities available. 3RD SHIFT SANITATION -BAKERY - MAINTENANCE MECHANICS We are hiring for the following positions: Sanitation Supervisor Bakery Supervisor Maintenance Mechanics To learn more about the above positions, apply in person or online at www.nationpizza.com/careers 601 E. Algonquin Road in Schaumburg EOE www.nationpizza.com/careers (id:4457547)
- JOB FAIR - cash in this season join the amazon team in kenosha now hiring part-time and full-time jobs join us for on-the-spot job offers Monday, November 14th and Tuesday, November 15th 9am to 4pm Memorial Hall 72 7th Street -Racine, WI apply today:amazon.com/kenoshajobs Amazon is an Equal Opportunity-Affirmative Action Employer-Minority / Female / Disability / Veteran / Gender Identity / Sexual Orientation (id:4456807) INCOME TAX PREPARER - Tax preparer needed starting in January. Must have PTIN and have experiance. Flexible hours. Elgin area. 847-741-5033. (id:4457150) ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT - F/T ADMIN ASST Exp'd, detail oriented person. Small property mgt office. Good computer/phone/people skills. Send resume to firstname.lastname@example.com (id:4456906)


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Areopagitica and Of Education: with Autobiographical Passages from Other Prose Works (Crofts Classics)
1 - 2 weeks availability
DescriptionIn one volume. The classic defense of intellectual liberty and the freedom to publish, and Milton's plan for training rulers to be fit to govern. Also includes three autobiographical passages from other prose works. Edited by George H. Sabine, who provides a short introduction, this edition also contains a list of principal dates in the life of Milton and a bibliography.
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- Saver Delivery: Yes
- 1st Class Delivery: Yes
- Courier Delivery: Yes
- Store Delivery: No


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MLS #1772906 Official listing information! NA neighborhood - 228 Cedar St located in Lebanon TN 37087, priced at $600, with 1 bedrooms.228 Cedar St Lebanon TN - MLS #1772906 Close
Rental property for rent in Lebanon, TN at 228 Cedar St. This 1 bedroom rental property is priced at $1/sqft.
Newly remodeled 1 bedroom 1 bath apartment. New flooring, paint, cabinets, fixtures, doors. No pets allowed. Water is included in rent. Will be ready November 1. Will show property in the order the applications are received.
Listing information last updated on December 9th, 2016 at 7:18am CST.
Have any comments or questions about 228 Cedar St, Lebanon, TN? Ask your question and/or share your thoughts about this property.


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- Car Insurance
- Two Wheeler Insurance
- Health Insurance
- Travel Insurance
- Term Life Insurance
- About Coverfox
- Claims
Let us call you back. Just share your number for a call back in less than 15 minutes
Is it super urgent? Call us on our Toll Free numbers
Someone from the team will get back to you ASAP!
Oh! Just in case you still need our Toll free1800 209 9970
Your Claim Assistance request has been registered with us.
We will contact you before 11am tomorrow.
What is Zero Depreciation and why is it so important?
Zero depreciation or Nil Depreciation or Bumper-to-Bumper Cover, is the magic add-on that costs anywhere between 15-20% of the standard premium and is a MUST BUY for all new or relatively new (up to 5 years) cars.
It basically does not take into account the depreciation on car parts and saves you from spending a lot of money from your pocket in case of an accident, which you may have had to pay for replacing parts of your car.
Don't understand? Let's explain this in detail.
Depreciation is quite simply the decrease in value of things or 'assets', as they get older. For example, a newer car is obviously priced higher than an older one. Similarly, there is a certain depreciation associated with all the materials like glass, plastic, metal that make up your car.
Each of the materials or parts has a different rate of depreciation. Here's a quick video explaining how this works:
In case you make a claim, with a basic car insurance policy, the insurance company only reimburses the depreciated value of car parts replaced, irrespective of the actual cost. If your car is brand new, this can turn out to be really expensive!
To understand how to remedy this with a solution, here is a quick recap of what zero depreciation does for you:
Let's run through this with a quick example. Say, your car is worth Rs. 10,00,000. Then the tentative cost of damage to the parts and its depreciation would look something like this:
|Cost of Damage (in Rs.)
|Cost of Depreciation (in Rs.)
|% Depreciation
|Metal Part
|Plastic Part
|Fibreglass Parts
For such a scenario, with a normal standard policy, you'd have to pay Rs. 7,350 approximately.
However, when zero depreciation comes into the picture:
|Cost of Premium and Claim
|[Without Zero Dep] Amount (in Rs.)
|[With Zero Dep] Amount (in Rs.)
|Basic Premium (A)
|Zero Dep Add-on (B)
|Total Cost of Policy (C) A + B
|Deductible applied per claim* (D)
|Cost of Repair(E)
|What you need to pay(F)
|Your total expenses in the year (G)
|You save (E-G)
Thus, even if you have more than one claim in a year, you will definitely save a lot on account of the zero depreciation add-on!
Is zero depreciation cover different from the standard cover? How?
The biggest difference is that a zero depreciation cover promises full settlement coverage. On the other hand, standard comprehensive cover— i.e a plan that does not offer zero depreciation – tends to estimate the coverage based on the 'current value' of your vehicle. The current market price of your car plays an important role in the depreciation of the vehicle.
If at all wrecked your car in accident, your standard policy will pay for the repair expenses only after subtracting for depreciation. However, in a policy that has the zero depreciation cover, your insurance company will have to foot the bill without adding depreciation charges.
I heard that zero depreciation cover is more applicable to new cars. Is it true?
Usually, only new cars can avail the zero depreciation add-on. Insurance companies define a specific age limit when it comes to zero depreciation. In case your car happens to be older than the particular limit specified by them, then you won't be eligible to use the add-on cover for your car.
Is there any restriction on the number of claims?
Adding a zero depreciation cover is no doubt very beneficial for a new car. But, remember that it may limit the number of claims you can make annually.
A reason for this is because generally, your car is depreciated once a year. It means if you never had the zero-depreciation add-on cover, your insurance provider would take into account the depreciation on car parts and you would have to spend a huge sum from your pocket.
But as a new driver, if you keep wrecking your car and keep making claims, it would leave your insurance provider in a fix about paying your expenses time and again regardless of depreciation.
Hence, the limit! Again, this clause may vary from one insurance company to another. So, you need to speak to your insurer about this before buying the policy.
How do I understand if the zero depreciation add-on cover is ideal for me?
By now you would be aware that the zero depreciation add-on cover is recommended to all brand new cars. Apart from that, it is also essential for:
• Those who own luxury vehicles as the parts of such cars are very expensive. Obviously depreciation on such parts too would be more.
• New drivers who aren't confident of their driving skills should opt for this cover.
• Those who are accustomed to living in accident prone areas where there are high chances of them wrecking their vehicles.
• If you are super-conscious about small bumps and dents of your car, you should definitely opt for this cover.
• In case your car is fitted with expensive spare parts, you do know that if an accident occurs and depreciation of such parts are going to be considered, you would end up spending more than required and get into a huge loss


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- You are here:
- goodtoknow
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Tom Daley
Young diver Tom Daley follows a tough training regime, exercising for at least five hours every day. Before he heads off to morning training, Tom eats a small bowl of bran flakes for breakfast. Cereal is packed with iron and fibre - without it he wouldn't have the energy to maintain that amazing six pack!
Workout like Tom...Always have a healthy breakfast. Watch out for the hidden sugar in cereals though, check our best and worst cereals guide for the worst offenders.
Your comments
- How to have a healthy takeaway: The best and worst options on the menu
- Tested: Best and worst sun creams
- What celebrities really eat in a day - revealed!
- Celebrity tattoos
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- The X Factor contestants: Where are they now?
- Celeb bikini gallery
- 15 bloated stomach causes
- 10 tips for getting rid of cellulite


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Item Id: 246-00188
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When your hunger calls for chewy caramel, rich chocolate, and peanut flavor, grab a WHATCHAMACALLIT Candy Bar! It's not your everyday candy bar, so it's great for mixing things up on family movie night or giving as a fun and unexpected gift. So many rich sensations in one bar make WHATCHAMACALLIT Candy Bars a satisfying snack and a filling dessert!
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Phobias of attachment-related inner states in the psychotherapy of adult survivor of childhood complex trauma
Liotti, G. (2013), Phobias of Attachment-Related Inner States in the Psychotherapy of Adult Survivors of Childhood Complex Trauma. Journal of Clinical Psychology, vol. 69 (11), pp. 1136-1147
The clinical case described in this paper illustrates the relevance of taking into account the dynamics of disorganized attachment in the assessment of attachment-related phobias (phobia of attachment and phobia of attachment loss) during the psychotherapy of chronically traumatized patients. These opposite phobias typically coexist in the same patient, appear both as phobias of inner states (affect phobias) and of relational experiences, and are linked to dissociated representations of self-with-other. Theory and research on attachment disorganization provide a clinician friendly conceptual framework for capturing both the intra-psychic (e.g., intrusive and non-integrated mental states) and the relational (e.g., dramatic unsolvable dilemmas in interpersonal exchanges) aspects of the attachment-related phobias. The therapeutic strategy and the key interventions that logically follow from a case formulation based on this conceptual framework are extensively dealt with in the paper


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kclb wrote:
Hm. Only 2 days has passed. Still need to wait up to 8 more days. ahhhh. Gimme my AMEX!
chiwiseguy wrote:
kclb wrote:
Hm. Only 2 days has passed. Still need to wait up to 8 more days. ahhhh. Gimme my AMEX!
I am on day 2 also. Can't they ups overnight it?!?!?!?
thenewguy23 wrote:Should I convert to blue at activation? How hard is it to do this? Also I am planning on doing a lot of traveling in the coming years so does the blue have the same airline rewards?
SanFranMatt wrote:
thenewguy23 wrote:Should I convert to blue at activation? How hard is it to do this? Also I am planning on doing a lot of traveling in the coming years so does the blue have the same airline rewards?
Do you generally travel on Delta? If so, you're probably better off keeping what you have.
I fly on Jetblue the most, so I use their Amex. But if you converted the Delta to Jetblue, you might not be eligible for the 50 Jetblue points at activation (you'd have to ask).
thenewguy23 wrote:What is this "luv button"? Sorry if I seem ignorant. I have a number for capital 1 that I called to get a cli is this the same thing or something?
thenewguy23 wrote:Got approved last night for the Amex Delta Skymiles card. Was sort of surprised but then seeing that other people are being approved with lower scores, I guess I am not that shocked anymore. My scores are Eq 656 TU 652 Ex 622...also what number am I calling to ask for a cli at activation?
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Welcome to the City of Missoula Historic Preservation Program webpage.,As a Certified Local Government, the City of Missoula assists the State Historic Preservation Office in implementing the National Historic Preservation Act through preservation programs of National Register of Historic Places, Historic Architecture and Archaeological Survey, Review and Compliance, and Preservation Planning.
In an effort to raise awareness and community support in preserving the historic built environment here in Missoula, the Historic Preservation Officer and the Historic Preservation Commission integrate sustainability, economic development, and multi-agency coordination into the overall historic preservation program objectives, with the goal of enhancing the community's understanding of the benefits of historic preservation.
Historic Preservation Awards: Public outreach and education are core values of the Historic Preservation Program here in Missoula. The Historic Preservation Commission annually recognizes individuals and groups who have restored or contributed to the preservation of historic properties with a public, catered, awards event during May, National Historic Preservation Month. Now accepting nominations for 2016 awards!
Tours of historic neighborhoods are led by Commission members during Historic Preservation Month, and, during the Western Montana Fair, they are on hand to document the stories and oral histories of fair-goers!
Are you considering an addition to your historic home? The local Historic Preservation Commission is here to assist you! Historical Architects are available to guide your design to a level that is compatible with the historic fabric surrounding your property –free of charge!
Historic Preservation Permits are required for alterations to historic properties that are individually listed on the National Register of Historic Places. Leslie Schwab, Historic Preservation Officer, will assist you in navigating the regulatory framework established in the City's Historic Preservation Ordinance. A list of properties subject to review by the Commission can be found HERE.
HP Permit Issued for Fort Missoula Regional Park
An application for an Historic Preservation Permit was issued by the city of Missoula for the Fort Missoula Regional Park Development: Phases 1&2 in November, 2015. The City of Missoula Parks and Recreation Department are the project applicants, representing both the City and the County portions of the regional park. The project area, which included playfields, trails, and an Open space zoning designation, was recently annexed into the City of Missoula with an Open Space zoning designation and the Fort Missoula Historic Character Overlay District that extends to the limits of the Fort Missoula Historic District. The Fort Missoula Historic District was listed on the National Register of Historic Places in 1987 and recently updated and expanded in 2012.
View the FMRP Historic Preservation Permit Application here.
Historic Preservation Awards
2015 Award Recipients
Our site is under construction and we will soon have more information available.


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Do you want to take part in a bostin' cycle ride, organised by cyclists for cyclists, riding through wonderful countryside, following fully-signposted routes with well-stocked feed stations, emergency support and a great atmosphere ..?
Then you need to enter a Bostin' Ride sportive – as featured in Channel 5's cycling show "Tour de Celeb"!
Whether you are relatively new to cycling or an 'old hand', we are sure that you will enjoy the beauty of our routes and the delights of our events – all organised by cyclists for cyclists to enjoy and with all our cycle sportives being British Cycling registered and insured they are all run to the highest standards of care and professionalism leaving you only to enjoy the day.
Follow the links above to see our forthcoming events and then click on the red enter buttons to ensure yourself of a place.
We would like to keep you updated on this and future events and special offers so please join our mailing list and "Like" us on Facebook – see below.
Now that's a bostin' idea!
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Published on
Financial Strategies for the Growing Business
When you're growing a business, the state of your bank balance is really not a sufficient clue as to how your business is doing. This strategy may work when you're starting out but as you grow you need more.
Unfortunately most businesses fail to improve their systems as they grow and so are not in a position to have a clear picture of their profitability and progress.
During this webinar we'll look at ways to ensure that your systems and reporting are growing in line with your needs and look at ways to 'notch up' your game when it comes to monitoring your business performance.
In this webinar, sponsored by GoToMeeting Corporate with guest speaker Alycia Edgar, you will learn:
The five stages of business financial knowledge
Systems you need in place to monitor your business at each stage
Reports you must grow into at each stage
Resources you will require along the journey
How to link all the facets of your business to drive profits
How to love your business numbers and what they can do for you
For more great webinars, check our website. http://www.abn.org.au/site/events


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Warm Honey Mustard Potato Salad
Total Time
Prep 10 mins
Cook 15 mins
Whole Foods.
Ingredients Nutrition
- 2 lbs new potatoes
- 2 stalks celery, diced 1/2 inch
- 15 -20 cornichons, sliced into rounds (about 1/4 pounds)
- 1 red bell pepper, diced 1/2 inch
- 2 tablespoons honey mustard dressing
- Scrub the potatoes and cut them into 3/4-inch cubes, leaving the skin on.
- Steam or boil the potato pieces until they are just tender but still firm.
- While the potatoes are cooking, assemble the rest of the ingredients in a large bowl. As soon as the potatoes are done, drain them and transfer into the bowl. Toss just enough to blend everything, and serve immediately.


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Clothes on your preemie(8 Posts)
Dildals Thu 08-Aug-13 06:54:43
paperclipsarebetterthanstaples Thu 08-Aug-13 07:04:39
MiaowTheCat Thu 08-Aug-13 08:54:09
Dildals Thu 08-Aug-13 09:24:33
AlisonL1981 Thu 08-Aug-13 11:25:41
Poppet45 Fri 09-Aug-13 08:35:28
softkitty79 Wed 14-Aug-13 13:33:34
fairimum Thu 26-Sep-13 12:51:45
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