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Most Cited International Journal of Industrial Organization Articles
The most cited articles published since 2011, extracted from Scopus.
Is there a U-shaped relation between competition and investment?Dario Sacco | Armin Schmutzler
Volume 29, Issue 1, January 2011, Pages 65-73
We consider a two-stage game with cost-reducing investments followed by a linear differentiated Cournot duopoly. With competition inversely parameterized by the extent of product differentiation, investment in the subgame perfect equilibrium is typically minimal for intermediate levels of competition. Laboratory experiments partly confirm the U-shape in a reduced one-stage version of the game. In the two-stage version, there is no evidence for positive effects of moving from intermediate to intense competition. © 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
To join or not to join: Examining patent pool participation and rent sharing rulesAnne Layne-Farrar | Josh Lerner
Volume 29, Issue 2, March 2011, Pages 294-303
In recognition that participation in modern patent pools is voluntary, we present empirical evidence on participation rates and the factors that drive the decision to join a pool, including the profit sharing rules adopted by the pool's founders. In most participation contexts, the at-risk group is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to identify. For pools centered on technologies that result from a standard-setting process, in contrast, we are able to identify a relatively unambiguous population of patents eligible for inclusion but that have not been included in the pool. We find that vertically integrated firms, with patents and downstream operations, are more likely to join a patent pool and among those firms that do join, those with relatively symmetric patent contributions (in terms of value) to a standard appear more likely to accept numeric patent share rules for dividing royalty earnings. © 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Access regulation and investment in next generation networks - A ranking of regulatory regimesRainer Nitsche | Lars Wiethaus
Volume 29, Issue 2, March 2011, Pages 263-272
This paper analyses how different types of access regulation to next generation networks affect investments and consumer welfare. The model consists of an investment stage with uncertain returns and subsequent quantity competition. The access price is a function of investment costs and the regulatory regime. A regime with fully distributed costs or a regulatory holiday induces highest investments, followed by risk-sharing and long run incremental costs regulation. Simulations indicate that risk-sharing creates most consumer welfare, followed by regimes with fully distributed costs, regulatory holiday and long run incremental costs, respectively. Risk-sharing benefits consumers as it combines relatively high ex-ante investment incentives with strong ex-post competitive intensity. © 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Access pricing, competition, and incentives to migrate from old to new technologyMarc Bourreau | Carlo Cambini | Pinar Doǧan
Volume 30, Issue 6, November 2012, Pages 713-723
In this paper, we analyze the incentives of an incumbent and an entrant to migrate from an old technology to a new technology, and discuss how the terms of wholesale access affect this migration. We show that the coverage of the new technology varies non-monotonically with the access price of the old technology: a higher access charge on the legacy network pushes the entrant firm to invest more, but has an ambiguous effect on the incumbent's investments, due to two conflicting effects: the wholesale revenue effect, and the retail-level migration effect. When the new technology is also subject to access provision, we find that migration from the old to the new generation network at the wholesale level can be incentivized if a positive correlation between the access prices (to the two old and new generation networks) is maintained. © 2012 Elsevier B.V.
Effects of innovation on employment: A dynamic panel analysisStefan Lachenmaier | Horst Rottmann
Volume 29, Issue 2, March 2011, Pages 210-220
This paper estimates the effect of innovation on employment at the firm level. Our uniquely long innovation panel data set of German manufacturing firms covers more than 20 years and allows us to use various innovation measures. We can distinguish between product and process innovations as well as between innovation input and innovation output measures. Using dynamic panel GMM system estimation we find positive effects of innovation on employment. This is true for innovation input as well as for innovation output variables. Innovations show their positive effect on employment with a time lag and process innovations have higher effects than product innovations. © 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
The impact of FDI through mergers and acquisitions on innovation in target firmsJoel Stiebale | Frank Reize
Volume 29, Issue 2, March 2011, Pages 155-167
This paper analyzes the effects of cross-border mergers and acquisitions on innovation activities in target firms. The empirical analysis is based on survey and ownership data for a large sample of small- and medium-sized German firms. After controlling for endogeneity and selection bias, we find that foreign acquisitions have a large negative impact on the propensity to perform innovation activities and a negative impact on average R&D expenditures in innovative firms. Furthermore, innovation output, measured as product and process innovations, and the share of sales from product innovations, is not significantly affected by a foreign acquisition for a given amount of innovation efforts. Hence, the estimation results do not provide any evidence of significant technology transfer through foreign acquisitions in form of a higher innovation success. © 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Does competition raise productivity through improving management quality?John Van Reenen
Volume 29, Issue 3, May 2011, Pages 306-316
A classic question in industrial organization is whether competition raises productivity and if so, through what mechanism? I discuss recent empirical evidence from both large-scale databases and specific industries which suggests that tougher competition does indeed raise productivity and one of the main mechanisms is through improving management practices. To establish this, I report on new research seeking to quantify management. I relate this to theoretical perspectives on the economics of competition and management, arguing that management should be seen at least in part as a transferable technology. A range of recent econometric studies suggests that (i) competition increases management quality and (ii) improved management quality boosts productivity. © 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
The economics of advertising and privacyCatherine E. Tucker
Volume 30, Issue 3, May 2012, Pages 326-329
One of the new realities of advertising is that personal information can be used to ensure that advertising is only shown and designed for a select group of consumers who stand to gain most from this information. However, to gather the data used for targeting requires some degree of privacy intrusion by advertisers. This sets up a tradeoff between the informativeness of advertising and the degree of privacy intrusion. This paper summarizes recent empirical research that illuminates this tradeoff. © 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Legal unbundling can be a golden mean between vertical integration and ownership separationFelix Höffler | Sebastian Kranz
Volume 29, Issue 5, September 2011, Pages 576-588
We study an industry in which an upstream monopolist supplies an essential input at a regulated price to several downstream firms. Legal unbundling means in our model that a downstream firm owns the upstream firm, but this upstream firm is legally independent and maximizes its own upstream profits. We allow for non-tariff discrimination by the upstream firm and show that under quite general conditions legal unbundling never yields lower quantities in the downstream market than ownership separation and integration. Therefore, typically, consumer surplus will be largest under legal unbundling. Outcomes under legal unbundling are still advantageous when we allow for discriminatory capacity investments, investments into marginal cost reduction and investments into network reliability. If access prices are unregulated, however, legal unbundling may be quite undesirable. © 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Price wars and price collusion in China's airline marketsYahua Zhang | David K. Round
Volume 29, Issue 4, July 2011, Pages 361-372
In the absence of an effective antitrust law, both fare wars and price collusion have been pervasive in China's airline markets, causing concern for both airlines and consumers. A study of monthly airfare data from 2002 to 2004 confirms that fare wars occur periodically, as well as price collusion. Both tend to be short-lived. The fact that collusion is more likely to occur in January and April when demand is high, as revealed by China Eastern's and China Southern's price-war and collusion models, has been confirmed by interview information obtained from the airlines' sales managers. However, there is also evidence in these models suggesting that collusion can be more easily formed when demand is low. High airport concentration measured by the HHI may facilitate collusion in certain circumstances, but it may also lead to more price wars under other conditions. Concentration in both airports and routes does not appear to systematically affect the occurrence of fare wars and collusion in all the models estimated. We also reject the possibility that mutual forbearance due to multimarket contact plays any important anti-competitive role in China's airline markets. © 2010 Elsevier B.V.All rights reserved.
Rent seeking in groupsT. K. Ahn | R. Mark Isaac | Timothy C. Salmon
Volume 29, Issue 1, January 2011, Pages 116-125
Rent-seeking contests between groups involve conflicts of interests at the levels of individuals, groups, and the society as a whole. We conduct a series of economic experiments to study the behavior of groups and individuals competing against each other in rent-seeking contests. We find substantial over-contribution to rent-seeking relative to the equilibrium predictions of standard models regardless whether individuals compete against other individuals, groups compete against other groups, or individuals compete against groups. © 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Buyer confusion and market pricesKenan Kalayci | Jan Potters
Volume 29, Issue 1, January 2011, Pages 14-22
We employ a price setting duopoly experiment to examine whether buyer confusion increases market prices. Each seller offers a good to buyers who have homogeneous preferences. Sellers decide on the number of attributes of their good and set prices. The number of attributes bears no cost to the sellers and does not affect the value of the good to the buyers but adds complexity to buyers' evaluation of the goods. The experimental results indicate that the buyers make more suboptimal choices and that prices are higher when the number of attributes of the goods is higher. Moreover, prices and profits are higher than those in a benchmark treatment with perfectly rational (robot) buyers. © 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Public procurement design: Lessons from the private sectorSteven Tadelis
Volume 30, Issue 3, May 2012, Pages 297-302
Public procurement regulations put constraints on the contracts and award mechanisms that public procurement agencies can use. These constraints are not present in the private sector, and recent studies suggest that the added flexibility in private sector procurement offers efficiency advantages. This paper offers a short progress report of these recent studies, and argues for the need to enhance the tools that are currently at the disposal of public sector procurement offices. © 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Price leadership and coordination in retail gasoline markets with price cyclesMatthew S. Lewis
Volume 30, Issue 4, July 2012, Pages 342-351
This study examines the coordination mechanism used by gasoline stations in the midwestern United States where prices exhibit highly cyclical fluctuations known as Edgeworth cycles. Stations in these markets repeatedly coordinate large marketwide price increases following periods of aggressive price undercutting. By studying these periodic price jumps both over time and across cities, I find that a particular retail chain in each city acts as a price leader initiating each price restoration. The leader signals the new price level to competitors by simultaneously jumping prices at all its stations to a single price. Competitors follow quickly with a large majority of stations jumping to the exact same price within a 24 hour period. The characteristics of the leading firms and the nature of observed price coordination suggest that successful price jumps may be facilitated by the existence of a retailer controlling the prices of a significant number of stations in a city. Identifying the important role of these firms in the market contributes to a broader understanding of price leadership and coordination and highlights another potential reason why price cycles exist in some in retail gasoline markets and not others. © 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Supply function equilibria with capacity constraints and pivotal suppliersTalat S. Genc | Stanley S. Reynolds
Volume 29, Issue 4, July 2011, Pages 432-442
The concept of a supply function equilibrium (SFE) has been widely used to model generators' bidding behavior and market power issues in wholesale electricity markets. Observers of electricity markets have noted how generation capacity constraints may contribute to market power of generation firms. If a generation firm's rivals are capacity constrained then the firm may be pivotal; that is, the firm could substantially raise the market price by unilaterally withholding output. However the SFE literature has not fully considered the impact of capacity constraints and pivotal firms on equilibrium predictions. We characterize the set of symmetric supply function equilibria for uniform-price auctions when firms are capacity constrained and show that this set is increasing as capacity per firm rises. We provide conditions under which asymmetric equilibria exist and characterize these equilibria. In addition, we compare results for uniform-price auctions to those for discriminatory auctions, and we compare our SFE predictions to equilibrium predictions of models in which bidders are constrained to bid on discrete units of output. © 2010 Elsevier B.V.All rights reserved.
Can information costs affect consumer choice? Nutritional labels in a supermarket experimentKristin Kiesel | Sofia B. Villas-Boas
Volume 31, Issue 2, March 2013, Pages 153-163
This paper investigates whether information costs under currently regulated nutritional labeling prevent consumers from making healthier food choices. We implement five nutritional shelf label treatments in a market-level experiment. These labels reduce information costs by highlighting and summarizing information available on the Nutritional Facts Panel. Following a difference-in-differences and synthetic control method approach, we analyze weekly store-level scanner data for microwave popcorn purchases from treatment and control stores. Our results suggest that consumer purchases are affected by information costs. Implemented low calorie and no trans fat labels increase sales. In contrast, implemented low fat labels decrease sales, suggesting that consumer response is also influenced by consumers' taste perceptions. A combination of these claims into one label treatment increases information costs and does not affect sales significantly. © 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
The determinants of merger waves: An international perspectiveKlaus Gugler | Dennis C. Mueller | Michael Weichselbaumer
Volume 30, Issue 1, January 2012, Pages 1-15
One of the most conspicuous features of mergers is that they come in waves that are correlated with increases in share prices and price/earnings ratios. We use a natural way to discriminate between pure stock market influences on firm decisions and other influences by examining merger patterns for both listed and unlisted firms. If "real" changes in the economy drive merger waves, as some neoclassical theories of mergers predict, both listed and unlisted firms should experience waves. We find significant differences between listed and unlisted firms as predicted by behavioral theories of merger waves. © 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Platform competition for advertisers and users in media marketsMarkus Reisinger
Volume 30, Issue 2, March 2012, Pages 243-252
This paper analyzes a two-sided market model in which platforms compete for advertisers and users. Platforms are differentiated from the users' perspective but are homogenous for advertisers. I show that, although there is Bertrand competition for advertisers, platforms obtain positive margins in the advertising market. In addition, platforms' profits can increase in the users' nuisance costs of advertising. As a general insight, I obtain that factors affecting competition in the user market in a well-known direction without externalities now have opposing effects due to competition in the advertiser market. The model can also explain why private TV platforms benefit if their public rivals are regulated to advertise less-a result at odds with models in which there is no competition for advertisers.
Timing of technology adoption and product market competitionChrysovalantou Milliou | Emmanuel Petrakis
Volume 29, Issue 5, September 2011, Pages 513-523
This paper examines how product market competition affects firms' timing of adopting a new technology, as well as whether the market provides sufficient adoption incentives. It demonstrates that adoption dates differ, not only among symmetric firms, but also among markets with different market features. More specifically, technology adoption can occur earlier in a market with Cournot competition than in a market with Bertrand competition. It can also occur earlier in a market in which goods are not too close substitutes. Therefore, this paper shows that competition toughness does not always reinforce adoption incentives. When goods are sufficiently differentiated, adoption occurs later than is socially optimal. © 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Best-of-three contest experiments: Strategic versus psychological momentumShalom D. Mago | Roman M. Sheremeta | Andrew Yates
Volume 31, Issue 3, May 2013, Pages 287-296
We conduct an experimental analysis of a best-of-three Tullock contest. Intermediate prizes lead to higher efforts, while increasing the role of luck (as opposed to effort) leads to lower efforts. Both intermediate prizes and luck reduce the probability of the contest ending in two rounds. The patterns of players' efforts and the probability that a contest ends in two rounds are consistent with 'strategic momentum', i.e., a momentum generated due to strategic incentives inherent in the contest. We do not find evidence for 'psychological momentum', i.e., a momentum which emerges when winning affects players' confidence. Similar to the previous studies of contests, we find significantly higher efforts than predicted and strong heterogeneity in effort between the subjects. © 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Low-cost airlines and online price dispersionEnrico Bachis | Claudio A. Piga
Volume 29, Issue 6, November 2011, Pages 655-667
This paper presents a new form of online pricing tactic where airlines post, at the same time and for the same flight, fares in different currencies that violate the Law of One Price. Unexpectedly for an online market, price dispersion may be accompanied by a hidden discount that tends to persist in the period preceding a flight's departure. The econometric analysis reveals that airlines post dispersive fares in less competitive routes with more heterogeneous demand. Furthermore, temporal persistence of intra-firm fare dispersion suggests that it is an equilibrium phenomenon engendered by the airlines' need to manage stochastic demand conditions for a specific flight. © 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Competition between exchanges: A research agendaEstelle Cantillon | Pai Ling Yin
Volume 29, Issue 3, May 2011, Pages 329-336
This paper describes open research questions related to the competition and market structure of financial exchanges and argues that only a combination of industrial organization and finance can satisfactorily attack these questions. Two examples are discussed to illustrate how the combination of these two approaches can significantly enrich the analysis: the "network externality puzzle", which refers to the question of why trading for the same security is often split across trading venues, and the impact of the multi-sided character of financial exchanges on pricing and profitability. © 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Classic promotion tournaments versus market-based tournamentsMichael Waldman
Volume 31, Issue 3, May 2013, Pages 198-210
As initially formulated in the seminal analysis of Lazear and Rosen (1981), an important perspective for understanding the role of promotions in firms is the tournament perspective. That is, a promotion and, in particular, the wage increase associated with a promotion is a prize that serves as an incentive for workers to exert effort and take other actions beneficial to the firm such as the accumulation of human capital. In this paper I consider whether the best way to model promotion tournaments is by having firms commit to prizes ex ante as in Lazear and Rosen's initial formulation, or whether promotion prizes should be modeled as arising from the signaling role of promotions and the competition between firms for promoted workers. © 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Efficient division of profits from complementary innovationsRichard J. Gilbert | Michael L. Katz
Volume 29, Issue 4, July 2011, Pages 443-454
Many products-including microprocessors, telecommunications devices, computer software, and on-line auction services-make use of multiple technologies, each of which is essential to make or sell the product. The owner of one technology benefits from the existence of complementary technologies. We show that, despite this externality, the structure of payoffs that support efficient R&D investment by duopolists racing to discover a single innovation generalizes to the structure that supports efficient investment for complementary innovations. The paper also examines how alternative intellectual property regimes and legal institutions affect R&D investment in complementary technologies. The results have policy implications for the organization of R&D, the assessment of damages for patent infringement, and allocations of value in patent pools. © 2010 Elsevier B.V.All rights reserved.
Tacit knowledge with innovative entrepreneurshipDaniel F. Spulber
Volume 30, Issue 6, November 2012, Pages 641-653
Tacit knowledge affects the trade-off between entrepreneurship and technology transfer. I present a formal model in which an inventor and the existing firm engage in a strategic innovation game by choosing whether to compete or to cooperate through technology transfer. The model highlights how the problem of tacit knowledge affects the inventor's R&D investment and the existing firm's investment in absorptive capacity. The inventor's tacit knowledge implies that benefits from own-use through entrepreneurship can exceed the benefits from technology transfer. In equilibrium, higher-quality inventions result in entrepreneurship and lower-quality inventions result in technology transfer. R&D investment and absorption investment are strategic substitutes in the innovation game with the option of entrepreneurship. The possibility of entrepreneurship increases R&D investment and reduces absorption investment. The equilibrium probability of entrepreneurship is decreasing in the costs of R&D, increasing in the costs of absorption, and decreasing in the set-up costs of new firms. © 2012 Elsevier B.V.


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Alternalite Electric Inc.Category: Electrical
Company description: Alternalite Electric, Inc. is a female- and minority-owned electrical contracting company in North Olmsted, Ohio. We are a signatory contractor of the IBEW Local 38 Union and are proud to serve Cuyahoga and surrounding counties. We offer commercial, industrial, and institutional electrical installation services with a focus on green energy (LED lighting, building automation, lighting maintenance and retrofit, etc.). Services also include fire alarm and safety systems, heat tracing, commercial service work, power distribution, emergency generators, and industrial control work.
We pride ourselves on our excellent customer service, both before and after the job. With years of experience under our belts, we guarantee high-quality workmanship performed on time - every time. In addition, we have a host of certifications to help you meet your diversity spend goals, including MBE, FBE, DBE, EDGE, SBE, CSB, Section 3, SDB, and EDWOSB.
Ohio Electrical Contractor's License #46518
Ohio Fire Alarms/Detection License #54185378
- Certifications
- Year founded
- 2011
- Number of employees
- 5
- Top Local Executive
- Gertrudis (Trudy) Ramos (president, CEO); Jose L. Ramos Jr. (executive vice president)
- Company web site
- www.alternalite.com
- Phone
- (440) 777-7800
- (440) 777-7878
- Corporate e-mail address
- firstname.lastname@example.com
- Address
- 4171 Linden Circle
North Olmsted, OH 44070 [Map]

subset: commoncrawl


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Devils At Risk Of Defaulting On Loan
Well, according to the New York Post, they?re not.
The team?s cash-strapped owner, less than six months after restructuring its debt, has missed an interest payment and now risks defaulting on its new loan, a source with direct knowledge of the situation said.
The latest financial blow-up at Devils Arena Entertainment ? a missed interest payment in April of nearly $3 million ? has surprised those close to the once-proud NHL franchise.
If the report is accurate, it?s not clear if it?s just a short-term cash-flow issue or evidence of a larger problem for owner Jeff Vanderbeek.
The NHL, according to the Post, ?said the story was inaccurate but declined to give specifics.?


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Kenwood XR900-5
Crutchfield Customer Review (What's this?)
I installed this in by 2002 Avalanche it is powering 4 kenwood speakers and a sub. After working with it for a while I finally got it tuned in and I must say his amp is very good and is really clear. It was easy to install but just took me a while to get just right but well worth it sounds great!!
Pros: Nice sounding and clear
Cons: None


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Principal's Note
A Note From the Principallt is hard to believe we are already into the month of April. With lots to do and little time to get things accomplished, the last two months of school will fly by. Our state assessment schedule is attached. As you can tell, each grade level will be testing. Please be sure students are eating a well-balanced breakfast and getting a good night's sleep. These small things help with student attention and productivity. If at all possible, please try to schedule student appointments so students are present during testing times. We appreciate your help in encouraging students to do their best on the tests!Karla King, EMS Principal_______________Check out the administrators' blogs for the month of Septemberhttps://ehsmedia.eldoradoschools.org/wiki/projects/brandondial/bloghttps://ehsmedia.eldoradoschools.org/wiki/projects/Q28585e6/blog
8th GradeELA April 5-7 In ELA classes (Towner, Liby)Science April 5-7 In Science classes (Arpin, Boss)Math April 12-14 In Math classes (Liby, Vides)H/Govt. April 12-14 In SS classes (Arpin, Green)7th GradeELA April 5-7 In ELA classes (Mooney, Samp)Math April 11-14 In Math classes (Luehrs, Jeffress)6th GradeELA April 4-7 In ELA classes (Robinson, Spencer)Math April 12-15 In Math classes (Staats, Olson, Robinson, West)H/Govt. April 13-14 In SS classes (Meyer, West)
Homework Center, 3-4 PM
6th graders — Rooms 109 & 112, Mondays & Wednesdays
7th graders — Room 312, Mondays
Room 307, Tuesdays
Room 303, Wednedsays
8th graders — Rooms 207, Mondays & Wednesdays
Room 206, Tuesdays & Thursdays


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Item: HWD003
Chocolate Chip Cookies from The Hollywood Cookie Diet
Meal replacement cookies
Source of fiber and protein
12 Ct
This item is only available for shipment in the United States.
Chocolate Chip Cookies from The Hollywood Cookie Diet
Meal replacement cookies
Source of fiber and protein
Eat a cookie and skip a meal with The Hollywood Cookie Diet in Chocolate Chip. The delicious cookies help you lose and maintain weight by satisfying your hunger. Each cookie is a delicious meal and a source of fiber and protein. You can use The Hollywood Cookie Diet for as long as you want until you achieve your weight loss goals. They recommend one cookie for breakfast, midmorning snack, lunch and mid-afternoon snack, for up to four cookies a day. Combine The Hollywood Cookie Diet along with an exercise plan to help meet your weight loss goals. Each cookie is individually wrapped for eating on-the-go. Take a tasty meal with you to the office, on the plane, on the road, to they gym or anywhere else you go.
Serving Size 1 Cookie (40 g)
Servings Per Container 12
|Amount Per Serving
|% Daily Value*
|Calories 150Calories from Fat 60
|Total Fat 6 g
|Saturated Fat 2 g
|Trans Fat 0 g
|Cholesterol 5 mg
|Sodium 95 mg
|Total Carbohydrate 22 g
|Dietary Fiber 3 g
|Sugars 9 g
|Protein 5 g
|Vitamin A
|Vitamin C
*Percent Daily Values are based on a 2,000 calorie diet. Your daily values may be higher or lower depending on your calorie needs.
|Total Fat
|Less than
|65 grams
|80 grams
|Saturated Fat
|Less than
|20 grams
|25 grams
|Less than
|300 mg
|300 mg
|Less than
|2,400 mg
|2,400 mg
|Total Carbohydrate
|300 grams
|375 grams
|Dietary Fiber
|25 grams
|30 grams
Calories per gram:
Ingredients: White Wheat Flour, Chocolate Chips (Sugar, Cocoa Butter, Soy Lecithin), White Sugar, Protein Blend (Soy Protein Isolate, Milk Protein Concentrate, Whey Protein Concentrate), Tapioca Syrup, Canola Oil, Isomalto-oligosaccharide, Vegetable Glycerine, Water, Unsalted Butter, Eggs, Inulin, Vanilla Extract, Baking Soda, Potassium Sorbate, Cinnamon, Salt, Natural Cocoa Powder.
Allergen Information: Contains Wheat, Soy, Milk and Eggs. Produced on equipment that is used to produce products that contain: Peanuts and Tree Nuts.
Directions for use: Enjoy up to four cookies per day in place of breakfast and lunch.
Suggested schedule: One cookie for breakfast, midmorning snack, lunch and midafternoon snack. Eat a sensible dinner. Exercise regularly.
Store in a cool and dry place.
Always consult a physician before beginning any weight loss program. Do not use if pregnant, nursing, diabetic, taking medication or if you have a medical condition.
1.20 lbs
"With my personal 100% money-back satisfaction guarantee, you have nothing to lose and great savings to gain."
Lee Swanson, Founder of Swanson Health Products
If you are dissatisfied for any reason, we'll give you a full refund and pay return shipping.
We are dedicated to offering the highest quality products at the best price. Find out more about how we ensure such a high standard in everything we do.Learn More


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If we had one major gripe about this cruise was our rooms we were underneath the pool deck. Balcony Cabin 8139 and the boys had inside 8137. It was like a herd of buffalo was overhead the whole day starting at 6:00 am with the deck chairs being moved.
We first sailed the Miracle in 2004 and really haven't noticed that much wear and tear. These people work hard to keep up appearances!
Our teens were in and out of the teen club and made some great friends with who they still talk to. They had the time of their lives!
We met some great people from the CC Board who spent time with on the cruise with on a couple of the Islands. 1st stop was Grand Turk was previously here and really didn't enjoy the commercial Margaritaville pool, this time we went rented golf carts toured the island and made a stop at Jack's Shack! We loved it. Beautiful beach and strong drinks, what more could you ask for?
2nd Stop was Half Moon Cay my new favorite Port! Couple we met rented a cabana and we tagged along wonderful!
3rd stop was Nassau- Not my favorite port..just went shopping and came back and relaxed at the empty pool!
All in all great food, great company, great Cruise!