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Islamism has featured prominently in the politics and policies of modern Syria on a number of different levels. Like other majority Sunni Muslim Arab countries governed by secular autocrats, Syria has a long tradition of Sunni Islamist opposition activity. The fact that the hereditary dictatorship of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has long been dominated by Alawis, an Islamic offshoot sect viewed as heretical by religious Sunnis, renders it uniquely vulnerable to Islamist challenges. It has managed to survive for nearly a half-century in spite of this Achilles heel by brutally suppressing dissent and tightly regulating Sunni religious practices.
Notwithstanding its heavy-handed treatment of Islamists at home, the Assad regime has eagerly armed, financed, and sheltered foreign Islamist organizations committed to fighting its enemies abroad. The sectarian and ideological affiliations of these groups have been varied, ranging from the Shi'a Hezbollah militia in Lebanon to the Sunni Palestinian Hamas movement and al-Qaeda-aligned terrorists battling U.S.-led coalition forces in Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003. In addition to advancing the regime's regional strategic objectives, support for these groups helped defuse Islamist militancy at home by appropriating radical causes that resonated with disaffected youth.
The eruption of a popular uprising against Assad in March 2011 and the country's subsequent collapse into civil war changed everything. Although protests were initially peaceful, multi-sectarian, and explicitly oriented around the pursuit of democratic change, the escalating violence and prolonged breakdown of law and order in many areas of the country were exploited by indigenous and foreign Islamists (including many who had hitherto supported the regime).
Once the bête noire of secularists, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood dominates the Western-backed Syrian National Coalition, but has largely been eclipsed on the ground by more radical Islamist forces. Flush with financing from the Arab Gulf (in contrast to cash-starved, poorly armed secular-leaning rebel forces), more radical Salafi-jihadists close to al-Qaeda have gained dominion over key parts of northeastern Syria. Many rallied alongside Iraqi jihadists under the banner of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS, now the Islamic State), which seized control of large swathes of Iraq's Sunni heartland in 2013 and 2014.
More than three years of civil war in Syria have enabled an extraordinarily diverse array of Islamist actors to flourish. Broadly speaking, they can be divided into three categories: anti-regime Sunni political Islamists ostensibly committed to advancing their agenda by democratic means; Sunni salafi-jihadists committed to either forcibly establishing an Islamic republic in Syria or using it as a stepping stone to pursue regional and international ambitions; and a rump coterie of pro-regime Islamists, mostly Shi'a and non-Syrian.
Political Islamists
The first category of Islamists ranges from the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood (SMB) to various traditionalist, reformist, and moderate Salafi Sunni religious currents that dominate the Syrian opposition in exile.
Though established in 1946 as the Syrian chapter of the Egypt-based pan-Islamic Muslim Brotherhood movement, the SMB had a very different base of socio-economic support. Whereas the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt drew mass support from rural areas, the Syrian Brotherhood was dominated by the Sunni urban nobility and middle class.
In 1963, the secular Arab nationalist Ba'ath party seized power and began implementing land reforms and nationalizing industries, which severely threatened middle-class interests. With independent political parties and media outlawed, the mosque became the one semi-protected space where dissidents could voice opposition to regime policies.
As power within the regime became increasingly concentrated among a narrow clique of Alawi officers headed by Gen. Hafez Assad, who assumed the presidency in 1971, Brotherhood agitation intensified. In 1973, violent demonstrations instigated by the Brotherhood led the regime to modify a clause in a proposed new constitution that would not require the president to be Muslim (instead, Assad persuaded influential Lebanese Shi'ite cleric Musa al-Sadr to issue a ruling certifying that Alawis are Shi'a Muslims and therefore eligible for the presidency).
During the late 1970s, Islamist militants affiliated with the Brotherhood launched an armed insurrection against the Assad regime with the goal of replacing it with an Islamic state, with some material support from rival Arab states. Unable to rally support in rural areas where armed resistance was more tactically feasible, the rebellion never seriously threatened the regime. Thousands of Islamists were imprisoned, and membership in the Brotherhood was made punishable by death. When militants seized control of large parts of Hama in 1982, regime forces brutally destroyed much of the city, killing tens of thousands.
This episode virtually eradicated the SMB's influence in Syria for the following three decades. Most ranking members of the Brotherhood went into exile,1 where they splintered into rival factions centered around figures from Aleppo and Hama. Meanwhile, the Assad regime's soaring regional influence in the 1980s dissuaded rival governments from sponsoring armed opposition in Syria. The devastation resulting from the Brotherhood's failed insurrection made dissidents inside Syria wary of any association with Islamism in challenging the regime.
The tenure of Ali Sadreddine al-Bayanouni of the Aleppo wing as head of the SMB from 1996 to 2010 witnessed a gradual moderation of the Brotherhood's platform, rhetoric, and tactics. The SMB renounced violence in 2001. In 2004, it adopted a new political platform calling for multiparty democracy and minority rights. Bayanouni also worked to improve the Brotherhood's ties with secular opposition forces. In 2005, the Brotherhood joined secular dissidents inside Syria in signing the Damascus Declaration calling for a "peaceful, gradual" democratic reform process.
After the Damascus Declaration initiative failed to galvanize internal opposition to the regime, the Brotherhood focused its attention on warming up to Western and Arab governments bent on bringing Assad to heel in the wake of his alleged involvement in the 2005 assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. In 2006, it formed an alliance with recently exiled former Vice-president Abdul Halim Khaddam, a Sunni ex-Ba'athist with close ties to the Saudi royal family by way of Hariri.
When international and regional pressure on Syria began to wane, however, the Brotherhood tried to reach an accommodation with Assad. In 2009, following Israel's Operation Cast Lead in the Gaza Strip, Bayanouni suspended the Brotherhood's anti-government activities, apparently hoping that Assad would reciprocate by allowing the movement to reestablish a presence inside Syria. When this didn't happen, Bayanouni and his allies were soundly defeated in internal Brotherhood elections in Istanbul the following year. His successor, Mohammad Riad al-Shaqfeh, nevertheless decided to continue the suspension, expressing hope that Turkey would mediate between the Brotherhood and the regime.
The outbreak of mass protests against the Syrian regime in March 2011 took the Brotherhood by surprise. As in other Middle East states experiencing the so-called "Arab Spring," Islamists initially played little discernable role in the unrest.2 The SMB declined to endorse the uprising for nearly two months,3 calculating whether its interests would best be served by extracting concessions from a weakened Assad or helping achieve his overthrow. Once it became clear the regime was not going to be able to extinguish the uprising, however, Brotherhood leaders threw their weight fully behind the cause.
The Brotherhood lacked a strong organizational presence inside Syria, while its predominantly urban social base left it ill-suited to connect with a popular uprising emanating primarily in rural areas and the outskirts of major cities. Moreover, the Brotherhood's secretive and elitist structure (members are typically admitted only after a long process of vetting that can last years), which served it well organizing cell-based resistance in the late 1970s and avoiding regime infiltration in exile, was not a great model for mass mobilization.
Nevertheless, the movement had an advantage over secular exile groups due to its established organizational hierarchy, large network of members and affiliated Brotherhood chapters around the globe, and burgeoning relations with Qatar and Turkey (which turned against the Assad regime several months into the uprising).4 The SMB played a prominent role in the August 2011 establishment of the Syrian National Council, which brought the Syrian opposition in exile under a single umbrella, and its successor organization, the Syrian National Coalition (SNC).5
Since then, a number of moderate Islamist currents have been vying for influence with the Brotherhood within the SNC. A reformist current, more receptive to liberal democratic norms than the Brotherhood, includes the National Action Group, co-founded by Obeida Nahas, who served as political advisor to Bayanouni and was reportedly the architect behind the Brotherhood's short-lived alliance with Khaddam.6 Much like Turkey's ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), Nahas and his allies describe themselves as religious conservatives, not Islamists.7
The Movement for Justice and Development (MJD), founded in London in 2006 in response to Bayanouni's alliance with Khaddam, actually named itself after the AKP. Its political platform calls for the Syrian constitution to declare Syria a nation of "Islamic civilization and culture," but without making sharia a principal source of legislation.8 The Syrian National Movement (SNM), led by Emad ad-Din al-Rashid, advocates acceptance of the "Islamic reference" (al-Marja'iyya al-Islamiyya) as a source of legislation and the basis for the national identity.9 SNC Secretary-General Badr Jamous is affiliated with the SNM.10
Another current of devout (though not Islamist, strictly speaking) Sunni opposition leaders is comprised of traditional Sufi religious scholars (ulema) who fled Syria during the revolt, many of whom had acquired substantial followings inside Syria as a result of the Assad's regime's relaxation of controls over religious life in the past decade. Muhammad Kurayyim Rajih's League of the Ulema of Sham (LUS), led mostly by clerics from Damascus and Homs, is the most notable traditionalist group. Moaz al-Khatib of LUS, former imam of the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus, served as the first president of the SNC. LUS Vice President Sheikh Osama al-Rifai is the spiritual leader of a moderate Sufi movement called Jamaat Zayd (Zayd's Group), which was allowed by the regime to operate in Syria in the 1990s.
Finally, the Brotherhood and other political Islamist groups have been joined on most issues by a hybrid movement known as the Sururis. Based mainly in the Arab Gulf, Sururism "blends Salafism with Muslim Brotherhood ideology," notes journalist Hassan Hassan.11 Named after Muhammad ibn Surur al-Nayef Zayn al-Abidin, a Syrian Islamic scholar initially affiliated with the Brotherhood who emigrated to Saudi Arabia in the 1960s,12 Sururis adhere closely to the ideological precepts of Salafism (see below), but reject both the political quietism of traditional Salafis and (outside of the Syrian context) the Salafi-jihadist embrace of violence.
Due in part to lavish financing from donors in the Arab Gulf, Syrian Sururis have played an influential role in the rebellion. By September 2012, according to scholar Aron Lund, a financing network run by compatriots of the aging Surur and funded primarily by Arab Gulf donors appeared to be "active in supporting both humanitarian and paramilitary Islamist groups."13
In April 2011, pro-Brotherhood ulema joined together with traditionalists, reformists, and Sururis to form the Syrian Islamic Council (SIC), purporting to be an official religious authority for rebel forces. Headed by Osama al-Rifai, it is aligned with the Qatar-Turkey axis and opposed to al-Qaeda-linked extremists.14 Most Islamists in the SNC have avoided raising divisive social issues, such as veiling women and banning alcohol.
Nevertheless, the dominance of Islamists in the SNC has alienated many secular opposition figures. Kamal Lebwany, a dissident physician released from detention in November 2011 after nearly a decade in a Syrian jail, has lamented that the "the Muslim Brotherhood monopolizes everything" and warning that its pretensions to democracy are "a liberal peel covering a totalitarian, nondemocratic core."15
Although the Brotherhood declined to establish a fighting force in Syria bearing its name, it has provided funding to a range of different militias. The Commission for the Protection of Civilians (CPC), established in December 2011, is the primary vehicle for this. Most CPC recipients were initially loyal to the Free Syria Army (FSA) and its Supreme Military Command, but they included some Salafi-jihadist groups that later drifted away and now operate under the Islamic Front umbrella (see below). The intent of the financing has been less to directly control military units or promote their ideological agenda than to increase the Brotherhood's leverage sufficiently to make gains in an internationally-brokered settlement.
Although the CPC was initially the main source of external financing for the revolt, it was soon supplanted by the fundraising networks of radical Salafi preachers based in the Arab Gulf. Many of the CPC's early recipients have since drifted away from the Brotherhood as more sources of funding have become available, most notably the Tawhid Brigade, Ahrar al-Sham, and Suqour al-Sham.16
A second umbrella of Brotherhood-backed militias in and around Idlib and Hama is the Shields of the Revolution, which is nominally loyal to the FSA Supreme Military Command.17 Over the course of the war, militias affiliated with the Brotherhood have been eclipsed in strength by more radical groups. "Without a negotiated cease-fire," scholar Aron Lund wrote prophetically in mid-2013, "the real outcome of the Syrian conflict is likely to be determined on the battlefield, where the Brotherhood's failure to establish a strong presence could significantly weaken its hand."18
Regime-backed foreign Islamists
At the beginning of the uprising in March 2011, the Syrian regime retained an impressive array of foreign and domestic Islamist proxies.
In the Palestinian territories, Syria had supported the Sunni Islamist groups Islamic Jihad and Hamas, an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, for two decades. Alongside militant secular Palestinian groups, both were allowed to maintain offices and military bases inside Syria.
In Lebanon, the Assad regime was a principal supporter and conduit to the Shi'a Islamist Hezbollah movement, channeling Iranian arms and funds to the militia as it waged war against Israeli forces occupying southern Lebanon prior their withdrawal in 2000, then intermittently against Israel itself. Syria also co-opted a number of Lebanese Sunni Islamist factions based in and around Tripoli.
Finally, the Syrian regime covertly supported foreign jihadists entering Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime in 2003.19 Many Syrian jihadists affiliated with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) were allowed to set up safe houses and even recruit volunteers inside Syria.20 When the Assad regime dialed back its support for Iraqi insurgents in 2007-2008, many of these jihadis left Iraq. Hundreds were imprisoned upon their return to Syria, while some were allowed to cross into Lebanon, where they founded the group Fatah al-Islam in the Nahr al-Bared Palestinian refugee camp.
When demonstrations against the Syrian regime first erupted in March 2011, most of the regime's Sunni Islamist allies remained on the sidelines.21 Once it became clear that Assad was unable to stamp out the uprising by force, however, they abandoned the regime in droves. Hamas leaders departed their longtime home in Damascus for Doha, Qatar, in January 2012,22 while Salafi-jihadists came out squarely in support of the uprising.
Hezbollah, on the other hand, has steadfastly stood by the Syrian regime. The movement has used its considerable political power within Lebanon's quasi-democratic system to ensure that the Lebanese Army and other state security institutions have acted to prevent smuggling and other pro-rebel activities in Lebanon.
In late 2012, Hezbollah forces began entering Syria, ostensibly to protect Shi'a shrines but in reality to bolster pro-regime forces. In mid-2013, Hezbollah forces were instrumental in the regime's recapture of Qusayr, a predominantly Shiite Syrian town of 30,000, visible from the Lebanese border and essential to sealing off rebel supply routes into Lebanon.
Many military-age men among Syria's tiny Shi'a minority have joined Iranian-backed militias charged with defending Shi'a shrines throughout Syria, though they are outnumbered by the infusion of thousands of Iraqi Shi'a. The largest is the Abu Fadl al-Abbas Brigades, named after a widely revered military commander in the Battle of Karbala between the progenitors of today's Sunni and Shi'a,23 which reached an estimated strength of at least 10,000 by mid-2013.24 There have been reports that many Iraqi volunteers have returned to Iraq to defend against the advance of ISIS, and that Hezbollah has been recruiting Lebanese Shi'ites to fill their places.25
Salafi jihadists
The Syrian civil war has witnessed a proliferation of militant groups adhering to Salafism, an ultra-orthodox Sunni Islamist current that believes Muslims must return to the ways of al-salaf al-saleh (the righteous ancestors) from the time of the Prophet Muhammad and rid themselves of "innovations" (bidaa) that have taken root in the centuries since. The latter include not only such secular conventions as democracy and the nation-state, but also a millennium of Islamic jurisprudence and traditions that have come to define how most Muslims practice their faith. Non-Sunni Muslims and Sufis are viewed as heretics. In sharp contrast to the Muslim Brotherhood and its offshoots, Salafis traditionally eschewed participation in politics, focusing instead on missionary work (daawa) to convert Muslim societies to their way of thinking.
During the late 1970s, a younger generation of Salafis in the Arab Gulf (many of them expatriates) began to reject the movement's traditional political quietism and either agitate for Islamic rule at home or fight perceived enemies of Islam abroad. Thousands went to South Asia to combat the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. After the Soviet withdrawal and the fall of Kabul to the mujahidin, many of these so-called "Arab Afghans" returned home to continue fighting for their beliefs or joined Osama bin Laden's expanding al-Qaeda network. Many Arab Afghans later went to Iraq in the wake of the 2003 U.S.-led invasion, where they eventually congealed into AQI, rebranded in a 2006 expansion as the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), and trained a new generation of jihadist youth.
In late 2011, ISI chief Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi began infiltrating operatives into Syria, many of them Syrian nationals. After releasing a January 2012 video statement calling itself Jabhat al-Nusra (The Support Front),26 the new organization claimed responsibility for a multitude of spectacular suicide and Improvised Explosive Device (IED) bombings during the first half of 2012, most notably a February 10 twin bombing in Aleppo that struck a two military facilities, killing 28, and March 17 bombings against the Air Force Intelligence headquarters and Criminal Security department in Damascus, killing at least 27. Nusra also displayed undeniable prowess on the battlefield, spearheading the capture of numerous regime bases and fortified installations.
Led by a mysterious, as-yet-unidentified commander known as Abu Mohammad al-Golani (assumed to be a Syrian hailing from the Golan Heights), Nusra quickly received endorsements from al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri27 and influential jihadi ideologues.28
In sharp contrast to ISI's strategy during the Iraq war, which alienated local Sunnis, Nusra has developed cooperative relations with non-jihadist rebels and limited its mistreatment of civilians. When Nusra was officially designated a terrorist group by the U.S. government in December 2012, the Brotherhood and many FSA commanders publicly defended it.
Fearful that Nusra was growing too independent, in April 2013 Baghdadi declared that ISI and Nusra had merged to form the Islamic State of Syria and Iraq (ISIS). However, Golani disputed the merger and asked Zawahiri to mediate. When Zawahiri ruled in favor of Golani, ISIS broke away from al-Qaeda, taking most foreign fighters operating in Nusra's ranks with it.
ISIS aggressively consolidated areas of northeastern Syria under its control, clashing frequently with other rebels, including Nusra, and even executing several of their military commanders.29 It soon became clear that ISIS, unlike other rebel groups, was not fighting first and foremost to overthrow Assad–indeed, the regime's endurance had created conditions ideal for its growth.
In contrast to most other insurgent groups operating in Syria, ISIS derives most of its income from indigenous revenue sources, not outside donations. ISIS' extortion of local businesses in Syria and Iraq nets around $8 million per month, according to one estimate.30 Having gained control of most of the oil-rich province of Raqqa, ISIS draws even more revenue selling off Syrian crude oil (as much as $2 million a day, alongside $1 million a day from Iraqi oil, according to one estimate).31 ISIS (along with Nusra, to a lesser extent) has reportedly sold crude oil to the Assad regime.32 ISIS was reported to have looted $425 million in cash from the central bank in Mosul after its capture of the Iraqi city in June 2014, making it by some accounts the world's richest terrorist organization.33 After overrunning much of northern Iraq in the spring and summer of 2014, ISIS changed its name to "the Islamic State."
A third Salafi-jihadist current encompasses a broad array of groups funded primarily by Salafi activists in the Arab Gulf, and increasingly by Arab Gulf governments themselves as a means of limiting the growth potential of Nusra and Baghdadi's Islamic State. Most of these groups joined the Syrian Islamic Front, an umbrella coalition established in December 2012, and its successor, the Islamic Front. Together they have roughly 60,000 fighters.
Ideologically, these groups share much in common with hardline jihadists. They reject democracy, openly claim to be fighting for an Islamic state, and do not recognize the SNC.
Unlike the transnational jihadists, however, the Islamic Front groups downplay or even deny pan-Islamic ambitions (scholar Abdul Rahman Al-Haj calls them "deferred Caliphate" jihadists),34 avoid anti-Western demagoguery, and adopt slightly less inflammatory rhetoric concerning Syrian minorities.35 The Islamic Front "wants to come across as reasonable and responsible actor," notes Aron Lund.36 The Islamic Front groups have few foreign volunteers fighting in their ranks (mostly concentrated in Ahrar al-Sham), and none are known to have used suicide attacks significantly.
Most Islamic Front groups rely heavily on financing from Arab Gulf donors, most of it channeled under the guise of humanitarian aid through Kuwait, which has been the primary hub for private fundraising because of its lax regulatory environment and the political strength of Salafis.37 The tiny oil-rich emirate was dubbed "the Arab world's main clearinghouse" for donations to radical Islamist rebels by the Wall Street Journal38 and "a virtual Western Union outlet for Syria's rebels" by the New York Times.39
In 2013, the Kuwaiti government prohibited some prominent Salafis from preaching to the public40 and passed new laws bolstering the power of public prosecutors to monitor suspicious transactions and freeze funds.41 However, there is little evidence that these measures have been effective. In March 2014, Treasury Undersecretary David S. Cohen warned that Kuwait remained "the epicenter of fundraising for terrorist groups in Syria," where activists "openly advertise their ability to move funds to fighters in Syria."42
Closer regulation of Salafi fundraising may have been intended to pave the way for patronage of the Islamic Front by the Arab Gulf governments. One of the leading Islamic Front groups, the Army of Islam, was formed in October 2013 by the merger of Liwa al-Islam and numerous smaller, Saudi-backed Salafi-jihadist groups operating in the suburbs of Damascus. The Saudi government reportedly offered funding to those who joined, with the apparent intention of halting the expansion of Nusra and ISIS.43 Liwa al-Islam leader Zahran Alloush, the son of Saudi-based Syrian religious scholar Abdullah Mohammed Alloush, became leader of the Army of Islam.
Because "deferred-Caliphate" national jihadists are overwhelmingly Syrian-born, the Arab Gulf states are more confident that they will put down their arms when the fight against Assad is over, rather than moving on to the next front in the global jihad.
The emergence of the Islamic Front contributed to the eclipse of the FSA, as some of its members, such as Tawhid and Suqour al-Sham, had previously been loyal to the Supreme Military Council.44 In September 2013, they joined Nusra other major Salafi-oriented militias in signing a statement rejecting the Western-backed SNC and committing to the imposition of sharia as the "sole source of legislation."
Notwithstanding the steady growth of radical Sunni Islamist forces over the past three years, there was little sign of violent extremism within Syrian society prior to the uprising. However, the spread of radical Islamism has been facilitated by socio-economic conditions in much of Syria on the eve of the uprising, sectarian polarization during the war, and the influx of resources from external sponsors.
Syria is an extraordinarily diverse country. Sunni Arabs are by far the largest ethno-sectarian group, comprising 67 percent of the population. Non-Arab (predominantly Sunni) Kurds number roughly nine percent of the population. The remainder consists of non-Sunni, predominantly Arab religious minorities–Alawis comprise about 12 percent of the population, Christians of various denominations 10 percent, Druze three percent, and various Shi'a denominations around one percent.45 Communal solidarity (asabiya) is very strong among all of these minorities, owing in part to centuries of oppression and discrimination at the hands of Sunni rulers.
Alawis, an offshoot of Shi'a Islam, arguably suffered the most prior to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the close of World War I. Branded as heretics by most Sunnis, shunned as deviants by religious Shi'a, and lacking powerful co-religionist regional allies, Syrian Alawis were poor, under-educated, and socially isolated in roughly four dozen remote villages in northwestern Syria.46
During the French mandate period (1920-1943), many Alawis and other minorities joined the military as a means of socio-economic advancement, whereas their Sunni counterparts tended to shun cooperation with colonial authorities. Consequently, minorities were overrepresented in the military when Syria gained independence. Many of these officers flocked to the Ba'ath Party, which espoused a secular, non-sectarian, socialist agenda. By 1963, Alawis comprised 65 percent of noncommissioned officers in the Syrian army, which helped pave the way for the Ba'ath coup that year and Hafez al-Assad's subsequent ascent to the presidency in 1971.47 In the decades that followed, Alawi domination of the security apparatus became even more pronounced.
But Syria was not an "Alawi state." The ruling party's ideology was rigidly non-sectarian – even references to sect were avoided in state-run media. Indeed, in its zeal to erase the appearance of sectarian differences, the Assad regime pushed its own Alawi community to adopt the outer trappings of Sunni Islam (e.g. building mosques, even though Alawis don't customarily use them).
Assad made sure that the façade of civilian government in Syria appropriately reflected Sunni demographic weight. The positions of prime minister, foreign minister, and army commander were nearly always held by Sunnis, for example, as were most parliamentary seats, judicial offices, and other high visibility posts. Many second-generation Alawi power barons later forged business partnerships with Sunnis and some (including Bashar al-Assad) took Sunni wives.
For most Syrians, opposition to the regime was not primarily rooted in matters of faith. The Assad regime's statist economic development and social welfare policies gave it sufficiently strong base of rural support cutting across sectarian lines that lasted through the turn of the century.48 "It is quite plain that the conflict is not about religion," noted historian Hanna Batatu wrote in 1982 as the Brotherhood-led revolt reached its climax. "It is not the beliefs of the Sunnis that have been in danger or under attack since the Ba'thist take-over in 1963, but the social interests of the upper and middle elements of their landed, mercantile, and manufacturing classes."49 Representing similar constituencies, many traditionalist Sufi preachers in Hama and Aleppo supported the Brotherhood-led revolt against the Assad regime (and in Hama their followers took up arms).50
Islamism was an effective tool for mobilizing and channeling mass dissent against an Alawi-dominated regime. Once the leaders using this tool were killed, imprisoned, and exiled, however, Syria enjoyed nearly three decades of relative domestic tranquility, with only sporadic outbreaks of Islamist and sectarian violence. Some observers point to this long stretch of stability as evidence that religious extremism had declined among ordinary Syrians – that bad memories of the Brotherhood's folly had inoculated the country against the appeal of radical Islamism. However, the unrivalled power of the Ba'athist state during this era is sufficient to account for the scarcity of internal Islamist opposition.
Like the rest of the region, Syria began experiencing an Islamic revival during the 1990s, evident in growing mosque attendance, more women wearing the hijab, and more men growing beards. Islamic bookshops proliferated and restaurants in many areas of the country stopped serving alcohol.51
Hoping to safely channel this religiosity away from political activism, the Assad regime allowed some quietist Sufi currents to begin relatively freely, such as the abovementioned Zaydis. For example, a women's charitable organization known as the Qubaisiaat—named after the female religious leader, Munira al-Qubaisi, who runs it—saw its influence spread rapidly.52
Assad also allowed some traditional Salafi charities, funded by donors in the Arab Gulf and Syrian expatriates working there, to operate in rural areas during the mid-2000s, though Salafism was a "relatively negligible component of the country's religious scene" at the time of the uprising, notes the International Crisis Group (IGC).53
The 2011 revolt
Militant Islamism certainly was not a cause of the popular uprising that erupted in 2011. There are plenty of socio-economic drivers, most notably a pronounced "youth bulge." Syria's population of 23 million is the youngest in the Middle East outside of the Palestinian territories,54 with 53 percent below the age of 20.55
Bashar Assad's economic reforms solidified support for the regime among the urban elites and middle class, but at the expense of rural areas. UK-based Syrian journalist Malik al-Abdeh characterized the uprising as a "revolution of the rural Sunni working classes against the Alawi-dominated military elite and the urban bourgeoisie (both Muslim and Christian) that has profited from the Assad dictatorship."56 It was not religion that triggered their decision to rise up to the regime after years of quiet obedience, but the "demonstration effect" of watching Egyptians, Tunisians, and Libyans overthrow their own governments.
Early in the uprising, observers sympathetic to the opposition argued that "there are few traces of radical Islamism in Syria" and that, should the Assad regime fall, "the chance of Syria turning into an Islamic state is almost nil."57 But the secular democratic orientation of the uprising steadily eroded as the violence escalated and prospects of a peaceful solution evaporated.58 This was partly because the regime had little trouble suppressing protests in non-Sunni and mixed towns and neighborhoods, where demonstrations were never large enough to give safety in numbers. In Sunni majority areas, in contrast, demonstrations "were 20 to 30 times larger [and] organized under the semi-inviolable protection of mosques."59 For ordinary Syrians contemplating whether to protest in the streets, ironically, it was much safer to be a Sunni than to be an Alawi.
Moreover, while a majority of Christians, Druze, and Kurds – perhaps even Alawis – supported demands for political reform and human rights, they were much less willing than devout Sunnis to take greatest personal risks challenging Assad. Consequently, regime repression further tilted the demographic composition of uprising by weeding out minorities and those of little religious faith.60 As the country rapidly slipped into full-blown civil war in early 2012 and it became a question of whether to stand up and fight the regime, the revolutionaries on the ground were almost exclusively Sunni. Sunnification was followed by Islamization as most emerging rebel groups adopted explicitly Islamic names and iconography.
Some attribute this Islamic awakening to the fact that donations from the Arab Gulf states and private Arab donors outpaced assistance from the West. According to such "resource mobilization" explanations,61 the influx of cash from Salafi donors not only strengthened jihadist forces vis-à-vis the FSA, but also led relatively secular groups within the FSA to adopt Salafi dress and customs.62 Many rank and file fighters of Salafi-jihadist militias are devout Sunnis with no firm extremist convictions. "Size, money, and momentum are the things to look for in Syrian insurgent politics—ideology comes fourth, if even that," notes Lund.63
However, much as Pakistan and Afghanistan became the crucible for indoctrinating adventure-seeking youth from across the Arab world into the Salafi-jihadist path during the 1980s, conditions in Syria are perfect for converting a new generation of extremists.
In the first three decades after the Ba'ath Party seized power in 1963, the Syrian state worked to secularize Syrian society and control Islamic religious expression, especially in the wake of the first Syrian uprising. All formal Islamic institutions were closely managed by the state,64 while preaching outside of the mosques or outside of appointed prayer times was prohibited. With no independent political parties, media, unions, or other associations allowed to come between citizen and state, neutering the mosques was the final link in the chain.
Only heavily vetted ulema loyal to the regime and willing to actively legitimate it were allowed to preach. The most prominent was Ahmed Kaftaro, head of the Naqshbandi Sufi order and Grand Mufti of Syria from 1964 until his death in 2004. Sermons were typically designed to discourage politicization of religious faith.
The resurgence of Islamic revivalism throughout the Arab world in the 1990s led the Assad regime to take a new direction aimed at endowing Syria with a more authentic Islamic look and feel. The regime released large numbers of Brotherhood members who had been held in Syrian prisons since the early 1980s,65 while cultivating close ties with Sunni Islamists in the Palestinian territories and elsewhere in the Arab world (its relations with most non-Syrian branches of the Muslim Brotherhood were quite cordial).
Upon ascending to the presidency after his father's death in 2000, Bashar al-Assad continued efforts to promote an Islamic posture. The new president released hundreds of Islamist prisoners, lifted a longstanding ban on wearing female headscarves in Syrian schools,66 and allowed mosques to remain open between prayer times.67 He began favorably referencing religion in public speeches,68 while state universities held Koran reading competitions.69 The Syrian military even announced that Islamic clergy would be allowed to give lectures to military cadets for the first time in 43 years, a decision that Defense Minister Hassan Tourkmani called a response to "the thirst for God in the barracks."70
Rather than seeking to defuse Islamist militancy, state-vetted preachers now sought to harness it in support of the regime. A notable voice was Mohammad Said Ramada al-Bouti, whose televised sermons made him one of the most recognized figures in Syria in the 2000s. Bouti and other state-sanctioned clerics preached that enemies of Islam were conspiring to sow the seeds of fitna (civil strife) in Syria and the broader Middle East, using agents ranging from women's rights activists to the Muslim Brotherhood to set brother against brother.71 In 2003, the aging Kaftaro even issued a fatwa calling for resistance to U.S.-led coalition forces in Iraq.
Although falling well short of the kind of unfettered religious freedom that could pose direct political and security threats to the regime, state-modulated Islamization dramatically changed the public landscape of Syria, from styles of dress to architecture.72
Whereas the late Hafez al-Assad kept his regime's Palestinian and Lebanese Islamist clients at arms-length and never allowed them to operate unsupervised in Syria, Bashar al-Assad went much further during the Iraq war by allowing militant jihadists to preach and recruit inside Syria. The most notable was Abu Qaqaa (aka Mahmoud Qoul Aghassi), a preacher in Aleppo who was allowed to directly recruit local youth to fight in Iraq and even offer weapons training at his mosque. Some have suggested that Abu Qaqaa was, or became, a Syrian intelligence agent, as many of his recruits were tracked and arrested upon their return to Syria. His assassination in 2007 was widely seen as either payback from jihadists for betraying them or "disposal" by a regime that no longer needed or trusted him.73
In addition to directly sponsoring jihadist violence for political and strategic reasons, the regime used its close connections to the Islamist underworld to stage false flag operations designed to cast blame on Islamists. The most infamous is the February 2005 assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafiq Hariri in Beirut, which was intended to pin responsibility on Salafi-jihadists (the Syrian mukhabarat, or secret police, even recruited a real, unwitting jihadist to make the video-taped claim of responsibility).
During the height of the Assad regime's support for jihadists in Iraq, Syria experienced a number of suspicious and ultimately foiled or minimally destructive "terrorist attacks" that were likely orchestrated by the regime to bolster its diplomatic efforts to present itself as a victim of al-Qaeda, notably an April 2004 attack on an abandoned UN building in Damascus.74
In the aftermath of the 2005 Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon, the Assad regime allowed numerous Syrian veterans of the Iraq war to infiltrate the country, presumably to create the impression that Lebanon was less secure. There they started a group called Fatah al-Islam that fought a bloody 2007 battle with the Lebanese Army that left much of the Palestinian Nahr al-Bared refugee camp in ruins.
As part and parcel of the regime's Islamic "awakening," the mukhabarat organized periodic demonstrations designed to give the appearance that Islamists are allowed to assemble and express themselves publicly. In February 2006, as the controversy over a Danish newspaper's publication of cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad was sparking Muslim protests worldwide, the regime engineered large riots outside the Danish and Norwegian embassies (both of which were torched).75
During the first four months of the uprising, while thousands of pro-democracy protestors were being rounded up, the Assad regime released hundreds of Islamists in its jails, many of them Iraq war veterans who had run afoul of the authorities after returning to Syria in 2008-2009. Many of these parolees later played major roles in the rebellion, including Zahran Aloush, the commander of the Army of Islam; Abdul Rahman Suweis of the Haqq Brigade; Hassan Aboud of Ahrar Al Sham; Ahmad Aisa Al Sheikh, commander of Suqour Al Sham; and possibly Nusra commander Abu Mohammad al-Golani (whose true identity has never been confirmed).76
Some interpreted the releases as a horribly botched effort to win the support or at least quiescence of radical jihadists. Others believe that the releases were intended to have precisely the result they had – jumpstarting a violent Islamist insurgency that will lead the international community to think twice about aiding the Syrian opposition, while solidifying support for the regime among minorities and urban, middle-class Sunnis.
Having blamed foreign jihadists for the uprising from the very start, the emergence of ISIS – a jihadist organization full of foreigners that makes no effort to appear civilized – was a blessing for Assad. There is some evidence of collusion between the two. For example, regime airstrikes against ISIS bases in some areas of Syria all but stopped when the group began targeting other insurgents in much of 2013 and early 2014.77 However, fierce battles between the regime and ISIS in the summer of 2014 over control of oil fields belied claims that ISIS is secretly in league with Assad.
[1] Thomas Mayer, "The Islamic Opposition in Syria, 1961-1982," Orient 24 (1983); Patrick Seale and Maureen McConville, Assad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East, (London: I.B. Tauris, 1988), 320-338.
[2] Nir Rosen, "Islamism and the Syrian Uprising," Foreign Policy, March 8, 2012,http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/03/08/islamism_and_the_syrian_uprising.
[3] Hassan Hassan, "In Syria, the Brotherhood's influence is on the decline," The National (UAE), April 1, 2014.http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/comment/in-syria-the-brotherhoods-influence-is-on-the-decline.
[4] Jared A. Favole, "Brotherhood Raises Syria Profile: Islamist Group Tries to Organize Opposition to Assad Regime, as Protests Waiver," Wall Street Journal, May 17, 2011,http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703509104576327212414590134.htm; Khaled Yacoub Oweis, "Syria's Muslim Brotherhood rise from the ashes as dominant force in the opposition," Al Arabiya (Dubai), May 6, 2012, http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/05/06/212447.html.
[5] Thomas Pierret, "Syria: Old-Timers and Newcomers," in Robin Wright (ed), The Islamists are Coming: Who They Really Are (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2012), 76.
[6] Raphael Lefevre, "Between Pragmatism and Radicalism: The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and the Ba'ath Regime," in George Joffé, ed., Islamist Radicalisation in Europe and the Middle East: Reassessing the Causes of Terrorism (London: I. B. Tauris, 2012), 173.
[7] Neil MacFarquhar, "Trying to Mold a Post-Assad Syria From Abroad," New York Times, May 5, 2012,http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/06/world/middleeast/from-abroad-trying-to-mold-a-post-assad-syria.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all.
[8] Pierret, "Syria: Old-Timers and Newcomers."
[9] Ibid.
[10] Thomas Pierret, "The Syrian Islamic Council," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 13, 2014, http://carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=55580
[11] Hassan Hassan, "New Syrian Islamic Council repeats the patterns of old," The National (UAE), April 22, 2014, http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/comment/new-syrian-islamic-council-repeats-the-patterns-of-old.
[12] In Saudi Arabia, Surur developed a large following and influenced the "Islamic Awakening" movement in the Kingdom. Alongside notable Saudi figures such as Salman Al-Ouda (a former student) and Safar Al-Hawali, Surur denounced the Saudi regime after it allowed the entry of U.S. forces into the Kingdom ahead of the 1991 Gulf War. Although the Sururis (al-sururiyyun), as they were derogatively called by the Wahhabi clerical establishment (to highlight the movement's foreign influences), fell into line after the Saudi government began arresting their leaders, they retained a substantial following in the kingdom. Some came out in favor of the Arab Spring uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia, but they have been more reluctant than the Saudi branch of the Brotherhood to press for political change at home. See Jarret M. Brachman, Global Jihadism: Theory and Practice (London: Routledge, 2009), 36-38. See also Abdulaziz Alhies, "Concerns in the Gulf," Al-Ahram (Cairo), December 20, 2012, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/News/620/21/Concerns-in-the-Gulf-.aspx; William McCants, "Islamist Outlaws: Saudi Arabia Takes on the Muslim Brotherhood," The Brookings Institution, March 17, 2014, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2014/03/17-saudi-arabia-outlaws-muslim-brotherhood-mccants; Stéphane Lacroix, "Saudi Islamists and the Arab Spring," London School of Economics and Political Science, May 2014, http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/56725/1/Lacroix_Saudi-Islamists-and-theArab-Spring_2014.pdf.
[13] Aron Lund, "Syrian Jihadism," Swedish Institute of International Affairs, September 14, 2012, http://www.ui.se/upl/files/77409.pdf.
[14] Thomas Pierret,"The Struggle for Religious Authority in Syria," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 14, 2014, http://carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=55593.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Aron Lund, "Struggling to Adapt: The Muslim Brotherhood in a New Syria," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace," May 7, 2013, http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/05/07/struggling-to-adapt-muslim-brotherhood-in-newsyria/g2qmfa=searchResults&maxrow=20&tabName=pubs&qry=&fltr=&channel=&pageOn=365&reloadFlag=1.
[17] Raphaël Lefèvre, "The Brotherhood Starts Anew in Syria," Majalla, August 19, 2013, http://www.majalla.com/eng/2013/08/article55244734.
[18] Lund, "Struggling to Adapt."
[19] Raymond Tanter and Stephen Kersting, "Syria's Role in the Iraq Insurgency," inFOCUS Quarterly, Spring 2009, http://www.jewishpolicycenter.org/827/syrias-role-in-the-iraq-insurgency.
[20] U.S. Department of the Treasury, "Treasury Designates Members of Abu Ghadiyah's Network Facilitates flow of terrorists, weapons, and money from Syria to al Qaida in Iraq," February 28, 2008, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp845.aspx.
[21] Lee Smith, "Crack-up," Tablet, April 28, 2011, http://www.tabletmag.com/news-and-politics/65981/crack-up/.
[22] Fares Akram, "Hamas Leader Abandons Longtime Base in Damascus." New York Times, January 27, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/28/world/middleeast/khaled-meshal-the-leader-of-hamas-vacates-damascus.html?gwh=58C00E217CFD163EF15817D69C917AF0.
[23] Phillip Smyth, "Hizballah Cavalcade: What is the Liwa'a Abu Fadl al-Abbas (LAFA)?: Assessing Syria's Shia "International Brigade" Through Their Social Media Presence," Jihadology.net, May 15, 2013, http://jihadology.net/2013/05/15/hizballah-cavalcade-what-is-the-liwaa-abu-fadl-al-abbas-lafa-assessing-syrias-shia-international-brigade-through-their-social-media-presence/. See also Phillip Smyth, "Hizballah Cavalcade: From Najaf to Damascus and Onto Baghdad: Iraq's Liwa Abu Fadl al-Abbas," Jihadology.net, June 18, 2014, http://jihadology.net/2014/06/18/hizballah-cavalcade-from-najaf-to-damascus-and-onto-baghdad-iraqs-liwa-abu-fadl-al-abbas/.
[24] Mona Mahmoud and Martin Chulov, "Syrian War Widens Sunni-Shia Schism as Foreign Jihadis Join Fight for Shrines," Guardian (London), June 4, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/04/syria-islamic-sunni-shia-shrines-volunteers.
[25] "Hezbollah mobilizes to defend Shiite shrines in Syria," Now Lebanon, June 12, 2014, https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/lebanonnews/551145-hezbollah-announces-general-mobilization-in-syria.
[26] Bill Roggio, "Al Nusrah Front claims suicide attack in Syria," Long War Journal, February 26, 2012, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/02/al_nusrah_front_clai.php.
[27] "I appeal to every Muslim and every free, honorable one in Turkey, Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon, to rise to help his brothers in Syria with all what he can, with his life, money, wonders, opinion, and information." As cited in Bill Roggio, "Al Baraa Ibn Malik Martyrdom Brigade forms in Syria," Long War Journal Threat Matrix blog, February 18, 2012, http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2012/02/al_baraa_ibn_malik_martyrdom_b.php.
[28] On March 6, 2012, prominent jihadi cleric Abu Mundhir al-Shinqiti released an online fatwa urging all capable Muslims to join the ranks of Jabhat al-Nusra. See "Fatwa by Senior Salafi-Jihadi Cleric: Muslims Are Obligated to Join the Ranks of the Syrian Jihadi Group 'Jabhat Al-Nusra'," MEMRI Jihad and Terrorism Threat Monitor no. 4565, March 13, 2012, http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/6168.htm. Other important jihadi ideologues have also given their approval, including the prominent online essayist Sheikh Abu Sa'd al-'Amil, the prominent Jordanian Salafi Sheikh Abu Muhammad al-Tahawi, and the popular Lebanese Sheikh Abu al-Zahra' al-Zubaydi. See Aaron Y. Zelin, "Syria's New Jihadis," Foreign Policy, May 22, 2012, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/syrias-new-jihadis.
[29] Other Salafi-jihadists were not immune. In May 2014, for example, ISIS militants captured and beheaded Muthana Hussein, a senior commander of Ahrar al-Sham. See "Islamist militias unite under 'code of honor',"Daily Star (Beirut), May 19, 2014, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2014/May-19/256938-islamist-militias-unite-under-code-of-honor.ashx#ixzz35eSDD8nV.
[30] Lori Plotkin Boghardt, "Saudi Funding of ISIS," Washington Institute for Near East Policy PolicyWatch 2275, June 23, 2014, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/saudi-funding-of-isis.
[31] Robin Mills, a Dubai-based energy analyst, interviewed in Karen Leigh, "ISIS Makes Up To $3 Million a Day Selling Oil, Analysts Say," Syriadeeply.org, July 28, 2014, http://www.syriadeeply.org/articles/2014/07/5856/isis-3-million-day-selling-oil-analysts/.
[32] "Rebels in Syria Claim Control of Resources," New York Times, January 28, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/29/world/middleeast/rebels-in-syria-claim-control-of-resources.html?_r=0. [33] Terrence McCoy, "ISIS just stole $425 million, Iraqi governor says, and became the 'world's richest terrorist group'," Washington Post, June 12, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/06/12/isis-just-stole-425-million-and-became-the-worlds-richest-terrorist-group/.
[34] Abdul Rahman Al-Haj, "Salafism and Salafis in Syria: From reform to jihad," The Afro-Middle East Centre (Johannesburg, South Africa), June 22, 2013, http://www.amec.org.za/articles-presentations/syria/361-salafism-and-salafis-in-syria-from-reform-to-jihad.
[35] Aron Lund, "Syria's Salafi Insurgents: The Rise of the Syrian Islamic Front," Swedish Institute of International Affairs, January 2013, 22, http://www.ui.se/eng/upl/files/86861.pdf.
[36] Ibid., 18.
[37] Elizabeth Dickinson, "Playing with Fire: Why Private Gulf Financing for Syria's Extremist Rebels Risks Igniting Sectarian Conflict at Home," The Brookings Institution, December 2013, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2013/12/06%20private%20gulf%20financing%20syria%20extremist%20rebels%20sectarian%20conflict%20dickinson/private%20gulf%20financing%20syria%20extremist%20rebels%20sectarian%20conflict%20dickinson.pdf.
[38] Ellen Knickmeyer, "Kuwaiti Court Upholds Parliamentary Vote, a Setback for Muslim Brotherhood," Wall Street Journal, December 23, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304244904579276383918948044.
[39] Ben Hubbard, "Private Donors' Funds Add Wild Card to War in Syria," New York Times, November 12, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/13/world/middleeast/private-donors-funds-add-wild-card-to-war-in-syria.html.
[40] Elizabeth Dickinson, "Sectarian divides from Syria extend their reach," The National (UAE), July 26, 2013, http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle-east/sectarian-divides-from-syria-extend-their-reach. "Kuwait scholar Shafi Al Ajami suspended from imamship," Gulf News, August 22, 2013, http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/kuwait/kuwait-scholar-shafi-al-ajami-suspended-from-imamship-1.1222936. "Kuwait pulls cleric from TV over sectarianism," Al Jazeera (Doha), August 13, 2013, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/08/2013813124256264315.html.
[41] Zoltan Pall, "Kuwaiti Salafism and Its Growing Influence in the Levant," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 7, 2014, http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/05/07/kuwaiti-salafism-and-its-growing-influence-in-levant/ha83?reloadFlag=1#.
[42] Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David Cohen, remarks of before the Center for a New American Security on "Confronting New Threats in Terrorist Financing," March 4, 2014, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2308.aspx.
[43] "Saudi Arabia boosts Salafist rivals to al Qaeda in Syria," Reuters, October 1, 2013.
[44] Aron Lund, "Islamist Groups Declare Opposition to National Coalition and US Strategy," Syria Comment, September 24, 2013, http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/major-rebel-factions-drop-exiles-go-full-islamist/.
[45] "Syria," in World Factbook 2013-14 (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2013), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sy.html.
[46] Leon Goldsmith, "Alawites for Assad: Why the Syrian Sect Backs the Regime," Foreign Affairs, April 16, 2012, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137407/leon-goldsmith/alawites-for-assad?page=show; Akil Hashem, "Former Syrian General Akil Hashem on the Uprising in Syria: Without Intervention, No End in Sight," Foreign Affairs, April 16, 2012, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/discussions/interviews/former-syrian-general-akil-hashem-on-the-uprising-in-syria?page=show; Tony Badran, "Divided They Stand: The Syrian Opposition,"Mideast Monitor 1, no. 3, September-October 2006, http://www.mideastmonitor.org/issues/0609/0609_3.htm.
[47] Hashem, "Former Syrian General Akil Hashem on the Uprising in Syria: Without Intervention, No End in Sight."
[48] Raymond A. Hinnebusch, "The Islamic Movement in Syria: Sectarian Conflict and Urban Rebellion in an Authoritarian-Populist Regime," in Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, ed., Islamic Resurgence in the Arab World (New York: Praeger, 1982), 150-151.
[49] Hanna Batatu, "Syria's Muslim Brethren," MERIP Reports no. 110 (November-December 1982), 13.
[50] Paulo Pinto, "Dangerous Liaisons: Sufism and the State in Syria," in S. Jakelic and J. Varsoke, eds.,Crossing Boundaries: From Syria to Slovakia (Vienna: IWM, 2003), http://www.iwm.at/wp-content/uploads/jc-14-01.pdf.
[51] Eyal Zisser, "Syria, the Ba'th Regime and the Islamic Movement: Stepping on a New Path," The Muslim World 95, no. 1 (January 2005), 60-62.
[52] Ibrahim Hamidi, "The Qubaysi ladies take up Islamic preaching in Syria with government approval," Al-Hayat (London), May 3, 2006, http://faculty-staff.ou.edu/L/Joshua.M.Landis-1/syriablog/2006/05/qubaysi-womens-islamic-movement-by.htm; Andrew Tabler, In the Lion's Den: An Eyewitness Account of Washington's Battle with Syria, (Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books, 2011), 125; Katherine Zoepf, "In Syria, a quiet Islamic revival," New York Times, August 28, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/28/world/africa/28iht-syria3.2620838.html?sq=qubaisiate&st=cse&scp=1&pagewanted=all.
[53] Tentative Jihad: Syria's Fundamentalist Opposition, The International Crisis Group, October 12, 2012,. 4,http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/egypt-syria-lebanon/syria/131-tentative-jihad-syrias-fundamentalist-opposition.aspx.
[54] "World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples," Minority Rights Group International, October 2011, http://www.minorityrights.org/?lid=5266.
[55] David Kenner, "Syria Comes of Age: An extraordinary population boom fuels the revolt against Bashar al-Assad's regime," Foreign Policy, December 8, 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/12/08/syria_population_boom_revolution?page=full.
[56] Malik al-Abdeh, "How I understand the Syrian revolution," syriaintransition.com, March 1, 2012, http://syriaintransition.com/2012/03/01/how-i-understand-the-syrian-revolution/.
[57] Hussain Abdul-Hussain, "Syria After Assad," NOW Lebanon, April 13, 2011, http://nowlebanon.com/NewsArchiveDetails.aspx?ID=261197.
[58] This evolution can be tracked in the names of nationwide demonstrations following Friday afternoon prayers, selected each week from among slogans nominated by major activist groups in a poll on the Syrian Revolution 2011 Facebook page. Early rallies had names such as "Friday of Anger," while later on names with religious slogans began to appear, such as "If You Support God He Will Grant You Victory." "The battle to name Syria's Friday protests," al-Jazeera (Doha), April 14, 2012, http://me.aljazeera.net/?name=aj_standard_en&i=8888§ion_name=in_depth_features&guid=201241314026709762&showonly=1.
[59] Gary Gambill, "Assad's Survival Strategy," Foreign Policy, April 6, 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/04/06/assads_survival_strategy?page=full.
[60] "While it is premature to characterize the protests as an Islamist uprising," wrote Gambill three weeks after the start of the uprising, "there is little doubt that those most eager to risk death or severe bodily harm are overwhelmingly Sunni and deeply religious." Gambill, "Assad's Survival Strategy."
[61] Zach Goldberg, Syria's Salafi Awakening: Existential Psychological Primers (Part 1/2), Fair Observer, July 15, 2014, http://www.fairobserver.com/region/middle_east_north_africa/syrias-salafi-awakening-existential-psychological-primers-01474/.
[62] Lund, "Syria's Salafi Insurgents: The Rise of the Syrian Islamic Front," 10.
[63] Lund, "Islamist Groups Declare Opposition to National Coalition and US Strategy."
[64] Zisser, "Syria, the Ba'th Regime and the Islamic Movement," 45.
[65] They were released in several presidential amnesties in December 1991 (2,864 prisoners), March 1992 (600 prisoners), November 1993 (554 prisoners), November 1995 (1,200 prisoners), and 1998 (250 prisoners).
[66] Eyal Zisser, "Syria, the Ba´th Regime and the Islamic Movement," 54.
[67] Sami Moubayed, "The Islamic Revival in Syria," Mideast Monitor 1, no. 3, September-October 2006, http://www.mideastmonitor.org/issues/0609/0609_4.htm.
[68] For example, Assad ended a November 2005 speech at Damascus University with the popular saying "Syria is protected by God" a sentiment completely alien to decades of Ba'athist propaganda. See Bashar al-Assad, "Comprehensive Political Speech Delivered by H.E. President Bashar al-Assad at the Damascus Auditorium," official copy of speech issued by Tishreen newspaper, November 10, 2005, http://www.presidentassad.net/SPEECHES/ASSAD_DAMASCUS_UNIVERSITY_SPEECH.htm; Tabler, In the Lion's Den, 118.
[69] Tabler, In the Lion's Den, 134.
[70] Ibid., 134.
[71] Wikas, "Battling the Lion of Damascus," 25.
[72] Lina Khatib, Islamic Revivalism in Syria: The Rise and Fall of Ba'thist Secularism (New York: Routledge, 2011), 109-142.
[73] Mohammed Habash, "Radicals are Assad's best friends," The National (UAE), January 1, 2014, http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/comment/radicals-are-assads-best-friends. "
[74] "The Bombing in Damascus: Ten Reasons to Doubt Syria's Claim," Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, May 2004, http://www.meforum.org/meib/articles/0405_s2.htm.
[75] "Syrian protesters set fire to embassies," Associated Press, February 4, 2006, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/feb/04/religion.syria.
[76] "Assad regime set free extremists from prison to fire up trouble during peaceful uprising," The National(UAE), January 21, 2014, http://www.thenational.ae/world/syria/assad-regime-set-free-extremists-from-prison-to-fire-up-trouble-during-peaceful-uprising; Raniah Salloum, "From Jail to Jihad: Former Prisoners Fight in Syrian Insurgency," Spiegel (Hamburg), October 10, 2013, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/former-prisoners-fight-in-syrian-insurgency-a-927158.html.
[77] Ben Hubbard, Clifford Krauss and Eric Schmitt, "Rebels in Syria Claim Control of Resources," New York Times, January 28, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/29/world/middleeast/rebels-in-syria-claim-control-of-resources.html?_r=0.


text:
The Complete Guide to Overcoming Traumatic StressTerrible events are very hard to deal with. Those who go through a catastrophic life experience, such as a car accident, assault, long-term abuse, an illness or bereavement, often feel permanently changed by the impact of what has happened. They become numb and shut off from those around them, or grief or guilt may constantly weigh them down. Memories of horrifying scenes may intrude unexpectedly
An Introduction to Coping with Post-Traumatic StressThis is a new addition to the popular 'Introduction to Coping with' series of self-help booklets. Written by one of the authors of the popular self-help title Overcoming Traumatic Stress, An Introduction to Coping with Post-Traumatic Stress offers valuable guidance for those who have gone through catastrophic life events. Such events can range from train disasters and car accidents to natural

subset: commoncrawl


text:
Reviewed By Jim K (North Charleston, SC) Reviewed for a 1999 Jeep Wrangler —1/10/2015 8:29 PM
AEM cold air filter is a great fit and looks great!!!
Reviewed By Thomas T (TROY, OH) Reviewed for a 1999 Jeep Wrangler —12/9/2014 4:29 AM
Install of the entire kit was very straight forward. Install instructions were great (yes I read the instructions) and the kit hardware is quality. Air filter shield contacts the AC compressor connections causing abrasions on the side of the heat shield. Need to make a work around for that. Looks clean and noticeable horse power increase for a almost stock jeep. Thanks K&N and AutoAnything.com T Trotter


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Gorilla Glass
An advanced alkali-aluminosilicate glass technology developed by Corning that is used in a variety of screens for mobile devices like smartphones and tablets as well as displays for PCs and TVs. The scratch- and impact-resistant qualities in Gorilla Glass, combined with its incredibly thin profile, enable it to protect device displays without adding significant weight or interfering with capacitive touch screens.
The first generation of Gorilla Glass was used in the screen of the original iPhone from Apple that debuted in 2007. Gorilla Glass 2 became available in 2012 and offered a 20% thinner profile than the original Gorilla Glass.
The most recent development in Gorilla Glass was announced in early 2013. Gorilla Glass 3 with Native Damage Resistance offers "enhanced scratch resistance, reduced scratch visibility and better retained strength once a scratch does occur," according to Corning. The first product to employ Gorilla Glass III, the Samsung Galaxy S4, became available in April 2013.
While Gorilla Glass is now the predominant technology used in protecting mobile device screens, it may face competition in the future from another Corning product, Willow Glass, which offers flexible, bendable qualities that make it ideal for wearable computing devices like Apple's rumored iWatch device.
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This second Study Guide describes the basics of Java, providing an overview of operators, modifiers and control Structures. Read More »The 7 Layers of the OSI Model
The Open System Interconnection (OSI) model defines a networking framework to implement protocols in seven layers. Use this handy guide to compare... Read More »


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I've been thinking about vacation…and thinking about how we no longer have our big van for the kids to spread out and have some space for long drives anymore. I miss those days of long and short trips as we played fun car travel games while we traveled along!
Teens don't really want to do much except sleep and listen to music in the car or play silly word games..but I was thinking about when they were younger..how they needed a little more entertainment..I mean a road trip to little's is an hour ride to Grammies house! LOL
So I thought it would be fun to do a little round up of 10 Printable Car Travel Games and Ideas for Kids for you to enjoy from these awesome creative Bloggers and Websites!
Ok I LOVE this idea from Glue Sticks Blog…it's a road trip binder for kids! So creative! Thank you!!
Here is some printable fun to put into the binder!
This first one is for the older crew from I Heart Organizing! I love that each plate is visual so kids can look fast as cars go by.
What trip would be complete without a game of Road Trip Bingo!? This cute Road trip Bingo is by Oopsey Daisy but featured over at Thirty Handmade Days..Thank You!
Another Amazingly awesome printable idea for teaching patience and making a game of it..with a prize at the end! Yay! Thank you Design Mom!
Ok…I know this isn't a printable..but it's just so cute..you could put the binder full of printable car travel games inside the pocket! Thank you Amazing Mae!
Everyone loves Dot to Dots! Here are some super cute and FREE ones to print out from Raising Our Kids!
A great set of Fun Mazes for kids to adventure through as they travel. Raising Our Kids has LOTS of cute FREE Mazes to print out for your binder!
Older kids usually always love Doodle Art..so have them draw a Doodle Art of their Name! Thank you Make and Takes!
I love this idea…and so simple! These are really fun! Rainbow Rice Eye Spy Bottle..Thank you Pink and Green Mama!
So now my fun creation..easy to make and easy to travel with!
DIY Gingerbread Game For Gaining Wisdom! A full tutorial on how to make this fun vintage game..it's yummy too 😉
So enjoy your travel trip even if it is just an hour away!
Just in case you want to just buy something instead of make it..which by the way is perfectly OK, here are a couple of cute little car games that kids would love!
The most important thing is that you enjoy each other!
Fire HD 7 Kids Edition Tablet, 7
We LOVE these little Kindle Fires! We have several and it makes traveling so easy with the kids and grand kids. They are selling for really inexpensive these days!
More fun games, ideas and books for your road trip with the kiddos…
Everyone loves National Geographic right!?
I just love, love, love this game! Lots of interesting, funny and fun cards to "stare" at and then guess what was in the picture!
Get a little creative and using thinking skills!
For MORE Travel Ideas, Games and Printables you can hop on over to
3 Boys and a Dog and A Life in Balance
Don't forget to have some Travel Snack Foods on hand for those hungry little guys and girls!
What are some of the boredom busters you use for travel trips…short or loooong?
Linking up with: Family Fun Friday, Create it Thursday, Homemaking Party, Better Mom Mondays, Titus 2 Tuesday, Titus 2sday, Raising Homemakers, Inspire Me Monday, Homemaking Party, Made by You Monday, Anything Goes and these great parties!


text: As most are probably aware, we are hitting a bug[0] in the yum depsolver when trying to mash dist-f7-updates-testing. Tim Lauridsen wrote a patch[1] that seems to fix the problem and allows us to compose updates-testing again (WOOOOOOOO!). Tim sent the patch to yum-devel for review, but in the mean time I'd be happy to apply this to the yum on releng1 so we can get these repos back under testing. What do you guys think? luke [0]: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=360291 [1]: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=360291#c24


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java desktop apps
Hendra Kurniawan
Ranch Hand
Posts: 239
posted 3 years ago
I saw in netbeans about a JSR where swing will be dropped. is this true? does this mean all kinds of java desktop app will be dropped in the future? thanks
Rameshwar Soni
Ranch Hand
Posts: 247
posted 3 years ago
There was a similar topic a few days ago and its here
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text: Situated on a private beach in San Jose del Cabo Marbella Suites en la Playa is within easy reach of Desert Park Natural Reserve Cuadra San Francisco and Chileno Beach. Also nearby are Cabo Real Golf Course and Santa Maria Beach. The 41 guestrooms at Marbella Suites en la Playa include air conditioning. Complimentary wireless high-speed Internet access is provided. All units at this 3-star aparthotel have kitchenettes with microwaves refrigerators and coffee/tea makers. Housekeeping is offered daily. Lie back and work on your tan with relaxing beach amenities like umbrellas and sun loungers. Pamper yourself with a treatment at the full-service spa and enjoy amenities at Marbella Suites en la Playa like an outdoor pool and a fitness center. When you're in need of a refreshing drink stop by one of the aparthotel's 2 beachside bars or 2 beach bars. Guests can enjoy a meal at the onsite restaurant. Complimentary wireless Internet access is available in public areas and an Internet point is located on site. Additional amenities include a terrace and a garden. Complimentary self parking is available onsite for guests.


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September 13, 2013 Updated Sep 13, 2013 at 3:48 PM EDT
Actress Nicole Kidman was knocked to the ground after a collision with a paparazzo on a bike.
Find out more by watching the video below.
What are your thoughts CLICK HERE to leave us a "QUESTION OF THE DAY" comment.
© Copyright 2016, A Quincy Media broadcasting station. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed.


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This is my first attempt ever at anything other than a sheet cake! I got the instructions from aother member on this site. I used all BC frosting and rice crispie treats for the head and neck. The kids loved it!
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Northern District of Ohio Torts - Injury Cases
Other Personal Injury Cases, Dockets and Filings
Cases filed
Cases 1 - 10 of 810
Ball v. Family Dollar Stores of Ohio, Inc.
as 1:2016cv02550
Plaintiff: Erik Ball
Defendant: Family Dollar Stores of Ohio, Inc.
Cause Of Action: Diversity-Personal Injury
Stephens v. Dickinson et al
as 5:2016cv02162
Plaintiff: Johnson Stephens, Jr.
Defendant: Matthew Dickinson, Elinor M. Stormer, Mike DeWine
Cause Of Action: Civil Rights Act
Lapine v. Materion Corporation
as 1:2016cv02119
Plaintiff: Kevin Lapine
Defendant: Materion Corporation
Cause Of Action: Diversity-Personal Injury
Donovan v. ConWay Freight Inc.
as 4:2016cv01910
Plaintiff: Stephen A. Donovan
Defendant: XPO Logistics Freight, Inc
Cause Of Action: Diversity-Petition for Removal
Sullivan v. Anderson et al
as 1:2016cv01885
Plaintiff: Brian L. Sullivan
Defendant: Dustin Anderson, Megan Anderson, Cynthia Day and others
Cause Of Action: Diversity-Other Contract
Morgert v. Lowes Home Centers, LLC
as 3:2016cv01853
Plaintiff: Gary Morgert
Defendant: Lowes Home Centers, LLC
Cause Of Action: Petition for Removal- Personal Injury
Wick et al v. GreenPoint Mortgage Funding Inc,. et al
as 1:2016cv01835
Plaintiff: John Wick , Shirley Wick , Leadonna Wick
Defendant: GreenPoint Mortgage Funding, Inc. , Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.
Cause Of Action: Truth in Lending
Spaude et al v. Mysyk et al
as 1:2016cv01836
Plaintiff: Thomas W. Spaude , Angela M. Spaude , Dennis C. Macieski
Defendant: Paul Mysyk, Harrison Schumacher, Quantum Energy, LLC and others
Cause Of Action: Diversity-Personal Injury
Crutcher v. Court Psychiatric Clinic et al
as 1:2016cv01803
Plaintiff: Vernice L. Crutcher
Defendant: Court Psychiatric Clinic , City of Cleveland Law Department
Cause Of Action: Fed. Question
Spaulding, et al. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran ("IRAN"), et al.
as 5:2016cv01748
Plaintiff: Michael S. Spaulding , Jacqueline Hudgens-Spaulding , Natika Spaulding and others
Defendant: Islamic Republic of Iran ("IRAN"), Iranian Ministry of Information and Security, Bank of Markazi Jomhouri Islami Iran
Cause Of Action: Diversity-Wrongful Death
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.


text:
9 posts tagged with modelmaking.
Displaying 1 through 9 of 9. Subscribe:
David Neat's neat, model model blog
David Neat is a model maker and teacher. Of David Neat, Makezine says "This modest blog may be the Holy Grail of model-making sites."
Paper people not included.
Mouses Houses 'Pictures from my own private mouseland' (tumblr) [more inside]
"Things my little sisters have made for their Barbies."
"They pay a lot of attention to detail." A DIY miniature world made out of household scraps.
Some nifty special effects models
Steve Howarth has made a lot of practical special effects miniatures, including work on the Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy movie, Moon, Crystal Maze and many more projects. Perhaps the most interesting is his work on Red Dwarf. [more inside]
Airfix - Making History
The Royal Air Force Museum London will be launching in Summer 2013 a signature exhibition commemorating and celebrating the national institution that is Airfix. This will chart the history of this Great British Institution by displaying original Box Art as well as Airfix's most popular models from the 50s, 60s, 70s, 80s and 90s in the Museum's Art Gallery. In preparation, this post will focus upon the history* of the company, its founding in the late 1940s by a Hungarian immigrant, through its boom years in the 1960s, the later years of decline and under investment, and finally its current resurgence in the market place. Look at the ways in which Airfix products are developed, including the painstaking research and the cutting edge technology used to design and manufacture modern kits. (text inspired by numerous sources) [more inside]
That's no Lunar Transporter!
Spaceships that became other spaceships: The Millennium Falcon, The Colonial Viper, The Eagle Transporter - from the blog of Gavin Rothery, visual effects designer on Moon. Previously.
Master of Miniature Guns
"What we are talking about here are models that reproduce real guns in details. These are acting mechanisms and real copies of guns decreased 4-4.5 times. They could fire if real bullets were used."
Real or Photoshop? It's real! (mostly ...)
If you have kids, you almost certainly have at least one of the 'I Spy' books, or something from the 'Can You See What I See?' series on your home bookshelf. Created by artist/photographer Walter Wick, the books have page after page of images filled with astonishing amounts of detail, including any number of objects for the kids to find. Wick's website has dozens of pages taking us behind the scenes, showing us how many of these wonderful photos were created, many involving the construction of incredibly detailed models that are used for just a single shot. The Impossible Columns is perhaps my favourite.
Page: 1


text:
And just WHO invented WMD in Iraq? And why did G.W. continue the Persian Gulf War?Jacques Ottawa wrote:
<quoted text>
55,000 in Vietnam alone by inventing the Gulf of Tonkin incident. 4,000 in Iraq by inventing non-existent WMDs and Taliban presence in Baghdad. You're welcome.
WW1, WWII, Korea, all respectful of the US constitution. As was Yugoslavia, the constitution, the UN and NATO.
BARACK OBAMA BIRTH CERTIFICATE: Suit contesting Obama's citizen...
There are 228134 comments on the Chicago Tribune story from Jan 8, 2009, titled BARACK OBAMA BIRTH CERTIFICATE: Suit contesting Obama's citizen.... In it, Chicago Tribune reports that:The U.S. Supreme Court will consider Friday whether to take up a lawsuit challenging President-elect Barack Obama 's U.S. citizenship, a continuation of a New Jersey case embraced by some opponents of Obama's ...
Join the discussion below, or Read more at Chicago Tribune.
Since: May 10
Location hidden
#130343 Nov 28, 2012
#130344 Nov 28, 2012
No, the US Constitution determines who will be citizens,"and subject to the jurisdiction, thereof", after all we are a Constitutional Republic.
Since: May 10
Location hidden
#130345 Nov 28, 2012
Libtards believe that if two sides just stop fighting, the war is over. But that is not true. A war only ends when one side Capitulates or signs a Peace Treaty.
World War One ended October 2010 when Germany finished paying off war reparations and the Korea War has NOT ended. Yes, we are still at war with North Korea as there is no Peace Treaty and no surrender.
Since: Dec 11
#130346 Nov 28, 2012
First, let me address your last question. When filling out a truth table, I generally use a T for TRUE and an F for FALSE. I know, some may use esoteric symbols, but why complicate things? BTW, I've been in the field for about thirty years, now in one aspect or another. My first programming languages were IBM assembler, COBOL, and RPG (the first one).
Now, I am not saying anything about someone conning his way into anything. I'm saying that given the two true statements, the third statement is the ONLY logical conclusion. You twist it any way you wish.
Since: Dec 11
#130347 Nov 28, 2012
But, according to you, an alien CAN'T be the President. That was your original statement. Barack Obama IS the President. Ergo, Barack Obama is not an alien. How are you NOT getting this?
#130348 Nov 28, 2012
Everybody who is in the USA except for foreign diplomats and their families are subject to the jurisdiction of the USA.
#130349 Nov 28, 2012
the US Constitution has complete jurisdiction over all three branches of the government, they must work within it, to do otherwise would be UnConstitutional.
Since: May 10
Location hidden
#130350 Nov 28, 2012
Ah Jacques, G.W. RESUMED the Persian Gulf War when Saddamn Hussein failed to abide by the armistice that stopped hostilities. Saddamn violated 27 United Nations resolutions. It had nothing to do with WMD's or Taliban in Baghdad.
And what is sad is that we have had this discussion a half dozen times and you still go back to WMC and Taliban (al Qaeda). I really wish you would get an education.
#130351 Nov 28, 2012
They are subject to our laws. Period. Why can't you loons understand this basic fact? Obama was born owing allegiance to the same country as his father. Twist, dance, skip all you want, it doesn't change this fact.
#130352 Nov 28, 2012
One of Obama's parents was indeed a US citizen. BOTH of them were in the USA at the time of his birth and hence subject to the jurisdiction of the USA, as is everyone who is in the USA, except for foreign diplomats and their families.
Since: May 10
Location hidden
#130353 Nov 28, 2012
Faulty logic. You think some one did not commit a crime if he was not convicted. In many criminal trials that can find the suspect quilt, not guilty or .... innocent.
Billy Dale, Travel Gate trial, was initially acquitted but the judge ruled he was INNOCENT and therefore the federal government had to repay him his legal fees. In Bill Clinton's investigation Pres. Clinton tried to make the same claim that he was innocent but he was not found innocent and the federal government did not pay his legal expenses.
And that brings us back to Obama. He has not proven to be a Natural Born citizen as all documents he has provided have been found to be fraudulent and until there is a real criminal investigation, he is NOT innocent.
#130354 Nov 28, 2012
Play Law is not real law.
Play justices are not real justices.
A toy badge doesn't make you a real sheriff either.
LOL, little boy.
Since: May 10
Location hidden
#130355 Nov 28, 2012
LRS wrote:
<quoted text>
No kidding? You can't use that train of thought/logic because of the eligibility part. All you're saying is that someone could and may have conned his way into office. However, requirements say an alien is not eligible for the office. Perhaps you will like this version better, an alien cannot legally hold the office of president. BTW, what characters are used to fill in a truth table (as to computers)?
Libtards will do or say anything if they think it will prove their cause. How many wife beaters claim that their women made them beat them because they burned diner? How many Libtrads think it is okay for me to speed because everyone else does it?
In my younger years I thought it was okay to drive so long as I was not tooooo drunk. And after a few years of that I thought it was okay to drive buzzed. And somewhere between age 25 and 28 I came to the realization that it would be best if I did not drink and drive, period! The problem with Libtards is that they never mature, it is always someone else's fault!
#130356 Nov 28, 2012
And when Play Justice Dale wears his engineer's cap and starts up his electic train set he's a REAL engineer.
Hee hee.
Since: May 10
Location hidden
#130357 Nov 28, 2012
Jar of Glenn Becks Urine with an Obama Figurine Inside For Sale?; Posted on November 28, 2012
Renowned artiste Glenn Beck put an Obama bobblehead in a glass jar,urinated into it, called it art and is now selling it for the low, low price of $25,000.(While Beck initially claimed to have peed into the jar, it is actually beer, according to MSN.)
Beck created Obama in Pee Pee in response to a Boston artist who made a controversial painting of President Obama being crucified.
Read more: http://conservativebyte.com/2012/11/jar-of-gl...
#130358 Nov 28, 2012
As related to computers a truth table would be filled in with 1's or 0's. Representing on or off. Your logic is laughable at best. The only way an alien could be president is by conning his way into office. Eligibility doesn't fit in a truth table. Geeezzzzz.
Vaughan, Canada
#130359 Nov 28, 2012
Oh, so now you admit that Dixie is a he. Progress indeed.
Oh, would I deny that he is stronger, that he could lay me out cold? Why not? I'm sre he could do it. Did I ever say I was stronger, and a better fighter? So, what does it prove? You know, even I could lay Stephen Hawking flat. What would that prove? I could also lay Nelson Mandela flat right now, as well as Mother Teresa when she was alive. And that would make me better than them ? That would therefore make Dixie better than me as he laid me out cold? How childish and pre-pubescent of you. Grow up. Please learn that when you are bested intellectually, you either do your homework for the next encounter or you just disappear and take on someone at your low level.
#130360 Nov 28, 2012
Under the Constitution he was born a citizen of his father's nation, " and not subject to the jurisdiction, thereof".
Since: May 10
Location hidden
#130361 Nov 28, 2012
Sen. Schumer wants to use Hitler's tax? What a hoot!!!
Those Fleeing Obamas America: Prepare to be taxed
- David Rushton, November 28, 2012
Senator Charles Schumer has recently proposed a new law to tax Americans heavily for leaving the United States. It was in reaction to the news that Eduardo Saverin, co-founder of Facebook, had renounced his American Citizenship and was taking his $2 billion dollars in capital gains with him.
Schumer proposed to tax him 30%. Sadly John Boehner, Republican, Speaker of the House (I still think hes a disguised Democrat), said he would support the measure.
Schumer must thank Adolph Hitler for this idea. The Fuehrer instituted the Reichsfluchsteuer tax of 25% on Jews leaving the Fatherland in the 1930s. So Herr Schumer has merely taken the basic idea and upped it by 5%.
Vaughan, Canada
#130362 Nov 28, 2012
Then why is it to you?
Tell me when this thread is updated:Subscribe Now Add to my Tracker
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