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tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-210653432016-09-24T08:17:49.062-05:00Kansas DefendersA discussion about issues, appellate decisions, and other news of interest to Kansas defenders. This site does NOT necessarily reflect the opinion or position of the Appellate Defender Office or of the Kansas Board of Indigent Defense Services. Nor does this in any way constitute legal advice or is it even warranted to be remotely accurate! It is intended to be a resource for Kansas defenders and others interested in the criminal justice system in Kansas.Randall Hodgkinsonhttp://firstname.lastname@example.com:blogger.com,1999:blog-21065343.post-10112823457943122352015-05-02T16:24:00.000-05:002016-03-03T16:25:21.206-06:00Benign intent does not equal good faithSam S. Kepfield won in State v. Cox, No. 112,387 (Kan. App. April 10, 2015), affirming Judge Chambers' suppression order in a Reno County drug prosecution. On appeal, the state argued that Judge Chambers had improperly held that Ms. Cox had standing to challenge the search of her bag. The COA agreed with Judge Chambers:

Under these standards, Cox clearly has standing to challenge the search of the Buckle shopping bag. Cox and Simmons both confirmed that Cox knowingly left her bags in Simmons' car. Simmons positively identified which shopping bag belonged to Cox, and [the trooper] removed and searched only that bag. Even if, as the State argues, [the trooper] did not know for certain that the Buckle bag belonged to Cox before searching it, "the 'state of mind of the searcher regarding the possession or ownership of the item searched is irrelevant to the issue of standing.'" Cox clearly maintained a legitimate expectation of privacy in the bag she readily identified as her own. Thus, Cox had standing to contest the search of the bag.
The COA also rejected the state's argument that Ms. Cox had impliedly consented to search of her bag in these circumstances:

The State's argument that Cox implicitly consented to the search based on the circumstances fails for at least two reasons. First, Simmons specifically identified the Buckle bag that belonged to Cox. Thus, there was no need for [the trooper] to open the bag to look for the wood sander in order to verify ownership of the bag. Second, [the trooper] had the opportunity to ask Cox for her consent to search the bag when he spoke with her on the telephone, but he failed to do so. Under these circumstances, any consent implied by the situation is simply insufficient to substitute for the required express consent.

In summary, the record lacks any indication that Cox's consent to the search of her bag was "'unequivocal, specific, and freely given.'" Because it cannot fairly be said that Cox consented to the search of her Buckle bag, the district court did not err in suppressing the evidence found in the bag.
Finally, the COA rejected the state's claim that the good-faith exception should prevent suppression in this case (1) because it was not raised below and (2) because the trooper was not relying on a search warrant or a statute:

This is not a case where [the trooper] was relying in good faith on a search warrant later found to be invalid or on a statute later declared unconstitutional. Although [the trooper's] motivation for opening Cox's Buckle bag may have been benign, the fact remains that he violated Cox's constitutional rights by searching her bag without a warrant and without her consent. This case presents a situation where the exclusionary rule should be applied in order to deter [the trooper] and other law enforcement officers from making the same type of mistake in the future. Thus, the district court correctly applied the exclusionary rule to suppress the evidence found in the Buckle bag.
[Update: Ms. Cox filed a motion to publish this previously unpublished case, which was granted on July 8, 2015.]

[Further update: the state did not file a PR in this case and the mandate issued on October 29, 2015.]

Randall Hodgkinsonhttp://email@example.com:blogger.com,1999:blog-21065343.post-31885678843706179232013-06-22T20:52:00.000-05:002016-03-03T16:09:39.957-06:00Closing courtroom violates Public Trial Clause
Rebecca L.Kurz won in State v. Cox, No. 103,674 (Kan. June 21, 2013), obtaining a new trial in a Labette County aggravated criminal sodomy prosecution. During the jury trial, the district court cleared the courtroom while photographs of the victim's genitalia were displayed and discussed. Defense counsel suggested that the district court's concerns could be addressed by simply passing photographs to the jurors without closing the courtroom. The KSC held that the district court's procedure violated the Public Trial Clause:<o:p></o:p>

The district judge's wholesale closure of the courtroom during the presentation of this evidence, in the absence of the State or the judge expressing any "overriding interest" combined with the lack of meaningful consideration of alternatives, violated Cox's Sixth Amendment right to a public trial.<o:p></o:p>

The KSC reiterated that a Public Trial Clause violation cannot be harmless and also rejected the state's attempt to have the case remanded to allow the district court to make some retrospective findings with regard to the need to completely close the courtroom.<o:p></o:p>
Randall Hodgkinsonhttp://email@example.com:blogger.com,1999:blog-21065343.post-39422472332745044752015-03-21T16:05:00.000-05:002016-03-03T16:07:23.962-06:00Refiling as subterfuge violates speedy trialPatrick H. Dunn won in State v. Anunda, No. 110,629 (Kan. App. Feb. 27, 2015)(unpublished), affirming Judcge Martin's order dismissing a Douglas County aggravated sexual battery prosecution. The state had dismissed a prior case a few days prior to jury trial and refilled on a similar, but lesser offense. Judge Martin had ruled that the dismissal was not for necessity, but a subterfuge to avoid the speedy trial limits. The COA upheld that finding:

To summarize our narrow ruling here, we hold: the State can violate the speedy trial rights of an accused when it arrests the accused for a particular charge and others, then does not actually include that particular charge in the information, then does not ask that the accused be bound over on that particular charge at the preliminary hearing, then, 10 days before trial asks that the particular charge be included as an alternate count, relying on the preliminary hearing record for probable cause, and, when that request is denied, then, as a subterfuge, dismisses the case 4 days before the trial and simultaneously refiles a case containing only that particular charge if the tacked together statutory speedy trial time in the cases exceeds that prescribed by the applicable section of K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 22-3402.
The COA also noted that the state had failed to brief any argument to reverse the district court's alternative holding that the case should also be dismissed under the Due Process Clause.

[Update: the state did not file a PR and the mandate issued on April 2, 2015.]

Randall Hodgkinsonhttp://firstname.lastname@example.com:blogger.com,1999:blog-21065343.post-69825531733852196512015-08-29T15:19:00.000-05:002016-03-03T15:58:37.266-06:00Promise to not arrest and surrounding circumstances support suppressionSam Kepfield won in State v. Cousins, No. 112,497 (Kan. App. Aug. 7, 2015)(unpublished), affirming Judge Rose's suppression of incriminating statements in a Reno County aggravated criminal sodomy prosecution. Judge Rose made the following findings regarding the interrogation:

Considering the totality of the circumstances including defendant's physical condition and the length of the interview, the State has not met the burden of proving defendant's statements were the product of his free and independent will. Primary in this analysis is the detective's statement to defendant, 'You are not going to be arrested.' This statement was followed by another statement, 'I am not arresting you today[,'] but the defendant could have logically interpreted the statement as a promise that he would not, at any time, be arrested for the alleged crimes. The statement was certainly made by a person who defendant reasonably believed had the power or authority to make good on his promise.
The COA rejected the state's claim that Judge Rose did not appropriately evaluate the evidence:

The State is correct in asserting that false statements by law enforcement officers do not automatically render a suspect's confession involuntary. But here, the district court did not rely on any assertion that the officers made false statements to Cousins about the evidence in the case to persuade him to confess to the crimes. Instead, the district court properly relied on the "totality of the circumstances" in determining that Cousins' statements were not the product of his free and independent will.

In summary, as the district court found, the entire interrogation lasted over 3 hours. Cousins was 18 years old and he informed the detectives that he was not feeling well. The detectives repeatedly told Cousins that he was not going to be arrested. At one point Cousins asked, "You want me to just lie and say something to get out of here?" Cousins strenuously maintained his innocence throughout most of the interview. Then, about 2 hours and 20 minutes into the interview, Cousins finally made incriminating statements as a result of leading and suggestive questioning by the detectives. On several occasions, Cousins simply adopted the fact scenarios that were suggested to him by the officers as to how he molested N.A.N. Any one of the circumstances of the interview, standing alone, may not have been enough to make the statements involuntary. However, all the circumstances together support the district court's conclusion that Cousins' statements were not the product of his free and independent will. Thus, we conclude the district court did not err in granting Cousins' motion to suppress his statements.
As a result, the COA affirmed the suppression order.

 [Update: the state filed a PR on September 8, 2015.]

[Further update: the KSC denied the state's PR and the mandate issued on February 2, 2016.]Randall Hodgkinsonhttp://firstname.lastname@example.com:blogger.com,1999:blog-21065343.post-77761056561171928732016-01-09T15:02:00.000-06:002016-02-25T15:03:43.272-06:00Search incident to arrest nor inevitable discovery justified search of wallet left on carShannon Crane won in State v. Reed, No. 113,576 (Kan. App. Dec. 18, 2015), affirming Judge Rose's suppression order in a Reno County drug prosecution. Judge Rose found the following facts:

Defendant was handcuffed and at the rear of his vehicle when his wallet was first searched. The search of the wallet was not justified by safety reasons or as an effort to safeguard evidence of the offense of driving while suspended. The officers were in possession of defendant's driver's license, the only evidence relevant to the crime for which defendant was being arrested. There was nothing protruding from the wallet suggesting any type of safety concern. Officer Carey testified it is police department policy to search a person's effects before placing them in a patrol car. The court assumes this policy is for safety reasons. Here though, defendant was separated from his wallet. Defendant apparently was not asked what he would like done with his wallet, if anything. If officers were concerned about security of defendant's property there was a passenger who arguably could have assumed custody of the wallet. There was no indication the passenger was a minor child or under the influence of drugs or otherwise incapacitated.

 The search was not authorized as incident to arrest. The inevitable discovery doctrine does not authorize the admission of the evidence because the wallet was not lawfully seized.
The COA agreed that the search incident arrest doctrine did not apply:

If Reed's wallet had been in his pocket or even in his hand when he was arrested, the search in this case clearly would have been constitutional as a search incident to arrest. But here, Reed placed his wallet on the roof of his car prior to his arrest. Before officers searched Reed's wallet, Lahaan arrested Reed, placed him in the back of the patrol car, and continued to complete the investigation and interview other people at the scene, including Reed's passenger. By the time Carey searched Reed's wallet, there was no possibility that Reed could access the wallet. Therefore, under Gant, the justifications of the search incident to arrest exception were absent and the exception did not apply. The State's undeveloped argument that Gant is inapplicable because it concerned an automobile is unpersuasive in light of the language quoted above from Gant.
The COA also agreed that adopting the state's argument would constitute a huge expansion of the inevitable discovery rule:
The State argues that it would have been unreasonable to expect officers to leave the wallet on the roof of the car. The State further asserts that "[i]f an item is personal in nature, plainly connected to the suspect, and left out in the open, law enforcement should be able to lawfully collect the item. Once the items are lawfully with law enforcement, they may be searched. [Citation omitted.]" If the court accepts the State's assertion, it is essentially saying that officers may search any item an arrestee is "plainly connected to" and which is "left out in the open" without further requirement from the Fourth Amendment. This would run afoul to the Fourth Amendment's premise that warrantless seizures are impermissible without an established exception to the warrant requirement.
Finally, the COA rejected the application of the good-faith rule:
The State contends that the officers acted "with an objectively reasonable good-faith belief that their conduct was lawful." But even if Carey's motivation for searching Reed's wallet may have been benign, the fact remains that he violated Reed's constitutional rights by searching his wallet without a warrant and without an applicable exception to the warrant requirement. This case presents a situation where the exclusionary rule should be applied in order to deter Carey and other law enforcement officers from making the same type of mistake in the future. Thus, the district court correctly applied the exclusionary rule to suppress the evidence found in Reed's wallet.
[Update: the state did not file a PR and the mandate issued on January 26, 2016.]
 Randall Hodgkinsonhttp://email@example.com:blogger.com,1999:blog-21065343.post-67952776172684528052015-11-28T14:45:00.000-06:002016-02-25T14:45:35.867-06:00Dispositional departure was a "no brainer"Janine Cox won in State v. Snyder, No. 112,044 (Kan. App. Nov. 6, 2015)(unpublished), affirming Judge Fleming's downward dispositional departure sentence in a Labette County drug prosecution. Judge Fleming adopted several mitigating factors asserted in Mr. Snyder's departure motion, including appropriate action since charging, no criminal history, family support, and taking responsibility for his actions. The COA held that evidence supported all of these factors, even if contested by the state. The COA did acknowledge that a lack of criminal history, by itself, might to support a departure, but that it could be considered along with other mitigating factors, as was done in this case. Ultimately, the COA affirmed:

Here, the district court found the decision to grant the departure was a "no brainer" because "prison doesn't make people better citizens, generally, and it's punishment for the sake of punishment." The district court considered the factors in light of the purposes of the KSGA—(1) reduce prison overcrowding, (2) protect public safety, and (3) standardize sentences so similarly situated offenders are treated the same in order to reduce the effects of racial or geographic bias. The district court found Snyder was amenable to probation and was not a threat to public safety based on his lack of criminal history, his good behavior while the case was pending, the fact he took responsibility for his actions, and his family support. Taking all of these factors into consideration, we find the district court did not abuse its discretion when it granted Snyder's departure motion.
[Update: the state did not file a PR and the mandate issued on December 14, 2015.]
 Randall Hodgkinsonhttp://email@example.com:blogger.com,1999:blog-21065343.post-28680636272943358392015-11-21T14:34:00.000-06:002016-02-25T14:35:12.053-06:00Social guest generally not subject to search warrant of premisesTracey T. Beverlin won in State v. Hunter, No. 112,963 (Kan. App. Oct. 30, 2015)(unpublished), summarily affirming Judge Meisenheimer's suppression order in a Pratt County drug prosecution. Officers had a search warrant for a residence and when they executed that warrant, officers met Ms. Hunter at the front door. Ms. Hunter provided her ID to the officers from her purse and then indicated she wanted to leave. Officers detained her telling her she was subject to the search warrant. Officers conducted nonconsensual search of Ms. Hunter's purse and found amphetamines and marijuana.

At trial, Ms. Hunter argued that the officer was not authorized to search her purse pursuant to the warrant because there was insufficient evidence of a relationship between her and the residence. The district court agreed and the COA affirmed. The parties agreed that a social guest at a premises that is subject to a search warrant is not generally subject to a search, unless circumstances suggest a relationship between the person and the illegal activities described in the warrant. But the COA held that the district court's finding that the state had failed to prove such circumstances was supported:
In any event, as the district court found, there was no evidence establishing a relationship. The search warrant application was based on Reyna's report to McCarley that he previously had smoked marijuana and methamphetamine with Roberts at the residence on Brendon Court. Specifically, Reyna told McCarley that on the evening of December 14, 2013, Reyna was at the residence and observed Roberts crush up some type of prescription pills, mix them into a solution, and use a needle to inject the solution into his body. Reyna told McCarley that Roberts did not have a prescription for these pills. As the district court found, there was absolutely no evidence connecting Hunter with the illegal activities described in the application for the search warrant. The district court found this lack of connection to be especially apparent because it had been more than 2 days from the time that Reyna had observed Roberts crushing up the prescription pills to the time that Hunter's purse was searched without her consent.
[Update: the state did not file a PR and the mandate issued on December 14, 2015.]
 Randall Hodgkinsonhttp://email@example.com:blogger.com,1999:blog-21065343.post-570660131938729412015-10-24T14:14:00.000-05:002016-02-25T14:18:25.146-06:00Agreement supported dismissal of drug chargesMichael X. Llamas won in State v. Tyner, No. 112,045 (Kan. App. Oct. 2, 2015)(unpublished), affirming Judge Dickinson's dismissal of two Harvey County drug related cases. Ms. Tyner and her attorney testified that she had entered into an agreement with a prosecutor whereby she would not contest a probation violation proceeding in exchange to the state's agreement to not file some pending charges (the charges at issue in the instant case). The prosecutor testified and indicate that he had not entered into any agreement with Ms. Tyner. On appeal, the state argued that the district court abused its discretion by finding an enforceable agreement. The COA held that substantial competent evidence supported the finding of an agreement and that, therefore, this was simply a credibility contest:

The district judge was faced with a straightforward factual dispute in this matter. The defendant contended a plea agreement prohibited the filing of the two drug-related cases, and the State denied there was any plea agreement. It is the district court's obligation to weigh the evidence and make credibility determinations based on that evidence. Here, the district court was persuaded that there was a plea agreement which prohibited the State from bringing the two drug-related cases, and substantial evidence supports the determination.
As a result, the COA affirmed the dismissals.

[The state did not file a PR and the mandate issue on November 19, 2015.]Randall Hodgkinsonhttp://email@example.com:blogger.com,1999:blog-21065343.post-56254627025162506662015-10-17T11:54:00.000-05:002016-02-25T11:56:31.777-06:00Sufficient factors supported downward dispositional departureAndy Vinduska won in State v. Lebeuf, No. 112,857 (Kan. App. Sept. 25, 2015)(unpublished), affirming Judge Bosch's downward dispositional departure sentence in a Clay County trafficking in contraband prosecution. Judge Bosch found several mitigating factors:

(1) Lebeuf's age; (2) that Lebeuf had no recent history of violence; (3) that drug treatment would better protect society than a prison disposition; and (4) reasons "pretty much as stated by [Lebeuf's] attorney to the court." The factors argued by defense counsel were that the degree of harm was significantly less than typical, that Lebeuf had accepted responsibility for his conduct, and that Lebeuf was addicted to methamphetamine.
The COA agreed that the factors regarding age and degree of harm were not substantial and compelling reasons for departure in this case. But the COA affirmed the remaining findings:

As to the remaining factors relied upon by the district court to support a departure sentence, we find that those factors were supported by substantial competent evidence. The presentence investigation report supports the district court's finding that Lebeuf had no recent history of violent crime. By pleading no contest, Lebeuf elected not to contest the charge and to accept a conviction. The drug and alcohol evaluation confirmed Lebeuf's addiction to methamphetamine and that there was a treatment program available to treat this addiction.
Since the district court found some proper factors supporting the departure, the COA held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by granting a dispositional departure.

[Update: the state did not file a PR and the mandate issued on October 30, 2015.]Randall Hodgkinsonhttp://firstname.lastname@example.com:blogger.com,1999:blog-21065343.post-43146761125361041862015-05-23T10:50:00.000-05:002016-02-25T10:52:33.009-06:00"I ain't talking no more" is unambiguous invocation of right to remain silentBenjamin J. Fisher won in State v. Brisco, No. 112,644 (Kan. App. May 1, 2015)(unpublished), affirming Judge Chambers' suppression of several incriminating statements in a Reno County murder prosecution. The following facts were set out in the COA opinion:

The next day, Brisco was interviewed by law enforcement the first time. He denied any involvement in the murder. The following day, Brisco was arrested and interviewed a second time. The detective read Brisco his Miranda rights, and he agreed to speak with the detective. Brisco began to talk to the detective about his version of the events from the night of the murder. At one point during the interview, Brisco indicated he did not want to talk to the detective during the interview but then continued to talk anyway. However, 4 hours into the interview at approximately 11:25 p.m. Brisco placed his hat on his head, folded his arms over his chest, and stayed silent for several seconds. The detective reinitiated questioning. He asked about the gun used, but Brisco remained silent until he stated, "I ain't talking no more." The silence continued until the detective asked Brisco further questions to which Brisco gave responses.
The COA agreed with Judge Chambers that the statements were obtained in violation of the right to remain silent:

While Brisco's first invocation of his right to remain silent was ambiguous because he continued speaking to the detective of his own accord, Brisco's second invocation of his right to remain silent was not ambiguous or equivocal. During the interview, Brisco placed his hat on his head, folded his arms over his chest, and stayed silent for several seconds. The detective then asked about the gun used, but Brisco remained silent until he stated, "I ain't talking no more." The silence continued until the detective asked Brisco further questions to which Brisco gave responses. Moreover, the detective never asked any clarifying questions pertaining to Brisco's invocation of his right to remain silent. Not only did Brisco's body language suggest that he was no longer willing to talk, but he specifically stated that he was no longer willing to talk to the detective. Unlike Brisco's first attempt to invoke his right to remain silent, he did not reinitiate the conversation; the detective did. The state concedes that it was the detective that reinitiated the conversation. Thus, the district court did not err when it determined that Brisco's statements made after he unambiguously invoked his right to remain silent should be suppressed.
[Update: the state filed a PR on May 28, 2015.]

[Further update: the KSC denied the state's PR and the mandate issued on July 31, 2015.]

Randall Hodgkinsonhttp://email@example.com:blogger.com,1999:blog-21065343.post-79353669022394556122015-11-14T10:41:00.000-06:002016-02-25T10:51:42.901-06:00No good-faith exception for illegal cell phone searchesTimothy J. Grillot won in State v. Jones, No. 113,397 (Kan. App. Oct. 23, 2015)(unpublished), affirming Judge Fleming's suppression order in a Labette County prosecution. The state conceded that a cell-phone search was illegal pursuant to Riley v. California, but argued that the evidence obtained as a result should still be admitted under the good-faith exception. The COA noted that there was only one federal court case and one non-final Kansas COA case upholding cell-phone searches incident to arrest. As a result, the COA agreed with Judge Fleming that the good-faith exception did not apply:

On the facts presented in the defendant's motion to suppress evidence (and not challenged through evidence by the State), Jones was a passenger in a car involved in a brief police chase, and officers arrested him when he got out of the car. An officer then found cash in Jones' pants pocket and searched data on Jones' cell phone to see whether the cash might be tied to illegal activity. The officer had no warrant, and the State presented no testimony or argument that the officer needed to examine any data on the cell phone to protect anyone's safety. On these facts, the district court properly granted the defendant's motion.
[Update: the state did not file a PR and the mandate issued on December 28, 2015.]Randall Hodgkinsonhttp://email@example.com:blogger.com,1999:blog-21065343.post-31366961974008462822015-11-21T14:14:00.000-06:002016-02-24T14:14:27.529-06:00Trooper's repeated failure to appear justified dismissal with prejudiceIn State v. Stufflebean, No. 112,873 (Kan. App. Oct. 30, 2015)(unpublished), the COA affirmed a magistrate judge's dismissal of a traffic citation with prejudice after a Highway Patrol Trooper failed to appear for the bench trial. Recognizing that dismissal with prejudice is an extreme remedy, the COA still upheld the magistrate judge's action:

Here, the record on appeal reflects that the magistrate judge dismissed the charge against Stufflebean with prejudice because the trooper who issued the traffic citation failed to attend the bench trial. While there is no transcript of the original bench trial in the record, the district judge affirmed the magistrate judge's dismissal in part because Stufflebean had driven over an hour each way to appear in the Jefferson County District Court two previous times—once for the first appearance and once for the bench trial at which Moomau was absent.

It was not unreasonable for the magistrate judge to find that requiring Stufflebean to appear in court yet again was prejudicial to him, especially after he needlessly traveled to Jefferson County at least one other time due to the trooper's failure to attend the bench trial. It is also reasonable not to require a defendant to travel multiple times in order to resolve a traffic infraction when the issuing officer failed to attend the bench trial with no excuse. Also significantly, the magistrate judge's decision did not punish the public and it did not create windfall for Stufflebean. The charge against Stufflebean was not for a violent or especially dangerous offense, meaning he was not an appreciable danger to the public. Stufflebean at most faced a fine if found guilty, meaning he did not gain a substantial windfall through the dismissal when compared to other hypothetical defendants facing prison sentences or large restitution obligations.
[Update: the state did not file a PR and the mandate issued on Decvember 14, 2015.]Randall Hodgkinsonhttp://email@example.com:blogger.com,1999:blog-21065343.post-66596826719842371602015-05-16T14:03:00.000-05:002016-02-24T14:06:58.115-06:00Absconding is more than just not reportingPatrick H. Dunn won in State v. Huckey, No. 112,273 (Kan. App. April 24, 2015), obtaining a remand order in a Ellsworth County probation violation case. In particular, the COA expounded on the definition of "absconder" for purposes of an intermediate sanction statutes. The panel looked to other cases defining "absconder" for purposes of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine and concluded that "absconder" means something more than failure to report on probation:

The Campbell court ruled that the district court's finding that Campbell was a fugitive based upon a mere allegation in the State's motion was insufficient. The panel ruled that the district court erred on this point, but it ultimately affirmed based upon the legal insufficiency of Campbell's motion to modify sentence.

We find the reasoning of the Campbell panel sound. In this case, the only mention of Huckey being an absconder from supervision was by the State when counsel argued that caselaw suggested that if you failed to report for 2 months you are an absconder; if it is less than 2 months, you are not an absconder. We have found no reported cases that rule this way.

On appeal, the State has abandoned that argument. Instead, the State contends that because the statute fails to define absconder, then it is left to the absolute discretion of the sentencing court to decide if a probationer is an absconder. In other words, if a probationer fails to report one time, the court, acting within its discretion, could validly rule such a probationer is an absconder, making the intermediate sanctions inapplicable when probation is revoked.

Such an interpretation of the statute runs counter to the elaborate set of intermediate sanctions created by the statute that must be imposed in cases of probation revocation before ordering the original sentence to be served. Why bother to create all of those sanctions if the legislature simply allowed the sentencing court to bypass all of the sanctions with a simple finding that this probationer is an absconder? The reasoning in Campbell is compelling. Absconding is more than just not reporting.
Because the state had not shown any evidence of absconding, the COA remanded for further proceedings.

[Update: the state filed a PR on May 22, 2015.]

[Further update: the KSC denied the state's PR and the mandate issued on August 12, 2015.]Randall Hodgkinsonhttp://firstname.lastname@example.com:blogger.com,1999:blog-21065343.post-89329095941587264932016-01-09T11:33:00.000-06:002016-02-24T14:04:43.507-06:00Cannot detain while getting a search warrant without moreKimberly Streit Vogelsberg won in State v. Daugherty, No. 110,131 (Kan. App. Dec. 18, 2015)(unpublished), obtaining a suppression order in a Butler County drug prosecution. Ms Daugherty argued that officers obtained statements from her during an illegal detention and that the tainted evidence invalidated a search warrant predicated on those statements, which in turn led to incriminating evidence. The state relied on cases that stood for the proposition that a person can be detained during execution of a search warrant. But the COA held that Ms. Daugherty's case was easily distinguishable:

In Daugherty's case, of course, officers did not have a search warrant when they detained her. Given the cases' strong emphasis on the search warrant to justify a seizure, Summers and Mena do not control the result here.
The COA went on, then, to consider whether a person can be detained while officers get a search warrant. Ultimately, the COA followed a Fourth Circuit case that held a seizure unreasonable where there was not warrant, no probable cause--or even reasonable suspicion--of criminal activity, and no reasonable suspicion of destruction or concealment of evidence. As a result, the COA held that Ms. Daugherty's detention was similarly unreasonable:

police in our case did not have probable cause to believe that Daugherty had done or would do anything wrong. Nor could Daugherty have destroyed evidence that was in the room; officers were preventing anyone from entering. No officers suggested that Daugherty represented a threat to their safety; the officers didn't handcuff or restrain her while they kept her in the motel lobby. She was seized without being given an option to leave, and the officers did not have a search warrant (or the imminent prospect of one) at the time. We conclude that her seizure in these circumstances violated her right to be free from unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 15 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights.
The COA also rejected the state's argument that the reading of Miranda rights during the illegal detention reduced the effect of the illegal seizure. The COA held that, while giving of Miranda rights may be relevant, it did not overcome the fact that the statements were made during the illegal detention and immediately used to get a search warrant.

Finally, the COA held that the state's speculative theory regarding inevitable discovery was not sufficiently litigated at the district court and therefore remanded for further findings.

[Update: the state did not file a PR and the mandate issued on January 26, 2016.]Randall Hodgkinsonhttp://email@example.com:blogger.com,1999:blog-21065343.post-91061831705952879462016-01-09T11:44:00.000-06:002016-02-24T14:04:14.054-06:00Aiding and abetting instruction given during jury deliberations is clear errorRick Kittel won in State v. Hover, No. 113,214 (Kan. App. Dec. 18, 2015)(unpublished), obtaining a new trial in a Reno County aggravated battery prosecution. Ms. Hover argued that the district court's improperly giving an aiding-and-abetting instruction in response to a jury question. During deliberations, the jury asked "If we determine that the defendant was guilty of battery, does she share responsibility for all the harm that was done[?]" Over defense objections, the district court gave a pattern instruction for aiding-and-abetting. The COA held that the instruction was legally inappropriate:

Hover's defense was that the State had failed to prove its case. Hover pointed out the variances in the witnesses' trial testimony and attempted to undermine the State's witnesses' credibility. Moreover, Hover argued that her hemophilia would have resulted in bruises on her hands had she been fighting, but she had no bruises. Hover offered the jury an alternative explanation of the fight: that Kelsie and Renae were the ones who hit Spencer and Hover was trying to break up the fight.

We find that the aiding and abetting instruction was not legally appropriate for the simple reason that neither party asserted an aiding and abetting theory during the trial. Moreover, Hover argues that the instruction was legally inappropriate because giving it violated her constitutional right to present a defense—she was unable to present a defense to or argue against the theory that she was guilty as an aider and abettor since that theory was not introduced until after the close of evidence and argument.
On reversibility, the COA held that the error was clear:

This case essentially boiled down to a credibility contest between witnesses supporting the State's theory—that Hover battered Spencer—and witnesses supporting the defense theory—that Hover was present but did not touch Spencer. By erroneously introducing a new theory of culpability during deliberation, without supplemental argument or presentation of evidence, the district court fundamentally changed the grounds on which the jury could convict Hover. We cannot be sure that the erroneous instruction on aiding and abetting caused the jury's verdict, but there is a real possibility that it did so. Stated differently, after carefully reviewing the entire record, we are firmly convinced there is a real possibility the jury would have rendered a different verdict had the instruction error not occurred. Thus, we conclude the supplemental jury instruction on aiding and abetting was clearly erroneous.
As a result, the COA ordered a new trial.

[Update: the state did not file a PR and the mandate issued on January 26, 2016.]Randall Hodgkinsonhttp://firstname.lastname@example.com:blogger.com,1999:blog-21065343.post-75986401090937451552015-12-05T08:49:00.000-06:002016-02-24T09:02:06.131-06:00No concern for welfare supporting welfare checkRick Kittel won in State v. Canfield, No. 112,610 (Kan. App. Nov. 13, 2015)(unpublished), obtaining reversal of a Shawnee County drug conviction. Police had received a call from a caller who claimed he was the father of Ms. Canfield's children expressing concerns about the children. Police went to the house and pounded on the door until Terrance Jackson came to the door and told police that Ms. Canfield was not there. From the doorway, the officer could see two children, but no contraband in plain view. The children appeared clean and unharmed. The officer arrested Jackson and another officer entered the home. Upon entry, officers found Ms. Canfield sitting on a bed and arrested her on an outstanding warrant and, during a search incident to arrest, found drugs.

The district court had denied the motion to suppress holding that the officers were permitted to make a warrantless entry for a "welfare check" of the children. The COA disagreed:

When Jackson eventually reopened the door, Officer Cruse warned Jackson about obstructing his efforts to execute the arrest warrant on Canfield. He said nothing to Jackson about harboring children in a dangerous environment. But he was able to see behind Jackson the two children standing in the hallway. The children appeared to be clean, and there was no contraband in plain view. The home appeared to be clean and well taken care of. There was no indication the children were in immediate danger.

Officer Cruse did not speak to the children. He did not ask Jackson about the children. He did not inquire who the children were, where their parents were, who was looking after them, or whether there had been any drugs consumed in their presence. The only suspicion he had was that if the children were there, Canfield also may be there. At that point Officer Cruse entered the residence, not for the purpose of addressing the needs of the children but to arrest their mother. He walked right past the children and into the room where Canfield sat on the bed.

There is no testimony that either officer did anything whatsoever to look after the well-being of the children during the entire time they were at Canfield's home. The generalized concern expressed in the call to the police dispatcher was not borne out by any observations by the police officers when they arrived at the Canfield home. We find no evidence in the record which would lead a prudent and reasonable officer to see the need to enter Canfield's home to protect the children. Thus, we conclude the district court erred in finding that Officer Cruse was justified in entering Canfield's home to conduct a welfare check of the children.
As a result, the COA reversed the drug conviction.

[Update: the state did not file a PR and the mandate issued on December 28, 2015.]
 Randall Hodgkinsonhttp://firstname.lastname@example.com:blogger.com,1999:blog-21065343.post-23585731882586867412016-01-02T09:00:00.000-06:002016-02-24T09:01:56.480-06:00Insufficient search warrant affidavit leads to suppression of residential searchWashburn student intern Michelle David and I won in State v. Savage, No. 112,882 (Kan. App. Dec. 11, 2015)(unpublished), obtaining a suppression order in a Douglas County drug prosecution. Police had obtained a search warrant to search Mr. Savage's home based on a report from a neighbor, a trash pull, and an old conviction for drug possession. The COA held that there was insufficient evidence presented in the affidavit to support the warrant. The COA agreed with the district court that the remote conviction, by itself, was of little value in the probable cause calculus. Additionally, the non-specific report from the neighbor was not particularly probative. It also held that items found in the trash pull did not establish a sufficient contemporaneous connection to the home:

The affidavit at issue here clearly established a nexus between the garbage retrieved and the residence to be searched. The affidavit states that two trash bags were pulled from in front of Savage's home, on the same day, one yellow bag and one white bag. In the white bag were 14 pieces of mail along with two other documents addressed to Savage at the address to be searched, as well as mail addressed to two other individuals at the same address. Furthermore, an unknown quantity of marijuana mixed with coffee grounds and an opened package of Zig-Zag rolling papers were found. In addition, the trash pull was done the day before the warrant was requested, so the information was not stale. Nevertheless, we are compelled to find that the items recovered from the trash pull fail to establish a fair probability that further evidence of the crime of possession of marijuana would be found in Savage's home.

Even though the affiant requested a search warrant "to complete a more thorough investigation of possession of marijuana," a close examination of the evidence reveals that there is insufficient evidence to suggest a fair probability that marijuana would be found in Savage's house on July 2. The only evidence of criminal activity is that someone who was in the house possessed marijuana and unused rolling papers at some unknown time and subsequently discarded both. The amount of marijuana found is not delineated in the affidavit, but the fact that it was mixed with coffee grounds would suggest it was a small amount, consistent with individual use and not distribution. We do note that no partially burned or used rolling papers were found. We acknowledge that the possession of any amount of a controlled substance, even if it is not measurable or usable, is a crime in Kansas. However, the question is whether marijuana and unopened rolling papers found in a trash bag established probable cause to believe that contraband or evidence of a crime would be found in the residence. Neither party suggests that any criminal charges could be pursued merely for the marijuana found in the trash bag. It is unclear when the past use occurred, when the garbage was removed from the house or even when it was scheduled to be picked up. Even assuming weekly garbage collection, the contraband may well have been evidence of marijuana use several days prior to the examination of the garbage.
So, in totality, even giving appropriate deference to the magistrate, the COA held that the affidavit was lacking ("not even close"). Finally, the state had not argued the good-faith exception to the trial court and had not asserted any reasons for allowing that issue to be raised on appeal or the first time. As a result, the COA ordered that the evidence found during the search of Mr. Savage's home be suppressed.

[Update: the state did not file a PR and the mandate issued on January 25, 2016.]Randall Hodgkinsonhttp://email@example.com:blogger.com,1999:blog-21065343.post-22263801511854305852015-07-11T15:28:00.000-05:002016-02-23T16:50:50.850-06:00Failure to investigate and call critical witnesses results in new trialRichard Ney won in Gadbury v. State, No. 111,367 (Kan. App. June 19, 2015)(unpublished), granting Mr. Gadbury a new trial in a Ford County rape and aggravated criminal sodomy prosecution. Mr. Gadbury sought habeas relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel on several points. The COA noted that this case, where the defense was based on consent, depended on the jurors' views of credibility of the complaining witness and Mr. Gadbury. In that light, the COA held that trial counsel was deficient in several respects: (1) failure to obtain the complaining witness' medical records, failure to pursue a motion for independent psychological evaluation of the complaining witness, (3) failure to call a critical witness, and (4) failure to investigate and impeach one of Mr. Gadbury's ex-wives' credibility. After finding multiple deficiencies, the COA held a new trial was required:

[t]he cumulative effect of trial counsels' demonstrated errors has resulted in prejudice to Gadbury's right to a fair trial. The evidence of Gadbury's guilt was not overwhelming. We are convinced that there is a reasonable probability that, but for the ineffective assistance of counsel Gadbury received, the trial result would have been different.
[Update: the state did not file a PR and the mandate issued on July 23, 2015.]Randall Hodgkinsonhttp://firstname.lastname@example.com:blogger.com,1999:blog-21065343.post-34455078876575418752015-08-01T15:38:00.000-05:002016-02-23T16:50:29.969-06:00State must present evidence of construction zone speed limit to support convictionLinus A. Thuston won in State v. Sigg, No. 112,577 (Kan. App. July 10, 2015)(unpublished), obtaining reversal of a Allen County speeding in a construction zone conviction. In particular, Mr. Sigg argued that K.S.A. 8-1559(c)--the Kansas statute at issue--requires that "the speed limit shall be effective when appropriate signs giving notice thereof are erected." The COA reviewed the entire record and held it was insufficient on this point:

in the present case, there is no evidence in the record of a sign notifying drivers of a lower speed limit at the location where Sigg was stopped. Although Officer Smith testified that the location of the stop was in "a placard construction area zone," he never identified the location of any signs indicating a lower speed limit. Although the State characterizes the evidence as conflicting, the issue presented in this appeal is not whether the construction zone was unmarked. Rather, the issue is whether there is any evidence of a speed limit sign that notified drivers—such as Sigg—of a lower speed limit. Perhaps there were such signs but there is simply nothing in the record to tell us so.
As a result, the COA reversed.

[Update: the state did not file a PR and the mandate issued on August 13, 2015.]Randall Hodgkinsonhttp://firstname.lastname@example.com:blogger.com,1999:blog-21065343.post-34415923400866212662015-09-12T09:57:00.000-05:002016-02-23T16:49:20.260-06:00DNA testing statute applies to aggravated indecent liberties under Jessica's LawJanine Cox won in State v. Kelsey, No. 111,598 (Kan. App. Aug. 21, 2015), obtaining DNA testing in a Labette County aggravated indecent liberties with a child prosecution. Mr. Kelsey argued that the Equal Protection Clause required extending K.S.A. 21-2512, which allows for DNA testing in listed types of cases to all cases involving off-grid sex crimes. The COA followed KSC precedent and agreed that testing should be available to Mr. Kelsey:

Then, more recently, in Cheeks, our Supreme Court rejected the State's suggestion that the severity of the crime was a rational basis to exclude second-degree murder from K.S.A. 21-2512 for the same reason used in Denney. Citing K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 21-6807(a), the court pointed out that even though first-degree murder was classified as an off-grid felony when the legislature enacted K.S.A. 21-2512, the legislature included rape as a crime eligible for postconviction DNA testing and that both rape and second-degree murder, both being level 1 or 2 person felonies, were "'relatively equal in severity.'" In other words, similar does not mean identical when focusing on severity levels of crimes when making this type of analysis.

We are constrained to follow the ruling in Cheeks. As the Supreme Court did in Cheeks, we find no legitimate legislative goal that is met by this distinction in severity levels of the crimes for the purpose of an equal protection analysis. Given Kansas' obvious commitment to exoneration of the innocent through DNA—both sampling and later testing—and following our Supreme Court's lead in extending K.S.A. 21-2512 rather than nullifying the statute in such instances as here, we likewise extend K.S.A. 21-2512 to include testing for those in the same situation as Kelsey.

In so holding, we clarify that, like Cheeks, we are not adding a new crime to the statute's coverage but are expanding the statute to cover a much narrower class of offenders, i.e., offenders convicted of aggravated indecent liberties with a child under the age of 14 and sentenced under Jessica's Law to the mandatory hard 25 life sentence.
Judge Atcheson concurred, but would not have applied a requirement that persons demonstrate that they are "similarly situated" as an element of the Equal Protection claim.

[Update: the state did not file a PR and the mandate issued on September 24, 2015.]Randall Hodgkinsonhttp://email@example.com:blogger.com,1999:blog-21065343.post-54903668495832263622015-09-19T10:29:00.000-05:002016-02-23T16:47:59.657-06:00Restitution is limited to crimes of convictionKimberly Streit Vogelsberg won in State v. Miller, No. 111,573 (Kan. App. August 28, 2015), vacating a restitution order in a Sedgwick County burglary and theft prosecution. Mr. Miller argued that the $4,700 restitution order for plumbing and electrical repairs to a home did not relate to the charges for which he was convicted. The COA agreed:

Miller's theft conviction involved only theft of a machete and baby powder; he was neither charged with nor convicted of theft of copper piping or wiring. So the theft conviction cannot support the restitution award.

As for the burglary conviction, we must first review what underlying facts are established based on that conviction. As charged and pled in this case, burglary is entering into or remaining without authority in a dwelling with the intent to commit a theft there.

To the extent Miller might have damaged the property merely by entering it without authority—such as by breaking a door or a lock—restitution might be awarded for that damage because it would have been caused by the act of burglary. But merely entering or remaining in the dwelling does not by itself cause a loss of copper piping or wiring.

Even if we surmise that it was the underlying intent to commit theft of the copper wiring or plumbing that made his unauthorized entry a burglary, that would not affect the outcome here: The mere intent to steal something doesn't cause the loss. It's the act of theft that would cause the loss, and Miller was neither charged nor convicted of theft of the copper items.

The district court's factual finding that these losses were the "direct result of Mr. Miller's actions" is supported by the evidence. But these losses were not the direct result of Miller's crimes of conviction. Accordingly, the district court erred by ordering restitution for the damages caused by removal of the copper wiring and plumbing.
[Update: the state did not file a PR and the mandate issued on October 1, 2015.]Randall Hodgkinsonhttp://firstname.lastname@example.com:blogger.com,1999:blog-21065343.post-14997863290737187062015-10-03T16:11:00.000-05:002016-02-23T16:47:48.916-06:00"Ease of access" not relevant when considering prescription drugsI won in State v. Arb, No. 111,009 (Kan. App. Sept. 11, 2015)(unpublished), obtaining a new trial in a Lyon County distribution of oxycodone prosecution. The main issue on appeal involved problems with jury instructions and Ms. Arb's defense of entrapment. The district court gave an entrapment instruction, including the limitations--found in the pattern entrapment instruction--that entrapment is not available for persons with a previous disposition to commit the offense, which can be shown by "evidence of the circumstances at the time of the sale . . . setting of the price of the Oxycodone by the defendant, solicitation by the defendant to make her sale, prior sales of the defendant, or ease of access of the Oxycodone by the defendant." The COA agreed with Ms. Arb's claim that "ease of access" is not a factually appropriate when dealing with a prescription drug, as it did in this case.

The problem may be better illustrated in considering when ease of access does cut against an entrapment defense. Consider the government agent attempting to make a controlled buy of cocaine or some other illegal drug. If the targeted individual already has the cocaine, that demonstrates unlawful conduct in possessing the drug at all and suggests a predisposition to traffic. After all, the target had to acquire the cocaine in the first place. Similarly, if the target disclaims present possession of cocaine but touts knowledge of how to readily get some, that suggests past conduct indicative of a disposition to trade in the drug. So those circumstances would tend to cloud a defense of entrapment.

But the same inferences cannot be logically or legally drawn from a target's possession of oxycodone obtained with a valid prescription. There is nothing unlawful about filling a valid prescription at a pharmacy. So ease of access in that circumstance is not indicative of a predisposition to engage in illegal drug trafficking. The district court, therefore, erred by instructing the jury otherwise. In this case, the pattern jury instruction should have been tailored to remove that factor. Although district courts should avoid gratuitous rewrites of pattern jury instructions, those instructions can and should be edited to reflect legal principles appropriate to the evidence in a given case.
In addition, the district court failed to give a pattern instruction regarding the burden of proof with regard to affirmative defenses. In combination, the COA held that the instructional deficiencies constituted clear error and required reversal.

[Update: the state did not file a PR and the mandate issued on October 29, 2015.]Randall Hodgkinsonhttp://firstname.lastname@example.com:blogger.com,1999:blog-21065343.post-22029774188742119512015-10-31T16:29:00.000-05:002016-02-23T16:47:28.128-06:00Accidentally showing prejudicial unredacted video requires a new trialDerek W. Miller won in State v. Barnhart, No. 112,067 (Kan. App. Oct. 9, 2015)(unpublished), obtaining a new trial in a Ford County aggravated battery prosecution. On appeal, Mr. Barnhart argued that the publication of an unredacted video of a key witness required a new trial. The parties had agreed that several statements on the video were so prejudicial that they had to be redacted. But, in error, the unredacted video, including statements about Mr. Barhart's prior history with drugs and alcohol, prior violence, attendance at corrections, failed drug tests, and recent release from prison, was shown to the jury. The district court attempted to correct the oversight by a limiting instruction. But the COA held that the error required a new trial:

The unredacted statements on the video were not played for any legitimate purpose and, as the prosecutor admitted during oral argument, occurred because she was in a hurry and the error was hers. While we recognize the playing of the unredacted video was not intentional, that does not lessen the prejudicial impact it had on Barnhart's right to a fair trial. The video highlighted Barnhart's prior wrongful acts, and as such, these statements were extremely prejudicial.

The final step in determining whether the district court erred in not granting a mistrial is whether the improper statements affected the outcome of the trial. Here, the jury heard multiple highly prejudicial statements about Barnhart. The jury was also called upon to determine the credibility of the victim and the witnesses to decide whether to believe their initial version of the events or their recanted version. Once the jury heard the unredacted video, it was impossible for a limiting instruction to cure, especially when it failed to address all of the prejudicial issues the jury heard when the video was played. We cannot say the error was harmless, and we are not firmly convinced it did not affect the outcome of the trial. The party benefitting from the error always bears the burden of proving it harmless under this standard. The State has not convinced us the error was harmless. Once the video was exhibited and the bell was rung, we find the district court abused its discretion in not granting a mistrial sua sponte when the prosecutor inadvertently violated the agreement with Barnhart's attorney to only exhibit the redacted video to the jury.
[Update: the state did not file a PR and the mandate issued on December 18, 2015.]Randall Hodgkinsonhttp://email@example.com:blogger.com,1999:blog-21065343.post-52473933347553203992015-11-14T16:44:00.000-06:002016-02-23T16:47:06.162-06:00Drinking and walking is not necessarily a crimeDonald R. Snapp won in State v. Crane, No. 112,494 (Kan. App. Oct. 23, 2015)(unpublished), obtaining a suppression order in a McPherson County drug prosecution. Mr. Crane was arrested for crossing the street as a pedestrian under the influence. The COA held that Mr. Crane was not illegally crossing a neighborhood street and that officers' brief encounter with him on another street did not establish probable cause of a violation of K.S.A. 8-1543, which states: "A pedestrian who is under the influence of alcohol or any drug to a degree which renders such pedestrian a hazard shall not walk or be upon a highway except on a sidewalk."

The COA first held that, contrary to the district court's holding, Mr. Crane could not have been violating other pedestrian laws (like failing to cross at a crosswalk). Finally, the COA observed that simply consuming alcohol does not equate with being a hazard:

While it is clear from the record Crane had consumed alcohol, what is not clear is that he was intoxicated and a hazard in crossing the street to his friend's house. He crossed the street in a legal fashion, he had successfully crossed one street before the officers moved in to arrest him, he was able to walk and communicate successfully, and there were no cars approaching from either direction before or after Crane crossed the street. When the totality of the circumstances is considered, no objectively reasonable police officer would have had probable cause to arrest Crane for being a pedestrian under the influence. All evidence of criminal wrongdoing obtained after Crane's unlawful
seizure was therefore tainted.
[Update: the state did not file a PR and the mandate issued on December 28, 2015.]Randall Hodgkinsonhttp://email@example.com:blogger.com,1999:blog-21065343.post-82393411506778035032015-08-22T15:50:00.000-05:002016-02-23T15:52:07.509-06:00Insufficient evidence of amount of damageCorrine E. Gunning won in State v. Wilson, No. 111,280 (Kan. App. July 31, 2015)(unpublished), reversing a Douglas County felony criminal damage to property conviction related to damage to a shed and a tanning bed found within the shed. Mr. Wilson argued that the state failed to prove that he had caused more than $1,000 of damage, required to show a felony. The COA noted that the victim testified that material to fix a damaged shed cost $208, but that there was no evidence regarding the cost of labor to repair the shed. Similarly, the state did not present any evidence of the value of the tanning bed:

Notwithstanding a lack of evidence as to the dollar amount of damage that was sustained to the tanning bed, the State argues in its brief that a reasonable jury could have concluded from the evidence presented at trial that the damage to the tanning bed was equal to or greater than $752. Citing to Cox's testimony that she was told it would cost more to fix the tanning bed than it was worth, the State argues the tanning bed's fair market value on the date it was damaged was the proper measure for the jury to use in determining the amount of damage sustained to the bed. But the State's argument is grounded in impermissible inference stacking. The rule against inference-stacking prohibits a jury from speculating on unjustifiable inferences and is applicable when the evidence is so uncertain or speculative that it amounts only to mere conjecture or possibility. It applies here because there was no evidence to establish what precisely was wrong with the tanning bed; thus, the information provided by the retail sales clerk to Cox that it would cost more to fix the tanning bed than it was worth is without any evidentiary support and speculative. To then rely on this speculative evidence to support a conclusion that the value of the damage sustained to the bed is the fair market value of the bed on the day it was damaged impermissibly stacks an inference upon an inference.

Because there is absolutely no evidence in the record from which a jury could have determined the value of the damage sustained to the tanning bed, we conclude Wilson's conviction must be reversed. Based on the evidence in the record, the proper remedy is to remand the case with directions to resentence Wilson for a class B nonperson misdemeanor conviction for criminal damage to property.

[Update: the state did not file a PR and the mandate issued on September 3, 2016.]

Randall Hodgkinsonhttp://email@example.com


text:
Help with a logic
I need to write a C++ program to do the following things, and i have displayed my attempted code. Please let me know if there is more effective way to do this.
- I need to calculate the % based on the input values (run-time)
- The percentage value will keep on increasing based on the input values.
For eg
If the input is 30, then it after completing the 1st operation it should display 1 % .... and after completing 2nd operation it should display 2 % and so on, and when it completes 30th operation it will display 100 %.
Note: the input values is a random number.
My logic
Case 1: If the input is 30
1/30 = 0.03 and multiply the result by 100 then the value is 3 %
30/30 = 1 result will be 100 %
It is ok to have the % is some increasing order, rather than more presisely with 1%,2% etc.
But problem is my logic will not work for this case
Case 2: If the input is for eg 300
then 1/300 = 0.033 and multiply the result by 100 then the value is 0.33, in this case i should multiply by 1000 instead of 100 to get the round value.
Any idea on how to deal with this.
Thanks in advance.
Re: Help with a logic
try to explain better what you want to do
Re: Help with a logic
I also don't understand the problem here:
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subset: commoncrawl


text:
About us
We are Wren & Cooper, designers and makers of hardwood contemporary furniture.
Founded by Mark Cooper and Mariah Wren, our intent is to make the furniture we want to see in the world, as perfectly as possible from honest materials. Objects that are thoughtfully designed, highly functional and precisely crafted with a focus on simple profiles and subtle graphic details. We build our furniture by hand using traditional joinery methods, making one piece at a time, to customer order. We use materials and finishes that are pleasing to the eye and touch that will gain patina with age and use. This work is directed toward those who are seeking beautifully made solid wood furniture that will endure and retain its value for generations.
We are based in bucolic Bucks County, Pennsylvania, where where we continue to build upon the region's storied tradition of fine furniture making.
When you place an order you can expect to have your new furniture within 8 - 12 weeks.


text:
Robert Reich: Democrats want a deal that raises taxes only on America's wealthy and doesn't substantially alter Medicare, and Social Security — which is the opposite of what Republicans want.
Why Jobs Still Matter More Than Budget Deficits
Robert Reich: Government should extend unemployment benefits, and not cut spending until the nation's rate of unemployment is down to 5 percent. Then, and only then, should we move toward budget austerity.
Trigger Deficit Cuts When Unemployment Drops to 5 Percent
Robert Reich: So the best of all worlds is to have a big jobs plan now, and also commit to automatic cuts triggered when unemployment falls to 5 percent.
Why the Tax Deal Is an Abomination
Robert Reich: The deal the President struck with Republican leaders is an abomination. It's larger than the bailout of Wall Street, GM, and Chrysler put together, larger than the stimulus package, larger than anything that's come out of Washington in years. The president needs new advisors.
The American Jobs Emergency Requires Action
Robert Reich: Not only do we need extended unemployment benefits. We need a new WPA, modeled after the WPA of the Great Depression, to put jobless Americans to work. We need a national infrastructure bank to rebuild our crumbling highways and water and sewer systems, thereby putting additional people back to work.
Why A Civil Society Extends Unemployment Benefits
Robert Reich: A record number of Americans is unemployed for a record length of time. This is a national tragedy. It is to the nation's credit that many are receiving unemployment benefits. This is good not only for them and their families but also for the economy as a whole, because it allows them to spend and thereby keep others in jobs.
No Jobs – The Theory of "Structural" Unemployment
Carl Bloice: With high unemployment and no jobs, the actions of those in Congress who hold up the extension of benefits to the unemployed are morally repugnant. making it. The fellow who said the jobs are not coming back failed to say where they went.
The Enthusiasm Gap
Robert Reich: The Dem base is lethargic because congressional Democrats continue to compromise on everything the Dem base cares about. For a year now it's been nothing but compromises, watered-down ideas, weakened provisions, wider loopholes, softened regulations.


text:
This Property is Off-Market
25 Acres in Mills County, TexasGoldthwaite , TX 76844 | Mills County, TX
|Listing Status:
|Off Market
|Listing Type:
|25 acres
|Property Type(s):
|Last Updated:
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|Property ID:
DescriptionThe Orchard
Property Profile: This is a must see ranch, whether you are looking for a hunting / recreational property or a full-time income producing property. The ranch features a two bedroom, one bath limestone home with a 2400 sq. ft. barn. There is also a 12 +/- acre coastal field, a 200 +/- improved variety pecan orchard and 20 fuit trees including plum, peach and pear around the house. For more information on this turnkey property give us a call today.
Acreage: 25 (+/-)
Town: Goldthwaite
County: Mills County
Location: The ranch is located 9 miles South of Goldthwaite on CR 421.
Wildlife: Whitetail Deer, Rio Grande Turkey and Dove.
Utilities: Electricity and a water well.
Improvements: Improvements include a 1217 sq ft. two bedroom, one bath limestone home with a galvanized metal roof and a covered porch. The home features an open floor plan with a cathedral ceiling. The large living room features laminate hardwood flooring and an limestone fireplace. The eat-in kitchen has all wood cabinets and a bar. The two bedrooms have laminate hardwood flooring and share a Hollywood style bathroom.
Out back there is a 2400 sq. ft. metal barn with a 1200 sq. ft. shop with a concrete floor and a 9 x 14 roll up door. There is 1200 sq. ft. of covered space for hay, parking of implement storage. The barn also features a 5600-gallon rainwater collection system.
Taxes: Taxes are $1,216.63 a year according to MCAD.
Price: $259,000
Presented by: Steve Gist 325-642-1024 & Clayton Gist 325-642-6310
Lone Star Properties
1010 Fisher Street
Goldthwaite, Texas 76844
Office Phone: 325-648-3100
Fax: 325-648-3105
Map of 25 Acres in Mills County, Texas
Information Provided By
This Property is Off-Market. Last modified on 3/3/2014
Steve Gist & Clayton Gist


text:
Connolly's focus on Hub schools makes the grade
Credit: Boston Herald
City Councilor John Connolly, in a mini-debate on Boston Herald Radio last week, came up with what seemed a throwaway line, but it just might be the most insightful line in the race thus far.
When asked about the chatter from pundits, myself included, about which candidate, if elected, will be the first candidate of color, first woman, first Latino, and so forth, Connolly said that he'd like to think that he would be the "first teacher" to become mayor of Boston.
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Fight against corruption
Sep 05, 2013
Pakistan's SC tells govt to appoint head of anti-graft body
Mar 23, 2013
Images: Kejriwal goes on indefinite fast against inflated power, water bills
Nov 27, 2012
Aam Aadmi Party clarifies: 'Don't have an economic policy yet'
Oct 08, 2012
Why is Chidambaram peeking into Vadra's tax returns?
Sep 17, 2012
Brace! Aseem Trivedi promises 'more venomous' cartoons
Aug 20, 2012
Saffron vs black money: Does corruption have a colour?
Aug 13, 2012
'Small rape': Let's cut Kiran Bedi some slack, please!
Aug 10, 2012
How Baba Ramdev is debasing the debate on corruption
Aug 08, 2012
No, Mr Katju, we can't fight corruption by sitting on our hands
Jul 27, 2012
Team Anna is losing its message and its audience


text:
Time: September 13, 2014 at 7pm to October 11, 2014 at 6pm
Location: Hygienic Galleries @ 79 Bank Street New London, CT 06320
Phone: 8604438001
Event Type: gallery, opening
Organized By: Hygienic Art
Latest Activity: Sep 13, 2014
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"The Quickening"
Tales of Impending Transformations
Troy Zaushny, Brad Guarino, John O'Donnell, Blake Shirley
The Underground Gallery Presents:
Falo Blu (Pola Esther, Brian Keith Stephens, Jason Theophilus), Kim Abraham, Jay Curland. And special musical guest DJ Ben Jammin on opening night.
For Artist Biographies Please Scroll Down!
Troy Zaushny is a painter and printmaker from New London, Ct. His work is a contemplation of spiritual identity, consciousness, and the natural world as they are being transformed by science and technology.
His recent achievements include a solo exhibit at the Pratt-Wright Gallery in Noank, Ct. and two mural commissions in New London (in collaboration with Michael McNabney). These include the restoration of "The Ladies" mural at the Hygienic, and creation of "The Hard Hat Painters" mural on Golden St. funded by the Connecticut DECD office of the Arts. In 2012, Troy was an artist-in-residence at the Alle School of Art and Design in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and produced a mural for 'Ethiopia Reads' with 40 kindergarteners in their school courtyard in Mercado (district in Addis Ababa).
Image: digital scan 8"x 8" 2014
Brad Guarino is a painter and draughtsman who lives in New London, CT. In his paintings and drawings, he contrives fictional worlds populated exclusively by men. His narratives explore the artificiality of gender constructs, how boys are socialized, and how this socialization affects their interactions with other men.
He has exhibited his work nationally and internationally, including the Aldrich Museum of Contemporary Art's Radius exhibition, the Sixth International Triennial of Graphic Arts (Sofia, Bulgaria), and the Balkan Quadrennial of Painting (Stara Zagora, Bulgaria.) Guarino did postgraduate study at Bulgaria's National Academy of Art on a Fulbright Fellowship, and was twice an artist-in-residence in southern Bulgaria on Griffis and Orpheus foundation fellowships. He has won awards at the Society of American Graphic Artists' National Exhibitions, FilmsOnArtist's International exhibition, Lore Degenstein's National Figurative Drawing and Painting Exhibition, and at Connecticut State Artists Annual Exhibitions. He has also received individual artist grants from the Berkshire Taconic Community Foundation and Connecticut's Office on The Arts. His work has been published in New American Paintings, Manifest Drawing Center's Seventh International Drawing Annual (INDA7), and Span Magazine (New Delhi, India).
John O'Donnell is a multidisciplinary artist and performer. His current body of work uses video, sculpture and performance to point at moments of everyday life while highlighting the mysterious moments we often overlook while shuffling to the toaster or coffee maker in the morning. His installationPsychedelic Pantry, is on view at the New Britain Museum of American Art from September 7, 2014 - Febuary 8, 2015.
His videos have been exhibited at the Chelsea Art Museum in New York and at film festivals in Boston, Los Angels, Minneapolis, Atlanta, Moscow and Saint Petersburg, Russia. He has created performance pieces for the Museum of New Art in Detroit, MI, Proof Gallery in Boston, MA, FluxSpace in Philadelphia, PA and SOHO20 Gallery in New York, NY. He has exhibited his prints at the Print Center in Philadelphia, the International Print Center in New York, the Sofia Print Triennial, Sofia, Bulgaria and Seoul Museum of Art in Seoul, South Korea.
Blake Shirley is a painter who is interested in the instability of memory and perception. His fragmentary paintings ride the line between representation and abstraction while using geometric lines that reference architecture and an illusion of space.
He received his BFA from the University of Utah and his M.F.A. from the University of Connecticut. His work is represented by One Art Space, New York and has exhibited nationally and internationally. He has had a residency at Vermont Studio Center and the Radius Program at the Aldrich Contemporary Art Museum. He has had grants from the Connecticut Commission on the Arts and The Artist Trust Fund. His work is in collections at Poland's Akademia Sztuk Pieknych in Krakow Poland, and The London College of Art, School of Printing and Publishing.
In the Underground Gallery:
Falo Blu is a collective, established by Pola Esther and Brian Stephens inviting other creative minds to work on site specific art projects. Faloblu believes that art should be fun therefore tries to induce playful function into their presentations.
The installation "Butterfly Bush" at the Hygienic Galleries is a collaboration with Jason Theophilus. It talks about fragility of life, transformation and simple idea that butterflies are good for you! They are good for your soul as much as apples are good for your body.
Kim Abraham is a Hygienic resident artist and yogi. She uses art and yoga to try to make the world a better place and celebrates the folks taking the journey with her.
Ben Jammin (Ben Abraham) is a resident DJ. He has participated in the arts at the Hygienic as an artist, model and collaborator since 2009.
Jay Curland has been creating visual art deliberately for a year and a half and is enjoying it immensely. He is currently majoring in printmaking at ECSU where he has had great fortune in teachers, all the artists and many others. He also enjoys playing the drum set.


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Product DescriptionComplementary dusky Brown and blue tones blend seamlessly with horizontal stripes, to create a slick and stylish range to suit any interior space.
- Professional launder recommended
- Length 170 cm
- Width 120 cm
Care Instructions
- Care Instructions: Professional launder recommended
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An employee of a downtown ice cream shop said a woman whom he described as "homeless" told him that he would have to pay $14 if he wanted to get his lost cell phone back, according to Athens-Clarke police.
The victim said he realized his phone was missing last Tuesday. He later talked with the woman, who said the person who took the phone sold it.
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The Amarillo Area Corvette Club will sponsor a Show 'N Shine from 10 a.m. until 5 p.m. Saturday at Westgate Chevrolet, according to information from the club.
The event is open to all 'Vette owners.
There is no entry fee, and there will be people's choice voting for the shiniest 'Vette, the information stated. Votes will cost $1.
AACC will be selling merchandise, with all proceeds from voting and merchandise sales going to Special Olympics and the Angel Tree fund.
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on March 2, 2014 - 12:01 AM
, updated March 6, 2014 at 4:38 PM
Orchard Park
The Orchard Park School Board has revised its 2013-14 school calendar, adding additional student attendance days to make up for seven snow days so far this winter.
In order to meet the state Education Department's requirement for 180 days of student attendance, the district changed March 28 to a full day of attendance instead of being used for staff development. It also made April 21 a full day of attendance for all grade levels, shortening spring recess by one day.
May 23 will be a conference day, so students will have off from school. But if another snow day is required, May 23 would become a full attendance day for all students.
Further, elementary students will have full days on June 23 and 24, instead of half days. The last elementary attendance day will be June 24.
"We're trying to get more student dates in prior to testing dates and the advanced placement exams, with the hope to capitalize on the lost instructional days due to snow days," Superintendent Matthew P. McGarrity said.
Last week, administrators presented the School Board with a second budget draft that shaves the projected budget shortfall from $2.2 million to just shy of $160,000. The draft calls for 16 full-time equivalent staff cuts, along with cuts to programs and in other areas.
Cost-saving suggestions include switching to electronic report cards to save $10,000 and increasing the facilities' use charges, to boost revenue by $25,000.
There's also a suggestion to pay substitute teachers $89 daily. Currently, regular subs get $89, building subs are paid $101 and retired Orchard Park teachers are paid $118.
The School Board next meets on March 11, when administrators plans to release more 2014-15 budget details.
Also this week:
• The Town Board will hold a work session at 6 p.m. Wednesday in the supervisor's conference room, followed by a regular meeting at 7 in the board room in the municipal center, 4295 S. Buffalo St.


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From the Institut de Biologie des Hopitaux de Nantes and Hotel Dieu, Nantes, France.
Acknowledgments: The authors thank Jerome Tokars, MD, MPH, for manuscript review and assistance with data analysis and Dominique Gautreau, Anny Blin, and Michele Fleury for technical assistance.
Grant Support: In part by grant 931305 from the Institut National de la Sante et de la Recherche Medicale.
Requests for Reprints: Daniel Villers, MD, Service de Reanimation Medicale, Hotel Dieu, Centre Hospitalier Universitaire de Nantes, 44035 Nantes Cedex 01, France.
Current Author Addresses: Drs. Villers, Giauffret, and Nicolas: Service de Reanimation Medicale, Hotel Dieu, Centre Hospitalier Universitaire de Nantes, 44035 Nantes Cedex 01, France. Drs. Espaze, Coste-Burel, Ninin, and Richet: Laboratoire de Bacteriologie, Virologie, Hygiene Hospitaliere, Institut de Biologie des Hopitaux de Nantes, 9, Quai Moncousu, 44035 Nantes Cedex 01, France.
Copyright ©2004 by the American College of Physicians
Background: Acinetobacter baumannii is an important opportunistic pathogen that is rapidly evolving toward multidrug resistance and is involved in various nosocomial infections that are often severe. It is difficult to prevent A. baumannii infection because A. baumannii is ubiquitous and the epidemiology of the infections it causes is complex.
Objective: To study the epidemiology of A. baumannii infections and assess the relation between fluoroquinolone use and the persistence of multidrug-resistant clones.
Design: Three case–control studies and a retrospective cohort study.
Setting: A 20-bed medical and surgical intensive care unit.
Patients: Acinetobacter baumannii was isolated from 45 patients in urine (31%), the lower respiratory tract (26.7%), wounds (17.8%), blood (11.1%), skin (6.7%), cerebrospinal fluid (4.4%), and sinus specimens (2.2%). One death was due to A. baumannii infection.
Measurements: Antimicrobial resistance pattern and molecular typing were used to characterize isolates. The incidence of A. baumannii infection and the use of fluoroquinolones were calculated annually.
Results: Initially, 28 patients developed A. baumannii infection. Eleven isolates had the same antimicrobial susceptibility profile, genotypic profile, or both (epidemic cases), and 17 were heterogeneous (endemic cases). A surgical procedure done in an emergency operating room was the main risk factor for epidemic cases, whereas previous receipt of a fluoroquinolone was the only risk factor for endemic cases. The opening of a new operating room combined with the restriction of fluoroquinolone use contributed to a transitory reduction in the incidence of infection. When a third epidemiologic study was done, previous receipt of a fluoroquinolone was again an independent risk factor and a parallel was seen between the amount of intravenous fluoroquinolones prescribed and the incidence of endemic infection.
Conclusion: Epidemic infections coexisted with endemic infections favored by the selection pressure of intravenous fluoroquinolones.
Lanes A, B, C, and D: Raoul 1 size marker; lanes 1 through 7: pattern R1 (epidemic strains); lanes 8 through 14: pattern R2 (endemic strains from the second and third case–control studies); and lanes 15 and 16: sporadic strains. Kb = kilobase pairs.
Lanes A, B, and C: 1-kilobase DNA ladder size marker. Lanes 1 through 16: Isolates are shown in the same order as in . Bp = base pairs.
infections in an intensive care unit, 1989-1993. OR = operating room.
White bars represent oral administration of fluoroquinolone; striped bars represent intravenous administration of fluoroquinolone.
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Doctor insights on:
Using Sweet Oil For Earache
Hi, my daughged has earache. I that i can put a drop of vegtable oil mixed with water in it? Is this true? I dont have any olive oil right now.
Try paracetamol: Vegetable oil won't hurt her but is not likely to help her ear. ...Read more
Earache (Definition)
An earache can be a sharp, dull, or burning pain in one or both ears. The pain may ...Read more
Earache. Have no olive oil, just vegetable oil can this be used? Have used paracetamol but no good yet.
More time: Paracetamol should be given at the proper dose at least 4 times a day and for 2-3 days. If there are other signs of problems like a significant fever, or any drainage from the ear or severe pain an exam would be indicated. Many ear infections will pass without antibiotics, but a doctor can always tell more by looking at the ear. ...Read more
My 2 year-old daughter has thick green mucus coming out her eyes and runny nose and fever of 101 for 3 days? I've used garlic oil in her ears for earache.
See dr.: The symptoms as described could be caused by a bacterial infection, and it is recommended for you to bring your daughter to a dr. For an evaluation a soon as possible. Best wishes. ...Read moreSee 2 more doctor answers
Does camphorated oil work for ear ache in babies?
NO: Put nothing in the ear of anyone unless it has been evaluated & is art of the treatment. A heat source to lay on & Ibuprofen can soften the pain until the kid is evaluated. ...Read more
I had an ear ache, so I put baby oil in it. Now I can't get the oil out?
Irrigation: The oil may have solidified and is attached to either the ear canal skin or even the ear drum. Try 3% hydrogen peroxide, 4 times a day (dropper full) for a week. If that does not help see an ENT doctor for proper and safe removal by either microscopic removal or simple irrigation of warm water. ...Read more
Sore throat fever then ear ache alternating between ears Irrigated with Eleph wash & put garlic oil in ears pain stopped blood in ears did drum burst ?
Otitis Media: . You need to consult a physician. Any history of prior ear infection or recent trauma ? You need an examination of ears and throat for infection and labs. If it's Otitis media prescription of antibiotic Ear drops like Ciprodex and / oral antibiotics will help to resolve your symptoms. ...Read more
How can I calm the pain of an earache?
Earache: For an acute earache warm olive oil, then place drops in the ear canal. You can place tissue in the ear to hold the oil in place. Then you need to get an exam to deteermine the cause, infection, TMJ syndrome, punctured ear drum, whatever. This is not something to play around with. ...Read moreSee 1 more doctor answer
What can help earache, are there any home remedies?
It depends...: This depends on the type of earache. There are 2 main types. If otitis externa (swimmer's ear) topical application of hydrogen peroxide, colloidal silver or mullein oil helps. If otitis media, it usually goes away without treatment but homeopathy can dramatically speed recovery. See http://www.Homeopathic.Com/articles/using_homeopathy_for_ailments/homeopathic_medicines_for_earaches.Html. ...Read more
My daughter has bad earache.Whats the best to help it?
See the doctor.: Earache can be caused by middle ear infection, ear canal infection, eustachian tube dysfunction, or even referred pain from a sore throat. Please take her to the doctor for examination and diagnosis;each of the above causes is treated differently. If Acetaminophen or Ibuprofen can keep the pain under control until tomorrow am, see the doctor then; if not, take her in today. ...Read moreSee 2 more doctor answers
Earache on 10 month old baby. What can I give her?
Homeopathy and drops: Most doctors advise antibiotics for ear infections but research shows while they may relieve pain a bit sooner there is greater chance of recurrence. An old home remedy is crushing some garlic, warming it in olive oil and putting a few drops of the warm oil in her ear. My favorite treatment is homeopathy. Many mainstream pharmacies carry hyland's infant earache drops. See comment for more info:. ...Read moreSee 1 more doctor answer
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Delta Dental of Michigan
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MIChild is a state and federally funded health insurance program for uninsured children of Michigan's working families. The program is offered through the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services (MDHHS) and targets children under age 19 in low-income families. The monthly premium for each family (includes all children in the family) is $10.
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Best route map between Wellsville, KS and Topeka, KS. This route take about 53 Miles.
The distance and estimated time is placed on the right depending on the status of the road.
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FOOD FRIENDLY FASHION - A Thanksgiving Style Guide
- from: MomTV
- uploaded: Nov 20, 2012
- Hits: 1216
MomTV Pick!
♥ Head over to my blog to enter the stretchy jeans giveaway - http://www.TheChriselleFactor.com ♥ Follow me on Twitter- http://www.twitter.com/ChriselleTweets ♥ Like me on Facebook- http://www.facebook.com/Chriselleinc Thanksgiving is right around the corner, and to most of us that means Family, Friends, & FOODDDDDD!!!!!!!!!! In this tutorial I share with you a few different looks for different ocassions where you will not only look incredibly chic but also incredibly comfy! The holidays are upon us so we thought this Food Friendly Fashion tutorial was totally appropriate with all the holiday festivities coming up! Chic has never looked so YUMMY! Music By - Joseph Vincent "Bumble Bee" Courtesy Catch Adventures Buy Joseph Vincent's Debut Album Blue Skies on iTunes Now https://itunes.apple.com/us/album/blue-skies/id569148578 ♥ Twitter: http://www.twitter.com/josephvincent12 ♥ Subscribe to his channel - http://www.youtube.com/user/hoorahjencar ♥ Like him on FB - https://www.facebook.com/josephvincentmusic OUTFIT DETAILS Look 1- Fancy Family Dress- H&M Shoes- Jimmy Choo Necklace- Zara Look 2- Hostest with the Mostest Sweater- H&M Pants- H&M Shoes- Baleciaga Watch- Daniel Wellington Look 3- All Business Blouse- Elizabeth & James Trousers- H&M Shoes- Jimmy Choo Watch- Daniel Wellington Look 4- Shift Comfort Dress- Club Monaco Shoes- Lanvin Necklace- Loud Love Jewelry Vest- Mcginn Collection Look 5- Cute n Comfy Sweater- Dear Creatures- http://www.shopdearcreatures.com/Cat-Sweater--Brown_p_253.html Denim Button up-Club Monaco Jeans- Denimocracy (giving away 3 of these on my blog) http://www.TheChriselleFactor.com Boots- Coach Watch - Daniel Wellington


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Ram Herrera
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Bottle opener custom keychains are made of aluminum and is laser engraved to last as lifetime!
A handy logo divot tool with removable ball marker to have around the golf course.
A resuable alternative to plastic bottles, this promotional sports bottle comes with a screw top carabiner clip lid.
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